1 Tuesday, 11 June 2013
2 [The accused entered court]
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Please continue,
6 Ms. Edgerton.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours. And as I undertook
8 yesterday for the general, I have a copy of his Defence statement in his
9 own language. If I can ask Mr. Registrar to assist me. That may help
11 And just two small things out of courtesy to Dr. Karadzic. The
12 document -- one of the documents I read from yesterday, P5583, I wasn't
13 able to identify the B/C/S passage I had quoted from and that was -- I
14 have now checked. It was at page 3 in e-court in B/C/S, second paragraph
15 from the beginning of the page.
16 And the final thing is D3676, which the witness spoke about
17 yesterday in answering one of my questions and addressing himself to
18 Your Honours, is, I'd noticed when I looked at the document last night -
19 and this is just a cross-referencing - also footnote 141 in P973 which is
20 Dr. Donia's report. And that being said, I'll continue.
21 WITNESS: DUSAN KOVACEVIC [Resumed]
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton: [Continued]
24 Q. General, yesterday just before we broke we were talking a little
25 bit about the Supreme Command and your evidence on that from the Perisic
1 case that meetings didn't happen according to set dates. Now, you also
2 told the Judges in the Perisic case that these meetings of the
3 Supreme Command were always called by Dr. Karadzic; right?
4 A. Yes, that's right.
5 Q. And Dr. Karadzic was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of
6 the Republika Srpska; right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And he was General Mladic's only superior; right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And he commanded the Army of Republika Srpska through
11 General Mladic; right?
12 A. That's what the regulations said. However, the Main Staff
13 independently planned some operations in terms of military engagement and
14 combat activities.
15 Q. You said that in your statement, but I want to come back to
16 something that you said in the Perisic case in that regard. In the
17 Perisic case, you told the Judges there that while military operations
18 were planned outside the knowledge of members of the Supreme Command and
19 government, and they lay solely within the competence of the Main Staff,
20 they were planned with the knowledge and approval of the president of the
21 republic, and you said that in your testimony in the Perisic case at
22 transcript page 12648; is that correct?
23 A. Yes. In principle, that's what the procedure was like.
24 Q. Can you just have a look at paragraph 27 of your statement for
25 me. And have a look at the very last sentence of paragraph 27. That
2 "Operations were planned without the knowledge of the members of
3 the Supreme Command and were exclusively with the jurisdiction of the
4 Main Staff of the VRS."
6 A. It is correct that planning as an overall process of combat
7 activities was something that was undertaken by the Main Staff of the VRS
8 without the participation and knowledge of the Supreme Command. As for
9 approval --
10 Q. Can you just let me get to the end of my -- the question and then
11 I'll give you every opportunity to make a full answer. And I'm going to
12 quote to you what you said in the Perisic case from 12648.
13 JUDGE KWON: I'd like to see the passage. Shall we upload it.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Of course. In the Perisic transcript,
15 Your Honour; correct?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, yes. Yes. You quoted a sentence, but --
17 MS. EDGERTON: I didn't quote it. I wanted to quote the exact
18 sentence now just for clarity for the witness. It has a Defence ID
19 number, which Mr. Reid will be able to find for me in a minute. 1D26013.
20 Q. Now, the sentence that you said, that you gave to the Court in
21 the Perisic case reads, General:
22 "The operations lay solely within the competence --"
23 JUDGE KWON: Let's read out from the question.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Ah, of course.
25 Q. You were asked by Mr. Lukic:
1 "... can you tell me, was there," and he was referring to the
2 Supreme Command, "was there a debate on military operations of the VRS,
3 and were decisions taken about the VRS military operations at these
4 meetings of the Supreme Command?"
5 And your answer was:
6 "In principle, no. Operations were planned outside the knowledge
7 of the ... Supreme Command and government. The operations lay solely
8 within the competence of the Main Staff, with the knowledge and approval
9 of the president of the republic."
10 A. In principle, it is correct. However, the president of the
11 republic could occasionally authorise the Main Staff to carry out
12 operations independently for which he believed were urgent and necessary,
13 and those needed to be implemented without consultation.
14 Q. Thank you. Over the course of your service as defence minister,
15 you attended a number of Supreme Command meetings --
16 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry to interrupt you, Ms. Edgerton.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Of course.
18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kovacevic, you said in principle the operations
19 were planned outside the knowledge but with the knowledge and approval of
20 the president of the republic in principle. Then your statement in your
21 statement, para 27, that operations were planned without the knowledge of
22 the members of the Supreme Command is an incorrect statement in
23 principle. If you could clarify.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Planning combat operations was
25 exclusively done within the Main Staff of the VRS. As for approval to
1 initiate an operation, it was in the hands of the president of the
2 republic, i.e., the Supreme Commander, Radovan Karadzic. It happened
3 that the president of the republic, i.e., the Supreme Commander,
4 Dr. Karadzic, was abroad. Under such circumstances, it wasn't possible
5 for the Main Staff commander to meet with the Supreme Commander, and he
6 had Dr. Karadzic's approval to act independently under such conditions
7 and carry out certain operations should there be sudden attacks or
8 breakthroughs through the VRS lines.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Kovacevic.
10 Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
12 Q. Now, just with regard to the Supreme Command meetings that we've
13 been discussing, could you tell us where are the tape recordings, the
14 transcripts of those tape recordings, and the minutes of those meetings?
15 A. While I was a member of the Supreme Command, as the minister of
16 defence, I didn't know where such material was left. I suppose it was
17 stored in the president of the republic's cabinet, that is to say, in the
18 office of the Supreme Commander. However, I really don't know where it
19 was kept.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MS. EDGERTON: I'd like to look at another document, and it's a
22 military document, D325. It's the combat readiness report of the Bosnian
23 Serb Army, dated 1 April 1993. If we could in this document, please, go
24 over to page 7 in English and page 8 in B/C/S.
25 Q. Under the heading "Command and Control," I'd like to draw your
1 attention to the fourth full paragraph on both pages.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps, I think you might, Mr. Registrar, have to
3 enlarge the Cyrillic version a little bit more, and it's the fourth full
4 paragraph I'm interested in.
5 Q. Now, that paragraph, General, is a retrospective and it talks
6 about the past year, and it begins with:
7 "We have carried out individual and concerted battle operations
8 according to a single design and plan, entrusting subordinate commands
9 with detailed or overall missions as appropriate."
10 And then if we step over to the next paragraph, you can read the
11 rest of paragraph 4, it continues:
12 "Over the past year, the Army of Republika Srpska has been under
13 a single control and command structure. Despite the fact that we
14 initially had a large number of different armies and paramilitary
15 formations, this unity has been attained by following well-known
16 principles such as unity, continuity, flexibility, efficiency,
17 operationability, and security, with subordination and a single command
18 having a crucial bearing on the relations in the command and control
20 Now, General, this doesn't reflect chaos or disorganisation, does
22 A. That was the position of the Main Staff, but they, too, say that
23 there was a lack of unity and different armed groups and paramilitary
25 Q. Thank you. And, General, you know your former Chief of Staff
1 from your service in the Bosnian Serb Army came to testify here before
2 this Tribunal, and at transcript pages 25438 to 25439, he told us in
3 February last year about the army's communications. And on the
4 12th of May, 1992, General Milovanovic didn't travel to Banja Luka with
5 the rest of the Main Staff. He remained behind to develop a schematic
6 for the organisation of the army and to work on its communications
7 system, and he said that the existing communications were still in place,
8 and from that morning, on the 12th of May, even before the VRS was
9 officially established at the embassy, he at the command post was
10 receiving reports from subordinate units. And he was asked if
11 General Talic from the 5th Corps, for example, needed to contact
12 General Milovanovic that day, whether he could do it, and
13 General Milovanovic confirmed that he could. And furthermore,
14 General Milovanovic told us that he established push-button
15 communications at the Main Staff so that from that day on, the
16 12th of May, he could get directly in touch with all the units that were
17 going to be resubordinated to the VRS. That's not chaos, is it?
18 A. At the time, I was not in the Main Staff. I arrived only as late
19 as July or August. I don't know now General Milovanovic communicated
20 with the subordinate units. I do know well that the seat of the
21 Main Staff was designated to be located in Crna Rijeka, near Han Pijesak,
22 in an underground military facility. It used to be a reserve command
23 location of the JNA. It contained all kinds of equipment and provided
24 conditions for prolonged stays underground. I spent several months there
25 as a member of the Main Staff. I know the facility very well. I had
1 known it since before the war for over a decade. It was one of the most
2 up-to-date communications systems within the JNA.
3 Close by there was a repeater at Veliki Zep. Communications
4 systems were underground so that they could not be destroyed by even
5 atomic bombs.
6 General Milovanovic had inherited from the JNA the entire
7 communications infrastructure. I don't know, though, how he established
8 specific communication.
9 Q. Thank you. In your statement, at paragraph 35 you said that
10 General Milovanovic [sic] made public statements and public addresses to
11 municipal leaders, and among other things, frequently pointed out that he
12 should be president of the Republika Srpska, and I'd like to show you in
13 that regard another document. It's P2567, and it's a note on the
14 42nd session of the Supreme Defence Council, dated 23 August 1995.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript. There is a major
16 difference, not Milovanovic but Mladic.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was about to ask Ms. Edgerton. Could you
18 read the transcript, your question. "Among other things, frequently
19 pointed out that he should be the president of the Republika Srpska."
20 Who was he?
21 MS. EDGERTON: General Mladic, and that's the reference in the
22 witness's statement.
23 Thank you, Dr. Karadzic.
24 Q. General Kovacevic, have a look at this document, which is dated
25 23 August 1995. At this meeting of the Supreme Defence Council -- your
1 indulgence for a moment. President of Serbia -- and tell us when you've
2 gone through the first page. The President of Serbia,
3 President Milosevic, warned the people present that representatives of
4 the international community did not want Dr. Karadzic as a negotiator
5 because the leadership in Pale had, up until that point, rejected several
6 peace initiatives and plans over the previous couple of years, and he
7 turned to General Mladic to ask for his opinion as to who could represent
8 the Serbs at the forthcoming peace conference.
9 And we can go to page 2 in both languages. And Mladic, at
10 page 2, talked about the attempts of "our enemies" to divide the Serbs in
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina into Karadzic's men and Mladic's men, which if not
12 stopped could lead to further divisions.
13 And if you look at the second paragraph in your language on
14 page 2, you see General Mladic tell President Milosevic that he wished to
15 emphasise he had no active political ambitions, that he wished to serve
16 the people to whom as a soldier he belongs, and that first and foremost
17 he belongs to his professions, to the army and the people, and he should
18 be perceived solely in this light, which is, General, completely contrary
19 to your assertion that Mladic wanted to become president of
20 Republika Srpska.
21 A. I was present on several occasions at the meetings of municipal
22 leaderships at which General Mladic had contributions. He pointed out
23 that after the war he should be the president of the republic. It was so
24 well known to everyone in Republika Srpska, especially the soldiers.
25 There were attempts to split up the army into two factions, one
1 in favour of Karadzic, the other in favour of Mladic. I personally -- I
2 was personally asked, "General, who do you support, President Karadzic or
3 General Mladic?" I refused to state my position, having said that I have
4 two eyes and that both are mine. By the same token, the two of them are
5 the leaders of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they should
6 not be set apart.
7 That was the reason why at Supreme Command sessions I opposed
8 proposals to have General Mladic removed as commander of the VRS
9 Main Staff. Proposals for his removal were expressed on two or three
10 occasions by the President of the Republic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic. I
11 always asked President Karadzic to present to us the reasons for which
12 General Mladic should be removed and that we should analyse the
13 consequences caused by his removal. I informed the Supreme Command of my
14 knowledge to the effect that should there be a removal, there would be a
15 conflict between the units of the VRS, which would be a disaster.
16 President Karadzic accepted my position and decided not to remove Mladic,
17 at least during my mandate as the minister of defence. That is precisely
18 how things developed.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe in line 10 on page 10,
22 instead of "conflict" it should be "clashes," because the witness said
23 armed conflicts or clashes rather than conflicts in general, the stress
24 being on "armed."
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Ms. Edgerton, in your question, page 8,
1 transcript page 8, line from 6:
2 "In your statement at paragraph 35 you said that
3 General Milovanovic made public statements and public addresses to
4 municipal leaders, frequently pointed out that Mladic should be the
5 president of the Republika Srpska."
6 But I can't find the passage on the statement. If you could help
8 MS. EDGERTON: My apologies, and completely --
9 THE ACCUSED: 34, I suppose --
10 MS. EDGERTON: -- my mistake, and that's -- Dr. Karadzic is
11 right. It's in paragraph 34, the immediately preceding paragraph, the
12 last four lines or five lines of that paragraph.
13 JUDGE KWON: So whole sentence -- the subject of whole sentence
14 should be Mladic instead of Milovanovic.
15 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
17 MS. EDGERTON: And I obviously didn't realise I had given the
18 wrong name in the question.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.
20 MS. EDGERTON:
21 Q. So these discussions within the Supreme Command that you've just
22 told us about, General, would be recorded in those tape recordings, set
23 out in those transcripts and in those minutes that we discussed earlier.
25 A. I was not keeping notes or minutes, and I assume that is the way
1 it should be. I never saw such a transcript or minutes and never read
2 any such minutes.
3 Q. And it was General Subotic who during your tour as your service
4 as defence minister was responsible for recording those sessions, wasn't
6 A. Yes. General Subotic recorded these sessions.
7 Q. Now, just with respect to the municipal leaders that you referred
8 to in speaking about meetings where you were present with General Mladic,
9 could you identify specifically one or two of those municipal leaders who
10 we would be able to go and contact?
11 A. I remember very well this meeting at the municipality of Bileca.
12 I remember the meeting at the Main Staff with the presidents of the
13 municipalities of the Sarajevo and Zvornik regions. At that meeting I
14 was present, too, and --
15 Q. I'd just like their names. Who specifically was at those
16 meetings and would have heard that?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? Just in line 2, it is not
18 Bijelica, it is Bileca. The name of the municipality is Bileca. It is a
19 transcript-related question.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 MS. EDGERTON:
22 Q. If we can get back to it, could I have the --
23 JUDGE KWON: Did we hear the answer from the witness?
24 MS. EDGERTON: No. I'd just like to remind him.
25 Q. Could we have the specific names.
1 JUDGE KWON: If you remember.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really cannot recall the names of
3 the presidents of municipalities who were present. I didn't even know
4 many of them. I'm not able to say except for Ratko Radic, who I know
5 well, from the municipality of Hadzici. I also know others but I cannot
6 remember their names.
7 Q. And could you at least identify perhaps the year in which you
8 might have heard these discussions, because I would like to go and look
9 through General Mladic's personal notebook where those meetings you're
10 talking about might be recorded?
11 A. Well, I think it was from September up until the end of 1992 in
12 Bileca. At the Main Staff in Crna Rijeka, I think it was in the middle
13 of 1993.
14 Q. Thank you. At least it gives us something to go on. I'd like
15 now to go over to paragraph 35 of your statement where you referred to
16 Dr. Karadzic's attempt to remove General Mladic and where you say that -
17 your indulgence for a moment - all the generals of the VRS Main Staff
18 stood by Mladic.
19 Now, in contrast to this, in your Perisic testimony at transcript
20 page 12774, you told His Honour Judge Moloto that you knew that Mladic
21 had Dragomir Milosevic arrested because he failed to support him, and he
22 failed to sign the list in support of General Mladic. And then
23 Judge Moloto asked you:
24 "So the correct position is that not all generals supported
25 Mladic. There were those against him, for example, Dragomir Milosevic."
1 And you answered:
2 "Yes, that's correct."
3 A. In my statements I said that all generals in the Main Staff
4 supported General Mladic. I never said that all generals of the Army of
5 Republika Srpska supported General Mladic. It is correct that
6 General Milosevic had been arrested. It is also correct that the
7 Minister of Defence, Milan Ninkovic was also arrested by General Mladic,
8 and he asked me to bring him medicine to Crna Rijeka, to the Main Staff,
9 because over there no civilians who were in positions of authority could
11 I did that for him, and at the same time I asked General Tolimir
12 to prevent a conflict between the police that was on its way with five
13 buses from Doboj on orders issued by Minister Ninkovic, that he should be
14 freed from the prison in Crna Rijeka, and Mladic had soldiers ready to
15 meet this police and the two units almost clashed and that would have
16 been a catastrophe. I asked General Tolimir that he and I try to ease
17 these tensions. I persuaded Biljana Plavsic and he persuaded
18 General Mladic that the two of them should meet at this place called
19 Han Pogled and Romanija near Han Pijesak. That's where they talked,
20 where they reached agreement. Milan Ninkovic was released. The general
21 was also released, and there were no further arrests. And all of this is
22 precisely a consequence of these misunderstandings and conflicts between
23 General Mladic and Dr. Radovan Karadzic.
24 Q. Thank you. Now, also in your testimony in the Perisic case, you
25 told the Judges that you learned of the killings in Srebrenica in
1 mid-August or the first part of August 1995, and I would like to know how
2 did you know?
3 A. At the time, I had -- I held no office in the Government of
4 Republika Srpska, and I did not have any position in the Army of
5 Republika Srpska. In July 1995, I went to Knin with my family in two
6 vehicles to see my parents in order to find a solution as to how to get
7 my parents out of Knin and to see whether they could go on living there
8 at all or not. I stayed there up until the beginning of August. On my
9 way back by car, my driver was present and this other man with the other
10 vehicle, as we were passing through Konjevic Polje, we went through a
11 blockade and positions of one particular unit of the Army of Republika
12 Srpska. We were stopped then. They conducted checks, and it was only
13 then that they let us go.
14 As we arrived in Pale, I found out from the media about
15 Srebrenica. Later on, my knowledge was based on what I read in the
16 press, heard in the media, in statements made by certain persons, and
17 personal conversations with some generals like General Miletic. I did
18 not take part in any way in affairs related to Srebrenica.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for just a moment, Your Honours.
20 Q. Just to clarify one thing, you've just said that you had no
21 position in the government or the Army of Republika Srpska at that time,
22 but at that time you were a member of the state committee for centralised
23 procurement to the armed forces of the VRS, and the committee chair was
24 Dr. Karadzic, and on the committee was General Mladic; Mr. Krajisnik;
25 Mr. Cosic; Milan Ninkovic, who was your successor defence minister;
1 Ranko Pajic, who was the minister of finance; and Tomo Kovac, who was the
2 deputy minister of internal affairs. Right? At the time you were still
3 a member of this committee.
4 A. It is correct that the composition was of a temporary nature.
5 This was no institution. It did not have a stamp or a seal of its own,
6 and it is correct that I was a member of that team.
7 Q. And in June of 1992, 20 June, in fact, you were named team leader
8 of an executive team tasked with organising and transporting ammunition
9 for the needs of the Bosnian Serb Army from the Federal Republic of
10 Yugoslavia, and by the 27th of June, you were to place that ammunition in
11 a number of agreed locations, depots, in the RS and inform Dr. Karadzic
12 when the task was accomplished; correct?
13 A. That's correct that I was appointed by President Karadzic to be
14 in charge of a team that was supposed to find possibilities for
15 transporting ammunition from Yugoslavia to the depots of the Army of
16 Republika Srpska. When I received these orders, I personally went to see
17 three border crossings from Zvornik, Visegrad, and I established that at
18 these border crossing points there was international police. On one side
19 there was the police of Serbia, on the other side the police of
20 Republika Srpska.
21 I was outside the army and outside the government at that time,
22 and I had no influence over the police. I thought that it was
23 inappropriate for me to be in charge of that team. I returned to
24 President Karadzic. I made him aware of the situation at the border
25 crossing points, and I said that I cannot work on these matters. I left
1 this order at the office of the president of the republic, and he said,
2 "All right. You don't have to do that." And indeed, I never did that
3 kind of work ever, up until now.
4 Q. All right. I just want to come back now to something you
5 mentioned in terms of your sources of information regarding the killings
6 of men and boys in Srebrenica. You said one of -- you learned about it
7 in part from personal conversations with some generals like
8 General Miletic. So what did General Miletic tell you?
9 A. To the best of my recollection, all the information I received
10 from military personnel roughly boiled down to the following: Most of
11 the Muslim soldiers and civilians were killed during the breakthrough --
12 Q. General --
13 JUDGE KWON: Let him continue --
14 MS. EDGERTON: Of course.
15 JUDGE KWON: -- and then you may ask further questions.
16 Please continue, Mr. Kovacevic.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So most of the Muslim population
18 and soldiers were killed during the breakthrough. As they had set out,
19 several thousand of them, roughly each soldier brought his family along,
20 too, and they started this breakthrough. They came across the combat
21 positions of the Army of Republika Srpska, and there was a mutual
22 exchange of gunfire, and the Army of Republika Srpska prevented that
23 breakthrough. In this fighting it was mostly Muslim soldiers and
24 civilians that were killed.
25 The second piece of information I got was from Stefan Karganovic,
1 who was a member of the commission, and he gave me documentation about
2 Srebrenica, and it says that about 400 Muslims were executed, 400 Muslims
3 from Srebrenica, and that there's no doubt about that. So that is this
4 crime that was committed, whereas all others went missing or were killed
5 during the breakthrough. From other officers I heard the same thing,
6 that a number of Muslims were killed intentionally because of the crimes
7 that they had committed, in Fakovici on the 7th of January, 1993, in the
8 village of Kravica in Jezestica on the 12th of July, 1992, and in many
9 villages in Podrinje where over 3.000 Serbs were killed before
10 Srebrenica, and that was retaliation only, which could not have been
11 prevented through the system of command and control.
12 Furthermore, I found out from the team investigating crimes
13 against Serbs that several hundred Muslims were found alive all over the
14 world, and their names are carved in at the memorial cemetery in
15 Potocari. I found out from the documentary film "Sarajevo 1 and
16 Sarajevo 2," where a man of theirs who was police commander when all of
17 this happened, I think his name is Miholjcic [phoen] or something like
18 that, he says that Muslims in Srebrenica killed at least 1.000 people
19 amongst themselves.
20 That would be it basically.
21 MS. EDGERTON:
22 Q. Now, you talked about a couple of things that I'd like to go back
23 to, and one of those things was the execution of 400 Muslims from
24 Srebrenica. Now, is that -- what -- what did General Miletic tell you
25 about those 400?
1 A. He did not tell me about the number, but he said that there were
2 intentional uncontrolled executions of Muslims as revenge because of the
3 crimes that Muslims had previously committed in Serb villages. Also,
4 that most of the Muslims lost their lives during the breakthrough. That
5 is what I was told.
6 Q. So your evidence is that General Miletic told you that, and I'll
7 find your words exactly --
8 JUDGE KWON: He told us that it was Stefan Karganovic who was a
9 member of the commission. What commission was it, Mr. Kovacevic?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The government of the Netherlands
11 established an international commission that dealt with investigations of
12 the crimes committed in Srebrenica. He was one of the members of this
13 commission. Three times I had the opportunity of meeting him, it just so
14 happened. He gave me reports of that commission, and he told me that it
15 was proven beyond any doubt that 400 or 401 or 1 less than 400, I'm not
16 sure, but anyway, that was the number persons intentionally executed.
17 And investigators of The Hague Tribunal were also members of this
19 JUDGE KWON: Executed where, Mr. Kovacevic?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were taken to a number of
21 locations. I believe one was toward Bijeljina, Pilica, or something. I
22 don't remember the exact names of those places, but executions were
23 organised outside of Srebrenica.
24 JUDGE KWON: Back to you, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON:
1 Q. You said in your evidence that -- your indulgence for a moment.
2 Now, it seems by your evidence General Miletic wasn't the only
3 general you spoke with. You said you learned about the killings from
4 some generals like General Miletic. Tell us specifically what other
5 generals you spoke with.
6 A. I didn't speak to any general, but that was confirmed by
7 General Mladic and by General Tolimir, I believe, at some meetings.
8 The -- I mean the centralised supply committee meetings.
9 Q. What did General Mladic and General Tolimir confirm as regards
10 the killings at those committee meetings?
11 A. That was informal conversation. I personally wasn't present and
12 they didn't inform me of the events. In their conversations, they stated
13 with certainty that a smaller number of Muslims was executed in
14 retaliation of the crimes committed against Serbs in 1992 and 1993. Most
15 of them, however, got killed during the breakthrough. That was the
16 essence. I didn't ask any questions about that, but that's what I heard
17 from them in the conversation.
18 Q. A smaller number being how many?
19 A. Nobody has ever given me precise information except for
20 Karganovic in his report, that is the report of that commission which I
22 Q. And when did these conversations with General Mladic and
23 General Tolimir take place?
24 A. That was until late 1995 most probably.
25 Q. So these were -- these were conversations in the -- in the
1 periphery of the committee meetings or these were personal conversations?
2 I'm not still not quite clear about this.
3 A. Those were informal conversations during the breaks at that
4 meeting. Somebody asked something and then the answer came, and I didn't
5 ask anyone, but I heard the answers.
6 Q. Who asked?
7 A. I really cannot recall. There were about two dozen of us. Some
8 committee members or possibly all. I really don't remember who asked the
9 question. It's irrelevant to me.
10 Q. And this is the committee -- when you talk about this committee,
11 that's that state committee for the centralised procurement for the armed
12 forces of the VRS that we talked about a few moments ago?
13 A. Yes. That was a provisional committee, the purpose of which was
14 to introduce order into the procurement of the VRS under the control of
15 the highest authorities of the RS.
16 Q. All right. Just one more question about this area, and it's
17 about -- it's about the mention of the -- the 400 that you spoke about
18 from Mr. Karganovic, the 400 intentionally killed. I want to know do you
19 actually believe this information from Karganovic, or do you know today
20 that, in fact, thousands of men and boys were executed in organised
22 A. Up to this day, to my knowledge it remains roughly like that. I
23 have never received information to the contrary or different information.
24 In all TV broadcasts and in all newspaper articles, there was always
25 mention of the greatest number of Muslims getting killed in the
1 breakthrough. And a number of Muslims was executed in retaliation for
2 the crimes that the Muslims committed against the Serbs in 1992 and 1993.
3 That's the gist of all information up to this day.
4 There's also the information published by the commission for the
5 investigation into crimes against Serbs, namely that they found a number
6 of Muslims who were -- who are alive, and their identity was established,
7 but in spite of that, their names were carved into the monument of the
8 killed in Potocari. And it is certain that the number is not correct --
9 Q. You're repeating yourself a little bit, General. Just before we
10 leave this area, I just want to ask you about these informal
11 conversations, one last thing about these informal conversations with
12 General Tolimir and General Mladic where you heard them confirm the
13 information about the killings. Now, you said these were informal
14 conversations during a break in that committee meeting, the committee for
15 procurement, and you said that there was -- I'm not sure how many off the
16 top of my head, but about a dozen people there.
17 Now, I read you the names of the formal members of the committee,
18 Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Cosic, Milan Ninkovic,
19 Branko Pajic, Tomo Kovac, but you talked about a dozen people there. So
20 who else was there at this meeting where you overheard this information?
21 A. Apart from the members of the commission, assistant -- the
22 assistants to the ministers of defence, commerce, procurement, the police
23 were present, people from the government, and the commodity reserves, and
24 even the managers of major companies, such as the manager of Serbian
25 forests, so that there must have been over ten people present.
1 Q. All right. So throughout the fall of 1995, you were obviously in
2 scenarios where you had conversations with these people and
3 Dr. Karadzic -- what did Dr. Karadzic say about these killings either to
4 you or that you overheard during this period?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Where was it confirmed that I
6 attended these committee meetings and that I spoke about the killings?
7 JUDGE KWON: No. She didn't mean to say that you attended that
9 Please answer the question, Mr. Kovacevic.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not know that Dr. Karadzic
11 ever spoke to anybody about Srebrenica. I really wasn't present at any
12 such occasion, and I have never heard a single word from him about
13 Srebrenica. I wasn't in such a position to be able to discuss this topic
14 with him or to be informed by him, because I didn't hold a high office.
15 I have never heard President Karadzic putting forward any information
16 about the Srebrenica operation or the casualties of either side there.
17 MS. EDGERTON:
18 Q. Did you hear him express any view in August 1995 or after that
19 about the tragedy? What was his view about the killings?
20 A. I have no knowledge or memory about that. I really cannot
21 answer. I do not remember.
22 Q. All right.
23 A. I don't know.
24 Q. I'm just going to go, to conclude, back to one area --
25 JUDGE KWON: If you are leaving this subject.
1 Mr. Kovacevic, you told us that the -- it was your initial
2 information that you heard at the time that about 400 Muslims were
3 executed, and Ms. Edgerton asked you later on that whether you stood by,
4 in particular in relation to the numbers executed, whether you stood by
5 that information, and this is your answer:
6 "Up to this day, to my knowledge it remains roughly like that. I
7 have never received information to the contrary or different
9 Do you remember having said so?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I never dealt with this
11 matter, but I did get information from various sources, including the
12 media. Of course I cannot say the figures are correct, because it's not
13 for me to speak about that and qualify it as true or false. I can only
14 say what I read and heard.
15 THE ACCUSED: Transcript --
16 JUDGE KWON: In that regard, I was wondering, Mr. Kovacevic,
17 whether you followed some of the witnesses here at the Tribunal, or
18 judgement delivered at this Tribunal in relation to -- or with respect to
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I followed some, but I do not
21 have a complete knowledge of everything. Certainly it is up to this
22 Tribunal to establish the exact figures and correct information as part
23 of the proceedings, and that should be authoritative for me and for
24 others too.
25 THE ACCUSED: Transcript, please.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: Line 1, the witness said, "It was not my
3 competence." So it should be translated that. Not: "It was -- it's not
4 for me to speak about it."
5 JUDGE KWON: It means the same thing, but, thank you,
6 Mr. Karadzic.
7 Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.
8 MS. EDGERTON:
9 Q. Thank you. I thought I might leave that area but I'd like to
10 come back to one thing and it has to do with this committee for
11 centralised procurement. General, that -- the task of the committee was
12 to provide for procurement of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, a whole
13 range of things for the VRS; right?
14 A. Yes, that's right.
15 Q. So this committee must have been involved in -- this committee,
16 General, surely would have been notified of the massive logistic effort
17 that it took to procure the buses, and the trucks and the fuel to move
18 40.000 civilians out of Srebrenica on the 12th of July.
19 A. There was certainly no discussion at committee meetings about
20 these matters. I now hear for the first time from you that the committee
21 was duty-bound to find this out. It was not known to me. This is the
22 first time I hear of it, that the committee took part in providing buses.
23 It certainly isn't anything I know.
24 Q. Well, General, we can have a look at a document in this regard,
25 P4525. It wasn't a committee who took part in providing buses. The
1 buses --
2 MS. EDGERTON: You'll have to enlarge the B/C/S.
3 Q. The buses were ordered on the 12th of July, 1995, by Main Staff
4 General Skrbic through the Ministry of Defence with the utmost urgency to
5 mobilise all buses available in municipalities of Pale, Sokolac,
6 Rogatica, Visegrad, Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, Milici, Bratunac, and
7 Zvornik, and your expertise in logistics -- your expertise was in
8 logistics. Your specific brief was the procurement of goods for the
9 armed forces of the Bosnian Serb Army, and your evidence is you didn't
11 A. It is possible that upon the request of the Main Staff the
12 Ministry of Defence mobilised buses, but I have no knowledge of that and
13 was not involved. It really isn't anything I know. This is all that I
14 can say. It is possible that these buses were mobilised. I believe that
15 this is correct.
16 Q. We'll leave this, then, and I'd just like to come back to one
17 area that you --
18 JUDGE KWON: Is that your last question, Ms. Edgerton?
19 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, it is, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, very well.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, General. I have nothing further.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.
23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, but I'm afraid it
25 would take longer than six minutes. Would you prefer that we take a
1 break now?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if it is convenient. We take a break for half
3 an hour and resume at 5 to 11.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.23 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
8 Excellencies. Good morning to everybody.
9 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Kovacevic. Yesterday at
11 page 90, I believe we were close to a misunderstanding. Did you meet
12 anybody from the Defence team but not on this occasion, I mean earlier?
13 A. Yes, I did last year.
14 Q. Who did you meet?
15 A. The attorney present here. I can't recall his name now.
16 Q. Mr. Sladojevic?
17 A. Yes, Sladojevic.
18 Q. Did you then review the statement that he compiled based on your
19 testimony? Did you then review the transcript of your evidence and
20 earlier statements?
21 A. Yes. We reviewed all my earlier statements that I had given to
22 the bodies of this Tribunal.
23 Q. Thank you. The statement admitted here, did it have anything to
24 do with that interview?
25 A. This statement is a compilation of all my statements given so
1 far, but it does not include everything that can be found in my earlier
2 statements. However, the essence is summarised in this statement.
3 Q. Thank you, General. Let me start with the most recent things.
4 On page 23, a bit further, you were asked about my attitude toward
5 Srebrenica. Can you remember what the situation was like in the other
6 theatres of war at the time? Was there anything that was drawing my
8 A. Yes. It was known or there were indications that Operation Storm
9 would begin. Such information was arriving from the Croatian side and
10 the Muslim side, and all the leadership of the RS was focused on
11 responding to that offensive and fending it off.
12 Q. Thank you. Strategically speaking, what was the situation of the
13 attack on Dinara and the municipalities of Glamoc, Grahovo, and the
14 others over there? What was its significance for the RS and for the RSK?
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
16 MS. EDGERTON: I really even at its broadest don't see how the
17 strategic significance of the attacks on these areas arise from the
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think it explains why they may
21 not have been discussing Srebrenica and --
22 JUDGE KWON: That may be leading then.
23 Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. But general said that
25 there were indications of Storm and preparations, which has to do with
1 the very area, with Mount Dinara and attacks on us. Storm could not take
2 place before --
3 JUDGE KWON: You're not giving evidence. Put the question to the
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Where did the preparatory attacks occur in July before Storm and
7 at the time of events in Srebrenica?
8 A. At Glamoc, Grahovo, Petrovac, Bihac, in that area bordering on
10 Q. Thank you. What was the importance or what would happen and what
11 did happen once they managed to seize control of that area?
12 A. For the Republika Srpska Krajina, it meant that they could not
13 have strategic facilities needed for defence under their control. For
14 Republika Srpska, it meant that whoever was in charge of those features
15 or facilities was in a favourable position to advance deep into RS
17 Q. Thank you. Before going westwards, and you told us today that
18 you wanted to pull out your parents, did you know what was the envisaged
19 scope of active combat around Srebrenica?
20 JUDGE KWON: Just a --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't comment.
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: I was premature. I apologise.
24 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed.
25 Do you remember the question, Mr. Kovacevic?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot provide a specific answer
2 of importance concerning Srebrenica given the fact that Srebrenica was a
3 protected area and that the Serbs took control of that area so as to be
4 able to move parts of forces engaged in that area to Banja Luka, Drvar,
5 and Petrovac. That is to say, the area in which Storm was supposed to
6 take place.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. If it requires speculation, please don't, but let me ask you the
9 following: Was the main preoccupation of the Main Staff Srebrenica or
10 the events to the west?
11 A. I think you designated General Milovanovic, Chief of the Main
12 Staff, to be in charge of defence in Bihac, Glamoc, and Petrovac, thus
13 providing great importance and putting -- placing a lot of stress on
14 defending that area. The Main Staff headed by General Mladic was in
15 Banja Luka, in the centre of military schools barracks. He was in charge
16 of these defensive preparations to defend Banja Luka. It is visible from
17 that that both you and the Main Staff at the time focused all of your
18 attention and all of the measures that were necessary to the western part
19 of Republika Srpska.
20 Q. Thank you. This morning on page 8 you were asked if the
21 Main Staff had communication links, and it was suggested that it couldn't
22 be described as chaos if the Chief of Staff could contact the units. Can
23 you tell us what the capacity was and the possibility of the Chief of
24 Staff of the Main Staff to get involved in mutual relations between
25 municipal units and authorities?
1 A. He certainly had good telephone communication with Banja Luka and
2 the Lukavica barracks, as well as some other centres, larger towns in
3 Republika Srpska. Cables were laid in such a way as to enable it. The
4 centre was in Crna Rijeka near Han Pijesak where the Main Staff was
5 deployed. I responsibly claim that General Milovanovic in 1992 had
6 almost no communication with the units in the field, units such as
7 battalions, brigades. For example, I can mention Cajnice where the
8 brigade commander was Kornjaca - I forgot his first name - and he had
9 great difficulty in establishing any kind of communication with the
10 Main Staff. I say that because in September and October 1992, I was in
11 the team created by General Mladic touring all units in the field. That
12 is the source of my knowledge of the disorder, chaos, wilfulness, and how
13 the people in those units could not navigate their situations.
14 As the team, we provided orders and instructions to the
15 commanders of those units on how to act and how to organise and establish
16 their units, as well as how to exercise command.
17 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber what kind of names did the
18 units have when they were established, and when were they made part of
19 the VRS? Also, tell us who had decisive influence before the VRS was
20 formed in the rest of 1992?
21 A. The mobilised units of the JNA later on became TO units of
22 Republika Srpska. The units were commanded and controlled exclusively by
23 local authorities. The brigades or battalions were usually named after
24 the place where they were set up. For example, the Cajnik [phoen]
25 Brigade in Cajnice, the Prijedor Brigade in Prijedor, the Mrkonjic
1 Brigade in Mrkonjic, and so on and so forth. The local authorities and
2 commanders of those units for the most part were the people in charge of
3 such units, organising defence in their respective areas. Only after
4 some six months or more did the Main Staff establish through corps
5 commands a full line of command and control.
6 Q. Thank you. General, after a decision was made on the
7 establishment of the armed forces, is there a fundamental document
8 without which the armed forces could not have been established?
9 A. When I was appointed the minister of defence, I inherited the
10 Law on the Armed Forces and the Law on Defence which I believe was put
11 into force in late 1992. These were the two basic laws, and at the same
12 time, the organisational establishment structure of the armed forces was
13 created from the Main Staff down to the lowest ranking unit. The
14 organisational establishment structure was created by the Main Staff, and
15 it was approved by the Supreme Commander, the president of the republic,
16 Radovan Karadzic.
17 Under the organisational establishment structure, the armed
18 forces were planned to be established within one year.
19 Q. Why was the year necessary? What was to be achieved?
20 MS. EDGERTON: Before the witness answers.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MS. EDGERTON: I don't see how this is linked to an area of the
23 cross-examination yet.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, there was a
1 whole line of questions on command and control and the position of the
2 Supreme Commander within the system of command and control in the armed
3 forces. These questions are a foundation for some follow-up questions.
4 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if Ms. Edgerton dealt with command and
5 control as such, although she touched upon that while reading out some
7 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think the issue of
8 General Mladic's independence from Dr. Karadzic goes directly to the
9 command and control, and I think these documents -- this document that
10 he's leading up to will show the difference between the strategic and
11 operational control that Dr. Karadzic had which we think arises from the
13 JUDGE KWON: That could be an explanation. Yes, I understand
15 Please carry on, Mr. Karadzic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have in e-court
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, are you familiar with the document? Can we see the
20 stamp? Yes, the 15th of June, 1992.
21 A. I am familiar with the document. It is based on this document
22 that the establishment structure of the VRS was drafted.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, item 4.
25 In the English it may well be on page 3.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. General, do you know -- can you tell us what is the importance of
3 this part of my decision in item 4? Which kind of authority did I
4 retain, and what was delegated to the Main Staff in terms of strategic
5 and tactical control?
6 A. Yes. It states that the Main Staff is in command of subordinate
7 units, and the Main Staff is directly subordinated to the president of
8 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is how it worked. You
9 did not issue orders to lower ranking units such as the corps or
10 brigades. Instead, it was done by the Main Staff. You had an obligation
11 or task under the regulations to approve or authorise the Main Staff to
12 implement certain tasks.
13 Q. Can you tell us who had strategic command and who had operational
14 and tactical command?
15 A. Strategic command was in the hands of the president of Republika
16 Srpska. Operational command was at the level of the Main Staff.
17 Tactical command was at the level of the corps and brigades.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In my question on line 19, it
19 should be "tactical" instead of "strategic."
20 Thank you. Can we see item 6. In the Serbian as well, which is
21 on the next page.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. You said that the Main Staff created a more detailed
24 organisational structure. Can you tell the Chamber what did I decide in
25 item 6.
1 A. You authorised the Main Staff to determine closer organisation
2 and establishment of units within the corps. Your decision was that the
3 corps should be established. The Main Staff was in charge of determining
4 closer or more detailed organisation of the corps. With respect to
5 whether they would have three or four brigades each and what other units
6 it would contain, as well as the levels of manning strength. That's what
7 was decided by the Main Staff.
8 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us if and how the issue of volunteers
9 was regulated and their status vis-a-vis the JNA?
10 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 MS. EDGERTON: While this has been going on for some time, I note
13 in the witness's written evidence he specifically says at paragraph 17
15 "From 3 May 1992 until early September of the same year, I did
16 not hold any military or other office, and I was not a member of any army
17 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
18 So I would think if Dr. Karadzic is going to go further into this
19 on redirect, he would be obligated to establish some kind of foundation
20 for the information he's now eliciting.
21 JUDGE KWON: So your question was whether this question was
22 related to the time-frame after this witness had quit his position,
23 Ms. Edgerton.
24 MS. EDGERTON: He's discussing documents even -- from even before
25 the period where he has given evidence he joined any military forces. He
1 specifically said he was not in any military or other office at this very
2 period that this document is dated. So I don't know where this
3 information is coming from at all.
4 JUDGE KWON: Well, let us ask the witness whether he has some
5 basic knowledge when he took up the office of the minister of defence, in
6 particular with respect to some organisation matters.
7 Yes, Mr. Kovacevic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? I kindly ask you that you
9 ask the general which position he held in September 1991.
10 JUDGE KWON: You may ask that question as well, yes. Please
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, sir, which position can you hold in September 1991?
14 A. I was commander of the 744th Logistics Base, whose command and
15 headquarters was in Sarajevo.
16 Q. Thank you. You were asked about the arming of Serbs, the arming
17 of volunteer units. The question of volunteers, was that regulated by
18 some document before our conflict broke out?
19 A. Since I had some problems yesterday as well in relation to this
20 question, I asked yesterday, and I kindly ask the Court once again today,
21 to have this document displayed, 08342, as designated in my statement.
22 On the basis of that document, I can give an answer to the Prosecution
23 and to the Defence.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we please have
25 65 ter 15120. Can we first see that in e-court. 65 ter 15120.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. The 13th of September, 1991. General, can you tell us who was
3 sending this document and what does it pertain to, and what does the
4 preamble say?
5 A. The instruction refers to articles of the Law on National
6 Defence. It was sent from Belgrade, and it has to do with the procedure
7 of admitting volunteers and their mobilisation in terms of manning JNA
8 units that were manned from the reserve force. So there were peacetime
9 formations of JNA units that had lower personnel levels, and then there
10 were wartime formations envisaging a considerably larger number of
11 soldiers and officers. When mobilisation was ordered, volunteers were
12 mobilised as well. This instruction orders that volunteers also be
14 I, together with other officers from the command, took part in
15 terms of supplying weapons and military equipment to these volunteers.
16 Then they were sent on to wartime units of the JNA -- or, rather, the
17 2nd Military District. And they were placed under the command of these
18 units, or, rather, the command of the JNA. I wish to note that we had
19 six corps then, more than ten independent brigades and regiments, six
20 logistics bases, and according to wartime establishment, the personnel
21 levels of these units at the end of 1991 or beginning of 1992 envisaged
22 over half a million soldiers and officers.
23 Q. Thank you, General.
24 A. I do apologise. These volunteers and mobilised soldiers were
25 deployed according to their wartime assignments and according to the
1 establishment of these units. Within the establishment of a particular
2 battalion, it was exactly specified how many persons would be taken in,
3 in terms of specific military speciality.
4 Q. Thank you, General. In the second paragraph of paragraph 2, it
5 says that they can come from any part of the SFRY if they are not younger
6 than 60 or -- younger than 18 or older than 60. In view of the ethnic
7 composition, who volunteered from an ethnic point of view into these
9 A. I know that the largest number were Serbs, about 90 per cent if
10 we're looking at the total numbers for the 2nd Military District. I know
11 that there were volunteers of other ethnic backgrounds too, among them
12 Croats and Muslims for the most part.
13 These persons, upon their arrival as volunteers, were asked
14 whether they wanted to join the Army of Republika Srpska voluntarily or
15 whether somebody was forcing them to do that. All of those who stated
16 that they had come voluntarily were admitted, equipped, armed, deployed
17 in various units, and placed under the command of the JNA, and these
18 soldiers of different ethnic backgrounds were for the most part very
19 good, excellent, with regard to all matters, all the way up until the end
20 of the war.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay. Can we please have
22 paragraph 10 now. It's the last page in Serbian. The one but last.
23 Page 3 in Serbian, yes.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber what paragraph 10 means and
1 what it regulates?
2 A. All soldiers, volunteers, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds,
3 once they are recorded as members of the unit where they had been
4 deployed, enjoyed equal rights -- or, rather, rights equal to those
5 enjoyed by any other soldier or officer irrespective of ethnic background
6 and there were no division along those lines. They also had the right to
7 receive a salary and to have medical care and their families received
8 assistance. Everything that these units had made available to them.
9 Q. Thank you. Did you know why this was resorted to, these
10 regulations, these instructions in September 1991, to admit volunteers
11 into the army? What led the secretariat, the federal ministry, to
12 prescribe this?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Just an observation that the question -- any
15 question related to volunteers was specifically limited to the issue of
16 arming as it was referred to in the document. I used General Mladic's
17 diary. I think in this line we've actually gone quite far in a way
18 outside the cross-examination.
19 JUDGE KWON: I tend to agree with the observation. Volunteers
20 were only mentioned during the course of arming.
21 THE ACCUSED: Okay.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Shall we move on?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Fine.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, sir, you were asked and you spoke about the security
1 situation in your military district at the beginning of April. In terms
2 of securing resources, relocation, et cetera, were there any orders or
3 instructions that said what you were supposed to do with JNA resources in
4 the areas where they might be endangered?
5 A. From the 1st of March, 1992, when a member of a Serb wedding
6 party was killed, Gardovic, in Sarajevo, blockades started on roads.
7 Also, at the same time blockades started of all barracks and military
8 installations in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a
9 blockade had been carried out earlier on in the territory of Croatia --
10 or, rather, in the territory of the Knin Corps, and there was this great
11 danger that these forces, armed paramilitary forces, would seize the
12 military equipment and weapons that was at military facilities.
13 Under my control, there were over 100 different military
14 facilities, depots, containing material reserves, including food,
15 weapons, medical material. So we had to start mobilisation, and we had
16 to admit volunteers on the basis of these instructions, because the
17 regular units of the JNA had been abandoned by members of the Croat and
18 Muslim people. So some units remained with only 10 or 15 per cent of
19 their prescribed personnel levels, say a warehouse of 2.000 tonnes of
20 ammunition had only 10 or 15 soldiers there, and this depot would be
21 surrounded by 100 to 200 persons, armed. That is why we were compelled
22 to mobilise volunteers.
23 And then we received orders to the effect that all the materiel
24 from the JNA should be relocated from these threatened areas to other
25 areas where they would be safe. The reason for the relocation of
1 materiel reserves of the JNA was exclusively the fact that they came
2 under threat. It was paramilitaries and other armed groups that
3 threatened them at local level.
4 The organisation of this relocation of the reserves from the
5 depots of the logistics bases was something that I personally did. I
6 personally led this effort. New relocations were decided upon only on
7 the basis of safety and security regarding these resources. It had
8 nothing to do with ethnic background.
9 In the area of Visegrad, for example, there were locations where
10 Muslim villages were in the immediate vicinity, but they did not threaten
11 these reserves in any way.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this 15120 be admitted,
14 Excellencies, instructions on admitting volunteers.
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3678, Your Honour.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. P2833. That's a
18 Prosecution exhibit. Could that please be displayed now.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Are you familiar with this order that was sent from the
21 Federal Secretariat for National Defence, the Federal Ministry of
22 Defence, that is, to the command of the 2nd Military District?
23 A. Yes, I'm familiar with this, but this is just an accompanying
24 document. The content of the actual mission is attached to this.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the next page.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Since we haven't got much time, could you please tell us what is
3 specified in paragraph 1. Perhaps you can tell us about this in your own
4 words. And then paragraph 2 as well.
5 A. This is exactly what I have already replied to. Due to the
6 threat posed to the units and the materiel of the JNA as well as the
7 commands, an order is issued to execute the task as soon as possible,
8 establish staffs and detachments and volunteer units, and man them with
9 officers and other personnel from the JNA as well as their weapons and
11 This is an order to act upon these lines and we -- so we did.
12 Q. Thank you. What about the variants in clause 2? What shall be
13 done with assets that are safe or not safe, that can or cannot be
15 A. This was the most difficult task implemented by teams headed by
16 me. The roads were blockaded and so were the facilities, blockaded by
17 armed groups. So ways and means had to be found for the majority of the
18 materiel to be relocated to safe places. Whatever could not be relocated
19 should be destroyed.
20 Q. Let's go to the next page. Meanwhile, can you explain the term
21 "safe area"? What does it mean?
22 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Safe areas, the concept, the term, did not come up
24 in the cross-examination. And just another observation, D3676, which was
25 an associated exhibit with this witness which I spoke to Your Honours
1 about this morning, is one and the same as this document that we see now,
2 P2833. So we're revisiting an associated exhibit.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, if I may reply. This
4 doesn't mention safe areas but Serbian areas, as if the army had been
5 relocating its assets to Serbian areas, but this says safe areas. And
6 Serbian areas aren't mentioned at all.
7 A safe area could also be a Muslim village, such as Sokolje,
8 which was armed by the JNA. It was mentioned here by an officer that he
9 gave a hundred rifles to the villages there because they were willing to
10 defend Yugoslavia.
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well, but does that term appear in the
12 document? I couldn't locate it.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In clause 2 we read "safe areas"
14 and "areas under threat." So these are the terms used rather than
15 "Serbian" and "non-Serbian."
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Did General Kukanjac take any measures based by this document
20 from the Federal Secretariat?
21 A. Yes, he did. He formed teams consisting of officers from
22 headquarters, and mostly I was also a member of those teams who -- which
23 went out in the field in the area of responsibility of the corps or
24 brigade in question to establish to what extent it was safe. We spoke to
25 the responsible persons from the villages and in populated places
1 irrespective of their ethnicity.
2 When we got commitments from the locals or from the municipal
3 authorities that the JNA could relocate its reserves to their territory
4 safely, we started relocating and transporting these reserves for the
5 needs of the corps and units of the military district. Simultaneously,
6 we also employed a unit from the reserve force consisting of volunteers
7 from those localities who secured these assets from theft.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see 1D9030.
9 Q. General, sir, let us try to get this over as soon -- as fast as
10 possible so that we may save time. 1D9030. Please take a look at this
11 document. Tell us if this is familiar. But this isn't it.
12 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.
13 MS. EDGERTON: I was looking for a translation.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D9030. That's not this document.
15 Now then the number is correct.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, you spoke about General Kukanjac's action. It seems
18 there is no translation. Please tell us what this is.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
20 MS. EDGERTON: There is a translation. If we could just have a
21 moment before Dr. Karadzic goes further with his questions.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do read it, General.
23 MS. EDGERTON: Because it --
24 JUDGE KWON: We'll put it on the ELMO.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Yes. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: In the meantime, please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This is dated 4 April, General. That is one day later than the
4 document that we have just seen. How does this fit in your information?
5 What is this document about?
6 A. This document is a consequence of the order issued by the SSNO
7 that we saw a minute ago, and this is an order to raise combat readiness
8 in the units of the 2nd Military District. All units must be ready to
9 defend themselves, and some units should be pulled out of garrisons and
10 barracks. In these activities, retired military persons and citizens
11 should also be employed. There is also a prohibition to issue weapons
12 and military equipment to TO units, because it was a widespread
13 occurrence -- it was widespread practice that the TO and others wanted to
14 forcefully remove weapons and equipment of the TO and the JNA.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Please briefly summarise item 6.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down, please. [In
19 English] Could the Serbian page be lifted a little bit to see number 6.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Just tell us briefly what General Kukanjac is ordering in item 6.
22 A. He's ordering that all activities of the units of JNA must be
23 aimed at the protection of citizens of any ethnicity from the terror and
24 attacks of paramilitaries and the negative consequences of the
25 unauthorised decision of the Presidency of SRBiH.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 MS. EDGERTON: If this had been about to continue longer, I was
4 going to rise on the basis that it was outside of the cross-examination,
5 but I think Dr. Karadzic should be cautioned in my respectful submission.
6 Just because this is redirect doesn't mean he is obviated of the need to
7 establish foundation before putting something to the witness. Now, this
8 witness has specifically said in his testimony yesterday that he was
9 detained from the 1st of March until the 3rd of May, and he had -- 1992,
10 and he had no insight or influence on things happening in the field. So
11 knowing that, I find it odd that the witness is able to offer any comment
12 with respect to this document which is dated during the period of his
13 detention. So I think Dr. Karadzic should take care when he's putting
14 these things to the witness in his redirect examination.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, can you tell us where you were on the 11th of April,
18 A. I was at the headquarters of the 2nd Military District in
19 Sarajevo, in the Bistrik building on the square of the 6th of April.
20 Q. And what about the 4th of April?
21 A. I was in the same building.
22 Q. Did you go about your duties?
23 A. Yes, I was able to do so partly, because the headquarters was
24 blockaded and we couldn't enter or leave freely, but a number of times
25 with General Kukanjac I left the building in an APC to go to other
1 facilities in the Sarajevo Sector and the sector of the 4th Corps.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
3 MS. EDGERTON: Could I just urge Dr. Karadzic to take further
4 caution because the witness testified in chief that he was physically --
5 or pardon me, in cross-examination that he was physically unable to leave
6 the building or communicate by phone.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, that's not a valid objection
8 to a question, especially after the answer has been given that it
9 contradicts some other evidence. If Ms. Edgerton thinks that that's
10 important to her, she could ask when it's her turn to re-examine the
12 JUDGE KWON: That's fair enough as well. Do you object to the
13 admission of this document, Ms. Edgerton?
14 MS. EDGERTON: No, on the basis of its authenticity.
15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll receive this.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3679, Your Honours.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. General, can you tell us who Major-General Muharem Fetahagic was
19 and what his ethnicity was?
20 A. I know that a meeting took place between General Kukanjac and a
21 group of generals from the headquarters of the 2nd Military District with
22 President Izetbegovic about the situation and the problems in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Izetbegovic demanded that Muslim generals be
24 appointed to positions in the 2nd Military District. General Kukanjac
25 accepted, and Muharem --
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The question was whether you knew
2 that general and what ethnicity he was.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Muharem Fetahagic was
4 appointed assistant commander of the 2nd Military District for political
5 affairs. I had known him from before, and for a short while we were at
6 headquarters, both of us. He --
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And, Mr. Karadzic, as requested by
8 Ms. Edgerton, could you be kind as to indicate to what cross-examination
9 part your question is related to before putting your question so that we
10 can follow more easily.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, sir, it was put to you that the situation right before
14 the war was not as you described it, that the situation was different and
15 that there was conscious activity aimed at strengthening the Serbian
16 people. Did you have information from the MPV about what was going on in
17 the 2nd Military District with regard to the safety of the population and
18 the army?
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
20 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honours, but where in the
21 transcript of yesterday's proceedings, apart from the specific question
22 about this witness's involvement in arming, does this generalised
23 proposition appear?
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson, would you like to add anything?
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think what Dr. Karadzic is
1 trying to do is address the issue of General Mladic's diary and the
2 comment of this witness as recorded by General Mladic that he had
3 participated in the arming of 16.000 Serbs and the question of what he
4 meant by that, whether that was some kind of work with the SDS or whether
5 it was part of the activities of the JNA during this period to conscript
6 and arm Serbs for that purpose. So I think on that basis he's getting to
7 the area that's relevant.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The Chamber will allow the question.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, sir, did the MPV keep you informed of the situation and
13 security of civilians and soldiers in the area of the
14 2nd Military District?
15 A. Yes. We received daily reports from the subordinate units, from
16 the level of the corps about the security situation with respect to
17 civilians and soldiers in the area of responsibility of the corps.
18 We sent reports, daily reports to the SSNO in Belgrade, and in
19 turn received daily reports from Belgrade, as well as orders on how to
20 act in trying to overcome the problems in place.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could the witness be
22 shown 65 ter 04999.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. I have a better copy, but I hope, General, you will be able to
25 read. It is dated the 11th of April. Do you recall having received this
1 information pertaining to the area of your corps? It is all-encompassing
2 information, and it addresses both Serbs and Muslims without any
4 A. This was drafted in the command -- it was received by the command
5 of the 2nd Military District. Such information was sent down to the
6 corps and independent battalions and regiments, that is to say, the
7 subordinate units. It addresses the conduct of political elements and
8 the damage caused to the security situation and political situation in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina by all sides and parties.
10 I cannot read the document because it is unclear, but that would
11 be the gist of it.
12 Q. Thank you. Can we have --
13 JUDGE KWON: Did you say that it was received by the
14 2nd Military District?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that this document -- or,
16 rather, information was drafted based on information received from the
17 SSNO administration. The 2nd Military District command is what we can
18 see on the top with the confidential number and the date of the
19 11th of April. So it was pursuant to SSNO information and the
20 information obtained by the political organ and the security organ at the
21 2nd District Command, and it was on that basis that the document in
22 question was drafted and forwarded to the subordinate units.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have the next
24 page. Right at the top.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. What does the report say? Does it mince words with regards to
2 Babic, or does it say that his further action will cause further
3 instability? In other words, I'm trying to see whether it is biased or
4 not, the text itself.
5 A. The information contained in the text is not biased. The
6 formation of any paramilitary formation is forbidden, including those
7 called the Chetnik brigade of Petar Mrkonjic, which was set up by
8 Milan Martic, or at least he tried to do so in the RSK.
9 Q. Can I be more precise, is it Babic or Martic?
10 A. Babic. I misread the first time around.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It seems that it was signed on behalf of Muharem Fetahagic.
15 A. Yes, at the time General Fetahagic was assistant commander for
16 political affairs and someone signed in his stead, although I don't know
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3676, Your Honours, which will
21 replace the previous document which was identical to Exhibit P2833.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, do you know when General Mladic was appointed to a
1 position in the 2nd Military District and what that position was?
2 A. Initial information on his appointment is something I received,
3 and I believe I addressed it yesterday, when General Kukanjac arrived by
4 helicopter to the barracks in Lukavica and Sarajevo. He was accompanied
5 by General Mladic. They held a meeting at which, in addition to
6 General Kukanjac and General Mladic, there was Colonel Gagovic and
7 myself. General Kukanjac told us then that he was to retire and that
8 General Mladic would be taking over his duties.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 16806.
11 65 ter 16806.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, in the first paragraph we find that he was appointed
14 Chief of Staff on the 25th of April. So he was to replace
15 General Kukanjac. On the 9th of May, he took over his duties, and on the
16 10th of May, Kukanjac retired, leaving Mladic in charge.
17 Can you tell us when the decision was made on the establishment
18 of the VRS?
19 A. The VRS was formed on the 12th of May, 1992, at a session of the
20 People's Assembly of the RS in Banja Luka. He was appointed commander of
21 the VRS at that session.
22 Q. Thank you. So did we bring General Mladic, or did we simply
23 inherit him, so to say, at his position of the 2nd Military District
25 A. Mladic was first appointed by the SSNO, and he commanded the
1 2nd Military District until the 12th of May, 1992, when he was appointed
2 commander of the VRS.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3680, Your Honours.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you. There were quite a few questions put to you about the
9 misunderstandings between the civilian and military leadership, i.e.,
10 myself and Mladic. Did you know what President Milosevic's position with
11 regard to our misunderstandings, whose side was he on?
12 A. I had no occasion to obtain precise information in that respect.
13 From my contacts with General Mladic, as well as at official meetings, I
14 could see that Mladic kept saying that Milosevic supported Mladic and the
15 Main Staff and the VRS as a whole.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 32379 in
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 MS. EDGERTON: And apologies again. Just an observation. The
21 area of cross-examination relating to General Mladic was about his
22 political ambitions.
23 JUDGE KWON: And also you referred to General Milosevic -- or,
24 no, President Milosevic.
25 MS. EDGERTON: I did at a later time refer to General Milosevic
1 in the cross-examination as one of the generals who did not support
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. What better evidence of General Mladic's
5 political ambitions than his contacts with Slobodan Milosevic in
6 May of 1995?
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We agree with you, Mr. Robinson.
10 Please carry on, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we go to the next
12 page in Serbian, please. This page in the English is fine.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Please look at the part where Milosevic says -- well, perhaps you
15 can tell us what was President Milosevic's position concerning the fall
16 of Western Slavonia, I think? Who did he accused and for what? It says,
17 "Unfortunately Ratko --"
18 Can you see it?
19 A. Yes, I know nothing about this document and I would rather not
20 analyse it. However, we can see that Milosevic is accusing
21 Radovan Karadzic of all problems that were created. I don't think I need
22 go any further.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we have the
24 following page in both versions.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Have a look at the part where President Milosevic speaks. He
3 "I think what they said was meaningless. Karadzic promised eight
4 brigades," and so on.
5 Could we have set aside eight brigades to defend Western
6 Slavonia, and were we the guarantor of the Vance Plan or was it Serbia
7 and Yugoslavia?
8 A. I know that the guarantor was Yugoslavia and that it was expected
9 of Milosevic to engage VJ units to protect the Serb population that was
10 in danger. In accordance with the international community plan, it was
11 not envisaged that the protection be provided by the VRS. That
12 protection did not materialise from Yugoslavia. Only at the very last
13 moment did the 5th Banja Luka Corps help a bit with receiving the Serb
14 refugees from Western Slavonia.
15 Q. Thank you. Did we have reserve eight brigades? How many reserve
16 brigades did we have?
17 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 MS. EDGERTON: Dr. Karadzic hasn't told any of us a thing about
20 what this document is, and I think he should do that.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I think it is an
22 intercept. There is a 65 ter number. A conversation between Mladic and
23 Milosevic. Milosevic is blaming me and told Mladic all sorts of things
24 against the leadership.
25 JUDGE KWON: I didn't follow you, Ms. Edgerton. As a matter of
1 principle, Mr. Karadzic should introduce what the document is about, but
2 we all know, don't we.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Actually, I did not know what it was and the
4 provenance, which is why I rose, Your Honour, in all honesty.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the third page in the
7 English version, and I think it is also the next page in the Serbian.
8 The next page in Serbian, please. One more. One more page in Serbian.
9 Page 5 in Serbian. It should be page 3 in English and 5 in Serbian.
10 Page 4 in English.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Yes. We see Milosevic say the following:
13 "Unfortunately ... you have a completely mad political leadership
14 which is dragging you to death."
15 That's the problem. What can you say about this position? Did
16 he treat the civilian and the military leadership the same?
17 A. No, he did not have a same -- the same position. Milosevic was
18 more on the side of the army. We can see in this document and it is
19 proof that President Milosevic was against the political leadership of
20 Republika Srpska and that it provided an incentive to the arguments
21 between President Karadzic and the Main Staff and General Mladic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification following our
25 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3681, Your Honours.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. And now -- actually, did you have any knowledge as to what
3 happened at the Sana Assembly in -- on the 15th of April, 1995? Were you
4 informed about direct conflicts and also when I said that Mladic was
5 acting as if he were head of state?
6 A. I did not attend that Assembly, but I did hear from people who
7 were present there that this was quite a clash between you, as the
8 president of the republic, and General Mladic, as commander of the
9 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. In an evident manner, the
10 wishes and aspirations of General Mladic became clear in terms of this
11 struggle for power.
12 Q. Thank you. General -- actually, I'm not going to have this
13 called up, the record of the Assembly meeting. It's been admitted.
14 Did you report often, on a daily basis, about the problems and
15 obstacles you had when carrying out these relocations of equipment and
16 weapons of the 2nd Military District?
17 A. Yes. From when I was appointed to this position in the
18 2nd Military District on the 3rd of May, 1992, and all the way up until
19 the end of April -- or, rather, say until the 1st of May, I sent daily
20 reports to the SSNO, and in these reports I described the problems
21 involved, the situation and requirements that had to do with logistics
22 for units and institutions of the 2nd Military District.
23 Q. In line 20 it says "from the 3rd of May, 1992." Is that a
24 mistake? When were you appointed, actually, as base commander?
25 A. Before that I was commander of the logistics base, and I sent
1 such reports, but weekly reports with a similar content to the command of
2 the 1st Military District, and this logistic base was within that
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Excellencies, I
5 would like to have a few significant documents admitted, those that were
6 signed by General Kovacevic, and he describes the problems and obstacles
7 and sabotages he encountered in carrying out his job, and I will do this
8 through a bar table motion if it would be useful for you. We have to
9 further questions for General Kovacevic, and we thank them for having
10 made the effort to come and testify.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
12 MS. EDGERTON: I recognise the time, Your Honour, but first I
13 think that if Dr. Karadzic wishes to have documents admitted through
14 General Kovacevic, he has the opportune moment to do it now.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 MS. EDGERTON: And indeed he should be doing that. And again
17 noting the time, I would be coming back to Your Honour at whatever time
18 Dr. Karadzic is finished with just one small request for about a
19 five-minute re-cross on a specific issue.
20 JUDGE KWON: I think you can do this right now unless
21 Mr. Karadzic has further re-examination. It's up to you whether to put
22 those documents to the witness or not. If the requirement is met, those
23 documents may be admitted through a bar table motion, but I cannot say a
24 word about it at this moment.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Whether I will have any questions
1 depends on what Madam Edgerton would like to raise.
2 MS. EDGERTON: If Dr. Karadzic chooses, despite the fact that
3 General Kovacevic is here, not to deal with those documents now, with
4 Your Honours' permission I'd just like to re -- ask for re-cross on the
5 small point of inheriting General Mladic, if I may.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed.
7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
8 Further Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
9 Q. So, General Kovacevic, in respect of a document, Dr. Karadzic
10 asked you whether they, I presume referring to himself and the SDS,
11 brought General Mladic or simply inherited him, so to speak, to stay at
12 his position of the -- as 2nd Military District commander, and that was
13 at page 51 of the temporary transcript of today. And you answered
14 saying, Mladic was first appointed by the SSNO and he commanded the
15 2nd Military District until the 12th of May when he was appointed VRS
17 Now, General, at the 50th Assembly session in April 1995 which
18 you said you didn't attend, Dr. Karadzic spoke about his relationship
19 with General Mladic, and I'll quote -- I'll provide the exhibit number in
20 a moment, but I'll quote to you what Dr. Karadzic said about
21 General Mladic coming to the 2nd Military District.
22 He said:
23 "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for
24 Mladic, General Ninkovic, then a Colonel, and General Perisic had visited
25 me before that, and I had noticed Mladic's blunt statements in the
2 And Dr. Karadzic continued, he said:
3 "He was already in Knin then. I took an interest in him,
4 together with Mr. Krajisnik. I went to General Kukanjac's office and
5 listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin. We
6 spent countless nights in the office of General Kukanjac at that time.
7 President Krajisnik was already president of the Assembly, and I was just
8 president of the party. I did not have any state function. We asked for
9 Mladic and said that they should set up the headquarters as they saw fit.
10 We wouldn't interfere."
11 So you didn't hear Dr. Karadzic say this, did you, in front of
12 the Assembly of Serbian people at Sana in April 1995? That's a yes or no
13 question, General.
14 A. I until now I haven't heard what you've stated just now.
15 Q. So Dr. Karadzic in his question, Dr. Karadzic was actually being
16 misleading, building a lie into his question, wasn't he, because he was
17 suggesting to you that Mladic was inherited, right, or else he lied to
18 the Assembly.
19 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President.
20 She's asking what Dr. Karadzic's intent was in asking the
21 question. I don't see how he can just speak to that. She can ask him
22 what he understood the situation was one way or the other, but to
23 speculate on why Dr. Karadzic asked a question is not proper.
24 JUDGE KWON: Probably you will reformulate your question,
25 Ms. Edgerton.
1 MS. EDGERTON:
2 Q. Based on what you now know having heard this quotation, do you
3 think that Dr. Karadzic and the leadership of the SDS inherited
4 General Mladic as he put to you, or do you think he was telling the truth
5 to the Assembly of Serbian people in April 1995?
6 A. What I stated until now in relation to this question is correct.
7 Since this is the first time I hear of this statement of Dr. Karadzic's,
8 I assume that there were consultations between the ruling party and --
9 actually, the Main Board of the SDS and President Karadzic as to which
10 general would be appointed to that position, but I really do not have any
11 other knowledge about that except for what you said just now.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 MS. EDGERTON: And the -- that comes -- the quotation I read
14 comes from Exhibit P970, English page 324. And nothing further.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: One question.
17 JUDGE KWON: No. What -- could you tell us what it is about.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Directly in relation to what
19 Madam Edgerton asked just now. I wanted to ask whether that changed the
20 fact that Mladic was appointed on the 25th of April as deputy.
21 JUDGE KWON: No, we will not allow that question.
22 Unless my colleagues have a question for you, Mr. Kovacevic, that
23 concludes your evidence. On behalf of the Chamber and the Tribunal as a
24 whole, I would like to thank you for coming to The Hague to give it. You
25 are now free to go, but we'll rise all together. Please have a safe
1 journey back home. We will have a break for 45 minutes and resume at
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 --- Recess taken at 12.38 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 1.27 p.m.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE KWON: I take it we have a new member from the OTP today.
8 MR TIEGER: That is completely correct, Mr. President. Another
9 lawyer who I believe needs no introduction to the Court and that is
10 Melissa Pack. And as the Court is aware, we will not be seeing
11 Mr. Gaynor any longer. We will be seeing Ms. Pack more regularly from
12 this point forward.
13 JUDGE KWON: Welcome, Ms. Pack.
14 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Would the witness make the solemn declaration,
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
18 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Milinic. Please be seated and make
20 yourself comfortable.
21 WITNESS: GORDAN MILINIC
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
2 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Milinic.
3 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
4 Q. Did you give a statement to the Defence team?
5 A. Yes. I gave the Defence team a statement. I know a lot, and I
6 want the truth to be learned here.
7 Q. Thank you. Please speak slowly as you did just now, and also you
8 and I should both pause between questions and answers.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D09600 in
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Microphone not activated] [no interpretation]
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see that. I see that.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Mr. Karadzic's microphone
14 was off.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Thank you. Have you read this statement and have you signed it?
17 A. Yes, I read the statement. I compiled it personally and I signed
18 it myself.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the last page so that
21 the witness could identify his signature.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is my signature, my very
23 own signature.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said
1 to the Defence team?
2 A. Yes, yes. It does faithfully reflect everything I said.
3 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today,
4 would your answers basically be the same as they were in this statement?
5 A. Yes. The answers would be absolutely the same except that I
6 would like to add that I'm still a professional diplomat of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Right now I'm minister-counsellor at the Ministry of
8 Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. I served not only as
9 ambassador but also as consul general in Stuttgart and ambassador to
10 Berlin, ambassador to Moscow. Right now I'm posted at the ministry
11 itself and I shall probably be sent abroad to a different destination.
12 I'm adding all of this because it says here that I worked at the Ministry
13 of Foreign Affairs. I still work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
15 Q. Thank you. I am not sure that this is recorded correctly. Your
16 position in Berlin, you were deputy ambassador there; right?
17 A. Yes, yes, deputy ambassador. Bosnia-Herzegovina, since it is a
18 specific state of three peoples, it always had three key diplomats. That
19 is to say that one person would be an ambassador and the other two would
20 be deputy ambassadors. They would have different ethnic backgrounds, and
21 I as a Serb was deputy ambassador while my ambassador was a Croat.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
23 be asked to speak slowly.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Before we proceed further, Mr. Milinic, I'd like to
2 advise you to put a pause between the question and answer and please
3 speak slowly for the benefit of the interpreters.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I know, I work in the
5 diplomatic service, I know what the problems of interpretation are. I
6 shall do my best to speak slowly.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
10 statement according to Rule 92 ter.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. There are eight associated
13 exhibits, four of which are not on our Rule 65 ter list and we would ask
14 that they be added as we hadn't incorporated an interview with
15 Mr. Milinic until after the list was filed.
16 JUDGE KWON: Did you say eight items?
17 MR. ROBINSON: Oh, sorry, seven items.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Do you have any objections, Ms. Pack?
19 MS. PACK: No, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: I draw your attention, Mr. Robinson, to the item
21 that is referred to in para 26, that is 65 ter 22016. In the view the
22 Chamber, the witness merely says he has been shown this document and --
23 without offering any substantive comment on this document. So as such,
24 the Chamber is of the view that it does not form an indispensable and
25 inseparable part of the statement. Otherwise, the Chamber is satisfied
1 with the requirements of the associated exhibits, so we'll admit the
2 92 ter statement as well as the other six associated exhibits.
3 Shall we assign the numbers.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That's 92 ter statement 1D9600
5 will be Exhibit D3682, and the six associated exhibits as listed in the
6 92 ter notifications will be Exhibits D3683 through to Exhibit D3688.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now I would like to
9 read out in the English language a brief summary of Mr. Milinic's
11 [In English] Gordan Milinic is a lawyer who served as security
12 advisor to the president of the Republika Srpska from February 1994 to
13 December 1995. He later served as ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 to Russia and other diplomatic positions.
15 While working as the president's security advisor during
16 July 1995, Ambassador Milinic reviewed the reports of the security
17 services of the Ministry of Interior as well as of the reports of the
18 security organs of the Main Staff of VRS on a daily basis. None of
19 those -- these reports made any reference to the killings of prisoners
20 from Srebrenica.
21 Ambassador Milinic was aware -- unaware of the killing of
22 prisoners from Srebrenica in July 1995. He believes that
23 President Karadzic was also unaware of such killings.
24 Ambassador Milinic worked closely with President Karadzic and
25 observed his relations with his subordinates. President Karadzic
1 displayed trust in his subordinates. When presented with a document for
2 his signature, President Karadzic received an oral explanation about what
3 the document was about and rarely read documents presented for his
4 signature, such as directive 7.
5 Ambassador Milinic began working for the Presidency around the
6 time of the first Markale shelling in February 1994, and was also working
7 for the Presidency when the second Markale shelling took place in
8 August 1995. The information reported to the Presidency on both
9 occasions was that the Bosnian Serbs had not fired the shells which
10 exploded at the market.
11 Ambassador Milinic was aware of the relations between
12 President Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb Army. He believes that
13 President Karadzic had a difficult time asserting his authority over the
14 army and notes that he tried to dismiss General Mladic on more than one
15 occasion without success.
16 Ambassador Milinic knows Radovan Karadzic's attitude towards the
17 war and the plight of civilians. President Karadzic never favoured the
18 forced expulsion of civilians and used his influence whenever possible to
19 see that civilians were treated humanely and in compliance with the
20 Geneva Conventions.
21 [Interpretation] Now I would kindly ask for this document to be
22 called up, I have a question for Ambassador Milinic in relation to this
23 document that was not admitted as an associated exhibit, 65 ter 22016.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Ambassador, do you remember this? Do you remember this letter
1 that you sent to the Main Staff?
2 A. Yes, I remember. This letter speaks of disobedience of the
3 military organs vis-a-vis the president of the republic, that is to say,
4 soldiers had looted a gasoline station. Also, there was a blockade of
5 traffic in Brcko. This was done via the soldiers of the VRS, the
6 civilian police is not in charge. They could not intervene. But the
7 military security organs did not take any measures whatsoever. We
8 urgently sent a letter here to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika
9 Srpska and yet again we did not receive any information as to the taking
10 of any kind of measures vis-a-vis the perpetrators of such crimes. For
11 me this was total disobedience and I informed the president of the
12 republic about that.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Let us see what document is linked to this letter of yours. Do
17 you remember what this is? It's not very legible in Serbian, but perhaps
18 we can also use the English.
19 A. Well, not exactly. Oh, I see. English. Yes, let's try. Let's
20 try to read this. I cannot. I really cannot find my way here.
21 Q. [In English] Second paragraph, seizing alcohol, shops and
22 unprofessional contact by soldiers and military conscripts had also been
23 documented and so on.
24 A. Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. Alcohol. I see that. Indeed. There
25 were so many problems in the relations between the Main Staff and
1 President Karadzic. This was one of the problems. I don't remember
2 exactly now. I don't remember this particular case. Well, this is a
3 case of lack of military discipline. You always reacted when there was
4 such lack of discipline, and you asked for that to be resolved.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you. Can you tell us whether each and
6 every incident reached me or whether you made a selection in terms of
7 what you would communicate to me and according to which criteria if there
8 was a selection carried out?
9 A. Well, yes. I made an effort, because you were so very busy and
10 you had such a lot of work as president of the republic, and as for all
11 smaller things, I tried to have that resolved without you. And, yes, I
12 did make some kind of a selection. However, we did not have any
13 authority vis-a-vis the Main Staff. We could only use you. We the
14 civilian authorities could only use you so that you could send an order
15 to the Main Staff so that they react to such things. And all my
16 experience, and indeed I have such a lot of experience, is that you're a
17 man who did not [Realtime transcript read in error "did for the"] command
18 the Army of Republika Srpska. The Main Staff did not respect you at all.
19 They were a clique of generals who worked on their own and they used you
20 only as a cover. You were a cover, a screen for them, and they just
21 asked you to provide them with money, fuel, and everything else you
22 needed. That is my impression.
23 I am a man who knows all the secrets in Republika Srpska at that
24 time. It's been 20 years now. I remember quite a few things. It is sad
25 that that is what the truth was but that is what the truth was. You
1 tried to put an end to that. You tried to dismiss the military
2 leadership, but you could not do that. I always remember the session of
3 the National Assembly when Pantelija Milovanovic, a member of parliament,
4 spoke and said: The Supreme Commander should be the Supreme Commander.
5 Let us take some measures so that the Supreme Commander really commands
6 this army. This army is not being commanded by Radovan Karadzic.
7 Ah, all right. Another member of parliament, I'd just like to
8 say what he said. Gentlemen, I would like to inform you that
9 General Bozo Novak, before a line of soldiers openly says, Radovan
10 Karadzic is not our commander and the Main Staff does not recognise
11 Radovan Karadzic as its commander. So this is what members of parliament
12 said in the National Assembly. I was present there, and you have all the
13 records and you can find these details as well.
14 Everybody saw that something was wrong, that something wasn't
15 going right, but the president was powerless. Had Radovan Karadzic been
16 asked, not a single person would have lost his life in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, not a single person would have been killed.
18 Radovan Karadzic was a person of peace. He went to peace conferences.
19 He sought peaceful solutions. He always said, We, Serbs, fight with the
20 left hand, like boxers do, who just defend themselves, and we are waiting
21 for peace and we're asking for peace. That is the main thing that our
22 president focused on all the time.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted?
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milinic, we see two letters here in this
25 document. Do you know how they are related to each other? First one is
1 dated 1st of September or -- 4th of September.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 4th of September, yes. This is
3 my letter dated the 4th of September.
4 JUDGE KWON: And second one is 8th of September.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I really cannot read this
6 second letter. It may be an answer to my request. This is about an
7 incident in Brcko, the blockade of traffic and the robbery of the gas
8 station --
9 JUDGE KWON: Shall we show the second page.
10 Any objection, Ms. Pack?
11 MS. PACK: No, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3689, Your Honours.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. [No interpretation]
16 THE INTERPRETER: Please switch on the microphone.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Oh, excuse me. On page 66, line 22, you're recorded as having
19 said: [In English] "You are a man who did for the command." Who did not
20 command. [Interpretation] What exactly did you say? I believe that you
21 heard the interpretation but you speak English.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. In line 22, of course you cannot scroll up, it says that: "You
24 are a man who did for the command," and I remember you saying "did not
25 for the command."
1 A. You mean about you. I said that you did not command the VRS and
2 I'm convinced that it's the case. I was with you every day. I was
3 involved in all matters on a daily basis. I'm a man who received all
4 strictly confidential information. I am a man who knew everything. It
5 is a pity that the truth was such and that I now must bring everything to
6 light what happened to -- in the leadership. But there were cases when
7 the fighters in the trenches got flyers against the civilian leadership
8 of the VRS.
9 I took part in international seminars and I know what civilian
10 control of the armed forces is. In the Republika Srpska that did not
11 exist. The civilian authorities did not control the military structures,
12 nor was it able to. This man here tried to replace the commander three
13 times. He wanted to change the composition of the Main Staff three
14 times, and each time the Main Staff was too powerful, and it had weapons
15 so that the president of the republic could not replace the people from
16 the Main Staff. At any rate, they gathered and organised a protest
17 against the president and said that they do not recognise, they do not
18 acknowledge the document replacing the commander. And they continued to
19 command as a -- as an independent body. They just needed the civilian
20 authorities as a pretext, and then they would return to the auspices of
21 the National Assembly and say, yes, we work for the people. We work for
22 the National Assembly. Whereas, in fact, these generals who had been
23 raised from all over the place were members of various parties.
24 The Serbian Democratic Party did not act during the war. It
25 was -- their members worked illicitly. There were people who were
1 members of the Yugoslav left. That was the party of Milosevic's wife and
2 other parties. They had their own programmes and they didn't care about
3 the wishes, the orders and the suggestions of the civilian authorities of
4 the RS.
5 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. There will be more -- you will get an
6 opportunity to say more. I have no further questions at this moment.
7 [In English] There will be more opportunity -- okay, okay.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milinic, as you have noted, your evidence in
9 chief in this case has been in its most part admitted in writing, that
10 is, through your written witness statement and now you will be
11 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.
12 Yes, Ms. Pack.
13 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Cross-examination by Ms. Pack:
15 Q. I want to return to your statement, paragraph 10, which you
16 describe your role as a security advisor. Your job was to communicate
17 information to the president so that he was kept informed on the events
18 on the ground throughout the RS. That was the core of your work, wasn't
20 A. Yes. The core of my work isn't really stated in any of these
21 documents but I was in military intelligence, which means that before the
22 war I worked for the Military Intelligence Service together with
23 Major Fikret Muslimovic. Before the war, when the multi-party system
24 came into being in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fikret Muslimovic called me a
25 Chetnik because I was a Serb and I called him an Ustasha as he was a
2 Q. Pause a minute, please. I'm just going to ask you to direct your
3 attention to my questions because we don't have that much time. So I
4 want to ask you about the period not before the war but during the war
5 and we're talking about the period in which you served as security
6 advisor to the then president of the RS. That's the period we're
7 concerned about. Now paragraph 10 you describe that job, and you say
8 that the means by which you got information for the president was through
9 the DB; is that correct?
10 A. What I've just said, that I was in military intelligence, I
11 should have told you more about that job. You know what intelligence
12 services are. You know what the CIA is, and that every army has its own
13 intelligence service as does every state. The RS had the state security
14 sector. That was the civilian intelligence service which had its
15 regional offices throughout the RS. All the territory was covered with
16 agencies. Intelligence work comprises thousands of agents in --
17 everywhere. So had the --
18 Q. Yes, we -- yes, thank you.
19 A. -- military intelligence service --
20 Q. Yes, we know what intelligence agencies are. So let's just get
21 back to the question. Your job was to communicate information you
22 received from the DB; is that correct? That is what you say at
23 paragraph 10 of your statement?
24 A. That is correct. My job was to be in the position of information
25 from all security services in the RS, from state security and from
1 military security, and to make them -- make this information available to
2 President Karadzic, Deputy President Koljevic, and Mrs. Plavsic. I
3 worked for the entire Presidency, and before each important meeting,
4 President Koljevic would come to me for information, to get the latest
5 information. The military intelligence was information from our spies
6 about the movements of the enemy, where the enemy units are, what was
7 going on. That was mostly what they were into.
8 Q. Pause -- pause please.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So you're saying now you received information both from the DB
11 and also from the VRS Main Staff intelligence and security sector. Is
12 that what you're saying? Those are the sources of your information which
13 you then communicated to the president; right?
14 A. Correct. Right.
15 Q. Now, as one of his advisors you were a close and trusted member
16 of the president's -- then president's inner circle during the war. In
17 1995, let's say.
18 A. Yes. I worked for the entire Presidency of the RS. I was the
19 hub to which all intelligence came.
20 Q. All right.
21 A. I had to be a highly informed man.
22 Q. You remained in his service, the accused's service even after he
23 left office; is that correct?
24 A. No. I went to foreign affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
25 of the RS. I was assistant minister.
1 Q. Well, in 1997, you and other employees of his office, of the
2 president's office, you were assigned to the newly formed department for
3 special purposes, weren't you? And that was located where the
4 president's -- the former president's office had been in the Famos
5 factory in Pale; is that right?
6 A. None of that is correct. Here is how it went: After
7 President Karadzic left, I became assistant minister of foreign affairs
8 of the RS, and after that, Dayton united us into a joint Ministry of
9 Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 Q. Hang on a minute. You were appointed assistant minister in
11 October 1997; is that correct? When you were appointed, October 1997?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. I'm talking about the period prior to that. Let's move on.
14 Let's move on. I'm now asking you to look at a document, please.
15 MS. PACK: It's 65 ter 25233, please.
16 Q. You were aware of a RS police investigation into the
17 disappearance of the RS presidential archives, the investigation that
18 took place in 2004, were you? You don't need to look at the screen. You
19 can just answer my question, please. Yes?
20 A. I got a letter while I was ambassador to Moscow. The Ministry of
21 the Interior asked me whether I knew the whereabouts of those archives.
22 I replied that I knew nothing.
23 Q. Okay. I'm asking you about this investigation. So you knew
24 about the investigation, and you can see here that this is a preliminary
25 report related to that investigation. And you were aware of that, were
2 A. Yes. I got an official letter in Moscow. I was officially
3 informed, and I officially replied that I knew nothing of those archives
4 because I had gone to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My official
5 transfer was signed by Biljana Plavsic and the date was the
6 10th of January, 1997. That's when she officially --
7 Q. Pause a moment. You were officially --
8 A. -- transferred.
9 Q. -- appointed as the assistant minister in October 1997. That's
10 right, isn't it?
11 JUDGE KWON: Probably you need to repeat your question, Ms. Pack.
12 MS. PACK:
13 Q. You were appointed as the assistant of the minister in the
14 Ministry for Foreign Affairs in October 1997. That's right, isn't it?
15 Just to get the dates right. Yes?
16 A. Yes, but an official who was relieved from his post is entitled
17 to leave and pay even after the cessation of service. I was receiving
18 pay from the Presidency until the whole business was over. That is the
19 absence -- during the absence of an official after the expiry of his term
20 in office.
21 Q. I just wanted to quickly refer you to a section of this document.
22 It's page 2 in fact of the English which isn't shown on the screen. It
23 goes over on to page 2. Just page 1 here of the B/C/S that you see on
24 the screen, and you see here that -- that this report identifies three
25 persons as the persons in charge of the archive, the presidential archive
1 for -- which disappeared in 1998. And you're one of those three persons,
2 aren't you, at point -- at paragraph 3, you're identified there. You'd
3 agreed with that.
4 A. Yes, I'm mentioned there, but at the time I already worked for
5 foreign affairs in Sarajevo even. It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
6 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since 1998 or as of 1998, I was with the Ministry
7 of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and I travelled all over the
8 world. Actually, I worked in Vienna, not in the RS.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 A. I was -- I worked at an out-of-country voting centre.
11 MS. PACK: I'd like to tender this document, please.
12 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6397, Your Honours.
15 MS. PACK:
16 Q. I want to ask you to look at another document, please. This is
17 65 ter 25234. Now we're still on the presidential archives and the
18 investigation into their disappearance. You know, don't you, that the
19 content of those archives, the content of those archives -- you don't
20 need to look at the screen yet. You can listen to the question. They
21 included army --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. They included army and state security documents, didn't they?
24 Military and also DB documents. Is that right?
25 A. All documents I worked with, the top secret ones, couldn't stay
1 in offices long. Immediately after processing those documents were
2 returned to the archives.
3 Q. That's right --
4 A. The confidential archives.
5 Q. And these are the documents that were in the archives, the state
6 security documents, the military documents, to which you've been
7 referring; right?
8 A. Yes, yes. These documents had to be archived in a top secret
10 Q. And we're also talking about the VRS security organs, those
11 documents too are archived in the presidential archive; is that correct?
12 A. Yes. Each highly confidential document sent to the president of
13 the republic had it be returned to the archives of strictly confidential
14 documents and couldn't be kept in offices.
15 Q. Now, you're aware, perhaps you're not, that in this case the
16 Court has heard evidence that when ICTY investigators were in Pale in
17 1998 for purposes of searching the presidential archives, this is prior
18 to their disappearance, a number of documents were hidden. They'd been
19 removed. Are you aware of that evidence that's been heard before this
21 A. I am only familiar with 1995 and 1996. There were investigators
22 of the Tribunal coming and the entire archives were placed at their
23 disposal. They worked for days copying whatever they were interested in
24 and they were allowed to view everything. I kept running into them into
25 the hallways. Everything was allowed to them. It was at the time when I
1 was working for the service of the president. I kept meeting them. They
2 worked there, photocopied there, everything was allowed. I don't know
3 about 1998, though, because by that time I no longer worked for the
5 MS. PACK: I'm not going to call it up, Mr. President, but I'm
6 referring to exhibit -- prior Exhibit number P03 -- sorry, 03932,
7 paragraph 36.
8 Q. Now let us look, please, at this document that's on your screen.
9 MS. PACK: I'd like if we could move, please, on the English to
10 page 6; in the B/C/S page 5.
11 Q. Now, this is the report of the investigation conducted by the RS
12 MUP on the disappearance of the archives in 1998 and I'm just going to
13 refer you, please, to one paragraph here at this page. And in the
14 English you can see that paragraph starts: "Working in the
15 [indiscernible] service," describing the people who in 1997 were working
16 for the newly formed office for special purposes, and you can see there
17 that your name is included within that list of persons. In the B/C/S you
18 can also see, as you read down the page, the penultimate paragraph of the
19 page. Do you see that?
20 A. I see it. This man could have encountered me when I visited
21 occasionally. I told you, at the time, on the 10th of January, I was
22 already relieved of my duties in the service of the president. That was
23 1997. By that time I had already started working for the foreign office
24 and I was still on the payroll of the Presidency as an official no longer
25 within his term of mandate. I was engaged actually in the foreign office
1 of Republika Srpska and I was preparing a seminar for diplomats in
2 Bijeljina in the summer of 1997 as new diplomats of the RS were being
3 trained to assume their positions in the joint foreign office of
5 Q. Thank you.
6 A. That was my job, and perhaps now and then I dropped by to see the
8 MS. PACK: I'd like to move please to the conclusions of this
9 report which appear at page -- substantively at page 14 of the English,
10 14 and 15, as we start at 14. And in the B/C/S, please, at page 10. And
11 you can see there -- you can see there at page 10 that the report is
12 concluding -- making conclusions about these missing archives. And it
13 says at -- at paragraph 5, a part of the documentation reached the
14 territory of the Republic of Serbia and is being used by the committee
15 for the defence of Radovan Karadzic for writing their books and
16 documents. That's paragraph 5, and that's on page 14 of the English.
17 And if we could move in the English to page 15, staying -- and
18 the B/C/S, please, at page 11. You can see here two areas identified.
19 In English it's the second area. But the two areas which need to be
20 identified as a focus of investigation, the first being to further
21 investigate Ljubisa Savic, Mauzer, and secondly, a second hypothesis,
22 which is that people close to Radovan Karadzic or his security moved the
23 documentation from the official premises of the Presidency to a certain
24 passive location and that they gave a part of the documentation, and so
25 it goes on, to the committee for the defence of Radovan Karadzic headed
1 by Kosta Cavoski and so on. So these are the various hypotheses of RS
2 MUP as to where the presidential archives went. You were aware of these
3 findings, were you, at the time?
4 A. No. I don't know at all where it is. I know that Ljubisa Savic,
5 Mauzer, indeed dropped by because he was the chief of police of the RS.
6 I met him at Pale because at the time I worked for the Ministry of
7 Foreign Affairs we knew each other. I know he came to the premises but I
8 really don't know whether he took anything with him. I know nothing
9 about this.
10 MS. PACK: I'd like to tender this document, please. The whole
11 of it.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. The witness hasn't
13 confirmed anything about the document nor does it contradict his
14 testimony. In addition, this is a document which I believe should have
15 been disclosed to us a very long time ago in connection with testimony of
16 a Prosecution witness, and we will have -- be looking into the issue of A
17 disclosure violation but we can put that aside for the moment, but what
18 this witness has said about this document doesn't justify its admission.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Pack, would you like to respond?
20 MS. PACK: Well, the document does contradict the witness's
21 testimony to the extent that he -- it is talking about an office for
22 special purposes which is set up in 1997 or thereabouts following the
23 accused's departure from office and it is an office of which this witness
24 is said in the document to be part. I'm afraid I'm unable to deal with
25 the allegation of disclosure violation in that is perhaps something that
1 will be addressed in due course.
2 THE ACCUSED: Where it says -- where it says the special office
3 for special purposes?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the first I hear of that
5 office for special purposes. It sounds a bit funny.
6 MS. PACK: In English it's at page 6 and it's the third from
7 bottom paragraph, the bottom sentence, and in the B/C/S, similarly you
8 can see it -- it's at page 5 of the B/C/S in e-court.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 THE ACCUSED: It says service for special -- service
11 [Interpretation] As part of the state security. It's not in office.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6398, Your Honours.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we would only admit those two
15 paragraphs. To admit this document for that limited purpose is really
16 unfair. This is a document with a lot of allegations and information and
17 this would really be unfair to admit all of this for this one point.
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit those pages shown to the witness.
19 MR. ROBINSON: I think the only thing that should be admitted is
20 this page or if you want to admit the cover sheet. The other page that
21 was shown to the witness, he didn't have any -- don't contradict him and
22 he didn't have any substantive comment on.
23 MS. PACK: Mr. President, just to respond. There were -- there
24 were the conclusions that I also read, so it was the -- it was the
25 paragraphs relating to the office and then the conclusions later which
1 were put to the witness and he, in fact, did respond to the content, not
2 all of it, didn't agree with all of it, didn't disagree with all of it,
3 but certainly there is a basis for admission of the conclusions also.
4 JUDGE KWON: I tend to agree with it.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can clarify? This is the
7 first time I heard of this service for special purposes. What is it? I
8 didn't work there.
9 JUDGE KWON: Could you wait a minute.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, if you're going to rule
12 against us, would you please look at lines 14 through 18 to see what the
13 witness said about the conclusions before you do. Page 78.
14 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, the fact that these conclusions are
15 basically hypotheses, would this have any bearing on -- on the question
16 of admissibility?
17 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I think that definitely diminishes the
18 weight if you find it admissible but the question that's before you, I
19 think, is: What did this witness say about that portion of the document
20 and whether that is sufficient comment on the document or contradiction
21 of -- or the document contradicts his testimony to be admissible in the
22 first place. And I don't think they've met that standard. If they
23 didn't meet that standard, then the question of the hypothesis becomes
24 the issue of the weight of the document.
25 MR TIEGER: Mr. President, because this involves a -- I apologise
1 for that, but this is a matter that's come up time and time again and I
2 just want to point out one aspect of what I consider to be Mr. Robinson's
3 argument and that is when he acknowledges, and sometimes he hasn't, the
4 fact that part of admissibility can depend upon contradiction that he
5 sometimes tries to limit it to the contradiction of what the witness has
6 said at that -- in that particular narrow portion. But of course, it's
7 contradiction of the witness's overall testimony including aspects of his
8 statement and those portions of the Defence position to which the witness
9 has given support, and that's quite a different matter. Narrowly
10 defining it, as Mr. Robinson often tries to do, is not fair, not
12 MR. ROBINSON: There's nothing not statement about the archives.
13 JUDGE KWON: Let us leave it there.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 MR. TIEGER: And --
16 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber by majority will not accept this, with
17 me dissenting. Let's proceed.
18 MS. PACK: It remains the case, though, that the two pages are
19 admitted is -- is that right, Mr. President? But just not the whole of
20 the document? Sorry, the one page. [Microphone not activated] That was
21 page [overlapping speakers] -- in English.
22 JUDGE KWON: The majority is fine with accepting one page. We
23 gave a ruling, Mr. Tieger, please.
24 MR. TIEGER: I just want to respond to something else which I
25 consider to be --
1 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed.
2 MR TIEGER: The document was disclosed more than two years ago.
3 JUDGE KWON: Oh.
4 MR. ROBINSON: The information that Mr. Reid had sent me when I
5 inquired was it was disclosed as part of the Rule 66(B) material for this
6 witness which came just a few months ago, but perhaps it had also been
7 disclosed earlier so I'll look into that. Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Shall we give the number.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6398, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
11 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
12 Q. Now, you -- you said this afternoon you were the man who knew
13 everything, and you were close to the accused and communicated with him
14 even after his departure from office about his archives, about documents;
15 is that correct?
16 A. I have to repeat yet again. I was security advisor to the
17 Presidency of Republika Srpska. The Presidency entails the president of
18 the RS, Dr. Radovan Karadzic; Deputy President Professor Nikola Koljevic;
19 and Deputy President Biljana Plavsic. You can see that I was employed by
20 Biljana Plavsic until the 10th of January, 1997.
21 Q. That is not the question I asked you and I'd be grateful if you
22 would focus on my questions and -- and try to answer my questions so that
23 we can proceed in an effective --
24 A. [In English] Please repeat, please repeat your question.
25 Q. Thank you. So the question was whether or not you communicated
1 with the accused after his departure from office, from the office of
2 president, about his archives, the presidential archives, and about
3 documents. That was the question.
4 A. [Interpretation] Now the question is precise, and my answer will
5 be as precise. No. On the topic of archives and documents, I did not
6 communicate any further. First of all, you keep insisting on some kind
7 of personal relationship of mine with President Karadzic, but then you
8 need to insist on my relationship with both Ms. Plavsic and Mr. Koljevic
9 because I worked for them as well. It was the Presidency of the RS. I
10 also worked for Biljana Plavsic not only for Radovan Karadzic. I was
11 Presidency --
12 Q. Pause -- pause there, please.
13 A. -- advisor until the 10th of January.
14 Q. You're testifying in these proceedings against this accused so
15 I'm asking you questions about this accused. Okay? So your evidence is
16 that you never communicated with the accused about documents, about the
17 archives. Did he communicate to you about documents, about his archives
18 after he had left office? It's a reasonably simple question.
19 A. Yes. No. Yes. Radovan Karadzic withdrew from all positions in
20 order not to damage the reputation of Republika Srpska. Holbrooke
21 threatened with doing away with the RS and the SDS. And he withdrew and
22 he stood by it. He didn't do anything after that.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milinic, could you please concentrate on
24 answering the question.
25 MS. PACK:
1 Q. So your answer was: "Yes. No. Yes."
2 JUDGE KWON: So what was your question. Please repeat it.
3 MS. PACK:
4 Q. Did you communicate with the accused about documents -- sorry.
5 The question then was: Did the accused communicate with you about his
6 archives, about documents, after he'd left office?
7 A. On the topic of the archives and documents, absolutely not.
8 MS. PACK: Okay. Can we have up, please, 65 ter 21583. Now
9 we've got this document both in B/C/S and in English, and it's just the
10 first page of both English and B/C/S versions of this document, please.
11 Q. Now I want to you look closely at the document on the screen.
12 Look, please, at the header and you can see there to whom this document
13 is addressed. Can you identify the names that appear there on the top?
14 A. Mira and Milijana were -- and Saska were the secretaries. This
15 document never reached me. I've never seen it before. By that time I
16 worked intensively for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I was
17 difficult to find. I was in Vienna in the out-of-country voting centre.
18 This document has never reached me. I have never seen it.
19 Q. Of course you don't deny that it's addressed to you. You're one
20 of the addressees along with General Subotic and members of the -- former
21 members of the office of the former president. It's dated 9th December
22 1997 --
23 A. No, you're wrong. [In English] No, you are not right. You are
24 not right. You are not right. [Interpretation] You're wrong because the
25 document was addressed to Mira, Milijana and Saska, and then
1 General Subotic and Mr. Gordan Milinic should be included if located. I
2 wasn't located because I was in Vienna or wherever. So it was addressed
3 to the secretaries, Mira, Miljana, and Saska. And it says "include" [In
4 English] to involve if you can Mr. -- General Subotic and Mr. Milinic.
5 [Interpretation] I was not found and I was not involved. I was deeply
6 involved by that time with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was a
7 controller in the out-of-country voting centre in Vienna.
8 Q. So that's the --
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Milinic, could you read out the
10 first three lines in B/C/S. Read slow. Za Milosa -- could you read it.
11 Read out.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mm-hmm.
13 JUDGE KWON: Slowly. So that we can hear. Could you read? Yes.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For Milos, Mira, Milijana, Saska
15 and include also General Subotic and Mr. Gordan Milinic. That's it.
16 Include if they could locate us.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, please continue.
18 MS. PACK:
19 Q. You didn't read out the whole of the first part of the -- the
20 document, did you? You stopped. Now I want you to, please, perhaps do
21 that exercise again, if you don't mind, Mr. President. Can you read out,
22 please, the whole of that first section in B/C/S so we can just be sure
23 that we've got it right. All of it.
24 A. Yes. What is added is the other implementers need not be
25 included but issued tasks instead, that is to say, if they needed someone
1 else's assistance in their work. That's what it referred to.
2 Q. Now, this document gives various different tasks to different
3 people, and some of those people aren't identified as -- as people to
4 whom the letter is addressed at the top there. They're just identified
5 in the body of the letter, but let's put that to one side. Can we go
6 down, please, to one, two, three, four -- fourth paragraph, fourth
7 paragraph, please?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask what this document is?
9 Is there some kind of sign, signature, anything?
10 JUDGE KWON: Let us see. Let's continue.
11 MS. PACK:
12 Q. So we're looking, please, at the paragraph that I -- I referred
13 you to.
14 "It is very important when it comes to Srebrenica that I see the
15 document first by which I appoint Mr. Deronjic civilian commissioner, and
16 I think that was after our army's entry into the town. It is important
17 to see with what tasks he was appointed and the original should be in our
18 archive. However, the original of his agreement with the Muslim civilian
19 together with the testimony of the UNPROFOR officer must be with him, so
20 he should be asked to bring it, and he does not have to meet with them."
21 Just pausing there, he's talking about meeting with investigators
22 there from the ICTY, isn't he? Deronjic meeting with investigators from
23 the ICTY in December 1997. You're aware of that?
24 A. I have no idea. No idea about this letter, about these events.
25 Q. Let's just go to the bit that concerns you at the end of this
1 paragraph, please.
2 "When it comes to Deronjic and Bratunac, Bratunac, G. Milinic can
3 arrange it that someone from the DB go and return with the original in
4 three hours. Although Deronjic should not be afraid to come. He does
5 not even have to meet with him, and if he does, that cannot be bad for
6 him," and so it goes on.
7 So these were instructions to you to arrange to get someone from
8 the DB to go and get an original document from Bratunac from Deronjic.
9 Is that something you remember being instructed to do?
10 A. I did not receive any such instructions. No one found me with
11 regard to this document. I don't know who wrote this. I don't know what
12 this is. I don't know what this is all about. I don't find this clear
13 at all. I did not have any contact with this, who this is who is
14 mentioning my name, who is writing this. I do not find that clear at
16 Q. But this --
17 A. [In English] I don't know anything.
18 Q. This document is from the accused, isn't it? It's from the
19 accused. Just read it and you can see that it's from the accused. It's
20 talking about his defence and addressed to his close associates, talking
21 about Ljiljana getting -- going through the folders at home. He's
22 talking -- it's from the accused, isn't it?
23 A. Give me the rest of the text. Give me the rest of the text. Is
24 there a signature of his there? Give me the text further on. This is
25 just one page. I don't find that clear that this comes from the accused.
1 Let me see the rest of the text. Let me see if there's a signature or
2 anything there. Maybe this is a forgery. How should I know who wrote
3 this? This is the first time I see this. I don't know what this is all
4 about. No one ever contact me -- contacted me in relation to this. No
5 one. Ever.
6 Q. Who appointed Deronjic civilian commissioner? It says: I
7 appointed -- I appoint Deronjic civilian commissioner. He's talking
8 about that document. Who -- who made that appointment? Are you able to
9 tell us?
10 A. [In English] It was in 1995.
11 Q. Who made the appointment?
12 A. [Interpretation] I think that he was appointed either by the
13 government or the president of the republic --
14 Q. It was the accused --
15 A. -- but that was -- that was -- that was 1995, sometime in August,
16 September. Somebody appointed him civilian commissioner. I believe it
17 was the president who appointed him, but this was a legal act by the
18 legal government for establishing civilian authority. I remember --
19 Q. I'm not asking for details --
20 A. -- that in 1995 Deronjic worked on establishing the civilian
21 authorities in Srebrenica.
22 Q. You're an intelligent man. You're looking at a letter that's
23 addressed to you that you apparently didn't receive in Vienna and it's
24 talking about the appointment of Deronjic by the writer of this letter as
25 civilian commissioner, and I'm asking you whether or not this letter is
1 from the accused.
2 A. I cannot establish on the basis of anything that this comes from
3 the accused. I have already told you that this is the first time I see
4 this letter, and I have no idea what this is all about. Now that I read
5 it I see that it has to do with Deronjic. I know that sometime from
6 August, September 1995, Deronjic was commissioner for organising civilian
7 life in Srebrenica. That I know. That I remember. But this letter, I
8 have no idea. You know what that means? I have no idea. I've never
9 seen it. I have no idea.
10 MS. PACK: I'd like to tender this document, Mr. President. And
11 if I may just deal with the genesis of the document, I can deal with that
12 briefly. I have the --
13 JUDGE KWON: But before doing that.
14 MS. PACK: Yes.
15 JUDGE KWON: I'd like to ask a question for Mr. Robinson. I note
16 Mr. Karadzic's intervention, I quote: "May I ask what that document is?
17 Is there some kind of sign, signature, anything?" Lines 10 and 11 on
18 page 86. Is the -- is the Defence case, is it the Defence case that
19 Mr. Karadzic had nothing to do with this letter?
20 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, we haven't -- we've just seen
21 this letter and we haven't discussed that, but I don't think that's the
22 Defence case. The Defence case is -- we're going to state our position
23 as respect to this admissibility of this letter, and if we have any
24 evidence to lead about the letter, we'll do so in due course, but we're
25 not either affirming or denying who the author was and we're not required
1 to at this point.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Pack. Yes Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For me it would be important to
4 know what the provenance of this document is. Was this letter sent or
5 was it found in my archives? Was it found with someone to whom it had
6 been sent? I simply don't know where the Prosecution got this from.
7 MS. PACK: I -- I --
8 JUDGE KWON: We are about to hear from Ms. Pack about this.
9 MS. PACK: I can assist, Mr. President. It was a document that
10 was on diskette which was part of the inventory of the red bag and its
11 contents that were later identified as belonging to the accused and were
12 recovered from the location of Majora Zorana Radosavljevica Street number
13 327 in Belgrade on the 11th of August, 2008. It was recovered at the
14 time of the accused's arrest as a result of a phone call stating that a
15 red bag could be found at this location. And in that bag was the
16 diskette and on that diskette was this document. It was seized then by
17 an investigator from this Tribunal, seized on the 20 -- 11th of August,
19 JUDGE KWON: And now you're tendering that.
20 MS. PACK: Yes, I should like to tender that, please.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
22 MS. PACK: I should add -- I should add it's also on the
23 accused's 65 ter list. So there's no question -- let me -- let me just
24 check that.
25 MR. ROBINSON: It's not necessary. We don't object to the
2 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll receive it.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6399, Your Honours.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just want it to be clear for the
5 Trial Chamber. I have a lot of texts that were never sent to anyone.
6 They just remained as drafts, but I have no objections, really.
7 JUDGE KWON: We are aware of that situation as well. It may go
8 to the weight, but we'll see what weight will be given to this letter.
9 Please proceed, Ms. Pack.
10 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Now, I want to return to your statement, please. Paragraphs 21
12 and 22 talk about directive 7. You express at paragraph 22 your complete
13 astonishment that the accused's signature is on this document, is on
14 directive 7. Completely astonished.
15 A. [In English] Mm-hmm. Yes.
16 Q. Can I ask you to look, please, at directive 7. That's P00838.
17 I'd like you to look at a particular part of that document.
18 MS. PACK: That's at page 10 of the English, B/C/S page 15,
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could I please have a look at the
21 first page and the last page to see whether this is a document of the
22 president of the republic?
23 MS. PACK:
24 Q. I'm not going to show you these pages. This is an exhibit that
25 is -- is going to take too long. This document has been admitted --
1 JUDGE KWON: No, no. Let's start. Let's show the first page as
3 MS. PACK: Let's start with the first page, please. Page 1.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Supreme Command of the armed
5 forces of Republika Srpska. That is not right. This should be the
6 letterhead of the president of the republic and there should be a number,
7 01- -- yes?
8 MS. PACK:
9 Q. I haven't asked you a question yet. You're being shown the first
10 page --
11 JUDGE KWON: And show him the page 23 or --
12 MS. PACK:
13 Q. You're being shown the first page --
14 A. I thought you were asking me for my comment.
15 Q. No, I wasn't. I'm showing you the first page so you can see what
16 this document is. It's the document to which you've referred in your
17 witness statement, right? Directive 7. So this is the first page and
18 you can confirm that this is the document about which you are speaking in
19 your witness statement, and we can look at the last page, please?
20 JUDGE KWON: 23.
21 MS. PACK: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. Just showing you the last page so that you can confirm -- this
23 actually the -- the penultimate page will probably be the better page.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, not in Serbian.
25 MS. PACK:
1 Q. And -- and there you can see --
2 JUDGE KWON: In English the first page.
3 MS. PACK: And in English the first page. Thank you very much,
4 Mr. President.
5 Q. So you can see there what this document is. Satisfied that this
6 is -- I'm showing you directive 7, yes?
7 A. Give me the last page so I see the signature.
8 Q. So the last page is -- is -- is the preceding -- is two pages
9 back --
10 JUDGE KWON: Page 21.
11 MS. PACK: Thank you. That's the one.
12 Q. Now, this is the last page of the directive, directive 7. Okay?
13 I'm not asking you --
14 A. The signature --
15 Q. -- for a comment at the moment. I'm just asking for you to
16 confirm that this is the document about which you are speaking in your
17 statement. Yes?
18 A. Yes, that's the document that I am speaking of, yes.
19 MS. PACK: Can we move, please, back to page 10 of the English
20 and page 15 of the B/C/S.
21 Q. Now, I just want to ask you about -- in the B/C/S it's the
22 paragraph midway through the page with the heading "Drina Corps." You
23 see that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You can see the bottom of the first paragraph there. I'm going
1 to read out that sentence:
2 "By planned and well thought-out combat operations, create an
3 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope the further
4 survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
5 A. Madam Prosecutor, you've missed the point altogether. In
6 paragraphs 21 and 22 I said something different. I was not speaking at
7 all about the content --
8 Q. Well, wait a second --
9 A. I was saying --
10 Q. Wait a second. What you say in paragraph 22, what you say is
11 this contains sentences completely contrary to the accused's convictions
12 so that you doubt he ever signed it. So I'm asking you about this
13 sentence here, this sentence that you see. You see this sentence? And
14 I'm asking you if you consider that this sentence is one of the sentences
15 you were astonished by because what it says is so obviously repulsive and
17 A. This vocabulary is not the vocabulary of President Karadzic.
18 These are some military terms that the president did not really use when
19 writing, when he composed certain texts. These are military terms and
20 this was written by someone from the army, yes.
21 Q. So you suggest that the accused was tricked into signing this
22 document or he just didn't bother to read it? Is that the two hypotheses
23 that you have?
24 A. Yes. These are the two hypotheses. This document was not
25 written in accordance with the rules of the office of the President of
1 Republika Srpska.
2 Q. Stop a moment --
3 A. This document had to be -- yes?
4 Q. Are you seriously suggesting to this Court that the Supreme
5 Commander of the armed forces signed a directive outlining the main
6 priorities of the armed forces for the upcoming period, strategy, roles
7 of the various corps, he signed it without bothering to read it? Is that
8 what you're suggesting?
9 A. What I am suggesting is that perhaps he hadn't even signed this
10 document. This signature looks like his signature, but I'm not sure that
11 he's the one who signed this. I'm not sure that this is his signature.
12 Q. You're suggesting it's --
13 A. That it's his signature.
14 Q. You don't think it's his signature?
15 A. I'm actually even thinking along those lines. I'm wondering
16 whether this is his signature at all because everything was done against
17 the rules of our office. Just look at each and every document of our
18 office. Just look at what documents written in the office were. Take,
19 say, a document of mine that I worked on. Up there it says: The
20 President of Republika Srpska. There should be a letterhead there and
21 then there should be a register in the strictly confidential archives --
22 Q. Stop a moment --
23 A. -- of the president of the Republika Srpska. This has not even
24 been registered properly. It's not even in the register.
25 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... let's get back to the
2 A. Mm-hmm.
3 Q. In this court one of the accused's former secretaries has
4 testified that on this document appears the accused's signature. This is
5 his signature. You deny that this is the accused's signature. Or what
6 are you saying, that might be the case, you're not sure? What is your
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
9 JUDGE KWON: Overruled.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
11 JUDGE KWON: Answer the question and we'll adjourn for today.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I wish to express my doubts
13 in terms of this document, in terms of whether it was written in the
14 office of the president of the republic. The president had a military
15 office of his own with strictly set procedure. There has to be a sign
16 there saying "strictly confidential." Yes?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's show page 21. Let's forget the
18 formalities or whatever procedure there must have been. Do you think
19 this is a signature of Mr. Karadzic or not?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The signature looks like it, but I
21 cannot guarantee fully that it is his, no. It's similar. It is similar.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll adjourn for today and continue
23 tomorrow at 9.00, but I'd like to advise you, Mr. Milinic, while -- in
24 the meantime you're not supposed to discuss with anybody else about your
25 testimony. Do you understand that, sir?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite. No problem whatsoever.
2 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is adjourned.
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day
5 of June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.