Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 34654

 1                           Monday, 4 March 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  I'm not sure why that

 6     signal indicates that we are in private session.  I take it we are in

 7     open session.

 8             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, and

10     everyone in the courtroom.

11             Mr. President, when we -- as we were adjourning the other day,

12     the Trial Chamber asked if the Prosecution would address the Defence

13     motion for a modification of segregation regime first thing this morning,

14     and I'm prepared to do so now if the Court wishes.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, there is no basis for granting this

17     motion.  First, the motion itself states that there is no reason why

18     Dr. Karadzic should not be able to have contact with Mr. Martic.  That

19     reflects a failure to review the order and the reasons given for the

20     order that remains in -- that remains under seal, so I won't refer to it

21     directly, but let me say more generically that it is a fairly

22     conventional and time honoured prophylactic measure to impose some

23     measure of segregation to avoid the possibility of interference or

24     improper communications between an accused and certain witnesses in this

25     case.  This is a witness who was convicted for his participation in a

Page 34655

 1     joint criminal enterprise which involved the accused, so the basis for

 2     imposing restriction under such circumstances should be fairly clear.

 3             I am not aware that there is any jurisprudence suggesting that

 4     such segregation is in any way impermissible and the Defence has

 5     suggested none.

 6             Now, this order was made in early January, and now, approximately

 7     two months later, we see this motion which is clearly a motion for

 8     reconsideration which in no way attempts to address the standards for

 9     reconsideration.  I want to be clear that I'm not suggesting that there

10     should be an insurmountable standard for motions for reconsideration.

11     Clearly if mistakes are made under appropriate circumstances, they should

12     be remedied, but here the point is there is no attempt to even

13     acknowledge the standard much less attempt to show how the Defence motion

14     satisfies that standard.  Instead, two things are suggested in passing,

15     basically.  One, that Dr. Karadzic has not been segregated from other --

16     all other detainees, and two, that the Prosecution has been free to have

17     contact with its witnesses at any time except during their testimony.

18             With respect to the first, Mr. President, given the ambitious

19     nature of the Defence witness list, the accused would have to be in

20     virtual isolation to segregate him from every person on his list, I would

21     suggest, and it appears that for those persons who -- from whom he was

22     not initially segregated after the witness list came out was obviously a

23     somewhat idle gesture to impose it at that time.  And in any event, it

24     does not serve the Defence to argue that an imperfect system should be

25     made more imperfect simply because logistical aspects make it difficult.

Page 34656

 1     It's clearly a different situation imposed on the Registry's attempt to

 2     balance the interests and the Trial Chamber's attempt when there's a

 3     temporary detainee coming in from outside.  And in any event, here the

 4     Registry was responding to a direct order from the Court.

 5             And finally, with respect to the assertion about the Prosecution

 6     being free to have contact, the Defence team is also free to have

 7     contact.  This is not a measure imposed on Dr. Karadzic as counsel, this

 8     is a measure imposed on him as an accused and it does not apply to the

 9     remainder of the trial team.  There is no impermissible or improper

10     segregation being imposed with respect to the teams, and this is a

11     misleading characterization.

12             So for those reasons, Mr. President, I would submit that there is

13     no basis for this motion, and it should be denied.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Would you like to add anything, Mr. Robinson?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, very briefly.  I'm actually

17     very surprised to hear the Prosecution's position because we didn't

18     interfere or attempt to take any positions when it was deciding how it

19     could meet its witnesses and prepare its witnesses.  In fact, if you

20     think of Momir Nikolic, who was also detained at the UNDU, I'm sure he

21     was pulled out of his cell at least 20 times, if not more, so that the

22     OTP could meet with him during the course of his detention and the course

23     of his preparation for testimony.

24             So I think it's a little incongruous for the Prosecution, first

25     of all, even to be taking a position about how the Defence can access its

Page 34657

 1     witnesses, and secondly, to take one that's completely contrary to its

 2     own practice with its witnesses.  So the reason that we believe that this

 3     motion is well founded is because there's simply no logical reason for a

 4     restriction on Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Martic meeting before his testimony,

 5     and any restrictions ought to be proportional to the aim at which they're

 6     directed.  And the aim here is to avoid interference with a witness who

 7     is going to give testimony, and that applies when the witness starts his

 8     testimony.  That's how it applies to the Prosecution, and that's how it

 9     applies to the Defence.  And so we don't mind that kind of segregation

10     once the testimony starts, but there's no logical reason why Dr. Karadzic

11     can't meet with Mr. Martic on any other occasions.  And so in the absence

12     of any logical reason for the restriction, we don't think that it ought

13     to be maintained.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  I just want to address what may be a -- what appears

16     to be a misunderstanding, because I don't think it was intended to be a

17     mischaracterization, but to do so, I need to refer to the order which

18     remains confidential.  So unless anyone is minded to lift that

19     confidentiality, we'll have to move into private session for me to refer

20     to that.

21             JUDGE KWON:  So you would like to address that issue in private

22     session.

23             MR TIEGER:  Well, I will be talking about something specifically

24     in the Court's order.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Could the Chamber move into private

Page 34658

 1     session briefly.

 2                           [Private session]

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for all the submissions.  The Chamber will

25     consider the issue and will issue its decision in due course.

Page 34659

 1             Shall we bring in the witness.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, now, before we do that, first of

 3     all, if we could just put on the record something with respect to the

 4     exhibits that were tendered during the testimony of President Bulatovic,

 5     and that is that we have agreed with the Prosecution on the pages to be

 6     included in those exhibits.

 7             So for P6161, we agree that it should be pages 31 is and 32 and

 8     45 and 47 -- through 47.  For P6162, we have agreed that it should be

 9     pages 24 through 30.  And then for P6164, we have agreed that should be

10     pages 1 through 29, and 62 through 96.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I thank the parties for their

12     co-ordination and co-operation.  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  Because of the submissions this

14     morning, Mr. Robinson may have momentarily forgotten that I had indicated

15     to him that there were a couple of additional pages with respect to 6141.

16     So we'll get those on the record by the end -- before the end of the day.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I have to mention something,

19     too, because we have not yet identified the B/C/S pages.  I think that is

20     definitely something that the Registrar wants to know.  And in relation

21     to P -- P6161, it would be the B/C/S pages 26 to 27, and 38 to 41.  And

22     in relation to P6162, it's the same pages in B/C/S; that means 24 to 30.

23     In relation to P6164, it's the B/C/S pages, so far, 1 to 29, and 31 [sic]

24     to 96, and more perhaps if Mr. Tieger and Mr. Robinson agree.  And then

25     there's forgotten P6165, and for this the parties had agreed it would be

Page 34660

 1     the pages 1 to 29 in English, and that is 1 to 35 in the B/C/S.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, there is a mistake in the

 4     transcript.  I've probably misspoken.  It needs to be -- in line 22, it

 5     needs to be 61 to 96 and not 31 to 96.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  As regards the associated exhibits

 7     Defence is planning to tender through this witness, General Vasiljevic,

 8     is 1D21027 not part of 20137?

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  I'll have to check that, Mr. President.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I think, Your Honour, I was also surprised

11     and didn't understand why it were two different ones.

12                           [The witness entered court]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, General.

14             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Would you make the solemn declaration, please.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

17     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Please be seated and make yourself comfortable.

19             General Vasiljevic, probably you will be well aware of this, but

20     before you commence your evidence, I must draw your attention to a

21     certain Rule of evidence that we have at this Tribunal.  That is

22     Rule 90(E).  Under this Rule, you may object to answering any question

23     from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you

24     believe that your answer will incriminate you in a criminal offence.  In

25     this context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to

Page 34661

 1     an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that

 2     might provide evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.

 3     However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you and as a

 4     consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know that

 5     the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question, but in

 6     that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony compelled

 7     in such circumstances would not be used in any case that might be laid

 8     against you for any offence save and except the offence of giving false

 9     testimony.

10             Do you understand what I have just told you, General?

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General Vasiljevic.

13                           WITNESS:  ALEKSANDAR VASILJEVIC

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

17     Your Honours.  Good morning, everyone.

18                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

20        A.   Good morning.

21        Q.   I have to ask you, as I ask everyone else speaking B/C/S, to make

22     pauses between question and answer and to be slow when speaking so that

23     everything will be recorded.

24             Did you give a statement to my Defence team?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 34662

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show 1D07820 in

 3     e-court.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, can you see on the screen in front of you the statement?

 6        A.   Yes, I can see it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed this statement?

 8        A.   Yes, I have.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show the last page to

11     the General so that he could confirm that he has signed it.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is my signature.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  Is everything you told the Defence team truthfully

15     recorded in this statement?

16        A.   I think so, yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to ask you the same questions today, would

18     your answers be the same as in the statement essentially?

19        A.   Yes, essentially they would be the same.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this 92 ter package?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  You were correct concerning

23     the duplication of that one exhibit, so we're tendering six associated

24     exhibits.  If you'd like me to read the numbers or if you already have

25     that information, it's up to you.

Page 34663

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it's necessary.  Any objections,

 2     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour, no objections.  I just

 4     wanted to -- to make -- question whether this -- this statement is the

 5     latest version, because there were a few more paragraphs to be removed.

 6     Is that the final version?

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  There's a -- the final redactions have been

 8     made in e-court, the document that includes all the latest redactions.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Then no objections.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll admit the statement as well as six

11     associated exhibits.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  The statement will be Exhibit D3065, and the six

13     associated exhibits will be Exhibits D3066 to D3071 respectively.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will now read a short

16     summary of General Vasiljevic's statement in the English language.

17             [In English] Aleksandar Vasiljevic is a retired general from the

18     Yugoslav Army, VJ.  From 1986 to 1998, General Vasiljevic was the chief

19     of the counter-intelligence service within the Department of Security of

20     Federal Secretariat for People's Defence.  In 1988, he was commander of

21     division in Sarajevo where he stayed until July 1990.  From 15th of June,

22     1991, to May the 8th, 1992, General Vasiljevic was the head of the

23     Department for Security.  In May 1992, General Vasiljevic retired.  He

24     was reactivated on 7th of April, 1999, and he became deputy chief of the

25     security department of VJ.

Page 34664

 1             As chief of the counter-intelligence service, General

 2     Aleksandar Vasiljevic's job was to uncover foreign intelligence services,

 3     intelligence activity against the JNA and the army and to uncover the

 4     activities of the Yugoslav enemy emigration.  In addition to -- in

 5     addition, he was to uncover enemy activities within the JNA.  In this

 6     role, he uncovered Croatian separatist groups within the JNA as well as

 7     Albanian separatist organisations who tried to carry out several

 8     terrorist operations including poisoning of food of soldiers and

 9     officers.  Further, a significant number of foreign intelligence agencies

10     were discovered in Yugoslavia, and following Tito's death, there was a

11     rise of nationalist tensions which the foreign services exploited,

12     supporting separatist movements.

13             General Vasiljevic considers that as early as in the mid-'80s

14     [sic] the Croats armed themselves illegally and with a large number of

15     weapons.  They created their illegal army, which they later renamed to

16     law enforcement officers when they were uncovered.  All that time they

17     were arming their HDZ party illegally, and advocated the killing of JNA

18     and Serbs on their doorsteps regardless of age or gender.  The Croatian

19     authorities had prepared everything to create a Serbian camp.  When this

20     information became public, this caused a general uprising and revolt

21     among the Serbs.  The state of SFRY was unable to prevent these events

22     because it had to order the army to disarm all these formations and

23     arrest all rebels.  The Serbs in Croatia, therefore, had no other choice

24     but to organise themselves in order to protect themselves.

25             The JNA did not try to protect Serbs in Croatia, merely prevent

Page 34665

 1     clashes between the two ethnic groups.  Serbs did not have paramilitary

 2     organisations.  In the second half of 1990, HDZ, Croatian party, had

 3     control in Western Herzegovina, which the authorities of BH were aware

 4     of.  Despite Aleksandar Vasiljevic's request not to involve BH in the

 5     war, Croatia tried to get Bosnia and Macedonia involved at all costs.

 6             In July 1991, the first reports of the SDA, Muslim party in

 7     Bosnia, military organisation in the Doboj sector of BH were received.

 8     Military training had begun in Croatia, which then spread to Sarajevo.

 9     However, there were no hard facts.  Sometime in mid-September,

10     information was passed to General Vasiljevic that the Patriotic League

11     was being formed from SDA headquarters and that three or four officers

12     had left the army and joined them.

13             There were regional offices for the Patriotic League in Serbia

14     and part of Montenegro and there existed both military and political

15     staff at every level.  The Patriotic League began to block roads and JNA

16     facilities.  The Patriotic League was financed through exchanges of old

17     Croatian money, in which -- as a matter Yugoslav money that was in

18     Croatia, in which the Patriotic League would take half of the amount of

19     exchange.  This money was used to buy weapons from the Croats.

20             In early 1991, the SDA began to make defence plans and preparing

21     for secession and joining Croatia.  Radovan Karadzic issued an order that

22     Serbs should not provide Muslims and Croats with an excuse to attack.

23     The SDA conducted raids to obtain more weapons from the Patriotic

24     League -- for the Patriotic League.  JNA operations were disrupted,

25     attacks carried out on military organs, and secretariats for national

Page 34666

 1     defence in municipalities were broken into and records set on fire.

 2             The Patriotic League opened fire upon two wounded Serbs.  To

 3     prevent escalation, Serbs were reminded not to retaliate, and they

 4     remained passive.  Pleas were made in the JNA to stop Bosnia being

 5     dragged into the war as the Croats were moving troops through Bosnia.

 6     Some JNA troops were mobilised which was met with some resistance from

 7     the troops in Croatia and between 12 and 15 soldiers were killed.  A

 8     number of Muslims left the JNA and a large number of Serbian volunteers

 9     and -- filled their places.

10             In October 1991, joint check-points with the BH MUP were

11     established to secure five bridges, and this action postponed the war in

12     Bosnia by six months.  However, these types of actions were not possible

13     in Croatian part of Herzegovina.  Roadblocks in the area were set up and

14     heavy and anti-aircraft weapons appeared in Western Herzegovina where the

15     HDZ were well armed.

16             The charitable society Merhamet was used by the SDA Crisis Staff

17     for paramilitary organisation of its members.  In December 1991, further

18     weapons were distributed to the Patriotic League from the chief of the

19     MUP of police.  In early 1992, the Serbs did not have a military staff.

20     They did not have people making plans or a structure of the units, and

21     they did not issue orders to attack the JNA units.  The JNA were

22     supported by the Serbs as people responded to the call-up and the

23     mobilisation, recording -- reporting for compulsory military service and

24     did not block the JNA army barracks or attack JNA members and their

25     families.

Page 34667

 1             After a joint meeting at the BH MUP on 19th of January, 1992, it

 2     was agreed that paramilitary units should be disbanded.  However, this

 3     was not done because there was no political will by any of the military

 4     leaders to publicly issue a call to their people to lay down their

 5     weapons.  The service wrote a report to the SFRY Presidency about the

 6     situation and proposed that the Presidency declare a state of emergency.

 7     However, this was returned without an option about the measures proposed.

 8             At a meeting with Izetbegovic, General -- of General Vasiljevic,

 9     he denied -- Izetbegovic denied knowledge of the SDA paramilitary

10     organisations and refused to communicate with Milosevic, the Serbian

11     leadership, or to preserve Yugoslavia, but he did promise that as long as

12     it was up to him, there would be no attack on the army in Bosnia.

13     Publicly, Izetbegovic denied having any knowledge of the Patriotic

14     League.

15             In March 1992, a Serbian wedding guest was killed in Bosnia, and

16     the Muslims began to make public appearance in Patriotic League uniforms.

17     Barricades were erected and despite the efforts of the service these

18     remained standing.  The situation worsened as the Green Berets opened

19     fire on a military police patrol and entered flats of military servicemen

20     searching for weapons.  During March, there were a number of skirmishes

21     between the military and the paramilitary units.

22             Fighting broke out in Bijeljina and was the first armed conflict

23     between Serbs and Muslims and the first serious clash as a bomb was

24     thrown to -- at the cafe where Serbs and Muslims gathered.  Cafes, two

25     cafes.  The SDA carried out planned attack during April 1992, killing

Page 34668

 1     officers, seizing weapons, raiding a number of premises, blocking JNA

 2     premises, disarming soldiers, and spreading misinformation.  Many further

 3     attacks occurred in the Serbs -- or on the Serbs despite the talks of

 4     withdrawal.  These were not successful.

 5             The Republika Srpska military security arrested the Zute Ose,

 6     Yellow Wasps, and turned them over to the Bijeljina MUP for killings

 7     committed.

 8             Relations between Serbs and JNA were complex.  The JNA assisted

 9     local commanders in BH if requested.  The JNA was attacked as the enemy

10     by the SDA, but the JNA continued to assist the Serbs by arming them

11     with -- when they could.  The JNA was a guarantor of peace.  The Serbs

12     sent recruits and reserves to the JNA as they did not have their own

13     military organisation.  Co-operation between the army and the BH MUP was

14     supported by the Serbs, check-points were set up to control the territory

15     and assist in disarming.

16             And that would be the very short summary of this significant

17     statement, and I do not have questions for General Vasiljevic at that

18     moment.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just one quick question for Mr. Karadzic or

20     Mr. Robinson.  In paragraph 218, it refers to 1D55.  We -- that we

21     admitted just now, but it refers to a JNA warehouse, but looking at the

22     document, I don't see any comment about JNA warehouse.  If you could

23     clarify that issue, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, by your leave, I

25     just need some time to have it clarified.

Page 34669

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we upload 1D55.  Or if you are minded to

 2     withdraw that exhibit, we'll just proceed.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, we have withdrawn

 4     far too many documents.  In other words, this is an invaluable witness,

 5     and we can lead hundreds of documents through him.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, can you tell us what the command of the 741st DOP is?

 8        A.   It is the command of the 741st Replenishment Regiment located in

 9     Travnik.  Within their area of responsibility, there was a warehouse of

10     JNA weapons and ammunition cache in Slimena.  At that warehouse there was

11     an attack on the 5th of April by members of the HOS, which was a Croatian

12     paramilitary force, and the Patriotic League.  31 soldiers were taken

13     prisoner and one officer at the warehouse.  The HOS members executed two

14     soldiers by firing squad on the site and the rest of the soldiers were

15     taken to their military prison in Ljubuski, whereas 10 soldiers were left

16     in the hands of Muslims.  DOP doesn't stand for any volunteer unit, but

17     it was an establishment unit called Replenishment Regiment.  It was a

18     kind of reserve unit as part of the JNA.

19        Q.   Thank you, General.  So in paragraph 218, it shouldn't say "KOS"

20     but "HOS," H-O-S?

21        A.   Yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, does this answer

23     your question about the document?

24             JUDGE KWON:  My question was whether this document refers to

25     either that JNA warehouse or the attack against it.

Page 34670

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, as the

 2     General just explained.  He explained the acronyms used in the heading.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether this document refers to what

 4     General just has said.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I see your point, because

 6     this document is referring to the Territorial Defence depot at Slimena.

 7     So perhaps Dr. Karadzic can ask the witness what the connection is

 8     between that depot and the JNA warehouse referred to in paragraph 218.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The General has heard what Mr. Robinson has said.

10     Can you assist us as regards this document you are looking at on the

11     monitor.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could someone please put the volume

13     up for me to hear interpretation.  If I understood properly, I need to

14     explain what the link is between the 741st Replenishment Regiment and the

15     warehouse.

16             JUDGE KWON:  The warehouse which is allegedly to be TO depot at

17     Slimena.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  It was a JNA warehouse under

19     the authority of the command of the -- of the 741st Replenishment

20     Regiment.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  General, do you see the document in

22     front of you?  In the first paragraph it refers to the TO depot,

23     Territorial Defence depot, at Slimena.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At Slimena a part of the weapons

25     could have been that had been withdrawn from the TO by virtue of an order

Page 34671

 1     of the chief of the General Staff from 1989.  This is a daily report

 2     drafted by the commander of the Replenishment Regiment describing the

 3     situation on that day.  Some pressure is being exerted by members of the

 4     HOS and Muslims, primarily members of the Patriotic League, to have the

 5     weapons distributed to them as well so that they wouldn't be left without

 6     any.  So the Slimena warehouse was a military warehouse where part of the

 7     TO weapons were probably located following their withdrawal in 1989 by

 8     the order of the Chief of the General Staff.  However, it was not a TO

 9     warehouse.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General.

11             Since this has been already admitted, I'll leave it at that, but,

12     Mr. Karadzic, in the future, when you are tendering documents as part of

13     associated exhibit, be cautious whether they form indispensable and

14     inseparable part of the statement.

15             General Vasiljevic, as you have noted that your evidence in chief

16     in this case has been admitted in writing, i.e., through your written

17     statement in lieu of your oral testimony, and now you will cross-examined

18     by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor,

19     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

20                           Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

21        Q.   Good morning, General.

22        A.   Good morning.

23        Q.   General, first of all, I wish to thank you for participating in

24     an interview with the Prosecution last week, and I will address some of

25     the topics that we discussed during the interview in the course of the

Page 34672

 1     cross-examination, and as we have to cover quite some topics and very

 2     little time, I kindly ask you to just answer the questions as precisely

 3     as possible and not add matters that I didn't ask you about.  Otherwise,

 4     I will have to interrupt you, and I would not like to do that.

 5             General, in paragraph 32 of your statement, you said that in the

 6     relevant time, the JNA was the fourth strongest army in Europe, and in

 7     paragraph 70 you -- you stated, referring to the situation in March 1991,

 8     you said that the army did not burst at ethnic seams.

 9             General, at that time you were proud of being a JNA officer;

10     right?

11        A.   That is right, and I'm still proud for having been a member of

12     the JNA.

13        Q.   And you saw the JNA as a multi-ethnic army with a mission to

14     protect the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia; right?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   General, you were retired on the 8 of -- 8th of May, 1992,

17     together with 38 other generals, although the conditions for your

18     retirement were not met; is that right?

19        A.   It is.

20        Q.   Those retiring you at that time were opposed to your view of the

21     multi-ethnic concept of the army; is that correct?

22        A.   Partially correct.

23        Q.   In your testimony in the Slobodan Milosevic case, you said the

24     following:  You speak of the general climate of discrimination at that

25     time, that there was an ethnic cleansing of the army of those who were

Page 34673

 1     not born in Serbia and Montenegro, and you gave the example of

 2     Deputy Tumanov, and that you also said that General Panic scolded you for

 3     still having some Croats in your service.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I refer here to the -- to the

 5     Slobodan Milosevic testimony of the General, and it is uploaded under

 6     65 ter 22492, and I was referring to the e-court pages 306 through 308,

 7     and e-court page 589.

 8        Q.   General, that -- that captures the situation, how it was in

 9     spring 1992, does it not?

10        A.   Yes, it does.

11        Q.   General, in the beginning of the armed conflict in the former

12     Yugoslavia, the JNA acted as a buffer army between the two sides, but

13     that changed in the course of the year 1991; is that correct?

14        A.   The general principle in the JNA did not change.  However, much

15     depended on the movements of certain local commanders in the field who

16     deviated from the positions provided by the SSNO, the Federal Secretariat

17     of All People's Defence.  So in the field there were occasions where they

18     supported local forces.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have document P02601 on the

20     screen.

21        Q.   General, and as it is coming up, it is a cover letter by

22     Major General Polic of the 9th Corps Command of the JNA, and if we go to

23     the next page, it is enclosing the directive -- on both pages, please.

24     It's enclosing the directive of the Federal Secretariat of

25     National Defence on the use of the armed forces of the 10th of October,

Page 34674

 1     1991.

 2             General, I assume you are familiar with this directive.

 3        A.   It was not on the 10th of October but on the 10th of December.

 4        Q.   Yes, you're right.  I misspoke.  Thank you very much.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we have page 3 in both languages, and we

 6     have to focus on the top part.  And -- in both languages.

 7        Q.   And as it says here:

 8             "Our armed forces are entering a new period of exceptional

 9     significance for accomplishing the ultimate aims of the war:  protection

10     of the Serbian population ..." and so on and so forth.

11             General, the JNA at that time was no longer a buffer, no longer

12     protecting all peoples, but, rather, protecting the Serbs, at least

13     according to this directive, is it not?

14        A.   Since this is December 1991, it means that the war in Croatia had

15     ended by that time and Slovenia had seceded.  Not -- by not honouring any

16     procedure, Croatia had seceded as well from the then Yugoslavia and the

17     JNA was put in a new position as compared to the period before the

18     15th of September when there were military attacks of the Croatian armed

19     forces on the JNA, when the war broke out between Croatia and the JNA.

20     So this is late 1991 when the directive was drafted.

21             It was decided that people be protected from terror and

22     destruction.  Those people who disagreed with living outside of

23     Yugoslavia, those who were denied their right to enjoy the same privilege

24     as the other people as to choose where to live.  The Serb people refused

25     to live in the seceded banana states and it opted for remaining in

Page 34675

 1     Yugoslavia.  Since it was contrary to the policy in place in Croatia at

 2     the time, they were supposed to be protected from persecution and the

 3     conflict between the autonomous regions which had been constituted at the

 4     time.  The JNA, in other words, was protecting the Serb population that

 5     was in danger.  It doesn't mean that it persecuted others who lived in

 6     Serbia.  You know well that Serbia is a multinational state, and neither

 7     Croats nor any other ethnicities had problems with remaining there and

 8     living there as they had before.  I see nothing that would be disputed in

 9     this directive.

10             By your leave, since I recall it particularly well, although you

11     asked me not to go off on a tangent, but the directive also deals with

12     the issue of dealing with paramilitary and volunteer formations once

13     wartime activities have been concluded.

14        Q.   Yes.  Thank you, General.  I actually wanted to move on to this

15     topic, and if you go to page 4 in both languages, under point 6 -- under

16     point 6 it says:

17             "In all zones of combat operations, place under command of the

18     most senior JNA officer all units of the JNA and TO as well as volunteer

19     units ..." and so on and so forth.

20             And, General, that is what you just referred to, this principle

21     of unified command; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And this principle continued also in Bosnia, and it was also

24     applied by the VRS; is that right?

25        A.   One needs to distinguish between the TO and -- well, I've already

Page 34676

 1     testified about it in the Milosevic case.  In Slavonia and Srem, there

 2     were two TOs in my view.  There was the legal TO and a local TO

 3     established by the new authorities in the area.

 4        Q.   Let --

 5        A.   In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was only one TO.  So it had not been

 6     divided into two, at least not until late March 1992.

 7        Q.   But here in this particular order when it refers to the JNA and

 8     the TO, it was basically the Serb TO; correct?

 9        A.   Yes.  It was the TO of the independent or autonomous region of

10     Western Srem and Baranja.  Let me remind you --

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour --

12        Q.   Sorry, General.  I have to interrupt you because we have to move

13     on.  If we need more details, I will tell you.

14             But here the Serb TO in that area and later also in Bosnia, they

15     were considered friendly force and co-operating with the JNA while the

16     Croat and the Muslim TOs were not; correct?

17        A.   Well, the Serb TO, as you define it, never attacked the JNA.  The

18     Muslim and Croat TOs were objectively paramilitary formations by

19     definition, and they attacked the JNA.  Neither of the TOs, although I

20     underscore the difference between the TO in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the TO

21     in Krajina and the Sirmium or the Srem region.  As for the Patriotic

22     League, as what was to become the TO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, well, they

23     killed our first officers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On the 5th of April,

24     1992, in the village of Sapna, for no reason at all, a military police

25     patrol was attacked when warrant officer Mihajlo Stanojevic was killed

Page 34677

 1     and two reserve sergeants as well as four soldiers out of the ten that

 2     were there.  For no reason at all.

 3        Q.   Let me stop you here.  I mean, we have all these details in

 4     written form already before the Court, so we do not need to repeat this.

 5             I would like to -- to move on now and referring to armed Serbs.

 6     You have mentioned armed Serbs in your statement, and I refer here to

 7     paragraphs 88 and 113.  General, the JNA or, rather, elements thereof

 8     armed the Serb TO in Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

 9        A.   It is right if we address it as an occurrence or a relationship

10     as of March 1992.  Let me remind you of the fact that the TO of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina, objectively speaking, was broken up because the

12     reserve part of the TO which comprised Muslims and Croats, simply did not

13     respond to any call-ups to replenish the units of the TO, the legitimate

14     TO headed by Drago Vukosavljevic, a JNA general.  So the manning levels

15     in units went down because Alija Izetbegovic called on all Bosniaks and

16     Muslims to leave the army, and they prevented any new recruits being sent

17     to serve their military term in the JNA.  The JNA did not have

18     appropriate manning levels at the time.  The manning levels were raised

19     by some TO ranks which by that time one could refer to as the Serb TO,

20     but until the 8th of April, 1992, it existed as the TO of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22             It was not a paramilitary unit.  Some TO units were simply

23     drafted.  They were mobilised.  In the conflict in Croatia, there were

24     some Serbian TO units that were mobilised and sent to the area of Srem.

25     I discussed them, for example, the Smederevo TO detachment, the

Page 34678

 1     Palanka TO detachment, et cetera.  Those were legal TO units.  However,

 2     your question was whether there were instances where someone from the JNA

 3     armed the so-called Serb TO as you call it.  There were such instances,

 4     and I can cite an example where we raised a criminal report against a

 5     major who issued weapons to local Serbs without any approval.

 6        Q.   But, General --

 7        A.   That is why --

 8        Q.   General --

 9        A.   May I go on?

10        Q.   No.  Let's -- let's go step-by-step.  One of these officers who

11     provided weapons to what I call the Bosnian Serb TO, and you call it

12     differently, was General Talic; right?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   I would like to refer you to a document that you basically know

15     about from your testimony in the Milosevic case.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And it's here -- Your Honour, it's here

17     P05431.

18        Q.   And, General, when you -- it should be -- yeah.  And when you see

19     it coming up, you will remember it because you also discussed it in the

20     Milosevic case.  It's a report of the 1st kk to the Main Staff of the VRS

21     concerning the control and issuance of weapons to the TO staffs dated

22     31st August 1992, and when we move to the next page, please, we basically

23     see a list of items being provided.  It's a lengthy list of items.  You

24     remember this particular document, do you?

25        A.   Yes, certainly.  I said then that this is a document from

Page 34679

 1     August 1992.  It was a period when I had already retired.  That was the

 2     period when the Army of Republika Srpska was established as a legal army,

 3     and it has to do with the requests when TO units were being established

 4     in accordance with the Vance Plan.  And especially in Krajina the TO

 5     units were manned and they went to depots that were under lock and key.

 6     It says here that in the period when the army was established, because I

 7     cannot see when the weapons were issued.  This is from the month of

 8     August.  They had to sign for it and then it had to be returned

 9     eventually.  So I do not see anything strange about it.

10             This was the moment when the Army of Republika Srpska came into

11     being, and it is my duty to recall, though you said -- you will say that

12     you haven't asked me that, that there was an order of the chief of

13     General Staff, General Blagoje Adzic who said that no equipment or

14     weapons must be issued to any TO unit or anyone else unless this was

15     verified at the level of the General Staff.  So it was not just chaotic

16     distribution of weapons any old how, but it was a lawful and organised

17     distribution of weapons to the units that were supposed to provide

18     protection of the rear in this particular area.

19        Q.   But your understanding of this document, if we go back to the

20     first page, is not that those items were all provided in -- on the

21     31st of August, but, rather, it's a -- it's a document referring to what

22     had been done until the 31st of August; correct?

23        A.   Yes, but you do know that from the 19th of May, there was no more

24     JNA, and in Bosnia, the Army of Republika Srpska had been constituted and

25     General Mladic was appointed commander of that army.

Page 34680

 1        Q.   Let's -- let's move on.  General, during the interview that we

 2     had last week, you confirmed that you were aware that certain JNA

 3     officers would co-operate with the SDS; correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And that on that -- through this way Serbs got weapons; is that

 6     correct?

 7        A.   You are partly correct.  You asked me then when we talked, just

 8     as you're asking me today, whether some officers co-operated with the

 9     SDS.  The answer I gave was along the following lines, that we had

10     certain JNA officers who were being disciplined because they had

11     expressed some kind of nationalism, Serb, Croat, et cetera, whereas those

12     officers whose names had been mentioned had not co-operated with the SDS.

13     Before the SDS had been constituted, they had expressed extreme Serb

14     nationalist positions.

15             Again, I have to be rather extensive in order to paint a clear

16     picture for you.

17             When I was in Sarajevo on the 23rd of April, 1992, with regard to

18     reaching agreement on when Alija Izetbegovic would meet with

19     General Blagoje Adzic and Branko Kostic, then the security officers

20     briefed me about the security situation in their areas of responsibility,

21     and, inter alia, they told me that the SDS headquarters were moved to

22     Pale.  There is not a single officer active-duty member of the JNA who is

23     with them in their headquarters.  There is no a single officer who moved

24     there with them.  We had no officers in these SDS staffs, whereas we do

25     have Muslim officers who actually constituted the Patriotic League.  So

Page 34681

 1     one officer, I can even give you the name if necessary, he was a major,

 2     he established contact with people from the top echelons of the SDS, and

 3     that is why criminal charges were brought against him and then he fled

 4     and he became a wanted man.  That's only case we had of that kind.  Also,

 5     in Tuzla we had officers who held these extremist positions, and this

 6     colonel contacted some Chetnik formations.  Not with the SDS committee in

 7     Tuzla but with the Chetnik units that were there.

 8        Q.   General, you also confirmed during our talks last week that in

 9     fact the majority of the Serb JNA officers originating from Bosnia

10     supported the SDS because they had the same objective, namely, first

11     staying in Yugoslavia and later on having their own Serb republic or

12     entity in Bosnia.  That was the general position at that time; correct?

13        A.   Well, you keep linking that to the SDS, and this actually has to

14     do with one's attitude towards the Serbian issue as such and towards what

15     had been happening in Yugoslavia over the preceding year.  They thought

16     that when various peoples expressed their wish where they wanted to live

17     and went their own way, they thought that the Serbs also had the right to

18     decide on where they wanted to live.  They did not want to live seceded

19     in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they thought that their place was in

20     Yugoslavia.  They wanted to remain in Yugoslavia.  Whether that was SDS

21     policy, I don't know.  However, it does not mean that these officers were

22     linked to the SDS.

23             I kindly ask you to accept that, because I know what the

24     situation was in the JNA.  We have Serb nationalists.  We have extremists

25     who believe that Serbs are exploited, that they're subjugated like all

Page 34682

 1     other peoples who had -- held such beliefs and that were manipulated in

 2     that way.  However, this doesn't have to do with links between officers

 3     and the SDS.  That is why I presented that information of the

 4     23rd of April, when the chief of security briefed me stating that there

 5     was not a single officer who went with the SDS to Pale or to some

 6     military staff if they had one, and I was not aware of them having one to

 7     begin with.

 8        Q.   General, you already mentioned that you investigated and

 9     disciplined certain officers for their extreme nationalist behaviour, and

10     as I remember our talks, in relation to the Sarajevo Corps, that is, the

11     JNA force corps, you had actually four officers investigated, colonels,

12     that is; right?

13        A.   The interpretation is not correct that I carried out an

14     investigation.  An investigation is carried out when there is evidence or

15     suspicion of the commission of a crime.

16             I was a security officer.  We did not carry out investigations.

17     It was the SUP that carried out the investigation.  We carried out

18     different operative measures at different levels to a different extent

19     vis-a-vis persons for whom we believed that they were expressing views

20     from the viewpoint of Serbian nationalism.  It's not true that they were

21     all in the 4th Corps, the Sarajevo Corps.  This corps came into being in

22     its real form only after I left the position of division commander.  Some

23     of them were in the 4th Motorised Division and others were in the

24     4th Corps that existed then.  However, if you're speaking about 1992,

25     March, April, it is correct that all of these officers were in the

Page 34683

 1     4th Sarajevo Corps.

 2        Q.   And --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance?  I wanted

 4     to intervene.  This misunderstanding stems from line 18, page 26.  The

 5     General said that they were being processed, not disciplined.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 7        Q.   You -- you mentioned among those four was a Colonel Gagovic, and

 8     you said he's a Montenegrin, and you couldn't remember the first name.

 9     Do you now remember the first name?  You wanted to think about it.

10        A.   I didn't really think about it, but I seem to remember now that

11     it's Milosav Gagovic.

12        Q.   And to your knowledge, did he at that time deal with logistics in

13     the Sarajevo Corps?

14        A.   Yes.  That's at the time when I was commander of the division in

15     Sarajevo.

16        Q.   I would like to move on to something that you already touched

17     upon, and we need to see 65 ter 01726.  And as it is coming up, General,

18     it is an order from the command of the 2nd Military District, dated

19     9 January 1992, regarding an earlier order on the procedure from the SSNO

20     dated the 31st of December, 1991.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have page 2 in the B/C/S

22     and page 3 in the English.  Or rather, wait, wait.  Can we first look --

23     let's have the first page.

24        Q.   Looking at the preamble and point 1 of the order, this order

25     enforces the procedure to be applied for the equipment of TO units with

Page 34684

 1     weapons and equipment.  That's what the preamble says.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And the underlying order, the underlying

 3     order is on the next, page 2 in the B/C/S and page 3 in the English.

 4        Q.   You -- you refer to this order in your statement already at

 5     paragraph 207, and you have already touched upon it here.  The reason why

 6     the TO units are now requested not to contact the SSNO directly, but,

 7     rather, go through the command of the JNA units in which zone they are

 8     located, that's because they had so many requests suddenly to deal with

 9     at the headquarters; right?

10        A.   This is the end of 1991.  This is a period when preparations are

11     being carried out for the demilitarisation of the Knin Krajina.

12     Territorial Defence units are being formed in the Knin Krajina, and

13     equipment and weapons are being provided -- are being sent to the

14     warehouse, and there is this joint key that is used to lock them.  That

15     includes the international forces, and this does not pertain only to the

16     units of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina because this is

17     procedure related to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That is to say that Kukanjac

18     had not only Bosnia-Herzegovina under his command but also part of the

19     Krajina.  But this also pertained to the Territorial Defence units of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina that were supposed to be constituted, and in the

21     documentation that was shown, and I believe that you will find that now,

22     too, you will see about the constitution of the special MUP detachment in

23     Banja Luka and they're asking the military to give them two helicopters,

24     two military helicopters.  This is megalomaniac requests.

25             This is not illegal.  These are not paramilitaries.  These are

Page 34685

 1     legal units of the Territorial Defence that were primarily constituted on

 2     the basis of the Vance Plan in the area of the Krajina and they were

 3     supposed to be demilitarised, whereas the JNA was pulled out from that

 4     area into Bosnia as a guarantee that the Serbs would not be attacked

 5     after that.  So this document pertains partly to Krajina and partly to

 6     Bosnia.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

 8     document.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6169, Your Honours.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13        Q.   And, General, you have already referred to this, as you call it,

14     megalomaniac order or request.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have a look at it.  It is

16     65 ter 01713.

17        Q.   And as it is coming up here, it is General Kukanjac, on

18     24th April 1992, is forwarding and endorsing a request of the Ministry of

19     Interior of the Serb Republic for a huge number of weapons, equipment

20     and, as you said, helicopters even.  That is what you just referred to;

21     correct?

22        A.   Yes.  That's already the 24th of April.  Not to say that two days

23     after that, there was an oral agreement between General Adzic and

24     Alija Izetbegovic concerning the fate of the JNA, the division of the

25     JNA, leaving equipment and weaponry and so on, and then these

Page 34686

 1     megalomaniac requests come in as to what they would get from the JNA.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not catch the end

 3     of the sentence.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was taken up to the highest

 5     level in order to keep under control what would happen with JNA weapons

 6     and equipment once the JNA withdraws.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 8        Q.   Yes.  General, you have to speak a bit more slowly.  The

 9     interpreters didn't catch part of what you said, but I think the answer

10     is translated -- is sufficient.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

12     document.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, it's already in evidence as

15     Exhibit P5432.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18        Q.   General, in your statement you focus on the activities of the

19     Muslims.  The arming of the Serbs and their activities was not a priority

20     for you in your work because the -- as you said, the Serbs were

21     supporting the JNA and the focus, therefore, was on the Muslims; right?

22        A.   I focused on the problem that was against the JNA.  Had the Serbs

23     organised themselves through paramilitaries and had they attacked the

24     JNA, then they would have been processed by JNA organs.  So we did not

25     focus on the Muslims because they were Muslims and the Serbs were on the

Page 34687

 1     other side.  What we discovered was a paramilitary organisation whose

 2     activity was aimed against the JNA.

 3             In my explanation of the introduction of this operative action

 4     that had to be approved by the Federal Secretary for National Defence, I

 5     refer to the parameters why it is the military that has to deal with

 6     these services.  Serbs did not threaten us.  I did not have

 7     security-related problems with the Serbs, and we applied measures from

 8     the scope of our legislative -- legal powers because Serbs were not

 9     working against us.  Croats weren't, and Muslims weren't either, but

10     their paramilitaries did work against the JNA and that's why I took

11     action.  I assume that I've been speaking too fast again.

12        Q.   During your interview that we had last week, you said that the --

13     the Serbs and the SDS considered the JNA to be their army basically.

14     Right?

15        A.   Not in the sense that they were the owners and commanders of the

16     army but that it was their army, just as the JNA used to be the army of

17     all the peoples of Yugoslavia.  So that was that in that sense, but it's

18     not that they commanded it or took it upon themselves to act as if it

19     were only their own.

20        Q.   General, you have already referred to a meeting between

21     General Adzic and President Izetbegovic and other persons, including

22     members of the SFRY Presidency on the 26th of April, 1992, in Skopje, and

23     it's also referred to in your statement, and we indeed have a transcript

24     of an audio recording of this meeting that I would like to discuss with

25     you next.

Page 34688

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 11020 on the

 2     screen.  And let's -- sorry.  And let's just move into the text, page 3

 3     in the English and page 4 in the B/C/S.

 4        Q.   And we have here Mr. Izetbegovic proposes that the elements of

 5     the Yugoslav Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be transformed as of

 6     tomorrow into the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a bit further

 7     down under point 2, that the armed forces must accept the authority of

 8     the civil government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a bit further down, next

 9     paragraph, that the composition of the command personnel in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina should be changed as well as the next -- as it says in

11     the next paragraph, the troops.

12             General, you were aware of this position that Izetbegovic took;

13     correct?

14        A.   First of all, I read this document here, the one that's been

15     displayed just now.  I don't know who wrote it up and who authorised

16     it -- or, rather, who authored it, because there are certain

17     interruptions and ambiguities.  When I say "interruptions," they

18     interrupt the negotiations for lunch and then they continue after that.

19     And I did not see how it continued, and usually people agree on a lot of

20     things over lunch.  I know about this interpretation of General

21     Blagoje Adzic on the 27th of April, in Belgrade, when he briefed the

22     General Staff about what they had agreed upon, and that was a preliminary

23     agreement.  I can say what I know from that oral briefing, because there

24     were many options there that were being looked at.  One was that the JNA

25     would stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it had to be harmonised with

Page 34689

 1     the ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And there are different

 2     options that are bandied about.  So I don't see from this what it was

 3     that was ultimately agreed upon.

 4             I know what General Adzic told us about when he returned, though.

 5     The first and basic thing was with regard to the fate of the army.

 6     General Blagoje Adzic advocated the following:  That the JNA should stay

 7     until the peace forces arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, guaranteeing a

 8     peaceful resolution of the Bosnian crisis.  A position was taken that was

 9     allegedly agreed upon by both sides that all of those who were not

10     citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and were within the JNA would leave

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina by the 19th.  All of those who are citizens of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina and are in the JNA in some other areas would be

13     duty-bound to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina by that dead-line.  Retired

14     military personnel were guaranteed equal rights as if they had been

15     pensioned off in the JNA.  However, in terms of the division of the

16     remaining equipment and weaponry from the JNA, a multi-disciplinary

17     commission was supposed to be set up as was done in Skopje when the army

18     was leaving Macedonia.  That was supposed to be agreed upon during

19     May 1992.  However --

20        Q.   But, General, let me interrupt you here, because we do not have

21     this transcript of the section that was after the lunch.  We only have

22     this one, and I would like to stick with this one for a few more minutes,

23     because what you have said what the agreement is actually in your written

24     evidence.

25             I was wondering only about Mr. Izetbegovic's concerns about the

Page 34690

 1     ethnic composition of the JNA at that time, and he basically states here

 2     on this page that it was -- had been upset and should be restored to

 3     reflect the ethnic composition of the population.  And if I understand

 4     you correctly, he is right here.  The -- the JNA had become sort of a

 5     Serb army at that time.  Most of the personnel were Serb, of Serb

 6     ethnicity; isn't that correct?

 7        A.   I have to say again that it is not so.  First of all, it did not

 8     become a Serb army, because not all the Muslims left the JNA by the

 9     19th of May.  I have specific data; namely, that by the 31st of January,

10     1992, a total of 317 Muslim officers had left the JNA, of which 65 had

11     not done it in a lawful way.  So they were treated as military deserters.

12     And we had 69 Muslim officers who reported to the security organs, the

13     appearance of the Muslim paramilitary formations which tried to win them

14     over.  So it is not true that the JNA was left without any Muslims by

15     that time.

16             What Mr. Izetbegovic did not mention at the meeting was that the

17     2nd Military District as the highest military command in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have any Muslim generals.  There was

19     Muharem Fetahagic who hails from Kumanovo -- or, rather, was transferred

20     from Kumanovo to Bosnia precisely for the reason that he would be a

21     Muslim general in the army.

22             Another general who was a Muslim was wounded in

23     Dobrovoljacka Street.  I will try to remember his last name.  He used to

24     be in 51st Brigade.

25             Then for a while the commander of the 4th Corps used to be a

Page 34691

 1     Croat, a general who later on left the JNA and went away.

 2             So what you emphasise is only one segment.  Blagoje Adzic

 3     responded to them then in this text.  I can see it.  What would it be

 4     like?  You have caused the JNA to be composed mainly of Serbs, because by

 5     your calls from August 1991, you invited Muslims not to respond to

 6     call-ups.  You prohibited the Muslims from serving the JNA.  So you

 7     caused this composition of the JNA.  So he asked:  How can you now

 8     request that a Muslim be appointed the commander of this, conditionally

 9     speaking, Serbian Army?  It would be the same as if I would request from

10     you to appoint me as the commander of your Patriotic League.

11        Q.   Let me -- let me --

12        A.   So this is all something that can be seen from the discussion.  I

13     have read it now.

14        Q.   Yes.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Let us move to page 9 in the English and

16     page 13 in the B/C/S.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we do it after the break, if it is convenient?

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll take a break for half an hour and

20     resume at 5 past 11.00.

21                           --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, please continue.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25        Q.   General, we were just -- before the break we spoke about the

Page 34692

 1     composition of the JNA in Bosnia at that time, and let's move to English

 2     page 9 in the document and page 13 in the B/C/S, and then we can see what

 3     General Adzic says about that point.  And General Adzic speaks of several

 4     tens of thousands troops and states that the JNA is mainly filled with

 5     personnel from Bosnia-Herzegovina, with over 80 per cent of them coming

 6     from that territory and over 90 per cent of them being Serbs living

 7     there.

 8             General, what the SSNO says here, would that be correct?

 9        A.   I suppose that it's correct.  I do not have the figures that

10     testify to the strength of the JNA.  It is strange, though, that he

11     speaks precisely how many people there are in the TO, 35.000 in the

12     Serbian TO, and then about the Croats, and then he says several tens of

13     thousands in the Muslim TO.  He should have said precisely how many there

14     were.  Personally, I don't think that there were several tens of

15     thousands of JNA members in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But this is his

16     statement, so I cannot comment on it, and I'm not aware of this

17     information.

18        Q.   And just leaving aside the numbers, whether you remember them and

19     whether General Adzic is right here, but these JNA personnel that were --

20     that were at that time in Bosnia and were coming, originating, from

21     Bosnia, they were transformed into the VRS when it was created, except of

22     course those that were unwilling or, rather -- and, rather, left; is that

23     right?

24        A.   Yes.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we move on to page 22 in the English,

Page 34693

 1     and it is starting on page 32 -- sorry, yes, 32 in the B/C/S and goes

 2     over into page 33 and even page 34.

 3        Q.   And Mr. Izetbegovic is again speaking, and he's referring to

 4     strong paramilitary organisations of the SDS having its control -- having

 5     under its control quite a number of territories, and he speaks of

 6     Bijeljina, Foca, Samac, and the surroundings of Sarajevo.

 7             By that time, 26th of April, General, would that be correct?  Did

 8     the Serbs control quite a huge territory by then?

 9        A.   I know that they had control in the places which are mentioned

10     here, that means Bijeljina, Zvornik, and Visegrad, but not in the entire

11     territory.  He talks about the towns in which a conflict with the

12     Patriotic League broke out between the Serbian population and the

13     Patriotic League and the forces that were infiltrated from Serbia, but

14     I'm not aware of the fact that they controlled the entire territory along

15     the Drina River.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

17     document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6170, Your Honours.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21        Q.   General, in paragraph 19 of your statement, you refer to the time

22     that parties with mostly national prefixes became legal, and giving your,

23     let's put it, multi-ethnic views on how the country should continue, that

24     was a disturbance, right, having these national parties giving speeches,

25     inflaming the populations?  Correct?

Page 34694

 1        A.   Yes.  Everyone was doing it from their own position.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just please ask whether the

 3     General has his statement available, and can he check it when the

 4     Prosecution quotes specific paragraphs.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  General, do you have your statement with you now?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I haven't brought it with me.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, but I didn't quote anything

 8     from a paragraph.  I only mentioned that in paragraph 19, he spoke

 9     about -- he referred to parties with mostly nationalist prefixes became

10     legal.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We can continue, but I don't see any difficulty with

12     providing the witness with his statement.

13             Can you print one in the meantime in B/C/S.

14             You'll have it in due course.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I didn't bring it, unfortunately.

16        Q.   General, in your testimony in the Milosevic case - and I refer

17     here to e-court page 510 - you said the following:

18             "There was a spectre of ethnic passions fanned in all

19     environments.  Rather than stopping the passions and hostilities,

20     political authorities fanned them.  The pattern was that the other ethnic

21     group was blamed for something that had been done, whereas one's own

22     people were, in the interpretation of the leaders, victims."

23             General, that captures your observations during the events;

24     right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 34695

 1        Q.   And when you say all groups, this includes the SDS as well,

 2     correct?

 3        A.   It's one thing when we talk about groups and another when we talk

 4     about parties.  There were parties that were quite extreme.

 5             And as for the previous question, if you allow me to go back, you

 6     selected a specific part of my statement where I said that the parties

 7     mostly had ethnic prefixes, but as for extremes, I mentioned there that

 8     the HDZ brought extremists from the terrorist part of emigration who --

 9        Q.   General --

10        A.   -- then appeared at their convention in the Lisinski hall.  So

11     this is what I said previously, just to make a correction, even though I

12     don't have the statement in front of me.

13        Q.   Yes.  Yes.  I'm sorry.  General, I have to interrupt you, because

14     that is what we actually have in writing already here, and I address

15     things that are not already in evidence before this Court.  So we don't

16     need to repeat this.  Thank you.

17             But let's move on to the next topic and only briefly you have

18     described in your statement, and I refer here to the paragraphs 130, 149,

19     and 150, to several attempts of the security administration and the

20     Bosnian police to get a grip on the arming of troops outside the JNA and

21     how you co-operated, and we do not need to repeat it as it's all in

22     writing.

23             I just want to refer to a joint proposal of the security

24     administration and the BiH MUP to disarm all paramilitary formations, and

25     you refer in paragraph 157 to it, and you say the politicians did not

Page 34696

 1     support it, not in Bosnia and not on the federal level.

 2             That's how it was; right?

 3        A.   As I cannot describe this extensively, one could not say that it

 4     was only the politicians who did not support this.  Based on a meeting

 5     with the military leadership on the 24th of December, which was held with

 6     the Presidency of the -- of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had envisaged a plan

 7     of disarming all paramilitary formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  On the

 8     19th of January, we held a meeting.  At the meeting, the representatives

 9     of MUP from Croatia, Bruno Stojic and Brano Kvesic who was head of the

10     state security in Croatia obstructed this.  They advocated that the

11     people would not return the weapons and, if they were pressured to do so,

12     that war would break out and that political parties should call on their

13     peoples to return the weapons.  And then an argument broke out between

14     the representatives of the Serbs in the MUP and these Croats, and the

15     meeting did not -- was not completed, and there was no plan to be applied

16     as we had hoped.

17             On the 5th of February, I went for talks with Alija Izetbegovic,

18     because the previous attempt had failed.  However, their interpretation

19     was that political parties would not accept this.

20             Whether they contacted between the 19th of January and the

21     5th of February when I came to Sarajevo again, whether they had contacts

22     with their ethnic leaders, this is something I don't know, but it was

23     obvious that generally speaking, no one wanted to accept it.  The

24     Presidency of SFRY did not react to this either.

25        Q.   Yes.  And --

Page 34697

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just say something about

 2     the transcript so that there would not be a confusion.  General talked

 3     about the Croats in Bosnia rather than Croats from Croatia on T5.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 5        Q.   As we do not have much time, I move on now to another meeting,

 6     and we have no time to look at the document, but, General, you -- in your

 7     statement you mentioned that you met Mr. Izetbegovic as well as other

 8     Presidency members, and you may remember the meeting you had on the

 9     15th of October, 1991, with all the members of the Presidency.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, it is 65 ter 24661, but I think

11     I don't need to pull it up.

12        Q.   In that meeting, non-Serb -- non-Serb members of the Presidency

13     were concerned about what they called excessive high concentration of JNA

14     units in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Do you remember that, that that was a

15     concern they had?

16        A.   Yes, I remember, and I inspected the document you talk about,

17     which is entitled "Notes from the meeting."  So much more was said than

18     you just mentioned.  There was interpretation as to why the number of

19     troops in Bosnia increased, but what you just said is correct.  But in

20     any case, it is just an extract from that.

21             If you wish to ask me about the following meeting which took

22     place on the 24th of December, I already expressed my reserve about the

23     way this meeting is interpreted.  This is the key point.

24             At that meeting, neither on the 15th of October or on the 24th,

25     none of the Serbian representatives were present except for the members

Page 34698

 1     of the Presidency, Mr. Koljevic and Ms. Plavsic.  Mr. Karadzic did not

 2     attend it, nor did Mr. Krajisnik.  The first time I met Mr. Karadzic was

 3     when I came here.  They did not attend this meeting, but during the

 4     discussion, even though he did not attend it, it says that he opposed the

 5     peacekeeping forces entering Bosnia.  This is why I believe it is said

 6     that he attended the meeting, but the notes are not authentic, because

 7     persons who did not attend it are listed.  And I never said anything at

 8     the meeting, because the principle is not for the subordinates to enter

 9     the discussion when you have the federal minister who is present.  So the

10     notes are untruthful, to say the least.

11        Q.   Your -- but as you said, you remember the meeting.  The non-Serb

12     members of the Presidency, they feared that the JNA would turn against

13     them if they continue to pursue an independent Bosnia; right?

14        A.   No.  It was not so.  It wasn't that they were afraid that the

15     army would turn against them.  This is not noted there.  I have my

16     original notes from the -- from both meetings, and this was not

17     expressed.  We would have -- you will have to be more precise and tell me

18     what the notes say.

19             They were not afraid of the army.  Alija Izetbegovic even asked

20     the army to help to disarm the paramilitary formations, but he requested

21     that paramilitary formations in Banja Luka also be disarmed.  That was at

22     the meeting of the 24th of December when they took over a relay owned by

23     the TV and turned it in another direction.

24             He was saying all the time what the Serbian side was doing and

25     never mentioned the paramilitary formations which had already grown by

Page 34699

 1     that time and had an enormous amount of weapons.  I don't know if you

 2     would ask me that or not, but there is something that is usually skipped

 3     over.

 4             As a former member of the Yugoslav People's Army, I care to say

 5     that the first victims, the first casualties in Bosnia-Herzegovina were

 6     military personnel, and in principle members of the military police.  Let

 7     me give you the dates, the 18th of September, 1991, the 5th of April --

 8        Q.   Let me stop you -- General, I'm sorry, but we have only very

 9     limited time, and you have actually provided these details in the written

10     statement.  And I would like to move on so that we can cover one more

11     topic where you can basically help us with, and that is the paramilitary

12     units, irregular troops of all kind, and I want to discuss this with you

13     as you have made observation.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 01718 on the

15     screen.

16        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an order of the SFRY Presidency on

17     the engagement of volunteers in the armed forces of the SFRY during

18     imminent threat of danger, dated 10 December 1991.  I'm quite confident

19     that you know this decision.  Do you?

20        A.   I saw that decision here, because this is not the army

21     Official Gazette but the Official Gazette of Serbia, and I read these

22     provisions when I testified in the case against Mr. Milosevic.

23        Q.   Yes.  And as it says here in paragraph 1, that "... during the

24     imminent danger of war, the JNA and the TO are reinforced, among others,

25     with volunteers who are from the moment they joined units and

Page 34700

 1     institutions of the armed forces of the SFRY, equal in all things with

 2     soldiers and military conscripts."

 3             General, there was a shortage of troops given the poor response

 4     to mobilisation at that time; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And this reinforcement with volunteers, that also occurred in

 7     Bosnia?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And the volunteers or paramilitaries that you observed in Croatia

10     would reappear, at least some of them would reappear in Bosnia, and I

11     would just ask you about a few.  The Yellow Wasps, they caused havoc in

12     Zvornik; right?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And they were associated with Seselj?

15        A.   Yes, they were.

16        Q.   And you have already given quite an extensive account of Arkan

17     and his men in Bijeljina, and that's in your statement on paragraph 171

18     further.  They were in Bijeljina.  You said that already.

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And your observations of such group -- troops in Croatia, from

21     these observations you were aware that some of these volunteers and

22     paramilitaries, and I include here Arkan, would loot, would mistreat the

23     non-Serbs, and would even kill prisoners of war or innocent civilians;

24     right?

25        A.   That's right.

Page 34701

 1        Q.   And in relation to Arkan, you also mentioned in your testimony in

 2     Milosevic that his status in the field would shift constantly.  At times

 3     he was part of the TO, sometimes police unit, and even on one occasion

 4     part of the Novi Sad Corps; right?  You -- is that correct?

 5        A.   No.  He was never a member of the Novi Sad Corps, but the

 6     then-corps commander General Bijorcevic had direct links with him, but

 7     they were never a part of the Novi Sad Corps.

 8        Q.   Officially definitely not, as you have already mentioned also in

 9     the Milosevic case, but I seem to recall that you refer to an order you

10     have seen where Arkan was basically named as a reconnaissance group of

11     the Novi Sad Corps, but that was only a fiction; is that right?

12        A.   It is true that General Bijorcevic not ordered him but sent him a

13     memo claiming that in the area of Badovinci they were a reconnaissance

14     group of the Novi Sad Corps, although they were not part of the Novi Sad

15     Corps, nor did the other officers from the Novi Sad Corps know that

16     Bijorcevic had issued them such a document.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I was referring to the e-court

18     pages 62 to 63 from the Milosevic testimony.

19        Q.   General, Arkan's Tigers, as they were also called, were the

20     dominant armed group taking part in Bijeljina; right?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And when we spoke last week, you mentioned that after the

23     take-over of Bijeljina, Ms. Plavsic and the commander of the JNA

24     Tuzla Corps met Arkan in Bijeljina; right?

25        A.   Yes.  It wasn't just Ms. Plavsic who was there.  There was also

Page 34702

 1     the commander of the Tuzla Corps, Djeneral Jankovic, then Fikret Abdic

 2     was there, as well as some other politicians who came as a delegation on

 3     behalf of Sarajevo to calm things down in Bijeljina.  It is true that

 4     Ms. Plavsic was there and she greeted Arkan, kissing him on the cheeks

 5     when they met.

 6        Q.   General, if you look back at the observations you made regarding

 7     the events in Bosnia, would it be fair to say that crimes against the

 8     non-Serb people by Serb troops were tolerated by the political

 9     leaderships at certain times?

10        A.   What political leadership?

11        Q.   I would -- I was actually referring to all political leaderships.

12     But we can -- we can go and take one particular example.

13             You are aware that the Yellow Wasps were arrested and later on

14     set free; correct?

15        A.   I didn't know they were set free.  It was probably after I

16     retired.  What I do know is this:  Proceedings were instituted in

17     Loznica, I believe, and one of them was released because he was not

18     mentally fit to stand trial.  He was held in the detention unit, though,

19     after he was declared unfit.  I think it occurred sometime later, in 1993

20     or 1994.  I think that's when the trial took place.

21             Recently, some people from that group were tried before the war

22     crimes court in Belgrade, and I don't think all of the judgements have

23     been handed down yet.

24        Q.   And you also mentioned that Lukic was arrested and set free and

25     then arrested again; correct?

Page 34703

 1        A.   Yes.  It all took place later, after I retired.  However, it is

 2     true.

 3        Q.   And in the Milosevic case - and I'm referring here, Your Honours,

 4     to page 284 in e-court - you, in fact, spoke about a modus operandi at

 5     that time to avoid prosecuting such perpetrators by transferring them

 6     back and forth over borders.  Does that capture the prevailing attitude

 7     at that time?

 8        A.   I don't know whether that was the prevailing attitude, but in

 9     both cases you mentioned, objectively speaking, that's what had happened.

10        Q.   I have one -- yes.  I have one more topic, and that's now an

11     entirely different one, and it refers to paragraph 189, where you

12     describe in the statement an event, an attack on the military depot near

13     Foca on the 26th of April, 1992.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And I would like to have D01683 on the

15     screen.

16        Q.   And, General, as it is coming up, you refer in your -- in your

17     statement to a military depot near Foca, and would that be the JNA fuel

18     depot in Filipovici near Ustikolina?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And we have here a document from the 744th logistic base command,

21     17 April 1992, that refers to the situation in that area.  Do you know

22     this particular document?  Have you seen that before?

23        A.   No, I have not.

24        Q.   Before we go into details, let me just understand whether I

25     understood your comments properly.  In paragraph 189, and if I understand

Page 34704

 1     the English translation correctly, is it your evidence that some of the

 2     Muslim refugees taking shelter there were armed, that they disarmed the

 3     JNA officers, and when the Serbs became aware of this, they attacked the

 4     depot and disarmed the Muslim attackers?  Is that your evidence?

 5        A.   That's it more or less.  Information was received through

 6     security organs to the extent that some 200 Muslims, refugees, took

 7     shelter in the warehouse.  They were received there and fed.  The

 8     decision to do so was made by Major Kurtovic, who was at the warehouse.

 9             Since some of the Muslims were armed, the personnel of the

10     warehouse, including Kurtovic, were disarmed, and then an SDS unit became

11     involved clearing up things.  I have no further information, and what I

12     state in the statement is what I have learned from the security organ.

13             If you wish me to do so, I'll re-read it to see what happened

14     indeed, or perhaps you can put a question.

15        Q.   You have already mentioned now that the SDS units were indeed

16     dealing with the situation at that time, and that's basically said here

17     in this -- in this document.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to tender this

19     document.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Was it not already admitted as you indicated, D1683?

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  You're right.  You're right.  Sorry.

22        Q.   General, we --

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I think we need to go into

24     private session.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 34705

 1                           [Private session]

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24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 34706

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 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in open session.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you.

20        Q.   General, there's also evidence before this Tribunal that - and I

21     refer here to the adjudicated facts, Your Honour, 758 and 759 - that on

22     the day of the attack on the warehouse by these SDS troops, nine Muslim

23     men were murdered after an SDA membership card was found.  General, are

24     you aware of that?

25        A.   No.  No.

Page 34707

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, no -- no further questions.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  You're not tendering 65 ter 1718, are

 3     you?

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Sorry, I've --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Which seems to be an SFRY Presidency order.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.  I would like to tender

 7     it.  I forgot.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit it.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6171, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have re-examination?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Briefly, only perhaps one or two

13     questions.

14                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] General, sir, in this indictment, I'm being

16     charged with the following -- well, on page 27, you were asked about the

17     positions of officers who supported the SDS.  Did the JNA change its

18     position about the SDS and supported it, or was it the SDS who suffered a

19     change of heart and then supported the JNA?

20        A.   I'm not aware of any JNA position changing concerning the SDS.

21     It simply did not engage in discussions with any political party.

22             Now, whether the SDS changed their position vis-a-vis the JNA,

23     well, I seem to remember something which was in early April, perhaps,

24     when the SDS changed its position concerning the purpose of co-operating

25     between the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the TO, and they justified it

Page 34708

 1     by having -- by the situation being changed.  The MUP had split into the

 2     Serb and Muslim parts, so there was no purpose in further co-operating

 3     with the Muslim MUP.

 4             Until the last day of my service, we never changed our position

 5     on co-operating with the MUP.  That is the only change I am aware of in

 6     terms of SDS position at the beginning, which was praised at all of the

 7     meetings.  It was stated that the co-operation in question was a positive

 8     move which contributed to preserving peace in Bosnia for at least a few

 9     months.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In the indictment, I am charged with supporting JNA

11     draft calls.  In your knowledge, does that amount to a criminal offence?

12        A.   I don't know why you would be charged with something the people

13     were supposed to do anyway as citizens.  There were some volunteers which

14     were called that in the sense that they participated in the conflict in

15     Croatia.  That's how they were referred to in street parlance.  In

16     Croatia, there were two collection centres for volunteers at the

17     beginning of the war which were soon disbanded because those volunteers

18     would not remove their party insignia.

19             In the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, we also had two collection

20     centres for volunteers where in an organised fashion they were received.

21     We did not establish such centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because

22     people themselves, as per their war deployment, reported to JNA units,

23     and the SDS called on their -- on its membership to honour their duty as

24     citizens.

25             I'm not saying that perhaps such volunteers did not form a

Page 34709

 1     paramilitary unit of their own, but those people arrived in the JNA of

 2     their own accord and were made part of the JNA.

 3             Since the truth seems not to be able to out here in terms of

 4     JNA -- the JNA in Bosnia, in addition to the volunteers who voluntarily

 5     joined the JNA, eight of them were executed by firing squad in the centre

 6     of Sarajevo in front of the police hall.  They had been taken prisoner in

 7     Dobrinja and dragged out of an APC which had broken down.  These were not

 8     actually volunteers but JNA soldiers who had been drafted from the

 9     reserve force.

10        Q.   Thank you, General.  It is very good that you mention it.  At

11     page 46 you were asked whether you were aware that volunteers and

12     paramilitary units which you had met in Croatia would engage in looting

13     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Can one put the sign of equation between a

14     paramilitary formation and volunteers?

15        A.   No.  Those who reported in Croatia as volunteers were brought

16     there by political parties through their rallies, and by that time they

17     had set them up as some sort of military units which had not -- which did

18     not make part of the JNA later on, but they moved under the name of this

19     or that volunteer group.  They had different names such as Dusan Silni,

20     Leva Supoderica, and so on and so forth.

21             The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was completely different.

22     There, there was general refusal to call-ups, and the 216th Mountain

23     Brigade in Han Pijesak had only 33 per cent manning levels.

24             In our army where -- where during exercises the reserves used to

25     respond to such exercises in great numbers, if the percentage was less

Page 34710

 1     than 90 per cent, the commander was considered unsuccessful.  There was a

 2     call to not to respond to call-ups in Bosnia-Herzegovina starting with

 3     Alija Izetbegovic and the Patriotic League, and in that case this brigade

 4     had the manning level of only 33 per cent.  I was unaware of the

 5     Yellow Wasps during the conflict in Croatia.  I heard of them for the

 6     first time concerning the Zvornik incident.  As for Arkan's units, they

 7     were in Croatia.

 8             And I cannot put the sign of equation between volunteers and

 9     paramilitaries.  Paramilitary units had already been established and

10     those groups moved about the theatre.  Even in Kosovo they attempted to

11     insert a paramilitary group of 25 headed by some Jugoslav Petrusic.  They

12     circumvented the collection centres for volunteers.  Ninety per cent of

13     those who reported to the collection centres were eliminated as unfit to

14     join the army due to their previous conduct.

15        Q.   Could you observe that someone could report as a volunteer and,

16     later on, to cut himself loose, creating a paramilitary unit and refusing

17     to adhere to JNA regulation -- regulations?

18        A.   If someone chose to go maverick, that person was an individual.

19     It was not a group and as such would be considered a military deserter.

20     That person would have to be bring in because they had been members of

21     the regular army.

22             I don't know of such cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina out of the

23     people who responded to the call-up to wartime units.  I have no such

24     information.

25        Q.   And the last question, General:  You mentioned that you had

Page 34711

 1     several officers in Sarajevo who were being processed or investigated,

 2     and it was misinterpreted as if you had disciplined them.  The processing

 3     you mentioned, did it manage to prove that, for example, Colonel Gagovic

 4     had committed a crime?

 5        A.   No.  Only Gagovic was mentioned in that context.  Although we are

 6     not in closed session, I can tell you that there were a few dozen

 7     investigations or processing procedures conducted by security organs at

 8     the time on different elements of their responsibility or liability that

 9     fell within the remit of security organs.  There were several

10     investigations conducted on the topic of Serb nationalism.  As far as I

11     know, Gagovic was not connected to any person from the SDS.  As far as I

12     know, he was appointed the Chief of Staff in the command of

13     General Djurdjevac in the 4th Corps.

14             Now, as to his own criteria on how the problem in Bosnia should

15     be dealt with, well, I suppose he did, but he could not do anything

16     autonomously or use artillery without the corps command or Djurdjevac

17     knowing.  He did not have any links to the paramilitaries either.  As far

18     as I know, after the 19th of May, he did not remain and he joined the SDS

19     instead.

20             That's extent of information I have.  I think he went back to

21     Belgrade.

22        Q.   Did you mean the VRS or the SDS?

23        A.   Well, later it became the VRS.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.

25             Your Excellencies, I have no further questions of

Page 34712

 1     General Vasiljevic.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Unless my colleagues have a question for you, that

 3     concludes your evidence, General Vasiljevic.  On behalf of this Chamber,

 4     I thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to

 5     go.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7                           [The witness withdrew]

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, the two of us will now leave

 9     and another -- another counsel will come.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11                           [The witness entered court]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

14     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Markovic.  Please be seated and make

16     yourself comfortable.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18                           WITNESS:  PERO MARKOVIC

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Markovic, I

21     must draw your attention to a particular Rule we have here at the

22     Tribunal.  That is Rule 90(E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

23     Under this Rule, you may object to answering a question from

24     Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you believe

25     that your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence.  In this

Page 34713

 1     context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an

 2     admission of guilt or saying something that might provide evidence that

 3     you have committed a criminal offence.  However, should you think that an

 4     answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer

 5     the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

 6     compel you to answer the question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal

 7     would ensure that your testimony compelled under such circumstances would

 8     not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence

 9     save and except for the offence of giving false testimony.

10             Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understood.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Markovic.

13             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

14                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Markovic.

16        A.   Good morning.

17        Q.   Kindly pause and speak slowly.  Actually, both of us should, so

18     as to make it easier for the interpreters and to have everything in the

19     transcript.

20        A.   Very well.

21        Q.   Mr. Markovic, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?

22        A.   I did.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D07822 in

25     e-court.  1D07822.  Aha, very well.

Page 34714

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Markovic, do you see that statement of yours on the screen

 3     before you?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Please give your answer now.  The interpretation is over.

 6        A.   Yes, I see that statement.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read this statement and signed it?

 8        A.   Yes.  I read it and signed it.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

10     the last page so that he can identify his signature.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Is this your signature?

13        A.   Yes, it is my signature.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said

15     to the Defence team?

16        A.   For the most part, yes.  There is a small mistake in number 13.

17     May I correct it?

18        Q.   Certainly.  We'll ask you to do that.  Do you have a hard copy of

19     your statement there?

20        A.   No, I don't.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I kindly ask that the witness

22     be allowed to look at his statement.  Could he also be provided with a

23     copy.  During the cross-examination he will probably have certain

24     paragraphs quoted to him.

25             Can we now please have paragraph 13 on page 4 on our screens.

Page 34715

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   What was it that you wanted to correct there?  Please tell us

 3     what it is that should be corrected.

 4        A.   It says here that it's Christmas, but I actually spoke about

 5     Easter.

 6        Q.   Line 3, it says "over the Catholic Christmas," but it should say

 7     "over the Catholic Easter"?  Is that what you're saying?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  What about the rest of the statement, does it

10     faithfully reflect what you said to the Defence team?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today in

13     this courtroom, would your answers basically be the same as those

14     provided in this statement?

15        A.   Yes, they would be the same.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

18     tender this 92 ter ...

19             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection?

20             MR. ZEC:  No objection.

21             JUDGE KWON:  You are tendering an associated exhibit?  Yes,

22     Mr. Robinson.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  No associated exhibits.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.  If you would bear with me a

25     minute.  Yes, we'll admit it.

Page 34716

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3072, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'm going to read

 4     out the summary of Mr. Pero Markovic's statement in the English language.

 5             [In English] Pero Markovic was elected president of the

 6     Executive Board of the Brcko Municipal Assembly.

 7             He was involved in the SDS since beginning -- the beginning and

 8     was present at the founding Assembly on the 26th of August, 1990.

 9     Following the multi-party elections, the Brcko local government was

10     formed from members of the SDA, HDZ, and SDS as a coalition.  The

11     Executive Committee of Brcko was composed of nine members, three from

12     each of the parties.

13             Pero Markovic considers that when the Executive Committee was

14     established, it was largely unfit for the purposes or interests of the

15     Serbian people in the municipality.  This is because the SDA and HDZ

16     formed a joint front and were able to out-vote the Serbian members of the

17     committee.  Therefore, discussions could not be implemented -- decisions

18     could not be implemented that were in the interests of all.  The SDS

19     attempted in every way possible to reach a political agreement with the

20     other parties for the benefit of all citizens of the municipality,

21     regardless of religion or nationality.

22             A number of factors had a big impact on the overall inter-ethnic

23     relations in the town, including the civil wars being waged in Slovenia

24     and Croatia because of their immediate proximity to Brcko and that the

25     leaders of the HDZ openly supported the separatist activities in these

Page 34717

 1     republics.  Further, the SDA in Brcko were under pressure from the SDA

 2     leadership from Sarajevo to make personnel changes to allow separatist

 3     activities to take place.  Mr. Pero Markovic also spoke to a number of

 4     Muslim neighbours and friends who were against the demolition of the

 5     federal Yugoslavia but were under pressure from the SDA and the HDZ and

 6     had to work towards BH seceding.

 7             Mr. Pero Markovic was aware that an order was sent from the --

 8     from Jerko Doko, the minister of defence of the Socialist Republic of

 9     Bosnia and Herzegovina, that no mobilisation was to be conducted for the

10     JNA and that the reserve police stations and a police force were to be

11     created.  Pero Markovic believes that the reserve police forces and

12     paramilitary units were only formed in towns and neighbourhoods inhabited

13     by Muslims and Croats.  This caused the Serb residents in the

14     municipality became anxious and fearful of their safety and put all their

15     hopes in the protection of the JNA.

16             Pero Markovic considers that the symbol of the first rift between

17     the ethnic groups of Brcko was in the SDA and the HDZ tying their party

18     flags together.  He was aware that the bridge over the Sava River may be

19     destroyed if the unrest continued.  He therefore called a meeting to

20     discuss the possibility of preventing this.  However, less than month

21     later, the Croats destroyed their part of bridge.  A makeshift bridge was

22     then created.  However, this only allowed pedestrians to cross.

23             Further, in April 1992, the Croats stopped pedestrians from

24     crossing the bridge, meaning that between 3.000 and 5.000 people remained

25     in Brcko were unable to return to their home countries from which they

Page 34718

 1     had travelled for the holiday.  On the night of 29th of April, 1992,

 2     Mr. Pero Markovic was awoken by a detonation that discovered -- and

 3     discovered that the bridge over the Sava River had been torn down on the

 4     right bank of the Sava River.  That means on the bank on Bosnian side.

 5     The town was gripped by chaos, and the work of the local authorities was

 6     paralysed.  Mr. Pero Markovic over the radio urged everyone to report to

 7     work and remain calm.

 8             Mr. Pero Markovic was aware that paramilitary units were

 9     mobilising in BH because in March 1992, a large group of well-armed men

10     stopped a JNA column from the local garrison and arrested and disarmed

11     all the JNA members from the column.  He called a meeting, and Muslim and

12     Croat leaders confirmed the attack and stated that they would ask their

13     compatriots to release the soldiers, which eventually happened.

14     Pero Markovic therefore concluded that there was collusion between the

15     local government and the paramilitary groups.

16             On 30th of April, 1992, Mr. Pero Markovic was informed that a

17     large group of men fit for military service from Croatia had arrived in

18     the village of Gorica.  It was suspected that they were members of the

19     HOS or Green Berets.  When questioned, the men stated that they were on

20     holiday.  However, Pero Markovic was suspicious as the holiday period was

21     over.

22             On his return to Brcko, Mr. Pero Markovic saw that a barricade

23     had been created -- erected in front of the hospital and was guarded by a

24     number of heavily armed men, the majority of which had automatic weapons.

25     He concluded that these men were members of Muslim paramilitary groups,

Page 34719

 1     Patriotic League and the Green Berets.  He was also informed that

 2     check-points had been set up in the afternoon on all major roads and

 3     intersections making it impossible to move around the city.

 4             On the afternoon of 1st of May, 1992, members of the Muslim

 5     paramilitaries mounted an attack on the town of Brcko, targeting an area

 6     inhabited exclusively by Serbs.  At the same time paramilitary groups and

 7     the HOS were active in Brcko, the JNA withdrew to Serbia and civilian

 8     authorities were dysfunctional.  This led to the town effectively being

 9     ruled by paramilitary groups who made arrests and physically mistreated

10     everyone.  These activities made many Serbs fear for their safety.  This

11     was amplified when the Serb civilians saw a television broadcast of the

12     massacre of the JNA soldiers.

13             Throughout the war, the town centre and surrounding villages came

14     under indiscriminate gunfire almost every day from Croatia and territory

15     under the control of B and H.  That means from north and from south.

16     This shelling caused large-scale destruction of civilian facilities and a

17     large number of civilians who were wounded or killed, and such shelling

18     rendered normal life in the municipality impossible.  Serbs, Muslims, and

19     Croats all sought to leave the municipality because of this.

20             Both during and after the war, the Muslim and Croat sides spread

21     numerous lie and told untruths about the war.  They misinterpreted [sic]

22     the number of people killed in Brcko as it was publicly stated that more

23     than 8.000 Muslims were killed in Brcko.  However, Mr. Pero Markovic is

24     aware that 911 Muslims have been killed in different circumstances.

25             Mr. Pero Markovic had numerous and direct contact with

Page 34720

 1     Radovan Karadzic, and throughout he demanded full respect -- Karadzic at

 2     that time demanded the full respect for other ethnic groups as well as

 3     demanding they represent the interests and welfare of all.  Karadzic

 4     never asked Pero Markovic to plan or do anything to harm others

 5     regardless of their religion or ethnic background.  Karadzic asked the

 6     authorities to look for solutions for the benefits of everyone.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Mr. Markovic, I wanted to ask you the following:  The first time

 9     your bridge was destroyed from the Croatian side and the other time it

10     was from the Bosnian side.  Was this something new on the Sava or had

11     bridges been destroyed earlier on as well?

12        A.   As far as I know, perhaps even a year before that, the bridge

13     between Orasje and Zupanja, near Brcko, had been destroyed.  Zupanja is

14     on the Croatian side and Orasje is on the Bosnian side.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.  We have a document, and

17     perhaps if we have an opportunity, we shall show all the things that had

18     been destroyed up until the 28th of February.  But at this point in time,

19     Excellencies, I have no further questions.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Mr. Markovic, your evidence in this case

21     has been admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony, and now

22     you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the

23     Prosecutor.

24             Mr. Zec.

25             MR. ZEC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 34721

 1                           Cross-examination by Mr. Zec:

 2        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Markovic.  Mr. Markovic, you told us in your

 3     statement about the composition of the local government in Brcko before

 4     the war.  Let me ask you quickly a few -- couple of questions about some

 5     other officials in Brcko in that period.

 6             Dr. Milenko Vojinovic, also known as Dr. Beli, was president of

 7     the SDS in Brcko.  This is correct, isn't it?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   He was also a deputy in the BiH Republican Assembly before the

10     war, later RS Assembly, member of the SDS Main Board, and member of the

11     municipal War Presidency in Brcko.  This is correct, isn't it?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   In his capacity as the president of the municipal SDS and the

14     deputy in the Assembly, he co-ordinated the work of the Municipal

15     Assembly, municipal SDS, pursuant to directions of the SDS leadership in

16     Sarajevo.  This is correct, isn't it?

17        A.   I assume so.

18        Q.   Bosko Maricic was vice-president of the SDS Municipal Board,

19     member of the municipal War Presidency, isn't it?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   He became deputy in the RS Assembly in 1995, after the death of

22     Dr. Vojinovic.  This is correct, isn't it?

23        A.   I think so.

24        Q.   Djordje Ristanic was president of the Serbian Municipal Assembly

25     in Brcko and president of the War Presidency.  This is correct, isn't it?

Page 34722

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Before the war there was a garrison of the Yugoslav People's

 3     Army, the JNA, in Brcko.  Commander of the garrison was Colonel

 4     Pavle Milinkovic.  This is correct, isn't it?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   You say in paragraph 7 and 8 of your statement that members of

 7     the SDA and HDZ followed instructions from their leadership in Sarajevo

 8     and Zagreb.  Is it also correct that you followed instructions from the

 9     SDS leadership in relation to your activities?

10        A.   For the most part.

11        Q.   You told us that the interest of the SDA and the HDZ was

12     independent Bosnia and Herzegovina outside Yugoslavia, which is, you say,

13     against the interest of Serbian people in the municipality of Brcko.  At

14     the same time in the discussions with other two parties, the SDS asked

15     for the division of the municipality.  This is correct, isn't it?

16        A.   Well, I cannot claim that the SDS asked for that.  This idea

17     concerning the division came from us, the parties that were in power,

18     without any instructions from the SDS.  If you remember, the

19     Executive Board was three, three, three, so that was the idea of the nine

20     of us there.

21        Q.   Okay.  Just to be clear, according to the 1991 census, Serbs made

22     about 20 per cent of the municipal population and about the same number

23     of Brcko town.  This is correct, isn't it?

24        A.   Approximately.

25        Q.   There were several meetings held on this topic of division of the

Page 34723

 1     municipality, including the one around 17 April 1992 which you referred

 2     to in paragraph 33 of your statement.  Let me first make it clear.  At

 3     this time, during these discussions, everyone at these meetings was aware

 4     of the situation in Brcko at the time.  The war was ongoing in Croatia,

 5     Arkan was in Bijeljina, Zvornik, crimes were taking place in Eastern

 6     Bosnia, Brcko was packed with refugees and people forced out of their

 7     homes trying to cross the bridge in Brcko in order to leave, wasn't it?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             MR. ZEC:  Can we have P03020, page -- English page 5, and B/C/S

10     page 6.

11        Q.   In front of you, Mr. Markovic, there will be a transcript of a TV

12     documentary about Brcko which was produced in Sarajevo.  You will be able

13     to see it on the screen, and it's about the negotiations that -- that you

14     talk about in your statement.

15             Mato Jurisic, a Croat --

16             MR. ZEC:  So English page 5; B/C/S, 6.

17        Q.   So if you -- you can look at the screen.  It says here MJ, that's

18     Mato Jurisic, a Croat, he refers to the committee that you also talk

19     about in paragraph 33.  Munib Jusufovic says that he did not want any

20     division.  Mustafa Ramic said that the SDS wanted to divide town into two

21     parts.  Ibrahim Ramic said three-quarters of the town would have belonged

22     to the Serbs, the entire industrial area, the railway, and the harbour.

23             MR. ZEC:  Next page in English and B/C/S.

24             He says that -- okay.  Can we have in B/C/S next page?

25             Ibrahim Ramic, that the other two communities did not consider

Page 34724

 1     this to be a serious proposal.

 2        Q.   Was this, Mr. Markovic, a general position of the parties during

 3     these negotiations?

 4        A.   You've put many questions.  If we are talking about the division,

 5     we tried in a way to do our best to prevent a war, all three sides.

 6     Unfortunately, this never came to pass.  I already talked about that.  We

 7     had this Municipal Assembly session that was broadcast on local TV and

 8     that was the reason.  We just didn't want any kind of conflict to occur.

 9        Q.   And the only other question I want to ask about this, if you look

10     at the screen it says Vinko Marjanovic, he says -- you can see "VM."  You

11     can read that.  According to him -- yeah, you can read that.

12        A.   Very well.

13        Q.   According to him -- Vinko Marjanovic was a Croat, isn't it?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   According to him, at some point he had discussion with you and

16     you told him that peace would not prevail regardless of the outcome of

17     the negotiations.  Did you say this to Mr. Vinko Marjanovic?

18        A.   I don't remember that.  No, I don't remember.

19        Q.   In the morning hours of 30th April 1992, at 4.50, the bridges

20     across the Sava River were blown up and this was practically the

21     beginning of the war in Brcko municipality.  This is correct, isn't it?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   You told us in your statement, paragraph 31, that you were in

24     Stanovi in the first week of May 1992.  When exactly did you go to

25     Stanovi, and when did you return to Brcko?

Page 34725

 1        A.   On the 30th of April, I left, and I'm not sure when it was that I

 2     returned, possibly on the 7th.

 3        Q.   Djordje Ristanic testifies -- testified that the day before the

 4     bridges were blown up, the garrison commander warned him to move to

 5     Stanovi for safety reasons and to bring other War Presidency members with

 6     him.  This is in P03023, page 18.

 7             Did you go, Mr. Markovic, to Stanovi with this group of people?

 8        A.   No.  My parents lived there.

 9        Q.   Djordje Ristanic also testified that the War Presidency returned

10     to Brcko on 4 May 1992 and that it was initially placed in the building

11     called Sumadija in the Bijeljinska Street, which was the head the forest

12     company.  This is at transcript page 16710.  He said that there were

13     discussions about future executive government after 6 May 1992, and

14     according to him, you did not want to continue performing this position.

15     This is correct, isn't it?

16        A.   Yes.  If it matters, the building is Sumarija, not Sumadija.  It

17     really does matter in our language.  I don't know whether it matters in

18     English too.  Sumarija means forestry building because it was a forestry

19     company.

20             As for the take-over of power since that kind of chaos prevailed,

21     hardly anyone would want to play any role in government at that point in

22     time, myself included.

23        Q.   The War Presidency had meetings from early May 1992, and it was

24     in charge of issuing passes for moving, public services, and other issues

25     related to the functioning of the local government.  This is correct,

Page 34726

 1     isn't it?

 2        A.   Well, we tried to pretend we were a government.  There was no

 3     water, electricity.  Somebody had to try at least to take care of that.

 4             MR. ZEC:  Can we have 65 ter 17268.

 5        Q.   In front of you, Mr. Markovic, there will be a travel permit

 6     issued by the Brcko War Presidency on the basis of the decision of the

 7     War Presidency of 3 May 1992.  The heading of the document, it has

 8     information about the new Serb authorities in Brcko.

 9             English version says that the heading is illegible, but you can

10     look at the stamp, Mr. Markovic, and there's a signature of

11     Djordje Ristanic.

12             Mr. Markovic, the local authorities resumed their work in Brcko

13     shortly after the take-over operations had begun.  This is correct, isn't

14     it?

15        A.   No.  There was no one to take it over from.  By the

16     30th of April, we had normal government, and after that none whatsoever.

17     So there was no one to take it over from.  If I properly understood the

18     interpretation of what you said.  You said took over the power, but there

19     was no one to take it over from.

20        Q.   What I meant is before 30th April 1992, it was, let's call it a

21     joint government in Brcko, and after 30th April 1992, as we can see in

22     this document, it's a Serb municipality of Brcko.  That's what I meant.

23        A.   All right, but there was no take-over as you just said.

24             MR. ZEC:  Your Honours, I would tender this document.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I don't think the witness has

Page 34727

 1     really said anything about the document that would cause it to be

 2     admitted through his testimony.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zec.

 4             MR. ZEC:  The witness's evidence was that -- and I believe he

 5     said middle May there was no government.  Here this document shows that

 6     there was a government before middle May, and they were functioning.  So

 7     this is classic impeachment document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  But did he confirm that it is a governmental

 9     document?  All you said is "illegible."  Did he confirm the signature of

10     Ristanic?

11             MR. ZEC:

12        Q.   Mr. Markovic, if you look at the document, can you confirm the

13     signature?  Is that Djordje Ristanic?

14        A.   Yes.  It seems to me that it is Djordje Ristanic's signature, but

15     the date which is in the upper part of the document is the 8th rather

16     than the 4th, as I believe you said.

17        Q.   I did not say 4, but, yeah, thank you.  And also if you look the

18     stamp, this is the stamp that the new Serb government or authorities in

19     Brcko used after 30th April 1992.

20        A.   I oppose your claim that there was a taking over of power.  There

21     was no power at all, and I said that we were trying to establish some

22     sort of power.  If you have a situation in which nothing is functioning,

23     then it's normal to attempt to establish some kind of authority and

24     power.  So this could have been an attempt.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

Page 34728

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6172, Your Honours.

 2             MR. ZEC:  Your Honours, did you want to take a break or shall I

 3     continue?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll take a break now for 45 minutes

 5     and resume at 20 past 1.00.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 1.22 p.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Harvey.

 9             MR. HARVEY:  Mr. President, might I just take this moment,

10     please, to introduce Ms. Marija Grujeska, who has been working in our

11     Belgrade office for almost a year now, and she is not going to make a

12     long speech, I assure you.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Zec, please continue.

14             MR. ZEC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15        Q.   Mr. Markovic, the Brcko garrison and Lieutenant-Colonel

16     Pavle Milinkovic remained in Brcko during and after the take-over of the

17     city; correct?

18        A.   I don't know why you keep using this term "take-over."

19        Q.   Can you confirm that Pavle Milinkovic remained in the city in

20     this period?

21        A.   Yes.

22             MR. ZEC:  Can we have quickly D01577.

23        Q.   In front of you there will be a travel permit issued by the

24     commander of the Brcko garrison, Lieutenant-Colonel Pavle Milinkovic on

25     8th July 1992, and in paragraph 20, you say that it moved to Serbia in

Page 34729

 1     May 1992.  So that's -- I'm asking this question.

 2             So it is clear, isn't it, that Pavle Milinkovic remained in Brcko

 3     during this period?

 4        A.   There is no signature here but a facsimile on this pass.  The JNA

 5     left Brcko on May 19.

 6        Q.   Mr. Markovic, I asked you and you said yes.  I asked you whether

 7     Pavle Milinkovic and Brcko garrison remained in Brcko just a moment ago

 8     and you said yes.  And this is basically confirmation of what you said.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we --

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Up until May 19 --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Milinkovic and the garrison as the

13     garrison could not walk.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Do not interrupt while the witness

15     is saying something, Mr. Karadzic, please.

16             What did you say, Mr. Markovic?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that the JNA left Brcko on

18     May 19.  I have no information as to when exactly Pavle Milinkovic

19     crossed the border.  I believe he did that at this time.

20             JUDGE KWON:  In the previous set of conversation, you confirmed

21     that Mr. Milinkovic stayed in Brcko at this time, didn't you?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Up until May 19.  I didn't say

23     anything else.

24             MR. ZEC:

25        Q.   Mr. Markovic --

Page 34730

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  What was your point, Mr. Karadzic?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, my objection was about

 3     confusing questions that say during the take-over and during and after

 4     the take-over whether the JNA and the garrison left.  How can a garrison

 5     leave?  So just to simplify questions.  The JNA left on the 19th, but the

 6     garrison didn't leave.  It didn't go anywhere.

 7             And thirdly, do we have confirmation that this is Milinkovic's

 8     signature?  It is typed, but do we have a signature as well?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  It's not an appropriate intervention, Mr. Karadzic,

10     at all, the last point.

11             Yes, back to you, Mr. Zec.

12             MR. ZEC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   Mr. Markovic, I don't want to spend a lot of time on this, but if

14     you look the date of this document, it's July 1992.  So he was there way

15     after May 1992.  This is correct, isn't it?

16        A.   I cannot confirm this.

17        Q.   MUP of Serb republic regulated the movement in Brcko by issuing

18     passes for movement.  This is correct, isn't it?

19        A.   This pass was issued by the garrison command rather than by the

20     MUP, if this is the one you have in mind.

21        Q.   No, it's not.  This was my question.  Can you confirm?  I'll show

22     you another document, but can you confirm that the MUP of Serb republic

23     was regulating movement in the city by issuing documents such as this

24     one?

25        A.   I think that the passes were issued by the War Presidency.

Page 34731

 1             MR. ZEC:  Can we have 65 ter 24668.

 2        Q.   In front of you there will be a travel permit that has the same

 3     format as the one that's been seen a moment ago.  And this permit has the

 4     stamp of the MUP of Serb republic on it for which you say in paragraph 20

 5     of your statement there was powerful [sic] to do anything.  So can you

 6     have a look at the stamp and confirm this is the stamp of the MUP of Serb

 7     republic.

 8        A.   That's what it says here, but at the time anyone could make a

 9     stamp.

10        Q.   Mr. Markovic, this is the stamp of the MUP of Serb republic.

11     That's correct, isn't it?

12             MR. ZEC:  Perhaps, Mr. Registrar, we could blow-up the area

13     that -- this area where the stamp is.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

15             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I tender this document.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may just say something.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Markovic.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says down there commander

19     Lieutenant-Colonel Pavle Milinkovic.  He is a soldier and the stamp is

20     from the police, as the gentleman claims.  And in the heading it also

21     says "Garrison," Brcko garrison.  So it's the army once again.  So one of

22     them is too many.  One of them is surplus; right?  I don't know which.

23             MR. ZEC:

24        Q.   When I introduced this document to you, I said it uses the same

25     format as the one that we saw signed by Milinkovic, but this one has

Page 34732

 1     stamp of the MUP of Serb republic and has no Milinkovic signature on it.

 2             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I tender this document.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6173.

 6             MR. ZEC:

 7        Q.   Mr. Markovic, a unit under command of Zika Ivanovic or

 8     Zika Crnogorac was in Brcko during this period, wasn't he?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   He also issued passes for movement, didn't he?

11        A.   I don't know that.  Possibly.

12             MR. ZEC:  Perhaps we can have quickly D01578.  I'll move on.  I

13     won't use this.  This is already in evidence.  Can we have P03026.

14        Q.   Mr. Markovic, the War Presidency issued passes for people they

15     believed should be released from Luka camp, and those passes were

16     provided to Goran Jelisic.  This is correct, isn't it?

17        A.   I don't know that.

18             MR. ZEC:  Can we have P03026.

19        Q.   In front of you there will be a pass issued by the War Presidency

20     on 14 May 1992.  It has the same format as the one we saw earlier, but

21     this was -- this one was signed by Adolf.  This Chamber -- sorry, this is

22     Goran Jelisic, who called himself the Serb Adolf Hitler.

23     Djordje Ristanic testified that the War Presidency gave these passes to

24     Jelisic for people they believed should be released from Luka.

25     Transcript page 16 -- 16718.

Page 34733

 1             Mr. Markovic, this was a way of co-ordination between

 2     Goran Jelisic and the War Presidency.  This is correct, isn't it?

 3        A.   No, I don't know.  Goran Jelisic was never a member of the

 4     War Presidency.  Up until those days he was a completely unknown person.

 5        Q.   I did not suggest that he was member of the War Presidency.  He

 6     was in Luka camp, and I said that War Presidency, when they believed one

 7     should be released from the Luka camp, they would provide these passes

 8     such as this one to Goran Jelisic in the Luka camp to release people.

 9     This is correct, isn't it?

10        A.   You may be partly right.  The passes were used by everyone,

11     whoever wanted to leave.

12        Q.   That's not my question.  War Presidency provided passes to

13     Goran Jelisic if they believed one should be released from Luka camp,

14     isn't it?

15        A.   I cannot answer like that.  It's possible that Ristanic

16     personally gave it to him, but officially no one ever gave it to him at

17     all.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 16, it's not recorded that

19     the witness said "not only those from Luka."  So whoever wanted to leave,

20     not only those from Luka.

21             MR. ZEC:  Can I move on, Mr. President?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             MR. ZEC:

24        Q.   Mr. Markovic, you told us in your statement in paragraph 9 that

25     the Serbs had put all their hopes for protection in the units of the JNA

Page 34734

 1     garrison in Brcko.  This Chamber has received evidence that Serbs in

 2     Brcko believed that the forces within Brcko were not sufficient to take

 3     control of the municipality.  The SDS asked for assistance from

 4     Bijeljina, which was part of the same region, SAO Semberija and Majevica.

 5     This is correct, isn't it?

 6        A.   I don't know why you are saying the SDS.  It wasn't just the SDS,

 7     if I understood you well, or maybe it's a question of interpretation.

 8        Q.   My question was that the SDS asked assistance from Bijeljina.

 9     That's correct, isn't it?

10        A.   The War Presidency asked for that rather than the SDS.

11             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I refer to transcript page 16711 and

12     P00956, page 16.

13        Q.   Mr. Markovic, as a result of this request, various Serb forces

14     came to Brcko, mainly from Bijeljina, to assist the take-over of town.

15     This is correct, isn't it?

16        A.   Can you help me, because you said "various Serb forces."  What

17     exactly did you mean by that?

18        Q.   I will be asking you about specific units that came.  So can you

19     confirm that Serb forces came?

20        A.   Yes.  Yes.

21        Q.   The first Serbian force that arrived to Brcko about four to six

22     months before the war was the group of instructors of Captain Dragan, the

23     Red Berets or Knindzas as they called them at the time.  This is correct,

24     isn't it?

25        A.   I am not aware of that.

Page 34735

 1        Q.   Among this group of Captain Dragan instructors there was Rade and

 2     Bozo Bozic, Simo Radovanovic, Sasa Vukojevic, Goran Petkovic, and others.

 3     This is correct, isn't it?

 4        A.   I learned about some of those names but I don't know when they

 5     arrived.

 6        Q.   They arrived and formed a special unit which provided trainings

 7     for Brcko residents.  This was one of the first Serbian forces in Brcko;

 8     correct?

 9        A.   I don't know.  I'm not aware of that.

10             MR. ZEC:  This is in P02888, English page 3, B/C/S e-court

11     page 9.  And in D01412, English page 7, B/C/S page 5 and 6.

12        Q.   The largest -- Mr. Markovic, the largest part of the Serbian

13     forces that came to Brcko was from the area of Semberija.  That is from

14     Bijeljina and Ugljevik.  Those were Serbian guards under the command of

15     Ljubisa Savic, also known as Mauzer, and a unit of radicals under the

16     command of Mirko Blagojevic, wasn't it?

17        A.   Those units were present in Brcko.

18        Q.   Branislav Filipovic, also known as Sumar, was among the

19     volunteers of the Serb Radical Party that took part in the take-over of

20     Brcko.  This is correct, isn't it?

21        A.   I'm not aware of that.

22        Q.   Had you ever heard of name Branislav Filipovic, also known as

23     Sumar?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   This Chamber has received evidence that the command of the Brcko

Page 34736

 1     garrison authorised Branislav Filipovic to bring weapons from Belgrade

 2     for the needs of the Brcko garrison.  This is in P02877.  They also gave

 3     him a vehicle for his trips to Belgrade and Bijeljina in May 1992.  This

 4     is in P02902.  There's also a receipt issued to Branislav Filipovic in

 5     Belgrade for the weapons he took for the needs of the Brcko garrison.

 6     This is in P02876.

 7             Mr. Markovic, the Brcko War Presidency issued Sumar or

 8     Branislav Filipovic a pass to travel out of the war zone and Brcko

 9     municipality, isn't it?

10        A.   Excuse me, but the War Presidency met very rarely.  It is

11     possible that someone from the War Presidency issued this pass and gave

12     it to him, but this is not something that I'm aware of.

13             MR. ZEC:  Can we have P0874 [sic].

14        Q.   Mr. Markovic, in front of you there will be a pass issued by the

15     Brcko War Presidency.  This pass was issued to Branislav Filipovic to be

16     able to go out of the battle zone in Brcko municipality.

17             MR. ZEC:  P02874.

18        Q.   Mr. Markovic, if you -- if you look at this pass, can you see

19     name of Branislav Filipovic?

20        A.   I can see the last name, and I suppose that it is the

21     corresponding first name.

22        Q.   It says also that there's a note that Sumar was a volunteer from

23     Bijeljina, but if you look the signature, do you recognise this

24     signature?

25        A.   No.  It's completely illegible.  It's completely illegible.

Page 34737

 1             MR. ZEC:  Can we have the reverse side of this document.  There

 2     is second page.  Mr. Registrar, can you also turn for the witness to be

 3     able to see this handwriting.  Can you turn it around?

 4        Q.   Do you recognise this handwriting, Mr. Markovic?

 5        A.   No, I don't, but I can read out the names.

 6        Q.   Can you?

 7        A.   Djordje Ristanic, Pero Markovic.

 8        Q.   This refers to you, isn't it?

 9        A.   I suppose so.

10        Q.   Is it then possible that Sumar made a note of these two names on

11     his pass?

12        A.   I don't know that.

13        Q.   Among the units -- I asked you a moment ago about Ljubisa Savic,

14     also known as Mauzer, and you confirmed that he was present in Bijeljina.

15     Is it also correct that he came to Bijeljina on 2nd May of 1992?  I'm

16     sorry, not Bijeljina, Brcko.

17        A.   It is possible that he arrived on the 2nd of May.

18             MR. ZEC:  Can we have 65 ter 45341B.

19        Q.   It is correct, isn't it, Mr. Markovic, that Mauzer made agreement

20     with the command of the garrison at the time with the Presidency of the

21     municipal -- Serbian municipal -- municipality of Brcko for him to arrive

22     to Brcko?  Isn't it?

23        A.   It is possible that there was an agreement, but I wasn't privy to

24     it.

25        Q.   So if you see that --

Page 34738

 1             MR. ZEC:  Can we have also B/C/S, please.

 2        Q.   At the beginning it says -- this is -- Mr. Markovic, this is

 3     Mauzer speaking.  This is the documentary of the unit under

 4     Ljubisa Savic, also known as Mauzer.  And he's talking here about his

 5     arrival to Brcko, and in the first line --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I was told that there's no B/C/S translation.

 7             MR. ZEC:  Oversight, but it should be available somewhere.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  This is the translation for English and B/C/S exists

 9     in the form of audio recording.

10             MR. ZEC:  So we have tape which is transcribed in B/C/S and then

11     translated in English.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

13             MR. ZEC:  We can also play, but I believe we spend a lot of time

14     if I play the video, so we will be able to find transcript very quickly.

15     I'll come back to this in a moment.

16        Q.   Mr. Markovic, you said that Zika Ivanovic, also known as

17     Zika Crnogorac, was in Brcko.  He led a unit of the Serbian MUP of

18     Red Berets.  This is correct, isn't it?

19        A.   Yes.

20             MR. ZEC:  Can we have 65 ter 15117.

21        Q.   Mr. Markovic, in front of you there will be a certificate issued

22     by the MUP of Serbia, unit for special purposes, dated 27 June 1992.

23     Signature, commander of the unit, Zika Ivanovic.  This is Zika Ivanovic,

24     commander of the Red Berets that came to Brcko, isn't it?

25        A.   I don't know the man's name, but I am aware of Zika Crnogorac if

Page 34739

 1     this is the person in question.  Otherwise, I don't know what his first

 2     and last name is.

 3        Q.   Zika Ivanovic, nickname is Zika Crnogorac; correct?

 4        A.   Fine.

 5             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I would tender this document.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, there's no basis for this through

 7     the witness.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zec, what witness confirmed is name.  What would

 9     you respond to Mr. Robinson's observation?

10             MR. ZEC:  He confirmed that the unit commanded by Zika Ivanovic

11     or Zika Crnogorac came to Brcko and this is certificate to show that he

12     was -- that he was member of the Serbian MUP, and he's signing this

13     document as the commander of special purposes unit.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, this witness did not identify the

15     person whose name appears on this document as being the same as the one

16     that Mr. Zec is representing it to be.  He just said "fine," meaning he

17     agrees with -- meaning whatever you say, whatever, but he didn't say that

18     he knew that this man whose name appears on this document is the same one

19     that they had been discussing.

20             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, when I first asked -- I'm sorry.  When I

21     first asked about Zika Ivanovic and his presence in Brcko, the witness

22     said yes, I believe, earlier today.

23             JUDGE KWON:  The question is what the witness confirmed about

24     this document.  I will consult my colleagues.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 34740

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zec, the Chamber would not receive this document

 2     through this witness.

 3             MR. ZEC:  Can we have 65 ter 15118.

 4        Q.   Mr. Markovic, in front of you there will be another certificate

 5     issued by Zika Ivanovic.  This time he entitles his unit as a unit for

 6     special purposes Brcko under SAO Semberija and Majevica.  This

 7     certificate was -- is dated 9 July 1992, confirming that Joco Stevanovic

 8     is a member of this unit from 20 June 1992.  Zika said we need every man,

 9     especially a sniper.  Zika ends with words "in co-operation of MUP

10     Krajina with the units of SAO Semberija and Majevica."

11             Mr. Markovic, this is the unit under Zika Ivanovic that came to

12     Brcko, isn't it?

13        A.   I'm not aware of that.

14        Q.   Can you confirm that units from MUP Krajina, Semberija and

15     Majevica were present in Brcko?

16        A.   I don't know that.

17             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I would tender this document.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Same objection.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I may assist.  In line 24,

20     page 84, the witness said, "I don't know what his real name is, but I did

21     hear of a Zika Crnogorac."  Page 83.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zec, should we take a different action from the

23     one we saw before, 15117?

24             MR. ZEC:  Perhaps, Mr. President, if I show another document to

25     show that Zika Ivanovic is Zika Crnogorac, maybe then it will be clear as

Page 34741

 1     to who we're talking about.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 3             MR. ZEC:  P02855.  Can we have next page in both languages.  So

 4     English page I'm looking is 5.  In English -- in English, that's

 5     second-last paragraph.  Can we have B/C/S next page.  I'm sorry, back.

 6     Previous page.  I'm trying to find the same quote basically.  Sorry, the

 7     last page in B/C/S.

 8        Q.   Mr. Markovic, if you look at third paragraph from the top, it

 9     says:

10             "Krajina Special Police with 45 men led by Zivojin Ivanovic, also

11     known as Crnogorac ..."

12             Mr. Markovic, this is -- this is Zivojin Ivanovic, also known as

13     Zika Crnogorac, isn't it?

14        A.   Possible.

15             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I tender the previous document, which

16     was 65 ter 15118.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I think this previous

19     document as well as the one before it can be admitted with this link.

20     Even though the witness didn't confirm anything about the document, it

21     might be considered sufficiently contradictory to be admissible.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Well, given the circumstances, the Chamber will

24     admit them.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibits P6174 and 6175 respectively,

Page 34742

 1     Your Honours.

 2             MR. ZEC:  Now I would like to play a video-clip, which is P02852,

 3     and I would like to play second clip which starts from time-code 00:09:02

 4     of the tape V000-3533.  This is a celebration ceremony of the Red Berets

 5     unit of the Serbian state security in 1997 in Serbia.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             MR. ZEC:  We can stop.  Perhaps while we're waiting I can now

 8     call 65 ter 25341B.

 9             Mr. President, I believe we have now the video that I intended to

10     play a moment ago, which is P02852, which is a celebration ceremony of

11     the Red Berets.  So we can start.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We do not have the

14     transcript.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Did you hear the interpreter's

16     comment?

17             MR. ZEC:  Yes, I have, and I believe should be in e-court.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot see e-court

19     independently in the booth.

20             MR. ZEC:  Perhaps we can play without translation.  I'm only

21     interested that the witness hears the name of people, that's all.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             MR. ZEC:  We can stop, Mr. President.

25        Q.   Mr. Markovic, did you hear the name at the beginning of this

Page 34743

 1     clip?

 2        A.   I did.

 3        Q.   That's Zika Ivanovic, isn't it?

 4        A.   That was the name that was pronounced.

 5        Q.   This was Zika Ivanovic who was assisting the take-over of Brcko.

 6     Here we see him saluting the unit accompanied by Slobodan Milosevic and

 7     Jovica Stanisic from the Serbian State Security.  The reality is,

 8     Mr. Markovic, there was no confusion as to what was the task of these

 9     units in Brcko during the take-over and who was behind them.  All these

10     units had one task, to make Brcko Serbian, which they accomplished very

11     fast.  It was only after the take-over was accomplished and Muslims had

12     been detained or expelled, only then did these units cause difficulties

13     for the Serbian authorities in Brcko.  This is correct, isn't it?

14        A.   It is not.

15             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I would just go back -- would like to go

16     back to the document that I was trying to upload, and there was no B/C/S

17     translation, which was 65 ter 45341B.

18             JUDGE KWON:  What's the 65 ter number of the video-clip that we

19     just saw?  You said 25341B.  Is there a mistake?

20             MR. ZEC:  The clip that we saw is P02852, and this clip starts

21     from 00:09:02 of the video-tape V000-0533.

22             JUDGE KWON:  All right.

23             MR. ZEC:

24        Q.   Mr. Markovic, in front of you is a transcript of the video

25     interview of Ljubisa Savic, also known as Mauzer.  And when I asked you

Page 34744

 1     earlier about his arrival to Brcko on 2nd May 1992, he said, and you

 2     confirmed that, as I believe.  And you can see now at the beginning of

 3     this transcript that he's saying that he came on 2nd May 1992 to Brcko.

 4     This is correct, isn't it?

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I notice that the

 6     transcript refers to an unidentified male person and doesn't make any

 7     reference to Mauzer.  Perhaps there's some other way of establishing

 8     that, but I don't see how this witness can be asked to comment on the

 9     statement of Mauzer when we don't have a foundation for that.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Zec.

11             MR. ZEC:  Then we can upload the video and see.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] An intervention, please.  The

13     witness did not confirm anything.  He simply allowed for the possibility

14     that Mauzer arrived on the 2nd.  He said it was possible.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Well, let's see what witness will say about this

16     video footage, yes.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             MR. ZEC:

19        Q.   Mr. Markovic, do you recognise person on this frame?

20        A.   Yes.  This is Mauzer.

21             MR. ZEC:  Does this satisfy, Mr. President?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So the transcript that we saw is a transcription of

24     this video that we are seeing now.

25             MR. ZEC:  That's correct.  Mr. President, that's documentary

Page 34745

 1     about Ljubisa Savic Mauzer unit, and it goes chronologically from their

 2     establishment throughout the war, all their operations, and it's

 3     accompanying various video-clips about their activities, and that's

 4     Mauzer speaking about the unit.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue.

 6             MR. ZEC:  So I believe it will be now easier if we go back to the

 7     transcript and just see a few portions of it.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Will that be your last question?

 9             MR. ZEC:  Yes, it is.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MR. ZEC:

12        Q.   Also, Mr. Markovic, I asked you about agreement with Mauzer with

13     the local authorities, and you said, "I believe that's possible" or

14     something like that.  So if you look at the transcript, in English it's

15     at line 11 -- from line 11, and in B/C/S line 29.  Can you read,

16     Mr. Markovic?

17             "Mauzer said the agreement with the command at the time with the

18     Presidency of the Serbian municipality of Brcko was that help would

19     arrive to Brcko from Semberija the following day.  When we returned from

20     Brcko, we called all Crisis Staffs in Semberija - there were 54 of them -

21     asking them to send volunteers.  Some 700 of us headed out."

22             This is how Mauzer came to Brcko, isn't it?

23        A.   I don't think there were 700.

24        Q.   But can you confirm that this was the way how he arrived to

25     Brcko?

Page 34746

 1        A.   I don't know how he arrived in Brcko.

 2        Q.   When I earlier asked you the same question, you said "possible,"

 3     didn't you?

 4        A.   It is possible.  Yes, that's what I said.

 5        Q.   And the reason he came to Brcko was because Brcko had to be

 6     Serbian.  It was a hub.  It was an umbilical cord, a connection between

 7     the -- a connection and a link between eastern Serbian Krajinas, so to

 8     say, Serbian lands.  This is the reason why he came to Brcko, isn't it?

 9        A.   I have no idea what this has to do with it.

10        Q.   If you look -- if you look the same page or in English it's from

11     line 28.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What did not find its way in the

13     transcript is the witness said, "I don't know what Luka has to do with

14     it."

15             MR. ZEC:  In B/C/S can we move to see the -- so it's line 11 in

16     B/C/S.

17        Q.   Can you see when he says at that Brcko was a connection, link

18     between eastern Serbian Krajinas and Serbian lands?  So that's the reason

19     he came to Brcko, because Brcko had to become Serbian for this reason,

20     isn't it?

21        A.   I don't see why it would be that way.  He arrived in Brcko that,

22     if we're going to put it that way, already had been Serbian.

23             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, I would tender this video.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Objection, Mr. President.  This is a third-party

25     statement after the fact.  It hasn't been confirmed at all by the

Page 34747

 1     witness.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Zec.

 3             MR. ZEC:  I don't think that he did not confirm anything.  The

 4     witness was saying "possible," and this was happening.  It's not that he

 5     didn't say it is not correct.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zec, the Chamber finds that what -- the

 8     testimony of this witness is a bit short of confirmation of the content

 9     of this video, so we'll not admit this at this moment.

10             MR. ZEC:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I have nothing further.

11             Thank you, Mr. Markovic.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, just a few

14     matters.

15                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Markovic, on page 88 of today's transcript,

17     the following was suggested to you, the following order of events or

18     sequence of events.  It seems that first that Zika Crnogorac took Brcko,

19     and then Muslims were either detained or expelled.  Can you shed more

20     light on the actual sequence of events?  When did Muslims leave the Serb

21     part of Brcko, and what does this have to do with Zika Crnogorac's

22     arrival?

23        A.   It has nothing to do with the arrival of Zika Crnogorac.  As far

24     as I can remember, he arrived in July or in June 1992.

25        Q.    Thank you.  And when did the Muslims leave, as well as Serbs,

Page 34748

 1     from the central part of Brcko?

 2        A.   I've already explained that.  The destruction of the bridge on

 3     the right bank of the Sava River was the point when practically the

 4     entire population left the town of Brcko - Serb, Croats, and Muslims -

 5     and that basically it was an empty town for quite a while.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Today it was often suggested to you that there was a

 7     take-over of power in Brcko.  Can you please tell us who was it was that

 8     was in power in Brcko before these events and after these events?

 9        A.   Well, I was the representative of the authorities until the

10     destruction of the bridges.  I was the president of the Executive Board,

11     and also there was a Muslim who was president of the municipality and so

12     on and so forth.  So it was according to this ethnic key that the various

13     offices in the municipality were divided, and in mid-May, a government

14     was reinstated, and there was a man who was appointed whose last name was

15     also Markovic, but that wasn't me.

16        Q.   Thank you.  We see "Serb municipality of Brcko" in some of the

17     letterheads.  Can you explain to us what it was that you held under your

18     control and what was meant by the Serb municipality of Brcko?

19        A.   I've already explained that.  I said today that we had

20     discussions on the territorial division of town, and in Brcko, it was

21     possible to divide most of the territory along ethnic lines because the

22     villages have a majority population belonging to one particular group.

23     Also, it was possible to divide the town itself in a similar way.  For

24     example, there is a part of town that's called Serb Town, and then it

25     continues along into the, say, Serb villages, and the situation is

Page 34749

 1     similar on the two other sides as well.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  How old is this, this Serb Town?  What's the oldest

 3     part of the town of Brcko?

 4        A.   I think that that's the oldest part of town.  I don't know how

 5     old it is.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  The Serb municipality of Brcko, did it control the

 7     Muslim municipality of Brcko or the Croat municipality of Brcko, and who

 8     was in power there?

 9        A.   Well, throughout the war there were practically three

10     municipalities of Brcko.  One was under the control of the Serbs and

11     another one was under Muslim control.  I think it was called "free

12     Brcko."  And then there was one that was under the control of Croats, and

13     it was called the --

14             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear what it was

15     called.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps 80 per cent or 90 per cent

17     of the territory of Brcko was controlled in that way if we look at the

18     inner city itself.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Ravne Brcko.  Could you please speak a bit slower.  We do have

21     time.

22        A.   Ravne Brcko.  That was the part of the municipality that was

23     under the control of the Croat authorities.

24        Q.   And what about the Muslim municipality of Brcko and the Croat

25     municipality of Brcko?  Was there a change of government there as well?

Page 34750

 1     Who was in power there?

 2        A.   I don't know who was in power there.  Over the local radio that

 3     was called Free Radio Brcko, I could hear that it was those people who

 4     had been together with me in the local government.  Some of them were

 5     mentioned here today as well.  They were in the local government together

 6     with me before the destruction of the bridges.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P6175, could I call that up,

 9     please.  We had it admitted a few moments ago.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   While we're waiting, in Markovic, do you know who General Tolimir

12     is?

13        A.   I heard of General Tolimir.  Now, I don't know who he is.  I

14     mean, I think he was a high-ranking officer of the Army of

15     Republika Srpska.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation So this seems to be the other way

17     round.  Give us the other one, the 74 or the 76.  Oh, not, not this,

18     please.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Actually, now that we're on this one, tell us, is there a stamp

21     here, and is there a registration number?

22        A.   No, neither.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Since you worked in the state administration, would

24     you consider this to be an official document?

25        A.   No.

Page 34751

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have Tolimir's

 2     text, P6174.  That's what I wrote down.  Maybe it's 76 too.  They were

 3     admitted as a series, so I don't know which number was assigned to which

 4     one of them.  74, then.  No, no.  Sorry, that's not it.

 5             MR. ZEC:  P02855.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you to Mr. Zec.  The last

 7     page in Serbian and in English.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   This gentleman, General Tolimir, who did he work for?  He was a

10     colonel then, a general now.  Was he in the Army of Republika Srpska?

11     What state was he in?

12        A.   I think it was the Army of Republika Srpska.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Please, in the third paragraph from the top of the

14     page where he speaks about Zika Crnogorac in Brcko, what is his position

15     vis-a-vis Zika Crnogorac?

16        A.   I don't know about that.

17        Q.   And can you take a look at the penultimate paragraph?  Actually,

18     you can read it out loud to us.

19        A.   "The presence and activity of paramilitary formations negatively

20     affect the Serbian people in two ways, by diminishing trust in the

21     government and its capacity to deal with war profiteers, criminals, and

22     mass murderers, and secondly, by immensely discouraging the fighting

23     along of the members of the army of the SRBH often resulting in the

24     abandoning of positions."

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now that you know that this text was written by

Page 34752

 1     Tolimir about the paramilitary formations, can you tell us now what the

 2     position of this General of the Army of Republika Srpska is vis-a-vis --

 3        A.   Negative.

 4        Q.   And does it say here that the government does not have the

 5     strength or that the government does not want to?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             MR. ZEC:  Mr. President, when I asked these questions the witness

 8     did not know anything and he said doesn't know anything.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'll rephrase.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Markovic, what was the position and attitude of the

12     authorities vis-a-vis Zika Crnogorac and the paramilitaries?

13        A.   We tried to get rid of them in every conceivable way, and we

14     asked the leadership of Republika Srpska for assistance and also from the

15     army, whoever could help us.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have the strength to deal with them?

17        A.   No.  That's why we asked for assistance.

18        Q.   When did you actually deal with them and in what situation?

19        A.   In mid-July, I think, something like that.  A unit came under the

20     command of Mico Davidovic.  I think that it was sent from the MUP of

21     Republika Srpska with that intention.  It was only that unit that managed

22     to drive them out of Brcko.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now see P2888.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   On page 71, you were asked about the War Presidency and about

Page 34753

 1     them signing something.  Now, this is what I'm asking you:  The

 2     War Presidency at the time, could it implement any decision of its own?

 3        A.   It was virtually impossible.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  This is a summary of events and situations, and we

 5     can see that on the penultimate page.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the penultimate page please

 7     be shown to -- actually, the participants can see for themselves the

 8     penultimate page.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Whose signature is this, Mr. Markovic?

11        A.   Djordje Ristanic.

12        Q.   And on the back of that ID where it says "Ristanic Djordje" and

13     "Markovic Pero," are those your signatures?

14        A.   No.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now, please, could we

16     have page 2 in English and page 4 in Serbian.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Did you -- did the Presidency establish or support any one of

19     those paramilitary formations?

20        A.   No, none of them.

21        Q.   Please focus on the penultimate paragraph.

22             "The policy of the Serb leadership of the municipal

23     War Presidency was that all conscripts had to be placed under the command

24     of the Brcko garrison immediately."

25        A.   It's changed now.

Page 34754

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please return the

 2     previous page.  It is 4 in e-court and it says 3 on the page itself.  In

 3     English it's fine.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now it's all right.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   So under the command of Colonel Milinkovic and that all war

 7     operations would be commanded by, et cetera, et cetera, the Serb

 8     population did not for one moment form any paramilitary formations.

 9             How does this fit into your own knowledge?

10        A.   Precisely.  I said in my statement that all our eyes were focused

11     on the JNA then.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Where was your military-age population, under whose

13     command?

14        A.   The JNA, later the Army of Republika Srpska.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we have page 8 in

16     e-court in Serbian, and page 4 and then later on page 5.  Actually, first

17     page 4 in English.  Eight in e-court, Serbian.  Actually, it says 7 on

18     it.  Page 4 in e-court.  What is written is 7, but it's the eighth page.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Now, I'm going to read it out until it is here.  This primarily

21     refers to Ljubisa Savic, Mauzer; Mirko Blagojevic; Sasa and Peja; Arkan's

22     volunteers; and instructors, Captain Dragan special unit.  They also took

23     most of the weapons and equipment, and the units that withdrew from the

24     Brcko front line took a significant amount along with them.  They kept

25     quite a lot of weapons in unnecessary locations.  For example, some

Page 34755

 1     mortars are still in the hospital compound.  All of this led to a series

 2     of incidents with which the command of the Brcko Brigade was unable to

 3     deal efficiently.

 4             How does this fit into what you yourself knew?

 5        A.   I said similar things.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have page 5 and

 7     then 6.  First 5 in English and 9 in Serbian.  Fine.  We have it in

 8     Serbian already.  This is the right page in Serbian.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   The first page of the second paragraph, "Certain formations ..."

11        A.   You want me to read it out loud?

12        Q.   Yes.

13        A.   "Certain formations have established their warehouses and looted

14     goods in Brcko as well as Bijeljina.  Like, for example, the special unit

15     in the duty-free zone.  This unit has even produced its own seal so that

16     it could issue appropriate documentation.  The command of the unit

17     believes it should have its own till, its own current account, and, as

18     was said earlier, it should organise the public security station,

19     influence the civilian political leadership, the military police and the

20     entire command structure."

21             Should I go on?

22        Q.   Yes, the next paragraph.

23        A.   "It is important to mention that the unit carried out an attack

24     on the public security station (senior organs have been informed of it).

25     All these activities have been accompanied by rapes, unauthorised

Page 34756

 1     interrogations, the issuing of dubious permits to leave town (probably

 2     for a hefty fee), and there are indications that in the most drastic

 3     cases, members of unknown formations have executed people."

 4        Q.   Thank you.  What was the position of the authorities vis-a-vis

 5     such groups and formations in terms of what they were doing?

 6        A.   I've already told you that we tried any which way to get ride of

 7     them, and only when reinforcements came from the top of the Republika

 8     Srpska MUP we managed to chase them away, and until that point all of us

 9     living in Brcko had to put up with it.

10        Q.   Thank you.  What about regular passes?  What were they used for

11     by those moving through the territory?

12        A.   If someone needed to go, for example, to the Military Medical

13     Academy in Belgrade or to do something in Bijeljina, then they relied on

14     the passes.

15        Q.   Thank you.  The person who was issued with such a certificate,

16     could they discard of it, throw it away or abuse it in some other way?

17        A.   Well, if they wanted to.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D1412, please.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Were military conscripts free to move around without appropriate

22     permits?

23        A.   No, they were not.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1412.  Thank you.  That's it.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 34757

 1        Q.   It is a document of the Federal Ministry of the Interior.  The

 2     date is the 8th of August.  That is a report on providing expert

 3     assistance to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina MUP.  You

 4     were asked about it already today.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have page 7 in English and

 6     in Serbian page 5.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Please have a look at the last paragraph, "In the area of

 9     Brcko..."  Please read it out.

10        A.   "In the area of Brcko there was a group of Red Berets active

11     headed by Captain Dragan.  Rade and Bozo Bozic, the brothers were

12     particularly exposed, stood out, as well as the group of Zivojin ..."

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next page, please.  The next

14     page in Serbian.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we please zoom in on the

16     bottom part.  I can't read out the beginning.  It probably says

17     "Crnogorac Ivanovic."

18             "Which comprised some 40 members who presented themselves as

19     Serbian MUP officials.  Ivanovic and his group had IDs and the stamp of

20     the Krajina MUP as well as the official IDs of the Serbian MUP.  Under

21     threat, they took 22 IDs from the public security station.  Upon their

22     arrival in Brcko, the Ivanovic group undertook certain tasks upon them

23     without any authorisation which otherwise belonged -- were in the remit

24     of the MUP, such as searches of premises, commandeering vehicles,

25     et cetera.  They beat regular policemen and mistreated them up to the

Page 34758

 1     point of using force.  Such conduct was also exerted in the presence of

 2     military officers and concerning civilians."

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go two lines down, "The Red Berets ..."

 4        A.   "The Red Berets of Captain Dragan commanded by Rade Bozic,

 5     inter alia, burst into the public security station in Brcko and held

 6     hostage the municipal president and the Chief of Staff of the

 7     1st Posavina Brigade, I believe.  They threatened them and blackmailed

 8     them, telling they would be liquidated unless the three arrested members

 9     are released from detention in Bijeljina.  On another occasion, the Bozic

10     brothers and the Red Berets burst into the police station where they

11     broke into the safe and took away money, communications equipment,

12     weapons" --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Let us stop here.  I don't see the point of asking

14     the witness to read out the document which has been already admitted.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  You're right,

16     Your Excellency.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Let me just say this:  In line 5 it reads that the authorities

19     were afraid for their own lives, too, or those from the authorities.  Can

20     you tell us who held power in Brcko before Mico Davidovic arrived?

21        A.   The Red Berets and some such people.  Davidovic drove all of them

22     out.  He had them arrested, and they had to leave the next day.

23        Q.   Thank you.  It was suggested to you in one of the questions that

24     the municipal authorities in the Serb municipality of Brcko actually

25     found it appropriate to have paramilitary units driving Muslims out and

Page 34759

 1     arresting them, and only later, the authorities became dissatisfied with

 2     their conduct.  Can you tell us about the sequence of events.  When and

 3     how did the Muslims leave Brcko at the time these units arrived?

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

 5     begin again because there was an overlap.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Because of overlapping, the interpreters were not

 7     able to hear you, so could you start again your answer.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.  I said already that on

 9     the 30th of April, all of us residing in Brcko tried to go away from

10     there any which way possible, and in the course of those few days or

11     weeks, it was a deserted town.  It was definitely fruitful ground for

12     such paramilitary formations to loot.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did any Muslims remain living in your -- or in the

15     Serbian part of Brcko municipality, such as a village or in the town

16     itself, and until when?

17        A.   They reside there even today.  They lived there throughout.  Many

18     people of different ethnicities lived in that Serbian part of Brcko.

19        Q.   What about during the war?

20        A.   During the war as well.  There were many killed and wounded of

21     all ethnicities during the war in Brcko.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Were there any Muslims in the VRS from Brcko?

23        A.   There were.  There were even killed VRS fighters from there and

24     their families enjoyed the same rights as those of all other fighters.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Markovic,

Page 34760

 1     and thank you for everything you have done for all three peoples and for

 2     carrying out the duties of the bodies of authority in that area.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Well, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Markovic.

 5     Thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you're free to

 6     go.  Have a safe journey back home.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8                           [The witness withdrew]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Before the adjournment, the Chamber will issue an

10     oral ruling on the accused's "Motion for Modification of Segregation

11     Regime with Witness Milan Martic" filed on the 1st of March, 2013, in

12     which the accused moves for a variation of the terms of the Chamber's

13     order for the temporary transfer of a detained witness issued

14     confidentially on the 8th of January, 2013.  The Chamber recalls that it

15     ordered, inter alia, that (i) Martic be kept segregated at the UNDU from

16     the accused, and (ii) no contact take place either inside or outside the

17     UNDU between Martic and the accused other than is necessary for purposes

18     of witness proofing.  In the motion, the accused requests that his

19     segregation from Martic only be limited to the period in which Martic is

20     giving evidence as there is no reason why he should not have contact with

21     Martic either prior to or after his testimony.  Earlier this morning, the

22     Office of the Prosecutor orally informed the Chamber that it opposes the

23     motion, noting that the motion is effectively a motion for

24     reconsideration and that the accused has failed to meet the relevant

25     standard.

Page 34761

 1             As a preliminary matter, the Chamber considers that the motion is

 2     in fact a motion for reconsideration of the 8th of January order.  The

 3     Chamber first reminds the accused that when filing motions which are

 4     essentially requests for reconsideration, he must address the applicable

 5     legal standard as opposed to simply avoiding the issue altogether.

 6             In the present case, the Chamber recalls that in its

 7     8th of January order, it explicitly provided for proofing and for the

 8     witness's transfer to the UNDU a week prior to his expected testimony,

 9     then scheduled for the week of 4th of March, as it deemed this time

10     period sufficient for the purpose of preparing a Rule 92 ter statement

11     and disclosing it to the Prosecution in a timely manner.

12             The Chamber did not impose any limits on the proofing that the

13     accused may deem necessary within the course of boundaries of UNDU

14     organisational constraints and outside of court hearings.  However, the

15     Chamber considered that segregation other than for proofing purposes was

16     warranted in this case to preserve the integrity of Martic's forthcoming

17     testimony.  This continues to be the case.  The Chamber thus considers

18     that the accused does not demonstrate either a clear error in reasoning

19     or particular circumstances justifying that the 8th of January order be

20     reconsidered in order to prevent an injustice and therefore denies the

21     motion.

22             The hearing is now adjourned.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Does it also mean that there are no

Page 34762

 1     restrictions after his testimony, because there's no reference to it?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think that our ruling did deal with that

 3     issue.

 4                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Basically I think it's a matter for the

 6     Detention Unit.  If necessary, the Chamber will come back to the issue.

 7             The hearing is adjourned.

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.52 p.m.,

 9                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 5th day

10                           of March, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.