1 Friday, 31 May 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Gaynor, please continue.
8 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 WITNESS: MILE POPARIC [Resumed]
10 [Witness answered through interpretation]
11 Cross-examination by Mr. Gaynor: [Continued]
12 Q. Mr. Poparic, when we broke yesterday we were discussing the
13 measurement of the azimuth of the Markale 2 incident.
14 MR. GAYNOR: If we call up --
15 A. I apologise, but I cannot hear well. Can the volume be raised?
16 MR. ROBINSON: Somebody needs to speak for a test so I'll do it.
17 JUDGE KWON: Do you hear me -- no? Let us see.
18 Yes. Mr. Poparic, do you hear me well?
19 THE WITNESS: Okay, okay.
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
21 MR. GAYNOR:
22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Poparic.
23 A. [In English] Good morning.
24 Q. Now, when we broke yesterday we were discussing the measurement
25 of the azimuth of the Markale 2 incident, and if we can go, please, to
1 your report D3644 at page 112 in English and that's 113 in B/C/S. Now if
2 we could focus, please, on footnote 212. Yesterday you clarified your
3 evidence about the measurements by the French UNPROFOR troops and you
4 accepted that you had made a mistake in footnote 211. Now in footnote
5 212 you say:
6 "It is clear that the French sappers did not measure the azimuth
7 of 2850 mils and that for unknown reasons they accepted the results of
8 the measurement of the Sarajevo CSB."
9 Now, Mr. Poparic, is it correct that you now accept that the
10 French did in fact measure the azimuth themselves?
11 A. [Interpretation] I will explain. I accept that they measured the
12 azimuth - and that's the one we can see on the video-clip, that's the
13 azimuth at 2.800, 157.5 degrees is the value - and they rounded up the
14 value to 2.850 which is 165 degrees. It's interesting that the CSB also
15 measured an azimuth of 2.850, but the units of measure are different.
16 The CSB of Sarajevo has units where the circle is divided into 6.000
17 units, whereas the French divided into 6.400 units. These two facts make
18 the results appear the same at first sight, but they differ substantially
19 by 10 or 11 degrees. They did measure 2800 and rounded it up to 2850
20 which matches the other result, but different units were applied and
21 there is a substantial difference in the azimuth --
22 Q. Let's have a look at the report of CSB Sarajevo.
23 MR. GAYNOR: Could we look at P1908, page 3, B/C/S, page 2 in
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll not broadcast this.
1 MR. GAYNOR: Very well, Mr. President. Thank you.
2 Q. Now in this report it's clear that the CSB Sarajevo have accorded
3 the azimuth as 170 degrees plus or minus 5 degrees. It's in paragraph 2.
4 There's no reference in that report to any measurement by mils. And also
5 we can look at it in a minute, P1934 - perhaps we can look at it now -
6 which is a report compiled by Emir Turkusic. And if we look at that at
7 page 5 in B/C/S and page 4 in English, we see there that Emir Turkusic,
8 who was also within the RBiH MUP but within the KDZ part of that measured
9 it as 170 degrees plus or minus 5 degrees.
10 So what is the basis of your assertion that the investigators of
11 the Sarajevo CSB used a compass with a division of 1.600 while they did
12 the calculation and what is the relevance of that assertion to these
14 A. The CSB Sarajevo investigators worked together with UNMO
15 observers, I believe. There was a Lieutenant-Colonel Konings. And in
16 the report of the UNMO observers it is stated that the azimuth was 170
17 degrees or 2850 mils. In some documents that you showed, the value is
18 expressed in degrees, but in some others it's expressed in mils. 170,
19 according to this division of 1:6.000 is -- equals 2850 mils or actually
20 a little less. The exact value is 170 point something.
21 Now, in this system of a division of 6.000 --
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down and repeat
23 the figures.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Poparic, please speak slowly and repeat from:
25 "The system of division of 6.000 ..."
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If these 170 degrees are expressed
2 in mils according to the division of the circle into 6.000, we'll get
3 2850 or -- actually, that's a bit over 170 but that can be neglected. If
4 the value of 2850 in the division of 1:6400 is converted into degrees,
5 then we get 165 degrees. That's the value the French sappers came up
6 with. And the difference is about 10 degrees. There are documents here,
7 though, that state the value as 170 degrees or 2850 mils. So there can
8 be no error.
9 MR. GAYNOR:
10 Q. But you accept that the French UNPROFOR troops recorded the value
11 as 2.850 mils and the CSB recorded the value in degrees as 170 plus or
12 minus 5 degrees; you accept that, don't you?
13 A. I accept that the French measured the value of 2850. They put
14 down 2850, but actually I heard that they measured 2800 which is not a
15 significant error. That was fairly done. It's -- we're talking about a
16 rounding of 2 degrees. And there's a police clip where we see that
17 they're using military compasses that has a division into mils. Now, how
18 they converted the values, I don't know. Maybe they measured the value
19 in degrees originally and then converted into mils or the other way
20 around, I don't know, but it doesn't really matter. I accept that this
21 is the result of CSB and UNMO and this result equal -- is equal to an
22 angle of 2850 mils in the 1:6.000 division. If it were -- we're talking
23 about the 1:6400 division, then the value would be slightly different,
24 about 3.000. And the difference is obvious and there can be no
1 Q. All right. We'll move on to another subject. If we can turn to
2 the next page in English and B/C/S of your report, which is D3644.
3 That's page 113 in English and 114 in B/C/S. We're now going to look at
4 your assertions concerning the cymbeline radar system.
5 On that page you say that -- it goes:
6 "On the condition that the shell had a certain minimum angle of
7 descent of 67 degrees and considering the conditions for which the radar
8 had been set up, it was easy to determine the maximum lower incoming
9 trajectory for each charge ..."
10 And if we turn to the next page in both languages, we see the
11 graph containing a great deal of information about that Cymbeline radar.
12 Now, did you draw this graph yourself?
13 A. Yes, Mrs. Subotic and I drew it. These trajectories are -- were
14 calculated using a programme used to make firing tables. We used it to
15 have a graph with the relevant points, but it seems we failed to point
16 out to which shell this is applied. It's the M49 shell which corresponds
17 to the Russian 0F-473 model. We chose it deliberately, although I'm not
18 sure that the VRS had these shells because the UNPROFOR report stating
19 that these shells could not be seen on the radar is based on the firing
20 table for this M49 shell, that's why we calculated the trajectories for
21 this very shell to check what UNPROFOR had stated. And, by the way, the
22 range of this shell is shorter than that of the other.
23 MR. GAYNOR: Can we focus, Mr. Registrar, on either one of these
24 images. They're both exactly the same.
25 Q. Now, you're confirming that these trajectories are not in fact
1 for the 120-millimetre mortar projectile; is that right?
2 A. No, no. We misunderstood each other. It's not 122 but 120. But
3 these are the trajectories for a 120-millimetre mortar shell, but it's an
4 older model that was manufactured under licence from the Russians. It is
5 called a heavy shell and the one used now is a light shell. So this one
6 is a bit heavier and has a shorter range and carries a bit more explosive
7 and so on. That's why I pointed out that we calculated these
8 trajectories for this very shell because the UNPROFOR in its report
9 stated the limitations in range and explained why it couldn't be seen on
10 the radar and all that referred to this mine. So there can be no
11 mistake. In the report about the shelling, the trajectories for that
12 other shell were stated, which actually corroborates what I'm saying. We
13 have information for both kinds of shell showing that they couldn't be
14 seen on the radar.
15 Q. But the trajectories we're looking at on the screen at the moment
16 do not correspond to the trajectories for the MK -- M74, 120-millimetre
17 mortar projectile which is considered to have been the cause of the
18 explosion at Markale; is that right? That's right, isn't it?
19 A. I'll explain. It's that mortar that you mentioned, but it's not
20 the M62 shell but the M48 -- sorry, M49 shell. It's only a different
21 shell fired from the same mortar because one mortar can fire different
22 types of shell. These are newer shells. The M62 shell is the most
23 frequent model and there are other variants, whereas the older model is
24 heavier. This is the shell for the 120-millimetre shell that was
25 allegedly used to fire a shell on the Markale market.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 6, lines 5 and 6, due to the
4 different rules applying to negations in Serbian and English, it was
5 recorded wrongly. The witness said that it was impossible that they
6 could not be seen on the radar. [In English] It showed that they
7 couldn't be -- it couldn't be that they hadn't been seen.
8 JUDGE KWON: I don't think I'm following.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 6, line 5, I'll read out
10 what was recorded.
11 [In English] It showed that they couldn't be seen on the radar.
12 It should be all the way around. It couldn't happen that they wouldn't
13 be seen on the radar.
14 JUDGE KWON: Do you see that, Mr. Gaynor? Line -- it's line 1.
15 THE ACCUSED: Line 5, line 5.
16 MR. GAYNOR: It's just slipped off my screen but we can -- I can
17 ask the witness to clarify.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 MR. GAYNOR:
20 Q. Now, Mr. Poparic, you heard that. Could you clarify what your
21 words were.
22 A. I said that we showed that the M49 shell fired from a
23 120-millimetre mortar must have been caught by the radar beam, and we
24 also showed in the other report containing a similar diagram that the M62
25 shell fired from the same mortar also must have been caught by the radar
1 beam. All shells irrespective of the model fired from that mortar must
2 have been caught by the radar beam. I think it's clear.
3 Q. Okay. Now, in any event your analysis depends to a very great
4 deal on the location of the centre point of the radar beam and of the
5 radius of that beam which was in operation on that day. So I want to
6 explore that with you. And a third point which is the location of the
7 centre point of the radar beam in comparison to the market-place. So
8 let's start with the first thing. Do you see the centre point of the
9 radar beam which appears to be quite high in the sky above the
10 market-place? What is the source of your placing the centre point of the
11 radar beam at that point?
12 A. The centre point you are referring to is irrelevant in this
13 depiction of ours. The height of 548 metres - or we can round it to
14 550 - this line is important because that's what UNPROFOR stated as a --
15 for which UNPROFOR was a source, above which anything must have been
16 caught, which means that a trajectory 900 metres high would not have been
17 registered, whereas if we were to show the other diagram in the other
18 report, it would be easier to explain. This height of 550 metres is the
19 height of which UNPROFOR says that anything above that must have been
20 observed. It was stated by the engineers using the radar. Maybe the
21 radar beam was wider, but that is not important. We only made a sketch,
22 an approximate sketch of the front of the radar beam in relation to the
23 trajectory. It may have been twice as wide or half as wide, but that's
24 not really relevant. All we care about is the lower limit because the
25 problem is the lower limit and not the centre point.
1 Q. Sir, you're suggesting that two things are irrelevant. One is
2 the centre point of the radar beam and the second is the radius of the
3 radar beam; is that right?
4 A. That is right. It is relevant for the one who decides how to
5 position the radar and how to -- where to point it, but I think they did
6 a very good job about that because the report states that it was at about
7 1.050 metres from the separation line. I don't think that's precise
8 enough because if we look at the situation on the ground the separation
9 line was some 2 kilometres away. They probably had in mind the direction
10 of the radar beam. Why was it necessary to place the radar there? It
11 was their task to observe all the projectiles coming from the VRS
12 positions and vice versa. If we take a look at Sarajevo, how wide the
13 inhabited area is, then we're talking about some 4 to 5 kilometres. And
14 if we consider the lower or the descending part of the trajectory,
15 then ...
16 Q. Mr. Poparic --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat the last part of his
19 MR. GAYNOR:
20 Q. Could you repeat the last part of your answer.
21 A. I said that Sarajevo is 4 to 5 kilometres wide there, and if we
22 imagine that the furthest point is targeted or the point nearest to the
23 VRS positions, then the radar must be positioned in such a way that it
24 can catch all these trajectories. And this position of a thousand metres
25 is roughly at the point where all the trajectories meet, as is the case
1 here. They would all be within the beam. And the technicians who did
2 that did a very good job about positioning their radar.
3 Q. Now, Mr. Poparic, at the bottom of -- just under this graph in
4 the English language version you say:
5 "It can be seen in the picture that there was no curve which
6 could have slipped under the beam ..."
7 Now, I put it to you surely that depends on exactly where the
8 centre point of the radar beam was and how large the radius of the radar
9 beam was on the day in question?
10 A. Well, I believe that this has been misinterpreted because it says
11 here that it could not go under the beam, which means that they all had
12 to be caught within the beam. That's the essence. In principle you are
13 right. It depends on the central point of the radar beam and its width.
14 However, we did not have that information. We received a different piece
15 of information. According to the information that we received, we got
16 the lower limit of the radar beam which was 548 or 550. That was the
17 most important thing for us. Everything above that would go beyond the
18 radar beam, you see. What matters to us is the lower limit, and we
19 received that information from the UNPROFOR report. And this is official
21 Q. Mr. Poparic, thank you for confirming that you did not have
22 information on the central point of the radar beam and its width. I'd
23 like you also to confirm that you do not have any information for where
24 precisely the radar was located in relation to the target or in relation
25 to the front line; isn't that correct?
1 A. There is some information as to its position, but we don't have
2 the exact co-ordinates.
3 Q. Well --
4 A. I repeat once again, we received the official UNPROFOR data from
5 its report about the height at which the radar could not caught any of
6 the trajectories, and this is the only relevant information. The rest is
7 technical details which matter to the people who placed the radar and
8 handled the radar, who make sure that the radar beam catches everything.
9 In our report, it is stated what was the minimum height up to which the
10 trajectories could be caught. We received that from UNPROFOR. And let
11 me repeat: Based on that they concluded that they -- the trajectory
12 slipped under the beam. We are showing here that UNPROFOR when it claims
13 that the radar beam which caught trajectories up to 550 metres could not
14 catch these trajectories. However, we demonstrate very clear that it was
15 supposed to all -- to catch all the trajectories, so we have to compare
16 what UNPROFOR claimed and what was the real situation on the ground.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And if you show that part in the
19 shelling report, I can provide some more details as to where UNPROFOR
20 made a cardinal mistake in their analysis and this is the key to the
21 whole problem.
22 MR. GAYNOR:
23 Q. Well --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
25 MR. GAYNOR: Yes.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 10, line 9 and 10, we again
3 have a countersense. It says:
4 [In English] "... that would go beyond the radar beam, you see."
5 [Interpretation] The witness said that everything that would go
6 above 548 would have been registered by the radar because it would have
7 been caught by the radar beam.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is what I said.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Mr. Poparic, ultimately you are asking the Trial Chamber to
12 prefer your graph and your conclusions over the conclusions reached by
13 UNPROFOR, which was the organisation which was actually operating the
14 radar on the day of the Markale incident; isn't that right?
15 A. I'm not asking for anything from the Trial Chamber, I don't have
16 that right. I'm just telling you what the situation was. The fact is,
17 however, that UNPROFOR operated the radar and that they claim that the
18 radar was on for 24 hours, that it was in a good working order. The fact
19 is also that none of the technicians who operated the radar confirmed the
20 findings that the radar could not catch any of the shells. The
21 conclusion was reached by Lieutenant-Colonel Powers [phoen] together with
22 General Smith. I don't know whether he is an artillery man or something
23 else. However, none of the technicians who were in charge of operating
24 the radar didn't -- confirmed the finding that the radar beam was placed
25 in such a way that it could not catch those trajectories. We claim that
1 it would have been impossible if we bear in mind that -- the position of
2 the radar beam. The key issue here is the height, the lowest level of
3 the radar beam, of 548 or 550 metres if we round it off.
4 Q. We'll move now to the Markale 1 incident which is the next
5 incident -- actually, it appears at page 116 in the English of your
6 report. You have there a graph setting out the possibility of hitting
7 the target with the first shot. Now, let's just go through this graph in
8 some detail. First of all, the target dimensions of 25.8 metres by 34
9 metres, that refers to your understanding of the size of the Markale
10 market-place; correct?
11 A. Yes, that's how large the market is, and you can see it on the
12 land survey map that we had at our disposal.
13 Q. Very good. Now, if we can just go to charge 0 plus 5 as an
14 example, we see that the Vd set out is 29 metres and the Vp is 12 metres.
15 Now, if we can translate that into layman's language, that essentially
16 means that if you were to fire a 120-millimetre mortar projectile from a
17 distance of 5.782 metres from the market-place, there is a 50 per cent
18 chance that it would land within an ellipse which is 58 metres by 24
19 metres. Is that correct?
20 A. I believe that you are wrong in just one thing. When you use
21 this Vd and Vp, when we are talking about probable deviations on range
22 and on direction and when we say 50 per cent of the hits will be correct,
23 this concerns a group of projectiles. If we fired ten of them, we can
24 expect that five will hit the target. If ten are fired, it may be
25 expected that five will hit the target, and we're talking about a
1 different thing here. In the theory of firing, it is also studied and
2 the calculations are based on that at theory. We are looking for the
3 information as to how probable it is for the shell -- the first shell to
4 be correct because we had only one shell here. In the theory of firing,
5 we have a solution to that problem as well. What is the probability for
6 the first shell to hit your target? And this is not the same as when you
7 have a group of projectiles because the first five may be off target, the
8 last five may hit the target, so you get your 50 per cent. Here the
9 issue is how probable is it for the first projectile to hit the target?
10 And this is a different matter. So we're talking about a very essential
11 difference in looking at the probability through the Vd and Vp
12 statistical measures because we're talking about a group of projectiles.
13 We're not talking about a sequence of projectiles that will hit the
14 target. We say if there is ten of them, we have a 50 per cent
15 probability that they will hit the target, which means five will hit the
16 target and five will be off target. According to the theory of firing,
17 there is also a probability which we have to calculate, and that is how
18 probable is it that the first projectile would hit the target. The
19 probability is much lower and it is only logical.
20 Q. Now, can we move to the next page of your report, please, and
21 there we have a sketch which has been prepared, I understand, either by
22 you or Mrs. Subotic of what you understand to be the dimensions of
23 Markale market-place. And if we can focus in just on the sketch. First
24 of all, can you confirm as a separate issue that the placement of the
25 stalls in this sketch that you prepared is not, in fact, based on the
1 contemporaneous video taken in the minutes after the incident?
2 A. A few minutes after the incident the stalls were all over the
3 place. There is a difference. This is the placement which differs in
4 the passage between Marsal Tito Street and Dzenetica Cikma Street. On
5 the day of the incident in that area there were more stalls in the --
6 that passage, approximately up to here, up to the building on 22nd
7 December. There are two -- there were two rows of stalls, and there was
8 an obstacle in the passage from Marsal Tito to Dzenetica Cikma Street
9 with stalls -- you couldn't go through that passage. I don't know why.
10 Later on on the clip you can see that they were moving those
11 stalls and then you can see the cars entering that area in order to
12 transport the dead. On the day of the incident that area was full of
13 stalls for some unknown reason. But this is an approximate layout, this
14 is a schematic representation of the layout. But when we are talking
15 about the probability, that probability referred to the entire market.
16 We looked at the probability for the shell to hit the entire area, and if
17 we had looked at the probability of the shell hitting anywhere between
18 any of the stalls, the calculation would be totally different.
19 Q. Now, I want to take you to --
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On line 18 and 19, the witness
23 said -- it says:
24 [In English] "A few minutes after the incident the stalls were
25 all over the place."
1 [Interpretation] The witness said the stalls were upside down.
2 Everything was [In English] Turned over or turned upside down
3 [Interpretation] Overturned or turned upside down.
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
5 Do you confirm that, Mr. Poparic?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can confirm, but I would like to
7 also to emphasise that the main difference between the sketch and the
8 real situation in the market-place lies in the fact that I mentioned a
9 while ago. In the passage between Marsal Tito street and
10 Dzenetica Cikma Street there were another longitudinal row of stalls and
11 there were also some stalls that prevented the passage into that street
12 for some unknown reasons and those stalls were perpendicular to the row
13 of longitudinal stalls.
14 JUDGE KWON: So in the end you agree with Mr. Gaynor that this is
15 not based upon the contemporaneous scene? That was the crux of the
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we are looking at the number of
18 the stalls and their layout, Mr. Gaynor is right. As far as the
19 dimensions of the market-place are concerned, this is correct. This
20 sketch was transferred from the land survey map. It is very precise. We
21 checked that it tallies with the real situation. The dimension of the
22 market-place correspond to the situation as it was on the day, and as for
23 the layout of the stalls, it may have been different but we did not even
24 take that into consideration when we were calculating our probabilities.
25 All we were looking at was the area, the space of the market-place.
1 MR. GAYNOR:
2 Q. Very well. Mr. Poparic, we'll take it for the purposes of this
3 exercise that we accept the dimensions of the market-place itself are
4 correct, setting aside any difference we might have about the location of
5 the stalls. And I'd like the usher to assist you with a pen and I'd like
6 you to draw an ellipse in whatever direction you prefer of 24 metres by
7 58 metres around that market-place, please.
8 A. It would be correct to start at the centre of the market. If
9 somebody were to target it, obviously it would be logical for that person
10 to choose -- I will assume that it is here. What did we say? 24 --
11 Q. You say that the market-place was 25.8 metres by 34 metres. And
12 I'd like you to draw an ellipse of 24 metres by 58 metres.
13 A. Yes. The axis or semi-axis should be 24 or -- I didn't
14 understand you.
15 Q. I would like you to draw around the market-place an ellipse of 24
16 metres by 58 metres.
17 A. So the entire ellipse should be 24? Is that what you're asking
18 me to do?
19 Q. Mr. Poparic, you know exactly what I'm asking you to do.
20 A. I don't know whether we understood each other properly.
21 Q. You know what an ellipse is, don't you?
22 A. I know, yes. When I draw an ellipse, we usually use semi-axes.
23 Are you referring to the external dimensions of the ellipse? Okay. 24
24 by 58 -- okay. I will draw based on what I understood. This could be it
25 if we understood each other well, that is.
1 Q. I think we have. Now, that marks the area within which 50
2 per cent of the projectiles would land if you were to fire a
3 120-millimetre mortar projectile from a distance of 5.782 metres from the
4 market-place; isn't that right?
5 A. That is right, but if we are talking about a group of
6 projectiles, if several projectiles are fired. This is only logical. If
7 we say that the probability is 50, that means if ten projectiles were
8 fired it is to be expected that five will land in this area.
9 Q. Well, I put it to you that the mortar crew which had fired this
10 projectile in fact stood a pretty good chance of hitting the market-place
11 if they wanted to, especially if they were firing from a mortar which had
12 been in position for many months and they had access to prerecorded
13 target data.
14 A. This doesn't change anything in the conclusion, what we're
15 talking about. And these are Vd and Vp. These are not only
16 characteristics of the mortar. It also means that we're talking about
17 the characteristics of the shell as well, and it all depends on the crew.
18 They cannot influence the characteristics that a shell has. It is a
19 projectile which has some shortcomings and there is also a dispersion
20 that you have to take into account. And it's not up to the crew. The
21 crew can calculate the elements, it can do its job well, it can position
22 the asset properly, so -- so as to increase the precision. But the Vd
23 and the Vp that we're talking about are the characteristics of the shell
24 and there -- nobody can influence that. Every shell will have a
25 dispersion margin that the crew cannot influence. The crew can perhaps
1 increase that dispersion if they do not have the firm basis for the asset
2 and they don't calculate the elements properly. Every shell has some
3 shortcomings which reflect in the lack of precision which can be bigger
4 or smaller. And this is implied by Vd and Vp. These are characteristics
5 of the series of the ammunition.
6 When you test ammunition, the criteria that is applied is whether
7 that shell satisfies the criterion of probable dispersion. This is the
8 characteristics that are characteristic of ammunition on which a crew
9 cannot influence. I heard somebody -- a member of the crew who said: I
10 can hit a match, which is ridiculous. No person can influence the
11 characteristics of ammunition. Vd and Vp are primarily the
12 characteristics of a shell and the crew cannot influence that.
13 You also have to take into account weather conditions, the wind,
14 and everything else, and all that falls under the general category of Vd
15 and Vp.
16 Q. Could you sign --
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
18 Yes, while witness signs this image.
19 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
20 Just a second. Be careful. Let's not lose your marking. Yes.
21 THE WITNESS: Okay.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now this has been clarified;
23 however, on line 4 there is again a countersense. The witness sense that
24 this doesn't at all depend on the crew.
25 JUDGE KWON: Okay.
1 THE ACCUSED: Of crew at all, not all depends.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you, Mr. President. I'd like to tender that.
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6349, Your Honours.
6 MR. GAYNOR: Thank you.
7 Mr. President, no further questions.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Shall we have a short break, five minutes, to change the setting?
10 We'll continue with Mr. Kecmanovic. Correct? Yes.
11 You understand the schedule, Mr. Poparic? You heard the --
12 there's a change in the witness schedule, so your evidence will be
13 interposed by Mr. Kecmanovic's evidence. I thank you for your kind
14 understanding, Mr. Poparic.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.
16 MR. ROBINSON: And just to be clear, Mr. President, Mr. Poparic
17 is to remain in the building because we expect to resume his evidence
18 later today.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 Five minutes.
21 --- Break taken at 9.52 a.m.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 [The witness takes the stand]
24 --- On resuming at 10.02 a.m.
25 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration,
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
3 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
4 WITNESS: NENAD KECMANOVIC
5 [Witness answered through interpreter]
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Kecmanovic. Please be seated and
7 make yourself comfortable.
8 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
10 Excellencies. Good morning to everyone.
11 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Professor Kecmanovic. Did you
13 hear me?
14 A. Yes, I did. Good morning.
15 Q. Tell us, did you give a statement to my Defence team?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. Thank you. And thank you for making a pause before answering and
18 speaking slowly so that the transcript may be accurate.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up in e-court
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Do you see on the screen in front of you your statement?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Thank you. Did you read and sign this statement?
25 A. Yes, I did.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the last page so that
2 Mr. Kecmanovic may identify his signature.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is my signature.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said
6 to my Defence team and is there some sort of confusion concerning an
7 abbreviation, or rather, does it faithfully reflect what you said and
8 disregard what I said last because it relates to the English version
10 A. Yes, it does.
11 Q. If I were to put the same questions to you today would your
12 answers essentially be the same?
13 A. Yes, essentially they would.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 Can you tell us, what would be the abbreviation in Serbian for
16 the party that you headed in Bosnia?
17 A. SRS.
18 Q. Meaning? What is the full name?
19 A. The Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia and
21 Q. Does the abbreviation in Serbian call to mind some other
22 political parties and are there any connections there?
23 A. Yes. The acronym is the same as that for the Serbian Radical
24 Party. Now, the orientation of my party was pro-Yugoslav. It was a
25 party in Bosnia-Herzegovina and I was the leader of that party in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the then-prime minister Ante Markovic was the
2 leader of the party at the level of Yugoslavia. Now, because of our
3 orientation some members of other political parties would half
4 jokingly/half seriously say that we were the party of reserve Serbs. The
5 reformist orientation was how they referred to us because we were in
6 favour of remaining in Yugoslavia but that was also the orientation of
7 the Serbian Democratic Party.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wish to tender this
10 document into evidence, but I only wish to note that the acronym of SRS
11 in it does not stand - and I mean in the English version - does not stand
12 for the Serbian Radical Party but rather for the Alliance of Reform
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. In the English version it's noted as SRSJ.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, Mr. Karadzic is actually
16 referring to paragraph 8, where there is the "Serbian Radical Party"
17 behind the abbreviation "SRS" and that's wrong.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that it was in the course
19 of translation that this came about. This was an interpretation on the
20 part of the translator that this was the Serbian Radical Party, and I
21 wish to thank my learned friend for this comment.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Noted.
23 Any objection, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: However, in the view of the Chamber paragraphs 45
1 and 46 of Mr. Kecmanovic's statement contain a detailed information about
2 mistreatment of Bosnian Serbs, including the existence of detention
3 centres. The Chamber is of the view that this level of detail is not
4 relevant to the charges against the accused, and accordingly orders the
5 redaction of these paragraphs.
6 With that redaction, the Chamber will admit Mr. Kecmanovic's
7 statement as Defence -- next Defence exhibit.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3645, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read
11 Professor Dr. Nenad Kecmanovic's statement in a summary version in
12 English and then I will put some other questions.
13 [In English] Nenad Kecmanovic was president of the Alliance of
14 Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for BH. Until 1989 he was a member of the
15 Communist Party. He was nominated as BH representative for a member of
16 the SFRY Presidency.
17 After the elections of 1990, the Assembly of the Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina was accepted positively by the public. On June the 1st of
19 1992, Professor Kecmanovic joined the BH Presidency. He proposed a work
20 programme to be established within the BH Presidency. Alija Izetbegovic
21 was the only one who kept reservations against the platform which was
22 based on the Cutileiro Plan. Communication with the other parts of BH
23 was not possible for all members of the Presidency except for
24 Alija Izetbegovic.
25 In April 1992, Professor Kecmanovic participated in a meeting
1 with Mirko Pejanovic, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Radovan Karadzic at Terme
2 hotel in Ilidza where specific measures to deal with the situation of
3 conflicts were discussed. A subsequent meeting with the same purpose was
4 arranged in May 1992 between Momcilo Krajisnik and Alija Izetbegovic.
5 Momcilo Krajisnik proposed temporary division of the territory according
6 to the existing territorial and ethnic distribution and the front line.
7 Pressure came from the Serbian people because there were victims falling
8 on both sides. A copy of this plan was also sent to Pale.
9 In spring 1992, the status of the BH -- of the JNA in BH was
10 discussed by the Yugoslav President Branko Kostic and Minister of Defence
11 General Adzic. A proposal for an agreement was accepted and supported by
12 Slobodan Milosevic; however, it was rejected within the BH Presidency.
13 The JNA was supposed to remain in BH to guarantee peace and security and
14 to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts.
15 President Karadzic was fully concerned about what was happening
16 in Sarajevo. The National Equality Council was developed before the
17 elections in 1990. Its primary functions were to ensure the protection
18 of vital national interests of each of the three constituent peoples and
19 to preserve the equality of the rights of all ethnic groups. Out-voting
20 of the Serbian deputies in the BH Assembly was one of the main causes of
21 the war. Between the end of 1991 and March 1992, the situation in the
22 entire country was especially in Sarajevo very tense and violence kept
23 spreading. Attacks were mainly carried out against the Serbs, especially
24 against the families of the JNA officers. The Serbian side launched an
25 initiative to enable citizens of Sarajevo to leave the city if they
1 wished, supported also by President Karadzic. Regardless of their
2 ethnicity, the Serbian side guaranteed everyone safe passage across its
3 territory. After May 1992, it was impossible to leave Sarajevo. The
4 media espoused war time propaganda: The Muslim victims were innocent and
5 crimes were committed only by the Serbian army.
6 Private prisons in Sarajevo exclusively detained Serbian
7 civilians and abused them under false accusations that they were hiding
8 weapons or giving light signals to the Serbian artillery. For example,
9 they existed in the basement of the Zagreb hotel, those prisons, and
10 Europa hotel. The police organs, including Minister Delimustafic, had no
11 information about this and could not assist in freeing these people.
12 During meetings with leading representatives of the Serbian
13 leadership in summer of 1992, the shelling of Sarajevo was raised on
14 several occasions. The shelling was arbitrary and non-selective as
15 presented. The Muslim artillery was located in the most densely
16 populated parts in the city and Serbian artillery was forced to respond
17 to the fire aiming towards the locations where the fire was coming from.
18 As to how the events were reported through media, news came from
19 two sides: Radio Sarajevo, which was under Muslim control, and
20 Radio SRNA under Serbian control. BBC and other global media transmitted
21 information similar to the one provided by the Muslim media. That had
22 quite a substantial effect on Muslims and Croats, who in the beginning
23 kept the same distance from all three ethnic parties. Later, they became
24 negatively biased against the SDS, RS, and the Serbs. President Karadzic
25 emphasised the necessity to find a solution for the conflict in BH
1 through political negotiations and to avoid or stop the war at any cost.
2 [Interpretation] That would be the short summary. I'd like to
3 put several additional questions to Professor Kecmanovic.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Firstly, not challenging the ruling of the Trial Chamber
6 concerning paragraphs 55 and 56, your decision to leave Sarajevo, did it
7 have anything to do with the elements related in these paragraphs? In
8 other words, was it what you could or could not do for the citizens of
9 Sarajevo of other ethnicities something that had an impact on this
10 decision of yours?
11 A. Of course, yes.
12 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, that's just blatantly leading and
13 not -- and I will stop there. You could have asked: What's the reason
14 for your leaving?
15 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, that's actually also the objection and
17 proposal I would have made, but I also want to note that he also in the
18 summary did disregard your decision and has basically exactly told these
19 details that you had just excluded.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, back to you, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. But it was excluded
22 only today. Had it been excluded earlier on, I would have left it out of
23 the summary. But at any rate, the summary is not an exhibit so no
24 prejudice there or no damage there.
25 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Professor Kecmanovic, did you have an opportunity to become
4 familiar with the SDA policy vis-a-vis the multi-ethnic character of
5 Bosnia and their espousal of a civic state? What was it that you
6 observed during your political work and especially during your tenure in
7 the Presidency?
8 A. The political activity of the Party of Democratic Action - at the
9 time, Muslim; today, Bosniak - consisted of a contradiction, as it were,
10 which emerged sometime in the watershed period when the US Ambassador
11 Zimmerman and Izetbegovic met which was during the Lisbon negotiations
12 under the leadership or chairmanship of Cutileiro. Up until that point,
13 the Party of Democratic Action mostly operated as a counterpart to the
14 SDS and HDZ. It had a national agenda and was mono-ethnic by
15 composition. I think it also had the elements of a religious party.
16 This especially applied to Izetbegovic, the leader of the party, and his
17 closer associates who were put on trial in the so-called Sarajevo trial
18 because of Islamic -- Muslim fundamentalism.
19 And let me say that the SDA was the first one to be set up as a
20 national party, followed by the HDZ and then SDS, within two months of
21 each other. So from a purely national or religious national party, it
22 underwent a sudden change of turn where it was all of a sudden advocating
23 a civic Bosnian state. So this was a turnabout which was supposed to
24 camouflage what was a strategic change where Bosnia and Herzegovina would
25 be a state ruled by the three parties that won the elections, but in this
1 way suddenly it would become a unitary state led by the predominant force
2 which was at the time the Muslims.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 A. I'd like to add and say that the -- had the Bosniak population
5 wanted this unitary option, they would not have voted for the SDA but
6 rather for my party, the Party of Reform Forces or the late
7 Nijaz Durakovic's party. And there was several more parties who had this
8 multi-ethnic character because they gathered representatives of all the
9 three ethnicities.
10 Q. So can you tell us how many of these multi-ethnic parties were
11 there that you just referred to?
12 A. Well, there was the party that I headed at the level of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia
14 for Bosnia-Herzegovina; there was the SDP, which was practically the
15 reformed communist party or the League of Communists as they used to be
16 called; then there was the liberal civic party led by Rasim Kadic; there
17 was also a party of civic orientation, although it was composed primarily
18 of Bosniak Muslims, that's Zulfikarpasic, the party of Adil
19 Zulfikarpasic, a Muslim-Bosniak party as it was called, which unlike the
20 SDA advocated that there -- that an agreement be reached with the Serbs
21 and Croats. It was in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining within
22 Yugoslavia. It was a party which had an inner circle of Bosniak elite
23 with a pro-civic orientation. Adil Zulfikarpasic himself had lived for a
24 long time abroad in Switzerland and returned to Sarajevo shortly before
25 the war. It seemed to me that he espoused similar ideas and similar
1 activities shortly before the elections, and I mean political party
2 activities. There was a period of time where Zulfikarpasic appeared
3 together with Izetbegovic; however, it was precisely on the issues that I
4 mentioned earlier on that they parted ways because Zulfikarpasic thought
5 that the SDA espoused extremist views. In some of his books that were
6 published he even referred to it as a fascist or a pro-fascist party.
7 That was where his confrontation with Izetbegovic emerged. And at a
8 meeting in Tesanj which was one of the main strongholds of the SDA,
9 because of these positions up there, they were excommunicated from the
10 SDA, and that was when he proceeded to establish this Muslim-Bosniak
11 party of his.
12 Q. Thank you. Did Mr. Pejanovic also have a party of his own? I
13 think you mentioned him somewhere.
14 A. Yes. Pejanovic headed the socialist party as it was called, just
15 as the SDP was a transformed League of Communists, Pejanovic headed the
16 socialist party which was a reformed socialist alliance. For those who
17 are less well-versed with it, before the war in the socialist Yugoslavia
18 this was an organisation akin to a national front. It was there to
19 gather the broad national masses who favoured socialism but were not
21 Q. Thank you. Since foreigners find it difficult to tell somebody's
22 ethnicity on the basis of their name, can you tell us out of these five
23 alternative multi-ethnic parties had Muslim leaders and how many had
24 other leaders?
25 A. Well, Pejanovic was a Serb, just as I am; Zulfikarpasic was
1 undoubtedly a Muslim, a Bosniak, was - he passed away; as for the Liberal
2 Civic Party, it was led by Rasim Kadic, who was also a Muslim or a
3 Bosniak. Those were the more important parties. I can't recall others.
4 Q. And later Durakovic?
5 A. Yes, he was the head of the SDP, the Reformed Communists, also a
6 Bosniak, Muslim, passed away recently.
7 Q. Can you tell us if you were privy to the war strategy of the
8 Presidency or the Muslim part of it with regard to interventions of a
9 foreign military force. Were you able to learn anything about their
10 position on this score?
11 A. Well, primarily what could be observed and heard in the
12 Presidency in the span of that one month during which I was active there,
13 I believe that the position of the Bosniak part of the Presidency, as
14 well as that of Stjepan Kljuic who represented the HDZ but espoused a
15 pro-Bosniak policy and was less important at the time because by that
16 time the HDZ core members for busy forming Herceg-Bosna, their position
17 was that the matter in Bosnia would be resolved by a NATO intervention,
18 and Izetbegovic spoke frequently at Presidency sessions that by the 15th
19 of August at the latest NATO would intervene and that would have a
20 decisive impact in the context of the resolution of the situation in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I think that this anticipation had a negative
22 impact on Izetbegovic's readiness to agree to any compromise in his
23 discussions with the other parties.
24 The Presidency was more of a screen for the world in general, and
25 this can be said of the government at the time as well because to all
1 intents and purposes Izetbegovic pursued his policies basically through
2 the leadership of the SDA. By way of illustration, officially the
3 minister of the interior was Alija Delimustafic; however, Izetbegovic did
4 these sort of affairs through Bakir Alispahic rather than through
5 Delimustafic. He was the head of the town security service and he was a
6 party loyal and through Hasan Cengic who didn't have any official
7 positions at the time but he was in charge of military affairs within the
9 So keep up the appearances of it all functioning in a
10 multi-ethnic way, there were these bodies of the government and the
11 Presidency, but as you went deeper down the real powers were wielded
12 within towns and in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- well, I cannot say it was only
13 the Bosniak and Muslim people, but people from the SDA who wielded power
14 in these positions.
15 I'm sorry if I can say this. Divjak was often times mentioned as
16 a Serb who was in the military leadership and it's true that he was among
17 the top three men in the BH army, but if you go further down the chain
18 you won't find a single colonel or a lieutenant-colonel, et cetera, who
19 would be occupying an even slightly significant position who wasn't a
21 Q. And when was it that you realised the way the SDA worked and what
22 was the view expressed by it -- by the elite which joined Zulfikarpasic
23 when they broke away from them?
24 A. I didn't understand your question.
25 Q. A moment ago you revealed to us what the decision-making
1 mechanisms were within the SDA and the government in general. Can you
2 tell us how did the SDA take decisions and what sort of view was taken of
3 this by the Bosniak elite that joined Zulfikarpasic and broke away from
5 A. Well, you see, the circles that or the circle around
6 Zulfikarpasic was a very narrow one. From the more prominent figures
7 there was a professor of Faculty of Philosophy --
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the name.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- who joined Zulfikarpasic. At
10 the time I was in the Presidency, they were critical of Izetbegovic's
12 I had occasion to speak to Muhamed Filipovic, there was Pejanovic
13 there. Even before Pejanovic and I joined the Presidency I -- we could
14 hear Muhamed Filipovic speaking very critically of Izetbegovic and his
15 views. We would even have discussions with Izetbegovic, and Filipovic,
16 together with Pejanovic and myself, expressed serious criticism of the
17 way the government was run in Sarajevo. As you may know, the authorities
18 in Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina -- well, that was one and the same for
19 us. When you said "authorities in Sarajevo," it meant the authorities of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina because we did not have much contact with those
21 outside of Sarajevo.
22 Q. You mentioned Hasan Cengic and Alispahic --
23 JUDGE KWON: Just for record, can you repeat the name of the
24 professor from Faculty of Philosophy who joined Zulfikarpasic.
25 Interpreters didn't catch it.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The name is Muhamed Filipovic.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Can you tell us -- you mentioned Hasan Cengic and then Alispahic.
5 Can you tell us, what were the main personal factors in
6 Alija Izetbegovic's circle and what was their political position?
7 A. Even then it was known and ever since the war the Bosniak papers
8 in Sarajevo write about the SDA being led during the war by the convicts
9 group that comprised other people around Alija Izetbegovic who had also
10 been convicted of Muslim nationalism or pan-Islamism. Izetbegovic's
11 Islamic Declaration was a sort of foundation or a programme, a platform,
12 if you will, around which they had gathered and which was at the centre
13 of that process. It was not only a religious or theological work, but
14 also a political platform which would reflect upon Izetbegovic's
15 subsequent behaviour in politics. Nowadays his son Bakir Izetbegovic,
16 who is a member of the Presidency, in his statement immediately upon
17 being elected to the Presidency, he stated that even today he was keeping
18 the Islamic Declaration on his desk, by which he wanted to say that he
19 still adhered to that text, programatic text.
20 If you were referring to the people in the party leadership,
21 apart from Cengic there was also Omer Behmen, Rusid Prguda,
22 Edhem Bicakcic, Husein Zivalj, the aforementioned Hasan Cengic, and a few
23 people more. But I must also add that these people or at least some of
24 them never had transparent high positions in the public administration.
25 They remained in the shadow. Hasan Cengic who was in charge of military
1 matters and never was in a high position until after the war --
2 JUDGE KWON: I think we heard enough.
3 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, I actually become a bit
5 concerned. We know that the witness is under a considerable time
6 constraint and I have also two hours of cross-examination and now we hear
7 a lot of things, including the views of Bakir Izetbegovic, which are
8 definitely not relevant in this case. So I think -- I'm getting worried
9 that here that time is wasted, that I at the end will not have for the
10 cross-examination. So I think there should be some limitations.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 How much more do you have for your examination-in-chief,
13 Mr. Karadzic?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question -- actually,
15 one and a half.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Professor Kecmanovic, was it your conclusion or impression or did
18 you have information about the reliability --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the question.
20 The interpreter didn't understand.
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters were not able to
22 understand you. Could you repeat your question, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I kindly ask that one question to
24 be separated from the half question.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. My first question is: Did you have information and did you reach
2 a conclusion about the reliability in implementing what had been agreed
3 between the Serb and the Muslim side?
4 A. In my statement I pointed out this characteristic of the late
5 Alija Izetbegovic who was known for changing his opinion, and he was a
6 good man to talk to at leisure, but he was an very unpleasant negotiator
7 because he would often change positions. On one occasion he even said
8 that he had one opinion in the morning and another in the afternoon, and
9 that was criticised as inconsistency and unreliability. I cannot say
10 that Izetbegovic had a tendency to slight his partners in talks, but
11 maybe it was a feature of his character.
12 There was an opinion that this was the result of pressure being
13 exerted on Izetbegovic from within his party, various factions in his
14 party. But some of his closest co-workers did say that he took most
15 decisions himself.
16 Q. And the Serbian side, what -- or rather, the SDS, how reliable
17 were they?
18 A. In this respect I think that the SDS and you personally were much
19 more consistent and more direct, to my mind even a bit too much so.
20 Q. All right. You will probably get the opportunity to speak about
21 the reasons of your -- of your separation.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I have an intervention about
23 the transcript. On page 33, line 18, "pan-Islamism" was omitted and
24 "Islamic fundamentalism." Both should have been recorded, first
25 pan-Islamism and later on Islamic fundamentalism because that's what the
1 witness said.
2 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Kecmanovic?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I confirm.
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
5 As you have noted, Mr. Kecmanovic, your evidence in chief in this
6 case has been admitted in its most part in writing, that is, through your
7 written statement. And now you'll be cross-examined by the
8 representative of the Office of the Prosecutor after a break of half an
10 We'll resume at quarter past 11.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.44 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 11.17 p.m.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
16 Q. Good morning, Dr. Kecmanovic.
17 A. Good morning.
18 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, at the outset of this cross-examination I would
19 like to thank you for attending an interview with the Prosecution on
20 Wednesday and I will come back to some of the facts that you told us
21 during this interview as we go. And one other remark, as we discussed
22 during this interview we have only very limited time for the
23 cross-examination, and therefore I would kindly ask you to answer my
24 question as short and focused as possible.
25 This morning, Dr. Kecmanovic, you described what your party, the
1 Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia-Herzegovina was
2 standing for, and this policy of your party essentially put you into
3 opposition to the nationalist parties which you referred to this morning
4 as mono-ethnic parties, and that would include the SDS as well; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And you also described this morning that basically the SDA party
7 was the power centre and not so much the official organs and you
8 described Izetbegovic being in the power centre as such surrounded by his
9 other people. The same would apply to the SDS, would it not? It was the
10 power centre of the Bosnian Serbs; correct?
11 A. Which period are you referring to?
12 Q. I'm referring to the period before the -- immediately before the
13 war and before the official organs of Republika Srpska were established.
14 So before the outbreak of the war.
15 A. I can say that it wasn't really the same thing. In the Serbian
16 Democratic Party the distribution of power, as it were, in the party was
17 greater. There were some people who were almost on the same footing with
18 Karadzic and they were candidates for some positions. Likewise, Karadzic
19 at the very beginning was not the first man of the party; that position
20 was vacant. They had a sort of collective leadership. As is stated
21 there, I was the one supposed to fill that position, but --
22 Q. Let me interrupt you. I was actually referring to the situation
23 before -- immediately before the outbreak of the war, and when you were
24 actually having discussions with Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic, at that
25 point in time Mr. Karadzic was definitely the power centre in the SDS
1 party and the SDS party was actually the body that counted at that point
2 in time, was it not?
3 A. You mean the time before the leadership of the SDA left this city
4 and went to Pale --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: SDS.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me explain so we understand
7 each other better. We must distinguish the period until -- including the
8 co-operation of the three ethnic parties and the period when the SDS
9 withdrew from the joint bodies and left, which period are you referring
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
12 Q. Actually, I thought I was quite precise. I was talking about the
13 period when you had the talks - you and Mr. Pejanovic - had the talks
14 with Krajisnik and Karadzic. That was the period and that was the talk I
15 was referring to.
16 A. All right. So it's the period when they had already left the
17 common bodies in Sarajevo, I mean the Serbian representatives. Obviously
18 there were several people on an equal footing, but Karadzic was number 1
19 nominally. I communicated with Krajisnik, Koljevic, Karadzic, and that
20 shows that the leadership was more of a collective thing, certainly more
21 so than on the Muslim side. Karadzic was the number one man in reality
22 and also formally, but you could also speak about a collective
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
25 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I take it that you can scroll back the
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: At page 37, line 14, was your question about SDA
4 party or SDS party?
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 37 --
6 JUDGE KWON: Line 14.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, I actually -- I spoke about the SDS
8 party -- SDA party being the power centre. That's what he told us this
9 morning and I was referring to the SDS being --
10 JUDGE KWON: Ah, yes, I missed it. Yes. Thank you. The same
11 would apply to the --
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would also like to intervene in
15 the transcript at this juncture.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 38, line 1, Dr. Kecmanovic
18 said -- apart from saying that there were a number of people who were on
19 the same footing with Karadzic and who were candidates, but it was not
20 recorded that Karadzic did not run.
21 JUDGE KWON: Probably -- do you confirm, Mr. Kecmanovic, what
22 Mr. Karadzic indicated?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 Let's continue, please Uertz-Retzlaff.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
2 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 5 of your statement you refer to the
3 criticism that you received after joining the BiH Presidency. You are
4 aware that the term "Izetbegovic" or "Alija's own private Serbs" was used
5 by Mr. Karadzic when referring to you and that participate -- and your
6 participation in the work of the BiH institutions; correct?
7 A. Yes, I know -- or actually, I don't know that it was Karadzic
8 personally who said that, but I know that people from the RS leadership
9 spoke about that. You also had the opposite case, the Muslim side spoke
10 about Karadzic's Serbs --
11 Q. Sir, I'm not asking about opposite cases. I just asked you to be
12 precise and answer just the question I asked and not tell a story from
13 the other side.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: So can we please have 65 ter 15 --
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see, if I may just for a
16 moment. I do want us to work efficiently in this cross-examination, but
17 sometimes such digressions are in the function of an explanation what
18 that really means. It was customary for all three sides for people who
19 were not included in the ethnic movement to consider them traitors or
20 Radovan's people or something. It was, as I said, usual at the time and
21 was not seen as an insult.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 15896 on the screen,
23 65 ter number.
24 Q. And as it is coming up, it is an announcement by Mr. Karadzic
25 dated the 2nd of June, 1992, in which he refers to you and Mr. Pejanovic
1 joining the Presidency as somewhat illegal. If you look at the box in
2 your language it's this box you find there. He mentioned that somewhat
3 illegal and refers to you as private Serbs of Alija Izetbegovic. And he,
4 in fact, even compares you with the private Serbs of Ante Pavelic.
5 Dr. Kecmanovic, he compares you here with the Serbs co-operating with the
6 Croat leader Pavelic, an ally of the Nazi Germany during the Second World
7 War; right?
8 A. I didn't know about what you have just showed me, and this really
9 is a serious insult but this is the first time I see this.
10 Q. And the publication "Nas Glas" is what? Is it a daily or ... ?
11 A. I don't know. This is news to me. I've never seen this before.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript please. May I?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Firstly, on page 40 it was not
15 recorded what Dr. Kecmanovic said, that the Muslim side called some Serbs
16 Karadzic's Serbs and the Serbian side Alija's Serbs. And I kindly ask
17 the witness to be allowed to read this whole article to really see if he
18 was compared to Ante Pavelic as has been suggested.
19 JUDGE KWON: If necessary, you may take up the issue later on,
20 but I think the witness had opportunity to read this and the question was
21 fair enough.
22 Shall we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Can this exhibit be -- please be admitted.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Your Honour, the witness has said that:
1 "I don't know. This is news to me. I've never seen this
3 So I don't think there's any foundation to admit it through this
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think --
6 JUDGE KWON: Is it not related to his statement?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Well, it's not related to his credibility, so, and
8 it's a question of foundation, actually, as opposed to relevance.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I was discussing with the
10 witness basically that he was -- that he was called Alija's Serbs and
11 those kind of things and he confirmed this. And now I showed -- and he
12 said that he didn't know that Karadzic said that. And I showed him an
13 example. And the fact that he just didn't see that before doesn't mean
14 that he has not now referred to it and dealt with it, so I think there is
15 a foundation laid.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6350, Your Honours.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
20 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 5 of your statement you also say
21 that such things would be said publicly for propaganda purposes and were
22 not really meant. Is it your evidence that Dr. Karadzic had in these
23 cases when he would say such things, would he mislead the public? Is
24 that your evidence?
25 A. I believe that this was in the function of propaganda. I can't
1 believe that he meant that sincerely. Even if he had meant that, he
2 would not have advocated for me to lead the SDS. He personally advocated
3 that. Therefore, he could not sincerely think what he said and what he
4 wrote. Otherwise, he would not have spoken to me later on on several
5 occasions. At the end of the day, he invited me to this Tribunal as a
6 Defence witness; otherwise, perhaps the Prosecution would have called me
7 as a Prosecution witness.
8 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, the purpose of such what you call propaganda
9 would be to cause outrage against dissidents from the nationalist agenda
10 that the SDS pursued; correct?
11 A. You see, all the three nationalist parties including the SDS
12 participated in the elections, and one such convincing majorities in the
13 elections that they didn't feel any special need to gather around
14 themselves a relatively small - to my great disappointment - a relatively
15 small number of people who voted for some other parties, including my
17 Q. And the purpose of such propaganda, calling someone Alija's Serbs
18 comparable to Ante Pavelic's Serbs, that purpose would also be to put
19 pressure on you and others to not express any views outside the
20 ethnocentric policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership and not work in the
21 Bosnian institution; correct?
22 A. You see, when it comes to the people who may have participated in
23 the institutions on one or the other side, we're not talking about people
24 at large. We're talking about individuals who do -- do not cave in under
25 such pressures. They behave autonomously. I could have joined the SDS
1 at any moment. I would have been admitted with open arms before the
2 elections and after the elections, but even that did not sway me to
3 change my mind and become a member of the SDS. I believe that this
4 applies in general terms to people of my kind who were subjected to the
5 same kind of pressure and propaganda, as you call it.
6 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, you resigned from the BiH Presidency in July
7 1992, and before you did that there was considerable pressure on you from
8 the Bosnian Serb leadership to do that; correct?
9 A. Pressure not to become a member of the Presidency? Is that what
10 you're asking me?
11 Q. No, I was asking you -- I was referring to the fact that you
12 resigned in July 1992, and I asked you whether it's right -- correct that
13 before you did it you got pressure from the Bosnian Serb leadership to do
15 A. I was under no pressure. Nobody put any pressure on me. All
16 that was my autonomous decision. If I had caved in to such pressures, I
17 would have probably been the leader of the SDS or I would have joined it
18 later on or something of that kind. There was no pressure put to bear on
20 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, there is evidence before this Trial Chamber --
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, I refer here to the 14th
22 Republika Srpska Presidency Session of the 3rd of July, 1992, and it's
23 D438 under point 2 and point 12.
24 Q. -- and I'm just referring to this here, Mr. -- Dr. Kecmanovic.
25 They say here in this record that you, Mr. Pejanovic, Mr. Simovic,
1 Mr. Nikolic, and other Serbs shall be publicly invited to withdraw from
2 their positions in the official bodies in the -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 And you are aware of such public invitations, are you not?
4 A. I almost don't know about those invitations. The situation in
5 Sarajevo was such that I didn't have the time to follow such matters,
6 especially when I started working in the Presidency. It -- I was
7 familiar with that to a certain extent. Somebody conveyed that to me,
8 perhaps Simovic or Pejanovic. But I really did not pay much attention to
9 that. I perceived that as an expected reaction.
10 Q. Equally, this Trial Chamber has evidence in front of it --
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honours, I refer now to D440,
12 that's the 15th RS Presidency Session of 6 July.
13 Q. -- and there a position was adopted on talks that
14 Messrs. Koljevic and Krajisnik should have with you and Mr. Pejanovic.
15 It states under item 3 in this session that they were appointed to
16 conduct such talks and that the aim of the talks would be to determine
17 conditions for your resignation. They even formulated demands you should
18 put to Mr. Izetbegovic. Dr. Kecmanovic, these talks did take place, did
19 they not?
20 A. The Defence team showed me this document, therefore I'm familiar
21 with it. I had not seen it before that. I can give you a very precise
22 answer to your question. Perhaps the accused Karadzic can help me with
23 that. I don't doubt that such a decision was adopted. This is, after
24 all, an official document. However, when I was in Pale before proceeding
25 towards Belgrade, not for a single moment did any such matter came up, no
1 such talks were conducted. I did not sit down with Krajisnik and
2 Koljevic in any official capacity and nothing of that kind was told me.
3 The late Professor Koljevic waited for me in Lukavica. We went to Pale
4 together. We were met by Karadzic, Plavsic, and Krajisnik there. First
5 we had dinner and we talked over dinner. Then we had some one-on-one
6 talks on the following day and on the day after. Nobody gave me any
7 conditions to comply with. The talks never went in that direction at
9 Q. Let's move on to another topic. In your statement you several
10 times refer to the fact that the policies of the SDS and your own party
11 were similar. Dr. Kecmanovic, that refers basically to the fact that
12 both parties at some point in time wanted that Bosnia-Herzegovina remain
13 part of Yugoslavia; right? That was where you basically agreed; correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. And when the former Yugoslavia was no longer an option in April
16 1992, the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to have a state of their own in
17 certain territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
18 A. I wouldn't put it that way. I believe that it was more about
19 creating a confederal or federal union, some sort of a union or a
20 structure that would be based on the territorial and ethnic
21 concentrations of the population. As far as my party is concerned, after
22 the changes that you have just mentioned, there were some shifts in the
23 positions. In my party we supported that concept that was also a concept
24 advocated by the Cutileiro's commission of the European Union. A new
25 situation had arisen, so it was decided that there would be cantons.
1 Entities were not mentioned, but rather cantons or semi-cantons. The
2 Swiss model came up quite often, the Belgian model. In any case we
3 sought for more realistic solutions. More or less, everybody
4 participated in that. I believe the SDP was the only party that kept on
5 insisting on a centralised and unitarian structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 In my party manifesto, the territorial and ethnic issue was not a
7 priority. We spoke about the division that would be based on historical
8 demographic, geographical traffic conditions, and finally on territorial
9 and ethnic principle, and this is that would end up in the platform of
10 the Presidency --
11 Q. Let me interrupt you. I didn't want to hear so many details of
12 the period before when there was still the Cutileiro Plan. I was
13 actually referring to the fact that after April 1992 when Yugoslavia in
14 the former was not existing anymore, that was the period I was asking for
15 and you did not answer that question.
16 Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 54 of --
17 A. Please, let's clarify things. I want to answer rather than skip
18 a question of yours.
19 Q. But I had asked you a concrete question. I spoke about the
20 period after April 1992, and then I said the Bosnian Serb leadership
21 wanted a state of their own. And then you spoke about something
22 completely different.
23 A. Very well. Then my short answer would be: As far as I know,
24 they didn't want a state of their own. They wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to
25 be transformed into a union, federation, or confederation of territorial
1 and ethnic units of all the three peoples. Is that okay for an answer?
2 Q. Let's move on. Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 54 of your statement
3 you refer to an expert report which you prepared for Prijedor. And in
4 the interview on Wednesday you also spoke about this expert report and
5 you -- that you prepared it for the Kvocka case --
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this is case number IT-98-30/1.
7 Q. And I'm just -- want to refer you to a passage that is in there
8 and as you remember this report and you remembered it well during the
9 interview, I see no reason that we have to pull it up in e-court. In
10 your Kvocka report --
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And that is 65 ter 25087 for the Defence to
13 Q. -- you have a section: The Muslim-Croatian war. You probably
14 remember this, Dr. Kecmanovic, that you have this report and this section
15 or do we have to pull it up?
16 A. That was a report. It was not a testimony; right?
17 Q. No, it was a report. It was a report that you prepared in the
18 Kvocka case and you had a section in there where you described the
19 Muslim-Croatian war. And in that section --
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And for the Defence to know, it's on page 34
21 in e-court.
22 Q. -- you say -- or better, wrote:
23 "Essentially" --
24 A. I would love to see it in an electronic form, please.
25 Q. Okay. Good. We can do that.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25087 and we need
2 the page 34 in e-court.
3 JUDGE KWON: And in the B/C/S?
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: There is, unfortunately, Your Honour, there
5 is no B/C/S --
6 JUDGE KWON: We have only six pages.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No. You should have actually the entire
8 report. There is a B/C/S only of six pages and that's the Prijedor part,
9 but I'm referring to the main part of the report and that is -- the
10 English version e-court page 34.
11 JUDGE KWON: So shall we show from page 31, then, which has the
12 title, the Muslim-Croatian war.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, yes. Can we have --
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you kindly provide me with a
15 translation, if not in e-court perhaps a hard copy could be provided,
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We do not have a hard copy either --
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll print out from page 31 to page 34 and we'll
19 provide it to you in a moment.
20 Yes, please in the meantime --
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I'm just -- can we move to the page 34
22 in e-court. And it's only a small -- yes. And it's actually at the very
24 Q. It says here on the very top:
25 "Essentially, it was an inevitable war that arose from the very
1 logic of the Muslim and Croatian movements, which, just like the Serbian,
2 aspired to create their own ethnic space and establish their own nation
4 Mr. -- Dr. Kecmanovic, you are saying here that the Muslims and
5 the Croats and the Serbians aspired to create their own ethnic space and
6 establish their own nation states. That's what you wrote in your report
7 that was tendered in a case before this Tribunal. Are you now saying
8 that's wrong?
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Shall we wait until the witness
10 receives the hard copy.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have not received the translation
12 that I asked for.
13 JUDGE KWON: It's on top of page 32. We don't have it in your
14 language, unfortunately. Page 32 in hard copy, but page 34 in e-court.
15 Probably you heard the translation of that sentence. Yes, can you answer
16 the question?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can. I would like to have
18 the text before me. It would make things easier, but I can answer
19 anyway. Could you please repeat your question, please.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
21 Q. I have asked you before -- I asked you whether the SDS or the
22 Serbian -- Bosnian Serb people wanted to create their own state. You
23 said no they didn't. And then I quoted to you what I quoted to you, and
24 then I asked you -- but you are saying it here, right here.
25 A. Yes. Well, you see, I'm talking about here not only about Serbs
1 but also Croats and Muslims. And that statement seems to be
2 contradictory to what I stated in the report on the face of it. However,
3 we're talking about somewhat broader considerations of the problem. Just
4 a while ago I mentioned the term "confederation of unions." In any case,
5 those would have been areas where -- which in either the confederal
6 option or a unionist option would give security to all of the three
7 peoples who had -- who had very negative historical experiences, and
8 those experiences accumulated from one generation to the next. There was
9 the 1941, 1918, and other historical events that had created
10 uncertainties and concerns that had accumulated through generations.
11 There was hostilities, needs to take revenge, and certain things. And
12 they may have been suppressed either by the goodwill of the people or
13 under the oppression of the communist regime. However, deep down it
14 existed, and in the moments of crisis such sentiments surfaced to the
15 ground. And it seemed that all the three peoples wanted something of
16 that sort.
17 Q. Yes, thank you. Dr. Kecmanovic, you speak here in this sentence
18 of inevitable war, and in this context I would like to address paragraph
19 56 in your statement where you express your belief that it was possible
20 to transform Bosnia-Herzegovina territorially and ethnically without any
21 radical or forced changes to the ethnic structure on the ground. You
22 also say here in that paragraph that the metaphor about the leopard and
23 his spots which apparently faithfully reflects the highly mixed ethnic
24 composition of Bosnia is largely a construct. Dr. Kecmanovic, you
25 yourself used this very same metaphor in your expert report that we are
1 looking at here at the moment.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have page 21 in the
3 e-court, page 21. Is that page 21? No. Can we have page 21. 21 of the
4 report that we just spoke about. It's --
5 JUDGE KWON: E-court page.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: We speak about 65 ter 25087, e-court page
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, collapse the B/C/S.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, yes.
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kecmanovic, given that we do not have the
11 translation, providing the English version in hard copy seems to be of no
12 point. If you could take a look at the monitor, we zoomed in
13 sufficiently or hear the translation which will be read -- relayed to
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
16 Q. We are looking at the chapter 3, "National Visions of the
17 Break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina." And if we zoom in on the second
18 paragraph under this chapter, it says:
19 "A fall-back position for all three peoples was that if none of
20 them could take the entire republic in the direction they desired, they
21 could divide it on the basis of their right to national
22 self-determination including secession. The problem, however, lay in the
23 fact that the territorial and ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 resembled a leopard's skin. Large concentrations of a given group
25 outside the larger multi-ethnic towns were not mutually connected. Party
1 headquarters on all three sides were feverishly preoccupied with ethnic
3 And in the next paragraph it says:
4 "But in vain, because none of them could combine unconnected,
5 ethnically homogeneous enclaves into nationally compact cantons and at
6 the same time avoid massive movements of people, both their own and those
7 of the two other ethnic groups. Neither Muslims, Serbs, nor Croats were
8 prepared to either leave their homes or stay in them as national
9 minority. As in an ancient tragedy, each side consistently followed the
10 line of its national interests, which could have been accepted if viewed
11 separately, but which, when they intersected, led inevitably to the
12 catastrophic outcome of civil war."
13 And, Dr. Kecmanovic, that is what you wrote in the Kvocka report
14 and was what unfolded after the outbreak of the conflict was, indeed,
15 massive ethnic cleansing, was it not?
16 A. What was massive ethnic cleansing?
17 Q. What unfolded in Bosnia-Herzegovina; for instance, in Banja Luka;
18 for instance, in Foca; for instance, in Eastern Bosnia; and around
19 Sarajevo, isn't it?
20 A. Not around but in Sarajevo. Do you agree? I mean, Sarajevo is
21 the most traumatic example of it because the highest number of
22 inhabitants left Sarajevo. If you compare it to the other figures of
23 inhabitants leaving their native areas, the highest number of departures
24 was in Sarajevo. Are you aware of that?
25 Q. We'll come to did your --
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Do you agree then, Mr. Kecmanovic, that
2 in Banja Luka, Foca, and in Eastern Bosnia ethnic cleansing took place?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would not call it ethnic
4 cleansing because it has a different connotation at least in the
5 circumstances of Bosnia-Herzegovina because this is a reference to ethnic
6 cleansing on one side only, whereas ethnic cleansing took place on all
7 three sides.
8 JUDGE KWON: But you would view as ethnic cleansing what happened
9 inside the city of Sarajevo?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would simply call all these
11 events with a single term rather than referring to certain events in one
12 part of the country as ethnic cleansing and to other events in other
13 parts of countries as simply resettlement of peoples.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I object to the
15 misrepresentation of what Mr. Kecmanovic said in his report. He spoke of
16 massive movements rather than ethnic cleansing. Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff
17 translated "massive movements" into "ethnic cleansings."
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, this is an intervention
19 that's --
20 JUDGE KWON: Inappropriate.
21 Yes, please continue.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can the two pages be admitted,
23 it's page 19 -- e-court page 21 and e-court page 34.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would, however, kindly ask to be
25 provided with this section of the report in B/C/S in the course of my
2 JUDGE KWON: Unfortunately, we don't have it at the moment.
3 Probably it might -- somewhere it exists at the Tribunal?
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I actually have discussed it
5 also with you, Dr. Kecmanovic, and asked you whether you have the B/C/S
6 version and it was my understanding that you do have the B/C/S version of
7 this report. What we do have -- we looked everywhere. We only had the
8 translation of these six pages related to Prijedor but Mr. Iain could not
9 find any B/C/S version.
10 JUDGE KWON: That's where we are, Mr. Kecmanovic.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the situation is such that we
12 simply cannot discuss the matter without the necessary material.
13 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objection, Mr. Robinson?
14 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit those two pages as well as the first
16 page of the document, cover page.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6351, Your Honours.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. I would like now to move on to the platform, the platform that
20 you worked on in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and you
21 mentioned this platform in paragraph 11 of your statement and I think you
22 mentioned it also today.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have 65 ter 25060 in
24 e-court. And we have here both languages again.
25 Q. And we can see from the second page, from the second page but
1 maybe we do not have to look at it now, from the second page we can see
2 it was adopted on the 26th of June, 1992. When we -- can we look at
3 point 4. If we look at point 4, that's this -- the second page in both
4 languages, we see conditions -- we see conditions for peace negotiations
5 listed, and among them are: (a), the secession of hostilities; (b), the
6 establishment of the political situation before the aggression; (d)
7 compensation; (c) -- but I read (d), compensation for the war damages and
8 punishment of the perpetrators. And at the end of this paragraph it
10 "Bosnia and Herzegovina will not accept negotiations which have
11 as their basis the establishment of ethnically pure territories or a
12 regional division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on a solely ethnic basis.
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina will never accept any kind of territorial or
14 demographic changes and advantages which have resulted from war and
16 Dr. Kecmanovic, that is what you together with your colleagues in
17 the Presidency made their goals; right?
18 A. Yes. Let me add that certain amendments were made in addition to
19 what the conclusions were not only of the working group but also of the
20 Presidency. For instance, in the preamble to this paper, mention is made
21 of the aggression on the part of Yugoslavia or the JNA against
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was not in our version and it was added at a
23 later date by --
24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the name of the
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- at the Presidency, but let's go
2 back to what you're interested in.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
4 Q. Yes. This -- I actually asked you that this is what you and your
5 colleagues have agreed about and you actually drafted it. So --
6 A. Yes, yes. You see, a moment ago I did say that the basis for the
7 platform was a document adopted by my party, in fact. I made sure that
8 it was used and I did say that earlier on after insisting that
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina stay within Yugoslavia we accepted Cutileiro's
10 proposal and the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina as the basis and
11 that's -- please allow me to finish. You say --
12 Q. No, no, wait a minute. We have very little time, and
13 therefore --
14 A. Very well.
15 Q. -- as you -- I understand that you want to tell the whole story,
16 but we do not have time for the whole story and so we have to,
17 unfortunately, restrict ourselves.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this please be admitted, Your Honour?
19 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, a direct answer to your
21 question. It reads here not on the -- not on a solely ethnic basis. So
22 ethnicity was not taken as a sole criterion but as one of. Do you see
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. There is another place where you quoted something where this
2 issue is also being relativised. I don't know if you agree.
3 Q. I actually have read it this way. In English it is the same.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6352, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 23, page 56, it turned out
9 that this was -- what was said was that this was added at a later stage
10 by Ganic and Ganic was not recorded in the transcript.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
13 Q. Did the -- when you met the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale, you
14 conveyed these platform goals, did you not?
15 A. No. You see, this was a public document and I think that they
16 were aware of this without my playing a part in it.
17 Q. And when you'd had your talks in Pale, the Bosnian Serb
18 leadership did not agree to these goals and conditions for negotiations;
20 A. Well, we simply didn't discuss it.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have Exhibit 65 ter 25069A on
22 the screen.
23 Q. And as it is coming up, and you will see it in a minute, it's an
24 excerpt from the Bosnia-Herzegovina 128th Presidency Session of the 24th
25 of June, where you indeed discuss the platform. And it's only an excerpt
1 because it is a lengthy record, but as you mentioned in the interview
2 that we had you are aware of the Presidency sessions and you indeed
3 reviewed them in anticipation of your testimony. Can we please have page
4 3 in the English and page 4 in the B/C/S. And we have here Mr. Akmadzic.
5 In the lower part, he says:
6 "Those prerequisites are: 'Cease war operations, recognition of
7 the single system of government, and negotiations which have as their
8 foundation the creation of pure ethnic territories cannot be accepted.'"
9 That's basically what we also saw in the document. And you all
10 agreed in the Presidency about this; correct?
11 A. May I have the entire document?
12 Q. We are not going into details of the entire document and we are
13 only discussing this page here, and what I just mentioned was how
14 Mr. Akmadzic summarises it and at the very bottom he says the following.
15 He refers to the extreme militant faction within the SDS and that the
16 Presidency had opted not to speak to them. To whom is Mr. Akmadzic
17 referring when he speaks about the extreme militant faction within the
18 SDS, can you tell us?
19 A. Truly, I don't know.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have the next page in both
21 languages, and we are again looking at the lower part.
22 Q. And, in fact, you yourself are speaking here and you make clear
23 that the starting point is the situation as it was before the war and
24 that any kind of changes within the national structure of the populations
25 that were created by war, moving away, et cetera, will not be accepted.
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have page 6 in both
2 languages, and in the B/C/S we look at the last sentence and in the
3 English we look at the upper part.
4 Q. And in fact you say here, Dr. Kecmanovic, those are territorial
5 ethnic changes caused by violence, war, genocide, moving away, et cetera.
6 That refers to what we just some minutes ago spoke about, that
7 is, the expulsion of population, crimes, and you even refer to genocide,
8 that activities had taken place, and you wanted this to be reversed;
10 A. Of course this is an accurate reflection of what was said. Of
11 course I was not in favour of acknowledging anything that is the result
12 of violence, genocide, of course, or migrations. At any rate, it did
13 happen. And of course it is very difficult to establish what is the
14 result of violence and what the various departures were motivated by. I
15 can give you examples of persons who did not suffer any violence and yet
16 did move to other areas where members of their ethnicity were present
17 simply because they felt safer and better there.
18 Q. But during the Presidency sessions, you received information
19 about such violent acts; correct? Mr. Halilovic reported about it. You
20 heard others. That's correct, isn't it?
21 A. See, I did hear it from Halilovic, whose report I did not trust
22 that much. I trusted my own eyes and what I observed in Sarajevo, and
23 that was violence that was suffered by the Serbian people.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this please be admitted, Your Honour?
25 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask one thing? Is the
2 Serbian side identical to the English? I'm interested in the first line
3 where Kecmanovic says that it is inappropriate to name the person by
4 their first and last names, the persons that you do not want to speak to.
5 And I don't see this in English.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's a different page. It's a different
8 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can that page be received as well,
11 JUDGE KWON: Given that it is only a seven-page document, we'll
12 admit it in its entirety.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. I would -- actually, what I have done
14 is I selected the sections where there is a discussion ongoing on a
15 certain topic. I never just had one page. I always had a certain
17 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P6353.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
19 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, in your statement in paragraph 35 you speak about
20 your impression that the leadership in Pale was very concerned about what
21 was happening in Sarajevo and that for them what was happening in the
22 other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina was of secondary importance.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25085 on the
25 Q. And, Dr. Kecmanovic, as it is coming up it is again just a -- no,
1 I think we have both languages. We should actually have both. No, that
2 can't be it. I have this actually it looks different in what I have,
3 "Seasons in Hell."
4 JUDGE KWON: Check the 65 ter number.
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, the 65 ter number is correct, but we
6 have it actually in a different format so that two pages are all on --
7 oh, I see we have it in this format, but of course it's a bit difficult
8 to read. The B/C/S -- let's then see.
9 Q. What we have here indeed is an excerpt from Mr. Ed Vulliamy's
10 book "Seasons in Hell." Mr. -- Dr. Kecmanovic, you know Mr. Vulliamy,
11 the journalist; correct?
12 A. No.
13 Q. He -- and if we look at page 1, last paragraph -- can we see
14 the -- can we see the other page, this -- yes, this side? Can we look
15 at -- no, the previous again, the previous. In the last paragraph --
16 yes, the last paragraph. Now I have it. In the last paragraph
17 Mr. Vulliamy describes a conversation he had with Nikola Koljevic in
18 Belgrade, during which Koljevic admitted to the journalist that Sarajevo
19 was designated the piece of violent theatre which would captivate the
20 world's attention and draw it away from the principal programme. And if
21 we now move to -- again to the other side, yes. And he says:
22 "It amazes me that you all took so long to get to the point.
23 Poor Sarajevo! That was all you could think about. The crossroads of
24 Europe! None of you had ever been on holiday in Trnopolje ..."
25 Do you know about this meeting in summer 1992 between
1 Koljevic/Vulliamy and did you perhaps attend?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Okay.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then we move on, Your Honour.
5 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, during the interview we heard you said that you
6 were not aware of the six strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs, and, sir,
7 there's evidence before this Court that the first strategic goal of the
8 Bosnian Serb leadership was the separation of the Serbian people from the
9 other two national communities. And further on, Dr. Kecmanovic, we have
10 evidence before this Trial Chamber that this strategic goal means, as
11 Mr. Karadzic explains in the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian
12 people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is on the 12th of May, 1992 --
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, that's 65 ter, or rather,
14 P956, e-court page 9.
15 Q. -- and he says:
16 "It means separation from those who are our enemies and who have
17 used every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who
18 would continue with such practices if we were to continue to stay
19 together in the same state."
20 Dr. Kecmanovic, you said you were not aware of this session and
21 what Karadzic said there, but given your interest in participation and
22 participation in politics at that time, you must have been aware that
23 Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership saw the Croats and the
24 Muslims as the enemy of the Serbs. You were -- you knew that; right?
25 A. Not a priori as enemies. That would have been inconceivable, to
1 consider a whole people as hostile. I never heard Karadzic say that or
2 heard that being said about him. The political leaderships and
3 leaderships of ethnic parties would discuss these issues and there would
4 be confrontations in that sense only.
5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we'll stop here and we'll have a
6 break if it is convenient.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you, Your Honour, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at
9 quarter past 1.00.
10 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.29 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 1.16 p.m.
12 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
13 Mr. Robinson, the Chamber will grant your reply -- your request
14 for reply to the Prosecution's response regarding videolink testimony of
15 Nikola Poplasen.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President, we'll be able to file
17 that today.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, you were aware that the Bosnian Serb leadership
21 did not want to live together with the Muslims any longer; correct?
22 A. You see, that must all be viewed in the context of the fact that
23 the Muslims, together with the Croats, actually made that co-existence
24 impossible because they imposed relations of unequality on us after
25 out-voting the Serbian representatives in the Assembly and the government
1 and so on.
2 Q. So the answer was yes?
3 A. I think it wasn't merely the opinion of the leadership of the RS
4 but also that of the Serbian people since it was put into the position of
5 being dominated by the other two peoples, that was reactive. It was
6 imposed upon them.
7 Q. In this regard I just want to quote to you something from the
8 17th Session of the Republika Srpska Assembly dated 24th and 26th July
9 1992. That's D92, page 86. And Mr. Karadzic is speaking about the
10 Muslims and to be with them -- the impossibility to be with them in a
11 unitary state. And I quote:
12 "We know very well the fundamentalism -- what the fundamentalism
13 is and that we can't live together. There is no tolerance. They
14 quadruple through birth-rate and we Serbs are not up to that. Not only
15 are the Serbs not up to that, but the Christians in Lebanon are not up to
16 that Oriental mentality stemming from Islam."
17 These kind of arguments made publicly, you are aware of this, the
18 birth-rate and all these kind of things; right?
19 A. I'm not familiar with this specific statement by Karadzic that
20 you have quoted, but the example of Lebanon is very telling because
21 that's where a prosperous country fell apart, it was called the
22 Switzerland of the Arab world, because the demographic changes that were
23 in favour of the Muslims was such that the Muslim population demanded
24 more power because of their growing share in the structure of the overall
1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25024 on the
3 Q. And as it is coming up, it is an article that you,
4 Dr. Kecmanovic, wrote in Nin, a Belgrade daily, on the 20th of January,
5 1995, with the title: "Lava Cooling."
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Again, can we please have page 2 in the
7 English and we look at the last, the very last, paragraph, and then we
8 move on to the next page as I'm reading. And in the -- in the B/C/S it's
9 page 1, also the last paragraph. And then while I'm reading we go over
10 to the page 2.
11 Q. What you are saying here, and I quote, you speak about
12 Izetbegovic first and then you say:
13 "At the same time, on the other side, in addition to territorial
14 and ethnic separation from the Muslims ... Pale demand in the form of an
15 ultimatum to also be connected with Serbia as its national mother
16 country. However, on this side of the Drina River, after the dissolution
17 of the SFRY, there remains tens of thousands of Sandzak Muslims living
18 there without any demarcation. Moreover, having fled across the river,
19 numerous Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims joined them as refugees.
20 "When they meet their countrymen Serbs from Bosnia here in
21 Belgrade, they ask each other why could they not live together on equal
22 terms back home, since they can do ... here as refugees."
23 When it says here, Dr. Kecmanovic, "Pale demand," that would be
24 Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership; correct?
25 A. Clearly you are merely -- you have merely read a fragment. But
1 we must read the text as a whole. It was ironically written and in a
2 humorous tone although the topic is serious. The Serbs considered the
3 Muslims to have been Christians originally who embraced Islam, whereas
4 the Bosniaks consider the Serbs to be original Muslims who converted to
5 Christianity. In the subheading of the text we can see that it is
6 untenable that people of different ethnic or political affiliations must
7 live together. After all, today in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina there
8 are members of all three ethnicities as minorities, and in Banja Luka
9 there are significant numbers of Muslims and Croats whom I know and I
10 socialise with them as -- just as there are many Serbs who remained in
12 Q. But I had actually asked you to deal with this particular
13 paragraph, but in any event you call this the Bosnian paradox and that's
14 a result -- this Bosnian paradox that you here describe is a result of
15 ethnocentric policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership and their claim that
16 there is no life together with the Muslims, is it not?
17 A. No. In the whole 65 ter I relativise the question if living
18 together is possible or living separately, and I conclude that these are
19 relative things and that both options are possible. I also point out
20 that the choice for ethnically homogeneous wholes, these choices were
21 made by all three sides. And finally there are young people in all three
22 communities, and I also have Bosniak friends in Sarajevo just as I know a
23 number of Bosniaks who were close friends of Dr. Karadzic's.
24 Q. Let me --
25 A. And -- just a moment. What you have mentioned, Pale, you insist
1 on this, Pale in this the text is a metaphor for a centre of the Serbian
2 nation, Sarajevo as a metaphor for the Muslims. West Mostar or Grude a
3 metaphor for the Croats. So that's the way to understand it without
4 anybody specific at Pale in mind. That was the position of the entire
5 people, not only of their leadership --
6 Q. Let me interrupt you --
7 A. -- just a moment --
8 Q. No, no, let me interrupt you here --
9 A. -- may I interrupt you --
10 Q. -- I interrupt you --
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kecmanovic, I think you answered the question.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
13 Q. And I only wanted to --
14 A. If I may --
15 Q. We have no time --
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kecmanovic, if necessary, Mr. Karadzic will take
17 up the issue in his re-examination, rest assured. The Chamber will
18 monitor that you will be able to speak whatever you wish to and have to.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please. In line 23 it
20 was not recorded what Mr. Kecmanovic said, namely, that he personally
21 knew Karadzic's Muslim friends. That was not recorded.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
24 Q. In this -- the next -- the very next paragraph in this article
25 you write the following:
1 "'For us Serbs, there is no life together with the Muslims!'
2 That is one of the most frequently used programme slogans of the Serbian
3 national movement in Bosnia ..."
4 And, Dr. Kecmanovic, on top of this movement stood the Bosnian
5 Serb leadership; isn't that right?
6 A. I kindly ask the President of the Trial Chamber to caution the
7 Prosecutor not to interrupt me and constantly mentioning the shortage of
8 time. I'm not short of time. I have time -- I have hours and hours. I
9 can stay as much as you want. The organisational problems that there may
10 exist are no problems of mine. And now if you --
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kecmanovic, we'll make sure that you have the
12 opportunity to answer the question to the extent necessary and relevant.
13 The Chamber will ensure that you speak out when it is relevant and
15 At the previous time, because I find that you answered already
16 sufficiently, we agreed with Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. But -- yes, shall we
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just wanted to make now an
20 Q. That we are hurrying so much through what we wanted to discuss is
21 basically due to the fact that you have indicated through the Victims and
22 Witnesses Unit and the Defence that you cannot continue to stay here. If
23 that of course would change, we would have more time and we could be much
24 more detailed. So --
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that is the case. I confirm.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You know, I've been here since
2 Sunday, which means five or six full days at the disposal of the team and
3 this Tribunal and I'm willing to return, but I can't stay longer at a
4 time than I have already stayed now because of my commitments in Belgrade
5 and Banja Luka.
6 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue?
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.
8 Can this document be --
9 JUDGE KWON: No, but I don't think we heard the answer from your
10 last question.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh, yes.
12 Q. So I had asked you that: Mr. Karadzic was on top of the Serbian
13 national movement, was he not? That was my question.
14 A. He was at the head of the national movement because the Serbian
15 people elected him to that position. In other words, he reflected the
16 mood and the opinion of his voters.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this document please be admitted,
18 Your Honour?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6354, Your Honours.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
22 Q. During the interview we had on Wednesday, you mentioned that
23 given your professional background you are aware of the effect that
24 propaganda has on various audiences; right?
25 A. Yes. We spoke about that and your opinion was that propaganda
1 had a decisive influence, to which I said that it was not the case, that
2 it did have influence but not a decisive one otherwise we would have been
3 able to resolve everything through propaganda, which means this would
4 have been an attack on the principles of democracy, among which there is
5 the position that people are of age and that they use their head to
7 Q. In paragraph 43 and 49 of your statement in which you refer to
8 the one-sided reporting and propaganda by the Bosnian BiH media
9 portraying the Muslims as victims and the Serb soldiers as the sole
10 perpetrators, that was the same just reversed for the Serbian propaganda;
12 A. Yes, and the Croatian too. When a civil war begins, naturally
13 the media to a great extent are turned into propaganda tools. That's how
14 it has always been everywhere. But the problem in this case, and I think
15 I state that somewhere, that the so-called international propaganda
16 almost fully sided with the Muslim side, which confused people about what
17 it's all about. I even spoke about that to some of my Bosniak friends
18 who were neutral with regard to both sides. They started to view the
19 Serb side negatively because in our conversations when I was asking them
20 what was happening, why they had changed their minds, they would reply,
21 "But, you see that the whole world is supporting the Muslim side." They
22 even mentioned the Russian side then that was at the time of Yeltsin and
24 Q. Let me interrupt you. You are going into too many broad details.
25 You confirmed when we talked that propaganda can cause fear; correct?
1 A. Yes, I did.
2 Q. And it can cause hatred; right?
3 A. Now we are really going into details, and given that you're in a
4 hurry, this -- and this is a very fruitful topic, we could go on for a
5 very long time. But yes, it does have a significant influence.
6 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, do you recall that when the rallies were taking
7 place in 1990 and 1991 and in the parliaments, reference were made to the
8 suffering of the Serbs during World War II. Do you recall that?
9 A. I do not, but I know that in talks, even outside of institutions
10 given the inter-ethnic tensions, among Serbs there was a lot of conjuring
11 up of the Second World War when there was Pavelic's state and there
12 was -- there were the same alliances against the Serbs now. And that
13 1991 the Muslims and Serbs -- the Muslims and Croats --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- joined forces against the Serbs.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
17 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, such kind of references was an important
18 propaganda tool, was it not, because it was meant to remind the Serb
19 audiences of the suffering of the nation and to cause this suffering,
20 namely, the Croats and the Muslims; correct?
21 A. I don't think that any propaganda was required for that. I lived
22 in Sarajevo since birth. No one of my friends and neighbours had such
23 experiences in the previous generation. I can remind you of Pavelic's
24 Budak's motto that one-third of the Serbs should be converted
25 Catholicism, one-third expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and one-third
1 killed. That was part of Pavelic's ideology in the NDH. Children had to
2 learn that at elementary school. It was part of the educational
3 curriculum. We all knew that, although we were not there during the
4 Second World War. But we all had a relative who came to harm in the
5 Second World War. We didn't need Karadzic or the SDS to remind us.
6 Q. Yes. In paragraph 13 of your statement you describe that the
7 Bosnian Presidency was constantly in session and in paragraph 28 you
8 refer to the minutes of the Presidency. When you were not present during
9 sessions you would get the minutes and transcript; correct?
10 A. No. This is an opportunity to point out a fact that has to do
11 with the reliability of these minutes. When it was noted that I was
12 absent from the sessions of the Presidency, even in October although in
13 mid-August I resigned and sent it by fax to the Presidency and also
14 informed the "Tanjug" which was published all over the region, but for
15 September and October it is constantly stated that I wasn't present at
16 Presidency sessions, as if I was still a member of the Presidency --
17 Q. Let me interrupt you --
18 A. -- this casts a shadow on --
19 Q. -- my question was actually answered. There was no need to
21 While you participated in Presidency session, you did discuss the
22 expulsion of Muslims, did you not?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Let me first go to 65 ter 25083, and it is the 124th Presidency
25 Session, Bosnian Presidency Session, of 20 June 1992. And we would need
1 the second page in the English and in the B/C/S.
2 Mr. Kecmanovic, I'm aware that you were not present during this
3 particular session, that is the one where the declaration of war was
4 adopted. But I still would like to address one point and that is --
5 let's look at page 3 in the English and page 4 in the B/C/S and the last
6 paragraph. Page 3 in the B/C/S -- in the English and 4 in the B/C/S.
7 That's not correct. Page 3 in the English should be -- oh, yeah, I'm
8 sorry, I'm sorry. If you look here it says in the last paragraph, there
9 is a reference to:
10 "The problem of the relocation of Muslims from Banja Luka,
11 underlining that they received threats that they would be killed if they
12 did not leave ..."
13 And Mr. Izetbegovic said that if that would be tolerated, it
14 would create ethnically pure regions and that the country should not
15 succumb to this kind of pressure to establish ethnically pure regions.
16 Dr. Kecmanovic, although you were not present, but this problem
17 with Banja Luka and the expulsion of Muslims from there, that was a topic
18 that you were aware of and you got information about; correct?
19 A. About these -- Izetbegovic's words, I didn't know anything about
20 them nor did I attend the session. However, it is indicative that
21 Izetbegovic was very concerned about the situation in Banja Luka, and the
22 fact was that people were fleeing Sarajevo and they were even prevented
23 from leaving Sarajevo. And that was never a topic at any of the sessions
24 of the Presidency, although I wanted it to be discussed. Unlike
25 Banja Luka, Sarajevo had an inner circle. It was encircled from the
1 inside and the authorities in Sarajevo did not allow the people to leave
2 the city. As far as I know about Banja Luka, I can't be a hundred
3 per cent sure. People didn't have any problem in Banja Luka to leave it.
4 As far as I know, I can't testify about something that I did not see with
5 my own two eyes.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this be admitted?
7 JUDGE KWON: This page?
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The Presidency session.
9 MR. ROBINSON: We don't object to the whole thing being admitted.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
11 MR. ROBINSON: It's only three pages.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, it's only three pages.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6355, Your Honours.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Now I would like to have 65 ter 25071A on
16 the screen.
17 Q. And it is an excerpt of the Presidency session of 30 June 1992,
18 and you were actually present on that occasion. And as it is coming up,
19 you received information during Presidency sessions about the detention
20 of non-Serb civilians; correct?
21 A. About detention of ... ?
22 Q. Detention of non-Serb civilians in facilities run by Bosnian Serb
23 forces, did you not?
24 A. Not in any detail. You mean in the territory outside of
1 Q. Yes, yes.
2 A. I did not have any such specific information. As far as I can
3 remember, we did not receive such information. If we received
4 information, it was rather general. As a rule, it was not written.
5 Sefer Halilovic as the Chief of the General Staff of the Bosniak army,
6 which was known as the BiH army, during the session or the beginning of
7 every session he would provide a very general report on the situation on
8 the ground. He mostly referred to the victories of the Muslim side,
9 i.e., the BiH army. The tone was very optimistic when he spoke. I
10 believe that I mentioned in my report that one time Izetbegovic lost his
11 nerve and he said that if he had --
12 Q. Let me --
13 A. -- if he were trusted the Bosniak army would already have won --
14 Q. You have again digressed from my question and what you have said
15 is already in your statement, so let's not waste time in this way. Let
16 us move to page 7 in the English and page 15 in the B/C/S. We need to
17 look at the upper part of the English and -- it's actually you speaking
18 and in the context of the arrest of the academic Leovac, you say the
20 "To be frank, the more cases like this we have" --
21 A. I don't have that on the screen.
22 Q. That's -- it should be -- it should be on page 15 in the B/C/S.
23 That's -- you are speaking. It should be. It's the -- oh, no, it's the
24 previous -- in the B/C/S it's the previous. 31221. Yes. That's where
25 you are speaking in the context of the arrest of academic Leovac. You
2 "To be frank, the more cases like this we have, the more we would
3 indirectly tolerate this, signing up to the anarchy that is happening on
4 the other side where the crimes are of course incomparably worse,
5 genocide, et cetera. However, this does not excuse us anything in
6 establishing the rule of law in areas we control."
7 When you speak here of the "other side," that means the Bosnian
8 Serb forces; right?
9 A. That's right. However, when I say this I only quote what
10 Izetbegovic and other members of the Presidency belonging to the Muslim
11 and Serbian side said about the Serbian side at the Presidency sessions.
12 I warned them when I heard there was that that was also happening on my
13 side before my own two eyes.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move on to page 10, upper part in the
15 English, and in the B/C/S it should be page 17.
16 Q. And Mr. Pejanovic is speaking and he says:
17 "I think we are reacting inadequately to the spreading and
18 increase in the number of camps for Muslims in the republic. We are not
19 doing enough to animate the public either in Bosnia or
20 internationally ..."
21 Dr. Kecmanovic, you got information in the Presidency of the many
22 camps for Muslims run by the Serb forces as Mr. Pejanovic says here, and
23 he's speaking about civilians; right?
24 A. You should ask Pejanovic that. As far as I can see, I didn't say
25 anything about camps for Muslims. He is the one whose words you are
1 quoting. We heard about that. It was constantly mentioned, but that was
2 propaganda and nobody could be certain of any information that was
3 launched from the other side including this particular information.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this please be admitted, Your Honour,
5 the entire session -- minutes? This block.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6356, Your Honours.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25020 on the
10 Q. And as it is coming up, it is another Presidency session, the
11 117th of the 12th of June, 1992. And can we please have page 3 in both
12 languages. And now we have here under item 1 and 2 we have Dr. Brkic
13 speaking, the assistant minister of national defence, pointing to the
14 great problem regarding the arrested civilians who are being taken to
15 Pale and other camps. So now it's Mr. Brkic referring to arrested
16 civilians taken to Pale and about other camps. Dr. Kecmanovic, what is
17 he particular referring to? Which civilians were taken to Pale, do you
19 A. No, I don't know. No, no. I don't know.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this be admitted, Your Honour?
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
22 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6357, Your Honours.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25056A on the
1 screen, and it is another Presidency session. It's the 114th Session
2 from 9 June, 1992. And page 1 in both languages.
3 Q. We have Commander Halilovic speaking right in the beginning about
4 the military situation and speaking about the artillery fire which was
5 opened at the city during the last 70 hours and he provides further
6 details. As you, yourself, were living in the city, were you in fact a
7 victim of this artillery fire? You experienced it?
8 A. I was not a victim. I just testified to that fire, I bore
9 witness to it.
10 Q. Yes. And the citizens in Sarajevo were terrified when that
11 happened, were they not?
12 A. Including me personally.
13 Q. And you feared -- you yourself and the other citizens, you feared
14 for their lives; right?
15 A. Yes. There is a remark here; however, after very short
16 experience we sought shelter and if we did it in time, if we found
17 shelter in a cellar, in a basement, the danger would be reduced to a
18 minimum because the power of those shells was not so destructive. They
19 could not pierce the walls of a building. You were in danger if you
20 found yourself on the street.
21 Q. And a little bit further down in this session he also speaks in
22 this -- on this page he speaks -- Halilovic speaks about the lack of
23 artillery on the side of the government forces and he speaks about ten
24 weapons against the 150 on the other side. This lack of weapons on the
25 side of the Bosnian army, that was a concern and a matter of discussion
1 in various Presidency sessions; correct?
2 A. Yes, that's correct.
3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can this please be admitted,
4 Your Honour?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I would like to
7 mention that the ambitions of the BiH army were not to defend the
8 territories that they held, but rather to liberate every single foot of
9 the soil of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to Halilovic. That's why
10 they needed so much weaponry because they had VRS on the one side and
11 Croatian troops on the other in the HVO and the HV.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25087 again on the
14 Q. And it's the Kvocka report that we have spoken before. And I
15 would like to have page -- e-court page 31 on the screen. And I'm sorry,
16 we don't have the B/C/S, so I read slowly that you can follow. You refer
17 here -- is this -- yes. You refer here to the Sarajevo citizens that
18 "became tragic victims of two nationalist extremes ...," you refer to the
19 genocidal and chauvinist hatred. And then you say:
20 "The superior Serbian artillery laid waste to the central and old
21 part of the city, while the Muslim, which grew stronger with time,
22 responded by targeting the newly built residential areas on the outskirts
23 of the city ..."
24 And at the end of the paragraph you refer to the fact that "the
25 quantities of weapons that started arriving was not enough for the Muslim
1 army to threatened the Serbian artillery emplacements positioned on the
2 hills around the edge of the city.
3 Dr. Kecmanovic, that is how you experienced the situation;
5 A. Yes. My impression was that there is a disbalance between the
6 two capacities at the moment when I experienced that. We're talking
7 about the period while I was in Sarajevo in practical terms. It was up
8 to the 5th of July, I was in Sarajevo until then, and on the 5th of July
9 I left.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this page also be admitted?
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll add this page to the Exhibit P6351.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
13 Q. And now I want to put the last document to you, and that's
14 65 ter 25077. And as it is coming up, it is an interview you gave to
15 "Borba," that's a Belgrade newspaper; right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And it's interview on 29th and 30th August 1992. Now we have to
18 move a bit around in the various columns here. On page 1 in the English,
19 the right column, right in the middle, and in the B/C/S, the first page,
20 left column at the end, in relation to the Serbs in Sarajevo you say the
22 "The Serbs were in a ... difficult position. On one hand, they
23 shared the same ordeals of war time Sarajevo as the Muslims and Croats,
24 and they were equal victims of the constant artillery and infantry
25 clashes. On the other hand, the situation was made even more difficult
1 for the Serbs by the fact that the war propaganda imposed on an indirect,
2 collective feeling of guilt upon them."
3 And, Dr. Kecmanovic, a few lines further down you also refer to
4 the fact that the members of the other two peoples gradually started to
5 see all Serbs as all the same butchers. What you say here is a fair
6 assessment of the situation at that time; correct?
7 A. What is your question? Just a while ago I said -- I'll try and
8 answer. A few minutes ago in my response I said that I was one of those
9 who feared the shells that were launched from the Serbian side. Nobody
10 targeted either Muslims or Croats. Serbs faced the same threat as the
11 other two peoples. And then it is stated that the Serbs suffered from
12 the predominantly Muslim authorities and at the hand of Muslim civilians
13 because they treated them as collaborators, as those who stayed behind in
14 order to help the Serbian side.
15 Q. That's understood. Thank you.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please move on to page 4 in the
17 English, left column at the bottom, last paragraph, under the header
18 "Everyone to his own Crowd." And in the B/C/S it's page 2, the left
20 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, you refer in this paragraph to destruction and
21 expulsion, and at the end you speak about the practical problem that many
22 houses that have been abandoned and burned and property had been stolen
23 and destroyed and so many people, even if they wanted to return, would
24 not have anywhere or anything to go back to.
25 Dr. Kecmanovic, what you describe here, that's the result of the
1 policy that is very often referred to as ethnic cleansing; correct?
2 A. We are coming back to the ambiguity as regards ethnic cleansing,
3 and with the help of the President of the Trial Chamber we managed to
4 establish that that phenomenon which can be termed that way or perhaps in
5 a more adequate way is less stigmatised. That's something that happened
6 on all the three sides. When you quote my words, when I said about the
7 looting of houses and other premises, that was something that somebody
8 from the other side of the front line couldn't do. That could be done
9 only by the people in the city itself. The looting was carried out by
10 the Green Berets, the Patriotic League, and other Muslim paramilitaries,
11 and different structures within the armed forces which -- I apologise,
12 let me finish --
13 Q. Thank you.
14 A. -- please let me --
15 Q. Actually, we have very little time.
16 JUDGE KWON: Let him finish.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Okay.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Which carried out those acts. In my report I didn't mention that
20 the entire city, all of its shops were looted. Shop windows were
21 shattered and all that was done by the insiders, the forces who lived
22 inside the city. They started as the Patriotic League and then they were
23 incorporated into the regular BiH forces. That was not done by the
24 Serbs, I'm sure.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please move on to the next page in
1 the English and it's the right column, first paragraph. And in the B/C/S
2 we stay with the same page but you have to look at the second column from
3 the left and a bit below the header "quartermaster support."
4 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, you state here the following:
5 "The Muslims really are the most poorly armed and which is
6 particularly tragic they have suffered the most in the war so far ..."
7 Dr. Kecmanovic, you're speaking here in April -- in August 1992
8 and this is what you wrote; correct?
9 A. I was a victim of propaganda here. We received information that
10 during the first several months of war, 300.000 people had been killed in
11 the civil war in Bosnia and that those people were all Muslims. It was
12 later on a few years later that we learned from an independent
13 international commission headed by a Bosniak, Mr. Tokaca, and that
14 commission that there were only a 100.000 victims throughout the war.
15 When I say "only," I sound cynical but that is not my intention. And the
16 break-down of the victims, applying a rational criterion: If you look at
17 it in relative terms with regard to the number of the population, I would
18 say that the number of the victims on all the three sides was
19 proportionally equal.
20 JUDGE KWON: Do you see -- I can't locate the passage. Where can
21 I find it?
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The passage is under the header
23 "Quartermaster Support." It's on --
24 JUDGE KWON: Could you take a look at the monitor, e-court.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It was supposed to be page 4 in the
1 English -- page 5 in the English, the right -- the right column. Page
2 5 -- page 3? Page 3 in the English. I was just told page 3 in the
3 English. There should be a header "Quartermaster Support." No, it's
4 actually the next page. It should be the next page -- no, no, no,
5 it's -- it's page -- it's page 3, right column, first paragraph, but
6 it's -- no, it can't be. It's under the quartermaster support. Can we
7 look at the next page --
8 JUDGE KWON: I see a passage which says:
9 "The Muslims really are the most poorly armed" --
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
11 JUDGE KWON: " -- and which is particularly tragic, they have
12 suffered the most in the war so far ..."
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, that's the one. Yes, sorry.
14 JUDGE KWON: E-court page 4 on the top of the right column.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, yes. I'm sorry.
16 JUDGE KWON: I take it the witness read --
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
18 JUDGE KWON: -- the proper column.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: Proper part. Let's continue.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.
22 Q. And one last thing, and we remain on the -- the English remains
23 on this page but it has to be a bit lower down. We have to see the --
24 yes, we have to see this.
25 And for the B/C/S, Dr. Kecmanovic, we have to go back to the
1 first page and you have to look in this little box at the bottom, and
2 it's all under the header "aggressors and 'aggressors.'" The journalist
3 asks about the Serbs and how can one justify the fact that they have used
4 weapons to conquer more than two-thirds of the territory in spite of the
5 fact that they only have one-third of the population in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And you answer, inter alia:
7 "Just as in parliamentary competition, that is, in the political
8 phase, the Muslims and Croats did not shrink from abusing their numerical
9 superiority to out-vote the Serbian side, the Serbian side did not shrink
10 from using the advantage in heavy weapons in war time ..."
11 And you further state:
12 "Everyone in postelection Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in peace and
13 in war, had ruthlessly exploited their advantages without concern for the
14 weaker side ..."
15 Dr. Kecmanovic, that is what you answered at that time. Is it
16 your evidence that the out-voting of a minority by the majority in a
17 parliament can be compared to the ruthless use of heavy weapons and
18 military superiority in achieving one's goals? Do you equal that?
19 A. No. They cannot be equalled because the former was the cause and
20 the latter a consequence. You see, the Muslim side with the assistance
21 of Croatia caused the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by dominating in the
22 common bodies and abusing the majority, and that's what led to the war in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and to everything else. Of course in this context the
24 answer would be the one that you would like; however, I think that the
25 former is worse because of the sequence of events and because of the
1 causality. Of course, in any other situation it would be different.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to tender this exhibit,
3 Your Honours, and I see my time is up and that was my last question.
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6359, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency. I will do my
8 best to be fast, but I do believe that we need to release the other
9 witness. We do have only half an hour left, don't we.
10 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Kecmanovic, though, I'd rather address you
14 as "professor," just with the last document we were looking at, can we
15 have the last page. What were the reasons why you got into the
16 Presidency at a time when Biljana and Nikola withdrew?
17 A. I personally thought that it was a mistake that Biljana Plavsic
18 and the late Nikola Koljevic left the Presidency. It was along those
19 lines that I spoke to Momcilo Krajisnik at Lukavica when I asked for a
20 meeting with Pejanovic concerning our membership of the Presidency. I
21 thought it would have been much better if they had stayed on. I told
22 them that they should go back to the Presidency, this was still possible,
23 but unless they would do that Pejanovic and I would go into the
24 Presidency because in a way we would be representing the Serbs who were
25 outside of the boundaries of Republika Srpska who were in a way
1 unprotected and the Serbs in Sarajevo directly asked for that because
2 they didn't have any deputies, any government members, or Presidency
3 members who would represent the Serb people. It was my position or
4 rather the condition that I expressed was that all the decisions should
5 be taken by consensus and that there should be the right of veto in the
6 parliament and that this would be able to counter the developments in
7 Sarajevo. I thought that our requests would be agreed to; however, as
8 you can see in the report that I wrote, none of this in fact happened.
9 Q. Thank you. Were you able to bring about the protection of the
10 Serbs in Sarajevo and were you able to have a bearing on the way the
11 decisions were made in the Presidency in a satisfactory manner?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I have page 1, please.
13 Paragraph 6. [In English] "What was controversial." [Interpretation]
14 "What was controversial." Can we have the left column enlarged, please,
15 in Serbian. Can we scroll down, please.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] How does it start?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up, please.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. "What was controversial."
20 A. Yes, I can see that.
21 Q. Can you tell us what is the meaning of the paragraph. In English
22 it starts with "what was controversial," the second from the bottom,
23 "what was controversial - I do not know how much ...," et cetera.
24 In other words, did you agree that Izetbegovic should promote you
25 to the rank of a representative of all Serbs and not just the Serbs in
2 A. Yes. I did not accept that I should represent all the Serbs in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather only those who were in that other area
4 which was under the control of the Presidency of Sarajevo. Even in my
5 contacts with official dignitaries such as the visit to Sarajevo of
6 Lord Carrington and Cutileiro when the Presidency prepared the concept of
7 the meeting in advance so that members of the Presidency who included
8 representatives of all the three ethnicities, would, in fact, exclude
9 from negotiations the leadership of Republika Srpska and perhaps even the
10 Croatian leadership which was represented by Stjepan Kljuic in Sarajevo.
11 My response to that was that this would not work. I said that I simply
12 did not represent all the Serbs but only the Serbs in that particular
14 If they wanted to communicate with the person who based on the
15 elections represented the majority of the Serbs, I told them that they
16 should go to Pale and talk to you, to Dr. Karadzic, who was the president
17 of Republika Srpska and president of the Serb Democratic Party. Later on
18 at the press conference Lord Carrington did, in fact, say that this was
19 my position and I suppose that you did hear of it at Pale.
20 Q. Thank you. This is my next question: Were you able to assist
21 the Serbs in Sarajevo to the extent that you felt was sufficient and were
22 you able to bring your influence to bear on the Presidency to the extent
23 that you found satisfactory?
24 A. If I had been able to, I would probably have remained in
25 Sarajevo. Unfortunately, soon it became all too obvious that nothing
1 will come out of it. Izetbegovic and the Bosniak majority in the
2 Presidency simply had the majority vote and they worked in such a way
3 that they bypassed the Presidency. And whenever I expressed my
4 disagreement with certain issues at the Presidency, they would take it
5 off the agenda and deal with these issues at certain Presidency meetings
6 where I wasn't present. To put it simply, I could not wield any sort of
8 As for specific assistance to the Serbs, in a number of cases, I
9 believe that I was able to provide significant significance by making
10 sure that certain people were released from prisons like
11 Dr. Trifko Guzina [phoen], who was a professor at College of Medicine;
12 and another, Professor Lipovac, who was a professor at the Faculty of
13 Philosophy. They were members of the Political Council of the SDS but
14 they were not members of the SDS, and they were prominent intellectuals.
15 They were detained, their families intervened with me, and I contacted
16 the minister of the interior --
17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the name.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- who told me that he was not
19 aware of this whole system of private prisons and paramilitary groups.
20 Truth be told, he did refer me to one of these paramilitary commands or
21 commanders, one of whom was a criminal from before the war who I knew.
22 And it was actually through him that I was able to get my hands on the
23 important information which did not have to do with only these two
24 individuals but also Professor Leovac's wife who was a professor at the
25 University of Technology, a technological university. They were not the
1 only cases, but these cases involved well-known figures. So this was
2 something that I didn't do as a member of the Presidency or within the
3 line of hierarchy of the Ministry of the Interior; rather, I relied on my
4 personal acquaintances and connections with people who I stayed in
5 contact with after having been in touch with them at a certain point in
6 my earlier career.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. [No interpretation]
9 THE INTERPRETER: Can the accused repeat the reference and his
11 JUDGE KWON: Please repeat your question.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apologies.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. We were able to see from Exhibit P6355, which is a record of the
15 meeting of the Presidency session held on the 6th of June, 1992, when the
16 war was declared in Montenegro and Serbia that neither you nor
17 Mr. Pejanovic were present. What was the view that you and Mr. Pejanovic
18 held vis-a-vis the declaration of war?
19 A. Since this topic came up at one of the earlier sessions or it may
20 have been on the same day that the decision was taken at the morning
21 session, when we heard such a decision announced we expressed our
22 reservations and said that we would veto it. However, it was precisely
23 because of that that late at night we would normally work until 6.00 or
24 7.00 p.m., late in the evening at around midnight an emergency session
25 was called to which neither Mr. Pejanovic or I were invited where this
1 decision was taken. When on the following morning Fikret Abdic announced
2 at a press conference that the decision had been taken, some of the
3 journalists who were there knew that we would not support the decision.
4 They asked Abdic if the decision had been taken unanimously. He said
5 that all those present cast their vote and the Serb representatives
6 weren't there at all in fact.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up 19832, 65 ter
8 document. 19832. I don't have a Serbian version, although there might
9 be one in e-court.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. But I will read it out for you and it will be interpreted -- oh,
12 there is, after all, a copy. We're interested in the beginning.
13 "The latest findings of UNPROFOR about the reasons --
14 [In English] the reasons for and the perpetrators (Muslims) of the
15 monstrous crime in the bread queue in Sarajevo is reason enough that I
16 can no longer remain a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
17 Nenad Kecmanovic told ..."
18 And the sixth paragraph there you said:
19 "These changes eliminated the minimum conditions under which I
20 entered the Presidency so that now my engagement justifies the simulated
21 civic option behind which Alija Izetbegovic, as one of the national
22 leaders, is trying to impose a unitary solution on less numerous nations,
23 Kecmanovic said."
24 Is that a view you hold today as well?
25 A. Well, today even more than at the time. The course of the later
1 events in Bosnia-Herzegovina through to this day has shown that this is
2 how things stand. Everything that happened later proved my view to be
3 true rather than the other way around. The Bosniak leadership, despite
4 the fact that they formally espoused a civic option, although they could
5 hardly conceal their unitarist pretensions, and this was something that
6 turned out in the later events as well. Nowhere where the Bosniaks were
7 in the majority and wherever they had an opportunity to implement the
8 principles of civic democracy regardless of the Serbs or the Croats,
9 nowhere did they do this, not even in the capital. They had an
10 opportunity to declare it a district based on the proposals from the
11 international community, but they refused to do so and which led to a
12 situation where the Serbs are next to none in Sarajevo. Some people say
13 that there is even more Chinese than Serbs in Sarajevo. Also on the
14 issue of the cantons, they didn't achieve this. Moreover, in the entire
15 Federation you have the same problem occurring with the Croats. The
16 relations between the Serbs and the Muslims have the same troubles as
17 existed between them and the Serbs because the Croats felt that they are
18 being dominated over and the international community did establish that
19 there was this domination being enforced, that something had to be done,
20 constitutional amendments, a revision of the Dayton Accords, et cetera.
21 So my convictions today are even firmer than they were back in 1992.
22 Q. I will try to put questions to you now which will allow you to
23 give me a yes or no answer. You also mention the incident at
24 Vase Miskina Street here as something that was a monstrous crime. Do you
25 still stand by this position today that this had an impact on you?
1 A. Absolutely. As things stand today, this is clearer than it was
2 at the time. I was following the testimony of the lady who is an
3 explosives expert here before the Tribunal and her expertise was very
4 compelling. What made me suspicious of it at the time - and this
5 involved a house that was a hundred metres away from mine - was that the
6 Sarajevo TV crew appeared there at an incredible speed. Even at the
7 time, suspicions arose of it having been pre-staged, but even later new
8 evidence emerged that --
9 JUDGE KWON: Shall we stop here? It goes too far.
10 Please continue.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this document be
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3646, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. On page 76 and I will try to phrase my questions as yes/no
18 questions. On page 76 in connection with Exhibit 6356, an OTP exhibit,
19 you state that General Halilovic could not be fully trusted when it comes
20 to the representation of the military situation. Was General Halilovic
21 to be fully trusted when he spoke about the sufferings of the Muslims and
22 other events in Bosnia?
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Just a second.
24 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think that's a leading
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff suggested that
4 Dr. Kecmanovic was informed by Halilovic of the sufferings of the
5 Muslims, and Mr. Kecmanovic said that Halilovic couldn't be trusted
6 because he lied a lot about the military situation, so I asked him a
7 question whether he was to be trusted on other things. That's not
8 leading. That's taking up an issue from cross-examination.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I answer?
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, it would have been better if
13 he had just asked the second part of the question without making
14 reference to the first, but it's not really a leading question if it's
15 only limited to that.
16 JUDGE BAIRD: I tend to agree, Mr. Robinson.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Shall we ask the witness to answer
18 or shall we continue?
19 JUDGE BAIRD: Rephrase, rephrase.
20 JUDGE KWON: Could you reformulate your question.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Was General Halilovic at Presidency meetings to be fully trusted
24 regarding information about events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
25 suffering of the people and the victims?
1 A. I have mentioned that his almost daily statements at Presidency
2 meetings were one-sided and biased. When he spoke about the sufferings
3 of the -- of Muslim civilians, this is blown out of proportion, and on
4 the other hand when he spoke about the successes of the army that he led,
5 he also would exaggerate incredibly. Even the Muslim and Croatian
6 members of the Presidency were distrustful and Izetbegovic himself once
7 pointed out to him not to exaggerate and said, "If you were really so
8 successful militarily, we would be controlling all of Bosnia-Herzegovina
9 by now."
10 Q. Thank you. On page 66 you were asked what Pale demanded. Did
11 the Dayton accord grant us special links with Serbia that we had
13 A. There is no need to even answer that. Yes, it did.
14 Q. It was suggested that the Serb side - or specifically I claimed
15 that we couldn't continue living with the Muslims in one state. Did that
16 equally refer to the SFRY and the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. The Serb option - and when I say "Serb," I say it with full
18 consciousness that it wasn't only the position of the SDS but also of my
19 party and it was also the opinion of other Serbs who weren't members of
20 any party - the first option was that Bosnia-Herzegovina should stay part
21 of Yugoslavia. But everything else was imposed by force because the
22 legitimate and legal Serb option was ignored. Everything that happened
23 subsequently is merely a consequence of that position of the sides in the
24 conflict which was first political and then also military.
25 JUDGE KWON: I would like to let you know that the Chamber wishes
1 to rise at 3.45 sharp today -- 2.45.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll try to cut things
3 short, and I kindly ask for Professor Kecmanovic to answer yes or no
4 whenever he can, although I'm not allowed to ask leading questions the
5 way the OTP did.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Did you --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please start over.
9 JUDGE KWON: Repeat, please.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Did you notice whether in me and the rest of the Serbian
12 leadership and the leadership of the Serbian movement there was a
13 difference in the attitude toward the Muslims we considered
14 fundamentalists and the Muslims we didn't consider fundamentalists?
15 A. Yes, absolutely, there was a difference.
16 Q. Thank you. On page 60 you spoke out against genocide and you
17 said that this didn't refer to any specific side. The document is P6353.
18 Did you mean a specific perpetrator or one specific side are responsible
19 of committing genocide?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Thank you. When you said "movements of population," that the OTP
22 linked to ethnic cleansing, did you mean forcible removal of
23 population -- forcible resettlement of population or transfer --
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that is leading.
25 JUDGE KWON: What did you mean? You can ask -- simply ask in
1 that way: What did you mean by "movement of population," "massive
2 movement of population"?
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Page 53, what did you mean by "massive movement of population"?
5 A. "Massive movement of population" is a very broad term. It is
6 something that has continued in Bosnia-Herzegovina even after the end of
7 the war and not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but in all of former
8 Yugoslavia. Movements of population have been present since the Second
9 World War. A great percentage of Serbian and Croatian population left
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina in peace time after 1945. This process is taking
11 place even now, after 1995. I did not place that in the context of the
12 use of force because in that case it's called something else.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have on one part of the
14 screen P06352 and on the other part D220.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. While we're waiting, Dr. Kecmanovic, did you notice in the Serb
17 leadership or any official Serb factor intentions or inclinations or
18 desires to transfer population or an inclination toward ethnic purity?
19 A. The people I communicated with - and that's you, Plavsic,
20 Krajisnik, Koljevic - I never observed that. It seems to me that at one
21 point when there was a discussion about the division of territory and all
22 sides took part in that and all international agreements from Cutileiro's
23 before the war and up until the ones after the war were all about that,
24 and I don't know why this is being stigmatised. Even the international
25 factors were in favour of such a solution and now it's become something
1 odious, but I would like to remind of your suggestion, I think, your
2 proposal that in places where a Muslim or Croatian -- where the Muslims
3 or the Croats are the majority in that territory, that there should be
4 sub-autonomies for places in that territory with a definite majority. I
5 believe that was applied to something in northern Bosnia. So there
6 should be safety for everybody through the system of sub-autonomies.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get page 2 on the right
8 half. And on the left side there is the platform that I issued on the
9 22nd of April, 1992.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Please focus on paragraph 5. Can you tell us how this tallies
12 with your understanding of our attitude toward the use of force?
13 A. I think that paragraph 5 is almost identical to what the
14 Prosecutor mentioned from what I had stated at a Presidency meeting in
15 Sarajevo. In other words, an advantage obtained by force will not be
17 Q. On page 2, or rather, on the right-hand side can we see item 4,
18 sub-item (c), if we could just see that. We can remove this left half of
19 the screen. Next page, item 4(c).
20 "The recognition of the legal authorities of the state of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina and its institutions in its entire territory."
22 Can you tell us how you understood this and under what conditions
23 these authorities could be legal without the legitimate representatives
24 of the Serbian people?
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I think that's leading.
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no way.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Item (c) --
4 JUDGE KWON: Well, you -- the last part of your question was
5 leading. What is your question? Could you reformulate your question?
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Dr. Kecmanovic, please, how do you understand this? What is the
8 Muslim side pleading for? What legitimate authorities would those be in
9 all of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. I understood this to mean some sort of authorities in accordance
11 with what was mentioned at the beginning, that would come about only by
12 all three sides agreeing again, the same way it happened in Dayton.
13 That's the only way for Bosnia to be preserved, and I'm afraid the
14 chronic impossibility to reach such agreement can only result in a
15 separation. Who was supposed to take part in this? Maybe you and I
16 together if I had stayed in the Presidency or only the Pale leadership,
17 that's open to speculation. But it's certain that the Serbian people
18 would have to have its say. But if this had been like this at the
19 beginning, I'm sure that there would have been no civil war.
20 Q. And my last question: Did they, that is the Muslim-Croatian
21 coalition, understand this item (c) the same way as you do regarding the
22 legality of authorities at this moment?
23 A. The Bosniaks, I'm afraid, no; I'm not sure about the Croats. I
24 think that they were in favour of that but not the Bosniaks.
25 Q. Thank you, Professor Kecmanovic. If there were more time, I
1 would have more questions but given the time I will finish.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 That concludes your evidence, Mr. Kecmanovic. On behalf of the
4 Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague. Please have
5 a safe journey back home. We'll adjourn but there's one thing.
6 The Chamber is still considering the motion by Mr. Tolimir
7 requesting to suspend the subpoena and to allow to appeal on the
8 decision. Given the circumstances, it seems prudent to reschedule his
9 evidence which is scheduled for next week to a further date pending the
10 outcome of the decision -- the request.
11 The hearing is adjourned.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir --
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Kecmanovic.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I thank you for the good wishes for
15 my return to Belgrade. I have a request if you would let me say good-bye
16 to the accused.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic must have heard this statement of
18 yours. It is not consistent with our practice.
19 THE ACCUSED: But it was approved in Krajisnik case.
20 JUDGE KWON: Not at this time. Thank you.
21 The hearing is adjourned.
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.51 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of
25 June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.