1 Thursday, 20 June 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Please continue,
7 Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning to all in
9 the courtroom.
10 WITNESS: BOGDAN SUBOTIC [Resumed]
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
13 Q. Good morning, Mr. Subotic. When we adjourned --
14 A. Thank you, good morning.
15 Q. When we adjourned yesterday, we were discussing aspects of
16 Srebrenica in 1995. I had -- you had mentioned or the issue of
17 directives came up in the context of your statement. I mentioned that we
18 would be turning to the question of directives, and so I wanted to turn
19 to paragraphs 231 through 233 of your statement, and those paragraphs
20 reflect a discussion about directive for further operations number 7
21 signed by the Supreme Commander in March of 1995 as we see in
22 paragraph 231, and you explain in your statement that you learned about
23 directive number 7 after it had been drafted. That we see at the
24 beginning of paragraph 232. You describe that Dr. Karadzic went to the
25 Main Staff, and as you say in paragraph 233, a few days after his return
1 from the Main Staff I asked the president what was discussed. He told me
2 it was about drafting and signing a directive and a large number of other
3 documents. The paragraph goes on to describe how you reminded him
4 that -- of your understanding or agreement that you would be present and
5 review contents to which he replied, well, General, who am I supposed to
6 trust if not the generals at the Main Staff, and then you state that the
7 president would never knowingly put his signature under that disputable
8 text of directive number 7. That's found at the last sentence of
9 paragraph 233.
10 First, General Subotic, what were you referring to when you
11 indicated the "disputable text of directive number 7"?
12 A. I can tell you that I personally did not see the directive at
13 all. I did not have it in my hands ever. However, later on before I
14 testified in 2006, there was a dispute, as far as I understood it, and as
15 I say, I have never seen the directive personally. As far as I know,
16 there was a dispute about the sentence which allowed some use of force or
17 something of that kind. To be honest, I would like you to quote from
18 that directive, because I don't know. I have never learnt about that,
19 which is why I claimed that. Because we had a system, President Karadzic
20 and myself, according to which all the documents that were of some
21 significance had to be reviewed. Otherwise, what would have been my role
22 in the office? I was the expert, especially in terms of the military.
23 Q. You described that in your statement, and I referred to it just a
24 few minutes ago. In fact, your statement contains an excerpt or two from
25 the document itself at paragraph 231, there's a reference to the sentence
1 as follows with reference to the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves "by planned
2 and well thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of
3 total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the
4 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
5 So as a matter of fact, you yourself refer to portions of that,
6 and is that one -- is that part of the disputable text that you were
7 referring to? In other words, were you -- were you saying in your
8 statement that this is the kind of thing that you claim Dr. Karadzic
9 would not knowingly have signed because of the nature of what that says,
10 or are you referring to another part of the document?
11 A. No, no. I had in mind that part. I have not got the translation
12 of paragraph 231 into Serbian, but now you have jogged my memory.
13 Q. Okay, good. I would also call up 838, the document itself, and
14 turn to B/C/S page 15 and you can see it. And that's also found on
15 English page 10 in 838.
16 A. I still don't have it on the screen.
17 Q. It's on the screen, sir. You see under the Drina Corps in the
18 middle of the page?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You see the end of that first paragraph?
21 "By planned and well thought-out combat operations --"
22 A. I've found it.
23 Q. "-- create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no
24 hope of further survival --"
25 A. [Overlapping speakers]
1 Q. "-- or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
2 And, sir, when you were calling it disputable --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. -- isn't it the case that what you meant was this is a patently
5 illegal order to create no hope of further survival or life for the
6 inhabitants of those enclaves?
7 A. Yes, yes, absolutely. Absolutely. I accept what you are saying.
8 This is absolutely what was disputable for me. Knowing
9 President Karadzic and what had been done by the two of us up to then, I
10 have a serious doubt that President Karadzic ever read this. I don't
11 know how things unfolded in the Main Staff. However, I doubt that he
12 would have accepted this if he had read it. Moreover, now that I look at
13 it and when I reflect on this, I may not be mistaken if I said that I
14 believed that President Karadzic never read this, and on the other hand,
15 I would not exclude the possibility that that page had been subsequently
16 either altered or tempered with in another way. Because you see, you
17 legal professionals, all the lawyers in the world initial all the pages
18 of any serious document. I personally believe, or, rather, I doubt that
19 President Karadzic ever read this. I don't know whether he read this,
20 whether that was how it was written. I would not be able to say. So
21 these are my serious doubts. However, knowing him --
22 Q. General, you don't have to make the same point repeatedly. I
23 understand your position on that. So it's your position -- let's set
24 aside for the moment your speculation that somehow this was substituted
25 afterwards, it was your position in your statement and as you just stated
1 here that the Supreme Commander signed a directive that laid out the
2 course of operations for his military forces after participating in the
3 drafting of it without bothering to read it. That's your position. And
4 that explains why Dr. Karadzic's signature is on this document that
5 contains this order; correct? That's what you're saying?
6 A. What confuses me is this: The principle concerning strategic
7 documents pertaining to the army was such that a document was prepared by
8 the Main Staff. That was the first draft. The first draft was then
9 discussed, and then possible corrections were made to that draft. If I
10 had participated in the drafting of this document, I am giving you a
11 serious guarantee that I would not have allowed this be written in this
13 Q. Right. And apparently your testimony is that Dr. Karadzic is the
14 kind of guy who when he gets a document that dictates what his forces
15 will be doing doesn't bother to read it but says, Great, here's my
16 signature. That's it.
17 A. I cannot say that he did not bother. I cannot say that. I
18 wasn't there. If I had been there, I would have sat down together with
19 Radovan Karadzic, I would have looked at the document together with him,
20 I would have perused it together with him, and then I would alert his
21 attention to a possible irregularities. I'm telling you this very
22 honestly and I adhere that.
23 Q. And what prevented you from looking at the document after it had
24 been signed? Did you consider it to be the equivalent as a nonrefundable
25 plane ticket?
1 A. He was not in the office -- or, rather, that document was not in
2 my office. I did not have an occasion to see it. It was signed in
3 Han Pijesak and that's where he stayed as far as I know. I personally
4 never saw it.
5 Q. I'm asking you why you didn't ask to see it. I didn't have to --
6 why didn't you say to Dr. Karadzic, You know, I didn't a chance to review
7 it, as you say you had agreed, so let me take a look at it and make sure
8 there's nothing problematic, disputable, or more realistically illegal
9 about it?
10 A. I gave a statement, and I said that I should have seen it.
11 However, I don't know whether he was convinced that that's not how it was
12 written. I don't know. What I stated in my statement is correct. I
13 can't change it now. I can't speculate. However, I have my doubts about
14 President Karadzic having allowed this to be said or written. These are
15 my doubts, and I have to share them with you. And there's nothing else
16 to it.
17 Q. Let's move on to a somewhat different aspect of the operation and
18 consequences of the operation --
19 JUDGE KWON: Just one question from me for the witness. I'm not
20 sure whether the witness could assist us. Could we see the first page of
21 this document in B/C/S. And the second page in English.
22 General Subotic, this directive 7 is dated as 8th of March, 1995.
23 Do you see that?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
25 JUDGE KWON: Can we see the second last page in the B/C/S and the
1 first page in the English. But the date on which General Milovanovic
2 sent out this directive to the unit was 17th of March, almost ten days
3 after the signature date. Can you tell us why it was so, if you could?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see here that the Main Staff
5 of the VRS - and this is first time I see the document - sent this to the
6 command of the 1st Krajina Corps, and I don't know why it was sent to the
7 1st Krajina Corps. I wouldn't know that. Let me just read the two
8 sentences here. I don't understand anything. I don't know why this was
9 sent to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka in the first
10 place. I wouldn't know.
11 JUDGE KWON: It's so natural that if a directive, some document
12 like directive has been signed it should be circulated to the subordinate
13 units, but is it usual to send or circulate this kind of document after
14 almost ten days after the signature? Would it be usual?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, in general terms,
16 in principle I would not find it commonplace, but I don't know why they
17 did that. To put it simply, I never saw this document, and I can't say
18 anything concrete about it.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Back to you, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
22 Q. In paragraph 185 of your statement, General Subotic --
23 A. 185?
24 Q. 185; right.
25 A. Just bear with me, please. Very well.
1 Q. You describe some issues raised around the beginning of
2 October 1995 concerning the exchange of prisoners, first talking -- that
3 is you and Dr. Karadzic, talking to Serbs who were interested in having
4 prisoners exchanged and presumably therefore having Serbian prisoners
5 come home, and then a conversation or -- or a discussion that
6 Dr. Karadzic had apparently following that discussion with the
7 representatives of the people who had been killed in Vijenac about
8 exchange, Dr. Karadzic talking to the commission for exchange to try to
9 arrange an exchange. So if I understand that correctly, after the
10 conversation with these Serbian civilians who were concerned about the
11 fate of their family members, Dr. Karadzic then contacted the commission
12 for exchange and said get in touch with the Muslims and arrange for
13 exchange. That's an accurate understanding of what you've -- the
14 information you provided? That's just the backdrop to the question I
15 want to ask you. So is that -- do we have an accurate grasp of the
16 situation at that time? Talk to these people, they wanted an exchange,
17 Dr. Karadzic then talked to the commission to assist those -- those
19 A. I can only confirm very precisely and say that things happened as
20 they are described in paragraph 185. I can't change any of that. I can
21 read the paragraph for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, but I wouldn't
22 change a single word in this paragraph. The conversation that happened
23 that night had a huge impact on me. I'm very familiar with the
24 situation, and I can only confirm that the veracity of what is written in
25 paragraph 185.
1 Q. All right. And then the people he was talking to at the
2 Commission for Exchange said where are the prisoners from Zepa and
3 Srebrenica? And Dr. Karadzic said well, as far as he knew, they had been
4 exchanged. That's what you say here; correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Now, the fact is, General Subotic, that there had been enormous
7 pressure that began very shortly after the fall of the enclave for the
8 Bosnian Serb authorities to identify where the missing Muslim men and
9 boys were and to -- where they were held or what had happened to them.
10 Isn't that right? Do you acknowledge that? The enormous pressure from
11 the international community, and indeed even ultimately pressure from the
12 Serbian community because exchanges weren't -- were -- of Serbs were
13 being held up because of the question of where the men and boys from
14 Srebrenica were?
15 A. I accept just the last part that you said, and the other thing
16 remains as I said it. Because what is stated here by those people, by
17 the parents, they are angry at Mladic and at others about why there was
18 no exchange carried out between Zepa, meaning the Muslim prisoners and
19 the Serb prisoners. What I wrote I cannot change, and I do not accept
20 any other variations.
21 Q. First of all, is it your testimony that you were unaware of any
22 pressure from the international community, either the international
23 media, or international representatives on the Bosnian Serb authorities,
24 and particularly Dr. Karadzic, to identify where the thousands of missing
25 Muslim men and boys were?
1 A. I didn't know that. No, not at all. I did not have any
2 information, nor did I know, and it wasn't my area of responsibility
3 either. There are other commissions. Others were entrusted with that.
4 That was not something that I was entrusted with. I stand by this
5 completely, behind everything that is written in paragraph
6 170 [as interpreted].
7 Q. Well, I thought I understood you in the course of your statement
8 to make a point about your concerns about the -- what the international
9 media was saying; in fact, there's a portion in your statement devoted to
10 propaganda and what the international media was saying about the
11 Bosnian Serbs that you considered unfair. Let me give -- let me just
12 recite for you quickly a little bit of the evidence in this Court about
13 what was being written in the international media in the aftermath of
14 Srebrenica. So at P4397, on the 17th of July, there was an article in
15 the British publication "The Independent."
16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction as to the previous
17 answer of the witness: It's paragraph 185.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. That discusses a film that was made two days after Srebrenica and
20 what it shows, a reference by a UN official to General Mladic reportedly
21 saying that Serbs had been forced to kill lots of people because they
22 were trying to break out of Srebrenica. The article says the fate of the
23 menfolk of Srebrenica has been a concern to their families and
24 international human rights since the enclave fell last Tuesday, and first
25 a delegation of the ICRC being prohibited from visiting Bratunac where
1 many of the captured Muslim men were believed to be held. Just a few
2 days later P4398, referring to possibly the biggest mass execution of
3 Muslim prisoners by the Bosnian Serbs in more than three years of war.
4 According to residents of the Bosnian Serb controlled town of Bratunac
5 and Serbs from Serbia who had visited the area, as many as 4.000 captured
6 Muslim men from Srebrenica have been killed by the Bosnian Serbs. Two
7 days after that, 4400, 23 July another article even if -- saying even if
8 a fraction of the stories emerging from Srebrenica are true, the men of
9 Zepa have every reason to be afraid of becoming POWs of General Mladic.
10 And again referring to information from residents of the Serb controlled
11 town of Bratunac and Serbs from Serbia about thousands of captured men
12 from Srebrenica who had been summarily executed. And stories of mass
13 executions of prisoners have started to cross the Drina River, irritating
14 Bosnian Serb authorities because this time the tales are recounted by
15 Serbs. Or just one more, P4401, two days after that reporting that in
16 the days after Srebrenica fell, residents reported seeing truckloads of
17 men being brought to shallow pits dug on the other side of the river bank
18 and shot by Bosnian Serb soldiers, and stating -- and reporting that
19 thousands of men from Srebrenica were taken prisoner by the Bosnian Serbs
20 after the "liberation" of the Bosnian enclave on 11 July. Some estimates
21 of prisoners executed are as high as 4.000.
22 Now, is it your testimony, General, that none of this information
23 and none of these allegations and none the concern of the international
24 community reflected in these articles was known to you at the time, that
25 you had no awareness of this whatsoever?
1 A. I assert that all of this is a lie. I would not assert that it
2 was a lie had these gentlemen from England called Serbian journalists so
3 that together at the actual location they could establish what the
4 situation was, and then they could write the article together in English
5 and in Serbian. Then I would believe them. I read six books about
6 Srebrenica which were written after the war with all the details.
7 Q. You've mentioned that [overlapping speakers]
8 A. And that is why I do not believe, I do not believe at all,
9 Mr. Tieger, this. I didn't even know about this, this -- this title,
10 nothing like that. I don't believe that. I just simply don't believe
12 Q. I wasn't asking you --
13 A. Had it been realistic.
14 Q. I wasn't asking for your opinion about the accuracy of these
15 articles. We have a lot of information about that, General. I was
16 asking you if you claim to have been totally unaware that these reports
17 were being made and disseminated internationally.
18 A. I state that I did not know that at all. I state that
19 absolutely. Only after the end of the war I learned some other things.
20 At that time, I didn't know anything.
21 Q. Were you unaware that on July 24th, 1995, the Special Rapporteur
22 of the commission on human rights sent Dr. Karadzic a letter expressing
23 his deepest - and I'm referring now to P6396 - expressing his deepest
24 concern regarding the recent events in the Srebrenica area which resulted
25 in the forced displacement of some 40.000 individuals and referring to
1 reports that as a result of these events several thousand individuals are
2 unaccounted for and there is fear that many have been killed or detained
3 and calling for a proper investigation and evaluation, and in particular,
4 calling for access to those who had been detained during the recent
5 events? Were you unaware of that?
6 A. I did not know. I absolutely did not know.
7 Q. What about a letter sent to Dr. Karadzic by the
8 Special Representative for the Secretary-General on the 12th of August
9 also requesting access to investigate these allegations and what happened
10 to the men and boys of Srebrenica, to the thousands of men and boys who
11 were the subject of the international community's concern. Were you
12 unaware of that too? Is that your testimony?
13 A. I did not have the opportunity to see the letter or to know about
14 it. I didn't have the opportunity. I don't know.
15 Q. And you claim this is something Dr. Karadzic didn't mention to
16 his special advisor. He kept this from you.
17 A. I would not say that he did not mention it or that he concealed
18 it from me. I don't know. Perhaps I wasn't there. I have no idea. I
19 am simply not aware of it. I simply don't know about it. If there is a
20 letter, this letter in Serbian, perhaps I could refresh my memory, but
21 like this, no, I -- I am not aware of it.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. -- could we have the exhibit number for
24 that letter? I couldn't find it in e-court [overlapping speakers] by the
1 JUDGE KWON: It's in front of us.
2 MR. ROBINSON: I'm speaking of the 12th of August, letter.
3 MR. TIEGER: 2288.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 8 of the transcript, the
6 witness did not say the -- the -- I would not say that he did not mention
7 it or conceal it. This "did not mention it" is superfluous.
8 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue. Thank you.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Okay. This letter has not been translated. I can read it to
11 you. Dear -- it's dated the 12th of August, 1995. It's from the
12 Special Representative the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia,
13 Mr. Akashi. It states: Dear, Dr. Karadzic, it refers to the
14 Resolution 1010 of 10 August in which the Security Council expressed its
15 deep concern and reports of grave violations of international
16 humanitarian law in and around Srebrenica and at the fact that many of
17 the former inhabitants of Srebrenica are not accounted for. I am equally
18 concerned at these reports, especially at the allegation of the existence
19 of a mass grave identified by the government of the
20 United States of America.
21 And he requests as a matter of urgency and in accordance with the
22 directives of the resolution he mentioned, that Dr. Karadzic allow
23 UNPROFOR, and co-operate with UNPROFOR, to investigate the report of the
24 existence of a mass grave and requests immediate access for
25 representatives of UNHCR, the ICRC, and other international agencies to
1 persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa in areas of
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina under Bosnian Serb control. Then he asks further
3 that ICRC representatives be permitted to visit and register any persons
4 detained against their will, including any members of the forces of the
5 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6 So I mention that to you as another reflection of the concern by
7 the international community and pressures placed on the Bosnian Serb
8 authorities. Is that a document again that you profess to be -- to have
9 been completely unaware of reflecting concerns by the international
10 community and demands by the international community that you also
11 profess to be unaware of at the time?
12 A. I attended practically all the meetings between Akashi and
13 Mr. Karadzic, and I took notes, kept the minutes, and if any of this was
14 referred to, then I am aware of it. And I knew that Mr. Akashi and
15 Mr. Karadzic would always and frequently speak in Pale or in some other
16 places, and I was always present, and I knew that. And this was talked
17 about. All the questions were talked about. There was an understanding.
18 There were agreements about these things that were happening, but this
19 specific something that you offered here I did not take part in that, but
20 I know that the president always allowed, as far as the Red Cross is
21 concerned and UNPROFOR and as far as all the international organisations
22 are concerned. He actually had problem with the army and the commanders,
23 actually, because he always permitted everything that the international
24 community asked to be done.
25 Q. All right. So I'm a little confused now. Are you saying you
1 were aware of these pressures or you were not aware of these pressures by
2 the international community to allow to identify where the men and boys
3 of Srebrenica were and to allow access to them if they were still alive?
4 A. Mr. Tieger, the international community was pressuring
5 Republika Srpska every minute, every moment, and you are asking me now to
6 split hairs. I always was under pressure, not just myself but everybody
7 in Republika Srpska. How could I have known about every instance of
8 pressure by the international community? These pressures were there
9 every day. So I will tell you what I know sincerely. I'm not afraid of
10 anything. But don't impose any mention of any pressure on me that I'm
11 not aware of it. There's no reason for that.
12 I am not aware of this. Therefore, I cannot discuss it.
13 Q. Let's turn back --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Mr. Subotic, you said you are not
15 aware of this. You were not aware of this at the time. But do you agree
16 that Mr. Karadzic received this letter from Mr. Akashi?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that he did. If you say
18 so, then I believe that he did receive it, because I know that he had
19 contacts very, very frequently and very solidly with Akashi. I don't
20 have any doubts about it.
21 JUDGE KWON: If Mr. Karadzic had received this, you would also
22 have received this as well. So is the thing that you now don't remember
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I did not receive the letter.
25 I did not have the letter in my hands in the Serbian language.
1 Therefore, had I had it, I don't know if he had received the letter, I
2 would believe that he would have taken measures to do what Akashi was
3 requesting in the letter. But this was not in my remit to deal with
4 this. This was in the remit of other structures in Republika Srpska.
5 JUDGE KWON: I think you -- this is one part I don't follow among
6 your answer. You said:
7 "I did not receive the letter. I did not have the letter in my
8 hands in the Serbian language."
9 When an international actor like Mr. Akashi, who was in
10 particular the Special Representative for the Secretary-General, when
11 they -- when such international actors sent that letter to Mr. Karadzic,
12 did they send also in Serbian language?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That I don't know. I know mostly
14 whenever I was at the talks with Mr. Akashi there was interpretation into
15 Serbian. I would take notes. Ninety per cent of the conversations then
16 I would note down. As for this specific case, we did not have, as far as
17 I can remember, talks, because then I would remember it. I would have it
18 written down somewhere.
19 JUDGE KWON: You answered that you didn't have the letter in the
20 Serbian language. It sounded to me that you received the letter in
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. What I wanted to say was I
23 would have known about it had the letter been in Serb. I would have
24 known. Perhaps I didn't express myself properly. It's logical if I had
25 seen the letter I would not have know what it was about because Karadzic
1 did not give me the letter or speak to me about the letter. I don't know
2 if I was at the office at that time. I don't recall simply.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER:
5 Q. Getting back to paragraph 18 --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. There seems to have been an omission
7 on the part of French translation. I take it it will be supplemented
8 later on. Shall we continue. Yes.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
10 Q. So in light of this backdrop, General Subotic, getting back to
11 paragraph 185 where you state that Dr. Karadzic said that as far as he
12 knew the prisoners from Zepa and Srebrenica had been exchanged, I want to
13 ask you what you meant by -- what you understood he meant by "as far as
14 he knew." So did -- how many prisoners did you understand had been
15 exchanged, prisoners from Srebrenica and Zepa?
16 A. I don't know. The number of prisoners was not -- actually, you
17 saw here that these parents were angry. They were asking where Mladic
18 was and where Tolimir was and why were the prisoners from Zepa not
19 exchanged for their prisoners. That's how I understood it in that
20 conversation and that is what I noted down. Therefore, that is
21 disputable. We didn't know Radovan or I when we spoke with them whether
22 they were actually exchanged or not, but he said, As far as I know, the
23 prisoners were exchanged. But we were not there. Other teams were there
24 for the exchange of prisoners, but at that meeting there were just the
25 two of us because the parents came to address us.
1 Q. And according to you, what steps did you and Dr. Karadzic take in
2 the wake of this meeting to find out whether or not prisoners from
3 Srebrenica and Zepa had been exchanged, how many had been exchanged, and
4 when that exchange had taken place?
5 A. We did not have any information prior to the meeting nor did we
6 know that they would come. They came at midnight to the office in
7 Banja Luka. At midnight, Mr. Tieger. We were just caught up, caught out
8 in the situation, both Radovan and I, and then we asked for the people
9 who were deal with that, who knew what was happening with the prisoners
10 to come. The two of us didn't know anything about it. I mean, simply
11 what I wrote down is what I stand by. I have nothing else to say
12 regarding that.
13 Q. Okay. And your testimony is that by October of 1995, there was
14 no particular reason for you or Dr. Karadzic to have any awareness of
15 where Srebrenica prisoners were or how many there were or whether they
16 had been exchanged; correct? That's your testimony. So you were just
17 caught out when this issue came up.
18 A. Correct. Correct.
19 Q. All right. I want to turn to another subject, and that is
20 something you raised in paragraphs 240 and 241 of your statement, and
21 that's about Blagaj Japra, the Japra Valley, and in those paragraphs --
23 A. Could I please see the text in the Serbian.
24 Q. General Subotic, this statement that I'm referring to was
25 prepared by you and the Defence, or at least by -- I mean, I don't know
1 the extent of your participation in this firsthand, but this is a
2 document that has your signature on it and to which you attest -- yes.
3 A. Yes. Can I please see the document so I can just remind myself.
4 I cannot memorise so many pages.
5 Q. What's in front of you right now? I see there's a document in
6 front of you. What is it?
7 A. What I see before me is in English. It states "Blagaj Japra,"
9 Q. And what's the document --
10 A. But it's in English.
11 Q. Mr. Subotic, what is the document that you have on the table in
12 front of you if it's not your statement?
13 A. I have a document on the table. Paragraph 240, page 91,
14 Blagaj Japra, but it's in English.
15 Q. So --
16 A. 241 is also in English, on page 92.
17 Q. General Subotic, there's only -- there's only --
18 JUDGE KWON: Let me ask the witness. If you did not understand
19 your statement, how could you sign the document as your statement? You
20 confirmed that you signed the document.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I received a statement in Serbian,
22 but it statement I didn't bring my own. I was told that I could not
23 bring anything into the courtroom, but this is something that I found on
24 the desk here, the statement, and it's in English. You have Serbian and
25 English sporadically. I don't know what that is.
1 JUDGE KWON: Could you see the last page. Last page of the
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I signed. I signed the document,
4 but I didn't know that in my document -- well, in my document everything
5 is in the Serbian language, the document that I received from the
6 Defence, but this one is partially in English and partially in Serbian.
7 The paragraphs and the pagination are the same. I don't know why this
8 happened. Perhaps it's because of something on your ...
9 JUDGE KWON: So I'll read out the passage where Mr. Karadzic
10 asked you questions. It's yesterday's transcript, page 39984.
11 Dr. Karadzic showed you the statement that you have with you now:
12 "Do you see that statement of yours on the screen?
14 "Have you read that statement and have you signed it?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I read it in the Serbian language
17 and I signed it, but this, this, theirs, I mean mine, the one I have in
18 the hotel, all of it is in Serbian. I didn't even know that there is
19 this mixed thing, Serbian-English. I don't know why.
20 JUDGE KWON: Shall we strike out the witness statement? I think
21 probably Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Robinson need to clarify.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I believe that the witness is
23 mistaken. What is in front of him is what he signed, and what he signed
24 is a compilation of his statement as he gave it to Mr. Sladojevic and
25 also the excerpts from his verbatim testimony in the Krajisnik case. So
1 that's what the statement consists of.
2 JUDGE KWON: What is contained in paragraph 24 is part of his
3 statement which he gave on 20th of May, 2006.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Prosecution. Prosecution.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Subotic, having heard this clarification, are
6 you minded to change your answer with regard to paragraph 240?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What do you mean change? I don't
8 understand the question now. If I knew how to read this answer or if
9 someone would read it out to me, then I could recognise it or not
10 recognise it. But I don't know how to read it, so I don't know whether I
11 can change it. I believe that that's it, but it's just written in the
12 English language.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: Let me ask one question to Mr. Robinson for
15 clarification. Take paragraph 240. That's a part of witness's
16 statement. I take it there's a Serbian version of his witness statement,
17 isn't it? Why do we have it English here?
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, Mr. Sladojevic has told me
20 he's not sure actually what the status is of the portions of the
21 statement that relate to interview by OTP of Mr. Subotic, so he believes
22 that they may also have been in English like the Krajisnik testimony, but
23 he's not sure.
24 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, I'm concerned whether we need
25 to strike out all the English part from his statement. If you could
1 assist us in that regard.
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. First, definitely with respect to the
3 Krajisnik testimony, this is no different than other 92 ter witnesses who
4 have listened to their testimony before --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. But we need to satisfy the
6 requirement that if asked, witness would have answered the same question
7 here. That's not satisfied here in this case.
8 MR. ROBINSON: I believe he would say that if -- that his
9 testimony he gave in the Krajisnik case was the same.
10 JUDGE KWON: But he wasn't offered that opportunity, because he
11 can't read English at all.
12 MR. ROBINSON: That's true, but he gave the testimony, and I also
13 believe he listened to the recordings of the testimony from the Krajisnik
14 case. So he can say that the answers that he gave would be the same,
15 which is what I believe he has said when he was first questioned by
16 Dr. Karadzic. So those portions that are in English from the Krajisnik
17 case I think fall with the same parameters that we have for other
18 witnesses who have testified in this Tribunal and whose testimony have
19 come under 92 ter.
20 With respect to the statement from the interview, we would have
21 to check on that.
22 JUDGE KWON: Any observation to make, Mr. Tieger?
23 MR. TIEGER: Well, just a couple. I mean, first of all, it is
24 the case that witnesses in the past who cannot read English, instead of
25 being shown a transcript had reviewed the previous testimony or the
1 previous statement in another form so that they were in a position to
2 affirm that that was accurate. So I don't have a problem with the
3 modality, and I'm not trying to suggest that. And the -- and I'm not
4 trying to make this particularly a precise memory game for the witness so
5 that he has to be able to correlate the paragraph number with information
6 he previously reviewed for the purpose of making the statement, but
7 that's -- and, in fact, the -- the -- my point in raising this was not to
8 challenge that the witness had said what he said - it is reflected in
9 paragraphs 240 and 241 - but instead to point out what was omitted that
10 he also said but didn't make it into the statement that appears in front
11 of Your Honours.
12 So I wasn't actually challenging the position that he didn't
13 stand by 240 and 241. He's repeated several times, and I think he
14 would -- whether he recalled what he said in Krajisnik or not, that he
15 doesn't back down from that. But in this particular instance, it's a
16 question of selective identification of what he previously said.
17 JUDGE KWON: Whether or not the Prosecution is challenging, I'm
18 concerned about the requirements of Rule 92 ter have been met in this
20 Did you try to say something, Mr. Subotic?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we have two
22 variants. The first variant is that you allow me within 10 minutes of
23 time to bring my own statement that I have at the hotel and everything
24 will be fine.
25 The second variant is that this be read out to me from English
1 into Serbian, and I will immediately confirm whether that's it or whether
2 it's not, and I will say what I know, but precisely --
3 JUDGE KWON: So by way of -- by way of example, let me turn to
4 paragraph 241.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If somebody could read that out to
6 me in Serbian, then I will answer Mr. Tieger.
7 JUDGE KWON: I will do that. This is pat of your testimony in
8 Krajisnik case. So Judge Orie asked you:
9 "Judge Orie: This Chamber received evidence which suggests that
10 such an event did take place, and that is not just stories, but that
11 includes documentary evidence, that includes some pictures. So,
12 therefore, if you say, well, hardly could have taken place since we
13 didn't know about such a massive event, I just inform you that of course
14 there was no finding from the Chamber in that respect, but there is quite
15 a bit of evidence."
16 And you answered like this:
17 "I have no reason to doubt what you're saying, but I do have
18 reason to doubt that anybody in Pale was informed. I can simply not
19 fathom that somebody could have been informed at Pale without raising a
20 campaign on that issue. That's the only thing I'm saying."
21 And this is my question for you: Before you signed the statement
22 which is in front of you, did anybody of the Defence team read out that
23 paragraph to you?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They read that part out to me, and
25 they gave it to me in the Serbian language in my copy of the statement.
1 I don't know. I didn't go into this.
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Subotic. I would like you to be
3 precise. If you don't remember, please say you don't remember. You said
4 that the Defence team gave this part in the Serbian language. Is it
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. It's not that it was
7 given to me. It was read out to me. But I was told that this would
8 be -- I mean, in my copy in the Serbian language, all of it, not only
9 this, but also those other ones.
10 JUDGE KWON: Be precise, please. Did you receive this part in
11 Serbian language, or the Defence team only read out the part to you?
12 Which is correct?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I -- well, they had two copies. I
14 didn't know that in their copy this was in the English language. I
15 received a copy in the Serbian language. All the items, all the
16 paragraphs, all the pages. I have that copy, but since I was told that
17 I'm not allowed to bring anything into the courtroom, I didn't bring
18 that, but I have a copy of the statement.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Subotic.
20 Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Well, His Honour just kindly read out to you what 241 says, and
23 that's the gist of what you convey in your -- the information you provide
24 about events in the Japra Valley and the awareness in Pale and among the
25 Bosnian Serb leadership about what happened; that is, that you have
1 reason to doubt that anybody in Pale was informed because nobody raised a
2 campaign on that issue.
3 Now, that did not reflect the entirety of the discussion that
4 took place during your testimony in the Krajisnik case, and if we turn to
5 pages 26470 --
6 A. What -- I mean, I don't understand this question sufficiently.
7 What I said in the Krajisnik case, well, I wasn't asked for anything
8 precise. I wasn't asked for anything precise. I was just -- I mean,
9 well, the statement I gave is what I knew then. It's not that I had any
10 precise information and so on, and no one asked me for precise
11 information. But later when the statement was taken from me, I mean in
12 2012, that was something different because there was information that was
13 accessible to me and that was generally accessible, a lot of information.
14 Q. And what you said in the Krajisnik case to Judge Orie was that:
15 "You see, Mr. President, this involves," and again this is
16 referring to the Japra Valley operations, "... this involves a huge
17 amount of people, 4.000 people. It's not a small group. It's neither 4
18 nor 40. I believe that there is nor municipal authority or police force
19 in that area that could have kept this from the government or Pale.
20 Since that was never a subject of discussion ever, I simply cannot
21 conceive that something like that could have happened without anybody
22 having been informed whereas the communication lines were working."
23 So what's not contained in paragraphs 240 and 241 is the fact --
24 is your position that there is no way that this event, that any municipal
25 authority or police force from that area could have kept this information
1 from the republic-level authorities or from Pale; correct?
2 A. Correct. Correct. I stand by that and that is what is written
3 in my statement, the one in the Serbian language, likewise what
4 Mr. Tieger read out just now. And I stand by that and I cannot claim
5 anything else.
6 Q. Let me turn to another event not involving 4.000 people but
7 involving a large number of people that was known -- also known to the
8 authorities in Pale, and that's the events at Koricanske Stijene. And
9 that's referred to in your statement at paragraphs 242 through 260.
10 And in those paragraphs, Mr. Subotic, you relate the awareness of
11 Dr. Karadzic about the event, refer to a session of the Presidency or at
12 least the attendance of Presidency members and others at an ad hoc
13 meeting or session, Dr. Karadzic giving you the order - and at this time
14 you were the minister of defence - giving you the order to go to
15 Banja Luka and hold a meeting. Your participation in a meeting involving
16 prosecutors, judges, chiefs of police stations in the area and others,
17 and passing on verbally the order of the president and the Presidency to
18 take immediate investigative actions and all actions necessary,
19 et cetera. And then it also provides information in the subsequent
20 paragraphs about some of the -- about what happened afterwards and what
21 transpired. For example, you were asked the question, it appears in
22 paragraph 244, how many of those policemen who escorted or guarded the
23 convoy were interviewed about what happened to what, as it turned out,
24 were more than 200 Muslim civilians who were massacred. And you
25 indicated you didn't know, you were not informed about that.
1 So that's the event in the portion of your testimony that I'm
2 referring to, Mr. Subotic.
3 Now, as part of your statement, you indicate that one -- you
4 suggest there that there were three people responsible for the killings
5 at Koricanske Stijene, that is three policemen, one of whom was
6 prosecuted, two of whom were killed, presumably meaning in combat after
7 they fled, after they went to the army.
8 First of all, when you refer to one person prosecuted, you're
9 referring to one person prosecuted many years later by the ICTY and
10 convicted of that crime here; right? Or do you claim to be aware of
11 somebody else who was prosecuted by Republika Srpska authorities for the
12 murder at Koricanske Stijene?
13 A. Mr. Tieger, I gave that statement in the Krajisnik case very
14 precisely and in great detail, and in that statement I said all the
15 things that I learned at that meeting in Banja Luka, when this entire
16 team went to the site, to the scene of this crime, where we visually saw
17 this area. So I gave this statement only on the basis of the notes I
18 took at that meeting. What I was told by the police, the judges, in
19 order to be able to convey all of that to the state Presidency. That was
20 my task. Everything that you repeated just now about those three
21 persons, I noted all of that down at that meeting in Banja Luka. That is
22 to say I -- actually, that is what I was told. I was not an
23 investigator. I was not aware of the case. Quite simply, I conveyed the
24 information to the Presidency. I know, I do know, later when the trial
25 took place and so on, that it was, after all, the way you are saying. It
1 wasn't only these three, and so on and so forth, but I could not judge
2 anything, I could not investigate, and that is why my statement -- I
3 mean, I claim that it's only from that meeting and that event where we
4 were on that day, nothing else. And I personally condemned that at that
5 meeting, personally, as a human being, and I asked absolutely for very
6 precise investigations, and so on and so forth. So I have nothing else
7 to say with regard to that case.
8 Q. Mr. Subotic, this is not exactly a major whodunit. Everybody
9 there knew that the people who had been killed were part of a convoy that
10 was escorted by a policeman from the Prijedor Police Station; right?
11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note: We cannot hear the
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Subotic, probably you turned off your
14 microphone. The interpreters did not hear you. Could you repeat your
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm saying -- I mean, I don't know
17 which part I should repeat.
18 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat all over.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, my task was in Banja Luka at
20 the Ministry of the Interior to bring together all relevant persons and
21 institutions that should explain to me what it was that had happened.
22 The president, who entrusted me with this task, or, rather, the member of
23 the Presidency were primarily interested in the following: Whether the
24 military, the army took part in this. Immediately at the beginning of
25 the meeting that was eliminated. The army had nothing to do with that
1 event. So it was the police from Prijedor, and all of it was explained
2 to me. I wrote all of that down precisely, who said what. The head of
3 one centre, the other centre, and everybody else who took part, I
4 explained all of that when I testified at Mr. Orie's. I did not know
5 whether it was true or whether it was not true, whether that is exactly
6 the way things happened or not.
7 Later on in the later period I found out because that was made
8 public. There were trials, arrests, and so on. What Mr. Tieger said to
9 me just now, that was confirmed exactly, but I didn't know about that. I
10 could not inform the Presidency about that because the information I
11 provided was what I wrote down specifically. That's it.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. General, you said just said that according to you you eliminated
14 from the outset that it was the army and knew that it was the police from
15 Prijedor. That was the question I had asked you. So policemen had been
16 sent to escort the convoy, which means that -- that since you had the
17 police chief -- the relevant police chiefs there, everybody knew who
18 those police member were; right? Right there on the spot, their
19 identities were easy to identify.
20 A. Mr. Tieger, they just announced three persons to me, I mean as an
21 answer that I could convey to the Presidency. I don't know anything
22 else. Whether they did know or whether they did not know, that was their
24 Q. You're suggesting that this matter was considered so important by
25 the leadership that it sent you out personally to make sure to order that
1 all appropriate measures were undertaken to solve it. I'm saying to you
2 it was crystal clear who was involved. Do you even know if any of those
3 people were interviewed, interviewed, by Republika Srpska authorities in
4 connection with this crime in 1992 or 1993 or 1994?
5 A. I don't know about later when I left. I know that the ministry
6 took part, the MUP, and the Ministry of Justice. As I said, there were
7 judges, and I don't know all the relevant ones, but I didn't take part in
8 that. Did I not have an opportunity to learn about this.
9 Q. This Trial Chamber has received evidence that the people involved
10 and responsible, directly responsible, hands on, for these killings were
11 not in hiding and had anyone been looking for them they would have been
12 found. And you can turn to P4257 for that evidence. And that makes
13 sense, doesn't it, I mean, since their identities were known as
14 policemen, it wouldn't have been so difficult to get ahold of if anyone
15 had wanted to find them; right?
16 A. If you have that, I believe that's the way it is, but I do not
17 know about that, but, say, logically I can infer that these persons
18 should know that if, as I said, they said that later. Well -- but I was
19 not in the know. Had I known about that, I would have conveyed that
20 immediately, and I would have included it in my note.
21 Q. And so that would further suggest that people involved didn't
22 want to find them. That also logically follows, doesn't it?
23 A. According to what you are claiming, this would be a logical
24 conclusion. However, I cannot claim that because I didn't participate in
25 any of that. That was not my task. It was a task that was supposed to
1 be carried out by investigators, judges, prosecutors. I don't know who
2 else, but in any case, professionals. I was not at the receiving end of
3 any further information. I didn't receive any information, and I didn't
4 really express any interest in receiving further information.
5 Q. So according to you, these most elementary aspects, the most
6 rudimentary aspects of a serious investigation were not undertaken, but
7 you didn't care, and as far as you know, I take it, Dr. Karadzic didn't
8 do anything about it or care about it either?
9 A. Mr. Tieger, we had zillions of other problems. We had
10 institutions that were in charge of those matters. It was not up to the
11 two of us to monitor the work of the police, the formers [as interpreted]
12 of everybody else and their uncle. You have to understand that we are
13 not computers. Competent people were tasked with doing that. Whether
14 they did it or not, I don't know. I know practically nothing about what
15 they did. However, that was our system. So the system had to function,
16 and things had to be done according to that system.
17 I cannot invent things in order to satisfy somebody's needs or
18 requirements. I don't know. How was I supposed to know what the police
19 did? I was not the chief of the police or the minister of police, for
20 that matter. I knew for a fact that the military did not take part, and
21 that was what mattered to me. And the rest I did according to the
22 Presidency's instructions. I submitted my report. The ministry did
23 their own job. The prosecutors, the judges did what they were supposed
24 to do, and I don't know what they did. I did not get involved, therefore
25 I cannot discuss that matter.
1 Q. Last question before the break. Slobodan Avlijas, the deputy
2 minister of justice or at least a high ranking official in the
3 Ministry of Justice at that time, participated in the meetings concerning
4 what to do about Koricanske Stijene. That is the meeting in Banja Luka
5 attended by senior officials, including you. That's T35186. And he
6 testified and told this Court that everybody knew what had happened and
7 that in any properly functioning state, Simo Drljaca would have been
8 arrested right there. Do you dispute that?
9 A. This is not what I noted. What I noted I conveyed at the trial
10 of with Mr. Orie. And as for that word, Simo Drljaca was removed from
11 his position, so I don't know. I suppose that what you're saying is
13 Q. Simo Drljaca became an assistant minister in the MUP, a higher
14 ranking position, and in fact was given a major award by Dr. Karadzic
15 after this event, isn't that right?
16 A. I don't know whether he was decorated because of that.
17 Dr. Karadzic did not explain why people were decorated. It was the
18 chiefs and commanders who were supposed to provide their input as to
19 whether somebody deserved to be decorated or not. This is how things are
20 done all over the world, in all the states. That's how people are
21 decorated. And people can deceive a president, people can deceive a
22 king, because things are not double checked; because if things were
23 checked then no decoration would serve any purpose. I'm telling you this
24 as an expert as the chief of a body in the Republika Srpska government.
25 But look here, there is a law on decorations, and in the law on
1 decorations it says that anybody who commits a crime or a big
2 transgression, any decoration is taken away from them. I am the author
3 of that law. I don't know whether this was really followed through if --
4 whether Simo Drljaca was decorated and whether the decoration was taken
5 away from him. If he was decorated, then the chief of police, his boss,
6 had to take the decoration from him because the law on decorations is a
7 public instrument, and I don't know whether that was ever done.
8 Q. For the record, decoration is found at P4261. I see we're
9 overdue for the break, so that I will resume afterwards.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I would request that the witness be
11 allowed during the break to go to his hotel which is nearby to bring the
12 version that he has of the statement so he can look at it and we could
13 verify what it is that he has. I think he could do that within the
14 30 minutes of our break.
15 JUDGE KWON: I have no difficulty with it.
16 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 10 past 11.00.
17 I'm sorry. We'll resume at quarter past 11.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.24 a.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Just a note, Mr. President, before I resume that I
22 understand the witness brought the statement back from the hotel room. I
23 considered that in the interests of time I might ask to take a look at it
24 before the Court resumed the Bench, but when we began to do so, the
25 witness was very interested in explaining something about it, so we just
1 said, Stop, wait until the court resumes and anything that needs to be
2 explained can be handled then. Mr. Robinson was with me, and I believe a
3 representative of the Registrar as well.
4 So that's where we are now. The witness has that document. I --
5 I haven't seen it. I know the Court inquired about it. Mr. Robinson
6 raised it. It's difficult to know exactly in whose court this
7 immediately falls, figuratively, but I presume the Bench wants to either
8 ask about it or see it, and I certainly would like to see it at some
10 JUDGE KWON: I leave it to the parties. Let's continue.
11 MR. TIEGER:
12 Q. Okay. Mr. Subotic, I understand that you went back to your hotel
13 room, came back with the document, the Serbian version of the statement
14 that you referred to earlier and you have it with you now. I would ask
15 if with the assistance of the Registrar if I could briefly examine that
17 A. Can I provide a certain explanation for the benefit of the
18 Presiding Judge? There was some confusion, indeed --
19 JUDGE KWON: You will have an opportunity to explain that, but at
20 this time could you kindly provide that to Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Mr. Subotic, I understood you to stay, and I'm referring back to
23 page 25 or 26 of the -- of today's -- of the transcript of today's
24 testimony that you had two -- there were two copies. You didn't know
25 theirs was in the English language. You received a copy in the Serbian
1 language, all the items, all the paragraphs, all the pages. I have that
2 copy, but since you were told not to bring anything to the courtroom you
3 didn't bring it but you have a copy. Is this document that was just
4 handed to me the document you were referring to?
5 A. Yes. Yes. It was my mistake. I was mistaken. If I may be
6 allowed to explain in very simple terms. Can I explain things to you,
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, please go ahead.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, so far I have
10 provided three statements to The Hague Tribunal, in 2007, 2008, and in
11 2006. All the statements have been translated into Serbian. I have
12 received them, and I have them in Banja Luka, and I have initialed all
13 the pages in those statements, and those statements are in Serbian,
14 exclusively in Serbian. That's why I was sure that I have a statement in
15 Serbian. However, when Messers. from the Defence took a statement from
16 me, they were reading sections in English, and they asked me -- at the
17 same time I had my own copies which were translated, and that's why I
18 thought that those were valid statements, and I adhere by that all the
19 time, because I initialed every page, and now that I have arrived here to
20 testify, they showed me all that. I initialed everything, and this is
21 theirs, their signature as well as mine. But I believed -- or, rather, I
22 simply forgot. Otherwise, I would have told you that I had that
23 translation. In other words, in that sense I suggest that when you're
24 putting questions to me to read everything in Serbian and then I will
25 confirm what I stated. I can confirm, because everything has been
1 initialed. Well, this was my mistake. I apologise to the Trial Chamber
2 and to you for having been convinced that I had that in my hotel. I
3 don't. I did not bring of that. I did not dare take those statements
4 with me on my travel. This is what this is all about.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Okay. And just to make this clear, because I'm not sure that
7 your explanation was completely clear to the Court, when you said you
8 were mistaken, this document I have in front of me now that you brought
9 back from the hotel room is a mixture of English and Serbian; right? So
10 some paragraphs in English, some paragraphs in Serbian.
11 A. Only those paragraphs which were taken from my previous evidence
12 given before The Hague Tribunal, only those paragraphs. I suppose that
13 the Defence did not have them translated into translation, whereas I do
14 have all that translated into Serbian, because after each time I provided
15 evidence I received the translation of the evidence into Serbian.
16 Q. Mr. Subotic, I am not aware that your -- that the testimony you
17 gave in the Krajisnik case was transcribed into Serbian.
18 A. Yes. I have it in Banja Luka. I received that.
19 Q. And who do you say transcribed that and provided it to you?
20 A. I believe that it was the office in Banja Luka. This was done
21 subsequently. And as for what happened in Pale, I received that
22 personally in Pale, those two days in Pale. Since I was in Banja Luka on
23 several occasions in that office, I believe that I received it from them.
24 In any case, I got it from Banja Luka.
25 Q. And you say you have a copy of your Krajisnik testimony in the
1 Serbian language in Banja Luka that you can provide us.
2 A. Yes. I can send it to you from Banja Luka. I don't know how,
3 but I can.
4 Q. We can make arrangements for that. Meanwhile let me return this
5 document to you for such use as you may make of it with the -- with any
6 portions that are in Serbian that may be referred to.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, just to round out this topic, I
8 would like to just inform the Chamber that we -- I have an e-mail here
9 where we requested the transcript of -- the portions of the statement
10 that were in English be transcribed -- be translated into Serbian but the
11 language section declined to do that. So that's why, at least for our
12 side of it, the statement was in both languages.
13 JUDGE KWON: The version of statement the witness signed was in
14 the B/C/S in most part.
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. He signed the version that's uploaded into
16 e-court as the B/C/S original, which contains B/C/S and English.
17 JUDGE KWON: But his original statement was translated into
19 MR. ROBINSON: No. His original statement was taken -- was --
20 his original statement is the one that he has in front of him. It was
21 then translated into English by the CLSS.
22 JUDGE KWON: No, no. I mean his statement of, for example,
23 20th of May, 2006, was it not translated?
24 MR. ROBINSON: It was not translated. It was in English that we
25 had, as far as we were working with the English, and so it was contained
1 in English in the version that we considered to be the original version,
2 along with the Krajisnik transcript references.
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Do you have his statement with you?
4 Paragraph 240, footnote 250, it refers to 65 ter 20639, witness statement
5 dated 20th of May, 2006.
6 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's correct.
7 JUDGE KWON: Which is in B/C/S.
8 MR. ROBINSON: As I understand it, we were working with English
9 version at the time.
10 JUDGE KWON: So you could have inserted this part into B/C/S,
11 which was sent to the CLSS.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, apparently that's correct. There are four
13 statements as Mr. Sladojevic has explained to me. That's the only one
14 that's in Serbian. And that could have been done but it wasn't.
15 JUDGE KWON: So when witness said that he had all the statements
16 in B/C/S version which he initialed every page, I understood in that way
17 that -- so 240 could have been put in B/C/S, but I will leave it at that.
18 Shall we continue.
19 MR. TIEGER: Just on the heels of Mr. Robinson's comment, just to
20 note that the information that CLSS declined to translate, the Krajisnik
21 testimony is consistent with my understanding that there is no B/C/S
22 version of that testimony, but I'll move on as the Court has suggested.
23 Q. Mr. Subotic, at paragraphs 219 through 226, you deal with the
24 subject as the header indicates, "Prisoners of war and collection
25 centres." And on the heels of our discussion before the adjournment
1 about matters about which the Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale were
2 informed, I want to talk about the information you provided in the
3 statement and the information that was available at the time.
4 Now, first of all, included in that portion of your statement is
5 a colloquy between Judge Orie and yourself during the Krajisnik testimony
6 when Judge Orie quoted to you from a record of the government session
7 held on the 15th of June, 1992, which stated:
8 "'The government has considered the proposed report. It has been
9 concluded that the issue of prisoner exchange is extremely important,
10 complex, and delicate, and that if sufficient attention is not paid to
11 it, it can cause a number of negative consequences for the whole
12 republic. It has been agreed that a working group consisting of
13 Professor Branko Djeric,'" who was, as we know, the president of the
14 government at the time, the prime minister, "'Milan Trbojevic,'" who was
15 the vice-prime minister, "'Dr. Dragan Kalanic,'" minister of health,
16 "'Mico Stanisic,'" minister of the interior, "'Bogdan Subotic,'" you, the
17 minister of defence, "'and Momcilo Mandic,'" the minister of justice, and
18 it provided they "'should consider all the aspects of the prisoner
19 exchange problem and they should propose systematic and other solutions,
20 taking into account our international regulations. It is obvious that
21 solving this problem is urgent and that the regulations and concrete
22 measures for solving this issue should be proposed as soon as possible.'"
23 And you indicated to Judge Orie you -- that this was a reference
24 to prisoners who had been taken, you said, on both sides of the
25 municipality. Prior to that -- although you emphasised that these were
1 prisoners taken on a local scale and not major battles.
2 Now, Mr. Subotic, the language that accompanied the establishment
3 of this working group, referring to the problem as important, complex and
4 delicate, that's a reflection, is it not, of the awareness at that time
5 that thousands of Muslims and Muslim civilians in particular had been
6 taken under detention and if that problem wasn't resolved there would be
7 significant -- could be or would be significant negative consequences for
8 the Bosnian Serb Republic?
9 A. I did not hear at that session that thousands were mentioned. I
10 didn't hear anybody mentioning any figure. And as for the rest, I accept
11 that, but no figures were mentioned at all.
12 Q. Well, did you -- when -- when you came to understand, as
13 reflected in the report, that the problem was extremely important and
14 complex and required the involvement of the highest officials of the
15 government, including, as mentioned, the prime minister himself, the
16 vice-prime minister, the minister of the interior, and so on, did you
17 make any effort to find out the extent and scope of the problem?
18 A. For us and for me personally it didn't make any difference
19 whether we were talking about three, five, a hundred, or a thousand. It
20 was all the same to me.
21 As far as I can remember, and I didn't note any such thing, that
22 any figures were mentioned. It's different if different places. This
23 was based on different information. In any case, that problem was very
24 seriously taken into account, and this is how things were done at the
25 time as far as I know during the first government.
1 Q. Now, you had an opportunity during the course of your Krajisnik
2 case to see a photograph of at least some of the people who had been held
3 in custody, and you acknowledged, and it's there in your statement in
4 paragraph 226, that it was "... illegal, to hold people in detention and
5 treat them in a fashion that resulted in a condition like that" depicted
6 in the photograph; correct?
7 A. It's not quite like that. You remember very well if you read
8 everything what I -- you were also present in the courtroom. You
9 remember very well that I said things were staged, and I showed how some
10 images, some photographs, were not adequate. I explained a lot of that
11 to you. You are aware of that, so I don't see any need to discuss that.
12 I entirely stand by my statement of that day. I have nothing new to say.
13 Q. So is that your testimony to this Trial Chamber, that you are not
14 aware of -- or you did not acknowledge in any way that prisoners were
15 held in Bosnian Serb detention facilities in condition that reduced them
16 to an emaciated condition, that were not held in unhygienic [sic]
17 conditions, under -- with -- with inadequate food? You're denying all
18 that and saying it was staged, is that it?
19 A. Mr. Tieger, I stand by my statement absolutely, and if you wish,
20 because the Trial Chamber and all the people present here would need to
21 hear my statement and then decide on it. I stand by my statement, and I
22 have nothing further to add, the one that I provided to Orie. I cannot,
23 otherwise that is that. I have no other statement. But -- and I cannot
24 give you a different answer, because you did not read to the
25 Trial Chamber all that I said in the statement. I would like the Defence
1 and the others to find out.
2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last part of
3 that sentence.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know what it is. I could read it
5 out. If I had a Serbian translation here, I would read it out. I would
6 ask the Trial Chamber to allow me to read it out. I have no other answer
7 for you other than that.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. No, sir, I'm asking you a question in front of this
10 Trial Chamber, in front of these Judges right here, and I'm asking you if
11 your position is that Muslim -- Muslims were held in Bosnian Serb
12 detention facilities and treated in a fashion that resulted in their near
13 starvation, that -- that they were held in conditions where hygienic
14 facilities were totally lacking. Basically they were held in brutal and
15 inhumane conditions. Do you -- do you accept that that was the case, do
16 you deny that that was the case, or do you say that you don't know? What
17 is it as you're testifying before these Judges now?
18 A. I am saying that I did not give such a statement the way you are
19 telling it now. I provided a different statement, and I stand by that
20 statement that I provided to Mr. Orie. And you are asking me in a
21 suggestive way for me to accuse somebody or defend somebody in a way, and
22 that's something that I cannot do. What I said in that statement stands
23 before this Court and the court of God, and I have nothing more to add to
25 Q. Well, one of the things you acknowledge in that statement,
1 Mr. Subotic, is that you were the person responsible for providing -- for
2 ensuring that soldiers had sufficient food and supplies - that's at
3 page 26533 - correct?
4 A. Which soldiers? Whose soldiers?
5 Q. As minister of defence, were you or were you not responsible for
6 ensuring that the VRS had adequate supplies, ammunition, food, and so on,
7 or was that not part of your portfolio?
8 A. I was, yes. I was. That's true, but it's not the way you are
9 telling it. It's different. Read exactly what I said, exactly what I
10 said, please. Please do not impose things in a leading way. I do not
11 accept that. I did not say it the way you are telling it.
12 Q. Question at page 26533:
13 "Q. What was in your domain, Mr. Subotic, according to what you
14 told us, was logistics including such things was food; right?
15 "A. Yes."
16 A. No, no. Just specifically -- all right. Yes. Yes. And it is
17 still a yes.
18 Q. And who do you claim was responsible for providing food to the
19 prisoners taken and held by the members of the army for whose supply of
20 food you were responsible for?
21 A. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know who was responsible.
22 I don't know who was responsible. I don't know who that was. You did
23 not ask me that there, and I did not give an answer to that then. You're
24 asking me now that now, and I don't know to tell you who it was. I was
25 not the head of any camp or a quartermaster in order to be able to know
2 Q. Well, in fact -- in fact, you said in your testimony it was the
3 responsibility of whoever set up the camp to ensure that the prisoners
4 were fed, and that's at page 26523.
5 A. Mr. Tieger. Mr. Tieger, read to me -- read to me word-for-word
6 what I said. Then I will give you an answer yes or no.
7 Q. Mr. Subotic, when this working group was set up about the complex
8 and delicate and extremely important problem of prisoners, did you or
9 anybody else make -- on that working group make an effort to find out how
10 many prisoners there were and how they were being treated?
11 A. Yes, that was done, but I don't have any indicators now, because
12 I took the least part in that, so I didn't have any numbers or anything.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to speak into
14 the microphone.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not see a camp, actually, for
16 myself, with my very own eyes. I just saw it on television or something
17 like that. I did not see it in real life.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Are you denying that there were thousands of Bosnian Muslim and
20 Bosnian Croat prisoners being held at that time, civilian prisoners being
21 held at that time, or do you say that you don't know or that it was true?
22 A. I don't have any figures at my disposal. I personally have no
23 figures available, and I'm not able to say anything with any certainty,
24 because that's not something that I knew, and I didn't have any
25 possibility of knowing it.
1 Q. You had no possibility of knowing it, Mr. Subotic? The -- on the
2 1st of June, 1992, the 1 KK sent a report to the Main Staff, that's
3 P5398, about the 7.000 prisoners they captured during events around
4 Prijedor. On the 17th of July, 1992, a report was sent to Dr. Karadzic
5 and to Professor Djeric from the Ministry of the Interior stating:
6 "The army, Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies have requested that
7 the army round up or capture as many Muslim civilians as possible, and
8 they leave them -- leave such undefined camps to internal affairs organs.
9 The conditions in some of these camps are poor. There is to food.
10 Individuals sometimes do not observe international norms, et cetera."
11 At the 17th Assembly session -- and that by the way was P1096.
12 At the 17th Assembly session held on July 24th to 26th, 1992,
13 Representative Milanovic stood up and said - and that's at page 30
14 through 31 of the English and page 30 of the B/C/s:
15 "We have a huge problem with captured people of other
16 nationalities. We have hundreds and thousands of these prisoners."
17 On the 2nd of June, 1992, a day after the VRS -- the -- the
18 report from the 1 KK to the Main Staff I referred to earlier,
19 Dr. Karadzic met with Radislav Brdjanin - and that's according to as we
20 see in P1478, at pages 55 through 61 - and Brdjanin talked about the
21 problem of the Krajina with 14.500 Muslims and wanted a position about
22 prisoners from the highest level.
23 Now, in light of that information plus more, do you seriously
24 assert to this Court that you had no possibility of knowing that
25 thousands of Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilians were being held by the
1 Bosnian Serb authorities?
2 A. No. No, I did not.
3 Q. You don't deny that was the case. You just say you weren't aware
4 of it; is that it?
5 A. I don't know. I'm not denying anything, not do I know that it
6 was like that, and I don't -- this report was not something that I had in
7 front of me. I'm seeing this for the first time.
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the end of that
10 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last sentence, Mr. Subotic.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I repeat the last sentence?
12 Is that right?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I did not know and that
15 I don't know and that I was not aware either of this report or of the
16 figures, and I have nothing else to say.
17 MR. TIEGER:
18 Q. I've got a limited amount of time left, so I want to move on to
19 just a couple of more topics, Mr. Subotic. At paragraph 26 of your
20 statement, you say the Serbs made no -- "there was no plan. Serbs did
21 not make any plans before the war." Then you go on to say that only the
22 Muslims made plans.
23 Now, this Court has received evidence that Dr. Karadzic talked
24 both before and after about the steps that he had formulated and was
25 prepared to take. For example, P1387, English pages 74 through 75, B/C/S
1 pages 57 through 58, at the 38th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly,
2 Dr. Karadzic recalled the earlier days, and he explained how all the
3 steps were carefully planned to be executed once at a time, and he said:
4 "Let us use Alija's mistake to increase the price of wine.
5 Remember how all the SAOs," that's Serbian autonomous regions, "and all
6 those measures before the war always took place following Alija's
7 mistakes. There were nine to ten actions that we carried out. We
8 brainstormed them all together. However, we did not pull all nine moves
9 straight away, but we carried them out after Alija made a mistake. It is
10 then we'd make a move and the Muslims would curse his mother afterwards
11 and not ours."
12 And similarly in P2554 at a SFRY Presidency meeting in
13 December 1991, well before the 38th session, Dr. Karadzic again
15 "We made a list of moves, ten moves in the direction that we want
16 that the result be. But we do not put them into action until
17 Alija Izetbegovic messes something up. When Alija messes something up,
18 we make move number five and then we wait, and when he messes something
19 else up we make move number six."
20 And said the same thing in P953 --
21 JUDGE KWON: Let's break it down.
22 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
23 Q. So is it your position that Dr. Karadzic never told you, despite
24 the fact that he told everybody in the Bosnian Serb Assembly and
25 everybody present at the SFRY meeting in December 1991 that he had plans
1 for what was going to happen in Bosnia?
2 A. I did not have such contacts with Mr. Karadzic in 1991. I didn't
3 know him, and I didn't even know he existed. Specifically, in this case,
4 I have no ideas about that. This is something that I never -- I'm
5 hearing of this from you for the first time, so I cannot give any
6 comments on this. We can move on. Let's go to the next question.
7 Q. Well, let's talk about one of those very concrete steps that were
8 taken. You referred in paragraphs 52 through 55 to Crisis Staffs, and
9 tried to assert to the Court, did assert to the Court that they were all
10 self-organised and had nothing to do with the Bosnian Serb leadership;
11 right? That was your position?
12 A. Yes. Yes, that is correct.
13 Q. Well, this Court has heard a lot of evidence about the document
14 commonly known as Variant A and B, which called for the establishment of
15 Crisis Staffs. For example, P2568. We heard from a member of the
16 Main Board and Executive Board about his presence at a meeting of SDS
17 functionaries at the Holiday Inn during which Mr. Karadzic distributed
18 numbered copies of the Variant A and B document to municipal
19 representatives and gave a speech about the threat that Serbs were under,
20 and their municipal leaders were called up to take the Variant A and B
21 document. That's something you didn't know about, Mr. Subotic?
22 A. Absolutely not. In 1991, I did not have any information along
23 those lines, and I did not act along those lines. I was doing some other
24 things in 1991 to prevent the attack of Croatia on Bosnia-Herzegovina,
25 and I have a lot of statements about that. As for this, I don't know
1 anything about this. I'm not aware of it.
2 Q. Well, let's move to 1992. For example, on January 26th 1992, at
3 the 6th Assembly session of the -- of Bosnian Serb Republic, in front of
4 the Assembly, during which there was a discussion about the further steps
5 that the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats had taken toward a sovereign
6 and independent Bosnia, Mr. Cizmovic stood up and said: To resolve this
7 problem I propose that we begin with an urgent operationalisation and a
8 declaration on the establishment and promulgation of the Serbian Republic
9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tasks set out in the instructions of
10 19 December 1991 should be carried out.
11 And then this Trial Chamber has heard repeated evidence that on
12 the 14th of February, at an extended session of the Main and
13 Executive Boards, including municipal presidents and so on, Dr. Karadzic
14 activated the second level of variant A and B in a speech that referred
15 to that second level four separate times, including saying that's why we
16 called you here today. You didn't know about that either?
17 A. I didn't know any of that. I began to acquire knowledge on the
18 8th of April, 1992, when I came to Pale. Before that, I never went to
19 Pale, and I did not contact anyone. So I have no information or any
20 other evidence that I know anything about it.
21 Q. Well, let me just tell you about -- you refer to one -- two
22 Assembly sessions you were present at where this information was brought
23 to your attention in a very explicit manner. First the 46th Assembly
24 session, that's P1403, and then we're talk about the 50th which we talked
25 about before. So at the 46th Assembly section at English pages 347
1 through 348 and B/C/S 304 --
2 A. What is the date of that, please? Could you please say it?
3 Q. I'll get that for you in a second. I thought I had it. That was
4 November 1994, sir.
5 A. Could you please tell me which paragraph, what the number is.
6 Q. It's not in your statement?
7 A. All right. Very well.
8 Q. And I'm also telling you that the transcript of that session,
9 which is in evidence, also reflects your presence at the session. But
10 more importantly, here's what Dr. Karadzic said at that session and then
11 said at the 50th:
12 Everything was as clear as day in the municipalities. He said,
13 Please, remember how we used to work before the war. Everything was as
14 clear as day in the municipalities where we were majority and in those
15 where we were minority. Do you remember the instruction A and
16 instruction B? We had Crisis Staffs, and it was clear they were the
17 authority. They could make mistakes, but they were still the authority.
18 The people were not left without the authority because they were the
19 Crisis Staffs.
20 And then at the 50th Assembly session to which you've explicitly
21 referred in your statement, Dr. Karadzic said the following - that's P970
22 at English pages 316 to through 317, B/C/S page 278:
23 "At the moment the war began in the municipalities where we were
24 in the majority we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
25 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
1 up secret government, Municipal Boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents
2 of Executive Boards. You will remember the Variant A and B variants. In
3 the B variant where we were in the minority, 20 per cent, 15 per cent, we
4 had set up a government and a brigade, a unit, no matter what size, but
5 there was a detachment with a commander. Distribution of weapons was
6 carried out thanks to the JNA. What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and
7 distributed to the people in the Serbian areas but it was the SDS which
8 organised the people and created the army. It was an army. Together
9 with the people, those were the armed forces of the Serbian Republic of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina. They created the space, liberated and created
11 the space."
12 Mr. Subotic, those are words by Dr. Karadzic spoken in your
13 presence that clearly indicated the plans that were set in place and
14 implemented by the Bosnian Serb authorities before the war contrary to
15 your assertion in your statement that there were no plans by the
16 Bosnian Serbs; isn't that correct?
17 A. Do you have those plans? Could you provide those plans so that I
18 can see them? I cannot understand that you can say this from I don't
19 know where. Do you have the plans of the Bosnian Muslims? Do you have
20 the plan of the Serbs in order to be able to assert this before the
21 Trial Chamber? You cannot just be talking off the top of your head.
22 Crisis Staffs existed. All of that existed, but these were necessary, a
23 necessary evil. And of course we organised ourselves in some fashion,
24 but you don't have any documents that were not legal. Show any illegal
25 document on the basis of which Republika Srpska was established and then
1 we can talk and allow anyone, let anyone, anyone from Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina, give you such a plan, a copy. We cannot just be talking off
3 the top of our heads, Mr. Tieger. These are just leading things.
4 Q. I suggest we not talk off the top of our heads. Look at
5 paragraph 26 of your statement, please, and tell me if you didn't testify
6 before this Court in the form of this statement that, "Serbs did not make
7 any plans before the war"? Is that your testimony or not?
8 A. Let's see. Let's look at paragraph 26. It's in the English
9 language. Please read it out for me, and then I'll see when I did or did
10 not. Read it in B/C/S.
11 Q. "There was no plan. Serbs did not make any plans before the
13 That's a direct quote from the signed statement.
14 A. Yes. They did not make any plans.
15 Q. Okay. Thank you. I just have one more topic to cover with you,
16 sir, in the limited time I have, and that's in relation to the document
17 that Dr. Karadzic showed you yesterday. That's 11274. During which
18 he -- this is a session of the Bosnian Presidency during which he took
19 your attention -- drew your attention to a portion of that document that
20 referred to the declaration of a state of war, and he asked you:
21 "Did we declare a war on the Muslim-Croat coalition? Did they
22 declare a war on us?"
23 And then you were shown that document. Now, I'd like to show you
24 other parts of that document just to identify the context in which that
25 declaration of war was discussed, and if we can call up 11274, please.
1 If we can look at page 1 of the English translation and page 24
2 of the B/C/S moving on to 25.
3 That's a reflection of Mr. Halilovic talking, and he's talking
4 about indications about agreement of exchange and resettlement, and then
5 he talks about playing directly into the hands of those whose intention
6 it is to create some ethnic territories, to move the population, and to
7 create national units.
8 Turning to page 2 of the English and page 25 of the Serbian -- or
9 B/C/S, we see Mr. Abdic talking, who expresses concern about the need to
10 talk more about the fact that UNPROFOR has been put into a situation
11 where ethnic cleansing is being carried out under its supervision.
12 Page 3 of the English, page 28 of the B/C/S, Mr. Izetbegovic
13 says: If we don't accept the ultimatum, these people really could be
14 hurt. If we accept it, we're legalising ethnic division, that is the
15 alteration of the demographic picture of Bosnia, the creation of
16 ethnically clean territories, like some precondition for the creation of
17 some kind of a Serbian state in BH.
18 Page 4 of the English and page 28 through 29 of the Serbian,
19 Mr. Izetbegovic continues noting that: Wherever they surrendered their
20 weapons, et cetera, they ended up getting hurt. He's talking about, I
21 think, they later simply point their cannons and kill all those people.
22 That's the context in which the Bosnian Muslim authorities
23 declared or discussed the declaration of a state of war, isn't it?
24 A. Bosnian Muslims declared war from our side. Everything was done
25 to prevent a war, everything. And the only guilty party for starting the
1 war is the Bosnian Muslims or, rather, Alija Izetbegovic and the
2 international community. Had that -- had they not done what they had
3 done, there would have been no war. We Serbs asked for just one thing,
4 to have the right in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Serb community to have
5 its rights like in other countries all over the world that have mixed
6 communities. So my conscience is clear there, and I have no dilemma in
7 terms of who is guilty of starting the war. So the international
8 community assisted Alija Izetbegovic and had that not happened, there
9 would have been no war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As regards this part. If
10 you have some more, because you intimated that there would be another
11 question in this regard, but I did not hear that right.
12 Q. There will be.
13 MR. TIEGER: But let me tender those -- tender those pages along
14 with what was tendered during the examination-in-chief.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive them.
16 THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]
17 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.
18 THE REGISTRAR: That will be added to Exhibit D3716.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. And, Mr. Subotic, the reason -- first of all, Dr. Karadzic asked
21 you whether or not the Bosnian Serbs had declared a state of war, and the
22 reason that the Bosnian Serb authorities refrained from introducing a
23 state of war is because of their position that if something is done by
24 the civilian authorities without a state of war, such as settlement and
25 resettlement, but that is much better and it is not discarded after the
1 war. In other words, that all the demographic redistribution that was
2 taking place at the time that was referred to in the excerpts I talked to
3 you about earlier, that was reflected in the Bosnian Muslims and
4 Bosnia Croats by the thousands in the camps, that that democratic
5 redistribution wouldn't be discarded after the war or was less likely to
6 be discarded if a state of war was not declared. And that was the
7 reason, wasn't it?
8 A. Where is that written?
9 Q. Well, I'm glad you asked that question because apparently you
10 demand that. Let's turn to D00456 --
11 A. Where is that written?
12 Q. -- D00456, English page 57, B/C/S page 61 through 62. That's the
13 20th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, and we'll see Radovan Karadzic
15 A. Please read it out to me so that I can hear what it is. I cannot
16 remember that.
17 Q. In English it states the following: "We have refrained --
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let's find the passage.
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. "We --"
21 JUDGE KWON: Where is it?
22 MR. TIEGER: It's about the -- in English it's about the fourth
23 line down, and --
24 Q. Are you able to find it, sir, "We have refrained from introducing
25 a state of war"?
1 A. I don't have it in Serbian on my screen. Could somebody please
3 MR. TIEGER: Can we scroll down until we can see -- we can see
4 more. Or scroll up until we can find a point of reference. Another
5 point of reference would be the reference to Presidency and government.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It's not on this page. I do
7 not see it on this page.
8 MR. TIEGER: All right. Let's turn to -- is this -- B/C/S
9 page -- it should be the Serbian page 61, going on into 62. I -- I can't
10 see if this is the --
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have page 59 here on the screen.
12 MR. TIEGER: Sometimes the electronic versions don't conform to
13 the hard copy notations.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Microphone, please.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]
16 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry?
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, turn on your microphone.
18 THE ACCUSED: I couldn't before Mr. Tieger turned off.
19 JUDGE KWON: Okay.
20 THE ACCUSED: Now I see, but it is not at beginning of sentence.
21 [Interpretation] Until now, "we have refrained," [In English] This is
22 sort of 15th line from the bottom. [Interpretation] It's actually around
23 the 15th line from the bottom of the page and the sentence does not start
24 with those words, "We have refrained." I'll tell you how the sentence
25 actually starts, "I don't know what else we'll be doing tonight." So
1 that is the lower third of the page, "I don't know what we will be doing
2 tonight. Please, if we are to continue tonight, could somebody else us
3 from a legal point of view whether we have to change it."
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have it.
5 JUDGE KWON: Okay. It starts on the second line in English.
6 Shall we start from there, "I don't know what else we will do tonight."
7 MR. TIEGER:
8 Q. Okay. And the quote is as follows in the translation:
9 "We have refrained from introducing a state of war because it is
10 much more important, more founded and feasible if something is done by
11 the civilian authorities without a state of war under regular
12 circumstances such as settlement and resettlement. When the civilian
13 authorities do this, it is much better. It is not discarded after the
15 And that's the reason or at least one of the reasons,
16 Mr. Subotic, why a state of war was not declared by the Bosnian Serb
17 authorities; correct? At least according to Dr. Karadzic.
18 A. Yes, but what is negative there? I would like to know in terms
19 of your question what is negative here.
20 Q. I have one more matter to -- I ask you the questions, sir. I
21 have one more matter to raise with you and then we'll adjourn and I'll be
22 finished, and I'd like to call up P1483, page 155 in both versions. And
23 it's in May of 1993, Mr. Subotic -- excuse me a second.
24 [Prosecution counsel confer]
25 MR. TIEGER: Sorry. And I'd like both the English and the B/C/S
1 called up of 1483, at page 155.
2 On the 27th of May, 1993, Colonel Bogojevic met with
3 General Mladic, as reflected in his notebook, and he related that four to
4 five days ago Simo Drljaca had arrived, sent by the minister of the
5 interior, and Drljaca came about the Tomasica mine, the mine near
6 Prijedor where earlier they had buried around 5.000 Muslim bodies.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me one second, Mr. Tieger. Mr. President,
8 this appears not to have been notified to us as being an exhibit which
9 will be used in cross-examination. If I'm mistaken about that. I'm
10 looking at the two e-mails, and I don't see this one, but -- so I would
11 object to it being brought to the witness unless there's some explanation
12 for why we weren't notified.
13 MR. TIEGER: Well, I regret the omission. If so, that would be
14 the first time that I recall that ever happening in a long period of
15 time. I'm not quite sure what difference it would make, if they need
16 in -- in those terms. I'm not quite sure why the Defence doesn't want
17 the witness confronted with this, but I -- I -- I -- given the kinds of
18 notification we normally receive from the Defence on matters of this sort
19 and the accommodation we have provided, I find this to be a fairly
20 extraordinary objection, and I'm not -- I don't think it's well founded.
21 JUDGE KWON: Shall I take it as a word of apology for your
23 MR. TIEGER: I regret the omission, but I --
24 JUDGE KWON: All right. Let's continue.
25 MR. TIEGER: All right. Thank you, Mr. President. I'll
2 JUDGE KWON: But let us find the passage. Probably in English it
3 starts from the previous page.
4 MR. TIEGER: It does but where I was reading from is -- we are
5 now on -- on the correct page. We can go to the previous page to see
6 the -- but this is -- this is the passage I was reading from.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Probably. We need to start from the previous
8 page in both versions so that witness can follow. Yes. In B/C/S as
9 well, shall we go back to the previous page?
10 MR. TIEGER:
11 Q. All right. This page reflects what I had just mentioned to you
12 earlier, the meeting of Colonel Bogojevic who related Drljaca's arrival,
13 having been sent by the minister of the interior about the Tomasica mine.
14 And if we continue to the next page in both languages, please. That's
15 the mine near Prijedor where earlier they had buried around 5.000 Muslim
16 bodies. And then General Bogojevic said:
17 "I'm sure the world knows about this from the released prisoners.
18 Drljaca came to leave this with us and they want to get rid of it by
19 burning, grinding, or some other way. There are all kinds of bodies, and
20 they have involved Subotic in this. The team includes Drljaca. He was
21 in charge even while this was being done. At the meeting where General
22 Subotic, Arsic, Drljaca, me, and Mile Matijevic from the Banja Luka SUP."
23 He asked for the position. The position was "They killed them,
24 so they should get rid of them. And an investigation must be launched in
25 connection with this case and information retained to prevent it from
1 getting into the hands of unauthorised people."
2 A. What it's date? I cannot see the date here.
3 Q. May 27th 1993.
4 A. The 27th of May, 1993. This is the first time I see this and
5 hear of it, but I know what this is about. So it is well known that the
6 first conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred in Prijedor, the first one
7 as far as the Bosnian Krajina is concerned. I wouldn't dare speak about
8 Herzegovina and the rest down there, because I'm not familiar with that.
9 This conflict occurred already in the beginning of May in
10 Prijedor, and during that time I was minister in the Government of
11 Republika Srpska and Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say I came on the
12 5th -- on the 8th of April. After that I assumed my duty, and, I don't
13 know, for more than a month, I think, I did not move from Pale at all.
14 Since communications were very bad at the time, we had not even
15 established a government yet in full. There were five or six of us. So
16 that is to say that the formation of the government was underway.
17 Some information was coming in about clashes between Serbs and
18 Muslims, ethnic groups in the town of Prijedor itself. Now, what
19 happened there and is to what extent, we did not know. We were not in a
20 position, we from the government, not at all. We hadn't even been
21 established yet as such for -- for us to get any meaningful information.
22 Time elapsed. Sometime in 1993, in the month of May, Haris Silajdzic, in
23 a public statement on the radio said that in Prijedor, in the beginning
24 of May 1992, 5- to 7.000 Muslims were killed. Around the 12th of May -
25 I'm not sure. I don't remember correctly - in 2003, among other things,
1 I became the chief inspector of the army. I personally heard this
2 information in Pale. And that was the first time I heard of anything
3 like that. Then I decided, because that was my task, to check because I
4 knew it wasn't the army. In Prijedor, in May, there was the JNA, a
5 military unit, but it was in Slavonia. As far as I remember, it was
6 precisely in Slavonia.
7 So in this conflict with the Muslim population or fighters or
8 whatever, I don't know how it was that they clashed, it was the
9 Territorial Defence that took part. It only could have been the
10 Territorial Defence, possibly the police. That is why I, around the
11 22nd or 23rd of May, I cannot remember exactly, I went to Banja Luka. I
12 asked for information as to what it was that happened in Prijedor in May,
13 what Haris Silajdzic had stated in the media. It turned out that no one
14 could tell me anything specific, and I addressed precisely this
15 Colonel Bogojevic who was head of security in the 1st Krajina Corps, and
16 I asked him and he said, We don't know all of it either, but the Prijedor
17 police would have to know and the Territorial Defence. They were the
18 ones who took part in this. I asked the colonel that we go there and
19 see. We found Colonel Arsic there who was commander of the JNA unit who
20 maybe could have or should have had some information about that. I,
21 Bogojevic, and Arsic went together to the police to see Drljaca, who was
22 chief of police at the time. I don't know exactly what his exact title
23 was. I first put this question: Did the army take part in this? The
24 explanation I was given was that this military unit, I think it was
25 called the 27th or some brigade, that was a JNA unit, that it was
1 somewhere in Okucani or towards Papuk, but that that was this clash
2 between the opposing parties, that is to say the Muslims and the
3 Territorial Defence in Prijedor.
4 Simo Drljaca, well, I asked where were these people who were
5 killed buried, and he said at the mine of Tomasica. I asked that we all
6 go there together to see whether anything can be seen there or something
7 like that, because according to military regulations in a state of war,
8 and so on, which had already been regulated, well, not exactly in May but
9 by the end of June I as minister of defence issued these regulations.
10 This was regulating how this should be done, how people should be buried,
11 one's own soldiers, enemy soldiers, and so on and so forth. I asked that
12 we take a look, and when we arrived there, so that is about a year after
13 this massacre, I asked Mr. Drljaca. He said that it was the materials
14 that took part in this and part of the police. I asked how many were
15 there, because I said Haris Silajdzic -- well, this is what initiated my
16 interest in it. When I asked the question how many people, fighters, or
17 whoever they were, civilians, were buried there, he said up to 500, up to
19 I could not make any decision then. For me it was important that
20 the army didn't do it, and that was confirmed by Colonel Arsic and
21 Drljaca. When actually after that Krajisnik and I went to see the
22 president of the municipality we talked a bit about that, but he said
23 that's how they were buried. That's how it was. No one touched
24 anything. The location and time are well known. When I returned to
25 Pale, I notified the minister of justice, it was Mr. Jovo Rosic, and I
1 asked him, I mean I explained this to him, what it was that I found out,
2 and I asked him to start an investigation about this case.
3 What happened after that I don't know. That is what I know about
4 this case.
5 Q. One follow-up question. So your testimony is that before the
6 attack on Kozarac on May 24th, 1992, before the confinement of thousands
7 of Muslims and Croats in Omarska and Keraterm, before the room 3 massacre
8 where 150 people were killed, before the attack on the Brdo in
9 July of 1992, before the killing of over 150 people from the Brdo and
10 Omarska and so on, that already at least 500 and according to Bogojevic,
11 5.000 Muslims had been killed before that in Prijedor? That's your
13 A. That's what we were told by Drljaca to me, Bogojevic and Arsic.
14 I didn't know anything about that, to be honest, although there were
15 rumours. There was information that we received in Pale that there had
16 been conflicts between Muslims and Serbs in the territory of Prijedor.
17 There was nothing strange about that. The war had already started,
18 therefore there was nothing specific. And as for Kozarac and the rest, I
19 really at that time -- I did not have a possibility or time to deal with
20 that problem at all throughout the entire first war -- year of the war I
21 didn't have the time, or at least up to June I didn't. Perhaps two or
22 three times I turned up in Banja Luka and once I was there with
23 Krajisnik. When we went to visit the president of the municipality, I
24 know that Krajisnik asked him about the situation with the population in
25 Prijedor, and that was sometime around the 12th or the 13th of May. He
1 said we have about 5.000 Muslims, about 5- to 6.000 Croats in terms of
2 the other population. That's what I know. I remember that very well.
3 After that case, in 1993 I remember that, and then I wondered how
4 come that there were 5.000 Muslims and that they were killed by the
5 Territorial Defence at the beginning of the war since the
6 Territorial Defence perhaps had one company. I don't know how many. I
7 didn't know how many men they had at their disposal. So who was it who
8 was capable of killing that many people? I didn't find any of that
9 logical. But listen, see, according to Haris Silajdzic there were 5- to
10 7.000 and so on and so forth. In any war the figures get exaggerated,
11 and that was also true of Srebrenica and so on and so forth. This is
12 what I know about that case.
13 I don't know where this has come from, where this information has
14 come from. From Bogojevic? I haven't a clue really. I really don't --
15 am surprised. What did he say? Let me see. Just bear with me for a
16 moment. That Subotic got involved. What does that mean? What does it
17 mean when he says that I got involved? What was I involved in? Maybe he
18 thought that I as the main inspector of the army and I came to check the
19 situation. I don't know what I was involved in. As a minister, what was
20 I supposed to be involved in during the first days of the war. I was in
21 Pale. I didn't know whether I was coming or going, what was I supposed
22 to do, how I was supposed to set up my ministry from the 12th of May
23 onwards? I really don't understand. He should explain his own words to
24 you, I guess.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. Subotic.
1 Thank you, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, in light of the time for redirect
4 which will probably be somewhat extensive, I'm proposing that we excuse
5 Colonel Salapura for today so that he can start his testimony in the
7 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
8 Mr. Subotic, before Mr. Karadzic starts his re-examination, I
9 will put some questions to you, and I ask you to be very precise, because
10 depending upon your answer, the Chamber may order redaction of some part
11 of your statement.
12 So you have your statement, signed statement with you right now.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
14 JUDGE KWON: And some parts of the paragraphs are written in
15 English as we saw before.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.
17 JUDGE KWON: It is my understanding that there are three kinds of
18 paragraphs that were written in English, so shall we go to paragraph 236.
19 Or we shall go to paragraph 240 first which we saw earlier today. Could
20 we upload it. Next page. Yes, 240. Under the subtitle of Blagaj Japra.
21 This is written in English, but this is a quotation from your
22 witness statement you gave on the 20th of May, 2006, which --
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.
24 JUDGE KWON: Which was also written in the B/C/S on which you
25 signed and initialed every page. Do you remember?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember that, yes.
2 JUDGE KWON: So you were confident this is true because you
3 signed the original B/C/S version at the time when the witness statement
4 was made.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.
6 JUDGE KWON: All right. Then let us move to next paragraph,
7 paragraph 241. It's a question from Judge Orie and your answer, and
8 there's another question from Judge Hanoteau and your answer. This is a
9 transcript from the Krajisnik case. When you gave testimony at the time,
10 the transcript was made only in English and no -- and it is my
11 understanding and I am confident --
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.
13 JUDGE KWON: -- that no Serbian translation was made at the time.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, there wasn't, but I did provide
15 the statement. I signed it, and only later did I receive its
17 JUDGE KWON: I don't understand your answer, Mr. Subotic. What
18 we are talking about is your testimony in the Krajisnik case.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Yes, yes, yes. I did
20 provide that statement. I remember that very well.
21 JUDGE KWON: What do you mean by the statement, providing that
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I uttered those words. When
24 Mr. Orie asked me questions, I answered, yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'm coming to that. So when Defence produced
1 this part of statement, i.e., that is paragraph 241, how did you find
2 that the paragraph 241 was correct? Did the Defence read out this
3 paragraph to you?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes. The Defence read
5 out that paragraph to me when they took a statement from me. Whenever
6 they took statements from me, they read those statements to me first from
7 English, and the statements that I provided in the Krajisnik case, and I
8 confirmed their correctness because I knew that there were no alterations
9 to them made.
10 JUDGE KWON: And shall we go back to paragraph 236.
11 Mr. Tieger, who was JR?
12 THE ACCUSED: Maybe Jean-Rene Ruez.
13 JUDGE KWON: So --
14 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President. Which footnote are we
15 referring to?
16 JUDGE KWON: 236.
17 MR. TIEGER: That's the problem. I believe that was
18 John Ralston.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Do you see paragraph 236? This is an
20 interview you gave at the -- at the Prosecution --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see that, yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: So you were asked by the representative of the
23 Office of the Prosecutor, John Ralston, and you gave your answer. You
24 see the initial BS?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
1 JUDGE KWON: How did you confirm that this part was also correct?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Sladojevic interpreted
3 that to me when he was taking my statement.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure the Chamber understand you when you
7 said Mr. Sladojevic interpreted that to you. What did exactly he do?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He told me that he would also
9 include some statements from my previous testimony which in essence
10 correspond with what I know. He -- he told me that those statements
11 would be included verbatim from your previous evidence because in essence
12 they correspond with my entire statement; i.e., I repeat them in one way
13 or another almost verbatim in the same vein, and I accepted that that
14 could be exclusively done in the way I testified before Mr. Orie. I
15 accepted that voluntarily. Therefore, there's no reason for things to be
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I understand that, Mr. Sladojevic told you
18 that those parts would be included -- included verbatim from your
19 previous evidence, but my question is whether Mr. Sladojevic or any other
20 person, including interpreter, read out your statement in its entirety
21 that is to be included in your statement.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. What is now before me was
23 read out to me, both the parts in English as well as the parts in
24 Serbian. We spent an entire day during proofing on that.
25 [Trial Chamber confers]
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll an a break for 45 minutes and
2 resume at 1.45.
3 --- Recess taken at 1.01 p.m.
4 --- On resuming at 1.51 p.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: If I could just quickly note one matter unrelated to
7 this witness that I've already mentioned to Mr. Robinson, that is that in
8 light of the timing and nature of Mr. Zametica's proposed 92 ter
9 statement, the Prosecution will be asking at an appropriate moment that
10 his testimony be led live, so I wanted to let the Chamber know in case it
11 had anything in mind by way of arguments for timing just before the
12 witness testifies or any time before.
13 JUDGE KWON: To be led live in its entirety.
14 MR. TIEGER: Correct. Well, in light of the fact that there is
15 apparently no way of segregating the new portions from the previously --
16 the previous draft, that is correct.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we're against that but if the
19 Chamber were minded to do that we would prefer to postpone his testimony
20 until the 3rd of July, which would be after the 14 days would have
21 expired from the receipt of the more recent statement, so if you could
22 let us know, but we are unlikely to make much progress with his testimony
23 tomorrow in any event, so if it's determined that there was not enough
24 notice to allow him to testify under Rule 92 ter at this time, we would
25 simply prefer that he be recalled at a time when there is sufficient
2 JUDGE KWON: We can't decide in vacuum. We'll hear from the
3 parties sometime today or tomorrow.
4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies; good
6 afternoon to everybody.
7 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General, sir.
9 A. Good afternoon.
10 Q. I'll start with last things first, and I will base my questions
11 on what we heard from you yesterday. Could you please tell us, General,
12 sir, how you understood the situation which resulted in casualties that
13 were buried in the mine in Prijedor.
14 A. Those casualties were result of a conflict as Drljaca confirmed,
15 and that conflict involved the Territorial Defence and police forces
16 during May in Prijedor. I have nothing else to say because I didn't hear
17 anything different.
18 Q. Thank you. Were there any signs, were there any rumours that
19 they were the result of a crime, that they were killed? Did Bogojevic
20 specify the way casualties came by?
21 A. To be honest, I didn't ask any questions since he said that they
22 were killed during clashes in the town of Prijedor, I did not ask any
23 questions. I didn't have any reason to doubt those words because it was
24 publicly known that there was fighting going on in Prijedor. I was in
25 Pale, so I did not have precise possibilities to know more than I did.
1 Q. When it comes to that burial and sanitization, did that happen
2 before or after you issued your instructions?
3 A. They were buried immediately after.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: All right. This is the second time Dr. Karadzic is
6 introducing terms of art that have particular connotations that were not
7 either -- they're not contained in the document, for example. Now we
8 have sanitization. Previously we had casualties. It's clear what he's
9 intending to convey with his use of the words, and I want to urge
10 open-ended questions that don't direct the witness to particular
11 formulations of events.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
14 Q. General, sir, what instructions did you give in the month of June
15 after the army started functioning properly?
16 A. I prescribed everything in terms of documents concerning warfare,
17 the burial of casualties, and so on and so forth. Therefore, I didn't do
18 anything else.
19 Q. Thank you. That provision concerning burials, what does it set
20 out? Which casualties is the army supposed to bury?
21 A. I know from some parts, for example, in Zvornik where I was
22 present when General Stankovic, who is a pathologist, dealt with some
23 casualties in Zvornik that were buried at the cemetery, and they were
24 Muslims. Pathologists did their bit that they were supposed to do. They
25 had documents. The graves were marked with numbers. I saw that, and
1 that was in accordance with the military regulations that prevailed in
2 the JNA and in all the other militaries in the world. I had an occasion
3 to see that. That was prescribed by our rules and regulations. People
4 could not be buried in any way. Their graves had to be marked. Their
5 names had to be known, and so on and so forth. And later on the mortal
6 remains could be transferred to other places depending on requirements
7 and some other thing. I don't know what.
8 Q. Thank you. Was every killed enemy soldier buried in the place
9 where they were found? What procedure was followed?
10 A. Listen, it depended on the conditions. For example; I don't know
11 why those people in Prijedor did it the way they did. In Prijedor there
12 are Muslim cemeteries and so on and so forth, so they could bury them in
13 Muslim cemeteries, which would have only been fair, and so on and so
14 forth. They should have marked those graves. However, maybe the
15 conditions were not in place. Maybe it was not possible due to fighting
16 and conflicts. I don't know. I never investigated the circumstances.
17 My information dated from one year after the conflict and after the
19 Q. Thank you. Tell me, after the war or at any time, were those
20 bodies exhumed when that burial site was discovered? Did anybody mention
21 the number of bodies that were found there?
22 A. I know from the media, from the press, and from TV that that
23 burial site in the Omarska mine was exhumed. To be honest, I was never
24 in those mines, so I don't know what the name refers to. However, that
25 information did not contain the number of casualties, but that was done
1 after the war. I know that. In peacetime I don't know when, in what
2 year, but that can be checked in the territory of Banja Luka.
3 Q. Thank you. You were asked whether you denied that Omarska,
4 Keraterm were camps where the civilians and fighters were detained and
5 other people. Can you tell us how many people were released from Omarska
6 and Keraterm and how many were found as guilty of having participated in
8 A. According to the information that I had even before the end of
9 the war, 60 per cent of the people who were detained there were released.
10 I don't know what happened to the remaining 40 per cent. I don't know.
11 I'm not privy to that information, but I know for a fact that I came
12 across information according to which 60 per cent were released.
13 Q. Who was it who was in charge of the investigations and triages
14 that happened there? Who was it who decided that some should be released
15 and that some should be kept? Do you know that?
16 A. Yes, I did know that, because --
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: More of the same and I'm going to keep rising when
19 this keeps happening. You can scour the transcript. There is no mention
20 of triage up to now. This is part of a continuing pattern by
21 Dr. Karadzic trying to indicate to witnesses where he wants them to go
22 and what assumptions he wants them to build into their answers.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Actually, Mr. President, I don't agree with that.
25 This is not a leading question and the witness is free to give any answer
1 he wants. I don't think that Dr. Karadzic is asking an improper question
2 at all in this way. I don't really understand the basis for an objection
3 that Dr. Karadzic is creating some kind of suggestion to the witness.
4 The question is open-ended. He can answer it in any way he wishes.
5 JUDGE KWON: How about the word "triage"?
6 MR. ROBINSON: Nevertheless, that's not suggested. It's up to --
7 if that's how Dr. Karadzic characterises and the witness understands what
8 the import of the question is that's not suggestive simply charactering
9 of something one way or the other.
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: In my system, as Mr. Robinson well knows -- first of
12 all, we should be arguing this outside the presence of the witness, but
13 never mind. This assumes facts not in evidence. So Dr. Karadzic wants
14 to ask the witness about something that the witness has not testified to,
15 that was not raised in the examination, that is now presented as a fact
16 and ask him who was in charge of that fact that the witness hasn't
17 testified about and that wasn't part of any earlier answer. That is the
18 existence of triage. Now, and -- and as I said before, this is another
19 reflection of the same pattern that exists of providing the witness with
20 something as a fact and then having the witness automatically build it
21 into his answers.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will rephrase.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will rephrase the question.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. General, sir, these 60 per cent, were they released --
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Bear that in mind. The Chamber
3 agrees with Mr. Tieger's observation. Please continue.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, sir, according to what you heard and found out these
6 60 per cent, were they just released indiscriminately, and what about
7 these other per cent and what is this the result of? Did others decide
8 about that?
9 A. Others were aware of that. I didn't know about it, but nobody
10 asked me about it. Mr. Orie didn't ask me about that. I was responding
11 only to Mr. Orie's questions. I didn't know who would be asking me what.
12 So this means that the investigative organs interviewed individuals.
13 This was publicly shown by the organs of power. It's not a secret. All
14 those who were not -- who were not -- who did not participate in the
15 fighting, and so on and so forth, who did not, they were released. I
16 know that for sure. There's nothing else to it.
17 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to move to page 54 of today's
18 transcript where the declaration of war was discussed. First, I'm asking
19 you this: It was read how I said that the municipalities had their own
20 units. Are you able to tell us whether the municipality has the right to
21 any armed formations and to which ones?
22 A. According to the law on the national defence of the
23 Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
24 the municipality had all the powers in that sense at the municipal level.
25 This is particularly interesting until the formation of
1 Republika Srpska -- or, rather, for the beginning of the war, until we
2 formed our own organs, laws, and so on and so forth. So we copied
3 certain things from those laws. We did not change the laws of
4 Yugoslavia. Therefore, the municipalities did have such powers at the
5 municipal level. They had their own Municipal Staffs. They had their
6 own weaponry. They had -- all of this existed on one side and the other
7 side, the Muslim side, the Serb side, and the Croat side.
8 Q. Thank you. You were asked or actually what was disputed was your
9 assertion in the testimony in the Krajisnik case that Serbs did not have
10 any preparations. What sort of preparations did you mean when you said
11 that you did not have any preparations?
12 A. Serbs had no preparations at all for armed fighting. They simply
13 had -- Serbs had political preparations, preparations through which they
14 attempted, and it wasn't just the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in
15 Croatia, Slovenia, and so on and so forth. They were trying to convince
16 people not to go into war, not to embark on war, that if we needed to
17 split up then we should split up. So that was it. No Serb was willing
18 to participate in the war. Not a single Serb. Believe me, we loved
19 Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a wonderful country. Therefore there were no
20 military preparations that were carried out until the beginning of the
21 war. As one says only with the entrance of the army to Sarajevo, they
22 were escaping in front of the enemy, they were getting killed in
23 Sarajevo. It was then that people understood what it was all about, how
24 things were proceeding and then they began something at their own level,
25 they made some attempts.
1 Q. Thank you. And then my learned friend Mr. Tieger said as I --
2 that I said that we had a series of pre-planned moves. When
3 Mr. Izetbegovic made one move, we made another move. So this political
4 counter game, did that lead to war? Did it have a military nature?
5 A. No, no. It was just precisely that political game that tried by
6 all means. This is generally known. Everybody knows this. Muslims in
7 Sarajevo know this, and many Muslims would confirm that, and -- and they
8 could testify to it. Thus no one was in favour of war. Quite the
9 contrary. We accepted that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina. It should be one state, because Yugoslavia was dismembered.
11 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
13 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, but I'm going to keep objecting to this.
14 So this is another example so Dr. Karadzic says to the witness about this
15 matter. So did these political counter moves and so on. What the
16 witness actually said when he was presented with that information was, I
17 didn't have any contacts with Mr. Karadzic in 1991. I didn't know him.
18 I didn't know he existed, specifically in this case. I have no ideas
19 about that. Well, now Mr. Karadzic gave him some ideas and it comes out
20 in his testimony and that's what's happening over and over.
21 JUDGE KWON: I also agree, and also it reduces the probative
22 value of the witness's answer. While the Chamber is able to recognise
23 such -- such the probative value of such questioning, but please refrain
24 from putting a leading nature in your -- in your questions. Please
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I just wanted to respond
2 briefly to Mr. Tieger. This was a consequence of the fact that
3 Mr. Tieger presented our political measures to the witness as military,
4 war measures, and that brought him into the situation of having to say
5 that he didn't know anything about it. Had he read which measures we had
6 taken, then ...
7 JUDGE KWON: It is you that inserted the term political
8 counter-gain and it's not appropriate when you conduct re-examination.
9 Please proceed.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, your Excellency, but in
11 that case I would ask that the witness be shown the measures to which
12 Mr. Tieger alluded so that we can see. He presented them as part of
13 preparations for war, but they were not of a military nature, so he
14 confused the witness.
15 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed. It's up to you how to conduct your
16 re-examination, Mr. Karadzic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, just give me a little time to
18 collect myself and I will come back to that.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General, sir, you were shown the transcript of the
21 20th of June, 1992, where the Muslim side -- or, rather, the Presidency
22 declares war and proclaims a state of war. Was this the first time that
23 they undertook and adopted some aggressive warmongering actions in
24 relation to the Serbs?
25 A. No, no. They already from the attack by Croatia to -- and
1 preparations for the attack on.
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Is this the first time that they
3 adopted some aggressive warmongering actions in relation to the Serbs?
4 Please reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, very well. I apologise.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Was that the first time that any law was being referred to or
8 mentioned which would direct towards fighting against the Serbs?
9 A. No, it was not. Already from the beginning, after the formation
10 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the referendum, this already started to
11 be prepared and so on and so forth.
12 Q. Thank you. Can we look at D332 in e-court, please. General,
13 sir, please, could you read the date and the first sentence and then
14 could you read paragraph 4.
15 A. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of
16 National Defence, Territorial Defence Staff, Sarajevo, number such and
17 such. The date, 20 -- I don't know if this is 20 -- 20th or the 27th -
18 I'm not sure - of April, 1992. Order on the implementation of decision
19 number such and such of the RBiH Presidency pursuant to the decision of
20 the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. Thank you. Could you read item four now?
22 A. Four: Hurriedly plan and begin combat operations in the whole
23 territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and co-ordinate them
24 with the Territorial Defence staffs of regions, districts, and the
25 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In planning combat operations, plan
1 extensive measures of protection of the civilian population and property
2 of the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 Commander Colonel Efendic. Hasan. I'm missing some letters, but last
4 name is Efendic. This is the person who replaced Vukosavljevic,
5 General Vukosavljevic.
6 Q. General, sir, against whom should combat actions be planned and
7 commenced on the territory of the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina?
8 A. Well, it's not against angels or anyone. It's against Serbs and
9 probably Croats at that time. Possibly.
10 Q. Thank you. And --
11 JUDGE KWON: Please remember, Mr. Subotic, to put a pause before
12 you start answering the question.
13 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. The Serb side at that time or at any point later did it make a
17 plan and issue a similar directive for offensives on the entire territory
18 of Bosnia and Herzegovina or in territories which were majority Muslim or
20 A. Absolutely not ever until perhaps the end of 1992 when there were
21 orders by the army for certain operations like that, but otherwise before
22 that this was not definitely the case, no.
23 Q. Thank you. Can we now see 1D44050 in e-court, please. There is
24 no translation, but I'm briefly just going to read five or six lines.
25 First of all, let's identify the document though.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
2 MR. TIEGER: We're about to see a document that doesn't have an
3 English translation, so I won't be able to tell why it's being raised at
4 this point to this witness, but -- so I'm a little bit lost as to the
5 manner in which this arises from the cross-examination and what is
6 intended by putting this particular document in front of the witness
7 rather than seeking whatever information he might have that's relevant to
8 redirect examination.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, there was a
11 question as to the declaration of war and the conduct and actions of the
12 Muslim army and possible preparations on the Serb side. The topic is the
13 same as the one dealt with with the previous document, and the author is
14 the same, General Hasan Efendic.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: That's not justification for leading the witness,
17 which is apparently what this is an effort to do. Meanwhile this
18 document is in front of the witness and he's reading it. So
19 Dr. Karadzic, as has been his custom, one way or another continues to try
20 to lead witnesses.
21 JUDGE KWON: He put a question, albeit very brief, on the
22 previous page. Very well. Now that the witness has read the document,
23 what is your question?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he didn't read the part that
25 I'm interested in. It's on a different ...
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Is this directive correct, General, sir, is this how they acted
3 based on this directive from the 29th of April?
4 A. I am familiar with that situation. First of all, I would like to
5 tell the Trial Chamber that in Bosnia and Herzegovina this post was
6 health by General Vukosavljevic, and he was replaced because he is a Serb
7 by ethnicity even though he was married to a Muslim woman from Sarajevo.
8 Therefore, he was not suitable for the preparations, because he wouldn't
9 do that. He was lieutenant-general by rank. He was a very serious man.
10 I knew him personally. We all knew him, because he was the commander of
11 the Territorial Defence for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a
12 number of years. So he was deliberately replaced so that Hasan Efendic
13 could subordinate himself to Alija Izetbegovic and then --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- he could be acting according to
16 the wishes of Alija Izetbegovic.
17 JUDGE KWON: In order to put a document to the witness, first you
18 should put a foundational question and lead the witness to tell us what
19 this document is about, and you may then proceed to ask some content of
20 the document. I don't see from the document what this directive is about
21 at all, and I don't know what this document is about.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, the directive has
23 been taken down.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. Just wait. The directive has
1 been taken down. I already put questions on it, then it was adopted.
2 This is D332 it was earlier on the screen. This is a review by the same
3 man about the development of the military --
4 JUDGE KWON: You're not giving evidence. Put a question to the
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. All right. General, do you see this document? Can you tell us
8 what the document deals with?
9 A. He is justifying the declaration of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
10 rather, Alija's declaration of war, and he is trying in some way to
11 explain that, the reasons for declaring war. That is the essence.
12 Q. Can we see page 4. What is written there? Can you read out the
13 heading for the Trial Chamber.
14 A. Well, now I have page 3.
15 Q. Can we please have the first page yet again and could you read it
17 A. "Development and growth of defensive liberation forces." Please,
18 this is clear. Defensive liberation forces. These are forces that were
19 attacked, not those that are defending themselves.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Subotic, what you were asked about is to read
21 out the title. Please concentrate on answering the question.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: Well, I agree with the Court's guidance, and I also
25 think it's clear that what's happening is that in lieu of asking this
1 witness focused questions that might elicit information that he has in a
2 non-leading way that arise from the cross-examination, instead he's being
3 turned to documents that Dr. Karadzic wants information to be elicited
4 about and being asked to read it out and affirm -- it's classical
5 leading. It's also very peripheral to the cross-examination which dealt
6 with the matter that Dr. Karadzic raised in a very specific way and now
7 he's returning using that subject as a broad platform from which to
8 discuss everything about Muslim preparations for war.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll withdraw that, Excellency.
10 I'm going to abandon this topic altogether and I'm going to go back to --
11 JUDGE KWON: Speaking for myself, and I take it my colleagues
12 would agree with me but I tend to agree with Mr. Tieger's observation.
13 So, Mr. Robinson, if you could have a word with Mr. Karadzic how to
14 conduct his re-examination in the future.
15 Shall we adjourn for today with the witness -- with this witness
16 and I will hear from the parties about Zametica's evidence.
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I was informed that we can -- Mr. Salapura's
19 evidence has not been concluded which he will continue tomorrow for about
20 half an hour or an hour.
21 Yes. Mr. Subotic, you may be excused. We'll continue tomorrow
22 morning at 9.00.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
25 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I think I can shortcut
1 this discussion just by doing some math here. I don't think we'll reach
2 Mr. Zametica tomorrow, so instead I think we'll reschedule his testimony
3 for the 3rd of July and that will obviate any problems.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: I certainly haven't thought through the impact --
6 what I understand Mr. Robinson to be saying is that the circumstances are
7 such that he's in a position to reformulate the schedule in a manner that
8 doesn't implicate any loss of time to the Court or any impact on the
9 Prosecution. I actually haven't thought it through from that respect,
10 but if his point is he can do something unilaterally that doesn't have
11 any implications to the Prosecution's schedule, I suppose that's a way of
12 saying it doesn't really matter what the Prosecution says in response. I
13 haven't thought it through fully from that point of view and to see what
14 impact it has, so my position was predicated upon the impact of dealing
15 with that statement under the circumstances that we expected to occur,
16 and you'd have to give me just about at least two minutes to consider the
17 implications of what Mr. Robinson just suggested.
18 JUDGE KWON: Very well, Mr. Tieger. So we'll deal with it when
19 it will arise as a matter of fact. So we'll deal with it immediately
20 before Mr. Zametica is due to testify.
21 There's one matter.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE KWON: So I'd like to ask the parties whether -- or how
24 they view this: Mr. Salapura is going to testify in the Mladic case
25 tomorrow morning for some time, after which he's due to come to this
1 courtroom and to give testimony, this time as a Defence witness. In
2 terms of perception or appearance, whether there's any problem or
3 whatever, can I hear from the parties.
4 MR. ROBINSON: We don't see any problem. Maybe I'm missing
5 something that is not blatantly obvious to me, but in reality, the
6 Prosecution is interested in proving the events in Srebrenica and some of
7 the things that occurred there, and they're using Colonel Salapura to do
8 that in the Mladic case. We're interested in showing that Dr. Karadzic
9 didn't have any knowledge of those events, and we're using
10 Colonel Salapura in our case for that purpose. So I don't see any
11 inconsistency, but if I'm missing something about the perception, maybe
12 you can let me know.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, I'm also happy to focus on particular concerns
15 the Court might have, but my initial reaction is that this is a
16 reflection of an aspect of witness testimony that we see reflected in
17 various ways when insider witnesses are called, and that is in part that
18 parties may call witnesses in respect of particular information and ask
19 the Court to consider the witness's testimony in light of the totality of
20 evidence and the extent to which that witness's testimony about certain
21 matters is convincing and credible and corroborated by the totality of
22 the evidence and disregard other aspects of the witness's testimony that
23 may be, for whatever reason, whether it's -- well, for various reasons,
24 not considered reliable by the Court. So I -- given the position that
25 certainly has been taken in respect of insider testimony in other
1 instances, I think it would not be necessarily surprising that a
2 witness's evidence is of interest in some respects to either party,
3 although all of the evidence that that witness may provide may not be
4 accepted or indeed may be challenged by the party that calls the witness,
5 and I say that completely in the abstract, because I haven't conducted
6 myself the particular analysis of what evidence I think the Defence
7 specifically intends to rely on, what evidence I think is likely to be
8 adduced from this witness in the Mladic case, but I think that broad
9 principle is -- is one that we're familiar with in the institution.
10 Given the fact that people close to the events are also people
11 close to the -- very often to the accused and are other parties of
12 interest, there is often a viewed need to elicit information from those
13 people, understanding the possibility that not all information elicited
14 will -- can be assessed in and given precisely the same weight.
15 JUDGE KWON: In conclusion, you do not see it problematic?
16 MR. TIEGER: I can say this, Mr. President, when you raise it, it
17 makes me rethink it and -- and consider the possibility of -- of giving
18 it further thought, but the -- the answer to your question at this moment
19 is no, it is not something that we had intended to raise with the Court
20 in the manner you just asked about.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Maybe there's some English custom that Mr. Tieger
22 and I are missing, but we're going under the principle that the witness
23 is not the property of either party and therefore it could be okay.
24 JUDGE MORRISON: I don't think you're missing any English
1 JUDGE BAIRD: You're not, you're not.
2 JUDGE MORRISON: I think the Chamber's just acting out of an
3 abundance of caution. But I speak purely for myself, if neither party
4 sees any difficulty, then so be it.
5 JUDGE BAIRD: This is the point. I mean, if both sides agree,
6 then the matter comes to an end, but from the standpoint of perception, I
7 thought that instinctively it might not have been the best course of
8 action and possibly a day to interpose himself between the two bodies of
9 testimony, but if both sides agree, then, you know, so be it.
10 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. I think especially under the circumstances
11 where we wouldn't have any other witnesses tomorrow if we did have this
12 problem, a gap, so I think it's better to go ahead.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll do so.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Indeed, I have exercised restraint,
17 but this is not the first time that Mr. Tieger is mentioning that
18 witnesses are close to me. Mr. Tieger called all the witnesses who are
19 not close to me. And none of these witnesses that are called by the
20 Defence are particularly close to me. Simply they are not Prosecution
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The hearing is adjourned.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.40 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Friday, the 21st day
25 of June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.