Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 39975

 1                           Wednesday, 19 June 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 6             Yes, Mr. Harvey.

 7             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Mr. President; good morning,

 8     Your Honours.  Happy birthday, Dr. Karadzic.

 9             Your Honours, may I introduce Fabian Gems, who is a law graduate

10     from the university of Graz in Austria and has just completed six months

11     with the standby team to which he's been a terrific adornment.  Thank

12     you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I note the LiveNote is not properly working in

14     personal computers, but I think we can carry on.  After a long weekend,

15     there are several matters to deal with before we begin today.

16             First, the Chamber will issue two oral rulings.

17             First, the Chamber is currently seized of two motions by the

18     accused for the videolink testimony of Nikola Poplasen and of

19     General Milenko Zivanovic filed on the 27th of May and the

20     11th of June 2013, respectively.  The Chamber has received the

21     Prosecution's responses filed respectively on the 30th May and the

22     14th June 2013, opposing both motions on the grounds that the information

23     provided by the accused in support of both motions is insufficient to

24     demonstrate that Poplasen and Zivanovic are unable or have good reasons

25     to be unwilling to come to the Tribunal.

Page 39976

 1             The Chamber has reviewed the information and the medical

 2     documentation provided by the accused in the confidential annexes in

 3     support of both motions.  The Chamber is concerned by the cursory nature

 4     of the medical information provided by Poplasen and Zivanovic's family

 5     practitioners.  Both doctors simply describe the relevant witnesses'

 6     symptoms or diagnosis and advise against "long trips" without elaborating

 7     further on the length of travel recommended or describing the anticipated

 8     effect of such travel on the witnesses' health.  The Chamber is thus

 9     unable to assess whether Poplasen and Zivanovic are in fact unable or

10     have good reasons to be unwilling to come to the Tribunal.  The Chamber

11     hereby requests the accused to obtain further medical documentation to

12     address these deficiencies in the information already provided.

13             Next, in assessing the accused' motion to admit documents

14     previously marked for identification filed on the 29th of May, 2013, the

15     Chamber has noted issues with four of the documents referred to in the

16     motion; that is, MFI D1267, D1669, D2594, and D3354.  Regarding MFI D1267

17     and D1669, the Chamber notes that their English translations are

18     incomplete.  For MFI D2594 and D3354, the Chamber notes that the English

19     translations do not correspond to the B/C/S original documents, and

20     furthermore, for D2594, the original document is illegible in areas.  The

21     Chamber therefore instructs the Defence to upload to e-court complete and

22     accurate English translations for these four documents, as well as a

23     legible, original copy of D2594 by Wednesday, 26th of June, 2013.

24             That said, I'd like to know where we stand in terms of

25     Mr. Beara's testimony.

Page 39977

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  You may recall that the

 2     Prosecution requested that Mr. Beara's lawyer's appearance be excused on

 3     the date that we had asked him to appear and indicated that he had

 4     represented to them that he would file a motion last week to suspend the

 5     proceedings as to Mr. -- Colonel Beara until a decision by the

 6     Appeals Chamber and the issue concerning General Tolimir and whether a

 7     person who had a case pending appeal could be compelled to testify.  No

 8     motion was forthcoming.  Also, there was no response to my e-mail in

 9     which I included the transcript of our discussion on that topic and asked

10     the counsel for Colonel Beara to agree to a date upon which Colonel Beara

11     would appear before the Chamber.

12             So as a result of that, I'm requesting that you order

13     Colonel Beara to be present on the 27th of June so that we can determine

14     whether or not he's prepared to testify.  If he is, we can go ahead and

15     start his testimony.  If he's not, we can -- you can entertain any of the

16     requests for suspension of his testimony pending the appeal decision in

17     Tolimir.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning, and good

20     morning to all in the courtroom.

21             This matter has been the subject of some ongoing discussions

22     between the parties, including discussions I've had with Mr. Robinson and

23     perhaps more pertinently discussions between Mr. Nicholls and

24     Mr. Robinson.  As the Court will recall, Mr. Nicholls was in contact with

25     Mr. Beara's attorney and had more direct information.

Page 39978

 1             Among the matters discussed was why the situation here was being

 2     seen to be treated in a manner differently than the acknowledgement that

 3     as occurred.  I think with Mr. Poparic that the expression of an

 4     understandable interest and about waiting until the resolution of the

 5     Tolimir matter should result in the expedient of continuing the matter

 6     until that resolution took place.  Another matter that was raised was the

 7     question of the parties' agreement to a particular date rather than the

 8     unilateral imposition of a particular date that may have suited the

 9     Defence.  I know that Mr. Nicholls had intended to speak further to

10     Mr. Robinson about this, but let me indicate by the way the discussions

11     as usual were amicable and cordial, but I don't think they resulted in

12     the kind of progress that I would have expected in a matter as seemingly

13     straightforward as -- as this.  So -- and the net result is that the

14     potential significant inconvenience to parties, both to Mr. Beara's

15     lawyer who must travel a long distance for what we all seem to currently

16     understand is a pointless reason, and the inconvenience to Mr. Nicholls

17     who would be required to fruitlessly prepare for an anticipated cross

18     that was not likely in any event to occur exists.

19             So I would at least encourage the opportunity for some further

20     discussion as we had anticipated between Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Robinson at

21     the first break.  Then if no progress is made, at least we can come back

22     to the Court and with a clearer idea of what all the parties have in mind

23     and therefore what a better solution might be.

24             JUDGE KWON:  So I take it at least that the Prosecution is

25     opposing to calling him only the 27th as indicated by Mr. Robinson.

Page 39979

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Could I hear from the parties again then after the

 3     first break, first thing?  Very well.

 4             And next there are some procedural issues, logistical issues with

 5     respect to the next witness's evidence?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, we have a lot of problems in

 7     getting documents from Dr. Karadzic at the UNDU because of some

 8     technological work that they did this weekend but we have those documents

 9     now.  They're in e-court, and we'll have to lead them live.  So they will

10     be -- the testimony of the witness will take longer than we anticipated,

11     but other than that he's prepared to begin his testimony.

12             JUDGE KWON:  No, I'm talking about Mr. Salapura.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, and the witness after General Subotic,

14     Colonel Salapura is also testifying in the Mladic case and his testimony

15     was envisioned to begin yesterday but apparently there's been some delay.

16     So it's not expected that he will complete his testimony in that case

17     until tomorrow morning.  So we don't know whether or not we'll be

18     finished with General Subotic by then, but in the event that we are we

19     may have some delay before our next witness is available, and in that

20     event we were suggesting that the Court might inquire into the

21     feasibility of sitting in the afternoon tomorrow so that we wouldn't have

22     any delay.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So I take it that Mr. Salapura in that case would be

24     testifying in two cases consecutively for a whole day.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.

Page 39980

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I think the Court -- I understand the Court's

 3     question, and we raised it at least in passing, noting that very point,

 4     that it would be a fairly potentially formidable task for anybody and

 5     given the witness's age it might present a problem.  We're not

 6     suggesting -- I mean, we were in agreement on the suggestion.  I'm just

 7     acknowledging the understandable concern raised by the Court about that

 8     possibility.  Not much we can do about it, and as the Court I think is by

 9     now aware, one of the reasons is that there was a suggestion about

10     inverting the witnesses and having Mr. Zametica come first, and as

11     Mr. Robinson indicated to the legal officer yesterday, that's not a

12     possibility because of the submission of -- of what he referred to I

13     think as a substantially revised statement.  I think it's fair to say

14     that it's -- it's so revised as to constitute virtually a new statement.

15     An example of that is the fact that when we noted to the Defence that it

16     didn't include track changes, there was an instant acknowledgement that

17     the statement was so different that no track changes were possible.  I

18     think that's a reflection of the fact that it's essentially and

19     practically a new statement, and therefore submitted on the eve of his

20     testimony.  So we're still attempting to deal with the assimilation of

21     that new statement and would be absolutely impossible to accelerate that

22     witness's appearance.

23             So that's the situation we're in.  We recognise the same

24     potential imposition on the witness that might be created by a full day

25     of testimony that is going from one courtroom to another, from morning to

Page 39981

 1     afternoon, but as Mr. Robinson pointed out, in another matter the witness

 2     appeared to testify for a number of days running without any difficulties

 3     that the parties are aware of.  That certainly doesn't preclude the

 4     witness may say, No, it was tough, and for that reason I would prefer not

 5     to be on the stand for many hours in a row.  Unfortunately, the

 6     suggestion that Mr. Robinson made about the possibility of an afternoon

 7     session is the -- appears to be the only potential resolution of the

 8     difficulty faced by the extended testimony in the Mladic case.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just clarification.  So Mr. Salapura will appear in

11     the Mladic case as the Prosecution witness, and he will be the Defence

12     witness in our case.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

14             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber has decided to stick to original

15     courtroom time and to see how it evolves.  Thank you.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, could I make a quick point about the

17     absence of a LiveNote or visuals.  I understand that broadcast is not

18     working either.  The Court may not be aware of how often difficulties are

19     averted or obviated by the fact that other members of the team are able

20     to simultaneously follow the proceedings and on occasion alert me to

21     issues that need to be brought to the attention of the Court, need to be

22     clarified, and so on.  I note that in particular in connection with the

23     issue that the Court raised about Mr. Beara.  I don't think anything

24     irreversible has happened or particularly problematic, but I did get an

25     inquiry from Mr. Nicholls about what was happening.  It's a reflection of

Page 39982

 1     the utility and importance of LiveNote and the broadcast.  So I would ask

 2     that we do our best to get us back online before we proceed too much

 3     farther.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I take it the LiveNote issue has been resolved, it's

 5     working now, and then I don't see any problem with the broadcast that can

 6     be checked out as well.

 7             Please call the next witness.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We're ready for

 9     General Bogdan Subotic.  If he could be brought in.

10                           [The witness entered court]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration,

12     please.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

14     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.  May God

15     help me as I speak.

16                           WITNESS:  BOGDAN SUBOTIC

17                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, General Subotic.  Please be seated and

19     make yourself comfortable.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Before you commence your evidence, General, I

22     must draw your attention to a certain Rule of evidence that we have here

23     at the International Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E).  Under this Rule, you

24     may object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution,

25     or even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate

Page 39983

 1     you in a criminal offence.  In this context, "incriminate" means saying

 2     something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal

 3     offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might

 4     have committed a criminal offence.  However, should you think that an

 5     answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer

 6     the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

 7     compel you to answer the question; but in that situation, the Tribunal

 8     would ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would

 9     not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence

10     save and except the offence of giving false testimony.

11             Do you understand what I have just told you, General Subotic?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do understand.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, your Excellencies.

16     Good morning to all.

17                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General Subotic.

19        A.   God be with you, Mr. President.

20        Q.   Please bear in mind that we should both speak slowly and pause

21     between question and answer so that the interpreters would interpret

22     everything, otherwise we will be wasting time by repeating what we said.

23             So, General, have you given a statement to the Defence team?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.  That was a bit too fast.

Page 39984

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please call up 1D9614.

 2     Could we please have that in e-court.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Please look at the screen now.  Do you see that statement of

 5     yours on the screen?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read that statement, and have you signed it?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

11     the last page so that he could identify his signature.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is my signature.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said

15     to the Defence team?

16        A.   Absolutely.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Do you find it necessary to suggest any amendments,

18     any changes?  Are there any typos there?  Are there any mistakes, big

19     ones, small ones?

20        A.   No need for any of that.

21        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today as

22     were put to you by the representatives of the Defence team, would your

23     answers basically be the same?

24        A.   They would be the same.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 39985

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

 2     tender this package on the basis of Rule 92 ter.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Let's deal with the associated exhibits separately.

 4             Any objection to the statement, Mr. Tieger?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  We don't have an objection, Mr. President.  That --

 6     that should not be seen as -- we know the Court has frequently

 7     proactively reviewed statements for paragraphs or sections that run afoul

 8     of the general guidelines, so we -- we certainly are not suggesting those

 9     don't exist, but we didn't file anything independent of that, so there's

10     otherwise no objection.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3695, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let's come to the issue of associated

14     exhibits.  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We're offering 19 associated

16     exhibits, ten of which were not on our 65 ter list either due to

17     inadvertence or the fact that the documents were added to the statement

18     after the list was filed.  So we are asking that those ten be admitted to

19     the list and the 19 associated exhibits be admitted.  I can detail which

20     ones those are if that would be helpful because they are not -- some of

21     the ones that are on our list are already admitted and others don't have

22     translations and so that's why the list is somewhat -- the number is

23     somewhat less than what appears on our list of associated exhibits.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we go through one by one?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  I think that's the best.

Page 39986

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just for the first item.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, the first item is 1D04152.  The Prosecution

 3     has indicated that it will be objecting to that document on the grounds

 4     that it wasn't sufficiently incorporated into the statement, and I don't

 5     necessarily disagree with that.  So it's up to the Chamber, but ...

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, then please deal with it.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay we'll lead that one live if necessary.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  All right.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  The second one is 1D05614.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  The third one is 1D261 --

12             JUDGE KWON:  So it's the second one the Chamber would like the

13     Defence to deal with it live as well, because all the witness said about

14     this document is he was shown this decision.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Very well.  The next one is 1D26126.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  That will be admitted.  Shall we give the

17     number.  Let's deal with it one by one.  It's Exhibit D3696.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19             The next one is 1D26133.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit D3697.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm pre-empting, but if you have any problem, please

23     rise, Mr. Tieger, as we go by.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I will.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 39987

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, the next one is 1D26139.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Any objections?  Yes, that will be admitted.  Shall

 3     we give the number for that.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3698, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And next?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  1D26140.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3699.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  1D26142.

10             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber is of the view that it does not form an

11     inseparable or indispensable part, and also I have some question about

12     the relevance, so I'll leave it to you to lead it live as well as showing

13     the relevance.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  The next one is

15     Exhibit D1D26144.  The Prosecution has indicated it doesn't believe it

16     forms an indispensable part of the statement, but I believe that it does,

17     so you'll have to decide on that.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.  The Chamber agrees with you.  We'll receive

19     it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3700, Your Honours.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  The next one is

22     1D26214.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Is it relevant, Mr. --

24             MR. ROBINSON:  I think it's relevant but not indispensable.  I

25     mean it's up to you.  It's a corroborating document.

Page 39988

 1             JUDGE KWON:  It's about witness's termination of his service.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll receive it.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3701, Your Honours.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Next one is 65 ter number 04216.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, received.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3702.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  The next one is 65 ter number 08032.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it as well.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3703.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  The next one is 65 ter number 11500.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber has doubt as to its nature of

13     indispensable, inseparable.  It's part of the part, so we'll not receive

14     it.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Very well.  The next one is 65 ter number 15334.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3704, Your Honours.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  The next is 65 ter number 15457.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3705, Your Honours.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  The next one is 65 ter number 17664.  The

22     Prosecution objects as not being an indispensable part of the statement,

23     I tend to agree with them, so it's up to you, but we could be prepared to

24     lead this live if necessary.

25             JUDGE KWON:  That being the case, I will leave it to the Defence.

Page 39989

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  The next one is 65 ter number 18071.  The

 2     Prosecution also objects to this as not being an indispensable part but I

 3     disagree and think it is, and also note that we've been admitting the

 4     minutes of these sessions regularly and don't see any reason why this

 5     couldn't be admitted.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We agree.  We'll receive it.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3706, Your Honours.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Next is 65 ter number 20609.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3707.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Next is 65 ter number 32060.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I would like the Defence to deal with it live,

13     because there seems to be some mistake because it does not seem to be the

14     correct document.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Very well.  And the last one is

16     65 ter number 32124.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3708, Your Honours.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  That concludes the associated exhibits,

20     Mr. President.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We dealt with it like this because there

22     is some confusion as to the associated exhibits.  Very well.

23             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'm going to read

25     out the summary of General Subotic's statement in the English language

Page 39990

 1     and then I will ask the witness to answer some questions in relation to a

 2     few documents that we will be leading live.

 3             [In English] Bogdan Subotic was minister of defence of the

 4     Republika Srpska from April 1992 to February 1993.  When the new

 5     government of the Serbian Republic of BH was elect on

 6     19th of January, 1993, Bogdan Subotic was appointed chief inspector of

 7     the army and military advisor to the Supreme Command of Republika Srpska,

 8     and in May 1993, also as advisor to the decorations office of the RS

 9     President Karadzic.

10             There are many reasons behind the outbreak of war in BH,

11     including Alija Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration with a worked-out plan

12     for the Islamisation of BH in the next ten years, as well as the creation

13     of national parties with very difficult programmes in BH.  The

14     international community contributed significantly to the outbreak of

15     armed conflict.  This is especially reflected in illegal imports and

16     procurement of weapons from other countries.  In early 1992, at the

17     beginning of the war in BH no weapons from outside came to arm the Serbs.

18     Following the clashes between Croatian and Serbian armed forces at

19     Plitvice in Croatia, the Croats blocked Jasenovac, and Ustashas from

20     Croatia, the ZNG and Patriotic League and other paramilitary units,

21     flooded BH.

22             Bogdan Subotic decided to use all the available equipment and

23     soldiers to block borders with the BH in areas where they had been

24     breached in order to prevent raids by these paramilitary formations.

25     Serbs did not make any plans before the war.  Alija Izetbegovic did make

Page 39991

 1     plans.  The Serbs made efforts in the Assembly of BH and wanted to

 2     preserve Yugoslavia.  They did not have any plans about incorporating

 3     municipalities.

 4             From the outset, Muslims and Croats in Sarajevo were prepared to

 5     engage in war.  The police forces were cleansed of Serbs and the illegal

 6     formations within the Patriotic League were reinforced, within the

 7     Territorial Defence and the reserve police force, there were also

 8     independent armed units.  The authorities left the Serbs without any

 9     protection and allowed armed groups and formations to kill and abuse

10     Serbs and go unpunished.  Complicity in the crimes against the Serbs in

11     Sarajevo included top authorities in BH.  All decisions made by the

12     Muslim leadership were made at meetings of the innermost SDA leadership.

13     The media in Sarajevo, which were mostly under Muslim control, played an

14     important role in demonising the determines, instigating war and inciting

15     crimes against them.  The international press portrayed Alija Izetbegovic

16     and his so-called multi-cultural Bosnia as an unarmed and unexpectedly

17     attacked victim of Serbian aggression.  The Islamic religious community

18     took an active role in the pursuit of the political objectives of the

19     Muslims in BH as well as in the crimes against the Serbian people.

20     Radovan Karadzic did not illegally influence or pressure the work of the

21     government in Republika Srpska beyond the legal authorities of the

22     President of Republika Srpska.

23             The Crisis Staffs were created in municipalities in 1992, after

24     the other side created theirs.  This lasted until mid-1992, when the

25     communication system was established and the Assembly took control over

Page 39992

 1     the municipalities.  They were practically not regulated.  Everyone had a

 2     difficult time, both the municipality leadership and the

 3     Territorial Defence.  A temporary solution organised to prevent and

 4     anarchy.  No one from the leadership was controlling the Crisis Staffs.

 5     There were no lines of communication arose to -- the Territorial Defence

 6     units were self-organised with no Supreme Command.  The structure of the

 7     army was proposed by General Mladic in accordance with the law.  Until

 8     the army was formed on the 12th of May, 1992, the public defended

 9     themselves.  There was an agreement between Alija Izetbegovic,

10     Radovan Karadzic, and the authorities in Belgrade that JNA units would

11     stay in BH as a guarantor of peace to prevent all conflicts and war, and

12     the time discussed was five years.  They secured very little.

13             On 12th of May, 1992, in Banja Luka the army was created by the

14     National Assembly.  Bogdan Subotic's task was to propose a Law on Defence

15     and the army to the government.  The decision on 12th of May, 1992,

16     stated that the defence minister was responsible to bring out all

17     enactment and implementing legislation within three months pursuant to

18     the law.  Radovan Karadzic never made decisions without expert

19     consultations.  He always obeyed the law and never made decisions by

20     himself.  He would consult the government or the relevant minister before

21     making a decision.  He was not a soldier, and therefore when he made

22     decisions regarding the army, he would call on the minister of defence to

23     look at the laws and the rules so that he could make a decision which he

24     could then pass to the Main Staff.  The Main Staff initiated military

25     operations.  They would prepare a proposal for the president who would

Page 39993

 1     consider it; he would then decide and issue his instructions.

 2             General Mladic conceived of the Ministry of Defence so that no

 3     one could interfere with the VRS leadership.  President Karadzic did not

 4     interfere with Bogdan Subotic's work, nor did he interfere in the work of

 5     the government presided over by Professor Djeric.

 6             General Bogdan Subotic did not agree with Mladic's method of

 7     leading the army and he could not support it.  When he was appointed the

 8     minister of defence of BH he created the Law on Defence and the Army.

 9     The duties of the ministry were resolutely regulated by this law with all

10     the necessary explanations.  The state administration functioned pursuant

11     to the constitution, laws and regulations and instructions that were

12     resolutely worked out immediately after the formation of the

13     Republika Srpska.

14             General Mladic was in charge of strategic operations.

15     President Karadzic always consulted colleagues on all matters proposed.

16     No decisions were made without consulting the Assembly.  From 1993 they

17     had good communications and received daily reports.  President Karadzic

18     received his information from three different directions, from the army,

19     the police, and state bodies, municipalities.  The government in Pale did

20     its best to ensure the rule of law and response international

21     humanitarian law in 1992.  Communication was poor until 1993 and the

22     situation improved only after that.

23             General Bogdan Subotic disagreed with the way General Mladic

24     conducted the affairs and commanded over the army.  General Mladic was

25     pigheaded, stubborn, and self-obsessed.  He did not care much about

Page 39994

 1     others' opinion.  He was a narrow-minded sort of soldier.

 2     General Subotic was against the war and the Orthodox commanders did not

 3     understand or like him.  The military was very single-minded and stubborn

 4     with no sense of compromise and this is where the problems occurred.

 5     President Karadzic is very religious and is a very humane man.  In these

 6     situations which were not planned he could not agree with the

 7     single-mindedness of certain commanders.

 8             In Banja Luka in August 1995, there was a document signed by

 9     Generals who did not agree with President Karadzic.  It was a petition

10     from the generals saying that they would only obey Mladic.  The petition

11     was insubordination.  President Karadzic brought an order to dismiss

12     General Mladic, but it was not carried out.

13             The competence and authority of the Ministry of Defence were

14     limited to formations and logistical and political matters.  Operation

15     and command were not under the authority of the minister until the end of

16     the war.  President Karadzic never issued any document containing the

17     words kill, destroy, burn or slaughter.  The army and General Mladic had

18     views that were different from those of the president and the government.

19     He had a very Orthodox view of his objective, that he had to defeat the

20     enemy, force him to capitulate and so on.  General Mladic was going for

21     the military victory whereas the state leadership wanted to achieve

22     results through negotiations.

23             When Main Staff was established General Bogdan Subotic

24     encountered his first problem as minister of defence.  General Mladic

25     imposed upon the leadership of Republika Srpska that this should be

Page 39995

 1     called the Main Staff.  Mladic and Karadzic were both commanders.  The

 2     government and the Assembly allowed General Mladic to assume the role of

 3     commander, but there could not be two commanders.  President Karadzic did

 4     not have effective command and control over the territorial units from

 5     April the 1st, 1992 --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please slow down.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  You are requested to slow down when reading the

 8     summary.  So could you start over about from the "... effective command

 9     and control ..."

10             THE ACCUSED:  The government and the Assembly allowed

11     General Mladic to assume the role of commander, but there could not be

12     two commanders.  President Karadzic did not have effective command and

13     control over the territorial units from April the 1st, 1992, until the

14     creation of the VRS or on May the 12th, 1992, because the

15     Territorial Defence of municipality staffs organised a protection -- the

16     protection of the Serbian population on their territories, either alone

17     or in co-operation with the JNA that was withdrawing.  Many factors

18     contributed to complications between President Karadzic, the state

19     leadership, and the Main Staff of the army.

20             General Mladic attempted every method of denigrating

21     President Karadzic's achievements and work by giving completely false

22     informations -- information about his actions and work.  On the

23     8th of May, at the session of the Supreme Command, General Mladic spoke

24     rudely saying that he was not after power and President Karadzic was not

25     in touch with the population, and that Mladic was always closer to the

Page 39996

 1     battles than the president.  General Mladic's attitude and conduct were

 2     impermissible.  On August the 1st, General Mladic told Karadzic that he

 3     was not his Supreme Commander.  On August the 5th on Belgrade Radio,

 4     Mladic stated that he did not recognise any decisions that he was in

 5     charge and nobody could replace him.  On 15th of September, at a session

 6     of the War Presidency of the Krajina municipalities, President Karadzic

 7     acknowledged that he bore most of the responsibility, but added that he

 8     was not listened to and that his orders were never carried out.  He added

 9     that citizens were also to blame because they did not want to support any

10     measure against negligence.

11             President Karadzic had great respect for international

12     humanitarian law.  Apart from tasking General Bogdan Subotic with

13     preparing the Law on the Army, President Karadzic asked him to study and

14     prepare all of the necessary documents which would bind the

15     Republika Srpska to respect the international law of war in combat.  They

16     also had the legal framework for the application of

17     International Law of War.  It was mandatory for all commanders to

18     instruct their soldiers on the conduct required in relations -- relation

19     to law or war.  Throughout the war the President never wanted to sign any

20     documents regarding armed conflict unless General Bogdan Subotic or other

21     experts confirmed that that document was in full compliance with the

22     legal obligations.  President Karadzic never gave any verbal or written

23     orders to kill, slaughter, execute, shoot, burn, or destroy.  No crimes

24     were ever planned or permitted by these regulations or anyone's

25     positions.  Sanctions were envisaged and applied as soon as a crime was

Page 39997

 1     discovered.  The Main Staff was responsible for implementing the

 2     regulations on the law of war, including the treatment of prisoners.

 3     Every soldier in the VRS was informed of these instructions.

 4             On 12th of May of 1992, all units were placed under the command

 5     of VRS.  Paramilitaries were only incorporated into VRS if they had not

 6     committed crimes.  The military courts were under the purview of the

 7     president and investigated all the cases of known violations and issued

 8     about 300 judgements, judgements of crimes against the Muslims and

 9     Croats.  President Karadzic never exerted pressure on military courts or

10     the office of the prosecutor.  He never exerted pressure or illegal

11     influence on the judiciary.  President Karadzic took appropriate steps

12     within his power to ensure that investigations were conducted into crimes

13     committed by army members, the Republika Srpska police, or individuals

14     against the Bosnian Muslims or Croats.  He always asked the prosecutor

15     and the president of Supreme Military Court of the Republika Srpska to

16     provide detailed information and demanded that appropriate measures be

17     taken.  He endorsed the absolute independence of the judiciary and

18     recommended that enemy crimes be prosecuted and also the perpetrators

19     from their side be tried.

20             President Karadzic never issued orders to shell Sarajevo.  He

21     never prevented or ordered to prevent the supply of the Muslim part of

22     Sarajevo with water, electricity, and humanitarian aid.  He always

23     insisted that civilians be provided with conditions for a normal life

24     regardless of their ethnicity.  Furthermore, there were frequent power

25     cuts and telephones lines were up and down at the seat of the state

Page 39998

 1     authorities in Pale caused by the Muslim side.

 2             The international community helped the Muslims a great deal.

 3     Equipment, food and weapons were sent to the Muslims.  There was much

 4     dissatisfaction in the army about it, why it was allowed to happen.

 5     There were attempts to speak to the Muslims in Srebrenica, calling them

 6     to hand over their weapons, to leave and so on.  President Karadzic had

 7     no knowledge of any crimes committed against Muslims in Srebrenica in

 8     July or August 1995.  There was great mistrust between the Main Staff and

 9     the president, which is probably why the Presidency received very little

10     information from the military leadership.  President Karadzic believed

11     the civilian population should decide of their own free will whether they

12     wanted to stay or leave Srebrenica and that no one must be forced.  The

13     population wanted to get out of Srebrenica, and this is also what the

14     Muslims wanted.

15             The Republika Srpska leadership agreed to hand over the airport

16     in Sarajevo to the international community so that humanitarian aid would

17     be delivered to the civilian population in Sarajevo to both Serbs and

18     Muslims equally.

19             Military rule was also necessary because of the strong activity

20     of the paramilitary formation, parastate bodies and institutions and

21     because the legal state bodies and other social subjects were not

22     performing their function in accordance with the constitution, the law,

23     and the agreed defence objectives and did not comply with the decisions

24     of the government and other state authorities.  President Karadzic and

25     General Bogdan Subotic were against the introduction of a state of war

Page 39999

 1     fearing the misconduct from individuals within the ranks of the army and

 2     the government.

 3             [Interpretation] That's the summary.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I take it you are going to lead some

 5     documents with the witness.  Before you do so, Mr. Karadzic, I'd like you

 6     to deal with the witness about his career, in particular after he quit

 7     the job of minister of defence and what he did after he quit that post,

 8     and in particular what he did at the time of 1995, because it's not clear

 9     from his statement.  Yes, please continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, your Excellency.  That

11     is precisely what I meant.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, sir, can you briefly tell us about your education and

14     then also about your career.

15        A.   I completed the secondary military school and then the military

16     academy, then the Command Staff Academy of the Yugoslav People's Army.

17     As a soldier, I worked for the most part in the field of education and

18     training, that is to say at the school centre for armored units and

19     mechanised units where students of the secondary school and the military

20     academy were trained as well as those from officers' schools.

21             I achieved significant results in that field, in the JNA, I after

22     all worked at the school centre for 30 years.  I received six state

23     declarations, high-ranking ones at that, also a golden plaque of the

24     school centre of the armoured and mechanised units.

25             My position was that I should carry out all my duties

Page 40000

 1     conscientiously and precisely, all the duties entrusted to me by the

 2     state.  That is also the position I was in in 1991 when Yugoslavia was

 3     destroyed, when it was broken up by the international community, because

 4     that was a marvelous state of fraternal peoples, but the mighty from the

 5     international community and America could not bear that, so they tried to

 6     sow discord among us by all means, and that is how --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  General, I'm afraid Mr. Karadzic has limited time.

 8     The question was about your education and your career.  If you could

 9     concentrate on answering the question, please.

10             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After I was minister for about a

12     year, I was appointed head of the military office of the

13     President of Republika Srpska and military advisor too.  Also, I was the

14     chef de cabinet for decorations of Republika Srpska.  It was called the

15     decorations office.  That's what the law called it.  Then I was appointed

16     chef de cabinet of the Supreme Command.  Then I was also appointed chief

17     inspector of the army.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us in particular in view of this

20     position that you held as chief inspector of the army, tell us in the

21     briefest possible terms what your duties were and whether you managed to

22     carry that out and why the president needed his own source of information

23     and his own inspection.

24        A.   You know what?  All armies worldwide, including our own, there is

25     this need to have a military inspector.  In all countries there are

Page 40001

 1     inspectors who check the work of the army.

 2             In our army, during that year while I was minister of defence, a

 3     great many things happened, things that people didn't even know about.

 4     The president didn't know about it.  I didn't.  The government didn't

 5     know about it.  We noticed that, as did the government and the members of

 6     parliament, and they were absolutely in favour of appointing me to this

 7     position so that I could check on what was going on in the military

 8     units.  My task was to see whether legal provisions, the law, were being

 9     adhered to in the government ministry, Ministry of Defence.  I took that

10     task very seriously, and I worked on it very precisely.  I was often

11     praised by the Main Staff, too, although to my mind I think they were a

12     bit afraid of that task.  However, even they praised me considerably for

13     everything that I had observed that -- also about everything that I

14     indicated to them, and things did improve.

15             Unfortunately, after one year, after what year while I was chief

16     inspector of the army, General Mladic and the Main Staff brought a lot of

17     pressure to bear.  They didn't want me to be chief inspector of the army

18     any longer.  Obviously, they did not like the truth that I conveyed to

19     the government, the Ministry of Defence, and the president of the state.

20     And I mean -- well, actually, their intention was that they do their --

21     that they do things their way and that the Supreme Commander and the

22     Supreme Command and the government just have a bit of insight into that,

23     the government least of all, because the government as a civilian organ

24     was not really highly regarded by them.  So, in fact, after that, after

25     1993, the president had no one to get official information from except

Page 40002

 1     the information that they provided as they saw fit.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  I've been waiting for the interpretation, that's why.

 3             General, sir, now, I'm not going to ask about lack of discipline

 4     and things like that.  During that year while you were inspector, did you

 5     see the army committing any crimes?

 6        A.   No, nowhere, wherever I went, and I toured the area from

 7     Banja Luka, Kupres, Jajce, and those other municipalities out there

 8     towards the west.  Then I toured in detail the areas of Bijeljina,

 9     Sarajevo, and Herzegovina.

10             Nowhere.  I did everything.  I saw everything, wrote everything

11     down, but I never received any information in writing or verbally that

12     anyone had committed any crimes.  I did have information about certain

13     groups, certain criminal groups or individuals did certain things, and I

14     conveyed that to the organs in charge and the Main Staff, too, of course.

15     So for example, there was this specific example, actually, when I had

16     this inspection out there, I mean facing the Muslims in the Bijeljina

17     corps.  I wrote that in my statement.  That's rather interesting.

18             The Muslim media, that evening when I appeared, when I showed up

19     for this inspection, in their media -- they used very strong language in

20     their media.  They said that I came to carry out an inspection, that I

21     would dismiss General Mladic on that day, that I would do this and that

22     and the other thing.  They were gloating, which was not true.  And there

23     were cases like that.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And as for these other positions that you held, head

25     of the military office and president's military advisor and head of the

Page 40003

 1     decorations office, how long did you actually stay in these positions?

 2        A.   Up until the end of the war, until Dayton.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  What happened after that?

 4        A.   You mean after Dayton?

 5        Q.   First of all, tell us -- tell us --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Does it mean that you worked as an

 7     inspector of the army until the end of the war?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  I said that after 1993,

 9     sometime at the beginning of 1993, General Mladic insisted that I should

10     no longer be the inspector, that the inspection is no longer needed

11     because the organs of the General Staff would carry on performing that

12     duty.  Unfortunately, he managed to convince the president of the

13     republic to accept that, although MPs in the Assembly were not willing to

14     accept that.  However, this is how things happened.

15             As for the other duties, I continued performing them until the

16     end of the war, and I continued being the head of the decorations office

17     even after the war, up until 2004.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I'm afraid that on line 13 I'm not sure whether that

19     was in 1993.  I believe that you said "1994."

20        A.   You mean the abolishment?

21        Q.   Yes.

22        A.   I don't know.  I can't remember, although I wrote that in my

23     statement.  I know that I was there until the end of 1993.  I know that

24     for sure.  I don't know whether I stayed on for a couple more months in

25     1994.  I can't remember.

Page 40004

 1             JUDGE KWON:  What is still unclear to me is whether you stayed as

 2     an advisor to the Supreme Command until the end of the war.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Until the end the war I

 4     remained the advisor of the Supreme Command until the end of the war.

 5     Also I remained affiliated with the military office of the president of

 6     the republic.

 7             If you would allow me, I have just remembered the reason why I

 8     was removed from the position as the main inspector of the army was the

 9     following:  When I had planned an inspection visit in Semberija, I had

10     prepared a team which included two colonels from the Main Staff.  They

11     were supposed to help me.  However, nobody knew where that inspection was

12     to take place save for myself and the president of the republic, i.e.,

13     the Supreme Commander.

14             When I arrived at the border facing Muslims, I was met by the

15     military police of the VRS.  They stopped me, and they told me, General,

16     sir, General Mladic ordered that nobody was allowed to enter the zone of

17     combat activities.  I answered I'm the main inspector of the army.  I

18     have the authorities from the state to do that.  And then the commander

19     of the police who first addressed me said, General, sir, my task is to

20     force you to return should you not obey the order.  Obviously I returned.

21     I did not want to create trouble.  I reported back to Pale and I reported

22     back to the president of the republic and that's when my mandate stopped.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   What positions did you hold and until when after I transferred my

Page 40005

 1     presidential duties to the vice-president, Professor Plavsic, on the

 2     15th of May?

 3        A.   I remained as the advisor of the President of the Republic,

 4     Mrs. Plavsic, and as the head of the decorations office.  She had the

 5     right to ask for my opinions, those that she deemed necessary to help her

 6     with the organisation of the army, the army in general, the decorations

 7     and so on and so forth, and I stayed in that position until 2004.  In

 8     2004, I was arrested by the SFOR in Banja Luka, and I was remanded in

 9     custody in Tuzla for four days.  About that I have a special note and a

10     special submission, and I will kindly ask the Trial Chamber and the

11     Prosecution to allow me to show you what I have prepared, because for

12     that reason I filed a civil suit in the united -- in America, and I would

13     like this Trial Chamber to accept that document, to look at it, and you

14     decide what you want on that.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we look at 1D9618 in

16     e-court.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   While we're waiting for the document to appear, General, sir, you

19     mentioned decorations and citations that you received while you were

20     still in the JNA.  What about the VRS, were you decorated by the VRS?

21        A.   Yes, from the VRS I received four decorations, but those were not

22     military decoration.  Those were decorations for work, for humanity, and

23     so on and so forth.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber what you can read on

25     this page?  The document has not been translated.  What is this document

Page 40006

 1     about?

 2        A.   The title of this document is:  "Tortures by the

 3     High Representative and my arrest."

 4             Your Honours, Prosecutors, Defence counsel, I experienced a major

 5     injustice.  I was arrested on the order of Paddy Ashdown who forced the

 6     president of the republic, Mr. Dragan Cavic, and speaker of the Assembly

 7     of Republika Srpska, Dragan Kalinic, in 2004, to find anybody who knew

 8     the whereabouts of Radovan Karadzic.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

10             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Well, this is one document we haven't seen before.

12     I'm questioning the relevance of this line of examination.  This appears

13     to be part of the matter that the witness proactively wanted to raise in

14     connection with a lawsuit he has going, or something to that effect; in

15     any event, it doesn't appear to have a great deal of relevance to the

16     proceedings here.

17             JUDGE KWON:  About the credibility, Mr. Tieger?

18             MR. TIEGER:  If the accused wants to address the witness's -- the

19     credibility of -- fine.  If the Court sees it that way, that's --

20     that's -- I have no problem with that, as with any number of matters the

21     accused raises that the Prosecution considers questionable relevance,

22     it's -- it's -- we're willing to listen to it.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We discussed this in the

25     proofing with the witness and this does relate to his credibility and to

Page 40007

 1     the situation where he was placed on a blacklist by the

 2     High Representative, arrested by the international authorities for his

 3     connection to Dr. Karadzic.  It's something that the Prosecution went

 4     into with Mr. Bjelica and other witnesses.  So it's an issue that relates

 5     to his credibility.  We had discussed possibly raising this issue in

 6     redirect examination, but given that it's been a matter of a lot of

 7     importance to this witness Dr. Karadzic decided to lead it in chief.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll allow the Defence to continue, but

10     briefly.

11             Yes, please continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   General, sir, it was recorded that pressure was put on the

15     president of the republic and the Assembly to look for Radovan Karadzic.

16     Can you tell us just briefly what was the reason why you were arrested

17     and ill-treated?

18        A.   In my statement or in my lawsuit I have described all the

19     details, but let me just tell you in a nutshell.  Ashdown put pressure on

20     the president of the republic and on the Assembly -- or, rather, the

21     speaker of the Assembly, and the two of them under that pressure caved

22     in, and they said to us, If anybody knew where Karadzic was that would be

23     General Subotic.  I received that statement personally from an American

24     colonel who was the deputy of the then commander of SFOR, Virgil Pecket.

25     In our conversation, he told me later on because he was a professional

Page 40008

 1     soldier and he respected me as a general, he told me, Your president and

 2     your speaker of the Assembly suggested that to Ashdown.  However, all

 3     that amounted to nothing, because nothing of that was true.  But I can

 4     only say that every detail and the tortures that my family and myself

 5     experienced can only be seen in movies.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Besides your arrest, were they interested in anything

 7     else?  Were there any other actions with regard to the documents and all

 8     other possession of yours?

 9        A.   My opinion is that everybody knows, everybody saw, because the TV

10     crews were always present.  In principle, I am an analyst as a soldier

11     and in general terms.  From 1991, I maintained notes about the most

12     significant and most important events at that took place.  I continued

13     doing then -- that in the course of the entire war in the Assembly, in

14     the government, at all the meetings that I attended, and I was

15     everywhere.

16             Everybody saw that, TV recorded that.  I used my own kind of

17     shorthand to make those notes.  Those notes contained dates, names,

18     times, and so on and so forth.  Later on I concluded after the four days

19     that I had spent in custody in Tuzla and when I returned on day five,

20     when I returned home, I realised that after I was arrested all those

21     diaries containing taken my note had been taken away.

22             There was a team which descended upon my family house.  A hundred

23     people participated in that, as far as I know - later on,

24     Colonel Williams admitted to that - and they had taken away from my house

25     all sorts of things, bag full of things.  They also took the 20.000

Page 40009

 1     German marks that I kept in an envelope, and so on and so forth.

 2             However, after the war, while I was working in Banja Luka in

 3     peacetime, after 1996, I worked in the offices of three presidents of the

 4     republic, including President Cavic.  In my office I had enough time to

 5     copy the most important parts of my notes.  I typed them on a computer.

 6             As far as I know, Mr. Tieger has those notes because they asked

 7     me to e-mail all those notes to the Trial Chamber, to the Court, at least

 8     that's what Mr. Sladojevic told me.  And that's all true.  So far from

 9     the year 2004, from the 3rd of March, 2004, when there was an assault on

10     my house, nobody has ever turned up with those diaries of mine.  I don't

11     know who took them.  Nobody ever requested anything from me, nothing.  To

12     this very day I am not aware of their whereabouts.

13             What was important for myself, for my office as a minister and

14     what I did during the war, I noted all the those things, the most

15     important things.  I don't know what happened to those notes, who took

16     them away, and so on and so forth.

17             Later on I submitted requests to SFOR.  However, they turned me

18     down.  They did not admit anything.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document please be

20     admitted and I see that it time for our first break.

21             JUDGE KWON:  It is not already sufficient what is reflected in

22     the transcript, given that this is not translated?

23             Mr. Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, it is corroborative of his

25     oral testimony.  He would like it to be part of the written record, and

Page 40010

 1     if we could MFI it and get it translated that would be appreciated.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  No, I object, and that has no -- this has no place

 4     in -- in our documentary base.  The witness explained a matter that I

 5     continue to think is of marginal relevance, this kind of anticipated

 6     rehabilitation of some sort, but I don't know what this document is, and

 7     I don't understand why we're -- I mean it is a voluminous record for good

 8     reason, but why we would clutter it with document of this type I can't

 9     see.

10             Also, I -- I want to -- well, let's -- let's deal with this one

11     matter at a time.

12             JUDGE BAIRD:  Mr. Robinson, can the witness corroborate himself

13     would you say?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, documents generated prior to his testimony

15     in court can corroborate a witness even if they're authored by the

16     witness.

17             JUDGE BAIRD:  Corroborate.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, I mean, documents created at an earlier date

19     prior to the witness's testimony can corroborate his in-court testimony,

20     I believe.  What weight you would give to that corroboration is another

21     thing but I -- in principle I think an earlier drafted document can be

22     corroborative.

23             JUDGE BAIRD:  So the broad principle is a witness can corroborate

24     him.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, we have lots of letters from witnesses, for

Page 40011

 1     example, that they wrote during the war.  That is an example of how a

 2     witness can corroborate himself by some previously written document.

 3             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.

 4             Mr. Tieger, do you wish to comment on that at all?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I will.  I -- I mean, I accept -- I understand

 6     Mr. Robinson's point but this is a matter that's not in dispute.  The

 7     witness raised the matter that he was upset with SFOR officials or with

 8     Mr. Ashdown and he took some kind of action.  That matter is not

 9     particularly in dispute.  It was raised apparently to appease the witness

10     who raised some concerns about this, but now this is -- this is an

11     attempt to get before the Court all sorts of allegations, specifically

12     allegations that know nothing about on an untranslated document that

13     really are not relevant to the case.  So there are two different matters,

14     Your Honour.  One, I do accept the idea that if a witness says, I engaged

15     in this event happening, engaged in this action, here's a document which

16     shows the contemporaneous document from the time that shows I did it,

17     that may have point.  But here on this very marginal matter the fact that

18     the witness may have initiated some kind of action is one thing, and it's

19     not particularly in dispute.  The details of those allegations apparently

20     as reflected in this document are really irrelevant and not a matter

21     subject to the purported corroboration mentioned by Mr. Robinson.

22             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, as I always understood it, the witness

24     doesn't corroborate himself.  He may produce a document which shows

25     consistency.  Consistency and corroboration are two entirely different

Page 40012

 1     things.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I accept that, Your Honour, and I -- you're right.

 3     I was not focusing on the precise term that His Honour Judge Baird was

 4     focusing on and I think Mr. Robinson and I both missed that in favour of

 5     the sort of the general point of consistency as noted by Judge Morrison.

 6             JUDGE BAIRD:  Yes, there are indeed two different concepts.

 7     Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, we allowed this line of questioning

 9     because it may relate to the credibility of the witness.  The Chamber is

10     satisfied with what is reflected in the transcript, i.e., his oral

11     testimony.  In that sense, this document is unnecessary or irrelevant.

12     We'll not receive it at the moment.

13             JUDGE BAIRD:  Given the time -- yes, Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  I can raise this matter after we return,

15     Mr. President.  It's just a clarification of the record, so I don't need

16     to hold up the adjournment.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Okay.  We'll have a break for half an hour and

18     resume at five past 11.00.

19                           --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 11.09 a.m.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Very briefly, I just

23     wanted to clarify a potential ambiguity or lack of clarity in the record.

24     The witness referred to some diaries and notes having been taken by SFOR,

25     and then later on as he was explaining that said, As far as I know

Page 40013

 1     Mr. Tieger has those notes.  Just to clarify what that is about, it has

 2     nothing to do with any SFOR action.  When we reviewed one of the

 3     submissions of the draft 92 ter statement, we noticed portions that

 4     clearly appeared to us to be not from the witness's recollection but to

 5     be reflections of something that had been previously recorded which we

 6     thought was possibly a diary and inquired of the Defence.  At that time,

 7     we were told something to the effect that the diary from which it had

 8     been taken was no longer with the witness but that he had taken some

 9     notes from those materials earlier and that was where the -- those

10     portions of the draft statement had come from, and those notes were sent

11     to us.  Most, if not all of those are incorporated in the statement the

12     Court has.  But I just wanted to explain how the reference to the

13     Prosecution's possession of those notes came about.

14             And, finally, with respect to the discussion we just had about

15     corroboration and consistency, just to note that I think that reflects a

16     bit of a legal cultural gap between two systems.  Mr. Robinson and I

17     discussed it briefly.  I think we both consider that in our -- the system

18     that we were trained in, that a document produced by a witness can be

19     used to corroborate that witness.  The example I used in that case -- in

20     discuss with him was if a witness testified that there was some damage to

21     my house and I -- and, in fact, I filed an insurance claim in connection

22     with that and then produced the insures claim he had filed, that would

23     be, in our system, corroboration rather than consistency.

24             But in any event, the distinction between those two concepts is

25     not one that was particularly at the forefront of our minds.  So I only

Page 40014

 1     raise that because I -- I didn't -- I didn't want to undercut

 2     Mr. Robinson's submission, and, secondly, because the distinction is not

 3     as clearly to me as it was to His Honour Judge Baird and His Honour

 4     Judge Morrison.  I didn't want to later be seen as agreeing or

 5     disagreeing with a concept I couldn't claim to fully understand.

 6             JUDGE BAIRD:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  You see, corroboration as

 7     we understand it by definition is independent evidence, and if it is to

 8     be independent evidence, well, then it follows that it couldn't come from

 9     the witness to be corroborated.  That is the basic -- the basic

10     principle.

11             MR. TIEGER:  And not to protract it, but I would say our system

12     would deal with that by identifying the nature of the purported

13     corroboration to determine whether it was, for example, so self-serving

14     as to be deemed not legitimate corroboration or whether the manner in

15     which it was produced was sufficient to give it appropriate weight for

16     corroboration.  I may be wrong.  I don't want to protract this legal

17     discussion any further.

18             JUDGE BAIRD:  Fair enough.

19             MR. TIEGER:  But I think that's probably where the two systems

20     tend to converge.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  I think it's probably where the two systems tend

22     to diverge, but nevertheless it's tomato and tomato.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Any further update, Mr. Robinson, about Mr. Beara's

24     testimony?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I spoke with Mr. Nicholls and

Page 40015

 1     we are in agreement that we're both asking the Trial Chamber to have the

 2     matter scheduled for the 27th of June and we also ask the Trial Chamber

 3     not to require Mr. Nicholls to be prepared to cross-examine on that day

 4     given the uncertainty of what Mr. Beara is likely to do.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll consider the matter.

 6             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, sir, you wanted to add something, but because of time

10     constraints if it's in the document, then it's not necessary, because the

11     Chamber has already announced its decision, and we have enough of your

12     words already that refer to that matter anyway.

13        A.   I'm not a lawyer by profession, but, please, this incident by

14     SFOR does concern President Karadzic and myself.  I was charged by the

15     High Representative of aiding the hiding of President Karadzic.  I proved

16     that this is not correct.  It was proved in any case that this was not

17     correct.  However, I want to say this:  I had a contact and a visit to my

18     house by three Americans from Washington.  They asked me mostly to tell

19     them something about where Karadzic was hiding.  I, of course, didn't

20     know that, but then they continued.  The high-ranking advisor to the CIA

21     director came to me.  Of course he did announce his visit by letter, and

22     he brought me a letter without a signature and without an address line,

23     and so I figured out that the letter refers to President Karadzic where

24     they are urging him -- of course he asked me to deliver it.  I said, I

25     don't know where President Karadzic is, perhaps he's in the

Page 40016

 1     United States.  But of course I said, I cannot accept a letter that is

 2     not addressed to anyone and that is not signed, you know.  So we spoke

 3     for a long time in my house, and during that time I wrote a letter to

 4     President Bush.  My daughter translated it.  And I asked that gentleman

 5     to take that letter to President Bush, but I did address it, and I also

 6     did sign it.  And I wrote to him about what was being done in

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina, what his army was doing, and other organs, how they

 8     are behaving.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And that is why I insisted.  Well,

11     that's all from me.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I think we are going a bit too far.

13             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you.  I'm going to try to follow the chronology a little

16     bit.  Did you know what my position was regarding the response to the

17     call-up in 1991 before there was war in our area but the war was

18     beginning in Croatia?

19        A.   Your position was very correct and proper.  It is known that the

20     war was started by Slovenia, continued by Croatia, and then it

21     transferred the war to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  These are facts, and nobody

22     can deny that.  The Yugoslav People's Army, or Serbs from Croatia, Serbs

23     from Slovenia, whoever could, fled to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina and the Yugoslav Army and the people, and Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina was full of people, of soldiers, and so on and so forth.

Page 40017

 1        Q.   Yes.  I'm sorry, we need to be as brief as possible.  What was my

 2     position regarding the response by our people to the call-up, and how did

 3     this stand in relation to the law?

 4        A.   The response was just.  You came out in favour of the people

 5     organising themselves in order to prevent chaos, that lives had to be

 6     saved, neighbourhoods, houses, and so on.

 7        Q.   Can we --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  General Subotic, I know it is very

 9     difficult for you, but for the benefit of us having a correct

10     translation, interpretation, please pause before you start answering.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  All right.  Very

12     well.  I apologise.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 32060.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, sir, do you remember that we communicated by telephone

17     then in December 1991?  Do you remember that I was interested in the

18     situation at the front and the response of our people to mobilisation?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Very often in the indictment, and it is being

21     ascribed to me as some kind of sin, that he was in favour of

22     mobilisation, meaning myself.  Can you tell us whether this was a

23     violation of the law?

24        A.   No, there was no violation of the law.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

Page 40018

 1             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  The first part of the question was leading,

 3     but I let it go because it wasn't an issue particularly in dispute, and I

 4     also saw that Mr. Sladojevic was trying to caution Mr. Karadzic.

 5             The second part, though, making a comment, and clearly indicating

 6     to the witness what the accused's concerns are about the matter and then

 7     seeking a response that will adequately address the accused's concerns is

 8     inappropriate both as leading and as commentary and as even guiding a

 9     witness beyond what would normally be found in a leading question.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Absolutely.  Just a --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  You need to put a foundational

13     question first, and then please refrain from putting a leading question.

14     Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency.  I think that

16     I did lay the foundation when I asked him whether he was aware of what my

17     position was on the mobilisation before the war in Bosnia while the war

18     was raging in Croatia.  I think that's the foundation.  I apologise if it

19     was leading.  I can put it to the witness differently.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, sir, have you looked at this intercept recently?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And are you able to say whether my interest and my

24     conduct -- what was my conduct and interest like?  Did I have any kind of

25     order in mind?

Page 40019

 1        A.   No, you did not.  Your -- you were concerned.  You were asking

 2     what's going on, what is the situation like.  I said that these people

 3     from Croatia were making a push at Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 6     intercept.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  This is Exhibit D3708.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, we saw in your document on the 15th of April you made a

11     decision on the establishment of the Territorial Defence of the

12     Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Are you able to tell us what

13     that implied?  Was there a chief?  Was there a single command planned?

14        A.   The Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was inherited,

15     practically from the former Yugoslavia, the old Yugoslavia.  Croats,

16     Muslims accepted their own men and in their own areas according to the

17     laws of Yugoslavia.  The same thing happened in those areas where there

18     were Serbs.  I couldn't say that there was no intermingling among them

19     and so on and so forth, but simply people organised themselves in the

20     best way they could.

21             Right at the beginning I tried -- there was nothing when I came

22     to Pale on the 8th of April, and then I tried to direct things so that we

23     could do something in terms of organisation.  There was no army.  The JNA

24     was in withdrawal throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It was withdrawing

25     from Slovenia and Croatia.  And we had to have some kind of force that

Page 40020

 1     would need to protect people, ordinary people, households, and so then we

 2     made the decision to use the already existing TO organisations, to

 3     reinforce them as much as we could, and because they had broken off into

 4     parts according to the ethnic principle.  We wanted to consolidate that

 5     there, and we wanted to do something until the army was formed.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And are you able to say if you appointed anyone to be

 7     at the head of this Territorial Defence, a chief?

 8        A.   Yes.  Colonel Vidoje was appointed as chief of the

 9     Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Republika Srpska.  He

10     had his own staff.  I asked General Kukanjac.  I requested that he send

11     me any surpluses that he had, extra officers, people who could do

12     something professionally in the interim until the army was formed.

13        Q.   What you have just said is in P5565.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we look at D5614 now, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, by appointing this colonel, Vidoje Lukic, was there now

17     a control and central authority established over the municipalities?

18        A.   To a certain extent, but in essence, no.  To be honest, I did

19     try, but it was not easy.  We did not in the true sense of that word

20     manage to achieve that until the army was formed.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please look at this document.  Could you

22     see who signed it, and could you tell me if you took part in the drafting

23     of this decision?

24        A.   Yes, yes.  The government -- the government and myself as the

25     minister of defence in the government.  This document was signed by

Page 40021

 1     Branko Djeric.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this please?  Thank

 3     you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  What was the question about this document,

 5     Mr. Karadzic?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was whether the

 7     general took part in the drafting of the decision signed by Djeric and

 8     whether by appointing Colonel Lukic central control was established over

 9     these municipal and other territorial defences that he referred to as

10     being scattered.  It was only on the 15th of April that we got some

11     colonel.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll receive it.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3709, Your Honours.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, sir, could you please tell us this:  A bit earlier you

16     mentioned this multitude of Territorial Defences.  Can you please tell us

17     according to the then national defence law in force at the time, what

18     were the powers of the municipalities in terms of defence?

19        A.   The powers of the municipalities were there.  I mean, they had

20     municipal staffs.  They had municipal units of the Territorial Defence.

21     All of that was pursuant to the Law of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

22     and the found situation at the beginning of April or March or in late

23     1991 onwards was what was then used in all the municipalities.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And are you able to say how this was?  What were the

25     autonomous functions of the municipality in relation to defence affairs?

Page 40022

 1        A.   The municipality had its municipal staffs.  It had its own units

 2     of the Territorial Defence which in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

 3     were formed for the purpose of extraordinary situations, emergencies, and

 4     this was under the laws of Yugoslavia.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And how did this reflect in our conditions in 1991 to

 6     the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 7        A.   Well, that was the only kind of organisation, that initial phase,

 8     the only organisation that provided any kind of security to the

 9     population, that people will not be able to do whatever they wanted and

10     that anybody would be able to attack whoever they wanted.  There was some

11     sort of safety or security.

12        Q.   According to what you know, who was it that was supposed to pay

13     the reservists who were registered in the TO of some municipality?

14        A.   That was the duty of the government.

15        Q.   And did it actually make the statements in the beginning?

16        A.   Well, there was a symbolic payment, not right at the beginning,

17     though, but around that time.  Until the army was formed there was some

18     kind of symbolic, minor compensation.

19        Q.   And what would the powers of the municipalities in terms of

20     salaries for their brigades?

21        A.   This went through the municipal TO staffs.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we please look at 65 ter

24     18709.  This is the Official Gazette of the Serbian people in -- dated

25     the 13th of June, 1992.  Could we please now look at page 15.  7500,

Page 40023

 1     that's the ERN number.  I believe that's page 15.  And what we can see

 2     here is we can see your -- actually, my and your order for the respect of

 3     international law.  It seems that this is not translated.  This is 206.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   That addendum which you signed, you can see the signature in the

 6     right-hand column.  It says --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter's note:  We do not see this on

 8     the screen.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The lower left-hand corner, 206.

11             JUDGE KWON:  You said we do not have a translation for this.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the 65 ter.  The

13     Prosecution did that, but it's not translated.  Perhaps it is, but I

14     don't see that it is.  If we have 206 translated, then all the better.

15             JUDGE KWON:  That being the case, why don't you collapse the

16     English version and zoom in on the B/C/S.  Yes.  206.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the bottom.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Thank you.  This is what it says here:

20             [As read] "Rules on the level and way of payment of compensation

21     to members of the reserve force of the army who haven't been included in

22     establishment units of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina until

23     now."

24             So that is the heading.  And now Article 1, and could you please

25     focus on Article 2 now.  That would be the top of the right-hand corner.

Page 40024

 1     It says here:

 2             [As read] "The resources for compensations referred to in Article

 3     1 of these rules shall be ensured as subsidies to budgets of

 4     municipalities that municipalities will plan as separate items.  Payments

 5     and control of resources shall be ensured by the organ of defence of the

 6     municipality on the basis of records that will be provided by the command

 7     and the units of the army."

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear

 9     Dr. Karadzic.  He started speaking too fast after he stopped reading.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a moment, Mr. Subotic.

11             The interpreters were not able to catch up with your speed,

12     Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   So, yes, the units of the army.  So it's the question that wasn't

16     interpreted.  Can you tell us until when this kind of financing of

17     municipal units through municipal budgets went on and whether volunteers

18     were treated equally?  I mean, how did this reflect on volunteers that

19     were part of municipal units?

20        A.   As far as I can remember now, this lasted up until the end of the

21     year approximately, and volunteers in these municipal units were treated

22     equally.  I mean, together with these reservists.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted,

24     Article 206?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll mark it for identification.

Page 40025

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3710, Your Honours.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   When was a state of war proclaimed briefly, for a short period of

 4     time, end of June 1995?  Do you remember what the powers were of the

 5     War Presidencies in respect of mobilisation and other things that were

 6     done in relation to defence?

 7        A.   This is the powers that they had.  All the population that was

 8     available, except for those who were involved in some work obligation and

 9     for the very bare necessities of functioning, I mean, they were supposed

10     to respond to call-up, to mobilisation, because we had this critical

11     situation in the western part of Republika Srpska.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D44042 in

14     e-court.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Can you tell us whether you remember this document that you

17     issued?  Actually, can you read it?  The text, not the part up there.

18        A.   Commissions established on the basis of the order of the

19     president of the republic, number 01-1120/95, dated the

20     16th of June, 1995, for checking mobilisation shall complete their

21     activities on the 30th of July, 1995, because the decision on the

22     declaration of a state of war gave these powers to the War Presidencies.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Just one more thing.  Can you tell us about this

24     stamp?  What does number 2 mean within the stamp?

25        A.   Number 2?  The president of the republic had stamp number 1, and

Page 40026

 1     the head of the military office had stamp number 2.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be marked for

 3     identification?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D3711, Your Honours.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  General, the establishment of the military judiciary

 8     was within whose authority?  Can you tell us whether you worked on that?

 9     Can you tell us about the problems you had to resolve just briefly?

10        A.   That was within your authority as the president of the republic,

11     and I as your assistant and head of your military office was given

12     certain tasks regarding organisation, then preparing sessions and

13     preparing other documents, that is to say, everything that you as the

14     president of the republic did not have enough time to do.  That is to say

15     I carried out all of those preparations.  Then they came because you

16     called them, and then we resolved these problems together, and that is

17     the way things went until the end of the war.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have and to what extent investigation organs

19     and experts, and so on?  What was it that you found there and how did

20     this develop?

21        A.   Yes.  You gave me the authority to find professional judges all

22     over Republika Srpska in agreement with the Ministry of Justice and so

23     on, also to find pathologists and experts who could assist military

24     courts in resolving crimes and carrying out other professional work in

25     that regard.  There are documents to that effect and so on.

Page 40027

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D44040.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Can you tell us --

 4        A.   We see here, I mean, this decision say for a military conscript.

 5     Dr. Branko, medical centre in Banja Luka.  He is appointed a medical

 6     expert in the field of pathology.  That is to say that I had the

 7     authority, in agreement with the Ministry of Justice and so on, and

 8     through consultations, et cetera, to admit him, I mean into the military

 9     judiciary.

10        Q.   Thank you.  What was the attitude towards crimes committed by

11     Serbs against Muslims or Croats?  What kind of instructions did people

12     have, say this military pathologist, in terms of the ethnicity of the

13     victims or perpetrators.

14        A.   Very precise instructions, that's what they had.  And I really

15     insisted up to a maximum that this should be precise, accurate, timely,

16     and so on.  So I never allowed -- well, maybe you also remember this from

17     debates and sessions that we had with the military judiciary and so on,

18     then also with the minister of justice together.  We always insisted that

19     all of this had to be done on the basis of regulations.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware of cases when experts like this one or

21     investigators, military investigators, the military judiciary or military

22     prosecutor and so on, that they hushed up or concealed something?

23        A.   No, no.  I'm not aware of any such case.  I certainly would have

24     been informed.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted

Page 40028

 1     for identification?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D3712, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Can I just mention it wasn't particularly a problem

 6     here, although it could have been.  If we could just have a -- a -- some

 7     summary indication of what the document is before the witness explains

 8     it.  That was a bit lacking, but the witness's explanation I think

 9     allowed us to understand it sufficiently, but I'm concerned with other

10     documents that may be more of a problem.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, sir, did you have any insight into the situation the

16     beginning of 1992, before the outbreak of the conflict?  Did you know to

17     what extent the SDS could control processes on the ground?

18        A.   Well, in part I did have insight because, I mean, I had, I mean,

19     my own organs of the Ministry of Defence and all municipalities, and so

20     on.  And I got that from them because they worked with the members of the

21     party and so on.  This was a single system of work.  All of that

22     functioned on the basis of those instructions that we had, I mean, that

23     were prescribed.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

25             MR TIEGER:  I apologise for rising, but I think there is an

Page 40029

 1     ambiguity that is significant here.  The question was about the beginning

 2     of 1992 which I normally take to mean around January or February.  The

 3     witness is answering in the context of his arrival in Pale after April as

 4     I understand it, so if the -- if the colloquy continues I think we have a

 5     built-in ambiguity.  I think we need to know specifically what time

 6     period we're talking about.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  If you could clarify with the witness, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Excellency.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, within the JNA was there information about the situation

11     on the ground, and from that point of view did you have reports about the

12     attitude towards -- or, rather, the participation of political parties in

13     developments before the outbreak of the war.

14        A.   In part, yes, I did, I mean.  Well, not everywhere, not in all

15     areas.  But, I mean, where I functioned, I did.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D44034.  Could we please have that

17     displayed.  Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Please, this was signed by Radislav Mitrovic from the command of

20     the 7th Operations Group, and could you please look at line -- or,

21     rather, paragraph 3.

22             Are you familiar with such documents and this kind of

23     information?  It says up here, "Information provided by."

24        A.   This text is barely legible.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show the top of the

Page 40030

 1     page, the command of the 7th Operations Group, the

 2     19th of February, 1992, information provided.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Now, please, are you familiar with this?  Was this customary?

 6     Are you familiar with such an information?  How often did they circulate

 7     through the JNA?

 8        A.   I'm aware of some but not all.  For example, this one, from the

 9     command of the 2nd Military District, I did know about this, for

10     instance.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And I'd like to ask you to look at the second -- no,

12     third paragraph in the 1st Military District, a telegram arrived signed

13     by Milan Babic, and the JNA's required to leave Krajina, and SDS

14     extremists are spreading an alarmist campaign and announcing the

15     establishment of their own army.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the

17     question or answer.  We were doing a sight translation of the document.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Was that the SDS in Croatia, Babic --

21             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Just a second.  The interpreters didn't hear

22     your question in full.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   The SDS, is this the SDS in the Serb Krajina within Croatia?  Is

25     that what is mentioned?

Page 40031

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Or Bosnia?

 3        A.   No, no.  In Krajina, in the Croatian Krajina.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 3.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 7             MR TIEGER:  Maybe the Court is not having the difficulty I am in

 8     following the colloquy, but it does seem to implicate the concern I

 9     raised before where we're immediately into a document on the basis of a

10     question about whether or not the witness had any familiarity with

11     information being about -- through the JNA about the situation, a

12     question so broad as to encompass anything and not provide any

13     assistance.  Now we're talking about a particular document about which we

14     know nothing because we have no translation, and we're -- we're focusing

15     on particular parts as if there's some understanding of what that

16     document in general is.  It's difficult to know where the questions are

17     going, what they're relevant to without at least some indication and

18     understanding of what the document is, and I think in the past we've

19     operated on that basis, at least an indiction of what we're looking at

20     before we get into the details.  It also has implications in terms of

21     leading but more importantly just in terms of simple comprehension we

22     have a problem.

23             JUDGE KWON:  The heading says the 7th operation group, but the

24     witness said from the command of the 2nd Military District.  So I tend to

25     agree with Mr. Tieger's observation.  We have little information about

Page 40032

 1     what this document is about.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, sir, can you help us with this?  What kind of document

 4     is this -- or, rather, documents that circulated in the JNA?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.  On the other

 6     page.  On the second page.  Could we see the second page?  Could we see

 7     who this was sent?  My mistake I --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  So that's a leading question as well, whether it was

 9     circulated throughout -- in the JNA or not.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Can you tell us who this information was sent to, General?  It

12     says so on this page.

13        A.   This information was sent to members of the JNA.

14        Q.   Thank you.  What kind of information is this?  What does it speak

15     of?

16        A.   It speaks of --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Sent by who?  That's a question for

18     the witness.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we see the first page.  Could

20     we enlarge the signature so the general could see who this is.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mitrovic, Mitrovic, but I don't see

22     this, the name, I mean.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Please read his position and rank.

25        A.   Assistant commander for morale and, I don't know, some kind of

Page 40033

 1     affairs.  So, in fact, this was -- as we say, this was the military

 2     ideologue in the 7th Tactical Group.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can we go pack to page 2 and then page 3?  What is

 4     this document?  Is this the first time you see it -- or, rather, is there

 5     something unusual here or is it the usual type of document, and what is

 6     it by its nature?

 7        A.   In terms of its nature, it is propaganda.

 8        Q.   And how does it portray the situation on the ground, falsely or

 9     correctly?

10        A.   Falsely.  No, falsely.  This is a document that I see before me,

11     and it presents the situation falsely.

12        Q.   Can we take a look at page 3 now so that we see how they portray

13     the situation in Bosnia.  So just in Bosnia, down there we see the Serb

14     Krajina.  Can you read this to yourself and then see --

15             THE PROSECUTOR:  The witness did not answer the question about

16     whether or not it was the first time he saw the document which I think is

17     significant since he's characterising it as false and now being asked to

18     address portions of the document which he may or may not have seen

19     before.  I think it would be useful to have an answer to that question.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, have you seen this ever, and are you familiar with

23     this type of information that are sent out in the field?

24        A.   I saw this information, and I am familiar with this type of

25     information.

Page 40034

 1             JUDGE KWON:  As Mr. Tieger properly indicated, when we do not

 2     have the English translation, it's difficult to follow the witnesses

 3     answer, whether -- when he says this is false or not or not.  So please

 4     bear that in mind.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Please, it says here the latest developments in BiH, the second

 8     paragraph.  Could you read it out.

 9        A.   Yes:

10              "The recent developments in BiH confirm that the SDS is not in

11     full control over the situation either.  Some local leaders and

12     extremists objectively inflict damage on the Serb people there."

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear

14     Mr. Karadzic's because we were finishing the sight translation of the

15     document.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Mr. Subotic, please pause.  Please

17     pause.  And, Mr. Karadzic, you as well, please pause.  Please repeat your

18     question, Mr. Karadzic.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   How does this paragraph fit into your own knowledge and

21     experience?

22        A.   This paragraph absolutely reflects an illogical position that is

23     detrimental for the Serb people.  It's as if it were written from

24     Croatia, from some Communist ideology.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber something about the

Page 40035

 1     relations between the SDS and this type -- this profile of JNA officer

 2     and also in Republika Srpska.

 3        A.   JNA officers who came to Republika Srpska and who were in

 4     Republika Srpska otherwise, who happened to be there, who were Orthodox

 5     Communists, they did not attach any importance to political parties.

 6     Croatian officers, to Croatian political parties, Bosnian officers to

 7     Bosnian parties, Serb officers to Serb parties.  They only knew one

 8     thing, I mean, one ideology.  That was Titos, and those were the views

 9     they expressed.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Should I tender this document,

12     Excellencies?  Do you need it?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Subotic, what I find it difficult to follow is this:

14     You said this is written by a Mitrovic in the 7th Tactical Group to be

15     circulated to JNA members for propaganda purpose.  I don't follow.  Who

16     was Mitrovic, and what was he doing?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mitrovic is an ideologue in this

18     7th Tactical Group.  Political Commissar, if we can put it in army terms.

19     He didn't like something there, because he was still living in the clouds

20     and he did not realise what was happening in the territory of the former

21     Yugoslavia.  And then he tried to -- well, in terms of people who were

22     protecting Yugoslavia, who wanted to protect the people, I mean, didn't

23     work.  That is what this Mitrovic is trying.

24             JUDGE KWON:  And is a -- is the 7th Tactical Group a part of JNA?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, 7th Tactical Group, that is

Page 40036

 1     part of the JNA.  That doesn't mean that all members of this

 2     Tactical Group thought the same way as this Mitrovic did.  We in the

 3     Army of Republika Srpska also had quite a few "komesars" whose views

 4     differed from the views of the entire Serb people.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll mark it for identification.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI 3713, Your Honours.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, sir, could you please help us.  In one paragraph of your

 9     statement you mentioned that the Islamic religious community was involved

10     in the arming; is that correct?

11        A.   Absolutely.  Absolutely.  It can be proven.  There are details

12     which I provided in my statement.  I even provided some very accurate

13     figures about that.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D44015.

16     1D44015.  The number is good.  1D20706.  This is a 1D document.  I would

17     like to call up that in e-court.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Please read the body.  You don't have to read the heading.

20        A.   This is an authorisation authorising Senad Sendic to take over

21     1.000 rounds for 120-millimetre mortar from the Mesihat of the Islamic

22     community, and those rounds were sent to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

23     in Zivinice all for to meet the purposes of the Army of Republic of

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  These are to be taken over due to the deterioration

25     of the situation on the Visoko-Sarajevo theatre of war.  This should not

Page 40037

 1     be obstacles put in the execution of this authority.

 2        Q.   Who signed this?

 3        A.   This was signed by the commander of the Main Staff.  I don't see

 4     the name.  I can see just the facsimile.

 5        Q.   Is it Sefer Halilovic perhaps?

 6        A.   Yes, but the only thing I can see is Halilovic.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be marked for

 9     identification.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D3714, Your Honours.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   And just one last question accompanying a document.  General,

14     sir, how did you perceive Crisis Staffs?  What did you think and what did

15     you say about their abolishment?  Did you say anything?

16        A.   I asked you to abolish the Crisis Staffs as soon as possible, as

17     soon as the minimum requirements were in place for that.  That happened

18     one month after the creation of the army.  In conversations, the two of

19     us were on the same page.  We both did not think that they were

20     necessary.  As soon as the military and all the other institutions were

21     set up Crisis Staffs were no longer necessary.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I'd like to call up 65 ter

24     11500 in e-court.  Can the upper half be enlarged, please.  There is a

25     translation.

Page 40038

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, sir, on the 7th of July, 1992, you organised a press

 3     conference; is that right?

 4        A.   Yes, and I called for the abolishment of the Crisis Staffs.

 5        Q.   It says that they have already been abolished.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   It says "where possible."  What does it mean where it says "where

 8     possible"?

 9        A.   Where things were okay, they were not necessary.  Where things

10     were not okay, they were necessary.  Wherever it was possible to abolish

11     them, they should be abolished.  There were municipalities where the

12     situation had not been ripe for the abolishment of the Crisis Staffs.

13     That was that.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3715, Your Honours.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   And another thing, General, sir, did we declare a war on the

20     Muslim-Croatian coalition?  Did they declare a war on us?  If that was

21     the case, when -- when did that happen?

22        A.   No, it did not declare any war.  As far as I know, we never

23     declared a war on anything.  And as for the Muslim-Croatian coalition,

24     they did.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 40039

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you now look at 1D44036.  I

 2     apologise.  I would like to call up 11274 in e-court.

 3             This is the transcript of the Presidency meeting which took place

 4     on the 20th of June, 1992.  I would like to call up page 4 in the Serbian

 5     version.  Towards the end of the page we will locate that in English as

 6     well.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Please look at the bottom of the page after the discussion on the

 9     implementation of a certain decision.  Izetbegovic concludes here is a

10     decision on the proclamation of a state of war.  It has been proclaimed.

11     Do you remember that that happened very early on in June of 1992?

12        A.   Yes, that was very out and in the open.  It was not hidden.

13        Q.   I don't know how big the translation is, whether that can be

14     found in the English translation.  Can you please read it?

15        A.   What Izetbegovic says?

16        Q.   Yes.  Both lines, please.

17        A.   "I would not give it much publicity.  I would like to send it to

18     the Security Council.  I would not give it large publicity here, simply

19     so that we did not create an atmosphere, especially when it comes to a

20     delayed action.  So people might reckon that that is something.  We have

21     to work and to dramatise things less."

22             And then Abdic says:

23             "I am not insisting on that."

24             Izetbegovic says:

25             "Therefore, the day of the declaration here, the decision on the

Page 40040

 1     proclamation of the state of war has been passed."

 2        Q.   Okay.  We don't need anything else.  I am not going to ask

 3     anything about Izetbegovic's mental state when he said that.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, if not the

 5     entire transcript, at least the first four pages.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We didn't have that -- we didn't

 7     have the English translation of that part.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is why I asked the general to

 9     read it.  It seems that the translation is only partial.  It seems that

10     only Halilovic's words have been translated.

11             JUDGE KWON:  No.  It has some other parts.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that this particular part

13     has not been translated.  I cannot go through the document on my screen.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, do you have any difficulty with marking

15     for identification of what was shown to the witness?

16             MR. TIEGER:  Well, it depends on what we mean by that.  If it's

17     just those particular lines -- first of all, I have no problem with

18     marking it for identification as a general matter.  If it's the --

19     Dr. Karadzic seemed to concede that there was a context to this that

20     needed to be provided, including, for example, the words we see on screen

21     in English.  That seems to be the case, as far as I look at it.  And

22     finally, I would note that we would want to look at the remained of the

23     transcript to see if similar context is necessary.  So we're somewhat

24     handicapped.  I'm inclined to think based on what I can read on this page

25     in English that that has to go in, too, and presumably the portions of

Page 40041

 1     the transcript between this portion and that portion which the witness

 2     read out.  So marking it for identification at this point is probably the

 3     best expedient.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark for identification only those pages shown

 5     to the witness.  And, Mr. Tieger, you can come back during your cross if

 6     necessary to tender the remaining part which has been already translated.

 7     That may be consistent with our practice.

 8             Yes.  Shall we assign the number.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI 3716, Your Honours.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   And now the last question and the last document, General, sir,

12     although there would be some more useful documents, but we don't have

13     time for that.  What was your attitude in terms of discipline in the

14     army, in your capacity as the minister of defence?  When did we manage to

15     achieve discipline in the Army of Republika Srpska?

16        A.   My attitude was well-known.  I insisted on the strictest

17     adherence to the rules of discipline.  Obviously it was not easy to

18     achieve that, especially not at the beginning of the war and especially

19     during the first year.  However, we always insisted on talks between the

20     government and the Supreme Command as well as the Presidency of the

21     republic.  I -- in other words, we all advocated that.  However, I cannot

22     confirm, as I had said here, that discipline was at an enviable level,

23     especially not at the beginning.  Later on, things improved.  Things were

24     applied more often.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we knew look at 1D44047.

Page 40042

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Do you remember the interview which you gave to Milos Solaja?

 3        A.   Yes, I remember that interview.  I have it personally in

 4     Banja Luka.  I'm in possession of that interview.  I was very strict

 5     there.  I was very explicit in terms of discipline in the army.  That

 6     interview of mine was very positively regarded everywhere in

 7     Republika Srpska.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  It says here on page 5, topic:  Disorder and lack of

 9     discipline in the armed forces.  And then your interview follows.  Is

10     that your interview.

11        A.   Yes.  My photo is missing from the English version, but I

12     remember that interview very well and I have it in Banja Luka.

13        Q.   Can you remember the date?  It is not mentioned here, or the time

14     when the interview was provided?

15        A.   It was in the second half of 1992, but to be honest, I really

16     can't remember.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  No.  I would object.  I don't think within our

20     practices it's appropriate to say, I gave an interview, it was on such a

21     date, now I tender it.  Lots of material would be coming in which would

22     essentially be 92 ter kind of material in -- in that manner.  So I don't

23     think this has been adequately dealt with if for purposes of admission at

24     this point.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I was about to raise that question.  What was your

Page 40043

 1     question about this document for the witness?  Except for that he gave an

 2     interview.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I asked him

 4     about his attitude as a minister towards discipline, whether he was

 5     satisfied with the level of discipline and when was the satisfactory

 6     discipline achieved.  Three or four questions.  He answered that at first

 7     he was not satisfied, that he was very strict and very consistent --

 8     consistent in terms of discipline in the army, and then he said that this

 9     interview confirms that.

10             JUDGE KWON:  You could have made a full stop after his oral

11     testimony.  What's the point of tendering this interview if you do not

12     introduce the content of the interview with the assistance of the

13     witness?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that it was

15     self-explanatory.  We don't have the Serbian version.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, can you remember what you said and what prompted you to

18     provide an interview on that topic?

19        A.   We have an English version here.  I'm sure you can read what I

20     said during that interview.  However, I was inspired by what I saw on the

21     ground and what I wrote in my reports.  I saw what was going on and so on

22     and so forth, since I do not read English, if I did, I could read it back

23     to you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, if you could assist the Chamber why it

25     should receive this.

Page 40044

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  This is an interview given in

 2     1992, second half, so it corroborates the witness's current testimony as

 3     to his attitude towards discipline and against crimes, which would

 4     include crimes against Serbs.  And although because we don't have the

 5     original in the witness's language it's difficult to -- for him to

 6     remember exactly what he said in this interview, we can see from the face

 7     of the interview itself that it's relevant and consistent with his

 8     position that he's expressed in the courtroom.  For those reasons I think

 9     it should be admitted.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We are of the view that there is a basis to

12     admit -- admit this document.  We'll receive it.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3717, Your Honours.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies.  I will

15     not go on, although there are many documents which unfortunately are not

16     translated.  So I had to do it by live testimony, and then I don't have

17     any further questions.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I need to come back to some of

20     these topics, I can do that during the redirect.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  General Subotic, as you have noted, your

22     evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in its most part in

23     writing, that is your written witness statement.  We'll take a break now,

24     but after the break you will be cross-examined by the representative of

25     the Office of the Prosecution.  Do you understand that?

Page 40045

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Just one comment, Mr. President.  In response to

 4     what accused says, I understand that he may wish to make a discretionary

 5     judgement call about how he uses his time and which documents he wants to

 6     lead, but documents that should have been used in examination-in-chief

 7     should not be deferred until after cross when there's no opportunity

 8     that -- the cross-examination to deal with them.  So I think he should

 9     consider at the break whether or not some of what he's not addressing now

10     should be done before the cross-examination commences rather than

11     engaging in a practice that we've complained about before, and that is

12     deferring the addressing subjects and items that properly should have

13     been raised if examination-in-chief.

14             THE ACCUSED:  Sorry, I think a translation is responsible for

15     this conclusion.  I did say if the Prosecution gives me a reason, I

16     would --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Let's leave it at that.  I take it that Mr. Karadzic

18     is now fully aware of rules we have here.  We'll take a break for

19     45 minutes and resume at quarter past 1.00.

20                           --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 1.18 p.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.  Please proceed.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

25        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Subotic.  As the President indicated, I'll be

Page 40046

 1     asking you some questions.

 2        A.   Good afternoon.

 3        Q.   In paragraph 110 of your statement -- and I notice you don't have

 4     your statement in front of you.  I don't know if you want it to refer to

 5     in hard copy or not, but since we may be referring it during the

 6     course -- to it during the course of these questions, you're certainly

 7     welcome to have a copy.

 8        A.   Perhaps that would be good.

 9        Q.   Now, that doesn't necessarily mean you have to turn to a specific

10     reference if you don't feel the need, but if you do, by all means feel

11     free to do so.  I'm referring now to paragraph 110 of your statement

12     where there are questions asked by the Trial Chamber in the Krajisnik

13     case --

14        A.   This is in English.  Ah, all right.  Well, yes, go ahead.

15        Q.   Okay.  That was provided by the Defence team.  I imagine they

16     have the Serbian copy and can provide one.  Let's -- let's try to see how

17     far we get without it, but by all means, if you need it let us know.

18             In any event, paragraph 110 deals with questions by the

19     Presiding Judge of the Krajisnik Trial Chamber concerning whether or not

20     General Mladic went beyond what the political leadership wanted him to

21     do, and the exchange between you and the Trial Chamber that is provided

22     in your statement ends with Judge Orie's question.  Again, the question

23     was and again is whether there were any examples known of General Mladic

24     going beyond what he was expected to do by the political leadership, in

25     this case the question was and having military success in doing so.  You

Page 40047

 1     provided an answer in connection with Srebrenica that is reflected in

 2     your statement.  We'll be coming back to that later, but what is not

 3     included in the amalgamated statement is the remainder of that exchange

 4     with the Court which is found at transcript pages 26463 through 64, and

 5     after your answer about Srebrenica, Judge Orie said:

 6             "Let me take you back.  I want to focus on 1992 rather than at

 7     that later stage.  Do you have any such example in 1992?"

 8             You said:

 9             "No, no, I don't know.  I don't remember."

10             Then he continued:

11             "Yes.  Would that mean, and I'm now putting it in another way,

12     that whatever military action or military operation took place under the

13     command of General Mladic did not go beyond what the political leadership

14     wanted him to do?"

15             And your answer was:

16             "Believe me, I do not recall.  I simply cannot."

17             So those were your answers back in 2006 when you appeared in the

18     Krajisnik case; correct?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Okay.  Now, in your current statement, at paragraph 169 there are

21     references to the selection of General Mladic as commander of the

22     Main Staff of the VRS, and in that statement -- in that paragraph you

23     make two references.  One is to the effect that Karadzic told you that

24     Blagoje Adzic had proposed Mladic, and the other which appears at the end

25     of the paragraph that President Milosevic wrote a letter to

Page 40048

 1     General Mladic by which he bypassed President Karadzic and Mladic was

 2     promoted as the first figure in the RS.

 3             Now, with respect to the selection of General Mladic to head the

 4     VRS, do you recall being present at the 50th session of the Bosnian Serb

 5     Assembly in Sanski Most in April of 1995 when President Karadzic

 6     commented on the selection of General Mladic and who selected him?  I see

 7     you nodding your head, but you have to answer audibly.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And what President Karadzic said at that time, and that's found

10     on page 324 in the English, is the following, and this Court has that

11     document in evidence and has heard this reference before:

12              "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for.  I asked for

13     Mladic.  General Ninkovic, then a colonel, and General Perisic has

14     visited me before that, and I had noticed Mladic's blunt statements in

15     the newspapers.  He was already in Knin then.  I took an interest in him,

16     and together with Mr. Krajisnik I went to General Kukanjac's office and

17     listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin."

18             He explains then they spent countless nights in the office of

19     General Kukanjac and then says:

20             "We asked for Mladic and said that they should set up the

21     headquarters as they saw fit.  We wouldn't interfere."

22             So in April of 1995, President Karadzic made clear who selected

23     General Mladic for that position and that indeed it was his selection;

24     correct?

25        A.   Who do you mean "his"?  I didn't understand.  Whose choice is it,

Page 40049

 1     Karadzic's or Hadzic's choice?

 2        Q.   Your statement seems to indicate that it was Adzic's choice.

 3     President Karadzic said, and we have in this evidence, in April 1995 that

 4     he asked for Mladic.  He explained why, and then again repeated, "We

 5     asked for Mladic," and said they should set up the headquarters as they

 6     saw fit.  So it was President Karadzic by his own words who selected

 7     Mladic; right?

 8        A.   Yes.  Yes.

 9        Q.   Now, in your statement at paragraph 112 --

10             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, do you have B/C/S version with you,

11     Mr. Subotic?

12             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  There is no exact B/C/S

14     version completely because the paragraphs that quote from the Krajisnik

15     case have not been translated into B/C/S because the language section

16     declined to do that.  So the witness has the B/C/S of the portions that

17     are not in -- from the Krajisnik case, and then those portions of his

18     statement that are quoting from his testimony in Krajisnik are in

19     English.

20             JUDGE KWON:  So part of the B/C/S statement, B/C/S version

21     statement in English when it relates to the transcript of previous case.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Exactly.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   Your statement at paragraph 112 indicates that, and it seems to

Page 40050

 1     emphasise that General Mladic did not attend government sessions and that

 2     that was a problem, but the fact is, Mr. Subotic, that as you said in

 3     your 1998 interview, when the Presidency thought it necessary, they would

 4     summon General Mladic or his deputy, and they would appear and brief the

 5     Presidency; correct?

 6        A.   That is correct.

 7        Q.   And Mr. Djeric was part of that Presidency, attended those

 8     meetings, and was present on many of those occasions when General Mladic

 9     briefed the Presidency; correct?

10        A.   In my statement, I said specifically by meeting how many times

11     anyone from the Supreme Command was at -- from the Main Staff was at the

12     session of the Supreme Command, the government, or the Assembly.  I

13     stated that specifically, and then I also mentioned by name the generals

14     who attended these meetings.  All of that is in my statement.  I don't

15     have the statement in Serbian in front of me now in order to be able to

16     tell you that, but I guarantee that there is such a record.  And in any

17     case, I can say --

18        Q.   Sorry.

19        A.   -- that --

20        Q.   Sorry.  Please finish your answer.  In any case you can say

21     that ...

22        A.   I can say that the army, frankly speaking, insisted on attending

23     government meetings and Presidency meetings only when they needed

24     something.  That's how it was, and I stand by that 100 per cent.

25        Q.   In -- in your answer you mentioned the Supreme Command, the

Page 40051

 1     Assembly, and government sessions.  Even before the formation or

 2     establishment of the Supreme Command, as you indicated in your 1998

 3     interview --

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   -- General Mladic attended Presidency sessions; correct?

 6        A.   [In English] No.  No.  No.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8        A.   [Interpretation] when -- when he was invited.  When he was

 9     invited, he would attend.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In connection with -- I'll move on to a slightly

11     different subject.  I may come back to that issue.

12             Your statement contains a section which is generally headed

13     "Significant events during the war that indicate the nature of the

14     relationship between the civilian and military authorities," and then it

15     contains what appear to be large portions of your notes, and among those,

16     among that part of your statement we see at paragraph 157 a reference to

17     the 14th session of the Supreme Command, and that's session of the

18     Supreme Command that was held on March 31st, 1995, in which -- in

19     paragraph 157 you have marked the date 8 April, which I presume is the

20     date on which you made the notations that are reflected in the statement.

21        A.   Yes, yes.  Correct.

22        Q.   There you refer to hatred and lies expressed by General Mladic

23     against you personally and his taking advantage of your absence and the

24     fact that you had not attended that particular session, but as you note

25     here, later read the minutes.  And indeed, the minutes themselves reflect

Page 40052

 1     that you were the person who submitted them; correct?  And I believe you

 2     submitted them on April 5th.

 3        A.   Correct.  Correct.

 4        Q.   Now --

 5        A.   [In English] Yes.

 6        Q.   -- we have that transcript of that session of the Supreme Command

 7     in evidence, and I wanted to ask you about certain references made during

 8     that session that are not reflected in your notes but that do appear to

 9     be pertinent to the issue of the nature of the relationship between the

10     civilian and military authorities.  So let me ask you about a few of

11     those which you may recall specifically, you may recall generally, or if

12     necessary, I can call them up and show them to you in particular.

13             Now, with regard to you personally, at page 9 of the transcript

14     of that session, General Mladic expresses the view that you played a role

15     in the changes in proposals that were sent to the Main Staff and then

16     later sent on to the Assembly and claims that you deceived both

17     President Karadzic and the Assembly in doing so.  I take it that was one

18     of the remarks that you had in mind when you stated in your statement

19     that he expressed a great deal of hatred and lies against you personally.

20        A.   [Interpretation] Since I don't have the text from that meeting of

21     the Supreme Command, you need to tell me specifically what it was that I

22     did, and I will answer.  I would like you to tell me specifically what it

23     was that Mladic said, because I wasn't taking the minutes at that

24     session.  I was on a different assignment but what you said about me I

25     read it later.  But I did not pay attention to some of these specific

Page 40053

 1     things, but if you tell me specifically what it is, then I will answer

 2     sincerely.

 3        Q.   Well, this is a discussion that begins on Law on the Army, the

 4     Law on Defence, and so on, but I wasn't citing it for the purpose of

 5     having you respond to the specific allegation.  I just wanted to assist

 6     the Chamber in identifying some of the issues that you were referring to

 7     in your statement.  So he seems to be talking there about either the

 8     Law on Defence, Law on the Army, and materials that were sent to the

 9     Assembly, but I'm not asking you to respond to the accuracy of those

10     allegations at this point, because I want to take you to another comment

11     that is not reflected, in fact, in your -- in your statement, and that

12     can be found at page 49 of the English and page 44 of the B/C/S if we

13     need it, and that's where General Mladic says:

14             "It is a fact, Mr. President, most of all for me and for you, the

15     two of us have the most responsibility when it comes to the situation in

16     the army.  You as the Supreme Commander, I as a man at some rank who

17     should be together with my co-workers your right hand in the army.  Even

18     if we are not practising that because you probably -- I'm not going into

19     that.  I value Bogdan Subotic.  He is a descent man.  Your connotations

20     for him are all in order."

21             So this would appear to be a pertinent passage for a couple of

22     reasons, Mr. Subotic.  One, because General Mladic talks about his

23     conception of the hierarchy of the army with Dr. Karadzic at the top; and

24     two, because in contrast to the only reference in -- in your statement --

25     not the only -- the reference in your statement, General Mladic offers

Page 40054

 1     what seems to be a fairly generous assessment of you during the course of

 2     that session.  Now, would you agree --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  English speakers should pause as

 4     well until the translation is completed.  My impression is you start the

 5     next sentence while the previous sentences were being translated and even

 6     when the witness was about to answer the question.  I'm not sure whether

 7     witness followed your question.

 8             Do you understand what the question was, Mr. Subotic?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not entirely.  It's unclear.

10     It's a little bit confusing.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, why don't we show the text to

12     the witness in e-court?

13             MR. TIEGER:  Page 44 of the B/C/S, and page 49 in English.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Of what?

15             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, I'm sorry.  My apologies for that.  That is

16     P3149.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  While we're looking for that, Mr. President, I

18     would just like to urge Mr. Tieger to make his questions more simple.

19     This is very, very hard to follow even for an English speaker.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I will do my best, but what is happening here is

21     the -- I have to deal with voluminous materials and the question of

22     omission.  That means I have to direct the parties' and the witness's

23     attention to portioning of large materials and quickly summarise them and

24     then ask the question.  I'm about to ask the question in as simple a

25     manner as possible.

Page 40055

 1        Q.   Do you agree, General, that in this portion of the

 2     Supreme Command session that was held on the 31st of March, 1995,

 3     General Mladic indicated his understanding of Mr. Karadzic as

 4     Supreme Commander, his position as Dr. Karadzic's right hand, and also

 5     offered a generous or fair assessment of you?  At least not a hostile or

 6     hateful assessment.

 7        A.   I can answer that question.  In that specific situation and in

 8     all other situations when we're speaking about Mladic, Mladic is a man

 9     who is intolerant.  He reacts quickly, and if he doesn't like something,

10     he immediately reacts strongly to it.  It doesn't matter if it's

11     General Subotic, or Karadzic, or the prime minister, or a deputy.  I can

12     tell you I don't have anything against General Mladic.  I never insulted

13     him.  I never answered him back when he attacked me and referred to me

14     like that.  Everybody knows that at the Assembly.  I accepted him as he

15     was.  General Mladic was bothered by the fact that I analysed, which was

16     my duty, to analyse decisions --

17        Q.   What I'm -- you've had an opportunity in your lengthy statement

18     to express your views of General Mladic's personality.  Here I was

19     referring to a very specific passage in a document that is reference in

20     your statement.  I've showed you those passages and have asked you if, in

21     fact, as they appear to me, they reflect General Mladic stating that Mr.

22     Karadzic is the Supreme Commander, he is Mr. Karadzic's right hand, and

23     also expressing what I think would have to be acknowledged or non-hateful

24     views about you.  And the reason I'm asking you about that is -- go

25     ahead.

Page 40056

 1        A.   Yes.  I would -- I don't have the statement.  I would like to see

 2     the statement and then I can answer.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can scroll up what

 4     Mladic was saying and continued.  We can -- yes.  That's good.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Do you see it, sir?  It's at the end of the first paragraph.

 7        A.   At the end of the first paragraph.  Let me see.  Ah, you see,

 8     this is what Mladic says.  Could we zoom in on this part?  It's very

 9     small.  I'm not able to read it.  This first paragraph.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let us collapse the English for the moment.  Oh, no,

11     please do not touch the screen.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was all right just now.  Perhaps

13     you can bring this back.  Yes.  May I read to you slowly in Serbian and

14     then you can hear it in English.  You're right.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   We have the translation on the other side of the screen, sir.

17        A.   This is what he says, see, "You as the Supreme Commander --"

18     just one moment.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We can --

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the fifth line from the

21     bottom:

22              "You as the Supreme Commander and I as person of some rank who

23     should be together with my associates, your right hand in the army,

24     although we are not actually doing it like that, because I probably am

25     not going into that with you."

Page 40057

 1             So this means that he admits himself that he is not in it.  Do

 2     you understand?  Although this is -- this is -- well, I value

 3     General Subotic.  He's honest.  Your connotations about him are all

 4     alright, but I am the problem.  I am the problem because I have the task

 5     of checking documents of the Supreme Commander.  I am a professional

 6     soldier, very precise, and I do not permit any errors, and many errors

 7     were made when I did not have the opportunity to save documents by the

 8     president of the republic, and this is what is rankling him.

 9             MR. TIEGER:

10        Q.   Mr. Subotic, in fact, you know, I submit to you that you know in

11     fact that is not at all what General Mladic is referring to there because

12     you purport to have read the entirety of this transcript and therefore

13     you would know the concerns that are addressed in this particular

14     transcript, and they include --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Due to some technical difficulties,

16     we need to rise.  I will consult the court deputy.  We will rise for

17     five minutes.

18                           --- Break taken at 1.52 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 1.56 p.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   General Subotic, the fact is that at this meeting, the focus of

23     the representatives of the VRS, including General Mladic,

24     General Milovanovic, General Gvero, General Skrbic, all of whom were in

25     attendance, was on issues that they considered affected command and

Page 40058

 1     control and removed or reduced their effective command and control.

 2     First of all, do you recall that that was the subject of concerns

 3     expressed by the representatives of the VRS at that meeting?  As a

 4     general matter.  Then I'll ask you about some of the specific concerns.

 5        A.   Mr. Tieger, first of all, I was not at the session of that

 6     command.  All of this was staged while I was absent as head of the

 7     military office.  So that is why I wrote and I took a look at this now,

 8     the text further on, and that is why I wrote in my statement that Mladic

 9     took advantage of my absence, Mladic and these generals, because I would

10     have given them an answer that would have been confirmed by the Supreme

11     Command, I assure you of that.  So it is easy to speak about someone who

12     is absent.  But he is not fair, because he made this statement while I

13     was absent, and I stand by this, by this opinion of mine that I gave.

14        Q.   General Subotic, you purported to provide a series of relevant

15     extracts from events in order to paint a picture to this Trial Chamber of

16     the relations between Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic, and the Main Staff,

17     and I'm suggesting to you that you omitted some very significant things,

18     even though you were aware of them, and one of those is the fact that at

19     this very meeting that you reference in your statement, the Main Staff is

20     expressing concerns that some of the actions taken by Dr. Karadzic

21     undercut their command and control and make it more difficult for them to

22     do their work on behalf of the man they consider to be the

23     Supreme Commander.  And one of the factors they raised in this meeting

24     was that they didn't have an ability any longer to promote people.

25             Do you recall that raised in this session, and do you also recall

Page 40059

 1     that you didn't include that in your statement?

 2        A.   I did not attend that session, and I cannot comment on what it

 3     was that they were saying.  I simply cannot.  I was just informed after

 4     that session about what happened, but I didn't have any details.  So --

 5     well, let me tell you this:  I can respond to your question in part, in

 6     part.  I mean in principle generally.

 7             President Karadzic is not a man who was after victory as

 8     Supreme Commander.  President Karadzic very often, viewed from a military

 9     standpoint, made it impossible for the army to make military assessments,

10     but he did that only because the entire world was against us, and

11     President Karadzic was only able to relent to the demands made by the

12     world in order for us to survive, to go on, to find solutions by way of

13     negotiations.  That is the essence of President Karadzic, whereas

14     soldiers take a rifle to kill everyone, use cannons.  That's soldierly.

15     So, anyway, you do the assessing now, but I think President Karadzic did

16     things right, because in principle I am antimilitaristic, so I was not in

17     favour of a war and especially not for some victory at any cost.  That's

18     the problem.  So that's my answer.

19             You say that the generals were harmed.  No, they were not harmed.

20     No, on the contrary.  Had we been at a victory and had we won, there

21     never would have been peace in Bosnia.  Not a single people that is

22     vanquished is satisfied.  This would have been a pyrrhic victory.  That

23     is not something that Karadzic ever aspired for.

24        Q.   You're talking in part here about Mount Igman, right, and the

25     fact that the VRS took Mount Igman?

Page 40060

 1        A.   I'm saying -- Mr. Tieger, I'm talking about all operations, all

 2     operations.

 3        Q.   But that would be Mount Igman where the VRS had --

 4        A.   An example, Igman, now that you've mentioned it.  I'll tell you

 5     quite frankly.  I'll tell you quite frankly.  Mladic could have taken

 6     Sarajevo from Igman.  In Sarajevo, the Muslims asked Mladic, and we know

 7     that full well, we know that full well, they asked Mladic to give them

 8     24 hours to leave town.  Robert Owen came, and he stopped that.

 9     Radovan Karadzic accepted that.  I'm asking you, and I'm asking all of us

10     now, what would have happened had Mladic taken Sarajevo?  What would have

11     America done?  What would the world community have done?  Have somebody

12     give me an answer to that.  And he could have taken Sarajevo.  He could

13     have.  Ask Robert Owen.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  You meant David Owen?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

16             MR. TIEGER:

17        Q.   And --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We had this Robert Owen too.  He

19     was an expert for constitutional matters.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.  All right.

21     Specifically this is the Igman operation.  Sarajevo could have fallen, no

22     problem whatsoever.  Many times President Karadzic, just for the sake of

23     peace, for the sake of survival for both Muslims and Serbs and for

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Well, I mean viewed from a military aspect he made a

25     mistake, but viewed from a humane and human aspect he did an excellent

Page 40061

 1     job.

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   And as you made clear in your Krajisnik testimony, Mladic didn't,

 4     as you put it here, take Sarajevo because Karadzic told him not to;

 5     correct?

 6        A.   I did not quite understand the question.  I didn't hear it too.

 7     2006 when I went --

 8        Q.   You just went on how Mladic in your estimation could have taken

 9     Sarajevo, and as you made clear in your Krajisnik testimony --

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   -- the reason he didn't is because Karadzic told him to back

12     down; right?

13        A.   That's right.  That's right.  I've explained this to you.

14        Q.   One more -- one more thing about the meeting of the

15     Supreme Command in -- on March 31st 1995.  Do you also recall that

16     General Milovanovic made it completely clear, made explicit that it was

17     the Supreme Commander, Dr. Karadzic, who had the ultimate say and that in

18     a situation where there was a standing order by General Mladic about not

19     allowing passage of persons through a particular area or into a

20     particular area the -- General Mladic's subordinates in the VRS in

21     keeping with the concept of command and control had to obey unless and

22     until they received an order from the Supreme Commander, Dr. Karadzic, in

23     which event they would then follow that order; correct?

24        A.   That's right.  That's right.

25        Q.   Now, your statement also deals at paragraph 169 with events that

Page 40062

 1     took place in the aftermath of the events in the Krajina and the loss of

 2     the Croatian-Serb territories in the Krajina following Operation Storm

 3     and refers explicitly to the 52nd session of the Assembly in

 4     paragraph 169.

 5        A.   Yes, I have that.

 6        Q.   And the -- the thrust of the lengthy paragraph that appears there

 7     is to emphasise the refusal, as you characterise it, of General Mladic to

 8     follow the reorganisation and what he considered to be the -- his

 9     dismissal; correct?

10        A.   That's right.

11        Q.   Now, and you're -- you are familiar, as you indicate there, with

12     the events of the -- not only at that time, but of the 52nd -- the

13     discussions at the 52nd Assembly session itself where those issues were

14     raised before the Assembly; is that right?

15        A.   That's right.

16        Q.   Now -- so I take it then you recall that Dr. Karadzic made clear

17     from the outset that the issue was the fall of the Krajina and not what

18     he characterised as the successful Srebrenica operation.

19        A.   Yes, yes.  That issue was, yes, at that session, but I can tell

20     you what the essence is since you did not have an opportunity to -- well,

21     I was at the session myself.  Mladic -- well, his speech lasted for about

22     two hours, and in about two-thirds of his speech he made a political

23     speech.  He talked about politics.  So he didn't talk about the military.

24     He didn't talk about problems of the military.  He did not speak about

25     the problems of the JNA, warfare, and so on.  At that session, that is

Page 40063

 1     this very well-known session.

 2        Q.   It may be well known, Mr. Subotic, but I think you're confusing

 3     the 52nd Assembly session, that is the session that took place after the

 4     fall of Knin, with the 50th Assembly session at Sanski Most; isn't that

 5     right?  At -- during which --

 6        A.   Oh, all right.  All right.  All right.  I have this here about

 7     Knin.  Yes, yes, I've got it here.  And what I wrote is the way it is.  I

 8     cannot give up on any of that.  There's nothing for me to correct there.

 9        Q.   I'll return to the 50th in -- well, let me just ask you one

10     question about the 50th, because you refer to that in your statement too.

11     That's the Assembly session that took place after the session of the

12     Supreme Command we discussed.  At that session of the Supreme Command,

13     General Mladic indicated that he would be making a statement to the

14     Assembly or what is called -- what is translated in the words of expose

15     to the Assembly, and he did that at the 50th.

16        A.   Yes, yes.  He made this expose at the session of the

17     Supreme Command that lasted from the evening up until the morning.  And

18     in fact, there was no need for him to repeat that expose at the Assembly

19     session, but he did.  Nobody interrupted him.  Nobody stopped him from

20     doing it, but I'm telling you, and I claim that he talked about politics,

21     not about the military, not about warfare, not about what he was there

22     for.  Those are facts.  That is what all deputies in the Assembly know,

23     and the public in Republika Srpska know that.

24        Q.   Well, what your statement doesn't say and what you didn't explain

25     just now is those aspects of politics that Mladic talked about, at least

Page 40064

 1     in part, were complaints about the materiel and supplies that the army

 2     was receiving from the civilian leadership; right?  And that expose was

 3     criticised by the civilian leadership that was the object of that

 4     criticism?

 5        A.   In part.  In part.

 6        Q.   And your statement also doesn't mention the kinds of remarks that

 7     were made by high-ranking members of the Main Staff, including

 8     General Milovanovic, who said that the Main Staff has no intentions of

 9     attacking the government and that -- stating explicitly it is not up to

10     the army to lead the state, but the state is there to lead the army.

11     That's what General Milovanovic made clear on behalf of the Main Staff;

12     correct?

13        A.   He put that so well.  Excellent.  But I have something to add to

14     that.  They did not observe what he said.  They were the ones who were

15     not observing what he said.  At the session they criticised the deputies,

16     the ministers.  They did not criticise the army.  They were not

17     self-critical.  That's the problem.  And we did not achieve a thing at

18     this session.

19             What we achieved was a further rift, further disagreement.  After

20     that, the army went into this total campaign against Karadzic, against

21     the authorities, and for the most part they were addressing Serbia.  All

22     of that has been proven.  All of that is written down.  The newspapers

23     wrote about that, and there's no dilemma there whatsoever.

24        Q.   Well, we'll turn to a newspaper account momentarily, but let me

25     return now to the 52nd Assembly session.  Again, that's the session that

Page 40065

 1     followed within a few days of the events of Operation Storm.  And you

 2     will recall that, in fact, it was the -- that members of the Main Staff

 3     expressed concerns about various issues, and in particular, the issue of

 4     General Mladic's removal as commander of the Main Staff and appointment

 5     as a special advisor to the president; right?

 6        A.   Yes.  Yes.

 7        Q.   And although your -- some of your testimony in your statement

 8     seemed to suggest that the members of the Main Staff and the other

 9     generals were asserting that they wouldn't follow the Supreme Commander,

10     the position they took was -- and that is not described in your statement

11     was somewhat more nuanced, and that was expressed in the 52nd session in

12     this way, and that is that they wanted to follow the chain of command.

13     They considered the chain of command to be the Supreme Commander giving

14     orders to the commander of the Main Staff, the commander of the

15     Main Staff then giving orders to them, and that was the hierarchy and

16     chain of command that they insisted be followed in view of what they

17     described as the critical circumstances facing Republika Srpska.  That's

18     right, isn't it?

19        A.   No, it is not right.  It is true that they criticised, but what

20     they did was not realistic.  I can tell you when this comes to the 52nd

21     session and the situation it gave rise to -- as the main inspector in the

22     military, I carried out very precise inspections in the territories of

23     Drvar, Kljuc, the territory that had fallen directly, and I carried that

24     inspection out for a period of ten days, and I encountered terrible

25     things, disrespect of the regulations and laws, wilfulness.  I gave

Page 40066

 1     them -- or, rather, I wrote a report, I informed the Supreme Commander,

 2     the president, and the Assembly, and then I gave them tasks as the main

 3     inspector of the military, and they failed to comply with those tasks,

 4     and that gave rise to the second -- 52nd session and everything that they

 5     said at it.  And that's the truth.  If they had complied with the orders

 6     that the Supreme Commander issued upon my proposal after the inspection,

 7     Krajina would have never fallen.  We had enough power and strength.

 8     General Milovanovic knows that best, because he was the one who was in

 9     charge of the operation, and he also fell victim, as it were, because he

10     had entered Bihac.  However, it was ordered to him not by the

11     Supreme Commander but by somebody else to do differently.

12        Q.   Okay.  And -- and in fact, these -- this kind of criticism

13     concerning the fall of the Krajina was expressed by Dr. Karadzic not only

14     at the session, but he also expressed that publicly, did he not?

15        A.   Yes, yes.

16        Q.   Okay.  You referred earlier to newspaper articles.  Let me turn

17     quickly to 65 ter 13729.  And I'd like to turn to page 3 of the English.

18     And I believe --

19        A.   Yes, I have that.

20        Q.   Okay.  This is an interview published on the

21     16th of August, 1995, by "Telegraph" with Dr. Karadzic in which we'll see

22     a number of the themes that we've already discussed and that are

23     referenced in your statement as well.

24             At the bottom of page 2 of the English, we see mention of the

25     reasons for Mladic's dismissal, including the opening of the path to

Page 40067

 1     Glamoc and Grahovo, the fall of Knin.  And then there is expression on

 2     the following page in English, the fall of Kupres earlier and now of

 3     Glamoc and Grahovo is less the responsibility of the local commanders.

 4     Glamoc and Grahovo could not have been defended by the forces which were

 5     there.  That means that --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the appropriate Serbian page

 7     be shown to the witness.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I thought it would move along with it, but could we

 9     move the Serbian page to page 3 as well, please.

10        Q.   And there's reference to the fact that responsibility was not on

11     various people and not on General Milovanovic as you mentioned since the

12     disproportion of the forces was so great.

13             So is this a reflection -- another reflection of the position by

14     Dr. Karadzic that it was General Mladic who was responsible for the fall

15     of Knin and not some of the subordinate commanders, including

16     Milovanovic?

17        A.   Dr. Karadzic did not give that specifically, but in essence

18     responsibility was his.  He did not say that specifically in the

19     interview, but it was Mladic's responsibility, because previously

20     Milovanovic had gone several times to repair the situation.  Efforts had

21     been made, but the other commanders did not obey orders.  They didn't do

22     what they were told to do, and those are the facts.

23        Q.   Now, by this time, that is April -- August 16th, the decision to

24     remove Mladic had been rescinded, correct, and he stayed on as commander

25     of the Main Staff?  And that's reflected in this article as well when

Page 40068

 1     Dr. Karadzic talks about similar views of the -- so let's turn to page 2

 2     of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S.  Dr. Karadzic is asked about the

 3     conflict between you and Mladic for a long time, and what is the essence

 4     of this conflict?  He responds:

 5             "There is no conflict.  The competence is very clear.  I am the

 6     president of the republic and the only commander of the army, the

 7     Commander-in-Chief.  General Mladic is the second man in that hierarchy,

 8     the operative commander of the army, that is the chief headquarters

 9     commander.  There is mutual criticising.  I cannot say misunderstanding."

10             And he talks about the need to spot weaknesses and commanding,

11     leading and organising the army and so forth.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we be provided with the Serbian

13     version?  The witness is not able to follow unless he's given the right

14     page, and this is not the page that we have on the screen now.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I have it.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be enlarged a bit where it

17     says there's no conflict?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Tieger, this is correct.

19     There's no dilemma here.

20             MR. TIEGER:

21        Q.   Okay.  I'm going to return to that in a moment, but in the

22     remaining time I'd like to turn to a somewhat different matter.  As we

23     discussed briefly in talking about the issues that were raised at the

24     52nd Assembly session, Dr. Karadzic discussed the success of the

25     Srebrenica operation, although he criticised some aspects that were --

Page 40069

 1     that occurred after about not getting all the armed Muslims, and then he

 2     praised Krstic and Kusic for their role in the process, and we'll talk

 3     about that.  But you raised the issue of Srebrenica in your statement at

 4     a couple of places.  So -- and in paragraph 234 of your statement, you

 5     indicate your recollection of the discussion about the Srebrenica

 6     operation that took place before the operation within the

 7     Supreme Command.

 8        A.   I don't have the Serbian version.  I only have the English

 9     version.

10        Q.   All right.  Well, I'll relate what paragraphs 234 through 236

11     discuss.  They are under the heading "Srebrenica 1995."  They contain

12     both the question and answer and a narrative that begins with the

13     question you were asked, "Tell me, before the actions in Srebrenica in

14     July 1995, were they discussed in the Supreme Command?"

15             And you said, "Yes."  And you were asked about the nature of

16     discussions.  Your statement says, "We only discussed it in general," and

17     about the plan to block the advance of Oric's units and take Srebrenica,

18     so it was the plan just to take Srebrenica under the control of the

19     Serbian side.

20             First of all, do you remember discussing the plans that were made

21     at the Supreme Command in Srebrenica?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What plans?  Could we please see

23     the plans or the plan that was drafted by the Supreme Command?

24             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honour, that's -- these interventions sometimes

25     are a little bit much when I read from a statement taken by the Defence

Page 40070

 1     of this witness.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't agree.  He says that there

 3     are plans drafted by the Supreme Command that were discussed.  I need a

 4     reference for that.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Then he should have asked him at the time he was

 6     taking the statement and submitting it to this Court.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  At paragraph 234 of his statement, it was -- "So it

 8     was the plan just to take Srebrenica under control by the Serbian side."

 9             Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

10             MR. TIEGER:

11        Q.   So do you remember those discussions, sir?

12        A.   Yes, I remember those discussions.  It was not a plan.  There was

13     just a discussion.  First of all, I remember that it was stated that

14     there should be a separation between the two enclaves, between Zepa and

15     Srebrenica, and that had been agreed with the Muslims as well.  However,

16     the Muslim commander insisted -- why did we insist on the separation

17     between the two enclaves, because otherwise the demilitarisation of the

18     two zones would have been impaired.  The army of Muslims was in the

19     demilitarised zone.  There was a lot of discussions about that, and those

20     included Akashi and others.  Let me not mention them.  That was one

21     problem.  The second problem was --

22        Q.   I'm not asking for the moment about discussions at that took

23     place between the ABiH and representatives of the Bosnian Serbs.  I'm

24     asking you about what was discussed at the Supreme Command in connection

25     with the plan to take Srebrenica under the control of the Serbian side.

Page 40071

 1     Who was at that meeting?

 2        A.   It wasn't me.  You were speaking in English.  I did not hear you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is no interpretation.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I only heard your

 5     words in English.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   I said I'm for the asking for the moment about the --

 8        A.   Now I can hear.  Now I can very well.

 9        Q.   I was asking you about what was discussed at the Supreme Command,

10     not between representatives of the ABiH and representatives of the

11     Bosnian Serb authorities.  What was discussed at the Supreme Command in

12     connection with the plan to take Srebrenica under the control of the

13     Serbian side?

14        A.   What I've just told you.  Two things, that the enclaves should be

15     separate from each other, Zepa and Srebrenica, that is, and that

16     Naser Oric should be blocked in his activities, and if possible, that we

17     should enter Srebrenica.  That's what we discussed.

18        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Now, in paragraph 110 of your statement, you

19     include a passage that took place during the Krajisnik case where

20     Judge Orie was asking you about whether there were any examples of

21     General Mladic going beyond what he was expected to do by the political

22     leadership and having military success in doing so, and you said:

23              "You know what?  Now, I don't know whether this is a military

24     success or whether it's a catastrophe, now, that is debatable, but

25     Srebrenica is one such example because the political leadership did not

Page 40072

 1     ask Mladic for Srebrenica to happen.  I know with certainty that there

 2     was no such directive."

 3             Now, we'll talk about directives in a moment, but you related in

 4     one part of your statement, and you just confirmed to us, that there was

 5     a discussion at the Supreme Command about taking Srebrenica under Serbian

 6     control.  What are you referring to here in paragraph 110?

 7        A.   Well, both things are correct, my statement in 2006 and what I

 8     wrote.  Both are correct.  And I stick by both of these statements.

 9        Q.   In what respect do you assert that Srebrenica was an example of

10     General Mladic going beyond what he was expected to do by the political

11     leadership since you've told us that there was a plan to take Srebrenica

12     under Serbian control?

13        A.   Well, that's what happened when Srebrenica was taken.  That's

14     when he went beyond or allowed or transgressed or whatever you want to

15     call it.  I don't know who it was, actually, who allowed the crimes to be

16     committed.  It wasn't the Supreme Command.  Whether it was allowed by

17     Mladic or Erdemovic's group did it on its own, the mercenaries, nobody

18     knows that.  This has never been established.  This hasn't been

19     established yet.

20        Q.   And what crimes are you talking about?

21        A.   The crimes that happened after Srebrenica was taken.

22        Q.   So do you acknowledge that thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and

23     boys were murdered in organised exclusions following the fall of

24     Srebrenica?

25        A.   No, I don't know that.  No, I don't know that.  I don't know how

Page 40073

 1     many died.  There are certain figures which are mentioned in different

 2     versions, and up to this day these figures have kept changing.  Nobody

 3     knows what the exact figure is.  Your team or the judiciary team has its

 4     own figure, the journalists have their own figures.  Tens of books have

 5     been written about Srebrenica.  Experts from all over the world, from

 6     Yugoslavia, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they all proffered different

 7     figures.  I don't have any idea as to how many people were killed.  I say

 8     that personally.  I read several books about Srebrenica, and they are all

 9     different.  I read Meholici's book.

10        Q.   When did you first find out that there were executions of any

11     sort that took place at Srebrenica?

12        A.   Sometime towards the end of July, the month of July.  I was in

13     Pale.  I was in Banja Luka.  I didn't know a thing.  I did not know a

14     thing.  I am telling you honestly.  Nobody ever informed me about

15     anything.  I was in the office.  I did not receive any reports about

16     that.

17        Q.   Okay.  So you said sometime toward the end of July you found out

18     about executions that had taken place, and then you told us what you

19     didn't know about or didn't -- or weren't informed about.  What were you

20     informed about toward the end of July concerning executions of

21     Bosnian Muslims?

22        A.   Well, I was informed that Muslims, and I saw it on TV, that

23     Muslims were provided with buses to go to Tuzla.  I was also informed

24     that Naser Oric, and I knew that already, that Naser Oric had killed a

25     significant number of Muslims who did not agree with those things.

Page 40074

 1     That's what I knew, and I had that kind of information.  Not just me.

 2     That was generally known.  I didn't see anything.  I was not in the area.

 3     I was not duty-bound to go there.

 4        Q.   Just one last question so I can get a little more clarification

 5     before we break.  You worked with a man called Gordan Milinic; right?  In

 6     the office of the president.

 7        A.   Milincic, yes.  Yes.  To a certain extent, yes.

 8        Q.   He testified here recently --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Are we talking about the same

10     person?  The witness said "Milincic."

11             MR. TIEGER:

12        Q.   This is a man who later became part of the diplomatic service of

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina and was --

14        A.   An ambassador, yes.  Yes, an ambassador.  I think he held office

15     in Russia.  That's the man?

16        Q.   That's the man.  He testified here recently that the Srebrenica

17     graveyard was a farce and that the whole thing was a hoax.  Is that your

18     position too?

19        A.   I couldn't say fully that it was a hoax, but I believe that over

20     50 per cent of that is a hoax, over 50 per cent.  I am even convinced

21     about that.  I don't have any concrete proof.  I cannot prove that.

22     However -- whatever I have read so far and I have read a lot of material

23     about are Srebrenica.  I learned a lot.  Everything is really chaotic.

24     There are so many differences in those materials, so I really don't know

25     who it is in this world who can -- who can reconciliate those

Page 40075

 1     differences.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I note the time, Mr. President.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Mr. President.  We would

 4     like to have 65 ter 13729 admitted.  I don't know if Mr. Tieger intended

 5     to tender that, but we believe it should be admitted.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  That's a different form of admitting documents, but

 7     of course I have no objection.  Does it tell us -- the August 16th

 8     article.  Yeah, I join him [overlapping speakers].

 9             JUDGE KWON:  13729.  Yes, we'll receive it.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3718, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it as a P exhibit.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6407.

13             JUDGE KWON:  And, Mr. Robinson, is the Defence -- I'll rephrase.

14     Was the Defence planning to meet Salapura this afternoon?

15             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Yes, because his evidence has not been

17     concluded in the Mladic Chamber, and this Chamber has been informed by

18     the Mladic Chamber that he is not supposed to meet anybody else,

19     including the Karadzic Defence.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, we understand that.  We had our proofing with

21     him already, and we're just ready to have him testify now.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  And bear with me a minute.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE KWON:  With respect to the date on which Mr. Beara

25     testifies, in light of the parties' agreement that the 27th is a

Page 40076

 1     possibility, the Chamber hereby orders that Mr. Beara should appear on

 2     the 27th.  This should be conveyed to the witness as well as his counsel.

 3                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  9.00 on the 27th.

 5             Mr. Subotic, we'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.  In the

 6     meantime, I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody else about

 7     your testimony while you are giving evidence.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  The hearing is adjourned.

10                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.50 p.m.,

11                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day

12                           of June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.