Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 36303

 1                           Tuesday, 2 April 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Would the witness make the

 7     solemn declaration, please.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.  Good morning,

 9     Mr. President.  Good morning, Your Honours, especially the

10     Presiding Judge.  Good morning to the Defence and the Prosecution.

11             I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,

12     and nothing but the truth.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Komad.  Please be seated and make

14     yourself comfortable.

15                           WITNESS:  TRIFKO KOMAD

16                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Komad, before you commence your evidence, I must

18     let you know a certain Rule that we have here at the International

19     Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

20     Under this Rule, you may object to answering any question from

21     Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if you believe

22     that your answer might incriminate you.  In this context, "incriminate"

23     means saying something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a

24     criminal offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you

25     might have committed a criminal offence.  However, should you think that

Page 36304

 1     an answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer

 2     the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

 3     compel you to answer the question, but in that situation, the Tribunal

 4     would ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would

 5     not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence

 6     save and except the offence of giving false testimony.

 7             Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr. Komad?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Komad.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning.  Good morning your

13     Excellencies.  Good morning to everyone.

14                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Komad.

16        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

17        Q.   I have to ask you to pause between our interventions, that is to

18     say to speak slowly so as to have everything in the record.  Can you tell

19     us tell us whether you provided a statement to the Defence team?

20        A.   Yes, Mr. President.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can we please have in e-court 1D7981.

22                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

23             JUDGE KWON:  I'm afraid the e-court is still not working or

24     properly functioning, so shall we put the statement on the ELMO?  But if

25     it is the case of statement, given that we all have the statement, it

Page 36305

 1     would be sufficient to provide the witness with his statement in hard

 2     copy.

 3             Mr. Komad, do you have your statement with you now?

 4             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I was just noting if e-court is a problem, then

 7     we're just deferring the need to attend to it.  We'll obviously need to

 8     have a functioning e-court before we get to cross-examination, perhaps

 9     even before the remainder of examination-in-chief.  I just don't know the

10     extent of the problem.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I will inquire of the registrar whether it is a

12     problem of Courtroom III.

13                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

14             JUDGE KWON:  What I just heard from the registrar is that the old

15     documents that is already in e-court have no problem, but the problem is

16     with the new document that is to be uploaded on the e-court.  So let's

17     see how we can manage with this system.

18             Let's proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This again raises the issue of my

20     ability to upload documents, much like the Prosecution can.  That will

21     significantly reduce the problems, but nevertheless, we'll work this way.

22     Can we then have the English version on the ELMO, and I will ask

23     Mr. Komad, with the approval of the Chamber, to have a look at the hard

24     copy of his statement that's before him.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 36306

 1        Q.   Mr. Komad, can you see the English version on the screen of the

 2     statement you provided?

 3        A.   Yes, I can.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read this statement and signed it?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement accurately reflect everything you

 7     told the Defence team?

 8        A.   Yes, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10        A.   I'd like to correct something in the text, though, in item 2

11     where it is stated the teachers of Muslim ethnicity and professors

12     working at civilian universities should be the professors working at

13     civilian schools rather than religious schools.  So secular schools.

14        Q.   That's accepted.  Is there anything else?

15        A.   Well, perhaps only a few technical matters.  On the next page,

16     item 5, it says number 4.  That's where your apartment was, but it was at

17     Sutjeska number 2.  And in item 21, it says they wanted Banja Luka to be

18     the centre of the Serb people instead of Pale.  It should be Sarajevo,

19     because that was -- instead of Banja Luka it should be Sarajevo.

20        Q.   Save for the corrections, is everything else recorded accurately?

21        A.   Yes.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness kindly

23     be asked to pause.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat.

25             THE ACCUSED:  It shouldn't be -- instead of Pale it should be --

Page 36307

 1     instead of Banja Luka, it should be -- instead of SarajevoBanja Luka

 2     to be instead of Sarajevo.  Because Pale were a part of Sarajevo, Serbian

 3     Sarajevo.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Is that clear?  The word "Pale" should be replaced with

 6     "Sarajevo."

 7        A.   That's what I had in mind, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Komad, having in mind the corrections you have just kindly

12     mentioned, does the rest truthfully reflect your words?

13        A.   Yes, it does.

14        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you in the

15     courtroom today would your answers be basically the same?

16        A.   Yes.  The gist of it would be the same.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Excellencies, I

18     seek to tender this statement as part of the 92 ter package.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Mr. Tieger?

20             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.  There's one small section that

21     arguably fell within the Court's previous guidance, but it was very brief

22     and so I don't have any objection.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll admit the statement as well as the

24     four associated exhibits.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, the 92 ter statement 1D7981 will be

Page 36308

 1     Exhibit D3198, and the remaining four associated exhibits will be

 2     Exhibits D31992 to Exhibits 33201.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will read out a

 4     summary of Mr. Trifko Komad's statement in the English language.

 5             [In English] Mr. Trifko Komad worked from 1986 to the outbreak of

 6     war in the republican conference of the Socialist Alliance of B and H, in

 7     charge of issues related to religious communities.  For some time he also

 8     worked on issues of the People's Defence.  After the founding of the SDS,

 9     he became a member of the Main and Executive Boards.  In late 1992, he

10     became a member of the office of the Republika Srpska in Belgrade from

11     where he retired.

12             Trifko Komad saw that the Islamic and Catholic religious

13     communities had enormous influence on social trends and politics in B and

14     H.  The influence on both religions could be seen throughout BH.

15     However, the Orthodox religious group had a smaller standing.

16             Even before the establishment of the SDS, Islamic fundamentalists

17     were organising themselves and conducting monitoring exercises on cafes

18     and many Serbs were scared about the developing situation before the

19     establishment of the SDS.  Due to his position, Trifko Komad was asked to

20     comment upon the issue regarding Serbian ethnicity in a number of

21     political circumstances.

22             Trifko Komad was present at meetings in which the difficult

23     position of the Serbs in BH, the protection of the Serbian people and

24     plans for the future were discussed.  At first point the first clashes

25     between Croats and Serbs had already taken place and other parties had

Page 36309

 1     been established.  Despite the previous establishment of the SDA and HDZ,

 2     there was a huge resistance in BH to the Serbian people organising

 3     themselves and therefore this could not be done publicly.  In addition,

 4     Serbian people feared retribution in response to organising politically.

 5             When the Serbs were established -- the SDS was established in

 6     the -- it was for Yugoslavia and for the equal treatment of the Serbian

 7     people in the BH and Yugoslavia.  Trifko Komad considers that the party

 8     was led by the Serbian people and their wishes which were considered by

 9     the leadership of the SDS.

10             Following multi-party elections, when a coalition was formed it

11     was clear that the other parties were breaching the coalition agreement

12     regarding the appointments of the staff in the BH governmental bodies

13     which led to a loss of confidence in the truthfulness of the SDA's

14     claims.  The SDS advocated constitutionality and legality in its

15     activity.  However, other parties acted in illegal and unconstitutional

16     ways.

17             Muslim party leaders, presidents of municipalities and municipal

18     governments where Serbs were in power were invited to the SDS annual

19     party conference in July 1991 as guests to encourage co-existence and

20     joint action in BH.  Many people were allowed to participate in meetings

21     and media employees were also invited.  Unfortunately, there was a lack

22     of discipline in the local level of the party and the local leadership

23     were rather autonomous in their work, leading to inter-party clashes.

24             Trifko Komad was aware that the SDS wished to avoid bloodshed and

25     war in BH at all costs.  Due to the escalation of the situation in

Page 36310

 1     Sarajevo, he left in April 1992 with his son but only just managed to get

 2     his wife out soon after.  Both his parents were persecuted in Sarajevo,

 3     which led them to deaths.  His sister was also targeted in a hit and run

 4     incident.  Trifko Komad -- Trifko Komad considers that due to his

 5     political affiliation.

 6             Crisis Staffs were established in municipalities where there was

 7     the greatest danger of the clashes breaking out.  They were established

 8     to prevent clashes and protect the population, not to persecute the

 9     Muslims and Croat population.  When hostilities broke out, the Crisis

10     Staffs were left to their own devices, and in the majority of the Serbian

11     authorities did not have any information about their work.  Communication

12     was interrupted and local organs were operating autonomously, so wartime

13     commissions were introduced to link the republican government to the

14     local branches including Pale.

15             The SDS suspended its activity when fighting broke out to avoid

16     the possibility of the party using its power to influence the work of the

17     state organs.  Following this, Mr. Trifko Komad escorted humanitarian aid

18     convoys through Serbian territory.  There were instances when convoys

19     were stopped by armed Serbian forces and many members of the SDS fought

20     for humanitarian aid to be delivered unhindered to the Muslims and

21     Croats.  The general position was that the Muslims and members of all

22     other ethnic groups must be guaranteed all civil and other rights.

23     Dr. Karadzic personally stopped the requesting -- and requested --

24     supported and requested that the Muslims do not move away from Janja and

25     other places in Republika Srpska and became integrated -- instead to be

Page 36311

 1     integrated in population.

 2             And that is the summary and at that moment I do not have

 3     questions for Mr. Komad.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Komad, as you have noted, your evidence in

 5     chief in this case has been admitted in writing, that is, through your

 6     written statement in lieu of your oral testimony.  Now you'll be

 7     cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.

 8             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

11        Q.   Good morning to the Bench.  Good morning to all.  Good morning,

12     Mr. Komad.

13        A.   Good morning.

14        Q.   Mr. Komad, at paragraph 9 of your statement, you state that after

15     the inaugural conference of the SDS, which I believe was in July of 1990,

16     you became a member of the Main Board and the Executive Board and the

17     political council.  In that respect, I'd like to look at a few documents

18     or indicate to you that we have in evidence a few documents, including

19     the following:  D1275 reflect the minutes of the Executive Board of the

20     SDS held on 6 September 1991.  It lists at page 2 the members present,

21     including Mr. Dukic, the President of the Executive Board, Mr. Neskovic

22     and others, and then states in the subsequent paragraph that apart from

23     the members of the Executive Board, the following attended, and that

24     includes your name along with Jovan Turanjanin.

25             Similarly at P25 --

Page 36312

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you mean to show the document to the witness?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  It's in evidence, Mr. President, I'm not sure based

 3     on the question it will be necessary.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Similarly at P2584, a meeting of the Executive Board that took

 7     place ten days later on the 16th, it indicates before the agenda items

 8     are discussed the members of the Executive Board who were present and

 9     states further also in attendance were Trifko Komad and Jovan Turanjanin,

10     secretaries of the party services of the SDS BH.

11             Now, is it correct, therefore, Mr. Komad, that you were not a

12     member of the Executive Board but you were secretary of party services

13     serving the members of the Executive Board?

14        A.   No.  I was the secretary of the Executive Board, and you can find

15     that in certain documents.  The secretary of the Executive Board is at

16     the same time a member of the Executive Board.

17        Q.   And I take it then that you don't have an explanation for the

18     distinction that is made in the minutes of the Executive Board between

19     the members of the Executive Board and other persons such as yourself as

20     they are listed who are also in attendance and indicated as I said

21     earlier, secretary of the party services?

22        A.   I can't comment on that, but I claim that I was the secretary of

23     the Executive Board.

24        Q.   Similarly with respect to the -- your Main Board membership, I

25     wanted to look quickly at 65 ter 00698, which is a stenogram taken at the

Page 36313

 1     12 July 1991 session of the SDS party, and although there is a good deal

 2     of discussion, I wanted to turn directly to pages 87 through 93 of the

 3     English, and pages 107 through 114 of the B/C/S that reflect the election

 4     of the SDS BM Main Board for -- and goes through it in various reasons.

 5     So if -- in various segments.

 6             So if we look first at page 87, we see the election of persons

 7     from the Herzegovina region including in Mr. Vucurevic, Mr. Kozic, and

 8     Mr. Nadezdin.  Similarly for Stara Herzegovina.  As we turn the page we

 9     see the election of people from Romanija including Mr. Kusic and

10     Mr. Zugic.  Semberija, Birac, Tuzla, Central Bosnia.  And please pay

11     attention to the names, many of whom the Court will be familiar with.  On

12     to Western Bosnia, south-western Bosnia, Bosnian Krajina.

13             And then finally we see at pages 92 and 93 additional persons

14     elected including Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Najdanovic, Mr. Buha, Mr. Toholj,

15     Mr. Neskovic, and Mr. Saric.  And then at the bottom of page 93, we see

16     that Mr. Karadzic has been nominated as President of the SDS.  He is the

17     only candidate, and it appears to have been a unanimous vote.  That -- by

18     the way, that segment in B/C/S is at page 114, but I noted that the pages

19     were inverted, so I think it goes in reverse order from 19 -- immediately

20     jumps from 113 to 118 or 119 and then back counting down to 114 which is

21     why you may not see it on that page.

22             None of these names, Mr. Komad, are yours from any of those

23     regions, so it appears that as indicated with the Executive Board that

24     you are not listed as someone who was a member of the Main Board.

25        A.   Can I explain?  Under the statute, in addition to the nominees

Page 36314

 1     who are elected, the President of the party had a discretionary right to

 2     co-opt, I can't remember exactly how many but I think it's seven or eight

 3     people, and I was among those people co-opted into the Executive Board by

 4     the president of the party, and if you're talking about the Assembly on

 5     the 12th of July 1991, you can look it up in the statute.  I -- it is I

 6     who provide the explanation of the statute as well as the programme, the

 7     platform of the party.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Komad.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I tender 65 ter 00698.  I realise, Mr. President,

10     there's a reference to those last pages, and the Court's previous

11     guidance might have us just admitting those.  I'm just at the Court's

12     discretion.  But given the nature of documents we've previously admitted,

13     I'm more than happy to have the entirety of the document admitted and

14     imagine that the Defence will probably feel the same way about this

15     particular document.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We would prefer the whole

17     document be admitted.  It's of the kind of document such as Assembly

18     sessions that we've admitted in the past in their entirety, and so it

19     could be useful to have it all admitted.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  In the circumstances, we admit it in its

22     entirety.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6243, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  There's one thing you'd like to.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  I just want to correct the record.  The fourth

Page 36315

 1     associated exhibit will be Exhibit D3202.  Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just -- I don't think part of

 4     the answer of Mr. Komad was not recorded, that he was co-opted also into

 5     the Main Board, not only into the Executive Board.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Komad?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just one thing.  The secretary for

 8     the Executive Board was an opening, and the description of the opening

 9     made it clear that it would also be a member of the Main Board and that's

10     the opening I was running for, and I confirm what Mr. --

11     President Karadzic just said.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. TIEGER:

14        Q.   Mr. Komad, at paragraph 17 and 18 of your statement, you refer to

15     the plebiscite, and I just wanted to clarify one aspect of the

16     plebiscite.  So it is correct that the plebiscite ballots consisted of

17     two different ballots with different colours, one for Serbs, one for

18     non-Serbs, and with two different texts, one for Serbs and non-Serbs.

19     And in that respect, if we could look quickly at 65 ter 17542.  That's

20     the meeting of the Executive Board of the 25th of October, 1991, and if

21     we turn the page, we will see that it reveals that following the debate

22     it was concluded that whilst observing organisational and technical

23     requirements, two kinds of ballot papers should be printed out, blue ones

24     for the citizens of the Serbian nationality and yellow ones for other

25     nationalities.  Can you confirm that that was the case, Mr. Komad, with

Page 36316

 1     respect to the plebiscite ballot?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And similarly if we call up quickly 65 ter 06621 and 06622 --

 4        A.   Just one thing.  Please, can I say something about the text?  You

 5     also asked about the text, about the wording, was it the same.

 6        Q.   I'm going to show you two documents with respect to the text

 7     right now, Mr. Komad.  So you'll see on the screen 65 ter 06621 and then

 8     06622.  And while it's being called up, I'll describe briefly the

 9     difference.  06621 provides in Cyrillic:

10             "Do you agree with the decision of the Assembly of the Serbian

11     people," et cetera, "that the Serbian people remain in the common state

12     of Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia

13     Baranja," et cetera.

14             And 06622 for non-Serbs in Latin Scripps states:

15             "Do you vote for Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain as a republic with

16     equal rights in the common state of Yugoslavia?"

17        A.   This second text was also an official text for voters, members of

18     all ethnicities.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.  I tender those documents, Mr. President.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Those documents being?

22             MR. TIEGER:  06621 and 22.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Not the previous one?

24             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, I'm sorry, and also 65 ter 17542, yes.  Thank

25     you.

Page 36317

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit them all.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  65 ter 17542 will be

 3     Exhibit P6244, 06621 will be Exhibit P6245, and 06622 will be

 4     Exhibit P6246.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Now, at paragraph 30, Mr. Komad, you dispute an adjudicated fact

 7     which stated that on 21 November 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly

 8     proclaimed as part of the territory of federal Yugoslavia all those

 9     municipalities, communes, and settlements where a majority of registered

10     citizens of Serb nationality voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia,

11     and you make the point about the basic socio-political community being

12     the local community.

13             With respect to your dispute of that adjudicated fact, can we

14     turn to 1D20085.  That will be a decision taken at the November 21st 1991

15     session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, which states in its first paragraph

16     the territories of municipalities, local communities, and populated

17     places in which -- in which more than 50 per cent of the Serbian

18     electorate voted for the same joint state, and then we see in the last

19     portion of that paragraph, "... shall be considered the territory of the

20     federal state of Yugoslavia."

21             Now, with insignificant differences, that decision reflects the

22     text of the adjudicated fact that you disputed, does it not?

23        A.   Yes.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.  I tender that, Mr. President.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, may I explain my own

Page 36318

 1     position?  According to earlier regulations and the constitution of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, a local commune was defined as the

 3     basic socio-political entity.  We had encountered cases where

 4     municipalities were split in that period, and I quoted the example of

 5     Neum which separated itself from Capljina, the example of Milici which

 6     split from Vlasenica.  Janja was --

 7        Q.   What --

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   -- you're explaining is exactly what you state in your statement

10     and which is already before the Court.  My point was that you are -- you

11     disputed this fact, and that fact is reflected in precisely in this

12     decision.  Now, you may have an explanation about what you consider to be

13     the basic socio-political unit and how this might otherwise have been

14     written, but you've accepted that this decision, in fact, was made, as we

15     can see in the text, and that was the point I wanted to bring to the

16     Court.  So it's not necessary for you to repeat the text of the

17     information -- the text of your statement and the information you

18     provided there.

19        A.   All right.

20             MR. TIEGER:  So I tender 1D20085, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6247, Your Honours.

23        Q.   Mr. Komad, at paragraph 23 of your statement, you briefly

24     describe your information about the Variant A and B document, which as

25     you indicate in paragraph 23 is extremely limited.  Now, you also say at

Page 36319

 1     paragraph 11 that you were often present at the sessions of the Bosnian

 2     Serb Assembly.  Do you recall whether you were present at the sixth

 3     session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held on the 26th of January, 1992,

 4     that's P1349, at which following discussions about the need for action in

 5     the face of the apparent developments toward a sovereign and independent

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Cizmovic stated the following at page 13:

 7             "To solve this problem I propose that we begin with an urgent

 8     operationalisation and a declaration on the establishment and

 9     promulgation of the Serbian Republic of BiH.  Tasks set out in the

10     instructions of 19 December 1991 should be carried out."

11             So there in front of everybody at the Assembly Mr. Cizmovic made

12     an explicit reference to the 19 December document which reflected the

13     Variants A and B and the first and second level.  So notwithstanding the

14     fact that everyone in the Assembly was reminded about it, is it still

15     your position that you, Mr. Komad, knew nothing about it other than what

16     you say in paragraph 23?

17        A.   No, nothing else.  I believe I probably did not attend that

18     Assembly session.  If I had been there, I would have probably remembered

19     this.  I said before it was not my obligation to be -- attend every

20     session.  I attended from time to time.  The only thing I would like to

21     say is that the document you talk about was not before the organs of the

22     party, and it was not endorsed by the organs of the party.  If it had

23     been, it would have been in the protocol.  It would have been entered in

24     the log-book.  It would have had a stamp.  It would have been

25     officialised.  So I stand by the statement I have given.

Page 36320

 1        Q.   Mr. Komad, the president of the party would appear to be a fairly

 2     important organ of the party.  Were you not present at the session of the

 3     deputies club on the 14th of February, 1992, when Mr. Karadzic spoke and

 4     made four separate references to the Variant A and B document, including

 5     asking the audience whether they remembered what he was discussing and

 6     getting the response we know, and concluding at page 22 of P00012, "That

 7     is why we called you today, to intensify, to introduce the second level

 8     and to intensify the functioning of the government at any cost and on

 9     every single millimetre of our territory."

10             And for the benefit of the Court and the party, those individual

11     references are found at pages 5, 7, 17, and 25 of the English and pages

12     4, 5, 12, and 18 of the B/C/S.

13             Do you claim, Mr. Komad, that despite the fact again that

14     everyone at that extended meeting of the -- everyone at that extended

15     meeting of the deputies club was aware of the Variant A and B document

16     but you were not aware of it?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Nevertheless, Mr. Komad, you -- that document which,

19     among other things, called for the establishment of Crisis Staffs, and

20     you did acknowledge that the party did create Crisis Staffs at paragraph

21     26.  You also state at paragraph 27 that the party suspended its work

22     following the outbreak of hostilities.  In that connection, I wanted to

23     ask you how quickly you claim that the party suspended its work after the

24     outbreak of hostilities?  And I take it, by the way, that you considered

25     the outbreak of hostilities to be at the beginning of April.  If you

Page 36321

 1     consider otherwise, let us know.

 2        A.   Yes, that's what I believe too, with the proviso that the party

 3     was the initiator as far as the Crisis Staffs were concerned, but they

 4     were established by municipal authorities, by municipal governments,

 5     whereas the party was a political organisation and the initiator of that

 6     activity, but it was not the party that carried it out in all

 7     territories.  That was done by municipal and local authorities.  As for

 8     when the work of the party was put on hold, I believe it was May 1992.

 9        Q.   Did you --

10        A.   Or June perhaps.  May or June.  I cannot remember the exact time.

11     And that's what I said in the statement, that Mr. President called me and

12     informed me of the decision to put the work of the party on hold.

13        Q.   Okay.  But not before the party attempted to ensure the

14     transition from party Crisis Staffs into War Presidencies or

15     War Commissions as had been ordered by the republic level RS authorities;

16     correct?

17        A.   Yes, because the war was already going on.  The state of war was

18     imposed, so it's possible that the decision was not implemented in all

19     the territories at the same time.

20        Q.   And that's reflected in P2608, a document that you sent on the

21     31st of May, 1992, as the secretary of the Executive Committee to various

22     parts of RS authorities, specifically the SAOs, Herzegovina, Romanija,

23     Birac, and Semberija, advising them that the decision of the republic

24     authorities had been made, that War Commissions will be set up.

25     Actually, in this document you refer both to War Commissions and War

Page 36322

 1     Presidencies indistinguishably.  Tell them to continue performing their

 2     functions, and if they have any suggestions, remarks, or difficulties

 3     regarding implementation to contact the Presidency.  That is Mr. Karadzic

 4     as president of the Presidency directly; correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Now, at -- in part of your statement you refer to events in

 7     Trebinje, that's paragraph 20 of your statement, and the involvement of

 8     the SDS republic level with events there.  The Trial Chamber, Mr. Komad,

 9     has in fact received quite a bit of evidence about what happened in

10     Trebinje during that period of time, and I'd like to confirm the details

11     of what happened with you or challenge the full accuracy of your account

12     with the evidence the Court has received.

13             So first of all, Mr. -- let me march through that with you

14     step-by-step, Mr. Komad.

15             First of all, as we know from P6228, on the 2nd of September

16     Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Vucurevic talked about a problem that Vucurevic was

17     having with, among others, Grubac and Borkin [phoen].  And Dr. Karadzic

18     told Mr. Vucurevic at page 3 of that document:

19             "Who is not following our politics can go to another party."

20             On the subsequent page Mr. Vucurevic begged him to come that same

21     week, and at page 9 of that document Mr. Karadzic told him:

22             "Don't you worry, we will finish it."

23             You don't have any reason to dispute that that happened.  That's

24     an intercepted telephone conversation between Mr. Karadzic and

25     Mr. Vucurevic which the Court has received in evidence.

Page 36323

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   The next day, and that's found at P6229, Mr. Vucurevic continued

 3     to express concerns.  Mr. Karadzic again told him not to worry, he would

 4     resolve it, saying:

 5             "We won't have anyone eating shit under our banner."

 6             That's at page 7.  And assured Mr. Vucurevic that:

 7             "Momo and I will come.  We will bring it all to an end."

 8             That's at page 8.  And again you have no reason to dispute that

 9     chronology I take it, Mr. Komad.

10        A.   I don't know what they said to each other.  I cannot confirm

11     whether it's correct or not, but I suppose if it's an intercept, then --

12     I can see here on the display that that's the subject of their

13     discussion, but I cannot confirm either yes or no.  I suppose it's true,

14     because I cannot know what they talked about.

15        Q.   Well, Mr. Komad, you're -- you were involved in this according to

16     your own statement, and you paint these events as somehow being a --

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   -- failed effort by Mr. Karadzic but a triumph on your part

19     because somehow, as you painted, you had to intervene and therefore

20     succeeded where Mr. Karadzic could not.  So I want to continue with this

21     chronology.

22             On the 6th of September, according -- as we see from P2544,

23     Mr. Karadzic spoke to Mr. Milosevic.

24             MR. TIEGER:  And although the English translation of this

25     document has the date sometime in December, we received evidence long ago

Page 36324

 1     that clarified that date as being the 6th of September, Mr. President.

 2        Q.   Mr. Karadzic told Milosevic:

 3             "I've just been to Trebinje and sacked some fools.  They wanted

 4     to replace my man Bozo Vucurevic.  When I made that null and void last

 5     night, I kicked them out, brought other people into the party and so on."

 6             And he explains the municipal government collapsed.  That's at

 7     page 3 through 4 of 2544.

 8             Now, similarly, we have the minutes of the Executive Board of the

 9     same date.  That's D1275.  And those minutes reflect that on that date

10     Mr. Karadzic submitted a report on the situation which was endorsed, and

11     the decision to dissolve the Trebinje Municipal Board was adopted.  A

12     working group with Mr. Vucurevic named first was to be formed to conduct

13     all affairs until new organs were constituted and that working group was

14     obliged to consult with the Executive Board and Mr. Karadzic.

15             Now, that's an accurate reflection of what happened with respect

16     to Mr. Karadzic's involvement in the difficulties Mr. Vucurevic was

17     having in Trebinje and his salvaging of the position of what he called my

18     man Bozo Vucurevic as the leading figure in Trebinje; correct?

19        A.   I don't know whether he called him my man because he never called

20     him so before me, but as to the fact that there were conflicts or perhaps

21     better to say problems in the local organisation of Trebinje, that's

22     correct.  But it didn't happen only in Trebinje.  It happened in other

23     places, too.  Many people saw themselves as leaders and party foremen,

24     and in this competition there were occasional clashes of all sorts.

25             However, as far as Trebinje specifically is concerned, it's true

Page 36325

 1     that Karadzic went there and he informed us of the situation, and it's

 2     also true that Mr. Rajko Dukic and I, he as president of the Executive

 3     Board and I as the secretary, went to attend that session of the

 4     Municipal Assembly in Trebinje where these problems were discussed, and

 5     after that session the problem was forestalled.  Consultations took

 6     place, although not immediately, and the problem was solved not only in

 7     Trebinje but in other places too.  It existed in other places, too, but

 8     Trebinje was the glaring example of problems and disunity in

 9     self-organisation, which is small wonder.  Those were the first party

10     elections and many people saw it as a chance to push their ambitions.

11     That is how --

12        Q.   Okay.  And I appreciate that you're about to go into a good deal

13     of detail about Trebinje.  We have a good deal of information about that.

14     I want to focus on other aspects of this same issue.

15             As you point out, indeed this was not the only occasion that

16     triggered the intervention of the SDS republic level authorities, and

17     indeed it was not the first or last time that Mr. Karadzic ensured the

18     composition of the local authorities by intervening in a similar manner.

19             So, for example, in June of 1991, as we know from P2557,

20     Mr. Karadzic had a conversation with locals from Prijedor and was alerted

21     to problems that they were having, and that was a conversation with

22     Mr. Goran Babic from Prijedor.  Mr. Karadzic told Babic:

23             "Tell those people who made problems that they cannot join the

24     party now.  That is my order."

25             Page 3:

Page 36326

 1             "Tell them that I will introduce new measures in Prijedor and

 2     that I will tell them who the President will be there."

 3             "Tell him," referring to Mr. Srdic in that case, "everything.

 4     Tell him that I will dissolve board and I will place ten people to lead

 5     the party.  Tell him that I forbid any one of them to get closer to the

 6     party.  If you are not able to organise the real democratic elections

 7     without those bastards, I will name 10 to 15 people to lead it as I did

 8     last time."

 9             So P2557, an intercepted telephone conversation in June of 1991,

10     reflects another occasion on which Mr. Karadzic monitored the situation

11     in the municipality and intervened to ensure that the composition

12     remained as the SDS republic level desired; correct?

13        A.   I really can't say anything about your assertion.  I didn't take

14     part in it.  I did take part in the events in Trebinje, but as for

15     anything else, I can't say anything because it doesn't concern me, and

16     you don't find that in the statement either.

17        Q.   Well, let me ask you another event reflected in D1289.  That's a

18     conversation that took place a little earlier in June between

19     Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Brdjanin, and Mr. Cvetkovic.  And again Mr. Karadzic is

20     complaining about any departures from the SDS republic level party line,

21     and he states:

22             "They are complete idiots.  Insolent motherfuckers.  As long as

23     they are in SDS it will be decided here.  What is like that in a global

24     picture and what is not like that.  Whoever will not accept this can fuck

25     themselves and then we are going tell the people what they are doing.  I

Page 36327

 1     will send them to hell.  Those are idiots.  This is the party policy and

 2     whoever wants to eat shit, they will have to take off the SDS badge and

 3     eat shit in their own name."

 4             That's at page 6.  And he goes on on the next page of that

 5     intercepted telephone conversation to state:

 6             "If you ruin this, we will have --"

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Neither we nor the witness see the

 8     part of the intercept that Mr. Tieger is referring to.  Could we have

 9     that on the screen so that the conversation is read out in

10     interpretation, because it otherwise may have a changed meaning.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have that on the screen,

12     the part you were referring to, sir.

13             MR. TIEGER:  I think the first question -- this is a document in

14     evidence that by the way was introduced by the Defence.  The first

15     question is the extent to which the witness has any familiarity at all

16     with this event, and then the nuances of the translation, if any, may or

17     may not be relevant.  But I --

18             JUDGE KWON:  It will be fair enough if you are going to quote a

19     substantive part of the intercept.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I'm now turning to page 7 of the English.  That's --

21     where Mr. Karadzic stated:

22             "If you ruin this, we will have new municipal elections, and I

23     guarantee that none of you is going to be on the list.  I will be making

24     the list.  I will come to Banja Luka for a month and make SDS to this."

25             Mr. Komad, were you familiar with this and is this not a

Page 36328

 1     reflection yet again of Mr. Karadzic overseeing, monitoring, overseeing,

 2     and intervening to ensure that the SDS republic level party line was

 3     adhered to?

 4        A.   Given the fact that I'm not included in this conversation, I

 5     can't say anything about it.  Knowing Mr. Karadzic as a man, I find it

 6     difficult to believe that he would use such language and vulgarity

 7     because I consider him to be a high-brow intellectual and a highly moral

 8     person.  I did not participate in the conversation, so I wonder why this

 9     question is put to me.  I couldn't have been present at every

10     conversation.

11        Q.   The question is put to you, Mr. Komad, because you make certain

12     assertions in your statement based ostensibly on your own experience.  So

13     I am testing whether those assertions are contrary to your experience or

14     whether or not your experience is lacking in such a way that maybe the

15     assertions you make are contradicted by facts about which you did not

16     know or claim not to know.  Do you understand?

17        A.   I do understand, but you see I explained the situation in

18     Trebinje.  I described it briefly.  I haven't touched upon anything else.

19     I did say that there were problems, of course, and I still say that,

20     because it was the very beginning of multi-party organisation and the

21     beginning of the party as a political entity.  Of course there were

22     problems, and they were being dealt on the go.  As far as I know, it was

23     done on a democratic basis through constructive dialogue and raising

24     important issues.  That was the policy of the party, to deal with matters

25     through dialogue, taking into account the general values that the party

Page 36329

 1     had built into its platform.  That was the basis for such conversations

 2     and dialogue.  And the same principle was supposed to be -- was supposed

 3     to have been followed in the field when organising its work in the

 4     municipalities and local communes.

 5        Q.   Well, I'm not going to dwell on this for long, but with respect

 6     to your comment about constructive dialogue and general values, let me

 7     ask you about some other evidence we've seen.  P2556 is an intercepted

 8     telephone conversation with Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Stevandic from January

 9     of 1992, and among other things in that conversation Mr. Karadzic says:

10             "Well, I will not -- I will not -- well, let them go fuck

11     themselves.  Whoever makes a mistake, I will suspend him and throw him

12     out of the party.  I do not give a fuck.  I will throw the shit heads out

13     by a single stroke of the pen.  I cross him.  He is not in this party.

14     As soon as he betrays the basic -- the basic flows of the party and the

15     principal policy of the party."

16             Those excerpts are found at pages 4 through 5.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters do not have this text in the

18     original.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Was that a question, sir?  I

20     confirm that I did not take part in such conversations and I do not

21     recognise Mr. Karadzic in this.  I do not dispute that he was perhaps

22     upset and agitated when people say things, but his general demeanour as

23     party president did not boil down to what you are insisting on.  Quite

24     the other way around.  We were always in favour of democratic principles

25     and everything that was contained in the party programme and the

Page 36330

 1     programme of the main and Executive Boards.  We were in favour of the

 2     party acting along the agreed principles, democratic principles.  I can

 3     cite an example in favour of it.

 4             MR. TIEGER:

 5        Q.   You've had an opportunity to cite examples before.  I just wanted

 6     to -- I take it then that the positions reflected in this intercept were

 7     not part of the constructive dialogue that you referred to in your

 8     earlier answer; right?

 9        A.   Well, if that was -- I was discussing the party principles and

10     not a single conversation, which may have been imbued with emotion or

11     something else based on the reasons for it.  I was discussing the

12     principles of the party and the principles followed by party organs.  Its

13     president was also an organ of the party, so perhaps in affection he may

14     have said something, but it was not the policy or standing practice

15     applied by the party.

16        Q.   Okay.  Now, you've already mentioned and we've discussed to some

17     extent Mr. Vucurevic, who was the leading figure in Trebinje, the

18     president of the SAO Herzegovina and the leading figure there, and this

19     Chamber's already received evidence in D3170, that's a document tendered

20     by the Defence, where Mr. Karadzic said to him:

21             "Keep everything under your control, the entire Herzegovina."

22             Now, Mr. Vucurevic in fact was someone who was close to and

23     deferential to Mr. Karadzic, wasn't he?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And on the other side of Bosnia, that is in the north-west part

Page 36331

 1     of Bosnia, was the Krajina, and Mr. Brdjanin is someone who regularly

 2     checked in with Mr. Karadzic for guidance, direction, and approval;

 3     correct?

 4        A.   It wasn't only Brdjanin.  I think Vojo Kupresanin sought advice

 5     much more than he did, as well as some others from Krajina.  However,

 6     Brdjanin was one of the group as I have stated in the statement.  Now, if

 7     you're asking me who came to see him the most, then it was the men I

 8     mentioned, Vukic, Radic, Kupresanin.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We didn't hear the last

10     two names.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And this includes Brdjanin.  I

12     really can't say who came to see him most frequently.  If I try to think

13     back, it seems to me that they all came to see him rather frequently.

14     Brdjanin didn't come more often than the others, the others I mentioned.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Thank you.  We have received evidence, that is this Trial Chamber

17     has received evidence of a particular telephone call that Mr. Brdjanin

18     had with Mr. Karadzic on the 31st of October, 1991.  That's P2549.

19     Mr. Brdjanin calls concerning the problem with a dance that has been

20     scheduled that he thinks was inappropriately scheduled, and Dr. Karadzic

21     asks him:

22             "Can't you solve a single problem without Karadzic?"

23             "You have all the power in Krajina.  Why don't you exercise this

24     power?"

25             And then he continues after Brdjanin tells him, well, someone --

Page 36332

 1     pages 4 through 5 of the English.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask that the things

 4     being referred to be shown to us and to the witness especially.  This is

 5     not the translation.  It was simply Mr. Tieger's interpretation and we

 6     lose the context.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  It is not my interpretation.  I'm reading from the

 8     English translation of a document that's in evidence.  I don't -- since

 9     it is in evidence, I don't consider that for the purposes of this

10     question it's necessary for the witness to follow.  I'm happy if he can.

11     I can call it up.  And it is up.

12             JUDGE KWON:  But in order to elicit an informed answer, it would

13     be fair to show the document to the witness.  Let's continue, Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   And now moving on to page 5 of the English, as I said --

16             MR. TIEGER:  And you can move the -- you can move it one more

17     page in the B/C/S.

18        Q.   Dr. Karadzic tells him:

19             "Come on, man, do your job.  Don't call me about every minor

20     problem.  I am not your nanny.  You have power in your hands, you have

21     presidents of municipalities through whom you can exercise as power until

22     we achieve autonomy.  You should exercise power vigorously and to the

23     fullest.  Not a single bird should be allowed to fly over Krajina and

24     there not be a shortage of men from Krajina for the army.  You must

25     establish all that.  I've seen what was written and sent.  All of that

Page 36333

 1     must be implemented.  Take care of that.  Call each and every

 2     municipality president and keep checking if it has been implemented and

 3     accomplished."

 4             Now, Mr. Komad, do you recall what was happening at this time and

 5     what Mr. Karadzic was referring to when he talked about the need to

 6     implement all that was written and sent; that is, when he spoke to

 7     Brdjanin about that on the 31st of October, 1991?

 8        A.   I can't say anything really with regard to your question.  I

 9     don't know.

10        Q.   Let's take a look at P2548 then.  This is a telex that's entitled

11     "The Sarajevo SDS Order," and it refers to the meeting held on the 26th

12     of October, 1991; that is, five days before the meeting we just looked

13     at.  A meeting that was chaired by Dr. Karadzic.  And it orders, among

14     other things, to form commands and institute permanent watch immediately,

15     to institute full mobility of the territorial army, to form field units

16     and name their substitutes, to take over power in public firms, post

17     office, account-keeping institutions," that means the SVK, I take it,

18     "administration of justice, and especially in mass communication media,"

19     and then it goes on to order other things.

20             Mr. Komad, that's what Mr. Karadzic was directing Mr. Brdjanin to

21     do in that October 31st conversation; correct?  And that's what was going

22     on at the time.

23        A.   What was the question for me?

24        Q.   I asked you earlier if you knew what Mr. Karadzic was referring

25     to when he was adamantly instructing Mr. Brdjanin what to do on the 31st

Page 36334

 1     of October.  You said that you professed not to know.  So I showed you

 2     now the SDS order of the 26th of October, from five days before, and I

 3     asked you if, in fact, that wasn't what was happening at the time and

 4     that was what Mr. Karadzic was referring to when he was talking to, at

 5     least in part, to Mr. Brdjanin on the 31st.

 6        A.   As far as I can see, this is a SAO Krajina document.  Those were

 7     the issues discussed at that level in that body if this is indeed so.  I

 8     had no possibility of being included in it all.  As I've stated at the

 9     beginning, I'm here to testify to the work and functioning of the party

10     organs and not the executive organs.  The SAO Krajina was a type of the

11     executive organ at this particular point in time.  I cannot state any

12     conclusions of mine regarding documents as this one and this type of

13     activity.

14        Q.   So it's your testimony to this Chamber that you knew nothing

15     about these events and what was happening at that time with respect to

16     forming commands, taking over power in public firms and so on; is that

17     right?

18        A.   I was not included in it.

19        Q.   Well, let's take a look at P958.  P958 reflects a speech given by

20     Mr. Karadzic before -- just before the plebiscite in November of 1991,

21     and I'd like to look at certain aspects of that.  At page 4 of the

22     English and page 2 -- well, it's hard to say how this is in e-court.

23     Page 2 of the text in B/C/S.  It won't be e-court page 2 because we have

24     a cover page as well and some other pages, but it will be the second page

25     of the text.

Page 36335

 1             Mr. Karadzic states:

 2             "I'm kindly asking you, I've seen it not only in Krajina but also

 3     in Pale, you should seize completely and energetically.  It cannot happen

 4     that a company manager is not loyal to the party where that party is in

 5     power.  We cannot have a radio chairman or a newspaper editor who is not

 6     implementing the policy of the party in power."

 7             And then he continues in the next paragraph:

 8             "Be prepared soon to take over the SDK decisively, I mean to

 9     appoint your own man in the SDK."

10             Now -- and the SDK is the account-keeping facility; correct,

11     Mr. Komad?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And then at page 10 of the English, and that's the third to last

14     page of the text in B/C/S, Mr. Karadzic states:

15             "You presidents of municipalities, you have to do this job.  You

16     and especially if the army instructs you to do it, no one else, no

17     employee in charge.  You and nobody else, because you are presidents of

18     the national defence councils, and you are commanders of your towns.  And

19     also in Krajina, especially where the war is going on, everything that

20     Brdjanin has written for you."

21             Now, based on those two entries alone, Mr. Komad, this is a

22     reflection of Dr. Karadzic telling municipality presidents and others

23     gathered for the plebiscite speech about the need to implement the

24     Sarajevo SDS order of the 26th of October, 1991; correct?

25        A.   First of all, I can say that I was not in attendance when this

Page 36336

 1     speech was given.  That's one thing.  Another thing, when you read this

 2     out, I see that reference is made to the policy that had already been

 3     established at the national parties and ethnic divisions in the different

 4     municipalities and companies.  Of course, the goal was to have the

 5     personnel chosen and to be clear on the ideology and platform chosen by

 6     the party.  It was a lead-up to the war, in fact, and the will of the

 7     people was clear because people were fearful and there were conflicts in

 8     the environs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, threatening it with war.  So the part

 9     that you quoted from Mr. Karadzic's speech, this is the first time I hear

10     of it, but that is what it is stated, the ideology of the party that was

11     supposed to be conveyed to where it was supposed to go, that is to say,

12     to the people.

13             As for the concept of this speech, I may have a separate opinion,

14     but this is the first time I see it.

15        Q.   Well, maybe you can tell us then, Mr. Komad, who Mr. Karadzic is

16     referring to at page 5 of the English and page 4 of the B/C/S text.  And

17     if we look at the first full paragraph in English which begins with

18     Mr. Karadzic talking about "We and the Croats waking up in a state with

19     the borders recognised by Europe," and then just before the italicised

20     portion in English Mr. Karadzic states:

21             "Trifko, can I have some water?  Get that kid to bring it."

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly read slowly.  Thank you.

23             MR. TIEGER:

24        Q.   He's referring to you, isn't he, Mr. Komad?

25        A.   That may be.  There are other Trifkos, but it could be me.  I

Page 36337

 1     can't remember.  And given the fact that I hear of this text for the

 2     first time, I simply stated my view on the general position presented

 3     therein, but I can't really read the original.  It is so dense and

 4     illegible that I can't make things out.  I think I've provided you with

 5     my position when I said that it was already the multi-party stage and the

 6     functioning of the parties.  He was basically addressing the deputies of

 7     the SDS in the various municipalities and SDS personnel in different

 8     companies where they represented the party.

 9             I don't know whether this refers to me.  It may well be.

10             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  Mr. President, I note the time.  I don't

11     know if I've exhausted my time as allocated, but I don't think I have

12     much more than ten minutes in any event, but I think it's better -- I can

13     do it in a more efficient fashion I think if we take the break now.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll break, but before we do, about this

15     document, in particular translation.  I note there are several emphasis

16     or italicisation.  Who did that, while there's none in the original?

17             MR. TIEGER:  I can check on that, Mr. President.  This

18     translation, so far as I'm aware, has appeared in various cases, so it

19     wasn't done specifically for this case.  It was inherited.  But I'm happy

20     to check and see if it's more suitable to eliminate the italics and

21     replace it with normal font.

22             JUDGE KWON:  If you could do so.

23             We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

Page 36338

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   Mr. Komad, we're still discussing the plebiscite speech of

 4     November 1991.  That's P986.  And I wanted to turn you to a different

 5     excerpt, and that is found at page 6 of the English and page 7 of the

 6     B/C/S.  And there Mr. Karadzic says the following -- that paragraph

 7     begins with a discussion about what Mr. Karadzic says he told Izetbegovic

 8     concerning immigrants, Muslim immigrants from other areas to Bosnia, and

 9     he says:

10             "But I am telling you whatever Bosnia we have one day, no Muslim

11     foundation shall ever be laid in Serb areas and Serb villages whether or

12     not you import Turks, because we will instruct Serbs not to sell land to

13     Muslims.  The first foundations that are laid will be blown up and all

14     foundations that are laid will be blown up."

15             And then he continues some sentences later:

16             "They are implementing a demographic policy here, but we will be

17     implementing one, too, and the whole world will understand that.  The

18     world will understand when we tell them that we will not allow the

19     demographic picture to change either naturally or artificially.  No way.

20     Our territories are ours.  We may be hungry, but we will be there."

21             And then he continues:

22             "You must not sell land to Muslims.  You must not, because this

23     is a fight to the finish, a battle for living space."

24             Now, first of all, Mr. Komad, having heard these remarks, does

25     that refresh your recollection about your attendance at the plebiscite

Page 36339

 1     speech in November of 1991?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Neither the interpreters nor the

 3     witness nor I saw this passage on the screen.  We did not see that

 4     paragraph.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I have it at page 6 of the e-court at the bottom.

 7     That would be the one, two -- the third full page of text and the last

 8     paragraph of that page and continuing on to the top of page 7 of the

 9     e-court.  Or page 4 of the full text if the witness wants to look at it.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the reference for the

11     B/C/S and have it displayed on the screen, the Serbian page.

12             MR. TIEGER:  It's P986.  It's the one, two --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             MR. TIEGER:  P986, the third page of text in B/C/S, the bottom

15     paragraph beginning [B/C/S Spoken], et cetera.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's -- the "et cetera" is

17     precisely what I want to see.

18             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not disputing it.  I'm just identifying where

19     the passage is found.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I certainly want the witness to

21     see that too.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Are we on the correct page, Mr. Tieger?

23             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Mr. President?  I don't know what else I

24     can do other than to call up the -- oh, I'm sorry.  Okay.  I see the

25     problem.  It's P958.  My apologies to the registrar.  Otherwise,

Page 36340

 1     everything applies.  And as I say, the third -- I think it's page 6 of

 2     the B/C/S, but it's in any event the third page of text.  That's it.

 3     There you go.

 4        Q.   See at that last paragraph, Mr. Komad?  That's the portion that I

 5     was quoting --

 6        A.   Very poorly.

 7        Q.   Well, just to recap quickly, it begins with a reference to the

 8     Muslim gentlemen establishing a ministry.  It continues on about no

 9     Muslim foundations shall ever be laid in Serb areas.  First foundations

10     will be blown up, and then several sentences later:

11             "They are implementing a demographic policy here.  We will not

12     allow the demographic picture to change either naturally or

13     artificially."

14             And then finally, I believe at the top of the next page, but I

15     won't move any faster than you want me to.

16             MR. TIEGER:  And perhaps we can just show the next page in B/C/S

17     and get rid of the English for the moment.  No.  We're going to have both

18     pages at the same time, but that's fine.

19        Q.   Finally it states:

20             "You must not sell land to Muslims, you must not, because this is

21     a fight to the finish, a battle for living space."

22        A.   Yes, I see what you're driving at.  The question is am I aware of

23     it or not.  You keep asserting this and trying to portray Mr. Karadzic as

24     an absolutist, a man who ruled absolutely without the involvement of any

25     authorities, and I disagree about that.  This is just a verbal expression

Page 36341

 1     of anger, anger about the situation that was already what it was on the

 2     ground.  There was already mistreatment of Serbian people, displacements,

 3     movements of population.  If there is any expression of anger, it was

 4     part of the dialogue and attempts to find solutions by pointing out to

 5     the problems that was the meaning.  The party advocated this and

 6     Mr. Karadzic too.

 7             Let's go back to Trebinje where you said that Karadzic was an

 8     absolutist, and then I would like to ask how come he didn't deal with it?

 9     Why did Rajko Dukic and I have to go there?

10        Q.   Mr. Komad, I went through at that with you.  I'm not going back

11     there.  I showed you the documents that are in evidence, the

12     contemporaneous statements that were made at the time.  So you had plenty

13     of opportunity to do that.  If Mr. Karadzic wants to take you back there,

14     he's more than welcome to do so.  Let's stick to what I'm talking about

15     right now which is Mr. Karadzic's remarks in November about the

16     demographic policy and the demographic picture and the battle for living

17     space.  And in that connection, I want to take you to paragraph 24 of

18     your statement.

19        A.   In November 1991, there were already movements of the Serbian

20     population, especially from Croatia.  there were convoys of refugees from

21     Croatia.

22        Q.   Sorry, sir.  This is not a debate.  What I'm trying to do is ask

23     questions to focus on certain areas, particularly certain areas that

24     you've covered in your statement.  I'm about to move to one of those

25     paragraphs.  So I'd appreciate it if you would listen to the questions

Page 36342

 1     and answer the question asked rather than making a speech about what you

 2     think the impact of your testimony so far has been or not been.

 3             In paragraph 24 of your statement, you refer to a meeting between

 4     Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Tudjman.  And in connection with the demographic

 5     picture, I wanted to ask you about some aspects of that meeting which are

 6     not reflected in your statement.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  So if we could turn to P986, please, and this time

 8     it is P986.

 9        Q.   These, in fact, are the minutes of the meeting in January of 1992

10     between Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Tudjman, and other members of -- and other

11     associates of Mr. Tudjman.  At page 6 of the English and page -- well,

12     the page that has the ERN 9181 in B/C/S.  You will find those ERNs at the

13     top of the page.  Mr. Koljevic states:

14             "An independent Bosnia does not suit us at all because it brings

15     us and we think the Croatian people into a situation where we are

16     separated from our motherlands."

17             At page 13 of the English and at page 9189 of the -- in B/C/S,

18     Mr. Koljevic states that it is not so impossible to divide Bosnia with

19     the aim of homogeneity of certain areas.  He says that everything is

20     possible but complains that that option is excluded on the basis of a

21     stand taken by the internationals in advance when they look at the

22     leopard skin aspect of Bosnian demographics.

23             And page 32 of the English and the page which is 9213 through

24     9214 of the B/C/S, Mr. Koljevic talks about delimiting territorial

25     boundaries and arranging for the transfer of property and population, and

Page 36343

 1     he states the term "homogeneity" was, as you know, "vilified in

 2     Yugoslavia.  Why should it be something terrible for people to live with

 3     people who are closest to them?"

 4             And Tudjman responds that:

 5             "Whenever national problems so conceived emerged as they did with

 6     us, that was resolved," and he refers to World War I and World War II,

 7     "that was brought to a conclusion by exchanges."

 8             So, Mr. Komad, the meeting between Koljevic and Tudjman which you

 9     referred to in paragraph 24 of your statement in fact reflected a further

10     aspect of Bosnian Serb concerns about the demographic picture and a

11     further reflection of their interest in ensuring that ethnic separation

12     took place in a manner such that the -- the final demographic picture was

13     suitable to the Bosnian Serbs.  Isn't that right?

14        A.   I was present when Mr. Koljevic left for Zagreb and when he

15     returned from Zagreb.  I see this transcript for the first time, but I

16     know his reaction, and I reflected it in my statement.  He went on that

17     trip to beg Tudjman and the leadership of Croatia to do everything within

18     their influence to stop the winds of war from spilling from Croatia into

19     Bosnia.  That was the purpose of his visit.  And to ask that all issues,

20     including borders, to be resolved by dialogue.

21             I remember well, and I know this well because I'm from

22     Herzegovina, Tudjman said -- sorry.  He said, "Do you want Herzegovina to

23     be your border?"  And Tudjman said, "Yes, on the condition that you move

24     Muslims to your yard."  And that explains the later coalition between

25     Muslims and Croats.

Page 36344

 1             I did not see this transcript before, but I'm just relaying my

 2     impressions because I was present there, and that's what I said in my

 3     testimony.

 4             As for the other remarks on which you insist, of course I was not

 5     fully informed until the end, because transcript is one thing and my

 6     general impression that I stated is another.

 7        Q.   Mr. Komad, I have two hopefully quick matters.  The first is, and

 8     it involves having you listen first to an intercept and then a brief

 9     portion of a video-tape.  So if we can call up 65 ter 30304, please.

10     Maybe we better start that again.

11             Mr. Komad, this is a conversation between you and

12     Mr. Milorad Bojovic on the 4th of October, 1991, and I just wanted to

13     give you a chance to listen to it briefly.  I won't play the entirety of

14     it but you're welcome to look at the transcript of that conversation if

15     you wish, but let's play portion of it first so you can presumably

16     recognise yourself.

17                           [Audiotape played]

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   That's enough for now.  The conversation will continue,

20     Mr. Komad, and I can put up the two transcripts briefly for the benefit

21     of the Court.  This is a conversation between -- well, first of all, let

22     me ask you quickly if you recognise your own voice and that of

23     Mr. Bojovic?

24        A.   I recognise my voice.

25        Q.   And as you heard from the tape, this is a conversation in which

Page 36345

 1     you call because Professor Koljevic said that you should talk.  You talk

 2     about the Crisis Staff and the staff for regionalisation.  Mr. Bojovic

 3     says that he thought that they should not take any steps without an idea

 4     of how it should be done and what your plan is up there.  You talk about

 5     the decisions of the government of SAO Herzegovina and SAO Krajina,

 6     et cetera, and Mr. Bojovic talks about the need for synchronisation, and

 7     the concluding part of the excerpt we heard thus today was Mr. Bojovic

 8     says that they called so they wouldn't do anything stupid or rash, and

 9     you say all preparations should be carried out.  And he says, "Of course,

10     that's why I'm asking you because nothing can be done without your

11     approval."  And you say, "Well, then, there you are."  And he says he's

12     asking because you -- because these people have not been informed of

13     these matters, et cetera.

14             So was that the -- let me ask you, was that the type of

15     conversation you were having with municipality figures at that time in

16     respect of the implementation of regionalisation and the decisions of

17     SAOs?

18        A.   Yes.  If there were issues, yes.  If there were such issues, yes.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I tender 30304, Mr. President.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will receive it.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6248, Your Honours.

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   And finally, Mr. Komad, there was a brief discussion earlier

Page 36346

 1     about the language used by Mr. Karadzic, and I had the impression you

 2     were indicating some surprise at that, so I wanted to briefly play

 3     65 ter -- or at least a portion of 65 ter 40136B, which takes place

 4     around the time we've been talking about; that is, around the time of the

 5     plebiscite in 1991.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We don't hear the sound.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  "[Voiceover]

 9             "Reporter:  We no longer have any obligations towards the rest of

10     Yugoslavia.  We have the right to self-determination and the right for

11     people to self-organise.  When asked if it wouldn't be an act of

12     unconstitutional destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Karadzic replied in a

13     not quite diplomatically.

14             "Karadzic:  You cannot fuck up the entire Yugoslavia expecting

15     Bosnia to remain a virgin.  No way!  To point out at the end, three

16     million ballot papers have gone out to polling stations, two millions for

17     Serbs, the rest for the others.  The balloting is reportedly also taking

18     place in Serbia, America, wherever people live.

19             "Many dilemmas have been raised by the colour of the ballot

20     papers.  The blue ones are for the Serbs, the yellow ones for the others.

21     Many in Bosnia and Herzegovina noticed a similarity with the notorious

22     yellow armbands.  The SDS response for this was solely caused by

23     technical difficulties."

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   Now, Mr. Komad, as you can see, this deals with the subject

Page 36347

 1     matter that we discussed during the course of your testimony to some

 2     extent, but mainly I wanted to show it to you because of your reaction to

 3     some of the language you heard from Dr. Karadzic.  Here we see

 4     Dr. Karadzic publicly saying:  "You cannot fuck up the entire Yugoslavia

 5     expecting Bosnia to remain a virgin.  No way!" as a public broadcast.

 6             Did you see it, sir?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.  I tender that Mr. President.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that it was a joke.

10     Obviously it was not appropriate, but the then journalists such as that

11     one were intent upon showing Karadzic and other Serbs as lacking in

12     culture, lacking in education, and so on and so forth.  I believe that

13     this was why this was shown.  This was not the way he normally

14     communicated.  I already told you that there was a lot of anger, but this

15     is not a result of anger, but it was a joke which should not have been

16     aired publicly.  If it was uttered in a small crowd of people, it should

17     have been appropriate.  It would have been received as a joke.

18             As far as I know him, that's not the way he spoke publicly.  He

19     must have been joking.  As you can see from the context, it was more of a

20     joke than the real thing or his real expression of a real opinion.

21             MR. TIEGER:  I tender this excerpt, Mr. President, and that

22     concludes my examination.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

24             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6249, Your Honours.

Page 36348

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.  Not much.  I hope

 3     I will finish very quickly.

 4                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 5        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Komad, on page 41 of today's transcript

 6     Mr. Tieger summarised on line 13 and he said that you said that the

 7     Crisis Staff and the staff for regionalisation.  Could you please make it

 8     clear, which of the two staffs existed?  Did the two -- or did both exist

 9     in the autumn of 1991?

10        A.   As far as I can remember, the staff for regionalisation existed,

11     i.e., it was either a board or a staff for regionalisation.

12        Q.   Thank you.  At that time did we have a Crisis Staff at the party

13     level?

14        A.   No, we did not.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16        A.   If you will allow me.  In my conversation in the intercept, I use

17     the term the Crisis Staff for regionalisation, and I would like to

18     correct myself, and I did it on -- in the conversation as well, as you

19     could see.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know who else accompanied Professor Koljevic

21     on behalf of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency to meet with President

22     Tudjman?

23        A.   Boras, a member of the Presidency.  The Croatian member of the

24     Presidency.  Franjo Boras I believe was his name.

25        Q.   Thank you.  When it comes to those parts and elements where the

Page 36349

 1     import of population from Turkey is mentioned, do you know what that

 2     refers to?  Did you know at that time what was going on?

 3        A.   There was talk about the Mujahedin being on their way to Bosnia,

 4     that they had set up their camps where they prepared themselves.  We had

 5     reports, but the information was not very specific.  We did receive

 6     information, but it was not complete, but such information already

 7     reached us and circulated around Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 8        Q.   Sokolovic Kolonija is also mentioned.  It was built in Serbian

 9     Ilidza.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber what is meant when one says the

10     changing of an ethnic composition, what operations?

11        A.   I wanted to say before this Trial Chamber that the spiritual

12     status of the Serbs when they were compared with the other two religious

13     communities that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to do with a

14     long-term initiative that the Serbian being or the Serbian culture or the

15     Serbian spiritual culture is being quashed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  By way

16     of example, I can tell you that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the Second

17     World War until the year 1990, only one church was built in Krajpolje

18     where I was born, and there was a ban ongoing there.

19             In contrast, over 1.000 religious edifices were built in

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina serving Catholics and Muslims.  Likewise, not a single

21     letter, not for a single hour was Serbian Orthodox culture and thought in

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1945 to 1990.  In contrast, there was an Islamic

23     theological college which was in Bascarsija.  It was set up in 1970 as

24     the only one in Europe.  Also, there is a Franciscan theology, Jesuit

25     theology, and the secondary theological school in Visoko.  During that

Page 36350

 1     period of time not a single letter was thought about the Serbian Orthodox

 2     culture.  So there was a tendency to do away with the Serbian culture,

 3     and this information testifies to that.

 4             On the eve of the war I analysed the political postcards that

 5     were published in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a priest.  You could not see

 6     any symbol of the Serbian spiritual or Orthodox culture in any of the

 7     postcards.  In addition to that, settlements like you have just mentioned

 8     were built because various entities gathered around those places of

 9     worship.

10        Q.   I believe that you said "tourist leaflets" on line 10 and it says

11     "political."

12        A.   Yes.  Those were touristic leaflets, not political leaflets.  I

13     must have misspoken.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at P2548.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

16        Q.   Do you have an explanation for the fact that five days before the

17     conversation with Brdjanin that you were shown that Brdjanin had said

18     that there had been a meeting and that he was instructed to do the things

19     that he mentioned?  Can you look at the document?  Can you tell the

20     Trial Chamber what was applied in 1991, in October 1991?  Did we set up

21     garrison commands?

22        A.   No.  I don't know anything about that.  I don't know that any of

23     these things were implemented.  I don't have any information to that

24     effect.

25             Take over power in public companies.  We couldn't do that since

Page 36351

 1     the -- the authorities had already been set up.

 2        Q.   Did we put a ban on issuing building permits?

 3        A.   No.

 4        Q.   Did we put a ban on the employment of people who came from the

 5     war-struck areas?

 6        A.   What do you mean?

 7        Q.   Paragraph 9.

 8        A.   Paragraph 9, okay.  No.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  What about 13?  Did we impose higher tax rates in

10     October 1991?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   The bullet point 3, did we form field units and name their

13     substitutes?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   All in all, would you say that that document arose from the party

16     politics?  Was it ever applied?

17        A.   I've already told you when the Prosecutor was examining me that I

18     don't think so.  Not only do I not thing so, I'm sure that it wasn't a

19     fact.

20        Q.   Thank you.  On page 23 you discussed an intercept featuring

21     myself and Mr. Bozo Vucurevic.  A line was taken out of the context

22     there, and in that line there is reference to control.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm going to ask for the document

24     to be displayed.  I believe that it is D3170.

25             Can we go to the following page in Serbian, and I believe that we

Page 36352

 1     should be on the follow page in English as well.  In English it's the

 2     last line on the first page.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Please read the fourth line from the top.

 5        A.   "Whatever they have, whatever companies they have and can get

 6     from you from the company, they all found it there from one company."

 7        Q.   Mr. Komad, is this about political control or is it about

 8     procurement and the functioning of the companies?

 9        A.   It's about the functioning of the companies.

10        Q.   Thank you.  How were decisions made within the party?

11        A.   I've already told you, but I repeat.  The party tried to find the

12     best democratic solutions that existed in Europe and in the world.  By

13     way of example, I would like to mention the political advisory body for

14     ethnical co-operation which consisted of the three members of academy,

15     the three top intellectuals from the Serbian culture.  That council, that

16     advisory body, had a major input on the decision-making process.  They

17     sought the most democratic solutions that could be applied at the time in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Most commonly the party carried out activities in

19     the field, and it was the fieldwork that impacted the decision-making

20     process the most.  It was not the leadership of the party but the

21     municipalities that did that.  It was a democratic procedure which would

22     discuss issues like the statute, the programmes, some political positions

23     with regard to the plebiscite, and things like that.  All that was first

24     checked in the field.  We passed that by municipal bodies.  We even

25     carried out some sort of research, opinion surveys to hear what the

Page 36353

 1     people think, people in the field, at grassroot what they think, and

 2     that's how decisions were made.

 3             Everything that was decided was published by the party.  We had

 4     our own bulletins.  We had our own newsletter.  Where we could not

 5     penetrate public media in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we issued our own

 6     bulletins.  We published them on behalf of the party.  The general public

 7     was present when it comes to all the pertinent issues that had to be

 8     defined by the party and that had to be launched by the party.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now tell the Trial Chamber who had the right

10     to distort a decision that was democratically made?  Who was in charge of

11     the implementation of such decisions?

12        A.   The Executive Board was in charge of the implementation of

13     decisions.  I also participated in the Executive Board decisions of the

14     Assemblies, the highest body of the party.  They launched those

15     decisions, and the Executive Board was tasked with the implementation of

16     such decisions to make sure that those decisions were implemented among

17     the people, among the basic cells of our party at the local level.  That

18     was the kind of policy that was pursued by the party.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did anybody had the right to apply the programme of

20     another party and pass it as the programme of the Serbian Democratic

21     Party?

22        A.   No.  There was such attempts, but the answer's no.  There were

23     some elements from the old system, from the League of Communists, that

24     tried to assert themselves, but what was positive was applied, but what

25     the organs deemed not to be applicable could not be applied at all.

Page 36354

 1        Q.   On page 21, there was reference to the disbanding of the

 2     Executive Board of the party in Trebinje.  Is that something that was

 3     contrary to the statute or was that envisaged by the statute?

 4        A.   The statute envisaged that, but the experience was still

 5     practically non-existent.  It was a period when we were making our first

 6     step on the democratic path, and the -- an executive -- a Municipal Board

 7     could be disbanded if there were quarrels and if there were activities

 8     contrary to the basic principles, and in that sense one could reach a

 9     decision on the disbanding of a Municipal Board and the Executive Board

10     of the party at the municipal level.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be instructed to slow

12     down.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor imputed to me that I

14     participated in the events in Trebinje --

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   [No interpretation]

17        A.   I apologise.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes.  Could you start again.  Please

19     be slower.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you.  I'll try.

21             When it comes to the disbanding of Municipal Boards and the local

22     bodies of authority, that was based on the statute.  There was a

23     provision in the statute to that effect, that such boards could be

24     disbanded due to local disagreements, activities contrary to the statute

25     and programme of the party.  In that case the party could be disbanded.

Page 36355

 1             When it comes to Trebinje more specifically, because it was said

 2     to me that I can say what I think, if you, Mr. President, had absolute

 3     power, I can ask you why didn't you do that when you were in Trebinje for

 4     two days?  It was the Executive Board that concluded that Rajko Dukic,

 5     the President of the Executive Board, and I, as the secretary, should go

 6     to Trebinje in order to resolve the situation there.  That procedure is

 7     certainly democratic because we sought the best solutions in order to

 8     deal with the situation in Trebinje.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Thank you.  In the intercepts involving Kozic and Vucurevic,

11     Kominic [phoen] is mentioned as well as the SPO.  Could you tell the

12     Trial Chamber who those people were?  What were those bodies, and what

13     was the attitude of that party towards the SDS with regard to Trebinje?

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be asked to slow down

15     and not to start his answer before the question is finished.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Please wait a bit or put a pause before you start

17     answering the question, and please speak very slowly.  Could you repeat

18     your answer, please.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The SPO was a political

20     organisation based in Belgrade and led by Vuk Draskovic.  At that period

21     of multi-party activity, the SPO had established its branch or its

22     organisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a focus on the Serb inhabited

23     areas.  The SPO in a way competed with the SDS.  They used many means to

24     push out the SDS from those parts of the country where we had already set

25     up municipal bodies.  As for the names, can you remind me of the last

Page 36356

 1     name?

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Kominic?

 4        A.   He was the deputy, I believe.  Anyway, he was from the top of

 5     Vuk Draskovic's party in Belgrade.  He was literally critic active in

 6     Belgrade and who came to Trebinje with the purpose of expanding the

 7     activity of his party in competition with the SDS.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Chamber what was the position,

 9     especially vis-a-vis extremism of the SDS and the SPO?

10        A.   The SPO was a more radical organisation in terms of their

11     position concerning the activities of Serbs through the political system

12     than was the case with the SDS.  Generally speaking, the SDS had a

13     moderate or more moderate policy which could already be by the time

14     observed through the different documents and platform it published.

15        Q.   Thank you.  On page 20 and 21 there was discussion about

16     Trebinje.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 65 ter 30239.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   You were quoted from some documents from the beginning of the

20     crisis.  Some documents from early September were quoted to you.  This

21     one is the 17th of September.  Please look at the third line from the

22     bottom.  What does Mr. Dukic say?

23        A.   Do you want me to read it out?

24        Q.   Please just tell us what it's about.  And the last part which

25     says:

Page 36357

 1             "Trifko is kept abreast..."

 2        A.   Yes, Dukic is conveying his impressions from Trebinje.  And he

 3     delegated that authority to inform me -- to inform you to tell us how we

 4     participated at the Municipal Assembly session in Trebinje.  That was the

 5     purpose of this conversation as far as I can see.  Of course we said that

 6     we were hoping that things would settle down there after our visit, and

 7     indeed it was so.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And there it is stated that you were in favour of

 9     lifting the suspension from Grubac.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in both

11     languages.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   So that both Vucurevic and Grubac stay there.  That was your

14     proposal?

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness start

16     again.

17             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  Just put a pause.  The interpreters are not

18     able to follow up with your speed.  Shall we start again, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, at the Assembly session at

20     Trebinje, I advocated or actually proposed that Vucurevic and Grubac

21     should sit down as the two opposing parties as well as their associates

22     in order to reach an agreement in those areas that were open to

23     discussion rather than to have Grubac suspended.  There were some

24     proposals along that line.  That was my proposal, which was accepted, at

25     least at the outset.

Page 36358

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Thank you.  When you said at the Assembly session, did you mean

 3     the Municipal Assembly session or the meeting of the party?

 4        A.   The Municipal Assembly.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I'll read out what I say:

 6             "I proposed it to them back then but they didn't accept it.  They

 7     did not accept it the first time round, and the Executive Board then

 8     reached a decision to suspend -- or, rather, to dissolve the Municipal

 9     Board."

10             Was it the Municipal Board who made that decision or was it me?

11        A.   The municipal -- the Executive Board, Mr. President, as we can

12     see from the conversation, and I know it was so.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Two lines down I say again:

14             "Well, yes, this can be done democratically in public forums,"

15     and then Lukic says that you spoke to Vucurevic.

16             Now, help us out here.  Dusko Kornjaca from Ljubina, is this a

17     mistake?

18        A.   Yes, it is, Mr. President.  Dusko Kornjaca, as far as I know, is

19     from Cajnice, and Dusko Kozic is from Trebinje if that's the person in

20     question.  But I don't know why Dusko figures in this transcript in the

21     first place.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Then we propose that Grubac remain.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the next page.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   The third line from the top.  My last sentence.  Grubac's aims

Page 36359

 1     may be noble and good, but the means he chose are violent.  Do you know

 2     what I advocated actually, what kind of instruments to be used in

 3     political life?

 4        A.   Always I've said already, you were exclusively for dialogue, for

 5     discussion to apply the best possible solutions that will suit the most.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  The next large remark of mine, the means and ways he

 7     applies are rough.  One needs to take into account the model and method

 8     of the SDS rather than certain Communist or SPO principles or God knows

 9     what.  We have our moderate democratic methods.  And then further down we

10     say the democratic -- a democratic party does not make decisions only but

11     comes up with solutions.  How does this tally with what you know about

12     the party you were a member of?

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness start again.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Komad, you were fast again.  Could you start

15     again.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours.  Pardon.

17             My entire testimony is to the effect that we were constantly

18     looking for the best and most democratic solutions.  We consulted the

19     international community and scientists who could help us organise the

20     work of the party.  Now, as for how successful we were, that's a

21     different matter.  These were turbulent times with many difficulties of

22     things we had inherited and the problems that were brought about by the

23     looming conflict.  This problem of things we inherited from the previous

24     system that we had lived in before as well as the looming problems made

25     things that much more difficult in applying the democratic principles of

Page 36360

 1     the SDS.

 2             If I were to make a summary of our activity, I would say that the

 3     party did not have any militant or any kind of absolutist methods.  It

 4     was in constant search of the best methods.  I've already mentioned what

 5     kind of bodies and people helped us who were active in our area and

 6     within our organisation.  It was all done to create such methods.

 7             I mentioned that I was a member of the political council

 8     throughout its operation.  It comprised the best intellectuals who had a

 9     great impact on our programme and activities as a whole.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.  You were shown part of the transcript between

12     Professor Koljevic and Franjo Boras with President Tudjman.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have P986.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

15        Q.   Perhaps you can help us out.  Let's see if the document contains

16     what you've mentioned was your impression?

17             JUDGE KWON:  You're not tendering this intercept?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly.  I apologise.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Then you should have confirmed with the witness

20     whether the witness really spoke with you.  I think he appears up to this

21     page.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  In this document he does

23     appear.  We can leaf through it.  We can keep going through it.  Dukic

24     mentions you on page 1.

25        A.   Yes.

Page 36361

 1        Q.   As someone who worked on it?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Page 4 and 5, the witness spoke to you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have that shown to the

 5     witness?

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You actually scheduled some interviews on my behalf and I

 8     accepted it.  Do you agree?

 9        A.   Yes, I saw that.  It was towards the bottom where it says:

10     "Trifko has something else to ask you."  Rajko said that.  And then I

11     asked you about that.  That is correct.

12        Q.   Are you the Trifko?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Mr. Tieger?

16             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We will receive it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3203, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In this document, page

20     7 in the Serbian and 6 in the English, please.  In this P986, which is on

21     the screen.  Page 7 in the Serbian, page 6 in the English version.  The

22     intercept transcript could be removed.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Now, perhaps we should look at the previous page so as to see

25     that it is Professor Koljevic who speaks.  Look at the last long

Page 36362

 1     paragraph.  "We essentially proposed a tripartite community."  Can you

 2     look at it and tell us whether that is the gist of what was conveyed to

 3     you?

 4        A.   Please put it back, the paragraph, the one referred to by the

 5     president.

 6        Q.   This is Koljevic's intervention?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Before we continue, yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Once again Mr. Karadzic is not being mindful of the

10     distinction between cross and examination-in-chief or redirect

11     examination, so he's lapsing into a leading mode.  He'll need to find

12     out.  And I think the witness has basically identified what he remembers

13     of the information he received from Mr. Koljevic, but in any event, this

14     would not be the way to proceed in redirect.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I agree Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Mr. Komad, what Mr. Tieger presented as the topic and the gist of

18     that meeting and what you know about it, does it accurately reflect what

19     the meeting was about?  What did you know about it?

20        A.   As I've said already, I recall Mr. Koljevic going there and what

21     his intentions were when he went to talk to Franjo Tudjman.  I also

22     paraphrased the words of the late Mr. Koljevic as to what he said upon

23     his return.  He told us, of course, that he had discussions and that he

24     had conveyed -- he actually conveyed to us the thoughts of Mr. Tudjman as

25     to the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and some other parts.  That's it.

Page 36363

 1        Q.   Look at the last paragraph, please, and tell us how does it tally

 2     with what you learned from Professor Koljevic?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Again, I mean that's an insistence - as we've seen

 5     before - a stubborn insistence by Dr. Karadzic on ignoring both the

 6     objection and the ruling by the Court.  If Dr. Karadzic wants to ask

 7     generally about certain aspects in a non-leading way he can do so, but

 8     instead he offers up a -- he elicits a generalised account and then he

 9     goes right to the leading portions of the examination.  So he --

10             JUDGE KWON:  In your opinion, what the problem with the last

11     question is?

12             MR. TIEGER:  He can certainly -- if he's moving on to a

13     particular subject matter generally, then he can ask whether the witness

14     was -- recalls any discussion about certain topics, but now he wants an

15     affirmation of what's in the transcript, and the witness -- by now the

16     witness has been reading from the transcript in any event as it stayed in

17     front of him during the course of these questions.  But I think it's very

18     clear what Dr. Karadzic is trying to do here:  He wants to pop this

19     document in front of the witness and get affirmations about specific

20     aspects of the document, and that is quite different than eliciting from

21     the witness in a non-leading way what the witness was aware was addressed

22     by Dr. Koljevic upon -- either before he went or upon his return.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

25             Yes, Mr. Robinson, if you could assist us.

Page 36364

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  I think once Dr. Karadzic has shown that the

 2     witness is familiar with the context he's entitled to put -- to draw

 3     witness's attention to particular portions of the document and put a

 4     non-leading question to the witness, like how does that tally with your

 5     understanding.  I don't think there's anything wrong with doing that or

 6     anything leading, and I think the Prosecution did that continuously

 7     during its case once it had established that a witness was familiar with

 8     the topic.  It directed their attention to particular portions of

 9     documents or intercepts, and I don't think that this in any way is a

10     leading way of proceeding.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             That was my point of question for you, Mr. Tieger.  Yes.  You

13     have some --

14             MR. TIEGER:  I won't argue it further so we can move forward in

15     any event, but let me just say as a general matter:  It's -- it's one

16     thing to ask about a subject and then follow it up with a question.  It's

17     another thing to take a generalised topic -- "Were you ever" -- for

18     example, "Were you ever in Sarajevo?"  "Yes, you were."  "Oh, you know

19     where it is."  And then here's a document about something specific.  And

20     that latter approach more closely resembles what we see Dr. Karadzic

21     doing repeatedly here than a follow-up to more specific inquiries.  As I

22     say, I raise that as a general response to Mr. Robinson's point, but as

23     for this particular ruling, I leave it to the Court.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's proceed.  We'll allow the

25     question.

Page 36365

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Perhaps I can

 2     reformulate.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Did Mr. Koljevic go to see Tudjman in order to negotiate an

 5     aggressive or a democratic way to resolve the crisis?

 6        A.   As I said already, the basic idea of Mr. Koljevic's trip to

 7     Zagreb was not to have the war spill over into Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 8     rather, to stop all war activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the extent

 9     possible and also in Croatia, because the war had already started there.

10     So the specific goal of the trip to Zagreb was to invest an effort in

11     stopping the war which was already at the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go to the next page.  Would you look at this

13     and tell us -- the English page should remain the same.

14             Could you tell us how this fits in?  What is Professor Koljevic

15     advocating?

16        A.   He's advocating any other alternative, including division,

17     absolutely anything, any solution that is not war.  So he is in favour of

18     finding solutions for delimitation, agreements, negotiations.  That was

19     the purpose and his intention behind going to Zagreb.

20        Q.   Could we see English page 7 and Serbian page 9.  In paragraph 3,

21     Professor Koljevic says:

22             "We had no wish to impose on the Muslim people any of our own

23     options."

24             Is Professor Koljevic telling the truth here?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 36366

 1        Q.   Could we see Serbian page 11, English 8.  I will read out to you

 2     the third paragraph by Koljevic:

 3             "We tried to offer a surplus of sovereignty instead of denying

 4     sovereignty.  Let it be a Muslim sovereign, Serbian sovereign, and Croat

 5     sovereign Bosnia.  Let it be a sovereign state of sovereign peoples."

 6             And then towards the bottom you see along the principles of

 7     Switzerland.

 8             What did you know about this position of Professor Koljevic?

 9        A.   This position expressed by Professor Koljevic who was by the way

10     also chairman of the political council of the Serbian Democratic Party,

11     is a position that the Serbian Democratic Party and Professor Koljevic

12     advocated in talks and in dialogue, including here with Gojko Susak.

13     Those were the basic premises from which we proceeded in the party.  We

14     fought for the sovereignty not only of the Serbian people but of all

15     peoples.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, please,

17     both in English and in Serbian.  Serbian 12, English 9.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19        Q.   This was partially quoted to you where Professor Koljevic says in

20     view of the intermingled nature of territories, there would be the

21     possibility of transfers and exchange in a civilised way, and then he

22     says:

23             "And this is already happening spontaneously.  The ethnic,

24     territorial, and demographic principles should be equally applied."

25             Did anyone from the Serbian Democratic Party or any of its

Page 36367

 1     representatives in the government propose any violent, forced changes in

 2     Bosnia?

 3        A.   I understood you well, Mr. President.  I do not know of any such

 4     ideas, if they existed at all in anyone's head, but certainly in the

 5     minds of the Serbian Democratic Party, members, and its representatives,

 6     there was no such thing.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Did you together with me take part in my contacts

 8     with the grassroot level, and were you aware of what I recommended to our

 9     officials on the ground regarding co-existence with others, especially

10     Muslims, in terms of atmosphere and relations?

11        A.   You advocated co-existence, living shoulder to shoulder wherever

12     possible.  If that was not possible, if the relations had been disrupted

13     to that extent, you were in favour of division but on an equal footing.

14     You were in favour for equal rights for every individual but also peoples

15     as a whole.  That was your principle and the principle of the party that

16     you represented.

17             I did not attend any meeting or any negotiations apart from some

18     minor excesses where you would officially proceed from the position of

19     hegemonism and lack of respect for other peoples.  You put everyone on an

20     equal footing, the Serbian people and all the other peoples in

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That was the policy and the strategy of the party

22     you represented.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to call 1D05745 in e-court, please.

24     28 September 1991, talks between Trifko Komad, Branko Simic, and

25     Radovan Karadzic.  There is no other person with the same name and

Page 36368

 1     surname as you, right, Trifko Komad?

 2        A.   No, there isn't.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see the next page in

 4     both versions.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 6        Q.   You see, you are introducing to go me Branko Simic from Mostar.

 7     And further down below Simic speaks to me.  I'm reading this in English:

 8             [In English] "And there were disruptions in Opusici and Lokve,

 9     but I -- there isn't any serious problem there and the people are going

10     back there and of course Muslims have all gone back."

11             [Interpretation] I say, "uh-huh, uh-huh."

12             Then Branko Simic:

13             [In English] "Over there in the village of Opusici, Muslims and

14     Serbs got together," [interpretation] I confirm [In English] "and are

15     roasting lambs on the spit together."

16        A.   Lamb.

17        Q.   [Interpretation] And then I say:

18             "Excellent.  Let it be.  Let them know that we have nothing

19     against them."

20             And then further below:

21             "One needs to keep repeating our forces, our weapons are against

22     Ustasha.  Do not join the Ustasha and you have nothing to fear."

23             Do you recall this, and how does this position of mine fit in

24     with your recollection of our position towards the Muslims?

25        A.   Precisely as you stated it, Mr. President.  You always advocated

Page 36369

 1     that wherever possible normal relations should be established and

 2     fostered.  You found examples for our common history of living together

 3     and working together, and you always advocated for all the positive

 4     vibrations and positive experience to be built into our relations, the

 5     relations between Serbs and Muslims and Croats in our multi-ethnic

 6     community in Bosnia.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Csn this document be

 8     admitted, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3204, Your Honours.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   On page 18 you were asked the question in which it is not clear,

13     because negatives are used differently in our language and in English.

14     The question was:

15             "Do you claim, Mr. Komad, that despite the fact [In English] that

16     fact again one of that extended meeting -- at the extended meeting of the

17     deputies -- deputies club was aware of the variant A and B, and you were

18     not aware of it?"

19             [Interpretation] Then you answered:   "No."

20             Did you mean that you didn't know or that you don't claim that?

21     It's a linguistic problem.

22        A.   I meant to say that I was not aware of it.

23        Q.   Then in English the proper answer would be, "Yes, I claim that."

24        A.   Yes, I claim that I was not aware of that, that I did not attend

25     that meeting.

Page 36370

 1        Q.   Thank you.  There was discussion on pages 13 and 14 about the

 2     yellow ballot papers for the plebiscite of the Serbian people.  Could you

 3     first tell us who was that journalist who prompted me to make that

 4     unsavory joke?  Do you remember him?

 5        A.   He was very well known, Smiljko Sagolj, a journalist of Croatian

 6     provenance who was notorious for many incidents and excesses as a

 7     journalist and his tendentious reporting.

 8        Q.   Can you repeat the name?

 9        A.   Smiljko Sagolj.

10        Q.   And he's regretting -- he's moaning about Bosnia, not Yugoslavia.

11     How did you understand his comment?  Why did I make that joke?

12        A.   The coalition was already there.  The flags were already tied

13     together, the chequerboard flag and the lilies flag.  They were tied

14     together in many public places and they were hoisted together as a sign

15     of their coalition.  The Croats had already made a pact with the Muslim

16     side to make a coalition and to build an independent and sovereign

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That was the provocation he made and you reacted.  I

18     understood what you said as a joke, because I repeat I did not know you

19     as that kind of person.

20        Q.   Thank you.  What can you tell us about these different colours of

21     ballot papers, especially the yellow ones, because you saw back there

22     that Sagolj says we claimed it was for technical reasons?

23        A.   Yes, it was for technical reasons, because when counting we

24     wanted to know how many members of other ethnic communities accepted our

25     idea of living in a common state.  If the Court allows me, I would like

Page 36371

 1     to make a small digression.

 2             If we were to analyse the programmes and the documents of the

 3     Serbian Democratic Party, the HDZ, and the SDA, if we were to make a

 4     sociological analysis, we would see that in our platforms all of us

 5     advocated democratic principles and those programmes coincide a great

 6     deal, especially in enactments.  We differ mainly on one issue:  In what

 7     kind of state we are going to live in.  That was where the disagreement

 8     was.  HDZ and the SDA wanted the principle of the majority to rule.  They

 9     wanted to out-vote others, to out-vote us and marginalise us.  So through

10     these yellow ballot papers, we wanted to see how many members of other

11     ethnic communities agree with the idea of living together in a common

12     state.  We were just testing the ground.  That was our aim, not what

13     Sagolj and some others suggested.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Did that yellow colour of the ballot paper have a

15     special meaning or connotation?  Why was it yellow and not something

16     else?

17        A.   No matter what colour it was, they would always find something to

18     object about.  I know that yellow was chosen randomly so that we, the

19     technical services, could more easily analyse.

20        Q.   Could we now see 65 ter 31994.  And you, of course, know who

21     Miodrag Simovic is?

22        A.   Yes, yes.

23        Q.   Who is Miodrag Simovic?  Can you tell the Court?

24        A.   Miodrag Simovic is a professor at the law school of the

25     university.  He was deputy prime minister during the multi-party

Page 36372

 1     government.  He was the deputy prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a

 2     candidate of the Serbian Democratic Party.  He is now teaching at the

 3     university in Sarajevo, and he's also a member of the academy.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Before we upload this document, yes,

 5     Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Thanks, Mr. President.  Well, I'm having a hard time

 7     seeing how this won't run afoul of the general principle that I

 8     discussed.  I mean, if Dr. Karadzic had said do you remember that I told

 9     Mr. Simovic or Mr. Simovic told me, that would clearly be a leading

10     question.  I don't know where we're heading here, but it seems to be

11     potentially the same problem, because I don't know exactly offhand what

12     the text of this intercept is about.  It's difficult for me to speculate

13     about.  It's a relationship to something that was just raised, but it

14     doesn't seem like this is going to work without being leading.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the topic was the colour of

16     the ballot papers, and it is clarified in this intercept, but I wanted

17     the Chamber to know who Miodrag Simovic was, what his importance and his

18     position was, but I didn't want to say it myself.  I wanted to elicit it

19     from the witness.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Well, let us see.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we get the next page,

22     Serbian 2, English 3.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   I'll read out towards the bottom.  Karadzic says:

25             "Uh-huh.  And tell me about some of our other neighbours.  Some

Page 36373

 1     of them are interested.  Others are afraid of the plebiscite.  Is that

 2     your impression too?"

 3             And Simovic says:

 4             "I believe many more people of other ethnicities will turn out at

 5     the referendum --"

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   "-- than we can guess at this moment."

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Serbian next page, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   And then he goes on:

12             "That's what I think from some of my impressions from my contacts

13     with him.  That's my impression.  You see, after all it's a great thing

14     when we say Yugoslavia, declaring oneself in favour of Yugoslavia.  They

15     know it all."

16             And he goes on to say that 90 per cent of them know that without

17     Yugoslavia there is nothing.

18             And then on the next page he says:

19             "Although yesterday in 'Oslobodjenje' in some report he repeated

20     it, saying that the colour yellow denotes a second-rate people,

21     second-rate citizens, and I say he is a complete fool.  I say he's a

22     complete fool.  We wanted the colour to be white.  The printing press

23     said they had no yellow paper and white was -- sorry, they had no white

24     paper and yellow was cheaper anyway.  And then I say again, he's an utter

25     fool."

Page 36374

 1             So were we trying to send a message using that colour?  Did we

 2     try to humiliate anyone?

 3        A.   No.  No, we had no such intention.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Concerning the election of the secretary, it was

 5     interpreted or translated that I was not nominated to become president of

 6     the party.  Is nomination and election the same thing or are they two

 7     different things?

 8        A.   They are two different things.  You can be nominated by somebody,

 9     whereas election means that one is elected either by all citizens or by a

10     certain circle defined by a document.  That's the difference.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Is there a difference between nomination and

12     appointment?  The secretary of the Executive Board as a neutral body,

13     does he vote for one or the other faction or does he keep his neutrality?

14        A.   As I've already told you, the election or appointment is a more

15     democratic form than nomination because it arises from the opinions and

16     the decisions of a majority, the majority that is eligible to vote,

17     whereas anybody can be nominated even by an individual.  I already

18     explained that I as the secretary was appointed based on the advertised

19     opening and by virtue of my position I was a member of the Executive

20     Board.  I was not nominated.  I was elected.  A nomination is less

21     democratic than appointment based on the advertised opening for a

22     position.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

24             MR. TIEGER:  No.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

Page 36375

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3205, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Two more minutes, one document.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   You were shown some sentences from which it stems that everybody

 5     listened to me, that I was an autocrat, especially when it came to

 6     Krajina.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me.  Excuse me, please.  I'm quite certain

 8     that I didn't use that term.  This is commentary and leading at the same

 9     time and needs to be avoided.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely.  The Chamber agrees with Mr. Tieger.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  I apologise.  I will

12     rephrase.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   The picture that Mr. Tieger represented about me as a --

15             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Why doesn't Mr. Karadzic simply go to the specific

18     reference or to the subject matter without trying to characterise it or

19     comment on it in any way?  It would seem to me to be much simpler.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Do you need a break, Mr. Karadzic?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will finish before the break.

22     It's very difficult, though, because Mr. Tieger made such a salad of his

23     questions, so he showed so many documents that portrayed me in quite a

24     different way, and now I would like to ask Mr. Komad what he knew about

25     my relationship with people in the field, especially with the leaders in

Page 36376

 1     Krajina.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I have already spoke about

 3     your behaviour and conduct, about how you interacted with people as

 4     president.  I showed as much as I could that you used all the possible

 5     democratic principles that could be applied in all of your activities,

 6     including what you did in Krajina.  So I can't say anything else.  I

 7     can't present any other of your traits than the ones that I did.

 8             In my written statement it says that your tolerance sometimes

 9     went beyond what could be expected resulting in a lack of consistency.

10     When I was talking about activities as a president, I said that the

11     meetings of the main boards were attended by people who had not been

12     invited to attend them, but you believe that everybody had the right to

13     have their say, that everybody had to be given the possibility to say

14     what they wanted to say.  I would like to confirm that when it comes to

15     your attitude towards Krajina and the issues there, you sought democratic

16     solutions that would be applied across the board including Krajina.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   On line 23 you said "a lack of systematic nature" and it was

19     recorded as "inconsistency."

20        A.   I would like this to be translated as the lack of systemic nature

21     because at meetings you would set -- you would refrain from setting up

22     the agenda.  You left it to the others to do that.  Sometimes you would

23     even didn't -- would not do that.  It was not very practical.

24        Q.   My last question:  Did the Krajina leaders listen to me?  What

25     was their attitude towards me?  Did anybody listen to me, especially

Page 36377

 1     those people from Krajina?

 2        A.   I believe that a majority respected you, that they showed

 3     respect, and as a result of that they agreed with you.

 4        Q.   Did they obey me blindly?

 5        A.   No, no.  There were dialogues.  I don't want to say that there

 6     were arguments.  There were dialogues which were sometimes heated, I

 7     would say.

 8        Q.   Did somebody have to pay the price for disobeying me or

 9     contradicting me?

10        A.   I don't know of any such examples.

11        Q.   I am not going to call up a document which has already been

12     admitted, which is P2552.

13             Thank you, Mr. Komad.  Thank you for the co-operation that I had

14     with you over the years, and thank you for coming to testify.

15        A.   Thank you as well, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Well, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Komad.  On

17     behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The

18     Hague to give it.  Now you're free to go.

19             But before we rise for a break, there are a couple of

20     housekeeping matters I'd like to deal with now.  The first is scheduling.

21                           [The witness withdrew]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Pursuant to the courtroom schedule on the intranet,

23     it is noted as we are sitting for three days in the week of 20th of May,

24     but given that Monday is a UN holiday, Whit Monday, we will be sitting on

25     Friday as well, that is 24th of May, unless it would cause a lot of

Page 36378

 1     problems with the parties.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Let me simply say, Mr. President, that when we

 3     consume UN holidays or for -- and add them to the schedules, it's much

 4     more difficult for the parties, I believe, because the services are quite

 5     different.  So apart from the fact that it prevents hard working

 6     personnel - and everyone is working extremely hard - from getting what I

 7     would think is a much deserved break, it also becomes much more difficult

 8     to cope with preparation during that period because so much of the staff

 9     is otherwise gone, and I suspect that is replicated on the Defence side

10     as well.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I see the point, but it has been our practice,

12     hasn't it, that while we are sitting four days a week when there's a

13     holiday, we still continue to sit four days a week even if there's a

14     holiday.

15             MR. TIEGER:  It has been our practice, which is why I was able to

16     make the comments I did on the basis of experience, and as I say, I

17     suspect it would be echoed by the other side.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, we would prefer -- we've

20     already scheduled all our witnesses for May, and we would have to now

21     round up two more, which we'll do it if you order us to, but it's -- the

22     information that we -- that coming from the Chamber, and the registry is

23     not always very clear to us.  For example, we thought we weren't

24     signature on this Friday for a long time, and nobody notified us until a

25     calendar popped up and all of a sudden we were sitting on this Friday, so

Page 36379

 1     we scrambled and we have enough witnesses for this week, but when we saw

 2     the calendar for May there were two weeks in which we only had three-day

 3     weeks, and so we scheduled the witnesses accordingly and it makes it

 4     difficult.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We have three-day week in the week of 6th of

 6     May, but there seems to have been a mistake as regards the week of 20th

 7     May, but I will -- the Chamber will consider the issue, but you have

 8     problem with sitting on Friday, 24th of May specifically.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, we don't have a problem with that other than

10     we would have to recruit some more witnesses for that period, and I don't

11     know -- I think there's enough time between now and then we can probably

12     do that.  So we don't have a problem specifically with that date, but it

13     makes it difficult for us when we get conflicting information about the

14     calendar.  So had we had the information originally when we filed -- when

15     we prepared for May, we would have had no problem with that.

16             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will come back to this issue in due

17     course.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From my point of view as a person

19     of a certain age, I was hoping for some more breaks.  This rhythm is

20     killing us all.  We are working very hard.  Our witnesses follow in a

21     very rapid succession.  I'm not complaining.  I'm just trying to make

22     sure that the Trial Chamber has that in mind.  We all have to stay

23     healthy.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

25             The final matter is related to the exhibit issue.  The Chamber

Page 36380

 1     recalls that on the 20th of March, 2013, it requested that CLSS provide a

 2     revised translation for a specific excerpt of the video admitted into

 3     evidence as Exhibit P2 -- I'm sorry, P6211.

 4             The Chamber has now received a revised transcript in B/C/S as

 5     well as the corresponding English translation of this excerpt, and

 6     although there are only slight differences, the Chamber finds it

 7     preferable to have the revised versions in e-court.  Accordingly, the

 8     Chamber instructs the Prosecution to upload the revised versions of the

 9     B/C/S transcript and English translation as provided by CLSS to replace

10     those documents currently in e-court.

11             We will resume at 1.30.

12                           --- Recess taken at 12.45 p.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 1.34 p.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  For the record, Judge Lattanzi cannot be with us for

15     this session due to her official function.

16             Yes.  Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

18     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Bjelica.  Please be seated and make

20     yourself comfortable.

21                           WITNESS:  MILOVAN BJELICA

22                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

24                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

25        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Bjelica.

Page 36381

 1        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. President.

 2        Q.   Like everyone who speaks Serbian, I have to ask you and to remind

 3     myself to speak slowly and especially to make a pause between question

 4     questions and answers.  Have you given a statement to my Defence team?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  May I call up in e-court 1D7980.  Please look at the

 7     screen.  Do you see your statement on the screen?

 8        A.   Yes, now I do.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed this statement?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Could we see the last page so that the witness may

12     identify his signature.

13        A.   Yes, this is my signature.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you have

15     said?  Are there any errors?  Are there any corrections needed?

16        A.   Yes.  It is a faithful reflection of what I said.

17        Q.   Do you have your statement before you?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Well I shall ask for the leave of the Trial Chamber if you need

20     to use it.

21             If I were to ask you the same questions today as you were asked

22     when this statement was taken, would your answers be essentially the

23     same?

24        A.   Yes.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Excellency, I

Page 36382

 1     tender this 92 ter package.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I just note the revised statement has been filed,

 3     but I haven't had the time to check what the differences are.

 4             Mr. Robinson.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  There have been several

 6     paragraphs added to the revised -- to the original statement which deal

 7     with adjudicated facts and some additional documents which are referenced

 8     in the statement.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I just checked paragraph 23.  In my version I

10     already have paras 60 to 82.  But reference to 1D7305 has disappeared in

11     the new para-23.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  That's actually in paragraph 59 now, and I think

13     it was --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Fifty-nine, yes.  It was my mistake.  I thought it

15     was para 23.  Yes, 59.  It remains there.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, it was actually listed as an additional

17     exhibit because it wasn't listed at the time we submitted this list and

18     we have taken a position to put all untranslated documents as additional

19     exhibits pursuant to the Trial Chamber's instruction, but we have in the

20     meantime received a translation, so if the Chamber would be willing to

21     consider it as an associated exhibit, that would be helpful.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I remember you rose before I asked the question.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  I did rise just to tell you that there were 25

24     associated exhibits being offered and eight of them are not on our 65 ter

25     list and we would ask that those eight be added to our 65 ter list mostly

Page 36383

 1     because they were received after the list was submitted.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Can I hear from you, Ms. Gustafson.

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Good afternoon, Your Honour.  Thank you.  Yes, as

 4     we indicated in our e-mail yesterday evening, there have been 23 new

 5     paragraphs added to the statement, paragraphs 60 through 82.  They

 6     reference a total of 17 new documents not mentioned anywhere else in the

 7     statement.  Clearly this goes beyond the minor corrections and

 8     clarifications permitted at this stage under Rule 92 ter, so in our

 9     submission these additional paragraphs should be led live.

10             I note Mr. Robinson's comments a moment ago that there is now a

11     translation for 65 ter 1D07305.  As far as I'm aware, we have not yet

12     received that, so I had also objected to the admission of that document

13     and paragraph 59 which is essentially devoted to a discussion of that

14     document.  If I can see the translation, I'd be happy to reconsider

15     whether that objection still stands or not, but until I can see the

16     English, that's difficult for me to do.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think there would be any problem for the

18     Defence to lead live about 1D7305.  Do you have any observation to make

19     as regards the recently added paragraphs?

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We offered to the Prosecution

21     to postpone the cross-examination of this witness so that they can have

22     enough time to digest that material, and they've told us that they have

23     enough time to digest the material and go ahead with the

24     cross-examination now, but in line with the Chamber's practice they were

25     requesting it be led live.  If I'm misquoting Ms. Gustafson, she can tell

Page 36384

 1     me that, but that was my understanding of their position.

 2             But our position is that this is Dr. Karadzic's contribution and

 3     the only time he can make the contribution to his evidence, and we think

 4     that any remedy ought to be to have the Prosecution have as much time as

 5     they need for cross-examination.  If you want to lead the evidence live

 6     as long as it's not charged against our time, we have no problem and

 7     we're not prejudiced by that, but we would be prejudiced if we would have

 8     to spend against the 300 hours that we're given for our whole case to

 9     lead evidence that can simply be postponed so that the Prosecution has

10     enough time, and that's we think a more valuable use of the Chamber's

11     time and a better remedy.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If I can just comment on one remark Mr. Robinson

14     just made, which is that this is Dr. Karadzic's contribution and the only

15     time he can make the contribution.  In this case, the bulk of these

16     additional paragraphs are the witness's comments on a number of documents

17     that were shown to him, and I see no reason why if Dr. Karadzic knows he

18     wants to do this he can't communicate sufficiently with his Defence team

19     to ensure that this is done well in advance so we are not faced with this

20     kind of -- this bulky new material at the last minute.

21             And just in terms of the practice, it has been the Chamber's

22     consistent practice when this kind of volume is added at the last minute

23     of new material that this is led live and I believe there's a good reason

24     for that.  We are in this instance able to absorb this material into our

25     preparations and we don't need a delay, but if there is no

Page 36385

 1     counter-balance in terms of some impact on the Defence's time, then in

 2     our view there will be no limit as to the amount of additional

 3     information that will appear in these 92 ter statements, and it will

 4     become a significant problem in terms of our preparation.  It is not a

 5     simple matter to 24 hours prior to a cross-examination absorb and deal

 6     with this amount of new material.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  And your argument is that the minor changes that is

 8     to be covered by the so-called 48-hours rule is limited to really minor

 9     things so that these cannot be said to be minor changes.

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Exactly, Your Honour.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Without repeating too much, I don't think we could

13     really live with that kind of rule given that this is Dr. Karadzic's only

14     opportunity to have input, and if he's relegated to a minor player in his

15     own trial, I don't think that that's fair.

16             Also, Mr. President, in terms of remedies for whatever let's say

17     violations there might be, the Prosecution had many disclosure violations

18     for which there were no remedies.  So if you use the same logic that

19     Ms. Gustafson has used, there would have been remedies for those

20     violations to make sure that they didn't occur again, but also when you

21     did give us six or eight weeks to deal with late disclosure, you didn't

22     deduct that from the Prosecution's 300 hours.  So it would be similar if

23     you were to give -- make us lead this evidence live.  You shouldn't

24     deduct it from our 300 hours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  One more question for clarification.  You said that

Page 36386

 1     the Prosecution said to you that it is -- it would be okay to go ahead

 2     with cross-examination.  Could you expand?

 3             Or whether Ms. Gustafson could clarify that?

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Yes, Your Honour.  It's just that we don't need

 5     any additional time to prepare for this new material, just our position

 6     is it should be led live.  And just in response to Mr. Robinson's remarks

 7     about past disclosure violations, this is the practice the Chamber

 8     applied to the Prosecution [Overlapping speakers] --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just one question.  Even if the Chamber is to decide

10     to admit these paras, you are not asking for additional time for the

11     preparation of your cross.

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  No, I'm not.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Given the circumstances, i.e., given that the added

16     material is not that much and that the Prosecution is ready to proceed

17     with her cross-examination, we'll admit the statement but not the

18     document whose 65 ter number is 1D7305.  That paragraph should be led

19     live.  We'll give the number for the statement.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  That is Exhibit D3206, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  And just I forgot to raise this:  Mr. Karadzic, the

22     Chamber had an opportunity to skim through the statement.  Para 44, the

23     Chamber -- we will keep the first and last sentence, but the other part

24     should be redacted, as well as paragraph 45, 47, and paragraph 49 to 51.

25     They do contain too much detailed evidence, including names, ages of

Page 36387

 1     victims on crimes against Bosnian Serbs that are not relevant or

 2     necessary.

 3             With that caveat we admit this statement, and the other

 4     associated exhibits will be admitted and will be given numbers in due

 5     course by the registrar.

 6             Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  In light of Your Honour's ruling admitting these

 8     23 additional paragraphs, unless there's been a recent change, there are

 9     no translations for 65 ter 1D07974 referenced at paragraph 81 or

10     65 ter 05392 referenced at --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Is it the document that is being tendered?  I forgot

12     to mention that whether there's an English translation of 1D14014, which

13     is referred to in para 38.  Where do you find that document,

14     Ms. Gustafson, 7974?

15             MS. GUSTAFSON:  It's referenced at paragraph 81 and 65 ter 05392

16     referenced at paragraph 79.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I think it was listed as additional document and as

18     such I take it, Mr. Karadzic, you're going to lead -- deal with it live.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President, and also we do have

20     a translation of 1014 that I can see in e-court, so I don't know if

21     that's a problem with e-court.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We didn't have the time to look at it.  If

23     Mr. Karadzic could lead it live as well.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 36388

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will now read out in

 2     English the summary of Mr. Bjelica's statement, and then I will deal with

 3     the documents that need to be led live.

 4             [In English] Milovan Bjelica was born on 19th of October 1958 in

 5     Rogatica, Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He now permanently resides in Sokolac

 6     municipality.

 7             Milovan Bjelica was a member of the SDS in the Sokolac

 8     municipality.  He held several positions.  First, in 1990, he was a

 9     member of the Sokolac Assembly.  Later, in May 1991, Mr. Bjelica was

10     elected as vice-president of the SDS Municipal Board.  On 13th of

11     January, 1992, he became president of the SDS Municipal Board in Sokolac.

12     He was also a member of the SAO Romanija Assembly.

13             The SDS was formed during 1990 following the formation of the

14     SDS -- SDA and HDZ.  In July that year, the founding assembly of the SDS

15     was held in Sarajevo.  The party's key objectives were to preserve

16     Yugoslavia and the equality of the Serbian people in B and H.  The most

17     important organ of the SDS was the Main Board, and the Assembly which

18     was -- among other things elected president of the party and implemented

19     decisions of the SDS Assembly.

20             Following the declaration of sovereignty of BH on 15th of

21     November -- October 1991, it resulted in the breakdown of co-operation

22     that had been established following the inter-party elections 1990.  On

23     21st of November, 1991, the Serbs in BH adopted a decision to verify the

24     proclaimed Serbian autonomous regions and later that year the reserve

25     police force, Territorial Defence, and some reserve forces of the JNA

Page 36389

 1     that were mobilised due to the mounting political tensions.

 2             Muslim forces began to establish paramilitary groups, and by

 3     January 1992, the Patriotic League was fully formed.  There were sabotage

 4     and terrorist attacks carried out by the Muslim units.  There was also

 5     information that Muslims were volunteering fight in Croatia against the

 6     Serbs and bringing home weapons which alarmed the Serbian population.  On

 7     April the 4th, 1992, the Rump Presidency of BH, which did not include the

 8     participation of the two Serbian representatives, declared a general

 9     mobilisation of its police, military, and paramilitary units.

10             The Crisis Staff Sokolac municipality was formed in early April

11     1992.  The Crisis Staff was independent in its work and received no

12     instructions from the Presidency and National Assembly of Republika

13     Srpska.  There was no obligation to send documents of the Crisis Staff to

14     those organs of the Republika Srpska.  The Crisis Staffs were -- that

15     were formed in municipalities and local communities were not a secret

16     system of command and control.  The Crisis Staff in Sokolac functioned in

17     a democratic manner and helped with normal work and life in the

18     municipality.  A meeting of the Crisis Staff was held on 23rd of April

19     that called for the maintenance of good ethnic relations and a return to

20     normal life.  SDA members refused to attend the meeting.  Although the

21     Crisis Staff called on the Muslim people for tolerance and co-existence,

22     they started leaving the Sokolac settlements and all settlements where

23     they were a minority population they left.  There was no pressure of the

24     authorities for them to leave, and some remained at their homes nearly

25     until the end of the war.  Those who remained lived in peace and were not

Page 36390

 1     abused.

 2             In the summer of 1992, as the member -- as the number of killed

 3     and wounded of Serbian Army, police, and civilians increased, the VRS

 4     called on civilians to hand over their weapons.  Muslim units did not

 5     respond to that call and sabotage and terror continued.  The already

 6     difficult situation in Sokolac increased when large numbers of Serbian

 7     refugees started to arrive.

 8             In summer of 1992 a number of incidents occurred in which Serbian

 9     civilians were killed by Muslim extremists.  The VRS 2nd Romanija Brigade

10     decided to demilitarise the area and Muslim units put up armed

11     resistance.  Casualties were sustained on both sides.

12             There were no paramilitary or para-police units in Sokolac during

13     the war.  There were some informal groups of young men who terrorised

14     both Muslims and Serbs, but with gradual establishment of authorities,

15     these groups disappeared and these persons were expelled or arrested.

16     There were no camps or prisons in Sokolac municipality, nor there were

17     any instructions from the state authorities to set them up.

18             Milovan Bjelica was aware of two incidents in June and September

19     1992 in which 50 and 44 civilians -- Muslim males had been killed.

20     Regarding the incident in June, Milovan Bjelica only knew details of the

21     incident after the exhumation of the bodies, because the incident was

22     kept secret from the public.  Regarding the second, Milovan Bjelica heard

23     that it was committed by an informal group of Serbian youths, that the

24     perpetrators covered up the crime, and that representatives of the

25     Sokolac authorities were not informed about.

Page 36391

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   And now I would like to ask you to tell us something about your

 3     relationship with the regional command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade, i.e.,

 4     the relationship of the civilian authorities and that military command.

 5     For example, in September or in the course of the summer of 1992.

 6        A.   May I?  When it comes to the co-operation between the local

 7     civilian authorities of Sokolac municipality during that period of time,

 8     we had a Crisis Staff in the municipality of Sokolac.  It was active

 9     sometime up to the month of June or July.  After that, the Executive

10     Board of Sokolac municipality was set up.  The communication between the

11     command of the 2nd Motorised Romanija Brigade and the local authorities

12     in Sokolac municipality, i.e., the Executive Board and the president of

13     the municipality, was not satisfactory.

14             It was asked from the local authorities to provide additional

15     funds for the military, primarily for the food, fuel, cigarettes, the

16     food for the families of the combatants who were on the front line,

17     because at that time people did not receive salaries, which is why food

18     had to be supplied for the combatants as well as for their families.

19             The authorities in Sokolac municipality requested from the

20     brigade command to put a number of army members on standby to be given

21     work obligation in the companies that were still open.  They did not have

22     enough trained and skilled workers for production, and that merely

23     applies to the forestry and timber industry known as Romanija.  We did

24     not meet with the full understanding on the part of the command of the

25     2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade which resulted in misunderstandings.  The

Page 36392

 1     command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade characterised this as interference

 2     with the line of control and command in the units of the Army of

 3     Republika Srpska, and it reported back to its superior command about

 4     that.  We are going to see that document later on in the courtroom.

 5             The brigade commander reported back to his superior command with

 6     this regard.  That's why the relationship between one part of the command

 7     on the one hand and the authorities of Sokolac municipality were not --

 8     was not good.

 9        Q.   I would like to call up 1D07305.  This is a document which is

10     mentioned in paragraph 59.

11             Please pay attention to this document.  You have just mentioned

12     something that I would like you to talk about.  What is this document?

13        A.   This is document -- the document that I have just mentioned.  You

14     can see that the command of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade addressed

15     its superior command, i.e., the Main Staff, and I can see from the

16     document that it also contacted the Supreme Commander, i.e., the

17     president of the Serbian Republic.  It transpires from this document that

18     the command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade informs them that civilian

19     authorities should not interfere with the work of the military so that

20     the political structures of Sokolac municipality cannot do that.  They

21     have their orders from the superior command that they were supposed to

22     carry out and that they report only to the military leadership and the

23     state leadership of Republika Srpska.

24             Here they're trying to portray this as political interference,

25     but it wasn't political interference.  Things were just as I explained

Page 36393

 1     them in my previous answer before I was shown this document.

 2        Q.   In English it is on the next page, and in Serbian it is the last

 3     paragraph here.  The brigade commander claims that the SDS in Sokolac is

 4     also interfering and requesting that all of his activities should be

 5     subjected to the interest of the SDS.  How correct is that, or is it just

 6     a matter of antagonism?

 7        A.   The SDS never interfered with the control and command of those

 8     units, because that was not within the party purview.  The party purview

 9     was to encourage the local authorities to put in place conditions for a

10     normal life of our combatants and the local population in Sokolac

11     municipality.  The situation was the same elsewhere.  There was no

12     interference whatsoever, and during that period the work of the Serbian

13     Democratic Party was frozen.  So we could not interfere on behalf of any

14     party organs because it was you on a certain date, I don't know when

15     exactly, sent us a directive.  You sent it to the municipal structures of

16     the Serbian Democratic Party to put the activities, political activities,

17     of the party on hold, to suspend it for the time being.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  No objection.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll accept it.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3232, Your Honours.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Were you a member of the Crisis Staff?  Did you know anything

24     about the decisions that were made by the staff?

25        A.   Yes.  I became a member of the Crisis Staff by virtue of my

Page 36394

 1     position on the day when it was set up.  As far as I can remember, there

 2     were several persons who were members of the Crisis Staff by virtue of

 3     their duty.  President of the municipality; the president of the

 4     Municipal Board of the SDS; the chief of the police station, the local

 5     police station in Sokolac, that is; chief of the Defence Department in

 6     the municipality; representatives of the industry, education, health

 7     care.  Some were members and some attended the meetings of the Crisis

 8     Staff when needed.  The members of the Crisis Staff were never from one

 9     party alone.  There were also representatives of the other political

10     parties in Sokolac that were a member of the Crisis Staff as well.

11        Q.   How did the Crisis Staff deal with alcohol abuse and other risky

12     behaviours that might have led to the escalation of the crisis and

13     violence?

14        A.   We had such situations that certain individuals who returned from

15     the front line arrived in settled areas with weapons.  They would go to

16     local pubs where they had one drink too many, and then they would use

17     their firearms, i.e., they would open celebratory fire as we call it.  In

18     order to prevent such unfortunate events, to prevent those things that

19     could lead to accidents, the Crisis Staff discussed the issue and issued

20     orders to the effect that there would be a ban on serving alcohol in pubs

21     and on carrying weapons in settled areas or on public premises.  There

22     was a ban of bringing weapons to any place where there might be larger

23     groups of people present.  So we did everything possible in order to

24     prevent any unfortunate events that may have tragic consequences.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D4383.

Page 36395

 1     That document is mentioned in paragraph 79.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

 3        Q.   When you say celebratory shooting, where was fire most commonly

 4     opened?

 5        A.   It could happen in a pub or around a pub, in places like that.

 6        Q.   And when fire was opened did they aim at anything?

 7        A.   No.  It was opened in the air.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, could you look at the document and tell us

 9     whether that document is familiar to you?  You mentioned a number of

10     bans.  What can you tell us about that?

11        A.   This is exactly what I've just described.  I'm familiar with the

12     document, Mr. President.  This is a document that the Crisis Staff

13     issued -- or, rather, it adopted a decision and tasked the public

14     security station in Sokolac with the implementation of this decision.

15     Inspection services were tasked with the implementation of this document.

16        Q.   Can you read for the benefit of the Trial Chamber paragraph 2.

17     Can you please read it allowed.

18        A.   "All catering establishments in Sokolac must stop operating no

19     later than 24 June 1992 at 1800 hours."

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Where is this document referred to?  You said para

22     79?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 79.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Robinson?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.  In paragraph 79 I see that

Page 36396

 1     it's document 5392.  So we have to look a little bit further.  I'm

 2     advised it's the same document.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. Gustafson?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 65 ter number is different.

 5     It's 5392, whereas 1D is 4383.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I mean, I have no objection to it being MFI'd

 8     pending translation.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll mark it for identification.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3233, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber when you finally managed to

14     consolidate the municipal authorities during the first year of war, and

15     to what extent could it control the developments there?

16        A.   The municipal authorities did everything in their power to

17     maintain public order in the territory of our municipality and to provide

18     for the security of citizens in Sokolac.  However, it was a tall order.

19     There was a lot of weapons.  People returned from the front line.  They

20     were known to use weapons randomly from time to time.  We tried to react.

21     We had some shake-ups in the personnel of the public security station in

22     Sokolac in order to improve the situation as best as we could.  However,

23     things were not intolerable, but our goal was prevention in order to

24     avert any fatal consequences to the detriment of the security of the

25     citizens.

Page 36397

 1        Q.   In September 1992, did the Crisis Staff still function?  What was

 2     the composition of the power in September 1992?

 3        A.   As far as I can remember, in September 1992 the Executive Council

 4     of the municipality was already operational.  As far as I can remember,

 5     but I'm not sure.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And now I'd like to call up 1D7974.  This document is

 7     mentioned in paragraph 81.

 8             I would like to draw your attention to paragraph 2 where it says:

 9             "There was a unanimous conclusion to the effect that in the

10     territory of the municipality no legal regulations could be carried out

11     or implemented because the public security station Sokolac is not

12     functioning properly and because competent services cannot put a stop to

13     lawlessness which is constantly on the rise."

14             How do you interpret this, and how does this tally with what you

15     know about the power or the impotence of the authorities?

16        A.   That was already the time of an imminent threat of war which was

17     declared.  It was the area of responsibility of the

18     2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, and the public security station in town

19     controlled and made sure that laws were applied.  However, we were not

20     happy with the situation.  There were a few incidents that involved a

21     group of police reservists who controlled traffic at certain locations,

22     and a number of citizens complained, which is why the Executive Council

23     sent a request -- or, rather, a letter to the Ministry of the Interior

24     which was headquartered in Pale, telling them that the situation had

25     deteriorated and that it would be desirable to carry out a shake-up in

Page 36398

 1     the personnel in order to stop smuggling, thefts.  We even had some armed

 2     attacks against individuals.  There were also attacks at the public

 3     security station in Sokolac.  Those attacks were carried out by certain

 4     individuals who jeopardised the functioning of the authorities, the

 5     implementation of the law, conclusions and orders by the Presidency of

 6     Republika Srpska.

 7             The lack of will power in the then public security station to

 8     prevent such incidents jeopardised the security of the citizens of

 9     Sokolac and threatened to lead to the state of anarchy.  That's why we

10     asked the Ministry of the Interior to help the local authorities to

11     prevent this and to make sure that the citizens were safe in their town.

12        Q.   Thank you.  What conclusions and orders by the Presidency of the

13     republic are referred to that you had no power to implement them?

14        A.   For example, guaranteeing safety to all citizens residing in the

15     territory of Sokolac municipality and protecting the functioning of the

16     legal institutions of Republika Srpska at the time.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Be it from the Presidency, the government, or the

18     ministry, were any orders or instructions received that would distinguish

19     between people based on their ethnic or religious background in Sokolac?

20        A.   No, never.  Not a single document made us conclude at the time

21     that there was any kind of discrimination aimed at anyone in particular

22     or an ethnic group or an individual.  That was never the case.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted, and

25     paragraph 81 is the reference paragraph.

Page 36399

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3234, Your Honours.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   You just said that there was no difference in the way people were

 5     treated in the documents that were received in terms of distinguishing

 6     between the population in terms of religion or ethnicity.  You also

 7     mentioned that people left some villages, some Muslims, whereas in other

 8     villages they stayed.  Can you tell us what is the difference?  Can you

 9     cite the villages in your municipality and neighbouring municipalities

10     that were inhabited by Muslims who remained there, and what was the

11     difference between those who left and those who stayed?  To what extent

12     did it depend on the decisions and conduct of the authorities, and what

13     was their own behaviour?

14        A.   The villages neighbouring Olovo that were part of the

15     municipalities of Knezina and Kaljina at the beginning of the crisis and

16     upon invitation of the then municipal president from Olovo

17     Mr. Dzevad Abazovic were emptied.  People moved to the territory of

18     Olovo, and they took their cattle with them as well as whatever property

19     they could take in order to find shelter, because there were front lines

20     nearby, and so as to preserve their lives and property.  That is why they

21     responded to Dzevad Abazovic's call who came there together with the

22     president of the Serb municipality of Olovo, Mr. Milovan Zugic.  They

23     came to Knezina to a meeting with the leadership of Sokolac municipality.

24     On behalf of Sokolac municipality the meeting was attended by the

25     Municipal President Mr. Milan Tupajic, president of the Executive Board

Page 36400

 1     of Sokolac municipality, the chief of prison station in Sokolac, and I

 2     think at the time the chief of the CSB of the Sarajevo-Romanija region

 3     Mr. Cvijetic.  It was agreed that one part of the Muslim population move

 4     to the territory of Olovo, whereas another part or a part of the Serb

 5     residents move to the territory of Sokolac.

 6              That is what took place in the two local communes.  In the

 7     villages of Novoseoci, Vrbarije, and Burati that were in the direction of

 8     Rogatica, the population remained there, and some remained even after the

 9     Dayton Accords were signed.  Food was secured for them, and they had a

10     designated shop where they could supply themselves with basic necessities

11     which was as one enters Sokolac.  It was agreed upon by the

12     representatives of those villages with a municipal president.  They could

13     go there so as not to mingle with the rest of the population in town.  We

14     were afraid that if there were more of them in the town itself that it

15     may result in casualties.  We thought they would be safer at the entry

16     point in Sokolac, although there were people who came to town

17     individually buying what they needed.

18             I know there were problems with working the land and harvesting.

19     It was difficult to receive fuel, but Sokolac municipality did make it

20     possible for the residents of those villages to have fuel as well that

21     they could use for their agricultural machinery and whatever machinery

22     was necessary for them to go about working their land.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Line 15 on this page, let us try and clarify

24     something.  You said that at an entry point to the town there was a shop

25     that was dedicated to their supply so as not to mix with the refugees,

Page 36401

 1     whereas we seem to have victims in the town.  Can you tell us what the

 2     risk was?  What would be the risk of mixing these two populations and how

 3     many refugees were there in the town itself?

 4        A.   There were many refugees from Sarajevo and its municipalities

 5     such as Centar, Novi Grad, Hadzici, Stari Grad, Olovo, Kladanj, and some

 6     were from Zenica too.  The risk was that they would mix with the families

 7     which had by that time during the war lost their members due to combat

 8     with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We -- it was an attempt to suppress

 9     any kind of provocation or retaliation aimed at the Muslim population.

10     That was the reason for their personal safety, because by that time we

11     had had at least several dozen victims of Serbian ethnicity in the

12     territory of our municipality, and those who came from Sarajevo and

13     Olovo, some of them lost their nearest and dearest as well.  In Sokolac

14     itself during the war, there were some 1.300 killed soldiers and

15     civilians who were buried during that time.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned Vrbarije.  Until what time did the

17     residents, Muslim residents of Vrbarije remain living in their village

18     near Sokolac?  When did people leave and how?

19        A.   I cannot recall a specific date, but I know that they remained

20     for a few years at least in their village and that they co-operated well

21     with their neighbours.  Once they decided to go when the crisis was --

22     well, the situation was very difficult by that time.  It was difficult to

23     secure food and other necessities.  Then a number of them decided to go

24     to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled territory.  This was

25     arranged with international organisations.  I think it was the ICRC that

Page 36402

 1     was involved in it.  As far as I know, it was reported on by TV crews.

 2     It was recorded by the Serb radio and TV as well as by foreign crews.  It

 3     was broadcast in the media where people could see how they left and

 4     bidding farewell with their Serb neighbours, and both sides were crying

 5     and kissing, et cetera.  Once the crisis was over they returned, and as

 6     far as I know to date they live well with their neighbours, aiding each

 7     other.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  As for the arranged move between Knezevo and Olovo,

 9     was it on a permanent basis or was it temporary, and were there any

10     returns there?

11        A.   It was on a temporary basis.  I've said already that it was to

12     provide shelter for them for the time being in the municipalities of

13     Knezina, Olovo, and Kaljina.  By that time there were incidents on the

14     borders of those municipalities.  It was also for the sake of Serb

15     civilians for Olovo to find shelter in RS territory.  It was initiated by

16     the Olovo municipal president, a Bosniak Muslim, Mr. Dzevad Abazovic.

17     That move looking from this position was a good one, because most of them

18     surprised.  A number of Serbs returned to Olovo, and most of the Bosniaks

19     returned to their property and hearts.  They had left both with the

20     cattle and whatever property they could take temporarily, and they

21     returned immediately following the Dayton Peace Accords.  They still live

22     there and their children attend schools there, although there aren't too

23     many of their children theirs there.  In any case, they are religiously

24     active and their co-operation with their neighbours is a good one.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Abazovic, what party did he belong to?

Page 36403

 1        A.   As far as I know, the did.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D7991.  I think we

 4     have the subtitles in English so that we can follow it.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   What party was he?  You said he was the SDA?

 7        A.   Yes, the Party of Democratic Action.

 8        Q.   Abazovic was in the SDA.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now see this footage.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             "This is the village of Vrbarije near Sokolac in Bosnia inhabited

13     mainly by Serbs and Muslims.  After the imposed Dayton Peace Accords, the

14     villagers were aware of what this meant to them.  And as the town became

15     part of the Serb entity, the Muslims decided to collectively leave to

16     their own entity

17             "THE INTERPRETER:  [Voiceover] Both of you are in tears.

18     Neighbours, today you are parting ways.

19             "That we are.

20             "Well, is it hard?

21             "Yes, as you can see two neighbours saying goodbye in tears.

22             "From the depth of my hard and his.  Definitely.

23             "Definitely.

24             "You lived together for so many years.

25             "As many years as he's lived, together for 68 years without

Page 36404

 1     fights or disagreements, always helping each other our entire lives and

 2     now as well.

 3             "And how is it now?

 4             "It's hard.

 5             "Was there any abuse by the other side?  Was it bad for you here?

 6             "Never.  It couldn't have been better.

 7             "Are you sad?

 8             "Of course I'm sad.  We're saying goodbye to our neighbours.

 9     We've always liked them.  We got along great.

10             "Did the Serb kids ever provoke you or cause any problems?

11             "No, never.  Everything between us was good, just like before.

12             "No disagreements, no pressures, no fights?

13             "No, never, never here.

14             "You're alive and well?

15             "Alive and well.  Never had the slightest problem.  Lots of

16     people came, soldiers, different ethnic groups.  Nobody even gave me a

17     dirty look.  Our neighbours are here.  We're all crying.  We're saying

18     goodbye the way human beings should.

19             "I want things to be like before, for problems to get fixed so we

20     can live together again.  I want Yugoslavia back like it was before."

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you.  It is stated that these people left after the

23     agreement, after their village became part of the Serb entity.  During

24     the war were any of these people killed or were any Serbs killed by these

25     people?

Page 36405

 1        A.   None of them were killed.  There were cases close to their

 2     villages, perhaps not in the village itself, a mine was laid or mines,

 3     and upon return following a funeral when Ilija Macar and his wife were

 4     coming back, they came across those mines near the village and were both

 5     killed.  However, no one ever blamed the people who lived there for it,

 6     because we realized that it was some kind of provocation.  It was so

 7     clarified to me, and that those people should not pay for that.  They

 8     continued being treated the same way.  You can see that they are well fed

 9     and clothed as they left.  And they returned after a while, perhaps a few

10     years later after the Dayton Accords were signed.  They still work on

11     their land today.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Bjelica.  I didn't say that, but I suppose that we

13     will find it in the statement.  You are the mayor of Sokolac today;

14     right?

15        A.   Yes, I am.

16        Q.   You were elected by direct ballot; right?

17        A.   Yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender the video-clip into

19     evidence?

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I've got a number of objections to the

21     video-clip.  Firstly, the witness wasn't asked any questions about the

22     actual clip, so he wasn't asked to recognise anything or whether he'd

23     seen this before or what it depicted, so there's just a basic lack of

24     foundation for its admission.  In addition, we were informed that this

25     clip comes from a movie called "The Weight of Chains" that from what we

Page 36406

 1     can gather on the internet was created in 2010 that appears to take a

 2     clip from a source that is not apparent on the video, so we don't know

 3     where the original footage comes from.

 4             I also note that in the first few seconds of the video the

 5     commentator states that:

 6             "After the imposed Dayton Peace Accords, the villagers were aware

 7     of what this meant to them, and as the town became part of the Serb

 8     entity, the Muslims decided to collectively leave to their own entity."

 9             Now, that is directly contradictory to the accused's own case on

10     what happened to these villagers.  He tendered with the previous witness

11     from Sokolac D3189, which is the document from the Sokolac SJB to the

12     Sarajevo CJB stating that the 61 civilians from Vrbarije were transferred

13     to Kula prison in October of 1994, which is well over a year before the

14     Dayton Peace Accords, and this witness has said in his statement, and

15     again he indicated in his testimony, that these people left in 1994 and

16     in his testimony just now he said they returned sometime after the Dayton

17     Peace Accords.

18             So there are some serious concerns about the reliability of this

19     video and for those reasons we object to its admission.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I clarify things with the

21     witness?  First of all, the witness did mention Vrbarije on several

22     occasions.  Second of all, he mentioned that some people left in 1994 and

23     that some left after Dayton.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

25        Q.   Mr. Bjelica, do you know who actually recorded this footage at

Page 36407

 1     the time?

 2        A.   Well, I can see Mr. Skiljevic who was a TV journalist.  He was

 3     affiliated with the radio television of Republika Srpska.  I can also see

 4     Ms. Suzanna Obradovic who was also a journalist.  I can see

 5     Milomir Vitomir, Nedzo Vitomir, Mr. Kadri, and some others whom I know.

 6     I'm familiar with this.  I was not there, I was not on the spot, but I'm

 7     sure that this is an authentic document which aired on the media.

 8             I commented upon this document in the Krajisnik case.  The

 9     document was original.  I was a Defence witness for Mr. Krajisnik.  It

10     was sometime in April 2006.  And this video-clip was shown and tendered

11     into evidence in that case.  Perhaps it was not the same version, 2010.

12     It was the authentic document which aired on radio television and there

13     was another international channel that aired that same programme.  I

14     don't know which one.  The journalists are Skiljevic, Obradovic, Vitomir,

15     Djokics, and the others whom you can see kissing their neighbours and

16     saying their good-byes to them.

17             I've already told you that some of the locals left before the

18     Dayton Accords, some left after the Dayton Accords, but they all

19     returned.  Sixty or so people left on that day, but nobody ever killed in

20     either Vrbarije or Burate.  Those are two villages bordering on Sokolac

21     and Rogatica or rather halfway between Sokolac and Rogatica.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, is this enough?

23     The video-clip was edited later, and in 2006 it was shown before this

24     Tribunal in a different case as the original footage that was shown on

25     television.

Page 36408

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you agree that this is part of movie which is

 2     called "Weight of Chains"?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was used subsequently as a

 4     document in 2010, whereas in 2006 [Realtime transcript read in error

 5     "1996"] Mr. Bjelica used this document in the courtroom when it was not

 6     part of the whole show.  I keep on repeating 2006 and it keeps on being

 7     recorded as 1996.  2006.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  It's not clear from Mr. Bjelica's answer who filmed

 9     this and when.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Serbian Radio Television.  He

11     said that.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Can you help us, Mr. Bjelica?  Which channel produced this clip?

14     And you already told us about the journalists.

15        A.   The Serbian Radio Television and Radio Romanija produced this

16     video-clip.

17        Q.   When was that?

18        A.   On the day when they left.  It was shot on the spot.

19             JUDGE KWON:  When was it, Mr. Bjelica?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It may have been sometime in late

21     1995 or early 1996.  After the Dayton Accords were signed in any case.  I

22     can't give you the exact date, unfortunately.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Just two remarks.  Dr. Karadzic's answer wasn't

25     clear, but I assume the Defence will agree as they told me this this

Page 36409

 1     morning that this video-clip we just saw came from a movie called "Weight

 2     of Chains" which, as I said, from the internet appears to have been

 3     created in 2010.  Also, Dr. Karadzic has picked up on Mr. Bjelica's

 4     assertion that this video was played in the Krajisnik.  It certainly

 5     wasn't played in court in the Krajisnik case because I have recently read

 6     Mr. Bjelica's testimony in the Krajisnik case several times and there is

 7     no video played.  So I don't know where that comes from.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that I'm right and that I

 9     understood Mr. Bjelica who said that he used the information from that

10     film.  That film existed in 1995, and it became part of the documentary

11     in 2010.  That's how documentaries are made.  The existing materials are

12     used and compiled in order to make up a documentary.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think the Chamber has sufficient a

15     foundational provenance of this film to be admitted at this stage.  Until

16     that time, we'll mark it for identification.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3235, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I think I have some -- you have some further

19     questions, but we'll do that tomorrow given the time, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, your Excellency.  I am done

21     with my examination-in-chief.  I believe that Mr. Peter Robinson will be

22     able to understand the concerns about these excerpts and we will be able

23     to obtain more information or maybe a better copy from the TV house that

24     produced it.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Are you not tendering 1D14014?

Page 36410

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.  Everything that we

 2     have led live is being tendered into evidence.  A total of three

 3     documents and the video-clip that we've just seen.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We should lead that live

 5     tomorrow morning.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             Mr. Bjelica, before we do, how do you spell your last name.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I spell it for you?

 9     B-j-e-l-i-c-a.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  There's no i before j.  That's what I

11     wanted to confirm with you.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, there's no i.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will adjourn for today and continue

14     tomorrow.  Can I advise you not to discuss with anybody else about your

15     testimony here.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

17             JUDGE KWON:  The hearing is adjourned.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.52 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day

20                           of April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.