Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 40236

 1                           Monday, 24 June 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Our start was delayed due to some logistical problems.  And we

 8     are sitting today pursuant to Rule 15 bis probably for the first session

 9     with Judge Morrison being away who is now flying from London this

10     morning.

11             Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13                           WITNESS:  PETAR SALAPURA [Resumed]

14                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

15                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton: [Continued]

16        Q.   Good morning, Colonel.  Colonel, I want to start today by talking

17     about the 10th Sabotage Detachment to go over a couple of things you've

18     said in your statement and previously.  Just, first of all, you were the

19     superior officer in charge of this detachment in the professional chain;

20     right?

21        A.   Yes, yes, professional control and command.

22        Q.   And as I understand your statement in paragraph 18, you -- what

23     that means is that you propose their use somewhere, and then it's up to

24     General Mladic to say yes or no; right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 40237

 1        Q.   And then if General Mladic orders the unit can take action, it's

 2     your job as their professional superior to make sure his orders are

 3     carried out; right?

 4        A.   Yes, so that they're implemented.

 5        Q.   And the unit's operations are monitored, not necessarily by you

 6     directly but by intelligence officers in the subordinate units and they

 7     would be providing you with reports on the operation; right?

 8        A.   Yes.  You could see that here also, I would issue directives and

 9     also a briefing so that I could assure myself of the level of competence

10     and to make sure that the assignment could be carried out without losses

11     or with minimal casualties and so on and so forth.  Then I would issue

12     the permission to start with the implementation of the assignment.

13        Q.   All right.  And after an operation, it would be normal for the

14     detachment to brief you; right?

15        A.   Yes, the detachment commander would submit a report and the

16     intelligence officer from the corps, for example, who was there directly

17     with him would monitor the organisation of that assignment.

18        Q.   And that report isn't necessarily a written report.  You could

19     have a conversation, an oral briefing; right?

20        A.   Yes, yes.  Yes, for the most part.

21        Q.   All right.  Just to go on to another topic.  And it's from the

22     evidence you gave in the Mladic case last week.  Can you confirm last

23     week you said your service was aware of the situation in Srebrenica up to

24     90 per cent, and that was at transcript page 13089.  That's correct,

25     right?

Page 40238

 1        A.   That it was aware of the situation in Srebrenica, that it was

 2     aware of the situation, this is a term that I did not use.  That is not

 3     my term.  This is a term used by the interpreter.  Therefore, my service

 4     was aware of the situation in Srebrenica almost to the degree of 90

 5     per cent.

 6        Q.   And --

 7        A.   We continuously monitored the situation in Srebrenica throughout

 8     the whole war.

 9        Q.   And you did that in a number of ways.  You did that through

10     electronic reconnaissance, you had direct information, you told the

11     Mladic Judges that you actually had a man inside, and you would receive

12     information from subordinate units; right?

13        A.   Yes, and reconnaissance.

14        Q.   All right.  I want to talk about directives now for a minute, and

15     you talked about them when you testified here before, in the Tolimir

16     case.  And you told my colleague Mr. McCloskey that you might have

17     participated in the planning of two or three of those directives, and

18     that was in the Tolimir case at transcript page 13494.  So I'd like to

19     know which ones?

20        A.   You mean throughout the war, throughout the whole period of the

21     war, yes.

22        Q.   Well, you told Mr. McCloskey you might have participated in the

23     planning of two or three directives.  So which ones were those?

24             Did you -- I don't want to interrupt your train of thought.

25        A.   Now, now -- yes, there was one directive for activities in the

Page 40239

 1     Sarajevo sector.

 2        Q.   Well, Colonel, every directive carried instructions for

 3     activities in the Sarajevo area, so maybe what I could do is show you a

 4     couple of them to see if that jogs your memory.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have a look, please, at P976.

 6        Q.   And that's a directive for further operations number 4 dated 19

 7     November 1992.  Now, this first paragraph of this document, General,

 8     looks very much like it has a large intelligence component to it.  Did

 9     you participate in the drafting of this directive, do you remember?  And

10     I can tell you that --

11        A.   Usually I would do the first item, but it wasn't a rule in each

12     directive.  Some directives were drafted at the level of the corps, and

13     then the corps intelligence organ would participate in the drafting, not

14     me.  For example, directly it could refer to Sarajevo.  For example, the

15     directive for Srebrenica is one I never did participate in.  It was

16     drafted at the level of the corps, therefore -- well, specifically I

17     would now need to ...

18        Q.   So is this one of the directives you participated in the drafting

19     of, from 11 November -- pardon me, from 18 November 1992?

20        A.   It's possible.  I really don't remember.

21        Q.   All right.

22        A.   It's been -- I'm not ruling it out.

23        Q.   How about we go and look at another one quickly, P977.  Let's

24     just jump over a year to 25 June 1993.  And this is directive for further

25     operations number 5, and we can stay on the first page but I'll tell you,

Page 40240

 1     Colonel, that paragraph 5(A) of this document, and it's in English page 3

 2     and B/C/S page 5, tasks the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, among other things,

 3     to take control of Trnovo and the Sarajevo-Trnovo road and the wider area

 4     between Treskavica and Jahorina and Igman and Bjelasnica, and to take the

 5     dominant feature on Igman and Bjelasnica to create conditions for the

 6     take-over of Sarajevo and the linking of Herzegovina with RS territory.

 7     So this has a pretty significant component related to Sarajevo.  Did you

 8     participate in the drafting of this directive?

 9        A.   I did, I did.  The first item, the one that contains information

10     about the enemy.

11        Q.   All right.  Let's go on to another one and we're going to jump

12     over to the end of 1993.  It's P4925.  And that's an amendment to

13     directive number 6 dated -- I think we'll probably have to make it a

14     little bit bigger if we can on the B/C/S side for the Colonel.  Dated

15     December 1993, and it's issued as a result of or immediately following

16     and as a result of the meeting you attended on 12 December with

17     Dr. Karadzic that I showed you on Friday of last week in General Mladic's

18     diary.  And this first paragraph that says basic characteristics of the

19     international political and military situation, that comes from the

20     intelligence administration; right?  That reflects your input --

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   All right.  Now, I just want to go on to directive number 7.  You

23     alluded to that a couple of minutes ago in your testimony, and that's

24     P838.  Now, you've seen this directive before during your different

25     testimonies here and you were shown it in the Tolimir case.  Now, in your

Page 40241

 1     statement, Colonel, at paragraph 19 you said you only heard about this

 2     directive much later than March 1995 when Colonel Lazic, a Drina Corps

 3     operative, told you.

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   But in the Tolimir case you were actually more expansive in your

 6     answer, and what you said was you learned of this directive in 1997, when

 7     Lazic told you.  He was one of the ones who participated in its drafting,

 8     and I'm going to quote your answer to you so please listen carefully.

 9     You said:

10             "I suppose" --

11        A.   Yes, yes.

12        Q.   "I suppose that it was done by the commanders in a circle of his

13     assistants.  I believe that a lot of intel information went into this

14     directive and that it could have been obtained from the Drina Corps, and

15     in the ops room there was a detailed intelligence map which was updated

16     every day by intel officers.  And if you consulted the computer, you

17     could have the updated information on Srebrenica and Zepa in five

18     minutes, and that could have been provided to either Tolimir or Miletic.

19     That was our obligation.  We as intelligence officers were obliged to do

20     that without even knowing what the purpose of the exercise was."

21             And that was at the Tolimir transcript, page 13497.  So my

22     question, Colonel, is:  From that answer it sounds like the document,

23     this directive, reflects input from both the Main Staff intelligence

24     administration and the Drina Corps level; right?

25        A.   [No interpretation]

Page 40242

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand whether the

 2     witness said yes or no.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:

 5        Q.   When you testified about this document in the state court of

 6     Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Kos case, on 13 May 2011, you were even

 7     more detailed.  And just one question about the -- your testimony in the

 8     Kos case.  You swore an oath there to tell the truth, right, just like

 9     you did here?

10        A.   Yes, yes, yes, yes.

11        Q.   All right.  Maybe we could have a look at a page of the

12     transcript of your testimony from that trial.  It's 65 ter number 25267,

13     pages 21 and 22.  And --

14             MS. EDGERTON:  And your indulgence for a moment.

15             Mr. Registrar, could you go down to the bottom of the page.  I

16     might have written the actual page number -- right down to the bottom so

17     I can see the page number.  Thank you.  And if we can stay there at the

18     bottom of the page.

19        Q.   So this is in English, Colonel, so I'm going to read to you the

20     question you were asked and the answer you gave, and it was about

21     Directive 7 and the operation of the Bosnian Serb army being prepared to

22     be launched against Srebrenica.  You said -- or the question was:

23             "Were you aware of the operation of the Vojska Republika Srpska

24     to be launched ... being prepared to be launched against Srebrenica?"

25             And you said:

Page 40243

 1             "No.  I was informed of it in the ICTY when I was there in 2004.

 2     They told me about the alleged plan and the directive of the

 3     Supreme Command, I didn't know about it back then.  I didn't know of it

 4     and I didn't participate," if we could go over to the next page, please,

 5     "I didn't participate in its devising or planning or anything else in

 6     this regard.  And when I returned from the ICTY, I asked Lazic, the

 7     Operations Officer in the Corps, and he said that there was such a thing,

 8     that the President had visited them and that they were preparing this

 9     directive of some sort, that it was prepared at the level of the

10     Main Staff and being distributed further to the level of the Corps."

11             So that's what you said.  Can you confirm that's true?

12        A.   That it was prepared, no, no, no, no.  Something is not quite

13     right here.  It was prepared at the corps command.  It's correct that the

14     president also came and it was prepared there, the assignments were

15     given.  As for the Main Staff, the duty operations officer from the

16     Main Staff can always get information from my administration.  He doesn't

17     have to say what it's about.  All needs to do is to say that he's

18     interested in the disposition of forces and the intention of the enemy in

19     the sector of Srebrenica and that's it.  So he could always have that or

20     in any other part of Republika Srpska.  So something is not quite ...

21        Q.   What's not right about this answer?  Is it true what I just read

22     back to you you said, or not?

23        A.   I do not recall that directive being planned at the Main Staff at

24     all, so I don't know how I could have said that it was planned at the

25     Main Staff and passed to the Drina Corps command.  This is why I asked

Page 40244

 1     Lazic:  "Is it true that there was a directive?"  He said that it was and

 2     that they drafted it, that the president of republika came to them and

 3     that it was drafted there at the corps command.  As for how others

 4     understood that and wrote it down, I don't know.

 5        Q.   I'll leave it at that, thanks.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  If you're leaving Ms. Edgerton.

 7             Mr. Salapura, I'm going to read out what you just said.

 8             It's at transcript page 8 and from lines 9:

 9             "It was prepared at the corps command.  It's correct that the

10     president also came and it was prepared there.  The assignments were

11     given."

12             What did you mean by "it"?  What was prepared at the corps

13     command?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The directive.

15             JUDGE KWON:  What did you mean by "directive"?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A directive is a directive.  A

17     directive is issued from the level of the Supreme Command or from the

18     level of the Main Staff.  And then beyond that, there would be an order

19     for combat.  That's the name of the document, that's what the document is

20     called.

21             JUDGE KWON:  So when you said it was prepared at the corps

22     command, did you mean that directive of the Supreme Command or the

23     order -- [overlapping speakers] -- just order for combat?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says "directive."  It clearly

25     states "directive," or rather, it is a directive.

Page 40245

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Have you ever heard of Krivaja 95?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I heard of Krivaja 95.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  When you said the president came to the Drina Corps

 4     and prepared something, did you mean Krivaja 95?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Krivaja 95 is the coded name of

 6     that.  I'm not saying it was just the president who was there.  Probably

 7     somebody was there from the Main Staff, the duty operations officer, the

 8     Chief of Staff, the commander.  I don't know who took part in the

 9     preparation of that directive.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  You -- just to be clear, Mr. Salapura,

11     you said:

12             "Krivaja 95 is the coded name of that."

13             What is "that" again?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that is -- that is the name

15     of that operation, the coded name, the encrypted name.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So let me be clear.  So "Krivaja 95" is the name of

17     the directive or the order for combat?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The name of the directive.  A

19     directive is written for the execution of those actions, and the

20     operation would be called by the coded name of Krivaja 95.  Operations

21     are executed and a directive is a directive.  An operation would be

22     carried out and it would be bearing that name.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I'll leave it at that.

24             Back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:

Page 40246

 1        Q.   Colonel, in your statement you talked about this preventive or

 2     pre-emptive action by the 10th Sabotage Detachment in Srebrenica in 1995,

 3     but you didn't give us any details about it.  So I want to get you to

 4     confirm your evidence about that action that you gave in the Tolimir

 5     case.  What you said there was that General Krstic had requested approval

 6     for the operation from General Mladic and General Mladic personally asked

 7     you to review the operation or the situation and see whether it was

 8     feasible; right?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And so you went to the Drina Corps command, and there you met

11     Milorad Pelemis, the detachment commander, and the Drina Corps security

12     chief --

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   -- and the Drina Corps security chief Vujadin Popovic --

15        A.   Yes, that's right.  Yes.

16        Q.   And that's the same Vujadin Popovic who was also convicted of

17     genocide, extermination, murder, and persecutions for his role in the

18     Srebrenica killings?

19        A.   Yes, okay.

20        Q.   And Pavle Golic was also at this meeting?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And you heard their plan and you gave your recommendations to

23     Mladic, and the operation was approved by General Krstic and

24     General Mladic; right?

25        A.   Yes, yes, right.

Page 40247

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have a look, please, at 65 ter number

 2     25096.

 3        Q.   Colonel, you've seen this document before dated 21 June 1995 when

 4     you've testified here previously.  That's your order for this operation;

 5     right?

 6        A.   Yes.  Yes, it is.

 7        Q.   Now, paragraph 1 of this document says that the command of the

 8     10th Sabotage Unit Detachment and the chief of the Drina Corps

 9     intelligence department, that's Kosuric; right?

10        A.   Yes.  Yes, but at that time he wasn't there so his assistant

11     Golic attended instead of him.

12        Q.   It says -- this document says that Pelemis and Kosuric are going

13     to be responsible for collecting information, planning, and carrying out

14     the task, but you said Golic replaced Kosuric in that regard; is that

15     right?

16        A.   No.  Golic was present at that particular meeting that I held,

17     but at this meeting Golic was not present.  I'm referring to this

18     conversation and deliberation and the drafting of this document.

19        Q.   Let's look at paragraph 3.  It says:

20             "Co-ordination between the units in contact will be done by the

21     Chief of the Drina Corps Intelligence Department and he will take charge

22     of the whole action."

23             Paragraph 4 says:

24             "Inform the Drina Corps Chief of Staff..."

25             And that was General Krstic at the time, wasn't it?

Page 40248

 1        A.   Yes, yes, that's right.

 2        Q.   Inform General Krstic about the task, and General Krstic is

 3     serving 35 years in prison for aiding and abetting genocide; right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Now --

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   -- in your statement you didn't give the date of this operation,

 8     but it happened overnight on 23 to 24 June 1995, about two weeks before

 9     the attack on the enclave of Srebrenica began; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment plus a unit of the

12     Bratunac Brigade passed through an old mining tunnel into the town centre

13     in the dead of night between 2.00 and 4.00 in the morning in what you

14     described in your Tolimir evidence as low visibility because of fog and

15     armed with infantry weapons fired into the town?

16        A.   Yes, yes, yes.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Before I go further, could I have this as a

18     Prosecution exhibit, please, Your Honour.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 25096 receives number P6408, Your

22     Honours.

23             MS. EDGERTON:

24        Q.   So after firing into the town, the units pulled back into VRS

25     territory through the tunnel.  Now, what you called a restrictive action

Page 40249

 1     in your statement you described as muscle flexing during your testimony

 2     in the Tolimir case.  Do you remember that?

 3        A.   I wasn't speaking about any muscles.  I said that that was a

 4     diversionary action and the assignment of very precise tasks in order to

 5     determine and identify the targets.  There was the brigade and the police

 6     station and at 4.00 in the morning we identified the targets and the

 7     timing and we took care that there was only a person on duty there

 8     without any other personnel present in order to avoid casualties.  And we

 9     knew that at that particular time of day there was fog often present that

10     would decrease visibility and that we would opt for diversionary actions

11     only that would last for a few minutes.  And it was emphasised that we

12     should try to avoid any casualties among UNPROFOR or civilian population,

13     i.e., women, children, and the others.  This action was to be understood

14     as a warning so that the opposing side in Srebrenica be made to stop

15     their continuous sabotage and ambush actions and attacks coming from that

16     area against the positions of the VRS territory because we were

17     constantly incurring casualties as a result.  That was a warning for them

18     to give up on that; however, two days after this operation they carried

19     out a counter-action against the territory of the VRS.

20        Q.   Let's stay on this operation.  I'm going to take you back to

21     exactly what you said in the Tolimir case.  You said, after giving the

22     explanation you've just given, you said --

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   -- "we wanted to flex muscle and show them that we were capable

25     of launching similar operations."

Page 40250

 1             So, Colonel, in circumstances -- let me just finish, Colonel,

 2     I'll give you every opportunity to answer.

 3             In circumstances which were such that you shouldn't have carried

 4     out an attack, in a town crowded with civilians, in a UN protected area,

 5     in darkness, fog, with no visibility, your only objective was to scare

 6     the people inside the area, like you said, to flex muscle?

 7        A.   Once again, please.  The phrase "flexing a muscle" is something

 8     that I never used.  It may have been just an arbitrary interpretation by

 9     the interpreters, and that was not the meaning of this operation.  The

10     meaning of this operation was to warn the opposing side to stop their

11     operations and to make it known to them that we are also capable of

12     carrying out similar operations, and for that reason you can see that

13     it's written there that all measures ought to be taken in order to avoid

14     civilian casualties among women and children, UNPROFOR members, and so on

15     and so forth.  So the purpose of that action was not the one as you are

16     representing.

17        Q.   Well, if we accept your version of the -- or your explanation of

18     the objective behind the operation, it didn't even matter whether or not

19     there were civilian casualties, Colonel.  Your objective was to scare the

20     people in Srebrenica, to intimidate them, and make sure they understood

21     they weren't even safe inside their homes because they never knew when

22     you were going to come out and shoot at them?

23        A.   Madam Prosecutor, the action was not aimed at the civilian

24     population and intimidating them.  You know that the command of the

25     28th Division was in Srebrenica and that there were about 8.000 members

Page 40251

 1     in Srebrenica, and you also know that this zone had never been

 2     demilitarised.  You know that our population and our troops were

 3     constantly being killed and they were seeking shelter from UNPROFOR;

 4     however, this position was abused.  Nobody would ever have had attacked

 5     Srebrenica had it been demilitarised and had the agreement been observed,

 6     and I particularly refer to this operation which was strictly restricted

 7     in its purpose and we had a very specific aim that we set and that's what

 8     it was.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 15, from line 22 through

12     24, it is not clear who sought protection from UNPROFOR.  The witness

13     said that our people were killed and that the Muslims, after these

14     killings, sought protection from UNPROFOR, that they returned to the

15     enclave seeking protection from UNPROFOR.  And as the transcript

16     indicates, it seems that it was the Serbs who were asking UNPROFOR to

17     provide protection.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I think we can understand correctly.  Let's

19     continue -- but, Ms. Edgerton, when was this attack?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't have the line reference for you, but 23/24

21     June, overnight between -- from 23 to 24 June 1995, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Is this action or an attack part of the criminal

23     activities in the indictment?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  No, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please continue.

Page 40252

 1             MS. EDGERTON:

 2        Q.   And talking about the objectives where you just responded to my

 3     question, Colonel, I'd like us to go back to Directive 7 for a second,

 4     that's P838 again.  And once we see it, to go over to English transcript

 5     page -- English page 8 and B/C/S page 15.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment.  Your indulgence, I

 7     just need to check the page reference because I don't see the right page

 8     reference here and that's my mistake.  But I can go without referring to

 9     the document because I'm sure --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Page 10 in the English.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  And it would be under --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Drina Corps you mean?

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, of course.

14             JUDGE KWON:  But ...

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   Sorry, Colonel, just out of courtesy I want to find you the

17     corresponding page in B/C/S, and it's completely my fault that we can't

18     find it right now.  Paragraph 6.  It might be page 15 in B/C/S.  E-court

19     page 15.

20             So my apologies, Colonel.  Under the tasks for the Drina Corps

21     that we see in this document, and you're familiar with this because

22     you've studied this document before, you see that the specific tasks for

23     the Drina Corps include "by planned and well-thought-out combat actions

24     to create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of

25     further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

Page 40253

 1             So, Colonel, if we were to accept your explanation of the

 2     objectives of this tunnel operation, that operation is completely

 3     consistent with the language of this directive, isn't it?  It was one

 4     more step for making life for civilians in the pocket unbearable.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Could you check whether we are on the correct page

 6     in the B/C/S?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm going to ask my colleague behind me.

 8                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  My colleague behind me advises we're on the

10     correct B/C/S page but we don't -- and he says it's in the middle of the

11     page, that's the heading that we see halfway through the B/C/S,

12     Drinski Korpusa.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  And it's -- the box I just read out, Your Honour,

15     is the first whole paragraph --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  -- by the heading "Drinski Korpusa."

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Would you like me to repeat my question, Colonel?

21        A.   Yes, I would like that.  Thank you.

22        Q.   If we were to accept your explanation of the objectives of this

23     tunnel operation, that would make it completely consistent with the

24     language of this directive.  It was one more step, that operation, in

25     making life for civilians in the pocket unbearable?

Page 40254

 1        A.   Please, earlier we spoke about this sabotage action and it has

 2     nothing to do with this directive.  I was not either the creator or the

 3     author of this directive.  Let us be clear on that.

 4        Q.   That wasn't my question.  My question is:  Isn't the objective of

 5     this operation consistent with the language of this directive.  This

 6     directive commands that Drina Corps forces make life -- create an

 7     unbearable situation of total insecurity for the inhabitants of

 8     Srebrenica and Zepa, and that's exactly what the tunnel operation was

 9     aimed at; right?

10        A.   You cannot establish a connection with -- between the tunnel

11     operation and this operation.  There is no connection whatsoever between

12     the two no matter how hard you try to do that.  I never wrote this

13     directive.  I may have received some information about the enemy from my

14     operatives.  I was not a commander and I didn't make any such -- after

15     all, this operation, you have my testimony in the Tolimir case, when I

16     said, if you remember, that when I set off on 25th to undergo medical

17     treatment, and he asked me on that occasion what I thought about the

18     enclaves of Zepa, Srebrenica, Gorazde, and so on and so forth.  I

19     responded by saying - and you can find this - that I did not think that

20     we should touch any of the enclaves at all.  And he agreed that the

21     enclaves were like ripe pears and that he shared my opinion, and later on

22     a decision was taken.

23        Q.   What kind of --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 40255

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 11, Colonel said 25th of June.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:

 5        Q.   So General Tolimir agreed that the enclaves were like ripe pears

 6     and that he shared your opinion, and later on a decision was taken.  A

 7     decision was taken to do what?  What did you mean, Colonel, when you said

 8     a decision was taken?  What are you talking about?

 9        A.   A decision to attack.  I'm talking about a decision to attack

10     Srebrenica which was taken later, but it has nothing to do with this

11     diversionary activity that was aimed at Srebrenica.  I'm not a commander.

12     I'm not a decision-maker or someone who issues orders.  I did not propose

13     the engagement of our own forces nor did I propose any engagement and

14     tasks.  You see what's written here, so please do not add anything to it

15     and do not make any presumptions.  It is very accurately written as to

16     what the 10th Sabotage Detachment was supposed to do in terms of its

17     tasks by going through the tunnel.

18        Q.   Colonel, where did you -- where exactly did you monitor this

19     operation from?

20        A.   You mean this one?  I never followed this operation.

21        Q.   But, Colonel, you saw Pelemis the very morning after the

22     operation was carried out, and he briefed you about the operation.  Where

23     did that happen?

24        A.   Oh, you mean the operation when the detachment entered the

25     tunnel?  I think I was in Vlasenica, but I cannot say that I'm 100

Page 40256

 1     per cent sure.  I was at the command post in Crna Rijeka, but I think I

 2     was in Vlasenica at the time when Pelemis came and submitted a report.

 3     So I make a reservation that a mistake is possible as far as this

 4     information is concerned after such a long time.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I'm just -- wonder if I could have

 6     some guidance about when we might have our breaks today given our delayed

 7     start for planning purposes.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  If it is okay with the parties, the Chamber is

 9     minded to adjourn at 3.00 for today.  So if it's possible, can we go for

10     a further 15 minutes more.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll take the first break at quarter to

13     11.00.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15        Q.   I want to ask you a little bit now about your trip to Belgrade,

16     Colonel, because you only told us about the way back in your statement

17     and not about how the trip came about and the way there.  So, first of

18     all, maybe you can confirm, you were in Banja Luka when Srebrenica fell;

19     right?

20        A.   Yes, I was in Banja Luka.  Let me just think a bit because you

21     are switching to something else, but okay.

22        Q.   And you travelled to Belgrade on the 12th of July?

23        A.   Yes, I did.  Excuse me, I have to tell you right now that I'm not

24     sure whether I went on the 11th or the 12th.  After all this time, I do

25     still think that we set off early on the morning of the 12th.

Page 40257

 1        Q.   And you went there -- you travelled there with two IT specialists

 2     from your intelligence centre in Banja Luka and a driver, right, your

 3     driver?

 4        A.   Yes, those were IT people, engineers versed in electronics and

 5     information technologies.

 6        Q.   What were the names of the two IT specialists and your driver?

 7        A.   One IT engineer was Mirko Obradovic, the other IT engineer was

 8     called Braco.  Give me some time to remember.  And the name of the driver

 9     was Radan Djukic.  Braco Erceg.  Braco Erceg.

10        Q.   And when you talk about the intelligence centre in Banja Luka,

11     you're talking about the 410th Intelligence Centre; right?

12        A.   Yes, that's the only one that existed.

13        Q.   And coming from the 410th Intelligence Centre, the people you

14     travelled with would have had information about the situation in

15     Srebrenica?

16        A.   These people?  These people have nothing to do with that.  They

17     deal with completely different things, electronics, the installation of

18     programme, and so on, technical equipment, computers.  There you go.

19        Q.   So why were they travelling with you?

20        A.   And they become involved in analysis a bit.  Well, they went to

21     install these programmes, and I was supposed to give them a ride to

22     Bijeljina.  And then from Bijeljina, from the centre, they were supposed

23     to be taken to Han Pijesak, and then that is where they were supposed to

24     install a new programme at the intelligence administration.

25        Q.   So you set off on the morning of the 12th and you travelled to

Page 40258

 1     Belgrade first via Modrica?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And then you stopped in Bijeljina?

 4        A.   No, first in Modrica.

 5        Q.   And then you stopped -- so you stopped in Modrica and then you

 6     stopped in Bijeljina; right?

 7        A.   If you're interested in why I stopped in Modrica, I can tell you.

 8     There was a group from the detachment that was there too, the 10th, that

 9     was supposed to carry out an assignment there.  The officer who was in

10     charge of that asked that someone come.  When he viewed the situation, he

11     thought that there might be civilian casualties and he asked for

12     permission to stop with the implementation of that task.  He presented

13     that to me and I accepted his explanation.  That task was given up on and

14     the unit continued reconnaissance for our unit that was operating in that

15     area.

16        Q.   Well, actually, Colonel, you've already given evidence in the

17     state court -- pardon me.  You've already given evidence, both in the

18     Tolimir case and in the state court, to the effect that the unit in

19     Modrica called you on the 11th because they weren't able to contact

20     Pelemis and called you through the 410th Intelligence Centre in

21     Banja Luka.

22        A.   Yes, yes.  Yes.

23        Q.   And then Kremenovic - and this is in your statement before the

24     state court - Kremenovic, the officer you've just --

25        A.   Yes, yes, yes.

Page 40259

 1        Q.   -- just referred to --

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   -- told you that Srebrenica had fallen and that the other part of

 4     the 10th Sabotage Detachment had been engaged in the operation; right?

 5        A.   Correct.

 6        Q.   So when you in your statement said that in August 1995 you spoke

 7     with Pelemis about the participation of the 10th Sabotage Unit in

 8     Srebrenica and he confirmed the unit was engaged in combat at the

 9     beginning of the operation, that wasn't the first time you knew about it

10     by any stretch?

11        A.   No.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the end of

13     the answer.

14             MS. EDGERTON:

15        Q.   Could you repeat what you just said, Colonel.

16        A.   I'm saying that I found out immediately in Modrica, but I hadn't

17     seen Pelemis personally until the month of August.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Could you tell us the para number or page where he

20     talked about hearing from Pelemis for the first time?

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Page -- it should be paragraph 8, Your Honour,

22     page 22 in English.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Here he said:

24             "I spoke with detachment commander Pelemis about the

25     participation in the Srebrenica events."

Page 40260

 1             And he confirmed the engagement in combat action at the beginning

 2     of the operation.  So here he talked about Srebrenica events, not

 3     necessarily limiting to the first part of the operation.  Shall we

 4     continue?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Quite so.

 6        Q.   And maybe we should just stay with this area for a little while,

 7     actually, and come back to the travel to Belgrade later just so we can

 8     flesh this out.  Because these, Colonel, are some of the changes you made

 9     to your final statement, and you did that by way of a clarification to

10     your evidence in the Tolimir case.  So in the Tolimir case at transcript

11     pages 13593 to 13594, you were asked:

12             "So are you saying that it wasn't until sometime after his

13     arrest," referring to Drazen Erdemovic, "on 2 March 1996 that you learned

14     that people were murdered by the VRS?"

15             And your answer was:

16             "Yes, when it was published in the press then the stories began."

17             And in your Tolimir testimony you then said you called Pelemis

18     and had the conversation you describe at paragraph 8 of your statement.

19        A.   Yes, yes, that's correct.

20        Q.   And then in your statement you say, as His Honour Judge Kwon just

21     indicated, in August 1995 you spoke with Pelemis about the participation

22     of the 10th Sabotage Unit in the Srebrenica events and he confirmed the

23     engagement in combat actions at the beginning of the operation.  And then

24     you say in your statement that following your testimony in the Tolimir

25     case you established more precisely that it was in late December 1995

Page 40261

 1     when you knew that the 10th Sabotage Detachment had been involved in

 2     executions.  And that's when you had the conversation with Pelemis that

 3     you elaborate on.  So let's go back to your conversation with Pelemis in

 4     August 1995 first.  That's when he was in the Krajina; right?

 5        A.   In December?

 6        Q.   August 1995.

 7        A.   No -- oh, August, yes.  In August he was.

 8        Q.   He was in the Krajina because you had detached the unit there;

 9     right?

10        A.   Not I.  He went to the Krajina in accordance with the decision of

11     the commander.  I suggested to the commander that the detachment be

12     transferred to that zone.  The commander issued an order and I just

13     conveyed that order, but please just one correction.  I would kindly

14     ask -- actually, this group of soldiers who were on leave, however, the

15     detachment did not take part in the execution and the top people, the

16     leaders of the detachment did not, so I would kindly ask that you speak

17     about a group of people not the detachment because it wasn't the entire

18     detachment.  This was a small group of people who at the time were on

19     leave and who had nowhere to go, home or wherever.  They stayed there and

20     that's how ...

21        Q.   Colonel, when you refer to the commander, do you mean to refer to

22     General Mladic?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Thank you.  When you talked to Pelemis in the Krajina in August

25     1995, what did he tell you had gone on in Srebrenica?  How members of the

Page 40262

 1     10th Sabotage Unit were involved?  And, General --

 2        A.   No, we did not talk about that at all.

 3        Q.   Pardon me, Colonel.  Understanding that by this time there was

 4     widespread public outcry about the missing men and boys from Srebrenica,

 5     and you would have known that because part of your job was to monitor the

 6     media.  So setting that in place, what did -- let's change the question

 7     around.  What did you ask Pelemis?  Let's hear it, General -- Colonel.

 8        A.   We did not talk about that at all.  I was in the Krajina.  We

 9     were at Ostrelj between Bosanski Petrovac and Drvar.  I just asked him,

10     "Why were you involved in Srebrenica when the detachment was supposed to

11     go to Herzegovina?" - this other group that was there was supposed to go

12     and reconnoitre in Herzegovina.  His answer was, "On orders from the

13     commander," that is to say -- well, Zivanovic -- no, Krstic.  Krstic I

14     think asked that that part of the detachment that had stayed on be

15     involved for entering into town and the commander approved that.

16             Go back to Ostrelj.  Our conversation at Ostrelj lasted five

17     minutes.  We were in a very difficult situation there.  Krajina, the

18     Republic of the Serb Krajina, part of it in Croatia, had already fallen

19     and then there were further operations, an attack against

20     Republika Srpska --

21        Q.   Colonel --

22        A.   -- and no one --

23        Q.   Colonel, I'm not asking you about the context.  You can tell

24     Dr. Karadzic about that all you like.  I'm asking you about the

25     conversation.  You knew, Colonel, at the least, by the 12th of July, that

Page 40263

 1     members of the 10th Sabotage Unit had been involved in the fall of

 2     Srebrenica.  The night of the 13th of July you were in contact with unit

 3     headquarters in Vlasenica to find out what was going on.  By the -- by

 4     the 18th of July, you knew from the media that there was widespread

 5     international outcry about the loss of the men and boys in Srebrenica,

 6     and your evidence is you didn't ask Pelemis what happened when you spoke

 7     with him?

 8        A.   No.  No, certainly not then, not from the media or anything.  We

 9     did not have any media then except newspapers of Republika Srpska.  In

10     the eastern part of Republika Srpska, there was no electricity.  We

11     didn't know anything, and I did not know truly.  And then, that is to say

12     up until the end of July, I was still undergoing medical treatment and

13     then General Mladic called me to come to Ostrelj and that's what I did

14     then if that matters.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we take a break?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, I see the time.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll resume at 17 past 11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.47 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.19 a.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I believe Judge Morrison will join us in the next

21     session.

22             Yes, please carry on, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

24        Q.   Colonel, just to go back to what you said before we broke, you

25     said that:

Page 40264

 1             "We didn't have any media then except newspapers of

 2     Republika Srpska," and "In the eastern part of Republika Srpska, there

 3     was no electricity."

 4             And that's one of the reasons why you didn't know about the

 5     killings of men and boys in Srebrenica; is that right?  You didn't know

 6     because there was no electricity in the eastern part of the

 7     Republika Srpska?

 8        A.   No, not even in the western part, even more than in the eastern

 9     one.  I don't know where you got that from.  That's not the only reason.

10     I said that we were absolutely oriented towards the situation in the

11     western part and that was the final operation, and after that there was

12     no talk about that.  I don't know of any intensive -- well, probably it

13     started later in the Muslim media.  I don't know exactly when, I cannot

14     say, but we considered this to be propaganda.  I -- I considered it.  I'm

15     speaking about myself.  No one talked about that --

16        Q.   So --

17        A.   -- it was only --

18        Q.   -- General -- Colonel, pardon me, not only was there no

19     electricity in the eastern part of Republika Srpska in July and August

20     1995, you just said there's no electricity in the western part as well;

21     is that right?

22        A.   Yes.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I'd like to go to a document and it wasn't on my

24     initial notification to the parties.  It's just arisen as a result of the

25     Colonel's answers immediately before the break and we've sent out a

Page 40265

 1     notification as soon as I was able to locate the document.  It's

 2     65 ter number 06664.

 3        Q.   And it's available in your language as well, Colonel.  Colonel,

 4     this is -- I'll just wait until it's enlarged in English.  This is a copy

 5     of a statement that was issued on the 17th of July, 1995, by

 6     Jovan Zametica, and you know who he is, don't you, he was

 7     President Karadzic's -- one of President Karadzic's advisors.

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And it's a statement that was issued on SRNA and it was picked up

10     by Belgrade SRNA and it says -- it's his denial of Muslim media and world

11     reports on events in Srebrenica.  And it says:

12             "Over the past few days, the world media assisted and prompted by

13     Muslim authorities have indulged in an orgy on the uncritical events in

14     Srebrenica and lists some of the allegations."

15             And then says:

16             "The truth is that nothing like that happened."

17             And if we could go over to the next page in this document,

18     please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure it has second page.

20             THE ACCUSED:  Not even in English, I suppose.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  [Microphone not activated] Mistake in my upload,

22     but I can still continue.

23        Q.   Colonel, this statement was issued over Banja Luka Srpska

24     Televizija on the 17th of July, 1995.  It was picked up by SRNA in

25     Belgrade, it was later picked up by the CNN.  So, Colonel, in Pale, not

Page 40266

 1     only did they have electricity there receiving media reports of what

 2     happened in Srebrenica.  They're denying media reports of what happened

 3     in Srebrenica.  France, England, and America knew what was going on in

 4     Srebrenica, and you're saying you don't because Banja Luka had no

 5     electricity?

 6        A.   No, no.  I was not in Banja Luka on the 17th of July.  I came to

 7     Banja Luka on the 18th.  On the 13th I was in Han Pijesak, or rather, on

 8     the 17th I was in Han Pijesak.

 9        Q.   So when you --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Where do you have the Banja Luka

11     television here?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  In this document it's not, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  The last paragraph says -- it says Zametica's

14     statement forwarded to SRNA, not mentioning the television.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, if I -- that's correct, but I can, in the

16     interests of time I proceeded that way.  I can provide a 65 ter number

17     for the document referring to Banja Luka in a couple of moments as well.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   So, Colonel, are you saying that there was no electricity in

21     Han Pijesak now?

22        A.   No.  In Han Pijesak there was electricity coming from generators,

23     the generators operated so the radio communications -- our communications

24     equipment was working because we had the oil-fuelled generator that was

25     operating.

Page 40267

 1        Q.   So, Colonel, on what basis are you saying that there was no

 2     electricity in eastern and western Republika Srpska in July and August?

 3        A.   I'm talking about the entire area.  I cannot say.  I mean, after

 4     all these years, sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't.  Now you're

 5     asking me to guess about every day and minute, but generally there was

 6     this problem.  It was Banja Luka that mostly remained without

 7     electricity, but the army had generators.  And I, from the 18th of July,

 8     was on sick leave and I was being treated at home again.  I interrupted

 9     that sick leave.  I cannot remember the exact date.

10        Q.   Colonel, you've just said now again that Banja Luka mostly

11     remained without electricity, and maybe we could go to the news report

12     for Banja Luka that I've since found.  65 ter number 00689.  Here you

13     see, Colonel, the initial statement by Jovan Zametica carried on

14     Banja Luka Srpska Televizija on 17 July 1995?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Zametica is making a statement on TV which isn't going to work if

17     they don't have any electricity, Colonel.  So with respect, Colonel, what

18     are you talking about?  Banja Luka knew because Zametica, Dr. Karadzic's

19     advisor, is here denying the killings at Srebrenica?

20        A.   Yes, that's clear.  I see that.

21        Q.   So Pale and the authorities there seem to be better informed than

22     you were?

23        A.   Possibly --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand the rest of

25     the sentence.

Page 40268

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The press media --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Most of the witness's

 3     answer was inaudible.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Salapura, could you repeat your question.

 5     Interpreters were not able to hear you.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm saying that that is possible

 7     too.  It is possible.  I cannot remember now these details.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, could I have this as a Prosecution

 9     exhibit, please.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And --

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Without interrupting the Colonel.

12        Q.   Please go ahead, Colonel.

13        A.   Yes, and I do not rule out that possibility because I know that

14     most people, also from the Main Staff, consider that to be almost

15     impossible even when they did hear about it.  I used to think that that

16     was impossible too, but you see it was possible.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive them both.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 06664 will be Exhibit P6409 and

19     00689 will be Exhibit P6410.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

21        Q.   And before we go back to your travels to the enclave, I still

22     want to stay on the subject of your conversations with Pelemis whenever

23     you might have had them.

24        A.   Yes, please go ahead.

25        Q.   So, Colonel, when you heard the answer from Pelemis that you've

Page 40269

 1     discussed in your statement, that whoever might have been involved in the

 2     executions had volunteered, you were basically satisfied with that

 3     answer; right?

 4        A.   No, I was not satisfied.  I was not satisfied.  I just said to

 5     him whoever had not only participated but whoever had engaged these

 6     people, involved them, should be held responsible.  I used one of our

 7     words, jargon:  Who feels an itch should scratch himself.  I don't know

 8     if this can be interpreted literally.  I don't know if the interpreters

 9     can do a literal interpretation or translation of that.

10        Q.   You told him to get the people who were involved to write

11     statements, and your evidence is you don't know what happened after that

12     or whether the statements were ever written; correct?

13        A.   Yes, after that I said that I did not know whether they wrote it

14     or whether they gave him statements about that because I think he was on

15     annual leave then and then he handed over his duty.  And then I also went

16     on annual leave after that and then we did not have any contact about

17     that.  At the end of his annual leave he left, he handed over his duty

18     and left, and yes, 1996, yes.  1996, beginning of 1996.  I used my annual

19     leave and then I had some time when I was entitled not to be assigned to

20     a particular post, and then I submitted my request for retirement.

21        Q.   Colonel, you know, Dr. Karadzic is calling a witness, Franc Kos

22     who was -- you would know, he was -- that's the trial that you went to

23     testify on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he was a commander in one of

24     the 10th Sabotage Unit's platoons, and he's coming to talk about the

25     executions.

Page 40270

 1        A.   Yes, yes.

 2        Q.   And --

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   -- I want to show you an interview he had with Dr. Karadzic's

 5     Defence counsel --

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   -- on 6 March 2013, and it's 65 ter number 1D07999.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  And your indulgence for a moment again.  I didn't

 9     realise there was an uploaded translation, so what I'm going to have to

10     do is find the B/C/S page reference to what I want to direct us to out of

11     courtesy to the Colonel.

12                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

13             MS. EDGERTON:  If we could go, though, to pages -- starting at

14     page 21 in English.  Actually, in English we could go over to page 20.

15        Q.   And I'll tell you this in --

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment.

17        Q.   I'll tell you this in summary, Colonel, and as soon as I have the

18     page reference in your language I'll give it to you so you can follow

19     along.  But Mr. Kos was at the base of the 10th Sabotage Detachment when

20     he received two calls from Colonel Beara on the morning of the 16th of

21     July, 1995, telling him to take seven soldiers and to come to the corps

22     command in Vlasenica.  And there was no one at the base at that moment.

23     But about an hour later, Pelemis, Dragomir Pecanac, and the full

24     complement of the 2nd Platoon arrived as well as some soldiers of the

25     1st Platoon who had been on leave.  Mr. Kos was eventually called to

Page 40271

 1     Pelemis's office, and there he found Pelemis, Pecanac, and

 2     Zoran Obrenovic, and Pecanac then said to him, "You and seven soldiers

 3     are going today to guard the prisoners."  And they went from there to

 4     Branjevo, where they then executed the prisoners?

 5             So, Colonel, that doesn't sound like anyone volunteered for the

 6     task; they received an order from Pelemis.  So, Colonel, either Pelemis

 7     wasn't telling you the truth or what you're telling us today isn't

 8     accurate.  Which is it?

 9        A.   No, I did not investigate the matter.

10        Q.   Just before you answer further --

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Again, out of courtesy, page 17 in B/C/S for the

12     Colonel.  And I think you found it for us already.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I think previous page seems to be the correct one.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  The previous page was the correct one.  My

15     apologies.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah, let him read it.  Shall we collapse the

17     English first for some time.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Let Mr. Salapura read it in full.

20             Tell us when you are done and we'll show you the next page.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, he didn't say this to me.  I am

22     seeing these details for the very first time.  I didn't know the details.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to read further?  I think it

24     continues on the next page.

25             Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 40272

 1             MS. EDGERTON:

 2        Q.   So your evidence is that on the 15th of -- and 16th of July you

 3     didn't know really what any part of the 10th Sabotage Unit was doing; is

 4     that your evidence?

 5        A.   Yes.  All I know is that I knew when I came on the 13th I was

 6     told that the duty operations officer had called, that that group that

 7     stayed in the base, that that group participated in the combat in

 8     Srebrenica, that they were given rest, that the soldiers went home, the

 9     security remained there, and a group of soldiers who had nowhere to go.

10     Later when I spoke with Miso in December, he told me what I said in my

11     statement and I stand by that.  I didn't call them anymore after the

12     13th, I didn't call them anymore.  Pelemis went with an APC.  He told me

13     that on the 13th they had an accident.  The car crashed, and he was hurt.

14     He went for treatment and then he got some sort of sick leave or

15     something and that was that.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for just a moment.

17                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   So your evidence then is that you had no contact with the unit or

20     any members of the unit after they participated in the killings at Bisina

21     under the command of Vujadin Popovic?

22        A.   No, not until Ostrelj.

23        Q.   You had no contact with them after their duty in Zepa?

24        A.   No, not until Ostrelj.

25        Q.   Even though it's procedure - and you said it was - for the

Page 40273

 1     commander to brief you after the conclusion of an operation?

 2        A.   Please, this is a part of the operation in which I had no part.

 3     This is not part of the tasks of the unit.  This is part of indirect

 4     duties.  This is something that probably was a result of direct

 5     engagement by the commander of the Main Staff.  I said that I came on the

 6     13th to that area, that I found General Mladic in Srebrenica, and I had

 7     come to inform him about what was ahead of us and I wanted to come back

 8     the next day, and I wasn't able to for health reasons.  And then the next

 9     day the road was already closed, so I was unable to return until the

10     18th.  The road was closed from Han Pijesak towards Vlasenica.

11        Q.   So let's have a look, Colonel, at 65 ter number 25271, please.

12             Colonel, this is a document from you dated 15 July 1995, ordering

13     the rear command post of the VRS Main Staff to approve paint for two

14     terrain vehicles for the 10th Sabotage Detachment.  So the day before

15     they go on operations at Branjevo you're actually --

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   You issued this.  So, Colonel, you had to have been in contact to

18     issue this order, otherwise you wouldn't have been aware of any need.

19     You wouldn't have been aware that they needed paint?

20        A.   That is -- yes, I was at the command post at the time.  This is

21     their logistics guy, most probably, who sent a request to us for

22     intervention --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand the last

24     sentence.

25             MS. EDGERTON:

Page 40274

 1        Q.   Could you repeat, please, Colonel, your last sentence.  The

 2     interpreters weren't able to understand.

 3        A.   This request was most probably sent to us by the detachment

 4     logistics person.  He sent it to the administration.  On the 15th, since

 5     I was at the command post, I signed it and I forwarded it to the

 6     logistics organ or the technical sector of the Main Staff of the Army of

 7     Republika Srpska.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I have this as a Prosecution exhibit,

 9     please, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  P6411, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  But before we go any further.

13             Ms. Edgerton, in -- at page 37, line 21, you said even though

14     it's procedure and you said it was for the commander to brief you after

15     the conclusion of an operation.  What operation did you refer to?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I was referring to the witness's evidence at the

17     beginning of his testimony, where I asked him --

18             JUDGE KWON:  It's operation on the 22nd or the 23rd of June?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  But he spoke generally at the outset of his

20     testimony in that regard, Your Honours, and said that after an operation

21     it would be normal for the detachment to brief him.  So I was referring

22     back to the testimony he gave at the -- the testimony he gave at the

23     outset of the proceedings today.  And he did subsequently confirm that he

24     received a briefing from Pelemis after the operation on the 23rd and 24th

25     of June as well.

Page 40275

 1             JUDGE KWON:  But did he confirm that he had received briefing

 2     either Pelemis or anybody above Srebrenica?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Not so far, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             Please continue.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   Colonel, I'd like to go to the testimony of someone else in the

 8     Kos case, the case that you testified in, 65 ter number 25280 is the

 9     transcript or is the transcript of the evidence of Petar Cvjetinovic.

10     And if we could go, please, over to page 27 in English.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  If you could scroll down, please.  Thank you.

12        Q.   I'll read this slowly for you, Colonel.  And Petar Cvjetinovic

13     was a member of the Panteri.  He was asked by Dusko Tomic:

14             "When did you learn about the events in Srebrenica and if you

15     could briefly to the Court what was the nature of your participation in

16     Srebrenica?"

17             And he answered:

18             "I'm not sure if it was the 15th or 16th July, I think it

19     happened on the 15th and attorney Tomic told me that this was on 16th ...

20     a driver of Petar Salapura found me in Bijeljina."

21             And if we could go over to the next page, please.  He's asked:

22             "Who was the driver?"

23             Response:

24             "Zoran Bogdanovic."

25             And Mr. Tomic says:

Page 40276

 1             "All right, and what happened next?"

 2             And then the witness says:

 3             "He asked that I should come to the private house, a private

 4     house of Bijeljina businessman Savo Jovanovic, and there was a basement

 5     in this house and the military security service had tapping service in

 6     the basement, and Panteri unit was also using the personnel there.  I

 7     found a Colonel Petar, Petar Salapura there.  I think he was a colonel at

 8     that time, and he talked to me, and Milorad Pelemis was also there.  He

 9     was also present, and Zoran Manojlovic was another person who was present

10     there."

11             Mr. Tomic asks who these individuals were.

12             And the witness said:

13             "Petar Salapura, I don't know exactly his position, but I know

14     that he was a member of the military security service of the

15     Vojska Republika Srpska.  Zoran Manojlovic was a member of the 10th

16     Sabotage Detachment and responsible for the security as far as I know,

17     and Miso Pelemis, he was the commander of the 10th Sabotage Detachment."

18             And he's asked:

19             "What happened next when you came there?

20             "Salapura talked to me," he responded, "he told me that I was the

21     ideal person to do a service to Republika Srpska.  He explained to me

22     that during the attack on Srebrenica there was murder, there was killing

23     of several thousand Muslim civilians, soldiers, and there were already

24     images circulating in the world that this had happened.  And he said that

25     I could be of help."

Page 40277

 1             And then the witness continues and says:

 2             "Petar Salapura told me that I was the ideal person to go to the

 3     military farm in Branjevo, and members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment

 4     were to arrive there.  I don't know from where, but later on I learned

 5     that they were in Milici in Vlasenica, and to help there at this military

 6     farm in Branjevo about certain issues, but they didn't tell me exactly

 7     what it was about."

 8             And he goes further in his testimony to talk about his role in

 9     the executions with members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment.  So,

10     Colonel, you've said that you have no knowledge of the killings, you

11     don't know of the details of what the 10th Sabotage Unit was doing, on

12     this day, the 16th of July in particular, and this witness directly

13     contradicts you and puts you at the heart of staffing and directing the

14     operation.  You were there -- you were there with your operative unit in

15     Banja Luka personally picking the people to go to Branjevo farm?

16        A.   In Banja Luka?

17        Q.   Pardon, Bijeljina.

18        A.   Madam Prosecutor, from the first to the last sentence everything

19     that is stated here is a lie.  I state that with full responsibility and

20     I think that the court in Sarajevo did establish that it was a lie.  The

21     man who -- I don't know the man, I never saw him.  He doesn't know me.  I

22     never saw him in my life.  And that has nothing to do with it.  These are

23     just fabrications by Dusko Tomic's lawyer with that person and there are

24     several, not just one.  That absolutely, absolutely is not correct, none

25     of it is.  The 15th and the 16th, I think these are the dates, were the

Page 40278

 1     days when I was in Han Pijesak.  I never went to Branjevo in my life,

 2     never ever.  I know where it is on the map.  Never ever.  He also was

 3     saying about some vehicle, that we were going somewhere.  In the end the

 4     lie was found out and ultimately I think that person needs to be tried

 5     because of those lies, but in any case he's already in Bijeljina, in

 6     prison, precisely because of fraud and lies and cheating.  He also served

 7     prison time in Serbia and now he's serving prison time in Bijeljina and

 8     his lawyer is Dusko Tomic.

 9        Q.   When then exactly did you come to learn about the killings at

10     Srebrenica, Colonel?

11        A.   The participation of the detachment?

12        Q.   No?

13        A.   The participation of the detachment in the killings?

14        Q.   No.

15        A.   Is that what we're talking about?  Or generally when?

16        Q.   When did you, head of intelligence for the VRS, under

17     Colonel Tolimir, when did you come to learn about the killings in

18     Srebrenica?

19        A.   This was something that appeared in the media, but I couldn't

20     really tell you the exact date when that was.  For the most part, my

21     first information could only be after the actions were ended in the

22     western sector prior to the Dayton Agreement.  When I asked for an

23     exchange to be carried out, exchange of our prisoners who happened to be

24     in Muslim prisons in Zenica, and we would on our part release the

25     prisoners that we had in Srebrenica.  And I asked that we exchange ten of

Page 40279

 1     theirs for one of -- ten of ours for one of theirs, and I think

 2     General Tolimir said that we didn't have enough prisoners for such an

 3     action to be carried out in that way.  As for the information received

 4     from the information media, it was clear that an execution had taken

 5     place.  But until December, I did not know that this was something that

 6     soldiers from the 10th Detachment took part in.  But as for finding out

 7     about it for the first time, I'm really unable to tell you the exact date

 8     when that was.  And no one, let me just say that as well, no one, no

 9     one -- I did not hear it at the Main Staff from anyone.  No one talked

10     about that and nobody talked about it in units either where I would go.

11     A lot of it came from the media from the outside, from the Muslim side.

12     And later when the Belgrade media began to write about it.  But I

13     wouldn't be able to say exactly when these first reports about it began

14     to emerge.

15        Q.   During your testimony in the Mladic case last week, you talked

16     with my colleague --

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   -- Mr. Vanderpuye about the operation, the killing operation, and

19     the scope of the killing operation.  And you said at transcript page

20     13103, in regard to the scale of the logistics of the operation:

21             "I can't say that everybody knew.  I can't say that.  Most did.

22     For example, some of my desk officers may have been unaware."

23             And then you went on further:

24             "But realistically speaking, yes, probably many people knew

25     because it was a sizeable operation.  These people needed to be

Page 40280

 1     transported, logistics units engaged, transport organised, engineering

 2     corps activated, so many people were probably engaged in it."

 3             And then at transcript pages 13125 to 13126 you also mentioned

 4     prisoners being taken through the zone as one of the reasons why people

 5     knew or had to know about the crimes.  You said:

 6             "If it was being done during the day, people could probably see

 7     that, the way they moved, and some people certainly did," but you really

 8     couldn't say everyone.  Some did probably.

 9             And then further on 13126 you agreed that people who had secured

10     and guarded the prisoners could see the people being put on trucks or

11     buses and being taken away.  And you indicated that there were exchange

12     commissions with the Main Staff and corps commissions for the exchange of

13     prisoners and they were probably also informed?

14        A.   Yes, yes.

15        Q.   And you, the head of intelligence, was not -- were not?

16        A.   No.  I'm talking about the moment when everything was passing

17     there.  MUP was involved in order to regulate the traffic.  They took

18     part in the implementation, but I'm not aware of that.  But I heard of

19     the involvement of MUP units.  Therefore, many people knew, but I suppose

20     that many people were appalled by this and they simply did not talk about

21     it.  I did not hear a single word uttered at the command.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please repeat the last

23     sentence.

24             MS. EDGERTON:

25        Q.   Colonel, could you please repeat your last sentence?

Page 40281

 1        A.   That could be the reason why people kept quiet, to put it simply.

 2     They were appalled by hearing that.  Some of them may not have even

 3     believed that it really happened, that they thought that it was just a

 4     media propaganda, and no one ever discussed this issue, not a single word

 5     was said in the Main Staff or elsewhere and nobody broached this subject

 6     at all anywhere.

 7        Q.   Just let's keep talking about logistics for a minute.  When you

 8     talked in your testimony in the Mladic case about the killings, you were

 9     describing a large-scale operation that involved the movement of

10     prisoners across military zones, it involved assets that had to be

11     secured from different corps departments and ministries.  It involved

12     personnel from different organs and administrations.  And your evidence

13     is that that wasn't discussed at the Main Staff?

14        A.   No, no.  Believe me, nobody talked about this.  I'm telling you

15     and I explained what was the probable reason for that.  Maybe one or two

16     persons discussed that privately, but nobody talked about this in my

17     presence.

18        Q.   But you would agree this kind of operation, this kind of -- the

19     scope of this -- the logistical scope of this kind of operation implies

20     some degree of higher level co-ordination, doesn't it?

21        A.   Well, most probably it involved that and you can see that people

22     were being brought from different sectors and different zones, and so on

23     and so forth.  Requisitions were made for vehicles, fuel, maybe somebody

24     asked for an explanation and somebody provided an explanation and so on

25     and so forth.

Page 40282

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I normally wouldn't break but I am

 2     keeping an eye on the time, and I've just been notified I have ten

 3     minutes left in the allotted time which was awarded before this witness

 4     completed his testimony in the Mladic case.  I wonder if I might, with

 5     Your Honours' leave, of course, be able to finish this area and then go

 6     back to the witness's presence in the enclave which we haven't had a

 7     chance to deal with yet.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  So in total, how much longer would you need from

 9     now?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I hope the ten minutes from my original allotment

11     and then something under 40 minutes there following, probably --

12     hopefully half an hour or between half an hour and 40 minutes,

13     Your Honours.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE BAIRD:  Ms. Edgerton, in total you're asking for 30 minutes

16     or 40 minutes?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I'd appreciate if at all possibility some

18     flexibility, Your Honour, and I would do my best to finish within an

19     additional half an hour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are planning to take a break at quarter to

21     1.00, so please try to conclude by then.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll do my utmost, Your Honour.  Thank you.

23        Q.   So, Colonel, you just said -- we were talking about the

24     co-ordination of assets from different sectors and zones, and you talked

25     about requisitions made for vehicles and fuel and somebody providing an

Page 40283

 1     explanation.  What level of decision-making and co-ordination does a

 2     logistics operation like this imply?

 3        A.   At this moment I wouldn't be able to tell you exactly, but most

 4     probably at the level of the corps because that was a corps operation,

 5     and it was up to the corps command to request from the logistics of the

 6     Main Staff some kind of materiel in order to reinforce the logistical

 7     support I suppose --

 8        Q.   Well, then --

 9        A.   -- concerning the regulation of traffic and groups and so on.

10        Q.   Let's talk about the exhumations and reburials of the Bosnian

11     Muslim men and boys who were killed at Branjevo, at Kozluk, at

12     Petkovici dam, at Orahovac, and Glogova that happened in September and

13     October 1995.  This was a massive logistics effort and it involved the

14     delivery of large amounts of fuel, the assignment of vehicles,

15     excavators, trucks, people from across different military sectors, from

16     different organs, including the police and the civilian authorities.

17     There is no way that was corps-level decision, was it, Colonel?

18        A.   It is possible that some aspects were resolved by the Main Staff

19     logistical department.

20        Q.   Colonel, you're a senior intelligence officer with, by the time

21     the war was over, 20 years' experience, you remained in the Main Staff.

22     You were involved in meetings, briefing, and conversations with

23     General Mladic and the assistant commanders and also with your

24     counterparts all the way up until after the end of the war.  You would

25     have heard the international outcry for access to Serb-held territory

Page 40284

 1     through the eastern enclaves because that was your job to do and you've

 2     said that again and again.  Your focus was strategic intelligence, and

 3     all you can say in response to this question was that it was possible?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Let me put this to you --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please.  Just a brief intervention.

 7     The witness said "yes" halfway through the question.  Therefore, I would

 8     kindly ask Madam Edgerton to establish whether the answer "yes" pertains

 9     to the entire question that she put.  He answered before the translation

10     was finished and he answered yes midway through the question, which

11     indicates apparently that he understands English.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Salapura, would you like to add anything?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what I could add.  I

14     don't understand.  Look, I told you that I left the area on the 18th of

15     July.  I was at home and in the hospital.  General Mladic called me and I

16     cut my sick leave short for a few days and he called me to come to

17     Ostrelj.  Croatia had already launched an attack on the Krajina and at

18     the time we were focused and concentrated on those problems.  Nobody was

19     discussing any longer about what was going on and what had been going on

20     until the completion of the Dayton Agreement.  In this period prior to

21     the Dayton Agreement, we were focused on this situation.  And before the

22     conclusion of the Dayton agreement I and a group of officers were sitting

23     and preparing information that was necessary to conclude the

24     Dayton Agreement.  I'm not denying that there were some other activities

25     at the same time, but my organ was focused and involved in what I just

Page 40285

 1     explained to you that we were doing and we were doing it

 2     around-the-clock.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript please.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 18 it should read:  I'm not

 6     denying that there may have been other activities.  [In English] "May

 7     have been" [Interpretation] "May have been" instead of, as it says here,

 8     that there were some other activities.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

10             Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

12        Q.   Colonel, you -- let me put this to you:  You remained involved in

13     intel work throughout the war.  You were, after General Tolimir, the most

14     senior -- the most senior intelligence officer in the VRS --

15        A.   Yes, yes, okay.

16        Q.   You knew because you were helping in the -- you were -- you knew

17     because you were working in the Main Staff and with foreign officials on

18     ways of getting the air-strikes to stop, you knew about the prospect of

19     international deployment on VRS terrain, and your job was to keep -

20     knowing that - your job was to keep the story of the killings outside of

21     the public eye.  And that's exactly what you were doing throughout --

22        A.   No, no.  It wasn't my job.

23        Q.   General -- Colonel, pardon me, I keep giving you a promotion.

24     But that's exactly what you did, Colonel, you covered up the story of the

25     killings when you issued -- when you made sure some of the participants

Page 40286

 1     in the Branjevo farm executions were issued with false IDs by your

 2     services together with the Ministry of the Interior?

 3        A.   No, no.  Please, no.  That was not the aim and that's not it.

 4        Q.   Well --

 5        A.   -- the objective was --

 6        Q.   Colonel, just before you answer --

 7        A.   -- for those people --

 8        Q.   Just before you answer, let's have a look at your order regarding

 9     the ID cards.  It's P4491.  You saw it during your testimony last week.

10        A.   Yes, yes.

11        Q.   So, Colonel, this is document which is coded, marked very urgent,

12     from you personally to Dragan Kijac, and it's dated 16 January 1996,

13     says:

14             "Considering that we have a group of members of the 10th Sabotage

15     Detachment who are foreign citizens or are on the list of individuals ...

16     indicted by the Hague Tribunal, we ask you to order the Bijeljina MUP to

17     issue personal IDs with Serb names to them or with different names for

18     Serb nationals ..."

19             And if we go down in English, you can see it in B/C/S, but if we

20     go to the bottom of the page in English, I'm sorry, it must be on the

21     second page in English.  The very -- the note at the bottom of this

22     document says to Mr. Kijac:

23             "You are required to act on this request by the VRS Main Staff."

24             So I'd like to hear your explanations about why this isn't a

25     cover-up, Colonel.

Page 40287

 1        A.   I don't see it in the original document, the registering of the

 2     persons and so on and so forth.  And please report back about your

 3     decision, no.  We sat down once I received the information from Pelemis

 4     about the participation and we made an assessment about the general

 5     safety and security of those people.  We also had information that some

 6     people from --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters didn't understand the word used by

 8     the witness --

 9             MS. EDGERTON:

10        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt you in the middle of your answer, but the

15     interpreters didn't understand one of the words that you used.  I

16     wouldn't normally interrupt you mid-answer like this, but to make sure

17     they understand you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  If you could repeat your answer from the beginning.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was not the goal.  The goal

20     was to have these people stay there and to be brought before justice.

21     Instead of someone else taking up this role on themselves and kill these

22     people in order to clear up the situation.  That is why this document was

23     written and sent to the ministry.  At the time when we sent it to the

24     ministry, and we immediately indicated which specific people were in

25     question because The Hague Prosecution was not yet initiating any

Page 40288

 1     investigation of those people at this level, but we wanted the minister

 2     to know the identity of those people.  In addition, we provided a list of

 3     the people so that they can be located if a need arose and to be

 4     relocated from their then-places of residence to other streets and

 5     residence places and that was the objective.  We wanted to avoid someone

 6     else taking that prerogative into their own hands and resolving this

 7     issue in a different manner.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:

 9        Q.   But that's not what this document says.

10        A.   Well, we didn't go into detail in this.  I discussed this with

11     the minister.  This document went through several different levels and

12     it's not very simple exactly like this, it's not so easy to write it

13     down.

14        Q.   So you discussed these perpetrators personally with Dragan Kijac?

15        A.   Yes, Dragan Kijac knew the identity of those people.  He gave his

16     approval, and he kept a list.  So there is very precise records of the

17     names of the people and people who did not participate there were also on

18     the list -- actually, were not participating in that group, but there

19     was -- there were people of interest and we undertook upon ourselves to

20     relocate them to different addresses.

21        Q.   So --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance.  AID was

23     not recorded, AID is a Muslim secret service.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The majority of the persons were

25     from the area of the Federation and they were not Serbs.

Page 40289

 1             MS. EDGERTON:

 2        Q.   So your explanation as to the mention of indictments by the Hague

 3     Tribunal is to the effect that -- well, actually, it looks like, based on

 4     your explanation, the contents of this document with reference to the

 5     indictments by the Hague Tribunal is nothing more than misinformation.

 6     So the -- there's false information in this document that you used to get

 7     false IDs for these people?

 8        A.   No, no, madam.  No.  This is put here -- let me tell you now.  At

 9     that moment, I thought it was horrible to say that these people committed

10     such and such crimes.  So in order for one to understand what this is all

11     about, I said that those were persons, and I quote literally, persons

12     against whom indictments were issued by the Hague Tribunal but no

13     indictments were issued at the time against any of them, not at that

14     particular time.  Perhaps with regard to Erdemovic there was some

15     information, I don't know, but I formulated it in this way in order to

16     help the minister understand who this referred to, who these people were.

17        Q.   People who he needed to hide; right?

18        A.   Well, no, not to hide.  He had a list of people, but not people

19     to hide but to provide them with safe shelter in order to avoid being

20     executed.  AID was looking for three or four of them and we wanted to

21     prevent that from being done.  We just wanted this to go through regular

22     proceedings.  We just didn't want anyone taking law into their own hands

23     and doing harm to those people.  That was the sole reason.

24        Q.   So instead --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

Page 40290

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Colonel said that those who took

 3     them to do the assignment should not be executed, that means by those who

 4     had given them assignment, that was not recorded.  And then the next

 5     sentence pertains to the danger that was coming from the AID.

 6     [In English] It could be clarified what Colonel meant.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I think it reads well as it is now.

 8             Let's continue.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

10        Q.   And this document doesn't say a word about AID; right?

11        A.   No.  There is no mention there.  I didn't mention anyone else.

12     Please, this document was encoded, I submitted to the Bijeljina municipal

13     SUP, and then it went through different levels.  That's why I didn't put

14     it, but I wanted the minister to know what this was all about and I

15     expected him to give his approval, but I wanted him to know exactly which

16     persons we were referring to and their exact location.  So if any court

17     of law was looking for them, they would know where they were.  That was

18     on the 16th of January when the border was porous, when there were no

19     troops guarding the border any longer.  And that was an additional risk.

20        Q.   Colonel, Colonel, I'd like to go back to the 13th of July and

21     your trip into the enclaves ostensibly to deliver some information to

22     either General Tolimir or General Mladic.  I'd like to know, first of

23     all, because you've never actually said it, who did you meet in Belgrade

24     to get the information that was so urgent?

25        A.   You want me to give you a name?  Please, I can't do that.  It's a

Page 40291

 1     person with whom I maintained contacts and who provided us with the

 2     necessary intelligence.  That's one thing.  Secondly, I told you I had a

 3     meeting with the Japanese military envoy, maybe with an Italian one as

 4     well.

 5        Q.   Actually, your statement doesn't say anything about any of the

 6     people that you met with in Belgrade, so that's why I'd like to know.

 7     Did they -- and the Japanese military envoy and the Italian one both

 8     spoke to you about the situation with respect to the prisoners of war in

 9     Srebrenica, didn't they?

10        A.   No.  The discussion was how the operation was already over and

11     the focus was shifted to Croatia, what would happen there, and about the

12     imminent attack, and they knew about that.  They knew what our views were

13     about that and which measures we intended to undertake.

14        Q.   Now something --

15        A.   August/September -- excuse me.

16             Secondly, the peace process was over on the date when we wrote

17     this, but as for the 13th of July they were interested to hear what our

18     plans were in the event of Croatia occupying the Republic of Serbian

19     Krajina proceed to attack Republika Srpska.  And the person that I

20     mentioned is, let's say -- let's call him an agent, and he was registered

21     under a special code-name which I cannot tell you.

22        Q.   So, Colonel, the thing that's -- Colonel --

23        A.   I think it doesn't really matter either.

24        Q.   The thing that's always puzzled me, Colonel, is that when you

25     received this information that was so urgent, why you didn't make your

Page 40292

 1     way to the western front where General Milovanovic was already

 2     operational to give him that information instead of going down to the

 3     eastern enclaves?  The person who needed that information more than any

 4     one of your commanders was General Milovanovic.  So why didn't you go

 5     there instead of going down to the enclaves if the information was so

 6     urgent?

 7        A.   It is the commander who ultimately makes the decision.

 8     General Milovanovic does things that are current matters.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure your last sentence was translated

10     because you spoke with your microphone off, but let us continue.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The decision, the final decision,

12     is made by the commander.  General Milovanovic is the Chief of Staff.  He

13     was in charge of those units there, but also there was a series of other

14     actions and manoeuvres that the commander has to decide about, and that

15     is why I went there and because I thought that we had little time and

16     that what was ahead of us were major problems, enormous problems, and

17     our -- my personal opinion was that we should go as soon as possible,

18     leave Srebrenica, the corps is finishing that, that operation is done and

19     over with militarily, and let us seek a solution in the western part of

20     Republika Srpska.

21             MS. EDGERTON:

22        Q.   So rather than go there urgently, you went there via Bijeljina,

23     via Nova Kasaba, via Bratunac, where you stopped at the brigade command,

24     via Potocari, and then found General Mladic in Srebrenica; right?  You

25     stopped four places along the way before you actually went to your

Page 40293

 1     commander?

 2        A.   I was looking for my commander.  I came and from Bijeljina I went

 3     straight to look for my commander, and I asked there where he was.  I

 4     didn't know where he was.  I know that he's in the area of Srebrenica,

 5     somewhere in that area.  That is a theatre that involves a broader area.

 6        Q.   Colonel --

 7        A.   That's why I went to the military police battalion, so that the

 8     commander could tell me where General Mladic is.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

10     be asked to speak into the microphone.  He is barely audible.  Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:

12        Q.   Colonel, when you answer my questions, I think you will help the

13     interpreters if you can try and lean forward a little bit into the

14     microphones.

15             Colonel, as an intelligence officer, you recognised that the

16     situation at Nova Kasaba and Sandici, where you saw hundreds of

17     prisoners, had massive intel potential, and you were in a unique

18     situation where you came face-to-face with the prisoners who had survived

19     and up until that point surrendered.  Isn't it the case, Colonel, that

20     you went there -- the real reason why you went there was to see and hear

21     for yourself what information had been gathered, how many people who had

22     surrendered, who had surrendered, to find out how big the column of

23     15.000 men and boys leaving -- of military age leaving Srebrenica

24     actually was, who had been armed, what communications they had with the

25     2nd Corps, you went to Nova Kasaba and passed through Sandici because you

Page 40294

 1     were doing your job?  You were gathering intel on the prisoners.  You, as

 2     the senior intel guy in the Bosnian Serb army Main Staff, were checking

 3     in to make sure the process was going on as it should?

 4        A.   Well, believe me, I never received any kind of assignments like

 5     that from anyone, the ones that you mentioned to me just now.  I was not

 6     interested in that at all.  I do not have any information there that

 7     would be important to me that I could get from some soldier who would be

 8     arrested.  And now if I were to ask is there an officer there, if I were

 9     to ask whether they were identified or not, Srebrenica is done and over

10     with militarily as far as I'm concerned.  The rest is just a routine

11     matter.  It was supposed to be taken care of in a routine manner, the

12     prisoners of war were supposed to be taken to a camp for POWs, and then

13     they're supposed to be processed and interviewed, and this is of greater

14     interest for the security service, not for my service.  From these

15     soldiers, my service could not get anything, not even from their

16     officers, whereas they can -- these other people can look for

17     perpetrators of war crimes, and so on and so forth, in different

18     operations that the forces from Srebrenica carried out in the territory

19     of Republika Srpska.

20        Q.   In your statement, Colonel, at paragraph 12 and page 15 in

21     English and page 10 in your language, you said:

22             "When I reached Srebrenica, I found General Mladic and explained

23     the situation to him."

24             But when you testified in the Mladic case last week at transcript

25     page 13054, you said that you met General Mladic at Potocari.  Are you

Page 40295

 1     trying to hide the fact that you were in Srebrenica?

 2        A.   No.  I was not in Srebrenica at all.  I was never in that area,

 3     and really when I came there I thought that I was on the periphery of

 4     Srebrenica.  And only when I talked to -- actually, when I saw the

 5     picture, what was behind the buildings, I showed that to the investigator

 6     of The Hague Tribunal in Banja Luka, and then I said, "No, that's where I

 7     was, that's it.  What is this?"  And then he said to me, "No, this is

 8     Potocari."  So I was in Potocari, I was not in Srebrenica.  I was not in

 9     Srebrenica itself.

10        Q.   Let's have a look at your statement, Colonel.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  And unfortunately I don't have the exhibit number

12     off the top of my head.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3720, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you very much, Mr. Registrar.

15             Could we have a look, please, at D3720, at page 15 in English and

16     page 10 in B/C/S.

17        Q.   Colonel, look at the third full paragraph of the page on the

18     screen in front of you --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Why is it so blurry?

20                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Please carry on.  I was watching the monitor, video.

22     Please carry on.

23             MS. EDGERTON:

24        Q.   Look at the third full paragraph, Colonel, on the page in front

25     of you --

Page 40296

 1        A.   Fine, fine.

 2        Q.   It says:

 3             "When I reached Srebrenica, I found General Mladic and explained

 4     the situation to him ..."

 5             Are you saying -- are you saying that the statement you signed is

 6     wrong?

 7        A.   Well, I made a mistake.  I confused things.  I thought it was

 8     Srebrenica but it wasn't Srebrenica.  And when I saw the picture -- I

 9     mean, the person who took the picture and the building that is behind the

10     back.  I was never in Srebrenica.  I mean, I thought that it was there.

11     I never was in Srebrenica.  I mean from some distance.  And then later I

12     gave this statement during the next conversation with the investigator.

13     Now I cannot remember his name, I'll remember that too, and then I asked

14     that that be corrected in Banja Luka.

15        Q.   Colonel, if you had been to Srebrenica, you would have seen the

16     body of the man in the town centre whose throat had been slit by a man

17     from your 10th Sabotage Detachment on the order of Milorad Pelemis.  Is

18     that why you're now insisting that you weren't in Srebrenica?

19        A.   That is what I hear from you now, that that was ordered to him,

20     that this person's throat was slit.  No, that's not the reason.  I was

21     not in Srebrenica.  Do you understand that?  These prisoners were all

22     gathered in Potocari at the base there.  That's where the buses came,

23     trucks towards the end, and that's where women, children, and so on were

24     loaded onto buses and that's where I was and I didn't go any further than

25     that.  And that's recorded.

Page 40297

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I'm keeping an eye on the time.  I

 2     recognise my undertaking and my best efforts.  I do feel I would like to

 3     go a little bit further with this witness and show him a video that he's

 4     seen previously and not had an opportunity to comment on.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  What video?

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  A video of the witness in Srebrenica with

 7     General Mladic, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  How long does it take?

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  I think the clip takes about two minutes all

10     together, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll take a break after that.  Please carry on.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

13             Could we please have -- I'd like to play a clip now from the

14     Srebrenica trial video which is P4201, part 3, from the video V0009016,

15     time codes 0008 to 0241.  And I hope my colleagues in the booth have

16     received their transcripts for interpretation.

17                           [Video-clip played]

18             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "You see, unfortunately, your camera

19     too can testify to this.  This was destroyed probably sometime in 1992 or

20     1993, just like everything else that was Serb in Srebrenica and around

21     it, as far as Muslim forces and followers of Alija Izetbegovic were able

22     to reach.  I have seen for myself today that our authority has been

23     established here in Srebrenica, and you saw over there that an evacuation

24     was carried out of all those who wanted to leave Srebrenica safely.  The

25     entire former enclave of Srebrenica is under the control of the forces of

Page 40298

 1     the Republika Srpska army.  We are at the old Orthodox church in

 2     Srebrenica.  It was destroyed and turned into a stable.  Well, I am

 3     archpriest Nedeljko Mitrovic, priest from Bratunac, and this church is

 4     dedicated to the shroud of the Holy Madonna.  Today, the 13th of July,

 5     1995, this church has finally been liberated.

 6             "Are you from here?

 7             "Yes, I am.  From this house.

 8             "From this house?

 9             "Yes.

10             "When were you expelled in from here?

11             "On 10th April 1992.

12             "Is there anything inside?  Have you been inside?

13             "Yes, I have.

14             "Let's go in for a while.  This is your own house?

15             "It's my own house.

16             "They have destroyed all of this?

17             "All of it.  I just got in through the gate.

18             "Did" --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a -- shall we stop here?

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We heard something that is

21     not in the transcript.

22             JUDGE KWON:  While they were translating, they couldn't hear you,

23     Mr. Salapura.  What did you say?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was there when this conversation

25     with this woman took place.  That recording does exist and then there's

Page 40299

 1     also the part with the journalist.  That is after the talk with the

 2     journalist and then Mladic talked to this woman.  And together with this

 3     investigator from The Hague Tribunal, I mean he told me that that was

 4     Potocari.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  No, I was asking just what you said.

 6             Please carry on, Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  It's only a few more seconds of film.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  But then we might have to hear what our friends

10     the interpreters have heard that's not in the transcript.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Probably we need to play a bit.

12                           [Video-clip played]

13             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "And do you know where he was

14     buried.

15             "I don't know that either.

16             "What kind of work did you do in Srebrenica before the war?  What

17     is your educational background?

18             "Secondary school of economics.

19             "Secondary school of economics."

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance.  The

21     missing part is precisely --

22                           [Video-clip played]

23             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "He was killed.

24             "Yes.

25             "And do you know where he was buried?

Page 40300

 1             "I don't know that either.

 2             "What kind of work did you do in Srebrenica before the war here

 3     at the revenue administration?"

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Okay.  For the record, the time code that we've

 5     just stopped at is 2:34.6.

 6        Q.   Colonel, that's you in behind the woman on the screen right now,

 7     isn't it?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Colonel, General Mladic is in Srebrenica, he says he's in

10     Srebrenica, he's in landmarks of Srebrenica, he asks the woman who is on

11     the screen with him if she's from there and she agrees, and your evidence

12     is that this is all happening in Potocari?

13        A.   Yes.  I said in my first variant that I found General Mladic in

14     Srebrenica, and then the investigator, your investigator, showed me the

15     recording of this conversation with General Mladic, where behind you can

16     see a building.  And then he said, "Is that it?"  And I said, "Yes."  And

17     then he said, "Well, that's not Srebrenica, that is Potocari."  That's

18     the first time I came there.  Do you understand that?  And when we set

19     out from there, then General Milovanovic, together with this woman, went

20     there and he -- she took him to her house.  We all went there.  There

21     were several of us and these cameramen and his security detail and so on.

22             THE ACCUSED:  I believe Mladic -- the witness said Milovanovic.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  The witness said Milovanovic, Dr. Karadzic.  The

24     witness should be asked to correct.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mladic.  Yes, Mladic,

Page 40301

 1     General Mladic.  Milovanovic was not there.  It was a slip of the tongue.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  And one more very short clip, please,

 3     Your Honours.

 4        Q.   Colonel, and this is from P4201, part 2, time code 17:59 to

 5     19:05.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll leave it, Your Honours.  It was the wrong

 8     clip and I think it's best to leave it given the time.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             We'll take a break for 45 minutes and resume at 1.40.

11                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.55 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 1.41 p.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Actually, Your Honour, I have nothing further.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good day, Excellencies.

18     Good day to all.

19                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Colonel Salapura.

21        A.   Good day.

22        Q.   I shall start with the latest.  On page 55 of today's transcript,

23     it was suggested to you that there had to be talks about POWs from

24     Srebrenica between yourself and the military attaches of Japan and Italy.

25     When was it that you saw these attaches, on which day, do you remember?

Page 40302

 1        A.   The 12th.

 2        Q.   The 12th of?

 3        A.   The 12th of July.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Until then, on the basis of what you know now, until

 5     then had something happened that would have had to be the subject of your

 6     conversations?

 7        A.   I did not know then.  I left from Banja Luka, as I said I was on

 8     sick leave.  I did not know at all what was happening in Srebrenica and

 9     around Srebrenica.  I only found out in Modrica when I arrived.  They

10     told me that our units had taken Srebrenica, liberated Srebrenica, and so

11     on.  So that is where I received this first information -- well -- so I

12     had nothing to say to them about Srebrenica or in relation to Srebrenica,

13     I mean in that contact.  The talks had to do with a completely different

14     subject.

15        Q.   Thank you.  On the basis of what you found out subsequently and

16     what you know now, do you think that they could have had any knowledge of

17     the killings on the 12th of July?

18        A.   I don't know.  I cannot speculate and I don't think so.  They

19     didn't ask me anything about that.  On the 11th the operation in

20     Srebrenica was over.  So on the 12th, I don't know, were there killings

21     on the 12th?  I did not see anywhere en route.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Just a brief question.  What do

23     reconnaissance/sabotage detachments do in any army otherwise?

24        A.   They go into reconnaissance missions; that is to say, they

25     reconnoitre the enemy forces starting with the front end and going in

Page 40303

 1     depth.  And now it depends on the units themselves what the depth may be.

 2     At any rate, in our situation it was 5 or 6 kilometres in depth into the

 3     territory.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5        A.   Sorry, also carrying out sabotage activities.  We in the Army of

 6     Republika Srpska had just this one sabotage unit that was capable of

 7     carrying out such operations.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us approximately from the beginning

 9     until the end of the war how many prisoners of war we had and before July

10     1995 how many times executions or killings of prisoners of war took

11     place?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't see how this arises from the

14     cross-examination, Your Honours.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, the cross-examination called into

16     question whether people knew of the executions and whether it had

17     happened in the past would also be relevant to whether someone would know

18     or expect that these prisoners would be executed.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Well, actually, I don't -- I didn't follow the

20     question.  What was your question, Mr. Karadzic, from the beginning until

21     the end of war?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Up until July 1995, how many POWs

23     did we have and how many times did executions, unlawful killings, take

24     place before July.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

Page 40304

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, can you answer the question?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not aware of a single case.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Although the Trial Chamber knows already, could you

 6     tell us, though, where it was to be expected that these prisoners of war

 7     would have gone?  Where were they supposed to be put up?

 8        A.   I was deeply convinced that they would be in POW camps.  As far

 9     as I can remember, that is to say up until now in that area, in 1992,

10     Susica, there was some camp there near Vlasenica and there was a rather

11     large camp in Bijeljina, in Batkovic, that was properly set up for normal

12     life.  Then there was Manjaca near Banja Luka, and I don't know whether

13     in the Herzegovina Corps there was one and around Sarajevo, down there,

14     what was the name of that?  Sorry about that.

15        Q.   Kula?

16        A.   Yes, Kula.

17        Q.   Thank you.  But in 1995 in the area of Eastern Bosnia, the

18     eastern part of Republika Srpska, there was another camp that had been

19     properly set up?

20        A.   Batkovic, yes, and it had the largest capacity too.  I personally

21     had never been there.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And can you please tell us if prisoners were to be

23     transported to Batkovic, where would they pass along the route from

24     Srebrenica?

25        A.   They would need to go through Zvornik to Bijeljina.

Page 40305

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2        A.   And then from Bijeljina to Batkovic through the town.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You were talking and you were asked about the

 4     transport people, so trucks and buses.  This action of transporting

 5     people from the north from -- towards Batkovic, was it something unusual

 6     or something that would alarm those who saw it?

 7        A.   The transport itself probably would not.  All that would be seen

 8     would be that there was a large number of prisoners, a mass.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And you were asked on the first day about contacts

10     and if it says there "call Salapura" and there is a tick saying that

11     Salapura was called, does that mean that they actually reached you?

12        A.   Not necessarily, because I don't remember much today.  I don't

13     remember many of those contacts today.  By phone mostly it was conveying

14     messages that were left perhaps from the level of the president's office

15     or something.

16        Q.   Thank you.  And from the Presidency, was I the only person that

17     you communicated with?  Did you have contacts with Subotic, Koljevic,

18     Plavsic, or anyone else from the president's office?

19        A.   I was in contact with all members of the Presidency, perhaps more

20     with Koljevic than with anyone else.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know who all of my secretaries worked for,

22     who did they make calls for, who did they receive calls for?

23        A.   I don't know.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever inform me verbally or in writing that

25     prisoners from Srebrenica were executed?

Page 40306

 1        A.   I did not.  I said that and I stand by that today, that I did not

 2     know that until late and that was not part of my duties, it was not part

 3     of my remit.  There are other services that would deal with that, with

 4     instances like that.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And, Colonel, sir, did you know anyone, either myself

 6     or anyone to the lowest-ranking state instance, if anyone had an

 7     intention or plan to commit genocide or to expel Muslims and Croats from

 8     the territory of Republika Srpska?

 9        A.   I did not know of such a plan.  No one ever told me about such a

10     plan, I never heard of such a plan, and as far as I am concerned a plan

11     like that would merely be the result of a sick mind.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Were there other -- in our army were there people who

13     were not of Serb ethnicity?  Were there other non-Serbs, Muslims, Croats,

14     Slovenians, what was the ethnic composition of our army?  Who were all

15     the ethnic -- what were all the ethnic groups in our ranks?

16        A.   I think there were others.  I couldn't tell you exactly who, but

17     all the minorities that lived in our territory were a part of the army,

18     the Serb ethnic group was absolutely dominant, though, but there were

19     others to a small degree.

20        Q.   Thank you.  In your opinion and according to what you know, would

21     the unlawful killing of prisoners at the end of the war be in the

22     interest of Republika Srpska?

23        A.   It was not in the interest of Republika Srpska.  At the end of

24     the war, then, and now I think it created more damage to the Serbian

25     people than harm to the people from whose ranks those prisoners came

Page 40307

 1     from.

 2        Q.   [No interpretation]

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat what he said.

 4                           [Defence counsel confer]

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, sir, for your efforts and for your testimony.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have no

 8     further questions.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Salapura, that concludes your evidence.  On

11     behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The

12     Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14                           [The witness withdrew]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Please call the next witness.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We're ready to hear the

17     evidence of Cedomir Zelenovic.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Not Zametica?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. Zametica was postponed until the 3rd of

20     July.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.  Okay.

22                           [The witness entered court]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Could the witness make the solemn declaration.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

25     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Page 40308

 1                           WITNESS:  CEDOMIR ZELENOVIC

 2                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Zelenovic.  Please be seated.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  And make yourself comfortable.

 6             Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Zelenovic, I must draw

 7     your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here at the

 8     international Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E).  Under this rule, you may

 9     object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or

10     even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate

11     you in a criminal offence.  In this context, "incriminate" means saying

12     something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal

13     offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might

14     have committed a criminal offence.

15             However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you

16     and as a consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you

17     know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the

18     question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your

19     testimony compelled in such circumstances would not be used in any case

20     that might be laid against you for any offence save and except the

21     offence of giving false testimony.

22             Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr. Zelenovic?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I have more or less

24     understood, Your Honour.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 40309

 1             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

 2                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Zelenovic.

 4        A.   Good afternoon, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   Could you, and myself included, please speak slowly, speak our

 6     sentences out slowly and make a pause between question and answer so that

 7     everything could be recorded in the transcript.  Did you provide a

 8     statement to my Defence team?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D9682 in e-court,

12     please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Could you please look at the screen in front of you, the Serbian

15     version is on the left-hand side.  Can you see the statement on the

16     screen in front of you?

17        A.   Yes, I can.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And did you read and sign the statement?

19        A.   Yes, I did both read it and sign it.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown the

22     last page so that he can identify his signature.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Is this your signature, sir?

25        A.   Yes, it is.

Page 40310

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you told

 2     the Defence team?

 3        A.   Yes, it does.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  And if I were to put the same questions to you today,

 5     would your answers essentially be the same as the ones in this statement?

 6        A.   Yes, they would be the same.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender the

 9     statement, Your Honours, pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. McKenna?

11             MS. McKENNA:  No objection, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it, but subject to portions of

13     paragraph 24 which the Chamber has difficulty in following its meaning.

14     It reads -- parts of it reads:

15             "The president of the Crisis Staff, Brano Grujic, gave him a

16     negative answer, and, in addition, told him that could not secure

17     provisions for the men who would keep people the freed parts of the

18     town."

19             So I would like you, Mr. Karadzic, to lead live that part if you

20     wish us to tender that part as well.

21             Yes, shall we assign the number.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3723, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I am now going to read

24     the summary of Mr. Cedo Zelenovic's statement in English.

25             [In English] Cedo Zelenovic worked as an engineer in the

Page 40311

 1     management of the aluminosilicate plant in Zvornik since 1975.

 2             Relations between the Muslims and Serbs in Zvornik were good

 3     before the first multi-party elections.  In 1991, the SDA Zvornik came

 4     under pressure from the SDA leadership in Sarajevo to implement SDA

 5     policy on the secession of BH from Yugoslavia.  In October 1991, the

 6     Muslim leadership in Sarajevo out-voted the Serbs and proclaimed the

 7     sovereignty of BH.  This was a clear signal that the Serbs were socially,

 8     culturally, and ethnically at risk.  The Serbs in BH established regional

 9     areas and municipalities, and this was the only way to protect themselves

10     and challenge the chauvinistic and separatist activities of the Muslims

11     and Croats in Bosnia.

12             The poor state of inter-ethnic relations was reflected in the

13     factory where Cedo Zelenovic worked.  In 1991 it was apparent that

14     Muslims and Serbs were forming their own groups in offices.  When talking

15     to their Muslim colleagues, Serbs were repeatedly told that they had

16     Serbia, and had no business looking for anything in BH.  Muslims strongly

17     opposed the Cutileiro Plan after accepted.  Alija Izetbegovic rejected

18     the Cutileiro Plan because he enjoyed the support of the United States.

19     There were countless stupidities in interpretations and relations among

20     employees.

21             Serbs taught by their experience from Second World War sought

22     protection from the regular forces of JNA.  The Muslim leadership on its

23     path of chauvinists and separatism saw the JNA as an obstacle, so they

24     portrayed it to its people in a planned and systematic fashion as an

25     occupational and Chetnik force.  Two soldiers were physically attacked in

Page 40312

 1     a Muslim village close to Kalesija because they were members of the JNA.

 2     In December 1991, the Crisis Staff was formed.  It was not operational

 3     except until 6th to 10th of April, 1992, when the interim government of

 4     the Serbian municipality of Zvornik was formed.  In March 1992, owing to

 5     the escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts, Muslim fundamentalists in

 6     Zvornik mistreated a number of Serbian residents.  Elderly Serbs were

 7     attacked and physically mistreated.  A JNA officer was attacked.  Muslim

 8     flags were put on buildings and groups of Muslim youths imbibed with

 9     nationalism moved about the town carrying religious flags and cassette

10     players with loud music.

11             After the Muslim-Croatian referendum for the independence of BH,

12     anti-Serbian hysteria started in BH and Zvornik.  Muslim and Croatian

13     flags were tied together at all political and sporting events.  All was

14     directed against the national interests of the Serbs in the municipality.

15     The Serbian leadership, headed by Radovan Karadzic, did its best to calm

16     the situation and avoid the conflict.  Karadzic asked that the leadership

17     in Zvornik to negotiate with the Muslims and find peaceful solutions to

18     problems.  A rally was organised in the town hall.  Karadzic and Muslim

19     leader Zulfikarpasic said that BH should remain in Yugoslavia and

20     arrangements needed to be made to avoid a war at all costs.  In the

21     internal organisation of BH should have been in line with agreements

22     between ethnic groups and for the benefit of all who lived in it.

23     Karadzic was committed to a peaceful solution to the problems in Bosnia.

24     People from the SDA were unhappy that Zulfikarpasic advocated a peaceful

25     solution and had therefore set up an ambush on the way between Zvornik

Page 40313

 1     and Sarajevo where they were going to assassinate him.

 2             The Zvornik SDS and SDA leaders negotiated a peaceful division of

 3     Zvornik.  While negotiating -- negotiations were ongoing, the chief of

 4     the SUP of police approved and armed the reserve police which were

 5     staffed exclusively with Muslims.  On 5th of April, 1992, in Sapna, armed

 6     Muslim extremists carried out a terrorist attack on a JNA vehicle in

 7     passing.  A JNA officer and a soldier were killed and the rest of those

 8     found in the vehicle were taken captive.  The attack in Sapna was the

 9     reason to seal off Zvornik and all the villages where they were the

10     majority population, as well as some bridges from the town to Serbia.

11     The Crisis Staff in Karakaj was convened after a number of Serbs fled to

12     Serbia from Zvornik.  A group of Muslim soldiers guarded the bridge in

13     Zvornik.  Under the pretext of looking for weapons, armed Muslims

14     searched Serbian homes.  Serbs were bullied and physically mistreated.

15             Arkan's soldiers beat up two Serbian negotiators in Mali Zvornik.

16     The Zvornik Serbian leadership had been trying to resolve the situation

17     peacefully.  Arkan prevented the negotiations from proceeding, so he took

18     over all the power and personally commanded his forces in the operation

19     to lift the blockade.  The Crisis Staff did not make a decision on

20     lifting the blockade from Zvornik; Arkan did this.  After the blockade

21     was lifted, local authorities were established, but they did not have any

22     power because of the number of paramilitaries and individuals.

23     Paramilitaries introduced the reign of terror.  All residents of Zvornik

24     were mistreated.  Paramilitaries seized the town and made all decisions

25     on the basis of their fighting strength and power.

Page 40314

 1             Muslim extremists planted explosives under the factory's red

 2     sludge piping above a drain, polluting the Sapna river and killing a huge

 3     number of fish.  They also planted 70 kilos of explosives in the spillway

 4     tunnel.  If activated, an unprecedented environmental disaster would

 5     occur.  On 27th of May, 1992, Muslim extremists attacked a column of

 6     trucks carrying ore to Cedo Zelenovic's factory killing five innocent and

 7     unarmed drivers.  More trucks and more people were massacred after this

 8     event and after which production was suspended.  Only after Zuco, Repic,

 9     and their paramilitaries were arrested in late July 1992 were relatively

10     normal conditions created for the local authorities.  All the arrested

11     paramilitaries were brought to justice and supposedly convicted of their

12     own crimes and offences mainly in Serbia.

13             [Interpretation] That would be the summary of Mr. Zelenovic's

14     statement.  I have no questions for him at this time except for those

15     that you indicated.  So I would kindly ask that the witness be permitted

16     to use his own statement if he has it in front of you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Mr. Zelenovic, do you have your statement in front of you --

19             JUDGE KWON:  When leading live, I would like you to put the

20     question directly to the witness.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Are you able to tell us what was the request by Arkan to Grujic

24     and the Serbian authorities in Zvornik and what the reaction of the

25     authorities was?

Page 40315

 1        A.   Arkan's request, Arkan and his assistant Peja's request was for

 2     us to decide at the Crisis Staff to lift the blockade of Zvornik.

 3        Q.   And what was the answer of the Serbian authorities?

 4        A.   Our response, the response of the Crisis Staff at the time one or

 5     two days before the conflict broke out, was that we were still trying to

 6     resolve things in a peaceful way and that we could not make that decision

 7     like that, nor were there any forces that would be able to help them.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the last part of

 9     the witness's answer.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zelenovic, the interpreters were not able to

11     hear the last part of your answer.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think the answer has now been

13     recorded.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Did you not say that there were no forces that would be able to

16     help them, the ones that they were requesting?  That was not recorded.

17        A.   Yes, yes, something like that.

18        Q.   Other than the decision to lift the blockade, what else did they

19     request from the authorities?

20        A.   As far as I can remember, they asked for police forces which --

21     well, at that time the police had separated.  The Serbian police was in

22     Karakaj, not all of them, just those who stayed there, and these others

23     probably left.  Thus, to help them in this lifting of the blockade of

24     Zvornik.  And they received the answer that I mentioned a little bit

25     earlier.

Page 40316

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this now sufficient,

 3     satisfactory, Your Excellencies?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  It's for you to present your evidence.  Very well.

 5             Mr. Zelenovic, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in this

 6     case has been admitted in its most part in writing, that is, your witness

 7     statement.  Now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the

 8     Office of the Prosecutor, Ms. McKenna.

 9             Yes --

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is an intervention here.  I

11     saw in English where these explosions were, where this explosion was

12     planted.  It says "red sludge," but actually it's red mud, "crveni mulj."

13     I just wanted to make that correction.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Zelenovic.

15             Yes, Ms. McKenna.

16             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17                           Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:

18        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Zelenovic.

19        A.   [No interpretation]

20        Q.   Now, at paragraph 19 of your statement, you discussed the

21     negotiations which took place between the SDS and the SDA in Zvornik.

22     I'd just like to clarify.  Is this a reference to the negotiations that

23     were taking place in early 1992?

24        A.   Your Honours, could you please put this variant -- could you

25     please put the Serbian version of my statement on?

Page 40317

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have your statement with you?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  In hard copy I mean.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, I have nothing.  I was told

 5     that I would be given everything here and that I should not bring

 6     anything with me.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, your statement will be forthcoming to you, but

 8     in the meantime read it from the monitor.

 9             MS. McKENNA:

10        Q.   So it's just the first sentence of paragraph 19 of your

11     statement, Mr. Zelenovic.

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And can you just clarify that this is a reference to the

14     negotiations which were taking place in early 1992?

15        A.   That should be the case.

16        Q.   And so you state, also in paragraph 19, that while the

17     negotiations were ongoing, Muslim reserve police in Zvornik were armed.

18     And at paragraph 14 of your statement you say that the Crisis Staff was

19     not operational until the 6th of April, 1992.  It's true, though, isn't

20     it, Mr. Zelenovic, that Serb municipality leaders were organising for war

21     before the Crisis Staff was formally operational on the 6th of April?

22        A.   Look, I was a member of the Crisis Staff that was set up sometime

23     in December and it says here it has certain functions for a few days,

24     with a view to calming down the situation and that was prior the arrival

25     of those paramilitaries.  And it basically became non-operational.  As

Page 40318

 1     for the preparations for war, I'm not aware of that.  What I do know are

 2     these things and that is that in the then-Bosnia and Herzegovina when

 3     Bosnia seceded from the former Yugoslavia and after the negotiations

 4     about the internal set-up of Bosnia failed, the only thing that Serbs

 5     could do was to form autonomous districts comprising two or three

 6     municipalities or only one municipality.  Now, if you would describe that

 7     as preparations for war, I would rather say that that was preparation for

 8     peace.  Throughout the First and the Second World War, the Serbs suffered

 9     a lot and were victims of heinous crimes --

10        Q.   Mr. Zelenovic --

11        A.   -- and in the Second World War --

12        Q.   -- I'm sorry, I'm going to have to interrupt you here.  We are

13     very limited in time, so I'm going to ask you to focus very carefully on

14     the questions that I'm asking you and answer them as concisely and

15     precisely as possible.  Now, I understand your evidence to be that you

16     weren't aware that the Crisis Staff was involved in organising for war in

17     early 1992.  And I'd like to show you a document on that topic.

18             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see P3390.

19             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

23             [Interpretation] In line 14, page 82, the witness said that the

24     Crisis Staff was suspended by the paramilitary, that it was the

25     paramilitary who suspended the Crisis Staff.

Page 40319

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Zelenovic?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             Yes, please continue, Ms. McKenna.

 5             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6             Could we please see page 19 of the English of this document and

 7     page 16 of the B/C/S.

 8        Q.   Now, you'll see, Mr. Zelenovic, that this is a report on the work

 9     of the Zvornik SJB for the year 1992.  I'd like to turn to page 21 of the

10     English and page 18 of the B/C/S now.  And halfway down this page it

11     says -- there's a passage that reads:

12             "As agreed upon with the Crisis Staff, a meeting was organised

13     with active and reserve policemen of Serb nationality in Celopek in late

14     March 1992.  A certain number of young people from Celopek and Trisic

15     were also invited to the meeting.  Over 150 Serbs attended the meeting,

16     assignments were handed out regarding the putting up of barricades at

17     certain locations, as well as on all other roads running across Serb

18     territories, securing of all important facilities in the Karakaj

19     industrial zone, and seizing of the bridges in Karakaj and Sepak.  Active

20     SJB personnel were given concrete assignments concerning the extraction

21     of vehicles and other materiel and technical equipment ..."

22             Now, were you aware that this meeting had taken place?

23        A.   No, no, I wasn't.

24        Q.   Well, if we could move to the previous page, which is page 20 in

25     the English and page 17 in the B/C/S.  And we see under the heading (a)

Page 40320

 1     which reads:

 2             "Description of Activities Undertaken on the Winning Over of

 3     Personnel for the Serb MUP by 4th of April, 1992."

 4             It says three paragraphs down:

 5             "Working on various check-points during the months of January and

 6     February, police personnel of Serb nationality enabled the transport of

 7     weapons, ammunition, and other materiel and technical equipment necessary

 8     for the arming of the Serb people in this territory of this

 9     municipality."

10             Now, were you aware that police personnel of Serb nationalities

11     were enabling the arming of Serb people in Zvornik in January and

12     February 1992?

13        A.   I'm not aware of that at all.  This is the first that I hear of

14     it.

15        Q.   Well, Mr. Zelenovic, your colleague Mr. Jovan Ivanovic recently

16     confirmed to the Trial Chamber that before the war meetings took place,

17     including in Celopek, in which the Serb leadership in Zvornik organised

18     the arming of the Serbs in the municipality.

19             MS. McKENNA:  And for the parties' reference that's T 39852 to

20     39855.

21        Q.   So it's a fact, isn't it, that the Crisis Staff, even if it was

22     not formally operational until the 6th of April, Serb municipality

23     leaders were organising for war well before that?

24        A.   Well, it seems to be one and the same question apparently.  As

25     far as my activities on the Crisis Staff are concerned in which I acted

Page 40321

 1     as a member of a charity society, this was not mentioned in any of these

 2     meetings.  This was only activated, as it says here, I don't know the

 3     4th, the 5th, or the 6th, as it is stated in the statement, and I wasn't

 4     present there.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now --

 6        A.   I mean -- I'm sorry.  Everything could be either true or untrue.

 7     I cannot vouch for that because I myself was not active in that part.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now at paragraph 26 of your statement you describe

 9     how Arkan took over all the power and personally commanded his forces in

10     the operation to lift the blockade of Zvornik, and you state that in

11     these battles he was joined by individuals and groups who came from

12     Serbia and Croatia.  And in paragraph 35 of your statement you say that

13     you never heard that the paramilitaries were invited in by anyone from

14     the Crisis Staff.  Now, we'll come back to the issue of who invited the

15     paramilitaries in, but it's a fact, isn't it, that the Zvornik

16     authorities were supportive of Arkan and groups from Serbia coming into

17     Zvornik, weren't they?

18        A.   Well, look, let me tell you this.  The Serbs --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat.  We didn't

20     understand what he's saying.

21             MS. McKENNA:

22        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Ivanovic.  Could you start your

23     answer again?  The interpreters did not understand what you were saying.

24        A.   Sometime, I don't know, the whole time since the sovereign Bosnia

25     was created, the Serbs were leaving and moving out of Zvornik, which left

Page 40322

 1     only 5 per cent of Serbs on the eve of the war, which is some 5.000

 2     according to the 1991 census, but people didn't run away as a whim.  They

 3     had to take their families away, they had to enrol their children in

 4     different schools, they felt threatened --

 5        Q.   Mr. Zelenovic, I'm sorry, again that's not responsive to my

 6     question.  I've asked you whether -- whether the Zvornik authorities were

 7     supportive of Arkan and groups from Serbia coming into Zvornik?

 8        A.   Look, whether it was the authorities or not, I was on the

 9     Crisis Staff.  I can tell you that I would have supported Satan himself

10     if it would have helped to calm down the situation.  You must realise if

11     there was some force from above that could force everyone to look and

12     find a peaceful solution, then you can call it support and that applies

13     to the authorities as well instead of going out and killing each other.

14        Q.   So do you agree that the government was supportive -- that the

15     Serb authorities were supportive of the paramilitaries coming in, just to

16     clarify your evidence on this point?

17        A.   Look, whether there was supporting or not, there are two things.

18     One thing is to support conflict as a means of solving a problem and it's

19     a completely different thing to support a so-called armed force coming

20     in, in order to establish some kind of balance because the Serbs were

21     vulnerable and threatened and by applying this force to compel and make

22     the other side to agree to the peace.  It was not like you describe it.

23     Your question, whether they were supportive, they were supportive in the

24     sense that I tried to explain to you and that is to avoid a conflict.

25     Your question was something else and I said that we would have supported

Page 40323

 1     any force, be it paramilitary or some other, just to have the problem

 2     solved in order to avoid conflict.  We didn't want the problem to be

 3     solved to the benefit of the Serbs, but we wanted to resolve this kind of

 4     ignorant attitude of the Muslim authorities which was prevalent

 5     practically from the date Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised and when the

 6     leadership headed by Alija Izetbegovic ignored all possible proposals,

 7     including the Cutileiro Plan.  And what happened, I saw something as

 8     coming from heaven above, and I don't understand why this is being to

 9     vehemently opposed.

10        Q.   We're going to come to discuss some of the specific types of

11     support that were provided, but let's just look at some of the

12     individuals who were involved.  So you've laid a lot of emphasis on

13     Arkan's role.  Could we please see 65 ter number 25239.

14             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 20 to 22, it is unclear.  The

17     witness said that he had seen Cutileiro's Plan as something coming from

18     the heaven above.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I think it's there.

20             Yes, Ms. McKenna.

21             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you.

22        Q.   Now, Mr. Zelenovic, if you look at the photograph of Mr. Karadzic

23     on the screen, can you read what it says behind him?

24        A.   Patron Saint's Day of MUP, St. Archangel Michael, Zvornik, can

25     you move it a bit, I suppose it's 1995.  You can't see the next digit.  I

Page 40324

 1     suppose it's 5.

 2        Q.   So it's clear that this celebration of the MUP patron saint took

 3     place after the Serb take-over of Zvornik?

 4        A.   No, no.  Can you tell me the year next to the word "Zvornik"?

 5        Q.   We're unfortunately unable to move the photograph, but it's clear

 6     that it's 90 something.  Do you agree that this would be after the

 7     take-over of Zvornik, given the context of the celebration?

 8        A.   Well, if I -- what I see is 95, it's nothing then.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MS. McKENNA:  So could we now see 65 ter number 25240.

11             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness did not say "then it

14     has nothing to do with this."  [In English] "What I see is 1995, it's

15     nothing then," "is nothing then" connected with -- [Interpretation] He

16     said that it has nothing to do with the take-over of Zvornik --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The interpreters are

18     interpreting only what they hear witness saying.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, let's continue.

20             MS. McKENNA:

21        Q.   Mr. Zelenovic, do you recognise the person at the podium in this

22     photograph?

23        A.   Arkan.

24        Q.   And so it's clear these photos show, don't they, that Arkan

25     continued to be received and supported by the local and indeed the

Page 40325

 1     republican leadership well after the take-over of Zvornik?

 2        A.   Look, let us go back to the question that you asked me a while

 3     ago, again in relation to Arkan.  I personally, and I believe some of the

 4     local authorities, the SDS and so on, not "so on," the authorities

 5     themselves genuinely saw in Arkan a force that would establish a balance

 6     from the Serbian side in order to resolve things in a peaceful way.  On

 7     the eve of the conflict itself, there were negotiations in that respect

 8     and it is common knowledge that he even, I don't know, beat up those

 9     Serbian representatives who were in negotiations with the representatives

10     of the Muslim side.  In that sense, you understand; but otherwise,

11     nothing could be solved unless there was a balance imposed from the

12     Serbian side and an increase of power which the Serbian authorities were

13     unable to achieve and control.  So things started going their own way.

14     All of this came as an outcome of the rejection by the Muslims to

15     negotiate.  That is what caused the conflict and the ball started

16     rolling.  You have --

17        Q.   Thank you.

18        A.   -- to understand these are the Balkans we are talking about.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Zelenovic.  I think again we are slightly straying

20     from the question.

21             MS. McKENNA:  I'd like to tender those two photographs, please.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  [Microphone not activated]

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Although ...  although -- I do

24     apologise, Your Honours.  I have to intervene.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

Page 40326

 1             We'll receive this, both these photos.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibits P6412 and P6413 respectively,

 3     Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I think we can move on.

 5             Yes, Ms. McKenna, please continue.

 6             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7        Q.   Now, we've been discussing --

 8        A.   No, no, I'm sorry.  I'm sorry, I do apologise.  I wanted to

 9     intervene in relation to this photograph.  Once again, if possible ...

10             JUDGE KWON:  If necessary, Mr. Karadzic will ask you further

11     questions.  Let's move on.

12             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   We've been discussing Arkan's role in the take-over, but

14     additional to Arkan and his men the operation to take over Zvornik was

15     also carried out by the Serb TO and by Serb SJB personnel, wasn't it?

16        A.   During the deblockade, could you just clarify the question?

17     During this conflict, the deblockade of Zvornik.  Could you clarify your

18     question?

19        Q.   My question is:  In addition to Arkan and his men, forces from

20     the Serb TO and the Serb SJB were also involved in this operation,

21     weren't they?

22        A.   Who took part?  I really cannot give you an answer to that.  I

23     don't know.  I mean as far as Serb forces are concerned of the police,

24     that's probably that SJB -- no, I don't think so.

25             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see P3390 again.

Page 40327

 1        Q.   This is the police report that we've looked at earlier, and this

 2     time I'm interested in page 22 of the English and page 19 of the B/C/S.

 3     And you'll see, Mr. Zelenovic, that two paragraphs down in the B/C/S it

 4     states:

 5             "SJB personnel acting together with forces of the Serb TO entered

 6     Zvornik and took hold of the town's vital facilities on 8th of April,

 7     1992."

 8             So do you agree that according to this contemporaneous document,

 9     forces of the Serb SJB and the Serb TO were involved in the operation?

10        A.   Well, not necessarily.  I mean, they came after the operation,

11     and of course there has to be a take-over and some kind of order has to

12     be established and these same forces and the authorities later on called

13     upon everyone to return to Zvornik.  You have to know that too, and the

14     way you put it, it doesn't have to mean that they took part.  These

15     forces, I mean, were so weak -- I mean, it's the Serb police, right?

16     It's only natural that they should come to establish some kind of order.

17        Q.   Well, let's --

18        A.   It doesn't mean what you said, that they took part in the

19     conflict.  I wasn't doing any counting and I didn't look at who was

20     participating.  I just know who made the decision.  I've already said

21     that and who did that.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Well, let's talk about who -- the type of order that

23     was established after, you say, the blockade was lifted.  Now, at

24     paragraph 28 of your statement you discuss that after the blockade was

25     lifted, the local authorities were established but that to your knowledge

Page 40328

 1     those authorities didn't have any power.  Now, I'd just like to clarify

 2     with you, you also say that after four days in the Crisis Staff you

 3     didn't join the government, but rather you went back to your work in the

 4     factory.  So you're not really in a position to speak to the power that

 5     the authorities had over the paramilitaries, are you?

 6        A.   No.  I mean, the way you put this is as if I did not want to take

 7     part in government.  I had major responsibility in the factory in that

 8     situation, I mean, for work to go on.  Practically I was there on the 6th

 9     I think, and I no longer showed up in these -- well, I mean the

10     Crisis Staff stopped operating and I had my duties at the factory.  And I

11     what happened, I mean, after that -- I mean, well, I cannot go into

12     detail since I'm not a member of government and since I wasn't anything

13     special out there, didn't take part --

14        Q.   But --

15        A.   -- as a member of the SDS.

16        Q.   But you do, however, in your statement talk about the fact that

17     the paramilitaries, and this is -- I'm referring to paragraph 30 in your

18     statement, the paramilitaries in effect seized power in the town and made

19     all the decisions on the basis of their strength and power and so this is

20     why the local authorities could not stand up to them.  And I'd just like

21     to explore with you the relationship between the local authorities and

22     the paramilitaries.  You mention a number of times in your statement the

23     Yellow Wasps and Zuco and Repic.  Now, the Trial Chamber has heard

24     evidence that the Yellow Wasps was the informal name of the Igor Markovic

25     unit.  Are you familiar with that?

Page 40329

 1        A.   I have no idea whatsoever.  I tried to stay away from these

 2     paramilitaries and Zuco.  I had personal experience with him in the

 3     factory and that is not -- that is not in this condensed version.  So he

 4     came to the factory and he wanted to make an armoured train out after an

 5     engine.  One was in working order and the other one was not.  And I said,

 6     "Okay, give him the one that didn't work," and I almost paid with my own

 7     life, and I stayed away from them.  I know because I talked to people who

 8     were in power that it was impossible, that you couldn't resolve anything

 9     with them.  And, I mean, the Serbs, the Serbs in Zvornik itself were in

10     jeopardy and the Muslims who had returned.  So practically one could not

11     go on living with them and we saw -- I don't know if I'm right.  It was

12     at the end of June I think, we thought that we were being saved by the

13     legal police, when they came from Pale, Mr. Karisik.  And in two or three

14     hours they arrested them in different buildings, they took them away,

15     they convicted them, and then we breathed a sigh of relief.  And now,

16     what the relations were among them, I mean, do you understand this?  The

17     authorities had to do what they had to do.  They couldn't get rid of them

18     in any other way but the way that I've just described to you now, as it

19     ultimately happened.

20        Q.   Well, let's look at some documents which illustrate the

21     relationship that the authorities had with the paramilitaries.

22             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see P2867.

23        Q.   Now, Mr. Zelenovic, this is Zvornik interim government decision

24     dated the 27th of April, 1992, and it's signed by Mr. Grujic as president

25     of the interim government.  And it states in Article 1 that:

Page 40330

 1             "Permission is hereby given to purchase material for the

 2     manufacturing of uniforms for the Igor Markovic special unit of the TO."

 3             Now, as I've told you, the Trial Chamber is aware that the Igor

 4     Markovic special unit is another name for the Yellow Wasps.  So this

 5     document shows Grujic providing the Yellow Wasps with logistical support.

 6     So it's not a case of the authorities not standing up to the

 7     Yellow Wasps; rather, it's a case of them actively assisting them, isn't

 8     it?

 9        A.   Well, Madam Prosecutor, it can also be put this way, that these

10     things, that is to say, knowing Grujic very well, and as far as I can

11     remember it's been a long time, he was even beaten up by these same

12     people.  So their hand was forced as far as the paramilitaries are

13     concerned, and I know that personally because we're friends, you know.  I

14     know his personal opinion about the paramilitaries, all these

15     paramilitary formations.  So this decision was forced.  It can be

16     interpreted in this way rather than what you had said.  That is my

17     opinion.

18        Q.   Mr. Zelenovic, there is an abundance of evidence on the record of

19     Mr. Grujic and the government providing logistical assistance, payment of

20     salaries to not just Arkan's unit, not just the Yellow Wasps, but the

21     White Eagles, the Aleksic's group, Niski's group and Pivarski's group who

22     were all on the payroll of the Zvornik TO.  Now, I'd just like to show

23     you P2913.  So it's your evidence that Mr. Grujic was forced into

24     providing this assistance to the paramilitaries?

25        A.   Well, all these documents -- I mean, well, he had to cover this

Page 40331

 1     in financial terms, but this is how it arrived.  I mean, on the basis of

 2     what I talked about then and when I asked them for help and -- what do I

 3     call them, these paramilitary -- these paramilitaries threatened the

 4     factory.  And he said nothing, you can do nothing, you can just be a

 5     victim, like me -- I mean, I'm talking on behalf of Grujic now.  And he

 6     had to cover himself in material terms.  That is how I see this, because

 7     I heard this from him with my very own ears.  That is the only way I see

 8     this.

 9        Q.   Well, let's look at a document that he wrote at the time which is

10     on the screen in front of you, which is a request dated the 6th of June,

11     1992, from the Zvornik interim government and it's signed by Mr. Grujic.

12     And it's stamped the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the same

13     date.  And he is informing the republican authorities that TO members

14     from the territory of the municipality received payments for April 1992

15     in a total amount of 32.100.000 dinars.  And he's asking to effect the

16     payment for the arming of the police members for the month of May.

17             Now, this is a document, Mr. Zelenovic, that specifically

18     discusses payments to the TO in April and May.  We've just discussed the

19     fact that the paramilitaries were paid as members of the TO during that

20     period, and yet in this document to the republican authorities there is

21     no mention of the fact that the payments were coerced in any way.  In

22     fact, Mr. Grujic just requests more funding.  So surely if Mr. Grujic was

23     being forced into paying the paramilitaries as part of the TO, he would

24     have mentioned this to the republican authorities in his letter on

25     exactly that topic?

Page 40332

 1        A.   Well, look, if you're done with your question, it was hard.

 2     These were very hard times, and to try to deal with these people, I mean

 3     directly and these clashes, you risked your head.  And to put anything on

 4     paper from that point of view, as you had put it, that would have been a

 5     stupid thing to do.  I tell you, I fled from the factory because they

 6     left and somebody said there, "Hey, he tricked you into taking an engine

 7     that wasn't working."  I wasn't even at the factory, I was in Serbia.

 8     You see, that's how I see it.  Who was not in that situation cannot -- I

 9     mean, well, you can put whatever, hundreds of these sort of, what,

10     evidence, things here.  But I've given you my opinion about this.  100

11     per cent, I stand behind this 100 per cent.

12             Grujic cannot say and write to I don't know who,

13     Radovan Karadzic, and say, "You know what?  I'm under threat by these and

14     those."  They were in all pores.  Quite simply, nothing could function.

15     Believe me.  After the 29th of June I think, I mean when they were

16     arrested, that is to say -- well, you could not even be in peace in your

17     own apartment, nowhere, so that was really a sigh of relief.  For us it

18     was as if it was an occupation force that was strangling us every day and

19     we were just waiting.  It was unbearable.  Their main task was to walk

20     around, to loot shops.  I don't know.  I mean, let me not qualify them.

21     It was impossible for the authorities to do anything.  They were

22     powerless.  They were a lot more powerful.  They were armed.  People with

23     troubled backgrounds.  So that was it.  The authorities had to behave the

24     way they did.

25        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Zelenovic.

Page 40333

 1             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honours, I note the time.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Does it mean you have more?

 3             MS. McKENNA:  I do have perhaps ten minutes more if that's --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's continue tomorrow then.

 5             Mr. Zelenovic, we'll adjourn for today and continue tomorrow.

 6     I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody else about your

 7     testimony while you are giving evidence.

 8             We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.  The hearing is

 9     adjourned.

10                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.

11                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 25th day of

12                           June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.