1 Thursday, 11 April 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 WITNESS: KOSTA CAVOSKI
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Professor Cavoski. Please be seated and
13 make yourself comfortable.
14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
16 Good morning to everyone.
17 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Professor Cavoski.
19 A. Good morning.
20 Q. For the transcript, could you please tell us your full name,
21 surname, father's name, date and place of birth.
22 A. Yes, my name is Kosta Cavoski. I was born in Banatsko Novo Selo
23 on the 26th of October, 1941. My father's name is Savo, and my mother's
24 name is Vera.
25 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the interpretation and I also ask you
1 to pay attention to your screen, and then only when the translation is
2 finished then we can continue. I'm not going to ask you to talk about
3 your works; that would take a long time. But I would like to start from
4 the top and to say that other than the fact that you are a member of the
5 Serbian academy of arts and sciences, could you please tell us what your
6 qualifications are and your career path?
7 A. I came to the faculty -- I graduated from the faculty of law in
8 Belgrade in 1964. For a while I was professionally involved in politics
9 as part of the student and the youth organisations. I was the
10 international vice-president of the association of students of
11 Yugoslavia. Then I decided to work in research and so I did my masters
12 and the thesis was called: The role of the American Supreme Court in
13 shaping American federalism, which qualified me as a historian familiar
14 with American constitutional history. Then I began to work as a teaching
15 associate at the faculty, and then I had my doctorate in the idea of
16 freedom and democracy or the possibility of freedom and democracy. I was
17 an associate lecturer until 1971. Then I was thrown out because the year
18 before that I was convicted for the delict of opinion because of a work
19 which was published in the magazine of "Glediste" under the title of the
20 value of Yugoslav law. And for that offence I was sentenced to a jail
21 sentence of five months conditionally over a period of two years, and
22 that was the reason why I was thrown out of the university, and for two
23 years I was unemployed. I worked on translations and, among other
24 things, I translated two treaties on the government by John Locke. Also
25 a famous work by the patriarch written by Firmer [phoen], an English
1 writer from the 16th century, who talked about the divine role of kings.
2 And then only at 1978 I began to work at the institute for management law
3 where I worked for ten years, then I worked at the institute for
4 philosophy and theory -- I'm sorry, thank you.
5 And then on the 1st of January, 1991, again I was employed as a
6 full-time professor at the faculty of law in Belgrade, where I completed
7 and did my career at the age of 68 as a tenured professor, of course, and
8 now I'm retired. In the meantime, in 2003, I was -- I became a member of
9 the Serbian academy of arts and sciences. This is my career in brief.
10 If necessary, I can clarify certain things or add some things.
11 Q. Thank you, Professor. Even though the -- your CV is very long, I
12 would just like you to tell us some of the most important things that
13 were published in your profession, and could you please tell us something
14 about any specialised fields that you particularly focused on during your
16 A. Because I had problems when I testified in the case of
17 Stanislav Galic because there I just summarised by bibliography, this
18 time I asked my colleagues in the Serbian academy of arts and sciences to
19 draft a proper bibliography, according to their standards. So all the
20 books are listed there, not only by title but also with a short summary,
21 so you can see what the content is. My first book was "Philosophy of
22 Open Society, Political De-liberalism" by Karl Popper --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have this
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After that, while I was younger I
1 did not do that so frequently, but now that I am older I'm working more
2 and more so that I published some 37 books. The ones that I can
3 emphasize is the book: "The Possibility of Freedom in Democracy," or,
4 for example, the book: "Constitutionality and Federalism, Court
5 Monitoring of Constitutionality in Anglo-Saxon States," thinking of the
6 United States, Canada, and Australia. We're talking about the
7 constitutional oversight -- judicial review of constitutional matters.
8 Then many other books followed; for example, "Party Multi-Pluralism or
9 Monism..." published in English which I published together with
10 Vojislav Kostunica, who is a bit younger than I am. And after the fall
11 of Milosevic he was first the president of the Federal
12 Republic of Yugoslavia and then after that the president or the
13 prime minister, Serbian prime minister.
14 What is a little bit unusual for lawyers, people in the legal
15 professional, which is my profession is that I also studied Aeschylus,
16 who is an old ancient Greek writer of tragedies and perhaps one of the
17 greatest poets. I translated his trilogy called Oresteia, where I showed
18 through interpreting his verses what his position was on absolute and
19 modified justice. Also an unusual thing is that I was also studying
20 political and legal philosophy. I have a study on John Locke. He is one
21 of the first great liberals of the 17th century in England. And then I
22 have a large monograph which I believe is original. It's a study on
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: There is too much
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you --
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Probably, Doctor, you are speaking a
3 bit too fast for the interpreters.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I will slow down now.
5 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And --
7 JUDGE KWON: -- from what you talked about Machiavelli.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After Machiavelli I also published
9 a large number of books, thanks to which I was able to summarise my
10 reviews and studies and publish them as some kind of an annal or review.
11 I was very interested in legal and political conditions in the
12 former Yugoslavia, especially in the period before the dissolution of
13 that state, the situation in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
14 Republika Srpska, Montenegro, Serbia, and so on and so forth. So I was
15 one of the best-known political analysts of that time. And because of
16 that and because of this large number of books, and also as the
17 Prosecutor noted in the Galic case, he said that I also wrote expert
18 analysis on the work of The Hague Tribunal or the
19 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Two of those
20 studies were published in English also. The first dealt with the case of
21 General Djordje Djukic, who died without seeing the trial to its
22 completion. The second is the case of President Radovan Karadzic. At
23 the time when there were just two indictments which were later amended,
24 this was published twice in English. The second edition also contained
25 some accompanying documents. I think for now this is sufficient and of
1 course, if required, I can speak more about my works.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you, Professor Cavoski. And specially I thank you for
4 slowing down your pace because then it could all be recorded in the
5 transcript. As you said yourself, you know, you are aware of what I am
6 charged with. And in the third final indictment I am charged with -- for
7 my alleged participation in a comprehensive joint criminal enterprise and
8 three subsequent criminal enterprises. The main goal of these criminal
9 enterprises are the lasting removal of Muslims and Croats from the
10 territories to which the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina lay claim, and then
11 the indictment also states that the Prosecutor does not believe that I
12 committed the crimes myself physically but that my responsibility lies
13 pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute of this Tribunal for
14 participation in the joint criminal enterprise. These allegations mostly
15 are based on reports of two experts of the Prosecution: Robert Donia and
16 Patrick Treanor. And so you are asked to study these reports and to
17 submit your own report about whether their reports are accurate, what is
18 stated in them, whether that is accurate.
19 And now I would like to ask you -- well, we do have your report,
20 it's a little bit summarised. It's a shorter version of the report --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
22 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Well, while I've had occasion in the past to
24 object to needless commentary by the accused, I considered that this
25 might be a fairly and clumsy long-winded attempt to move into the
1 question but it contained commentary that is both impermissible and
2 erroneous. For example, these allegations mostly are based on reports,
3 it's neither the accused's province to offer such commentary nor,
4 obviously, is that a correct submission. So --
5 JUDGE KWON: Otherwise it is of leading nature as well.
6 MR. TIEGER: That's very true.
7 JUDGE KWON: Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Yes, I do understand.
9 But I don't wish to -- well, I want to say what we are asking
10 Professor Cavoski to do.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Professor Cavoski, could you briefly tell us --
13 MR. TIEGER: Maybe that's a perfect opportunity to say it's not
14 for Mr. Karadzic to say what Mr. Cavoski was asked to do. He is to ask
15 the witness and to find out what the witness's position is in a
16 non-leading way.
17 JUDGE KWON: But what's the problem with the accused asking the
18 witness what he has been tasked to do?
19 MR. TIEGER: That -- I have no problem with that, Mr. President.
20 It's just that Mr. Karadzic was excusing what happened before by saying
21 essentially he wants to say what he was asked to do. That's been the
22 problem throughout. It's Dr. Karadzic who wants to tell the witness what
23 his evidence is.
24 JUDGE KWON: I take it by now Mr. Karadzic has understood it.
25 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Excellency, line 9, page 7,
2 this is precisely what I wanted to ask.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Professor Cavoski, could you please tell us what it was that the
5 Defence asked you to do?
6 A. I was asked to carefully review and study the reports of two
7 experts: One is Dr. Robert Donia and the other is Dr. Patrick Treanor.
8 I did that and, as is usual in studies of this kind, I attempted to
9 discover their material errors, inconsistencies, omissions of key facts,
10 and periodical malicious things that cropped up in the reports. And
11 thereby I tried to bring into question their credibility and veracity.
12 That is the nature of my report. By its nature, it's an analytical
13 report. I pointed, first of all, to the omissions in those reports in
14 order to show that the reports cannot be accepted as such in their
15 entirety. I can cite a number of examples where the errors are evident.
16 On page 6 I mentioned a quotation from Robert Donia where he
17 says -- it's on page 52, obvious errors, under 1, page 52 where it says:
18 [In English] "... MUP officers of Serb nationality dressed in the
19 blue uniforms ...," and so on.
20 [Interpretation] So as you can see he claims that the Serbian
21 policemen differed from others by their blue uniforms. And on this fact
22 that they wore blue uniforms he draws the conclusion that these were
23 Serbian policemen.
24 I am sufficiently old and I have relatively good memory and I
25 know for sure that all policemen in the former Yugoslavia from Jesenica
1 to Djevdjelija used to wear blue uniforms. Therefore, a blue uniform was
2 not a hallmark of a Serb policeman but of any policeman. And it's
3 obvious that this is a material error if not malevolence.
4 On page 7 which is -- it says here page 79, a person is
5 mentioned, and the name of this person is - pay attention to the name -
6 Rizo Selmanagic, and then it says a Serb veteran of the Second World War.
7 All right. I apologise. Thank you.
8 So it is said of Rizo Selmanagic that he was a Serb veteran from
9 the Second World War. Those of us who live in the territory of the
10 former Yugoslavia know well what names mean. On the basis of names we're
11 able to recognise the ethnicity of a person. For example, my name is
12 Serbian, my first name is Serbian, but the last name not quite. That's
13 why people sometimes wonder what my ethnicity is. I am a Serb, but I
14 don't have a typical Serbian last name. However, someone who is called
15 Rizo Selmanagic cannot be anything else but a Muslim. There were of
16 courses Muslims who declared themselves as Serbs. For example,
17 Alija Izetbegovic in the first census that was conducted declared himself
18 a Serb because there were only three possibilities, to declare himself a
19 Serb, a Croat, or as a non-aligned. There was no possibility to declare
20 himself as a Muslim.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can we please focus on certain areas. Could you tell us how in
23 these reports the period before the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
24 period of the Yugoslav crisis is depicted. How did they understand it
25 and how did they describe it? Can we just hear that from you briefly?
1 Because we have your report and I hope it will be admitted. What we do
2 not have is your assessment. How did they understand this, and how did
3 they describe it?
4 A. I thank you for the interruption and please interrupt me every
5 time, President Karadzic, whenever you believe that I am too extensive in
6 my statement because this is probably not necessary for the expert
7 testimony. My assessment is that the authors of both reports, Dr. Donia,
8 who makes many more errors, and Patrick Treanor, in whose report I found
9 only three insignificant material reports [as interpreted], by my
10 judgement, mostly described in a very inadequate manner the circumstances
11 in the former Yugoslavia on the eve of its breakup. A constitutional
12 question arose at the time, whether Yugoslavia could be broken up or not
13 and whether such an act would be constitutional or anti-constitutional.
14 Both authors glossed over this significant issue, and with great
15 sympathies, I have to say, mentioned the acts of the secessionists.
16 First of all, the Slovenian and then the Croatian governments and
17 eventually those committed by the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I
18 can understand that someone may believe that Yugoslavia needed to be
19 broken up, but this had to be analysed in the context of whether that was
20 allowed from the point of view of the constitution that was then in force
21 or not. Both authors seemed to skip this fact, Donia with the
22 justification that he did not deal with constitutional law even though
23 he, himself, referred to the decision of the Constitutional Court of
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina which denied the constitutionality of a Serbian
25 institution, the National Council. And Patrick Treanor also did not deal
1 with this issue.
2 In my view, this is something that is lacking and it is
3 significant because there was no constitutional basis for breaking up
4 Yugoslavia. Also, they make wrong assessments of the role of the
5 Yugoslav People's Army. The Yugoslav People's Army had the
6 constitutional duty to protect and defend the territorial integrity of
7 the former Yugoslavia. The fact that it failed to do so was its big
8 weakness that will be judged by history and the peoples who were the
9 victims. But it had to do that. Both Donia and Patrick Treanor, with
10 regard to the role of the JNA, very often described that as if it
11 defended only the Serb interests, the interests of the Serbian people,
12 rather than the interests of all nations and nationalities that made up
13 the then-Yugoslavia.
14 For a long time there were six units, both provinces, Serbia and
15 Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, which were in favour of
16 preserving Yugoslavia. The only ones that opposed were Slovenia and
17 Croatia. These two authors failed to note that. Then the
18 Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia made dozens and dozens of decisions
19 which denied the constitutionality even of some constitutional laws of
20 Slovenia and Croatia, then their regular laws and sub-laws. None of
21 these decisions is mentioned in these reports, even though they do refer
22 to a decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In
23 my view, these were great shortcomings. And Dr. Karadzic asked me about
24 their assessment and review of the circumstances and situation in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990, 1991, before the breakup of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina within the former Yugoslavia which had already been
2 broken up.
3 Q. Thank you, Professor. Of course I will ask you that. Can you
4 please tell the Chamber what was actually happening before the breakout
5 of the war in Bosnia as opposed to the way this is depicted in the two
7 A. As I seriously study history, I claim that the real truth will
8 only be discovered in about 30 years, once that all secret intelligence,
9 diplomatic, and other archives of the USA, the UK, Germany, and other
10 important states are open. What can be said on the basis of the
11 materials that are available at the moment is that for quite a long time
12 both the USA and the leading European powers were in favour of the
13 preservation of Yugoslavia within its borders. And then at one point,
14 perhaps under the influence of Germany, there was a change and the
15 conclusion which was adopted was that the so-called Versailles Yugoslavia
16 needed to be broken up, the Yugoslavia which was created by the peace
17 treaty of Versailles, and the borders of which were established on the
18 basis of the agreement signed at the Trianon with the neighbouring
19 countries and so on. At that moment the foreign powers began to support
20 the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, and then later on
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina as well.
22 So under such circumstances it was necessary to preserve first
23 the then-Yugoslavia and then also Bosnia and Herzegovina at any cost. I
24 was following the circumstances very closely because in addition to my
25 scholarly work I was involved in politics throughout my career and I
1 wrote articles and books simultaneously as the events were developing.
2 You can see that from my bibliography what I was assessing.
3 In my view the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina actually pursued three
4 policies. One was primary or first rate, the other one was secondary,
5 and they had a tertiary. The primary policy was the preservation of the
6 integrity of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the preservation of
7 Yugoslavia. So the preservation of Yugoslavia, that is to say
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of Yugoslavia, all of Yugoslavia.
9 At the moment when it was assessed that this would no longer be possible,
10 the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by the Serb Democratic Party, tried
11 to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina within the so-called Rump Yugoslavia
12 as we may call it, the Rump Yugoslavia.
13 What was important about this was an agreement that was very
14 important and had long-term consequences and which Adil Zulfikarpasic had
15 made with Slobodan Milosevic and which preceded the so-called
16 Cutileiro Plan. I personally knew this Adil Zulfikarpasic. I socialised
17 with him since around 1986 when I returned from the United States. He
18 was a very reasonable man and he concluded that the Muslims were living
19 together with the Serbs in 103 Bosnian municipalities and in a much
20 smaller number of municipalities together with Croats, and that it was
21 most important that they should keep friendly relations with the Serbs.
22 He claimed publicly that by authority, though a verbal one, of
23 Alija Izetbegovic he had arrived in Belgrade and concluded the agreement
24 which implied that Bosnia would remain a part of either Yugoslavia or the
25 Rump Yugoslavia. The agreement was concluded and signed and publicly
1 presented, but unfortunately Alija Izetbegovic later on said he wanted to
2 have nothing to do with it.
3 Q. Could I ask you just to clarify this for us. Did you know how I
4 reacted, what I agreed with Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic, and did the
5 Serbs on their part give up some of their plans for the sake of
6 preserving Bosnia within Yugoslavia?
7 A. President Karadzic, of course I cannot remember every single
8 detail, but I think that the Serbian Democratic Party abandoned its idea
9 about regionalisation which had already been implemented and which was in
10 accordance with the constitution and the law of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You
11 were willing to give it up on condition that this plan was adopted. So
12 both Filipovic and Adil Zulfikarpasic had left the Party of Democratic
13 Action and formed their own party with a Bosniak name and negotiated.
14 This was done by Adil Zulfikarpasic. The Serbs led by the Serbian
15 Democratic Party really made a big concession to the Muslims by doing
16 this in the hope that it was possible to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina and
17 peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was especially important. Because in
18 our Balkan region every inter-ethnic conflict sooner or later leads to a
19 fratricide and sometimes even civil war. So the Serbian Democratic Party
20 made this concession.
21 Q. Thank you. Can you please continue about item 2.
22 A. Well, another big opportunity to preserve peace in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Cutileiro Plan. He acted on the orders of the
24 European Union. He was a Portuguese diplomat. On several occasions
25 representatives of all three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina met; that is
1 to say they were represented by Alija Izetbegovic, Mate Boban, and
2 Dr. Radovan Karadzic. The plan had almost been agreed on. The
3 principles had been accepted and signed, and these were basically the
4 constitutional principles which implied the formation of three, we would
5 say, constitutional or constitutive units. Today the word "entity" is
6 more often used, but this would -- these would actually be confederal
7 units or entities of Bosnia as an overall Federation.
8 At first they did not have to, at least that was not envisaged,
9 they did not have to be completely linked territorially. It was supposed
10 that the municipalities with majority Muslim population would be part of
11 the Muslim entity; others which had Serbian majority of the population
12 would be in the Serbian entity; and likewise with the Croatian
13 municipalities. But there were some disputed municipalities and
14 arbitration of European Union was envisaged. The number of those
15 disputed municipalities was not great and the commission had been set up
16 which was supposed to resolve the issue. And this had almost been
17 successfully completed, and then something unexpected happened, namely,
18 the US ambassador, Warren Zimme rmann, who served in Belgrade arrived and
19 talked to Alija Izetbegovic. The letter complained to him that, well, he
20 had to sign this agreement with representatives of the Serbs and the
21 Croats which he and the Muslims did not really find to be completely in
22 their favour, to which as the media reports then said Zimmermann
23 responded: And why would you have to do this? And so he drew a
24 conclusion from that that the United States were not forcing the
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims to do this. And then Alija Izetbegovic, in an
1 act which was most heretical, withdrew his signature from the document
2 where he had already placed his initials. I say he only initialled it
3 because that was the preliminary form of the agreement.
4 When I was a witness in the Stanislav Galic case, the Prosecutor
5 read out to me an interview with Warren Zimmermann from much later on in
6 which he claims things did not develop in this way. And how did they
7 develop? This is something that the diplomatic archives will uncover in
8 25 or 30 years once it is available to curious scientists, scholars and
9 journalists. We were convinced because that was the way it was described
10 in the media at the time and Izetbegovic also told many people about
11 this, that that was actually a dialogue that he had with
12 Warren Zimmermann. So as you can see, and as I have written and
13 published, this withdrawal of signature from the Cutileiro Plan which was
14 treacherous was, as the lawyers would say, casus belli, the cause of war,
15 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And Izetbegovic was in a way aware of it.
16 Because in 1943 -- in 1993, rather, he stated, I think it's somewhere in
17 my report, I'm not sure which page that is on, that he more or less knew
18 that if he had to choose between peace and the sovereignty of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he chose the latter. And of course the latter
20 resulted in the civil war.
21 However, the Tribunal is more interested in the consequence,
22 whereas historians are more interested in responsibility. I as a
23 historian must say that those are responsible for this war who refused to
24 accept the Cutileiro Plan who, to my mind and in many people's opinions,
25 was fair.
1 Q. Did you mean the Tribunal or any court on page 16, line 10, as it
2 was recorded? Or did you mean both? I'm referring to the transcript.
3 A. You mean here in front of me? I meant the
4 International Criminal Court.
5 Q. Did we deny Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence in the context of
6 the Cutileiro Plan? Did we refuse that?
7 A. That solution was the least acceptable solution for the Serbs,
8 but still acceptable. The most favourable variant would have been the
9 preservation of Yugoslavia. Number two would have been what
10 Adil Zulfikarpasic had proposed, namely, for BH to remain in the
11 framework of a truncated Yugoslavia. And only -- the third solution that
12 was very hard to accept for the Serbs was for Bosnia to become
13 independent; namely, that the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina be separated
14 from the Serbs in Serbia and live in two different countries. But to
15 preserve the peace or as we say sometimes to keep Bosnia peaceful, Bosnia
16 was to be structured as a loose federation or confederation of three
17 ethnic entities.
18 Q. Thank you. Professor Cavoski, the model put forward by the
19 European Union through Ambassador Cutileiro, was it something new or were
20 you aware of similar examples in Europe, I mean this sort of structural
21 type in another European country?
22 A. I have dealt with the matter of federalism for a long time, and
23 Yugoslavia was a federation as well. Belgium, for example, which adopted
24 its first constitution in 1835 or was it 33? I'm not sure. And the
25 first Serbian constitution took that one as a model. Under that
1 constitution Belgium was a unitary state, whereas nowadays it is a very
2 loose confederation. The European Union wasn't much in favour of that
3 but the Flemings wanted it. And the only thing keeping Belgium together
4 is the city of Brussels which is on Flemish territory but has a
5 Francophone majority. Europe does not support Scottish secession from
6 England and the Scots were given to understand that if they decide to
7 leave Great Britain - and I believe that they became part of
8 Great Britain in 1701 - in that case they would have to wait for a number
9 of years until they joined the European Union. This doesn't apply to
10 Wales because the Welsh are not considering that. However, it does apply
11 to Basque and Catalonia. These are two parts of Spain in which different
12 languages from Spanish are spoken. The Basques speak a language which is
13 unrelated to any other European language, whereas the Catalan was also
14 developed from vulgar Latin.
15 Then in Italy there is the idea of Padania which is the entire
16 north of Italy as a separate state which would be economically more
17 prosperous. And then there could also be the question of the secession
18 of Sardinia and Sicily, because in Sardinia a special dialect is spoken
19 which is actually Catalan. Sicily is a complex matter because it was
20 formerly part of Magna Graecia, that is it belonged to the Greek
21 civilisation. And then it was part of the Roman Empire and after that
22 for a number of centuries the Arabs were present. And this population is
23 very mixed and have a special mentality.
24 When Italy was defeated, the Sicilians actually wanted to join
25 the United States of America as the 49th state, I think. This problem
1 could also arise in Transylvania, where there are many more Hungarians
2 than in Serbia, and they live in a homogenous territory where they have
3 been present for centuries. There are also very many Hungarians in the
4 south of Slovakia that could also secede. Things are not at all easy in
5 Europe. They're not as simple as they may look. The European Union
6 never supported secession except in former Yugoslavia.
7 Q. Thank you, Professor. You have noticed that these constituent
8 units didn't have to be territorially contiguous. To what extent is that
9 similar to the Swiss model where there are cantons which are established
10 on a linguistic basis but are not territorially contiguous?
11 A. Switzerland is a unique federation, the only federation in the
12 world which is not modelled after America - that's where all authors
13 agree - whereas our federation and the Soviet federation was also
14 modelled after the American one. Initially they only had three cantons
15 which united, and then the number of cantons increased. But what
16 determined the fate of Switzerland was the war of the seventh year in
17 1807. That was a war between the cantons, and the Bern canton was able
18 to defeat the Catholics and make sure that Switzerland remain an entity.
19 There was also the separation of a canton from another, the canton Jura,
20 because they had a different religion. But the Swiss live in peace now.
21 The principle is the following: Apart from the cantons which
22 have different criminal codes, only the civil code is the same for all of
23 Switzerland. They have four ethnic groups: The Germans who are mostly
24 Protestants which is very important; then the French who are also
25 Protestants; then there are Italians; and there's a small group of a few
1 ten thousand who speak a language that developed from vulgar Latin, but
2 they are also entitled to speak their own language in the assembly. So
3 there are four ethnic entities.
4 Q. Thank you. Let us return to the Cutileiro Plan and the
5 Lisbon Agreement. Did you notice or can it be found that in that
6 agreement which the Serbs accepted and remained faithful to it, there are
7 any grounds for persecution and the expulsion of population --
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
9 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: "Did you notice or can it be found in that agreement
11 which the Serbs accepted and remained faithful to it...," again I object
12 to the accused testifying and feeding information to witnesses -- or
13 purporting to testify in those comments and thus feeding information to
15 JUDGE KWON: Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, but that's what
17 Professor Cavoski's report says. These are his very words, that the
18 Serbs remained faithful to that agreement until the end, and this Bench
19 knows that we never --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: In light of the witness's previous answer, the
23 Chamber has no difficulty with allowing the question. Please go ahead.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Do you remember the question? Does that agreement contain any
2 foundation that would make possible or even oblige anybody to commit
3 crimes, genocide, or even transfer population? Or did you know what my
4 position and the Serbian position was with regard to exchange of
5 population, let alone with regard to destruction, persecution, and
7 A. President Karadzic, you don't have to tell me what is contained
8 in that agreement because I know it very well. I followed the events in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina very closely and I collected documents. Occasionally
10 I wrote about it, and at least once and maybe more often I wrote about
11 the Cutileiro Plan as well. That's part of my bibliography. That plan
12 does not envisage any re-settlement of population, let alone anything
13 worse than that. It was supposed that everybody would stay where they
14 were living, the places where the Serbian majority would be part of the
15 Serbian entity; those in the Muslim majority part of Muslim entity, and
16 so on. And then there was the issue of contentious municipalities. That
17 was to be resolved. And those were such municipalities where one
18 ethnicity had only a relative majority not an absolute one.
19 When -- it has to do with the drawing of borders of the
20 Croatian Banovina in 1939 which you know very well. Re-settlement of
21 population was not envisaged, let alone violent acts or even genocide.
22 Nothing of this kind was mentioned, and I'm surprised that anybody may
23 make such inferences. It was a usual agreement which envisaged the
24 federalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 Q. Thank you. How would you characterise the acceptability of
1 Mr. Izetbegovic's giving up on the agreement and opting for independence?
2 What were our option in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Could we -- were we able to
3 accept this ruse?
4 A. President Karadzic, that is a political question because one
5 thing is what was written about and what was discussed, whereas another
6 matter is the political usefulness. You were the leader of a people and
7 you took decisions that you thought were in the best Serbian interest.
8 If you're asking me for my personal opinion, I favoured the use of the
9 Yugoslav People's Army, that was my personal attitude, my personal
10 opinion, not yours, because we -- I thought that the country must be
11 defended and that's what the army is for. But my personal opinion is
12 irrelevant here and these proceedings.
13 Izetbegovic, however, had to know that his refusal of the
14 Cutileiro Plan would result in war. And this horrible consequence was
15 something that he accepted in advance by refusing the Cutileiro Plan.
16 And his travels to Libya several times and then to Turkey where he
17 offended the Turks because he refused to bow at the mausoleum of Ataturk,
18 but he did get some kind of support from Iran, for example. How much he
19 exactly got, I don't know, but it was probably significant, a significant
20 amount. But he will have to face the judgement of history.
21 Q. Could you tell us briefly in one sentence why Izetbegovic refused
22 to pay honours to Ataturk at his mausoleum?
23 A. I knew Mr. Izetbegovic personally and his son would come to see
24 me sometimes while I was living on Maksim Gorki Street. He was
25 imprisoned for -- because he was a dissenter. And he was a true believer
1 in -- Muslim believer. Kemal Ataturk was in favour of a secular Turkey,
2 not something few people know. He abolished the caliphate and all the
3 Muslim priests were marginalised. And Izetbegovic condemned Ataturk's
4 secularism and that's why he refused to bow.
5 Q. Thank you. How do the attempts to preserve peace and the
6 acceptance of the Lisbon Agreement and Cutileiro Plan characterise these
7 two expert reports that you studied and that were submitted here to this
8 Court as evidence?
9 A. I study history a lot and recently I have been looking into
10 antique ancient historians such as Thucydides, Xenophon, Tacitus,
11 Suetonius, and in particular, Polybius, and some of them I quoted. And
12 this is what is very important when we're talking about historians. It's
13 not just important for them to refer to facts, to things that really
14 occurred. What is important is in the sea of facts to discover those
15 that are most important in order to explain the causes of certain events.
16 And, you see, historian Robert Donia, he's a professor, a
17 historian, he did not do that. He had to have wanted to find the crucial
18 facts that resulted in the outbreak of war, not only in the former
19 Yugoslavia but in particular in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These facts would be
20 secession -- the secession of the Croatian and the Slovenian government,
21 that would be a cause of war in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the
22 attempt to set up an independent and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina
23 which would be majority Muslim on the ruins of former Yugoslavia. And
24 you would reach the facts by rejecting the historical agreement between
25 Zulfikarpasic and Milosevic and then by rejecting the Cutileiro Plan.
1 How come Robert Donia never asked himself what casus belli was on
2 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a key issue. Anybody
3 studying seriously history would have had to have dealt with that.
4 Q. Thank you. Professor Cavoski, could you please tell us if there
5 are any international legal duties or documents that would oblige us to
6 accept a violent unilateral, unconstitutional, and disagreed secession of
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina and to accept the rule of a minority Muslim
8 population over a majority Christian one?
9 A. Well, I dealt with federalism and secession as well as valid
10 international law, and I must say that during the past 20 years some
11 crucial changes have taken place. A former UN Secretary-General said
12 that there was no question of breaking up a member of the United Nations,
13 it was out of the question. So the possibility was not permitted for any
14 member of the UN to be disbanded from outside or from the inside as a
15 state. So the right of secession or independence was exclusively applied
16 to former colonial peoples and to their liberation from the colonial
17 domination of European powers. There is no federation in the world
18 except the former Soviet Union which permitted secession. In the
19 United States - this was controversial - two major writers, Taylor and
20 Calhoun [phoen] did look at that possibility. And since it could not be
21 resolved legally, this question was resolved in battle by the defeat of
22 the southern states in 1865. And after that the US court - and I quoted
23 that case, Texas versus White - was of the opinion that the
24 American Union was indestructible consisting of indestructible member
25 states. No attempts succeeded at secession.
1 Q. May I ask you, we don't have a lot of time so are you able to
2 tell us --
3 A. Yes, very well.
4 Q. We will make breaks, thank you, and we will speak slower. Can
5 you please tell us how Serbian agreements to preserve the peace and to
6 preserve the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina were presented in these
7 reports by the experts that was submitted by these courts, also the
8 preservation of Yugoslavia?
9 A. Well, to tell you the truth, President Karadzic, they were not
10 even dealt with. They were not presented. They did not feel the need to
11 state that Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina led by the
12 Serbian Democratic Party were prepared to make major concessions, to give
13 up the constitutional framework of the former Yugoslavia, to give up the
14 links, territorial and state links with Serbs in Serbia, just in order to
15 preserve the peace. So this is not talked about in any way in these
16 reports. Whenever needed - and I mention this in a number of
17 places - there was a malicious attempt to show that the
18 Yugoslav People's Army allegedly acted exclusively in the interests of
19 the Serbs, which I think was absolutely wrong, wrongly stated.
20 Q. Thank you. And are you able to tell us how these reports
21 presented the chain of events and Serbian conduct after armed conflict
22 broke out and how were the measures for the self-organisation and
23 self-protection or the conduct of the Serbian party, how were they
24 presented in this report or these reports, the appearance of staffs and
25 all the other measures that the Serbian people in those circumstances, a
1 completely newly occurring situation, carried out?
2 A. Well, I wanted to talk about something that is frequently
3 mentioned, and that is the Crisis Staff, the term "kriza," "crisis,"
4 which in old Greek means the moment of taking a decision. It was used a
5 lot in the 1980s in Yugoslavia because socialism was in crisis, then the
6 ruling party was in crisis, and then there were these so-called
7 crisologists who dealt with that. Former Yugoslavia as well as former
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina had laws on All People's Defence and social
9 self-protection, and these laws provided for specific measures in the
10 event of any danger of a conflict, internal uprisings, or in the event of
11 an external attack. The formation of Crisis Staffs in that opinion was a
12 legitimate, legal measure, which was taken in the event of the worst
13 possible scenario happening. So when you foresee the possibility of a
14 conflict breaking out, then you need to take measures, precautionary
15 measures. So these Crisis Staffs were a preparatory measure in the event
16 that the worst things came to pass.
17 I wanted to just refresh everybody's memory and talk about two
18 great thinkers in the field of political philosophy - these are
19 Thomas Hobbes and John Locke - who had the idea of a natural state of
20 affairs. A natural state is the state that precedes the establishment of
21 a state or occurs after the breakup of a state so that a natural state
22 would also be a state of civil war, just like a natural state could be a
23 presentation of actual international affairs in times of conflicts and
24 disagreements. So if somebody feels that a state is going to fall apart
25 and that the existing government would not be able to protect its
1 citizens, would not be able to protect -- vouch for their safety and for
2 their property, then they allow for the possibility for them to take
3 measures of precaution, measures of self-organising, in the event that
4 such circumstances should occur bordering on the natural state of affairs
5 in the Hobbesian sense of that idea. So I think that the Serbian side --
6 not just the Serbian side, though, both the Muslim and the Croatian side
7 also did that, all three sides established Crisis Staff.
8 The Crisis Staff of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
9 was most prominent headed by the seventh member of the Presidency,
10 Ejup Ganic, who was elected as an alleged Yugoslav-oriented person even
11 though he was a Muslim by ethnicity. He was the head of that
12 Crisis Staff and he tried in that way to bypass the powers of the two
13 Serbian representatives: Professor Biljana Plavsic and
14 Professor Nikola Koljevic. So that was the reason why this Crisis Staff
15 later was abolished. The Croats also set up Crisis Staffs, the Muslims
16 as well, and of course the Serbs did too. And in my view, this was not
17 only in line with the valid laws on All People's Defence and civilian
18 self-protection, but it was a precautionary measure in the event of the
19 worst scenario occurring, which it actually did occur.
20 Q. Thank you. In this process -- in this case the
21 Serbian Democratic Party and the Serbs in Bosnia are condemned the most
22 for drafting a paper, instructions in the event of extraordinary
23 circumstances which is popularly abbreviated to Variant A and B because
24 those were the options presented in the paper. I'm not going to go into
25 those who drafted this paper. All I want to ask you is this: Are you
1 familiar with that paper and are you able to tell us if that paper is to
2 blame for causing the crisis and does the crisis stem from that paper and
3 is it legal in terms of the Yugoslav laws then in force?
4 A. The paper as such cannot cause anything without the people who
5 would act pursuant to things stated in the paper. I did have those
6 instructions in my hands. I carefully studied it, both Variant A and B,
7 its two parts, and I believe that it was in line with the then-valid laws
8 on All People's Defence and social self-protection. Plan A provided for
9 the formation of Crisis Staffs in those municipalities in which the Serbs
10 were in a majority and they -- the mayor would be from the ranks of the
11 Serbs because that's how they were elected, according to the majority
12 population. Option B provided for the municipalities where the Serbs
13 were in a minority to organise special Crisis Staffs which would
14 encompass those settlements and villages where the Serbs were in a
15 majority and in the town itself where they constituted a minority in the
16 event that the safety and property was seriously endangered. This was a
17 measure - how shall I put it? - of a precautionary nature in anticipation
18 of anything that could possibly happen, which necessarily need not have
19 happened, but regretfully had Cutileiro's plan been accepted, war could
20 have been avoided, so that this instruction about the activities of the
21 Crisis Staff would not have been implemented at all in that case.
22 However, in my view, those who drafted the plan for far-seeing
23 because they saw that people needed to be prepared in advance in the
24 event of, God forbid, the worst circumstances taking place which did take
25 place. So in my opinion this was a precautionary measure which was both
1 legal and justified and, as such, it could not have caused anything and
2 it could not have caused war either.
3 Q. Thank you. Did you look into the Serbian proposal on forming
4 municipalities on the basis of ethnicity wherever there were conditions
5 for that? And were you informed about the proposal that even in the
6 event of conflicts breaking out, whenever Muslims or Croats were able to
7 form their own municipality they should form their municipality and have
8 their own police and administration?
9 A. Yes, of course I did notice that proposal and it was a very
10 rational one. If you did follow, and you're not a lawyer but a
11 neuropsychologist, but I'm sure you followed the events. In Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina laws on the organisation of municipalities were amended
13 often and municipalities had a tendency to grow larger and larger, so
14 that Serbian municipalities which were mostly rural municipalities would
15 be joined to a town that had a Muslim majority so that you were losing
16 the number of municipalities where Serbs were in a majority. Perhaps the
17 same case applied to Croat municipality. Because for historical reasons,
18 you know you're from Montenegro, I'm from Serbia, Muslims generally lived
19 in towns. Very few of them lived in villages and if they did live in
20 villages they lived along the Drina River. There were practically none
21 along the Sava River. So large swaths of territory were either Serbian
22 and to a degree Croat. So that the organisation of municipalities then
23 was unjust because it joined large Serbian territories with purely
24 Serbian villages and towns to places where the Muslims were in a
25 majority. And so, in my opinion, the separation of Serbian
1 municipalities or the separation of Muslim and Croat municipalities
2 allowed for smaller municipalities but people would be more satisfied and
3 could manage their own affairs more easily. I was born in
4 Banatsko Novo Selo in Banat which had a 7.000 population between the two
5 wars. Two-thirds were Romanians and they had their own municipalities.
6 Now we don't have any municipalities anymore. All of that is counted as
7 Pancevo which has a population of over a hundred thousand. In the same
8 way municipalities were formed in Bosnia so that Serbs, and to a degree
9 Croats, would lose the possibility of living in municipalities where they
10 were in a majority.
11 Q. Thank you. Earlier you mentioned a decision --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Now please continue. Please put a
13 pause and speak very slowly, Mr. Cavoski and Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Well, we're rushed for
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. You mentioned a decision by the Constitutional Court which was
18 disputed the Serbian council. How do things stand today in Serbia with
19 the existence of councils for separate ethnic groups?
20 A. Serbia is trying to join the European Union, even though I
21 believe that it will never actually join. I -- this is my personal
22 opinion. And the European Union demands the adoption of all -- or
23 recognition of the rights of all ethnic minorities as such, so there we
24 have so-called reverse discrimination. It's called positive action --
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm not sure this part is relevant.
1 Please move on, Mr. Karadzic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. All I wanted to ask whether this was something that was provided
4 for under the law?
5 A. Yes, yes. There is a council of the Hungarian national minority,
6 the Romanian national minority, a council for the Roma, and they decide
7 on their educational programmes so that they could have their national
8 language and history. They could have a say in that. And through the
9 councils they also run public media which broadcast programmes in the
10 language of that particular ethnic minority.
11 Q. Thank you. Well, you talked about a natural state. In Latin
12 that would be "status naturalis"?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Are you able to tell us if you had access to the organisation and
15 organised conduct of the Serbian population particularly during the first
16 year of the war? And what can you tell us about that? And could you
17 tell us what the basis for this action was? Did Serbs have any other
18 options and how did this -- how was this conduct presented in these two
20 A. I cannot say that the Serbs were a bit naive as opposed to
21 Muslims and Croats who had planned everything well, but it's a fact that
22 the Muslims and the Croats had formed their military units much before
23 the Serbs, and as these military units were not in existence in
24 accordance with the laws and the constitution I would characterise them
25 as paramilitary units. It is a fact that these two authors only
1 qualified the Croatian units as paramilitary, whereas the Muslim units
2 are qualified as the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which I think is not
3 fair but that is the position they have taken. The Serbs relied on the
4 Yugoslav People's Army, and when there were no sufficient recruits due to
5 the war in Croatia -- even though everyone was called up, the Muslims and
6 the Croats and the Serbs, it was mostly the Serbs who responded to the
7 call-ups and joined the ranks of the Yugoslav People's Army.
8 It was only when Milosevic - which in my view was a
9 mistake - accepted the Vance-Owen Plan for the Serbs in Croatia, the
10 then-Serbian Republic of Krajina as it was called, it happened that the
11 Yugoslav People's Army was supposed to pull out of Bosnia and Herzegovina
12 and it was only then that the Army of Republika Srpska was set up. As
13 far as I know - and I'm sure you know it better than me - the Serbian
14 side never allowed the activities of any paramilitary units, that is to
15 say highway robbers and others who supposedly waged an ethnic war but
16 plundered private property. So from the very beginning it was
17 well-organised and under strict discipline. So from that point of view
18 the Serbian army met all the criteria set by international law when the
19 civil war is at stake.
20 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us from the point of view of the
21 then-laws, especially the Law on All People's Defence and social
22 self-protection and in view of the nature of the natural state, did the
23 Serbian side have less detrimental resolutions? What options could it
24 choose from and, in your view, did the Serbian side act lawfully or
25 unlawfully when it defended its own survival?
1 A. President Karadzic, you raised a difficult issue and it's the
2 issue of the efficiency of laws and the constitution. The question which
3 arose was: Should one blindly trust the efficiency of the constitution
4 which was then in force and the laws which were then in force or should
5 one be cautious and do something else as well? To digress a little bit,
6 I believe this will be interesting for those who are prisoned. It was a
7 polemics between Sir Edward Coke and Thomas Hobbes. At some point in the
8 17th century Sir Edward Coke advocated the idea of the rule of law,
9 whereas Thomas Hobbes wondered how the other could say that at all. And
10 he responded in this way: Who has ever heard, he said, that paper and
11 ink can rule without people's swords because the laws are written in ink
12 on paper. So, you see, without adequate force - and that's the military
13 force - even the best constitution is powerless and serious people must
14 know this.
15 So in my view, at least we in Serbia and there were probably also
16 many Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina who reasoned in this way, we have the
17 constitutional order, the constitution mustn't be violated, and so on,
18 whereas the others took measures in a timely fashion to organise
19 themselves. Fortunately the Serbs in the last moment decided to do
20 something and the result were the Crisis Staffs and changing the remains
21 of the former Yugoslav People's Army and these were the soldiers who had
22 been born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were now turned into the
23 Army of Republika Srpska so that the soldiers of the Army of
24 Republika Srpska were almost exclusively natives of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
25 Q. Thank you. In your opinion did the Serbian side have the right
1 to organise itself and put up resistance to unilateral acts of the Muslim
2 armed forces, or did it have to accept the fait accompli and accept the
3 situation that was imposed on this community?
4 A. Well, the question of legal validity is one thing, and the
5 question whether something made sense or not is different. There are
6 people who are cowards and who would accept everything in order to save
7 their lives which I resolutely reject as a responsible man. In my view,
8 the constitution of some sort of Bosnia-Herzegovina in violation of the
9 constitutional rules of the then-Yugoslavia was an anti-constitutional
10 act. No rights could be drawn from this anti-constitutional act. From
11 the Roman law onwards there is the right -- ex turpi causa non oritur
12 actio, from lack of right, no right can be drawn. So if you have an
13 unlawful establishment of some sort of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you cannot
14 then draw from that a legitimate right to rule over the population of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other way around. Those who were still acting
16 in observance of the constitution of the former Yugoslavia for the
17 purpose of their own survival, had the moral right, a legitimate right,
18 to organise themselves and to oppose this even if this was not something
19 that was specifically written anywhere in the laws.
20 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Chamber what you learned
21 during the period in which you chaired the international committee on
22 establishing the truth about Radovan Karadzic?
23 A. At the time when you were already hiding and when it was unknown
24 where you were, to be frank I thought that you were abroad because that
25 would have been the best for you but unfortunately you were not there,
1 there was an idea to constitute a committee on establishing the truth
2 about Dr. Radovan Karadzic, even though there were people who had the
3 greater right than me to do that like the academician Rajko Petrov Nogo
4 or Gojko Djogo who were also your personal friends. People believed that
5 the chairman should be someone who had not really been close with you in
6 his life, and therefore I was appointed. Of course I could not reject
7 this because I didn't want to look as if I were frightened. I would
8 never allow myself to look like that, even though this was a very
9 responsible position. So we constituted this committee on establishing
10 the truth on Dr. Radovan Karadzic. Many well-known people were the
11 members such as the academician Vasilije Krestic, who was one of our best
12 known historians, or Professor Akmadzic, also a member of the academy of
13 arts and sciences, who for a long time used to teach in Sarajevo. There
14 were other renown persons such as Elena Guskova, and so on and so forth.
15 And we then attempted to give lectures, to attend conferences, appear in
16 the media, and explain what we believed to be the truth in your case. We
17 also engaged in publishing business. I was the editor, that is to say at
18 one and the same time the publisher of your works in six volumes in both
19 the Serbian and the English languages so that this is available to
20 everyone. I believe it has to be found in the archives of this Tribunal
21 because this shows what were all the documents that you signed, what were
22 the orders you issued, what were the interviews you gave during this time
23 before you disappeared from the political scene.
24 Q. Thank you. Did any declarations result in this work which had to
25 do with the indictment against me?
1 A. There were many nice initiatives to do something of the kind. We
2 were joined by several scholarly associates, Vice-President Radulovic,
3 who was an economist, and who drew up two powerful declarations which
4 requested the withdrawing of the indictments that had already been issued
5 against you and which were signed by the most respected people, such as
6 the then-patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox church Pavle. This was
7 published in several languages in a beautiful edition and was available
8 to the public at large. I believe that this had a great impact on our
9 public for the simple reason that the signatories guaranteed by their
10 honour that this act had been fully justified. It's a different issue
11 that the indictments were not withdrawn and that we are today sitting at
12 the trial against you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, if we have
14 sufficient time I would call up these two documents in the e-court or
15 would you suggest that we do that after the break?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break for half an hour and resume
17 at 11.00.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are starting this session without the
22 witness since there's a matter I would like to deal with in
23 private session. Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.
24 [Private session]
8 [Open session]
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, while we are waiting for the witness the
10 Chamber ordered on the 5th of 2013 -- 5th of April, 2013, that the report
11 of Kosta Cavoski be redacted in line with its decision. While the
12 Chamber notes the relevant portions of the report have been redacted, the
13 associated footnotes still remain. So therefore, the Chamber instructs
14 the Defence to further redact the associated footnotes in line with the
15 Chamber's decision.
16 MR. ROBINSON: We'll do that, Mr. President.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I advised Dr. Karadzic as a formal
19 matter to show the report to the witness and have him identify it so that
20 it could be admitted, but if that's not necessary we would ask that that
21 report be admitted. It's 1D6911 as redacted.
22 JUDGE KWON: Whether it's a formality or not, but I'd like
23 Dr. Karadzic to do that.
24 Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we please show
1 1D7731 in e-court.
2 JUDGE KWON: 6911.
3 MR. ROBINSON: This is 7731 which is one of the declarations the
4 witness had mentioned.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can show one image because this
7 is bilingual. Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Professor Cavoski, could you please tell the Chamber what this
10 document is.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps page 2 because page 1 is in
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that's a declaration which we
14 signed and which requested the withdrawal of indictments against you.
15 And as far as I can see, I have the text in English language here in
16 front of me. A number of reasons are listed there under different items.
17 It was signed by many respectable people and that can be seen in the end,
18 but we cannot see the end here. If we showed the end, we could see the
19 names of at least the first few signatories.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you. Can we just leaf through it.
22 A. Yes, here, for example, Professor Smilja Avramov, academician;
23 Ivan Maksimovic; Pavle Ivic; Dejan Medakovic; they're all academicians;
24 Niksa Stipcevic, as well; and in the very end Professor Kosta Cavoski. I
25 was not yet a member of the academy at the time. It seems that we were
1 listed alphabetically but it's not quite right because it's in the Latin
2 alphabet whereas we use the Cyrillic script normally. So about one half
3 of the signatories are members of the Serbian academy of arts and
5 Q. Thank you. Can you just briefly tell us what is the bibliography
6 of these people or their works and careers. Starting with
7 Professor Avramov, what is her position in international law?
8 A. Well, I would excuse myself, first of all, because it's not
9 justified for me to speak about myself, but as for the others they are
10 the best and most respected people in Belgrade and in Serbia.
11 Smilja Avramov, for example, is the best-known internationalist, that is
12 to say, an expert in international law; Ivan Maksimovic is a well-known
13 economist; Academician Pavle Ivic used to be our best dialectologist, he
14 was an expert for the Serbian language and its dialects; Dejan Medakovic
15 was the president of the academy of arts and sciences and he's a
16 well-known expert in the history of paintings, primarily frescos, he also
17 wrote about history; Niksa Stipcevic is an expert for romance languages,
18 primarily the Italian language and so on; Academician Vasilije Krestic is
19 our best-known historian; Miodrag Jovicic used to be a friend of mine and
20 he taught constitutional law and political system; then Milorad Ekmecic,
21 an even better known historian who was teaching for a long time in
22 Sarajevo; Mihailo Markovic was our best-known philosopher.
23 Internationally he published dozens of books, most of them in English
24 language, and he was the only philosopher who was more or less known
25 internationally and could teach anywhere. So these are the people who
1 signed it.
2 Q. Thank you. How would you assess their position and standing
3 during the one-party system?
4 A. As for myself and most of the people listed here, we were very
5 critical of Slobodan Milosevic from the moment when he really came to
6 power in 1987 when he toppled Ivan Stambolic and remained the only one to
7 rule because he did not want to introduce more democracy into the
8 then-system in Serbian. Most of us, not all though, were in opposition.
9 Some of the signatories believed that he could possibly resolve the Serb
10 issue. And so for a while they co-operated with him, as for example
11 Smilja Avramov, but as soon as she saw that he was not pursuing a
12 reasonable policy she left him. Among these people is also Academician
13 Professor Ljubomir Tadic, the father of Boris Tadic, who was our previous
14 president of the republic. He was one of the founders of the democratic
15 party, together with me, the first opposition party in Serbia and
16 Yugoslavia which we founded in November 1989. I was talking about
17 Ljubomir Tadic.
18 Q. Thank you. And before Slobodan Milosevic in the previous regime,
19 what was the standing and position of these people vis-a-vis the
20 one-party communist regime?
21 A. As early as in 1968 and onwards when we had big student
22 demonstrations, opposition was being formed but it was not real
23 opposition because it was not allowed. We were called dissidents. That
24 was typical of eastern Europe in that era. So most of these people were
25 from the ranks of the dissidents, as for example Mihailo Markovic. He
1 was a well-known member of the Praxis club. There were eight of them who
2 were thrown out of the faculty of philosophy and then employed in some
3 sort of institute and so on. They were in disgrace during the
4 then-regime but they were prominent experts and they were well-known
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this declaration please be
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3378, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D7732 now.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. We have 24 signatories here; correct?
16 A. Yes, 24.
17 Q. June 1996. Can you tell us what this document is?
18 A. This is the second declaration requesting the abolishment of
19 proceedings before ICTY against Dr. Radovan Karadzic, once again
20 published in four languages. It is similar to the previous one in terms
21 of contents. There are some changes, of course. I just wonder whether
22 the signatories are different, but we can see at the very end if we show
23 the last page.
24 Q. Can we please leaf through it in one language until we reach the
25 last page.
1 A. Yes, we can do it in English, no problem at all. Now we only
2 have it in Serbian but the Chamber cannot ...
3 Q. Can we leaf through it until we can see the signatures?
4 A. Yes, until we see the signatures but the English version would be
5 better because then the honourable Chamber could also follow. Yes. Here
6 there are 60 signatures, so the number is significantly bigger.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just leave the English
8 version on the screen, please, and collapse the Serbian and then zoom
9 into the version.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in addition to those who had
11 signed the previous declaration we can see here many more new people who
12 are well-known and well respected or were at the time. Unfortunately
13 many of them are among the dead now. For example, Enriko Josif, a
14 well-known composer and a member of the Serbian academy of arts and
15 science. He is Jewish. Enriko Josif, I knew him personally. He was a
16 great man, and so on. Or, for example, Slavko Gavrilovic, he's also new
17 here, a member of the academy. Dragoslav Mihailovic, also a member of
18 the Serbian academy of arts and sciences, a well-known writer, a novelist
19 who devoted a great part of his life to Goli Otok because he had been a
20 detainee at Goli Otok. He was jailed there for a number of years. So
21 these are the signatories.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. And at the top?
24 A. At the very top is the patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox church
25 Pavle. You see, he always signed his name with a cross which is typical
1 of high-ranking church dignatory. Serbian patriarch Pavle, that was his
2 title. He is the first and then other 60 signatures follow. Sixty-one
3 in total. This is the proof of what I said earlier that the Serbian
4 patriarch Pavle signed it.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this declaration also be
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3379, Your Honours.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please see 1D06911.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Now please tell us what this document is that we see.
13 A. This is the report I wrote for your trial: "A critical analysis
14 of the works of Robert J. Donia and Patrick J. Treanor and secession
15 within the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina." It's a report
16 prepared for your trial.
17 Q. Thank you. Please tell us how these two experts understood and
18 presented the legitimate rights of the Serbian people or the Serbian
19 authorities; in other words, how they treated the Muslim and Croatian
20 sides and how they treated the Serbian side from the point of view of
22 A. I will try to be brief because we should leave some time to the
23 Prosecutor for the cross-examination. Speaking about the Serbian
24 leaders, including you as president, both use the phrase "nationalists"
25 or "nationalist delegates" or "nationalist positions." In the English
1 language that is derogatory. Speaking about the Muslims, they never used
2 this word. Instead, they say activists, Muslim activists. And speaking
3 about the Croats, the words "nationalist" and "nationalistic" are used
4 only when Croats negotiate with Serbs about the alleged division of
5 Bosnia. Here I refer first and foremost to the talks that you as
6 president of the RS had with Mate Boban in Grac, the latter was president
7 of Herceg-Bosna. This was the third separate unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 So Mate Boban when he negotiates with the Serbs without the Muslims is
9 called a nationalist. However, when Croats negotiate with the Muslims
10 without the Serbs, that's considered fully legitimate and no such
11 derogatory term is used. And at the very end of the war under the
12 influence of the USA, Alija Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and a
13 representative of the Bosnian Croats met to craft the so-called
14 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, an entity without Serbs in the
15 framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and decided that this Federation would
16 be part of a confederation with Croatia. So this was a project going
17 beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was not a problem to
18 these two, but rather something normal. I believe that this can be seen
19 as a belittling attitude.
20 Q. Thank you. Please tell us how under the conditions of the
21 breakup of the single sovereignty to -- into three ethnic sovereignties
22 where the application of force, was it all right to call them the
23 government and call -- whereas us we were called the Bosnian Serbs. Did
24 they have the right to do that or did we have the right to sovereignty?
25 A. Well, I had been promised to be brief in order to leave some time
1 for the Prosecution. When the Presidency of Yugoslavia shrunk from eight
2 members to four, all international factors refused to co-operate with it.
3 However, when it comes to the Bosnian Presidency which had seven members,
4 the Serbs were the first to leave it, followed by the Croats which makes
5 for a total of four members, and finally Abdic in the Cazin Krajina
6 refused to attend, and as a consequence was evicted from the Presidency
7 by an illegitimate decision. However, Robert Donia and Patrick Treanor
8 qualified this remaining body the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
9 although their term in office of one year had already elapsed so that
10 under the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina somebody else should have
11 succeeded the president of the Presidency. However, the president
12 remained the same until the Dayton Accord and Paris.
13 Q. Thank you. I stand accused, that is, the Serbian side, and I in
14 particular, for ethnic cleansing and the permanent removal of Muslims and
15 Croats from the territories we consider aren't fully ours. Did you see
16 any evidence or any indication that the Serbian side refused refugees to
17 return once peace had set in?
18 A. I haven't seen anything like that in -- when I studied the
19 documents. I saw no written declaration or oral statement to the effect
20 that anybody from the leading circles of the RS stated anything of the
21 kind. On the contrary, it was always understood that refugees would
22 return and finally that became part of the Dayton Accord, too. After the
23 war I lectured at the faculty of law in eastern Sarajevo. I was
24 personally in the position to see that people were, indeed, returning.
25 Q. Thank you. Since you were aware that we were giving in, making
1 concessions, accepting various plans, did you see any evidence that the
2 Serbian side had plans that could not be implemented otherwise than by
3 using force and committing crimes?
4 A. I have never seen such evidence. I personally think that a large
5 part of the combat activities were carried out for self-defence and for
6 the preservation of your own identity. When war is waged, that is done
7 with a goal in mind and that goal was the preservation of the Serbian
8 ethnicity and the preservation of life and property.
9 Q. Was this neutrally and in a unbiased manner presented in these
10 two reports?
11 A. Certainly not. Let's take the example of Sarajevo. Speaking
12 about Muslim victims, their numbers are always stated. However, when the
13 Serbian victims in Sarajevo itself are mentioned then no numbers are
14 mentioned. They -- it is said that they -- there were about 150,
15 although there were maybe as many as 3.000. The perpetrators were never
16 mentioned. Before the courts in the Federation of BiH or here before
17 this Tribunal, the responsible persons are not mentioned but however when
18 it comes to the Serbs then names are always given. This applies also to
19 exchange of artillery fire, and so on.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I seek to tender this expert
21 report. We will revise the footnotes in connection with the paragraphs
22 that were deleted and the remainder is hereby tendered.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Well, in accordance with the proper redactions, no
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3380, Your Honours.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At this moment, I have no further
4 questions for Professor Cavoski. I'll wait for the cross-examination.
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a quick question for clarification. This
6 report itself includes Dr. Cavoski's CV, doesn't it?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's the last page, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,
11 Your Honours.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
13 Q. Good morning, Witness. Before I get into some of the details of
14 your report, I'll just follow-up on a few of the questions that
15 Mr. Karadzic asked you during the examination-in-chief. First of all,
16 with respect to the issue he raised during the very last part of the
17 examination about the implementation of plans that required force, let me
18 ask you this: Did you ever see any evidence, Professor, that the
19 Bosnian Serb leadership or Bosnian Serb forces sought territory, for
20 example, for strategic reasons on which Muslims were a majority?
21 A. I personally saw no such evidence, although I travelled around
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina even during the war --
23 Q. Sorry, sir, I'm not talking about your -- I see you're answering
24 in terms of your personal observations only. I'm -- and I'll let you
25 finish that, but I had in mind also documents you reviewed for purposes
1 of your report or any other reason.
2 A. Well, I can start answering to your second question. I mostly
3 focused on the analysis of these two reports and I did not analyse many
4 other documents which I did in my earlier works. I set myself the task
5 here to criticise these two reports item by item with special
6 consideration of the constitutionality aspect. I didn't deal with other
7 matters because that was not my task.
8 Q. Thank you. That may give me an indication of what answer I can
9 expect to my next questions. But let me follow-up on something else that
10 Mr. Karadzic asked you and that is about attitudes toward population
11 transfers. Do you know with whom Professor Koljevic met on or about
12 January 8th, 1992?
13 A. Well, as far as I was able to infer from this report, he met
14 Tudjman or his men in Zagreb. Either Donia or Patrick Treanor cites some
15 documents from that meeting. Nikola Koljevic as the vice-president of
16 the RS was there in that capacity.
17 Q. And do you know what was discussed at that meeting?
18 A. Among other things, territorial issues were discussed such as the
19 Croats in the Posavina and elsewhere and the attitude toward the Muslims.
20 That's what the reports of these two gentlemen say.
21 Q. Okay. So I take it you know it from those reports, and do I take
22 it that you don't recall from your own review of the transcript of that
23 meeting discussion about population transfers and the aim of national
25 A. That certainly was one of the issues raised, but it had to do
1 with Serbo-Croatian relations. I must say - but you probably know it
2 just as I do - when borders are drawn then the so-called process of
3 opting is applied -- is implemented. I was born in Banat and when the
4 border between the then-Yugoslavia and Romania was drawn, the Serbs who
5 left on the Romanian side could opt to be transferred to the Serbian side
6 and vice versa. But something like that was understood here as well.
7 Q. Okay. Let me indicate some basic ground rules to you. We'll
8 both try to abide by those. I don't want to interrupt you when you're in
9 the course of answering a question I've asked. At the same time, I have
10 to be mindful of the time I've been allotted and the efficient running of
11 the courtroom. So if I consider that you've strayed outside the
12 boundaries of the question, I will interrupt and mention that. Okay?
13 Do you know what was discussed at a meeting in Doboj on or about
14 February 13th, 1992, attended by members of the Bosnian Serb leadership,
15 including Mr. Karadzic?
16 A. I don't know that. I really don't.
17 Q. All right. That's reflected in evidence we've received in court,
18 but if you don't, and that's P3474, but if you don't know that I won't
19 pursue it.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could Mr. Tieger add that the
21 Defence considers the Brdjanin reports about what was allegedly said
22 fake. It would be fair to put that to both the Chamber and the witness.
23 MR. TIEGER: That's an absurd, with all respect in the context of
24 the courtroom, intervention. I didn't inquire about that because the
25 witness didn't indicate any knowledge of it. We could have discussed
1 that if we had entered into any discussion of the area, but now this is
2 a -- simply commentary by the accused that is quite unnecessary.
3 Q. Witness --
4 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber was not following either, but let's move
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. There was considerable discussion during the course of your
8 examination-in-chief, Witness, about the Cutileiro Plan. And I noted
9 that at page 29 of your report you mention the Cutileiro Plan and - as
10 you do in many parts of your report - criticise Professor Donia for
11 allegedly failing to give all the facts about the Cutileiro Plan that you
12 consider should be made. And in particular, he notes that, at page 95
13 through 96 of his report, "Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of
14 Sarajevo," that the three parties agreed to keep principles of the
15 Cutileiro Plan as it became known as a basis for further negotiations,
16 but they did not sign the agreement. And among the things you criticise
17 him for is the fact that the Cutileiro Plan was not signed but it was
18 initialled. And you -- that's the first sentence in the initiation of
19 your criticism of Professor Donia for that excerpt of his report.
20 Now, you also testified in the Galic case about the
21 Cutileiro Plan and that was back in 2003, and at that time you actually
22 made the assertion that the Cutileiro Plan was signed; correct?
23 A. That it was initialled.
24 Q. Well -- and I'll read you what you said in Galic, and that's at
25 page 19133 of 65 ter 24943. And you start discussing the various plans,
1 but when the European Union engaged the Portuguese diplomat
2 Jose Cutileiro to negotiate with all three sides, Alija Izetbegovic
3 participated in this himself and he signed that plan too. And then the
4 question was asked:
5 "I'd be very grateful if you could tell us very briefly what
6 happened after the signing of this agreement."
7 And your answer began:
8 "When this plan was signed ..."
9 So at that time, sir, you were making the assertion that, in
10 fact, the plan had been signed and that was your position as an expert
11 witness based on your careful review of all the documents; right?
12 A. I must first say that I'm a bit surprised by the fact that you
13 are now referring to my report in the Galic case while at the same time
14 disputing my right to analyse Robert Donia's report in other cases.
15 Unfortunately I don't have that report before me, but I trust that what
16 you read is correct. Talking about the signing, the declaration on
17 constitutional principles was signed, it really was, but the plan
18 couldn't be signed because it wasn't completed. A comprehensive plan is
19 signed which apart from the constitutional principles includes also the
20 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian
21 municipalities, and it explicitly states that the remaining contested
22 issues -- and even the Prosecutor criticised me for saying that some
23 municipalities had a Serbian majority, confronting me with a census from
24 1993 or 1994, as a result of which those municipalities did not have a
25 Serbian majority. As a lawyer I know perfectly well that such a document
1 can only be signed once this division is signed, but the constitutional
2 principles really were signed and it contains the way of the constitution
3 of the three entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 As for the difference between initialling and signing, I would
5 like to remind you that the Dayton Accord was initialled at Dayton and
6 signed in Paris, although it was the very same document.
7 Q. Do you know what Dr. Karadzic said about the March 18th agreement
8 in principles at the time? Did you look at what he said, for example, to
9 the Bosnian Serb Assembly about that document?
10 A. To tell you the truth, I even published it but I certainly cannot
11 remember each and every detail. I think that the agreement, although the
12 Serbs reluctantly accepted it eventually did accept it after all because
13 they wanted to preserve the peace. But I don't remember his exact words.
14 It was a long time ago.
15 Q. Well, let me quote his exact words, and this is at D90 at about
16 page 5:
17 "The document has been accepted as a basis as a foundation for
18 further negotiations. The document has not been signed. We would never
19 sign anything that we did not agree upon."
20 And then further, at page 43 in English and page 62 in Serbian:
21 "What we have here is a process ..."
22 And then Dr. Karadzic continues:
23 "We have entered into this process with our strategic goals and
24 we are accomplishing them stage by stage. We would never have signed
25 this paper as a document, never, never, never, but at this stage it would
1 be crazy not to accept it."
2 And then at page 46 in the English and page 66 through 67 in the
4 "Rest assured," quoting again, "there will be no signing before
5 we have achieved what we want and you all know our strategic plans ..."
6 And then I'll continue with that in a moment. So those are the
7 words of Dr. Karadzic contemporaneously. Your criticism of Dr. Donia for
8 asserting that there was an agreement on March 18th but that the document
9 was not signed is, in fact, completely consistent with what Dr. Karadzic
10 was reassuring the Bosnian Serb Assembly at the time it was taking place;
11 correct? And that's simply something that you overlooked?
12 A. No, I didn't overlook it at all. In the media at the time, at
13 least in Belgrade, it was presented as agreed that the constitutional
14 principles had been agreed upon and that the only thing remaining was the
15 division of municipalities between these through [as interpreted]
16 entities. That was what I knew at the time. I never had any document in
17 my hands that bears signatures, unlike you. I only relied upon what was
18 published in the media.
19 Q. Yeah, but -- thank you for that, but you criticised Dr. Donia.
20 In the spirit of his standard practice, you say, he failed to give all
21 the facts, the Cutileiro Plan was not signed but it was initialled.
22 Dr. Donia said it wasn't signed. Dr. Karadzic at the time emphasised
23 that it wasn't signed, and yet you're acting as if Dr. Donia is somehow
24 withholding a critical factor.
25 A. What I criticised Donia for is something much more far-reaching.
1 He didn't want to present the importance of these talks and the possible
2 outcome of peace in Bosnia at the price of serious concessions by the
3 Serbs. This is my crucial criticism of Donia, and I believe I'm right in
4 this respect.
5 Q. Right, because Dr. Karadzic had from very early stages of his
6 political career said that if the Bosnia -- if Bosnia moved towards
7 sovereignty and independence, that was something that the SDS and the
8 Bosnian Serb leadership would not accept and war would result, didn't he?
9 A. No. I said that there were three levels of concessions from the
10 Serbian side. The first request by the Serbian side was the survival of
11 Yugoslavia, and as a lawyer you know very well that this demand is a
12 legitimate one, to preserve the already-existing state which is now --
13 Q. Professor, I will interrupt you because I'm -- sorry, let's try
14 to keep it focused.
15 A. Yes, yes, go ahead, please.
16 Q. We've already talked about what you understand the gradations of
17 concession to be and what they may have -- what the Cutileiro Plan may
18 have represented. What I was asking you, and let me put it a slightly
19 different way, are you aware of any expressions by the accused, by
20 Dr. Karadzic, well before the -- either the recognition of sovereignty
21 and independence by the international community or the Cutileiro Plan to
22 the effect that he and the Bosnian Serb leadership would not accept any
23 move toward sovereignty and independence of Bosnia, any move that would
24 separate Serbs in Bosnia from Serbs outside Bosnia by a border and that
25 the Serbs were strong and would prevent that from happening, that war
1 would result? Are you aware of any expressions like that, for example,
2 in 1990?
3 A. As far as that is concerned, I was also saying that in 1990. But
4 you know it's one set of circumstances in 1990 and then another one in
5 1991, but did anyone expect in 1990 that powerful international factors,
6 the United States and the then-European Community, would recognise any
7 type of secession? All of them were in favour of preserving the
8 integrity of Yugoslavia, and so in such circumstances it's normal, not
9 just for Karadzic but for myself as well, to assert that Yugoslavia must
10 not be broken up and that this must be opposed by force in a manner that
11 is legitimate and that is by using the Yugoslav armed forces, the
12 Yugoslav People's Army. So at that point in time in 1990 that was quite
13 a normal thing. In 1990 we still didn't know what would happen. There
14 were these meetings of the presidents of the republics and the provinces
15 who travelled for meetings to different provinces, and you know that very
16 well. This was in 1990.
17 Q. It -- thank you, Professor. It would have sufficed if you had
18 said, yes, you were familiar with such pronouncements. But you've now
19 expressed your point.
20 With respect to the Cutileiro Plan, both today and in your
21 report, you also suggest that there was very little left to do after the
22 agreement on principle because there was -- all that remained was the --
23 were negotiations over the delineation of territory. And you said both,
24 if I recall your report correctly, that you considered that there was no
25 interest in contiguous territories by the Bosnian Serbs and that the
1 resolution of the borders of the Bosnian Serb entity would be based on
2 negotiations involving a majority presence in various places.
3 Now, with that in mind, let me ask you if you were familiar with
4 any expressions -- if you are familiar with any expressions by the
5 accused at that time to the effect that the Bosnian Serbs had certain
6 strategic objectives that involved linkage to Serbia, that Dr. Karadzic
7 and the Bosnian Serb leaders wanted to make the Bosnian Serb entity as
8 large as it could be, and that the determination of how large the
9 Bosnian Serb entity would eventually be would depend on conditions that
10 were established by the Bosnian Serb officials on the ground. Are you
11 familiar with expressions like that, that the delineation of territory
12 was going to involve, among other things, the actual conditions which the
13 officials on the ground would create?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please tell the witness
15 exactly which point of time you're talking about. Is it war, before the
16 war? Is it something that was stated at the Assembly? Could you please
17 give the context to the witness.
18 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Tieger said "at that time."
19 MR. TIEGER: Right, and if there's any doubt about it I'm talking
20 about the time of the Cutileiro Plan negotiations, February/March 1992.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. As for the strategic goals
22 and linkage, it's a fact that all three sides had that intention, not
23 just the Serbs but the Croats that were thinking of linking up with
24 Croatia, which is logical; and of course Muslims who wanted to be as
25 compact as possible, so their problem was that Cazin Krajina which is
1 separated and cut off by municipalities populated by either Croat or Serb
3 Thus, all three sides were taking that into account and I have to
4 tell you I'm seriously studying politics, I've been observing people for
5 a long number of years, you must make a fine difference between a man who
6 is sitting down and negotiating with Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban
7 about this division. And another thing is when each of them is
8 addressing their own National Assembly. I remember very well that
9 Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the president of Republika Srpska, held a speech
10 before the Assembly of Republika Srpska seeking the support for the
11 Vance-Owen Plan and the Assembly rejected that. And I know why he did
12 that because he was forced to sign conditionally that agreement in Greece
13 because of pressure by strong international factors, primarily
14 Slobodan Milosevic. So what a politician does is important not so much
15 what he says. There's a famous novel by Mesa Selimovic where the main
16 character says that a man is what he does and what he speaks. So always
17 an action must follow words.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. So you do not consider when a political leader turns to his
20 followers and says: The only remaining question is one of quantity and
21 it will happen according to our political will, our right to
22 self-determination and organisation. It will happen according to the
23 actual conditions which are up to you to create, that that's not an act.
24 That's only words that can be ignored. As an expert, you wouldn't even
25 pay attention to that. Is that what you're saying?
1 A. No. When we're talking about politics, the force of will and
2 resolve is very important and it has to be awakened and this is the
3 purpose of speeches and you will notice that always there is a minor
4 difference between what is said and what is eventually done. I said in
5 relation to the Vance-Owen Plan where Dr. Karadzic advocated
6 conditionally its acceptance, but the People's Assembly rejected that by
7 a majority. And as you can see there's always the discrepancy between
8 what he was saying and what he actually did. I also think that if you
9 were carefully observing or monitoring the speeches of
10 Slobodan Milosevic, he promised a lot that he did not actually manage to
11 achieve. As for Karadzic, in my opinion, he was much more consistent in
12 that regard. But for sure when he's addressing his own people and the
13 National Assembly, he tried to encourage them, to give some impetus and
14 this is the objective of political speeches. But as for what was going
15 on at negotiations, the municipalities that were planned, and sometimes
16 if you cannot find a solution for certain municipalities that are
17 disputed, then you would tend to accept the arbitrage of the
18 European Community and I think that was an honourable and honest way to
19 resolve things at that time.
20 Q. So do I take it that you were familiar or you were not familiar
21 with Dr. Karadzic telling the members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly,
22 telling the municipality presidents, telling delegates who were from
23 various municipalities that the quantity of the entity would depend upon
24 the actual conditions which were up to them to create? Yes or no, did
25 you know that or not?
1 A. No. As far as that goes, I knew that for sure because I was
2 drafting, I was editing, all of his speeches for publication. And as I
3 was editing the speeches both in Serbian and in English, I read this
4 several times but I did not expect you to discuss these things. So I'm
5 not prepared. I would have brought with me the report that I had
6 prepared for the trial of General Galic. You asked as the Prosecutor for
7 those parts to be cut out of my report that relate to other court
8 proceedings --
9 Q. Sir, I'm going to stop you. I'll ask you a few questions right
10 now about material in your report. Let's turn to page 41 of your report.
11 A. Yes, please, go ahead.
12 Q. Now, here at page 41 you focus on what you assert was the
13 malevolent insertion of the word "commander" in a discussion about the --
14 and here:
15 "Robert Donia malevolently inserted the word 'commander' in the
17 That is -- and the sentence is:
18 "Local SDS leaders were instructed to form an Assembly of the
19 Serb people and a Crisis Staff of the Serb people" --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, let's identify the page number first.
21 MR. TIEGER: It's 41 still on the same page, Mr. President, 41
22 of --
23 JUDGE KWON: Are you referring to this page?
24 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
25 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, let's -- sorry, let's allow the Chamber to
1 catch up.
2 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the B/C/S and the English are
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. All right, Professor, it is the part of your report that
6 discusses page 20 of Dr. Donia's "Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege
7 of Sarajevo" report and it's about -- okay.
8 A. [In English] 42, yeah, okay.
9 Q. Okay, thanks. And it's 41 in the English.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Now we have it.
11 MR. TIEGER: Okay. And thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. So the impugned sentence is:
13 "Local SDS leaders were instructed to form an 'assembly of the
14 Serb people' and a 'Crisis Staff of the Serb people,' which was to be
15 headed by a 'commander.'"
16 And you assert there, as you do in various parts of your report,
17 that this was a malevolent act by Dr. Donia, inserting the word
18 "commander" in that sentence. Now, can we agree, Professor, that the
19 context of this sentence in Dr. Donia's report is a discussion of the
20 Variant A and B document, the 19 December 1991 instructions?
21 A. First of all, you did not say here what was important and that is
22 that the word "komandant," commander does not exist in Serbian. In
23 footnote J on page 106 it only says Crisis Staff of the Serbian people
24 call and convene an Assembly of the Serbian people. He inserted the word
25 "komandant" there even though that word is not in the Serbian text that
1 he quotes in his footnote J. I know Serbian and Robert Donia knows
2 Serbian quite well. So he could not have made an error unless he meant
3 to do so. So he inserted a word that does not exist in the Serbian
4 version. This is my objection.
5 Q. Do you see this, Professor? This is the instruction of the
6 organisations and activities of the organs of the Serbian people in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina in emergency conditions dated 19 December 1991,
8 otherwise known as Variant A and B document, that you testified in the
9 last session you read very carefully. That's P03470.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And what it states at page 3 of the English, that's in option A,
12 first stage, is the following:
13 "The president of the Municipal Assembly or the president of the
14 Municipal Executive Board shall be the commander of the Crisis Staff.
15 The commander shall" --
16 A. Yes.
17 JUDGE KWON: Let's upload it so the witness can follow.
18 Page number, Mr. Tieger? Yes.
19 MR. TIEGER: That should be page 3 of both, I believe.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. It's toward the top of the page, Professor, and as I mentioned --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Okay:
25 "The president of the Municipal Assembly or the president of the
1 Municipal Executive Board shall be the commander of the Crisis Staff.
2 "The commander shall appoint a member of the Crisis Staff as
3 co-ordinator for relations with the municipal leaderships of the SDA ..."
4 And it goes on to describe the other aspects of preparation.
5 Similarly, for the -- for option B municipalities it states at page 5 of
6 both again, I believe:
7 "The president of the Municipal Assembly of the SDS" -- sorry,
8 for you, Professor, it will be 6 through 7. So if we can turn to page 6
9 and it will continue on to the next page as well.
10 "The president of the Municipal Assembly of the SDS shall be the
11 commander of the Crisis Staff.
12 "The commander shall appoint a member of the Crisis Staff as
13 co-ordinator for relations with the municipal leaderships of the SDA and
14 HDZ ..."
15 And it goes on to discuss the convening and proclamation of the
16 Assembly of the Serbian people, preparations for the take-over of staff,
17 et cetera, et cetera. So, in fact, the document that you claimed about
18 an hour ago that you read very carefully contains multiple references to
19 commander, and Dr. Donia's reference to the commander is hardly a
20 malevolent introduction of that phrase. It's an accurate reflection of
21 what the document states; isn't that right?
22 A. I'm afraid that you are misinterpreting this place. When I said
23 that he malevolently inserted it, it's because in the footnote on
24 page 106 that term is not mentioned. So he refers to the footnote as a
25 source, what it says in English, and then he adds that it will be headed
1 by a commander. So that footnote does not contain that term and that is
2 why I said that inserting it into the English text was malicious. I
3 don't dispute that the word appears in the original document. Donia
4 could have referred to the original document and could have cited that
5 instead of saying in footnote J that the Crisis Staff of the Serbian
6 people convened an Assembly of the Serbian people.
7 Q. So that's the kind of evidence you're bringing before this Court,
8 Professor? Even though local SDS leaders were instructed by this
9 document to both form an Assembly of the Serbian people and a
10 Crisis Staff of the Serb people, which in fact it said would be headed by
11 a commander, you now tried to suggest in the report that that assertion
12 in his report is malevolent because that word doesn't appear in the
13 particular footnote, although it is replete in the document itself?
14 That's the nature of your report; is that right?
15 A. No. I was very analytical and I tried to show that he did not
16 actually follow the Serbian text and that he was inserting words in the
17 English text that were not there in the Serbian text. This is not
18 permissible to anyone, particularly to a historian. A person has to be
19 very careful. When he translates into English he has to translate
20 precisely what is there in the Serbian original. So he did not do that
21 and this is impermissible.
22 Q. You're talking about significant matters here. You're talking
23 about a significant document. Did you say anywhere in your report to the
24 Bench, to whom you were submitting your report, that, in fact, there is
25 an omission of that word in the footnote but that, in fact, the assertion
1 is correct, that the document itself provides exactly what he says it
2 provides, and that it would -- therefore, if in your view the word
3 "commander" or "komandant" was added to that sentence to represent the
4 Crisis Staff as a military staff, then in fact it was a military staff
5 because the document itself says that? Did you bother to tell the Bench
7 A. When we're talking about a military staff, we know what a
8 military staff is, it exclusively commands military units. But if we're
9 talking about a staff that manages civilian affairs, such as protection
10 of the population, preparation of food reserves, equipment reserves,
11 health care, and other issues, then this is not a purely military staff.
12 Q. No, no, Professor. I'm using your words. You said that that
13 word was entered into the document because Dr. Donia malevolently wanted
14 the Trial Chamber, to whom it was submitted, to consider it as a military
15 staff, which as you say always has a commander. Now we see that in fact
16 the document itself uses the word "commander" repeatedly. So I was just
17 using your words, that therefore we can see that the Crisis Staff is a
18 military staff or at least has a military staff aspect; right? That's
19 what you're saying?
20 A. It just had the character of a military staff to a certain
21 degree. Hostilities had still not broken out so they were not
22 traditionally in that sense of the word military staffs. Let me repeat
23 this once again, I study history and I know very well how one must
24 formulate citations. It must be absolutely reliable. If somebody cites
25 a source and it's different in a footnote, and so on, if it's done
1 improperly then it throws doubt on his credibility. And since this is
2 something that you are mentioning, for example, in the remainder of the
3 text what was omitted was "Sarajevo, the Biography of a City." But here
4 it was not omitted and then you can see that some parties, some other
5 national parties also formed Crisis Staffs. It's on that same page
6 where -- discussing page 20 is that the most frequent form of such an
7 organ is a Crisis Staff. This is what Donia says in the book "Sarajevo,
8 the Biography of a City," which you requested be edited out of my report
9 but here it remains. Other parties formed Crisis Staffs, but when
10 they're being discussed he does not refer to commanders in that case.
11 Q. That's -- okay. Let me suggest a couple things to you: Number
12 one, that the -- that exploiting what is, at worst, a typo but which in
13 fact appears to be simply two incorporated references to suggest
14 malevolence itself reflects the bias of the person doing that exploiting.
15 And number two, the discussion here is about the Variant A and B
16 documents, sir, and what you're communicating to the Court about that
17 document and what you're not communicating to the Court about that
19 But let's turn --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I will come to the issue of the
21 reference, Dr. Cavoski, but do you now agree that the Crisis Staff was to
22 be headed or the Crisis Staff was to have a commander?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was provided for in the rules,
24 but that was supposed to be the president of the municipality. The
25 president of the municipality is not military officer. He's not even
1 somebody who went through military training. That is the word that is
2 used, the term, but that does not correspond to the military protocol.
3 As for these remarks of yours in the sense that I also maliciously stated
4 that, I just wanted to say something that is --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- something at the beginning of my
7 report that has to do with Patrick Treanor --
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, no we are referring to this part.
9 And can you upload the relevant part of Donia's report. I think
10 it's Exhibit P973. I take it it is e-court page 23 in the middle of
12 "Local SDS leaders were instructed to form an 'assembly of the
13 Serb people' and a 'Crisis Staff of the Serb people,' which was to be
14 headed by a 'commander.'"
15 And there's footnote 49 and looking at the footnote itself, I
16 can't follow what you're saying in your report. Could you explain to us.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as far as I can see after the
18 footnote --
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We need to see footnote 49 below 48.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please pay attention. After number
21 49 there is a letter J at the very end. So these are two footnotes. One
22 is footnote 49 and the other one is footnote J which you seem to have
24 JUDGE KWON: 49 J, then shall we see the next page?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is not on the next page. It
1 is on page 106 in the text which was available to me, page 106.
2 JUDGE KWON: E-court page 109.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Under J. I would ask you to look
4 at J, you will see what is written there in Serbian. There is no
5 "commander." Let me please read it out, under J:
6 "'Crisis Staff of the Serbian people;'" again open quotes,
7 "'convene and pronounce the assembly of the Serbian people.'"
8 So that is the original text, there is no word "commander." That
9 word is not there.
10 JUDGE KWON: I don't think I followed in full.
11 I'll leave it to you, Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Just to assist the Court slightly.
13 Q. Although the specific references to the locations in the report
14 where those aspects are mentioned, including the commander, are reflected
15 in footnote 49 and readily available to you in addition to the entirety
16 of the document itself; right? Or do you not know what [overlapping
17 speakers] --
18 A. I focused on the actual footnote which is referred to here, and
19 that is the footnote under J. I do not dispute what the other document
20 says, but this as the footnote provided no basis for using the word
21 "commander." It's simply not allowed. You said that it could have been
22 a typo and I wanted to say something, but the Presiding Judge stopped me.
23 When I mentioned Patrick Treanor's report, I said that these errors, the
24 three errors, were insignificant. He has but few such errors.
25 Unfortunately, Robert Donia has many.
1 Q. All right. Let's go to something I think similar, another
2 accusation of malevolence against Dr. Donia. That appears at page 16.
3 And that is the alleged omission or deletion of the negation "not" in the
4 context of something Mr. Krajisnik said in November of 1991.
5 JUDGE KWON: You mean page 16 in hard copy?
6 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, yes, Mr. President, it's page 16 in hard
7 copy and it will be -- it's that part of the report referring to -- well,
8 in any event page 16 in hard copy is the easiest way to get there.
9 Q. Professor, it's that part of your report -- okay.
10 A. Yes. Yes, right. It's page 15. It says here page 7 and it
11 begins under 5:
12 "The second session on the 21st of November, 1991, Krajisnik,"
13 and then a column.
14 Q. Okay. And that appears in the report on the thematic excerpts
15 from the Assembly of Republika Srpska; correct? Professor, you were
16 aware, I'm sure, that this report was to be submitted to this
17 Trial Chamber for its review and that the Trial Chamber would be
18 reviewing the document in English; correct? I mean, you're aware of that
19 practice at the institution?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Okay. So I presume you went to what was the original of the
22 submission to see whether there was any malevolent effort to fool the
23 Trial Chamber into misunderstanding what Mr. Krajisnik had said; is that
25 A. I received a text which included quotations in the Serbian
1 language, and as Donia is quite well-versed in the Serbian I suppose that
2 he had appropriately read it, selected excerpts, and included them in his
3 report. And then I noticed that he omitted the negation which is very
4 significant here because it turns out Krajisnik advocated resolutions
5 that would be to the detriment of other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina
6 and that was precisely where the negation should have been included, so I
7 believe that something like that is -- yes, please.
8 Q. Before you accused Professor Donia of malevolence, and I presume
9 malevolence for in your view for trying to mislead the Chamber into
10 thinking that something was the case when it was not, did you bother to
11 check what the submission in English that would actually reach the Court
12 and would read said? Did you bother to do that before making this
13 allegation of malevolence?
14 A. No.
15 Q. So --
16 A. I only had the report in Serbian. I believed it to be more
17 truthful because that's the source language. It's a different issue how
18 it was translated into English, especially as errors may happen when
19 something is translated into English. I therefore treated the Serbian
20 text as the source and I only looked at it, and I believe that I'm right.
21 Q. The English text says, Professor, exactly what you -- it has the
22 language that you complain is not there, that is, all the proposed
23 solutions must be based on the constitution and the laws, et cetera, but
24 not at the expense of other peoples. That's what the submission to the
25 Chamber said. Will you admit now there's clearly no malevolence in this,
1 or are you still going to stick by your accusations regarding this
3 A. I can only say that if Donia himself translated that into English
4 and I don't think that he did. But it cannot be excluded that the
5 translator concluded that this makes no sense and that Krajisnik said
6 something like that and that he then introduced the negation, no. If
7 Donia had wanted this, he wouldn't have made an error when quoting a
8 Serbian text.
9 Q. Okay. So what you're trying to tell this Court is -- and you've
10 looked at the rest of the passage; right? Look at the rest of the
11 passage. Because the rest of the passage, I submit to you, makes crystal
12 clear that there -- what Krajisnik is saying, and it says further on:
13 "The basic principle is not to impose the will ..." et cetera,
14 et cetera.
15 "We should respect the legitimate will ...," on and on.
16 So were you trying to suggest that Dr. Donia malevolently omitted
17 the word "not" in the first part of that excerpt but stupidly left in the
18 rest of those negations and the rest of the passage that would make it
19 obvious what Krajisnik was saying? Is that your interpretation of what
21 A. If Professor Donia had made only three errors, which is the
22 number that Patrick Treanor made, then I wouldn't have taken that into
23 account at all. As I said that the insignificant errors made by
24 Patrick Treanor are not important. However, it is quite frequent in his
25 report. I do this in a systematic manner. Unfortunately, great part of
1 my report has been redacted because it mentions the book "Sarajevo,
2 biography," which is not admitted among the documents of this Tribunal,
3 and so forth, as well as other documents. It is quite frequent and I
4 tried whenever I could to see how he came to do that, and whenever I
5 found errors which are frequent then I concluded that he was doing that
7 Q. Well, you also accused Mr. Treanor of purposely keeping silent
8 about essential facts, don't you. Let's turn to page 78 of your report.
9 Now, this is the section -- it's the third page of the section that
11 "Avoidance of relevant facts ..."
12 And it's where you're talking about a constituent people and
13 state-building nations.
14 JUDGE KWON: Could you identify the page number in B/C/S?
15 MR. TIEGER: That actually makes it slightly difficult,
16 Mr. President.
17 Q. Professor, can we [overlapping speakers] --
18 JUDGE KWON: We can compare the footnote numbers.
19 MR. TIEGER: Very good. Footnotes 42, 43, and 44 appear on that
21 JUDGE KWON: It seems to be the next page -- I'm not sure.
22 Yes, please go on. Continue, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
24 Q. So your criticism there, Professor, focuses on the following
25 passage of Dr. Treanor's report:
1 "The constitution dropped the reference in Croatia's constitution
2 to the Serbs as one of the constituent peoples of the republic, although
3 it did not guarantee national equality in Article 3 ..."
4 And that's an example of what you allege is keeping silent about
5 essential facts because, as you explain, he should have used the
6 expression "state-building nation." Now, in that connection, that is,
7 the allegations you raise about the matters I've just described, tell me
8 if this sounds familiar, Professor:
9 "Q. Were parts of the constitution changed?
10 "A. Well, first of all, there was the amendment number 60 which
11 was introduced. It didn't change anything as far as the
12 constitutionality, the constituent nature of the peoples of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina was concerned, and this concerned the Croats, the
14 Serbs, and the Muslims. First of all, the constitution was respected and
15 then later it was respected less and less. So the Muslim side within the
16 common authorities tried to obtain independence, and one of the
17 constituent peoples opposed such independence and that constituent
18 people, they were the Serbs."
19 Lots of references to constituent peoples there, Professor. Is
20 that also -- does that also represent the practice of omitting -- staying
21 silent about essential facts?
22 A. Well, now we are discussing an issue that I'm well-versed with
23 because I'm an expert for constitutional law. Some words, even when they
24 are of foreign origin --
25 Q. Professor, unfortunately --
1 A. -- when they're adopted in a language --
2 Q. You have to answer my question, sir. Before -- I'll -- I'll give
3 you a chance to explain nuances if it's necessary, but I want an answer
4 to my question. Is the passage I read to you another example of keeping
5 silent about essential facts because it uses repeatedly the expression
6 "constituent peoples" rather than "state-building nation"?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we know where this comes
8 from. First of all --
9 MR. TIEGER: Can Mr. Karadzic --
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- is it in the report --
11 MR. TIEGER: -- kindly stop his helpful intrusions. It's very
12 obvious by now what he's trying to do repeatedly, and he needs to be
13 admonished about that strongly.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it's unnecessary, it's
16 JUDGE KWON: You could give the reference --
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's not necessary at all. It's
18 not necessary for anyone to assist me. I'm telling you that the word
19 "constituent" has a quite specific meaning in the Serbo-Croatian
20 language. It means basically state building. And when you say in the
21 English language "constituent," it just means integral, an integral part
22 of something else and nothing more than that. Therefore, as
23 Patrick Treanor very well knows, as he knows the Serbian language very
24 well, he knows what the constituent knows in our constitutional legal
25 terminology, he had to make sure to formulate it well in the English
1 language. Because when you say it like this, that the Serbs are one of
2 the constituent peoples, then it turns out in the Serbian language that
3 they are one of the peoples that make part of this. And it's quite a
4 different sense when you say that Serbs in addition to the Croatian
5 people are a state-building nation, and this is why I chose this
6 particular formulation, "state-building."
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. So is it correct then that the passage I just read out to you is
9 another example of keeping silent about essential facts because it uses
10 the term "constituent peoples" repeatedly rather than "state-building
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked for the reference.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for Croatia, this was of major
14 significance because the Croats denied this to the Serbs, and as --
15 Q. No, no, no, if you can't answer the question just tell me, but I
16 don't want another dissertation on [overlapping speakers]... between the
17 two terms.
18 A. May I answer?
19 Q. You can answer. That's what I'm asking you to
20 do [overlapping speakers]
21 A. No, no, no. Please --
22 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, Mr. President, excuse me,
23 Mr. Tieger can't shut down the witness like that. That is -- not only is
24 it impolite but it's unfair. So I would ask that maybe we could take a
25 lunch break so Mr. Tieger can take a breath and calm down, but we have to
1 treat the witnesses here like professionals and that is not occurring.
2 JUDGE KWON: Before taking the lunch break let's hear the
3 witness, but it's fair to give the reference what you recited,
4 Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: I will, Mr. President, but then it will be clear why
6 I was asking for an answer before I did so and what I believe
7 Dr. Karadzic is doing. And, if I may say, I believe it is impolite for a
8 witness to avoid questions. I believe it's perfectly appropriate to urge
9 a witness to focus on a question, and I believe it's also an obligation
10 on the part of an examiner to bring that to the witness's attention. So
11 I reject Mr. Robinson's efforts to stop me from doing so.
12 Q. So this reference that I made --
13 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, just a second, I think it's perfectly
15 good timing to take a lunch break.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, if I may -- all right. I'd like to
17 continue with the -- follow-up on the Court's --
18 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue after the lunch break.
19 MR. TIEGER: All right.
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume at 17 past 1.00.
21 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.35 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.
23 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue, Mr. Tieger?
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you.
25 Q. Professor, just before the break we were quietly discussing
1 page 78 of your report, and I had asked you about a particular quote
2 involving the repeated references to constituent peoples. I don't know
3 if you've thought it over in the break and can answer me, but my question
4 was whether or not those repeated references to constituent peoples
5 without using the expression "state-building nation" represented another
6 example of keeping silent about essential facts?
7 A. I will very gladly answer this question of yours. You see, the
8 question is what is the context in which this is mentioned? He's dealing
9 with Croatia and the Croats actually adopted a new constitution from
10 which they deleted the provision that the Serbs were a state-building
11 nation because they deleted a provision from earlier constitutions which
12 said that Croatia was a state of the Croatian and the Serbian peoples.
13 More or less that was the provision. That was quite important. And in
14 that context, it was very important because Serbs made up 12.5 per cent
15 of the population in Croatia before the breakout of the war and it was
16 very important for them to keep the status of state-building nation.
17 When you let someone know that it's not so important, then it would be
18 sufficient to guarantee equality of nations. Under item 3, I can tell
19 you that this is not sufficient because equality of nations only means
20 the equality of citizens as such as compared to other nations. And when
21 you talk about the state building, then what one has in mind is the
22 equality of the collective as such with relation to the other collective
23 which makes up this state.
24 Yes, please.
25 Q. I can see I'm not going to get a yes or no answer to my question
1 and I will leave it at that, except to note in response to, as I would
2 have noted in any event and also in response to the accused's question,
3 that the passage I quoted, and I will submit it to the Court, appears at
4 page 19110 through 19111 of your testimony in the Galic case and that is
5 your response to a question posed to you during that case during which
6 you repeatedly used the expression "constituent peoples" and not the
7 expression "state-building nation." If you -- I take it you don't
8 remember your testimony, but perhaps you can confirm that you said that.
9 A. Yes, let me explain what the major difference is --
10 Q. No, sir -- I have -- if it's your position that there's a
11 difference between the two and the accused wants to get into the nature
12 of that difference, that's fine. So you've indicated you consider there
13 is a difference between your use of the words constituent peoples and
14 Mr. Treanor's use of the words constituent peoples. I will leave it at
15 that and move on in the interests of time.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, I think the witness has a right to
17 explain it this time.
18 MR. TIEGER: We have spent ten minutes with this witness
19 explaining the difference.
20 JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers] We can ask the witness to
21 confirm whether he said so.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. In the context of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina where it was not denied to a single people whether it
24 was a constituent people or not, it was fully --
25 JUDGE KWON: No, Dr. Cavoski, do you remember the question?
1 Whether you testified as cited by Mr. Tieger in the Galic case.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the Serbian language I used the
3 formulation "konstitutivni narod," constituent people. We used this
4 expression in Serbian and we know what it means. How that was
5 interpreted into English that was not up to me because I am not an
6 interpreter or translator, or nor did I translate my own text.
7 JUDGE KWON: Now I understand the answer.
8 Let's proceed, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Q. Professor, at page 13 of your report and for your ease of
11 reference --
12 A. [In English] Just a ...
13 Q. Yeah?
14 JUDGE KWON: And I have a question for the interpreters or can we
15 upload the B/C/S version. If we translate English word "constituent
16 people" or "constituent nation," is it translated into other words or the
17 same words?
18 THE INTERPRETER: It depends on the nuances but there is an
19 expression in the Serbian language which is "konstitutivni narod" and
20 that is the closest interpretation of "constituent people."
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I will leave it at that and I will leave
22 it for the parties to take up the issue further if necessary -- no, let's
23 move on.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may suggest, you might request
25 from the interpreters to interpret for you the Serbian word
1 "drzavotvorni." What are the ways it can be interpreted.
2 JUDGE KWON: You can take that issue in your re-examination.
3 Let's continue.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Professor this is a reference to the following excerpt from
6 Dr. Donia's report. On 28 March, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia
7 voted to enact constitutional amendments that eliminated most of Kosovo's
8 autonomy within the republic. That's shortly after your first reference
9 to the origins of Republika Srpska background report, page 5 of that
10 report. Do you find that? Okay. I see you have that. There you
11 state -- you criticise Dr. Donia for invoking an unreliable source and
12 then at the end of that critique of what Dr. Donia did assert that he
13 believed as true the quote of a publicist who probably heard or read
14 somewhere what he wrote. Now, the person you refer to as a publicist is
15 cited at the beginning of that passage by Dr. Donia and that's of Cohen
16 who wrote "Serpent in the Bosom," and that would be Professor Emeritus
17 Lenard J. Cohen. Are you familiar with the length of Professor Cohen's
18 career, where he taught, and any of his publications?
19 A. I have to say that I'm not familiar with that. This is a quite
20 common last name and it is pronounced Cohen. It's a Jewish last name. I
21 have a colleague and a friend with the same last name.
22 Q. So you will not dispute that Professor Cohen is co-founder of the
23 school for international studies at Simon Fraser University. Has been
24 Professor emeritus since 2009, has been in the field for over 35 years
25 and has numerous publications including at least two well-received books?
1 A. Of course I do not dispute that, but does it not seem usual to
2 you that someone who is writing a report about circumstances in the
3 territory of the former Yugoslavia should study all the constitutional
4 documents, if not all the laws? Therefore, it was only logical that
5 Professor Donia who has a good mastery of the Serbian language - I'm not
6 sure about Cohen - should study the amendments of the constitution and
7 then conclude or draw his conclusion on the basis of that as I did.
8 Q. At page 19 of your report, and there the operative -- this is
9 a -- the section -- section 3 of that part of your report beginning:
10 Hiding and withholding relevant facts, and it's a portion that refers to
11 page 9 of Dr. Donia's report: "Bosnian Serb Leadership and the Siege of
12 Sarajevo." And it addresses or responds to a portion of Dr. Donia's
13 report stating:
14 "According to the 1991 census, these municipalities held
15 relatively high percentages of Yugoslavs: 16.4 per cent in Centar,
16 15.9 per cent in Novo Sarajevo, and 11.4 per cent in Novi Grad."
17 And the discussion and the critique that you provide there is
18 about his alleged failure to adduce the real reasons why people declared
19 themselves as Yugoslavs and your assertion that Serbs are Yugoslavs and
20 no Croats and Slovenes are Yugoslavs. And in that connection I just
21 wanted to ask you one question, and that was: Do you -- is it true that
22 as back in -- during the war 1994 and around that operative time that the
23 Muslims tended to consider Yugoslavs as Muslims, the Croats considered
24 the Yugoslavs as Croats, and as you've indicated the Serbs considered
25 Yugoslavs as Serbs? Is that an accurate statement?
1 A. I didn't understand you fully. Do you mean that I said that
2 Muslims were Muslims, Croats were Croats, and many Serbs declared
3 themselves as Yugoslavs? Is that what you're alleging?
4 Q. No. First I drew your attention to the portion of your report
5 and what your position was in that connection, and then I asked you more
6 generally whether you considered it accurate to assert that Muslims
7 tended to consider Yugoslavs as Muslims and Croats considered the
8 Yugoslavs as Croats, and of course you've already indicated your position
9 that you considered the Serbs -- Yugoslavs as Serbs.
10 A. Unfortunately your question is not well phrased. Talking about
11 citizenship, all the citizens of Yugoslavia were Yugoslavs because they
12 had the Yugoslav citizenship but --
13 Q. I'm sorry, sir. I hope it was clear from context that I'm
14 talking about how people self-described, how people declared themselves
15 in the census. And you address in that portion of your report your
16 position that those people who declared themselves Yugoslavs were Serbs,
17 and I'm asking you if it wasn't the case that Muslims tended to consider
18 Yugoslavs as those people as Muslims and Croats tended to think that they
19 were Croats.
20 A. God forbid, a Muslim, Ejup Ganic, declared himself a Yugoslav to
21 win the elections to the Presidency, and then it turned out not only that
22 he was an ordinary participant but a very active participant in
23 everything that happened during the war. He was a member of the
24 Crisis Staff. There is a suspicion that he ordered the attack on the
25 convoy of the JNA --
1 Q. Professor -- I mean, Professor, I don't think that that can
2 fairly be described as an attempt to answer my question rather than an
3 attempt to talk about something you've already addressed repeatedly in
4 your report. If you can't answer my question, that's fine; if you can,
5 please do so. I've asked it twice, I think it's clear enough.
6 A. Yes. You don't really know the situations in the former
7 Yugoslavia. I can tell you openly that the Slovenians have always been
8 Slovenians --
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Cavoski, I'm sorry to interrupt. Whether
10 Mr. Tieger knows or not, you can answer yes or no, and you can explain
11 it. Could you concentrate on answering the question, please.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To my mind, the Yugoslavs for the
13 most part were Serbs and there were also some people from mixed marriages
14 who also declared themselves as Yugoslavs. This is my answer.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Well, that's not quite an answer because I asked you -- I
17 appreciate the fact that that's what's in your mind, but I asked you if
18 in the minds of Muslims the Yugoslavs were Muslims and in the minds of
19 Croats they were Croats. That was my question. And as I said if you
20 can't answer that, that's --
21 A. No. To be frank, I don't know. But I'm almost certain that both
22 the Croats and the Muslims knew that those who declared themselves as
23 Yugoslavs were almost, without exception, Serbs. They knew that because
24 I know the situation there unlike you.
25 Q. Well, I asked you that question because we've received evidence
1 that that's exactly what Dr. Karadzic said in 1994 to the members of the
2 Bosnian Serb Assembly. And that's found at P1385, English page 114, and
3 B/C/S page 84 through 85. Let me move on to a different topic, something
4 that you raised during the course of your direct examination. And that
5 was your explanation that -- about your role in constituting the
6 committee on establishing the truth on Dr. Karadzic. Now, that -- and if
7 I could call up 65 ter 24933. That article from "Glas Javnosti" concerns
8 the founding in mid-November of 2001 of the international board for truth
9 about Radovan Karadzic, describing who some of the members were, and so
10 on. That's a reflection of the same board or committee you were talking
11 about in your examination-in-chief; correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And there are various descriptions of the purpose of the board
14 and the positions of various participants in the board concerning
15 Dr. Karadzic. You're quoted as stating that Dr. Karadzic is the herald
16 of Serbian freedom, the creator of Republika Srpska, the chivalrous
17 knight who will not surrender. And did that -- does that accurately
18 capture your position at the time concerning Dr. Karadzic?
19 A. Yes, most probably. I don't really remember the details but I
20 think that this is most probably what I said.
21 Q. Okay.
22 MR. TIEGER: I tender that, Mr. President.
23 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6289, Your Honours.
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. Now, in addition to your work on behalf of the board for truth or
3 committee for truth about Radovan Karadzic, you also worked as a member
4 of the Defence team as a volunteer, that is, you were not paid for that;
5 is that right?
6 A. That's right.
7 MR. TIEGER: And if I could call up 65 ter 40614A.
8 Q. Okay. This is a video -- that's a transcript of a video of a
9 television show on Kopernikus television. You can turn to the video any
10 time you want, but we have the transcript provided as well. And we can
11 see in a portion of that transcript where you confirm your work on the
12 Defence team. And that's a -- that's the portion that would be in the
13 video from 48.46 to 49.53. I'm happy to play that video for you, sir, if
14 it's easier.
15 A. I can see it all. It's all right.
16 Q. Okay. Now, I'm going to -- I won't leave this video just yet
17 because I wanted to ask you about something else you said during the
18 course of your testimony, and that is your references to what you called
19 analyses of the work of the Tribunal. And on this show as well, you
20 spoke out about aspects of the work of the Tribunal, in particular the
21 payment to Defence lawyers and your position on what that meant, what its
22 purpose and effects were, and did so specifically in the context of
23 lawyer Vujin. Do you recall that or would you like to see the video?
24 MR. ROBINSON: I'm going to object to this on the grounds of
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is no need.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Well, I mean, the -- let's bear in mind, of course,
4 that the accused led evidence about this witness's analyses and
5 publications concerning the Tribunal, presumably an attempt to bolster
6 his credibility. At a minimum I'm certainly entitled to address what it
7 is he is actually saying.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think, you know, we're mixing
9 things here. First of all, certainly the fact that he was working for
10 free for the Defence team is very relevant, on this first page that has
11 been shown to the witness is definitely relevant. But his complaints
12 about payment to the Defence team, operation of this trial, don't seem to
13 be relevant to either his credibility or any of the issues in the
14 indictment and that's what I'm objecting to.
15 MR. TIEGER: Well, to the extent -- sorry.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: I think it should be clear that to the extent those
18 representations are inaccurate are, in fact, misrepresentations. It's
19 very relevant to this witness's credibility, especially in the context in
20 which this was raised. I'm not surprised Mr. Robinson is trying to avoid
21 further scrutiny of this, but it's a highly relevant issue.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if I could just reply one second.
23 You know, at the time these statements were made, the president has
24 reversed the Registrar four times on the funding of the Defence team so
25 we're getting into a lot of collateral issues. So if Dr. Cavoski or
1 Professor Cavoski at one point said that the Defence team was
2 underfunded, well the President has found that we were underfunded on
3 four separate occasions during the course of this case. So I don't see
4 how it affects the credibility or is relevant. And it just brings in
5 collateral issues that so far we didn't believe were relevant to the
6 trial or else we would have brought them up ourselves.
7 MR. TIEGER: This is not the funding -- this is not in connection
8 with the funding of this particular Defence team's composition, so maybe
9 that's the nature of the misunderstanding.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Mr. Tieger. Please, we'll
12 allow the question.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Professor, in connection with that matter, you stated at - and
15 this would be at e-court page 3 of this exhibit - you explained that what
16 happened in the court was -- and used the expression: He who pays the
17 piper calls the tune, but that there are some lawyers who overstepped the
18 boundaries which were tacitly placed, claimed that that's what happened
19 to Mr. Vujin who was cruelly punished for overstepping these attempted
20 boundaries, as you say, above people who would bring these proceedings
21 into question too much. And use that as an example of the fact that
22 lawyers cannot properly work at the Tribunal. So you took the position
23 publicly that the payment of remuneration to lawyers was a way of
24 controlling them so they couldn't properly represent their client and
25 that anyone who overstepped those boundaries was cruelly punished so --
1 as a threat and to bully other lawyers into compliance. That's what you
2 were telling the public when you made this interview; right?
3 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. I don't understand the
4 relevance of this at all. This -- how this goes to the witness's
5 credibility or that it's anything relevant. If someone is critical of
6 this institution -- for example, if someone is critical of the jury
7 system in the United States or in the United Kingdom, does the jury get
8 to hear that as something that's reflecting on their credibility? So I
9 don't see where -- this is just an effort to try to show the Chamber that
10 someone is before them who disagrees with this institution, and I don't
11 think that should be relevant to your assessment of Professor Cavoski's
12 credibility and I don't think it's relevant to anything that's an issue
13 of substance in Dr. Karadzic's case.
14 MR. TIEGER: Well, let's cut to the chase, Mr. President, if I
15 may, on this. I have not and had no intention of eliciting this
16 witness's many criticisms of the Tribunal, no matter -- for the most
17 part, no matter how outlandish I considered them to be, but this is a
18 different matter. This is a matter of misrepresenting a particular state
19 of events and then I might as well be clear about it now, the fact of the
20 matter is that Mr. Vujin was convicted for putting forward false
21 statements, manipulating witnesses, to the detriment of his client. So
22 my position is that Professor Cavoski in doing this is publicly making
23 misrepresentations for a particular purpose, and that particular purpose
24 does reflect on his credibility. And that particular circumstance
25 reflects on his credibility.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, the Chamber sees no reason to change
3 its position.
4 Do you remember the question, Mr. Cavoski, or shall I ask
5 Mr. Tieger to repeat his question?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember the question. This is
7 not the first time somebody has tried to make an issue of my critical
8 attitude towards this Court. I have published articles about this and
9 that is available to the Prosecutor. As for this Tribunal, I have from
10 the very beginning considered that there was no equality of arms --
11 JUDGE KWON: No. No, it's not related to general criticism about
12 this Tribunal. I will ask Mr. Tieger to put his question specifically.
13 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]
14 [Prosecution counsel confer]
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Sorry, first of all, I just wanted as a preliminary step to
17 confirm that this is what you said about both the practice -- okay. So
18 this accurately reflects what you stated. Okay.
19 It's also --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let's hear the witness. Please wait
21 a minute until the interpretation is over.
22 Yes, please carry on.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. And it's also the fact, is it not, Professor Cavoski, that
25 Mr. Vujin was sanctioned and not for overstepping boundaries that
1 would -- about being too aggressive on behalf of his client, but instead
2 for putting forward false statements, manipulating witnesses, of all
3 against his own client's interest. In other words, he was convicted of
4 contempt and that's why he was sanctioned, precisely the opposite of what
5 you were representing in the Kopernikus interview?
6 A. I can give a very clear answer. I said that and I said it based
7 on what Mr. Vujin had related to me. I co-operated with him when I was
8 to participate on the Defence of Stanislav Galic. What I said is based
9 on his words and I've never seen the Court's decision. I know very well
10 how Dusko Tadic fared who was an insignificant reserve police officer.
11 Nowadays he wouldn't be at this Tribunal at all, but he was in the early
12 days. And about these lawyers, I spoke to many one of them and I was
13 able to be convinced when I went to the office of Mr. Vujin. During the
14 trial, his colleague Ms. Pilipovic appeared as the Defence counsel
15 because Mr. Vujin wasn't allowed to. And he hired me to write a report.
16 Here's what I noticed. He gave me a text, about 300 pages long, and it
17 was the report of one James Gow, a historian, who at the time appeared in
18 the same role as Donia did. But he started his report with historical
19 situation from Emperor Dusan's times and the Kosovo battle. The Court
20 wanted to make that an adjudicated fact and incorporate that into the
21 Galic judgement. But I criticised him harshly and said that not only
22 didn't he know history, but he was also malevolus. I also engaged
23 Rados Ljusic, who was an excellent professor of history at the faculty of
24 philosophy, and Ms. Stefanovski, my colleague, who teaches the history of
25 law. And with their assistance I wrote a report. I asked him to have it
1 translated into English and show it to the Court. When I asked him what
2 he had sent, it turned out that it wasn't a translation of what I had
4 Q. Professor -- Professor --
5 A. So he didn't dare or wasn't allowed to send what I had written.
6 Later on I published that as a book in Serbian, the title is: "The
7 Judging of History in The Hague." James Gow was not hired anymore nor
8 did any historian deal with events before the year 1980 after this
9 criticism of mine.
10 Q. Whether or not that's a very clear answer to my question, I leave
11 to the Court but I will move on in the interests of time. I wanted to
12 ask you a bit more about your work on the committee --
13 MR. TIEGER: And I would tender the last exhibit, Mr. President,
14 which was 65 ter 40614A.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we don't have any objection to pages 1 and 3,
16 that's what were shown to the witness.
17 MR. TIEGER: All right.
18 Q. And in connection with your --
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. You're not tendering the videotape
21 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, I would tender the videotape as
22 well [overlapping speakers]
23 JUDGE KWON: Do you object to it?
24 MR. ROBINSON: The parts that were not put to the witness
25 shouldn't be admitted, yes. It's been our practice only to admit those
1 portions of things -- he can't scroll like we can, he's only been asked
2 and commented on pages 1 and 3, so that's all that should be admitted.
3 But if Mr. Tieger wants to go through the other two, we would agree they
4 can be admitted after the witness had a chance to comment on them.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Admitting page 1 and 3 won't hurt the
6 flow of the evidence.
7 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure that's been the case with documents as
8 short as this, four pages, but I'm not going to quibble at this moment.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll receive two pages.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6290, Your Honours.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. And I wanted to ask you further about your work on the committee,
13 sir, and in that regard because you -- if I understood you correctly, you
14 stated that you assembled documents that were signed, orders that were
15 issued, interviews, et cetera, et cetera. So you collected and then
16 reproduced various documents. Now, in connection with the assembly of
17 those documents and the acquisition of those documents, were you in
18 contact with Mr. Karadzic for that purpose?
19 A. I cannot remember precisely, but I believe it was either in late
20 1986 [as interpreted] or 1987 [as interpreted] when Dr. Karadzic simply
21 disappeared. It wasn't possible to set up contact with him. But I
22 contacted his brother and his cousin. From his brother, Luka Karadzic,
23 who lives in Belgrade I received these documents and his daughter,
24 Radmila, a very nice and well-educated girl, entered that into a
25 computer. I read the printed texts and revised them and proofread them.
1 I also gave some texts in Serbian to translators to have them translated
2 into English. And to the extent that I know English - and my knowledge
3 isn't perfect - I tried to see if it's well translated and
4 understandable. Most of these texts were received from Luka Karadzic.
5 Q. Well, I want to show you another document and ask you about that.
6 MR. TIEGER: So if we could call up 65 ter 24910A.
7 Q. This is a letter dated the 1st of October, 2001,
8 from Dr. Karadzic to Miroslav Toholj that appears in Toholj's book:
9 "Night Post Correspondence with Radovan Karadzic," which was published
10 after Mr. Karadzic's arrest and it covers letters from 1996 to 2004. And
11 if we could turn to page 2 of the English and page 2 of the Serbian,
12 Dr. Karadzic writes:
13 "I'm glad that the material for the site is slowly building up
14 and that the number of pages is growing. I also wrote to Kosta and I'm
15 very grateful to him for accepting the work in the committee and for his
16 commenting on the orders. I believe that he could also review the other
17 enclosures and that he can comment on them."
18 On page 3 of the English, and I believe still on page 3 of the
19 Serbian, there is another reference:
20 "I believe that you in the editor's office (although I believe
21 that it is you and Kosta as Jovan is in Herceg Novi) will assess it
22 appropriately, maybe even group it differently, as Ljiljana did it in a
23 more or less chronological order ..."
24 And at the next page in English and I believe the next page in
25 Serbian we see the following reference about publishing poems for
2 "There might possibly be some space for these poems also in the
3 'Christian thought' which I frequently receive from Kosta."
4 Now, those are references to you, sir; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And if we return to page 2 of the English and also page 2 of the
7 Serbian, we can find a further description of the enclosures that were
8 referenced or that were referred to in the previous references. And
9 there we see the following:
10 "I am sending you these disks that Ljiljana gathered. On the
11 ones I'm sending you, I deleted all that I thought should not go (I saved
12 the originals) but there might be more reductions necessary. I trust
13 that you will review each report and make a decision on it yourself."
14 And then it continues some lines later after references to
15 interviews and speeches from Assemblies and so on:
16 "Of course, I did not mention our worst disgraces, but I do think
17 that some of the things that disgrace us, up to an acceptable level,
18 should be published. I was particularly careful of not jeopardising
19 anyone. I also got rid of everything that would jeopardise anyone or
20 that would look like a non-gentlemanly stone-throwing at Slobodan or his
21 prime minister."
22 But he also notes that open letters to him, and so on, have
23 already been published so there's nothing to hide and then it continues
24 with the reference that I noted earlier, that those of you in the
25 editor's office, including you and Kosta will assess it appropriately and
1 maybe even group it differently. Now, this, in fact, is a reflection of
2 Dr. Karadzic's role in providing materials for publication that were
3 deemed acceptable and that eliminated those items that he considered
4 should not be published; correct?
5 A. I must say that I have no idea what Miroslav Toholj's role was in
6 all of this was. I received the documents, as I said, mostly from
7 Luka Karadzic and together with Radmilo -- Radmila, the daughter of
8 Radovan Karadzic, I edited all of that. I think there were a couple of
9 friends of Dr. Karadzic who are excellent authors and know the language
10 well to help me to edit things because my knowledge is not so great in
11 the sphere of language. So they helped me to do the best possible job.
12 So Karadzic did not provide me with those documents. I don't know how
13 they reached me. I had photocopies of documents with the proper heading
14 and signature, and I entered those documents into six collected volumes
15 of his political acts. I had photocopies. I did not receive any
16 diskettes. What I know was on diskette that I later saw at the book fair
17 was the book which was later transcribed by Toholj. I know that he
18 frequently wrote letters during the period of his hiding. I received
19 some of those letters, but this was such a long time ago or there were
20 such long intervals in between, so that when I gave the letters to his
21 daughter to somehow get them to him I would receive the replies even a
22 year later. So that was not so relevant then after such a long period of
23 time. He did not use a computer to write because that was something that
24 was prone to interception. So very rarely he wrote letters. He wrote
25 letters to Dr. Smilja Avramov. I know from time to time he did send
1 letters. Perhaps he was in contact with others. I don't know. All I
2 know is that I received a number of letters and then without him -- but
3 together with Luka Karadzic and with Radovan Karadzic's daughter I edited
4 the documents, gave them to be translated, and then I edited the six
5 volumes of the documents.
6 Q. Is it your testimony, Professor, that neither Mr. Toholj or
7 anyone else associated with the editor's office or in contact with
8 Dr. Karadzic in connection with this matter passed on his encouragement
9 to participate in assessing the materials appropriately as he had already
11 A. No, absolutely not. I can say that with certainty. I was the
12 one who was doing the editing. I decided on what should be published or
13 not. I know how historians work. Nothing must be put aside or omitted.
14 Everything has to be published. I don't know if I received everything,
15 but I did not take any part in the selection of the material.
16 Q. All right.
17 MR. TIEGER: I tender this, Mr. President.
18 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6291, Your Honours.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I believe that
22 essentially exhausts my allocated time. I appreciate the Court's
23 indulgence if I went slightly over, and that concludes the
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
1 Do you have re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies. I don't
3 think I have long. I believe that we will complete the witness today.
4 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Let's start from the most recent, Professor.
6 When you had the opportunity to send me the odd book or the magazine, how
7 did you do it? Who did you give that to?
8 A. I would hand it over in Pale, in eastern Sarajevo, thus where
9 your wife and daughter live in two separate apartments. So I did my best
10 as much as I was able to, perhaps not every month but quite frequently,
11 to write something and to send you the magazine "Christian Thought,"
12 "Hriscanske Misli," and I sometimes published articles there and I
13 thought that would be interesting for you. A few times with a long delay
14 sometimes you would send me something, saying that it was not so easy for
15 you to do that. But this just happened very rarely, two or three times
16 at the most.
17 Q. Was it possible that I sent something and that you did not
18 receive it?
19 A. Well, yes, that was possible. But I don't know. I cannot really
20 say whether this happened or not.
21 Q. When we're talking about Yugoslavs, are you able to tell us when,
22 according to your knowledge, the dissolution and the breakup of
23 Yugoslavia began?
24 A. Since I also studied constitutional law and dabble in history,
25 the key reason was the federalisation of the state. This was at the --
1 began in 1943 at the Avnoj session, and then later in 1946. Most
2 historians that I spoke to about this share this opinion, but if you
3 think about the point in time when this became really serious I would say
4 that it was the multi-party elections that were not at the federal level,
5 they were at the republican level. So the then-communist leadership in
6 Slovenia and Croatia thwarted the adoption of a federal election law
7 which would ensure multi-party elections. The law was never adopted, so
8 the multi-party elections were never held. Multi-party elections were
9 first held I think in Slovenia and then Croatia or perhaps the other way
10 around, and then much later in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
11 Except for Serbia, everywhere else parties were victorious that had
12 pronouncedly nationalistic orientation, or as Patrick Treanor would say,
13 they had a nationalist orientation. So then the federal organs were not
14 formed, the mandate of the Federal Assembly expired even though it was
15 extended twice. This was a six-year term. The government which had a
16 Croat for a prime minister also -- its mandate expired. So the only
17 thing that was left was a Presidency which was comprised of politicians
18 from the republics, and this was the road to destruction. And this was
19 something that was deliberately done.
20 Q. Thank you. The elections were held in 1990; is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Are you able to tell us then in light of that what was the
23 attitude in terms of being Yugoslav at the census in 1991? How popular
24 was Yugoslavdom among the Croats and others?
25 A. Well, I must say I'm not sure that I'm not familiar with the data
1 because that is something I did not look into, but I'm afraid when we're
2 talking about Croats it did not even occur to them to declare themselves
3 as Yugoslavs. They didn't do that before either, and I assume that
4 Muslims did not do that either. I don't have the data. Unfortunately it
5 was only the Serbs, but this would require a lot of time and perhaps
6 might tire the Court to explain fully. They declared themselves as
7 Yugoslavs because with the creation of Yugoslavia which was formed in
8 1980 with Serbia introducing into this newly formed Yugoslavia its
9 state-building identity, so it was easy for them to set aside their
10 Serbdom and take up Yugoslavdom in order to create a state national
12 Q. Thank you. And can you tell us to what extent did Mr. Donia and
13 Mr. Treanor encompass the broader Yugoslav area in their reports in
14 territorial and temporal aspects? How far did they delve into the past?
15 A. Well, I cannot really say it off the top of my head. I don't
16 have the reports in front of me, but they did not go too far back. What
17 they were interested in was 1989, 1990, perhaps sometimes they would
18 digress a little further back, but it was not a rule. Mostly they set
19 off from 1989 and then the key study began from 1990, when the opposition
20 political parties began to be formed.
21 Q. Thank you. And in their reports for this case was Croatia and
22 Slovenia -- were they looked at and did you have the opportunity to
23 analyse and comment on those sections of the reports?
24 A. As far as I can recall, Slovenia was just mentioned here and
25 there superficially and there was no broad discussion about it. They
1 probably felt that that was not relevant. In my opinion, when somebody
2 presents themselves as a historian they cannot stick only to the topics
3 that are mentioned in the indictment, they have to look at a broader
4 context and allow the Prosecution to interpret things in a broader way,
5 but they stuck by the indictment and then they submitted data that would
6 substantiate the indictment. And this is done something by -- that is
7 something that is done by investigators not by true historians.
8 I also want to say to the Prosecutor that Patrick Treanor,
9 although he's not a historian, was much more scrupulous than Robert Donia
11 Q. Thank you. And can you tell us whether the events in Slovenia
12 that touched upon the state issue of Yugoslavia had an effect on the
13 others within Yugoslavia?
14 A. Of course. Everything began with Slovenia. When the Slovenians
15 declared amendments to their constitution and began to talk about
16 sovereignty --
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
18 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: I don't believe that arises from cross, or at least
20 it's not apparent to me in what manner it does. My cross-examination
21 questions were fairly specific.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may respond. Mr. Tieger did
23 mention relations in Croatia and he talked about the position of
24 Professor Cavoski and the two experts in terms of the events in Croatia.
25 So now I'm laying the groundwork for the question of state-building
1 nations. And if you give me a little bit more time so I can develop this
2 line, perhaps then you will see what the connection is.
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I am following up on --
5 JUDGE KWON: We will allow the question, but do it in a
6 non-leading way.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. You started explaining the difference in the position or the
10 qualification of the peoples, the Serbian people, in Croatia and the
11 Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before that I would ask you to try
12 and remember what the word "constituent" means in the English language or
13 an electoral district. Does it talk enough about the rights of the
15 A. The word "konstituanta" exists in the Serbian language and it
16 means that it's the assembly which constitutes a country, at which a
17 constitution is abolished, "konstituanta." This is why we used the
18 foreign word "constituency" in order to express state-building. It would
19 be better to use the word "drzabotvornost" which is "state-building" in
20 Serbian, but we say "konstituantnost." What is the difference between
21 the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina? In Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina it was not disputed that there were three peoples. The
23 Muslims cannot dispute that to the Serbs or the other way around or the
24 Croats, but the problem of the Serbs in Croatia was that there were 12.5
25 per cent and therefore the Croats wanted and they succeeded to reduce
1 them to an ethnic minority and that is why it was important there that
2 Patrick Treanor should state that they were stripped of their
3 state-building quality. And therefore, they had, if I may say so, a
4 collective status as compared with the Croats as a collective because
5 before that Croatia was a country of both the Croatian and the Serbian
6 peoples. And after that, according to the constitution, just a state of
7 the Croatian people and the Serbs were an ethnic minority, just like
8 Hungarians and others, who are very few.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us by using the example of the
10 Bosnian Serbs if they are a constituent people whether this constituency
11 or constituent quality would still continue to exist if they were
12 out-voted about the issues relating to the country, even if they had less
13 than two-thirds?
14 A. When peoples are constituent, then a decision is made by
15 agreement. It cannot be adopted on the basis of simple majority, and
16 that is very important because such a principle is applied in a
17 federation. So, for example, in accordance with the constitution from
18 1974, it was not only the issue of the borders which was the key one, but
19 it was also the question of adoption of specific laws was conditioned on
20 the agreement of all the republics and autonomous provinces as
21 constituent units. So a majority of eight was required, and we have an
22 expression in the Serbian language, I'm not sure what it would be in the
23 English, which is the distributed simple majority. So when there was
24 voting in the Assembly, it was distributed in -- it was divided into
25 national caucus. You had the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes and in each
1 caucus you had to have a simple majority and also a general simple
2 majority and therefore the equality of all peoples was guaranteed. There
3 was no out-voting. What the Muslims and the Croats tried to do was to
4 out-vote the Serbs and they did that at the referendum. Unfortunately
5 this turned back onto the Croats because Tudjman abused them in order to
6 achieve independence of Croatia, in order to have that he had to accept
7 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but under the Muslim conditions
8 and he forced the Croats to be together with the Muslims when the
9 constituency was disputed and when Serbs were out-voted and it turned
10 back on the Croats up to this day. I claim here and you probably know
11 that, for example, when a Croat is to be elected who is to be a member of
12 the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, do you know what were the votes
13 thanks to which he was elected in the last elections? The Muslim votes.
14 He was elected on the basis of the Muslim votes. There is even a
15 decision of the court in Strasbourg which requests that others must also
16 be candidates --
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Cavoski, could you try to be simple in answering
18 the question. I think you answered the question.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. Thank you.
20 JUDGE MORRISON: And could you slow down a bit. I'm listening to
21 the interpreters who are doing a fantastic job, but they're speaking at
22 gabbling speed and it's difficult to follow.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, when a Serb is asking
24 questions from another Serb, so the language is an issue there we
25 apologise. We apologise. The Defence apologies and thanks the
1 interpreters. We'll try to slow down.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. On page 55 my learned friend Mr. Tieger told you that the Serbs
4 requested to be linked with Serbia. Can you tell the Chamber whether we
5 were asking for anything new or was it something that we already had and
6 did we have the right to have this link which had already existed?
7 A. Well, it's even a logical error. I would ask the honourable
8 Chamber for apology because I speak fast by nature and it's difficult to
9 abandon that, and I'm a professor so I'm used to being long-winded and I
10 also apologise for that.
11 The Serbs were the ones who created Yugoslavia in 1918 so that
12 all Serbs would be together. There were very few left in the
13 neighbouring countries. So it was a creation which implied that all
14 Serbs would be under one state roof. The Serbs even accepted the
15 federalisation of Yugoslavia in 1943 and 1946, even though I believe that
16 they shouldn't have done that. By allowing to be dispersed within a
17 number of federal units, but still within one single federation. And
18 then someone concluded: Well, that's not important at all, but let each
19 people have their own state. And that the Serbs would be in a number of
20 states, as they are now, it's only their problem. So the Croats have
21 this problem that some of them live in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the Muslims
22 that some of them live in the area of Raska in Serbia, whereas the
23 Slovenes have no problem at all. And the Serbs have a major problem
24 because except for Slovenia in all former federal units in the ruins of
25 the former Yugoslavia some of them continued to live. So when someone
1 says: Well, the Serbs wanted to be linked with Serbia, well they were
2 linked, they had been linked, but someone wanted to separate them by
3 force in a way that was against the constitution and unlawful.
4 Q. Thank you. On page 49 there was some discussion and some dispute
5 about whether Cutileiro Plan, that is to say the Lisbon Agreement, was
6 accepted, signed, or initialled and you said that you understood from the
7 media that as for the constitutional order it was finished; is that
9 A. Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have D00302 in
11 e-court now. Can we please zoom in, only the page in the Serbian
12 language because I believe the participants can call up the English page
13 for themselves if they need it.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. This is a page from the "Politika" daily devoted to this issue.
16 If we can scroll down a little bit, it says at the top: "Agreement of
17 the leaders of the SDS, the SDA, and the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Scroll up rather than scroll down
19 so that we can see what's on the top of the page.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Professor, does it say here: "Agreement of leaders of the SDA,
22 the SDS, and the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina"?
23 A. Well, I was telling you that I have all these extracts from the
24 press and the press clippings and on the basis of that I wrote my report
25 for the Stanislav Galic case and all my reports about this.
1 Q. Thank you. So was the issue of constitutional principles
2 something that was finished? Did more elaboration -- was more
3 elaboration necessary or did they only need to work on maps?
4 A. I suppose on the basis of this that the constitutional principles
5 had been agreed on and initialled and that what remained was the
6 territorial delineation of borders.
7 Q. Thank you. Can we just now zoom in in the highlighted section,
8 please. This is the statement of a high official of the SDA and the
9 deputy in the Federal Assembly, Irfan Ajanovic, in which he says that the
10 Muslims are satisfied -- they're most satisfied as there would be
11 82 per cent of them in their constituent unit. Is it clear from this
12 that in each constituent unit there would also be minorities?
13 A. Well, I precisely quoted Irfan Ajanovic on several occasions,
14 maybe even in my report for the Stanislav Galic case. One can see from
15 the report that the Muslims fared best actually, that only 18 per cent of
16 them would continue living in the Serbian or the Croatian units, whereas
17 the Serbs fared worst as it seems and the Croats fared relatively well.
18 The problems with the Croats was that they could not have contiguous
19 territory because some of them also lived in northern Bosnia in the
20 Posavina area. So they were satisfied. And Irfan Ajanovic was the
21 spokesman, the person authorised to give statements on behalf of the
22 party. It was him and nobody else.
23 Q. Thank you. Just your indulgence for a moment I want to ask you
24 about several lines --
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, I am of course speaking for
1 myself, but I'm at the moment at a complete loss to see how any of this
2 assists the -- certainly assists me in making any determination in
3 respect of central issues on the indictment. It may be that my
4 colleagues have different views, but I suspect not.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellency, this is how.
6 I'm referring to the cross-examination now, as there on page 49,
7 Mr. Tieger denied whether this was -- that this was accepted, signed, and
8 initialled. And Professor Cavoski referred to a press article, but this
9 substance is very important for passing the main judgement in this case.
10 If it's envisaged that there would be minorities and we accepted this
11 agreement, how can then be said what we had in mind and what we planned
12 was expulsion, murders, and genocide? This is what I'm going to refer to
13 in my closing arguments, but now I would like to establish what are the
14 views of Professor Cavoski. Was this something that had been envisaged
15 and planned or not?
16 JUDGE MORRISON: Two things: First of all, he has written an
17 extensive expert report and if these matters were considered to be either
18 important or pertinent they would be contained and indeed underscored in
19 that report. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, these are matters
20 for your eventual submission.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: And additionally, it's a mis-characterisation of the
23 nature of the cross-examination.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will leave off this
25 subject then.
1 I would just like to show how Ajanovic said that if the Serbs
2 refused it would be seen that it is their feeblemindedness and it would
3 be obvious who was opposed to the European Union; however, Ajanovic and
4 his party actually rejected the project a week later as noted by
5 Professor Cavoski, but let me move away from this topic.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. On page 47 you were asked about the legitimacy of population
8 movement. You talked about options and those who were to select those
9 options. Can you tell us how in 1995 Scandinavia was reorganised? Was
10 it on the basis of war or options?
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1905.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1905 Norway seceded from Sweden.
13 There were some problems as the Norwegian language is a Scandinavian
14 language but is somewhat different from Sweden. Sweden used to be a
15 major power as was Denmark. Today it is no longer so, it is just a
16 cultural factor. The citizens were allowed to decide which citizenship
17 they would opt for and way they would live, but there were no major
18 problems. Everything was done peacefully.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. On page 46 or 47 you were asked whether you knew that
21 Professor Koljevic went to see Mr. Tudjman, President Tudjman. I would
22 ask you if you know the time at which Professor Koljevic visited
23 President Tudjman, was he there as a representative of Republika Srpska
24 or as a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
25 A. As for his status, he never ceased to be a member of the
1 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so he could lose that position only in
2 elections and no elections were held. So my personal view is that all
3 the original members of the Presidency remained that and that unlawfully
4 Biljana Plavsic and Professor Koljevic were replaced at another point.
5 Now, when did he become deputy president of Republika Srpska? But there
6 were changes in the constitution when the position of the president and
7 two deputy presidents were introduced. To be honest, even though I'm an
8 expert of constitutional law, I do not have this piece of information at
9 my finger-tips.
10 Q. Thank you. If I tell you that he was accompanied by
11 Franjo Boras, a Croatian, a member of the Presidency of BiH, would that
12 help you?
13 A. It means that it was a time when they were all still members of
14 the Presidency, yes.
15 Q. Thank you. On page 46 you were asked whether you knew that we
16 requested certain territories in which the Muslims formed the majority of
17 the population. I will ask you the first question in the same vein as
18 the one I asked Mr. Donia. In the negotiations do you start with the
19 lowest price first or do you try to achieve the maximum and then you ease
20 a little bit?
21 A. I never had to do with state or inter-state negotiations but I
22 know that you have to have a negotiating strategy and it is very
23 important that the other side should not know what your negotiating
24 strategy is. So in negotiations you always try to win what is
25 satisfactory and ensuring all the while that it's not below a certain
1 minimum. So all the sides at the beginning normally ask more than the
2 minimum, they try to achieve the maximum and then they see that it's
3 illogical because you may want the Serb territory and we want the Muslim
4 territory, and so on. And then a reasonable solution has to be found
5 which does include certain factors such as at least a partial
6 contiguousness or territory or an equal division of the riches, the
7 mineral riches, and as it was especially important in Bosnia, the sources
8 of energy.
9 Q. All right. Thank you. Did you know that at some point before
10 the war we requested to have control of certain territory and that we
11 threatened that we would capture them by means of weapons or did we do
12 that through negotiations?
13 A. I have to say I never noticed that. I followed the press
14 regularly. I was very much interested in these issues but I never
15 learned about this at all.
16 Q. Thank you. And thirdly, were you convinced that we were not
17 hungry for territories and that we were willing for the sake of peace to
18 return significant portion of the territories that we had under our
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: I think the Court knows what the objection is.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can reformulate.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you know, or did you know, what our attitude toward
25 territorial issues was when this war began?
1 A. From the very beginning there was statements to the effect that
2 the eventual status of individual territories would be decided in
3 negotiations and that the Serbian side was willing - that's what was
4 said - to make territorial concessions. That mostly meant concessions to
5 the Muslims but partly also to the Croats. That was understood, and that
6 can be seen from the fact that at one point the VRS held about
7 70 per cent of the territory of BH and in Dayton the RS only got
8 49 per cent. And there was also a trick that was played on them with
9 maps so that 200 more square kilometres were taken away from them but
10 that's another story.
11 Q. Thank you. In Sarajevo itself, were we victorious militarily but
12 at the political level we ceded some valuable areas in town? I will
13 rephrase. At what -- what's the story like -- what's the situation like
14 in Sarajevo?
15 MR. TIEGER: I feel like I'm amassing objections multiply, so
16 leading, beyond the scope of cross will suffice for the moment. But
17 Dr. Karadzic is persisting in both of those transgressions.
18 JUDGE KWON: How does it arise from the cross-examination,
19 Mr. Karadzic?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 46 Professor Cavoski was
21 confronted with something he may not have known about me demanding a lot
22 of territory, including territories with a Muslim majority. And now I'm
23 asking Professor Cavoski what he knows about our attitude toward the
24 territory. Mr. Tieger actually first aborted this topic.
25 JUDGE KWON: But how is it related to Sarajevo?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We had militarily kept some
2 municipalities there but subsequently gave them to the other side.
3 Professor Cavoski taught there so it was an example of us ceding
5 JUDGE KWON: Please move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm done.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you, Professor Cavoski, and thank you for your evidence.
9 A. Thank you.
10 JUDGE KWON: Unless my colleagues have questions for you, that
11 concludes your evidence, Professor Cavoski. Thank you for your coming to
12 The Hague to give it. You are free to go.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 JUDGE KWON: Given the time it's impractical to start the next
15 witness, but there's one matter I would like to deal with. The Chamber
16 refers to the accused's two motions to admit documents previously marked
17 for identification filed on the 25th of March and the 2nd of April, 2013,
18 to which Prosecution filed its response on 5th of April and 10th of April
19 respectively. Before ruling on the motions, the Chamber notes that there
20 are issues with two of the exhibits tendered in the motions. The Chamber
21 first notes that as already raised in court when document was first
22 tendered, the B/C/S original uploaded into e-court for MFI D2800 contains
23 pages that do not appear to correspond to the same document.
24 Furthermore, the English translation uploaded into e-court for
25 Exhibit MFI D2800 does not correspond to the original and, in fact,
1 appears to be a translation of D2801.
2 Finally, the Chamber notes that for MFI D3061, the English
3 translation uploaded into e-court is only two pages while the original
4 document is eight pages, which the Chamber has decided to admit it in its
5 entirety. Therefore, the Chamber instructs the Defence to upload the
6 accurate original documents and/or translations into e-court for the
7 above-mentioned exhibits by Wednesday, 17th of April, 2013.
8 Unless there's anything else, the hearing is adjourned. On
9 Monday we'll start with Mr. Galic's evidence?
10 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
11 THE ACCUSED: Monday.
12 JUDGE KWON: Monday.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.45 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Monday, the 15th day of
15 April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.