1 Wednesday, 19 June 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
6 Yes, Mr. Harvey.
7 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President; good morning,
8 Your Honours. Happy birthday, Dr. Karadzic.
9 Your Honours, may I introduce Fabian Gems, who is a law graduate
10 from the university of Graz in Austria and has just completed six months
11 with the standby team to which he's been a terrific adornment. Thank
13 JUDGE KWON: I note the LiveNote is not properly working in
14 personal computers, but I think we can carry on. After a long weekend,
15 there are several matters to deal with before we begin today.
16 First, the Chamber will issue two oral rulings.
17 First, the Chamber is currently seized of two motions by the
18 accused for the videolink testimony of Nikola Poplasen and of
19 General Milenko Zivanovic filed on the 27th of May and the
20 11th of June 2013, respectively. The Chamber has received the
21 Prosecution's responses filed respectively on the 30th May and the
22 14th June 2013, opposing both motions on the grounds that the information
23 provided by the accused in support of both motions is insufficient to
24 demonstrate that Poplasen and Zivanovic are unable or have good reasons
25 to be unwilling to come to the Tribunal.
1 The Chamber has reviewed the information and the medical
2 documentation provided by the accused in the confidential annexes in
3 support of both motions. The Chamber is concerned by the cursory nature
4 of the medical information provided by Poplasen and Zivanovic's family
5 practitioners. Both doctors simply describe the relevant witnesses'
6 symptoms or diagnosis and advise against "long trips" without elaborating
7 further on the length of travel recommended or describing the anticipated
8 effect of such travel on the witnesses' health. The Chamber is thus
9 unable to assess whether Poplasen and Zivanovic are in fact unable or
10 have good reasons to be unwilling to come to the Tribunal. The Chamber
11 hereby requests the accused to obtain further medical documentation to
12 address these deficiencies in the information already provided.
13 Next, in assessing the accused' motion to admit documents
14 previously marked for identification filed on the 29th of May, 2013, the
15 Chamber has noted issues with four of the documents referred to in the
16 motion; that is, MFI D1267, D1669, D2594, and D3354. Regarding MFI D1267
17 and D1669, the Chamber notes that their English translations are
18 incomplete. For MFI D2594 and D3354, the Chamber notes that the English
19 translations do not correspond to the B/C/S original documents, and
20 furthermore, for D2594, the original document is illegible in areas. The
21 Chamber therefore instructs the Defence to upload to e-court complete and
22 accurate English translations for these four documents, as well as a
23 legible, original copy of D2594 by Wednesday, 26th of June, 2013.
24 That said, I'd like to know where we stand in terms of
25 Mr. Beara's testimony.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. You may recall that the
2 Prosecution requested that Mr. Beara's lawyer's appearance be excused on
3 the date that we had asked him to appear and indicated that he had
4 represented to them that he would file a motion last week to suspend the
5 proceedings as to Mr. -- Colonel Beara until a decision by the
6 Appeals Chamber and the issue concerning General Tolimir and whether a
7 person who had a case pending appeal could be compelled to testify. No
8 motion was forthcoming. Also, there was no response to my e-mail in
9 which I included the transcript of our discussion on that topic and asked
10 the counsel for Colonel Beara to agree to a date upon which Colonel Beara
11 would appear before the Chamber.
12 So as a result of that, I'm requesting that you order
13 Colonel Beara to be present on the 27th of June so that we can determine
14 whether or not he's prepared to testify. If he is, we can go ahead and
15 start his testimony. If he's not, we can -- you can entertain any of the
16 requests for suspension of his testimony pending the appeal decision in
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning, and good
20 morning to all in the courtroom.
21 This matter has been the subject of some ongoing discussions
22 between the parties, including discussions I've had with Mr. Robinson and
23 perhaps more pertinently discussions between Mr. Nicholls and
24 Mr. Robinson. As the Court will recall, Mr. Nicholls was in contact with
25 Mr. Beara's attorney and had more direct information.
1 Among the matters discussed was why the situation here was being
2 seen to be treated in a manner differently than the acknowledgement that
3 as occurred. I think with Mr. Poparic that the expression of an
4 understandable interest and about waiting until the resolution of the
5 Tolimir matter should result in the expedient of continuing the matter
6 until that resolution took place. Another matter that was raised was the
7 question of the parties' agreement to a particular date rather than the
8 unilateral imposition of a particular date that may have suited the
9 Defence. I know that Mr. Nicholls had intended to speak further to
10 Mr. Robinson about this, but let me indicate by the way the discussions
11 as usual were amicable and cordial, but I don't think they resulted in
12 the kind of progress that I would have expected in a matter as seemingly
13 straightforward as -- as this. So -- and the net result is that the
14 potential significant inconvenience to parties, both to Mr. Beara's
15 lawyer who must travel a long distance for what we all seem to currently
16 understand is a pointless reason, and the inconvenience to Mr. Nicholls
17 who would be required to fruitlessly prepare for an anticipated cross
18 that was not likely in any event to occur exists.
19 So I would at least encourage the opportunity for some further
20 discussion as we had anticipated between Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Robinson at
21 the first break. Then if no progress is made, at least we can come back
22 to the Court and with a clearer idea of what all the parties have in mind
23 and therefore what a better solution might be.
24 JUDGE KWON: So I take it at least that the Prosecution is
25 opposing to calling him only the 27th as indicated by Mr. Robinson.
1 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: Could I hear from the parties again then after the
3 first break, first thing? Very well.
4 And next there are some procedural issues, logistical issues with
5 respect to the next witness's evidence?
6 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, we have a lot of problems in
7 getting documents from Dr. Karadzic at the UNDU because of some
8 technological work that they did this weekend but we have those documents
9 now. They're in e-court, and we'll have to lead them live. So they will
10 be -- the testimony of the witness will take longer than we anticipated,
11 but other than that he's prepared to begin his testimony.
12 JUDGE KWON: No, I'm talking about Mr. Salapura.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, and the witness after General Subotic,
14 Colonel Salapura is also testifying in the Mladic case and his testimony
15 was envisioned to begin yesterday but apparently there's been some delay.
16 So it's not expected that he will complete his testimony in that case
17 until tomorrow morning. So we don't know whether or not we'll be
18 finished with General Subotic by then, but in the event that we are we
19 may have some delay before our next witness is available, and in that
20 event we were suggesting that the Court might inquire into the
21 feasibility of sitting in the afternoon tomorrow so that we wouldn't have
22 any delay.
23 JUDGE KWON: So I take it that Mr. Salapura in that case would be
24 testifying in two cases consecutively for a whole day.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: I think the Court -- I understand the Court's
3 question, and we raised it at least in passing, noting that very point,
4 that it would be a fairly potentially formidable task for anybody and
5 given the witness's age it might present a problem. We're not
6 suggesting -- I mean, we were in agreement on the suggestion. I'm just
7 acknowledging the understandable concern raised by the Court about that
8 possibility. Not much we can do about it, and as the Court I think is by
9 now aware, one of the reasons is that there was a suggestion about
10 inverting the witnesses and having Mr. Zametica come first, and as
11 Mr. Robinson indicated to the legal officer yesterday, that's not a
12 possibility because of the submission of -- of what he referred to I
13 think as a substantially revised statement. I think it's fair to say
14 that it's -- it's so revised as to constitute virtually a new statement.
15 An example of that is the fact that when we noted to the Defence that it
16 didn't include track changes, there was an instant acknowledgement that
17 the statement was so different that no track changes were possible. I
18 think that's a reflection of the fact that it's essentially and
19 practically a new statement, and therefore submitted on the eve of his
20 testimony. So we're still attempting to deal with the assimilation of
21 that new statement and would be absolutely impossible to accelerate that
22 witness's appearance.
23 So that's the situation we're in. We recognise the same
24 potential imposition on the witness that might be created by a full day
25 of testimony that is going from one courtroom to another, from morning to
1 afternoon, but as Mr. Robinson pointed out, in another matter the witness
2 appeared to testify for a number of days running without any difficulties
3 that the parties are aware of. That certainly doesn't preclude the
4 witness may say, No, it was tough, and for that reason I would prefer not
5 to be on the stand for many hours in a row. Unfortunately, the
6 suggestion that Mr. Robinson made about the possibility of an afternoon
7 session is the -- appears to be the only potential resolution of the
8 difficulty faced by the extended testimony in the Mladic case.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: Just clarification. So Mr. Salapura will appear in
11 the Mladic case as the Prosecution witness, and he will be the Defence
12 witness in our case.
13 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
14 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has decided to stick to original
15 courtroom time and to see how it evolves. Thank you.
16 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, could I make a quick point about the
17 absence of a LiveNote or visuals. I understand that broadcast is not
18 working either. The Court may not be aware of how often difficulties are
19 averted or obviated by the fact that other members of the team are able
20 to simultaneously follow the proceedings and on occasion alert me to
21 issues that need to be brought to the attention of the Court, need to be
22 clarified, and so on. I note that in particular in connection with the
23 issue that the Court raised about Mr. Beara. I don't think anything
24 irreversible has happened or particularly problematic, but I did get an
25 inquiry from Mr. Nicholls about what was happening. It's a reflection of
1 the utility and importance of LiveNote and the broadcast. So I would ask
2 that we do our best to get us back online before we proceed too much
4 JUDGE KWON: I take it the LiveNote issue has been resolved, it's
5 working now, and then I don't see any problem with the broadcast that can
6 be checked out as well.
7 Please call the next witness.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We're ready for
9 General Bogdan Subotic. If he could be brought in.
10 [The witness entered court]
11 JUDGE KWON: Would the witness make the solemn declaration,
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
14 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. May God
15 help me as I speak.
16 WITNESS: BOGDAN SUBOTIC
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General Subotic. Please be seated and
19 make yourself comfortable.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before you commence your evidence, General, I
22 must draw your attention to a certain Rule of evidence that we have here
23 at the International Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E). Under this Rule, you
24 may object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution,
25 or even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate
1 you in a criminal offence. In this context, "incriminate" means saying
2 something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal
3 offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might
4 have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an
5 answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer
6 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to
7 compel you to answer the question; but in that situation, the Tribunal
8 would ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would
9 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence
10 save and except the offence of giving false testimony.
11 Do you understand what I have just told you, General Subotic?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do understand.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, your Excellencies.
16 Good morning to all.
17 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Subotic.
19 A. God be with you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Please bear in mind that we should both speak slowly and pause
21 between question and answer so that the interpreters would interpret
22 everything, otherwise we will be wasting time by repeating what we said.
23 So, General, have you given a statement to the Defence team?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Thank you. That was a bit too fast.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please call up 1D9614.
2 Could we please have that in e-court.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Please look at the screen now. Do you see that statement of
5 yours on the screen?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Thank you. Have you read that statement, and have you signed it?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown
11 the last page so that he could identify his signature.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is my signature.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said
15 to the Defence team?
16 A. Absolutely.
17 Q. Thank you. Do you find it necessary to suggest any amendments,
18 any changes? Are there any typos there? Are there any mistakes, big
19 ones, small ones?
20 A. No need for any of that.
21 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today as
22 were put to you by the representatives of the Defence team, would your
23 answers basically be the same?
24 A. They would be the same.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to
2 tender this package on the basis of Rule 92 ter.
3 JUDGE KWON: Let's deal with the associated exhibits separately.
4 Any objection to the statement, Mr. Tieger?
5 MR. TIEGER: We don't have an objection, Mr. President. That --
6 that should not be seen as -- we know the Court has frequently
7 proactively reviewed statements for paragraphs or sections that run afoul
8 of the general guidelines, so we -- we certainly are not suggesting those
9 don't exist, but we didn't file anything independent of that, so there's
10 otherwise no objection.
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3695, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let's come to the issue of associated
14 exhibits. Yes, Mr. Robinson.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We're offering 19 associated
16 exhibits, ten of which were not on our 65 ter list either due to
17 inadvertence or the fact that the documents were added to the statement
18 after the list was filed. So we are asking that those ten be admitted to
19 the list and the 19 associated exhibits be admitted. I can detail which
20 ones those are if that would be helpful because they are not -- some of
21 the ones that are on our list are already admitted and others don't have
22 translations and so that's why the list is somewhat -- the number is
23 somewhat less than what appears on our list of associated exhibits.
24 JUDGE KWON: Shall we go through one by one?
25 MR. ROBINSON: I think that's the best.
1 JUDGE KWON: Just for the first item.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, the first item is 1D04152. The Prosecution
3 has indicated that it will be objecting to that document on the grounds
4 that it wasn't sufficiently incorporated into the statement, and I don't
5 necessarily disagree with that. So it's up to the Chamber, but ...
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, then please deal with it.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Okay we'll lead that one live if necessary.
8 JUDGE KWON: All right.
9 MR. ROBINSON: The second one is 1D05614.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 MR. ROBINSON: The third one is 1D261 --
12 JUDGE KWON: So it's the second one the Chamber would like the
13 Defence to deal with it live as well, because all the witness said about
14 this document is he was shown this decision.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Very well. The next one is 1D26126.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. That will be admitted. Shall we give the
17 number. Let's deal with it one by one. It's Exhibit D3696.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 The next one is 1D26133.
20 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit D3697.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: I'm pre-empting, but if you have any problem, please
23 rise, Mr. Tieger, as we go by.
24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I will.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, the next one is 1D26139.
2 JUDGE KWON: Any objections? Yes, that will be admitted. Shall
3 we give the number for that.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3698, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And next?
6 MR. ROBINSON: 1D26140.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3699.
9 MR. ROBINSON: 1D26142.
10 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is of the view that it does not form an
11 inseparable or indispensable part, and also I have some question about
12 the relevance, so I'll leave it to you to lead it live as well as showing
13 the relevance.
14 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. The next one is
15 Exhibit D1D26144. The Prosecution has indicated it doesn't believe it
16 forms an indispensable part of the statement, but I believe that it does,
17 so you'll have to decide on that.
18 JUDGE KWON: Okay. The Chamber agrees with you. We'll receive
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3700, Your Honours.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. The next one is
23 JUDGE KWON: Is it relevant, Mr. --
24 MR. ROBINSON: I think it's relevant but not indispensable. I
25 mean it's up to you. It's a corroborating document.
1 JUDGE KWON: It's about witness's termination of his service.
2 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.
3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll receive it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3701, Your Honours.
5 MR. ROBINSON: Next one is 65 ter number 04216.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, received.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3702.
8 MR. ROBINSON: The next one is 65 ter number 08032.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it as well.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3703.
11 MR. ROBINSON: The next one is 65 ter number 11500.
12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has doubt as to its nature of
13 indispensable, inseparable. It's part of the part, so we'll not receive
15 MR. ROBINSON: Very well. The next one is 65 ter number 15334.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3704, Your Honours.
18 MR. ROBINSON: The next is 65 ter number 15457.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3705, Your Honours.
21 MR. ROBINSON: The next one is 65 ter number 17664. The
22 Prosecution objects as not being an indispensable part of the statement,
23 I tend to agree with them, so it's up to you, but we could be prepared to
24 lead this live if necessary.
25 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, I will leave it to the Defence.
1 MR. ROBINSON: The next one is 65 ter number 18071. The
2 Prosecution also objects to this as not being an indispensable part but I
3 disagree and think it is, and also note that we've been admitting the
4 minutes of these sessions regularly and don't see any reason why this
5 couldn't be admitted.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We agree. We'll receive it.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3706, Your Honours.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Next is 65 ter number 20609.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3707.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Next is 65 ter number 32060.
12 JUDGE KWON: I would like the Defence to deal with it live,
13 because there seems to be some mistake because it does not seem to be the
14 correct document.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Very well. And the last one is
16 65 ter number 32124.
17 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3708, Your Honours.
19 MR. ROBINSON: That concludes the associated exhibits,
20 Mr. President.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We dealt with it like this because there
22 is some confusion as to the associated exhibits. Very well.
23 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now I'm going to read
25 out the summary of General Subotic's statement in the English language
1 and then I will ask the witness to answer some questions in relation to a
2 few documents that we will be leading live.
3 [In English] Bogdan Subotic was minister of defence of the
4 Republika Srpska from April 1992 to February 1993. When the new
5 government of the Serbian Republic of BH was elect on
6 19th of January, 1993, Bogdan Subotic was appointed chief inspector of
7 the army and military advisor to the Supreme Command of Republika Srpska,
8 and in May 1993, also as advisor to the decorations office of the RS
9 President Karadzic.
10 There are many reasons behind the outbreak of war in BH,
11 including Alija Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration with a worked-out plan
12 for the Islamisation of BH in the next ten years, as well as the creation
13 of national parties with very difficult programmes in BH. The
14 international community contributed significantly to the outbreak of
15 armed conflict. This is especially reflected in illegal imports and
16 procurement of weapons from other countries. In early 1992, at the
17 beginning of the war in BH no weapons from outside came to arm the Serbs.
18 Following the clashes between Croatian and Serbian armed forces at
19 Plitvice in Croatia, the Croats blocked Jasenovac, and Ustashas from
20 Croatia, the ZNG and Patriotic League and other paramilitary units,
21 flooded BH.
22 Bogdan Subotic decided to use all the available equipment and
23 soldiers to block borders with the BH in areas where they had been
24 breached in order to prevent raids by these paramilitary formations.
25 Serbs did not make any plans before the war. Alija Izetbegovic did make
1 plans. The Serbs made efforts in the Assembly of BH and wanted to
2 preserve Yugoslavia. They did not have any plans about incorporating
4 From the outset, Muslims and Croats in Sarajevo were prepared to
5 engage in war. The police forces were cleansed of Serbs and the illegal
6 formations within the Patriotic League were reinforced, within the
7 Territorial Defence and the reserve police force, there were also
8 independent armed units. The authorities left the Serbs without any
9 protection and allowed armed groups and formations to kill and abuse
10 Serbs and go unpunished. Complicity in the crimes against the Serbs in
11 Sarajevo included top authorities in BH. All decisions made by the
12 Muslim leadership were made at meetings of the innermost SDA leadership.
13 The media in Sarajevo, which were mostly under Muslim control, played an
14 important role in demonising the determines, instigating war and inciting
15 crimes against them. The international press portrayed Alija Izetbegovic
16 and his so-called multi-cultural Bosnia as an unarmed and unexpectedly
17 attacked victim of Serbian aggression. The Islamic religious community
18 took an active role in the pursuit of the political objectives of the
19 Muslims in BH as well as in the crimes against the Serbian people.
20 Radovan Karadzic did not illegally influence or pressure the work of the
21 government in Republika Srpska beyond the legal authorities of the
22 President of Republika Srpska.
23 The Crisis Staffs were created in municipalities in 1992, after
24 the other side created theirs. This lasted until mid-1992, when the
25 communication system was established and the Assembly took control over
1 the municipalities. They were practically not regulated. Everyone had a
2 difficult time, both the municipality leadership and the
3 Territorial Defence. A temporary solution organised to prevent and
4 anarchy. No one from the leadership was controlling the Crisis Staffs.
5 There were no lines of communication arose to -- the Territorial Defence
6 units were self-organised with no Supreme Command. The structure of the
7 army was proposed by General Mladic in accordance with the law. Until
8 the army was formed on the 12th of May, 1992, the public defended
9 themselves. There was an agreement between Alija Izetbegovic,
10 Radovan Karadzic, and the authorities in Belgrade that JNA units would
11 stay in BH as a guarantor of peace to prevent all conflicts and war, and
12 the time discussed was five years. They secured very little.
13 On 12th of May, 1992, in Banja Luka the army was created by the
14 National Assembly. Bogdan Subotic's task was to propose a Law on Defence
15 and the army to the government. The decision on 12th of May, 1992,
16 stated that the defence minister was responsible to bring out all
17 enactment and implementing legislation within three months pursuant to
18 the law. Radovan Karadzic never made decisions without expert
19 consultations. He always obeyed the law and never made decisions by
20 himself. He would consult the government or the relevant minister before
21 making a decision. He was not a soldier, and therefore when he made
22 decisions regarding the army, he would call on the minister of defence to
23 look at the laws and the rules so that he could make a decision which he
24 could then pass to the Main Staff. The Main Staff initiated military
25 operations. They would prepare a proposal for the president who would
1 consider it; he would then decide and issue his instructions.
2 General Mladic conceived of the Ministry of Defence so that no
3 one could interfere with the VRS leadership. President Karadzic did not
4 interfere with Bogdan Subotic's work, nor did he interfere in the work of
5 the government presided over by Professor Djeric.
6 General Bogdan Subotic did not agree with Mladic's method of
7 leading the army and he could not support it. When he was appointed the
8 minister of defence of BH he created the Law on Defence and the Army.
9 The duties of the ministry were resolutely regulated by this law with all
10 the necessary explanations. The state administration functioned pursuant
11 to the constitution, laws and regulations and instructions that were
12 resolutely worked out immediately after the formation of the
13 Republika Srpska.
14 General Mladic was in charge of strategic operations.
15 President Karadzic always consulted colleagues on all matters proposed.
16 No decisions were made without consulting the Assembly. From 1993 they
17 had good communications and received daily reports. President Karadzic
18 received his information from three different directions, from the army,
19 the police, and state bodies, municipalities. The government in Pale did
20 its best to ensure the rule of law and response international
21 humanitarian law in 1992. Communication was poor until 1993 and the
22 situation improved only after that.
23 General Bogdan Subotic disagreed with the way General Mladic
24 conducted the affairs and commanded over the army. General Mladic was
25 pigheaded, stubborn, and self-obsessed. He did not care much about
1 others' opinion. He was a narrow-minded sort of soldier.
2 General Subotic was against the war and the Orthodox commanders did not
3 understand or like him. The military was very single-minded and stubborn
4 with no sense of compromise and this is where the problems occurred.
5 President Karadzic is very religious and is a very humane man. In these
6 situations which were not planned he could not agree with the
7 single-mindedness of certain commanders.
8 In Banja Luka in August 1995, there was a document signed by
9 Generals who did not agree with President Karadzic. It was a petition
10 from the generals saying that they would only obey Mladic. The petition
11 was insubordination. President Karadzic brought an order to dismiss
12 General Mladic, but it was not carried out.
13 The competence and authority of the Ministry of Defence were
14 limited to formations and logistical and political matters. Operation
15 and command were not under the authority of the minister until the end of
16 the war. President Karadzic never issued any document containing the
17 words kill, destroy, burn or slaughter. The army and General Mladic had
18 views that were different from those of the president and the government.
19 He had a very Orthodox view of his objective, that he had to defeat the
20 enemy, force him to capitulate and so on. General Mladic was going for
21 the military victory whereas the state leadership wanted to achieve
22 results through negotiations.
23 When Main Staff was established General Bogdan Subotic
24 encountered his first problem as minister of defence. General Mladic
25 imposed upon the leadership of Republika Srpska that this should be
1 called the Main Staff. Mladic and Karadzic were both commanders. The
2 government and the Assembly allowed General Mladic to assume the role of
3 commander, but there could not be two commanders. President Karadzic did
4 not have effective command and control over the territorial units from
5 April the 1st, 1992 --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down.
7 JUDGE KWON: You are requested to slow down when reading the
8 summary. So could you start over about from the "... effective command
9 and control ..."
10 THE ACCUSED: The government and the Assembly allowed
11 General Mladic to assume the role of commander, but there could not be
12 two commanders. President Karadzic did not have effective command and
13 control over the territorial units from April the 1st, 1992, until the
14 creation of the VRS or on May the 12th, 1992, because the
15 Territorial Defence of municipality staffs organised a protection -- the
16 protection of the Serbian population on their territories, either alone
17 or in co-operation with the JNA that was withdrawing. Many factors
18 contributed to complications between President Karadzic, the state
19 leadership, and the Main Staff of the army.
20 General Mladic attempted every method of denigrating
21 President Karadzic's achievements and work by giving completely false
22 informations -- information about his actions and work. On the
23 8th of May, at the session of the Supreme Command, General Mladic spoke
24 rudely saying that he was not after power and President Karadzic was not
25 in touch with the population, and that Mladic was always closer to the
1 battles than the president. General Mladic's attitude and conduct were
2 impermissible. On August the 1st, General Mladic told Karadzic that he
3 was not his Supreme Commander. On August the 5th on Belgrade Radio,
4 Mladic stated that he did not recognise any decisions that he was in
5 charge and nobody could replace him. On 15th of September, at a session
6 of the War Presidency of the Krajina municipalities, President Karadzic
7 acknowledged that he bore most of the responsibility, but added that he
8 was not listened to and that his orders were never carried out. He added
9 that citizens were also to blame because they did not want to support any
10 measure against negligence.
11 President Karadzic had great respect for international
12 humanitarian law. Apart from tasking General Bogdan Subotic with
13 preparing the Law on the Army, President Karadzic asked him to study and
14 prepare all of the necessary documents which would bind the
15 Republika Srpska to respect the international law of war in combat. They
16 also had the legal framework for the application of
17 International Law of War. It was mandatory for all commanders to
18 instruct their soldiers on the conduct required in relations -- relation
19 to law or war. Throughout the war the President never wanted to sign any
20 documents regarding armed conflict unless General Bogdan Subotic or other
21 experts confirmed that that document was in full compliance with the
22 legal obligations. President Karadzic never gave any verbal or written
23 orders to kill, slaughter, execute, shoot, burn, or destroy. No crimes
24 were ever planned or permitted by these regulations or anyone's
25 positions. Sanctions were envisaged and applied as soon as a crime was
1 discovered. The Main Staff was responsible for implementing the
2 regulations on the law of war, including the treatment of prisoners.
3 Every soldier in the VRS was informed of these instructions.
4 On 12th of May of 1992, all units were placed under the command
5 of VRS. Paramilitaries were only incorporated into VRS if they had not
6 committed crimes. The military courts were under the purview of the
7 president and investigated all the cases of known violations and issued
8 about 300 judgements, judgements of crimes against the Muslims and
9 Croats. President Karadzic never exerted pressure on military courts or
10 the office of the prosecutor. He never exerted pressure or illegal
11 influence on the judiciary. President Karadzic took appropriate steps
12 within his power to ensure that investigations were conducted into crimes
13 committed by army members, the Republika Srpska police, or individuals
14 against the Bosnian Muslims or Croats. He always asked the prosecutor
15 and the president of Supreme Military Court of the Republika Srpska to
16 provide detailed information and demanded that appropriate measures be
17 taken. He endorsed the absolute independence of the judiciary and
18 recommended that enemy crimes be prosecuted and also the perpetrators
19 from their side be tried.
20 President Karadzic never issued orders to shell Sarajevo. He
21 never prevented or ordered to prevent the supply of the Muslim part of
22 Sarajevo with water, electricity, and humanitarian aid. He always
23 insisted that civilians be provided with conditions for a normal life
24 regardless of their ethnicity. Furthermore, there were frequent power
25 cuts and telephones lines were up and down at the seat of the state
1 authorities in Pale caused by the Muslim side.
2 The international community helped the Muslims a great deal.
3 Equipment, food and weapons were sent to the Muslims. There was much
4 dissatisfaction in the army about it, why it was allowed to happen.
5 There were attempts to speak to the Muslims in Srebrenica, calling them
6 to hand over their weapons, to leave and so on. President Karadzic had
7 no knowledge of any crimes committed against Muslims in Srebrenica in
8 July or August 1995. There was great mistrust between the Main Staff and
9 the president, which is probably why the Presidency received very little
10 information from the military leadership. President Karadzic believed
11 the civilian population should decide of their own free will whether they
12 wanted to stay or leave Srebrenica and that no one must be forced. The
13 population wanted to get out of Srebrenica, and this is also what the
14 Muslims wanted.
15 The Republika Srpska leadership agreed to hand over the airport
16 in Sarajevo to the international community so that humanitarian aid would
17 be delivered to the civilian population in Sarajevo to both Serbs and
18 Muslims equally.
19 Military rule was also necessary because of the strong activity
20 of the paramilitary formation, parastate bodies and institutions and
21 because the legal state bodies and other social subjects were not
22 performing their function in accordance with the constitution, the law,
23 and the agreed defence objectives and did not comply with the decisions
24 of the government and other state authorities. President Karadzic and
25 General Bogdan Subotic were against the introduction of a state of war
1 fearing the misconduct from individuals within the ranks of the army and
2 the government.
3 [Interpretation] That's the summary.
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I take it you are going to lead some
5 documents with the witness. Before you do so, Mr. Karadzic, I'd like you
6 to deal with the witness about his career, in particular after he quit
7 the job of minister of defence and what he did after he quit that post,
8 and in particular what he did at the time of 1995, because it's not clear
9 from his statement. Yes, please continue.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, your Excellency. That
11 is precisely what I meant.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General, sir, can you briefly tell us about your education and
14 then also about your career.
15 A. I completed the secondary military school and then the military
16 academy, then the Command Staff Academy of the Yugoslav People's Army.
17 As a soldier, I worked for the most part in the field of education and
18 training, that is to say at the school centre for armored units and
19 mechanised units where students of the secondary school and the military
20 academy were trained as well as those from officers' schools.
21 I achieved significant results in that field, in the JNA, I after
22 all worked at the school centre for 30 years. I received six state
23 declarations, high-ranking ones at that, also a golden plaque of the
24 school centre of the armoured and mechanised units.
25 My position was that I should carry out all my duties
1 conscientiously and precisely, all the duties entrusted to me by the
2 state. That is also the position I was in in 1991 when Yugoslavia was
3 destroyed, when it was broken up by the international community, because
4 that was a marvelous state of fraternal peoples, but the mighty from the
5 international community and America could not bear that, so they tried to
6 sow discord among us by all means, and that is how --
7 JUDGE KWON: General, I'm afraid Mr. Karadzic has limited time.
8 The question was about your education and your career. If you could
9 concentrate on answering the question, please.
10 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After I was minister for about a
12 year, I was appointed head of the military office of the
13 President of Republika Srpska and military advisor too. Also, I was the
14 chef de cabinet for decorations of Republika Srpska. It was called the
15 decorations office. That's what the law called it. Then I was appointed
16 chef de cabinet of the Supreme Command. Then I was also appointed chief
17 inspector of the army.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us in particular in view of this
20 position that you held as chief inspector of the army, tell us in the
21 briefest possible terms what your duties were and whether you managed to
22 carry that out and why the president needed his own source of information
23 and his own inspection.
24 A. You know what? All armies worldwide, including our own, there is
25 this need to have a military inspector. In all countries there are
1 inspectors who check the work of the army.
2 In our army, during that year while I was minister of defence, a
3 great many things happened, things that people didn't even know about.
4 The president didn't know about it. I didn't. The government didn't
5 know about it. We noticed that, as did the government and the members of
6 parliament, and they were absolutely in favour of appointing me to this
7 position so that I could check on what was going on in the military
8 units. My task was to see whether legal provisions, the law, were being
9 adhered to in the government ministry, Ministry of Defence. I took that
10 task very seriously, and I worked on it very precisely. I was often
11 praised by the Main Staff, too, although to my mind I think they were a
12 bit afraid of that task. However, even they praised me considerably for
13 everything that I had observed that -- also about everything that I
14 indicated to them, and things did improve.
15 Unfortunately, after one year, after what year while I was chief
16 inspector of the army, General Mladic and the Main Staff brought a lot of
17 pressure to bear. They didn't want me to be chief inspector of the army
18 any longer. Obviously, they did not like the truth that I conveyed to
19 the government, the Ministry of Defence, and the president of the state.
20 And I mean -- well, actually, their intention was that they do their --
21 that they do things their way and that the Supreme Commander and the
22 Supreme Command and the government just have a bit of insight into that,
23 the government least of all, because the government as a civilian organ
24 was not really highly regarded by them. So, in fact, after that, after
25 1993, the president had no one to get official information from except
1 the information that they provided as they saw fit.
2 Q. Thank you. I've been waiting for the interpretation, that's why.
3 General, sir, now, I'm not going to ask about lack of discipline
4 and things like that. During that year while you were inspector, did you
5 see the army committing any crimes?
6 A. No, nowhere, wherever I went, and I toured the area from
7 Banja Luka, Kupres, Jajce, and those other municipalities out there
8 towards the west. Then I toured in detail the areas of Bijeljina,
9 Sarajevo, and Herzegovina.
10 Nowhere. I did everything. I saw everything, wrote everything
11 down, but I never received any information in writing or verbally that
12 anyone had committed any crimes. I did have information about certain
13 groups, certain criminal groups or individuals did certain things, and I
14 conveyed that to the organs in charge and the Main Staff, too, of course.
15 So for example, there was this specific example, actually, when I had
16 this inspection out there, I mean facing the Muslims in the Bijeljina
17 corps. I wrote that in my statement. That's rather interesting.
18 The Muslim media, that evening when I appeared, when I showed up
19 for this inspection, in their media -- they used very strong language in
20 their media. They said that I came to carry out an inspection, that I
21 would dismiss General Mladic on that day, that I would do this and that
22 and the other thing. They were gloating, which was not true. And there
23 were cases like that.
24 Q. Thank you. And as for these other positions that you held, head
25 of the military office and president's military advisor and head of the
1 decorations office, how long did you actually stay in these positions?
2 A. Up until the end of the war, until Dayton.
3 Q. Thank you. What happened after that?
4 A. You mean after Dayton?
5 Q. First of all, tell us -- tell us --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Does it mean that you worked as an
7 inspector of the army until the end of the war?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I said that after 1993,
9 sometime at the beginning of 1993, General Mladic insisted that I should
10 no longer be the inspector, that the inspection is no longer needed
11 because the organs of the General Staff would carry on performing that
12 duty. Unfortunately, he managed to convince the president of the
13 republic to accept that, although MPs in the Assembly were not willing to
14 accept that. However, this is how things happened.
15 As for the other duties, I continued performing them until the
16 end of the war, and I continued being the head of the decorations office
17 even after the war, up until 2004.
18 Q. Thank you. I'm afraid that on line 13 I'm not sure whether that
19 was in 1993. I believe that you said "1994."
20 A. You mean the abolishment?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. I don't know. I can't remember, although I wrote that in my
23 statement. I know that I was there until the end of 1993. I know that
24 for sure. I don't know whether I stayed on for a couple more months in
25 1994. I can't remember.
1 JUDGE KWON: What is still unclear to me is whether you stayed as
2 an advisor to the Supreme Command until the end of the war.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Until the end the war I
4 remained the advisor of the Supreme Command until the end of the war.
5 Also I remained affiliated with the military office of the president of
6 the republic.
7 If you would allow me, I have just remembered the reason why I
8 was removed from the position as the main inspector of the army was the
9 following: When I had planned an inspection visit in Semberija, I had
10 prepared a team which included two colonels from the Main Staff. They
11 were supposed to help me. However, nobody knew where that inspection was
12 to take place save for myself and the president of the republic, i.e.,
13 the Supreme Commander.
14 When I arrived at the border facing Muslims, I was met by the
15 military police of the VRS. They stopped me, and they told me, General,
16 sir, General Mladic ordered that nobody was allowed to enter the zone of
17 combat activities. I answered I'm the main inspector of the army. I
18 have the authorities from the state to do that. And then the commander
19 of the police who first addressed me said, General, sir, my task is to
20 force you to return should you not obey the order. Obviously I returned.
21 I did not want to create trouble. I reported back to Pale and I reported
22 back to the president of the republic and that's when my mandate stopped.
23 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. What positions did you hold and until when after I transferred my
1 presidential duties to the vice-president, Professor Plavsic, on the
2 15th of May?
3 A. I remained as the advisor of the President of the Republic,
4 Mrs. Plavsic, and as the head of the decorations office. She had the
5 right to ask for my opinions, those that she deemed necessary to help her
6 with the organisation of the army, the army in general, the decorations
7 and so on and so forth, and I stayed in that position until 2004. In
8 2004, I was arrested by the SFOR in Banja Luka, and I was remanded in
9 custody in Tuzla for four days. About that I have a special note and a
10 special submission, and I will kindly ask the Trial Chamber and the
11 Prosecution to allow me to show you what I have prepared, because for
12 that reason I filed a civil suit in the united -- in America, and I would
13 like this Trial Chamber to accept that document, to look at it, and you
14 decide what you want on that.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we look at 1D9618 in
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. While we're waiting for the document to appear, General, sir, you
19 mentioned decorations and citations that you received while you were
20 still in the JNA. What about the VRS, were you decorated by the VRS?
21 A. Yes, from the VRS I received four decorations, but those were not
22 military decoration. Those were decorations for work, for humanity, and
23 so on and so forth.
24 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what you can read on
25 this page? The document has not been translated. What is this document
2 A. The title of this document is: "Tortures by the
3 High Representative and my arrest."
4 Your Honours, Prosecutors, Defence counsel, I experienced a major
5 injustice. I was arrested on the order of Paddy Ashdown who forced the
6 president of the republic, Mr. Dragan Cavic, and speaker of the Assembly
7 of Republika Srpska, Dragan Kalinic, in 2004, to find anybody who knew
8 the whereabouts of Radovan Karadzic.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: Well, this is one document we haven't seen before.
12 I'm questioning the relevance of this line of examination. This appears
13 to be part of the matter that the witness proactively wanted to raise in
14 connection with a lawsuit he has going, or something to that effect; in
15 any event, it doesn't appear to have a great deal of relevance to the
16 proceedings here.
17 JUDGE KWON: About the credibility, Mr. Tieger?
18 MR. TIEGER: If the accused wants to address the witness's -- the
19 credibility of -- fine. If the Court sees it that way, that's --
20 that's -- I have no problem with that, as with any number of matters the
21 accused raises that the Prosecution considers questionable relevance,
22 it's -- it's -- we're willing to listen to it.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We discussed this in the
25 proofing with the witness and this does relate to his credibility and to
1 the situation where he was placed on a blacklist by the
2 High Representative, arrested by the international authorities for his
3 connection to Dr. Karadzic. It's something that the Prosecution went
4 into with Mr. Bjelica and other witnesses. So it's an issue that relates
5 to his credibility. We had discussed possibly raising this issue in
6 redirect examination, but given that it's been a matter of a lot of
7 importance to this witness Dr. Karadzic decided to lead it in chief.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll allow the Defence to continue, but
11 Yes, please continue.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, sir, it was recorded that pressure was put on the
15 president of the republic and the Assembly to look for Radovan Karadzic.
16 Can you tell us just briefly what was the reason why you were arrested
17 and ill-treated?
18 A. In my statement or in my lawsuit I have described all the
19 details, but let me just tell you in a nutshell. Ashdown put pressure on
20 the president of the republic and on the Assembly -- or, rather, the
21 speaker of the Assembly, and the two of them under that pressure caved
22 in, and they said to us, If anybody knew where Karadzic was that would be
23 General Subotic. I received that statement personally from an American
24 colonel who was the deputy of the then commander of SFOR, Virgil Pecket.
25 In our conversation, he told me later on because he was a professional
1 soldier and he respected me as a general, he told me, Your president and
2 your speaker of the Assembly suggested that to Ashdown. However, all
3 that amounted to nothing, because nothing of that was true. But I can
4 only say that every detail and the tortures that my family and myself
5 experienced can only be seen in movies.
6 Q. Thank you. Besides your arrest, were they interested in anything
7 else? Were there any other actions with regard to the documents and all
8 other possession of yours?
9 A. My opinion is that everybody knows, everybody saw, because the TV
10 crews were always present. In principle, I am an analyst as a soldier
11 and in general terms. From 1991, I maintained notes about the most
12 significant and most important events at that took place. I continued
13 doing then -- that in the course of the entire war in the Assembly, in
14 the government, at all the meetings that I attended, and I was
16 Everybody saw that, TV recorded that. I used my own kind of
17 shorthand to make those notes. Those notes contained dates, names,
18 times, and so on and so forth. Later on I concluded after the four days
19 that I had spent in custody in Tuzla and when I returned on day five,
20 when I returned home, I realised that after I was arrested all those
21 diaries containing taken my note had been taken away.
22 There was a team which descended upon my family house. A hundred
23 people participated in that, as far as I know - later on,
24 Colonel Williams admitted to that - and they had taken away from my house
25 all sorts of things, bag full of things. They also took the 20.000
1 German marks that I kept in an envelope, and so on and so forth.
2 However, after the war, while I was working in Banja Luka in
3 peacetime, after 1996, I worked in the offices of three presidents of the
4 republic, including President Cavic. In my office I had enough time to
5 copy the most important parts of my notes. I typed them on a computer.
6 As far as I know, Mr. Tieger has those notes because they asked
7 me to e-mail all those notes to the Trial Chamber, to the Court, at least
8 that's what Mr. Sladojevic told me. And that's all true. So far from
9 the year 2004, from the 3rd of March, 2004, when there was an assault on
10 my house, nobody has ever turned up with those diaries of mine. I don't
11 know who took them. Nobody ever requested anything from me, nothing. To
12 this very day I am not aware of their whereabouts.
13 What was important for myself, for my office as a minister and
14 what I did during the war, I noted all the those things, the most
15 important things. I don't know what happened to those notes, who took
16 them away, and so on and so forth.
17 Later on I submitted requests to SFOR. However, they turned me
18 down. They did not admit anything.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document please be
20 admitted and I see that it time for our first break.
21 JUDGE KWON: It is not already sufficient what is reflected in
22 the transcript, given that this is not translated?
23 Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, it is corroborative of his
25 oral testimony. He would like it to be part of the written record, and
1 if we could MFI it and get it translated that would be appreciated.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: No, I object, and that has no -- this has no place
4 in -- in our documentary base. The witness explained a matter that I
5 continue to think is of marginal relevance, this kind of anticipated
6 rehabilitation of some sort, but I don't know what this document is, and
7 I don't understand why we're -- I mean it is a voluminous record for good
8 reason, but why we would clutter it with document of this type I can't
10 Also, I -- I want to -- well, let's -- let's deal with this one
11 matter at a time.
12 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, can the witness corroborate himself
13 would you say?
14 MR. ROBINSON: Well, documents generated prior to his testimony
15 in court can corroborate a witness even if they're authored by the
17 JUDGE BAIRD: Corroborate.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I mean, documents created at an earlier date
19 prior to the witness's testimony can corroborate his in-court testimony,
20 I believe. What weight you would give to that corroboration is another
21 thing but I -- in principle I think an earlier drafted document can be
23 JUDGE BAIRD: So the broad principle is a witness can corroborate
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we have lots of letters from witnesses, for
1 example, that they wrote during the war. That is an example of how a
2 witness can corroborate himself by some previously written document.
3 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
4 Mr. Tieger, do you wish to comment on that at all?
5 MR. TIEGER: I will. I -- I mean, I accept -- I understand
6 Mr. Robinson's point but this is a matter that's not in dispute. The
7 witness raised the matter that he was upset with SFOR officials or with
8 Mr. Ashdown and he took some kind of action. That matter is not
9 particularly in dispute. It was raised apparently to appease the witness
10 who raised some concerns about this, but now this is -- this is an
11 attempt to get before the Court all sorts of allegations, specifically
12 allegations that know nothing about on an untranslated document that
13 really are not relevant to the case. So there are two different matters,
14 Your Honour. One, I do accept the idea that if a witness says, I engaged
15 in this event happening, engaged in this action, here's a document which
16 shows the contemporaneous document from the time that shows I did it,
17 that may have point. But here on this very marginal matter the fact that
18 the witness may have initiated some kind of action is one thing, and it's
19 not particularly in dispute. The details of those allegations apparently
20 as reflected in this document are really irrelevant and not a matter
21 subject to the purported corroboration mentioned by Mr. Robinson.
22 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you.
23 JUDGE MORRISON: Well, as I always understood it, the witness
24 doesn't corroborate himself. He may produce a document which shows
25 consistency. Consistency and corroboration are two entirely different
2 MR. TIEGER: I accept that, Your Honour, and I -- you're right.
3 I was not focusing on the precise term that His Honour Judge Baird was
4 focusing on and I think Mr. Robinson and I both missed that in favour of
5 the sort of the general point of consistency as noted by Judge Morrison.
6 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes, there are indeed two different concepts.
7 Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, we allowed this line of questioning
9 because it may relate to the credibility of the witness. The Chamber is
10 satisfied with what is reflected in the transcript, i.e., his oral
11 testimony. In that sense, this document is unnecessary or irrelevant.
12 We'll not receive it at the moment.
13 JUDGE BAIRD: Given the time -- yes, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: I can raise this matter after we return,
15 Mr. President. It's just a clarification of the record, so I don't need
16 to hold up the adjournment.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Okay. We'll have a break for half an hour and
18 resume at five past 11.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.09 a.m.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Very briefly, I just
23 wanted to clarify a potential ambiguity or lack of clarity in the record.
24 The witness referred to some diaries and notes having been taken by SFOR,
25 and then later on as he was explaining that said, As far as I know
1 Mr. Tieger has those notes. Just to clarify what that is about, it has
2 nothing to do with any SFOR action. When we reviewed one of the
3 submissions of the draft 92 ter statement, we noticed portions that
4 clearly appeared to us to be not from the witness's recollection but to
5 be reflections of something that had been previously recorded which we
6 thought was possibly a diary and inquired of the Defence. At that time,
7 we were told something to the effect that the diary from which it had
8 been taken was no longer with the witness but that he had taken some
9 notes from those materials earlier and that was where the -- those
10 portions of the draft statement had come from, and those notes were sent
11 to us. Most, if not all of those are incorporated in the statement the
12 Court has. But I just wanted to explain how the reference to the
13 Prosecution's possession of those notes came about.
14 And, finally, with respect to the discussion we just had about
15 corroboration and consistency, just to note that I think that reflects a
16 bit of a legal cultural gap between two systems. Mr. Robinson and I
17 discussed it briefly. I think we both consider that in our -- the system
18 that we were trained in, that a document produced by a witness can be
19 used to corroborate that witness. The example I used in that case -- in
20 discuss with him was if a witness testified that there was some damage to
21 my house and I -- and, in fact, I filed an insurance claim in connection
22 with that and then produced the insures claim he had filed, that would
23 be, in our system, corroboration rather than consistency.
24 But in any event, the distinction between those two concepts is
25 not one that was particularly at the forefront of our minds. So I only
1 raise that because I -- I didn't -- I didn't want to undercut
2 Mr. Robinson's submission, and, secondly, because the distinction is not
3 as clearly to me as it was to His Honour Judge Baird and His Honour
4 Judge Morrison. I didn't want to later be seen as agreeing or
5 disagreeing with a concept I couldn't claim to fully understand.
6 JUDGE BAIRD: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. You see, corroboration as
7 we understand it by definition is independent evidence, and if it is to
8 be independent evidence, well, then it follows that it couldn't come from
9 the witness to be corroborated. That is the basic -- the basic
11 MR. TIEGER: And not to protract it, but I would say our system
12 would deal with that by identifying the nature of the purported
13 corroboration to determine whether it was, for example, so self-serving
14 as to be deemed not legitimate corroboration or whether the manner in
15 which it was produced was sufficient to give it appropriate weight for
16 corroboration. I may be wrong. I don't want to protract this legal
17 discussion any further.
18 JUDGE BAIRD: Fair enough.
19 MR. TIEGER: But I think that's probably where the two systems
20 tend to converge.
21 JUDGE MORRISON: I think it's probably where the two systems tend
22 to diverge, but nevertheless it's tomato and tomato.
23 JUDGE KWON: Any further update, Mr. Robinson, about Mr. Beara's
25 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I spoke with Mr. Nicholls and
1 we are in agreement that we're both asking the Trial Chamber to have the
2 matter scheduled for the 27th of June and we also ask the Trial Chamber
3 not to require Mr. Nicholls to be prepared to cross-examine on that day
4 given the uncertainty of what Mr. Beara is likely to do.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll consider the matter.
6 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. General, sir, you wanted to add something, but because of time
10 constraints if it's in the document, then it's not necessary, because the
11 Chamber has already announced its decision, and we have enough of your
12 words already that refer to that matter anyway.
13 A. I'm not a lawyer by profession, but, please, this incident by
14 SFOR does concern President Karadzic and myself. I was charged by the
15 High Representative of aiding the hiding of President Karadzic. I proved
16 that this is not correct. It was proved in any case that this was not
17 correct. However, I want to say this: I had a contact and a visit to my
18 house by three Americans from Washington. They asked me mostly to tell
19 them something about where Karadzic was hiding. I, of course, didn't
20 know that, but then they continued. The high-ranking advisor to the CIA
21 director came to me. Of course he did announce his visit by letter, and
22 he brought me a letter without a signature and without an address line,
23 and so I figured out that the letter refers to President Karadzic where
24 they are urging him -- of course he asked me to deliver it. I said, I
25 don't know where President Karadzic is, perhaps he's in the
1 United States. But of course I said, I cannot accept a letter that is
2 not addressed to anyone and that is not signed, you know. So we spoke
3 for a long time in my house, and during that time I wrote a letter to
4 President Bush. My daughter translated it. And I asked that gentleman
5 to take that letter to President Bush, but I did address it, and I also
6 did sign it. And I wrote to him about what was being done in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, what his army was doing, and other organs, how they
8 are behaving.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And that is why I insisted. Well,
11 that's all from me.
12 JUDGE KWON: I think we are going a bit too far.
13 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Thank you. I'm going to try to follow the chronology a little
16 bit. Did you know what my position was regarding the response to the
17 call-up in 1991 before there was war in our area but the war was
18 beginning in Croatia?
19 A. Your position was very correct and proper. It is known that the
20 war was started by Slovenia, continued by Croatia, and then it
21 transferred the war to Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are facts, and nobody
22 can deny that. The Yugoslav People's Army, or Serbs from Croatia, Serbs
23 from Slovenia, whoever could, fled to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina and the Yugoslav Army and the people, and Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina was full of people, of soldiers, and so on and so forth.
1 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, we need to be as brief as possible. What was my
2 position regarding the response by our people to the call-up, and how did
3 this stand in relation to the law?
4 A. The response was just. You came out in favour of the people
5 organising themselves in order to prevent chaos, that lives had to be
6 saved, neighbourhoods, houses, and so on.
7 Q. Can we --
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. General Subotic, I know it is very
9 difficult for you, but for the benefit of us having a correct
10 translation, interpretation, please pause before you start answering.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. All right. Very
12 well. I apologise.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 32060.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, sir, do you remember that we communicated by telephone
17 then in December 1991? Do you remember that I was interested in the
18 situation at the front and the response of our people to mobilisation?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. Very often in the indictment, and it is being
21 ascribed to me as some kind of sin, that he was in favour of
22 mobilisation, meaning myself. Can you tell us whether this was a
23 violation of the law?
24 A. No, there was no violation of the law.
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
1 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: Okay. The first part of the question was leading,
3 but I let it go because it wasn't an issue particularly in dispute, and I
4 also saw that Mr. Sladojevic was trying to caution Mr. Karadzic.
5 The second part, though, making a comment, and clearly indicating
6 to the witness what the accused's concerns are about the matter and then
7 seeking a response that will adequately address the accused's concerns is
8 inappropriate both as leading and as commentary and as even guiding a
9 witness beyond what would normally be found in a leading question.
10 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely. Just a --
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. You need to put a foundational
13 question first, and then please refrain from putting a leading question.
14 Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, your Excellency. I think that
16 I did lay the foundation when I asked him whether he was aware of what my
17 position was on the mobilisation before the war in Bosnia while the war
18 was raging in Croatia. I think that's the foundation. I apologise if it
19 was leading. I can put it to the witness differently.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. General, sir, have you looked at this intercept recently?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you. And are you able to say whether my interest and my
24 conduct -- what was my conduct and interest like? Did I have any kind of
25 order in mind?
1 A. No, you did not. Your -- you were concerned. You were asking
2 what's going on, what is the situation like. I said that these people
3 from Croatia were making a push at Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this
7 THE REGISTRAR: This is Exhibit D3708.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. General, we saw in your document on the 15th of April you made a
11 decision on the establishment of the Territorial Defence of the
12 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Are you able to tell us what
13 that implied? Was there a chief? Was there a single command planned?
14 A. The Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was inherited,
15 practically from the former Yugoslavia, the old Yugoslavia. Croats,
16 Muslims accepted their own men and in their own areas according to the
17 laws of Yugoslavia. The same thing happened in those areas where there
18 were Serbs. I couldn't say that there was no intermingling among them
19 and so on and so forth, but simply people organised themselves in the
20 best way they could.
21 Right at the beginning I tried -- there was nothing when I came
22 to Pale on the 8th of April, and then I tried to direct things so that we
23 could do something in terms of organisation. There was no army. The JNA
24 was in withdrawal throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was withdrawing
25 from Slovenia and Croatia. And we had to have some kind of force that
1 would need to protect people, ordinary people, households, and so then we
2 made the decision to use the already existing TO organisations, to
3 reinforce them as much as we could, and because they had broken off into
4 parts according to the ethnic principle. We wanted to consolidate that
5 there, and we wanted to do something until the army was formed.
6 Q. Thank you. And are you able to say if you appointed anyone to be
7 at the head of this Territorial Defence, a chief?
8 A. Yes. Colonel Vidoje was appointed as chief of the
9 Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Republika Srpska. He
10 had his own staff. I asked General Kukanjac. I requested that he send
11 me any surpluses that he had, extra officers, people who could do
12 something professionally in the interim until the army was formed.
13 Q. What you have just said is in P5565.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we look at D5614 now, please.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, by appointing this colonel, Vidoje Lukic, was there now
17 a control and central authority established over the municipalities?
18 A. To a certain extent, but in essence, no. To be honest, I did
19 try, but it was not easy. We did not in the true sense of that word
20 manage to achieve that until the army was formed.
21 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at this document. Could you
22 see who signed it, and could you tell me if you took part in the drafting
23 of this decision?
24 A. Yes, yes. The government -- the government and myself as the
25 minister of defence in the government. This document was signed by
1 Branko Djeric.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this please? Thank
4 JUDGE KWON: What was the question about this document,
5 Mr. Karadzic?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was whether the
7 general took part in the drafting of the decision signed by Djeric and
8 whether by appointing Colonel Lukic central control was established over
9 these municipal and other territorial defences that he referred to as
10 being scattered. It was only on the 15th of April that we got some
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll receive it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3709, Your Honours.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, sir, could you please tell us this: A bit earlier you
16 mentioned this multitude of Territorial Defences. Can you please tell us
17 according to the then national defence law in force at the time, what
18 were the powers of the municipalities in terms of defence?
19 A. The powers of the municipalities were there. I mean, they had
20 municipal staffs. They had municipal units of the Territorial Defence.
21 All of that was pursuant to the Law of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
22 and the found situation at the beginning of April or March or in late
23 1991 onwards was what was then used in all the municipalities.
24 Q. Thank you. And are you able to say how this was? What were the
25 autonomous functions of the municipality in relation to defence affairs?
1 A. The municipality had its municipal staffs. It had its own units
2 of the Territorial Defence which in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
3 were formed for the purpose of extraordinary situations, emergencies, and
4 this was under the laws of Yugoslavia.
5 Q. Thank you. And how did this reflect in our conditions in 1991 to
6 the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 A. Well, that was the only kind of organisation, that initial phase,
8 the only organisation that provided any kind of security to the
9 population, that people will not be able to do whatever they wanted and
10 that anybody would be able to attack whoever they wanted. There was some
11 sort of safety or security.
12 Q. According to what you know, who was it that was supposed to pay
13 the reservists who were registered in the TO of some municipality?
14 A. That was the duty of the government.
15 Q. And did it actually make the statements in the beginning?
16 A. Well, there was a symbolic payment, not right at the beginning,
17 though, but around that time. Until the army was formed there was some
18 kind of symbolic, minor compensation.
19 Q. And what would the powers of the municipalities in terms of
20 salaries for their brigades?
21 A. This went through the municipal TO staffs.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we please look at 65 ter
24 18709. This is the Official Gazette of the Serbian people in -- dated
25 the 13th of June, 1992. Could we please now look at page 15. 7500,
1 that's the ERN number. I believe that's page 15. And what we can see
2 here is we can see your -- actually, my and your order for the respect of
3 international law. It seems that this is not translated. This is 206.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. That addendum which you signed, you can see the signature in the
6 right-hand column. It says --
7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's note: We do not see this on
8 the screen.
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The lower left-hand corner, 206.
11 JUDGE KWON: You said we do not have a translation for this.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the 65 ter. The
13 Prosecution did that, but it's not translated. Perhaps it is, but I
14 don't see that it is. If we have 206 translated, then all the better.
15 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, why don't you collapse the
16 English version and zoom in on the B/C/S. Yes. 206.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need the bottom.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Thank you. This is what it says here:
20 [As read] "Rules on the level and way of payment of compensation
21 to members of the reserve force of the army who haven't been included in
22 establishment units of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina until
24 So that is the heading. And now Article 1, and could you please
25 focus on Article 2 now. That would be the top of the right-hand corner.
1 It says here:
2 [As read] "The resources for compensations referred to in Article
3 1 of these rules shall be ensured as subsidies to budgets of
4 municipalities that municipalities will plan as separate items. Payments
5 and control of resources shall be ensured by the organ of defence of the
6 municipality on the basis of records that will be provided by the command
7 and the units of the army."
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear
9 Dr. Karadzic. He started speaking too fast after he stopped reading.
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a moment, Mr. Subotic.
11 The interpreters were not able to catch up with your speed,
12 Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So, yes, the units of the army. So it's the question that wasn't
16 interpreted. Can you tell us until when this kind of financing of
17 municipal units through municipal budgets went on and whether volunteers
18 were treated equally? I mean, how did this reflect on volunteers that
19 were part of municipal units?
20 A. As far as I can remember now, this lasted up until the end of the
21 year approximately, and volunteers in these municipal units were treated
22 equally. I mean, together with these reservists.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted,
24 Article 206?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll mark it for identification.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3710, Your Honours.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. When was a state of war proclaimed briefly, for a short period of
4 time, end of June 1995? Do you remember what the powers were of the
5 War Presidencies in respect of mobilisation and other things that were
6 done in relation to defence?
7 A. This is the powers that they had. All the population that was
8 available, except for those who were involved in some work obligation and
9 for the very bare necessities of functioning, I mean, they were supposed
10 to respond to call-up, to mobilisation, because we had this critical
11 situation in the western part of Republika Srpska.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see 1D44042 in
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Can you tell us whether you remember this document that you
17 issued? Actually, can you read it? The text, not the part up there.
18 A. Commissions established on the basis of the order of the
19 president of the republic, number 01-1120/95, dated the
20 16th of June, 1995, for checking mobilisation shall complete their
21 activities on the 30th of July, 1995, because the decision on the
22 declaration of a state of war gave these powers to the War Presidencies.
23 Q. Thank you. Just one more thing. Can you tell us about this
24 stamp? What does number 2 mean within the stamp?
25 A. Number 2? The president of the republic had stamp number 1, and
1 the head of the military office had stamp number 2.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be marked for
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D3711, Your Honours.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Thank you. General, the establishment of the military judiciary
8 was within whose authority? Can you tell us whether you worked on that?
9 Can you tell us about the problems you had to resolve just briefly?
10 A. That was within your authority as the president of the republic,
11 and I as your assistant and head of your military office was given
12 certain tasks regarding organisation, then preparing sessions and
13 preparing other documents, that is to say, everything that you as the
14 president of the republic did not have enough time to do. That is to say
15 I carried out all of those preparations. Then they came because you
16 called them, and then we resolved these problems together, and that is
17 the way things went until the end of the war.
18 Q. Thank you. Did you have and to what extent investigation organs
19 and experts, and so on? What was it that you found there and how did
20 this develop?
21 A. Yes. You gave me the authority to find professional judges all
22 over Republika Srpska in agreement with the Ministry of Justice and so
23 on, also to find pathologists and experts who could assist military
24 courts in resolving crimes and carrying out other professional work in
25 that regard. There are documents to that effect and so on.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D44040.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Can you tell us --
4 A. We see here, I mean, this decision say for a military conscript.
5 Dr. Branko, medical centre in Banja Luka. He is appointed a medical
6 expert in the field of pathology. That is to say that I had the
7 authority, in agreement with the Ministry of Justice and so on, and
8 through consultations, et cetera, to admit him, I mean into the military
10 Q. Thank you. What was the attitude towards crimes committed by
11 Serbs against Muslims or Croats? What kind of instructions did people
12 have, say this military pathologist, in terms of the ethnicity of the
13 victims or perpetrators.
14 A. Very precise instructions, that's what they had. And I really
15 insisted up to a maximum that this should be precise, accurate, timely,
16 and so on. So I never allowed -- well, maybe you also remember this from
17 debates and sessions that we had with the military judiciary and so on,
18 then also with the minister of justice together. We always insisted that
19 all of this had to be done on the basis of regulations.
20 Q. Thank you. Are you aware of cases when experts like this one or
21 investigators, military investigators, the military judiciary or military
22 prosecutor and so on, that they hushed up or concealed something?
23 A. No, no. I'm not aware of any such case. I certainly would have
24 been informed.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted
1 for identification?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D3712, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: Can I just mention it wasn't particularly a problem
6 here, although it could have been. If we could just have a -- a -- some
7 summary indication of what the document is before the witness explains
8 it. That was a bit lacking, but the witness's explanation I think
9 allowed us to understand it sufficiently, but I'm concerned with other
10 documents that may be more of a problem.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
12 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, sir, did you have any insight into the situation the
16 beginning of 1992, before the outbreak of the conflict? Did you know to
17 what extent the SDS could control processes on the ground?
18 A. Well, in part I did have insight because, I mean, I had, I mean,
19 my own organs of the Ministry of Defence and all municipalities, and so
20 on. And I got that from them because they worked with the members of the
21 party and so on. This was a single system of work. All of that
22 functioned on the basis of those instructions that we had, I mean, that
23 were prescribed.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR TIEGER: I apologise for rising, but I think there is an
1 ambiguity that is significant here. The question was about the beginning
2 of 1992 which I normally take to mean around January or February. The
3 witness is answering in the context of his arrival in Pale after April as
4 I understand it, so if the -- if the colloquy continues I think we have a
5 built-in ambiguity. I think we need to know specifically what time
6 period we're talking about.
7 JUDGE KWON: If you could clarify with the witness, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly, Excellency.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. General, within the JNA was there information about the situation
11 on the ground, and from that point of view did you have reports about the
12 attitude towards -- or, rather, the participation of political parties in
13 developments before the outbreak of the war.
14 A. In part, yes, I did, I mean. Well, not everywhere, not in all
15 areas. But, I mean, where I functioned, I did.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D44034. Could we please have that
17 displayed. Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Please, this was signed by Radislav Mitrovic from the command of
20 the 7th Operations Group, and could you please look at line -- or,
21 rather, paragraph 3.
22 Are you familiar with such documents and this kind of
23 information? It says up here, "Information provided by."
24 A. This text is barely legible.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show the top of the
1 page, the command of the 7th Operations Group, the
2 19th of February, 1992, information provided.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Now, please, are you familiar with this? Was this customary?
6 Are you familiar with such an information? How often did they circulate
7 through the JNA?
8 A. I'm aware of some but not all. For example, this one, from the
9 command of the 2nd Military District, I did know about this, for
11 Q. Thank you. And I'd like to ask you to look at the second -- no,
12 third paragraph in the 1st Military District, a telegram arrived signed
13 by Milan Babic, and the JNA's required to leave Krajina, and SDS
14 extremists are spreading an alarmist campaign and announcing the
15 establishment of their own army.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
17 question or answer. We were doing a sight translation of the document.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Was that the SDS in Croatia, Babic --
21 JUDGE KWON: No. Just a second. The interpreters didn't hear
22 your question in full.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. The SDS, is this the SDS in the Serb Krajina within Croatia? Is
25 that what is mentioned?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Or Bosnia?
3 A. No, no. In Krajina, in the Croatian Krajina.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have page 3.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR TIEGER: Maybe the Court is not having the difficulty I am in
8 following the colloquy, but it does seem to implicate the concern I
9 raised before where we're immediately into a document on the basis of a
10 question about whether or not the witness had any familiarity with
11 information being about -- through the JNA about the situation, a
12 question so broad as to encompass anything and not provide any
13 assistance. Now we're talking about a particular document about which we
14 know nothing because we have no translation, and we're -- we're focusing
15 on particular parts as if there's some understanding of what that
16 document in general is. It's difficult to know where the questions are
17 going, what they're relevant to without at least some indication and
18 understanding of what the document is, and I think in the past we've
19 operated on that basis, at least an indiction of what we're looking at
20 before we get into the details. It also has implications in terms of
21 leading but more importantly just in terms of simple comprehension we
22 have a problem.
23 JUDGE KWON: The heading says the 7th operation group, but the
24 witness said from the command of the 2nd Military District. So I tend to
25 agree with Mr. Tieger's observation. We have little information about
1 what this document is about.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. General, sir, can you help us with this? What kind of document
4 is this -- or, rather, documents that circulated in the JNA?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon. On the other
6 page. On the second page. Could we see the second page? Could we see
7 who this was sent? My mistake I --
8 JUDGE KWON: So that's a leading question as well, whether it was
9 circulated throughout -- in the JNA or not.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Can you tell us who this information was sent to, General? It
12 says so on this page.
13 A. This information was sent to members of the JNA.
14 Q. Thank you. What kind of information is this? What does it speak
16 A. It speaks of --
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Sent by who? That's a question for
18 the witness.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we see the first page. Could
20 we enlarge the signature so the general could see who this is.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mitrovic, Mitrovic, but I don't see
22 this, the name, I mean.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please read his position and rank.
25 A. Assistant commander for morale and, I don't know, some kind of
1 affairs. So, in fact, this was -- as we say, this was the military
2 ideologue in the 7th Tactical Group.
3 Q. Thank you. Can we go pack to page 2 and then page 3? What is
4 this document? Is this the first time you see it -- or, rather, is there
5 something unusual here or is it the usual type of document, and what is
6 it by its nature?
7 A. In terms of its nature, it is propaganda.
8 Q. And how does it portray the situation on the ground, falsely or
10 A. Falsely. No, falsely. This is a document that I see before me,
11 and it presents the situation falsely.
12 Q. Can we take a look at page 3 now so that we see how they portray
13 the situation in Bosnia. So just in Bosnia, down there we see the Serb
14 Krajina. Can you read this to yourself and then see --
15 THE PROSECUTOR: The witness did not answer the question about
16 whether or not it was the first time he saw the document which I think is
17 significant since he's characterising it as false and now being asked to
18 address portions of the document which he may or may not have seen
19 before. I think it would be useful to have an answer to that question.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, sir, have you seen this ever, and are you familiar with
23 this type of information that are sent out in the field?
24 A. I saw this information, and I am familiar with this type of
1 JUDGE KWON: As Mr. Tieger properly indicated, when we do not
2 have the English translation, it's difficult to follow the witnesses
3 answer, whether -- when he says this is false or not or not. So please
4 bear that in mind.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Please, it says here the latest developments in BiH, the second
8 paragraph. Could you read it out.
9 A. Yes:
10 "The recent developments in BiH confirm that the SDS is not in
11 full control over the situation either. Some local leaders and
12 extremists objectively inflict damage on the Serb people there."
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear
14 Mr. Karadzic's because we were finishing the sight translation of the
16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Subotic, please pause. Please
17 pause. And, Mr. Karadzic, you as well, please pause. Please repeat your
18 question, Mr. Karadzic.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. How does this paragraph fit into your own knowledge and
22 A. This paragraph absolutely reflects an illogical position that is
23 detrimental for the Serb people. It's as if it were written from
24 Croatia, from some Communist ideology.
25 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Trial Chamber something about the
1 relations between the SDS and this type -- this profile of JNA officer
2 and also in Republika Srpska.
3 A. JNA officers who came to Republika Srpska and who were in
4 Republika Srpska otherwise, who happened to be there, who were Orthodox
5 Communists, they did not attach any importance to political parties.
6 Croatian officers, to Croatian political parties, Bosnian officers to
7 Bosnian parties, Serb officers to Serb parties. They only knew one
8 thing, I mean, one ideology. That was Titos, and those were the views
9 they expressed.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Should I tender this document,
12 Excellencies? Do you need it?
13 JUDGE KWON: Subotic, what I find it difficult to follow is this:
14 You said this is written by a Mitrovic in the 7th Tactical Group to be
15 circulated to JNA members for propaganda purpose. I don't follow. Who
16 was Mitrovic, and what was he doing?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mitrovic is an ideologue in this
18 7th Tactical Group. Political Commissar, if we can put it in army terms.
19 He didn't like something there, because he was still living in the clouds
20 and he did not realise what was happening in the territory of the former
21 Yugoslavia. And then he tried to -- well, in terms of people who were
22 protecting Yugoslavia, who wanted to protect the people, I mean, didn't
23 work. That is what this Mitrovic is trying.
24 JUDGE KWON: And is a -- is the 7th Tactical Group a part of JNA?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, 7th Tactical Group, that is
1 part of the JNA. That doesn't mean that all members of this
2 Tactical Group thought the same way as this Mitrovic did. We in the
3 Army of Republika Srpska also had quite a few "komesars" whose views
4 differed from the views of the entire Serb people.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll mark it for identification.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI 3713, Your Honours.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, sir, could you please help us. In one paragraph of your
9 statement you mentioned that the Islamic religious community was involved
10 in the arming; is that correct?
11 A. Absolutely. Absolutely. It can be proven. There are details
12 which I provided in my statement. I even provided some very accurate
13 figures about that.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D44015.
16 1D44015. The number is good. 1D20706. This is a 1D document. I would
17 like to call up that in e-court.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Please read the body. You don't have to read the heading.
20 A. This is an authorisation authorising Senad Sendic to take over
21 1.000 rounds for 120-millimetre mortar from the Mesihat of the Islamic
22 community, and those rounds were sent to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina
23 in Zivinice all for to meet the purposes of the Army of Republic of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are to be taken over due to the deterioration
25 of the situation on the Visoko-Sarajevo theatre of war. This should not
1 be obstacles put in the execution of this authority.
2 Q. Who signed this?
3 A. This was signed by the commander of the Main Staff. I don't see
4 the name. I can see just the facsimile.
5 Q. Is it Sefer Halilovic perhaps?
6 A. Yes, but the only thing I can see is Halilovic.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be marked for
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D3714, Your Honours.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. And just one last question accompanying a document. General,
14 sir, how did you perceive Crisis Staffs? What did you think and what did
15 you say about their abolishment? Did you say anything?
16 A. I asked you to abolish the Crisis Staffs as soon as possible, as
17 soon as the minimum requirements were in place for that. That happened
18 one month after the creation of the army. In conversations, the two of
19 us were on the same page. We both did not think that they were
20 necessary. As soon as the military and all the other institutions were
21 set up Crisis Staffs were no longer necessary.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I'd like to call up 65 ter
24 11500 in e-court. Can the upper half be enlarged, please. There is a
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. General, sir, on the 7th of July, 1992, you organised a press
3 conference; is that right?
4 A. Yes, and I called for the abolishment of the Crisis Staffs.
5 Q. It says that they have already been abolished.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. It says "where possible." What does it mean where it says "where
9 A. Where things were okay, they were not necessary. Where things
10 were not okay, they were necessary. Wherever it was possible to abolish
11 them, they should be abolished. There were municipalities where the
12 situation had not been ripe for the abolishment of the Crisis Staffs.
13 That was that.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3715, Your Honours.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. And another thing, General, sir, did we declare a war on the
20 Muslim-Croatian coalition? Did they declare a war on us? If that was
21 the case, when -- when did that happen?
22 A. No, it did not declare any war. As far as I know, we never
23 declared a war on anything. And as for the Muslim-Croatian coalition,
24 they did.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you now look at 1D44036. I
2 apologise. I would like to call up 11274 in e-court.
3 This is the transcript of the Presidency meeting which took place
4 on the 20th of June, 1992. I would like to call up page 4 in the Serbian
5 version. Towards the end of the page we will locate that in English as
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Please look at the bottom of the page after the discussion on the
9 implementation of a certain decision. Izetbegovic concludes here is a
10 decision on the proclamation of a state of war. It has been proclaimed.
11 Do you remember that that happened very early on in June of 1992?
12 A. Yes, that was very out and in the open. It was not hidden.
13 Q. I don't know how big the translation is, whether that can be
14 found in the English translation. Can you please read it?
15 A. What Izetbegovic says?
16 Q. Yes. Both lines, please.
17 A. "I would not give it much publicity. I would like to send it to
18 the Security Council. I would not give it large publicity here, simply
19 so that we did not create an atmosphere, especially when it comes to a
20 delayed action. So people might reckon that that is something. We have
21 to work and to dramatise things less."
22 And then Abdic says:
23 "I am not insisting on that."
24 Izetbegovic says:
25 "Therefore, the day of the declaration here, the decision on the
1 proclamation of the state of war has been passed."
2 Q. Okay. We don't need anything else. I am not going to ask
3 anything about Izetbegovic's mental state when he said that.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, if not the
5 entire transcript, at least the first four pages.
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We didn't have that -- we didn't
7 have the English translation of that part.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That is why I asked the general to
9 read it. It seems that the translation is only partial. It seems that
10 only Halilovic's words have been translated.
11 JUDGE KWON: No. It has some other parts.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that this particular part
13 has not been translated. I cannot go through the document on my screen.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, do you have any difficulty with marking
15 for identification of what was shown to the witness?
16 MR. TIEGER: Well, it depends on what we mean by that. If it's
17 just those particular lines -- first of all, I have no problem with
18 marking it for identification as a general matter. If it's the --
19 Dr. Karadzic seemed to concede that there was a context to this that
20 needed to be provided, including, for example, the words we see on screen
21 in English. That seems to be the case, as far as I look at it. And
22 finally, I would note that we would want to look at the remained of the
23 transcript to see if similar context is necessary. So we're somewhat
24 handicapped. I'm inclined to think based on what I can read on this page
25 in English that that has to go in, too, and presumably the portions of
1 the transcript between this portion and that portion which the witness
2 read out. So marking it for identification at this point is probably the
3 best expedient.
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark for identification only those pages shown
5 to the witness. And, Mr. Tieger, you can come back during your cross if
6 necessary to tender the remaining part which has been already translated.
7 That may be consistent with our practice.
8 Yes. Shall we assign the number.
9 THE REGISTRAR: MFI 3716, Your Honours.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. And now the last question and the last document, General, sir,
12 although there would be some more useful documents, but we don't have
13 time for that. What was your attitude in terms of discipline in the
14 army, in your capacity as the minister of defence? When did we manage to
15 achieve discipline in the Army of Republika Srpska?
16 A. My attitude was well-known. I insisted on the strictest
17 adherence to the rules of discipline. Obviously it was not easy to
18 achieve that, especially not at the beginning of the war and especially
19 during the first year. However, we always insisted on talks between the
20 government and the Supreme Command as well as the Presidency of the
21 republic. I -- in other words, we all advocated that. However, I cannot
22 confirm, as I had said here, that discipline was at an enviable level,
23 especially not at the beginning. Later on, things improved. Things were
24 applied more often.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we knew look at 1D44047.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Do you remember the interview which you gave to Milos Solaja?
3 A. Yes, I remember that interview. I have it personally in
4 Banja Luka. I'm in possession of that interview. I was very strict
5 there. I was very explicit in terms of discipline in the army. That
6 interview of mine was very positively regarded everywhere in
7 Republika Srpska.
8 Q. Thank you. It says here on page 5, topic: Disorder and lack of
9 discipline in the armed forces. And then your interview follows. Is
10 that your interview.
11 A. Yes. My photo is missing from the English version, but I
12 remember that interview very well and I have it in Banja Luka.
13 Q. Can you remember the date? It is not mentioned here, or the time
14 when the interview was provided?
15 A. It was in the second half of 1992, but to be honest, I really
16 can't remember.
17 Q. Thank you. Can this be admitted?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: No. I would object. I don't think within our
20 practices it's appropriate to say, I gave an interview, it was on such a
21 date, now I tender it. Lots of material would be coming in which would
22 essentially be 92 ter kind of material in -- in that manner. So I don't
23 think this has been adequately dealt with if for purposes of admission at
24 this point.
25 JUDGE KWON: I was about to raise that question. What was your
1 question about this document for the witness? Except for that he gave an
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I asked him
4 about his attitude as a minister towards discipline, whether he was
5 satisfied with the level of discipline and when was the satisfactory
6 discipline achieved. Three or four questions. He answered that at first
7 he was not satisfied, that he was very strict and very consistent --
8 consistent in terms of discipline in the army, and then he said that this
9 interview confirms that.
10 JUDGE KWON: You could have made a full stop after his oral
11 testimony. What's the point of tendering this interview if you do not
12 introduce the content of the interview with the assistance of the
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that it was
15 self-explanatory. We don't have the Serbian version.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General, can you remember what you said and what prompted you to
18 provide an interview on that topic?
19 A. We have an English version here. I'm sure you can read what I
20 said during that interview. However, I was inspired by what I saw on the
21 ground and what I wrote in my reports. I saw what was going on and so on
22 and so forth, since I do not read English, if I did, I could read it back
23 to you.
24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, if you could assist the Chamber why it
25 should receive this.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. This is an interview given in
2 1992, second half, so it corroborates the witness's current testimony as
3 to his attitude towards discipline and against crimes, which would
4 include crimes against Serbs. And although because we don't have the
5 original in the witness's language it's difficult to -- for him to
6 remember exactly what he said in this interview, we can see from the face
7 of the interview itself that it's relevant and consistent with his
8 position that he's expressed in the courtroom. For those reasons I think
9 it should be admitted.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We are of the view that there is a basis to
12 admit -- admit this document. We'll receive it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3717, Your Honours.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies. I will
15 not go on, although there are many documents which unfortunately are not
16 translated. So I had to do it by live testimony, and then I don't have
17 any further questions.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I need to come back to some of
20 these topics, I can do that during the redirect.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes. General Subotic, as you have noted, your
22 evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in its most part in
23 writing, that is your written witness statement. We'll take a break now,
24 but after the break you will be cross-examined by the representative of
25 the Office of the Prosecution. Do you understand that?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Just one comment, Mr. President. In response to
4 what accused says, I understand that he may wish to make a discretionary
5 judgement call about how he uses his time and which documents he wants to
6 lead, but documents that should have been used in examination-in-chief
7 should not be deferred until after cross when there's no opportunity
8 that -- the cross-examination to deal with them. So I think he should
9 consider at the break whether or not some of what he's not addressing now
10 should be done before the cross-examination commences rather than
11 engaging in a practice that we've complained about before, and that is
12 deferring the addressing subjects and items that properly should have
13 been raised if examination-in-chief.
14 THE ACCUSED: Sorry, I think a translation is responsible for
15 this conclusion. I did say if the Prosecution gives me a reason, I
16 would --
17 JUDGE KWON: Let's leave it at that. I take it that Mr. Karadzic
18 is now fully aware of rules we have here. We'll take a break for
19 45 minutes and resume at quarter past 1.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 1.18 p.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please proceed.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
25 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Subotic. As the President indicated, I'll be
1 asking you some questions.
2 A. Good afternoon.
3 Q. In paragraph 110 of your statement -- and I notice you don't have
4 your statement in front of you. I don't know if you want it to refer to
5 in hard copy or not, but since we may be referring it during the
6 course -- to it during the course of these questions, you're certainly
7 welcome to have a copy.
8 A. Perhaps that would be good.
9 Q. Now, that doesn't necessarily mean you have to turn to a specific
10 reference if you don't feel the need, but if you do, by all means feel
11 free to do so. I'm referring now to paragraph 110 of your statement
12 where there are questions asked by the Trial Chamber in the Krajisnik
13 case --
14 A. This is in English. Ah, all right. Well, yes, go ahead.
15 Q. Okay. That was provided by the Defence team. I imagine they
16 have the Serbian copy and can provide one. Let's -- let's try to see how
17 far we get without it, but by all means, if you need it let us know.
18 In any event, paragraph 110 deals with questions by the
19 Presiding Judge of the Krajisnik Trial Chamber concerning whether or not
20 General Mladic went beyond what the political leadership wanted him to
21 do, and the exchange between you and the Trial Chamber that is provided
22 in your statement ends with Judge Orie's question. Again, the question
23 was and again is whether there were any examples known of General Mladic
24 going beyond what he was expected to do by the political leadership, in
25 this case the question was and having military success in doing so. You
1 provided an answer in connection with Srebrenica that is reflected in
2 your statement. We'll be coming back to that later, but what is not
3 included in the amalgamated statement is the remainder of that exchange
4 with the Court which is found at transcript pages 26463 through 64, and
5 after your answer about Srebrenica, Judge Orie said:
6 "Let me take you back. I want to focus on 1992 rather than at
7 that later stage. Do you have any such example in 1992?"
8 You said:
9 "No, no, I don't know. I don't remember."
10 Then he continued:
11 "Yes. Would that mean, and I'm now putting it in another way,
12 that whatever military action or military operation took place under the
13 command of General Mladic did not go beyond what the political leadership
14 wanted him to do?"
15 And your answer was:
16 "Believe me, I do not recall. I simply cannot."
17 So those were your answers back in 2006 when you appeared in the
18 Krajisnik case; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Okay. Now, in your current statement, at paragraph 169 there are
21 references to the selection of General Mladic as commander of the
22 Main Staff of the VRS, and in that statement -- in that paragraph you
23 make two references. One is to the effect that Karadzic told you that
24 Blagoje Adzic had proposed Mladic, and the other which appears at the end
25 of the paragraph that President Milosevic wrote a letter to
1 General Mladic by which he bypassed President Karadzic and Mladic was
2 promoted as the first figure in the RS.
3 Now, with respect to the selection of General Mladic to head the
4 VRS, do you recall being present at the 50th session of the Bosnian Serb
5 Assembly in Sanski Most in April of 1995 when President Karadzic
6 commented on the selection of General Mladic and who selected him? I see
7 you nodding your head, but you have to answer audibly.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And what President Karadzic said at that time, and that's found
10 on page 324 in the English, is the following, and this Court has that
11 document in evidence and has heard this reference before:
12 "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for
13 Mladic. General Ninkovic, then a colonel, and General Perisic has
14 visited me before that, and I had noticed Mladic's blunt statements in
15 the newspapers. He was already in Knin then. I took an interest in him,
16 and together with Mr. Krajisnik I went to General Kukanjac's office and
17 listened to him issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin."
18 He explains then they spent countless nights in the office of
19 General Kukanjac and then says:
20 "We asked for Mladic and said that they should set up the
21 headquarters as they saw fit. We wouldn't interfere."
22 So in April of 1995, President Karadzic made clear who selected
23 General Mladic for that position and that indeed it was his selection;
25 A. Who do you mean "his"? I didn't understand. Whose choice is it,
1 Karadzic's or Hadzic's choice?
2 Q. Your statement seems to indicate that it was Adzic's choice.
3 President Karadzic said, and we have in this evidence, in April 1995 that
4 he asked for Mladic. He explained why, and then again repeated, "We
5 asked for Mladic," and said they should set up the headquarters as they
6 saw fit. So it was President Karadzic by his own words who selected
7 Mladic; right?
8 A. Yes. Yes.
9 Q. Now, in your statement at paragraph 112 --
10 JUDGE KWON: By the way, do you have B/C/S version with you,
11 Mr. Subotic?
12 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. There is no exact B/C/S
14 version completely because the paragraphs that quote from the Krajisnik
15 case have not been translated into B/C/S because the language section
16 declined to do that. So the witness has the B/C/S of the portions that
17 are not in -- from the Krajisnik case, and then those portions of his
18 statement that are quoting from his testimony in Krajisnik are in
20 JUDGE KWON: So part of the B/C/S statement, B/C/S version
21 statement in English when it relates to the transcript of previous case.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Exactly.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. Your statement at paragraph 112 indicates that, and it seems to
1 emphasise that General Mladic did not attend government sessions and that
2 that was a problem, but the fact is, Mr. Subotic, that as you said in
3 your 1998 interview, when the Presidency thought it necessary, they would
4 summon General Mladic or his deputy, and they would appear and brief the
5 Presidency; correct?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. And Mr. Djeric was part of that Presidency, attended those
8 meetings, and was present on many of those occasions when General Mladic
9 briefed the Presidency; correct?
10 A. In my statement, I said specifically by meeting how many times
11 anyone from the Supreme Command was at -- from the Main Staff was at the
12 session of the Supreme Command, the government, or the Assembly. I
13 stated that specifically, and then I also mentioned by name the generals
14 who attended these meetings. All of that is in my statement. I don't
15 have the statement in Serbian in front of me now in order to be able to
16 tell you that, but I guarantee that there is such a record. And in any
17 case, I can say --
18 Q. Sorry.
19 A. -- that --
20 Q. Sorry. Please finish your answer. In any case you can say
21 that ...
22 A. I can say that the army, frankly speaking, insisted on attending
23 government meetings and Presidency meetings only when they needed
24 something. That's how it was, and I stand by that 100 per cent.
25 Q. In -- in your answer you mentioned the Supreme Command, the
1 Assembly, and government sessions. Even before the formation or
2 establishment of the Supreme Command, as you indicated in your 1998
3 interview --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. -- General Mladic attended Presidency sessions; correct?
6 A. [In English] No. No. No.
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. [Interpretation] when -- when he was invited. When he was
9 invited, he would attend.
10 Q. Thank you. In connection with -- I'll move on to a slightly
11 different subject. I may come back to that issue.
12 Your statement contains a section which is generally headed
13 "Significant events during the war that indicate the nature of the
14 relationship between the civilian and military authorities," and then it
15 contains what appear to be large portions of your notes, and among those,
16 among that part of your statement we see at paragraph 157 a reference to
17 the 14th session of the Supreme Command, and that's session of the
18 Supreme Command that was held on March 31st, 1995, in which -- in
19 paragraph 157 you have marked the date 8 April, which I presume is the
20 date on which you made the notations that are reflected in the statement.
21 A. Yes, yes. Correct.
22 Q. There you refer to hatred and lies expressed by General Mladic
23 against you personally and his taking advantage of your absence and the
24 fact that you had not attended that particular session, but as you note
25 here, later read the minutes. And indeed, the minutes themselves reflect
1 that you were the person who submitted them; correct? And I believe you
2 submitted them on April 5th.
3 A. Correct. Correct.
4 Q. Now --
5 A. [In English] Yes.
6 Q. -- we have that transcript of that session of the Supreme Command
7 in evidence, and I wanted to ask you about certain references made during
8 that session that are not reflected in your notes but that do appear to
9 be pertinent to the issue of the nature of the relationship between the
10 civilian and military authorities. So let me ask you about a few of
11 those which you may recall specifically, you may recall generally, or if
12 necessary, I can call them up and show them to you in particular.
13 Now, with regard to you personally, at page 9 of the transcript
14 of that session, General Mladic expresses the view that you played a role
15 in the changes in proposals that were sent to the Main Staff and then
16 later sent on to the Assembly and claims that you deceived both
17 President Karadzic and the Assembly in doing so. I take it that was one
18 of the remarks that you had in mind when you stated in your statement
19 that he expressed a great deal of hatred and lies against you personally.
20 A. [Interpretation] Since I don't have the text from that meeting of
21 the Supreme Command, you need to tell me specifically what it was that I
22 did, and I will answer. I would like you to tell me specifically what it
23 was that Mladic said, because I wasn't taking the minutes at that
24 session. I was on a different assignment but what you said about me I
25 read it later. But I did not pay attention to some of these specific
1 things, but if you tell me specifically what it is, then I will answer
3 Q. Well, this is a discussion that begins on Law on the Army, the
4 Law on Defence, and so on, but I wasn't citing it for the purpose of
5 having you respond to the specific allegation. I just wanted to assist
6 the Chamber in identifying some of the issues that you were referring to
7 in your statement. So he seems to be talking there about either the
8 Law on Defence, Law on the Army, and materials that were sent to the
9 Assembly, but I'm not asking you to respond to the accuracy of those
10 allegations at this point, because I want to take you to another comment
11 that is not reflected, in fact, in your -- in your statement, and that
12 can be found at page 49 of the English and page 44 of the B/C/S if we
13 need it, and that's where General Mladic says:
14 "It is a fact, Mr. President, most of all for me and for you, the
15 two of us have the most responsibility when it comes to the situation in
16 the army. You as the Supreme Commander, I as a man at some rank who
17 should be together with my co-workers your right hand in the army. Even
18 if we are not practising that because you probably -- I'm not going into
19 that. I value Bogdan Subotic. He is a descent man. Your connotations
20 for him are all in order."
21 So this would appear to be a pertinent passage for a couple of
22 reasons, Mr. Subotic. One, because General Mladic talks about his
23 conception of the hierarchy of the army with Dr. Karadzic at the top; and
24 two, because in contrast to the only reference in -- in your statement --
25 not the only -- the reference in your statement, General Mladic offers
1 what seems to be a fairly generous assessment of you during the course of
2 that session. Now, would you agree --
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. English speakers should pause as
4 well until the translation is completed. My impression is you start the
5 next sentence while the previous sentences were being translated and even
6 when the witness was about to answer the question. I'm not sure whether
7 witness followed your question.
8 Do you understand what the question was, Mr. Subotic?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not entirely. It's unclear.
10 It's a little bit confusing.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, why don't we show the text to
12 the witness in e-court?
13 MR. TIEGER: Page 44 of the B/C/S, and page 49 in English.
14 JUDGE KWON: Of what?
15 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry. My apologies for that. That is
17 MR. ROBINSON: While we're looking for that, Mr. President, I
18 would just like to urge Mr. Tieger to make his questions more simple.
19 This is very, very hard to follow even for an English speaker.
20 MR. TIEGER: I will do my best, but what is happening here is
21 the -- I have to deal with voluminous materials and the question of
22 omission. That means I have to direct the parties' and the witness's
23 attention to portioning of large materials and quickly summarise them and
24 then ask the question. I'm about to ask the question in as simple a
25 manner as possible.
1 Q. Do you agree, General, that in this portion of the
2 Supreme Command session that was held on the 31st of March, 1995,
3 General Mladic indicated his understanding of Mr. Karadzic as
4 Supreme Commander, his position as Dr. Karadzic's right hand, and also
5 offered a generous or fair assessment of you? At least not a hostile or
6 hateful assessment.
7 A. I can answer that question. In that specific situation and in
8 all other situations when we're speaking about Mladic, Mladic is a man
9 who is intolerant. He reacts quickly, and if he doesn't like something,
10 he immediately reacts strongly to it. It doesn't matter if it's
11 General Subotic, or Karadzic, or the prime minister, or a deputy. I can
12 tell you I don't have anything against General Mladic. I never insulted
13 him. I never answered him back when he attacked me and referred to me
14 like that. Everybody knows that at the Assembly. I accepted him as he
15 was. General Mladic was bothered by the fact that I analysed, which was
16 my duty, to analyse decisions --
17 Q. What I'm -- you've had an opportunity in your lengthy statement
18 to express your views of General Mladic's personality. Here I was
19 referring to a very specific passage in a document that is reference in
20 your statement. I've showed you those passages and have asked you if, in
21 fact, as they appear to me, they reflect General Mladic stating that Mr.
22 Karadzic is the Supreme Commander, he is Mr. Karadzic's right hand, and
23 also expressing what I think would have to be acknowledged or non-hateful
24 views about you. And the reason I'm asking you about that is -- go
1 A. Yes. I would -- I don't have the statement. I would like to see
2 the statement and then I can answer.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we can scroll up what
4 Mladic was saying and continued. We can -- yes. That's good.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Do you see it, sir? It's at the end of the first paragraph.
7 A. At the end of the first paragraph. Let me see. Ah, you see,
8 this is what Mladic says. Could we zoom in on this part? It's very
9 small. I'm not able to read it. This first paragraph.
10 JUDGE KWON: Let us collapse the English for the moment. Oh, no,
11 please do not touch the screen.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was all right just now. Perhaps
13 you can bring this back. Yes. May I read to you slowly in Serbian and
14 then you can hear it in English. You're right.
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. We have the translation on the other side of the screen, sir.
17 A. This is what he says, see, "You as the Supreme Commander --"
18 just one moment.
19 JUDGE KWON: We can --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the fifth line from the
22 "You as the Supreme Commander and I as person of some rank who
23 should be together with my associates, your right hand in the army,
24 although we are not actually doing it like that, because I probably am
25 not going into that with you."
1 So this means that he admits himself that he is not in it. Do
2 you understand? Although this is -- this is -- well, I value
3 General Subotic. He's honest. Your connotations about him are all
4 alright, but I am the problem. I am the problem because I have the task
5 of checking documents of the Supreme Commander. I am a professional
6 soldier, very precise, and I do not permit any errors, and many errors
7 were made when I did not have the opportunity to save documents by the
8 president of the republic, and this is what is rankling him.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Mr. Subotic, in fact, you know, I submit to you that you know in
11 fact that is not at all what General Mladic is referring to there because
12 you purport to have read the entirety of this transcript and therefore
13 you would know the concerns that are addressed in this particular
14 transcript, and they include --
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Due to some technical difficulties,
16 we need to rise. I will consult the court deputy. We will rise for
17 five minutes.
18 --- Break taken at 1.52 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.56 p.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. General Subotic, the fact is that at this meeting, the focus of
23 the representatives of the VRS, including General Mladic,
24 General Milovanovic, General Gvero, General Skrbic, all of whom were in
25 attendance, was on issues that they considered affected command and
1 control and removed or reduced their effective command and control.
2 First of all, do you recall that that was the subject of concerns
3 expressed by the representatives of the VRS at that meeting? As a
4 general matter. Then I'll ask you about some of the specific concerns.
5 A. Mr. Tieger, first of all, I was not at the session of that
6 command. All of this was staged while I was absent as head of the
7 military office. So that is why I wrote and I took a look at this now,
8 the text further on, and that is why I wrote in my statement that Mladic
9 took advantage of my absence, Mladic and these generals, because I would
10 have given them an answer that would have been confirmed by the Supreme
11 Command, I assure you of that. So it is easy to speak about someone who
12 is absent. But he is not fair, because he made this statement while I
13 was absent, and I stand by this, by this opinion of mine that I gave.
14 Q. General Subotic, you purported to provide a series of relevant
15 extracts from events in order to paint a picture to this Trial Chamber of
16 the relations between Dr. Karadzic, General Mladic, and the Main Staff,
17 and I'm suggesting to you that you omitted some very significant things,
18 even though you were aware of them, and one of those is the fact that at
19 this very meeting that you reference in your statement, the Main Staff is
20 expressing concerns that some of the actions taken by Dr. Karadzic
21 undercut their command and control and make it more difficult for them to
22 do their work on behalf of the man they consider to be the
23 Supreme Commander. And one of the factors they raised in this meeting
24 was that they didn't have an ability any longer to promote people.
25 Do you recall that raised in this session, and do you also recall
1 that you didn't include that in your statement?
2 A. I did not attend that session, and I cannot comment on what it
3 was that they were saying. I simply cannot. I was just informed after
4 that session about what happened, but I didn't have any details. So --
5 well, let me tell you this: I can respond to your question in part, in
6 part. I mean in principle generally.
7 President Karadzic is not a man who was after victory as
8 Supreme Commander. President Karadzic very often, viewed from a military
9 standpoint, made it impossible for the army to make military assessments,
10 but he did that only because the entire world was against us, and
11 President Karadzic was only able to relent to the demands made by the
12 world in order for us to survive, to go on, to find solutions by way of
13 negotiations. That is the essence of President Karadzic, whereas
14 soldiers take a rifle to kill everyone, use cannons. That's soldierly.
15 So, anyway, you do the assessing now, but I think President Karadzic did
16 things right, because in principle I am antimilitaristic, so I was not in
17 favour of a war and especially not for some victory at any cost. That's
18 the problem. So that's my answer.
19 You say that the generals were harmed. No, they were not harmed.
20 No, on the contrary. Had we been at a victory and had we won, there
21 never would have been peace in Bosnia. Not a single people that is
22 vanquished is satisfied. This would have been a pyrrhic victory. That
23 is not something that Karadzic ever aspired for.
24 Q. You're talking in part here about Mount Igman, right, and the
25 fact that the VRS took Mount Igman?
1 A. I'm saying -- Mr. Tieger, I'm talking about all operations, all
3 Q. But that would be Mount Igman where the VRS had --
4 A. An example, Igman, now that you've mentioned it. I'll tell you
5 quite frankly. I'll tell you quite frankly. Mladic could have taken
6 Sarajevo from Igman. In Sarajevo, the Muslims asked Mladic, and we know
7 that full well, we know that full well, they asked Mladic to give them
8 24 hours to leave town. Robert Owen came, and he stopped that.
9 Radovan Karadzic accepted that. I'm asking you, and I'm asking all of us
10 now, what would have happened had Mladic taken Sarajevo? What would have
11 America done? What would the world community have done? Have somebody
12 give me an answer to that. And he could have taken Sarajevo. He could
13 have. Ask Robert Owen.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. You meant David Owen?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. And --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We had this Robert Owen too. He
19 was an expert for constitutional matters.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right. All right.
21 Specifically this is the Igman operation. Sarajevo could have fallen, no
22 problem whatsoever. Many times President Karadzic, just for the sake of
23 peace, for the sake of survival for both Muslims and Serbs and for
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Well, I mean viewed from a military aspect he made a
25 mistake, but viewed from a humane and human aspect he did an excellent
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And as you made clear in your Krajisnik testimony, Mladic didn't,
4 as you put it here, take Sarajevo because Karadzic told him not to;
6 A. I did not quite understand the question. I didn't hear it too.
7 2006 when I went --
8 Q. You just went on how Mladic in your estimation could have taken
9 Sarajevo, and as you made clear in your Krajisnik testimony --
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. -- the reason he didn't is because Karadzic told him to back
12 down; right?
13 A. That's right. That's right. I've explained this to you.
14 Q. One more -- one more thing about the meeting of the
15 Supreme Command in -- on March 31st 1995. Do you also recall that
16 General Milovanovic made it completely clear, made explicit that it was
17 the Supreme Commander, Dr. Karadzic, who had the ultimate say and that in
18 a situation where there was a standing order by General Mladic about not
19 allowing passage of persons through a particular area or into a
20 particular area the -- General Mladic's subordinates in the VRS in
21 keeping with the concept of command and control had to obey unless and
22 until they received an order from the Supreme Commander, Dr. Karadzic, in
23 which event they would then follow that order; correct?
24 A. That's right. That's right.
25 Q. Now, your statement also deals at paragraph 169 with events that
1 took place in the aftermath of the events in the Krajina and the loss of
2 the Croatian-Serb territories in the Krajina following Operation Storm
3 and refers explicitly to the 52nd session of the Assembly in
4 paragraph 169.
5 A. Yes, I have that.
6 Q. And the -- the thrust of the lengthy paragraph that appears there
7 is to emphasise the refusal, as you characterise it, of General Mladic to
8 follow the reorganisation and what he considered to be the -- his
9 dismissal; correct?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. Now, and you're -- you are familiar, as you indicate there, with
12 the events of the -- not only at that time, but of the 52nd -- the
13 discussions at the 52nd Assembly session itself where those issues were
14 raised before the Assembly; is that right?
15 A. That's right.
16 Q. Now -- so I take it then you recall that Dr. Karadzic made clear
17 from the outset that the issue was the fall of the Krajina and not what
18 he characterised as the successful Srebrenica operation.
19 A. Yes, yes. That issue was, yes, at that session, but I can tell
20 you what the essence is since you did not have an opportunity to -- well,
21 I was at the session myself. Mladic -- well, his speech lasted for about
22 two hours, and in about two-thirds of his speech he made a political
23 speech. He talked about politics. So he didn't talk about the military.
24 He didn't talk about problems of the military. He did not speak about
25 the problems of the JNA, warfare, and so on. At that session, that is
1 this very well-known session.
2 Q. It may be well known, Mr. Subotic, but I think you're confusing
3 the 52nd Assembly session, that is the session that took place after the
4 fall of Knin, with the 50th Assembly session at Sanski Most; isn't that
5 right? At -- during which --
6 A. Oh, all right. All right. All right. I have this here about
7 Knin. Yes, yes, I've got it here. And what I wrote is the way it is. I
8 cannot give up on any of that. There's nothing for me to correct there.
9 Q. I'll return to the 50th in -- well, let me just ask you one
10 question about the 50th, because you refer to that in your statement too.
11 That's the Assembly session that took place after the session of the
12 Supreme Command we discussed. At that session of the Supreme Command,
13 General Mladic indicated that he would be making a statement to the
14 Assembly or what is called -- what is translated in the words of expose
15 to the Assembly, and he did that at the 50th.
16 A. Yes, yes. He made this expose at the session of the
17 Supreme Command that lasted from the evening up until the morning. And
18 in fact, there was no need for him to repeat that expose at the Assembly
19 session, but he did. Nobody interrupted him. Nobody stopped him from
20 doing it, but I'm telling you, and I claim that he talked about politics,
21 not about the military, not about warfare, not about what he was there
22 for. Those are facts. That is what all deputies in the Assembly know,
23 and the public in Republika Srpska know that.
24 Q. Well, what your statement doesn't say and what you didn't explain
25 just now is those aspects of politics that Mladic talked about, at least
1 in part, were complaints about the materiel and supplies that the army
2 was receiving from the civilian leadership; right? And that expose was
3 criticised by the civilian leadership that was the object of that
5 A. In part. In part.
6 Q. And your statement also doesn't mention the kinds of remarks that
7 were made by high-ranking members of the Main Staff, including
8 General Milovanovic, who said that the Main Staff has no intentions of
9 attacking the government and that -- stating explicitly it is not up to
10 the army to lead the state, but the state is there to lead the army.
11 That's what General Milovanovic made clear on behalf of the Main Staff;
13 A. He put that so well. Excellent. But I have something to add to
14 that. They did not observe what he said. They were the ones who were
15 not observing what he said. At the session they criticised the deputies,
16 the ministers. They did not criticise the army. They were not
17 self-critical. That's the problem. And we did not achieve a thing at
18 this session.
19 What we achieved was a further rift, further disagreement. After
20 that, the army went into this total campaign against Karadzic, against
21 the authorities, and for the most part they were addressing Serbia. All
22 of that has been proven. All of that is written down. The newspapers
23 wrote about that, and there's no dilemma there whatsoever.
24 Q. Well, we'll turn to a newspaper account momentarily, but let me
25 return now to the 52nd Assembly session. Again, that's the session that
1 followed within a few days of the events of Operation Storm. And you
2 will recall that, in fact, it was the -- that members of the Main Staff
3 expressed concerns about various issues, and in particular, the issue of
4 General Mladic's removal as commander of the Main Staff and appointment
5 as a special advisor to the president; right?
6 A. Yes. Yes.
7 Q. And although your -- some of your testimony in your statement
8 seemed to suggest that the members of the Main Staff and the other
9 generals were asserting that they wouldn't follow the Supreme Commander,
10 the position they took was -- and that is not described in your statement
11 was somewhat more nuanced, and that was expressed in the 52nd session in
12 this way, and that is that they wanted to follow the chain of command.
13 They considered the chain of command to be the Supreme Commander giving
14 orders to the commander of the Main Staff, the commander of the
15 Main Staff then giving orders to them, and that was the hierarchy and
16 chain of command that they insisted be followed in view of what they
17 described as the critical circumstances facing Republika Srpska. That's
18 right, isn't it?
19 A. No, it is not right. It is true that they criticised, but what
20 they did was not realistic. I can tell you when this comes to the 52nd
21 session and the situation it gave rise to -- as the main inspector in the
22 military, I carried out very precise inspections in the territories of
23 Drvar, Kljuc, the territory that had fallen directly, and I carried that
24 inspection out for a period of ten days, and I encountered terrible
25 things, disrespect of the regulations and laws, wilfulness. I gave
1 them -- or, rather, I wrote a report, I informed the Supreme Commander,
2 the president, and the Assembly, and then I gave them tasks as the main
3 inspector of the military, and they failed to comply with those tasks,
4 and that gave rise to the second -- 52nd session and everything that they
5 said at it. And that's the truth. If they had complied with the orders
6 that the Supreme Commander issued upon my proposal after the inspection,
7 Krajina would have never fallen. We had enough power and strength.
8 General Milovanovic knows that best, because he was the one who was in
9 charge of the operation, and he also fell victim, as it were, because he
10 had entered Bihac. However, it was ordered to him not by the
11 Supreme Commander but by somebody else to do differently.
12 Q. Okay. And -- and in fact, these -- this kind of criticism
13 concerning the fall of the Krajina was expressed by Dr. Karadzic not only
14 at the session, but he also expressed that publicly, did he not?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. Okay. You referred earlier to newspaper articles. Let me turn
17 quickly to 65 ter 13729. And I'd like to turn to page 3 of the English.
18 And I believe --
19 A. Yes, I have that.
20 Q. Okay. This is an interview published on the
21 16th of August, 1995, by "Telegraph" with Dr. Karadzic in which we'll see
22 a number of the themes that we've already discussed and that are
23 referenced in your statement as well.
24 At the bottom of page 2 of the English, we see mention of the
25 reasons for Mladic's dismissal, including the opening of the path to
1 Glamoc and Grahovo, the fall of Knin. And then there is expression on
2 the following page in English, the fall of Kupres earlier and now of
3 Glamoc and Grahovo is less the responsibility of the local commanders.
4 Glamoc and Grahovo could not have been defended by the forces which were
5 there. That means that --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the appropriate Serbian page
7 be shown to the witness.
8 MR. TIEGER: I thought it would move along with it, but could we
9 move the Serbian page to page 3 as well, please.
10 Q. And there's reference to the fact that responsibility was not on
11 various people and not on General Milovanovic as you mentioned since the
12 disproportion of the forces was so great.
13 So is this a reflection -- another reflection of the position by
14 Dr. Karadzic that it was General Mladic who was responsible for the fall
15 of Knin and not some of the subordinate commanders, including
17 A. Dr. Karadzic did not give that specifically, but in essence
18 responsibility was his. He did not say that specifically in the
19 interview, but it was Mladic's responsibility, because previously
20 Milovanovic had gone several times to repair the situation. Efforts had
21 been made, but the other commanders did not obey orders. They didn't do
22 what they were told to do, and those are the facts.
23 Q. Now, by this time, that is April -- August 16th, the decision to
24 remove Mladic had been rescinded, correct, and he stayed on as commander
25 of the Main Staff? And that's reflected in this article as well when
1 Dr. Karadzic talks about similar views of the -- so let's turn to page 2
2 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S. Dr. Karadzic is asked about the
3 conflict between you and Mladic for a long time, and what is the essence
4 of this conflict? He responds:
5 "There is no conflict. The competence is very clear. I am the
6 president of the republic and the only commander of the army, the
7 Commander-in-Chief. General Mladic is the second man in that hierarchy,
8 the operative commander of the army, that is the chief headquarters
9 commander. There is mutual criticising. I cannot say misunderstanding."
10 And he talks about the need to spot weaknesses and commanding,
11 leading and organising the army and so forth.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we be provided with the Serbian
13 version? The witness is not able to follow unless he's given the right
14 page, and this is not the page that we have on the screen now.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I have it.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be enlarged a bit where it
17 says there's no conflict?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Tieger, this is correct.
19 There's no dilemma here.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Okay. I'm going to return to that in a moment, but in the
22 remaining time I'd like to turn to a somewhat different matter. As we
23 discussed briefly in talking about the issues that were raised at the
24 52nd Assembly session, Dr. Karadzic discussed the success of the
25 Srebrenica operation, although he criticised some aspects that were --
1 that occurred after about not getting all the armed Muslims, and then he
2 praised Krstic and Kusic for their role in the process, and we'll talk
3 about that. But you raised the issue of Srebrenica in your statement at
4 a couple of places. So -- and in paragraph 234 of your statement, you
5 indicate your recollection of the discussion about the Srebrenica
6 operation that took place before the operation within the
7 Supreme Command.
8 A. I don't have the Serbian version. I only have the English
10 Q. All right. Well, I'll relate what paragraphs 234 through 236
11 discuss. They are under the heading "Srebrenica 1995." They contain
12 both the question and answer and a narrative that begins with the
13 question you were asked, "Tell me, before the actions in Srebrenica in
14 July 1995, were they discussed in the Supreme Command?"
15 And you said, "Yes." And you were asked about the nature of
16 discussions. Your statement says, "We only discussed it in general," and
17 about the plan to block the advance of Oric's units and take Srebrenica,
18 so it was the plan just to take Srebrenica under the control of the
19 Serbian side.
20 First of all, do you remember discussing the plans that were made
21 at the Supreme Command in Srebrenica?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What plans? Could we please see
23 the plans or the plan that was drafted by the Supreme Command?
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that's -- these interventions sometimes
25 are a little bit much when I read from a statement taken by the Defence
1 of this witness.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't agree. He says that there
3 are plans drafted by the Supreme Command that were discussed. I need a
4 reference for that.
5 MR. TIEGER: Then he should have asked him at the time he was
6 taking the statement and submitting it to this Court.
7 JUDGE KWON: At paragraph 234 of his statement, it was -- "So it
8 was the plan just to take Srebrenica under control by the Serbian side."
9 Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. So do you remember those discussions, sir?
12 A. Yes, I remember those discussions. It was not a plan. There was
13 just a discussion. First of all, I remember that it was stated that
14 there should be a separation between the two enclaves, between Zepa and
15 Srebrenica, and that had been agreed with the Muslims as well. However,
16 the Muslim commander insisted -- why did we insist on the separation
17 between the two enclaves, because otherwise the demilitarisation of the
18 two zones would have been impaired. The army of Muslims was in the
19 demilitarised zone. There was a lot of discussions about that, and those
20 included Akashi and others. Let me not mention them. That was one
21 problem. The second problem was --
22 Q. I'm not asking for the moment about discussions at that took
23 place between the ABiH and representatives of the Bosnian Serbs. I'm
24 asking you about what was discussed at the Supreme Command in connection
25 with the plan to take Srebrenica under the control of the Serbian side.
1 Who was at that meeting?
2 A. It wasn't me. You were speaking in English. I did not hear you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is no interpretation.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I only heard your
5 words in English.
6 MR. TIEGER:
7 Q. I said I'm for the asking for the moment about the --
8 A. Now I can hear. Now I can very well.
9 Q. I was asking you about what was discussed at the Supreme Command,
10 not between representatives of the ABiH and representatives of the
11 Bosnian Serb authorities. What was discussed at the Supreme Command in
12 connection with the plan to take Srebrenica under the control of the
13 Serbian side?
14 A. What I've just told you. Two things, that the enclaves should be
15 separate from each other, Zepa and Srebrenica, that is, and that
16 Naser Oric should be blocked in his activities, and if possible, that we
17 should enter Srebrenica. That's what we discussed.
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now, in paragraph 110 of your statement, you
19 include a passage that took place during the Krajisnik case where
20 Judge Orie was asking you about whether there were any examples of
21 General Mladic going beyond what he was expected to do by the political
22 leadership and having military success in doing so, and you said:
23 "You know what? Now, I don't know whether this is a military
24 success or whether it's a catastrophe, now, that is debatable, but
25 Srebrenica is one such example because the political leadership did not
1 ask Mladic for Srebrenica to happen. I know with certainty that there
2 was no such directive."
3 Now, we'll talk about directives in a moment, but you related in
4 one part of your statement, and you just confirmed to us, that there was
5 a discussion at the Supreme Command about taking Srebrenica under Serbian
6 control. What are you referring to here in paragraph 110?
7 A. Well, both things are correct, my statement in 2006 and what I
8 wrote. Both are correct. And I stick by both of these statements.
9 Q. In what respect do you assert that Srebrenica was an example of
10 General Mladic going beyond what he was expected to do by the political
11 leadership since you've told us that there was a plan to take Srebrenica
12 under Serbian control?
13 A. Well, that's what happened when Srebrenica was taken. That's
14 when he went beyond or allowed or transgressed or whatever you want to
15 call it. I don't know who it was, actually, who allowed the crimes to be
16 committed. It wasn't the Supreme Command. Whether it was allowed by
17 Mladic or Erdemovic's group did it on its own, the mercenaries, nobody
18 knows that. This has never been established. This hasn't been
19 established yet.
20 Q. And what crimes are you talking about?
21 A. The crimes that happened after Srebrenica was taken.
22 Q. So do you acknowledge that thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and
23 boys were murdered in organised exclusions following the fall of
25 A. No, I don't know that. No, I don't know that. I don't know how
1 many died. There are certain figures which are mentioned in different
2 versions, and up to this day these figures have kept changing. Nobody
3 knows what the exact figure is. Your team or the judiciary team has its
4 own figure, the journalists have their own figures. Tens of books have
5 been written about Srebrenica. Experts from all over the world, from
6 Yugoslavia, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they all proffered different
7 figures. I don't have any idea as to how many people were killed. I say
8 that personally. I read several books about Srebrenica, and they are all
9 different. I read Meholici's book.
10 Q. When did you first find out that there were executions of any
11 sort that took place at Srebrenica?
12 A. Sometime towards the end of July, the month of July. I was in
13 Pale. I was in Banja Luka. I didn't know a thing. I did not know a
14 thing. I am telling you honestly. Nobody ever informed me about
15 anything. I was in the office. I did not receive any reports about
17 Q. Okay. So you said sometime toward the end of July you found out
18 about executions that had taken place, and then you told us what you
19 didn't know about or didn't -- or weren't informed about. What were you
20 informed about toward the end of July concerning executions of
21 Bosnian Muslims?
22 A. Well, I was informed that Muslims, and I saw it on TV, that
23 Muslims were provided with buses to go to Tuzla. I was also informed
24 that Naser Oric, and I knew that already, that Naser Oric had killed a
25 significant number of Muslims who did not agree with those things.
1 That's what I knew, and I had that kind of information. Not just me.
2 That was generally known. I didn't see anything. I was not in the area.
3 I was not duty-bound to go there.
4 Q. Just one last question so I can get a little more clarification
5 before we break. You worked with a man called Gordan Milinic; right? In
6 the office of the president.
7 A. Milincic, yes. Yes. To a certain extent, yes.
8 Q. He testified here recently --
9 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Are we talking about the same
10 person? The witness said "Milincic."
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. This is a man who later became part of the diplomatic service of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina and was --
14 A. An ambassador, yes. Yes, an ambassador. I think he held office
15 in Russia. That's the man?
16 Q. That's the man. He testified here recently that the Srebrenica
17 graveyard was a farce and that the whole thing was a hoax. Is that your
18 position too?
19 A. I couldn't say fully that it was a hoax, but I believe that over
20 50 per cent of that is a hoax, over 50 per cent. I am even convinced
21 about that. I don't have any concrete proof. I cannot prove that.
22 However -- whatever I have read so far and I have read a lot of material
23 about are Srebrenica. I learned a lot. Everything is really chaotic.
24 There are so many differences in those materials, so I really don't know
25 who it is in this world who can -- who can reconciliate those
2 MR. TIEGER: I note the time, Mr. President.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Mr. President. We would
4 like to have 65 ter 13729 admitted. I don't know if Mr. Tieger intended
5 to tender that, but we believe it should be admitted.
6 MR. TIEGER: That's a different form of admitting documents, but
7 of course I have no objection. Does it tell us -- the August 16th
8 article. Yeah, I join him [overlapping speakers].
9 JUDGE KWON: 13729. Yes, we'll receive it.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3718, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it as a P exhibit.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6407.
13 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Robinson, is the Defence -- I'll rephrase.
14 Was the Defence planning to meet Salapura this afternoon?
15 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes, because his evidence has not been
17 concluded in the Mladic Chamber, and this Chamber has been informed by
18 the Mladic Chamber that he is not supposed to meet anybody else,
19 including the Karadzic Defence.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we understand that. We had our proofing with
21 him already, and we're just ready to have him testify now.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. And bear with me a minute.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE KWON: With respect to the date on which Mr. Beara
25 testifies, in light of the parties' agreement that the 27th is a
1 possibility, the Chamber hereby orders that Mr. Beara should appear on
2 the 27th. This should be conveyed to the witness as well as his counsel.
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 JUDGE KWON: 9.00 on the 27th.
5 Mr. Subotic, we'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. In the
6 meantime, I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody else about
7 your testimony while you are giving evidence.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.
9 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is adjourned.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.50 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day
12 of June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.