1 Monday, 13 May 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours, and
8 thank you for this opportunity. I believe this is the first time that
9 the Prosecution has requested that the Court consider an adjustment of
10 the cross-examination allocation in advance of the witness commencing
11 testimony. Of course, that reflects an understanding that of the Court's
12 guiding principle which is that the allocation is not a fixed time but
13 provided that the parties use their time efficiently and continue to
14 inquire as to relevant issues the Court will permit a cross-examination
15 to extend beyond the allocation assessment, and of course that also
16 reflects the fact that it's difficult for anyone however subsumed in the
17 minutia of the material to assess exactly how much time that will take.
18 Nevertheless, notwithstanding that principle, in this case we
19 wanted to address the issue in advance for two reasons.
20 JUDGE KWON: This case being --
21 MR. TIEGER: In this instance with -- I'm sorry, in the instance
22 of expert Subotic.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, yes.
24 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, I didn't make that clear from the outset.
25 We wanted to address it in light of the convergence of both the
1 complexity and extent of the material and -- and the actual length of the
2 allocation, because it would, in fact, make it extremely difficult for
3 the cross-examining lawyers to actually adjust from the material that
4 really is critical to cover it.
5 If I could just make a couple of small points quickly in respect
6 of these issues and then one larger point. The two points that the Court
7 may not have had in mind at the time would include the fact that we made
8 a previous adjustment of time; that is, we reduced the assessment of the
9 time we needed when we were examining Ms. Andjelkovic Lukic who also gave
10 expert testimony, and the reason was that we understood that that expert
11 could only speak to a few issues regarding air-bombs and that
12 expert Subotic was the main author, notwithstanding the fact that both
13 experts tendered that. So we already made an adjustment in connection
14 with that, trying to be as efficient as possible, and I think clearly
15 were during the course of that.
16 Another factor to consider is the fact that many of the positions
17 advanced by this expert were not put to the witnesses about whom they are
18 now offered at the time they were here in court to deal directly with
19 those issues or to answer such questions, and that complicates the task
20 of the Prosecution in attempting to deal with the assertions in the
21 Subotic reports. So that -- that is actually another interesting
22 reflection of the wisdom of 90(h) which has not only an obvious fairness
23 aspect but clearly has an efficiency aspect as well which effects us
25 On a more general basis, although I recognise the inherent
1 limitations of comparing one witness to another, I think it is
2 instructive to note that the time allocated for other witnesses, so
3 Mr. Karadzic received three hours for Witness Higgs whose report covered
4 six scheduled incidents on mortars only and whose report was
5 approximately 19 pages, referencing about 30 documents, and moreover, he
6 didn't purport to do his own individual actual analysis in contrast to
7 Witness Subotic, so that the task was significantly different.
8 Similarly for Witness Sabljica, who as the Court will recall was
9 a Bosnian MUP ballistics expert, he had a 74-page report covering
10 approximately five scheduled shelling and sniping incidents, three
11 unscheduled incidents with about 30 exhibits and the Defence received
12 seven hours to cross-examine him.
13 Now, in contrast this witness we are talking about three reports
14 comprising 141 pages, 131 pages, and 151 -- 52 pages, and that's after
15 subtracting the CVs and the redactions, and these reports comprise
16 hundreds of documents, and the witness purports to have conducted a
17 de novo investigation of 14 mortar, artillery and air-bomb incidents,
18 13 scheduled and one unscheduled.
19 So the two lawyers focusing on this have attempted to identify as
20 clearly as they can the most critical issues to get into, but I think --
21 I'm confident that the amount of time they have invested in this effort
22 is instructive in the sense that no one casting even -- certainly not an
23 initial review of this material much less even a -- the most intensive
24 review that could be expected of someone who is not involved in the
25 cross-examination could begin to appreciate the complexities involved.
1 So with that in mind I have what I hope is a very modest
2 proposal, Mr. President. I have talked to Ms. Gustafson and Mr. Gaynor,
3 and I mention their names in particular because I think the Court will
4 appreciate based on the experience in court that they are extremely
5 skilled at using time in court efficiently, and I've asked them at the
6 minimum additional time that would suffice under these circumstances. I
7 would ask that the Court adjust the allocation by an additional two hours
8 before it begins to consider whether or not additional time given the
9 nature of the cross-examination is necessary. I think that would be a
10 fair balance under the circumstances and permit them to at least attempt
11 to craft their examination in a way that is not unduly difficult and that
12 continues to assist the Court.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. The Chamber finds your
15 submission to be fair enough and will grant your request.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue today, the Chamber will issue a
18 decision on the Prosecution motion for testimony of Radivoje Miletic and
19 Ljubisa Borovcanin to be viva voce, which was filed on the
20 2nd of May, 2013.
21 In this motion, the Prosecution requests that the Chamber order
22 prospective Defence witnesses Radivoje Miletic and Ljubisa Borovcanin to
23 testify viva voce. The Prosecution submits that their positions at the
24 time relevant to the indictment and the significant nature of their
25 anticipated evidence concerning the Srebrenica component of the case and
1 the criminal responsibility of the accused warrant the presentation of
2 their evidence viva voce.
3 The accused filed his response on the 7th of May, 2013, in which
4 he argues that the motion should be denied. The accused submits that
5 with regard to Borovcanin, the proposed 92 ter statement is "clear and
6 comprehensible," the associated exhibits are limited, and he was not in
7 proximity to the accused compared to others for whom viva voce testimony
8 has been ordered. With respect to Miletic, the accused argues that the
9 request is premature given that the accused's motion to subpoena him is
10 pending and that once the Chamber grants the subpoena request it should
11 review the potential Rule 92 ter statement before deciding whether
12 Miletic's anticipated evidence should be led viva voce.
13 Having reviewed the proposed Rule 92 ter statement of Borovcanin
14 and considered his position as deputy commander of the
15 Special Police Brigade of the VRS Ministry of Interior at the relevant
16 time, the Chamber finds that it is appropriate to receive Borovcanin's
17 evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter as originally proposed and thus denies
18 the Prosecution request in this respect.
19 With regard to Miletic, the Chamber first recalls that the
20 accused had been unsuccessful in obtaining Miletic's voluntary
21 co-operation, and the Chamber granted the accused's motion for a
22 subpoena. Further, having considered his proposed evidence as outlined
23 in the accused's Rule 65 ter witness list and in the subpoena motion as
24 well as his proximity to the accused as one of the core members of the
25 VRS Main Staff at the relevant time, the Chamber is of the view that his
1 evidence should be led live. Therefore, the Chamber grants the
2 Prosecution request in relation to Miletic's testimony and orders that
3 his evidence be led live.
4 Unless there's anything further to be raised, we'll bring in the
6 [The witness takes the stand]
7 WITNESS: MILAN MARTIC [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Martic. Please be seated and make
10 yourself comfortable.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
15 Q. Good morning, Mr. Martic. I know you just walked in. I want to
16 make sure you're settled before I begin the questions. Then we'll
18 A. Good morning to you, sir.
19 Q. I wanted to turn next to the portion of your statement found at
20 paragraphs 24 through 29 in which you focus for a number of paragraphs on
21 the issue of prospective unification of the Krajinas and suggest that
22 Mr. Karadzic resisted such unification and became more in favour of it
23 after the war started, and again those are found in paragraphs 24
24 through 29, and I believe that in particular that refers to the effort in
25 mid-1991 by persons within the Bosnian and Croatian Krajinas to unite.
1 Now, I wanted to put to you the proposition that the opposition
2 to the unification of the Bosnian and Croatian Krajina at that time did
3 not reflect an opposition to unification -- to the concept of the
4 unification of all Serbs in one state generally but arose instead out of
5 a tactical concern, a concern that the time was not right for doing so,
6 that to do so at that moment would result in less territory for the Serbs
7 and that it would be done when the time was right, after, for example,
8 proposed agreements had been rejected by the other side.
9 That's -- that's the nature of the opposition to the unification
10 of the Krajinas in mid-1991 that is discussed in paragraphs 24 through 29
11 of your statement; correct?
12 A. Yes, but you interpreted all that in your own way, and it does
13 not tally with the truth, not absolutely. If you're interested in my
14 view of the thing, of course I will share it with you.
15 Q. Well, let me ask you some specific questions and perhaps we can
16 identify the extent to which it corresponds with what happened at the
17 time and any nuances or larger issues in which you claim it does not.
18 This Trial Chamber, for example, has received evidence, that's
19 P2555, that Dr. Karadzic was concerned that if the Krajinas united at
20 that time, it would be viewed as a kind of secession from Bosnia by the
21 Serbs and the Serbs would only end up with half the territory that he
22 considered they should have. Were you aware of that at the time, that
23 that was his position on the issue?
24 A. Let me repeat. This does not reflect the truth, and I have to
25 explain. The attention of unification and declaration of unification
1 that was issued on the 27th of June in Grahovo, if I remember it well,
2 and that was issued by the SAO Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina, happened
3 after both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence and secession
4 from Yugoslavia. Milan Babic as the creator of that unification was an
5 undisputable authority not only in our Krajina but also in that part. He
6 initiated the unification --
7 Q. Mr. Martic, I'm sorry, and again I'm glad we had the brief
8 discussion the other day about the need to focus on the question. My
9 question is not the backdrop to the unification or who was primarily
10 responsible for moving it forward.
11 Your statement focuses on Dr. Karadzic's opposition to the
12 unification in those paragraphs. I put to you that his unification was
13 grounded not on an opposition to the concept of all Serbs in one state
14 generally but because the timing wasn't right and it would result in
15 this -- and a unification at that time would result in less territory for
16 the Serbs than was desired. And I asked you if you were familiar with
17 his position on that as reflected in a telephone conversation which this
18 Court has received in evidence at P2555.
19 A. I have to say again this does not reflect the situation as it was
20 during that period of time. Dr. Karadzic exclusively advocated the
21 preservation of Yugoslavia, and that is the truth. He was not in favour
22 of a Serbian territory but, rather, the preservation of Yugoslavia. The
23 unification, as I understood it, would result in the destruction of our
24 idea to preserve Yugoslavia. That moment he was far-sighted, and he saw
25 more than the rest of us who were in favour of the unification. He was
1 concerned about the preservation of Yugoslavia and the destruction of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. If that declaration was not -- had not been annulled
3 on that same day, they would have put us in the same position as
4 Milan Babic. And let me repeat. This does not apply to what you say,
5 the Serbian territory and that Serbs would have gained less. It was all
6 about the preservation of Yugoslavia. That was all it was about.
7 Q. Well, not the preservation of Yugoslavia in its existing
8 composition. You were aware, were you not, that Dr. Karadzic was
9 speaking before the commencement of the conflict about the effort to
10 concern about desire to keep the Serbian portions of Bosnia within
11 Yugoslavia so that then the Bosnian Serb -- the Serbian leadership would
12 have provided the Krajinas with a link to Yugoslavia, that is, with the
13 Serbian countries, the future state; right?
14 A. Of course not. Dr. Karadzic and the majority of the leading
15 people in Yugoslavia and Serbia fought hard for the preservation of
16 Yugoslavia. There were talks about our rights based on the constitution
17 and the constitution gave equal rights to Serbs, Croats and others, the
18 right to self-determination if it was impossible to go on living
19 together. I'm not excluding that possibility either. There were talks
20 about the other republics, i.e., the other peoples, and if they continued
21 insisting on separatism, we thought that we should use that right, the
22 right of self-determination and making a decision who we would live with
23 if they wanted to leave Yugoslavia, and I mean Croats, Slovenes and
24 others, they could but only pursuant to the constitution. And in that
25 respect I can understand Karadzic's word, if he indeed used them, that us
1 Serbs should also consider our options provided by the constitution.
2 Q. So you say of course not, but then you go on to explain that that
3 seems to be -- that the proposition I put to you indeed seems to be
4 correct or at least you accept that it could be correct; is that right?
5 Or do you -- I just need to know where you stand on this thing. Do you
6 say: That was not Dr. Karadzic's position and I know that's the case,
7 or, yes, that may have been Dr. Karadzic's position to make sure the
8 Serbian leadership kept what they considered to be the Serbian parts of
9 Bosnia linked to the other Serbian parts of the former Yugoslavia?
10 A. Well, you're presenting things the way you want, and you're not
11 analysing Dr. Karadzic's words properly. I repeat for an umpteenth time
12 that Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic, the president of the then
13 Presidency, advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia. They stuck to the
14 constitution, and the constitution gave the rights to the peoples, not
15 the republics, the peoples, the right to self-determination to cessation.
16 This is what it was all about. There was -- that was not about a plan to
17 create a Serbian state.
18 Q. Well, let's not jump ahead, Mr. Martic. Let's just stick to the
19 concrete discussions that did or did not take place. So in December of
20 1991 isn't it true that Dr. Karadzic was already talking about the
21 benefit of managing to keep what Serbian leaders considered the Serbian
22 parts, the Serbian areas of Bosnia, linked to the other Serbian parts of
23 former Yugoslavia? That's all. Isn't that what Dr. Karadzic was in fact
24 talking about in December of 1991, well before the commencement of the
1 A. I don't know what he was saying in December. I don't know. I
2 can't see that. But I know from my several encounters with Dr. Karadzic
3 and from his several debates that Serbs had to adhere to the
4 constitution. As far as the fact that Serbian territories are
5 interconnected in many parts, I'm sure that you can't blame Dr. Karadzic
6 for that. This is a fact that preexisted that situation; for example, in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in cadastral terms, the Serbs had over 60 per cent of
8 the territory where they resided. This is not a figment of
9 Mr. Karadzic's imagination. Those are the facts.
10 Q. Mr. Martic, the -- the -- regardless of the nuances of what you
11 assert Dr. Karadzic was -- was or was not saying at the time, and this
12 Court has received evidence in respect of those issues, for example, the
13 December 1991 meeting I just referred to as P25554 and the particular
14 comment that I referred to is found - this is for the benefit of the
15 parties - at the e-court English page 49 and B/C/S page 68, the reality
16 is that the leadership of the Serbian people in Bosnia, in Croatia, and
17 in Serbia held as a long-term objective the state unity of the Serbs, all
18 Serbs in one state; correct?
19 A. Well, the way you make up this construct, Serbs in one state, but
20 that's a reference to Yugoslavia. That Yugoslavia, let me remind you,
21 was established by the Serbs, and they made it possible for other nations
22 to live in that state as well, and that through two world wars, and that
23 kind of Yugoslavia was acceptable to the Serbs, and we thought that it
24 was acceptable to others, too, but it turned out that apparently it
1 Q. So is it your position in this Court, Mr. Martic, that once it
2 became apparent that Yugoslavia was dissolving and would exist no more
3 that the Bosnian Serbs, the Croatian Serbs, and the Serbian leadership in
4 Belgrade decided that it was no longer a goal or objective that all Serbs
5 should be within the same state?
6 A. Well, first of all let me state this: Yugoslavia did not fall
7 apart, and it wasn't dissolving or falling apart. It is broken up from
8 the outside especially by the Vatican and the Germans. It was smashed,
9 deconstructed. And in this destruction we as a constituent nation, not
10 only in Serbia but also in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, thought of
11 how we could remain and live together. The right to self-determination
12 that was given to other nations, we were entitled to that, weren't we? I
13 don't know what else you want me to say. Those are the facts.
14 Q. Well, I wanted you to answer the question which I'm not sure was
15 answered, so let me try it in a slightly different way. I mentioned the
16 leaderships in Bosnia, the leadership in Croatia, the leadership in
17 Belgrade, so let me show you three documents, one emanating from each of
18 those entities and ask you again about the objective of ensuring that all
19 Serbs were in one state. So if we could first call up --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Tieger. Can I intervene at the
22 Mr. Martic, a minute ago you said you -- "We could remain and
23 live together." Who are "we"? Did you mean the Serbs as a constituent
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Serbs as a constituent nation
1 including other nations, Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, Macedonians, and
3 THE ACCUSED: Excellency, that's exactly what I wanted to
4 intervene in transcript, because "we as a constituent nation" not only in
5 Serbia but in all Yugoslavia, Bosnia, this constituent didn't -- hadn't
6 been reported.
7 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Could we call up first
10 Q. This is a document already in evidence, so I can begin noting for
11 you what it contains. This is a -- I'm sorry, instead I'd like 65 ter
12 06618. I think that would be more efficient. I was first going to call
13 up one emanating from the Bosnian Serb leadership, and this is a document
14 dated the 19th of December, 1991, a date I imagine you remember, and it's
15 sent by Mr. Krajisnik referring to the historic occasion of the
16 proclamation of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina as the
17 Republic of Serbian Krajina as the RSK. He indicates:
18 "I am unable to join you on the verification of the historical
19 right of the Serbian people to live in one state."
20 He requests that his whole-hearted congratulations be conveyed,
21 and he continues later in the document, in the middle of the document,
22 all Serbs are engaged in a struggle for the same goal under the same
23 banner and we are all convinced of our ultimate victory.
24 I could also turn next to 65 ter 25048. This is a document
25 emanating from Belgrade, specifically from Mr. Stanisic. Sorry, there
1 seems to be a potential concern about the number, which there may be --
2 let me check on that.
3 A. Well, perhaps it's not a bad idea to pull up document by
4 document --
5 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
6 A. -- and present it.
7 Q. Well, yeah. I wanted to be as efficient as possible. These are
8 all documents dealing with exactly the same issue coming from different
9 places and different relevant places. Okay. That was the previous
10 document we saw. Sorry, if you didn't have it in front of you at the
11 time I'm sorry, and you can see the references that I made in court are
12 found in the first paragraph, the second paragraph, and the fourth
13 paragraph, as well as you can see in the third paragraph a reference to
14 not dividing us into several states.
15 And if we could turn next -- okay, that's 65 ter 25051. That was
16 the problem. Can we turn next to 25048.
17 As you can see here, Mr. Martic, this is a document from the
18 previous -- the previous document on the screen was exactly right. I
19 don't know where it just went.
20 MR. ROBINSON: I think you want 25051. 25048 is a 1994 document.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Anyway if the previous
22 document is 25051, that's the one we want.
23 Q. Again, I was starting to explain that was a document from
24 Mr. Stanisic, the head of the state security department of the
25 Republic of Serbia MUP, and he's writing on the occasion of security day
1 of the republic of RSK and notes that we are now entering the decisive
2 phase of the fight to achieve the common goals of all the Serbian lands
3 more determined and prepared than ever before.
4 And finally I indicated I would show you in addition documents
5 emanating from Croatian -- the Croatian Serbian leadership, and that's
6 65 ter 25045.
7 Now, I imagine you recognise these documents, Mr. Martic. These
8 are holiday greeting cards sent to Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, to
9 Mr. Jovica Stanisic, and also to Momcilo Perisic, indicating that the
10 previous year had been characterised by efforts to achieve united news
11 towards a common goal, the creation of a united Serbian state and
12 expressing the hope that in the upcoming year you will all be working
13 together toward the same goals and sending cordial wishes.
14 Now, Mr. Martic, I showed you all those because I wanted to put
15 to you the fact that the unification of the Serbs, the creation of a
16 united Serb state, was a goal shared by the leaderships of the
17 Croatian Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Serbs in Belgrade; correct?
18 A. Well, that is your interpretation, but I observe one thing here:
19 Everything that you have said has to do with various periods. The first
20 one was from 1991, and the other two documents, the other two events or
21 whatever was shown here, was -- were from 1994 and even 1995. There is a
22 huge difference in the interpretation of what you have said.
23 In this event where the president of the Assembly of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina, Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, extends his congratulations has to do
25 with our declaration of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina which was
1 declared at the moment when it was already known that Croatia would be
2 recognised by the international community and that peacekeeping forces
3 would come to our territories where they would be a protection force, and
4 as for the political solution for that part, the Krajina, that that would
5 be undertaken by peaceful means --
6 Q. Mr. Martic, excuse me. I -- we -- I don't object in theory to
7 the most expansive answers. We just don't have the time for you to
8 provide the backdrop to every issue --
9 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Tieger, in this case I think it's better to
10 hear him out.
11 Please continue, Mr. Martic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the other two instances, after
13 three and even four years, many things had happened in the meantime. At
14 this time there were several aggressions taken against the
15 Republic of the Serbian Krajina, and practically the Vance Plan had
16 already been destroyed. At that time war was raging in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. After many events, thorough attempts to do this
18 peacefully the international community did not allow this. They agreed
19 and condoned the separatism of Slovenia and Croatia and even they
20 recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they were aware themselves that
21 it would lead to war. As the situation evolved in 1994 and
22 1994 [as interpreted], it was quite normal that we, too, would think
23 about unity and unification of the remaining territories, which was the
24 Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, the Republic of Serbian Krajina and
25 Republika Srpska, that we should unite and live together. And again this
1 was within the framework of the constitution that all the nations, and we
2 were a constituent nation both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia, that
3 we would be entitled to self-determination. So everything arose from
4 that, because there was not a single reason why the international
5 community would not recognise and respect for us the same right that they
6 had recognised for others. Unfortunately, this unification never
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. I'm going to turn in a moment to some of the steps taken in
10 pursuit of the goal that I've focused on, but first I want to tender
11 those three documents and then I want to ask you another question about
12 the judgement in your trial.
13 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll permit them.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Mr. Martic --
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we give the number.
18 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 06618 will be Exhibit P6306, 65 ter
19 number 25051 will be Exhibit P6307, and 65 ter number 25045 will be
20 Exhibit P6308.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
22 Q. First of all, your Trial Chamber found:
23 "The evidence establishes the existence as of early 1991 of a
24 political objective to unite Serb areas in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 with Serbia in order to establish a unified territory."
1 Do you dispute that that was their finding at paragraph 442, yes
2 or no?
3 A. Well, I would like to be shown that paragraph if that's possible.
4 MR. TIEGER: That's 65 ter 25046, and as I say paragraph 442.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, but could I see the
6 Serbian version.
7 MR. TIEGER: [Overlapping speakers]
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have the English version before
10 MR. TIEGER: Okay, I don't --
11 JUDGE KWON: Did you not say paragraph 442?
12 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
13 JUDGE KWON: What you have is 42.
14 MR. TIEGER: Right. That's why I mentioned it again. I thought
15 there had been an adjustment made.
16 MR. ROBINSON: E-court page 159.
17 MR. TIEGER:
18 Q. Okay. I am reading from the second sentence:
19 "The evidence establishes the existence as of early 1991 of a
20 political objective to unite Serb areas of Croatia and in Bosnia with
21 Serbia in order to establish a unified territory."
22 Now, you can confirm it or not? I'm going to -- we can -- we can
23 refer to it in one way or another.
24 JUDGE KWON: Since we're here, what does section III I deal with?
25 I am seeing the footnote. I will leave it.
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. So what section -- section III is factual findings?
3 JUDGE KWON: We don't know at moment what -- we don't know what
4 evidence it does refer to, but you may put the question to the witness.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Yes or no, Mr. Martic? I don't want to spend too much time on
8 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, if he can't read it, I don't
9 understand how he can answer the question.
10 JUDGE KWON: I think he remembers what Mr. Tieger read out.
11 MR. ROBINSON: It's unfortunate, because if you look a few
12 sentences down you'll see that this is qualifying the fact that it was
13 not -- did not itself amount to a common purpose. So it's somewhat
14 misleading to just show it -- to just read one sentence to the witness
15 without him being able to see the paragraph.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. And then it goes on -- it goes on to talk about the
18 implementation through the commission of crimes which were found in -- in
19 the -- in this particular case and in this particular judgement. We are
20 talking about the objective. I focused on that objective alone, and --
21 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Tieger, instead of relying on the judgement,
22 what -- could you not just simply put your case to the witness.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Well, I intended to rely on both. All right. Very quickly,
25 Mr. Martic, let me ask you another question and I'll move on to something
1 else. That objective was also reflected in documents referring to and
2 justifying and explaining military operations, correct, such as
3 Operation Corridor; that is the objective of uniting the Serbs, linking
4 the Krajinas to the mother country, et cetera. Was cited in military
5 documents and other documents referring to Operation Corridor, including
6 documents by yourself. Would you like to see one?
7 A. Of course.
8 Q. 65 ter 25047, please. This is a document you sent to the
9 committee to mark the anniversary of the liberation of Cer. That was one
10 the early places "liberated" during Operation Corridor; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And you stated there opening a corridor to Serbia through your
13 beautiful area was not only a great military victory, it was also a
14 merging of the Serbian Krajinas with the motherland Serbian:
15 "Dear brethren and comrades in arms, we hope that this route will
16 not only be successfully defended and preserved but that it will be
17 extended so that after the unification of the RS and the RSK making use
18 of our joint victory at the corridor we shall finally also be united with
19 our brethren in Serbia and Montenegro."
20 Now, that's another expression this time by you although there
21 are other military documents reflect similar sentiments about the
22 objective of uniting Serb -- what was considered to be Serb lands and
23 uniting the Serb people in one state.
24 A. May I reply?
25 Q. Well, if you could answer yes or no and then if you need to
1 explain it go ahead, but I'd like to know where you stand on that issue.
2 A. Well, that requires an explanation. I cannot answer with a
3 simple yes or no.
4 When we look at this document that I sent, it's -- it was already
5 in 1995, on the 14th of June. So we are going back to the period when
6 all the possibilities were exhausted for us --
7 Q. Mr. Martic --
8 A. -- to gain the right on the basis of the constitution -- do you
9 want me to talk about the corridor or what is it that you want to hear
10 from me? In any case, our aspirations were indeed to determine who we
11 were going to live with. If everyone else was given the right, both the
12 Slovenes and the Croats and the Macedonians, why then would we be the
13 only ones who could not self-determine ourselves in a legitimate way,
14 which was provided by the constitution of the SFRY and the republic in
15 which we lived. But if you would like me to explain about this famous
16 corridor and to say a few words about it no problem.
17 Q. We may address that, but right now first of all I tender this
18 document Mr. President.
19 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6309, Your Honours.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. But right now I want to move on to the issue of some of the
24 concrete assistance that Serbia provided in support of the effort --
25 efforts of the Croatian Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs to unite. And if we
1 could turn first to P4263. That would be clip 1. Let me explain it by
2 way of background. This Court has received evidence already concerning a
3 ceremony that was held in Serbia in 1997 to mark the anniversary of the
4 formation of the special operations unit of the State Security Service,
5 and I wanted to turn to some aspects of that if we can, please.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Okay. Now, this is a portion of the ceremony in which
9 Dragan Vasiljkovic is recognised. In this case he's embraced by another
10 man. Perhaps you can identify both people here. Do you recognise the
11 man -- well, let's continue.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Do you recognise the man on the right?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. That's Jovica Stanisic?
17 A. Yes, I recognise him.
18 Q. Okay. So the man on the right is Jovica Stanisic. The man on
19 the left is Dragan Vasiljkovic, Captain Dragan, and that's found at
20 43:29.9. Correct?
21 A. That's what it says there.
22 Q. I want to turn to the -- let's turn to clip 3 of -- quickly to
23 42 - 45235A. Oh, I'm sorry, P2852. Excuse me.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MR. TIEGER: And stop. Do you recognise the man in the red
2 A. Yes. That's Legija, Ulemek. Milorad Ulemek.
3 Q. Okay. And he was Arkan's deputy, is that right, and was an
4 instructor at the Erdut training centre; is that correct?
5 A. That he was an instructor at Erdut is not something I know. I
6 know that he was in Arkan's units, and as far as I know, at the final
7 stage he joined the units of the Red Berets.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 MR. TIEGER: I'd like to turn next to 42 -- P4263, clip 2.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we ask Mr. Tieger to tell us
12 what year this is. Can we have the date?
13 MR. TIEGER: I announced it at the beginning. This document is
14 already in evidence. I believe it's 1997. By the way, I spoke with
15 Mr. Robinson before we began about the problem of clips in a document
16 like this. Virtually the entirety of the speech that I'm going to turn
17 to next is in evidence as one of the clips but not a particular portion
18 that I wanted to refer to, and so it's sometimes a little more cumbersome
19 to have portions of documents than -- especially when large numbers of
20 them are incorporated as others.
21 Okay. We turn next to 4 -- 65 ter 45235D, which has the entirety
22 of the speech.
23 [Video-clip played]
24 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Mr. President, we thank you for
25 accepting the invitation to attend the ceremony marking the anniversary
1 of the formation of the special operations unit of the State
2 Security Service. It was constituted on the 4th of May, 1991, at the
3 time of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and since it emerged has
4 constantly worked to protect national security in the circumstances where
5 the existence of the Serbian people was directly jeopardised through its
6 entire ethnic area. Its combat operations were anti-terrorist directed
7 at preventing war crimes, mass retaliation, and genocide. From the first
8 moment of its existence and establishment, the unit has passed through a
9 heroic epic and its part has been one of the most difficult ones in the
10 history of our struggle. Due to the international circumstances familiar
11 to us all, we were forced to operate in complete secrecy."
12 MR. TIEGER: Can we stop, please.
13 Q. First of all, did you recognise the speaker?
14 A. Yes. It's Franko Simatovic, Frenki, who's speaking. But the
15 image that I'm seeing, that you're showing me, is that of
16 President Milosevic, Jovica Stanisic, and some others.
17 Q. Okay. Thank you. And that's -- that's -- the last comment of
18 the witness's is a reference to where we stopped at 13:28.3.
19 Now, much of this speech is in evidence, and Mr. Simatovic goes
20 on to explain about the unit's history. Mr. President, allow us to
21 inform you briefly about the unit's history, its combat record, present
22 situation and function, and he states:
23 "When it was formed, its corps was made up of members of our
24 service, Republic of Serbian Krajina police, and volunteers from Serbia."
25 He then goes on to talk about various battles with armed Croatian
1 police forces in different areas, and he talks about the establishment of
2 26 training camps for Special Police Units of Republika Srpska and the
3 Republic of Serbian Krajina:
4 "26 training camps for Special Police Units of Republika Srpska
5 and the Republic of Serbian Krajina were also formed in that period. In
6 the Republic of Serbian Krajina in Golubic, Dinara, Obrovac, Gracac,
7 Plitvice, Sumarice," and so on and so on, "including ending with Ilok and
9 And then he states it's written in RSK but it appears to be a
10 reference in RS, in Banja Luka, Doboj, Samac, Brcko, Bijeljina, and other
12 And then for benefit of the parties that's found at page 11 of
13 the transcript. The previous references were at page 10 of the
15 And finally two other references I want to bring your --
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Page 11 of what? What transcript,
17 Mr. Tieger?
18 MR. TIEGER: Well, the transcript of the entirety of the video
19 that was taken at Kula.
20 JUDGE KWON: What we have is only four pages in the number you
21 referred to.
22 MR. TIEGER: Correct. Right. I'm sorry, no reference is needed
23 there. This is a reference to the fact that I thought it would be far
24 more efficient at this point to tender this entire exhibits since I'm
25 going to be referring -- this is -- this is the transcript of the current
1 65 ter number on the screen, 45235, which is the -- should be the --
2 JUDGE KWON: Did you not say 45 -- I'm sorry. 45235B?
3 MR. TIEGER: You're right, Mr. President. I called out the clip
4 of the Simatovic speech. I think we can certainly call up the entirety,
5 which is 45235, and that might be a much easier way to work over the long
6 haul. In any event, in one way or another I'm still referring to the
7 speech by Mr. Simatovic. So I can -- the parties can follow in the
8 current variation.
9 Q. Mr. Simatovic goes on to note, Mr. Martic, that the centre --
10 "The centre in which we are now bears the name of Radislav Kostic, a
11 distinguished member of this unit who was killed three years ago in
12 western," and that part can't be heard. And then he goes on to describe
13 when the service took over the building and how it transformed it into a
14 modern centre with training grounds, firing range, heliport, and so on.
15 And you were -- you were familiar with Mr. Kostic; correct? You
16 knew him?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And finally, shortly after Mr. Simatovic concludes his speech,
19 there is a moment when Mr. Simatovic pauses and says:
20 "Mr. President, dear guests, let us pay tribute to
21 deputy minister Radovan Stojicic, Badza, by observing a minute of
22 silence," and that is done.
23 And again, I take it you were familiar with Mr. Stojicic also
24 known as Badza; correct?
25 A. Yes, you're right.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, with reference to the training camps that were
2 referred to by Mr. Simatovic, the first one he mentions is Golubic, and
3 you -- you were familiar with that particular training camp; right?
4 A. Of course I was. I established it.
5 Q. With respect to the references to training camps at Ilok and
6 Vukovar, those camps are not referred to by name, but is it -- is it
7 correct that the reference to Vukovar is a reference to the Erdut camp
8 and the reference to Ilok is a reference to the Pajzos camp?
9 A. I presume so, though of course there's a difference and quite a
10 big difference as to who had -- who was in charge of these camps and at
11 what periods of time.
12 Q. When we have occasion to make reference to any of those camps
13 specifically, you can indicate what you think is appropriate by way of
14 that particular time for who was in charge at that moment.
15 Now, in collection with Golubic, let's take a look at another
16 video. That's 65 ter 40060A.
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MR. TIEGER: Stop for a moment, please.
19 Q. It may be obvious to everyone in the courtroom, but for the
20 record we should indicate this is you in front of the troops; correct?
21 A. Yes, at some sort of review at Golubic.
22 MR. TIEGER: And we happened to stop it at 41.7. If we can
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MR. TIEGER: And if we could stop, please.
1 Q. Again, it's obvious but if you can identify the people in the
3 A. The first on the left is General Ratko Mladic; Sejdo Bajramovic
4 is in the middle, he was a member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia at the
5 time; and Jugoslav Kostic, also a member of the Yugoslav Presidency.
6 Q. Okay. Thank you.
7 MR. TIEGER: If we can continue. That's at 1:35.1.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 16, it's not
10 "Cedo Bajramovic," it's "Sejdo Bajramovic," which again in our parts
11 indicates the religious affiliation and ethnicity. Sejdo.
12 MR. TIEGER: Next clip, please. Next clip.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Okay. And this is Arkan; correct? Zeljko Raznjatovic?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. TIEGER: That's at 3:39.9. The next clip, please.
18 [Video-clip played]
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. Okay. And that was you again at the portion preceding 3:51?
21 Correct, Mr. Martic? That was you speaking again?
22 A. Yes. Yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Were you able to hear your words, Mr. Martic?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I was not, but I can see that I
25 was speaking.
1 MR. TIEGER: Let's continue.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Tieger, is it your plan that you
4 play this video without sound? I take it there's a transcript.
5 MR. TIEGER: There is a transcript, and I think it was provided,
6 but if not, I apologise for that --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Tieger repeat the reference, please.
8 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. It's 65 ter 40060A, and this appears at the
9 first page. I think there's only one page provided.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Unfortunately, we don't have it. Yes, we have
11 found it.
12 JUDGE KWON: Then shall we play where Mr. Milan Martic said.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Milan Martic: Dear guests of this
15 ceremony for all the soldiers who fell for our Krajina, may they rest in
16 eternal glory.
17 "Zeljko Raznatovic: Against the Ustashas, about the defence
18 against the dagger, about the defence of the Serbian people not only in
19 the Krajina but throughout our blood drenched Serbian land because us
20 must know that this has never been a part of Croatia. The Serbian people
21 paid for this land with blood. I say to you that this never belonged to
22 Croatia. This is Serbia and will always be a part of the Serbia."
23 MR. TIEGER: First of all, Mr. President, I -- I -- I tender
24 those clips.
25 JUDGE KWON: Those clips being ... this one.
1 MR. TIEGER: This one and the previous clips we saw beginning
2 with Mr. Martic reviewing the troops. That's 40060A.
3 MR. ROBINSON: We don't have any objection, Mr. President. Can
4 we know the dates of this?
5 MR. TIEGER: This document has to be contextually dated.
6 Q. Mr. Martic, can you provide the date on which this ceremony took
8 A. Yes. This ceremony was held, I believe, in the spring, April,
9 perhaps even earlier in 1992, after a certain sort of truce was achieved
10 and the forces of the United Nations began deploying in our area. The
11 event itself has to do with the inauguration of an education centre where
12 personnel was to be trained, and this is why the people were present.
13 You didn't play my speech, but that's exactly the point I'm making, that
14 we want to have educated and trained cadre that would work professionally
15 and in accordance with the law, and as for what you're saying, that there
16 were other people present and saying certain things, I don't see anything
17 bad in that.
18 JUDGE KWON: I think we can admit it in one exhibit.
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: Shall we're sign a number.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6310, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask something? Was the bit
23 that Mr. Martic said and that wasn't played to us now transcribed? Do we
24 have this in its entirety?
25 JUDGE KWON: I think that has been transcribed, just a line.
1 Yes, Mr. --
2 MR. ROBINSON: I think he's referring to the rest of what
3 Mr. Martic said and a part that wasn't on the video but on the same
4 occasion. I think he's asking whether there's a transcript of that that
5 we might use in redirect.
6 MR. TIEGER: No, there is not to my knowledge, although the
7 defence of course has the entire tape.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's continue.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Mr. Martic, I wanted to turn back to what Mr. Simatovic was
11 talking about in the ceremony at Kula in Serbia, and that is about the
12 three arms of the unit, the special unit, and he mentioned, as we
13 discussed before, the DB, the RSK, police, and volunteers. So let me
14 turn first to the issue of the State Security Service of the republic --
15 under the Serbian MP.
16 Now, Simatovic also mentioned the name of Rade Kostic for whom
17 the centre was named as a distinguished member of the unit and
18 distinguished -- the language is -- right, well, distinguished member of
19 this unit who was killed three years ago.
20 Now, you also knew Mr. Kostic, is it correct, as, among other
21 things, someone who became an assistant member -- assistant minister in
22 the MUP of the RSK, that is in the police of the RSK; correct?
23 A. Yes. He was a friend of mine and my assistant.
24 Q. And if just we could call up 65 ter 25048 quickly. This reflects
25 the minutes of a board meeting of the MUP on the 10th of June, 1994, and
1 I call it to your attention simply because it indicates that Mr. Kostic
2 and Ilija Kojic are assistant ministers of the RSK movement. That's at
3 the top of the page. And I take it you can confirm that.
4 A. Yes.
5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. I tender that document.
6 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6311, Your Honours.
9 Q. Now, in addition to being an assistant minister in the MUP,
10 Mr. Kostic, as indicated in the Kula video, was also a member of the
11 State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia; correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And his superior was Jovica Stanisic?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. And the same was true of Mr. Kojic as well. He was also a member
16 of the State Security Service whose superior was Mr. Stanisic.
17 A. That's correct, with one difference. I asked these people to
18 assist me, and I was provided with Kojic and Mr. Kostic.
19 Q. And you were aware that Mr. Stanic's superior was Mr. Milosevic
20 himself; right?
21 A. According to some sort of structure that should be the case,
22 though I never looked in detail into their rules and who their supervisor
23 was. I think the situation there was a bit complex. At any rate, you
24 could tell -- you could say that their boss was the then president of the
1 Q. With respect to the then President of Serbia, Mr. Milosevic, you
2 indicate in a portion of your statement -- let me find it quickly.
3 Paragraph 43, that you had no contact with Milosevic and did not report
4 directly or indirectly to him.
5 Now, you mentioned time periods a couple of times during your
6 testimony. Is that a reference to a particular time period or does that
7 mean that throughout the course of the conflict, meaning from 1991
8 through 1995, you did not have contact with Milosevic and did not report
9 directly or indirectly to him?
10 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. The statement actually
11 doesn't say anything about having -- he's never said he didn't have
12 contact with Milosevic. I think that makes it erroneous. It says, "I
13 did not report directly or indirectly to Slobodan Milosevic."
14 MR. TIEGER: That's fine, I appreciate the clarification.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. But, excuse me, I had it written down. I thought Mr. Robinson
18 was actually correcting it accurately. In fact, it states:
19 "I did not report directly or indirectly to Slobodan Milosevic.
20 No incidents were manufactured by Slobodan Milosevic. In fact, during
21 this period I had no contact with Slobodan Milosevic."
22 So I renew my question to you, Mr. Martic, because you've been --
23 on a couple of occasions you've sought to refer to particular times
24 during the course of the war. I ask you, does this refer to some
25 particular time, or does it reflect the -- your position about your --
1 the nature of your contact and relationship with Mr. Milosevic from 1991
2 to 1995?
3 A. I was speaking about a specific period, specifically 1990 through
4 to the autumn of 1991. In that period, I never personally saw
5 Mr. Milosevic and had almost no contact with him. All of this was stated
6 in the context of the statements by Milan Babic who invented some sort of
7 parallel structures and about how Slobodan Milosevic engineered conflicts
8 in our area, and this didn't have a shred of truth in it. He invented
9 the parallel structures and the influence of the Security Service of
10 Serbia and everything else.
11 Q. Mr. Martic, we're discussing that. This is not an occasion for
12 you to repeat the allegations in your statement but to respond to the
13 questions. That question was about the time period we're talking about.
14 So in that respect, then, I take it -- does that mean you later had
15 contact with Mr. Milosevic and does that mean that you later reported
16 directly or indirectly to Mr. Milosevic, that is after the time period
17 you just identified?
18 A. Of course I did have contact, but your second question about me
19 reporting to him or being answerable to him, that's -- that something --
20 that really doesn't stand. A co-operation is one thing, and me being
21 answerable to him or him issuing orders to me is quite a different
23 MR. TIEGER: This is an appropriate time to take the break,
24 Mr. President.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
1 THE ACCUSED: I'm afraid there's a bit of misunderstanding coming
2 out from translation. "Reporting" and "odgovarao," and responding or
3 being subjugated, and President Martic said that the other part was not
4 right. He was not superior to President Martic. Because Mr. Tieger said
5 reporting, but translation that came to President Martic was "odgovarao,"
6 [interpretation] being answerable, [In English], being responsible to
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you. Shall we take a break?
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes. Yes, Mr. President. That was what I indicated
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll resume at 11.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
14 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Q. Mr. Martic, before we -- just before we adjourned, you were
17 talking about the nature of your contact and relationship with
18 Mr. Milosevic, and you stated that you did have contact but that as far
19 as you reporting to him or being answerable to him, that doesn't stand
20 having co-operation and issuing orders. Having co-operation is one
21 thing. Issuing orders is quite a different matter. In that connection
22 I'd like to look at two documents. The first is 65 ter 01 -- 08160.
23 This document is dated the 7th of December, 1994. It's from the
24 Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, and it states -- it's
25 headed "To the president of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina,
1 Mr. Milan Martic, and the commander of the Main Staff of the SVK, the
2 Serbian Krajina, Major Celeketic," and is that states:
3 "On the order of the president of the Republic of Serbia,
4 Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, urgently facilitate the passage of UNPROFOR
5 humanitarian aid in Western Bosnia ..."
6 And it explains the reasons, the first of which is that you,
7 Mr. Martic, promised this to Mr. Akashi, and it provides that a report
8 should be submitted on the completed task to the President of the
9 Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milosevic, by tomorrow at 0800 hours.
10 Now, this document, Mr. Martic, is a reflection of an order that
11 you and Mr. Celeketic received from Mr. Milosevic?
12 A. You can treat this as an order but this is not an order. If you
13 will allow me, I will explain what this is about.
14 The convoys in question requested by Mr. Akashi and the Red Cross
15 were sent to the forces of the 5th Corps in the Cazin and Bihac region.
16 Q. Mr. Martic. Mr. Martic, I have limited time. If it's necessary
17 to explain the backdrop to what is explicitly identified as an order and
18 that explicitly instructs you to submit a report on the completed task,
19 then you -- the Court will permit you to do so, but if you want to -- if
20 you're explaining the backdrop to this order and how this order came
21 about, that's not something that we're interested in at the moment. I'm
22 just focusing on the fact that on the 7th of December, 1994,
23 Mr. Milosevic issued an order to you, and I will follow up with your
25 A. Well, you see, this is how it is written, but the wording may be
1 a bit awkward.
2 I know that President Milosevic was often served incorrect
3 information. Maybe that was conveyed to him, and those who were in
4 charge in the General Staff conveyed his instruction to me in the form of
5 an order. I did not consider this to be an order. It was just my
6 obligation to, firstly, deal with the misunderstanding and involve the
7 Red Cross and to eliminate it, and that was the only time that we had
8 prevented the passage of convoys. Before that and a hundred time after
9 that the convoys were allowed to go through.
10 Q. The question -- I'm not getting into the subject of convoys and
11 humanitarian assistance for this moment. Thank you.
12 MR. TIEGER: I tender that document, Mr. President.
13 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Martic.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that the explanation is
16 important. It is important to know how the misunderstanding arose, but
17 if the Prosecutor is not interested, very well.
18 JUDGE KWON: You made it clear that you didn't consider this to
19 be an order. That's sufficient for our purpose. We'll accept it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6312, Your Honour.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. And the fact of the matter is that there was an immediate
23 response on the same day to that order, which was explicitly identified
24 as an order, and it also refers to the document as order and if we could
25 turn to 65 ter 25034. 25034.
1 This is a document dated the very same day. It's signed and
2 stamped, signed by General Celeketic. It's sent to Mr. Milosevic,
3 identified as Mr. President, and states "As regards to your order sent by
4 telegram," et cetera, et cetera, "we inform you that we carried out your
5 order," and explains how that was done.
6 So it's correct, is it not, Mr. Martic, that this is -- this is
7 the fulfillment of the requirement of the previous document that you and
8 General Celeketic report back by 0800 hours of the following morning, and
9 it against refers to the previous document as an order; correct?
10 A. This is correct. However, I have to add to this that this is
11 more an expression of respect towards President Milosevic, and that's why
12 the word "order" was used. Maybe I can explain. According to this
13 hierarchy line, when General Celeketic --
14 Q. Mr. Martic, I'm -- if the Court wants you to explain, that's
15 fine. If Mr. Karadzic wants you to explain also during his redirect he
16 can ask for further elaboration, but it seems to me that you provided the
17 nature of the same answer that you did before, which is that this is --
18 that you explained why -- your view of why the term order was used and I
19 wasn't asking for a general hierarchy --
20 JUDGE KWON: You asked whether this was an order and the witness
21 disagreed and wanted to explain his -- explain why he didn't think --
22 MR. TIEGER: Fine, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE KWON: -- that it was an order. It may be fair enough to
24 hear his explanation, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Martic, please continue.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What we can read in here is more an
3 expression of courtesy or respect for President Milosevic. However, in
4 reality, General Celeketic, when he was introduced to President Milosevic
5 after having been appointed commander of the forces of the Army of
6 Republic of Serbian Krajina said literally, "President Milosevic, I
7 respect you however the only person who can give me orders and the only
8 orders I am going to carry out will come from my President, Mr. Martic,"
9 and that's what President Milosevic took into account.
10 MR. TIEGER: I tender 65 ter 25034, Mr. President.
11 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Interpretation. The interpretation
14 into English was not good. It says here -- or, rather, the translation
15 is not good. It says here, "as regards to your order on my obligation."
16 [In English] Carried out the obligation.
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Then, Mr. Martic, could you read out
18 the first sentence. Read aloud.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Mr. President, as regards of your
20 order sent by the telegram of the Main Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia,
21 confidential number 1488-1 dated 7 December 1994, we inform you that we
22 have carried out your order."
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I meant the title of the document.
24 The type of this document is defined by the title which you can find
25 below the date.
1 JUDGE KWON: We see that. It's a subject you can take up in your
2 re-examination if necessary.
3 MR. TIEGER: Exactly. That's not an appropriate intervention
4 in -- in terms of --
5 JUDGE KWON: I thought it was a translation issue of the first
7 Shall we continue.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE KWON: But by -- although we have completed this issue.
10 How is this issue whether -- i.e., whether it is an order or not, is
11 relevant to this case?
12 MR. TIEGER: Because this is -- because it's relevant to this
13 witness's credibility. It's not an independent -- necessarily an
14 independent issue in the first place. Secondly, Mr. President, we're
15 seeing the appearance of numerous people for the same purpose doing the
16 relatively same tasks in both places, and of course that's relevant to
17 the -- to command and control, the JCE, and so on. So it has -- it's
18 relevant for both reasons.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: I lost track of the transcript to see if that was
21 admitted or not.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive that.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6313, Your Honours.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Mr. Martic, you earlier explained that Mr. Kostic and Mr. Kojic
1 were members of the DB for whom Jovica Stanisic was their superior. It's
2 correct, isn't it, that at some point you had a conflict with Mr. Kostic
3 and Mr. Kojic and one that -- and turned to Mr. Milosevic for assistance
4 in that regard; right? I'm referring to being stopped at the border in
5 October of 1994. You remember that; right? Do you want me to show you
6 the document that emanated from that episode?
7 A. Of course I remember, but I have to say that prior to that both
8 Kostic and Kojic were members of the MUP of Croatia. The MUP of Croatia
9 expelled them like it did all the other Serbs. They were temporarily
10 members of the DB. At my request they were assigned to me. I believe
11 that this is very important.
12 And as for your question, I can say that we did have a conflict,
13 and what you stated in your question is absolutely true.
14 Q. So if I understand you correctly, they were -- after they were no
15 longer in the MUP of Croatia, in the very early stages of events you
16 requested their assistance for your MUP and then later on there came the
17 time of this conflict?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Let me just show you two documents quickly, if I may, that
20 reflect those events. The first is 65 ter 05343. I'm just going to move
21 through that document fairly quickly, sir. If we could turn to the next
22 page, that's right. This is as we see a document dated the
23 7th of October. It's you writing to Mr. Milosevic and others regarding
24 an incident at the Tovarnik crossing and you explain at the beginning how
25 you were crossing on October 4th, that we're told as you were to cross
1 that the crossing on the RSK side was under the control of Ilija Kojic's
2 men. You go on to describe how you were stopped at gunpoint and the cars
3 searched. You then explain who you consider to be responsible for it as
4 you indicate in the middle of the paragraph at page 3 in the English, the
5 men who organised the incident were members of the paramilitary and
6 parapolice forces stationed in Erdut. They were under the direct control
7 of Rade Kostic of the state security department, and so on. And then as
8 we see at the back of the page you seek Mr. Milosevic's -- or toward the
9 back, seek his assistance and indicate to him that you would consider --
10 at the moment you would not go public with that information but would
11 consider various steps if that didn't happen -- if this matter wasn't
12 addressed. So that was the letter sent on the 7th of October, and
13 similarly in terms of efficiency -- first of all, you remember sending
14 that letter, I take it; right? That concerns the incident at that we
15 eluded to earlier.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And it's also correct that immediately after the incident on that
18 same day of October 4th, you were upset about what happened. You
19 telephoned Mr. Milosevic and essentially related the same thing,
20 explained to him what had happened to you at the crossing, who you
21 considered responsible, and asked him to deal with it by ordering
22 Mr. Stanic to withdraw those people. And let me give you some help with
23 that. Let's turn to 32810.
24 So again, Mr. Martic, as I explained a moment ago, this is a
25 record of a telephone conversation between you and Mr. Milosevic, an
1 intercepted telephone conversation dated the 4th of October, 1994, and as
2 you can see at the beginning, you indicate you're calling from Vukovar.
3 You just got the shock of your life. It was really intolerable. And you
4 explained that the same gang make arrested before. They came from Erdut,
5 they waited for you, held you at gunpoint, searched every vehicle, and so
6 on, and then you go on repeatedly during the course of that conversation
7 to insist that Mr. Milosevic ordered Stanic to withdraw that -- that --
8 the people involved.
9 So I just wanted you to confirm that that's a reflection of the
10 telephone conversation that you had immediately after these events that
11 preceded the letter you sent on the 7th.
12 A. Yes. That is all correct. Maybe this calls for an elaboration.
13 Q. Well, not -- I -- I think it's fairly straightforward. I am
14 interested in moving on. I am -- the Court may have a different view.
15 I'm not trying to unfairly limit your testimony, sir, but my -- I think
16 the questions I had about this document have been exhausted.
17 JUDGE KWON: Again, can I ask you the -- about the relevance to
18 Mr. Karadzic's case of this incident?
19 MR. TIEGER: Sure. The incident itself is not relevant by --
20 first of all, I'm a little reluctant to answer in front of the witness.
21 Normally I would approach the Bench on a matter like this. So if I'm
22 more elliptical than I would like to be I hope the Court will understand.
23 The Court has already -- the structure of the special unit,
24 including members of the DB, volunteers, RSK police and so on, has
25 already been raised. I spent some time identifying the overall objective
1 and then started to look at the steps that were introduced to -- by the
2 participants in those events, by in this case the Republic of Serbia, to
3 further those efforts. We've seen any number of the same figures
4 operating in Bosnia, and I'm going to in a moment, I hope, ask a couple
5 of questions about -- about Arkan, about Captain Dragan that reflect
6 that, and I've already asked about Mr. Kostic whose position is reflected
7 in this document. This Court has already received evidence about
8 Mr. Kostic in connection with events in Zvornik.
9 So there it's a great deal of inter-connection. This helps
10 illuminate the connections between the people involved on the ground in
11 events in Bosnia and other figures in Belgrade, other figures throughout
12 the territories that were claimed by the Serbs in an effort to unify the
13 territories considered to be Serb. So I -- again, when you're seeing
14 familiar names, knowing what their hierarchical relationship is to others
15 who share objectives, knowing when they were sent and why they were sent,
16 I submit, is extremely relevant for the Court's consideration of how they
17 ended up in various parts of Bosnia and why.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, do you have any objection to the
19 admission of these two documents?
20 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive them.
22 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibits 6314 and 6315 respectively,
23 Your Honours.
24 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, similarly I had a brief discussion
25 with Mr. Robinson at the break concerning the Kula video, and I'm pleased
1 that he agreed with the assessment that given the number of references to
2 that video and the material already in evidence, that it would be sound
3 to tender the entirety of that video, and I would do so now. That's
4 45235. I think I indicated I had an intention of doing so.
5 JUDGE KWON: It was not shown to the witness.
6 MR. TIEGER: He say various parts of it, Mr. President, including
7 parts that are already in evidence and he heard references to other
8 parts. So I -- and we discussed various aspects of what transpired at
9 that event. So he saw -- sorry, perhaps if I had done it at the time it
10 would have been clearer to the Court but we saw quite a number of parts
11 including Mr. Simatovic's speech. We saw Legija, we saw Captain Dragan,
12 we heard references to Badza and Mr. Kostic, et cetera.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Just for clarification, was this witness present
14 at that?
15 MR. TIEGER: No.
16 MR. ROBINSON: I think our position would be different then. I
17 didn't realise that. I think if the witness was present, we wouldn't
18 have any objection, but if he wasn't present, then we think it should be
19 limited to those portions that he can comment on.
20 MR. TIEGER: Well, my point was he commented on so much of the --
21 of the video that the continued practice of simply admitting excerpts I
22 think is creating more awkwardness and confusion than necessary.
23 JUDGE KWON: If my memory's correct that you made a reference
24 certain part of the video-clip, and you asked about the specific
25 individual, which Mr. Martic confirmed. We'll come back to this issue
2 MR. TIEGER: Very well. Thank you, Mr. President. Okay.
3 Mr. President, by the way, I think I'm nearly at my two hours. I have --
4 I want to cover just a few more documents in relation to people we've
5 already discussed. I have dramatically reduced even before we began but
6 certainly since we began given the length of the responses the amount of
7 material I want to cover, but I have three very specific areas I'd like
8 to address.
9 JUDGE KWON: And which will take how long, Mr. Tieger?
10 MR. TIEGER: I'm hoping no more than a half an hour,
11 Mr. President.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. Normally we don't take a
13 position on these things, but in this case I think we would object to an
14 extension of the time because, first of all, the witness's answers have
15 been very brief. This is not a witness who has gone on and on, and
16 Mr. Tieger made some choices about topics that you yourself have
17 questioned the relevancy of, as we do. And I think he should be limited
18 to maybe another five minutes to wrap up but I haven't seen from this
19 cross-examination anything that would warrant an extensive extension of
20 the time.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, please conclude in half an hour.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
24 Q. Mr. Martic, we've seen a number of references to Arkan,
25 Zeljko Raznjatovic, including his presence at the video we reviewed and
1 other references to him. First of all, we've -- this Court has already
2 received evidence that Mr. Arkan -- Arkan claimed to have a very good
3 relationship with you initially, what he termed as a brotherly
4 relationship, that's D1612, but that it later turned into some form of
5 conflict. Is that roughly accurate as you recall?
6 A. Well, one could say that that were different phases in our
8 Q. And, in fact, back when the relationship was -- was still in the
9 phase that Mr. -- that Arkan first refers to, that is the brotherly
10 phase, Arkan went with you to Bosnia during the general period of the --
11 of Operation Corridor, right, at the end of July 1992?
12 A. No, no. You've confused periods. First of all, we did not leave
13 together, and we did not jointly participate in the operation.
14 Q. And there's a reference in a diary, a war diary, kept by the
15 1st Krajina Corps. The entry date is dated 26 July 1992. It states -
16 and I'm happy to show it to you in a moment - General Ninkovic, commander
17 of the airforce and anti-aircraft defence; Minister Milan Martic from the
18 Serbian Republic of Krajina; General Borislav Djukic; and
19 Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, arrived at 1200 hours today. Does that
20 refresh your recollection about Arkan coming with you or at least on the
21 same day as you and the same time as you to the 1KK during the general
22 period of the Corridor operation?
23 A. When the corridor was broken through, I returned on the
24 16th of July. I very well remember that. And as for the period that is
25 discussed here, I believe it is not true. At least I can't remember that
1 I was there, because this was at least ten days after Operation Corridor.
2 Q. Very quickly. 65 ter 15768, B/C/S page 127 and English page 123.
3 Having the opportunity now to see the actual document and the reference
4 to the -- by the way, just to clarify for the Court, General Dukic,
5 he's -- was commander of the special understand of the RSK; is that
7 A. Yes, but his name is not "Dukic," it is "Djukic."
8 Q. Sorry. I mispronounced it. I see the slash on the D. Okay, so
9 having had a chance to see that now does that refresh your recollection
10 about the arrival of the 1KK at that time about those persons?
11 A. I really cannot remember this event, and I really don't think I
12 can see where this gathering was. I can't recall any of it.
13 Q. Okay. I guess we can't take it further in that case.
14 MR. TIEGER: I tender the document, Mr. President.
15 MR. ROBINSON: No objection to this page being admitted.
16 JUDGE KWON: On this item, whether it's only this page?
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, this item may go on to the next page.
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive these two pages.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6316, Your Honours.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Now, Mr. Martic, we heard the earlier references or saw the
22 earlier references by Mr. Kostic to the various components of the special
23 unit, and including volunteers, including DB members, including the RSK
24 police. Mr. -- Arkan's -- Arkan and Arkan's forces worked together with
25 the forces of the DB toward protecting the -- or toward what was
1 considered to be protecting the Serbian areas of Croatia; right?
2 A. Well, I can't put it that way, whether they worked together. As
3 far as I know, Arkan did go to the battle-field, and he placed himself
4 under the command of the one-time JNA, and then later either the VRS or
5 our army of Srpska Krajina. So he placed himself under the command. Now
6 that he was reassigned by the DB, I really don't know anything about
8 Q. Did you know that, for example, that Arkan and his group were
9 distributing weapons and ammunition and mines to, for example, the TO
10 staffs and that that materiel was provided by the MUP and the
11 Ministry of Defence of Serbia?
12 A. I -- this is really the first time that I've heard that, that
13 Arkan would distribute arms.
14 Q. Let's take a look at 65 ter 01855. This is a document dated the
15 19th of October, 1991. It's an information report from the -- submitted
16 to the first department of internal security of the SSNO, the Federal
17 Secretariat for National Defence, and it refers to the activity of the
18 Serbian volunteer -- Volunteers Guards, that is Arkan's unit, in the area
19 of Erdut and it states in part: During several consecutive contacts with
20 Arkan he stated that the weaponry, ammunition, and mines and explosives
21 had been supplied by the MUP and the Ministry of the Defence of the
22 Republic of Serbian and that he had been distributing them to the TO
23 staffs in Erdut, Sarvas, and Borovo Selo. Records were being kept
24 et cetera. So --
25 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I object to the
1 relevance of this. I think that this is now going into areas not related
2 to the credibility of this witness and that touch upon things that you've
3 excluded from this trial concerning arming of people in Croatia.
4 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, that -- that -- if I may respond.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: That is if it's necessary to respond and if the
7 Court's interested in time and wants to move -- want to rule on, that's
8 fine. But -- no -- that's the -- of course there's no independent
9 interest here in what the Court has sought to exclude, that is, and had I
10 wanted to get into the minutia of events and the details of events in
11 Croatia for their own sake there would have been ample material to do so.
12 This is not about the subject of arming in Croatia. This is about who
13 Arkan was and who he was connected to, a matter of significant relevance
14 to us in the context of the -- of events that took place in Bosnia. The
15 Court is aware -- and in that regard, too, I mentioned -- I can also
16 refer the Court to the fact that we've received evidence that Arkan's
17 appearance in Zvornik was prompted by the intervention of a DB member and
18 that's all I'll say about that and I can provide the Court with a
19 citation to that. So it these -- this material that I'm covering now is
20 extremely relevant and the attempt to find the context in which that
21 issue is illuminated that sort of deflect it by characterising it as some
22 effort in arming Croatia misses the point. The point is this is about
23 who Arkan was, who he was connected to, and as the Court I'm sure
24 considers relevant, how he ended up in Bosnia and what -- and for what
1 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I --
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Mr. Robinson.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think that this is still
4 something that you have to draw a line somewhere, so I appreciate it's a
5 difficult decision where to draw that line, but you could see that the
6 relationship between Arkan and Bosnia changed over time, was different in
7 1992 than it was in 1994 and 1995, and so simply to say in 1991 that
8 somewhere in Croatia he was taking arms from the Serbian MUP and
9 distributing it to people I don't think really adds anything to the
10 relevance to our case and goes, in my view, on the other side of the line
11 that you've already drawn when you made the decision on Mr. Babic's
12 testimony as to what would be relevant from Croatia and what would be
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is of the view we can do without this
16 document. Can you move on, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Well, Mr. President, I'm moving on, by the way,
18 to -- well, okay, I'll move on and see if it raises any other problems.
19 Q. Mr. Martic, you referred to Golubic training centre, and it's
20 correct, isn't it, that the first trainer at Golubic was Captain Dragan,
21 the person we saw in the video?
22 A. That's correct. However, I should -- well, never mind.
23 Q. And you were aware, were you not, that it was the DB that
24 recruited and sent him for that purpose; right?
25 A. Well, I have to explain this because I was interrupted earlier.
1 All of this follow upon the request of the president of the
2 Executive Council of SAO Krajina, Mr. Babic. It was sent to
3 President Milosevic and the Serbian MUP, a request to assist us with
4 training our forces.
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last portion
6 of the answer.
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Okay. Understood. So if we could turn quickly to 65 ter 18775.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, did you not hear the interpreter's
11 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry. No, I missed that.
12 Q. Mr. Martic, the interpretation staff indicated that they were
13 unable to hear the last portion of your answer. What we received back
14 was you said you had to explain. This followed the request of Mr. Babic:
15 "It was sent to President Milosevic and the Serbian MUP, a
16 request to assist us with training our forces."
17 And they didn't hear anything thereafter. So if you had
18 something additional, please indicate.
19 A. Well, I -- in answer to the second part of your question that's
20 correct, but it was my duty to say what ensued and what proceeded, and
21 how it came about that Golubic was established, this training centre.
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. And in connection with that, I just want to
23 quickly show you 65 ter 18775.
24 This is a document dated the 8th of November, 1991. It's from
25 Captain Dragan. He's expressing concern about what appears to be an
1 effort to transform his status into reserve captain of the TO, stating
2 the -- Captain Dragan has to remain Captain Dragan, and he explains that
3 it's -- it was a -- it would be a risk to drown or merge him into the
4 mass of reserve captains and he explains further:
5 "I have the obligation toward the state security service of the
6 Republic of Serbia and my activities within the TO have to be fully in
7 accordance with the mentioned service."
8 So I take it that that document is a reflection to essentially
9 the same thing you referred to earlier that after seeking assistance from
10 the MUP of Serbia they responded and now the person with whom they're
11 responding is reflecting his obligation back toward the State
12 Security Service.
13 A. Pursuant to a request by Dr. Babic, Captain Dragan arrived. I
14 believe he was brought by the DB people. Well, that second part we were
15 not really interested in, but it was clear how it came about that he
17 As for this document, what can I say about it? That's his
18 dissatisfaction with his status, because previously he had been very
19 present in the media and all of a sudden he disappeared from the media.
20 So I have no idea what this is about.
21 It does not necessarily mean, I don't really know, but it is
22 possible that he did have some obligation toward the State
23 Security Service of Serbia. I don't know about that. But I do know that
24 when he was brought in, he was brought per our request.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Martic.
1 MR. TIEGER: I tender the document.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. I don't think
3 Mr. Martic has been able to confirm the parts of the document that
4 Mr. Tieger wants him to confirm.
5 MR. TIEGER: But this is not the time of document that requires
6 that kind of contextual -- we've been through this before. This is a
7 document of the type that is not previously required that kind of
8 independent -- or affirmation like an interview or a newspaper article.
9 So this is offered for purposes of -- I mean, whatever the witness says
10 about it, he either affirms it or he says he doesn't know anything about
11 it in the context of a statement in which he's offering opinions about
12 the existence or nonexistence of a JCE. So it's relevant as impeachment
13 for that purpose.
14 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Martic made sufficient comment for the
15 purpose of admission in this case. We'll receive it.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6317, Your Honours.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Q. And, Mr. Martic, the last issue I wanted to take up with you
19 arises from paragraph 19 of your statement, where you say that -- I'm
20 sorry, paragraph 16 of your statement, where you assert that the JNA
21 basically or for the most part severed as a buffer between Croatian and
22 Serb positions. And then later in your statement, you go on to note
23 that -- to discuss General Mladic and offer some positive words about his
24 involvement in Croatia.
25 Mr. Martic, the fact is that contrary to your assertion in your
1 statement that the JNA served as a buffer, the fact is that, first, the
2 Trial Chamber in your case found that the JNA only -- served as a buffer
3 only until General Mladic arrived on the scene, and the fact is that
4 you've stated that yourself previously; isn't that right?
5 A. Yes, but you are skipping a lot of what had happened previously.
6 The JNA was as buffer there in terms of separating our forces from the
7 Croatian forces, but most importantly the beginning of the operation by
8 the JNA, whatever preceded that and not what Babic said or other
9 spin-masters who managed to pervert the facts and then use them against
10 me and giving falsified facts in place of the real facts. There is an
11 entire period when there were blockades of barracks and JNA garrisons
12 where JNA soldiers were not only Serbs but also Croats and Muslims,
13 Slovenes, people from all republics and of all ethnicities were put in a
14 very difficult situation. They were killed. They were stopped from
15 receiving the basic necessities: Water, food, electricity.
16 Q. [Overlapping speakers]
17 A. And even to the point where --
18 Q. I'm going to stop you right now, because now you are doing what
19 the Defence was asserting I was trying -- falsely asserting I was trying
20 to do by concentrating on events in Croatia. I'm asking you this: Your
21 statement indicates to this Chamber that the JNA served as a buffer. It
22 talks positively about Ratko Mladic, and I'm saying to you that the
23 reality is that you have admitted previously and I'll show you that in a
24 moment, that until the time Mladic arrived the JNA served as a buffer and
25 thereafter the JNA began functioning in offensive operations; right?
1 That's what happened. Now, I know you want to provide all the reasons
2 why that happened, but first can you acknowledge that that's true, that
3 it was, that the JNA's role as a buffer was only until such time as
4 Mladic came on the scene?
5 A. Well, I don't think that's exactly what I said, because as far as
6 I know, Mladic arrived in late July or thereabouts in 1991. Now, when
7 JNA for the first time clashed, was engaged in serious clashes, this was
8 on the 26th of August, which is a month later. I would not put a stress
9 on Mladic here because he was not the chief of that corps. I believe --
10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last part.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. The interpreter didn't hear the last thing you said.
13 A. Well, I said that at this time Mladic did not have a major role.
14 He was not the commander of the Drina -- the Knin corps. Rather, I think
15 he was the chief or the Chief of Operations, something like that.
16 Q. Well, you say now that's not -- that you wouldn't put the stress
17 on that, but that's exactly what you did when you were interviewed
18 earlier for a documentary. Let's turn to 65 ter 05263 at English page 10
19 and B/C/S page 10.
20 A. I'm not receiving any interpretation.
21 Q. No. I was hoping to have the --
22 A. I don't have the translation into B/C/S.
23 Q. There it is.
24 A. Mm-hmm. I see it.
25 Q. And you speak about General Mladic coming in June or July,
1 creating a self-confidence to the Serbs, openly stating that the Serbs
2 were right, and explicitly saying that until that moment the JNA and its
3 officers were a buffer zone between us and Croatians. And although then
4 a Colonel Mladic stated what other officers hadn't stated, that Serbs
5 were right.
6 So that was your position when you were interviewed here,
7 Mr. Martic, correct, that General Mladic deserved the credit and his
8 arrival deserved credit for changing what until that moment had been the
9 role of the JNA as a buffer zone?
10 A. As far as I can understand this, it is a distortion of my words,
11 that I would credit Mladic with basically starting with the war where the
12 conflict had been going on for a year before his arrival. When I was
13 speaking about the JNA, I was speaking about the Knin corps and the way
14 it was structured. Not a single man or person in a leading position in
15 that corps was a Serb, and it was only with the arrival of Mladic that
16 the Knin Corps had a Serb. So I'm not saying that with his arrival the
17 situation practically changed and this does not reflect the truth,
18 because for a good period of time he was a peacekeeper. He went to the
19 other side and tried to make peace. That's true. Very nearly the
20 clashes in Kijevo would happen, quite near to this period, and that was
21 when the JNA practically got involved in the conflict.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. Martic. I tender this, and I
23 appreciate the Court's additional time. That would be complete my
25 JUDGE KWON: I'm wondering about the format of this interview.
1 This interview transcription does not include the question.
2 MR. TIEGER: This particular -- no. That's -- it's a peculiarity
3 of this. And I think we've used this in the past. This was from
4 "The Death of Yugoslavia" series. Why it was transcribed in this way,
5 I'm -- I'm not entirely certain, but that is an unfortunate byproduct of
6 that particular transcription which is a transcription of lengthy tapes.
7 JUDGE KWON: It's part of "Death of Yugoslavia."
8 MR. TIEGER: That's my understanding Mr. President. I -- I can
9 double-check. It's a very lengthy piece. I can check the -- two things,
10 Mr. President. First of all, it -- it -- it is accurate, that is a
11 portion of that interview conducted apparently on October 14th, 1994, and
12 I should also add it was admitted as an exhibit, that is specifically
13 Exhibit 496 in Mr. Martic's trial.
14 JUDGE KWON: So, Mr. Martic, do you confirm that this is part of
15 your interview? Although it might have been distorted, as you indicated.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I do agree with the part that
17 it's disported.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive this part.
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6318, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Before you re-examine Mr. Martic, the
21 Chamber is minded to give its ruling on the accused's motion for
22 disclosure of records pertaining to Milan Babic filed by the accused on
23 the 18th of March, 2013.
24 The Chamber has reviewed the Deputy Registrar's fourth submission
25 regarding medical records pertaining to Milan Babic filed on the
1 9th of May, 2013, as well as the ex parte annexes attached therein.
2 These annexes contain inter alia the relevant medical information
3 referred to in Judge Parker's report on Milan Babic's death.
4 The Chamber notes that the said medical records, including
5 inter alia the psychological evacuations conducted on the
6 5th of March, 2004, and the 7th of February, 2006, containing no
7 suggestion that Milan Babic suffered from a personality disorder that
8 would affect his credibility as a witness as was alleged by Milan Martic.
9 Furthermore, the Chamber notes that the information provided by
10 Judge Parker in his report on Milan Babic's death is a comprehensive
11 account of the conclusions found in the medical reports and other
12 information that the Chamber has reviewed.
13 For those reasons, the Chamber is of the view that in the
14 circumstances, the interest of justice does not demand that the accused
15 be provided with the confidential medical information of Milan Babic. It
16 has, therefore, decided to deny the accused 's motion for disclosure of
17 Milan Babic's record.
18 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good afternoon, your
20 Excellencies. Good afternoon to everyone.
21 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, President Martic.
23 A. Good afternoon.
24 Q. I'd like us to finish before the break. In that regard, I will
25 ask you to provide me with short answers, if possible, if my questions
1 are as concise as possible.
2 You said a moment ago that the JNA got involved in the conflict
3 at a point in time when it actually was confronted with the reasons to
4 defend itself; right?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. The issue concerned Captain Dragan. Before his arrival at the
7 request of Milan Babic, was Captain Dragan convicted or even accused of a
9 A. I don't know about that.
10 Q. Thank you. Do you happen to know what sort of relations existed
11 between the state security of Serbia and the state security of
13 A. Insofar as I know, the two security services had some sort of
14 animosity and mistrust prevailing between the two. Yugoslavia had been
15 broken down, and there were still employees of other ethnicities working
16 for the state security of Yugoslavia. So I couldn't call their relations
17 harmonious, but they did co-operate.
18 Q. Thank you. Which of the two security services was the one that
19 Arkan was closer to?
20 A. It was the federal State Security Service. There are many
21 documents which confirm the fact that he was practically there in that
23 Q. Thank you. Did you happen to observe in whose official vehicles
24 would Arkan come from the Republic of Serbia, which of the two security
1 A. I think that the vehicles belonged to the federal service.
2 Q. Thank you. Now, on the issue of Arkan, was Arkan captured by the
3 Croatian side at some point?
4 A. Yes, he was, and it was, I think, in late 1990. He spent roughly
5 half a year in a prison in Croatia.
6 Q. Thank you. Did Croatia bring him before a court?
7 A. No. He was never tried.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. I know Mr. Karadzic is trying to move
10 forward quickly. He's generally pretty good about reminding witnesses to
11 pause so the translations can be made. That's not happening at the
12 moment, so if both he and Mr. Martic could be reminded accordingly.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
14 Please bear in mind. At least you should pause yourself,
15 Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I fully accept that, and I thank
17 Mr. Tieger. Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. In the document P6313, the title of the document is "Report on
20 the fulfillment of the obligation." Can you tell the Chamber whether
21 there is any difference between the fulfillment of an obligation and
22 execution of an order?
23 A. Well, the difference is enormous. One thing is the obligation
24 that would arise from regulations, and that would boil down to one's day
25 to day work. An order coming down from a superior institution is quite a
1 different matter.
2 Q. Thank you. My learned friend the distinguished Mr. Tieger
3 mentioned the joint criminal enterprise in connection with this document.
4 Perisic asked that Celeketic let the convoy pass through. What is your
5 understanding of the -- this event where a convoy was let through and the
6 existence of a joint criminal enterprise?
7 A. There is no joint criminal enterprise. That's a fictitious
8 construct on the part of the Prosecution.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER: Okay. First of all, I didn't introduce the document
11 in the terms that Mr. Karadzic is suggesting. I asked about the
12 document. It may be later on during the course of discussing the
13 document's reference I was obliged to explain some aspects of its -- of
14 how these issues interconnect, but that could not possibly in any event
15 be a basis for inviting a dissertation by this witness on these matters,
16 and I would ask that Mr. Karadzic be limited in redirect to factual
17 issues specifically arising from the questions asked in cross.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Absolutely. Mr. Tieger didn't raise the issue
19 of joint criminal enterprise with respect to that document.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, that may be correct, but in
21 his cross-examination he raised the whole issue of who these people were
22 working for and what the connection was between Milosevic and the people
23 in Serbia and the other members of the alleged joint criminal enterprise.
24 So I think that it comes within the scope of cross-examination.
25 JUDGE KWON: Of course, but connecting that to the document was
1 inappropriate, in my opinion. Please, let's continue.
2 MR. TIEGER: And just for what it's worth, if the accused wants
3 to limit himself to asking questions about particular people that appear
4 in a document or particular questions that were asked, that's one thing,
5 but to fall back on some broad question of opinion calling for this
6 breadth of legal and factual analysis akin to an expert is not
7 appropriate and that's another one of the -- the flaws in this kind of
8 approach and he adopted that approach in taking the statement. He wants
9 to reintroduce it in the redirect inappropriately. And that's another
10 thing -- I'm sorry to raise it but I'm just concerned it will come up in
11 further questions.
12 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do believe that I'm right. When
14 explaining the reasons why this document should be admitted, he mentioned
15 joint criminal enterprise. There, I caught them in the act, that they
16 were asking for the convoy to be let through. I mean, the latter part is
17 my addition, but that is the gist of it.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. At page 23 of today's transcript, line 20, mention is made of the
20 fact that Franko Simatovic, Frenki, said that the entire Serbian people
21 was in jeopardy, was at risk. When was that special unit that was being
22 discussed established, do you recall?
23 A. Yes. The thing is that it was not meant to be established as a
24 special unit. It was set up pursuant to a request from Milan Babic that
25 people should be brought over to train our policemen for possible combat,
1 which would come in handy since the conflict had basically begun.
2 Q. And the date of the 4th of May, 1991, that is mentioned, is it
4 A. Yes. It should be consistent roughly.
5 Q. Now, in the document where Jovica Stanisic is mentioned, the
6 neo-fascist elements in the Croatian government are mentioned. Can you
7 tell us and you tried to do so during the cross-examination, what were
8 the developments and what in these developments told you that a war was
9 in the offing, and what does this word neo-Fascism that was mentioned by
10 Simatovic tell you? What did this fact that he said that the entire
11 Serbian people was at risk, what did that tell you?
12 A. Well, of course, this requires a broader explanation.
13 MR. TIEGER: Of course it does, and I'm going to object because
14 it's the kind of question at best that can be posed to a witness in
15 direct examination. It's very unlikely to arise from a
16 cross-examination, and it didn't in this case. So to refer to some
17 isolated reference in one of the documents that were put to the witness
18 and then try to use that as a launching pad for a lengthy dissertation is
19 inappropriate and I object.
20 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to respond, Mr. Robinson.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I think the question was maybe -- quite a few
22 elements in it, but if you take the one part where he refers to
23 Mr. Simatovic saying that the entire Serbian people were at risk, this
24 relates to something that was introduced during the cross-examination and
25 I think Mr. Martic is allowed to explain what he believed Mr. Simatovic
1 was referring to.
2 MR. TIEGER: It's easy for Mr. Robinson to say this was raised
3 during cross-examination. I don't believe it was and I'd like him to
4 explain how he considers this was raised by the cross-examination other
5 than the fact that there are some documents that have peripheral
6 references to this concept.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, Mr. President, I thought that in the
8 address Mr. Simatovic was making at the ceremony, the anniversary
9 ceremony, that he had made some reference to that.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber doesn't consider that this topic arises
12 out of the cross-examination. Even if it does, it would not assist the
13 Chamber very much. Please move on.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. President, you were accused in the indictment and during the
17 cross-examination it was said that you were a participant in the joint
18 criminal enterprise together with me. I was allegedly a participant as
19 well, which implied among other things the unification of the Serbian
20 lands, the creation of a situation that would bring us all into one
21 country, et cetera.
22 What were the reasons for our communication? Did something
23 prompt us to it, or was it completely out of the blue that we wanted to
24 spoil an idyllic situation that prevailed in Yugoslavia?
25 A. In the briefest of terms, our ties were with a view to the
1 preservation of Yugoslavia because we were in jeopardy with a neo-fascist
2 government emerging in Croatia, and we were in the briefest of terms
3 fighting for the preservation of Yugoslavia. Now as for the joint
4 criminal enterprise alleged by the Prosecution, this is pure fiction.
5 It's not something that ever existed. Or, to put it properly, there was
6 a joint criminal enterprise on the part of the separatist forces that
7 waged an armed conflict against Yugoslavia, and there is hard evidence to
8 that effect. Both the presidents of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
9 publicly spoke out about it, that they wanted a war and that they could
10 have averted a war had it been in their interest. So obviously in that
11 quarter there was a joint criminal enterprise, but it was in somebody's
12 interest to accuse us who were in favour of Yugoslavia of that.
13 Q. You -- the charges accusing us that we wanted a common state.
14 Did we ask for something that we had not had before or we already had a
15 joint state.
16 A. We already had a joint state in which all the peoples were equal
17 and that included the Serbs, and we wanted the situation to remain as it
19 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the two presidents and their statements
20 according to which they wanted a war, and what did you know about the
21 activities and conduct of their closest associates? And as part of that
22 conduct was there something that inspired you, prompted you to
24 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, Mr. Martic.
25 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: Again, I object, sorry to do that, but clearly not
2 arising from cross. In fact it arises from the witness's -- if it arises
3 from anything, from the witness's answer to Dr. Karadzic's effort to
4 re-introduce the subject after it had been previously and successfully
5 objected to. But in any event, this is, you know, the activities of the
6 associates of the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia was
7 not a matter that was raised in cross-examination.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My brief response to that would be
9 this: The entire cross-examination suggested that the Serbs in Croatia
10 and Bosnia undertook unnecessary measures of caution or
11 self-organisation. The organisation of events as if there hadn't been a
12 reason for that, if there hadn't been a context.
13 I would now like to ask President Martic to tell us what was
14 behind that. Was that out of the blue that the Serbs provoked that, or
15 was there a reason? The Prosecution painted a picture and portrayed
16 Serbs as doing something with no good reason at all. And if you want me
17 to be of assistance there --
18 JUDGE KWON: I think your argument seems to be going too far. I
19 will consult my colleagues.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Karadzic, it's too broad. Please move on
22 to another topic.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. In that case, it was suggested that units, instructors,
25 Captain Dragan and others were sent to you. Why were they sent? Why did
1 your units and MUP members have to be trained?
2 A. On the 31st of March, Croatian forces attacked us in Plitvice
3 lakes. That was on the 31st of March. And one could say that that was
4 the first serious incident that ever happened. After that, Milan Babic,
5 who had already proclaimed himself as the president of the
6 Executive Council of the SAO Krajina, decided to join that area to Serbia
7 and that provoked rage, they in -- President Milosevic and others,
8 because at that moment it was impossible to do that. That was not
9 sustainable. After that there was a referendum, and the question for the
10 referendum was whether you want to stay in Yugoslavia. The response was
11 100 per cent positive. The people opted for staying in Yugoslavia.
12 After all that, Milan Babic did seek assistance. Actually, he requested
13 help. He sent a request to Milosevic, the President of Serbia and the
14 MUP of Serbia. He asked them to send people to train our own people for
15 a possible war in the future, although there was already a war going on.
16 Q. Did the leaders of Croatia even before that attack, do you
17 remember Boljkovic, Spegelj, and others? Did they make any
19 A. Yes, of course. Things were going on. I would like to inform
20 you about something else. Tudjman as the president of Croatia already in
21 1987 when he finally obtained a passport, although he could not have it
22 before, he travelled to Canada and explained his plan --
23 JUDGE KWON: I think it was a bit misleading as well, but I'd
24 like you to move on.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I wanted to play
1 a video-clip depicting Spegelj's words in the autumn of 1990 in
2 preparation of war. With your permission, I would like to play it, and
3 that was the foundation of everything that the Serbs did later in
4 Croatia. And Spegelj was the minister of defence of Croat. Am I allowed
5 to do that?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I will hear from you, Mr. Tieger, first.
7 MR. TIEGER: Well, first of all, it's an astonishingly - and I've
8 said it before but I continue to feel that way - leading approach to even
9 a bona fide attempt to introduce such a document explaining in advance
10 how the witness should receive it. But beyond that, we're far afield
11 from the questions posed on cross-examination. This is a continuing
12 attempt by Mr. Karadzic to circumvent the Court's previous decisions
13 about his effort to -- beyond the scope of direct and forces me to get on
14 my feet repeatedly but I will continue to do so when he continues to ask
15 questions that go beyond the scope, and this one clearly does.
16 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Mr. Tieger's observation.
17 If you have some other topics, shall we take a break? How long would you
18 need, Karadzic?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ten minutes or so. So perhaps a
20 break would be welcome before I continue, or perhaps if you can allow me
21 to go on for another ten minutes or so I can completely re-examination.
22 JUDGE KWON: I don't have any difficulty with it, if it is
23 convenient to you as well.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. President, you were asked about the opening of the corridor.
2 Why was it necessary to open a corridor in a state? Why was it necessary
3 to open that corridor?
4 A. The corridor was originally closed by the regular Croatian
5 forces. There were a total of seven brigades that Tudjman had sent out
6 to Posavina. Together with the Croatian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
7 and Muslims, they closed the passage and cut off our Republic of Serbian
8 Krajina, its western part and the Bosnian Krajina in its western part.
9 People there were completely cut off from the state of Serbia. Not only
10 were they cut off, but they were deprived of bare necessities, medicines.
11 As a result, the situation became extremely difficult. People who were
12 sick were dying because of the shortage of medicine. There was the
13 notorious case of the 12 babies who died in Banja Luka because of the
14 lack of oxygen. In Knin, people on dialysis were dying. So it was a
15 tacit murder of those of person. Before that, we sent hundreds of
16 letters to the United Nations, the Secretary-General, the presiding of
17 the Security Council, and two various other addressees asking them to
18 allow us to get our supplies from Serbia because the situation was simply
19 unbearable. It was simply unbelievable that we were a territory under
20 the protection of the United Nations and we were still reduced to such a
22 One of those attempts was our agreement in Banja Luka. What I
23 remember, President Karadzic, is something that is branded in my memory.
24 After all the possible attempts of correspondence and sending letters to
25 various addresses, you still tried to convince the international
1 community, at least that's what you told us, to give us the so-called
2 blue road, which means that our convoys with medicines and food would be
3 escorted by the United Nations. Unfortunately, that was all fruitless,
4 but I remember how much you tried to deal with matters in a peaceful way.
5 And after that, the only possible solution was to break the
6 corridor through by force otherwise we would have died. The whole region
7 was condemned to starvation.
8 Q. Thank you, President. I will move on to another topic. Let's
9 avoid confusion. You said the seven brigades of the Croatian Army. You
10 were talking about a corridor that was close. Was it in Croatia or
12 A. It was in Bosnian Posavina, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in other
14 Q. Thank you. You were asked about the possible unification or the
15 possible creation or preservation of Yugoslavia or the creation of an
16 alliance of Serbian states, and so on and so forth. Did I or you or
17 anybody else who was mentioned in the indictment show preparedness to
18 sacrifice peace for any goal whatsoever?
19 A. Of course the answer is yes. I remember that beared very well.
20 We even made concessions in order to establish peace. All the options
21 that were part of your activities were geared towards peace. One thing
22 that I cannot forget is your effort to have everybody accept Vance's
23 plan. Among many people, members of the academia, and wise people in
24 Serbia who opted for Vance's plan and peacekeeping forces that would be a
25 protective force in Croatia, and that all would result in a political
1 solution. You advocated that and that was accepted.
2 Another striking moment in your activity was when you worked in
3 favour of Cutileiro's plan, although it was not in favour of us, but even
4 at our own detriment you accepted that. So even at our own detriment we
5 did our best to find a peaceful solution.
6 Q. President, the first sentence on line 5, does this mean that we
7 were prepared to sacrifice peace for our own goals, or did we want to
8 deal with matters peacefully? The way it was recorded is that we were
9 prepared to sacrifice peace.
10 A. No, I may have misspoken. It was just the contrary. We were in
11 favour of peace, which is why we were prepared to do things that are our
12 own detriment at times.
13 Q. Thank you. In P2555 which is a document that I would like to
14 call up for a brief moment, this is my correspondence with Vukovic and
15 Grahovac. It's a P document, 2555, page 3. It's a Prosecution document.
16 Page 3, please. Let's look at the biggest entry in the middle.
17 Radovan Karadzic is speaking, and he says we want to stay in the federal
18 state of Yugoslavia. Do you want to be a Greater Serbia or a separate
19 republic? A separate republic is the best, an unrealistic option for
20 Milan to us for a separate federal unit. How does this tally with your
21 information about my activities and what I advocated? How does this
22 tally with my effort to preserve Yugoslavia?
23 A. As far as I can see this is what happened after the Grahovo
24 declaration, if I'm not mistaken. You are talking to Mr. Vukic, and you
25 explain to him what would happen if Babic's option had been accepted.
1 The option for us to ask to be in the federation as a new federation
2 member corresponds to the peaceful solution of the crisis, but obviously
3 it was impossible to form an association that would include Bosnian
4 Krajina, predominantly inhabited by the Serbs, and the Republic of
5 Serbian Krajina. I believe that this is what you're talking about. This
6 is your interpretation as to what would happen if things remained as they
7 were. You were in favour of a federal unit rather than the proposal
8 tabled by Mr. Babic.
9 Q. Thank you. You pointed out that you knew that I advocated
10 constitutional solutions. In your view did the course of developments
11 impose changes to our positions? Before the war broke out and after the
12 war broke out, did our positions remain the same? Could they remain the
14 A. Of course they had to change with the situation. However, in all
15 the combinations, as far as I knew you, you always advocated peaceful
16 options and solutions.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, President. I don't have
18 any further questions.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That concludes your evidence,
20 Mr. Martic. Thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.
21 And I -- the Chamber's thanks also go to Mr. Bourgon.
22 THE ACCUSED: I hope that the DU knows about your decision that
23 it concerns also President Martic, that I can meet him after the -- his
25 JUDGE KWON: I think the Chamber made it clear when it gave its
1 clarification on order earlier on.
2 Before we have a break, I have a question for Mr. Karadzic or
3 Mr. Robinson. I am take it that Mr. Borovcanin has already arrived?
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: And the -- under the anticipation that he would give
6 testimony last week.
7 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE KWON: When he is going to testify?
9 MR. ROBINSON: On the first week of June.
10 JUDGE KWON: While the Chamber fully understand the difficulty
11 related to the logistics and the unexpected delay as in the case of
12 Mr. Galic's testimony, the Chamber is concerned about the unnecessary
13 prolongation of the stay of the detained witnesses.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. The reason for
15 Mr. Borovcanin's scheduling is twofold. First you imposed a 14-day
16 notice requirement so that his testimony cannot commence until 14 days
17 after his statement is disclosed. And secondly, we had scheduled his
18 testimony for the end of May, but at the request of the Prosecution we
19 postponed it until early June because of the unavailability of the lawyer
20 who was to cross-examine.
21 JUDGE KWON: At the moment I leave it at that, but please bear in
22 mind that in the general sense the Chamber has concerns such as this.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at
1 [The witness withdrew]
2 --- Recess taken at 12.41 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 1.33 p.m.
4 [The witness entered court]
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, before we continue, as regards the
6 Special Police celebration video-clip, the Chamber will add only those
7 parts, excerpts shown to the witness, to the existing evidence.
8 MR. TIEGER: I think just by way of quick clarification,
9 Mr. President, if I may.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 MR. TIEGER: I take it that means the portions also read out to
12 him, it's not physically showing.
13 JUDGE KWON: No, physically shown. Shown parts. We didn't hear
14 anything about --
15 MR. TIEGER: Let's address it when we have a moment to do so and
16 I'll get the portions I'm referring to, but I advised him that the
17 transcript contained references. I hoped that transcript would be called
18 up, and so on, but it was intended to be the precise equivalent of
19 showing it in any other form. I mean, it was intended to cover -- to
20 confront the witness with the portion, the relevant portion of the video
21 and the transcript indicate precisely what the substance of that was and
22 in fact what it was verbatim, and then ask questions about that. So I --
23 I'm simply hoping that the fact that the video real wasn't shown should
24 not preclude those portions from being admitted in.
25 In this case to the best of my recollection, it's only the final
1 faze of a lengthy speech, most of which is already in evidence, so for
2 expediency I simply identified the portion that wasn't. And one
3 reference to one sentence, homage, that was paid to somebody else.
4 That's my recollection of what it included, but I would hope that that
5 wouldn't preclude the admission of those portions because it's simply a
6 different modality but the same substance.
7 JUDGE KWON: Without being asked general questions, all
8 Mr. Martic did was a confirmation of certain identification of a few
9 individuals. So I think in liaising with the parties, the court deputy
10 would be able to identify the portion put to the witness. That's the
12 Good afternoon, Dr. Subotic. Do you hear in me your language,
13 Dr. Subotic?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. If you could make the solemn
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
18 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 WITNESS: ZORICA SUBOTIC
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Doctor, please be seated and make
22 yourself comfortable.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
24 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Dr. Subotic.
1 A. Good afternoon.
2 Q. I see that your viral infection is a bit worse than it was during
3 proofing. So if at any point in time you need a break, please let us
4 know and I'm sure that the Trial Chamber will take due action.
5 A. Well, I've already said in the proofing room that I have a
6 problem with my throat, but I hope that won't be a problem and I will be
7 able to complete my testimony. I do have a request. During the
8 proofing, I realised that there were a certain number of errors in my
9 report that might lead to a misunderstanding or to a poor understanding
10 of the subject matter, so I would like to point them out now before we
11 begin, because there was no occasion to enter these corrections into my
12 report before I came here.
13 Q. Thank you. I will have to request, and I will have to remind
14 myself, too, that you pause between my question and your answer, and I
15 should do the same, and sometimes the interpretation will lag behind.
16 Now, as for the corrections, I will ask you when we reach that
17 point in the report. I will ask you about what it is you want to
18 correct, but before that, could you tell us briefly, because the
19 Trial Chamber have before them your CV and your bibliography, so would
20 you just briefly tell us about your background, your expertise, the posts
21 that you occupied, the work that you did, the jobs, the number of reports
22 or works that you did, and so on. Could you just give us a brief outline
23 of your background.
24 A. Well, I completed the University of Belgrade school of mechanical
25 engineering. That's how I began my career. And after I earned my
1 bachelors degree, I began working for the Military Technical Institute in
2 the classical weapons section --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Conventional weapons, interpreter's correction.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- in the ballistics subsection.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. How many expert papers did you write or draft?
7 A. Well, I believe over 100, perhaps 120 to 150. And these research
8 papers were -- they differed. There are papers that were published after
9 national an international conventions and congresses, and also the
10 research I did as part of my work at the Military Technical Institute.
11 In addition, since 2000 or -- since the year 2000, I have been an
12 expert witness for ballistics registered with the Ministry of Justice in
13 the Republic of Serbia, and I was re-appointed two years ago. And I also
14 work on developing designs for warehouses and ranges, shooting ranges,
15 for training purposes for firearms, as well as design of warehouses for
16 storing ammunition and lethal assets both for military purposes and for
17 civilian use.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
19 Dr. Subotic, although Mr. Karadzic advised you, I would like to
20 advise you again. In particular, we -- since we are going to deal with
21 very technical issues, it's imperative for you to put a pause before you
22 start answering the question. Probably you will be familiar with
23 watching the LiveNote transcription from time to time, so when
24 interpretation of Mr. Karadzic's question is concluded, it is then time
25 for you to start answering the question. If you could pay attention to
1 that, please.
2 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My apologies. I thought that I was
4 already minding it, and I will be very careful. My apologies once again.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Thank you. I believe that due to the speed of speech there may
7 have been a misunderstanding. Did you say that you design warehouses and
8 shooting ranges or only warehouses?
9 A. I said that I design shooting ranges and warehouses.
10 Q. I'm not sure how to interpret a shooting range. Perhaps it's
11 better to say shooting polygons, I'm not sure, but anyhow, these are
12 ranges where shooting is conducted; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you take part in other projects? Is there anything else in
15 your professional resume that you would like to point out as a dominant
16 feature of your expertise?
17 A. Well, I don't know if there's anything else I should add to this
18 resume that I've already handed in.
19 Q. Thank you. Could we now please take a look at your expertise on
20 modified aerial bombs. Could you please give us a brief summary of the
21 report. Tell us who drafted it and what it comprised.
22 A. Well, I will first answer your question and then I will take this
23 opportunity to make the corrections that you said I may do when the
24 document in question is before us. I prepared my paper together with my
25 associates --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
2 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
3 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry to interrupt at this stage. Two things.
4 The witness appears to be referring to a document that is apparently not
5 her report, a document she has in front of her, I'm sorry, and if we
6 could just get some indication of what that is and what the references
8 Two, she's now mentioned a couple of times corrections that it
9 appears Dr. Karadzic is familiar with she wishes to make to her report,
10 corrections that arose in proofing. We have received no notice of any
11 corrections, so I'd just like to get some clarification as to why that
13 JUDGE KWON: Perhaps Mr. Robinson could assist us.
14 MR. ROBINSON: I myself was not aware of corrections, so I think
15 Dr. Karadzic will have to address that.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have just learned about this just
17 before we began, and I believe these are really typographical errors and
18 minor details to deal with technical parameters and figures perhaps, but
19 there's nothing of a substantial nature. These are just minor errors
20 that Dr. Subotic noticed during the proofing. During the proofing we did
21 not make those corrections, but we will see what it is about when she
22 points them out.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We haven't learned this during the
25 proofing. The transcript does not reflect what I said.
1 JUDGE KWON: No. What doctor said is this:
2 "During the proofing, I realised that there were a certain number
3 of errors in my report that might lead to a misunderstanding or a poor
5 So it arose during the proofing process, didn't it? Dr. Subotic?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct. This happened
7 during my final preparations for this testimony, and I noted it down, and
8 I stressed it. I pointed it out here because I felt that I should do so,
9 and I brought these corrections with me here, but we did not really have
10 an opportunity -- I did not have an opportunity to give them to anyone
11 because I've just arrived recently.
12 JUDGE KWON: And what you have in front of you is those
14 So are you satisfied with the clarification, Ms. Gustafson?
15 MS. GUSTAFSON: It's not entirely clear to me, but I'll leave it
16 at that. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Shall we continue, Mr. Karadzic.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Well, I believe there's a misunderstanding, because Dr. Subotic
20 said that this happened during her preparations and not during our
21 co-operation. Her preparations on her own.
22 Now, could you please tell us what these corrections are, what
23 pages they should be on, and we will begin with the modified air-bombs.
24 A. Yes. On page 64, the last two lines in the text on this page
25 read in parentheses, "On condition that these were --"
1 Q. Doctor, because the pages differ in English and in Serbian, would
2 you please refer to paragraph numbers. Perhaps that's better. Would
3 this be in paragraph 30?
4 A. Just a moment, please. Yes, that's paragraph 30. The fifth
5 paragraph from the top. So it reads, "On the condition that these were
6 FAB 250/4," and it should read instead "On the condition that these were
7 FAB 250/4 or 250/3."
8 Q. Thank you. Would you please go on. Now, could you just tell us
9 what these /3 and /4 are a reference to?
10 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure I'm following. Did you locate the
11 paragraph, Ms. Gustafson?
12 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes. In the copy I have it's at the bottom of
13 page 66, some language that's in parentheses, two lines up from the
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the text
16 before us.
17 JUDGE KWON: I think the problem seems to be that we have various
18 versions of the report. Shall we upload it.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we then pull up in e-court --
20 just a moment, please.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I assume that the paragraph numbers
22 would be the same in any version.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph 30 in my version begins
24 with "Berko Zecevic," whereas paragraph 5 --
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, from the aforementioned, it
1 is clear that -- is that what you mean?
2 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit number -- or the 65 ter number for the
3 air-bomb report.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that's 1D25159. We have
5 a redacted version, so I'm not really sure. 7900. That's 65 ter 1D7900.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: I think in that 65 ter it is again at the bottom
7 of page 66, in the English at least.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. So can we see
9 paragraph 30. That would be between the pages 64 and 66.
10 JUDGE KWON: In my hard copy version, paragraph 30 appears on
11 page 69. That's the problem.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In Serbian we see it now, and those
13 are the last two lines where this correction has to be made. Could we
14 see page 30 in English. Yes, now, we have it. And here it is the last
15 three lines.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. So we should add either FAB or FAB-250/3. Could you tell us what
18 this is a reference to, FAB-250/3?
19 A. This designation FAB-250/4 and FAB-250/3 means that this is a
20 modified aerial bomb because two or three rocket engines were modified.
21 Q. Three or four.
22 A. Yes, three or four.
23 Q. Can you tell us where the next correction is?
24 A. Yes, in the same document, the next correction concerns
25 paragraph 47, which in my copy is page 72, line 3, where it reads, "As
1 stated in item --" actually, it reads under item 32, "As stated in item
3 Q. In English it does seem to say item 45.
4 A. Well, then it must be a correction that I notified you of earlier
6 Q. Can you direct your attention to line 3 in paragraph 47 in the
7 English version. Is that the correction you meant? You also have the
8 Serbian version.
9 A. Yes. Yes. I must have sent this correction out previously and
10 then noticed it unchanged in my own copy. Anyway, also, paragraph 61 in
11 my copy, that's page 94 paragraph 2, line 1, below image 42, it reads:
12 "For the projectile in image 41," whereas it should read "The projectile
13 from image 42."
14 There's one other correction.
15 Q. Can you help us with what we have on our screens? Where is that?
16 A. Well, I meant image or figure 42. That should be on the next
17 page, because we need figure 42.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have page 93 on the screen, and I
20 need page 94 in Serbian. Yes. There it is.
21 THE ACCUSED: English next page, please, too.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Can you give us the line in question?
24 A. I'm looking at the page in Serbian. It's paragraph 2 below
25 figure 42 where it reads: "For the projectile in figure 41," whereas it
1 should read "figure 42" instead of "figure 41."
2 Q. Can we find it in English, please? It's the second or the third
3 paragraph in English. You see it, the projectile in figure [In English]
4 60. It goes to the figure -- "Projectile in figure 41." It should be
5 "42." [Interpretation] Thank you. Can you give us the next correction?
6 A. There is another correction which relates to paragraph 64. Under
7 C in my copy it's page 96.
8 Q. 103 is the page in English. 103, 103 English, C.
9 A. Sub-item C, line 3, reads -- actually, line 2, "Aerial bomb
10 FAB-100 with one or three motors or engines," whereas it should read the
11 "FAB-100 aerial bomb with three engines," as is in fact the case. And
12 that will be all for this document.
13 Q. So the word "one," or rather, the bit "one or" should be deleted?
14 A. Yes, indeed, and only "three" should stay.
15 Q. Thank you. And those would be all the corrections you had in
16 this document?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Thank you. Can we now briefly go through the incidents. Can you
19 introduce them to us, and then if need be, we will go into more detailed
21 Look at incident G10, please. It is an incident at Hrasnica near
22 the Aleksa Santic school. Can you tell us in a nutshell what sort of
23 physical evidence you had and what were your conclusions based on that?
24 A. As was the case with all the other incidents, in this one, too,
25 we used the documents that contained the following information: They
1 were either the investigation documents belonging to the local police,
2 investigation documents belonging to UNPROFOR and KDZ, documents which
3 were witness statements or testimonies, footage which related to these
4 incidents, as well as all the various documents that we were able to
5 obtain from the previous trials which looked into these incidents.
6 As for this specific incident, based on the physical traces that
7 could be obtained from the site we arrived at the conclusion about the
8 type of bomb, the incoming trajectory or the direction from which it
9 came, and the possible target. We established what the type and form of
11 Now, the type of bomb, based on the material evidence contained
12 in CSB documents, and based on the information that could be gleaned from
13 the photographs of the feature that was hit, and on the basis of the
14 destructive power that could be ascertained based on these photographs,
15 it was concluded that this was the result of a FAB-100 with a TNT charge,
16 that the incoming trajectory, based on the diagram of the scene, which
17 was also provided, passed across the Aleksa Santic school.
18 Based on the video footage, it was established that this was a
19 military feature which was mentioned in this report, and in particular it
20 was established that this was not a bomb that would have spatial effect
21 because there are survivors, live witnesses who would not have survived
22 in that particular incident had the bomb been of spatial effect.
23 Another thing that I have to say is there was a FAB-100 with
24 three rocket engines of the Grad type, and that it impacted upon contact
25 with the building, which is something that was concluded by the
1 investigators of UNPROFOR. I think it was captain --
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the name.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- and this, too, can be deduced
4 from the facts that the projectile made where the damage was such that --
5 that the building caved in.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. When you say that this was an area bomb, can you tell us what the
8 charges of one bomb and what the charges of the other bomb would be?
9 A. When I say that this is an area bomb, I mean that it was filled
10 with liquid explosive, the so-called fuel air explosive, and I think that
11 my collaborator Dr. Andjelkovic explained this in greater detail, but let
12 me explain it briefly. This is the principle according to which this
13 bomb works: It consists of a single container wherein there is liquid
14 explosive. There is a small solid explosive charge whose only purpose is
15 to break open the container. Once the liquid explosive spills out, it
16 mixes with oxygen, thus bringing into play the primers under pressure of
17 between 20 to 40 bars that would be active in an area of between 20 to
18 40 metres.
19 The main purpose of this bomb would be to clear an area of mines.
20 However, this bomb proved highly effective in combat against living
21 organisms, and the effect of such a bomb is highly lethal, and as a rule,
22 any living organism in the area will die.
23 Q. Thank you. Why did you find it important to state that this was
24 not a fuel air-bomb?
25 A. Well, the reason behind it was that in my colleague
1 Berko Zecevic, in his expert report that was presented here in this case
2 claimed the opposite, in fact; namely that the fuel air-bomb was at play
3 here, and we had to analyse the effects upon the target and to check how
4 founded this assertion was from a highly technical point of view. I
5 forgot to mention that as I said at the very beginning, there is a
6 quantity of between 2 to 3 kilogrammes of liquid explosives. The
7 containers that are broken open remain in large fragments, and in none of
8 these cases were the investigators able to find large fragments of the
9 jacket which would be one of the serious reasons to suspect that there
10 was an area bomb at play at that scene.
11 Q. Thank you. Can we briefly look at paragraph 10 and figure 9.
12 You said that the bomb flew along its trajectory above the Aleksa Santic
13 school. And how far was it from the Aleksa Santic school that the bomb
15 A. We visited the scene of the incident, as is know, and the
16 school -- or, rather, the fence of the school is 20 metres away from the
17 building that was hit. The school itself was some 17 to 18 metres away.
18 We didn't really measure the distance. It was inappropriate to go there
19 when the school pupils were there. So we measured the distance between
20 the fence and the building, and it was found to be 20 metres, whereas the
21 report itself said that it was between 70 and 80 metres.
22 Q. And what does figure 9 depict? And we can leave only the English
23 version on the screen for the time being.
24 A. Figure 9 depicts a sketch of the site which was drafted by the
25 investigator. From the crater you can see the trajectory of the bomb,
1 and that trajectory, trajectory 1 which was established by the CVS
2 Sarajevo, when that trajectory is transposed onto Google Earth map, it
3 runs parallelly, and if you tie this to the place of the incident you can
4 see that it goes right above the Aleksa Santic school. That's why we
5 concluded, and also based on the fact that it was very close to the
6 school, i.e., that it was less than 0.5 probable radial aberrations, that
7 the target was most probably the Aleksa Santic school, because on the
8 site of the military school it was seen that -- it was also a military
9 facility, i.e., that military training was taking place there which is
10 what you can find in our findings.
11 Q. If you cannot calculate, can you then just assume what was the
12 overshoot in respect of the school? The bomb flew across the roof;
14 A. No, we did not do that calculation. It can be calculated. The
15 overshoot was very minute in terms of the height. I really can't tell
16 you how much, but I suppose it was less than 1 metre across the roof or
17 over the roof.
18 Q. Thank you. We don't have the time, but let me just say that you
19 did not see a new United Nations document dated the 9th February, and in
20 that document it is stated that that was probably retaliation for a
21 mortar shell that had landed a minute or two before that bomb. But it is
22 really not necessary to deal with the ballistics of that. However, if
23 you'd seen that report, I suppose that it would have been easier for you
24 to make your conclusions. Thank you.
25 JUDGE KWON: You're not giving evidence.
1 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
2 MS. GUSTAFSON: No, same thing. It doesn't appear to have been a
3 question, just useless commentary.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. If I had the time, I
5 would display the document, but I don't. If that document had been
6 disclosed earlier, I'm sure that Dr. Subotic would have added and would
7 have taken it into account.
8 Let's look at G11 and tell us, please, briefly, what that was
9 about. In my copy it's page 57. In English it must be thereabouts.
10 Paragraph 14 and 15.
11 A. Please allow me to take a look. Please bear with me.
12 THE ACCUSED: Could we have paragraph 14. Yeah, that's it.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. What is physical evidence and what did it show with regard to
15 this particular incident?
16 A. The incident occurred in Safeta Zajke Street 43. A bomb landed
17 in the street. Everything is very well marked here, and we had very good
18 traces. Obviously there were certain discrepancies with regard to the
19 findings based on documents. I will draw your attention to the fact that
20 we concluded based on the effects on the target that that was a bomb
21 FAB-100 with three engines. It was absolutely impossible for a bomb like
22 that, an area bomb, to create a crater of the kind as can be seen in
23 photos. It is impossible that something like that would happen. An area
24 bomb contains 3 kilos explosives, so a crater should be small. And we
25 also saw the craters that are produced by 120-millimetre shells.
1 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at paragraph 25, figure 15, and can
2 you explain the conclusions of previous investigations about the incoming
3 trajectory. Paragraph 25 in -- and figure 15.
4 A. Yes. Here we have three trajectories, strategic south which was
5 determined by the CSBs, marked by 1; the azimuth 155 trajectory as
6 determined by Mr. Zecevic. He did not investigate. He made his
7 conclusion based on the drawing and the azimuth 146 azimuth trajectory
8 which was determined by the defence expert based on the schematic. You
9 can see it in figure 14. You can see how we did that. That figure shows
10 that we overlapped the image of the street with a street plan and then we
11 drew our conclusions based on the position of the crater, and that's how
12 we were able to determine the trajectory of the bomb.
13 As I've already told you, here again there was a confusion with
14 regard to the claim that the bomb was an area bomb. From the technical
15 parameter, we can see that that was impossible, because a crater of these
16 dimensions could not have been created by an area bomb. On the other
17 hand, it was not a 250 bomb. Again, dimensions of the crater would not
18 correspond to such a bomb. We carried out investigations, and we
19 documented that in that case. The crater would have been of much bigger
21 Q. Thank you.
22 A. I apologise. Let me just say that all these three trajectories,
23 the one determined by us, by the CSB, and by Mr. Zecevic, they all
24 overshot the wire factory, which is why we concluded that it could have
25 been the target. And that factory was used in war production, at least
1 according to our information.
2 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what building would that be in
3 this photo or on -- in this figure before we go back to figure 14. Can
4 you look at the figure on the screen. Can you point us to the building.
5 A. The building is actually at the point where all these lines meet.
6 Actually, the bomb did not land on the building itself but on the street.
7 Q. How far from the building?
8 A. How far from the building? Let me see how far from the building
9 it landed. The place where the bomb landed was about 100 metres from the
10 wire factory. I have to say immediately that the distance of 100 metres
11 or so is within the range of one radial aberration. And let me say
12 immediately that we took into account the average distance from the place
13 from which the bomb was fired to the place where it landed as being
14 6 kilometres, because the exact parameters did not exist to tell us what
15 the place of launch was.
16 Q. Can you tell the participants, when you say one or two or three
17 radial aberrations, what measure is that, or radial deviation?
18 A. I'll try and explain it in simple terms. Actually we're talking
19 about a statistical description of the probability of the realisation of
20 an event or a statistical bias. When it comes to this kind of a physical
21 phenomenon, we use -- or, rather, the physical process behaves in
22 accordance with the Gauss distribution. According to that we have areas
23 within which certain events take place. Some of them with the certainty
24 of 50 per cent or 70 per cent, 90 per cent, or 100 per cent. When I say
25 1VV which stands for one probable radial deviation, that means that
1 within the range of 2 radial deviations there are 50 per cent of probable
2 realisations of a certain event. Within the range of 4, i.e., plus/minus
3 2 we can find 75 per cent, plus minus three is 90 per cent and 4 is the
4 margin of the area where these events --
5 Q. You mean the left or the right extreme?
6 A. I apologise. It seems that I was too fast. So the remaining few
7 percentage points is where we are talking. The reminder up to the
8 100 per cent which us ballistic experts consider to be inadmissible
9 deviation when it comes to the probability of hitting a target. I don't
10 know whether I've been clear enough, but I've tried to explain the bell
11 curve as best as I could in simple terms.
12 Q. Can you tell us something about the hypothesis as to how big was
13 the overshoot in terms of the height of the building?
14 A. I can't tell you how big the overshoot was but say that descent
15 angles were small. We can apply simple trigonometry and we can determine
16 how far it was because we're talking about a distance of no more than
17 100 metres. Those angles are relatively small, not bigger than
18 25 degrees. I can't tell you off the cuff how much it was and I wouldn't
19 be able to do even the simplest calculation without a calculator.
20 Q. Thank you. Can I draw your attention to incident G12. I believe
21 that you said 20 degrees, not 90.
22 A. Yes, it was 20, not 90. I'm sorry, I'm not following the
24 Q. And it was also said that you can't do it off the cuff without a
25 calculator; right?
1 A. Yes, that's what I said.
2 Q. Can you now look at G12 and tell us what this is all about? What
3 was the physical evidence there, and what did it allow you to conclude?
4 A. The physical evidence here, we can see the sketch of the site.
5 Q. Can we please look at paragraph 32. I apologise. And figure 16.
6 Perhaps it's on the following page in English.
7 THE ACCUSED: Next page English, please.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Go ahead, Doctor.
10 A. Here we have Majdanska Street with no number. This was a
11 modified aerial bomb which impacted next to the transformer station.
12 This is an industrial area, and in figure 16 we made it quite clear. The
13 point of impact of that projectile was about 130 metres away from
14 residential buildings. We established that it was a very serious
15 transformer station that was hit. Based on the crater and the appearance
16 of the crater which left physical evidence that is recorded in figure 18,
17 it was established that according to the experimental value which were
18 plotted by Hunting Engineering Limited, the projectile in question was a
19 bomb with solid explosive, FAB-100, and an impact fuse.
20 When that sketch is placed in Google map or is superimposed on a
21 Google map, we will see that there were some errors in determining the
22 trajectory, and we have demonstrated that in figures 19 and 20. As a
23 result, we have concluded the following --
24 Q. I apologise. Could you please tell us whose errors are that?
25 Whose calculations errors are those?
1 A. Those errors that have to do with the marking of due north in the
2 sketch of the impact site. In that specific case that area was 12.63.
3 When all of that is added together --
4 Q. Can we go to figures 19 and 20 and paragraph 39. Let's zoom in
5 on the first two figures, and then we'll zoom in on the bottom one. Can
6 you please tell us what you meant?
7 A. On the left-hand side you can see a Google Earth image where you
8 can see the azimuth of the transformation station wall in Majdanska. It
9 was 80.47. On the right-hand side is the sketch of the scene, and here
10 we have determined the characteristic angles. The blew line is actual
11 the same wall and we determined the characteristic angles that allowed us
12 to calculate and conclude where exactly the trace was and how big its
13 azimuth actually was. We determined that and the figure is 137.15. That
14 calculation is given in here and it doesn't influence the result greatly,
15 but it has to be made known that errors of that kind in determining due
16 north on the sketches of the site were found in great numbers when we
17 analysed the document -- documents that we had.
18 In other words, we cannot conclude with great reliability based
19 on the documents that we had at our disposal what the exact trajectory
20 was. In any case, the bomb came from the south-east and the range was
21 100 to 150 degrees. As you can see, the direction would be in the
22 direction of the transformation station, and we defined that
23 transformation station as the most probably target of that bomb.
24 Obviously, the distance of -- of the place of impact and the
25 possible target is within the boundaries of one radial deviation.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, in view that this is an industrial zone and
2 bearing in mind the transformer station, does that shed some light on the
3 selection of targets and that this bomb actually target this objective?
4 A. Well, the bomb, we can claim, did actually hit the target,
5 because as far as I remember, it did hit a high power line.
6 Q. Thank you. How certain is it that this industrial zone was the
7 target and not the settlement, the residential area? How far is the
8 residential area?
9 A. Well, we did provide in figure 16 the industrial zone marked, and
10 I believe that we did indicate that it was 130 metres, that the point of
11 impact was 130 metres from the residential part of the town.
12 Q. Thank you. Could we now -- could I now refer you to case -- to
13 case 13. That is the 6th of May, 1995. Incident 13. Could you tell us
14 what the physical evidence suggests, what kind of conclusions, or what
15 kind of conclusion does it impose?
16 A. That's paragraph 42?
17 Q. Yes, paragraph 42, but we have to wait a moment for it to come
18 up. Please go ahead.
19 A. Well, we cannot look at this case, this incident, without taking
20 into account the ricochet that occurred on studio C -- that struck
21 studio C of the TV building.
22 Q. That is incident 17, isn't it? That was deleted from the
23 indictment, but -- or, rather, not from the indictment but from your
24 report, well, from the indictment as well. But for the purpose of
25 explanation, could you please take the liberty and tell us how this is
1 related to that?
2 A. Well, you see, when analysing these two instances and in
3 particular when we analysed the trajectories that were observed here in
4 the -- in the case of this building where a projectile struck the roof of
5 a five-storey building, the trajectory that was determined by the SJB and
6 Mr. Zecevic, we shook that into account. Now, in view of the fact that
7 we had at our disposal the incident involving a ricochet on the
8 passageway, striking the passageway, these two were inter-related, and it
9 was clear because in ricochet on the passage could in no way be
10 connected -- be linked to the bomb that struck the TV building a month
11 later. And then when we analysed precisely and accurately all of this,
12 because we had these pictures and in our photo documentation, when we
13 analysed the ricochet trail, I believe we have that in figure 26, we can
14 see that it is consistent with the trajectory hitting the passageway,
15 because it is directly on the same path, flying over the building at
16 Safeta Hadzica Street 52. Now, we discussed here the possible ricochet
17 directions and we concluded that this could be either a FAB-100 or a
18 FAB-250 bomb in terms of its ballistics and characteristics of flight.
19 We showed this in tables 4 and 4A, and the incident itself in the
20 Safeta Hadzica street number 52 was -- is actually interesting. We did
21 not agree with my colleague Zecevic because he pursued from a premise
22 that is unacceptable in terms of the traces that were found, the effects
23 on the target and the characteristics of aerial bomb with a solid charge.
24 Q. Could we see figure 26, please. In Serbian that's around
25 page 80.
1 A. May I finish?
2 Q. Let me just help you. In paragraph 50, if we can see figure 26.
3 Could we show it to Dr. Subotic so that all involved can follow.
4 A. Well, I have it before me. Now, what happened in this incident.
5 On that day a bomb ricochetted from a passage roof. The azimuth was
6 determined in the expert report that analysed the ricochet and the
7 targeting of the television building, and we determined that the
8 direction was 323 plus/minus 3, and it was very clear because the passage
9 roof was visible, and it was at a 90-degree angle.
10 Q. I apologise, but could we have figure 26. We have before us
11 figure 23. Well, can we just see one of these. We just need one of
12 them. We don't need 23.
13 So could you describe what is this passageway and what kind of
14 ricochet are we talking about? Where did the bomb come from, hit the
15 passageway according to what you found, and then where did it ricochet
17 A. Well, to discuss this, we have to look at the part of the report
18 relating to the television impact.
19 Q. Could you please just describe this image. What is number 1?
20 What is number 3?
21 A. Well, I can, but that will not answer your question. I
22 apologise. That will not constitute an answer to your question. I
23 apologise, but let me do it. I'll do it in a minute.
24 In Google Earth here we have the image of the part of the town
25 where the TV building can be found as well as Safeta Hadzica Street
1 number 52. Number 1 denotes the impact of the ricochet from the same
2 air-bomb on the TV building. Now, the direction of flight that was
3 determined when this was analysed, the strike on the TV, which you can
4 find a little later in my report, was determined to be 232 plus/minus 3,
5 and the trajectory was over -- went over the building in Safeta
6 Hadzica 22, which is marked on this image with number 2.
7 Now, the direction between 1 and 2 and the indication number 3,
8 the marking for number 3, is the direction of the ricochet.
9 Number 4, number 4 is the azimuth of 285, which was established
10 by Berko Zecevic, which we showed to be incorrect in the second half of
11 our report based on this image. And number 5 marks the police station
12 where KDZ477 was.
13 Why is this relevant? Well, Witness KDZ477 testified that he saw
14 this air-bomb in flight. Later on, it was shown that he had claimed that
15 this happened on that day and then on the day when the TV building was
16 struck, actually, which was a month later. And then in the end he
17 reverted to his original claim where in fact he was one of the persons
18 who actually participated in the investigation of this incident involving
19 the television building. That's why it's marked here.
20 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us now where in your report we can
21 find these explanations for the incident in Safeta Hadzica Street
22 number 52? What part of report is this described in, the ricochet?
23 A. Well, part explanation can be found in this part here on the next
24 page from the page that we see before us. We checked the calculations,
25 checking the height of the Y axis for FAB-100 and for FAB-250. Then we
1 also checked the speeds after the ricochets, the velocities which -- for
2 both cases, FAB-100 and 250, and also the ricochet for the angles between
3 5 and15 degrees. And all of these co-ordinates as we can see on the next
4 page actually are consistent with the height of the trajectory in view --
5 in view of the height of the building.
6 Q. Could we see the next page so that we can understand what the
7 witness is telling us.
8 Is all the information in this chapter or can we find it
9 someplace else?
10 A. Well, the trajectory information can be found in the part which
11 discusses the incident involving the TV building where the angle of the
12 ricochet was determined, which represents the azimuth of the point of
13 impact on this building at Safeta Hadzica Street 52. This can be found,
14 if you allow me -- just bear with me a moment. That's in paragraph 97
15 and figures 70 and 71.
16 Q. Unfortunately, this incident was deleted or excluded, but I don't
17 know if we can see this in e-court anyway, because this incident is
18 related to this one, and there is -- we are -- we actually -- there's a
19 certain prejudice as a result of this to our case.
20 Now, could we show this image or perhaps we can show it on the
21 ELMO. Okay. I see that it's all been redacted. The photograph too.
22 Oh, well, then we'll have to take this up tomorrow. We will upload it in
23 e-court and show it. We don't have to admit it into evidence if that is
24 the Chamber's decision, but it can help understanding this better.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I was wondering if the Chamber
1 might reconsider its decision on the redaction of this incident given the
2 link that has been made by the witness at this time.
3 JUDGE KWON: Is there any difficulty, if necessary, for
4 Mr. Karadzic to separately produce the document?
5 MR. ROBINSON: To separately produce this particular image?
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure what it is about at the moment.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we can produce this image in a separate
9 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, shall we adjourn for today.
10 Doctor, you will know that you are not supposed to discuss with
11 anybody else about your testimony.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I do. Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue tomorrow at 9.00, but in Courtroom I.
14 The hearing is adjourned.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.45 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day
17 of May, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.