1 Tuesday, 9 April 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.51 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. I would like to apologise
7 to the witness, to the parties and the public for the delayed start this
8 morning and for the late change of the courtroom. Despite best
9 endeavours of the Tribunal's staff, we were unable to commence
10 proceedings in Courtroom III at the scheduled time due to a leak in the
11 public gallery and the courtroom which caused a few ceiling panels to
12 collapse. In the interests of giving the public access to today's
13 proceedings, the Chamber has moved the hearing to Courtroom I and for the
14 record, hereby expresses its sincere gratitude to the
15 Mladic Trial Chamber for their kindness to accommodate our request on
16 short notice.
17 That said, would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
19 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
20 WITNESS: MILORAD DODIK
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, President Dodik. Please be seated and
23 make yourself comfortable.
24 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies. Good
1 morning to everybody.
2 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.
4 A. Good morning, Mr. Karadzic. I extend my regards to you, the
5 Excellencies and everybody else present in the courtroom.
6 Q. Please state your full name for the record, as well as your
7 father's name and state your date and place of birth.
8 A. Milorad Dodik, born on the 12th of March, 1959, at Banja Luka.
9 My father's name is Bogoljub.
10 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the translation, and I would also
11 like to ask you to wait for the cursor to stop before you start speaking.
12 For the record, please outline briefly your education.
13 A. I graduated from primary school at Aleksandrovac [phoen] where
14 I was born. I graduated from secondary school at Banja Luka, and
15 I obtained my bachelor's degree in political sciences in Belgrade. I'm a
16 politologist by training.
17 Q. What did you do before you engaged in politics, or if you did
19 A. Early on, as a young man I was politically active. I was
20 president of the youth organisation in my birth place, that was at the
21 time of former Yugoslavia. Later, upon graduating from the faculty of
22 political science, I returned to the Laktasi municipality where I still
23 live, and I was elected president of the Executive Board of the
24 municipality. Since that time, I've been in politics.
25 As far as my previous education and training goes, I have
1 already described it.
2 Q. As a member of which political party did you run on the first
3 multi-party elections and then were elected to your position at Laktasi?
4 A. I became a member of the alliance of reformists in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was elected to the highest leadership in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I was president of the regional board of the
7 Bosnian Krajina as it was known then. It comprised some
8 20 municipalities that gravitated to Banja Luka. At the first
9 multi-party elections, I was a bearer of the elder role, and I was
10 elected to the first multi-party assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina before
11 the war.
12 Q. Before that war and after this war?
13 A. Yes, correct.
14 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell the Chamber who was the head of
15 the political party at the level of Yugoslavia and at the level of
16 Bosnia, and what was the party's position in terms of resolving the state
17 crisis. The rest is perhaps not interesting.
18 A. The president of the party at the level of Yugoslavia was the
19 then federal prime minister, Ante Markovic. And the republican
20 organisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was led by Professor Nenad Kecmanovic.
21 The basic approach to the resolution of the crisis was the preservation
22 of Yugoslavia and that it should join the European integrations. The
23 Prime Minister Markovic made great efforts to that effect at the time and
24 many times, in conversation with him, especially after the war, and in
25 particular over the last few years, he kept asserting that the leadership
1 of Slovenia played the greatest role in breaking up Yugoslavia, and he
2 could have prevented the breakup because the Slovenian leadership headed
3 by Milan Kucan insisted on independence and secession of Slovenia.
4 Q. Thank you. And as for democracy and economic issues, perhaps you
5 could tell us just one sentence about the orientation of this political
7 A. It had at its heart free democracy and multi-party system, and
8 free market was the hallmark of its attitude towards economy.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell the Trial Chamber how big was the
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in which your party won a certain number of
11 votes, or rather, seats and what was the composition of the assembly?
12 A. The composition was multi-party. This party that I was in won
13 around 10 per cent of the votes at the time. There were a number of
14 parties, the most important being the Party of Democratic Action, which
15 was led by Izetbegovic; the Croatian Democratic Union, which often
16 changed its president but I think that at the moment it was Mr. Kljujic;
17 the SDS, whose president were you; then we had SDP which was led by
18 Nijaz Durakovic; the reformists led by Nenad Kecmanovic; we also had the
19 liberals and the Serbian Renewal Movement and some smaller parties. They
20 all made up the political spectrum of the first multi-party assembly in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first three parties I enlisted, the Party of
22 Democratic Action, the HDZ and the SDS, began talks immediately after the
23 elections and they constituted the authorities at the Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 level while we remained in the opposition.
25 Q. Thank you. Was your party defined as a national party, that is
1 to say an ethnic party or was it multi-ethnic?
2 A. In our party, the members were representatives of all peoples or
3 all ethnicities that was clearly defined and we all knew who belonged to
4 which ethnicity, but it could be conditionally called multi-ethnic
5 because it had the representatives of all ethnicities.
6 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber what was the founder and the
7 president of the party at the level of Yugoslavia by ethnicity. I mean
8 Ante Markovic?
9 A. Ante Markovic was a Croat by ethnicity and he also hailed from
11 Q. And he was personnel from the Republic of Croatia; correct?
12 A. Yes. He was the cadre from Republic of Croatia.
13 Q. Thank you. Can you please briefly describe for us how this first
14 multi-party assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina looked, in terms of how it
15 faced the problems that were arising? How did you view the functioning
16 of the assembly in view of the challenges which arose at the time, rather
17 outside of Bosnia than in Bosnia itself. I mean Slovenia and
19 A. Well, it was obvious that first of all the
20 Party of Democratic Action which was the first one to be established as a
21 markedly ethnic and ethnically oriented party in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
22 persistently trying to implode the sensitive balance in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina through its activities, and the balance was based on
24 the fact that there were -- and there are three peoples living in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think the Serbian error and the error of the SDS
1 was that it was trying to defend the break-down of the balance in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina which was caused by the SDA led by Izetbegovic.
3 Throughout this early period it was evident that the SDA insisted on
4 taking over all the jurisdictions and to control all of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the beginning, we believed that it was proof that
6 the right that had been acknowledged even earlier by the communist system
7 should be broken down and that the aim of Izetbegovic was to create a
8 unified Bosnia, a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such conduct on his part
9 and the part of his party caused national or ethnic based regrouping even
10 of the people who were in other political parties and in particular it
11 drew distinct borders between the peoples or ethnicities in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily the Croats and the Serbs who opposed this
13 and the Muslims at the time because it was only 1993 that they
14 constituted themselves under the name Bosniaks.
15 It is my conviction that Alija Izetbegovic, in this period,
16 worked hard to promote his Islamic Declaration which had been written
17 earlier on and which requested for introduction of a society that would
18 be based on Sharia law and Islamic values in this territory. He had
19 clearly stated that in his Islamic Declaration earlier on and he was
20 brought to trial in the former Yugoslavia because of that. We were well
21 aware of the text of this declaration and I could see on a daily basis
22 how the political goals stated in Alija Izetbegovic's declaration were
23 being worked out in practice. The declaration clearly said that wherever
24 the Muslims established the authorities, they had to organise an Islamic
25 state and that as long as they were a minority, they should stay calm, be
1 integrated in the society, but once they became the majority they should
2 strive towards this goal without any doubt. So even though the SDS
3 elected me as a political representative of the Serbian people who was
4 supported en masse at the elections I thought that this was a policy of
5 dangerous intentions and that in this sense Izetbegovic lay the
6 foundations for the conflict which followed and which was dramatic in the
7 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conduct of other political parties,
8 primarily the Croatian Democratic Union at the time, was directed towards
9 giving support to the independence of the Republic of Croatia rather than
10 supporting the Croats within Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was why the
11 Croatian Democratic Union was integrated on the basis of the principles
12 aimed at the break-down of Yugoslavia.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger?
14 MR. TIEGER: The question was: How did you view the functioning
15 of the assembly in view of the challenges which arose rather outside of
16 Bosnia. Then the witness moved into a discussion about, among other
17 things, the Islamic Declaration, not a word of which is mentioned in the
18 65 ter summary that was provided to us. I realise when evidence is being
19 led viva voce it's not entirely controllable, but I think given time
20 concerns and notice concerns, that the accused needs to be a little more
21 careful about assisting the witness in addressing the questions asked.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I leave it to the accused. Could you
23 lead the witness in a proper way.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will.
25 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will, thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. In transcript, on page 6, lines 22 and 23, it is not correctly
4 recorded what the witness said because it turns out that he said that the
5 [In English] SDS elected me as a political representative of the Serbian
6 people [Interpretation] And the witness said that even though I was
7 outside the SDS, which represented the Serbian people and had great
8 support, I could still see and I was involved in the political life.
9 More or less like this. But the substance was that it was not the SDS
10 who elected someone, President Dodik had his own party and he entered the
11 parliament with it.
12 A. Correct. Mr. Tieger, I have sufficient time and I have come here
13 to talk. I have been called to appear before this Court and please do
14 not interrupt me because the context I'm talking about is very important
15 to understand how the assembly operated. Because without being able to
16 understand this --
17 JUDGE KWON: The point was to concentrate on answering the
18 question. Mr. Karadzic will lead you, if necessary. Please continue,
19 Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. How did the political parties you mentioned posit themselves in
23 view of unilateral secessions or the Slovenian initiative to break down
25 A. My party was against breaking up Yugoslavia, the SDA. The party
1 led by Mr. Izetbegovic wanted an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. It
2 wanted Yugoslavia to break down. The HDZ also wanted a break-up of
3 Yugoslavia and it supported Croatia's unilateral secession both in the
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, whereas the SDA [as interpreted] opposed the
5 break-up of Yugoslavia and was oriented towards seeking a compromise for
6 a continuation of joint life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 Q. Thank you. What was the position of the
8 Croatian Democratic Union as regards the secession of Bosnia, and what
9 was its position as regards its internal organisation?
10 A. I would like to say that I'm convinced, and the facts point to
11 that, all that happened later, that Izetbegovic's decision that Bosnia
12 should secede was a unilateral secession act. He did not have the power
13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would allow him to make such a decision. When
14 Izetbegovic made the decisions that Bosnia should be declared an
15 independent state he did not have any Serbian representatives in the
16 institutions of the government or in the authorities in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, such authorities were not constitutional
18 and were not representative. Therefore, the unilateral secession of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina was something that was very transparent and evident
20 and it was the cause of the later conflict. As for the HDZ, it at first
21 supported unilateral secession of the Republic of Croatia at the time.
22 It is a fact that its president, the president of the
23 Croatian Democratic Union, was also the president of Croatia,
24 Mr. Tudjman, which shows that this organisation had an identical goal,
25 even though it was based in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second goal which
1 was concealed was an alliance with the Muslims, that was the goal of the
2 HDZ, and it had to do with making decisions about the status of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but evidently that was not sincere because several
4 months after that, a war broke out between the Muslims and the
5 Croatian Democratic Union and this war between them lasted more than two
6 and a half years.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you can take a look at the transcript,
9 page 8, previous page, line 23, I take it the "SDA" should read the
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.
12 Exactly, the witness said that but it hasn't been recorded properly.
13 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. What was the position of the Croatian Democratic Union in view of
16 the internal organisation of such an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
17 what was the position of the Serbian Democratic Party and also the
18 Serbian deputies from other parties as regards the internal make-up of
20 A. The Croatian Democratic Union promoted and set up the
21 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna which in fact established power in its
22 territory. Their main political goal was the dissolution of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and joining the Republic of Croatia which caused armed
24 conflicts between the Muslims and the Croats, as I said earlier. So in
25 the early stage of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, they used the
1 opportunity of the organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina to support the secession
2 of Croatia in the first place, and then later on they organised and
3 implemented the plan to set up the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna so
4 that it could secede the join the Republic of Croatia. As for the
5 Serbian Democratic Party, the SDS at the time, it should be said first of
6 all that the SDS formulated policies which aimed at honouring and
7 observing the political and constitutional system as was extant at the
8 time, and it proposed that it should be expanded in order to recognise
9 and observe the ethnic and people's rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the
10 conditions had changed. In this early period of the multi-party system
11 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an initiative to form another Chamber which would
12 be called the Chamber of peoples in the assembly is well known and the
13 role of this Chamber would have been to protect the interests of the
14 three peoples. The leading Muslim political parties and the leading
15 Croatian political parties did not accept this, so the initiative of the
16 Serbian Democratic Party which was launched and which we all supported
17 did not result in any constitutional changes at the time.
18 Q. Thank you. What sort of majority was envisaged for the adoption
19 of constitutional changes or amendments and the change of the status of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia and the internal constitutional
21 issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What majority was needed according to the
23 A. A two-thirds majority was envisaged and it also included the
24 involvement of legitimate representatives of all peoples and ethnic
25 communities. That was why Izetbegovic himself could not tackle the
1 changing of the constitution because he could not ensure that he would
2 have the necessary majority and he wanted to redefine the constitution as
3 the constitution of a unitary country. Whatever happened later was
4 decided by the violation of this basic principle which meant that first
5 of all everyone had to be involved, that the constitutional provision of
6 a two-thirds majority had to be observed and that what had to be taken
7 into account in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the carefully balanced structure
8 that I will talk -- be talking about a lot today because it is the only
9 basis on which Bosnia-Herzegovina can survive, even today.
10 Q. Now that you have mentioned today's Bosnia, can you say what are
11 the main problems today as opposed to the period between 1990 and 1992?
12 A. Well, it's 20 years later, but the political positions of course
13 are almost identical.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, let me indicate to the witness it's my
16 responsibility to monitor whether the examination is proceeding along
17 relevant lines. I don't mean to interrupt him at all. So in this case,
18 I wonder about the relevance of this question to the issues in this case.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I agree, Mr. Tieger.
20 Mr. Karadzic, bear that in mind. The situation today --
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond to this?
22 Your Excellencies, through this witness who is well-versed and is
23 performing an important function now, I want to see whether the problems
24 between 1990 and 1992 were caused by the appearance of one party or are
25 they part of the nature of our relations in that part of the world?
1 I consider this to be very relevant.
2 JUDGE KWON: The situation today has nothing to do with your
3 case. Please proceed.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Can you please try to remember how many deputies were there in
7 the then assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and how many Serb deputies were
8 there in comparison with the two-thirds majority criterion?
9 A. This is generally known fact, I suppose. I cannot remember the
10 exact figure right now but I know that there were around 86 or 7 Serbian
11 deputies from all political parties, of which the greatest number was of
12 course from the SDS and then from the alliance of the reform forces which
13 was my party. From the SPO I think there were two deputies and 83
14 deputies from various political parties. Due to the developments in
15 November 1991, an assembly of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 was established in order to show quite clearly the political goals that
17 had to do with the way Bosnia-Herzegovina would be organised once it left
18 Yugoslavia. I also participated in the work of this assembly and also
19 other colleagues from my political party. There were representatives of
20 other political parties as well, and they were not only SDS deputies,
21 which indicates that we all understood the situation at the time and that
22 we rallied around protecting the basic political goals of the Serbian
23 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of the particular political
24 party to which they belonged.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. The indictment against me states that
1 the time, or rather, the period when I joined the so-called
2 joint criminal enterprise was October 1991 up until the
3 13th of November -- 30th of November, 1995. Can you remember whether the
4 assembly was formed in October or in November? I mean the assembly
5 of the Serbian people.
6 A. Possibly it was October. I cannot say exactly now. There is
7 information about that. It was in the autumn. But what is important is
8 that basically this was a multi-party political assembly, not a
9 mono-party political assembly. As a participant, I did not notice, and
10 it wasn't possible to ascertain that later either, that what they say you
11 are responsible for actually happened. The assembly of the Serb people
12 wanted the Serb people to be protected and organised in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they remain within Bosnia-Herzegovina with
14 clearly defined rights as they should have, and that was legitimate and
15 legal. No actions were referred to at the time, especially not violent
16 ones, in order to ensure these rights. Discussions and agreements were
17 called for, and that is what was pursued with the relevant political
18 factors in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Q. Thank you. So in that respect the indictment says that from
20 October at the latest Karadzic took part in joint criminal enterprise and
21 that the population of Muslim and Croat ethnicity should be removed on a
22 durable basis from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then various crimes were
23 committed, and the indictment lists them. Let us leave aside the fact
24 that claiming right to certain territory is not a crime. Did you notice,
25 ever, such positions in the SDS as described, especially with regard to
1 the lasting removal -- permanent removal of Croats and Bosniaks?
2 A. I heard about that only later after the war, when indictments
3 were being prepared for responsible people. I never heard at a single
4 assembly or at a single meeting about the promotion of such objectives
5 and you never said that. I never heard you say that, that you asked for
6 something like that, and you were not in the function of issuing orders
7 for anything, let alone anything criminal.
8 Q. Thank you. You said a moment ago that after October, discussions
9 were held and agreements sought. Could you tell the Trial Chamber how
10 the negotiations process evolved. Until the end of March 1992, what kind
11 of attempts were made to find a peaceful solution, from October up until
12 April 1992.
13 A. The very fact that after October and after the assembly of the
14 Serb people was established, the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina continued
15 to function shows that this was not a unilateral act. Rather, this was
16 an act that was supposed to affirm the rights that should have been equal
17 to those enjoyed by the other two peoples. There was also an assembly
18 held in January. I participated in that assembly as well. And then a
19 possible solution was discussed and also the establishment of Bosnia on a
20 new foundation. So the Serb side and my party had certain proposals to
21 the effect that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised as a community
22 that would affirm collective and joint rights of all.
23 Of course, this could not come to fruition because Izetbegovic's
24 idea was that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a unitary country with a
25 political system of one man-one vote which would mean that Bosniaks would
1 have absolute domination. This could not have been accepted then and it
2 can never be accepted in that area. There were many talks that were held
3 and the most important ones were those within the initiative of the
4 European union led by a Portuguese diplomat, Cutileiro, that resulted in
5 the so-called Lisbon Agreement. That was well known then and that meant
6 that within the Cutileiro Plan Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised --
7 actually, you heard Cutileiro here, and I hope that you are aware that
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organised on a new basis. However, when
9 Izetbegovic returned to Sarajevo he withdrew his signature, rejected that
10 plan, and then continued his unilateral policy which shows that he did
11 not want a solution, a political solution.
12 Q. Thank you. As a participant, an active participant and founder
13 of the assembly of Serb people and later on the National Assembly of
14 Republika Srpska, did you take part in the process of accepting this
15 Lisbon Agreement, this Lisbon plan? Did I report to the assembly? And
16 also the acceptance of that plan in that assembly, was it sincere and
18 A. Yes, of course I remember that. I remember that meeting of ours.
19 I just wish to remind you that you met with a great deal of resistance in
20 your own party, but with your own authority you asked for this plan to be
21 accepted. After that, the assembly as a whole accepted it. However,
22 I must say that from that moment onwards, there were major doubts as to
23 whether the other side would go for it as well.
24 Q. Thank you. Before that, the Serb community, and this assembly as
25 a whole, did they make any concessions in respect of their best
1 objectives and their first original interests and their best interests
2 and did they accept that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be independent and
3 on what condition?
4 A. You said then that this was an unavoidable compromise and that it
5 required giving up on certain objectives, and it was obvious through the
6 debate amongst us, the MPs, this plan was not a full affirmation of all
7 the previously set objectives. It was a compromise. You agreed to it
8 and after that the assembly agreed to it, too, in order to preserve
9 dialogue and the political process which made it possible to find a
10 solution by political means.
11 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how our acceptance to
12 leave Yugoslavia on the basis of the Lisbon Agreement, how the Serb
13 people as a whole took that and how the assembly took that?
14 A. Of course, the Serb people took that with disbelief, primarily
15 they wished to remain within Yugoslavia and they believed in that. We,
16 the political representatives of that people, believed in the idea of
17 Yugoslavia and that proved to be the best idea for the Balkan region. It
18 is precisely the disintegration of Yugoslavia that led to major
19 destruction in the Balkans and in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
20 The Serb people, that is to say accepted this with certain feeling of
21 disquiet, but they trusted the leadership and they were absolutely
22 prepared to carry out these agreements on the condition of course that
23 peace be preserved primarily in the area.
24 Q. Would the people have accepted to give up on that condition, too,
25 that is to say the existence of our own entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
1 Would the people have accepted a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, and which
2 are the peoples that would have accepted a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. Then, in the past and today, the Serb people reject a unitary
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think that at the time you, as president,
5 insisted -- I mean had you insisted on that concept then you would not
6 have enjoyed any support because the Serb people needed a guarantee for
7 their status. The Serb people live -- were a relative majority in the
8 former Yugoslavia and they were supposed to be turned into a marginal
9 minority in a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina and they would have been
10 outvoted all the time and this was part of the awareness of each and
11 every individual and that is why the political solution sought by the
12 Serb people were such. You could not have gone any lower than what was
13 accepted in Lisbon. The Serb people would not have gone for that.
14 The HDZ at first pretended, trying to represent themselves as a
15 party that wanted some kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, there was a
16 clear objective that the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna secede from
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, the parties of the
18 Bosnian Muslims exclusively existed on a unitary system in Bosnia with a
19 clear organisation, with a central republican power and the
20 municipalities, without any kind of middle level that would have ensured
21 equal national rights in the area. Definitely today I can say that one
22 of Izetbegovic's major mistakes was that he did not take into account the
23 sincere wishes of the other peoples who were supposed to be feeling free
24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so his behaviour only led to increased fear in the
25 other two ethnic communities, especially the Serbs and Croats.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness kindly
2 be asked to speak slower. The pace is too fast for interpretation.
3 Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Could I remind both of you to speak slowly and put a
5 pause between the questions and answers, for the benefit of the
6 interpreters and us. Thank you.
7 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. President, at the time, and probably today as well, these two
11 communities, did they actually represent the Christian majority there and
12 how is it possible to harbour that kind of ambition to impose a unitary
13 concept upon this Christian majority by the Muslim minority?
14 MR. TIEGER: All right. I will not object to that question,
15 although I think it appears initially to call for speculation, maybe the
16 witness and the accused have discussed where they want to go so that it
17 will be a response that bears on the issues here but I may be objecting
18 to that depending on where it goes.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the phrase "probably today as well"
20 was unnecessary. We'll see how it evolves. Or could you reformulate
21 your question, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'm going to leave out the
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. At the time these two ethnic communities, did they comprise the
1 Christian majority, and how is it possible to expect that a unitary
2 Bosnia be imposed upon them by the Muslim minority? I beg your pardon.
3 And you established that they did not have two-thirds, but from this
4 point of view could they impose their concept upon the Christian
6 A. According to the census from 1991, which was never formally
7 adopted because it involved a great deal of wrong-doing, but at the time,
8 the Muslims had about 46 per cent of the population, the Serbs 33 per
9 cent, and the Croats 17 per cent. This was preliminary. And perhaps it
10 is close to the actual state of affairs which shows that indeed in the
11 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Christians were a majority. Izetbegovic
12 was, I have to go back to that again, it's a fact, his
13 Islamic Declaration says so clearly, their political struggle for an
14 Islamic state has to be one of perseverance. He didn't want to miss the
15 opportunity of promoting those objectives then either. No matter what
16 this looks like to anyone, you in the Chamber, you in the Prosecution and
17 the public, I did recognise his activities at the time and how he was
18 carrying out his political plan in an operative sense. It has elements
19 of fanaticism, too. Probably there was also a concealed support that we
20 could not see or recognise then, support that he received from elsewhere.
21 That is why he persevered in his efforts, although they were not
22 realistic at the time.
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Now, this persistence in working for
24 these objectives that were against the majority, how did this affect the
25 outbreak of the war and the war option as such? What they wanted to
1 achieve, could that have been achieved through voting and who needed war
2 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for which objectives?
3 A. Izetbegovic did not have a political majority; his political
4 party didn't, his partners didn't. Without a majority that is needed for
5 decisions that were -- involve representatives of the Serbs and Croats --
6 I mean, he simply did not have that kind of majority, and that is what
7 the core of the matter is as far as the outbreak of the war in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned. Izetbegovic then started falsely
9 identifying himself as the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as he tried
10 to rally international support for his project. Of course, this
11 encouraged members of his ethnic community, and it persuaded them that
12 they were right in their political objectives, as they tried to implement
13 that political project. What is well known is that within Izetbegovic's
14 political party, the so-called Patriotic League was established and it
15 started arming the Muslims. This is best attested to by the fact that
16 the first killings in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina were committed
17 on ethnic grounds, motivated by ethnic principles, and it was Serbs who
18 were killed by Bosniaks. The others, especially the Serbs, perceived
19 this as something that led to affirming the necessity of better
20 organisation in pursuing their national interests and objectives.
21 Q. [No interpretation]
22 JUDGE KWON: Could you start over again?
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Let us go back to the Cutileiro Plan or the Lisbon Agreement.
25 You said that the assembly heavy-heartedly but honestly accepted that
1 plan, I mean the Serbian assembly. Did that plan make possible any use
2 of force or eviction of Muslims and Croats from the territories that were
3 to become part of the Serbian entity?
4 A. Absolutely not. There is nothing like that in that plan. It was
5 very difficult for us members of parliament to accept that was because
6 the autonomy under the Cutileiro Plan was such that the territory was not
7 solid, and that gave rise to doubt among us members of parliament. But
8 there is no mention of ethnic cleansing, the eviction of other
9 ethnicities. We certainly wouldn't have opted for that kind of political
10 autonomy of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a protagonist of
11 politics at the time, I refuse any such argument, and consider such
12 allegations to be malicious insinuations.
13 Q. I'm afraid I -- I'm not sure that your words were correctly
14 interpreted. It says solid territory. Did you say that the Serbian
15 entity was to be made up of a territories that were not connected?
16 A. Yes. That was a feature of that plan and that made Serbian MPs
17 uneasy. The Serb autonomy was to be preserved but, still, we accepted
18 that as -- in our will to preserve the peace.
19 Q. The need for continuity, did it impose itself after the war broke
20 out, and what were the six strategic goals in your understanding, the
21 second of which was, I think, a continuous territory? And why was it
22 important as the war broke out, whereas before the war we accepted
24 A. Before the war we accepted it because it meant freedom of
25 movement and communication between the individual parts. Once the war
1 broke out, many areas where the Serbs were the majority, such as mine,
2 were isolated and surrounded. It was logical to strive to achieve
3 continuity because only thus can you make possible political, economic,
4 and of course military life at that time. I believe that to be a
5 legitimate political goal because it was adapted to the new times. At
6 the time, the Banja Luka region was surrounded and totally isolated. We
7 couldn't communicate with other areas, economically, and for months we
8 were unable to come by oil and it wasn't possible to distribute electric
9 energy. We were without electricity for months. But if we made a
10 mistake, well, I hasten to add that even today I would whole-heartedly
11 vote for the decision we took then.
12 Q. When you spoke about your party, you said that you were party
13 chief at the regional level. This area was a centre of about
14 20 municipalities. From which time did associations of municipalities
15 exist and could the individual municipalities choose to belong to one or
16 the other?
17 A. Even before the Second World War, that area was organised
18 administer -- administratively into banovinas. In socialist Yugoslavia,
19 where there were six republics and two autonomous provinces all the
20 republics had certain powers. In Bosnia-Herzegovina there were a number
21 of associations of municipalities. They were free associations and their
22 existence was conditioned by the interests of the municipalities at the
23 time. The most obvious feature of their existence were the Chambers of
24 commerce that existed at that level and the municipalities could freely
25 choose to which association they wanted to belong. So it was up to the
1 decision of the local administration.
2 Q. Thank you. A short while ago you said that the Lisbon Agreement
3 did not envisage or allow violence or violent changes to the ethnic
4 make-up. Do you know any municipalities in the RS, starting from your
5 own, where the Muslim people did not, to a significant extent, leave
6 their homes until the end of the war, and what did that depend upon?
7 A. War certainly is not a normal state of affairs. War is
8 characterised by a lot of violence and chaos, and it's very difficult to
9 control chaos. It was important to prevent chaos but once it came about,
10 those in positions of responsibility had to try to contain it.
11 Unfortunately, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were many local warlords who
12 tried to interpret the situation in their way and find their own
13 responses to it. And such -- it was the same on all sides. As for your
14 question, in my municipality, there has been a small Muslim community,
15 and nobody bothered them. They didn't have any problems, especially not
16 at the beginning of the war. When their crucial problem was the issue of
17 weapons, whether those communities were armed and ready to enter into
18 conflict with the Serbian people. However, that was not the case, the
19 Muslim settlements were not bothered. And in Srbac municipality, there
20 is a small Muslim community in the village of Kobas where the Muslims
21 stayed throughout the war, and even today the majority of the population
22 there is Bosniak. It's the same with the municipalities of Gradiska,
23 Laktasi, Banja Luka. Where I live, things went the same way, and I was
24 certainly part of political life. I was a member of the War Presidency
25 of the Laktasi municipality, and I can confirm here that the Presidency
1 never got instructions from the republican authorities to harass other
2 ethnic communities in our area. I was an MP then, and member of the
3 Presidency, and I had contact with the Muslim community. I can speak
4 about some individuals from the time. I even gave shelter to some of
5 them in my own house, because they were scared. And I think this shows
6 that efforts were made to preserve peace and stability for all. Not all
7 Serbs interpreted that properly but I never had problems, political
8 problems, due to the fact that I had contacts and provided assistance to
9 members of other ethnicities, that is Muslims and Croats. Where I live,
10 everybody is familiar with that.
11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. For the parties, transcript page 23,
12 line 6 and 7, Mr. Dodik, you said that "even before the Second World War,
13 this area was organised administratively into banovinas." I don't follow
14 what a "banovina" means. Could you clarify?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The former Yugoslavia was organised
16 based on an agreement that was reached at national level. Banovinas are
17 administrative units established by the then-authorities of Yugoslavia.
18 Banja Luka was the capital of the Vrbas banovina. So even then
19 Banja Luka was a regional centre, to which a number of municipalities
20 gravitated. There were other banovinas in former Yugoslavia, too.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, due to the belated start of today, we
22 are sort of pressed with time, tight with time. So can I ask you how
23 much longer do you need for your examination-in-chief?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could speak for hours with this
25 valuable witness, but I hope that I'll need half an hour to ask him all
1 the most important questions, and possibly I'll need some more time
2 depending on what will happen in the cross-examination. So my answer is
3 about half an hour.
4 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is minded to take a break for 20 minutes
5 at 11.20 so I would like you to conclude by then.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. President, did you -- or, rather, were you criticised by the
9 central bodies, that is the Presidency and so on, the government, for
10 founding your political association at Laktasi?
11 A. No. Never. There were some reactions by ordinary people who
12 weren't politically active but I never -- I was never criticised by
13 political institutions officially.
14 Q. You said that you gave shelter to some people. Can you tell the
15 Chamber why those people were afraid? Did they fear the authorities or
16 somebody else? I mean the Muslims in the Serbian areas.
17 A. They were afraid of chaos, and instability. But it was the same
18 for everybody irrespective of their ethnic affiliation. The very fact
19 that you don't have electricity for years and have to live in darkness
20 creates very strange circumstances and good preconditions for paranoia
21 and fear, and if you add to that combat activity then that really is
22 understandable. Let me mention a concrete incident. A Bosniak family
23 and a Croatian family lived at Gradiska until 1994, when a sabotage unit
24 from Croatia entered the area around Gradiska and the defence lines of
25 the Serbian army and among the Serbian population they committed some
1 crimes. That's when the Bosniaks and Croats became afraid, because some
2 14 Serbs had been killed in that raid. They were afraid from chaotic
3 retaliation or something of that kind. Then I sat in my own private car and
4 drove these families to Laktasi, which is some 30 kilometres or so away, and
5 gave them shelter in my house. They are still alive today and can testify.
6 I can give you their names but I don't think it's relevant for this case.
7 Q. The Defence won't ask you about their names. If necessary, you
8 can say them in closed session.
9 How far is Laktasi from the confrontation line and where did your
10 soldiers fight? Did anyone get killed?
11 A. In our municipality, in the immediate vicinity of Laktasi, there is the
12 Banja Luka airstrip. It's three and a half kilometres away or up to 1 kilometre
13 as the crow flies. In the early days of the war, the Croatian artillery shelled
14 the airstrip and there were a number of people injured and one was killed. I
15 was a member of the police at the airstrip. It was in 1992 when it was shelled
16 from Croatia. Laktasi is some 30 kilometres from the border with Croatia. Like
17 everybody at the time, the people from my municipality too were members of the
18 Serbian army and under the command of the Main Staff they were deployed according
19 to the plans in force at the time. Units from our area mostly defended the corridor
20 which for Laktasi was a matter of life and death economically and socially. And
21 the Laktasi unit was deployed from Doboj to Modrica to preserve the corridor for
22 the functioning of civilian services. Once, a Mujahedin unit composed of the
23 holy warriors of Islam raided them and killed 16 young men from my municipality
24 in a single day. I remember the day when those 16 members of our unit were
25 collectively buried. I must say that when I learned that news, I was with you
1 at Pale – I don’t know if you remember - and we spoke about some peace
2 initiatives. When you heard the news - I certainly remember it very vividly –
3 you said that it was very painful and people were killed in war, but that we
4 must keep a cool head and that there should be no more casualties. Naturally,
5 this was consistent with my own value judgement of such events. Of course,
6 Laktasi was affected by combat activities, and the municipality of Laktasi took
7 part in the struggle for their own economic and social life, in the framework of
8 the operations I mentioned.
9 Q. Thank you. How did the return of the bodies of those killed
10 affect the situation locally, and what did we say who was -- should not
11 come to harm due to such incidents?
12 A. Yes. I remember that. As with anyone including the Bosniaks and
13 the Croats and the Serbs of course, death is a dramatic moment in life,
14 in particular if we are talking about the numbers as high as those
15 I mentioned. I think that general sadness was visible among anyone,
16 whether the people were related to those who had been killed or not.
17 What is important and what I wish to say is that in the conversation
18 between you and me and members of my deputies group, as we were with you
19 at the time, you said that in Laktasi we should pay our respects to those
20 who had been killed but that must not cause a reaction that would
21 threaten the Bosnian Muslim community in Laktasi. That was what we
22 believed and how I understood that at the time. And it was explicitly
23 stated in such a way at the time. And that never happened indeed.
24 Q. So the safety of your Muslims was preserved?
25 A. Yes. They had no problems whatsoever.
1 Q. Thank you. Could you please explain a bit to the Chamber what
2 the political life was like in the assembly of Republika Srpska, whether
3 people were allowed, and did they feel free to speak openly? Were there
4 any consequences? What was it like from the point of view of freedom of
5 speech and democracy in the assembly considering that you were a fierce
6 opposition and opposed anything stupid that ever appeared?
7 A. I think that those who made analyses, and I can confirm that in
8 the assembly of Republika Srpska, from the very beginnings, the right to
9 speak out was promoted and cherished, so whoever was a member of the
10 assembly and even those who were not but were invited as guests by the
11 local officials or some other communities or representatives of various
12 social categories had the right and it was possible for them to speak
13 before the assembly. I spoke often, and my views about how to organise
14 life, especially economic life at the time, were the focus of my
15 activities. In sum, no one had any problems because he or she spoke
16 before the assembly. I want to stress that primarily there were no
17 problems coming from you as the person who was heading Republika Srpska
18 or the prime minister or anyone else. Sometimes we may have had problems
19 at the local level with inarticulate individual who did not quite
20 understand the times but it was not your responsibility. In any case,
21 I had the feeling, and so did my friends, that the assembly was
22 continuously in session, and it was not simple at all to travel at the
23 time from Laktasi to assembly sessions. You had to travel towards
24 Bijeljina along the corridor and then via Zvornik further on to Pale, if
25 it was in Pale, and very often the assembly held its sessions in
1 different places from Banja Luka, Novi Grad, Bileca, Zvornik and many
2 other places where assembly met, in Prijedor as well, where the assembly
3 sessions were held and where as a rule all the deputies attended.
4 Democratic discussion was pronounced especially when we needed to adopt
5 legal regulations. Your role in the assembly was to present the
6 situation to everyone and the freedom of decision making was never
7 threatened. You did not request that certain decisions be taken. It was
8 up to the assessments of the MPs. The assembly sessions lasted for many
9 hours. Sometimes they would end late at night, even before dawn. We
10 always made decisions by compromise. Sometimes it was difficult to
11 achieve those compromises, but that is only normal.
12 Q. Here, the Prosecution sometimes extracts certain sentences which
13 may sound extreme or quite sharp as they were stated by certain MPs at
14 the time. Can you tell us what were the rights that the deputies had --
15 MR. TIEGER: This is an astonishingly leading effort.
16 JUDGE KWON: Please reformulate your question.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Could the deputies freely express even extremist views and did
20 such extremist views or positions adopted in the documents that were
21 produced by the assembly?
22 A. Yes, there were quite opposed views about certain issues which
23 reflected the political life, but the resolution that was adopted was
24 always balanced. There were some extreme requests by deputies.
25 I remember that the assembly should state its mind about certain actions,
1 and so on, but that was never done. And in this respect, none of the
2 deputies never had -- I didn't, as perhaps someone who was the most
3 representative member of this group which held a completely different
4 political positions never had any problems except for what I just said,
5 some local inarticulate individuals who believed that they had certain
6 rights and therefore I was in some conflict with them, but this is not
7 even relevant for what we are talking about now. In any case I am proud
8 that I was a member of this assembly. I'm proud of its internal
9 functioning and precisely of the possibility to express any kind of
10 political views. In discussion with many of my colleagues, they
11 expressed a same belief and conviction. I believe that the assembly took
12 all the most important decisions, and what I could decide by analysing
13 this period ever since there is not a single decision that was made by
14 the assembly or by you as the president which was not in accordance with
15 the decisions made by the assembly.
16 Q. Thank you. Was there a document that was adopted among the
17 documents of the assembly which allowed for the possibility, let alone
18 which ordered that lawlessness should be sanctioned when dealing with
19 anyone, and in particular with minorities? Would the deputies have
20 allowed that, and could anything like have been adopted by the assembly?
21 A. In my archives, I have practically all the most important
22 decisions made at the time. They are available to the Trial Chamber and
23 the public at large. I believe - I'm convinced - that there is not a
24 single decision there that could serve as a basis for crimes, expulsions
25 or anything such. And I believe that the position towards the events is
1 something that is visible through the decision-making process. No one
2 ever stepped up and said, We mustn't make such a decision so that we will
3 not leave such a trace. No one ever said anything like that. We freely
4 made the decisions that were adopted, and of course you as the president
5 expressed your views as well, but I can also confirm that what you
6 advocated in the beginning in some of the sessions was not always
7 accepted in the form as you requested it. It was very often changed
8 during discussion, especially when we talk about the certain laws that
9 were adopted at the time.
10 Q. Thank you. Based on our system, is it the president's obligation
11 to attend the assembly sessions all the time, as I did during the war, or
12 does it depend on the specific occasion?
13 A. Only when requested, the president attends the assembly, and then
14 he has to take the oath. You attended all the assembly sessions, even
15 those that I did not attend though those were few. I believe that that
16 helped to ensure the stability of this institution, and the assembly was
17 definitely, with all due respect to you as the president, the assembly
18 was the most important organ at the time. I believe that it even
19 considered some issues which were the jurisdiction of the government, and
20 that it therefore extended the scope of its activities. But in any case,
21 I definitely believe that the assembly was the most important organ
22 during that period, and that it took all the most important decisions in
23 the relevant time.
24 Q. Thank you. As for the political parties, there were several of
25 those. Did your party or did the SDS order its deputies how to vote and
1 how to act in assembly, or were there no clubs or rather no obligations
2 to one's party during the war? How did these 83 deputies behave in terms
3 of freedom expression and acting in accordance with their own conscience?
4 A. It was known precisely who belonged to which political party.
5 Among ourselves we knew that quite well. And we respected each other
6 completely in that sense. Apart from what is mere political passion,
7 there were no special discussions or conflicts among ourselves which can
8 be seen in some other parliaments. There was nothing that could create
9 animosity or hatred between us outside of the parliament hall. We were
10 united. And on many occasions, you and the leadership of
11 Republika Srpska, not just as assembly but as the deputies as a whole,
12 you would inform us as the very delicate negotiations and talks that you
13 had with various factors from the international community about various
14 contacts and communication you had with various international forums and
15 a variety of contacts you had with other relevant factors in the region.
16 As a proof of the freedom, I might note that in 1994, deputies
17 who were not SDS members, formed an independent deputies group, and
18 formally we acted as an independent deputies group, of which I was the
19 president at the time. I then discussed with you, and you supported such
20 work in the situation, even though there were high officials in
21 Republika Srpska who did not think that it was good at the time and tried
22 to persuade us. But we did not feel any problems. We never faced any
23 problems because we set up this group and organised ourselves in such a
25 Q. Thank you. Even though we were not formally in coalition, was
1 any of your members appointed to the first government in
2 Republika Srpska?
3 A. Mr. Kalinic was the president of the deputies club of the
4 alliance of reformist forces, the party that I belonged to, before the
5 war, in the assembly, and later on they became the minister of health in
6 the government of Republika Srpska which testifies to the fact that there
7 were even offers to some members of our party to be members of the
8 government, ministers in the government. For private reasons they
9 declined, but in any case, this example testifies to what that was like.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. You preserved your Muslim community in
11 Laktasi. Did you participate with some -- my representatives, people
12 I authorised, in alleviating the circumstances for the Muslims in some
13 other parts? Do you remember Mevludin Sejmenovic who was a deputy from
14 the joint assembly, and what can you tell us about your involvement and
15 my position to -- with regard to the Muslims in that part of the country,
16 the Krajina?
17 A. I apologise. I think that we had an assembly session of the
18 Republika Srpska Assembly after St. George's day, sometime in May, and it
19 was then that, together with deputy from your party, I contacted the
20 gentleman you mentioned, a Bosniak or Muslim deputy, and he was a deputy
21 of the SDA, Izetbegovic's political party, and he lived in a Banja Luka
22 suburb or he was staying there with his relatives. I went over to his
23 house and we had a discussion about that with him. He felt some fear
24 about possible further developments. We asked him to join the work of
25 the assembly of Republika Srpska as a Bosniak, which as I felt he had
1 already accepted, but later on he declined. Our position was that you
2 and the parliament speaker, Mr. Krajisnik, should be informed about that
3 in Banja Luka, at the army centre, where the assembly sessions were held.
4 So we sat down together, we talked about that, and you just said
5 that he was welcome and that you had no objections that he should be
6 involved in the work of the assembly. Of course, later on he did not
7 accept this, but other representatives of the authorities in
8 Republika Srpska reacted in a similar way. So unless I'm mistaken, that
9 was around the 10th or the 12th May when the assembly session was held in
10 Banja Luka, in 1992. So the war operations were still not intense and we
11 communicated with these people. As for the Muslim community in the
12 Laktasi municipality, I would like to say that at the very beginning, as
13 I said, I was the head of the police unit at the Laktasi airstrip. In
14 direct contact with us was a Bosniak populated village. There were many
15 people I knew from earlier on, and I have to say that then, as the police
16 commander at the airstrip, I learned that an unofficial group of armed
17 men intended to enter this village and square accounts with the Bosniaks,
18 so I brought my unit there and I prevented them from entering the
19 village. I was supported by all the local representatives of the
20 municipality. That was around mid-1992.
21 All the representatives of the authorities of Laktasi
22 municipality supported me in this, and practically all of them were
23 members of your party, the SDS. They remained there for quite a long
24 time, and at some point just before the war, some people from that
25 community moved out to Sweden. Others stayed. At the moment some people
1 have returned. And there was no violence in that particular area, and
2 I prevented one such potential act.
3 Q. Thank you. Dr. Mirza Mujadzic who was also with you in the joint
4 assembly said during his testimony here that where there were less than
5 50 per cent of them, we did not do anything to them. How --
6 MR. TIEGER: How is that not going to be a leading question?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am quoting what Mujadzic said
8 that where they were less than 50 per cent, that we never did anything to
9 them. I'm asking the witness how this fits in with what he knew.
10 JUDGE KWON: It's in itself leading. Why don't you put your
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. President, whether there would be any conflicts, what did
14 that depend on, religious affiliation or something else, say between
15 Serbs and Muslims in that area?
16 A. First of all, I am not retarded in order to need to have anything
17 suggested to me, and it's not that something can have a momentary affect
18 on me so that I could present my position. So speaking of Laktasi, that
19 would confirm the fact that where they were not armed, where they did not
20 support military activities of the Muslims, Muslims were not touched, and
21 there were no elements of conflict or crimes against them. This was not
22 only in Laktasi. It was also in Gradiska and elsewhere. You could go
23 there and see that houses remained intact there from the period before
24 the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But I know Mirza personally. He was
25 one of the more prominent activists of that party on the ground and he
1 organised the rebellion in Kozarac, which later led to certain things
2 that happened there, and crimes as well. At any rate this just confirms
3 what I said earlier on about Alija Izetbegovic and his
4 Islamic Declaration, and in it he says, Where we are a minority we should
5 try to keep quiet but where we are a majority we should try to --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the end.
7 JUDGE KWON: Because of your overlapping, the interpreters were
8 not able to hear the last part of the witness's answer. Could you ask
9 the witness to repeat what the interpreters missed?
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. It seems to me that they got everything: Where we are a minority
12 we should try to keep quiet and where we are a majority we should try to
13 establish our own authority. Our own way of life.
14 Is that what you said?
15 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Dodik?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll finish quickly, Excellency,
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you tell us the following: What was put to many witnesses
22 was that the high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina disqualified them
23 from public life, from political life. Can you tell us what you know
24 about that, what you know about the activity of the high representative
25 in relation to certain officials and what the nature of that activity
1 was, and what the role of the high representative is in that?
2 A. The high representative of the international community was
3 established on the basis of Annex 10 of the Dayton peace agreement signed
4 by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Republika Srpska, the
5 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some imaginary Bosnia-Herzegovina
6 that did not even exist, but the international factor at the time
7 accepted that it be represented by Izetbegovic. He did not have the
8 power to sign anything on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The high
9 representative had the role to interpret the Dayton Agreement as a
10 document of international law that was signed in Dayton, and as such, he
11 had powers to take part in the civilian implementation of that agreement.
12 The high representatives, or rather several of them, permanently, in the
13 period since that office was established, violated that agreement.
14 The best example of that is Mr. Holbrooke's assessment, what he
15 wrote in his book about his activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And he says
17 I went to Bosnia with a mandate of breaking up the
18 Dayton Agreement. I had 800 employees at my disposal from the office of
19 the high representative, and 35 million marks, no, dollars, per month, to
20 do that. Everybody helped me with that. My friend Chris Patten, the
21 representative of the European union, who said that the EU was asking for
22 everything I was asking for, and that is how I broke the resistance of
23 the Serbs in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the effort to create a
24 unified state, for which many people lost their lives in
1 I think that I have faithfully quoted him. This speaks the best
2 of the intentions of the high representatives. The mandate of the high
3 representative was supposed to be to implement Dayton, not to break it
4 up. And also in this way the Vienna agreement was violated. The high
5 representative unlawfully imposed many laws. He even intervened in
6 constitutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in this way, he served the
7 purpose of the first objective of Izetbegovic's, the creation of a
8 unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. He invoked the Bonn powers that he gave
9 himself. In the Bonn powers it says that the high representative --
10 JUDGE KWON: Our time is rather limited. The question was about
11 disqualification of certain individuals from public life. Could you deal
12 with that matter?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have time, I have
14 no limit from that point of view, but I think that this is a complex
15 issue and that this kind of introduction that I've been trying to make
16 should be made. I'm trying to say that the high representative massively
17 violated the powers that he had. He intervened in the constitution,
18 changed laws, replaced persons who had been elected, and he didn't have
19 the right to do that. He invoked the Bonn powers but that was not right.
20 The Bonn powers say that the high representative can make decisions from
21 the domain of decision making of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
22 and the council of ministers, but not in the parliament of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Throughout the civilised democratic world, it is the
24 parliament that passes laws. It is only in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the
25 high representative passed laws and dismissed people in this way. Hereby
1 a certain practice was established that leads to problems that Bosnia
2 faces to this day, the Venice commission also rejected this kind of
3 conduct on the part of the high representative. But he declared himself
4 to be beyond the law and above the law, and it is impossible to do
5 anything about this. And this is a good opportunity for me to say that
6 the high representative massively violated the Dayton Agreement to the
7 detriment of the Serb people and the autonomy of Republika Srpska that we
8 obtained on the basis of that agreement.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Just another brief question: During
11 your career, were you commended? Did you receive any decorations? Did
12 you receive any awards?
13 A. From the very beginning, while I was still a student, and while
14 I worked in the former Yugoslavia, I always got top honours. In the army
15 of the former Yugoslavia, where I served, I was commended as the best
16 soldier of that generation, and later on, the highest decorations of
17 Republika Srpska were bestowed upon me. You decorated me, like all other
18 members of the war parliament, and later on I also got top decorations
19 for my work from the representatives of other countries.
20 My political efforts have only been aimed at peace and
21 stabilisation. That's the way it was, as you know full well yourself
22 during the war too, and I must say that I was one of the persons who
23 advocated the acceptance of certain international agreements, although
24 they were not the very best for us. Now I'm glad that that was not
25 accepted because we would not have had this degree of protection of our
1 rights in that respect. I consider this to be quite normal in political
2 activity, that with regard to different questions there are different
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, at this point in
6 time I have no further questions for President Dodik.
7 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for 20 minutes. But before
8 that, Mr. Dodik, I was informed indirectly through the Registrar that you
9 should leave around 3.00. Could you confirm that? Tell us how late you
10 can stay at the Tribunal today.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For as long as necessary. Well,
12 before that was the tentative time, but since there is a government plane
13 waiting for me, I can extend that time, no problem whatsoever.
14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I appreciate it. We'll have a break for
15 20 minutes and resume at 10 to 12.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 11.31 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.52 a.m.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,
20 Your Honours.
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Dodik.
23 A. Good morning.
24 Q. Mr. Dodik, first I wanted to simply put on the record what those
25 of us in the courtroom were aware of, but the Trial Chamber would not
1 have known and that is that with the permission of security, you had an
2 opportunity before court began to greet and kiss Mr. Karadzic, that is
3 before the Judges entered the first time.
4 Mr. Dodik, today, as has been our practice, I have the
5 opportunity to ask you certain questions about your evidence, and
6 I expect to focus on very particular issues and the Judges encourage us
7 to cover them as efficiently as possible. And in that connection, let me
8 advise you that we have the benefit of both your previous testimony in
9 the Brdjanin case, and a previous recorded interview you gave to the OTP
10 in 2003 that you also confirmed during the course of the Brdjanin case.
11 So it's my intention to focus, if not exclusively, for the most part on
12 information you've provided before in the hopes of maximising the
13 efficiency -- the efficient use of the time we have. Now I mention that
14 in part because I am -- by simply citing you or referring you to
15 something you said before, that doesn't mean I'm asking you to repeat it
16 or further elaborate on it. I'm trying to focus on very specific issues.
17 And although I don't wish to interrupt you, if we stray beyond the
18 questions raised, I will do so in the interests of maximising the
19 efficient use of our limited time. Fair enough?
20 A. I understand this. However, I reject any possibility of you
21 quoting any of my previous statements. We have already discussed that
22 when I testified in the Brdjanin case. I told you that I have not signed
23 it, that I haven't authorised it, and if you continue to use documents of
24 that kind I'm going to consider it a -- really something that I cannot
1 Q. Mr. Dodik, I tried to be very clear in telling you that I had --
2 I intended to use only information that you provided that had been
3 recorded and transcribed, so that there is no question of your having
4 concern that it wasn't something you said, okay? So that's what I wanted
5 to let you know at the outset. My references will only be to such
7 So let's begin.
8 A. All right. I said, and of course I can confirm that we did have
9 a conversation. However I've never signed this, I've never authorised
10 it, and that is why I think you should focus your question on other
11 things and not to refer to that particular report.
12 Q. Mr. Dodik, for the third time I'm saying I don't have the
13 intention of referring to that report.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Why don't you start your
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. All right.
17 Q. First of all, Mr. Dodik, let me ask you if you accept or deny or
18 claim you don't have any information one way or another that massive
19 crimes were committed by Bosnian Serb forces against Bosnian Muslims and
20 Bosnian Croats during the course of the war and as we will be discussing
21 in 1992?
22 A. We had a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and military forces
23 were organised of both the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats. All
24 three sides violated the laws of war and committed crimes.
25 Q. All right. Given your political background, let me ask you some
1 questions about the political structures and authorities that were
2 operative in the area of Republika Srpska generally and then -- and more
3 specifically in the area where you resided.
4 First of all, with respect to the SDS generally, which was
5 discussed to some extent during your examination-in-chief today,
6 that's -- you talked about the hierarchy and organisation of the SDS
7 during the course of the Brdjanin case, and do you confirm that you said
8 the following: First, that "this was a firmly organised political party
9 with clear cut hierarchy and superiority"? That, "the SDS was a compact,
10 well structured organisation in which the hierarchy was respected," and
11 that "the party was internally highly homogenised and it functioned in a
12 highly disciplined fashion"?
13 And for benefit of the parties those references are found at
14 transcript pages 20468, 20542 and 20469.
15 A. The SDS was formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the establishment
16 of the Party of Democratic Action. It won the elections. It was one of
17 the winners precisely because it was as you mentioned and as I earlier
18 claimed that it was.
19 Q. Further, the party was controlled from the top, asked that
20 question in Brdjanin, you said, "Yes, absolutely. Mr. Karadzic was
21 president of the party which had its Main Board." That's at 20468. And
22 you also said at 20474, "The top, leadership of SDS headed by Karadzic
23 was at that time the uncontested leadership."
24 Those are also correct propositions; right?
25 A. Well, I am also the uncontested president in my political party.
1 Hierarchy is observed and this is normal for any political party, so I do
2 not see what I need to confirm here. I said that I mentioned this about
3 the pre-election campaigns when I was in one political party and he was
4 in another, and so we fought as opponents of different political parties.
5 They were well organised political party just like the SDA was and the
6 HDZ and the Reformist Party and the party organs were respected and
7 hierarchy was observed, then as it is today.
8 Q. And in that connection, you also testified in the Brdjanin case
9 that if the Main Board issued instructions the municipal boards and the
10 regional boards were obliged to carry out those instructions. That's at
12 A. Once again, I do not understand why you're asking me a question
13 about something that is included in the statute of that political party
14 and in the statutes of all other political parties. Yes, it's quite
15 logical that a political party, a political organisation, with a clear
16 structure -- that the decisions of the highest organs are observed by the
17 lower rank party structure. I don't see how the SDS is different in that
18 from any other political party or structure.
19 Q. Now, you confirmed at page 25 -- 20514 in your Brdjanin testimony
20 that you gave a tape recorded interview to the OTP in July of 2003, and
21 I wanted to ask you about it in addition to some of the things you said
22 there. Because during the course of that discussion, you explained some
23 of the ways in which the SDS hierarchy was effected and among the things
24 you said, when you were asked if you could provide a sense of the
25 hierarchy and -- of the SDS and how it controlled the regions and then
1 the local municipalities, you said:
2 "Well, it's quite clear. They had their own people in the
3 municipalities, that is the municipal board, presidents of the municipal
4 boards and the leadership of these boards, and they were elected with the
5 full approval of Karadzic and the leadership from Pale. Otherwise they
6 couldn't have been elected."
7 And that's found at --
8 A. Where can that be found?
9 Q. It can be found at page 16 in English and B/C/S of 65 ter 24921.
10 Do you need to see that, Mr. Dodik, or can you confirm it without a --
11 that that's an accurate assessment that you made at the time and that it
12 is what you said?
13 A. Well, I asked you not to use that report because it isn't
14 authorised. I don't -- I cannot back it up and you're suggesting certain
15 answers which you shouldn't do. I did have that conversation, but I did
16 not authorise its authenticity. I think that you're trying to trap me
17 here. As far as the SDS is --
18 JUDGE KWON: Can I advise you that it is for the Prosecution to
19 put their material to you, but you're free to answer in the way you like
20 to answer. You can say that it was true that you said so, or you can
21 say -- you could say otherwise. Do you understand that, Mr. Dodik?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand it quite well,
23 sir. But I don't understand the intention, because a long time back, in
24 2003, and the Brdjanin case, the Prosecutor and I spoke about this topic
25 and we said what I have repeated now, that he should not refer to this
1 conversation, and he replied, Okay, fair enough. I'll try you -- I'll
2 ask you the same question, it's a question with the same content, but
3 without referring to this conversation or interview. The SDS certainly
4 had a strong structure just like all political parties and I'm trying to
5 think what could be so specific. Of course, nobody can become president
6 of a municipal board without my approval. So, yeah, it must have been
7 like that in the SDS, but the only contentious thing here is that report.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. And I'm going to try once more to clarify this for you,
10 Mr. Dodik, so we don't have an unnecessary problem. First of all,
11 I think the reference that you made to the lawyer saying it was okay to
12 proceed in another way was to something Mr. Ackerman asked you, the
13 Defence attorney. But more importantly, for this purpose, that was a
14 reference to the interview over the course of four days that you did not
15 sign, and that was what you asked not to be asked about, and that's what
16 Mr. Ackerman agreed not to ask you about. But both -- but the taped
17 interview that was conducted shortly before you testified in Brdjanin was
18 indeed the subject of discussion. You confirmed it. Your words are on
19 there. So that's a different matter. That's why I indicated to you
20 today, knowing your sensitivity about the earlier statement which you did
21 not sign, that I did not intend to ask you about that but only about
22 matters that had been -- that you had -- where you had stated something
23 and it had been recorded. Perhaps that assists.
24 A. I didn't even know that it was taped.
25 Q. Well, you -- as I said, at page 20514, you --
1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we upload it?
2 MR. TIEGER: Absolutely.
3 JUDGE KWON: 65 ter number?
4 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 24921.
5 Q. Why don't we look at the first page, 24921, right. And as we can
6 see from the first page it provides the date of the interview and the
7 persons present and it begins by saying, "Now, Mr. Dodik, are you aware
8 this conversation is being tape recorded?" And you say, "Yes, I am."
9 And you were asked, "And we have your permission?" And you say, "Yes,
10 you do."
11 That's the interview that I'm referring to in addition to your
12 Brdjanin testimony.
13 A. I don't remember.
14 Q. Okay.
15 A. I can discuss any topic but I see that you insist on this
16 interview. But go ahead, whichever way you think fit. You could have
17 written anything in there.
18 Q. It's all on tape, Mr. Dodik. You want to hear the very beginning
19 to hear your own voice and to hear your agreement that it can be taped?
20 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson? Just a second. Yes,
23 Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I would suggest
25 Mr. Tieger just ask the witnesses the substance of what he wants to know.
1 If it's inconsistent with something that's in that recording he can use
2 it at that time, but we are expending a huge amount of time putting prior
3 statement to a witness. It's only supposed to be put to a witness when
4 there is an inconsistency or a need to refresh his recollection. So if
5 Mr. Tieger can simply put the proposition of the question without
6 reference to any statement or testimony if he doesn't get the answer that
7 he wants he can then go and take that next step. I think we would all
8 benefit from that procedure.
9 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, that is not --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can assist in finding a
12 solution. There are two interviews, and the witness must be told which
13 one was tape recorded because the Prosecution interviewed President Dodik
14 twice. I have one of these interviews before me, but this is not the one
15 I see.
16 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Tieger was clear about that point but as
17 to the way in which Prosecution put its proposition, it is Defence's
18 position to ask for the references. I think what -- that's what
19 Mr. Tieger was doing, but I'll leave it to Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Let's try to proceed and maybe we had some
21 unnecessary friction and we will have better luck in eliciting
22 information as we proceed.
23 Q. It was also the case with respect to the SDS hierarchy that the
24 SDS had their people posted in the media, in the police, and other
25 structures; correct?
1 A. They were the party that was in power, and it was normal for them
2 to do that. Yes, it is correct.
3 Q. And at one point, there were commissioners appointed to the
4 municipalities who were people from the core leadership or connected to
5 the core leadership, who had the power to give orders to the local
6 authorities and the organs of authority; correct?
7 A. I know that there were commissioners, but the way I understood it
8 they were commissioners for the political party. I said earlier that
9 I was a member of the War Presidency, but I was not in the position to
10 get such orders from these people.
11 Q. It is true that you knew the commissioner for your area, that is
12 Gradiska, Laktasi, and Srbac, and that person had the power to give
13 orders to the local authorities and the organs of authority, isn't that
14 right, because that's what you said at page 16 through 17 of
15 P24921 [sic], the recorded interview.
16 A. Answering to the previous question, I explained how I saw these
17 commissioners. Yes, I know who was there, and the SDS got almost
18 90 per cent of the votes. He worked with the party structure, and knew
19 what the decisions of the executive power would be, but I can repeat that
20 it's a normal thing even today in many countries.
21 Q. Now, with respect to issues of discipline or control, it's
22 correct, is it not, that SDS members who didn't agree with decisions were
23 minimised or rendered passive, and that differing views were not
24 tolerated in the period late 1991 to the fall of 1992, and that those
25 references can be found in the Brdjanin testimony at 20470 and 20542.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Just for Mr. Tieger's
2 benefit, it's not necessary to give us the references unless we ask for
3 it. I think that would make things simpler.
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Can you answer the question, Mr. Dodik?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. All that time, and
6 even now, I'm a member of another political party. Speaking about
7 another political party must be seen as a political discourse, and not
8 everything that we say about our political opponents is trustworthy. The
9 SDS was and still is a party with a clearly defined structure and party
10 discipline must be abided by. I think it's normal that whoever dissents
11 is marginalised or expelled from the party. It's the same thing in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia. Wherever there are problems within
13 a political party, the minority must either keep quiet or leave that
14 party. That's normal.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. And it's also true that in the context of 1991 and then moving
17 into 1992 with the conflict, that the use of the term "traitor" or the
18 power of the term "traitor" was also present in terms of the exercise of
19 party control; right?
20 A. That word was used even more widely in the whole society, and it
21 was used by the Bosniaks, too, and the Croats, and so did we. I don't
22 see what is less than normal there. Yes, I can confirm that, but I don't
23 think it was anything special or abnormal.
24 Q. And one of the consequences of that approach was that those who
25 didn't follow the SDS programme were considered traitors, and there were
1 various ways of ensuring loyalty. For example, if you were not with them
2 then the threat was that you could be immediately mobilised and thrown to
3 the most dangerous part of the front, correct?
4 A. Yes, there were such cases, of course. But it was not the rule.
5 I know of some such cases. But it was more at a local level, possibly as
6 the result of other things, too, not only obedience. But in such a
7 chaotic situation as the war even, there was such cases too, yes.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was not recorded that the
9 witness said the result of animosity.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Dodik, can I ask you again to speak more slowly.
11 Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
12 MR. TIEGER: For the record there is a reference earlier to
13 P24921. It should be 65 ter 24921 so we don't have to make a later
15 Q. Mr. Dodik, let me ask you then about some of the reflections or
16 expressions of these principles or approaches in the context of the area
17 where you resided, that is in the Krajina region. First of all, as you
18 testified to at some length in the Brdjanin case, the -- in the Krajina
19 region there was the Autonomous Region of Krajina and as we will discuss
20 the autonomous region of Krajina Crisis Staff; right?
21 A. There were Crisis Staffs.
22 Q. And the autonomous region of Krajina was a reflection of SDS
23 efforts and interests; correct? It was something that the SDS, that had
24 been present with the SDS for quite some time, even before its formal
1 A. I cannot confirm that, but I've already said that there was a war
2 and a crisis going on, I said that the Krajina was completely isolated,
3 that it had no communication, it did not have enough electricity or oil.
4 It was very hard to keep life going, and of course these questions had to
5 be resolved. The SDS was the leading political party in the area, but
6 today and before I said to you that I was part of that structure in my
7 municipality as a member of the National Assembly. I was duty-bound to
8 take part in the work of these institutions. We dealt with questions
9 that had to do with these economic and social aspects of life.
10 Q. Sorry, sir, but I want to focus on the autonomous region of
11 Krajina for a moment, not the National Assembly. Let me ask the question
12 a different way. The idea of creating certain autonomous regions was
13 very present in the then-governing party that represented the Serbian
14 people, and that was the SDS; right?
15 A. The regions existed earlier on and it was known exactly what
16 Krajina, Semberija, Posavina, Herzegovina were, what the Neretva region
17 was, and so on. So as an idea to establish a new social order, the idea
18 of these regions did not exist as such, but the idea of establishing
19 these regions with a view to the organisation of life, I believe that
20 that was the core of the matter.
21 Q. And you -- and the -- it's the case that the decisions that were
22 brought there, that is of the autonomous region of Krajina Crisis Staff
23 or assembly, were basically discussed and agreed on before that in the
24 SDS, and the SDS had indeed established a very strict party discipline in
25 that regard? That's correct, isn't it?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. How can the witness
2 know what happened in the party, in another party that was a political
3 adversary? It is speculation that is being asked for.
4 JUDGE KWON: I think --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is to be assumed -- I mean, I'm
6 speaking on the basis of the experience of my own party, political
7 parties, if you will, speak -- function in a similar way before going --
8 before parliament. They have discussions and agree how they are going to
9 position themselves in parliament. I think that that's what we do today
10 and that's what we did before, and that's the way things have been ever
11 since multi-party systems in the world came into being. So why would
12 anyone suggest anything to the deputies club? Before every session of
13 parliament, my political party has a session to see how they are going to
14 position themselves regarding particular issues that are to be discussed.
15 So I assume that that is the case with the SDS. So at these levels from
16 the level of the municipality to the level of the autonomous region of
17 Krajina, I cannot confirm that Mr. Karadzic was ever present and that he
18 took part in the decision-making process of these organs. I don't know
19 about that. Perhaps somebody else knows about that, but I do not know
20 and I cannot say that he was in charge of these organs in that way. As
21 for political parties, from the point of view of regional interest,
22 members of parliament can behave any way they think that they should
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the speaker please
25 be asked to speak slower. It is too fast for interpretation for the
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Dodik, again asked by the interpreters to speak
3 more slowly.
4 Mr. Karadzic, I was about to overrule your objection but the
5 witness has answered the question in any event. I take it Mr. Tieger was
6 putting his -- this question based upon his -- Mr. Dodik's previous
7 statement or testimony, so -- and Mr. Robinson didn't ask for the
8 reference. So that was the reason why I was about to overrule your
9 objection. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Mr. Dodik, you seem to be suggesting here, perhaps in response to
12 what Mr. Karadzic said, that what you say about the Autonomous Region of
13 Krajina, its hierarchy and input, was based on assumptions, but that's
14 not what you said in the Brdjanin case when you testified at length about
15 the Autonomous Region of Krajina Crisis Staff, for example. So you said
16 at page 20493, as far -- that -- that what you stated was, as far as I
17 knew the situation in relationships there and that's what I inferred on
18 the basis of many conversations with people who then and later confirmed
19 such impressions. Or you said at page 20516 in response to questions
20 from Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Brdjanin's attorney, so can we save a little bit
21 of time he said so can I understand that when you say you have this
22 opinion or impression it's based not only upon your observations at the
23 time but on your conversations with people since that time, am I correct
24 in that? In other words you're not just guessing it's based on something
25 you observed and heard? Now, that's what you said in Brdjanin and you
1 confirmed that that was correct.
2 A. I have a proposal. You have what I said in the Brdjanin case and
3 that's okay. What's the difference between what I said in response to
4 that question before and what you said just now? Of course,
5 I communicated. I was not isolated and it's only logical that I talk to
6 other people about these questions. From this position, I believe that
7 that is quite normal, that a political party, before it makes decisions
8 in the legislation and in government, that they see what their views are
9 going to be and behave accordingly. I see no lack of consistency in that
10 respect and with small modifications, basically the essence is the same.
11 Q. All right. You also mentioned in your earlier response something
12 about whether or not Mr. Karadzic was present or took part in the
13 decision-making process of the ARK Crisis Staff. Mr. Brdjanin was
14 president of the ARK Crisis Staff, and Mr. Brdjanin could not have become
15 president of the ARK Crisis Staff without the blessing and authorisation
16 of Radovan Karadzic; correct?
17 A. We can just make assumptions about that. I don't know what your
18 information is. But I think that Brdjanin was chosen by the
19 Crisis Staff. Whether there were interparty consultations, that is
20 something I can just assume but I cannot confirm that.
21 Q. Mr. Dodik, that is precisely what you said on the
22 17th of July, 2003, in the tape-recorded interview at page 6 of the --
23 excuse me, page 7 in e-court of the B/C/S.
24 JUDGE KWON: It's in front of us. Why don't we see the page? Is
25 this part where the witness said, "I don't think so"?
1 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
2 Q. Now, those were your words at the time. Now, Mr. Dodik --
3 JUDGE KWON: Did you find the passage, Mr. Dodik?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, and I'm not interested. I've
5 already told you that I did not authorise this and I don't stand by this
6 and you use it whichever way you want.
7 JUDGE KWON: No. It is a tape recorded interview as you saw
8 before. This passage reads like this:
9 "Could Brdjanin have become president of the ARK Crisis Staff
10 without the blessing or authorisation of Radovan Karadzic?"
11 And you answer:
12 "I don't think so."
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There you go. So what did
14 I confirm?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure that this translation
16 is right. He said, "I don't believe so." He did not say, "I don't think
17 so. "
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not make any assertions. If
19 I said I don't think so, it's just an assumption.
20 JUDGE KWON: It is for the Prosecution now to put their
21 questions. So could you listen to the question and try to answer the
22 question. Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: All right.
24 Q. As long as we are on the subject of assertions, you also went on
25 to say, as I believe you did in Brdjanin as well, that you considered
1 Dr. Vukic to be, from a practical point of view, a more important person
2 on the ARK Crisis Staff than Mr. Brdjanin because Dr. Vukic was the
3 president of the SDS; correct?
4 A. This is what it says here. I think it is him. That's what you
5 should have said. I think that he is the president of the party then --
6 had a very important role in terms of certain matters, the most important
7 one, that is what is written here. That is what I say, "I think." I'm
8 not saying "I assert" or "I claim."
9 Q. And then you went on to say, he - he meaning Dr. Vukic - had to
10 have full support and absolute support of the approval of Karadzic
11 because without it, he couldn't have been the president which also gave
12 him power at the local level. That's what you said in July 2003;
14 A. Yes, correct. That is written here, and in the context, yes,
15 this would be correct, so I think that's the way it was but I could not
16 know of all the internal relations of the SDS because I was not a member
17 of the SDS, and I had information only based on contacts with people and
18 that's why I said here very precisely that that's what I think. I did
19 not make any assertions though. Now I think that was not the case.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
21 be asked to speak slower?
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. And it was further your understanding at that time that in 1992,
24 the municipal Crisis Staffs functioned jointly with the regional
25 Crisis Staff and that the orders that the regional Crisis Staff gave to
1 the local Crisis Staffs were respected; correct? And you can find that
2 at the next few lines as well.
3 A. Well, the organisation we discussed a moment ago, to organise
4 economic and social life, that seems quite normal.
5 Q. Well --
6 A. Can you imagine what it would have been like had everybody done
7 whatever they wanted? Of course, there was some co-ordination. I know
8 of some certain economic matters where there were some joint decisions
9 and that is not being contested.
10 Q. Well, actually I wasn't asking you about your earlier testimony
11 about the Association of Municipalities, but I was asking you about the
12 ARK Crisis Staff and I was asking you specifically about your assertion
13 in July of 2003 that the orders that the regional Crisis Staff gave to
14 the local Crisis Staffs were respected. That's what you said then. That
15 was the case; right?
16 A. I believe that it is so.
17 Q. Now, you also discussed -- let me ask you this: It was also the
18 case that you discussed in your -- you were aware of an article on the
19 27th of February which was brought to your attention, that is an article
20 that was published on the 27th of February, 1992, that was brought to
21 your attention during the course of the Brdjanin case involving issues
22 between Mr. Krajisnik and Brdjanin in that latter part of February 1992.
23 Do you recall that?
24 A. I came here as a witness in Mr. Karadzic's case. I was not
25 preparing for either Brdjanin or Krajisnik. At any rate, well, I don't
2 Q. All right.
3 A. Maybe, but I did not --
4 Q. This is about Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Dodik. And I only mention that
5 to place it in temporal context for you, because it was around that time,
6 wasn't it, that Mr. Karadzic came to Banja Luka to discipline the
7 Banja Luka organisation, and after that the organisation came under the
8 direct control of the top leadership in Pale; correct?
9 A. Karadzic often came to Banja Luka, and I believe that they did
10 have these interparty discussions, but that is a bit different from what
11 you said a moment ago, that there was subordination, so it's either one
12 or the other. I don't know what they did at that meeting but it's only
13 logical that the SDS of Banja Luka and the SDS of -- at republican level
14 have co-ordination and co-operation and hierarchy, and I don't see
15 anything problematic there.
16 Q. Well, there may not be any problematic aspects from your point of
17 view about co-operation and co-ordination, but as you noted and then
18 seemed to dispute, I was asking you about a kind of hierarchical issue.
19 And the reality, Mr. Dodik, is that the portion of what I said that you
20 seemed to dispute was precisely what you testified to in the Brdjanin
21 case, where you said, again as I mentioned before, in the context of a
22 discussion that had began in connection with an interview of 27 -- that
23 is a newspaper interview of 27 February 1992, you said:
24 "Later on, Karadzic came to Banja Luka to discipline the
25 Banja Luka organisation, and after that the organisation came under the
1 direct control of the top leadership in Pale."
2 And you were asked when that was, and you said:
3 "I know it was around those days and months, maybe May 1992."
4 That's at 20544. So those were your words [overlapping speakers]
5 A. Okay. What's the problem? Did I say that I did not read that
6 about Brdjanin? What I said then you really don't have to make the
7 effort. Again, I'm prepared to sign everything that was said in the
8 Brdjanin case, so I'm not denying that. I did not assume at all that you
9 would be using that as the basic document in this examination because
10 I expected us to talk about what I knew about Mr. Karadzic's work.
11 However, in order to resolve the matter, and your efforts to prove my
12 inconsistency, I am telling you that the stenographic notes of my
13 Brdjanin testimony is something that I fully confirm but don't expect me
14 to remember each and every word that I uttered seven or eight years ago.
15 I really don't see anything problematic in that. I have no problem with
16 that. What I said before the Trial Chamber in the Brdjanin case, I stand
17 by that. I really cannot remember every sentence, every event. Don't
18 expect me to do that.
19 Q. I'm not trying to -- it's not a memory quiz, Mr. Dodik.
20 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Robinson is on his feet.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if it would be of any assistance --
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MR. ROBINSON: If it would be of any assistance we would agree
24 that his entire transcript of his testimony in the Brdjanin case can be
25 admitted in this case.
1 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed.
2 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Mr. Dodik, it's not a memory quiz. I'm not trying to catch you
5 in what you can remember or not, but as you mentioned you wanted to talk
6 about Mr. Karadzic's work and you talked about some aspects of what you
7 consider to be his work. I'm talking about other aspects of his work,
8 which I'm entitled to do.
9 Again, it's also the case that the ARK assembly regulated all
10 segments of life, and decisions were passed and observed by the
11 municipalities that were members of the group; right?
12 A. Is that what the record of my testimony in the Brdjanin case
14 Q. Yes, I can read it verbatim.
15 A. Then -- well, it's correct. No, no, no. It's all right.
16 I agree with everything that was said in that case. You can read out the
17 entire transcript. I'll just keep crying out yes. It's not a problem.
18 So whatever was said there I stand by it. Every single word. And I'm
19 not at a quiz. I know that perfectly well. I have come here to do a
20 serious job as a responsible man, to talk about what I know about this,
21 and I'm trying to be consistent in that and not to create confusion. So
22 we have a very simple situation. What I said in the Brdjanin case is
23 something that I stand by. You don't have to prove anything. Everything
24 that the transcript records is correct.
25 Q. Okay. But it's helpful -- thank you for that and I appreciate
1 that but the Trial Chamber will expect me to identify particular aspects
2 of that at appropriate times. So I wanted to move now to ask you about
3 more specifically about something that was mentioned earlier, and that is
4 that the SDS had their people posted in the media and in the police,
5 among other structures, and I wanted to ask you about a particular aspect
6 of the police, but in order to do that, I think it's necessary to move
7 into private session very briefly.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Could the Chamber move into private session
10 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me just say so that it's
23 correct, I requested that in the Brdjanin case, the private session, but
24 not today.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. Thank -- thank you for that clear indication, Mr. Dodik. So with
3 respect to the issue of people posted in the police, it's correct then
4 that the following is true, that the fame and notoriety of Ljuban's group
5 was very strong everywhere in Banja Luka and everyone lived in fear of
6 that group. Now, that was -- they became part of the police, right, as a
7 special unit; correct?
8 A. Yes. Yes. I mean, he -- it wasn't a special group and then
9 became the police. He was the police from the very beginning.
10 Q. And he, that is Ecim, was on the one hand Karadzic's protege in
11 Banja Luka; and on the other hand, he was very close to Arkan and his
12 people. He, meaning Ecim, managed to create the impression that he was
13 Karadzic's person there and that he was untouchable. And that's all
14 correct; isn't it?
15 A. He has said, well, that he managed to create this impression.
16 Now, whether it was so, it's something to be determined. The events
17 indicate that he did have certain contacts with Arkan and that's also a
19 Q. In -- what I just quoted -- what I just stated was, in fact, a
20 quote from your testimony in Brdjanin as we've discussed before, and then
21 you further elaborated on that saying:
22 "Karadzic, Krajisnik, Stanisic, Mandic, Zupljanin and Ecim were
23 part of one small compact team, and they were the most powerful people on
24 their respective levels at the time."
25 And that was correct; right?
1 A. Of course that they were the most powerful people; each one of
2 them in his respective level of responsibility.
3 Q. They were part of one small, compact team. You stated that under
4 oath also in Brdjanin; right?
5 A. Well, if that's what it says there, then I did state that of
7 Q. Now, I noted earlier, before asking you about the people that the
8 SDS had posted in the police, which we just discussed to some extent,
9 that you had also confirmed that they had their people posted in the
10 media and I wanted to ask you some quick questions about that. First of
11 all, the -- there was censorship of the media and control of the media,
12 that is there was control up to the level of censorship, by the
13 Ministry of Information, that is Mr. Ostojic, so that only what was
14 suited to the authorities was published; right? And I think you were
15 pretty clear about your position on propaganda in the Brdjanin case.
16 A. Well, if that's recorded in the transcript, I stand by that, too.
17 But now I can understand it from this point in time that it's quite
18 logical that during wartime people act in this way. That was how the
19 Croats acted, too, not just in Bosnia but in Croatia as well. That was
20 how the Bosniaks acted as well. They had an influence on their media.
21 It was also a sort of propaganda. That was what Milosevic was doing,
22 everyone was. Slovenia was doing that, too, when it was preparing its
23 secession from Yugoslavia led by Jelko Kacin, who is now an MP in the
24 European parliament. He was the chief of the propaganda bureau for the
25 violent secession, and today he's a European parliamentarian. So today
1 I understand that this is something quite normal, that in time when you
2 have such authorities and such things are happening, then information is
3 shaped in a specific way, and everyone was doing that.
4 Q. And more specifically, in the area where you were, that is in the
5 Krajina area or the Banja Luka area, there was the newspaper "Glas" and
6 it -- "Glas" was only used for -- as propaganda, that is for propaganda
7 purposes of the Serbian Democratic Party; correct?
8 A. It could be found that about that paper. Is that recorded in the
9 transcript that that's what I said.
10 Q. It is recorded at 65 ter 24921 --
11 A. All right, all right. If it's recorded then it's fine. It's all
12 right. You don't have to ask me. Everything is fine. So if that's what
13 is recorded there, everything is all right, and you don't have to ask me
14 any questions.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please receive
16 complete information about whether he said that in his testimony or if
17 it's from his interview.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, this is the transcript from
19 the Brdjanin case.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. No, Mr. Dodik, that was the tape recorded transcript which has
22 been transcribed; that is your words in B/C/S were transcribed into B/C/S
23 again. You can see them if you want, but it is -- it's not something
24 that someone thought they heard, it's a tape recorded interview.
25 I wanted to ask you quickly about a particular --
1 A. If you're trying to combine one and the other, I can understand
2 that is your job, but what I'm trying to say here is that what I said in
3 front of this respected Court before is something that I stand by, and
4 also what I talked about with you in various situations is something that
5 I never authorised. I never signed such a statement, and in that respect
6 I cannot accept that this should be a basis for a claim for or against
7 something. And thanks to Mr. Karadzic for his interventions, I have the
8 impression that through these questions you're trying to relay only on
9 what I said in the Brdjanin case. Once again in front of this
10 Honourable Court I want to say that whatever I said in the Brdjanin case
11 and whatever has been recorded here is something that I stand by, and
12 with respect to that, I see no problem at all. Except that I apologise,
13 I did not manage to remember every single detail. But once again
14 I repeat, if that's what is recorded I'll stand by that.
15 Q. I'll be more than happy to bring your attention to the
16 distinction between the two. I understand your position now that simply
17 because you said it can't be necessarily trusted, and then I'll bring to
18 your attention what you stated verbatim and then you can tell us whether
19 you stand by that or not. So is it the case that very often, that the
20 SDS -- is it the case that the SDS presented itself as the protecter of
21 the Serbian people, said that the Serbian people had to be protected from
22 the Ustasha and other massacres, would go back to stories from
23 World War II, but factually and in essence the idea was to gain power and
24 to gain control over the whole area and to rule through the social
25 institutions? Accurate or not?
1 A. Legitimate political struggle, which implies of course legitimate
2 means, assessments of events at the time among the Serbian people, there
3 was tremendous fear from the rehabilitation of the Ustasha traditions
4 because the memories of the Second World War were still quite fresh in
5 the Krajina region. The Serbs had perished in great numbers in the
6 Ustasha camp, Jasenovac, and the fear was more articulated through the
7 people's conviction that it was possible that the crime against the Serbs
8 would be repeated. And the Serbian Democratic Party, as a political
9 party, believed that this fear was relevant, and of course it responded
10 to it.
11 So nothing is incorrect, nothing is anti-democratic about it if
12 political option is trying to represent itself as the protecter of the
13 people's national interests. This is what I'm doing in political
14 practice in my political work nowadays. It is just that the frameworks
15 are different or the moment is different with regard to this.
16 Q. Well, that was said at P -- in P24921, at pages 13 of the --
17 excuse me, at pages 3 of both the English and B/C/S but I wanted to move
18 on very quickly to a specific example of the creation of a special
19 atmosphere. Do you remember the arrival of the SOS in the Banja Luka
20 area in April of 1992?
21 A. Of course I do. I talked about that as the then member of the
22 police, at the Banja Luka airstrip. I was aware that they had arrived in
23 the area.
24 Q. As a back drop to the questions I want to ask you, let's see if
25 we can agree on that, that they came in as an armed group, they blocked
1 the town, that they made certain demands, that a Crisis Staff was formed
2 and acquiesced immediately to their demands; is that all correct so far?
3 A. If I said it was so in the Brdjanin case, then it's fine. Now
4 I do not remember any more.
5 Q. Well, the most detailed information on that is available in your
6 tape-recorded interview so I'm not going to suggest that this was -- that
7 I'm relying, in particular, on your Brdjanin testimony, but that's why
8 I asked you about these very broad facts about the arrival and activities
9 of the SOS. You can confirm that much, can't you, that they were armed,
10 they blocked the town, they demanded -- made demands including -- made
11 certain demands, that a Crisis Staff was formed consisting of highly
12 placed Bosnian Serb officials, and they acquiesced virtually immediately
13 to those demands?
14 A. It was quite a long time ago. It's possible that it was like
15 that but I really cannot assert that now because quite a lot of time has
16 passed since, and I cannot confirm any of the details any longer.
17 Q. Okay. Well, if we have more time I could put the specific quotes
18 in front of you as a backdrop to what I'm going to ask you, but we can,
19 keeping with our own practice, have those admitted to the Court. But you
20 also noted in 2003 that these demands by this armed group, the SOS, were
21 "practically the same as the SDS policy"; right?
22 A. I said that much time has elapsed. I would have to be reminded
23 of all facts and then speak about it. It was long ago. I cannot
24 confirm. But I repeat: If it was said in the Brdjanin case then I stand
25 by it, but I can't confirm it off the top of my head.
1 Q. Well, does this refresh your recollection any further? You also
2 said that it was all planned and done within the SDS, through their
3 people in the media, in the police, in the local administration, and when
4 they, meaning the SOS, showed up, it was something they had already
5 known, they would show, already knew they would show up.
6 That's what you said in 2003, at pages 11 and 12.
7 A. The ruling political party, and it was the SDS at the time, of
8 course affected social processes, and it's normal. The country was at
9 war. And during that war those who got the confidence of the people
10 certainly bore the greatest responsibility, and the SDS got the trust of
11 the people. The people to a great extent stood by the SDS's programme.
12 I --
13 Q. [Overlapping speakers] I'm sorry, sir, I'm not talking about the
14 people's reaction to this. I'm -- I -- I asked you specifically about
15 whether the arrival of the SOS was something planned and done within the
16 SDS, so if you don't remember that, we'll --
17 A. I don't remember. I cannot confirm it was a direct instruction
18 of the SDS, but that group was there. That's beyond doubt. However,
19 I was not involved in the decision-making bodies of the SDS. I don't
20 know. I can tell you as what my reasoning is and my political analysis,
21 but I'm their political opponent and was at the time too.
22 Q. Well, from your perspective as someone politically involved in
23 both the republic level assembly and in events in Banja Luka, you also
24 noted that with respect to the arrival of the SDS and these events that
25 we've been discussing, that it happened because at that time:
1 "The SDS was still trying to present its policies as something
2 that could be accepted by the international factors, whereas, on the
3 other hand, along some other lines it prepared all this."
4 So that's what you stated before, that this was a particular
5 technique used to move along different lines on the ground while saying
6 something to the international community; correct? Saying something else
7 to the international community.
8 A. I'm confused by your question. I can positively state that
9 I wasn't present during these events and I didn't see President Karadzic,
10 but the SDS was in power and executed its -- these powers on the ground
11 and they were the political force that took the most far-reaching
13 Q. And you --
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I see the time. If it is convenient,
15 shall we take break?
16 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: After the break can I expect that you could conclude
18 in half an hour?
19 MR. TIEGER: I'll absolutely do my best, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll break for 40 minutes and resume at
22 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.05 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. Mr. Dodik, before we adjourned for the lunch recess, we had been
2 discussing the events following the arrival of the SOS in Banja Luka, and
3 the nature of those events and who was responsible, and I had asked you
4 about the -- your comments from 2003 about the SDS trying to present its
5 policies as something that could be accepted by the international
6 factors, whereas, on the other hand, preparing things like this on the
8 Now, you also spoke in that context --
9 A. I cannot hear the interpretation.
10 JUDGE KWON: Our usher will assist you.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I can hear it. But I didn't
12 hear it before.
13 JUDGE KWON: Can you hear me well in your language? Thank you.
14 Please repeat, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Sure.
16 Q. I was recapping what we had been discussing about the SOS and the
17 SDS efforts to present its policies for the international factor on the
18 one hand and to prepare events like this on the other, and in that
19 context, you spoke about a specially created atmosphere. So I wanted to
20 ask you briefly about that. What you said in 2003 was this was a
21 specially created atmosphere and it was very easy to implement these
22 things in such an atmosphere, and then you went on to talk about some of
23 the things that were easy to implement in that atmosphere, including the
24 dismissal of non-Serbs. Is that correct, that the atmosphere that was
25 created at that time, as we previously discussed, made it easy to
1 implement the dismissal of non-Serbs?
2 A. Of course there was dismissal of non-Serbs, but Serbs were also
3 dismissed in the territories controlled by the Muslims. That was part of
4 the atmosphere created in the entire region, and it was war.
5 I understand the role of Mr. Karadzic, who bears political responsibility
6 for some events. But he stands accused for a joint criminal enterprise,
7 which to my mind is a made-up category. And the things you've mentioned,
8 well, everybody knows that people were dismissed to a greater or a lesser
9 extent on all sides. I could testify about the political conditions in
10 connection with the war in Bosnia, and how the war unfolded. It is very
11 clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a unilateral secession and the
12 international --
13 Q. I'm sorry to -- I indicated I didn't want to interrupt but this
14 is straying quite far from my question and back to the areas you were
15 able to elucidate on at length in the examination-in-chief. Now, this
16 is -- again you referred to the criminal enterprise, and I think you
17 referred to that -- here you say it's a made-up category, earlier I think
18 you said it was a manipulation. But, Mr. Dodik, that's not exactly what
19 you were saying back around 2001, and when you --
20 A. That's possible.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. But such is life. We come to understand some things that may not
23 have been clear to us. And now, if I may speak freely here, all these
24 proceedings are based on the assumption that the Serbs were a factor of
25 disorder and that everybody else was right. And that --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat.
2 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Dodik, hold on just a second for a couple of
3 reasons. Number 1, I will tell you that's frankly wrong and it's not the
4 position of this institution or the Prosecution. And that -- or the
5 Tribunal. But more importantly, for this -- at this moment, it's not at
6 all what I'm asking you about. We are talking about what you said in
7 2001. You said, "That's possible." And among the things you stated back
8 then, and I'll be happy to show you the newspaper articles in which those
9 comments are reflected, was that you accused the SDS leadership of
10 organising and committing crimes during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Let's turn to P24906. Sorry, 65 ter 24906. My apologies.
12 A. Excuse me, what did you say? Who did I state this to, some
14 Q. Yes, I'm going to put this on the screen now. I think you said
15 it to the regional parliament in Banja Luka but this is the media
16 capturing some of those remarks. So this is a report from the BBC, the
17 source of which is Beta news agency from Belgrade, from the
18 12th of January, 2001, noting that you accused the Serb Democratic Party
19 of organising and committing crimes during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
20 saying it must be openly said that the crimes have been committed in this
21 region under the SDS leadership and this must be punished, and noting the
22 expectation that all leading SDS officials at various levels stand before
23 The Hague Tribunal. That's --
24 A. Where does it say The Hague Tribunal?
25 Q. That's in the second paragraph, sir. I think someone has got the
1 cursor there now.
2 A. Yes. That was the political struggle between me and the SDS in
3 2001. It was a time of transition of power. You can consider this as
4 political discourse which need not necessarily be based on facts, but I'm
5 not denying having said this.
6 MR. TIEGER: I tender this article.
7 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6278, Your Honour.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Can I just mention, Mr. President, that the
11 witness doesn't really read or speak English. So when we have only the
12 English translation, it would be good if we went slowly so that he could
13 actually understand the text.
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
15 MR. TIEGER: I appreciate that.
16 Q. And I noted also that at the time, you were criticised by
17 Mr. Kalinic for making those remarks, and in the course of that same
18 article in which that's made, Mr. Kalinic spoke about the dire economic
19 situation in the Bosnian Serb Republic with unemployment at the level of
20 40 per cent and many unemployed war veterans, and so on. That was an
21 accurate assessment of Republika Srpska's economic situation post-war;
23 A. We are speaking about 2001. Nowadays it's difficult in Greece
24 and Cyprus, too. Of course, the economic situation after a war is always
25 a challenge. This only confirms what I have said just now. Mr. Kalinic
1 was an SDS member. It is possible that I said this. I'm -- I don't
2 remember everything, but I believe that it has been relayed accurately.
3 By the way, I have so far given 20.000 interviews so I couldn't possibly
4 remember each and every one.
5 Q. Understood. The reason I raise that is because you also alleged,
6 not in 2001 but later, in both -- in 2005 and I believe afterwards, your
7 concerns about and the fact that Mr. Karadzic had taken 36 million
8 German marks from Banja Luka in the spring of 1997.
9 MR. TIEGER: Let's look at 65 ter 24901. And that's available in
10 the B/C/S as well so the witness can see it. That --
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What does B/C/S mean?
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. I'm sorry, that's an acronym we use here for the language
14 Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, so it all -- the witnesses of all
15 ethnicities can understand the language spoken here.
16 A. In -- where does it say in the law of Bosnia-Herzegovina that
17 there is a Bosnian language? Okay. Never mind. In Bosnia-Herzegovina,
18 there is no consensus about the Bosnian language. There is Serbian,
19 there is Croatian, there is Bosniak, but no Bosnian.
20 Q. Mr. Dodik, you will see in whatever language you choose to
21 characterise it in the left top column, the portion of the article that
22 I wanted to draw your attention to, that there are documents about
23 Radovan Karadzic taking 36 million German marks out of Banja Luka in a
24 bag in spring 1997. First he took bills in the equivalent of 28 million
25 German marks and then another 8 million on another occasion. And you
1 were bringing this conduct by Mr. Karadzic to the attention of your
2 community because you considered it unacceptable, incomprehensible,
3 illegal, and, I presume, deeply unfair to the impoverished war veterans
4 and widows.
5 A. Yes. So what is your question? You want me to confirm?
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. Yes, but when I made this statement, I didn't know that this
8 money was used for materiel for the reconstruction of the RS, especially
9 the eastern part. It was used as deposit for roof tiles, bricks, and so
10 on. But when I gave this statement, I didn't know it had been deposited
11 in such a way. Under the conditions when there was -- when the payment
12 system didn't work and all transactions were made in cash. Of course
13 this is a huge amount. But later, when I became prime minister, I was
14 able to see that merchandise worth more than 100 million marks had
15 arrived, mostly for the reconstruction of the eastern part of
16 Republika Srpska, above all the eastern part of Sarajevo. There is
17 nothing contentious about this statement except for the fact that you're
18 using the newspaper "Dnevni Avaz" which is a paper that we don't trust.
19 We think that they are liars. I didn't deny what the BBC says, but the
20 Bosniak newspaper "Dnevni Avaz" has been used for propaganda. It was a
21 case then and it's still the case today.
22 Q. But you confirm that particular article.
23 MR. TIEGER: I tender it.
24 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
25 JUDGE KWON: How is this relevant, Mr. Tieger?
1 MR. TIEGER: This goes in -- both to the information that the
2 witness had available about Dr. Karadzic generally before he came and
3 attested to various aspects of his conduct and character, and it also
4 relates to the reasons why he said he made the allegations in the
5 previous article. And it will be tied in with another point I want to
6 make as a general -- the general picture of the information available to
7 this witness about the accused.
8 JUDGE KWON: The timing in which Mr. Karadzic allegedly took this
9 money was 1997.
10 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we actually also think this is
12 relevant because it shows that the witness learned things later after
13 making some statements that turned out to be different than they were at
14 the time. This is a good example of that. So we would also urge it be
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The Chamber will receive it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6279, Your Honours.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Now, Mr. Dodik, in the previous exhibit, that is 6278, there was
20 reference in your -- in the comments that you made about the crimes that
21 had been committed, also to your position that Mrs. Plavsic was ignored
22 by the leading members of the party. And that, in part, that reflects
23 your - I think what is no secret -- your close relationship with
24 Mrs. Plavsic and your support of her over the years; correct?
25 A. Of course, Mrs. Plavsic is a good and honourable woman.
1 Q. And you were both aware of -- in contact with her and aware of
2 her position in the Bosnian Serb leadership, relations with the members
3 of the Bosnian Serb leadership, both during the war, in the immediate
4 post-Dayton period, and even thereafter; correct?
5 A. No. It's not so. Because I really came to know Ms. Plavsic and
6 to associate with her only after 1998 or from mid-1997 onwards. She was
7 the president and she was a prominent member of the SDS up until 1997
8 when the leadership parted ways and she slated elections as the president
9 of the republic. After elections the government was supposed to be
10 formed, and I accepted to take on this mandate for forming the government
11 in 1997, and then I associated with her. I spent a lot of time with her,
12 and this is why I can say that she is a really good and honourable woman
13 and a great patriot, and so on. As for the events before that time, that
14 is to say before the war, during the war and after the war, I knew
15 Ms. Plavsic, I heard about her, I met her sometimes during the assembly
16 sessions, but we didn't have a close relation. And as for the claims
17 that you expressed, I can only say that that was an opinion but that was
18 not even confirmed within the SDS, such relations between us at an
19 earlier time.
20 Q. Okay. Fair enough about your relations. But you spoke with her
21 subsequently, as I believe you indicated, you testified for her during
22 the course of her sentencing hearing here about, among other things, the
23 difficulties she had with other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership;
25 A. Yes. That's correct. And that was why they parted ways. I just
1 said that in mid-1997, when Karadzic was no longer actively involved in
2 politics, there was a rift in the leadership of the SDS and Ms. Plavsic
3 continued to perform her office, and if things were not so dramatic there
4 would not have been a rift. And they parted ways because they had parted
5 ways politically about certain issues, and that is true.
6 Q. And you became aware specifically, did you not, of her continuing
7 conflict with Momcilo Mandic, among others?
8 A. Yes. That conflict was generally known throughout the time while
9 it lasted.
10 Q. And specifically what Mrs. Plavsic has made no secret about
11 whatsoever, and I therefore presume that you had opportunities to discuss
12 it with her, was the onset of that conflict which began in 1992, as she
13 related in her book, "I testify" when she brought to the attention of the
14 Bosnian Serb leadership the activities of Batko in Grbavica. And she
15 described in detail how she went to a meeting involving Mr. Karadzic,
16 Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Mandic and Mr. Stanisic, told them what she had
17 learned about Batko, was stunned that Mandic simply smirked about it and
18 that she realised that both Mandic and Stanisic knew about him and his
19 activities and indeed were his protecters and order-givers, and then
20 explained since then - and believed it would surely be like to the end of
21 her life - Mandic had been harassing and threatening her. You were aware
22 of all that; right?
23 A. Years later, I learned the actual substance you're talking about
24 but I did not attend the meeting that you mentioned and I cannot confirm
25 that I know that. I did hear that a meeting was held. I'm not sure
1 whether this one, Batko, was mentioned then or not. But I do know, and
2 one could feel when we attended the assembly session, it was known among
3 the MPs that the relations between Ms. Plavsic and Mr. Mandic were not at
4 the level that was expected between members of the Presidency of
5 Republika Srpska and the minister in the Republika Srpska government. So
6 this was felt and known. And later on, Ms. Plavsic herself told me about
7 some of these things, this meeting and some problems that she had, but
8 this is more or less everything I can say about that.
9 Q. Okay. And -- give me just one moment.
10 [Prosecution counsel confer]
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. You spoke earlier today about Mr. Sejmenovic, and the story you
13 described as I see it here now --
14 A. What?
15 Q. You remember Mr. Sejmenovic? Because you testified about him
16 earlier today.
17 A. Yes. I think it's the man with that last name but it's easy to
18 check. He was in the assembly and I met him in Banja Luka under
19 circumstances I described.
20 Q. Well, the circumstances you describe to this Trial Chamber today
21 was that in the early part of May, around the 10th or 12th of May, you
22 went to see Mr. Sejmenovic where he was living, went over to his house,
23 to have a discussion with him. He was concerned about or had some fear
24 about possible developments so you invited him to work with the assembly
25 or in the assembly of Republika Srpska, thought he had accepted but he
1 later declined and that this was the -- you related that to him, that
2 this was something that Mr. Karadzic had approved. Mr. Dodik, the fact
3 is that this was not a benevolent invitation to suggest to somebody that
4 he might want to consider joining the Bosnian Serb assembly under
5 conditions where he could freely choose whether or not to do so. The
6 fact is that this man -- this was not early May. But this man had just
7 been taken out of Omarska; correct? And that's what you testified to in
8 the Brdjanin case.
9 A. Several things. Yes, he did come from Omarska. He arrived in
10 Banja Luka. We talked. I was not myself free. Under such uncertain
11 conditions, nobody was free. We discussed, we believed that by his
12 engagement he could eliminate the fear that existed in a significant
13 degree and that was the subject of our discussion. I didn't say earlier
14 that Mr. Karadzic accepted this in advance, but we said that we discussed
15 that later. Mr. Karadzic didn't even know that we were discussing about
16 this. I believe that for reasons that we were colleagues, I should talk
17 with him, and I did it not just alone but with Vojo Kupresanin, who was
18 also an SDS MP in the assembly at the time. So we talked about the issue
19 and I don't see anything wrong there. These were the first months -- he
20 had no more or less freedom than I had to decide what and how to do at
21 that time.
22 Q. This man was scared to death; right? He was very frightened and
23 he bore the physical effects of his time in Omarska. You could see it;
24 isn't that right?
25 A. No, no. I didn't see any consequences. One could see a degree
1 of exhaustion. I was very surprised. I do not scare anyone to death.
2 And when I was there, I did not notice that he was scared to death of
3 that conversation. After that, as far as I could follow, nothing
4 happened to that man later. I couldn't follow everything, though, but in
5 the first few weeks after that event, I think that he did not have any
6 problems whatsoever.
7 Q. All right. Just so we don't get caught up in semantics, let's
8 set aside "scared to death" and whatever that means to you. Are you
9 saying you couldn't tell this man was very frightened?
10 A. Well, I just said that I saw that there was some fear, but I did
11 not see any physical marks of violence. I didn't see. Perhaps that was
12 under his clothes, but I didn't see that.
13 MR. TIEGER: One moment, Mr. President.
14 [Prosecution counsel confer]
15 MR. TIEGER: All right. I think I'm at my half hour,
16 Mr. President, and that concludes the examination, thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
18 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very few questions, Your Honours,
20 very few.
21 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. President, something that you stated was
23 quoted to you as recorded in "Dnevni Avaz." Were your statements given
24 as part of your political struggle conveyed precisely in the media?
25 A. Of course not always, depending on the leanings of each medium,
1 it depended on that because they are not really responsible in terms of
2 the media freedom, as we can see in the west. This is why their articles
3 do not always stick to the facts. And most often this is the case with,
4 for example, "Dnevni Avaz" which is a well known paper of the Bosniak
5 people which was formed during the war and performed its propaganda role
6 practically throughout this time. And even to this day, in some of its
7 elements, as well as "Glasovski [phoen]" which was active in our part of
8 Bosnia and about which Mr. Prosecutor also asked me it preferred such
9 contents that was in accordance not just with the official policy but the
10 general atmosphere of the specific moment.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Pause. Pause, please. Yes.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Would you repeat such statements under oath, such as you accepted
16 everything that you had said under oath in the Brdjanin case? Would you
17 likewise repeat everything that was said in the media under oath?
18 A. Certainly not. Not under oath. But as for this specific issue,
19 I think that I explained everything that I said, and I did say that under
21 Q. Thank you. Could we just briefly see P6278, just to clarify
22 something semantically. This is your statement given to the BBC. And
23 could we please zoom in a bit? Mr. President, I'm going to read this out
24 slowly in the English language so that it would be interpreted:
25 [In English] "It must be openly said that crimes have been
1 committed in this region under the SDS leadership."
2 [Interpretation] Was it the region that was under the SDS
3 leadership or did SDS lead in the crimes?
4 A. No. The SDS did not lead in this. The SDS was the leading
5 political party and that was the context in which this was given.
6 Q. Thank you. I am accused here not because a party was formed and
7 structured and was successful in elections. Rather, I'm accused for
8 being involved in the commission of crimes. From what you know, what can
9 you say about my possible involvement in crimes?
10 A. With full responsibility and under oath, I can say here that
11 I never had the occasion at any meeting or when I met personally with
12 Mr. Karadzic, most often during assembly sessions that were held during
13 the war, I never heard the request being made to anyone to commit any
14 crime. Rather, I can repeat that Mr. Karadzic resolutely tried to find a
15 way to resolve the conflicts peacefully and that the responsibility for
16 crimes which were committed by certain paramilitaries in the territory of
17 Republika Srpska, that they needed to be taken to responsibility for
18 that. Of course it was a situation that is not normal. It was war. And
19 as I say here, I absolutely assert that Mr. Karadzic never insisted on
20 the commission of any crimes, nor did I witness that he was involved in
21 anything like that. What I believe needs to be said are the
22 circumstances under which that happened. At the very beginning of the
23 war, I did say something about that previously. But the key issue
24 remains, and these are the relations among the ethnicities,
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have the consensus for unilateral secession.
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be --
2 MR. TIEGER: I have to object. This is -- the witness is
3 straying into further elucidation of a favourite theme that is not
4 related to the question asked, calls for an objection as being
6 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered the question
7 already. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. We will return to something you did not finish. I would like to
11 ask you the following: Were you a member of the War Presidency in your
13 A. Yes. Laktasi municipality. As a deputy, I was supposed to be
14 involved in this. The SDS had the majority in this municipality. That
15 is to say that the municipal officials came from the SDS. And I was also
16 a member of this War Presidency as a member of another political party.
17 Q. So you were that officially, by nature of your position?
18 A. Yes, by the nature of my position, yes.
19 Q. Ex officio, yes, fine. In the Presidency did you receive any
20 orders from the Crisis Staff of the ARK, which you then had to implement?
21 A. I don't remember such a situation at all. We regularly
22 corresponded with them, but I don't remember any specific orders about
23 anything, so I cannot confirm that that happened.
24 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Chamber whether the
25 Crisis Staffs, the Presidencies, and some other ad hoc bodies in which
1 people held their positions ex officio were unlawful or illegal according
2 to our laws?
3 A. In all extraordinary situations and war is certainly an
4 extraordinary situation, this was considered something normal, and when
5 there are major floodings in the municipal area, then a Crisis Staff is
6 normally set up. Under the conditions that I talked about, that is to
7 say the isolation and social depravity, it was to be expected that such a
8 body would be formed. I also wish to say that throughout the time while
9 I was a member of the War Presidency of the Laktasi municipality, the
10 Municipal Assembly was also operational, and the War Presidency at least
11 in that municipality did not substitute the work of the Municipal
13 Q. Thank you. Mr. President I will read out to you, and this is P6,
14 a Prosecution document, it says, pursuant to Article 12 of the Law on All
15 People's Defence, and the Official Gazette of Republika Srpska, the
16 Executive Council of the Autonomous Region of Krajina at its meeting of
17 the 5th of May, 1992, adopted the following decision to form the
18 Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina. So here they refer to
19 Article 12 of the Law on National Defence. From what you know about
20 municipalities, what role did the president of the municipality, or the
21 president of any socio-political community have in the national defence
22 of his own area, if he had any such role?
23 A. Up until the first multi-party elections held in 1990, I had been
24 a municipal official. I was in charge of the executive power in Laktasi
25 municipality, and together with the municipal president I undoubtedly had
1 the obligation to follow all plans and to introduce innovations with
2 regard to the security situation in the territory of the municipality
3 that I belonged to. With regard to this, the president of the
4 municipality was the leader in charge of all the war plans which
5 according to the law at the time all municipalities had to have, so he
6 was in charge. He managed those plans as the president of the
7 municipality and in accordance with the Law on All People's Defence of
8 the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 JUDGE KWON: Please speak much slower, please.
10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. President, you were asked about the structure of parties and
13 so on. Please tell us if, in your party, decisions are taken in a
14 democratic fashion?
15 A. Of course they are. The respective body sits, there is
16 discussion about the matter in question, a common position is
17 articulated, and then the executive bodies or me as the president, are
18 then called upon to execute this decision.
19 Q. In my party or any party, who has the power to change a
20 democratically taken decision in the -- at the implementation stage?
21 A. If given explicit powers in line with the statute the party
22 president can do so, but he must consult the party bodies to get
24 Q. And if during the implementation stage you demand discipline and
25 in the implementation of democratically taken decisions, would you call
1 that autocratic ruling?
2 A. No, that's a democratic system of responsibility, with which all
3 party members must abide by. Whoever does not is infringing upon party
4 discipline and must bear the consequences in line with the party
6 Q. Thank you. Under conditions where everybody can found a party,
7 would it be allowed and honourable to implement the programme of one
8 party in another party?
9 A. Of course not. There is absolute liberty where we are from, and
10 we are one of the few countries where there is a huge number of political
11 parties. If they disagree with the articulated policy of one party,
12 they -- people are free to found their own, and I don't see why I would
13 carry out anybody's instructions if I'm a member of a different party.
14 Q. Today on page 44, it is recorded that you said that I was the
15 uncontested leader of the SDS. Was this leadership achieved by
16 undemocratic means, or did I have any means of coercion before the war or
17 during the war to force the members of the SDS to have me as their
18 uncontested leader?
19 A. You certainly are an uncontested leader. The people saw you as
20 such. And by virtue of that your statements and your conduct had the
21 support of the whole people. As far as I know, and that can be confirmed
22 by any serious assessment, the SDS was a movement that included everybody
23 who wanted to join it and be members of that political party. I cannot
24 confirm because I don't know. I was not witness to any instance of
25 undemocratic membership or your exerting coercion against any member of
1 your party.
2 Q. Thank you. On page 43, it was quoted to you what the Serbian
3 forces were doing. Can you, as a high official of the assembly now also
4 of the republic and previously of the executive power at municipal level,
5 say which armed group or individuals you would consider Serbian forces,
6 for which the authorities are responsible and were there any whom you
7 would not consider Serbian forces?
8 A. Only the army of the police of the Republika Srpska are
9 legitimate structures, and there were groups who -- which at the local
10 level abusing the impossibility to communicate, and also by using
11 elements of violence, there were some paramilitary groups that were not
12 under the control of the authorities and even exercised repression
13 against local authorities of the RS at certain periods. And these
14 paramilitary or militant organisations and individuals absolutely were
15 not under the influence of the local structures of power in the RS. I
16 can say, having been in contact with General Talic, who was a commander
17 of the 1st Krajina Corps, that he made efforts to place -- or, even to
18 place under control or even disarm these paramilitary formations in his
19 area of responsibility.
20 Q. Thank you. And when you spoke about the protection of the Muslim
21 community at Laktasi during the examination-in-chief, let me now repeat
22 the question because I didn't receive a complete answer. What was the
23 source of jeopardy for these Muslims? Was it the authorities?
24 A. No. They wanted to be protected by the authorities, and they got
25 that protection. I was a representative of the authorities and I've
1 already said that as commander of a military police unit at Banja Luka
2 airstrip I stood up for them and they were threatened by undefined groups
3 that weren't even made up of locals. They would suddenly turn up
4 somewhere, suddenly appear.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. President, for the efforts you made to come here
6 and testify.
7 A. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger?
9 MR. TIEGER: Can I have leave just to clarify one tiny
10 characterisation that Mr. Karadzic made that was contrary to what I said?
11 Maybe the witness needs to confirm. It's with respect to P62, I think
12 it's 78, is it?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
15 Further cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
16 Q. Mr. Dodik, very quickly, with respect to that BBC article that
17 captured your remarks about the SDS and leadership and crimes committed
18 in the region that Mr. Karadzic asked you about, that was not a statement
19 given directly to the BBC, was it? That was a statement to the regional
20 assembly in Banja Luka that the BBC picked up; correct?
21 A. You said it was Beta and then the BBC. I cannot tell which it
22 was, but the only reliable source is the minutes of the assembly, but I
23 believe I was able to clarify the SDS at the time was the undisputed
24 ruler in the area. But I didn't see SDS units or I didn't see political
25 commissioners in the military units that ran the operations. There was
1 no such thing. And as for the responsibility of the authorities, of
2 course authorities are responsible anywhere.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well. President Dodik, that concludes your
5 evidence. On behalf of the Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I would
6 like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you are
7 free to go. Please have a safe journey back home.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, the next witness is not available
9 until tomorrow morning, so ...
10 [The witness withdrew]
11 JUDGE KWON: Why is it so?
12 MR. ROBINSON: That's because I estimated that Mr. Dodik would
13 take the entire day and I've been asked by the victim and witnesses
14 section not to keep witnesses waiting too long, so I tried to balance
15 those two considerations, and as a result I told him he could just be
16 ready for 9.00 tomorrow morning.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic?
18 MR. KARADZIC: Being late this morning was also contributing to
19 sending witness back.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then we will resume tomorrow morning at
21 9.00 at Courtroom III. I was informed that everything is now okay in
22 there. Hearing is adjourned.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.38 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 10th day of
25 April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.