Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 37561

 1                           Tuesday, 23 April 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The witness entered court]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.11 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours.

 9             May I raise just one very brief housekeeping matter before we

10     commence, that is the following:  In keeping with our customary practice,

11     Mr. Robinson and I agreed upon the limited portions of previous

12     statements that were raised by the -- during the cross-examination of

13     witness Dodik, and we've provided to the Registrar a list of those

14     specific references contained in 65 ter 24921 and 24924.

15             So -- and we would ask that those be admitted with the -- as I

16     say, with the agreement and exchange of information with the Defence and

17     based on our customary practice.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.  So they are uploaded onto e-court.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will take a brief look and come back to

21     this issue.

22             Mr. Galic and Mr. Piletta-Zanin, with respect to the issues

23     raised by Mr. Galic yesterday, the Chamber is still looking into the

24     matter, particularly Chamber inquired of the Detention Unit as to whether

25     there could be a way in which an observation could be performed without

Page 37562

 1     necessarily awakening the detainee, and the Chamber was told by the

 2     Detention Unit that the commander will -- commander would consult the

 3     medical doctor as to the appropriate interval.

 4             We'll come back to this issue very soon.

 5             Having said that, let's continue.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

 8     Your Excellencies, good morning everyone.

 9                           WITNESS:  STANISLAV GALIC [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

13        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

14        Q.   Please, even though we are in a hurry and I wish us to finish as

15     soon as possible, I would ask you to make pauses and speak slowly.

16             We are still dealing with your relations with the UNPROFOR so if

17     we could please have 1D06320.

18             Yes, this is your report dated the 19th of January, regular

19     combat report.  1993 is the year.

20             In the first paragraph, about the enemy you say that the enemy

21     fired from all kinds of weapons, especially the sniper fire and wounded a

22     member of UNPROFOR on the Paolina-Hotin [phoen] road.

23             And under 4, unusual incidents, wounding of an UNPROFOR member,

24     commendation to our soldiers from the Vogosca Brigade who managed to pull

25     out the UNPROFOR member who would certainly have died.

Page 37563

 1             Can you tell us what that was about.

 2        A.   Well, quite a lot is already explained in the -- in item 1.  And

 3     here, in item 4, in a way, the development is described.  So there was

 4     fire.  I think that it was even necessary to pull out one UNPROFOR

 5     member, as far as I remember.  I'm not sure if this was the situation.

 6             In any case, they assisted the UNPROFOR members, and that was why

 7     they were commended.  And obviously the forces of the BH Army 1st Corps

 8     fired at UNPROFOR.

 9             So that would be the answer to your question, in brief.

10             Perhaps I still owe you a part of my answer from yesterday when I

11     talked about relations with UNPROFOR when I said that they did not

12     receive the right information, so I was too short and you -- I was

13     interrupted, so if you would allow me to add something now.

14        Q.   Yes.  But as briefly as you can, please.

15        A.   Yes, I have many comments to say, and I wish that I would be

16     given the opportunity to state that before this Tribunal.

17             I started yesterday with sniping incidents and then I continued.

18     But I also wanted to talk the main subjects which are important in order

19     to understand the relations between the UNPROFOR and the Army of

20     Republika Srpska and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and also my own attitude to

21     UNPROFOR.  They did not have sufficient information because if

22     General MacKenzie had had sufficient information, he wouldn't have led

23     the JNA column to the Vrojacka [phoen] Street where they then perished.

24     For sure.  That's why I think that they did not have sufficient

25     information.  I couldn't say because I would accuse General MacKenzie

Page 37564

 1     here if I said that he had sufficient information but still he led the

 2     column into the ambush laid by the BH Army.

 3             And another example involving the same general, MacKenzie, when

 4     there were talks, these were events preceding my arrival but they had an

 5     impact on the situation as it developed after my arrival.  When the talks

 6     about the airport were conducted, General MacKenzie was in charge of

 7     negotiating with the Serbian side and he promised that there would be a

 8     road next to the airport that would link Ilidza to Lukavica.  However,

 9     that was never realised and so the section the north western part of the

10     front remained cut off.  The operational reasons and problems which the

11     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps faced as a result is something that I wouldn't

12     discuss now.  But later on I received information during my trial,

13     General Nambiar said the following.  It is true that General MacKenzie

14     had promised the road to the Serbs that would link Lukavica with Ilidza,

15     but he was entitled.  He did not have the right to do that.  So that was

16     some sort of justification for that.  However, I do not believe that

17     MacKenzie wanted to deceive the Serbian side.

18             Another issue that is very important.  When we were withdrawing

19     from Bjelasnica and Igman on the 14th of August, 1994, and when UNPROFOR

20     was supposed to take over control of the area, when the agreement was

21     made, they believed that they would really hold those areas.  But later

22     on we saw that he couldn't take control of the areas but that it was

23     rather the BH Army which entered there and then committed various crimes

24     from there against the army of Republika Srpska, that is to say the

25     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and civilians as well.  I couldn't say that they

Page 37565

 1     did that deliberately to cause problems for us.

 2             Another thing connected to the airport, if I go back to the time

 3     when I was in command, the problem with the airport was that freight

 4     traffic was allowed in order to supply humanitarian aid and materiel and

 5     technical equipment that the UNPROFOR needed.  But then they abused it

 6     and there were manoeuvres of the BH Army from Sarajevo towards Igman and

 7     backwards, and we know that the tunnel below the airport was also dug at

 8     the time.

 9             When I regularly asked them throughout 1993 and up until the time

10     when the tunnel began to be operational whether someone was digging the

11     tunneling, they would tell me that the tunnel was not being dug.  It is

12     interesting.  I don't know if they didn't know, but according to some

13     information that we heard, I don't know if the information was correct,

14     but even the UNPROFOR forces were helping with the digging of the tunnel.

15     It's possible that they did.

16             There was a Military Observer here who testified and who said

17     that to this day he doesn't know that a tunnel had been dug even though

18     there is a museum devoted to the digging of the tunnel in Sarajevo.  I

19     don't know, I haven't visited it because I have been in detention all the

20     time but I read that in the paper.

21             Another problem that arose and something that we couldn't accept

22     in any way.  You must remember it quite well but let me remind you

23     anyway.  It was this.  When at some point in spring 1994 General van Baal

24     through Cekrcici or rather from Visoko through Cekrcici centre, these six

25     APCs to block off some pieces of equipment which, judging by the US maps,

Page 37566

 1     was within the 20-kilometre zone --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  General.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I got carried away a

 4     little bit.  Thank you.

 5             That those weapons were within the 20 kilometre zone; that is to

 6     say, the exclusion zone.  Judging by our map, when measured from the

 7     centre of the city, they were outside of the 20-kilometre zone which is

 8     something I explained to you earlier.  And so on.

 9             Before this, we made a phone call and we got in touch with the

10     general.  General Rose went to London to be knighted at the time and

11     van Baal as his deputy remained there.  He did not communicate with us

12     and our command sufficiently so that we would establish precisely where

13     the weapons were, whether it was within the 20 kilometre zone.

14             Later on the Canadian Battalion with 36 APCs, that was a big

15     provocation, a big and serious provocation because they tied up my

16     soldiers in Cekrcici.  That was how they entered.  Why did they have to

17     tie them up?  They could have -- yes, thank you.

18             Did they tie them up because we were friendly to them?  When the

19     UNPROFORs came along with their equipment, my soldiers went out to greet

20     them and they arrested them or tied them up.  And in that way, they

21     passed by them.  Later movements of those forces were blocked and a

22     serious incident could have happened.  We discussed that together in

23     Pale.  You, Mr. President, General van Baal and myself.

24        Q.   I think that this is sufficient --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

Page 37567

 1             Yes, I leave it to you, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Just one observation.  The General referred to

 4     General Nambiar's testimony in the Galic trial and General Nambiar never

 5     testified in the Galic trial.  He must have meant somebody else.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I respond?

 7             Mr. President, would you allow me to answer?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I will leave it to Mr. Karadzic.

 9             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Please tell us.  Tell us who did you mean?

12        A.   I meant General Nambiar precisely.  No one else to mean.  Because

13     he was the commander of the UNPROFOR forces in all of Yugoslavia, I

14     think, or something like that.  At such a high level.  And I said that

15     because his statement was used in my trial.  If I need to explain that in

16     more detail, so I'm sure it can be found among the documents.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we mark it for identification?

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3463, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Could we now please have 1D07727.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, can you please have a look at this.  The date is the 2nd

25     of April, 1993.  And an order is issued on your behalf:  Shooting

Page 37568

 1     aircraft, taking off or landing from the airport are prohibited most

 2     strictly.  And then under 2, strictly prohibiting fire against UN forces

 3     positioned at the airport.  And then it says under 5 that the order also

 4     concerns the aircraft carrying humanitarian aid over the SRK zone.

 5             Can you tell us how often you issued such orders and why.

 6        A.   Well, we have seen in one report that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

 7     forces were mentioned as possible attackers of an aircraft which was

 8     landing, even though later on it was established that the

 9     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps forces had not been responsible.  In such

10     situations, when things were critical, to put it that way, then I would

11     issue such orders.

12             I suppose that this order was linked with another order about the

13     so-called parachute operation.  I'm not sure whether it was the same

14     period, but let me explain what that was about.

15             Namely, we talked with the general who was representative of the

16     US army.  I think his name was Johnson.  I believe that was his name, but

17     it could have been different.  That was how I understood him at the time

18     and how I remember his name.  They then wanted to be -- to supply the

19     Muslim forces or men with humanitarian aid by goods that would be thrown

20     with parachutes from aircraft in Igman and in the area towards Gorazde

21     and Srebrenica.  But to have those freight aircraft fly there then, they

22     are slow and they are sensitive to any sort of fire, so I issued an order

23     that this part of the agreement had to be observed as well, meaning the

24     flying over of aircraft carrying humanitarian aid.  It was interesting

25     that we had made many efforts but not a single package fell on the side

Page 37569

 1     of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or even the Army of Republika Srpska.  No

 2     aircraft carrying such sort of aid was targeted from the area held by the

 3     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  But we had a piece of information about the

 4     aircraft that were supplying Igman and the area in the direction of

 5     Konjic.  I'm not sure where they were throwing the supplies, but it was

 6     fired by the BH Army troops.  I'm not sure which forces those were.  It

 7     could have been somebody else not just the BH Army.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3464, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now please

13     have in e-court 1D01568.

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, please focus on this.  The date is the 24th of July,

17     1993, for General Milosevic, your deputy, and the Chief of Staff, signed

18     by somebody else for him.  We see it's mentioned what the enemy is doing,

19     where he is firing from, Stupsko Brdo, provocations from snipers and

20     infantry weapons and also mortar shells.  Two were fired at Grbavica.

21     Sniper firing, one civilian killed by the Zeljeznica stadium.  This is

22     what I'm interested in.

23             Item 2, last sentence:

24             "All subordinated units have been strictly warned to prevent

25     incidents between VRS members and UNPROFOR members."

Page 37570

 1             So this is a repetition of the warning and a strict warning at

 2     that.

 3             Can you tell us what made you to repeat these warnings often to

 4     try and maintain good relations and prevent and avoid any incidents?

 5        A.   The problem was the situation that existed, and we were also

 6     implementing the Lukavac 93 operation.

 7             In that situation, UNPROFOR wanted a complete picture of the

 8     activities of the front line.  They wanted more information so they could

 9     monitor what was going on.  There was a permanent representative at our

10     forward command post.  It was a military observer who observed the

11     operation, and that's probably why this warning was required.

12             I apologise.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3465, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more about this topic.

17     1D06328, please.  1D06328.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Yes, this is the document.  It's a cable.  We see that it reads:

20     "Prohibition of Conducting Combat Operations Against UNPROFOR and Other

21     International Organisations."

22             In the preamble you say that the Geneva talks are under way and

23     any conflict with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian organisations

24     would be used for a renewed demonisation of the Serbs and could serve as

25     a motive for making moves detrimental to your people.

Page 37571

 1             And under item 2 of the order you say that full protection must

 2     be secured for all the UNPROFOR convoys, military observers, and convoys

 3     of international organisations who got approval to pass the territory

 4     controlled by the VRS.

 5             What was the interest of the VRS to provide safety and protection

 6     to these international factors and to prohibit fire at them?

 7        A.   If we remind ourselves of the previous conversation, we will see

 8     that the Muslim forces sometimes used the command posts on the positions

 9     of the international organisations as places from which they fired at our

10     units.  In order to avoid any such activity, this first part of the order

11     is about these things.  Neither the equipment nor the command posts or

12     positions of the UN were ever targeted by us.  The passage of convoys

13     that had a permit, and if I remember what the situation was like at

14     winter time, because all roads of the SRK were blocked from Tarcin and

15     Hadzici to Sarajevo and other directions too.  But if you stop such a

16     convoy, nobody else can pass because there was much snow in the area.

17     But there were probably requests made at check-point or something.  I

18     remember an instance when you called and said that a convoy must be let

19     through.

20             There were some problems.  The situation wasn't ideal.  Certainly

21     not.  I said what it was like around Hadzici and Blazuj.  And even though

22     the convoys only provided supplies to the part of Sarajevo controlled by

23     the BH Army 1st Corps, they regularly -- they were regularly able to

24     pass.

25             And if I may add something?

Page 37572

 1        Q.   Yes, go ahead.

 2        A.   The only convoy from Serbia to Sarajevo was led by Fil --

 3     Filaret [phoen], an ecclesiastical dignitary.  There were various

 4     organisations sending humanitarian aid to their people in Sarajevo,

 5     including Muslims and Croats.  When they moved closer to Dobrinja and the

 6     area controlled by the Muslims, they were stopped and fire was opened at

 7     them.  Three drivers were injured at the time.  I learned of it and it

 8     all went through UNPROFOR, and then the convoy entered Sarajevo.  That's

 9     the only such convoy sent by Serbs from Serbia that made it to Sarajevo.

10        Q.   On page 12, the transcript didn't record that I probably got

11     information from international organisations when I called you.

12        A.   That is my assumption.  Because they were known to contact you

13     and asked for assistance in some situations.

14             But I must mention one more problem.  When you issue an order,

15     and I have an order from the Main Staff, then I must report to the

16     Main Staff what I'm supposed to do.  Because that's how it has to be in

17     the army.

18        Q.   This was page 11, line 20.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3466, Your Honours.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   General, a minute ago you mentioned that our people perceived us

24     as not being treated equally with regard to humanitarian aid.  Were there

25     any other reasons, justified or unjustified, to provoke anger in both our

Page 37573

 1     soldiers and civilians against international organisations?

 2        A.   Yes.  One thing that made me angry, and the soldiers and the

 3     people too, was the fact that we found weapons and ammunition in those

 4     convoys.  It was also broadcast in the media.  I don't know if that

 5     content made it to the international media.  But we knew that in Sarajevo

 6     there were 350.000 people who needed food, so whenever we stopped a

 7     convoy, somebody would be hungry.  It was hard to say what should be done

 8     when weapons have been discovered, and yet the convoy carried valuable

 9     supplies.

10             There were units escorting the convoys; mostly Ukrainian units.

11        Q.   Did you inform them, did you submit protests to UNPROFOR with

12     regard to these incidents?

13        A.   Concerning all these events that were not normal and which we

14     considered as detrimental to our relations and the agreements, the SRK

15     had to implement about a dozen various agreements.  Only about

16     cease-fire.  Then there were agreements about humanitarian aid.  And we

17     wanted to honour all these agreements.

18             There was also the humanitarian commission, the Krajisnik

19     Muratovic commission.  Many considered it unimportant, but I thought it

20     was important.  I will probably be able to say more about it later.

21        Q.   When the other side didn't honour agreement, did you protest to

22     UNPROFOR?

23        A.   Whatever was not in accordance with the agreements or the safety

24     of the units of the SRK, I sent warnings or information to UNPROFOR or

25     protested pointing out the problems.

Page 37574

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01865, please.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While we wait, let me say that we

 3     always strove to take care of things through the Main Staff.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   But there were also protests from the corps command level.

 6        A.   Yes, yes, there were.  We saw that yesterday that there were

 7     protests from my level, because we had all these commanders coming to us

 8     and our relations were more immediate.

 9        Q.   Please take a look at this protest to UNPROFOR.  It's about the

10     behaviour of the enemy during a cease-fire.  They are regrouping their

11     forces, seizing territories, inflicting casualties on the civilian

12     population.

13             And toward the end of the first paragraph, it says:

14             "In case they don't stop these actions, the corps will be forced

15     to respond adequately ... it would put in question all efforts," and so

16     on.

17             And the last question:

18             "We ask you to intervene with the [sic] opposing party to stop

19     its actions."

20             Very briefly and if possible just answer yes or no:  When the

21     other side violates an agreement, do you have -- do you have a

22     carte blanche to respond immediately?

23        A.   In this situation, we don't have carte blanche.  We cannot

24     respond to enemy activity immediately.  Wherever possible, we warned of

25     such actions, and wherever UNPROFOR was able to do so, they were supposed

Page 37575

 1     to stop the enemy attack.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3467, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see 1D06321.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Here, in this document dated 8 April 1993, we won't go into these

 9     shells and the violations of the cease-fire agreement.

10             Instead, I direct your attention to item 9.  You inform the

11     Main Staff that this -- the misses, the -- or the shots that missed the

12     runway threatens planes, and so on.

13             Was this a frequent occurrence or what could be done?

14        A.   No, this didn't happen often.  However, it was rather frequent at

15     the time, and we were -- we didn't understand what was happening,

16     whether -- did they have bad pilots who didn't know how to land or ...

17             But they were all cruising above the SRK.  Now it's open to

18     discussion whether that was or was not air-space in which they were

19     allowed to cruise.  I am convinced that they did so to observe our

20     territory and take photographs.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I move to admit this document.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3468, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06322, please.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37576

 1        Q.   Your command is informing the Main Staff on the 24th of April,

 2     1993, about activities.  And toward the end of the first paragraph, they

 3     say:

 4             "They chose the most favourable moment when a lot of people were

 5     in the streets."

 6             And in item 5 you speak about an extraordinary event:

 7             "An UNPROFOR convoy that had set off from Kiseljak towards

 8     Sarajevo but was stopped at Kobiljaca because they didn't allow any

 9     inspection.  And another convoy ... that had set off for Sarajevo was

10     also stopped there because it hadn't been announced and it didn't allow

11     inspection either.

12             Then it goes on to say that:

13             "Four civilians and one soldier were wounded."

14             And the conclusion is:

15             "UNPROFOR forces are attempting to provoke a conflict with our

16     forces since they don't respect their peace mission and the agreements

17     signed."

18             Can we see the next page in both languages.

19             "Forecast:

20             "It is expected that such provocations will continue."

21             In such cases, serious cases, who protests, you or the

22     Main Staff?

23        A.   In such more serious situations, once the front line is reached,

24     because that's where Kobiljaca is, and you see that they don't allow

25     inspection of these convoys, this was April 1993 which was a tumultuous

Page 37577

 1     month with lots of combat activity, of course, that will give rise to

 2     suspicion.  I don't know what kind of inspection is mentioned here but at

 3     any rate there shouldn't have been any problems.  However, if they refuse

 4     to be inspected then that is a problem.  In such a situation the Main

 5     Staff is informed who had a representative, Mr. Indjic, who was in charge

 6     of co-operation with UNPROFOR, and he was also a liaison officer between

 7     the SRK and the Main Staff of the VRS.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3469, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   And now can we look at 1D01535?

15             This was issued on the 21st of May, 1995.  Under 1, you can see

16     that a tank T-55 was observed in the Sokolje sector.  There's a reference

17     to fire against Nedzarici from Stupsko Brdo and Mojmilo.

18             However, under 2 it says:

19             "Our units are observing the cease-fire.  UNPROFOR receives our

20     regular protests."

21             What was your experience?  Did UNPROFOR have a say with the other

22     side when we -- when it came to cease-fire violations?

23        A.   Well, when we see what sort of movements there were -- taking

24     place in the Sokolje sector, we can see that a tank appeared there quite

25     often, so this was nothing new.  Our protests were lodged in order to

Page 37578

 1     stop the fire that was opened by the 1st Corps of the BiH Army.  That is

 2     why we sent warnings and protest notes to the UNPROFOR Command, most

 3     commonly to the Sarajevo Sector of UNPROFOR.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Where is Sokolje; can you tell us?  Is it on the

 5     outer ring of Sarajevo or is it down-town?

 6        A.   Sokolje is a settlement near Rajlovac.  It's a new settlement and

 7     its inhabitants are mostly people who had arrived from Sandzak.  At least

 8     that's what I have been told.  I don't know for sure.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can this be admitted.

11             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Just for

12     the transcript, it should read not 17593 but 17595.  Thank you.

13             When I said 175, it's page 17, line 15, and the year is 1993.

14     Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3470, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to call up

18     1D01547.  Thank you.

19             The date is 10 June 1993.  I'm interested in page 3, which is the

20     most important page in this document with regard to the topic that we are

21     discussing.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Look at the conclusion.  It says here that artillery and mortar

24     fire has been stepped up.  The number of projectiles is growing by the

25     day.  And then in the middle it says that the enemy - and the word used

Page 37579

 1     here is "poturice" - is supplied with ammunition by UNPROFOR.  There's no

 2     logical explanation as to the number of shells fired.

 3             Did they have a -- an ammunition production --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Where do -- can we find the passage in English?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's bullet point 8(b).  8(b).  The

 6     following page.

 7             "Predictions:  [In English] We belive that the Turks in Sarajevo

 8     are being supplied."

 9             [Interpretation] That's in the middle of the page.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Supplied with ammunition by

12     UNPROFOR.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Was there any kind of shell production in Sarajevo?  If there

15     was, was that production enough to explain such high expenditures?

16        A.   According to the information that we had at the time, they could

17     produce shells, rifle grenades, mortar shells.  Those that they produced

18     were obviously different from the originals, but their effect was the

19     same.  So they did have some production.

20             However, whenever a convoy arrived in Sarajevo - I don't know

21     why - but I claim here those activities were stepped up and it seemed

22     that they have limitless quantities of ammunition at those times.  I

23     don't know why.  Was it due to the fact that another order was in place,

24     that they were in a different mood, or they had been supplied with

25     ammunition in a different way?  I was not in a position to be the judge

Page 37580

 1     of that, but one of the explanations is that they received ammunition

 2     from UNPROFOR either by means of those convoys that transported

 3     humanitarian aid or in some other way I really don't know.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Galic.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  It was interpreted in the document as Turks, but

 9     what does a "poturice" mean, Mr. Galic?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is not a term

11     that I would use.  My Chief of Staff used that term until the arrival of

12     Milosevic.  He used the term "poturice," but it was a derogatory term for

13     Muslims.  When you say "poturice" that means that you're referring to a

14     person who started life as a member of another ethnicity and then became

15     Turk.  That would be the interpretation.  If I did not make myself clear

16     enough, I can go on explaining because there is more to the term than

17     just this.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I think that's sufficient.

19             Thank you, Mr. Galic.

20             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3471, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just briefly --

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37581

 1        Q.   What would have been the ethnicity of those people who then

 2     became Turks and adopted Muslim religion?

 3        A.   Mr. President, the history of the Balkan peninsula, as you know,

 4     is very complex, but you can be a member of any ethnic group in order to

 5     become a Turk.  But in this particular case, those Turks were supposed to

 6     have started their life as Serbs.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  And now I would like us to see whether that term

 8     "poturice" referred to the people as a whole or just to the combatants.

 9     Was there any difference there?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  The general has just said that that is not a word

11     that he uses.  It was a word used by his Chief of Staff.  So how can he

12     now speculate on what his Chief of Staff might have meant when he used

13     that word?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Whether or not the general would be able to answer

15     the question, the Chamber will not be assisted very much.  Why don't we

16     move on.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             I would like to call up 65 ter 12397.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Were there armed incidents involving UNPROFOR and the

21     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?  How did you react in those cases?

22        A.   As far as I can remember, there was just one clash with members

23     of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  I wouldn't be able to say that it was

24     actually a clash with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  The people involved

25     were paramilitaries, members of a paramilitary army.  And I had a lot of

Page 37582

 1     problems subsequently.  I later on resubordinated those people to the

 2     Ilijas Brigade and they started behaving.  I believe that you are asking

 3     me about that.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5        A.   I can't remember any other conflicts involving UNPROFOR in any of

 6     our zones of responsibilities.  Really, we did not have any such problems

 7     with UNPROFOR.  There were minor things but not such problems.

 8        Q.   In paragraph 3, it says around at 10.25 they opened fire on our

 9     positions.  Can we go to the following page.

10             Your memory serves you well, General, sir.  It seems that

11     UNPROFOR and [indiscernible], that there was no love lost between them.

12     Under 7 it says that Vasilije Vidovic, Vasko was slightly wounded.  Is

13     that the person that you spoke about?

14        A.   Yes, I mentioned Vasko and that was at the time.

15     Vasilije Vidovic, also known as Vasko, was a member of the paramilitary

16     in the territory of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.  We had a vojvoda there.

17     Actually, we had three --

18        Q.   Besides sending protests, you did not use weapons in response to

19     their activities; right?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Well, too fast.  Too fast.  I'm not sure if your

21     question was correctly translated or reflected in the transcript.

22             Probably we need to hear the answer again.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, sir, also -- from the moment when you said also known as

25     Vasko whom you resubordinated to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and that you

Page 37583

 1     did not have any conflicts; is that correct?

 2        A.   No, it's slightly different but in essence it's the same.  I

 3     resubordinated him to the Ilijas Brigade, not to the

 4     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, because if I'd done that I would have

 5     resubordinated him directly to me.  He hailed from Ilijas, from

 6     Podogovo [phoen].  He behaved the way he did and that's why we had to

 7     resubordinate him to the unit up there.

 8             The question was whether we responded or reacted to UNPROFOR

 9     activities.  We did not.  The only thing we did is send protests and

10     whatever misunderstandings we may have had we resolved with UNPROFOR.

11     Actually, there was an incident involving a vehicle.  Somebody stole a

12     vehicle, and that's how the problem arose.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3472, Your Honours.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Did it arrive that NATO aircraft caused an incident and opened

19     fire against our army?

20        A.   We had information to the effect that fire was opened in an area,

21     and later on we could not check whether that was true or not.  There were

22     provocations, mostly by NATO aircraft, that patrolled the area of the

23     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  There were up to 150 sorties a day which

24     depended on the situation and on the weather.  When they broke the sound

25     barrier, that instilled fear among the troops and the people because it

Page 37584

 1     was not a pleasant sound to hear that.  And you were just hopeless.  You

 2     couldn't do anything because you could not open fire on such aircraft.

 3     Even if we had had the -- the carte blanche to do it, we did not have the

 4     means to do it.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up

 6     1D01562.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be reminded that he

 8     should speak slowly.  Otherwise, his words cannot recorded properly.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  General Galic, I understand you have a lot of

10     things to -- to let us know, but in doing so, please speak very slowly.

11     Otherwise, your words will not be recorded correctly.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. President.

13             I have been in detention for 14 years, so probably you should try

14     and understand me.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Please have a look at bullets 5 and 6.  It says at 1500 hours two

17     NATO pact aircraft flew over the positions above Cekrcici very low about

18     150 to 200 metres.  Fire was opened but there were no consequences.

19             So what did you do about this?  You just lodged a protest with

20     the UNPROFOR; is that right?  It says here:  "Protest Lodged with

21     UNPROFOR."

22        A.   I think that first of all the Chamber needs to be informed about

23     the location of Cekrcici.  It's quite a small area.  That was where a

24     check-point was from Visoko leading towards Ilijas and our check-point

25     was in operation there.  If something happened in that area or if there

Page 37585

 1     was firing there, it wasn't so dangerous or did not have such an impact

 2     on the disposition of other forces because other forces of our corps were

 3     deployed elsewhere.  That was why just a protest was lodged.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3473, Your Honour.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Were your protests lodged with UNPROFOR fruitful in any way?  Did

10     they result in anything advantage to us.  Did UNPROFOR have an influence

11     on the opposing side as it had an influence on you?

12        A.   That's a difficult question for me, now -- or, rather, not the

13     question itself but the answer.  For me to compare whether they had equal

14     or more or less influence on the other side.  But what they presented to

15     us as the measures taken against the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps beginning

16     from the implementation of the agreement that we talked about, that is to

17     say the exclusion zone, without heavy weapons.  I know that everyone came

18     to check and monitor that agreement, from Mr. Akashi to the commander

19     from Zagreb.  I mean, the UNPROFOR commander.  But we know that the

20     agreement was not implemented on the Muslim side and there were not so

21     many checks.  That's why we could say that we were not equally treated by

22     the UN representatives in general, not just UNPROFOR.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 1D06330.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37586

 1        Q.   The date of this document is the 28th of February, 1994; that is

 2     to say, after the Markale I incident.  And what the document says is that

 3     the enemy continues not to observe the agreed truce.

 4             And under item 2:

 5             "Our units all observed the signed truce."

 6             But can we please see the last page or the second one, rather.

 7     It could be the last page in English because the items I'm interested in

 8     are 8 and 10.

 9        A.   In Serbian, please.

10        Q.   Yes, thank you.  Please look at this number 8.

11             "The Muslims continue to breach the cease-fire with engineering

12     work," and so on.

13             And the last one, conclusions, the measures which the UNPROFOR is

14     taking after our protests have yielded no results so that lodging further

15     protests has no purpose.

16        A.   As you can see here, this is my signature.  So no "poturice" are

17     mentioned here but rather just the Muslims.  This is why I wanted to go

18     back to the explanation I provided earlier.

19             Whether measures were taken, I'm warning the Main Staff here that

20     they are not taking sufficient measures against the 1st Corps of the

21     BH Army.  Perhaps it's a bit severely formulated that there is no purpose

22     to continue lodging protests.  I was probably somewhat angry at the time.

23     Something else was going on in the zone of the corps and this was not

24     going well.  You keep writing protests and no results.  So that was why I

25     wrote it the way I did.  Perhaps it was a bit too strong.

Page 37587

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  What is a MOS violation, General?  In point 10.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That stands for Muslim forces.

 5     Muslim armed forces, to be precise.  The Muslim armed forces, MOS.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll admit it.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3474, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             1D01667 is the one we need to look at now, please.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While we are waiting for it to

11     appear on the screen, the Presiding Judge asked me about the MOS.  It is

12     good to see here that these forces, the Muslim air forces

13     [as interpreted], were crossing from Dobrinja towards Igman across the

14     airport where it says MOS.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  The date of this document is the 1st of March 1993.

17     You are saying where the enemy carried out its activities.  Under item 1,

18     fire at Nedzarici.  The faculty of transportation.  And under item 3, the

19     situation in the territory, you say that a meeting was held between you

20     and General Soubirou and that you protested because the truce agreement

21     was violated by firing sniper fire, regrouping of forces, engineering

22     works carried out by the Muslim army.

23             Were these activities allowed when a truce was in force?  Just

24     tell us briefly, yes or no.

25        A.   No.

Page 37588

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we please see the last page of this document.

 2             It -- the manners in which the truce was violated are listed here

 3     and you say in particular in the vicinity of the UNPROFOR units which are

 4     carrying out checks or monitoring in specific sectors.  Last sentence:

 5             "Meetings and agreements with the UN commander are not producing

 6     the anticipated results, particularly with regard to the -- respecting

 7     the cease-fire."

 8             So you were not satisfied with what you could achieve by

 9     protests; correct?

10        A.   Yes, this is all in the context of the agreement which had you

11     signed with Mr. Akashi on the 18th of February, 1994.  As far as I can

12     see this is the date, and I had missed it.

13             So this is -- continues all this time that agreement on the

14     cessation of firing in the entire Sarajevo zone was still in force.  That

15     covers the entire 20-kilometre zone.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3475, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D06329 is the one we

20     would need now, please.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, the date is now the 24th of March, 1994.  UNPROFOR

23     activities is a separate section.  We should have the translation too.

24     We have seen the date.  Perhaps we can scroll down.  What is described

25     here is a series of measures and counter-measures with regard to

Page 37589

 1     disagreements, objections.  They are trying to justify what they had

 2     omitted to do and once again the problems are listed here.

 3             No translation.

 4             If you could then please tell us.  It says here that all the

 5     problems were stressed again.  They were the subjects of discussion

 6     earlier but they have not been resolved.  Can you please read out what is

 7     mentioned under item 1 and onwards.

 8        A.   Well, let me say what the introductory section says.  It says

 9     that the UNPROFOR refused to transport me across the airport.  They

10     wanted to retaliate in a way because we did not meet some of their

11     demands.  They wanted to patrol in the Vogosca sector.  What was that

12     about?  When I needed to go to the north western section of the front,

13     and that was Ilidza, Hadzici, Ilijas, and that part of the front, if I

14     were to take the Lukavica-Pale-Sumbulovac-Hresa-Vogosca road, from

15     Sumbulovac towards Hresa, that section that was a path for horses, and I

16     didn't want to go there at all I would mean between four and six hours

17     depending on the enemy fire, and if I was transported by UNPROFOR, I

18     would cross the entire way from Lukavica to Ilidza in 10 to 15 minutes.

19     That was why I used that opportunity whenever I had it, whenever they

20     would provide me with their APC and place it at my disposal so that I

21     could do my job.

22             The other issues that we discussed which had not been resolved,

23     first:  The return of Muslims to the agreed line on Igman and Bjelasnica.

24     Do I need to provide explanations?

25        Q.   I think that the Chamber knows when you acceded those positions.

Page 37590

 1        A.   Number 2, preventing the Muslim movements below and across the

 2     airport.

 3             Number 3, monitoring the truce by preventing the movements of

 4     Muslim forces, firing, and engineering works.

 5             Perhaps it's not clear, those engineering works and what that is.

 6        Q.   The Chamber is aware of that.

 7        A.   All right.  Violations of agreement with regard to the deployment

 8     of the Russian unit in the general Grbavica area.  What is meant here is

 9     actually Debelo Brdo though it's not written that way.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

11             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I just didn't understand how Dr. Karadzic could

13     say the Chamber is aware of that when none of us are and we can't read

14     the document.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said that the Chamber already

16     knows what engineering works are in the military sense of the word, and I

17     believe that it does.  It means digging trenches, bunkers, getting closer

18     to positions, and I believe that the Chamber is aware of this.  So we

19     shouldn't waste any time on that.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Number 5, the use of caterpillars

21     and weapons with calibre higher than 12.7-millimetres.  That is

22     prohibited.

23             Under 6, continuing flights of UN helicopters above our positions

24     counter to the agreement.

25             Movement of UN vehicles and personnel without announcement and

Page 37591

 1     approval.  That's under number 7.

 2             Number 8, transportation of Muslims in UN vehicles.

 3             That's what this page contains.  I'm not certain if there's

 4     anything on the following page.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the following page to see what else

 7     you objected to.

 8             On top of the page you say regardless of the existence of the

 9     series of unresolved problems, six military observers persisted in trying

10     to shift the discussion to the issue of patrols along the front line.

11     And below, under item 8, conclusions, expectations, you note that the

12     enemy is continuing to violate the truce.  Further provocations are to be

13     expected and so on.  Correct?

14        A.   Yes.  Though it says on top of the page what was emphasised was a

15     major incident when the Canadians violently entered our positions in the

16     general Cekrcici area or sector.  That was the incident which I talked

17     about previously and it is now confirmed in this report.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be MFI'd, please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D3476, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06315, please.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   There should be a translation.  General, do you remember that you

25     also addressed the government with the information you had received about

Page 37592

 1     the burial and removal of the bodies of Serb civilians who had been

 2     killed in Sarajevo and that you requested that the government block such

 3     manipulation with the bodies through UNPROFOR.

 4             Do you remember this document?

 5        A.   It can be seen that I signed this document, and now that I'm

 6     reading it, I can remember what that was about in the particular period.

 7     The essence was that we had received information from those who had

 8     crossed over to our territory and also through our observation and

 9     reconnaissance and intelligence that bodies of those who had been killed

10     or wounded were being moved.  We did not know who that was, whether these

11     were Serbs' bodies, but most information was that the Serbs' bodies were

12     moved and buried under those who had already been buried at the cemetery

13     under other bodies so that it could not be seen where that was done.

14     Much information with regard to this.  And, therefore, I had to send it

15     to the Main Staff for their information.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?  And then we

18     could take the break.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3477, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will have a break for a half an hour and

22     resume at 11.00 -- oh, no, I'm sorry.  We'll break for an hour and resume

23     at 11.30.

24             Would that be sufficient, Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  I hope so, Your Honour.  And I thank you very much

Page 37593

 1     for that accommodation.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 11.34 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, I would like to move on to another topic, and that's our

 9     internal functioning and the co-ordination and compatibility between the

10     civilian and military components of the commands.

11             How did you perceive that command process?  Can you explain to

12     the Chamber the difference between the Main Staff and the General Staff?

13     How did -- how did it work?  And let us remain at the highest level, the

14     level of the republic, and not go down to the municipal level.

15        A.   At the level of the RS, there was the Supreme Command of the

16     armed forces of the Republika Srpska.  That command was headed by you.

17     There was also the Main Staff of the VRS, headed by the commander of the

18     Main Staff, and that was General Mladic.

19             It was customary for the Supreme Command to have its own staff,

20     rather than having a separate Main Staff.  That's based on the experience

21     from the Second World War in former Yugoslavia.  It was necessary at the

22     time because communication lines did not function, and that's when the

23     commanders of the Main Staffs, republic or republic [as interpreted] were

24     appointed, and that was communicated to the forces who had to obey them.

25             I don't know to what extent the RS needed a Main Staff.  To my

Page 37594

 1     mind, an organisational and formational problem arose due to that because

 2     there was the Supreme Command and the Supreme Commander who were to

 3     command the armed forces including the army of Republika Srpska, all of

 4     it.

 5             And now, there was the commander of the Main Staff who was not

 6     the commander of the army.  He was appointed by the National Assembly of

 7     the RS.  And his real position was commander of the Main Staff of the

 8     Army of Republika Srpska rather than commander of the Army of

 9     Republika Srpska.  Thus, the problem of the relations with subordinate

10     commands arose.  There was a kind of a parallel commanding or dual

11     commanding.  In Sarajevo, I had a lot of commands commanding me.

12             I'll give you an example.  The supreme commander,

13     President Karadzic commanded me.  So did General Mladic as commander of

14     the Main Staff, he also issued orders.  Sector commanders also --

15     UNPROFOR sector commanders also commanded.  They implemented some

16     Resolutions of the Security Council.  They were authorised to control

17     some things and so on.  So there were a number of lines of command, and I

18     had to adapt to that.

19             The relationship between the Supreme Command and the Main Staff

20     should have been for the Main Staff to be the staff of the

21     Supreme Command, and it should have done or should have worked the way --

22     in the way that was provided for in the laws and regulations, and the

23     commander of the Main Staff should have only commanded the army to the

24     extent as transferred to him by the Supreme Commander.

25             As far as I know, this authority mostly referred to

Page 37595

 1     organisational and formational changes, although the appointment of

 2     command was in the remit of the Supreme Commander.  The commander of the

 3     Main Staff was not able to do it.

 4             The Supreme Command could also directly command corps; that is,

 5     the corps commanders, but he could also command by way of the Main Staff.

 6     Most of the combat activities were only commanded by the

 7     Supreme Commander in principle through his directives, whereas it was the

 8     Main Staff that drafted the directives to the subordinate command and

 9     they were also signed by the commander of the Main Staff.

10             So there was a bit of confusion.  Who was it that actually

11     commanded the army?  Was it the Supreme Commander or the commander of the

12     Main Staff?  This duality was not so -- so much felt at the beginning,

13     because there were lots of other problems to take care of, but it was

14     understandable that the Supreme Command had to transfer some tasks and

15     obligations to the commander of the Main Staff because the Supreme

16     Commander was also president of the republic and party president and he

17     has a lot of work both internally and internationally, so he had to

18     transfer some of his authority to someone to command the army.

19             There was also the minister of the interior who commanded the

20     MUP, and on the other hand there was also the commander the Main Staff

21     who could exercise the authority transferred to him.

22             I could go on speaking about the organisation and commanding at

23     the level of the Supreme Command but that would take hours and hours.

24        Q.   Thank you, General.  Of the three levels of commanding,

25     strategic, operational, and tactical, to your mind what was still

Page 37596

 1     exercised by the Supreme Commander, that is the president of the

 2     republic, and what did he transfer to the Main Staff through his decision

 3     on formation and organisation dated 15 June 1992?

 4        A.   I'm not all that familiar with the content of that decision

 5     because that -- that's above my level.  There was communication between

 6     the Supreme Command and the Main Staff.  But basically, planning and

 7     conduct of combat activity was mostly transferred to the Main Staff so

 8     they were supposed to make these plans and the commander of the

 9     Main Staff was authorised to sign these.  You didn't deal with these

10     things much, but I'm sure that you exercised some sort of control.  To

11     what extent, I don't know.

12             There was also the Ministry of Defence, which had its duties with

13     regard to the army, especially when it comes to manning, materiel and

14     technical equipment, ammunition, and so on.  All plans about manning,

15     organisation, and formations were, to a great extent, transferred to the

16     Main Staff.  I suppose that they briefed you about their solutions to

17     some problems, but basically those powers were transferred to them.  They

18     were delegated.

19             I think this is it enough for a corps commander to know.

20        Q.   And now, General, sir, when it comes to the operative orders that

21     I sent to you, except for those that arose from my agreements with Akashi

22     or, for example, the agreement that was signed in Geneva with regard to

23     humanitarian work or with regard to some cease-fires, did you ever

24     receive from me an operative order to do one or the other thing, to take

25     one or the other area?  Did you ever receive any operative commands or

Page 37597

 1     orders from me directly?

 2        A.   Your question was very good, but my answer was not -- my previous

 3     answer was not as good as that.

 4             The strategical level of command was at the level of the

 5     Supreme Command and the Main Staff.  The operative level was at the level

 6     of the corps.  The tactical level actually was subdivided into two

 7     different levels, into basic tactical units and joint tactical units.

 8     Basic tactical units were up to the size of a battalion.  From battalion

 9     upwards, those units were the so-called joint tactical units, though a

10     division was the largest tactical unit, whereas a corps was an operative

11     unit.  I believe that I've said enough about that level.

12             And now I would like to answer your last question as to whether I

13     ever received any orders about a direct use of units in combat.  While I

14     was in charge, I don't remember any such orders that arrived at the

15     corps.  Whether you sent any or not, you should answer that.  I don't

16     think so.  If you did, then it was -- it was done through the Main Staff.

17     Some orders and directives went through the Main Staff to us, to the

18     corps command.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And if something like that happened would the

20     Main Staff have evoked my direct order or my agreement with somebody in

21     the preamble?  Did you receive information that it was at my request?

22        A.   As far as I can remember, we had a document before us in this

23     courtroom where I did evoke an order of the Supreme Command and the

24     Main Staff.  Whether they did the same in the Main Staff, whether they

25     referred your document and agreements that you signed, I don't know.  But

Page 37598

 1     I remember that particular document, and I drew your attention to the

 2     fact that the main commander the Supreme Command was cited.  They

 3     referred you, and I had to evoke the authority of a superior command

 4     because sometimes it's very good, especially in war time, to evoke a

 5     higher authority.

 6        Q.   And what authority did you have in mind?

 7        A.   I mean the authority of the commander of the Main Staff and the

 8     Supreme Commander.  Because the Supreme Commander had the authority.  Of

 9     course, he did.  There's no dispute about that.

10        Q.   Thank you.  You said that at first there were no tensions and

11     misunderstandings.  How did you perceive those misunderstandings once

12     they arose?  Were -- were those misunderstandings result of some crimes

13     or did they have some other conceptual or ideological background?

14        A.   When it comes to an ideological background, I don't think that

15     they had any such thing.  It's very difficult for me to say anything

16     about the relationship between the Supreme Command and the Main Staff --

17     command.  However, as far as I could tell, at a lower level, there were

18     no such misunderstandings.

19             At first, we were referred to as Tito's officers, and then I

20     remember that I was in Ilidza and I said I never sported Tito's kerchief

21     around the neck and you may have.  I don't know.  But things were done

22     gradually.  We sorted out and ironed out our difference gradually.  At

23     the level of the plan as to what needed to be done, which also was

24     tantamount to the three strategic and operative plan, it seems to me that

25     if I saw the things well, the first conflict arose while you were in

Page 37599

 1     Geneva.  An agreement should have been signed and at that time we were

 2     involved in an operation, Vukovar [as interpreted] 93.  That was in the

 3     month of August 1993, namely.

 4             Some of the orders that arrived at that time, I don't know

 5     whether they were in compliance with what you had regulated and what you

 6     had said before the beginning of the operation itself and your departure

 7     for Geneva.  I think that things were done differently and that they were

 8     not in keeping with what you wanted.  If my memory serves me well, of

 9     course.

10        Q.   I would like to make an alteration in the transcript.  It was not

11     Vukovar 93 but Lukavac 93.  I would like to ask witness to confirm that.

12        A.   Vukovar is in Croatia and Lukavac, of course, is in

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So, yes, I said Lukavac, not Vukovar.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

15             Mr. Karadzic asked you about the difference between Main Staff

16     and General Staff.  I -- I think you explained, in detail, about the

17     Main Staff, but I don't think we heard about General Staff.

18             If you could.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we did not have a

20     General Staff.  I skipped that part.  We had only a Main Staff.  In all

21     militaries, a General Staff is, indeed, set up, and that staff in war

22     time becomes the staff of the Supreme Command.  It has the chief of the

23     then General Staff.  It doesn't have a commander.  There are many other

24     organisational and establishment differences, but the main difference

25     would lie in that.  Those staffs have Chiefs of Staff.  They don't have

Page 37600

 1     commanders.  In all the militaries worldwide, that would be the

 2     situation.  If you need any more details, I can provide them, but I

 3     believe that it -- when it comes to Republika Srpska, no further details

 4     are necessary.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Maybe I can ask you to --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  At one point of time after the war, was the

 8     Main Staff transformed into a General Staff?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After the war, it became a

10     General Staff, yes.  I don't know when that happened, but, yes, it did

11     become the General Staff of the VRS.  It was no longer its Main Staff.

12             I believe that they moved to Bijeljina.  It became the

13     General Staff.  I was retired already.  I was pensioned off in 1994.  So

14     I was no longer with the army.

15             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16             I'm not sure that the answer given by the witness at the end of

17     page 38, line 25, is completely accurate.

18             Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED:  I suppose so because General Mladic --

20     General Galic said that as far as it is concerned with Republika Srpska,

21     that would be insufficient [sic].

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   That would be sufficient.

24        A.   Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I think we can understand the context.

Page 37601

 1             Let's continue.

 2             Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, sir, could you please tell the Trial Chamber something

 5     about the difference between the General Staff and the staff of the

 6     Supreme Command or rather between the Main Staff and the command of

 7     the -- Supreme Command in terms of the influence and activities of the

 8     Supreme Commander.  Is there any difference?  And if there is, what does

 9     it consist of?

10        A.   When it comes to the organisation and establishment, except for

11     the name there is no other important difference because it is a staff.

12     Both are the staffs that work for the Supreme Command.  The Main Staff

13     has a commander who has been authorised by the Supreme Command to do

14     certain things and he can command the staff where there's no other

15     commander.  He does staff work.  He has a Chief of Staff.  He doesn't

16     have a commander, and he directly carries out orders given to me -- to

17     him by the Supreme Commander, i.e., the Supreme Command.

18        Q.   I'm afraid you spoke too fast, so it seems here according to the

19     transcript that the Main Staff carries out staff work.

20        A.   Both staffs carry out staff tasks.  Both the General Staff and

21     the Main Staff.  However, General Staff does not have a commander.  It

22     has a chief.  Certain authorities and obligations can be transferred to

23     that staff by the Supreme Commander as well.  However, in the Main Staff

24     we have a commander.  As soon as you have a commander, that commander has

25     higher and wider authorities than a chief.  He can make decisions, issue

Page 37602

 1     orders, in a different way than a chief can.

 2             Have I been clear enough?

 3        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.

 4             Can you tell us, to the extent you know about my letters being

 5     sent to the corps level, to what extent did those letters concern

 6     operations or aborting operations and to what extent they concern

 7     humanitarian aid?

 8             Can you please tell the Trial Chamber on what occasions did I

 9     address certain corps and tackled certain issues with them?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  He's done it a few times now and I haven't risen,

12     but when Dr. Karadzic -- when Dr. Karadzic asked the question at page 41

13     about the extent what the General knows about particular types of his

14     letters, he was starting to lead the General.  And perhaps he should be

15     reminded not to do that.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think Mr. Karadzic can reformulate his question.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   I thought that we clarified that.  The General confirmed that he

20     did not receive any executive orders from me, but I know that I did send

21     letters.  I'm asking the General what were those letters about.  If those

22     were not executive orders, what were those letters sent to his corps

23     contain?

24        A.   Mr. President, as far as I can remember, there were no immediate

25     combat orders.  I did receive any such thing from the Supreme Command.  I

Page 37603

 1     received them from the Main Staff.

 2             You addressed us on several occasions with regard to humanitarian

 3     issues and with regard to the implementation of some agreements; for

 4     example, all those agreements that you helped sign, including the

 5     agreement that we have just discussed, TEZ [Realtime transcript read in

 6     error "DTEZ"].  I participated at that and with this regard I received an

 7     order.  But most of the issues concerned humanitarian aid and dealing

 8     with situations and issues.  There were no any other matters because

 9     the -- those matters were resolved by orders and directives by the

10     Main Staff.

11        Q.   Thank you.  On line 1, the TEZ should stand for the

12     Total Exclusion Zone.

13             Can you please tell the Trial Chamber something about Lukavac 93.

14     What did that operation entail in geographical terms?  What crisis do you

15     have in mind when you say -- because Lukavac 93 was a code-name and there

16     was another --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Please slow down.

18             "DTEZ" should read the "TEZ," which means Total Exclusion Zone.

19     So line 6 so reflect that as well.

20             Please slow down.

21             Please continue.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   General, sir, instead of Lukavac 93, could you explain the events

24     without using the code-name?

25        A.   Gladly.  I will gladly explain that part.  This was an operation

Page 37604

 1     by the Army of Republika Srpska --

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry.  Apologise for interrupting the

 3     General, but it's Lukavac, 93, not Lukavica 93.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Lukavac.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   You spoke about that on day one.  Is there any other term that

 7     could be applied to that event without using the code-name?  Where did

 8     the operation take place and what was its outcome?

 9        A.   In the army the code-names are customary.  It's nothing new.  But

10     it took place in Jahorina, Trnovo, Hojita [phoen], Igman, Bjelasnica.

11             On the other side there were auxiliary axis, Hadzici, Igman,

12     Trsevo [phoen] Brdo, the next auxiliary axis from which the

13     Herzegovina Corps was advancing is the Rogoj pass in the direction of

14     Trnovo.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And what about the agreement?  What did that

16     agreement refer to that was signed after that operation?

17        A.   I have never seen that agreement.  General Milovanovic came to me

18     together with my operative Cedo Sladoje.  They informed me that I had to

19     withdraw from that area, the area of mounts Bjelasnica and Igman, to an

20     area - and that was sometime on the 14th of August, 1993 - to an area

21     where I had been on the 31st of July of that same year.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  And what about the area where you were at

23     the time?  You withdrew from that area.  Who did you leave it to?

24        A.   Together with my forces and the other combined forces, because I

25     had been reinforced from forces from the other corps, I withdrew some 27

Page 37605

 1     kilometres away from that area that we had reached before then.  And that

 2     area of Mount Bjelasnica and Mount Igman was taken -- handed over to

 3     UNPROFOR.  I have already told you about the problems that we encountered

 4     during our withdrawal towards Hadzici and the area of Tresno [phoen] Brdo

 5     and [indiscernible].

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.  Who did you hand the area over to according

 7     to my agreement from Geneva?

 8        A.   To UNPROFOR.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You've just told us that I --

10             JUDGE KWON:  It's impossible to catch up with the speed.  It's

11     simply impossible to catch up with the speed.

12             Please slow down and put a pause.

13             Yes, please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I'm now asking the General this:  We are talking about the

17     relationship between the civilian commands and the military commands and

18     I would like to ask him to be as brief as possible in his answers because

19     I want to finish eventually.

20             You have just mentioned that I addressed the corps with regard to

21     humanitarian issues.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber what my position was

22     and what you received from me with regard to letting the convoys through

23     and the flow of humanitarian aid for the city of Sarajevo.

24        A.   Mr. President, from you and from the commander of the Main Staff,

25     I received orders according to which I was supposed to comply with

Page 37606

 1     everything that had been agreed.  The -- the direction of movement of

 2     those convoys, who had the right to stop and control them, or they were

 3     sometimes even not controlled and they would be allowed to go directly to

 4     the area under the control of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army in Sarajevo.

 5     If a major problem arose, such was the problem with arms having been

 6     found in those convoys, then we reported the incidents to the Main Staff.

 7     I don't know and I don't remember whether you issued anything about --

 8     with that regard, but I'm sure that you were abreast of the problem.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Having in mind our command structure, if you received

10     different instructions from me and Mladic, which ones were you supposed

11     to follow?

12        A.   Both.  But let me tell you this.  In terms of subordination and

13     the principle of unity of command, it is something that is part of every

14     military organisation.  Only one person is in command.  The other

15     principle is that a superior's order must be obeyed.  In this situation

16     my immediate superior to me, who issued different orders and who had

17     influence in terms of other aspects was General Mladic.

18             Let me remind you.  Perhaps this would not be the best way to

19     formulate it, but when in August 1995 you removed General Mladic, he

20     rallied all of the generals in place at the time who signed a letter

21     declaring their loyalty to him.  And, in the end, you had to withdraw

22     that order.  That's to my recollection because I had already been retired

23     by the time.

24             I remember us being together in Banski Dvori when civilians were

25     being pulled out of Drvar.  I suppose you recall that.  At the time, the

Page 37607

 1     situation was critical in that part of Krajina because between 14 and 17

 2     municipalities were lost.  Of course, people were upset with many things

 3     as well as with Supreme Commander, Mr. Karadzic.  I don't know about the

 4     extent but it was not very safe in the area of Krajina.

 5             I went to see him in Banski Dvori which also served as part --

 6     for the forward command post of the Supreme Command.  At the time, he

 7     tried to establish contact with the Main Staff, asking for Mladic and

 8     others, but was unsuccessful because no one responded for reasons

 9     unbeknownst to me.  I know the problem at the time was when the civilians

10     would pull out of Drvar and whether our army was there.  In that area,

11     the Croatian army had carried out an attack and there was a danger for

12     the civilians facing the fate they were not supposed to.

13             I recall your decision at the time and the hardship you had in

14     terms of reaching an agreement with the municipal president whom I had

15     known from before.  You had to agree with him on what would be done and

16     when and in what way civilians would leave Drvar.  That is how I could

17     see that something was not quite working right.

18        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, how did you see this attempt of mine

19     from August 1995 to have the Main Staff changed to the Supreme Command

20     staff?  What were my reasons for that?

21        A.   I think it -- it is the Sanski Most meeting, as far as I can

22     recall.

23             By doing that, you wanted to have the Main Staff changed to the

24     General Staff so as to have it directly subordinated to you and so that

25     there would be no question in terms of who was commanding the army.  I

Page 37608

 1     think that was your focus.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Chamber about Banski Dvori.  Where

 3     is it?

 4        A.   It is in Banja Luka.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can we move to another topic which is the issue of

 6     supply of Sarajevo, in terms of electricity water and gas.

 7             Please tell us where most of the water came to Sarajevo -- where

 8     from it came, who was in control of the sources and what it depended on

 9     whether the town would have water or not.  Was it our army that turned

10     the tap off, or were there other reasons in place due to which the supply

11     of water was made impossible?

12        A.   If we look at a map, any geographical map, you will see where the

13     water pipelines are.  The sources of water, for the most part, were in

14     the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  There were sources of water

15     inside Sarajevo, too, but they were far smaller.

16             The biggest problem regarding that issue was dealt with

17     Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Muratovic.  They discussed the supply of gas,

18     electricity, and water.  In the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, we always wanted

19     to meet all of their obligations.  The supply of water was directly

20     dependant on the supply of electricity.  If there was electricity, the

21     pumps could be working in order to achieve pressure.  If there was no

22     electricity, the problem was great.  We knew that only the natural flow

23     could be used to supply water to Sarajevo.  In such circumstance in both

24     parts of Sarajevo, in the area controlled by the 1st Corps of ABiH and

25     the SRK, there were many high-rise buildings in those areas which

Page 37609

 1     required greater pressure which could not be achieved without

 2     electricity.

 3        Q.   Thank you very much.  Can you tell us about the water supply from

 4     Bistrica and Tilava and other mountain sources such as Mostanica, could

 5     they reach Sarajevo by free-fall or -- and did you ever prevent that kind

 6     of water supply from such sources that did not require electricity?

 7        A.   As far as I know, there was never a manipulation in terms of

 8     water supply.  There was never any abuse of water supply in order to have

 9     someone sanctioned or punished by doing so.  It is impossible to stop the

10     flow of water because one creates a dam which then, in turn, may be very

11     dangerous.  On the other hand, the territory and the pipeline system was

12     intertwined.  For example, if in the area of Bistrik there was no water,

13     there was no water in Grbavica, and Grbavica was held by the SRK.  If

14     I -- I seem to recall that with the aid of UNPROFOR in the area of

15     Bacevac [phoen], which is Ilidza, we built a separate reservoir to supply

16     water to the area controlled by the ABiH 1st Corps.  If you were to ask

17     me about the capacity of that tank, I'd say I don't know about it but I

18     know it was constructed.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Bacevo was in Ilidza.  What was the level -- or

20     actually what was the importance of Bacevo and was it also dependant on

21     electricity supply?

22        A.   Well, Bacevo is lower down.  If we take into account the laws of

23     physics, it did require electricity in order to be able to use the

24     reservoirs in that area.

25        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, while you were in command of the corps,

Page 37610

 1     the SRK, were there any epidemics in the Muslim-held part?

 2        A.   Well, that's a very interesting question.  Neither in the Muslim

 3     nor in the SRK part in Sarajevo there were no epidemics as far as I know.

 4     Imagine, even though people already lived under difficult conditions

 5     because occasionally there wasn't any water or food, the rate of

 6     morbidity was low.  Even when there were greater problems.  For example,

 7     I was at Bjelasnica in winter-time, people did not fall ill.  It's a

 8     miracle.  I have no other explanation.  I'm not an expert.  But there

 9     must have been something that nature took upon itself to take care of the

10     people in such circumstances.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D06306.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   It is dated the 10th of November --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note:  Mr. Karadzic probably meant

16     October.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   -- 1992.  You are in command at the time.  Can we go to the next

19     page.

20        A.   I'm sorry, it is the 14th of October in my copy.

21        Q.   October.  Apologies, if I am mistaken.

22             JUDGE KWON:  And the date?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 14th of October, 1992.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   The third paragraph from the bottom that has to do with water,

Page 37611

 1     electricity, gas, and postal services.

 2             We see in item 10 that there was a conversation with

 3     General Razek and Magnusson.  You discussed water and electricity.  So

 4     what was concluded?  You say here the issue of water, electricity, and

 5     gas, we said that our side had done everything to achieve this but that

 6     the same should be applied to the other areas of Republika Srpska.

 7             Did you ever put in place any conditions, and did they provide

 8     the same thing for the Krajina that you did for Sarajevo?

 9        A.   I did not put any conditions in place --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic repeatedly leads the

12     witness and, with respect, I would ask that he be firmly cautioned.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Well, we discussed this issue of water supply

14     before, but I couldn't find the passage in the document and what -- I

15     don't remember what the point was.

16             Now I understand you are pushing hard to conclude as soon as

17     possible but, to the contrary, it ruins the probative value of the

18     witness.

19             Please take your time in putting the question correctly.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would have to check the

21     translation first --

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   But given the fact that in the report we see that the Serb side

24     was ready to implement everything but, it says, we mentioned --

25             JUDGE KWON:  That is leading, that comment of yours.  Just put

Page 37612

 1     the passage and ask the witness to answer the question.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, the third or fourth paragraph done deals with water and

 4     electricity.  Please explain your position with regard to that and do

 5     point out whether this was imposing a condition or merely a request to be

 6     treated equally.

 7        A.   Since the representative for civilian affairs was here - I forget

 8     his name - for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he agreed, we accepted all

 9     demands and stated that we would do whatever necessary to make possible

10     water, electricity, and gas supply.  But we also said that this should be

11     done elsewhere as well in other parts of Srpska.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

13             By "elsewhere," what -- what did you mean?

14             It says in English translation:

15             "The same should be applied to other areas of Republika Srpska."

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This report says that we supported

17     everything that was demanded with regard to water, electricity, and gas

18     supply in Sarajevo, and that this was the way it should be like in all of

19     Republika Srpska.

20             There were some towns in the RS - I don't remember which

21     exactly - that depend on the sources controlled by the BH Army, and those

22     towns had no water supply or electricity supply.  But I can't be more

23     precise than that.  We didn't put conditions, but what this is about is

24     taking measures to make possible such supply everywhere.  I don't think

25     it's a bad thing.

Page 37613

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be tendered.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will receive it.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3478, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D01177, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, take a look at the fourth paragraph from the top.  The

 8     one starting with:  "Around 1445 hours..."

 9             Why is this important?

10        A.   Shells were launched from 120-millimetre mortars of the BH Army

11     and the transformer station in Blazuj somewhere was hit.  Here it says

12     that four tonnes of fuel leaked.  But it isn't fuel; it's oil.

13             That transformer station at Blazuj was extremely important

14     because it was a switch for Ilidza and Vogosca, as far as I remember.

15     The power lines.  I'm sure that experts know better than I.

16             But the transformer station was hit.  And then reaction was,

17     well, there is no electricity and there's no water.  Of course there

18     isn't.  There is no electricity the pumps can't work and there is no

19     public lighting.  Of course, not.

20        Q.   How did that reflect on the pumps at Bacevo and the water supply

21     in the Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo?

22        A.   Well, I don't really know where exactly the power line ran, but I

23     suppose that it affected that area because one branch went from Jablanica

24     and Konjic descending to Hrasnica, referring to a power line, and

25     possibly it's important for the area you mentioned.

Page 37614

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3479, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now get 1D01445, please.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   What was the procedure for the repair of electric installations?

 8        A.   There were joint commissions.  As far as I remember, I don't want

 9     to read these documents because I know what was done, although I don't

10     know the details.

11             There were commissions that met.  They were joint commissions

12     with members from both sides.  And then the time and place were agreed

13     on, and what should be done by whom.  And the commands would be informed

14     that no fire should be opened at that place as long as the power line or

15     the water-pipe line or whatever it was were repaired.  This is it

16     basically.

17        Q.   Please take a look at the second sentence in the first paragraph.

18     It says:

19             "The enemy is taking advantage of the suspension fire" --

20             Your fire is meant, right?  Read it:

21             "The enemy is taking advantage of the suspension of fire in the

22     area where repairs are being carried out on the power transmission line

23     and is firing on our positions from the immediate vicinity of the area

24     where repairs are being carried out.  If enemy fire is neutralised, our

25     side is blamed."

Page 37615

 1             Do explain what this is about.

 2        A.   If an agreement is reached that fire should ceased from both

 3     sides, then the enemy takes advantage of that cease-fire and moves in the

 4     area where these repairs are carried out.

 5        Q.   And if you do respond?

 6        A.   If we do, then the agreement is null and void and no repairs will

 7     be carried out on either side.  There will be conflict which will again

 8     result in a new meeting and a new agreement about repairs.

 9        Q.   Look at this sentence:

10             "From the immediate vicinity of the area where repairs are being

11     carried out."

12             If you were to respond, then you would have been accused; right?

13        A.   We must understand this tactics.  I don't know if there was an

14     opportunity for our forces to take advantage of that.  I don't think that

15     they ever did because the agreement was that no combat activity should be

16     carried out in a certain area.  And then they would move their forces,

17     hiding behind this safe zone.  If a decision is taken to respond, then

18     all unwanted consequences would ensue.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3480, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 1D01552.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Can you help us.  This is dated the 19th of June, 1993.  The

Page 37616

 1     second paragraph of item 1 reads:

 2             "At 1720 hours and 1740 hours the enemy fired shells and rifle

 3     grenades on the cargo gate and power line near Pretis.  The latter was

 4     damaged and Pretis could not work due to a power outage.  Sniping at

 5     Vogosca," and so on.

 6             Tell us, if the state of affairs with the power line at Vogosca

 7     affected Velesici in the Muslim part of Sarajevo?

 8        A.   It is said here that this part of the power line targeted was

 9     damaged.  It runs parallel to the front line and enters Vogosca and

10     continues toward the centre of Sarajevo, but I don't have a map to be

11     able to say where exactly those power lines ran.  But I'm sure that they

12     go to the centre of the city because one line ran from Hadzici, another

13     from Vogosca, and one part from Pale down to the old city.

14             The power line went through the area of the 1st Corps of the

15     BH Army and only then would it reach the area of the SRK, whereas the

16     lines from Igman and Hrasnica originated at Jablanica and up to July they

17     had a hydroelectric power plant on the Zeljeznica river.  These are the

18     lines I know that were used to supply Sarajevo.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3481, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 15595.  The

24     15th of May, 1995.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37617

 1        Q.   General, on that day you issued an order for the unobstructed

 2     passage for humanitarian aid.  The order was sent to all units.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that there's no

 4     translation.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Can you help us, General.  In the preamble you refer to my

 7     directive.  It says -- or rather, would you read it aloud.

 8        A.   "Order:

 9             "For the unobstructed passage of humanitarian aid to be sent to

10     all units of the SRK.  Based on the directive of the Presidency of

11     Republika Srpska, strictly confidential 01-87-1/93, of 14 May 1993, the

12     order of the Main Staff of the VRS, strictly confidential number" -- this

13     is illegible.  I'll skip it.

14             "Also of the 14th of May, 1993.  In order to keep the signed

15     truce from -- on our side and the consistent implementation of the

16     directive, I order the following:

17             "Make possible the unobstructed passage and protection of

18     packages, equipment, and personnel that provides aid to the civilian

19     population of the opposing side.

20             "Second, ban the misuse of foodstuffs, crops, water

21     installations, and drinking water supplies for military purposes.  This

22     also included dams at hydro power plants."

23        Q.   Do continue.  This is also important.

24        A.   "Third, fully adhere to the Geneva Conventions for the protection

25     of the victims of war of 12 August," I suppose, "1949."

Page 37618

 1        Q.   Thank you.  So General, I issued a directive on the 14th and the

 2     Main Staff issued an order on the 14th, and on the 15th you already sent

 3     it out.  Did it reach all units and did you demand that this be

 4     respected?

 5        A.   It says in the heading "to all units of the Sarajevo-Romanija

 6     Corps."   And this order was complied with.  I don't think that anything

 7     was not implemented.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3482, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, let us now deal with the issue of command and control,

15     discipline and so on.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So I'd like to see 1D07524.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Immediately after you took over command, you probably made a

19     snap-shot of the situation.  And now let's see what the measures were to

20     correct shortcomings.

21             Take a look at this document and tell us what you ordered.

22     Actually, at the first page there's a description of the existing state

23     affairs and what you object to, and on the following page there is your

24     order.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes Ms. Edgerton.

Page 37619

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  When Dr. Karadzic tells the witness, Let's see

 2     what the measures are to correct shortcomings, he's leading the witness.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the document is

 5     self-explanatory.  I thought it was clear.  It's a document drafted and

 6     signed by General Galic.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Can you introduce this document to us without reading?  What

 9     prompted you to issue this document a week or two after taking command.

10        A.   Well, the font is so small that I can't read anything, so I can

11     only speak from memory to the extent I can remember things now.

12             But basically the situation I found was such that there was

13     neither a corps commander nor a Chief of Staff at the corps.

14     General Sipcic had left the corps about a month before I arrived.  Maybe

15     even two months.  And they left the command post with part of the Command

16     Staff.

17             At that time the airport was surrendered, and in the north-west

18     of the front line there is a lack of discipline and many unresolved

19     issues, that's the area of Ilidza, Hadzici, Ilijas, Vogosca, and

20     Rajlovac.  At the portion where the 1st Sarajevo Brigade and 2nd Sarajevo

21     Brigade were and the corps command toured Kijevo, Kasindol, and Jahorina,

22     when I arrived the front line ran through Jahorina.  In this section

23     toward the end of the Jug 92 operation conducted by the BH Army, they cut

24     off Herzegovina from the remainder of the RS.  So we were unable to

25     communicate, and they were exerting constant pressure on Lukavica and

Page 37620

 1     the -- those forces of the corps that were there.

 2             Then the authorities.  The situation was such that the JNA had

 3     left and TO units were left behind but they had not yet sufficiently been

 4     incorporated into the VRS.

 5        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  This all helps.  However, please pay

 6     attention to the paragraphs describing what you found looting, lack of

 7     discipline.  Look at the first page.  Look at those paragraphs where all

 8     that is described.  There's a reference to crime.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Maybe Dr. Karadzic could ask for the B/C/S version

10     to be enlarged so that the General could read it.  Because the General

11     said that he can't read it.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I think it -- it -- after that moment, the font will

13     enlarge a little bit.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, now the font is

15     good.  The letters have been blown up and now I can read the document,

16     whereas I couldn't do it before.  I spoke only from memory and you know

17     those things happened 20 years ago.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, sir, please do not read aloud.  Just cast a glance at

20     the document and then tell us what you found, what you established, and

21     then we will move onto the following page and we will see what you

22     ordered.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.  This is

24     impossible to interpret.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your answer, Mr. Galic.

Page 37621

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             With this regard, I have encountered different forms of looting,

 3     robbery, and all sorts of criminal behaviour, as well as all the other

 4     forms of acquisition of material gain.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   General, sir, in your own words, rephrase.  You don't need to

 7     read.

 8        A.   It says here that there are all sorts of evils that were caused

 9     by war and they are all mentioned here:  Looting, robbery, acquiring

10     material gain, because we're talking about property that had to be taken

11     over.  The authorities were still not in place and they were not doing

12     their job.  That's for sure.  It says furthermore that many thought that

13     was a period during which they could amass a large wealth, so -- and we

14     know there was a lot of looting everywhere and that was also present in

15     this area.

16             I'm saying here that while some people were waging war, the

17     others are making the most of it -- the situation in order to amass

18     wealth and that caused dissatisfaction among people.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page,

21     page 2.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   This is the order part of the document.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the English page be displayed

25     for the benefit of the English-speaking participants.

Page 37622

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Look at the bullet point 3 where you say that -- use all means to

 3     prevent looting, thieving, and so on and so forth.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 3.  I'm

 5     interested in bullet point 6 of this order.  For the benefit of the

 6     English-speaking participants in the trial, bullet point 6.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Under 6, you say:

 9             "I forbid the movement of civilian vehicles in combat areas.  I

10     also ban gathering of civilians in organised or unorganized manners."

11             Tell me, please, did the other side, the opposing side honour

12     that and apply that to their civilians?  Was that an obligation that

13     should have been complied with on both sides?

14        A.   At that time it was my assessment that we had to regulate that

15     part of combat activities about 5 kilometres in depth.  That some sort of

16     order had to be established, as it were, in order to prevent unnecessary

17     losses among civilians.  One of those measures was to ban people from

18     loitering at bus-stops, that humanitarian aid was not distributed in open

19     area, that if water had to be distributed, it had to be done in shelters

20     or in basements, not in open spaces, that buildings and other facilities

21     had to be protected from the enemy fire.  The other side, the opposing

22     side, as far as I know, and when I remember the incidents that we

23     discussed, I realised that they did not take all those measures.  In the

24     Additional Protocol number I regulates the obligations of the civilian

25     protection.  According to that protocol, the civilian protection should

Page 37623

 1     regulate all those issued and it should demand from the civilian

 2     population to behave in keeping with the decisions of the command and the

 3     civilian protection.

 4             I don't know what measures they took.  I am not in a position to

 5     know.  However, in view of the consequences I can tell that they did not

 6     do enough.  I don't know how much they could do together with UNPROFOR in

 7     terms of the protection of the population.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3483, Your Honours.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06324.

13             Could you please remind me when our next break is?  I would like

14     to finish before the break.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We are going to take a break at 1.00 for half an

16     hour.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll do our best to finish.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, sir, take a look at the document which was issued on the

20     22 --

21             JUDGE KWON:  We are not pressing you.  It's for you to decide how

22     to spend your time.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, thank you.  But I

24     have some precious witnesses that I need to lead live, so I'm wondering

25     whether I'll have enough time left to call all the witnesses that I have

Page 37624

 1     planned, so I'm trying to economise, or if you were to give me some

 2     additional time, I wouldn't be facing that problem at all.  If you gave

 3     me an additional couple of hours for --

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, sir, please look at the letter that was sent on the 22nd

 6     of May, 1993, to all brigades, regiments, and independent units.  You

 7     report or, rather, you inform and the document was signed by Sladoje on

 8     your behalf, and it was about what happened at the assembly on the 19th

 9     of May, 1993.  Please -- I'm drawing your attention to some criticism

10     that was addressed at the -- in military with regard to discipline and

11     order.

12        A.   That meeting was a joint meeting with the government and the

13     Supreme Command as well as the Main Staff, if I'm not mistaken.  And on

14     that occasion, the representatives of the government put forth some

15     problems that the Army of Republika Srpska was riddled with.  And that

16     included the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

17     There was a lot of criticism.  And that was an assembly meeting, not just

18     a -- any meeting.  It was a meeting of the Assembly of Republika Srpska.

19     There was a lot of criticism about alcoholism, looting, thieving, lack of

20     discipline, failure to respond to call-ups.  It was said that both order

21     and discipline had to be stepped up and my order followed that criticism.

22     The way I interpreted things was this:  If there was an internal order

23     and discipline, everything else will follow.  It will be easy to regulate

24     other things.

25        Q.   In paragraph 2 you demand rigorous measures to applied against

Page 37625

 1     those who abused weapons, looted, and you demanded that they be punished

 2     by court-martial.  Under 2 you put a ban on the organisation of any

 3     paramilitaries, parapolice units, and parapolitical groups on the part of

 4     individuals or group; is that correct?

 5        A.   When it comes to this part of my work, I can say that a lot was

 6     done at the corps level in order to improve the situation.

 7        Q.   Can we go to the following page, bullet point 2, in English.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The following page, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And in Serbian, the following page, bullet point 3, where it

11     says:

12             "I strictly forbid any involvement by all levels of command and

13     control in the affairs of the local authorities."

14        A.   And vice versa.  The authorities should not interfere with the

15     issues of army command.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.  Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3484, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06314, please.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   On the 26th of June, 1993, you noticed that there were a lot of

22     informal groups in the zones of responsibility and that those groups

23     instill fear among civilians and they bring uncertainty among the

24     soldiers.  And it says these informal groups also use arms, that they

25     don't refrain from that.

Page 37626

 1             What civilian population was being disturbed?  Was there any

 2     special group or did they disturb everybody irrespective of their

 3     religious affiliations?

 4        A.   Those informal group, that was a time when the corps had already

 5     dealt with paramilitaries and other informal groups that existed in the

 6     zone of responsibility of the corps.  First and foremost, those groups

 7     disturbed peace among the population irrespective of their religious

 8     affiliation.  Criminals did not choose their targets along those lines.

 9     They exercised their intentions irrespective of the affiliations of their

10     target group.

11             At that time we had a lot of negative occurrences in the north

12     western part of our zone of responsibility, and there were strifes for

13     that area to become independent by way of establishing a Chetnik corps.

14     There was a lack of discipline and excessive use of all sorts of

15     equipment, and that's why I was of the opinion that a commander of the

16     Igman Brigade had to be removed from his position.

17             At that time we disbanded Brna's [phoen] group that was in the

18     orchard.  It was another informal group that did not carry out its orders

19     and tasks.  It actually bothered both the authorities and civilians in

20     the area.  That group was disbanded and its members were attached to

21     various units.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3485, Your Honour.

Page 37627

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06316 is the document that I'm

 2     looking for now.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   And while we're waiting for it, General, sir, Brna's group, which

 5     you mentioned, did you recruit into your units those people who had

 6     committed crimes and used to belong to that group?

 7        A.   From that group --

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  That's another leading question, Your Honours.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  I beg to differ, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we -- shall he continue or, Ms. Edgerton,

11     could you explain a bit further?  Or can I hear from Mr. Robinson first.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  It doesn't suggest an answer.

13     The leading question -- definition of a leading question is a question

14     which suggests an answer.  This one doesn't suggest an answer.  It could

15     be answered yes or no.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll accept that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let us continue.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Please answer, General.

20        A.   No.  We did not recruit individuals who had committed crimes.

21     They were then handed over to courts and prosecutor's offices and

22     military courts.

23        Q.   Let's look at the document which was issued on the 31st of May,

24     1994.

25             You reported to the Main Staff that you had informed the brigade

Page 37628

 1     commanders about their order, and you said that we have removed three

 2     security organs from our units.

 3             Can you tell us briefly -- or, rather, can you tell us the Trial

 4     Chamber what was it that the Main Staff had ordered and why did you then

 5     remove the individuals in question?

 6        A.   We're talking about security organs who were removed from that

 7     position.  Those cadres by and large came from the reserve contingent and

 8     they were not well trained, and that's why they did things that were not

 9     in compliance with the Law on Security.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission please.  And let's look

12     at the last document.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Having looked at this document, I'm not sure whether

14     this is dealing with removal of certain individuals.

15             Yes, General.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We said that three security organs

17     were removed from their position or removed to another position.  That's

18     the interpretation I received.

19             Since they were being removed -- actually, since they were being

20     transferred, it means that they were basically removed.  That's my

21     understanding.  Because they were unsuccessful in his duties.  Perhaps if

22     they were good at their job, they would have been promoted.

23             THE ACCUSED:  These three security organs have been dismissed,

24     security and intelligence, and probably because of inappropriate

25     attitude.

Page 37629

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Galic, could you expand on that sentence, what

 2     it meant?  As far as you remember, what does "three security organs"

 3     mean?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm speaking from memory,

 5     Mr. President, because I don't see a single letter of this document, so I

 6     cannot comment in any other way, save for what I recall --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Could you see the last paragraph.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can make it out

 9     now because it has been zoomed in.

10             I do recall that some of the security organs were removed.  But

11     not only they, also brigade commanders were removed depending on their

12     respective remits.  It reads:

13             "Up until now due to their unprofessional and irresponsible

14     behaviour, three security organs have been removed (security intelligence

15     organs at battalion level)."

16             So the security organ at battalion level acted both as security

17     officer and intelligence officer, so it was a double-hatted duty.  What

18     it says is what I've already said:  They were removed due to their

19     unprofessional and irresponsible conduct.  They were not professional

20     enough to go about that job.

21             JUDGE KWON:  So my question is whether you remember what kind of

22     unprofessional and irresponsible behaviour this document referred to?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those organs applied specific work

24     methods that had to do with security and intelligence.  They are trained

25     specifically for that.  The people who were appointed to these positions,

Page 37630

 1     well, the positions had to be filled although the people may have been

 2     insufficiently professional.  However, they did not meet the threshold of

 3     professionalism and moral aptitude, since they did not have sufficient

 4     honesty, they did not value other people, they did not respect them, they

 5     perhaps acted inappropriately when dealing with captured persons -

 6     because they were the ones who processed captured persons, that may have

 7     been a problematic area, too - that was clearly identified and they were

 8     dismissed and other people appointed.

 9             I can tell you that we insisted on fair treatment concerning

10     those who were captured.  I recall a problem we had at Grbavica and two

11     policemen were wounded there trying to protect some of the captured

12     persons.

13             So professionalism was required in their work when processing

14     such persons as well as in terms of undertaking measures to gather and

15     process intelligence.  If they were not enough professional --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

17             My next question is this.  This document does not seem to refer

18     to individuals forming the security organs.  Rather, it refers to

19     security organs that have been dismissed themselves.

20             Could you assist us?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They did not dismiss themselves.

22     We say "organ," although it may refer to a person.  So a security organ

23     is a person.  If that is the chief of the security and intelligence

24     service, then he is the organ, rather than having the whole collective

25     body which requires a system.  But in this context, it pertains to a

Page 37631

 1     person, if this is helpful ...

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, indeed.  We'll admit it.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3486, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we take a break or do you like to continue

 5     with your last document?

 6             THE ACCUSED:  I have one last.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 12362.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I wanted to address the term "they removed themselves."

11             It's a reflexive verb in the English language and thus it may

12     have been translated inappropriately or --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  In the Serbian.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, sir, a moment ago you addressed the protection --

16             MS. EDGERTON:  We have gone through a mass of documents and we've

17     got no notification of this one.  This was not one of the almost 200

18     documents we received.

19             JUDGE KWON:  You're referring to this one we are seeing now.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  12362.  It was on the Prosecution's 65 ter list,

21     but I just want to put on the record we've received no notice.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.

23             Yes, any explanation?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm not aware of it, Mr. President.  I'll look

25     into it.  But in the meantime, we apologise if it has, in fact, not been

Page 37632

 1     notified.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Given that this is the last document, we can

 3     continue.  Yes.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, sir, item 5, please, you say that some people were

 6     injured by explosives or with a hand-grenade, a M75.  And you say that

 7     the cause of the incident was the drunkenness of the soldier and his

 8     anger at not having been allowed to physically mistreat Muslim prisoners.

 9             A moment ago you said that you removed people for things like

10     this.  Can you tell the Chamber briefly what you did in such cases and

11     whether the commands or commanders prevented individuals from mistreating

12     captured Muslims.

13        A.   I can certainly reply to that question.  When I arrived, the

14     initial prisoners arrived from Otes and they were Juka's fighters, some

15     nine or ten of them had been taken prisoner, and they were treated

16     fairly.  Juka did his utmost to have them exchanged.  We abided by the

17     standards, stating that the captured soldiers and prisoners have to be

18     kept safe.  I recall an exchange which was supposed to take place

19     concerning two captured persons.  We had some problems at the brigade

20     command to have them exchanged.  They were known to have been criminals

21     in the area of Sarajevo.  Perhaps you recall that issue as well because

22     Mr. Krajisnik came at the time to help me in dealing with the issue.

23             So we always sought to exchange all those taken prisoner and we

24     always strove to keep them save.

25        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  Perhaps we will have some additional

Page 37633

 1     questions after the cross.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But, for the time being, this

 3     concludes my examination, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll have a break, as indicated, for

 5     half an hour.  Let's have 35 -- we'll resume at quarter to 2.00.

 6             And we'll admit the last document.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3487, Your Honours.

 8                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.12 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Mr. Piletta-Zanin is on his feet.  I thought I

12     might give him the floor.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15             I did not want to interrupt my learned colleague, but I have a

16     few comments to make about the transcript.  For the sake of time, I

17     suggest we do it now, but I could also do that later, as you please.  It

18     is your procedure.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

20             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

21             I'll have to find my notes, but it can be done very quickly.

22             There are issues related to the French and the English

23     transcripts.  I would like to draw your attention to page 36, line 13.

24     General Galic didn't say that it came from the corps but that it went to

25     the corps.

Page 37634

 1             Page 37, lines 20, 21, two lines are missing about

 2     General Galic's answer.

 3             Page 10, line 23, for the French transcript, there was no

 4     reference to the Geneva Conventions but the Geneva Talks, "discussion de

 5     per Geneve" [phoen] in French.

 6             Page 10, line 21, General Galic never talked about people but he

 7     talked about assets, and I'm talking about the French transcript.

 8             I'm trying to give you the main points, Your Honour.

 9             There are other comments on former transcripts, yesterday's

10     transcripts, but I have to review my notes about that.

11             And, finally, I noted down that somewhere there is a declaration

12     about Muslim air force, page 26, lines 21 and 22.

13             And to be fully accurate, page 57, line 17, it's not:  "Can you

14     read" but it should be "I can read."

15             Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So what you did say about Muslim air force,

17     Mr. Piletta-Zanin?

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             MS. EDGERTON:  General Galic wants to say something, apparently.

20             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, sorry, Your Honour, I

21     was saying that I saw this on the transcript but maybe it was

22     automatically corrected, and I'm talking about the English transcript.

23     There was a mention about Muslim air force at the page that I indicated,

24     but maybe it has been corrected in the meantime.

25             So I just wanted to ask the Chamber to check if this is accurate

Page 37635

 1     or not.

 2             Thank you.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I think in light of the -- some of

 4     the discrepancies or potential discrepancies, I would ask that the

 5     Chamber undertake an exercise where it order the language section to

 6     listen to the tape of yesterday's session as a test and compare it with

 7     the written English transcript and to make a track-changes version of the

 8     English transcript of yesterday, and then we will see from that what the

 9     extent of the differences are between what is being said and what is

10     being transcribed.  And based on that one day of testimony, we can

11     decide -- or you can decide if there's any further steps that need to be

12     taken to remedy the discrepancies between what's being said and what's

13     being recorded in our record.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure if we need it at the moment, but I'll

15     hear from Mr. Galic first.

16             Yes, Mr. Galic.  Did you have something to say?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I wanted to say that

18     we did not mention Muslim -- the Muslim air force anywhere.  We mentioned

19     the Muslim armed forces.  That was the extent of my assistance, in order

20     to have a better formulation.

21             As far as I remember, we did not mention any air force, but the

22     armed forces.

23             Thank you.  That would be all.

24             JUDGE KWON:  That sounds --

25             JUDGE MORRISON:  Sorry.  General Galic, correct me if I'm wrong,

Page 37636

 1     I didn't think there was such a entity as a Muslim air force?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not use such a term in my

 3     presentation.  When asked by Mr. President as to what the MOS stood for,

 4     I replied by saying that it stood for the Muslim armed forces.  If one

 5     were to use air forces, of course, it would be incorrect, because such

 6     forces did not exist.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Muslim air forces were -- were referred to when you

 8     were saying about the -- some Muslim people crossing the airport.  So I

 9     take it that it should have read Muslim air forces, yes -- no, Muslim

10     armed forces, yes.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely.  I agree, Mr. President.

12     I agree with the last thing you said.  I did not use the term "Muslim" --

13     the Muslim air force anywhere in my testimony.

14             I agree with you that it is actually the Muslim armed forces.

15     That is the correct term.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Given that the -- while the court reporter is

18     transcribing the court proceedings at the courtroom, it is on a continual

19     basis, on an ongoing basis it is reviewed on back door until it is

20     produced as a corrected version.  The Chamber doesn't see a need at the

21     moment to take a step suggested by Mr. Robinson.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I -- I appreciate that.  But I

23     understand when it's reviewed it's review in English, so the tape is

24     compared to what's been written to see if the court reporter has caught

25     everything that was interpreted in English or said in English.

Page 37637

 1             So that doesn't really address the problem of whether what is

 2     being interpreted to us in English is accurate.  It doesn't seem like a

 3     very big step to check by having somebody to listen to the B/C/S for one

 4     day.  It would just take a few hours of someone's time.  So that was my

 5     point.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber sees no need to change its position.

 8             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

10             Just one note for my friend Mr. Robinson.  Of course Mr. Reid

11     will be e-mailing our list of cross-examination documents immediately,

12     but to expect additional documents related to the evidence today probably

13     during the day and on Thursday sometime, given that I'm also involved

14     with the next witness.

15             JUDGE KWON:  One more comment then.

16             The Muslim air force has been already corrected as Muslim armed

17     forces.  And I don't think what we heard during the hearing was Muslim

18     air force.  What we heard was, rather, Muslim armed force.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  I completely agree with you.  But I think there's

20     a dozen examples that Mr. Piletta-Zanin has raised over the course of

21     General Galic's testimony where what's recorded in the transcript and

22     what we heard is different than what was said.

23             But I think our team will undertake this exercise, and if it's

24     productive, we'll get back to you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

Page 37638

 1                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

 2        Q.   General Galic, I'm going to be cross-examining you for the next

 3     few days, it looks like, but unlike Dr. Karadzic, I'm going to encourage

 4     you to answer my questions and answer them succinctly, and unlike your

 5     soldiers, I'm going to be interrupting you if I feel that we've gone off

 6     topic, and I just need to you know that before we begin.

 7             Is that all right?  Do you understand?

 8        A.   I think that's fine.  We'll see when we start working if there

 9     are any problems.  We are here to reach agreement to say what is

10     important.  What is important is to present the truth, and we have to

11     arrive at it together.

12        Q.   Now all these -- Dr. Karadzic over the course of your

13     examination-in-chief discussed a lot of shelling and sniping incidents

14     with you.

15             And those were -- and you were convicted of all these incidents

16     on the basis of having command and control over the units responsible for

17     the shootings; correct?

18        A.   Well --

19        Q.   The question is -- the question is:  You were convicted of all

20     those incidents on the basis of command and control; is that correct or

21     is it not?

22        A.   I don't know which incidents you mean, the ones I was accused of

23     or the ones President Karadzic was accused of because there were

24     incidents in my judgement that are not part of the indictment in the

25     Karadzic case.  That's why my question to you is:  Are you trying to

Page 37639

 1     elicit a response to what refers to Mr. Karadzic or what refers to me,

 2     for which I was convicted?

 3        Q.   You were convicted of every single shelling and sniping incident,

 4     scheduled shelling and sniping incident that Dr. Karadzic read out to you

 5     from his indictment; yes or no.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And you were convicted on the basis of having command and control

 8     over the units responsible for those shootings of civilians; yes or no?

 9        A.   It's very difficult to provide answers to such complicated

10     questions.  I really ask to be allowed to comment because it's very

11     difficult to give a yes or a no answer, because I can answer but then we

12     won't understand each other later.

13        Q.   We'll get back to that later then and I'll help you understand.

14             So where I'd like to begin from there is to go to the subject of

15     protests and something that you said in your evidence in-chief to

16     Dr. Karadzic.

17             You said, as far as sniping incidents go, I do not remember a

18     single protest that was lodged just because of a sniping incident.  And

19     that's at transcript page 37397.

20             And in regard to shelling, you said, at page 37210:

21             "As far as I remember," talking about the observers, UN

22     observers, "As far as I remember, they never alerted me to the fact that

23     the artillery forces of the SRK were acting in a way that would not have

24     been legitimate."

25             You said:

Page 37640

 1             "I didn't ever -- or receive ever information to that effect."

 2             So I want to talk a bit about that and ask you a couple of

 3     questions.

 4             You referred today in your evidence to Major Indjic.

 5     Major Indjic was part of the group for co-operation with UNPROFOR, wasn't

 6     he?

 7        A.   That is correct.  He was the representative of the

 8     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Main Staff for co-operation with

 9     UNPROFOR.  Or the UN forces, which includes the UNMO.

10        Q.   And he had his office in your command.  That's where he was

11     headquartered, wasn't it?

12        A.   Yes, yes.  He had an office at the corps command, yes.

13        Q.   And so it's correct, isn't it, that any communication from

14     UNPROFOR went through him?

15        A.   Well, all -- all communication -- he was representative for the

16     co-operation with UNPROFOR.  Mostly all communication went through him

17     but not all through -- not all talks went through him.

18        Q.   Protests went through him --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Protests went through him.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 4, it was not recorded that

23     he was the representative of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the

24     Main Staff.  The Main Staff was not recorded.  This can affect the

25     subsequent examination.

Page 37641

 1             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  It's the

 2     same type of issue.  I do not remember if the French transcript is still

 3     interesting for anyone but me, but if it's the case, in Serb,

 4     General Galic said, page 78, that all written communications went through

 5     him, and I under lined the word "written," and you can't find this in the

 6     English transcript.  I don't know if anyone is following the French

 7     transcript and can confirm this, but there are huge discrepancies because

 8     afterwards he might be asked or -- or be told, You said all

 9     communications, and General Galic will not understand that because he

10     only talked about all written communications.

11             So we should be very careful about this.

12             Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  This time, Mr. Karadzic, you -- do you see a

14     phonetic mark after Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and, although the -- court

15     reporter missed this time, it will be reviewed and corrected in the

16     course of review process.  Rest assured, it will be corrected.

17             Just a second.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just ...

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Bear with me.

20             Yes, let us continue.

21             MS. EDGERTON:

22        Q.   Maybe we can get to the point this way.  General, Major Indjic

23     came to testify here and gave evidence in this case on behalf of

24     Dr. Karadzic, and he explained how his office worked.

25             Regarding protests he said - and that's at D2774 - it all went

Page 37642

 1     through the office of the liaison officers any communication from

 2     UNPROFOR, including protests.  So it wasn't possible for such protests to

 3     be sent to someone in the corps command another way.  It wasn't possible

 4     to bypass the office of the liaison officers.

 5             That's correct, isn't it?  That's how Indjic's office operated?

 6        A.   That is correct.  Yes, it's correct.  Because I didn't speak

 7     English, so I couldn't communicate directly.  Somebody had to translate

 8     it and Indjic was the only one who could do so.  There were some other

 9     people at the command who spoke some English but not enough to be able to

10     translate documents coming in or going out of the command.  That's why

11     this statement is correct.  But I added before, if you remember, that at

12     any other meetings with UN representatives, and I'm calling them that for

13     you to understand fully, that he wasn't always present.

14        Q.   Now, Major Indjic also told us, and it's at paragraph 85 of his

15     written evidence, as I said before, D2774, he also told us that

16     95 per cent of the protests were in verbal form.  That directly

17     contradicts what you've just told us, or what Mr. Piletta-Zanin has said

18     you've just told us.

19        A.   That is Mr. Indjic's interpretation, not mine.  We must

20     understand each other.  He communicated orally with them.  He received

21     their protests and I received written protests, and I said here that I

22     replied to each and every one.  We discussed here to the extent possible.

23     Oral protests could be stated in a conversation but they were not

24     official protests.  More generally speaking, all these protests --

25     there's a problem with all these protests, content-wise.

Page 37643

 1        Q.   Well, let's just stay on topic to talk about the system.

 2     Protests would come orally to the SRK because they were urgent; isn't

 3     that the case?

 4        A.   No.  Oral protests were lodged with Indjic's office, I suppose.

 5     So it was his office, but for someone to call me up directly to -- to --

 6     to launch an oral protest is something I don't remember at all.

 7             There were situations, if I may explain further, when there were

 8     meetings and talks about some problems, and then it was pointed out that

 9     this or that had happened, if you want to consider that an oral protest.

10        Q.   You don't?  You don't consider that an oral protest?

11        A.   I don't know what exactly you mean.

12        Q.   You've just told us that:

13             "...there were meetings and talks about some problems, and then

14     it was pointed that this or that had happened, if you want to consider

15     that an oral protest."

16             Don't you consider it an oral protest, General?

17        A.   Well, I think that's more of a warning and a discussion of

18     problems, not a protest.  A protest must have a certain form.

19        Q.   What form must a protest have for you to have taken action on it?

20        A.   I have my own view of protests and what form they should have.

21             If there's a protest about any sort of problem or incident, it

22     should contain a basic textual part with all information about the

23     incident in question.

24             Then if a commission worked on it and dealt with the incident,

25     there should be such information as well because without such

Page 37644

 1     information, if we're discussing at a general level, such as your forces

 2     fired at Brijesce Brdo, then three sides [as interpreted] should

 3     investigate, and in the situation that existed there was not much time to

 4     deal with such things.  If I had received information of the kind that I

 5     think it should be, then I would have been duty-bound to take specific

 6     measures and measures to prevent any subsequent occurrences.

 7        Q.   So what you're telling us is that if any protest that you might

 8     have received is not put to you writing, if it's not delegated to some

 9     kind of a commission, you took no action in regard to that protest; is

10     that correct?

11        A.   That is not correct.  I put forward my view of this matter during

12     the examination-in-chief.  If I received information, and we've discussed

13     such information protests here, I verified each such information with the

14     subordinate commands to see what had been said or what had been written

15     to me was, indeed, true.

16        Q.   General --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

18             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm doing my

19     best to follow what General Galic is saying, and I think that I heard in

20     the French transcript the opposite of what was said in the English

21     transcript.  It -- in French it says "c'est exact," it is correct, and in

22     English it was the opposite.  I do not want to break the rhythm and the

23     pace of my colleague, but we should find a solution for that.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Well, Mr. Galic, did you say that it was correct or

25     it was not correct?

Page 37645

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it is difficult for

 2     me to answer your question.  Whether what was correct or incorrect?  So

 3     if you could repeat the question, then I would be able to answer.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I will leave it to Ms. Edgerton.

 5             But before proceeding further, discussing this issue in vacuum

 6     does not help us much.  I like to clarify what Mr. Galic meant when he

 7     said -- I will quote you're saying Mr. Galic.  It's about protest.

 8     It's at the beginning of your answer:

 9             "There was situations, if I may explain further, when there were

10     meetings and talks about some problems, and then it was pointed that this

11     or that had happened, if you want to consider that an oral protest."

12             What kind of problems did you mean, and what kind of conversation

13     do you have in mind when you said pointing what had happened on the

14     ground?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, we have seen

16     from the documents shown here that there have been many instances of

17     talks with UNPROFOR or UN representatives where many open issues were

18     dealt with, not only incidents.  It included matters such as supply, the

19     passage of UNPROFOR, the exchange of prisoners of war, the passage of

20     humanitarian convoys, and so on.  There were other problems we dealt with

21     and not only incidents.  That's what I meant when I mentioned the talks.

22     But when our attention was directed to an incident that happened, then I

23     contacted subordinate units and had them check what it was about.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

Page 37646

 1             I believe it is important.  Page 81, line 23, records

 2     General Galic as saying:

 3             "If somebody tells me in general that somebody shoots -- shot at

 4     Brijesce Brdo, then I must investigate three brigades," and it was

 5     recorded here "three sides."

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Do you also recognise a phonetic mark there?  Yes.

 7             Please continue.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that is for Brijesce Brdo.

 9     But it should be "three brigades" rather than "three sides."

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  If I could just have your indulgence to find my

12     path again, please, Your Honours.

13             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] In the meantime, if I may, I

14     would like to say that it is perfectly correct, because if I remember

15     well, General Galic said, "for example," and it's recorded in none of the

16     transcripts.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   All right.  So maybe we can go back a little bit more towards the

20     beginning, General, and you can confirm the following:  Your corps

21     received verbal protests; correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Your corps received written protests; correct?

24        A.   Correct.

25        Q.   And your evidence is that whenever - and I'll find your words to

Page 37647

 1     Judge Kwon - you said, in answer to a question from His Honour

 2     Judge Kwon, I think, or you said in your evidence:

 3               [As read] "If you received information, and we've discussed

 4     such information protests here, I verified each such information with

 5     subordinate commands to see what had been said or what had -- whether

 6     what had been said or what had been written to me was true."

 7             Correct?

 8        A.   You are mixing different things so it's hard to say with whether

 9     it is correct.  But essentially it is.

10        Q.   You told Judge Kwon that in talks with UNPROFOR or UN

11     representatives you discussed matters like supply, the passage of

12     UNPROFOR, the passage of convoys, and so on.

13             So, in addition to information about protests for shelling and

14     sniping, issues were raised with you with respect to freedom of movement;

15     correct?

16        A.   I don't know what you mean.  To what extent?

17        Q.   Let's get back on track.  General Galic, you said in your

18     testimony in chief:

19             "As for sniping incidents, I do not remember a single protest

20     that was lodged just because of a sniping incident."

21             And you said the same thing about shelling incidents.  You were

22     never alerted to the fact that artillery forces of the SRK were acting

23     illegitimately.

24             Are you saying now that you did receive protests about shelling

25     and sniping and you acted upon them?

Page 37648

 1        A.   You have forgotten a very important detail here.  I said during

 2     the examination-in-chief that there were individual sniping incidents and

 3     I never received protests about them.  Neither verbal nor written.

 4     Nobody had ever told me that somebody was killed by individual sniping.

 5     There was some general protests.  We said that during the

 6     examination-in-chief.  I don't want the picture to be distorted.  That's

 7     what I said.  I adhere by that.  There were general protests.

 8             As far as artillery fire is concerned, I said in the

 9     examination-in-chief that in documents there is no reference to artillery

10     fire, only mortar shelling, and I said about every incident that was

11     discussed here whether I was alerted to such an incident or not.

12        Q.   You spoke in your --

13             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I refrain from

14     standing up, but I have no technical means to find that part again, but I

15     know that General Galic was very precise, and he said:

16             "I'm going to explain to you the difference between artillery

17     fire and other types of fire."

18             And if questions are asked about artillery in general without

19     making reference to what General Galic said, this is not fair.

20             And then my learned colleague has the means to do that.  She

21     should quote the exact sentence.  General Galic, when he talked about

22     that, talked about artillery fire from a technical point of view, and he

23     said that artillery was considered to be above a certain calibre, and I

24     think that my colleague knows that, and that's why I stood up.

25             Thank you.

Page 37649

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Piletta-Zanin, thank you for your intervention,

 3     but in this case we can continue.  I think we can follow the context.

 4             Please carry on, Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 6        Q.   So you received protests about shelling; is that correct?

 7        A.   Protests about shellings themselves, there were such protests.

 8     We discussed those during the examination-in-chief.

 9        Q.   All right.  You've now clarified these assertions in your

10     examination-in-chief to -- to the effect that you didn't receive

11     protests.

12             Now, let's talk about these two types of protests.  You said

13     there were general protests and there were specific protests; correct?

14        A.   Well, correct.  There were protests worded in general terms about

15     sniping in a certain area.  Or your artillery opened fire in a certain

16     place.  Or one or the other thing happened.  Those were protests in very

17     general terms, not backed by commission reports.  And I said that it

18     would have been good if all the protests had been backed up by reports,

19     schematics, sketches, and only then would I have been able to undertake

20     a -- specific measures.

21             When it comes to mortar shelling, I told you, and you know

22     exactly when I was informed, how I was informed, and in what specific

23     terms was I informed about them.

24        Q.   Why?  What difference would a commission report have made to a

25     protest that UNPROFOR laid across your desk?  Why did you need a

Page 37650

 1     commission report to do anything about it?

 2        A.   Because -- do you have any protest in regard to any of the

 3     incidents in the indictment against Dr. Karadzic?  Is there any such

 4     protest lodged with the command of my corps?  I received a protest about

 5     the incident that happened on the 4th of February.  I was not there.  I

 6     received it through communication means, and I made checks based on that.

 7        Q.   You're not answering my question.  My question is:  What

 8     difference would a commission report have made to a protest?

 9        A.   I don't know -- you know what?  In the international law or,

10     rather, when I used to deal with the international regulations, you know,

11     it is defined what a protest is and what it needs to contain.  It is

12     defined in Protocol I what a report should contain.  If -- it is supposed

13     to contain a schematic for me to see, and based on that schematic I would

14     know from which shell had come, either -- it would contain all the

15     ballistic data, then I would be able to say:  Okay, I have that

16     information.  This refers to that brigade and I'm sending a commission to

17     investigate.  Or if we were allowed, which we were not, to go to the spot

18     to be part of a mixed commission and that commission had been set up.  I

19     gave you an example when we went to the airport to investigate and I told

20     you what we established.  Without that, madam, everything else is pure

21     speculation.

22        Q.   So are you saying that absent a commission report, protests to

23     you from the United Nations were pure speculation?

24        A.   Well, from my answer, you could see that -- my answer to UNPROFOR

25     that some of those protests were speculations.  They were not accurate.

Page 37651

 1     And let me add also this:  That if you receive a protest in this way,

 2     in -- worded in general terms, that you know based on some information

 3     from which directions fire could come and which units could have opened

 4     fire, that means that all that time we would have to investigate all the

 5     time.  What would -- would we have been able to establish without

 6     documents?  It would be difficult.  At Markale there were a few

 7     commissions and what did they establish at the end of the day?  At the

 8     end of the day, they established that nothing could be ascertained.  That

 9     nothing could be established.

10        Q.   We'll get to Markale.  But now --

11        A.   No, no.  It was just a figure of speech, you know.

12        Q.   You've just said in your answer that some of those protests were

13     speculations and they were not accurate.

14             Which ones, General, were not accurate?  You should be able to

15     give us some examples if you're making that assertion.

16        A.   Madam, to try and remember all of that after 20 years, all of the

17     allegations, and to tell you, I have nothing in front of me.  You have a

18     book.  I have nothing.

19             However, can you try and remember when I answered UNPROFOR

20     protests?  I said that during the examination-in-chief it was said that

21     we had opened fire on Colina Kapa, and I answered that at that time there

22     were no Muslim forces at Colina Kapa.  That was my answer.  That was my

23     reply.  So I could have considered that speculation because after that

24     there's my sentence, if you remember that, where I say that they didn't

25     want to deceive us - I'm talking about UNPROFOR - they were just badly

Page 37652

 1     informed or they were not informed properly.

 2        Q.   Well, General, you know, there was another general who testified

 3     in your case, General Abdel-Razek who was in a command position in

 4     UNPROFOR, and he came here during Dr. Karadzic's case.  Now he said in

 5     P1258, his written evidence, that he took his complaints regarding the

 6     shelling directly to you.  That's at page 15 of P1258.  These points, he

 7     said, were the Serb shelling of UN headquarters and civilian centres.

 8     And I quote:

 9              [As read] "General Galic denied that the Serb shelled those

10     areas.  He said that the Bosnian side did the shelling.  I recall that I

11     told Galic, Listen, we're all military men.  I tell you that we know

12     where the shelling came from, it came from the Serb side.  I have

13     experience in these matters, and my staff and I have the means by which I

14     can say where the shelling came from."

15             Now, it seems like General Abdel-Razek coming from the

16     United Nations, protesting to you about the shelling of, among other

17     things, the UN headquarters, is not ill-informed at all, is he, General?

18        A.   During the examination-in-chief, I said something about

19     General Razek.  I said that he was not honest in our co-operation and

20     that he misrepresented himself.  You have to take with a grain of salt

21     all of those allegations of his.  I can't say what he claimed.  I was not

22     here so I don't know.  I don't know whether what he said was accurate.

23             However, a commission was sent to the airport to establish who

24     had shelled the UNPROFOR command post and it was established that that

25     was done by BiH Army, and the commission went out after his allegations.

Page 37653

 1     After that our commission was not allowed to attend any onsite

 2     investigation in the area of responsibility of the 1st Corps of the

 3     BiH Army.  If he had told --

 4        Q.   Before you go on further --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 6             Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 7             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 8     Thank you for giving me the floor.

 9             I know what my role is here, and if I am to carry out my duty in

10     full honesty, I should be able to check assertions made by the Prosecutor

11     as it was the case with the Defence earlier on.  I haven't received any

12     copy of the documents used.  Maybe it's a typo, maybe my colleague

13     misspoke, but I should be able to check with a written document what the

14     general exactly said, General Abdel-Razek.

15             Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure ... at the moment, it is left to the

17     Defence to check the veracity of the previous witness's testimony as

18     cited.  And I -- I don't think you have access to the e-court.  I'm --

19     why don't we continue at the moment.  But I think witness has sufficient

20     answers as to General Razek's credibility.

21             Let's continue.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   And, yes, General, because you speak at speed, I interrupted you

24     before we went on too far because I wanted to know about this commission

25     you have just spoken about.  And who was on that commission?  I want the

Page 37654

 1     names of who was on the commission.

 2        A.   I don't know the names of all of the people.  They were

 3     representatives of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, our representatives, and

 4     that representative testified here at this Tribunal.  There was also a

 5     representative of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army and a representative of

 6     the Sarajevo Sector.  That was the commission that worked at that time.

 7             There was Lieutenant-Colonel Ugljesic on behalf of the

 8     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  I don't know about the other two side.  He

 9     testified here.  In the meantime, he has died, but you have his testimony

10     on record.

11        Q.   So -- so you're saying that General -- if that's his rank,

12     Ugljesic is one of the people who was on this commission to deal with

13     General Abdel-Razek's specific complaint of Serb shelling of UN

14     headquarters; is that correct?

15        A.   It is not correct.  I shall speak slowly so nothing is omitted

16     because it is very important.

17             That was a mixed commission.  Its name was a lower-ranking mixed

18     military commission.  On its composition there was a representative

19     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, a representative of the 1st Corps of the BiH

20     Army, a representative of the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo.  The

21     representative of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, in that commission, was

22     lieutenant-colonel - not general, we're not all generals -- or perhaps we

23     are - but he was Lieutenant-Colonel Ugljesic.  He testified here at this

24     Tribunal.  His testimony is on record.  If you look at it, you will see

25     that he testified that UNPROFOR forces were shelled at the airport and

Page 37655

 1     that the BiH army was responsible.  And it was not the command of

 2     UNPROFOR that was shelled.  It was the forces and assets of UNPROFOR that

 3     were shelled at the airport, not its command.

 4             And that's as far as I can remember.

 5        Q.   We'll leave that so I don't waste any more time.

 6             Now, you talked about the accuracy, if I can put it that way, of

 7     General Abdel-Razek about allegations that Serb forces had shelled the

 8     UN.  And by the way, he said that they shelled civilian areas as well.

 9     I'm going to -- I wonder what you say about another individual who

10     testified at your trial, and that was Major Bergeron.

11             Now, Major Bergeron spoke about sniping, and at pages 11268 to

12     11270, he discussed his meetings with you on the issue of snipers.  He

13     said:

14              [As read] "On several occasions where we would meet with

15     General Galic or people or members of his organisation, we would often

16     mention the fact that there were snipers and the fact that the snipers

17     would kill civilians, be it women, children, and elderly people, for

18     apparently no other reason than to terrorise the population than to

19     demoralise the population."

20             Is there anything inaccurate about Major Bergeron's evidence

21     during your trial.

22        A.   I think that it is all inaccurate.  Everything is inaccurate.

23             It was his arbitrary observation without any specific evidence.

24     As far as opening fire on civilian targets is concerned, what do you

25     consider a civilian area in Sarajevo?  Were there any such areas in

Page 37656

 1     Sarajevo; civilian areas, that is?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.  The sentence:  Do we

 3     have civilian areas is not on the record.  Not "what do you consider

 4     civilian areas."  [In English] Before -- before is "what do you consider

 5     a civilian area," there was a part of answer that is:  "Do we have

 6     civilian areas in Sarajevo?"

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that was my question to your

 8     question.  I was answering your question with a question, but I can

 9     answer it in answer as well.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I think we have that answer already, to a certain

11     extent.

12             Let's continue.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   So what action -- pardon me.

15             So because he didn't have any specific evidence, you took no

16     action in response to Major Bergeron's assertions; correct?

17        A.   You spoke about his evidence here and what he said as a witness,

18     as far as I can remember.  And his allegations during evidence are

19     controversial and contrary to what actually happened during the war.

20     This is what I stated and what he said to me at the time.  You know, when

21     one comes here it's easy to talk about everything else, but did that

22     major bring a document to show you and to tell you, This is what I handed

23     over to General Galic.  Maybe we could have then discussed that document

24     to see whether he did hand it to me, to me personally, or somebody

25     representing me.  And now, based on his evidence on -- based on what he

Page 37657

 1     said that before the Trial Chamber, and you're inviting me to comment

 2     upon that, it's really difficult, and in my view it would not lead to a

 3     proper solution.  As much as he can claim that something is true and

 4     accurate, to that same extent, I can claim that it is not correct and it

 5     is not accurate, unless he has proper evidence to corroborate his words.

 6        Q.   What happens, General, when --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry to interrupt you because you seem to move

 8     away.

 9             Mr. Galic, your answer or, rather, your question was a bit

10     confusing to me.  What you did mean by asking whether do we have a

11     civilian area in Sarajevo?  Did you mean to say that there's no civilian

12     area at all in Sarajevo?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, that part of the

14     question was from the question that was put to me.  The aim was to

15     provide a more precise answer as to whether such areas were targeted.

16     And as for civilian areas in Sarajevo, on both sides, and whether there

17     were any such areas and what civilians areas there were, if any, I'm sure

18     that we will come back to that later and that we will discuss that issue.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Your question sounded to me as if you were saying

20     that every part of Sarajevo was militarised, so shelling any part of

21     Sarajevo was legitimate.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it's an erroneous

23     opinion.  I never said that.  I never thought that.  It never occurred to

24     me to think that.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 37658

 1             Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  And apologies.  I'm having trouble

 3     keeping my stride this afternoon.  Your indulgence for a moment.

 4        Q.   Just based on your answer about Colonel Bergeron.  I wanted to

 5     ask you, you said that - and I don't think you quite finished your

 6     sentence - that his evidence was not accurate and unless he had proper

 7     evidence to corroborate his words, and -- and you were referring to, I

 8     gather, his assertions regarding sniping.

 9             So I wanted to ask you, General, what happens when a

10     military observer, one of the UNMOs, or somebody else from UNPROFOR calls

11     your office and says, There's shelling in a given area and we know it's

12     coming from your forces, what do you do?  How do you respond?  And how

13     did you respond?

14        A.   I don't recall anybody calling me directly, but they must have

15     called Indjic and his Office for co-operation with UNPROFOR if anything

16     like that happened.

17             First, it had to be established where it was happening and what

18     problems arose.  I believe that then, if it had been established that the

19     target was not legitimate, that fire ceased.  That would have been

20     justified.

21             The duty officer was entitled to initiate that, not necessarily

22     the commander, because the commander wasn't always at the command post.

23        Q.   What kind of investigations were undertaken to establish where it

24     was happening?  Wasn't the word of UNPROFOR about where it was happening

25     good enough for you?

Page 37659

 1        A.   I said what would have been good enough to make a targeted

 2     investigation.  We needed information about which side it came from, but

 3     there was no possibility of a commission investigating it.  Then we had

 4     to know whether it was legitimate or not to shoot, whether there were

 5     forces there, whether there were civilians.  I never entered that zone

 6     with my forces.  I can show you where the forces were on that map.  That

 7     was part of the deployment.  And if you say that there was shelling from

 8     guns or mortars, anywhere in the zone, all I can do is trust you without

 9     evidence and then check with my subordinate units.

10        Q.   Okay.  Just before we go on too far, I don't think you've quite

11     answered my question.  Wasn't the word of UNPROFOR about where it

12     happened good enough for you?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it has been asked and

14     answered.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I answered what was required to

16     make it good enough.

17             MS. EDGERTON:

18        Q.   So unless UNPROFOR gave you specific information about which side

19     it came from, unless you had a commission investigating it, unless you

20     had information as to whether it was legitimate or whether there were

21     civilians at that location, you didn't do anything?

22        A.   I don't understand your question.  What kind of answer do you

23     want from me?

24        Q.   I want to know why the word and the protests of UNPROFOR, general

25     protests - if you want to call them that - weren't good enough for you to

Page 37660

 1     take action.

 2        A.   I think I gave you an answer but I can repeat.  We must put

 3     ourselves in a realistic situation.  Every day there's combat activity.

 4     There is conflict.  There's fire from both sides.  In such a situation,

 5     you get a report about somebody firing at a certain zone.  And then from

 6     the side of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, what kind of information would

 7     you be satisfied with to take measures in the corps?  What kind of

 8     measures was I in a position to take then?

 9             I'll tell you:  Unless I have the information that I mentioned,

10     no commission, no this, no that, how do I find out from where, who, what?

11     Because we're talking about 10.000 men.  It's not easy to investigate who

12     fired a shot at a window or who launched a mortar shell because that's

13     the kind of information I need to launch a specific investigation.

14             But, anyway, in the commands we would inquire over the phone, Did

15     you open fire from this or that kind of weapon on this or that zone?  And

16     then we got either oral or written replies, because I can't know what's

17     happening in Sarajevo if I'm in The Hague.  It was the same then.

18     Because I couldn't know everything that was happening at any given point

19     in Sarajevo.  We're talking about a large area with about 400.000 people,

20     almost.  Only in the area held by the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I would like to be able

22     to adjourn now because I also have a proofing with the next witness that

23     needs to commence on time.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, sorry.  I apologise.  I didn't notice the

25     time.

Page 37661

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President just for, I think General Galic

 2     already knows this, but tomorrow we'll be hearing the evidence

 3     Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and he will not be brought back to the Tribunal, and

 4     we expect to have him brought back on Thursday.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 7             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if this may

 8     help, I would very much appreciate to get from the Prosecution a copy of

 9     the documents it is going to show, and anybody can make a mistake and

10     that we have seen in the transcripts.  So if I could receive a courtesy

11     copy from Ms. Edgerton, I would be extremely grateful.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Without determining the issue, whether it's

13     necessary or not, I'll leave it to the Prosecution.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  With respect, Your Honours, I would suggest that

15     Mr. Piletta-Zanin contact Mr. Robinson, because Mr. Robinson has been

16     notified of the documents.  Because the length of time it would take to

17     put together that collection of documents would adversely affect our

18     preparation for the continued cross-examination.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I tend to agree with you, Ms. Edgerton.  And I would

20     recommend you to leave it to the Defence, as far as the correctness of

21     citation is concerned.

22             Given the time, shall we adjourn for today and discuss it

23     further, if necessary, on Thursday?

24             Hearing is adjourned.

25                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,

Page 37662

 1                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day of

 2                           April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.