1 Tuesday, 28 May 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 While entering the courtroom I was told by the Registrar that
8 today we mark the 400th trial day.
9 Yes, Ms. Gustafson, please continue.
10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honours. And good morning.
11 WITNESS: VLADIMIR LUKIC [Resumed]
12 [Witness answered through interpreter]
13 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson: [Continued]
14 Q. And good morning, Dr. Lukic.
15 A. Good morning.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: If I could have P3129, please.
17 Q. Dr. Lukic, in your statement you talked about the issue of
18 refugees and the return of refugees and at paragraph 33 you said that the
19 government tried to help and look after both Serbian and Muslim refugees
20 and did not discriminate in this respect. And at paragraph 46 you stated
21 that the government sought the return of refugees regardless of
23 Now, if we could go to page 8 of the English and page 12 of the
24 B/C/S, and these are the government minutes from the 20th of March, 1993.
25 And item 22, which is at the top of the B/C/S and the middle of the
1 English, in the second-last paragraph it states:
2 "The government emphasised the need for a synchronised and
3 organised action to populate the free areas in the territory of
4 Republika Srpska. To that end, conditions should be created for the
5 return of refugees ..."
6 And it's with respect to this particular item that you said that
7 the government tried to help and after both Serbian and Muslim refugees.
8 So although this document doesn't say anything about ethnicity, it's
9 clearly your evidence that this was a non-discriminatory policy. But in
10 fact, Dr. Lukic, your government sought to strategically populate the
11 Republika Srpska with ethnic Serb refugees in order to create a new
12 demographic reality in the Republika Srpska. Isn't that right?
13 A. I wouldn't be able to draw such a conclusion, not only from this
14 session but also from previous sessions, and first and foremost from what
15 was going on in the field. It is correct that we had refugees from all
16 over Bosnia and Herzegovina. I would say that a lot of them came even
17 from Croatia, maybe half of Croatia even.
18 What I have to say here is this: At one point in Banja Luka I
19 felt that there were more refugees than the citizens of Banja Luka
20 themselves. If I tell you that towards the end of the war when I
21 returned from the university, my wife told me that an armed soldier and
22 his wife had arrived and wanted to throw her out of our own apartment. I
23 believe that I've already told you that --
24 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but we're moving away from my
25 question and you're getting into numbers and problems. And my question
1 was specifically related to ethnicity.
2 So I'd like to now go to P1379, which is the transcript of the
3 34th Republika Srpska Assembly Session. This is a document we looked at
4 yesterday. We looked at a speech you made at this session, but I'd like
5 to look at another portion of it now. And if we could go to page 212 in
6 the English and 230 in the B/C/S. And this is a portion of the Assembly
7 where a number of government ministers present reports on the activities
8 of their ministries. And here we have Mr. Velibor Ostojic speaking, who
9 was at the time a minister without portfolio in your government.
10 And about three lines down and this is the middle in the B/C/S,
11 at the bottom of the page in the English, he says that:
12 "... I was leading the committee as a minister without
13 portfolio. We were aiming to achieve our goal, which was
14 ethnical - geographical continuity of Serb population, while
15 accommodating the refugees, and actually we were building new demographic
16 politics for the RS ..."
17 And then if we go to the next page in the English, he goes on a
18 few lines down to talk about this geographical continuity being
19 accomplished in several priority areas, including Stara Herzegovina,
20 Birac, and Posavina.
21 Now, as Mr. Ostojic stated here, Dr. Lukic, the government's
22 policy on refugees was linked with its goal of achieving the
23 ethnical-geographical continuity of Serb population in the RS; right?
24 A. First of all, Madam Prosecutor, you interrupted me. Second of
25 all, there was a huge problem of refugees and you simplified it. And now
1 you are trying to take things out of the context of some discussions that
2 don't necessarily have to be correct. I'm trying to say that we had to
3 accommodate thousands upon thousands of people. We had to split families
4 and we did that, and not only with our own ethnicity. We asked from
5 other ethnicities to accommodate people.
6 It is a well-known fact that when you talked about certain areas,
7 that Croats lived there. They had left to Croatia and they were settled
8 in what were formerly Serbian houses in Banija, Lika, Kordun, and
9 Slavonia. What could we do? Are you suggesting that we should have
10 thrown them into the river or should we have put them up in their houses?
11 I'm not doubting that there were some other ideas on the part of
12 some government members; however, I can only speak about the conclusions
13 of the government and what the government supported and what I myself
14 supported. And we also enjoyed support by Mr. Karadzic for all that. At
15 all costs, we struggled to accommodate refugees, to protect them. And
16 then when finally peace came of course we had to return people their
17 property. It was only logical. And Republika Srpska was the first one
18 that did that once the war was over.
19 Q. Okay. You said that things are being taken out of context.
20 Let's look at what Mr. Ostojic said six months later at another Assembly
21 session. That's P1388. And this is in March 1994, still while he was a
22 minister in your government. And if we could go to page 168 in the
23 English and 135 in the B/C/S. And again, Mr. Lukic, you attended this
24 session and, in fact, you discuss your attendance at this session in
25 paragraph 80 of your statement.
1 And again Mr. Ostojic begins his speech while bringing up the
2 issue of refugees. And right at the bottom of the page in the B/C/S, if
3 we could make that a little larger, just before the number 33 in the
4 English he says:
5 "But the first part of the work has been done. The document that
6 is called the Project on Demographic Policy of Republika Srpska was made.
7 We have to deal with this problem first, in order to establish the
8 geographic continuity of the Serbian population in RS area."
9 And if we turn the page in the B/C/S he states that:
10 "There are four areas that are extremely sensitive and which
11 should be worked on. The first is old Herzegovina ... Srbinje, Visegrad,
12 Rogatica. The second one is Birac - in the area of Vlasenica, Bratunac,
13 Zvornik. The third one is Posavina in two directions - along the
14 Sava ... and the outskirts of Trebova and Vlasic. The fourth one is
15 Sana - Una area, and the fifth one Vrbas area. The Sana - Una area is
16 Krupa, Novi, Prijedor, Kljuc, Sanski Most ..."
17 And he says:
18 "We lack the population ..."
19 Now, again, Dr. Lukic, you were talking about the republic being
20 overwhelmed with refugees, but here Mr. Ostojic is saying again that the
21 priority is to establish the geographic continuity of the Serb population
22 in certain areas of strategic importance where there is insufficient
23 population. This is about populating the areas of Republika Srpska that
24 have been emptied of Muslims and Croats with ethnic Serbs, isn't it?
25 A. No. No, for the following reason: You do not see that we in
1 Sarajevo had 155.000 Serbs, and then towards the end of 1992 when I left
2 only some 20- to 25.000 were still there. In Bihac we had over 40
3 per cent of the Serb residents and then not a single Serb remained living
4 in Bihac. In Mostar almost all the Serbs were expelled if not killed.
5 Let me not even talk about Zenica, Rogatica, and many other
6 municipalities that you yourself have mentioned, and obviously those
7 people had to be accommodated somewhere.
8 Please, Mr. Ostojic is the last person who can interpret the
9 government's decision. It is not my call to talk about deceased people
10 and I'm sure that Mr. Karadzic will agree. He was not the main person
11 there. There were four other university professors there. There were
12 two doctors, two professors, and so on and so forth.
13 I still claim that it was a very competent government which had
14 to listen to all sorts of discussions, but it was not prepared to
15 implement any of those words. And that is a fact. Please, give me just
16 one area where we implemented such policies. The contrary was true. We
17 asked the people to return. We wanted their property to be safe and
18 secure. That was the principal demand.
19 I'm sure that there were individuals who did what they did, and
20 you know it only too well. We don't even have to discuss it, let alone
21 investigate it, because those things are well-known and they could be
23 Q. In your answer, Dr. Lukic, you said that "Mr. Ostojic is the last
24 person who can interpret the government's decision."
25 In fact, a few months before he made this speech at the Assembly,
1 he was tasked, together with Mr. Brdjanin, by your government to, in
2 fact, prepare the programme for the accommodation of refugees in the
3 Republika Srpska, wasn't he?
4 A. Yes. The programme for the accommodation of refugees but not on
5 that basis. A lot of officials were living in rented accommodations.
6 They had to live somewhere, and on the basis that you're trying to impose
7 on me which is to say that it was the -- it was Ostojic's policies, the
8 government's policies, the policy of Republika Srpska, i.e., ethnic
9 cleansing. You can look at the situation as it is today and you will see
10 how many people returned where. You will see that the situation was not
11 the way you tried to portray it, how many people we accommodated despite
12 all the problems that we faced at the time.
13 Q. So you agree that Mr. Ostojic was tasked by the government to
14 prepare the programme for the accommodation of refugees. We've seen now
15 two Assembly sessions where Mr. Ostojic stated clearly that the policy
16 was about the ethnical-geographical continuity of the Serb population.
17 You were present at both of these sessions. You were the prime minister.
18 But you never stood up at either of these sessions and said: No, no, no,
19 Mr. Ostojic has got it all wrong, that's not the policy of my government,
20 did you?
21 A. You're ignoring the fact that we were living in war time. There
22 was a civil war going on. It was a war in which it was very difficult to
23 make the right decisions in all of the cases; however, a large number of
24 the people whom I know very well, both in the government and in the
25 Assembly, did not accept the fact that we should throw out people and
1 bring people in their stead. We tried to deal with the problems of the
2 Serbs, of the Muslims, and of the Croats. I know of a lot of cases where
3 we put up Croats and Muslims in a different apartment while we were
4 waiting for his own apartment to be vacated. And it was not easy to
5 vacate any of the apartments because everybody carried arms at the time.
6 Q. In your answers, Dr. Lukic, you've continued to insist that the
7 leadership called for the return of ethnic Muslim and Croat refugees to
8 the RS, but in fact the Republika Srpska leadership, while it was seeking
9 to populate empty areas of the RS with Serbs, was also working to prevent
10 the return of Muslim and Croat refugees, wasn't it?
11 A. First of all, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is not an
12 ethnically pure area where there were only Muslims who were chased away
13 or Serbs who were chased away or Croats who were chased away. The
14 population was mixed everywhere, and when you were talking about some of
15 the regions I know that there were a lot of Croats and Serbs living there
16 who were either chased away or they were killed.
17 Please, you do not say that Serbs were killed in Lima, in Duvno,
18 and Kupres at the very beginning of the war, in Brod, Sijekovac, and
19 Samac. Who could we have settled there? The Serbs who had been killed?
20 You do not mention that at all, and you keep on insisting on us taking a
21 Muslim or a Croat apartment from them. At the same time they were
22 allowed to return while those who had been living in their apartments
23 were asked to move out.
24 I repeat for the umpteenth time that a majority of the Serbs were
25 chased away from the cities where -- they even had a large share,
1 percentage share, and they had to move out to Serbia and many found their
2 abodes in third countries. I repeat once again and I claim, take a
3 cross-section. You will see that the Serbs in Republika Srpska returned
4 more property to Muslims and Croats than it was done in the Federation of
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a fact. I'm not making things up. These
6 are the facts.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could we go to P1385, please.
8 Q. And this is the transcript of the 37th Assembly Session from the
9 10th of January, 1994, and, Dr. Lukic, the records indicate that you were
10 present. You speak at this session and the minutes which are P1384
11 indicate that you were present. And if we could go to page 126 in the
12 English and page 94 in the B/C/S.
13 The context of this discussion is the -- the Assembly is at this
14 point debating the report on the Geneva and Brussels Conference and
15 defining a platform for further negotiations, so it's a discussion of the
16 latest negotiations. And this is about the middle of the page in the
17 B/C/S and it's right at the bottom of the page in the English. This is
18 Mr. Vojislav Maksimovic speaking and he says:
19 "What I would really like to see here is a firm attitude that the
20 Muslims and the Croats will not be allowed to return to the areas under
21 our rule. Accordingly, we should not return to the areas that will be
22 under the Croatian rule. I think we should be decisive about this.
23 Otherwise, I'm afraid that those people from Sandzak will occupy Srbinje
24 and surrounding areas because there are too many of them in that area.
25 So we should take a firm position and ban any of their returns to the
1 territories we have gained through these international combinations."
2 If we could go to the next page in the English and this is
3 towards the bottom in the B/C/S. A few lines down he says:
4 "I do not care if the Muslims will live at all, where they will
5 live, whether they will have a country or not. I am not interested in
6 that. The only thing I am interested in is my people and the territory
7 where my people live. Therefore, any thought about having 500 or more
8 Muslims within our future country is out of the question ..."
9 And if we move down to the bottom of the page in the English,
10 this is the next page in the B/C/S, Dr. Karadzic responds and he says:
11 "What Mr. Maksimovic has said is correct. Yet, I must draw your
12 attention to several things."
13 And he speaks about the whole world being against them. And at
14 the bottom of the page in the B/C/S and the next page in the English, in
15 the middle of the page in the English he says:
16 "Again, what Vojo has said is correct. My great-grandfathers are
17 turning in their graves. All of my grandfathers fought against the Turks
18 their entire lives, except my grandfather Stevan who fought against
20 Just at the end of the page in the B/C/S he says:
21 "As Vojo said, we are not creating our state, but instead we are
22 constantly trying to patch together a piece of land for them and finally
23 let them go. We cannot divorce from them. Our first strategic goal is
24 to get separated from them. The world must allow us to do that ..."
25 And he refers again to Mr. Maksimovic's speech at page 132 of the
1 English and 98 of the B/C/S, and this is in the middle of the page in the
2 English towards the bottom of the B/C/S he says:
3 "As to the return of the refugees, I owe an answer to Vojo's
4 question. According to the international law, we have no right to ban
5 the return of the refugees. In principle, all refugees can return, but I
6 would just add one sentence: 'This also has to be a two-way process.'
7 The Muslims and the Croats accepted the two-way process. Later on Owen
8 asked me: 'Why did you insist on the two-way process?' But when the
9 Serbs from Zvornik return to Zenica, then the Muslims from Prijedor will
10 return to Prijedor; therefore, it must be a two-way process. In
11 accordance with the international law, we cannot declare a ban of the
12 return of refugees."
13 Dr. Lukic, what Dr. Karadzic is saying here in response to
14 Mr. Maksimovic is that although it's impermissible under international
15 law to ban the return of Muslims and Croats, he had insisted on a two-way
16 process, conditioning the return of Muslims and Croats to the RS on the
17 return of Serbs to Federation areas. And this was Dr. Karadzic's cunning
18 way of limiting the return of Muslims and Croats to the RS, wasn't it?
19 A. Dear Madam Prosecutor, if you knew what the Serbs suffered during
20 the First World War at the hands of the Muslims, and I'm speaking now
21 only about Muslims, and then during the Second World War, if you will
22 believe me, I was only 8 years old when I watched the killing of 5,500
23 Serbs and 50 Jews. I was an 8-year-old boy. And then the rest that I
24 experienced during the war would take us a long way and you wouldn't have
25 any easy time listening to me.
1 So what was done in the previous wars had created hatred not just
2 on one side, on all the sides. And I can tell you that it was only
3 Dr. Karadzic's wisdom that could deal with that and the principle of
4 reciprocity was build into this. What's wrong with saying: Gentlemen,
5 allow the Serbs to return to the territories from which they had fled and
6 then we will allow people to return to our parts? But nobody respected
7 that. In Mostar the Muslims and the Croats split the city and the Serbs
8 are no longer there, and if you just look at Mostar you will understand
9 the return in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the relationships there.
10 On the other hand, I suppose that you do not believe that we
11 always agreed at Assembly sessions. There was a lot of discord. Many
12 times we kept our mouth shut, but when it came to the crunch we did only
13 the things that were right. And I claim that not only the government but
14 also the Presidency headed by Radovan Karadzic and the Assembly never
15 took decisions that would result in crimes, irrespective of the fact that
16 there were people, there were individuals, who were very radical there
17 and so on and so forth.
18 I really, really implore with you to bear in mind the
19 developments that preceded our bloody war, and it seems that the origin
20 of the evil is somewhere else. In the previous war, Serbs did not want
21 to re-live the Second World War. For 15 years I've been the president of
22 the association of Jasenovac/Donja Gradina. I am the leader of that
23 association and I apologise for what I'm going to say. Jasenovac was the
24 third-most notorious camp in Europe and in terms of monstrosity. It was
25 the first in Europe and it was set up to deal with Serbs, Jews, and
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the gentleman please repeat the numbers
3 of the people who died in Jasenovac.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you really think that it was not
5 possible that it had an impact, not just any impact but a huge impact on
6 the Serbs.
7 I did not tell you anything about Prijedor. My father himself
8 liberated Prijedor on two occasions, and he knows what he found there.
9 You have to believe that what was done in Kozarac during the Second World
10 War had to have its result.
11 I apologise for side-tracking, but I really see that I had to
12 tell you how things were in our parts.
13 MS. GUSTAFSON:
14 Q. Dr. Lukic, you've raised the crimes in Prijedor during World War
15 II a number of times, and in fact last week when I asked you whether you
16 could confirm that the Muslims in 1991 were the largest ethnic group in
17 Prijedor, you referred again to the terrible crimes from World War II
18 against Serbs in Prijedor and you said that this caused a disbalance - I
19 think probably "imbalance" would be the better word - in the ethnic
20 make-up of Prijedor. That was at transcript page 38783. So given --
21 A. I apologise, but I cannot hear well.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have problems both with the
23 transcript and with the LiveNote.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can hear poorly.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] At a convenient moment I would like
2 to correct the transcript and we don't have LiveNote.
3 JUDGE KWON: I think they have to re-start the programme.
4 Shall we take a short break for five minutes?
5 --- Break taken at 9.34 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 9.44 a.m.
7 THE ACCUSED: May I correct transcript before Madam Gustafson
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will speak Serbian.
11 On page 12, lines 15, 16, the witness said "Serbs, Jews, and
12 Roma" and not "communists". After that he said 700.000 Serbs, 25.000
13 Jews, and 80.000 Roma were killed at Jasenovac. We can check it with the
14 witness if necessary.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Dr. Lukic, do you confirm having said so?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Shall we continue, Ms. Gustafson.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
20 Q. Dr. Lukic, you've mentioned several times in your evidence the
21 crimes against Serbs in Prijedor during World War II, and in fact last
22 week you said that these crimes created an ethnic imbalance in the
23 municipality. You've talked about the fact that these previous wars had
24 caused hatred between the ethnic groups and about the fear among Serbs
25 that these crimes from past wars would be repeated.
1 Given all that, didn't you agree that in a place like Prijedor
2 that it would be right to bring in ethnic Serbs to replace the Croats and
3 Muslims who had left in order to correct this historical injustice and
4 prevent these crimes from happening in the future?
5 A. First of all, such a thing is impossible because I hope you
6 believe me that I know that there is no way of destroying a whole people
7 and wipe it out in a certain territory. I have mentioned the second --
8 World War II often probably, but at Kozarac there was a round table about
9 the suffering of 59.000 inhabitants of Kozara. Among them there were
10 also people from Prijedor. And whoever thinks that the consequences of
11 previous wars, especially the Second World War, did not cause fear, that
12 person obviously is unwilling to understand.
13 What do you think why it was that I went to this war and my 20 or
14 so close relatives? Not because they wanted to fool around there, but
15 because they were willing to give their lives for their liberty and the
16 liberty of their nearest and dearest. Many people suffered in Sarajevo,
17 things happened that shouldn't have happened, but there was hatred.
18 And when you were saying what was happening at our Assembly,
19 well, if you knew what we heard had happened at the Muslim Assembly or
20 the Croat Assembly, and -- because, you know, these were -- these things
21 were linked. What the ones did affected the others too. Many
22 intelligent people didn't accept many things, but they were silent. They
23 kept silent. Fortunately, many things were not implemented because,
24 after all, it wasn't possible to implement them.
25 Q. I'd like to go to 1D07862 now, please. And, Dr. Lukic, this is a
1 document you discuss at paragraph 36 of your statement, and in general at
2 paragraph 26 you asserted that Dr. Karadzic and yourself both insisted
3 that every crime be prosecuted regardless of the ethnicity of the
5 This is a document from the 6th of April, 1993, that -- written
6 by you and it's sent to the Main Staff of the army and the command of the
7 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. And in it you state that the government has
8 been informed that there are cases of looting, killing, setting fire to
9 buildings, and rape in the municipality of Novo Sarajevo, specifically
10 Grbavica, committed mostly by members of the VRS.
11 And at paragraph 36 of your statement you said that:
12 "The government demanded that VRS crimes in Sarajevo should be
13 prevented, and in this I have the absolute support of Dr. Karadzic,
14 General Mladic, and General Galic."
15 So I take it from this that General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic, and
16 General Galic were aware that there VRS soldiers were looting, killing,
17 setting fire to buildings and committing rape in Grbavica; is that right?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask that we first
19 check whether the witness has his statement in front of him; if not, he
21 Apart from that, Madam Gustafson seems to be implying that these
22 were crimes committed by the VRS.
23 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, I'm reading from the document which says
24 the crimes were committed by the VRS. This is a document tendered by the
25 Defence through this witness.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, shall we continue?
2 MS. GUSTAFSON:
3 Q. Dr. Lukic, my question was: Given -- you've said that you had
4 the support of Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic, and General Galic in these
5 efforts. I take it that these -- General Mladic, Dr. Karadzic, and
6 General Galic were all aware of these crimes being committed by VRS
7 soldiers in Grbavica; is that right?
8 A. First of all, there were crimes. There's no doubt about that. I
9 can say that it's hard to establish that it was done by soldiers. There
10 would have been soldiers there but there would also have been rogues who
11 went about and did nasty things, tortured women, and so on.
12 There was one guy - I hope I needn't mention his name - who
13 mistreated women and didn't care who they were. He was transferred to a
14 territory where there were no women at all, but he continued and then he
15 was killed by our own soldiers. I heard from the soldiers from where he
16 was transferred that they think they should have done it themselves.
17 Now some people are being tried, but I must tell you one thing,
18 that's for sure, that there were many rumours and it seemed that more was
19 happening than was actually happening --
20 Q. Dr. Lukic --
21 A. -- of course we know some people who came to harm this way --
22 Q. Dr. Lukic, I'm going to bring you back to this document. You're
23 writing to the commander of the Main Staff and the commander of the SRK
24 about a very serious subject, about terrible crimes being committed by
25 members of the military. Now, I take it that you would only have taken
1 such a step if you had reliable information, as this document says you
2 have, that these crimes were, in fact, being committed by members of the
3 VRS; right?
4 A. That's done in peace time. In war time, even suspicions are
5 checked. I got information that some bodies of ours were keeping camp.
6 I wrote a letter, but later when I checked I found out it was false, that
7 there was no camp there, that nobody had been detained, but I got such
8 information anyway. In war time information is often sent out and it
9 circulates, but it must be checked.
10 And if you're asking me whether there was such things at
11 Grbavica, well, at no place was there more of that than Sarajevo. And
12 let me tell you also that more Serbian women were mistreated in Sarajevo
13 than of -- than women of any other ethnicity. And I was in a position
14 where I could come by information.
15 Q. Well, in fact, Dr. Lukic, your concerns about the crime in
16 Grbavica at this point in time were related to the fact that even the
17 Serb population were becoming victims. In other words, it wasn't just
18 Muslims and Croats who were being victimised. Even Serbs were becoming
19 victims and that was your concern; right?
20 A. Thank you.
21 Q. Did you hear my question?
22 A. Half of it.
23 Q. My question was: Your concern at this point in time about crime
24 in Grbavica was the fact that it wasn't just Muslims and Croats who were
25 victims, but even the Serb population in Grbavica was being victimised;
2 A. It may seem that way when looked upon from these desks, but if
3 you find yourself in a war, in war time chaos, it looks different. And
4 it's difficult to say who may become a victim next. So, Madam
5 Prosecutor, I was living in a peaceful building without knowing that 50
6 metres from there there had been armed Muslim soldiers for months but in
7 civilian clothes. And that was close to a student hostel. I know that
8 many of my friends came to harm and that was before --
9 Q. Dr. Lukic --
10 A. -- any Croats or Muslims or Serbs -- but I cannot give you an
11 overview of an entire neighbourhood with some 10- or 12.000 inhabitants,
12 or even more.
13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could I have P1474, please.
14 Q. And, Dr. Lukic, if I could ask you again to please try to focus
15 your answer on the specific question I'm asking.
16 A. But I can hear poorly. The volume is very low.
17 Q. Is that better now, Dr. Lukic?
18 A. Yes, it's better.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to page 157 of the English and
20 page 159 of the B/C/S.
21 Q. Dr. Lukic, this is a military notebook from -- of
22 General Mladic's and the entry I'm about to show you is from about two
23 weeks before you wrote the document we just saw. It's dated the 25th of
24 March, 1993, and you can see the title is: "Meeting with Prime Minister
25 Lukic." And the second underline near the bottom of the page says:
2 "Theft, profiteering, looting, and desire to acquire wealth."
3 And on the next page it says in the middle of the -- in the
4 middle of the page:
5 "Some soldiers rape even Serbian women (in Grbavica). (Lukic)
6 himself took someone who had done this out of Sarajevo (he wouldn't say
7 his name)."
8 Now, Dr. Lukic, these notes reflect your concern that it wasn't
9 just Muslims and Croats who were being victimised by soldiers in
10 Grbavica. Even Serbs were victims; right?
11 A. Oh, come on, don't make up things. I am from Grbavica. I
12 escorted dozens of girls of other ethnicities to Belgrade. I asked our
13 soldiers to guard the Muslims where they were because where I was there
14 was no one to guard them, to keep them safe. I made use of my
15 connections to transfer Muslims from Petrovic to Belgrade and not only
16 one, a great number, Madam.
17 So if you -- if you're asking this question to me, then you're
18 asking the wrong person. I know a number of people who did very similar
19 things to what I did. For that reason, your question is an insult to me.
20 If I may add, what would you do if a mother came to you with her
21 16-year-old daughter and asked you to save her? And there were many
22 such -- nobody's protected in a war and there is no amnesty for anyone.
23 And everything is done on a scale. On the one hand there is Sarajevo, on
24 the other hand there is Srpsko Sarajevo. A shot from here, a shot from
25 there, and so on.
1 Q. If I could have --
2 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether the witness understood your
3 question. What did you understand Ms. Gustafson's question to be,
4 Mr. Lukic? Do you agree that you met Mr. Mladic on this day and having a
5 word --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see that I did. I have no
7 reason to doubt the content of Mr. Mladic's notes. But talking about
8 such meetings with the leading people of municipalities and so on, there
9 were many such meetings. Of course I cannot remember all the details,
10 but it's obvious that we did meet.
11 JUDGE KWON: But did you see his notation that you said -- you
12 referred to some soldiers who raped even Serbian women in Grbavica? Do
13 you remember having said that to Mr. -- General Mladic?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I may have told him about the case
15 that I have already mentioned to you. And the word "even", well, I don't
16 really use it at all.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour. If I could have 65 ter
20 1D07894, please.
21 Q. Dr. Lukic, this is a document you discuss at paragraph 91 of your
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Lukic, do you have your statement with you,
24 witness statement?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't.
1 THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Excellency. I just ask it would help
3 JUDGE KWON: Do we have a hard copy? And in the meantime shall
4 we continue?
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
6 Q. This is a, Dr. Lukic, 28th of June, 1994, letter from the Federal
7 Republic of Yugoslavia Committee for Gathering Information on Crimes
8 Against Humanity and International Law to the investigating judge of the
9 lower court in Prijedor. And you discussed this letter in your statement
10 and you state that it "represents a demand that Serbs who had committed
11 crimes in Prijedor should be questioned to determine their
12 responsibility." And you added that the government called for everyone
13 who had committed crimes to answer regardless of the ethnicity of the
15 This letter itself doesn't say anything about the crimes in
16 question being crimes committed by Serbs. So I'd like to ask you: What
17 is the basis for your assertion that this letter related to crimes
18 committed by Serbs?
19 A. In Prijedor there was a group of criminals, I would call them.
20 Looters looted whoever they were able to reach and robbed property, and
21 then they mistreated women unselectively and there were then individual
22 killings. Eventually there was a number of individual killings and our
23 service discovered 11 of them. They were interrogated, indicted, and
24 transferred to the judiciary by our services. What happened later, I
25 really don't know.
1 Q. Well, this document says that there is a letter enclosed showing
2 which witnesses to interview and about which circumstances, although that
3 enclosure is not included in the exhibit.
4 And I'd like to go now to 65 ter 25003. And this is a letter
5 dated a few days before the previous letter, also from the FRY Committee
6 for Gathering Evidence on Crimes Against Humanity and International Law,
7 to the Republika Srpska Committee for Compiling Data on Crimes Against
8 Humanity and International Law. And it's from the same author, Mr. Ilija
9 Simic, as the prior letter. And it states that:
10 "As agreed with your Commission ... we propose that the Lower
11 Court in Prijedor examine the following witnesses living in Prijedor and
12 its surroundings ..."
13 And then there is a list. So the first person is to be
14 interviewed about the arrest of Serbs in Kupres; the second witness about
15 his capture in Bihac; the third witness about the purging of Serbs in
16 Livno. The next page in the English. The fourth witness about the
17 arrest of a Serb in Livno; fifth witness, arrest in Slavonski Samac --
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How can this witness answer
21 questions about documents emanating from a judge in Belgrade? What has
22 that got to do with him?
23 MS. GUSTAFSON: I think the connection to the prior document
24 which was an associated exhibit tendered with this witness is crystal
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Since your questions were generally
2 a bit lengthy and since the witness was not shown his statement, I'm not
3 sure whether he understood your previous question really, whether these
4 documents in particular referred to in para 91 of his statement was
5 directly mainly or even partly to those crimes committed by Serbs. So I
6 didn't hear his answer to your question. Could you put your question
7 again, Ms. Gustafson?
8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sure.
9 Q. Dr. Lukic, the previous document --
10 A. Excuse me, I must first say that as hard as I tried to remember,
11 I still do not recall this document at all.
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Do you have your statement?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.
14 JUDGE KWON: Paragraph 91.
15 MS. GUSTAFSON:
16 Q. And --
17 JUDGE KWON: Shall we show him --
18 MS. GUSTAFSON: The previous document.
19 JUDGE KWON: -- the previous document, 1D7894.
20 So here you say this document represents a demand that Serbs who
21 had committed crimes in Prijedor should be questioned. Do you remember
22 having said that in your statement?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
24 JUDGE KWON: And then if you look at this document which is
25 before you -- so the question was: On what basis did you conclude that
1 this was directed to the Serb perpetrators?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Is there any information? Not all
3 information came in in writing. Much information came in through
4 different channels.
5 JUDGE KWON: I don't follow your answer. In your statement
6 explaining this document, you said this document represents a demand that
7 Serbs who had committed crimes should be questioned. What's your basis
8 for such a conclusion?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, probably one of the organs or
10 public servants or somebody else informed us that these -- that this is
11 about Serbs.
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This has again been interpreted.
14 The witness said "we had information" a few lines up, and he did not ask
15 is there any information.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
17 MS. GUSTAFSON:
18 Q. Okay. If we could go to 65 ter 25003.
19 JUDGE KWON: For the purpose of planning, Ms. Gustafson, since we
20 are sitting in a regular sitting schedule, we'll have our first break at
21 10.20 for 20 minutes and the second one at 12.00 for half an hour.
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
23 Q. Now, Dr. Lukic, this is a document dated a few days before the
24 previous document from the same author, from the same body to the RS
25 commission on compiling data for crimes against humanity and
1 international law, and it proposes that the lower court in Prijedor
2 examine the following witnesses living in Prijedor. And we had started
3 going through the list.
4 If we could go to the next page in the English. Entry number 6,
5 this is a witness to be interviewed about crimes against Serbs in Livno.
6 Number 7, crimes against Serbs in Bugojno. If we could go to the next
7 page in the B/C/S. Number 8, purging of Serbs around Zenica; number 9,
8 the same; 10, also crimes in Zenica; number 11, crimes against Serbs in
9 Zagreb, and so on and so forth.
10 If we could go to the last page in both languages just to see --
11 give you a chance to see the last entries, every single one of the
12 witnesses to be interviewed, according to this document, by the lower
13 court in Prijedor are witnesses to crimes against Serbs committed outside
14 of Prijedor. So the details in this letter make clear that the letter
15 you referred to in your statement has nothing to do with crimes committed
16 by Serbs in Prijedor, doesn't it?
17 A. I have to admit that I did not understand your conclusion at all.
18 When we spoke about Serbs in Prijedor, of course we had certain
19 information about them, that they had committed crimes. The service
20 arrested them, investigated the matter, and indeed was convinced that
21 they had looted, mistreated people, even committed some murders, and
22 that's why they were arrested and prosecuted.
23 As for this letter where other witnesses are being asked for,
24 what does that mean? That means that there is a suspicion that these
25 people are linked to some of the crimes that are mentioned here. That is
1 not an unknown thing. It is well-known that persons committed crimes and
2 then fled to other places. Of course they were searched for and many saw
3 justice, others did not, and that is how things go in war time.
4 Q. Dr. Lukic, maybe I can try one more time. I was asking you about
5 the document that you discussed in your statement from the FRY committee
6 to the investigating judge in Prijedor, stating that there are a number
7 of witnesses in Prijedor that need to be interviewed about crimes. You
8 said that was a document dealing with crimes committed by Serbs. Now I'm
9 showing you a document from a few days before from the same committee,
10 saying: This is our proposal for the crimes -- for the witnesses to be
11 interviewed by the lower court in Prijedor and they're all dealing with
12 crimes committed against Serbs in other areas. So I'm putting it to you
13 that the document you referred to in your statement has nothing to do
14 with crimes committed by Serbs.
15 A. Generally speaking, that statement is not correct. If we found
16 out, if it had been reported to us that a group of Serbs had committed
17 crimes, different kinds, they didn't really pick and choose who they
18 would steal from, who they would kill even, which women would be
19 mistreated, et cetera, and then if these people were indicted,
20 prosecuted. This document that came from Belgrade that you referred to,
21 that's a completely different document of a completely different nature.
22 It has to do with the search for persons who committed crimes elsewhere,
23 not in Prijedor. They didn't really have anything to do with Prijedor,
24 they just happened to be in Prijedor. That's the point.
25 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender this document.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6344, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, shall we take a break,
4 Ms. Gustafson?
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: We'll break for 20 minutes.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.20 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 10.42 a.m.
9 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.
10 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. Dr. Lukic, at paragraph 33 of your statement you discuss civilian
12 prisoners and the exchange of civilian prisoners. And it is your
13 position that civilian prisoners were a category of people who were
14 reasonably suspected of committing crimes and you said that these
15 prisoners were exchanged regardless of the seriousness of the crimes of
16 which they were suspected "because we wanted to save Serbian civilians
17 who had been imprisoned and terrorised in prisons on the Muslim side."
18 If we could go to P2684, please. I'm going to show you a
19 document and then ask you a question. This is an order from the
20 intelligence section of the VRS Main Staff from the 3rd of October, 1994,
21 and it discusses exchanges. And in the third paragraph from the bottom
22 in the B/C/S and near the bottom -- the second-last paragraph in the
23 English, Tolimir says:
24 "It should be kept in mind that in the exchanges we received
25 captured soldiers of the Republika Srpska while we mostly give them
2 Now, you said that you were exchanging civilians in order to save
3 Serbian civilians from the other side, but here General Tolimir is saying
4 that civilians are being exchanged for Serb soldiers; right?
5 A. Often in war one does not choose. One does what one has to do.
6 For example, with the Croats after the cease-fire agreement in 1993 we
7 exchanged all for all. Very often we would hand over a criminal, but we
8 cared about getting other people saved, rescued. And I have to say that
9 others, Muslims, et cetera, when we did not have firm, solid evidence of
10 major crimes, we would exchange them; or to put it more precisely,
11 release them thereby. So this was not an opportunity for us to think:
12 Will we do this? Such a person has such weight and another person has
13 another weight. Usually we did an exchange all for all or group for
15 Q. Okay. I'd like to talk -- ask you about something else in your
16 statement. At paragraph 56 you -- of your statement you said that the
17 Muslim side in Sarajevo wanted to present themselves to the world as
18 victims. And you said:
19 "As was the case with Cerska and Srebrenica, although the Muslims
20 had food and other reserves, they constantly presented a false picture
21 that civilians had nothing to eat and had no water ..." and so on.
22 I'd like to ask you about Srebrenica when you were prime
23 minister. You didn't go -- when you were prime minister in 1993 and
24 1994, you didn't go to the Srebrenica enclave to see the conditions for
25 yourself, did you?
1 A. I know Srebrenica from before the war because I did some work
2 there, for example, building a tunnel. Also, we measured Srebrenica, so
3 I know it. I covered at least 70 per cent of its territory of the
4 villages there. During the war I toured Srebrenica from all sides, from
5 Milici, Konjevic Polje, then Kravica, when that crime was committed by
6 the people from Srebrenica against it, then Bakovici and of course down
7 to Ljubovija, rather, Skelani. As for those crimes in the Second World
8 War and in this war -- and in this war --
9 Q. I'm sorry, I'm going to interrupt you because you're not
10 answering my question. When you were the prime minister, you didn't go
11 into the enclave and see for yourself the conditions that the Muslim
12 civilians in Srebrenica were living in, did you?
13 A. It was not possible for me to go, and let me end by saying that
14 because my comment would be very long.
15 Q. Okay. Well, a witness in this case, Major Tucker, did go into
16 the enclave when you were prime minister in March 1993, and these were
17 his observations. This is P4203, paragraph 178.
18 "The refugees in the streets had mostly not had any real food
19 since they had fled from Kamenica, Cerska, or their villages to the south
20 of Srebrenica. What food they had was mostly a sort of cake made from a
21 type of yellow flower that was quite plentiful under the cover of the fir
22 forests which covered most hillsides in the Srebrenica area. Water came
23 from the river that flowed through Srebrenica, but was polluted with
24 awful excrement, urine, washing water and oil. The most abiding memory
25 from my early days in Srebrenica was the stench of unwashed, dirty, damp,
1 and sweaty human bodies in extraordinarily crowded circumstances."
2 Now, it's your evidence that the Muslims in Srebrenica, among
3 other places, constantly presented a false picture that civilians had
4 nothing to eat and no water and so on. So is it your position that
5 forest flowers and contaminated water were adequate sustenance for the
6 Muslim civilians in Srebrenica?
7 A. You've inverted the situation. I spoke of Cerska and some other
8 places, and we checked and we took some cattle that had been taken from
9 our territories beforehand.
10 As for Srebrenica, you would have to have the following in mind:
11 Srebrenica was a protected area; however, Srebrenica non-stop created war
12 around its territory. They had large numbers of troops and they did not
13 feed their troops poorly, although I believe everything that the
14 gentleman wrote. However, I know that they were supplied in an illegal
15 way. All Serbs know that and they know how and UNPROFOR knows that full
16 well too.
17 On the other hand, at the most decisive moment they sent 5.000
18 soldiers to other theatres of war outside Srebrenica, and had they agreed
19 to a cease-fire, had they surrendered their weapons, the people of
20 Srebrenica would have certainly lived through the war better than anyone
21 else, either on the Serb side or on the Muslim side. Quite simply,
22 because of their leadership, they were not in a position to accept that.
23 Some lost their lives too.
24 Let me not mention to you some Muslims from Srebrenica who wrote
25 statements or actually entire books about the suffering of Srebrenica at
1 the hands of its own leadership.
2 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could we go to 65 ter 05907.
3 Q. And this is an associated exhibit you discuss at paragraph 94 of
4 your statement, Dr. Lukic. In your statement you discuss the fact that
5 you were a member of the state delegation in Dayton, and you note that
6 the document states that the delegation will stand by the strategic goals
7 adopted by the RS Assembly. And if we could go to page 2 in the English,
8 we can see that the document indeed states that the delegation is obliged
9 to adhere to the strategic goals as set out in 1992 by the National
10 Assembly of Republika Srpska.
11 I take it from this document and your evidence that at this
12 point, October 1995, you were familiar with the strategic goals of the RS
13 Assembly; is that right?
14 A. First of all, I was not at that Assembly and it was only on the
15 second day that I heard that I was chosen to go to Dayton. That is one
17 Secondly, what else could a person say, a person who is going on
18 behalf of a people that had suffered so much? However, in terms of the
19 general knowledge of this gathering that I highly appreciate, we all went
20 to Dayton with requirements that were far higher than what was realistic.
21 Thankfully, everybody lost a bit so we all remained dissatisfied. But a
22 document was adopted that nevertheless did bring about peace. Nobody's
23 wishes totally came true. Everybody was short-changed a bit, so that's
24 how we've lived since.
25 Q. Sorry, Dr. Lukic, I didn't ask you about the negotiations at
1 Dayton. I just asked you to confirm that at this time, October 1995,
2 when you were sent to Dayton with the delegation you were familiar with
3 the strategic goals created in 1992 by the National Assembly. Is that
5 A. First of all, we did not know. I said that I heard only later
6 that I would be going to Dayton, and others who came, none of them had
7 any principles and documents in their pockets that had to be abided by.
8 We all wanted to get more and we got what was allocated to us. That's a
9 fact. And to this day I'm saying from this particular position as well
10 that it's a good thing that none of us were completely satisfied.
11 Q. Dr. Lukic, when you went to Dayton with the delegation, were you
12 familiar with the strategic goals of the RS National Assembly?
13 A. I was not familiar with that. I did not hear about that. No one
14 discussed that. Once we boarded the plane, we started talking how, what,
15 and so on and so forth, as you can all assume because you are going into
16 a total unknown.
17 Q. Is it your position that when you went to Dayton you had never
18 heard of the strategic objectives of the RS Assembly?
19 A. These strategic objectives were adopted in Banja Luka, allegedly.
20 I was not present. I first read -- well, it was the very end of 1993 or
21 the beginning of 1994, but I have to say to you that no one talked about
22 them very much because war developments do not really take into account
23 some kind of plans that you adopted at some session somewhere.
24 Q. So is it your evidence that you first read the strategic goals of
25 the Serbian people at the end of 1993 or the beginning of 1994? Have I
1 understood your answer correctly?
2 A. That is correct. And I publicly stated that at another venue.
3 Let me not bore you with all of that.
4 Q. Okay. If we could go to P1379, please.
5 A. Paragraph?
6 Q. This is not discussed in your statement, Dr. Lukic. There's a
7 document that's going to come up on the screen. This is a document we've
8 seen several times now. It's the 34th Assembly Session that you were
9 present and spoke at, and if we could go to page 14 of the English and
10 page 13 of the B/C/S. This is Dr. Karadzic giving a -- more or less an
11 introductory speech. And about halfway down the page in both languages
12 he says:
13 "Strategic goals adopted by this Assembly have been or will be
14 achieved to the fullest extent just to remind those who do not know it.
15 The Assembly reached strategic goals of Serb people which have become, in
16 a certain way, our tasks, our obligation to realise them ..."
17 And then he goes into a discussion of each of the goals. He
18 talks about the first goal, the second goal, third goal, fourth goal,
19 fifth goal. He explains what they are. And at the next page he mentions
20 the sixth goal, an exit to the seaside. And then he goes on to discuss
21 at greater length the fifth, sixth, and fourth strategic goals.
22 Now, you were at this session, Dr. Lukic. Does this remind you
23 of the fact that you would have been familiar with the strategic goals at
24 this time, and indeed this is more or less consistent with what you said
25 a few moments ago, at the end of 1993? Do you remember this speech of
1 Dr. Karadzic's discussing the strategic goals?
2 A. I have to say that I do have some idea about things being said.
3 I remember very well the access to the sea that we negotiated in Dayton.
4 We offered 48 square kilometres of the municipality of Trebinje in order
5 to have access to the sea by Montenegro, Prevlaka Molunat, that part
6 towards Dubrovnik. These were some excerpts, but I've been saying that I
7 really did read this in the Official Gazette or somewhere, these
8 principles, but that's roughly when I read it.
9 And on some occasion, everybody talked about one of these
10 objectives or the other in terms of the wishes that people had in terms
11 of this war, and any country would like to have access to the sea. Why
12 would Republika Srpska be short-changed in that respect because, after
13 all, in our common state, Yugoslavia, we did have access to the sea.
14 Q. Okay. If we could go to 65 ter 25107, please. And, Dr. Lukic,
15 you mentioned in your statement, although you didn't discuss the
16 contents, you mentioned that you testified in -- in the Serbia versus
17 Bosnia case at the International Court of Justice. And this document is
18 a verbatim record of your testimony in March 2006. And it's only
19 available in English. I will read the relevant parts to you. If we
20 could go first to page 11.
21 A. I testified in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia
22 as a witness on the side of Serbia.
23 Q. Right. And here at the top of the page it says that the first
24 witness to be called by Serbia and Montenegro is Mr. Vladimir Lukic. You
25 were then called upon to take a solemn declaration, and you state:
1 "I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will
2 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth."
3 And if we could go to page 26. And this is when you were
4 cross-examined by counsel for Bosnia, Ms. Korner, and she is asking you,
5 in fact, about the strategic goals. And about halfway down the page
6 Ms. Korner says:
7 "Yes, quite. Karadzic set out, didn't he ..." and she's talking
8 about the 12th of May, 1992, Assembly "the six strategic goals of the
9 Serbian people at that Assembly? The answer to that is 'yes' or 'no,'
11 And then you answer:
12 "First of all, I was not present at that session so I cannot say,
13 because I do not know who said what, who proposed what, and who commented
15 And Ms. Korner says:
16 "Please, Mr. Lukic, are you telling us you did not know about the
17 six strategic goals?"
18 And you answer:
19 "Madam President, honourable Judges, and Members of the Court,
20 only two months ago or maybe three months ago, I read the text of these
21 strategic goals. I really do not know how it came about that these goals
22 should be formulated, but what I knew is that I discussed at one point
23 these issues with General Mladic. Because he was asking me and asking
24 the Government, in effect, to give them the idea, the goals, for the army
25 to follow, meaning how far they should go - the army. Of course, I
1 immediately reported it to Mr. Karadzic, but he simply actually did not
2 say anything about it. He said nothing and he did not actually inform me
3 that something of that sort existed, so I remained unaware of these goals
4 until two months ago."
5 Ms. Korner:
6 "So you never saw them when they were published in the
7 Official Gazette?"
8 And your answer:
9 "Only two months ago."
10 Now, Mr. Lukic, what you told the ICJ in 2006, that you'd only
11 heard of the strategic goals two months before is a lie, isn't it,
12 because you've said quite clearly to this Court today that you read the
13 strategic goals in late 1993 or early 1994?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to intervene, please.
15 JUDGE KWON: What's the point, Mr. Karadzic? Just a second --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The point is that the questions are
17 full of falsifications. The gentleman read it two months ago. The
18 witness is put in a very difficult situation here.
19 JUDGE KWON: No, I think the witness is able to and should be
20 able to answer the question.
21 Yes, Mr. Lukic.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First and foremost, I did not
23 attend that Assembly session. I did not participate. I don't know -- I
24 didn't know about that. I believe that what one can hear is something
25 that can be discussed, but please I interpreted and I told you
1 approximately when it was that I read those principles, as it were. And
2 I can't give you the exact date or month. I can't do that because it was
3 a long time ago.
4 In other words, the fact is that I did not attend that Assembly
5 session, that I did not participate in that discussion, that later on I
6 never read anything about that. And this is an explanation given by
7 President Karadzic and this is what General Mladic asked me and that's
8 how things were. Everything else after such a long time would be pure
10 MS. GUSTAFSON:
11 Q. Dr. Lukic, you said --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let me intervene.
13 The question was not whether you attended the session where
14 strategic goals were discussed or set out, but when you read that
15 strategic goals for the first time.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that what I said at the
17 court -- I believe that it was a couple of months before that that I had
18 read it. But I don't know when and I wouldn't even be able to interpret
19 those goals as I sit here today.
20 JUDGE KWON: But, Dr. Lukic, a minute ago when answering the
21 question from Ms. Gustafson you answered like this. It's page 33, line
23 "These strategic objectives were adopted in Banja Luka,
24 allegedly. I was not present. I first read -- well, it was the very end
25 of 1993 or the beginning of 1994, but I have to say to you that no one
1 talked about them very much ..."
2 And you went on. So you clearly said you first read them in --
3 at the end of 1993 or the beginning of 1994.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that I made a mistake
5 having said that. At the Tribunal here in The Hague I gave you the exact
6 point in time when I had read them. My memory was still fresh at the
7 time, so could you please take that as my statement.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
9 Back to you, Ms. Gustafson.
10 MS. GUSTAFSON:
11 Q. Okay. One last question on this topic, Dr. Lukic. I also read
12 to you or showed you a long discussion of Dr. Karadzic's in 1993 about
13 the strategic goals at a session you attended and you expressed your
14 familiarity with that. Do you now want to change your evidence on that
15 point as well and claim that you were no longer -- that you were actually
16 not familiar with that speech of Dr. Karadzic's in 1993?
17 A. In general terms, I'm familiar with it, but I'm not familiar with
18 the details thereof. Our sessions were sometimes long, there were a lot
19 of items on their agenda, so it was impossible to retain everything that
20 you heard at the session.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: I have no further questions.
23 Q. Thank you, Dr. Lukic.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 Mr. Karadzic, you have re-examination?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency. I would like to
2 clarify some things just briefly and then I would like to shed light on
3 some of the documents.
4 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Lukic, let's start with last things first.
6 Can you tell the Chamber when it was when you heard of the strategic
7 goals and then when it was when you actually read them?
8 A. Well, you know, it's very difficult to pin-point the time. I
9 heard of them somewhat earlier, perhaps sometime when I became prime
10 minister or somewhat later perhaps. However, I remember that after that
11 conversation with General Mladic which was noted here as well, I saw that
12 they actually existed, that a certain document did exist. Obviously I
13 spoke to some other members of the government, members of parliament as
14 well, but I remember your presentation most of all. But I don't remember
15 the details of that presentation, of that speech, that you gave. And
16 when I read the Official Gazette, finally then I saw the details of that
17 document. Up to then, I really wasn't aware of all the details. I did
18 not have them at my finger-tips.
19 Q. Thank you. Who was the head of the delegation of
20 Republika Srpska in Dayton?
21 A. The head -- or rather, the head of the entire delegation that we
22 participated in was President Milosevic. And as for the part of the
23 delegation representing Yugoslavia, there was also a delegation of
24 Republika Srpska and its head was the speaker for the parliament,
25 Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik.
1 Q. Thank you. Besides having been prime minister, your profession
2 as an expert in geography, did it play a role when you were appointed to
3 the commission?
4 A. I was a professor in geophysics sciences.
5 Q. Yes.
6 A. Yes. I had been the director of the Republican GD 2nd
7 Administration for nine years. For seven years I was the head of the
8 institute. For 20 years I had measured Bosnia and Herzegovina and I knew
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina very well. And on the other hand, I was also very
10 familiar with some other relations. For example, in the entire republic
11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina I was familiar with the structure of the
12 population in certain municipalities, even in many of the villages there
13 and so on and so forth. So I can tell you that our former opponents
14 often asked me about certain things and not only about those things that
15 were of service to our side.
16 Q. If 65 ter 05907 has not been admitted, and this is the
17 appointment of the delegation, I would like to tender it because it was
18 mentioned in the gentleman's statement.
19 JUDGE KWON: Was it not admitted?
20 MS. GUSTAFSON: I think it was admitted, Your Honours.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3607, Your Honours.
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: And I apologise for the interruption. I just
23 note that I forget to tender the extracts from the ICJ testimony, which
24 was 65 ter 25107, pages 1, 11, and 26.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit those two pages.
2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6345, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry, three pages. Yes.
4 Yes, I think the numbers were not assigned yet officially on
5 e-court. That's why you mistook that it was not admitted. Please
6 continue, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I believe that it was
8 among those numbers that were rejected when redactions were made.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Dr. Lukic, on page 30 you were asked about -- about P4203, about
11 what Major Tucker said about the situation in Srebrenica. Do you
12 remember, or rather, can you remember how many and what kind of epidemics
13 broke out in Srebrenica during the war?
14 A. Since during the Second World War I survived typhoid - and not
15 just me but many other people and families, although many died as well -
16 I was always afraid of contagious diseases and epidemics throughout the
17 war. And that's why I tried to have epidemics closely followed, not only
18 on our side but also on the side of our enemy. And I must state that
19 from what I heard and from what I learned from various channels, there
20 was not a single territory of any of the sides, there were no war
21 epidemics which are well-known from the previous periods, and that also
22 includes Srebrenica.
23 Q. Thank you. On page 25 you were asked about a letter sent by
24 Judge Simic. Was that the only letter that was sent to the commission,
25 not to you, but to the commission? Was that the only letter he ever sent
2 A. Whatever, no. There were a lot of letters left, right, and
3 centre. Everybody wrote, everybody had requests, everybody had
4 proposals. We discussed a lot of those things; however, many of the
5 letters, proposals, suggestions, complaints, both realistic and
6 non-realistic, were in constant circulation. They were always there.
7 Q. Thank you. The 11 people who were arrested in Prijedor, what was
8 their ethnicity? What was the ethnicity of the perpetrators?
9 A. I don't know exactly; however, I remember certain things from
10 what I read or from what somebody told me. They were not Serbs, all of
11 them, nor were those who were murdered and plundered all Muslims.
12 Q. On page 18, Ms. Gustafson implied that you reacted to crimes in
13 Grbavica only when the Serbs started suffering as well; is that correct?
14 A. Unfortunately, it's not true. It is not true. Indeed, it is
15 not. We reacted when humanitarian aid was not distributed evenly to
16 everybody. I can tell you that when it comes to the distribution of that
17 humanitarian aid and seeking routes for it to be delivered to the centre
18 of the city and Grbavica, I co-operated with UNPROFOR. I got into their
19 vehicles and drove around. We often reacted when it was not distributed
20 to everybody.
21 I'm sure that you will also remember that people did not receive
22 pension monies. We reacted then as well. We know some of the
23 municipalities' decisions. Some municipalities declared a state of war,
24 whereas some annulled court decisions, for example, for a Serb who had
25 committed a crime against a person of a different ethnicity, and we
1 reacted then and so on and so forth.
2 Mr. President, as a republic we functioned as a confederation of
3 municipalities, a confederation of war municipalities in that. It is a
4 notorious fact. That's what existed during the war. I have to say that
5 we had municipalities which were better off than the republic itself, and
6 with those people from those municipalities you could discuss everything
7 but the budget. They would not allow us to come close to that budget at
9 Q. Thank you. You were asked about Prijedor as well as to -- and
10 that's on page 40, lines 14 through 18, and I'm going to read it in
11 English. Page 14, lines 14 through 18.
12 [In English] "Given all that, didn't you agree that in a place
13 like Prijedor that it would be right to bring in ethnic Serbs to replace
14 the Croats and Muslims who had left in order to correct this historical
15 injustice and prevent these crimes from happening in the future?"
16 [Interpretation] You were shown a map as well depicting the
17 shooting range. Let me check the map number. Please bear with me. A
18 map showing that there were Muslims in Prijedor.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to call up P783. P783.
20 [Microphone not activated]
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There was no interpretation. The
22 upper left-hand corner, can it be zoomed in? Is there no interpretation
23 into English?
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Could you please look at the map. There are markings for
1 Muslims, 44 Muslims; 42 Serbs; and six Yugoslavs. In your view, who was
2 a majority in Prijedor?
3 A. As far as I can remember and you could tell that in terms of the
4 number of deputies, Prijedor and Sanski Most before the war were both
5 Serb cities. They had a Serb majority. This is not how you do -- you
6 colour a map. It all has to be green and the percentages have to show
7 shares. This is not how you colour a map. However, I don't want to talk
8 about Prijedor, Sanski Most, and others because I would take up too much
9 of your time, and the stories would be ugly.
10 Q. Can we now look at the statute which is 1D9100. We will have to
11 put it on the ELMO. Let's look at the statute of the municipality of
12 Prijedor. Before the elections in 1991, we're talking about the statute
13 which was issued by the communist Assembly. Let's put it on the ELMO.
14 I'm interested in page 1 first and then I will be looking for page 2,
15 Article 6.
16 Professor, could you please read the heading and the decision on
17 the changes to the statute and then we will go to page 2 where I'm
18 interested in Article 6. Do you see the preamble?
19 A. Of course I do.
20 Q. Can you please read it out aloud.
21 A. "Pursuant to Article 239 and 301 of the Statute of the
22 Municipality of Prijedor, the Official Gazette of the Municipality of
23 Prijedor. Issue number illegible, the 7th of 04, 985, the Assembly of
24 the Municipality of Prijedor at the joint session of all councils, dated
25 14th September, 1992, issued a decision on the changes of the statute of
1 the municipality of Prijedor."
2 Q. Could you please read slowly and can we now see page 2, Article
3 6, please. Slowly.
4 A. "In the statute of the municipality of Prijedor, Article 208 or
5 perhaps 206 through 212 is hereby raised and in the provisions of the
6 articles of the statute the word 'delegate' is changed into the word
7 'deputy', whereas the word 'delegation' shall be deleted. Article 6 --"
8 Q. Slowly, slowly.
9 A. "The word 'composition' and the appointment of the council before
10 Article 223 shall hereby be deleted and Article 233 is changed and from
11 now it shall read" --
12 Q. You are reading too fast.
13 A. "The Assembly of the municipality of Prijedor is a --" I can't
14 read, "has one house and 90 deputies of whom 41.59 per cent are of
15 Serbian ethnicity and 38.7 are of Muslim ethnicity, whereas 6.7 are of
16 Croatian ethnicity. There are 9.70 per cent Yugoslav and 3.31 per cent
17 of other nationalities and national minorities in proportion to the
18 ethnic structure of the population of the municipality of Prijedor."
19 Q. Thank you. So who was a majority on the eve of the elections?
20 What would you say?
21 A. There is no doubt about that. I knew that even earlier because I
22 did have some information, and there can be no doubt that Prijedor and
23 Sanski Most had a Serbian majority and that a number of municipalities by
24 the Sava also had a Serbian majority. Some Posavina municipalities were
25 mentioned as scarcely having any Serbian population at all, but that's
1 not true. There were some municipalities with a significant share of
2 Serbs and some even had a Serbian majority.
3 Q. Thank you. Do take a look at Bosanski Brod which is marked as
4 Croatian. 34 per cent of Serbs and 12 per cent of Yugoslavs, right, or
5 Muslims. 30 per cent of Yugoslavs?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You mentioned municipalities by the Sava. Is this one?
8 A. Yes, absolutely. Nobody wants to admit, but about 60 to 80
9 per cent of the population in any municipality who declared themselves to
10 be Yugoslavs were really Serbs.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted and marked for
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3620, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, about the map we just -- we are
17 seeing now, I don't see there's any translation for the legend. Probably
18 we need it.
19 MS. GUSTAFSON: We'll take care of that.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I continue?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Professor, did you know that before the war and even during the
25 first months of the war there was a discussion about talks according to
1 which each ethnic community should establish their municipality and that
2 this also applied to Prijedor offering the Muslims to establish their own
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: That was an absolutely leading question.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How else can I put it? This is
7 generally known to the Chamber and everybody else.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Were there any discussions? How else do I phrase it? Was
10 Prijedor also one of the cases in which there should have been two
12 A. There were many municipalities in which there were balanced
13 shares of different ethnicities, and in those municipalities a division
14 was envisaged along ethnic lines. As far as I know, Prijedor was one of
15 these but I'm not sure. I would say yes, though.
16 Q. Thank you. Then what can you say about the suggestion of the OTP
17 that it was the government's plan to settle Serbs in Prijedor with the
18 implication that they would be settled in Muslim villages?
19 A. Mr. President, I'm really not a person who thinks that you can
20 compensate for one crime with another crime. I'm on the side of truth
21 and truth can never lead to crime. Moving one group out, moving another
22 group in, and kill the ones so that the others may live, such options
23 don't stand a chance. And eventually that was the option of those who
24 began the war with massacres such as those that they were committing
25 during the previous war.
1 Q. Thank you. You were asked about document 1D5756. You were asked
2 about your attitude toward minorities, your opinion about settling, about
3 relations toward other communities, so could we please see the document
4 that I mentioned?
5 A. Which page is that?
6 Q. The document number is D7856. It's about a government session.
7 Actually, it's admitted.
8 JUDGE KWON: That was discussed in your statement in paragraph
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see that it was admitted
11 subsequently, so we don't have to ...
12 During the break some documents were admitted so we must fix
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. While we're waiting, you said, Professor, that there were extreme
16 positions in discussions even at government sessions. So let me ask you
17 if there is a single document which was adopted based on these extreme
18 positions or angry discussions by some delegates?
19 A. I don't know of a single instance of such an extreme attitude
20 being adopted, be it at government sessions or at Supreme Command
21 meetings and so on. And, Your Honours, in such a war which was a civil
22 war and a religious war, extreme positions actually nurture each other.
23 Because when we try to calm somebody, their reply is: But don't you know
24 what the others did or said? And so on. It's best to avoid such
25 situations, keep silent, and then do it your way and do it differently.
1 In war this can be useful.
2 Q. Thank you. A good part of the cross-examination was about our
3 attitude toward minorities, especially Muslims. Could we please see
4 65 ter 05985 which you mention in paragraph 41 of your statement. This
5 is the 68th Session of government from the 22nd to the 26th of April at
6 Bijeljina. Could we please see page 5 -- paragraph 4, that is, at 4. 4
7 in English, please. I don't know which page it is. In the proposed text
8 the bill was -- could we please see item 4 in English. It must be on the
9 following page. Could we please see item 4 in both Serbian and English.
10 It starts at the bottom of the page in Serbian, and in English it must be
11 on the following page.
12 [In English] Next page, please, next page.
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 THE ACCUSED: Next page.
15 JUDGE KWON: I think we have only two pages in English, which is
16 a partial translation.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get the following page in
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Dr. Lukic, did you have any co-operation with Herceg-Bosna and
22 did you enable their high officials to come to Republika Srpska to see
23 for themselves how the Croats were living there?
24 A. I think it was in April 1993, but give or take one month, owing
25 to your agreement with the president of Herceg-Bosna and with my
1 agreement with the prime minister of Herceg-Bosna whom I had known from
2 before the war for -- and I had a positive opinion of him, we made an
3 agreement to cease hostilities. We made an all-for-all exchange of
4 prisoners. We allowed them to come to our territory and see how their
5 people, or rather, people of Croatian ethnicity were living.
6 And to my mind what was very good was when the Croatian side was
7 in a position to lose more, even a couple of dozen thousand people
8 because they were in a serious conflict with the Muslims, you remember
9 well that we let entire formations and a huge number of people to move
10 from the upper part of the Bosna and the middle part of the Bosna River
11 to go to their territories and I'm convinced that's when we saved
12 thousands of people from being massacred. Mr. Prlic and I were trying to
13 get the Muslim side interested to accept the cease-fire to stop the war,
14 and the talks may have yielded some results.
15 Unfortunately, the Muslims didn't accept, they didn't want to
16 hear of it, and I'm still sorry that it didn't happen. But what we did
17 in respect of the Croats - and you remember that our hospitals were also
18 full of wounded Croats - we let many of them cross over and we assisted
19 them in every way. Of course they also paid us back in some cases.
20 What certainly is true was that the Muslim side accepted then but
21 they were striving to reach an achievement -- an agreement in Washington
22 for the Croats and Muslims to unite again against the Serbs and that war
23 should be continued with the assistance of NATO and so on.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D2941, please.
25 JUDGE KWON: Before we move from this document, I want you to
1 clear what the status of this exhibit. This was admitted, I mean 5985.
2 This was part of the associated exhibits referred to in paragraph 41, and
3 in paragraph 41 referred to items 2 and 27. But what was translated is
4 only item 2 but not 27. So probably put this marked for identification
5 pending the English translation of item 27 as well.
6 Yes, please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. That's
8 exactly it. Item 2 was also tendered.
9 So could we please see 1D2941. And I apologise because I did not
10 expect our attitude toward minorities to be put in question.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Please read the first two sentences from the top. Do you
13 recognise this photograph and do you remember this occasion? Is this
14 that visit on the 4th of October?
15 A. Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's go to the top of the page,
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Could you please read the first two sentences.
20 A. "My wish to visit Banja Luka to convince myself that Croatian
21 people live here was realised today because political conditions in that
22 regard have been established. Serbs and Croats in these areas did not
23 wage war. The majority of Croats remained in Banja Luka which is as a
24 result of a positive attitude of the Republika Srpska. Therefore, the
25 departure of Croats from these areas should be prevented. In other
1 words, the vacating of the apartments which should be regulated by law."
2 This was said by Jadranko Prlic, the president of Herceg-Bosna
3 whom I mentioned a few minutes ago. I had known him from before the war.
4 Q. Thank you. What kind of a reaction did this provoke on the
5 Croats in Banja Luka?
6 A. The reactions were mostly positive, although some could be
7 negative too. It wasn't always harmonious. It was not all wine and
8 roses. The majority of politicians, however, understood that this was
9 the direction to move in and this also gave us strength to continue
10 working in this way.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this please be admitted for
13 identification? Oh, sorry, there is a translation.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 MS. GUSTAFSON: Your Honours, my issue with this document is it
16 appears to be a part of an article that's literally been cut out of a
17 newspaper and put onto this sheet. We'd like to have the opportunity to
18 look at the whole article in its context and assess it and, indeed, see
19 if there are any other portions of this particular article that should be
20 included with this extract. In principle, I don't have a problem with
21 this extract going into evidence in light of the witness's answers, but
22 we would like an opportunity to review the entire article.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I would suggest we admit the
24 article and if the Prosecution has any other portions it would like
25 admitted, we won't have any problem with that.
1 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this and you may come back if there's an
2 issue in relation to this news clipping later on.
3 Shall we give the number?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3621, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, the Chamber is
7 minded to take a break, a bit longer break, till 12.30. Yes, we'll rise.
8 --- Recess taken at 11.52 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Professor Lukic, nevertheless, did you and Jadranko Prlic manage
14 to win over part of the Muslim population, or rather, some of the Muslim
15 leaders for peaceful co-operation?
16 A. Well, yes, Mr. Abdic, Fikret Abdic, and his part of the people.
17 That's the Muslim people in Western Bosnia, mostly in the area of
18 Kladusa. We had a few meetings with him and I must say that he was a
19 great supporter of bringing the war to an end since he was supposed to be
20 elected president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, he voluntarily
21 gave up on that office. During the war, we concluded through our talks
22 with Mr. Abdic he was truly against the war. As a businessman he was
23 well-known from earlier on. He was in favour of peace and tolerance
24 among all ethnic communities.
25 Q. Can you tell us what is decisive there, with one Muslim
1 orientation one could not establish peace and co-operate and with the
2 other one one could?
3 A. Obviously there was this orientation of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic in
4 terms of this purely Muslim option, this Islamic state, I beg your
5 pardon. And he could not give up on that, even at the cost of waging
6 war. I think that the best example is the Cutileiro Plan that he did not
7 accept. Basically he withdrew his signature. It no longer matters who
8 talked him into doing that. However, during the war when on several
9 occasions we tried to have some kind of contact at least, to fight less,
10 if I can put it that way. Unfortunately, we did not quite succeed in
11 that because, quite simply, he was in favour of creating an Islamic state
12 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no matter how big it may be, as he said on one
13 occasion, even if it were as big as a small coffee cup.
14 However, Mr. Abdic was a person with a broader outlook and indeed
15 he made proposals to us. He thought that Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban and
16 others who co-operated with them would manage to get something done in
17 terms of softening this Muslim hard-line in order to reach a timely
18 peace, most importantly to establish peace.
19 Q. Thank you. Could you briefly identify a document that we are
20 going to have placed on the ELMO now, please.
21 THE ACCUSED: May I ...
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Could you tell the Trial Chamber, as you look at the preamble and
24 the heading, can you tell us what this is about?
25 A. Well, the prime minister of the Croatian Republic of
1 Herceg-Bosna, Dr. Jadranko Prlic; the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska,
2 Dr. Vladimir Lukic; and the prime minister of the Autonomous Province of
3 Western Bosnia, Zlatko Jusic, MA, support the joint statement signed in
4 Zagreb on the 21st of October, 1993, between the president of the
5 Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, Fikret Abdic; and the president of
6 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban, MA; as well as the
7 declaration signed in Belgrade on the 22nd of October, 1993, between the
8 president of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, Fikret Abdic; and
9 the president of the Republika Srpska, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, as an
10 expression of true will in favour of establishing lasting peace in the
11 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Well, yes, I do remember this full well and I think that this was
13 indeed a high-quality document that would lead to ending the war in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was an opportunity if Croatia was ready to go
15 for peace too, but I must say that despite all the talks we had and this
16 document that you signed, unfortunately the war went on and you know
17 until when and so on and so forth.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please show the last page
19 now so that the professor could identify the participants.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Jadranko Prlic was there,
21 Vladimir Lukic, and Zlatko Jusic, Zlatko Jusic on behalf of Western
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would you please lift this up a
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And of course the president, Fikret
1 Abdic, down here.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The microphone is switched
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted or marked for
6 identification because I'm not sure that we have a translation yet?
7 JUDGE KWON: Is this a part of a book? Can we see the page
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] From some book, I don't know which
10 one, but it is authentic.
11 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the bottom? Yes.
12 Ms. Gustafson.
13 MS. GUSTAFSON: It's a Prosecution -- I mean, it's a document
14 from our evidence collection. I'm not -- I'd have to look into the
15 source. I don't have an answer at the moment.
16 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3622, Your Honours.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. You were asked about war booty. Could you please tell the
20 Trial Chamber how and in which way this question was regulated?
21 A. Well, war booty went through certain organs, and we also had
22 legal regulations about that. Whoever obtains war booty is to hand it
23 over to someone and also there are regulations on how it should be
24 guarded and also how it can be used and for what purposes, depending on
25 what the war booty actually is. So it had different purposes.
1 Q. Thank you. Did war booty include property that was seized,
2 property that was legal and whose owner was known?
3 A. No. Private property could never officially, publicly, through
4 certain organs, be included in war booty.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us about smuggled goods that were
6 seized, cars of unknown origin, smuggled food, drink, et cetera? Could
7 the state use that in a lawful way?
8 A. Well, no. Also people were looking at what it was, where it came
9 from, and so on. Also, there were regulations in that field, how to deal
10 with such property. In war if there is nothing else that gives a good
11 yield, it is definitely smuggling that yields fruit and I think that
12 that's a well-known thing here.
13 Q. Thank you. You were asked about Mico "Joje" and Mandic, how they
14 sold Golf cars and it says somewhere that Radovan Karadzic knew about
15 that. Did they sell that on their own behalf or did the state or
16 government assign automobiles to their services, say the police and so
18 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'm sorry --
19 JUDGE KWON: That's a leading question very much. You could ask
20 how could -- in which method, on what basis, did they sell those items.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it was suggested that they
24 were selling them, but it wasn't said that they were doing it for private
25 purposes. So it has to be specified.
1 JUDGE KWON: You are putting words to the witness.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something? Judge, sir,
3 may I say something?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, very well.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the other day I wasn't clear
6 enough when I spoke about this property. There was smuggling and there
7 were other things. But as regards the problem of Golf cars and some
8 other vehicles and so on and so forth, primarily this was given, or
9 rather, the municipality, for instance, had a lot of vehicles and then
10 they would let the ministries and other organs have some.
11 As for these mentioned persons and these vehicles, it is correct
12 that they exported some of these goods. They were sold, that is true,
13 but this money was used for a particular purpose, for different purposes.
14 For instance, you know that we had to take our wounded very far away
15 because in Republika Srpska we did not have enough hospitals. So many
16 vehicles were given to hospitals, ministries, and so on, for their use.
17 In other words, these goods, in a way, had been taken but for a
18 particular purpose and they were used for some general purposes.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you. You were asked, or rather, it was suggested that you
21 believed that there should be a Serb entity and within that context it
22 was necessary to have a corridor. Could you tell the Trial Chamber why
23 the Serbs from the western areas did not use the Brotherhood and Unity
24 Highway in that period of time?
25 A. Mr. President --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
3 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could just specify the period of time with
4 a date, I think that would be helpful.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- may I --
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a minute.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise, I do.
12 JUDGE KWON: Please wait. Mr. Karadzic, reformulate the
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. On page 53 you were asked, or rather, it was suggested to you
16 that -- how you imagined the Serb entity, and in that context it was
17 stated that you advocated the opening of a corridor. To the north of the
18 Sava River between Zagreb and Belgrade there is a highway called
19 Brotherhood and Unity. Why did the Serb side not use the highway? Why
20 did they have to secure a corridor on the southern bank of the Sava
22 A. Gentlemen --
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I couldn't find the reference, but
24 Ms. Gustafson wanted to know the time-frame about -- that you are asking
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was the previous day, sorry,
2 rather, last week, page 53.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. At the time when the corridor was created in the beginning of the
5 war, June 1992, that's when the corridor was created and you explained
6 that babies were dying and so on and so forth. So now I'm asking you
7 whether that corridor was indispensable and why they did not use the
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second --
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I --
11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Now that the time-frame has been specified, I
12 have an objection because the question is related to this witness's
13 proposals to Dr. Karadzic about a corridor in the fall of 1991. And now
14 he's being asked about why the corridor was opened in June of 1992 and
15 the attempt is being made to link this back to his earlier answers. And
16 I think that's confusing. The questions that I asked about the creation
17 -- or his proposals for a corridor in 1991 were related to the
18 contemplation of a separate Serb entity. It is now confusing to talk
19 about the war situation in 1992 and the opening of a corridor at that
21 JUDGE KWON: Well, Mr. Robinson?
22 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, I see her point that it's not
23 directly related to that portion of the direct examination, so perhaps
24 Dr. Karadzic can link it with another question.
25 JUDGE KWON: But a corridor may serve the same purpose
1 irrespective of the time-frame. That's -- yes, Ms. Gustafson?
2 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, Your Honours, in 1991 there was of course
3 no conflict in Bosnia and in 1992 there was. So the corridor -- creating
4 a corridor in 1992 when there are different parties with different --
5 with control of different parts of the territory, in my submission, is a
6 completely different question from the creation of a corridor in 1991
7 before there is an actual armed conflict. And my questions were related
8 to that pre-war scenario.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can rephrase --
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Ms. Gustafson's observation.
13 Please move on to another topic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I just wanted to ask whether in 1991, or rather, in the autumn of
17 1991 something happened in Croatia because we could not use all the roads
18 at that time -- but never mind.
19 The last question, Professor: You were suggested that the
20 Serbian Democratic Party fought to have influence on the government.
21 Apart from you who were not an SDS member, were there any other ministers
22 who were not SDS members or were members of a different party?
23 A. Please don't take my word for granted. I believe that there were
24 three or four other ministers who were either members of different
25 parties or not party members at all.
1 Mr. President, you asked me about something and I answered, but I
2 would like to add something to my answer. I believe that a mistake was
3 made so I would like to correct that mistake with your leave. And it's
4 about the movement of vehicles and people around Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 May I be allowed to proceed?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In late June or perhaps between
8 mid-June and the end of June, on Mount Igman in 1991 we held a Yugoslav
9 conference and that conference ended half a day earlier to allow people
10 to go home. And we suggested the people from Serbia not to go down to
11 the Sava River or take the highway. We told them to go across Mount
12 Romanija, but I don't want to bore you with all the details. Therefore,
13 the freedom of movement stopped existing as of May 1991 and connected to
14 a lot of risk. Some people who took the highway never got home if they
15 were on buses --
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Lukic, I don't follow. You wanted -- you said
17 you wanted to correct your evidence. What was your mistake?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Actually, it's not a mistake in my
19 answer. I was referring to the fact that one could [as interpreted] move
20 freely around Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in 1991. I wanted to
21 correct that statement. I wanted to add to that by saying that that was,
22 in fact, not true.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 18, it shouldn't be "could"
24 but "could not."
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
1 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Was the minister of veterans Dr. Dragan Djokanovic, while you
5 were prime minister was he an SDS member? If not, what party did he
6 belong to?
7 A. Dr. Dragan Djokanovic was the minister for veterans. He had his
8 own party but I don't know what it was called. He had his own party.
9 Q. And what about Mr. Kalinic, was he a member of the SDS at that
10 time or was he a member of another party?
11 A. He was still in Markovic's party at the time. You know it much
12 better than I do. You know what party that was.
13 Q. Thank you. And my last question: Is it possible that one party
14 which is in power allow for an embittered opponent to be appointed to a
15 responsible position on its behalf?
16 A. It was not possible before the war or during the war. It is
17 still not possible. It has never been possible at least in our neck of
18 the wood.
19 Q. And now on page 27, last week, line 6, you were asked a question
20 which due to the double negation in our language and an impossibility to
21 use that same negation in English it was not clear why you said "yes."
22 The claim was your job was not to investigate and then you said: Well,
23 yes. Does this mean that it was indeed your job to investigate or it
25 A. What investigation do you have in mind?
1 Q. It was about your term of office in the United Nations.
2 A. Yes, yes, I was not the one who investigated. As the
3 developments unfolded, I had to record them.
4 Q. Thank you, Professor. Thank you for having come to The Hague to
5 testify and thank you for your co-operation. This will be all that I had
6 for you.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That concludes your evidence, Mr. Lukic.
8 On behalf of the Chamber, I thank you for your coming to The Hague to
9 give it.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be given the floor to say
11 something? Would that be in order? Is it customary?
12 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Lukic. Please have a safe journey back
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just wanted to thank you. That
15 was all.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
17 [The witness withdrew]
18 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
19 [The witness entered court]
20 JUDGE KWON: If the witness takes the solemn declaration, please.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
22 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
23 WITNESS: MILE POPARIC
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 JUDGE KWON: Good afternoon, Mr. Poparic. Please be seated and
1 make yourself comfortable.
2 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
3 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
4 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Poparic.
5 A. Good afternoon. Before we start, if I may, I have to deal with
6 the corrections.
7 Q. We'll get there yet. But we have already noticed that both of us
8 are speaking fast and don't make breaks. So I kindly ask you to pause
9 between my question and your answer, and I remind both of us that we
10 should speak slowly so that what we say might be interpreted and
12 Now, although it's an integral part of your report, could you
13 please introduce yourself to the Trial Chamber and tell us what your --
14 about your education and your career.
15 A. I am a mechanical engineer. I graduated from the school of
16 mechanical engineering in Belgrade. I specialised in ballistics. I
17 graduated from the department for ballistics, and it was the only school
18 in the former Yugoslavia where one could learn about ballistics. Later
19 on that was also taught at the military academy in Zagreb, and I believe
20 that it exists in Belgrade these days. However, all the ballistics
21 professionals had to graduate from that school in Belgrade.
22 Q. I would like to ask you to slow down, please, if possible.
23 A. At the time when I was a student at that school you had to cover
24 all the areas of weaponry - rocket weaponry, classical weaponry,
25 ammunition, and assets. So my generation is the one that had -- that
1 gained general knowledge.
2 When I graduated from the school of mechanical engineering, I
3 also completed the school for reserve officers in Zagreb. I underwent
4 military training. I familiarised myself with all the types of weaponry
5 in the then-Yugoslavia, both infantry and artillery weaponry. And after
6 that I joined the JNA and I was assigned to work at the Pretis factory
7 where I was involved in the construction of rocket projectiles and
8 thereafter of artillery projectiles.
9 In 1991 I was transferred as an officer to the technical testing
10 centre where I remained working until the end of my professional career
11 when I was pensioned off in 2007.
12 Q. The technical testing centre is what we call TOC?
13 A. Yes, it was the testing centre which tested all the assets that
14 were supposed to become part of the standard catalogue of the JNA
15 armament and later on of the JNA armament.
16 Q. Thank you. Did you have a rank?
17 A. Yes, when I was pensioned off I had a rank of lieutenant-colonel.
18 Q. Did your centre co-operate with Pretis; and if it did, up to
20 A. The TOC co-operated with Pretis always. That co-operation was
21 never discontinued even during the war or after the war. I co-operated
22 with my colleagues from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina who still
23 work in that institution and they still use certain of Pretis' services.
24 I co-operated with them when I was still active. So the TOC co-operated
25 with Pretis constantly during the war and after the war. I'm talking
1 about this Pretis company from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 Q. Thank you. When you were transferred to the TOC in Belgrade, did
3 you get involved in expertise and did you participate in the testings
4 that were subsequently used?
5 A. Yes, we were involved with expertise in the army, which means
6 that all of the incidents that involved arms and ammunition had to be
7 investigated and somebody from the TOC had to be involved. I
8 participated in several such investigations, starting with the explosion
9 in the Vranje depot, some incidents among the troops. I also worked for
10 the military court in Podgorica, where I carried out forensic expertise
11 as a member of the TOC. The TOC was tasked with that and I was the one
12 who was actually the representative of the TOC that got the task. I did
13 not even mention it in my CV because I didn't think it was important.
14 Q. And what was the relationship with with the TOC and the Nikinci
15 testing ground?
16 A. The Nikinci testing ground is part of the TOC. I have to say
17 that the TOC in the SFRY had several testing grounds that it used. One
18 was in Prevlaka, another one was in Nikinca, and the third one was in
19 Kalinovik. Occasionally we could use some army testing grounds as
20 needed. The Kalinovik testing ground was a reserve testing ground in
21 case of war.
22 The TOC had its war assignment in Nevesinje and that's where the
23 war reserves of the TOC were stored. I remember that we had some flak
24 jackets there and during the sanctions I used them. Those had been
25 transferred to the Republic of Yugoslavia and we used them. That --
1 those were war reserves in Nevesinje. The testing ground was in
2 Kalinovik and the war reserves were kept in Nevesinje.
3 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Trial Chamber where are Nevesinje
4 and Kalinovik and where were they then?
5 A. Throughout the war they were in Republika Srpska and they still
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D28759. I
9 believe that it has a D number but I don't have it. So I would like to
10 call up 1D28759. Maybe it was not admitted. 1D28759.
11 JUDGE KWON: Could you check the number again?
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. While you worked at Pretis and at the technical testing centre,
14 the TOC, apart from specialising in projectiles, did you have an
15 opportunity to familiarise yourself with all kinds of weapons and
16 armaments that the JNA had?
17 A. Yes, absolutely, during my work, my studies, and the reserve
18 officers' school of the JNA.
19 Q. In your report too the rule is mentioned for the sniping rifle,
20 the mortar, that is, the rules of using these armaments. Can you explain
21 what that means and what kinds of rules those are for individual
22 armaments? 1D71 --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 7902, please.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The rule that I cited is a basic
25 document to be used by troops using any armament that is represented in
1 the army. For example, this rule or manual for the sniping rifle
2 contains all information those who need that rifle need to know. Talking
3 about this rifle, how do you use it, what kind of sights are available,
4 how snipers are selected, even the tests are described used to select
5 snipers, and later they are trained and so on. Then there are firing
6 tables and so on.
7 For each asset there is such a manual and they're not all the
8 same. Talking about the 82-millimetre mortar, well, that manual contains
9 the same information as that for the rifle; that is, the parts, the
10 advice for use, but also information regarding its positioning on the
11 ground, how the elements for firing are calculated, and even information
12 about the consumption of ammunition depending on the type of target and
13 depending on your intention, if you want to warn the enemy or destroy the
14 target. And whoever's in charge will decide about the use of the mortar
15 and the way it is used.
16 For example, if it's the commander's assessment that a target
17 must be destroyed because of the danger it poses to that commander's
18 unit, he can take such a decision. And then there are standard values
19 for that kind of action. For one type of target, for example, you need
20 216 shells of 80-millimetre calibre. That's a target 100 to 200 metres
21 wide and some 50 metres deep. And that is roughly the area covered by a
22 squad, an assault squad. Of course a commander can deviate from these
23 values. That's his discretionary right. In case of larger targets,
24 we're also talking about a larger number of shells and so on.
25 There are also rules in force for other assets and these rules
1 describe in detail how the asset is used by troops.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. In this indictment against me and my officers
4 disproportionality is often mentioned. Can you tell us based on what
5 we've just heard, 216 shells of 82-millimetre calibre rather than
6 80-millimetre as has been recorded, how is that determined? What does it
7 mean to fire disproportionately if you need as many as 216 shells to
8 destroy a target?
9 A. It's difficult to make such an assessment. Talking about a
10 mortar, the commander has the right to assess that his unit is threatened
11 and that the enemy position must be destroyed. Destruction means
12 destroying over 50 per cent of the enemy's assets. It all depends on the
13 situation. It's all part of the discretionary right of the commander,
14 and everything else is really about fine-tuning and I cannot go into all
15 the details. It all depends on the situation. Of course there are
16 situations when many shells are used without that being considered
17 disproportionate use. And the standards I mentioned are not peculiar to
18 the JNA. Those are international standards. The JNA didn't invent new
19 things in that respect. Thank you.
20 Q. I'm waiting for the transcript and I would also like to ask you
21 to mind that.
22 A. Unfortunately, I don't see the transcript.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Previous translation continues]...
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Thank you. Let us briefly see D3560. D3560. It was admitted
2 through Witness Subotic. Could you please tell us if you are familiar
3 with this or such a document and what does it mean?
4 A. Yes. This is a standard request for testing at the Nikinci
5 testing site -- test site. This is about 120-millimetre shell and a
6 functional test is requested and an extreme temperature test. And below
7 we see the composition of elements - the jacket, the primer, the basic
8 charge, and so on. This is the typical way how ammunition was sent to
9 Nikinci for testing and it shows that it was tested in accordance with
10 the regulations about quality of products which define the conditions it
11 must meet to be approved.
12 The test institution conducts the appropriate tests, and in case
13 all the test results are positive they make a relevant report and then
14 that asset can be sent to the warehouses or the units and so on. This is
15 from 1994 and it was signed by Miloje Jokic, the director of control.
16 And this shows that during the war the control procedure was fully abided
17 by at Pretis.
18 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us what this means, what we read
19 here --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
21 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
22 MS. EDGERTON: Good afternoon, Your Honours. I wonder if we
23 could just ask whether this document was cited in the witness's reports
24 and where it was cited in the witness's reports, because otherwise I
25 think we're a little bit at sea.
1 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough.
2 Could you assist us, Mr. Poparic?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can tell you specifically.
4 This document is not cited in the reports. But since I worked on other
5 reports with Mrs. Subotic too, I see it as a document which proves that
6 at Pretis there was product control in place which was in line with the
7 regulations. That was being contested specifically in the case of air
8 bombs, that Pretis did not work in accordance with the technical
9 documentation, regulations, and so on. However, this document shows that
10 they did work in accordance with the usual way of manufacturing
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. I believe I can call up another document. You said you are
16 familiar with the armaments held by the JNA. Could we please see
17 1D07465. It's a video-clip of the BH army which was put on YouTube.
18 It's the 4th Motorised Brigade of the 1st Corps. It's from 00.2.35 to
20 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Can we take it that this is another
22 item that was not cited in the witness's reports?
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Poparic.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Just a second.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It has to do with our reports.
2 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry? While it has to do with your report, but
3 it was not cited.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not directly cited, but
5 there are documents that are linked to this very video-clip.
6 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 Can we start at 00.2.35 and go through 00.2.55.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Please pay attention to the assets that can be seen there.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I'm not sure that we have seen everything.
15 A. Yes, I saw two assets. One was a multi-barrelled
16 rocket-launcher, it has 12 barrels. It's a Chinese-made launcher of
17 107-millimetre calibre. It's a very well-known MLR. It was also
18 manufactured in Iran and North Korea and many countries use it. The JNA
19 never had such a launcher. It had a launcher which was produced more or
20 less at the same time, in 1963, a 128-millimetre calibre launcher with 32
21 barrels. It was called Plamen. And the other asset was a 130-millimetre
22 M46 gun with a maximum range of 27 kilometres.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Poparic, I think you are speaking too fast.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.
1 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat from the part where you said it was
2 called Plamen.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The JNA never had the multiple
4 rocket-launcher 127-millimetres.
5 This launcher is interesting for us because in the documents that
6 were at our disposal in this case, there was a document issued by the KDZ
7 of the BH MUP. And they analysed the traces after an explosion in the
8 former Palmero Tojati [phoen] Street where one rocket from such a
9 launcher hit a private apartment. It was their conclusion that the
10 projectile had come from the direction of Ilidza and they also stated
11 that the launcher -- that the JNA had such launchers, which is false.
12 The launcher that we saw here on Igman didn't have a range as
13 long as Palmero Tojati Street because its range is 8,500 metres. And the
14 distance from Igman to that street is somewhat greater. So if the
15 investigators established that it was fired from the direction of Ilidza,
16 it could only have come from the Alipasino Polje industrial zone because,
17 as I said, the JNA did not have such launchers and therefore I believe
18 the VRS didn't have them either, at least I don't have any information to
19 that effect.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Thank you. In line 25, the previous page, it's not 127. You
22 said 107, didn't you?
23 A. 107.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I'm actually kind of wondering where
3 we're going with this because this is the second item that was not
4 referred to, footnoted, in the witness's reports. And expert or not,
5 that doesn't relieve the Defence of their obligation to notify the
6 Prosecution of documents that they might otherwise be using with the
7 witness, especially when it's not been cited in their reports. And, with
8 respect, I think we're on to an area that is completely irrelevant and
9 far and away outside of the scope of the witness's report.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was wondering about the direction in which we
11 are going.
12 Mr. Robinson, do you want to say something?
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. With respect to the
14 relevance, I think this is an attempt to show that with respect to the
15 incident in which the shelling -- shells landed in Alipasino Polje on the
16 22nd of January, 1994, that the origin of that fire was not from the
17 Bosnian Serb side. With respect to the notice, however, that's I think
18 our error, that if we're going to lead documents which are -- even though
19 he's a viva voce witness, if we're going to lead documents in addition to
20 those mentioned in his report, we should have given the Prosecution
21 notice and I apologise for that.
22 JUDGE KWON: Given that Mr. Poparic is an expert, I expected
23 Mr. Karadzic would lead evidence in order to tender his reports first.
24 So I was wondering where are we heading to. And I'm not sure about the
25 origin of this film as well. I don't think Mr. Poparic is in the
1 position to give evidence about that.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a film that is on YouTube.
4 We can see here that it says "Patriotic League Video." This is a series
5 of video films that --
6 JUDGE KWON: Are you involved in editing this page, filming of
7 this? Do you know when this was filmed?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This footage is part of a TV
9 programme from 1993. It was shown on BH television. This is just a clip
10 from that TV programme, and the entire video can be seen on YouTube and
11 probably the entire video might even be here. This is a video that
12 speaks about the 4th Motorised Brigade and its commanders speak
13 themselves and so on.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, because time is short
15 I didn't want to go into specific incidents. I wanted to complete these
16 general matters so that I can start with the incidents tomorrow and
17 complete them tomorrow, I mean the ones that are contained in the
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit those parts played. Shall we assign the
21 exhibit number?
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3619, Your Honours.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 Could I now ask for 65 ter 24216.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. A moment ago you spoke about the roles and ammunition spent, so
2 on this table could you explain that to us? Can you tell us what it
3 actually shows?
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
5 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
6 MS. EDGERTON: The document that is on the screen at this moment,
7 65 ter number 24216, is not footnoted, as far as I'm aware, in the
8 witness's reports for which he's the principal co-signatory -- pardon me,
9 the principal signatory, and we've not been notified that this was going
10 to be used. And as I said, we're still entitled to that notification,
11 Your Honours.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I was just telling
14 Dr. Karadzic that he should at this point give the Prosecution all of the
15 numbers of documents he intends to use during this examination. So I
16 don't know if you want to have him do that orally or we can adjourn early
17 for the day and we can give them that notice this afternoon so that they
18 can be ready tomorrow.
19 JUDGE KWON: Can he not deal with the -- his report for ten
20 minutes and continue tomorrow with these documents?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can, but then I'd have to move
22 on to the incidents themselves and I wouldn't want to interrupt that.
23 But whatever you wish. We can do it tomorrow.
24 JUDGE KWON: Given that the Chamber has another hearing at
25 quarter past 2.00, the Chamber will rise for today.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.37 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 29th day of
3 May, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.