1 Friday, 5 July 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.11 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Andan. Please be seated and make
11 yourself comfortable.
12 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies. Good
14 morning to everybody.
15 WITNESS: DRAGOMIR ANDAN
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Andan.
19 A. Good morning, Mr. Karadzic. And good morning to everybody.
20 Q. I would like to ask you to speak slowly and I would like to also
21 ask you to make a break after my question for the benefit of the record.
22 We want the record to reflect your words accurately.
23 If you look at the transcript, you will also see the cursor.
24 When the cursor stops, that means that the interpretation of the previous
25 intervention is over.
1 Mr. Andan, did you testify before this court in the
2 Stanisic/Zupljanin case?
3 A. Yes, I did.
4 Q. During the proofing in -- for your evidence in this case, did you
5 have an occasion to listen to your testimony that you provided in the
6 Stanisic/Zupljanin case?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Are you satisfied with the way your words have been recorded and
9 do you still stand by the same positions, those that you offered when you
10 testified in that case?
11 A. Yes, I'm satisfied and I stand by every word that I said at that
13 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today, the
14 same ones that you were put by the Defence, the Trial Chamber, and the
15 Prosecution in that case, would your answers essentially be the same?
16 A. Yes, they would.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7370.
18 1D7370A is the confidential version of this document, whereas the former
19 version is the public version of the document.
20 I would like to tender the transcript into the evidence pursuant
21 to Rule 92 ter.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. In addition to
24 the transcripts, we have offered 40 associated exhibits and we would ask
25 that they be added to our Rule 65 ter list as we had not decided to use
1 his Stanisic/Zupljanin testimony at the time that list was filed.
2 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Are there any
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honour. No objections
5 whatsoever. I only wanted to mention that in relation to the associated
6 exhibits, I found that many of the exhibits were not only referred to on
7 the pages that are indicated in the 92 ter statement, but in addition
8 they were also used and discussed on many other pages in particular
9 during the cross-examination. Therefore, I have no objections against
10 admission of all these documents.
11 JUDGE KWON: Can we upload 1D7430 referred to transcript
12 pages 21662 and 21730. 1D7430. Do we not need an English translation --
13 oh, we have now English translation. Yes, when we checked there was
14 none. That's fine.
15 The Chamber has some concerns about the relevance of those -- the
16 documents of the following: 1D7416; 1D7428, which is related to poker
17 machine; and 1D7439. The Chamber finds those three documents not
18 relevant so we'll not admit them. Otherwise, all the other documents
19 will be admitted and will be given -- assigned an exhibit number by the
20 Registrar in due course.
21 Shall we assign the exhibit number for the two versions, both
22 versions of the 92 ter transcript.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 1D7370 will be Exhibit D3773,
24 under seal, and 1D7370A will be Exhibit D3774.
25 MR. ROBINSON: I think they might have reversed the public and
1 confidential versions. The public version is 1D7370, so the one that
2 should be under seal should be 1D7370A.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That's noted, Mr. Robinson. Thank you.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm now going to read a
7 short summary of Mr. Dragomir Andan's testimony. I'll do it in English.
8 And then I'll ask him to answer a few additional questions with regard to
9 some documents, mostly those he himself drafted and those are additional
10 exhibits that have not yet been included in his testimony.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. Am I supposed to have
12 a translation in Serbian or am I supposed to look at the document in
13 English? Because I see it in English.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. You should be on channel 6.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Andan, do you hear me in the language you
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
19 MR. ROBINSON: I think he's referring to the transcript that is
20 on his -- the LiveNote that is --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The transcript, yes, the
23 JUDGE KWON: Unfortunately, we have only English transcript.
24 THE WITNESS: Okay.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
2 THE ACCUSED: Dragomir Andan was born in Sarajevo on
3 12th of April, 1951. Serb by ethnicity, his step-father was Croat. He
4 spent the majority of his career in the police since joining in 1976. He
5 also used to be member of the communist party. He lived in an area of
6 Sarajevo that was under Muslim control until leaving Sarajevo in April or
7 May 1992.
8 Until April 1992, and before the division of the MUP,
9 Dragomir Andan held a position of a senior inspector first class at the
10 MUP in Sarajevo. He was against the division of the MUP. After the
11 multi-party elections in 1990, the situation became more complex as a --
12 personnel changes took place and those who had been in service for over
13 20 years have been replaced by people who in some cases were never in
14 service before, which gave impression that professionalism no longer
15 mattered. Personnel of MUP of each ethnicity had meetings of their own,
16 in their offices or nearby restaurants. Dragomir Andan was not
17 associated to any of these meetings.
18 Dragomir Andan saw paramilitary groups, namely H-O-S, HOS, for
19 the first time in September 1991 on his return from a task in Ljubuski.
20 He transferred to the MUP of the Republika Srpska in May 1992, where he
21 remained until August 1992 when he transferred to the military and began
22 work in intelligence.
23 Dragomir Andan was sent to Bijeljina and Brcko in May 1992 to
24 rebuild public security stations structures of command and to introduce
25 the working protocols. They acted -- a crew that was led by Mr. Andan
1 acted in a highly professional manner, regardless of if it was petty
2 theft or a grievous crime, such as murders, and also regardless of the
3 perpetrator's ethnicity. Due to his -- due to this, they had ongoing
4 struggles with local political structures as well as paramilitary groups,
5 and the latter were often there just to loot for personal profit.
6 Dragomir Andan addressed the highest authorities in the Republika Srpska
7 as well as local authorities in Bijeljina to make them aware of constant
8 struggle of Bijeljina SJB due to the paramilitary groups coming to the
9 area and trying to destabilise SJB and its work.
10 During Dragomir Andan's time in Bijeljina and Brcko, they took
11 head of fight to try and dissolve and eliminate operations of
12 paramilitary groups, namely Red Berets in Brcko, Mauzer's Panthers in
13 Bijeljina, and Zuco's Yellow Wasps in Zvornik. However, although they
14 managed to make many arrests of the paramilitary groups and their
15 commanders, they were outnumbered and often threatened and approached
16 with force for doing this.
17 A police station in Janja was established, a predominantly Muslim
18 village, where Muslims never left, in order to protect them from any
19 threats posed by paramilitary groups in the area. During
20 Dragomir Andan's period in Brcko, the SJB had no authority over the Luka
21 collection centre. He had no knowledge of any Croat or Muslim civilians
22 being detained at the premises of company called Laser, restaurant called
23 Vestfalija, primary school in Loncari, DTV Partizan or co-operative store
24 in Pelagicevo in Brcko. He became aware of Batkovic camp, in Bijeljina
25 municipality, while in Brcko after inquiring about his friend Avdo --
1 Anto Vidovic. Dragomir Andan managed to get Vidovic released and
2 employed in Brcko in police -- in Brcko police or military as a car
3 electrician. He was a Croat. There were no other camps during his time
4 in Bijeljina, although Batkovic was run by VRS, or rather,
5 Eastern Bosnian Corps. There were no detention centres or camps held by
6 MUP of the RS.
7 Many reports of the working of SJB were sent to MUP; however,
8 this was not always possible in a timely fashion due to the interruptions
9 of dispatch -- in dispatch communication or in the phone lines.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Andan, let me ask you with regard ...
12 [Defence counsel confer]
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. -- this. Can you tell us something about the crisis related to
15 the position of the Chief of Staff of the public security station at
16 Pale? You also testified about that in the Stanisic and Zupljanin case.
17 A. Yes, but if you will allow me, I believe that there has been a
18 mistake in the interpretation. Anto Vidovic is not Anto Vidovic but
19 Avdo Vidovic. He was at the Batkovic camp rather than in the Luka camp,
20 as has been interpreted to me. I used the clout that I had with the
21 commander of the East Bosnia Corps. I knew that Vidovic was there and I
22 set him free from the Batkovic camp, not from the Luka camp, as has been
23 interpreted to me.
24 Q. I did say "Batkovic," but there was a mistake obviously.
25 In the Stanisic evidence you spoke about the crisis related to
1 the position of the Chief of Staff -- of chief of the public security
2 station at Pale.
3 A. May I? I'll try and rely on my memory to say something about
4 that crisis which happened at Pale and involved the chief of the public
5 security station, Mr. Malko Koroman. The minister of the interior,
6 Mr. Mico Stanisic, was not happy with Mr. Malko Koroman's work, and I
7 suppose that it was decided at the collegium meeting to remove
8 Malko Koroman from that position and for him to be transferred somewhere
9 else or for another duty to be assigned to him. From the moment that I
10 learned about that - and I don't know how I learnt that - armed people
11 started gathering around the police station at Pale. Their intention was
12 not to allow the removal of Mr. Koroman and not to allow the inspectors
13 who had brought the decision to give it to Mr. Koroman about his removal,
14 not to hand it to him. As I stated before, about 3.000 people gathered
15 there. Maybe I exaggerated the number a little, but I'm sure there were
16 about 1.000 to 1500 armed people who were intent not to allow
17 Mr. Koroman's removal. And then Mr. Karadzic intervened, as I've already
19 What I learnt is this: Mr. Karadzic's security detail as the
20 president of the republic learned that armed persons had gathered around
21 the police station. On the other hand, the legal powers, the police of
22 Republika Srpska, were ready to disperse that crowd and to forcibly
23 remove the chief of the police station. If that had happened, I'm sure
24 that there would have been an armed conflict as a result of that. So the
25 operative security asked Mr. Karadzic to be removed from Pale and to be
1 transferred to a reserve position as we call it in our police jargon.
2 However, another solution was found and the solution was this: One of
3 the chiefs of security, I don't know which one, received instructions
4 from Mr. Karadzic to go to the police station to try and appease the
5 crowd and to see if they can be dispersed in a peaceful way so as to
6 avoid conflicts. In other words, that the problem be resolved in a
7 peaceful way. Luckily enough, the problem was resolved in that way.
8 Mr. Koroman was told that he would not be removed, that the crowd would
9 disperse, and the crowd did disperse. And shortly after that, I believe
10 after three weeks, Mr. Koroman was transferred to another position in
11 Bijeljina in a peaceful and legal way, and that's how the problem at Pale
12 was resolved.
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. At transcript page 8, line 23, "the
14 operative security asked Mr. Karadzic to be removed ..." I think that
15 "Mr. Karadzic" should read "Mr. Koroman."
16 THE ACCUSED: No, Excellency, Karadzic to be displaced to the
17 reserve post for the security reasons.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's continue.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can we go through this as briefly as possible. This sort of
23 removal from position, was it normally within the purview of the relevant
24 minister, to be able to change the personnel as he saw fit?
25 A. Well, that's solely the power of the minister.
1 Q. We can see that Koroman ultimately did remain on the police
2 force. Now, did all this come about because of a criminal offence on his
3 part or because the minister was unhappy with him?
4 A. Well, there was no criminal offence involved. Simply put, the
5 minister wasn't happy with his work and dedication. He wanted to improve
6 the performance of the service by bringing in someone who would be better
7 at this job and who would improve the workings of the service. In that
8 way, the service would simply take a new course.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us if you were a member of the SDS and
10 if you had been asked to join the party in order that you may remain in
11 your position or be promoted?
12 A. I had never been a member of any party ever since my departure
13 from the League of Communists, and I am not a member of any party today.
14 I was never asked to join the SDS in order that I may retain any office
15 that I held or may be assigned to any new office.
16 Q. Thank you. You've extensively talked about your mission in
17 Brcko. I would like to show you a document of yours so that you can
18 comment on it.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up 1D0937. It is the
20 only document that hasn't been translated and that we will use, but it is
21 not a lengthy document. I'll ask Mr. Andan to tell us what this is
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you recall this? It's the 23rd of January, especially the
25 second paragraph, if you could read it out aloud, please.
1 A. "The situation relating to the paramilitary forces in Zvornik has
2 not been resolved. For this reason," there's a smudge there, "our forces
3 have been engaged on this to a large extent" -- oh, now I understand. So
4 I'll resume.
5 "The situation relating to the paramilitary forces in Brcko and
6 Zvornik has not been resolved, and for that reason our forces are to a
7 large extent engaged on this issue rather than in combat."
8 Q. What does the heading say? We see that it says "Security
9 Services Centre Bijeljina." Can we see the signature block?
10 A. Can it be scrolled down, please.
11 Yes, this is my document. It's a dispatch or a telegram. So it
12 was sent out encoded. This is one of the daily or weekly situation
14 Q. Thank you. I think that the interpretation was the other way
15 around in transcript, that -- it seems to say -- oh, it's because "the
16 situation relating to the paramilitary forces has not been resolved
17 because our forces are to a large extent engaged in combat rather than on
18 pursuing these paramilitaries." Is that right?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Do you recall that?
21 A. Yes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3810, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness another
1 document, it's 1D09138 and it's dated the following day.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Have a look at the document and can you tell us if you remember
4 what this is about? Paragraph 3, you report that the special unit
5 arrived in Brcko; right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And then you briefed the political structures on what needed to
8 be done and agreed on what would be done. Can you tell us at this point
9 in time, on the 24th of July, who was the authority in Brcko for all
10 intents and purposes? I don't mean de jure, I mean de facto. Could the
11 local authorities be in charge of what was going on?
12 A. If you'll allow me a short introduction, let me say, first of
13 all, that this is a daily report that we sent to the Ministry of the
14 Interior. As for the second paragraph, the Ministry of the Interior is
15 being informed about the fact that that very morning, at around 4.00 or
16 5.00, we arrived in Brcko with the special unit in order to try and
17 eliminate - I don't mean physically - but remove the paramilitary forces
18 that were rampant in Brcko at the time.
19 Now, what you asked me a moment ago, let me say that the
20 authorities were not able to be in control of all the levers of power, as
21 it were, because these paramilitary forces were a constant threat to
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in
24 English, please.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. The next paragraph about intelligence work, what sort of
2 intelligence work was this? You came to know that they had not yet been
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Can Mr. Karadzic repeat
5 his question and the witness his answer. It is going too fast and they
6 are overlapping.
7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
8 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, and before Mr. Karadzic repeats
10 his question, it was very leading so he should actually also change what
11 he asks.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Probably you have noted the interpreter's
13 request not to overlap each other.
14 If you could repeat your question and not in a leading way.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Can you tell us, what does this document report about and what
18 does the last sentence mean?
19 A. As I've already said, we arrived in the municipality of Brcko in
20 order to eliminate - and I said not in the physical sense - the
21 paramilitary group of the Red Berets who were rampant in the town,
22 looting, spreading unrest and turmoil in every respect. As we arrived in
23 Brcko, we had several meetings with representatives of the authorities
24 and the army. What followed next was that we gave an indirect ultimatum
25 to the members of the Red Berets that, by 1800 hours of that day, they
1 should be resubordinated to the army and that they should receive all
2 their further orders from the army and be part and parcel of that body.
3 We also said that they should not operate independently. On that and the
4 following day, we engaged -- well, it was also previously that we engaged
5 in intelligence work in order to gain as much information about them as
6 possible. And we continued that sort of intelligence work as we arrived
7 there in order to supplement the information we already had.
8 Q. Thank you. The English interpretation is finished.
9 Please explain to us, does resubordination to the army exonerate
10 those among their members who committed criminal offences and what does
11 this last sentence in the document mean, that work should continue on the
12 collection of documents and investigation?
13 A. We first gathered them at the barracks so that they may formally
14 be resubordinated to the army. We next resumed our intelligence work to
15 find out what sort of criminal offences they had committed in the
16 previous period so that they may be prosecuted. Our part of the job was
17 to collect information and put together a criminal report that we would
18 file with the competent prosecution.
19 Q. Page 13, line 17, when you listed the misdeeds that they did,
20 among other things you said lack of respect for human rights, and this
21 did not find its way into the transcript. Did you list among their sins
22 also the lack of respect for human rights?
23 A. Yes, I did mention that.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3811, Your Honours.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Can you tell us if there were cases of murder where perpetrators
6 were known and what was the position that your service took in that
7 respect in Bijeljina and Brcko? Can you recall a case or, let's say, the
8 case of one Kukic who was murdered.
9 A. As for Brcko, I don't remember. As far as Bijeljina is
10 concerned, I do remember that four members who were of Serb ethnicity
11 perpetrated the murder of Salko Kukic. It was murder for personal gain.
12 They killed him and stole around 120.000 German marks off him. As soon
13 as we learned of this crime, we arrested these individuals. As an aside,
14 let me say that we carried out all the necessary police work, we secured
15 the scene of crime, examined it. And then, as a result of our
16 investigatory work, we identified the perpetrators, located them soon
17 thereafter, brought them in to the police station in Bijeljina, obtained
18 custody for them, took written statements from them, and handed these
19 statements over to the prosecution.
20 Let me tell you that trial did not ensue directly after these
21 events, nor did -- nor were these individuals remanded into custody.
22 However, the documentation that we gathered in 1992 was re-activated in
23 2006 or 2007, and these individuals are currently serving their sentences
24 for that particular case.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up 1D09134.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Can you tell us, is this the criminal report that you submitted?
3 Do you recall the first page? Four perpetrators are listed on page 1; is
4 that right?
5 A. Yes. Yes. I remember the family name by Pojatar, because it's
6 very peculiar, Istok Pojatar and that is the criminal report in question.
7 Q. The victim, Kukic, what is his ethnicity?
8 A. Muslim or, as they say, Bosniak.
9 Q. Thank you. Beneath the accused it is stated that they are
10 reported here because they killed Salko Kukic at about 2230 hours on the
11 2nd of June, 1992. Is that the criminal offence that we discussed? And
12 that it was committed for personal gain.
13 A. Yes, I did say so a moment ago. Based on what we came to learn
14 subsequently, Salko came from a wealthy family. They probably learned of
15 a sizeable amount of jewellery and money that he had on him and decided
16 to commit this criminal offence.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the last page in
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Were you chief of the public security station in Bijeljina at the
23 A. I arrived in Bijeljina after I had completed my mission in Brcko.
24 I was police inspector at the time. Seeing that there was not enough
25 personnel in Bijeljina to fill the vacant posts, under-secretary
1 Cedo Kljajic, who was in Bijeljina at the time, asked me that I should --
2 aside from being inspector, and that was the training that I had at the
3 time, that I should also be chief of the public security station.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3812, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D09136.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
10 Q. Did you put them into custody and who had the authority of
11 remanding them in detention three days later?
12 A. Yes, the document shows that police custody was extended of --
13 the police custody of 72 hours which was provided under Law on Criminal
14 Procedure. Now, upon the expiry of the police custody, it is the
15 prosecutor who can either extend the term of detention or have the
16 individual released. As you were able to see in this line of documents,
17 we carried out the investigation activities. We took them into custody,
18 and for the remainder of the procedure, the individual was in the hands
19 of the prosecutor's office.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted,
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3813, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 Can we now have 1D09135.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. We have seen what the reason was and that it was done pursuant to
4 Article 6, which is murder, in the case of Rodic. Can you tell us now
5 what was the reason for detaining this individual pursuant to Article
6 165, and towards the bottom it says that there were grounds for suspicion
7 that this was done, but that he didn't report it. Was it his duty to
8 report that?
9 A. Yes, he was obliged to file a report, and he failed to do that
10 this is considered complicity to the commission of crime.
11 Q. And he was prosecuted for harbouring and concealing the facts?
12 A. Yes, he was put in detention as well and his case file was
13 prepared and forwarded to the prosecutor for further action.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3814, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Can you please now explain in more detail what was the role of
21 police and your personal role after the arrest of the Wasps and at which
22 point your responsibility ended?
23 A. After having collected all the intelligence relating to the
24 activities of the paramilitary formation called the Yellow Wasps, the
25 State Security Service and a few members of the public security service,
1 led by me at the time, were carrying out surveillance of all the
2 facilities where members of the Yellow Wasps were staying. We collected
3 intelligence about their activities in which they were involved in the
4 area of Zvornik municipality. We compiled and drew up an operational
5 plan and carried out the arrest of the Yellow Wasps by bringing them into
6 the responsible centre, and I think that it already existed, that was the
7 centre in Bijeljina, where they were processed, which means that they
8 were put in detention for 72 hours, written statements were taken from
9 them, case files were completed, a criminal file was -- a criminal report
10 was filed with the prosecutor's office. And the prosecutor's office in
11 Bijeljina took over the case.
12 Q. Thank you. And what happened with the items that they had looted
13 which you confiscated?
14 A. All the items that we found inside the facilities as well as the
15 motor vehicles that they had plundered, we confiscated them against
16 receipt on temporary confiscation. We used the gym to store smaller
17 items at the CSB Bijeljina, and as for the vehicles, we also stored them
18 in a depot that was secured by the police because inside this compound
19 were not only the vehicles that we confiscated during the mopping-up
20 operation of Yellow Wasps and there were other vehicles there as well,
21 and smaller items, as I said, were stored in the Bijeljina CSB.
22 Q. Thank you. And what was the further procedure regarding the
23 items whose owners were identified?
24 A. We had a case of a certain Simic, a jeweller from Zvornik. He
25 was also a member of the Yellow Wasps. During the search of his premises
1 and his residence, we found a large quantity of gold which we catalogued
2 and we gave his wife a receipt confirming that we had confiscated the
3 said items. On that occasion we also confiscated a BMW car from
4 Mr. Simic in order to make some check because we thought that that was
5 also the subject of a crime. Later on, through the processing procedure
6 and after Mr. Simic was released from detention, he provided documents
7 about the origin of the gold, stating that it was taken from his
8 jeweller's store and that the BMW had been purchased before the war on
9 which he had proper papers. We returned all these items, the gold and
10 the vehicle, and issued a proper certificate on that.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now take a look at 1D092 --
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. What happened with the items that were really looted and found in
15 the possession of members of the Yellow Wasps?
16 Are you familiar with this document?
17 A. Yes, I am familiar with this document. Through intelligence work
18 we obtained partial information as to which houses were robbed by members
19 of the Yellow Wasps, and this is a document that was sent to the public
20 security station in Zvornik and these items were handed over to them in
21 order for them to be returned to their original owners. Now it is stated
22 here that everything that has been stolen from known premises and houses
23 should be returned.
24 Q. The people who were robbed, what was their ethnicity, the
25 majority of them, the people robbed by the Yellow Wasps?
1 A. Most of them were Muslims. But in the course of this bestial
2 conduct, once they ran out of Muslim houses they switched to robbing Serb
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3815, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can we now have
10 1D09133. It's 1D09133.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Do you recall this document and can you tell us what is the
13 ethnicity of the person under number 1 in paragraph 3. Her name is
14 Hasnija. Let me just remind you that this is the same date as the
15 previous document, which is the 13th of August.
16 A. Yes, this is my document. Hasnija was a Muslim or a Bosniak.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?
19 JUDGE KWON: So all the questions you asked is whether Ms. Coric
20 is a Bosniak?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked him whether he remembered
22 this document as being the one produced by him and what it pertains to,
23 but it is a follow-up of the previous document which was a
24 self-explanatory one.
25 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Andan?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I can confirm that. As
2 Mr. Karadzic said, this is a follow-up document and it pertains to the
3 return of items to the owners from whom members of the Yellow Wasps
4 confiscated or robbed them of - I don't know how to qualify it - and it
5 contains instructions that I provided as the chief to the effect that
6 these items should be returned to the persons named in the document.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
8 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3816, Your Honours.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Did you know and did you provide occasional reports to the
11 Presidency and did you know what was my opinion with regard to your
12 action and to the existence of paramilitary in general?
13 A. I spent seven or eight years in the State Security Service or the
14 so-called secret police of the former Yugoslavia, or rather, of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The way we were trained was that once we face
16 complex problems we should provide reports to the top echelons of the
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership. At the time these kind of reports were
18 written and addressed to the central committee, to the Presidency, and to
19 the prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Having been
20 trained to pursue this practice, when I came to Semberija and Majevica
21 and after we had evaluated the total political situation, on two
22 occasions I sent reports to the leadership of Republika Srpska about the
23 huge amount of problems and the security and political situation
24 prevailing in the area of Republika Srpska, specifically Majevica and
25 Semberija. In that context, two letters were sent to Mr. President,
1 Mr. Karadzic. My wish and intention was to draw the attention of the
2 leadership to the situation that prevailed in Semberija and Majevica at
3 the time. Our objective was to inform the political leadership of
4 Republika Srpska and provide documents to that effect so that they can
5 have an insight into the situation in Semberija and Majevica.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have P29002
8 [as interpreted].
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Did you receive any feedback information as to enjoying support
11 for the actions that you were taking?
12 JUDGE KWON: Could you check the number again.
13 THE ACCUSED: P2900.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did receive feedback
15 information, notably from Prime Minister Stanisic, to the effect that you
16 were supportive of all the actions that we were taking in Semberija and
17 Majevica. However, I'm not sure whether you put your own comment on one
18 report and I think I saw it after the war anyway. Mr. Stanisic told me
19 that we enjoyed full support of the leadership of Republika Srpska and
20 that they expected us to continue with our activities.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you. Is that one of the two reports that you sent me on or
23 around the date of the arrest?
24 A. Yes, this is a cover letter that was attached to the report.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now take a look at the last
2 page. It is already in evidence but I need the last page.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Can you read the portion that is handwritten.
5 A. "Continue with restoring law and order and" -- I'm sorry, I can't
6 read this word.
7 "Continue with restoring law and order."
8 Q. Law and order?
9 A. Yes, and there's your signature underneath.
10 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, did you respond in a certain way to
11 the request by the president of Republika Srpska relating to the
12 existence of a camp for captured and imprisoned persons and the treatment
13 of these individuals? Do you remember receiving anything about that
14 and --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the last part
16 of the last sentence.
17 JUDGE KWON: Interpreters couldn't catch the last part of your
18 question, Mr. Karadzic. Could you repeat it?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. So did you receive any inquiries from the ministry and did you
22 act accordingly with regard to the East Bosnia Corps? Did you send a
23 request to receive a report about the situation in order to enable you to
24 provide a response?
25 A. As far as I can remember, a dispatch came from the Ministry of
1 the Interior. In that dispatch, they wanted answers about collection
2 centres possibly kept by the police. All the information about such
3 facilities had to be conveyed to the Ministry of the Interior. If my
4 memory serves me well, that was the issue. We answered that in the
5 territory of the Bijeljina CSB there were no such collection centres or
6 camps. As far as I can remember, we told them that there was the
7 Batkovic camp and that that camp was under the authority of the military
8 and that they should seek information from the military. Within that
9 context, a dispatch arrived and we responded to that dispatch in that
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D09141 is the document I would
12 like to call.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Is this how you learnt about Batkovic? Is that how you managed
15 to set that Croat, Vidovic, free?
16 We have the document. Please look at it. Is this a document
17 that somebody signed on your behalf?
18 A. Well, it is only logical when the number one person is absent a
19 document is signed by his deputy. I don't know who signed it, but I
20 stand by the document. Obviously we sent this document to the
21 East Bosnia Corps, asking them to respond to the dispatch that had been
22 sent to us by the ministry. When the dispatch arrived, since I do not
23 hail from Bijeljina, I asked my colleagues to gather intelligence to see
24 whether there was a collection centre or a camp in the territory of
25 Bijeljina. I was told that there was Batkovic; however, the military was
1 in charge, the military of Republika Srpska. And then the dispatch that
2 we received from the Ministry of the Interior was forwarded to the
3 East Bosnia Corps. We asked them to provide certain explanations or
4 provide details about the camp.
5 Q. On the 11th of August, 1992, was that camp made accessible? Did
6 the leadership learn about that camp as far as you know?
7 A. I don't know what leadership you had in mind; however, if you had
8 in mind the leadership of the police station, I would like to say that we
9 did not get involved in that. If you meant the leadership of the
10 republic itself, I'm sure that you were provided with adequate
11 explanation with regard to the dispatch.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3817, Your Honours.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. And now in very general terms, can you tell us something about
19 the period with regard to law and order and the abilities of the
20 authorities to manage the processes until the end of August. Tell us
21 from your perspective, from as much as you could glean into the
22 authorities of the civilian segment of the power.
23 A. It all depended on the organisation of municipalities and police
24 stations that existed there. When Muslims prevailed in a police station,
25 when they retired, they left a big void in the police stations. And that
1 was largely used by the paramilitaries that were headed by known
2 criminals. At that moment, they sensed there was an opportunity to amass
3 large wealth by looting and robbing.
4 In certain municipalities, during the first stage of the war
5 there was a state of lawlessness. Despite the legally elected powers,
6 they did not have the real leverage to oppose such paramilitary
7 formations. That was particularly true of Brcko, and I believe you will
8 find it in my testimony in Stanisic. I sent a dispatch on behalf, or
9 rather, the Ministry of the Interior sent a dispatch to send me to Brcko
10 in order to consolidate the situation there and to consolidate the ranks
11 in the Brcko police station. It was impossible for the legally elected
12 authorities to exert authority since they didn't have real leverage. The
13 situation was somewhat better in Bijeljina, but the situation was
14 somewhat similar in the territory of the Zvornik municipality.
15 Therefore, it was very difficult for all those who were members
16 of the executive powers to actually exercise their duties because the
17 police did not function as well as they should have.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 In the transcript there is a reference to a situation when
20 Muslims came to you to complain about the activities of groups and
21 individuals. Can you tell us, who did Muslims fear? Could they find
22 assistance and could they find refuge in the police stations?
23 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said "civilians of Muslim
25 ethnicity," but very well --
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I'm just wondering, again we have a
3 transcript reference because you didn't provide us with the reference of
4 the page.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I will find that.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. But I would firstly ask Mr. Andan to answer while I'm looking for
8 this reference.
9 JUDGE KWON: Can you answer the question, Mr. Andan?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, yes, I can. There
11 were several such examples, but I remember a very striking one. In
12 Bijeljina, a person came to the police station, a Muslim or a Bosniak. I
13 know that he was a veterinarian. He complained about being been stopped
14 by paramilitaries who stole his private car, a Golf. We filed his
15 complaint. Police officers from Bijeljina went there and we quickly
16 found those persons who stole the car. We invited the gentleman in
17 question, we returned the car to him, and a report was sent to the
18 prosecutor's office about those persons.
19 There were many such examples. I happened to reside in Bijeljina
20 at the time. One night, my neighbour, Amir Fidahic was attacked. I
21 personally intervened at that moment. Again there were members of
22 paramilitaries who wanted to enter Mr. Fidahic's house. I suppose they
23 wanted to rob him or do something else to him, perhaps even murder him,
24 God forbid. And I came out of the house where I lived. During that time
25 my wife called the police. We disarmed four or five persons, members of
1 that paramilitary group. We took them to the police station and that's
2 how the situation ended. There were several such examples, but these are
3 the two that I remember as very striking examples of the situation as it
4 was at the time.
5 Q. Thank you for your information. The first example can be found
6 on page 21453.
7 Mr. Andan, on page 21441, you mention that Brcko was an affluent
8 town and you say the same about Bijeljina and Zvornik. Can you tell us,
9 did you establish a correlation between the wealth of a municipality and
10 the presence of paramilitary formations? In other words, were there any
11 paramilitaries in Lopare and other poor municipalities, as it were?
12 A. As far as I can remember, Brcko municipality was the second- or
13 the third-most developed municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There
14 were a lot of economic activities going on in Brcko. There was the food
15 industry and other industries. Bijeljina was also rich due to its
16 agricultural resources. And as for Zvornik, it had several factories
17 which were of strategic importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina at the
18 time. Through our intelligence analysis, we learned that all those
19 paramilitary formations that arrived in the territory of Republika Srpska
20 arrived precisely in those developed municipalities because they could
21 loot there, they could obtain property, and they could amass wealth in a
22 very quick way. Nobody wanted to go to Cajnice, Kalinovik, Nevesinje,
23 and some other underdeveloped municipalities. They chose their targets
24 well. They chose wealthy municipalities because their main objective was
25 not warfare and helping Serbian fighters who were fighting for
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their main goal was to loot.
2 Q. And finally, my last question, Mr. Andan, before the break. Can
3 you please tell us, as a professional did you do things that you
4 personally didn't like? However, did you act as a professional in every
5 situation? You can just say yes or no, and then I'm going to show you a
7 A. Mr. Karadzic, that's how I was trained, that's how I was brought
8 up. Whatever I do, I have to do it professionally. In every situation,
9 even in the gravest war-time situation, I acted as a professional.
10 Q. Thank you. Can you remember when the Law on Co-operation with
11 The Hague Tribunal was adopted? As the chief of the CSB Eastern
12 Sarajevo, did you act in accordance with that law?
13 A. I can't remember exactly when the Law on The Hague Tribunal was
14 adopted. But I know that as the chief of centre and as the director of
15 the police of the MUP of Republika Srpska, I implemented that law in
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D09139.
19 There's no translation.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. This is your document. Could you please present the document to
22 us in the light of the previous question that you've just answered.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we first see the heading, the
24 top of the page, where you can see that the date is the 29 of October,
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Were you the chief of the public security centre in Serbian
3 Sarajevo at the time?
4 A. Yes, at that time I was the chief of the CSB in Sarajevo.
5 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Trial Chamber and the other
6 participants what is the nature of this document in the light of the
7 previous question about the implementation of the Law on Co-operation
8 with The Hague Tribunal? Since there is no translation, could you either
9 read the document or could you give us a summary of the document?
10 A. I can give you a summary or I can read it. I don't know what is
11 easier for you and for the Trial Chamber.
12 Q. Give us a summary because a translation will follow. Just tell
13 us about the contents of this document.
14 A. This document was sent to the investigators of The Hague
15 Tribunal. It represents and it sends them things that we found at
16 Famos-Koran where your office was for a certain while. We found some
17 disks and the film "Sarajevo: The beginning and the end." We found six
18 items at the Famos premises and we handed them over to the investigators
19 of The Hague Tribunal.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be marked for
22 identification? This brings my examination-in-chief to an end.
23 JUDGE KWON: If you could help the Chamber in terms of relevance,
24 Mr. Robinson.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Perhaps Dr. Karadzic could address this, but it
1 seems like it goes to the credibility of the witness.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, Mr. Robinson is
3 right. Before us we have a professional who acts professionally in every
4 situation, regardless of the recipient of his information.
5 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll -- yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I agree, it -- when you read
7 the transcript of his testimony, a lot of portions dealing with conduct
8 of Mr. Andan in the later years, and therefore I think it has some
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification pending
11 English translation.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3818, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break and after which we will hear
14 the cross-examination. But before we break, the Chamber will turn to the
15 accused's motion -- motions to subpoena Ratko Mladic and Mico Stanisic
16 filed respectively on the 18th of April, 2013, and the 24th of June,
17 2013. The Chamber recalls that on the 4th of June, 2013, it granted, by
18 majority, Zdravko Tolimir's application to appeal the Chamber's decision
19 issuing a subpoena compelling him to testimony, and stayed the execution
20 of the said subpoena pending resolution of the issue by the Appeals
22 The Chamber further recalls that on the 2nd of July, 2013, it
23 decided to postpone the testimony of two subpoenaed witnesses currently
24 involved in appeal proceedings at the Tribunal, i.e., Ljubisa Beara and
25 Radivoje Miletic, pending resolution of this issue by the Appeals
1 Chamber. Accordingly, the Chamber has decided to stay its determination
2 on the Mladic and the Mico Stanisic subpoena motions pending resolution
3 of the Tolimir's appeal by the Appeals Chamber.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. If I could just raise
5 one other brief matter which involves a response we received on Wednesday
6 from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the availability
7 of two witnesses for whom we have requested transfer to The Hague for
8 testimony as Defence witnesses, Franc Kos and Mendeljejev Djuric. Given
9 the response of the government, we would ask the Trial Chamber take steps
10 to bring both of these witnesses so that they can arrive by the
11 25th of July and can give testimony in this case on the 29th of July.
12 Those dates vary from those that we had previously submitted in our
13 written motion, and given the circumstances, we think it's better that we
14 have that testimony on those dates. Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 We'll resume at 11.06.
17 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I had one scheduling
21 matter I wanted to raise. I didn't think it was necessary, nor did
22 Mr. Robinson, to leave the witness in the witness room for that purpose.
23 The quick backdrop to this is simply my earlier indications
24 concerning the testimony of the expert witness Mr. Keserovic. The other
25 day I recited the circumstances surrounding the acceleration of his
1 testimony first from September and then to an even earlier date that left
2 us essentially about a week to deal with his testimony.
3 The Court kindly indicated that it was inclined to grant that
4 request but wanted to see how it evolved and whether it would be possible
5 to go directly to cross. I considered that that basically implicated two
6 possibilities: One, the nature of the direct; and two, the impact of the
7 preparations that took place in the meantime. With respect to the direct
8 examination, that really didn't feature in our assessment of the
9 impossibility of proceeding and I think was not -- we didn't consider
10 that the nature of the direct was part of that request.
11 So I wanted to let the Court know that with respect to the
12 efforts thus far, we did engage in the most intensive possible
13 preparation since we learned of the accelerated testimony, and I thought
14 it was important then to advise the Court that it has now become clear
15 that notwithstanding those accelerated and intensive efforts, that it
16 would not be possible to proceed with cross-examination on Tuesday
17 without really unfairly impacting the Prosecution's examination and the
18 quality and extent of the information the Court would -- is entitled to
19 receive and expects to receive.
20 I spoke to Mr. Robinson about this. Our proposal is that we
21 defer the cross-examination to the very beginning of the next week. I
22 think he considers this, under the circumstances, to be a fair request
23 and -- but would, of course, leave it to the Trial Chamber to determine
24 the schedule.
25 I raise this for a couple of reasons, not the least of which is
1 some measure of certainty as we undertake the remaining portions of the
2 examination -- of the preparation in hope -- hopefully in an organised
3 and rational fashion and one that doesn't have the -- those preparing the
4 cross-examination here engaged in sleepless nights from now until
5 Tuesday, rather than trying to engage in a more methodical and rational
6 preparation of the cross. So I would ask that the Court make that
7 decision and indicate that the cross-examination can be postponed until
8 the beginning of the following week. Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. The Chamber finds that it is
10 fair enough.
11 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, please proceed.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Andan.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. Mr. Andan, the testimony in the Stanisic and Zupljanin trial that
17 was accepted by the Trial Chamber this morning is very detailed and there
18 is no need to repeat the evidence you provided in that trial. I only
19 want to address some aspects of your previous testimony. And as the time
20 that we have for the cross-examination is limited, I would kindly ask you
21 to give short answers and focusing on the question that I ask. And if I
22 need more details, then I will ask you additional questions on that
23 particular topic.
24 Mr. Andan, in -- during the testimony in the other case - and I
25 refer here to page 21368 - and also this morning, you described that
1 after the multi-party election and the subsequent changes in the
2 political structure, professionalism in the police did not count any
3 longer when a new post or a post was to be changed; it was rather a
4 matter of party affiliation that was the most important factor. That
5 applied to all three sides, correct? It was the same for the Muslims,
6 for the Croats, and for the Serbs; right?
7 A. I think that you are partly right. I will try to explain this
8 and I will try to be as short as you asked me to be. Let me tell you
9 that at the lower levels of authorities - I mean municipalities - you are
10 practically right. As for the Serb personnel, at the top of the pyramid,
11 let's say the Ministry of the Interior, professionalism was honoured, if
12 I can put it that way. All the personnel who were appointed to senior
13 positions and who were of Serb ethnicity were individuals who had been
14 working in the Ministry of the Interior before. This, however, was not
15 the case where individuals of Bosniak ethnicity were involved as well as
16 Croat. So I'm -- I was talking about the top of the pyramid.
17 Now, if we talk about the lower level, that's where you're right.
18 Q. But these positions that were changed and filled with other
19 people, on the higher level that was agreed beforehand between the
20 political parties; correct?
21 A. I am not in a position to say that this was the case or that it
22 was not the case. If we take the position of the head of personnel of
23 the MUP and if that position is taken by a person who was director or
24 manager of a brewery, then, as a result, you may infer that it must have
25 been a political arrangement.
1 Q. I was asking this, actually, because you said exactly that, that
2 positions -- appointments were, in fact, agreed upon beforehand by
3 political parties. You said that in your testimony in the Stanisic and
4 Zupljanin case, and that is at page 21378. So I took it that at that
5 time when you gave this testimony you told the truth and that is what you
6 remembered; correct?
7 A. You are right. I did say that earlier on. Of course, the
8 command structure, as it were, was changed in the Ministry of the
9 Interior and of course the Serb, Muslim, and Croat individuals who took
10 up these positions did so with the previous approval of political
11 parties. And the positions were filled depending on the agreement
12 between the political parties, and of course again it depended on whether
13 this should be the Croat, Serb, or Muslim. If me as a Serb were to take
14 up the position of the head of administration, which according to the
15 power-sharing agreement fell to Serbs, then of course I would take that
16 position and it was the result of the agreement of the political
17 authorities. This, however, did not mean that I had to be a member of
18 that party as well.
19 Q. Yes. I just want to remind you, be very brief because these
20 details you have already given in your testimony.
21 In the beginning of the war, even persons with criminal records
22 were recruited into the Serb police force, such as in the Serb police in
23 Bijeljina and even more so in Sarajevo; correct?
24 A. I don't recall stating that the police forces in Sarajevo
25 recruited individuals with a criminal record. However, we did have
1 persons who were recruited into the police forces in Brcko and Bijeljina,
2 even in Zvornik, and that much is true; however, for Sarajevo, I don't
3 recall that any of the posts in my republican MUP were taken by -- well,
4 I know that they -- some of them were taken by Muslims with a criminal
5 record. So I can vouch for that. I know that they were, indeed, taken
6 on. I know their names as well.
7 Q. I don't think we need to go into these details. I just was
8 remembering that you said that -- not in your testimony, that's right,
9 but you gave two interviews to the Office of the Prosecutor, one in Brcko
10 and one in Banja Luka. And we will come to some of the things that you
11 said in these statements today.
12 Mr. Andan, in your testimony you refer to the mistrust in the
13 police along ethnic lines and you gave a lot of details and we don't need
14 to repeat that. For the participants here it's on page 21377.
15 This mistrust and antagonism was not only among the police, but
16 in fact developed in the entire populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?
17 A. Can you be a bit more specific, if possible?
18 Q. The nationalist parties and their leaders created an atmosphere
19 of mistrust and fear of the other ethnic groups in their speeches;
21 A. I would not phrase it that way. This is my answer. Naturally
22 from a system which propagated brotherhood and unity, we ended up with a
23 multi-party system which divided the ethnicities, I mean the Serbs,
24 Croats, and Muslims. As for my service, of course, with the arrival of
25 some new individuals who were suspect of certain reports coming from the
1 ground because they came from the Serbs, this created a degree of
2 mistrust because these reports were judged by whether or who they were
3 sent by. At the level of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, these were
4 political issues, and as a policeman I don't want to discuss that.
5 So I can state for a fact that as for the service, yes, this was
6 the case. There was a certain degree of mistrust among the individuals
7 working there with the introduction of a multi-party system in
9 Q. And you got information that with the help of the nationalist
10 parties - and I'm referring here to the SDS, the HDZ, and the
11 SDA - people were arming themselves; right? You got that information?
12 A. Unfortunately, that was the case. We received reports, though
13 these were mostly off-the-record reports, unofficially, that I was
14 informed that members of the three ethnicities were being armed and that
15 weapons were being distributed to them.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25237 on the
18 Q. And that, Mr. Andan, is a report of the interview you had with
19 the investigators in Brcko, the ICTY investigators in Brcko.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And unfortunately, we have it only in
21 English because it was not translated. Can we please have page 3 and we
22 look first at the second paragraph.
23 Q. And in that second paragraph you say -- you speak about the Serbs
24 having strong ties with the TO and the JNA and even sold weapons to the
25 Croats and the Muslims, and that the national parties were involved in
1 the arming of the public. That was recorded by the investigators that
2 interviewed you. That is how you described it in 2005; correct?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask one thing? Since this is
4 an English text, shouldn't the witness be told that these are not his
5 words but an interpretation of his words, "Andan stated," et cetera. So
6 these are not --
7 JUDGE KWON: It will be read out, and if he finds some question
8 he can clarify with the Prosecution. And you can -- but he understands
9 what this is -- this is a statement he gave and written in English.
10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I actually told Mr. Andan that it was
11 recorded in this way by the investigators, a report -- they made a report
12 out of this.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, shall we proceed.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
15 Q. Yes, so can you answer the question, please? Is that what you
16 had experienced and gotten the information about, Serbs having strong
17 ties to the TO and JNA, even selling weapons to the other sides, and the
18 national parties were involved in the arming of the public?
19 A. I would like to clarify one thing about this document. I think
20 it would have been logical for me to have written this document and
21 signed it, rather than making an interpretation of it or, as we called
22 it, to make an official note of it. That would have been the right way
23 to have taken my statement, written it down, and for me to have signed
25 However, let me give you my comment on this. It is correct that
1 I had an interview in Brcko with The Hague Tribunal investigators. I'm
2 not denying that. I'm afraid that my interpretation was not faithfully
3 reflected. Perhaps something was taken out of context.
4 Now, specifically the question that you were discussing, is it
5 correct that the Serbs had strong or stronger ties with the JNA and the
6 Territorial Defence? Well, it all depended on the territory where the TO
7 storage facilities were. Quite a few of these storage facilities with
8 weapons and ammunition were located in the territory of the Croatian and
9 Bosniak entity. For instance, there was one in Busovaca, and
10 they - that's to say, Muslims and Croats - were able to get armed easily
11 from there. Now, the storage facilities which were located on the
12 territory of the Serbs, it was only logical that they should be arming
13 themselves out of these. It is also logical that members of the JNA
14 where the majority of the officers were Serbs helped more, to a greater
15 extent, the Serb population than the Croat or Muslim.
16 Q. And in the next paragraph in this document there is a
17 reference - and I quote you from the documents, that is, what the
18 investigator have written down, that you said -
19 "The national parties created an atmosphere of mistrust and
20 constant reminders of what happened in World War II and reinforced that
21 they would never allow this to happen again."
22 Do you recall that?
23 A. I entirely reject this statement. I don't think I said this. I
24 would be happy if there was an audio recording of this. As for the
25 arming, well, I did state that and I explained the context in which I
1 did. Now, this statement, referring to the Second World War and that the
2 national parties spread propaganda among the people in this way, I fully
3 reject this allegation.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this page please be
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we don't have any objection. It was read
8 out. I'm not SO sure if there's any value to it, but it's up to you.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, did you say that it was a
11 tape-recorded interview?
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, it was not a tape-recorded interview.
13 It was an information report.
14 JUDGE KWON: Information report. The Chamber was discussing how
15 to assess this probative value when witness denies having said so.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: He --
17 JUDGE KWON: Whether -- yes, yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry, he has actually agreed to one part.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That is the previous paragraph, and he has
21 denied the other one.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, for our part we don't disagree
23 that it can be admitted and weighed by the Chamber. It's -- although
24 it's not his words, it's someone else's statement of his words, you can
25 give it whatever weight you think it deserves, and obviously it deserves
1 a lot less weight than if we had a recording or something signed by the
2 witness. But nevertheless, I think our practice has been to admit this
3 kind of evidence if you think it's necessary to have a written version of
4 what was read out to the witness.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit the first page and this page.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6433, Your Honours.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
8 Can we please have 65 ter 25230 on the screen.
9 Q. And now, Mr. Andan, we do have a taped interview that you gave to
10 the ICTY investigators in Banja Luka. And we have actually just made
11 excerpts from a very, very lengthy -- very lengthy interview. And I will
12 only address a few pages of it, therefore we made this excerpt.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: If we look at page 6, page 6, in the English
14 and page 5 in the B/C/S, please. And in the English we look at the end
15 of the first paragraph -- no, I think there's something -- I think
16 there's something wrong. It would need to be the page which says English
17 111. The B/C/S is correct but the English is not. 110, it's 110.
18 [Prosecution counsel confer]
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry, Your Honour, I had a mistake. It
20 needs to be 5 also for the English.
21 Q. And as I said, we look -- in the English we look at the end of
22 the first -- we look at the end of the big paragraph at the lower part.
23 And in the B/C/S we look at the second paragraph -- the second half of
24 that page in B/C/S.
25 In the context of the criminals in the police in various parts,
1 that's the topic that was also addressed, towards the criminal police
2 officers, you say the following:
3 "I must say something, that the war in Sarajevo was commenced --
4 was started together with Momcilo Mandic by criminals" -- I can't find
5 this right now ...
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I -- the previous, page 6, was
7 correct. Page 6 was correct. Page 6 in the English. And in the B/C/S
8 it is page 5. And if you look at the end of the second paragraph in the
10 Q. And, Mr. Andan, you have to look at the lower part -- the lower
11 part of the B/C/S. And you are recorded here as saying:
12 "I must say something, that the war in Sarajevo was commenced --
13 was started together with Momcilo Mandic by criminals."
14 Are you here referring to the erection of the first barricades
15 beginning in March 1992?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And when you refer to Mr. Mandic and the criminals, are you
18 referring to Rajko Djukic here or who do you mean by "criminals"?
19 A. Well, I'm not mentioning Rajko Djukic. You actually -- you might
20 mean Rajko Dukic, though I didn't mention him anywhere. I did hear of
21 him at the time. Now, these fir barricades that were organised in the
22 month of March with the assistance of criminals, most of whom I knew,
23 they manned the barricades at the time. Later on, through intelligence
24 work in the joint MUP, it was learned that Momcilo Mandic sent these
25 criminals to erect the barricades in March in Sarajevo. To the best of
1 my recollection, I don't mention Rajko Dukic at all; I didn't know him at
2 the time. Did I hear of him at the time? I'm not sure. I got to know
3 him in the course of the war.
4 Q. And when you say "criminals," whom do you mean then?
5 A. Well, let me not engage in guess-work. Let me mention the late
6 Skrba, the late Rato, the late Vule, they were all individuals with a
7 criminal record in our ministry whom we arrested and took into custody at
8 some point and they were the ones who were manning these barricades in
9 Sarajevo. There are others that I can't recall at present, I remembered
10 these three, but if you want me to I can tell you specifically who
11 these -- or which of these criminals they were.
12 Q. I think that's actually sufficient.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to have this page
14 admitted and we will have in the course of this testimony several more
15 small bits.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, very well. We'll admit the first page -- but
17 let us see the first page has been separately -- no. We'll admit this
19 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6434.
20 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you upload the first page later on. That
21 would be more convenient to find out what interview it was about.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, we will do that, Your Honour. Yes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
25 Q. Mr. Andan, you describe in your written evidence - and I refer
1 here to 21381 for everybody in court - you describe in a lot of details
2 of the barricades and we do not need to repeat them. I was just
3 wondering about something you said on page 21384 because -- and that's
4 why I asked about Rajko Dukic. You state that Rajko Dukic was the chief
5 of Crisis Staff and he and Momcilo Mandic were the organisers of the
6 barricades on the 1st and the 2nd of March. And you also stated on
7 page 21386 that Rajko Dukic was in charge of personnel affairs in the
8 SDS. So when you gave your testimony, you mentioned him in the context
9 of the barricades. I assume you knew him -- you knew that it better then
10 when you gave your testimony?
11 A. I already said that only later did we acquire certain
12 intelligence information that a certain Rajko Dukic was at the head of
13 the Crisis Staff that was leading the campaign of setting up barricades
14 in Sarajevo. Later I heard - and you can ask President Karadzic about
15 that as well - that he was the president of what was called maybe the
16 personnel commission in the party, and that is something that I also
17 learned later. That's what I learned from intelligence report.
18 But I must tell you the following. When the barricades were
19 erected in Sarajevo I was a member of the Ministry of the Interior of BH,
20 i.e., the joint ministry. That night we received an order to assemble at
21 the MUP without knowing what the problem was. We didn't know anything
22 about the barricades. The barricades appeared in the morning and we
23 learned about that only later.
24 Q. Mr. Andan, I stopped you because that -- all these details we
25 have already in the testimony and we do not need to repeat this because
1 we, unfortunately, do not have the time to do so.
2 Mr. Andan, in your testimony you describe in many, many details
3 what you and Mr. Davidovic's tasks were and your activities in relation
4 to Bijeljina and we do not need to repeat this here. I only was puzzled
5 by something you said in relation to Ljubisa Savic, nicknamed Mauzer, and
6 his Panthers. And you refer also to Vojvoda Mirko Blagojevic and his men
7 as the most significant paramilitary formations in Bijeljina.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And that, Your Honours, is on page 21437.
9 Q. And I was only puzzled about one point because you refer to the
10 troops commanded, if I can call it that, by Vojvoda Blagojevic were
11 called Serb Volunteers -- Volunteer Guard. And I was just wondering
12 whether that's an error, because in the course of your testimony you then
13 refer to Arkan's men as being the Serb Volunteer Guards. Could that be
14 a -- just an error?
15 A. There must have been a mistake made. They were Mirko
16 Blagojevic's Chetnik and the Serbian Volunteer Guards was led by Arkan,
17 and I apologise if I made an error.
18 Q. I just saw it and wanted to have you -- give you an opportunity
19 to correct that. And there was -- you also mentioned on page 21653 that
20 there was a link between Arkan's Serb Volunteer Guard and Ljubisa Savic's
21 Panthers. Do you know -- do you remember that, that there was that link?
22 A. Yes, I do. I remember that when I arrived in Bijeljina that
23 there were certain complications. Somebody, not me, informed Arkan that
24 Ljubisa Savic, Mauzer, was constantly hiding behind his name. I remember
25 one afternoon when Arkan came to Bijeljina and said in front of me and
1 Mico Blagojevic that he had nothing to do with Mauzer and he pleaded with
2 us to act according to the law with regard to the Mauzer, but there had
3 been some links between the two in the previous period.
4 Q. Mr. Andan, when I read the evidence on your achievements in
5 Bijeljina and Brcko and Zvornik and I also read the associated
6 documentation that was discussed in that testimony, I was a bit puzzled
7 about the strong focus on looting and robbery while one would think that
8 the focus on violent crimes like rapes and killings would be the focus of
9 the police work. Why was it looting and robbery rather than the more
10 serious crimes?
11 A. I am not sure that you perceived the entire situation in a
12 correct way with regard to what I did in the area. I am sorry that in my
13 file there is a rape of a Muslim woman, and I think that Mr. Davidovic
14 can confirm this, and I can confirm that we filed a report to the
15 court --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Andan, if you could speak a bit more slowly and
18 then could you repeat after you said, "We filed a report to the
19 court ..."
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We filed a report to the
21 prosecutor's office for the rape of a Muslim woman in Bijeljina, and that
22 can be corroborated by Mr. Mico Davidovic.
23 As for the other part relating to the looting, I believe that
24 those were the most serious crimes at the time. How can one explain such
25 instances when a member of a paramilitary unit comes to a Muslim house,
1 kicks the door with his foot or with his rifle, force his way into the
2 house, make a search, collect all the valuables, and leave? I can tell
3 you that any such instance could not have gone by without the owner of
4 the house suffering maltreatment in the process. And that is what we
5 considered as the most serious criminal offences at the time and we
6 wanted to provide protection to all the individuals living in those
7 municipalities in the period, and I am talking about Brcko, Bijeljina,
8 and Zvornik. So we processed other individuals as well, and we were
9 careful that people who were coming back from the front line be searched
10 at the check-points around Bijeljina and to confiscate any stolen items
11 from them and deposit them in our storage facilities.
12 For example, at one of the check-points we stopped an active-duty
13 officer of the Army of Republika Srpska and we confiscated a truck full
14 of stolen goods.
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
16 Q. Yes, thank you. I asked this question because here in front of
17 this Trial Chamber we had Exhibit P2882, it's actually your charging
18 document from 8 August 1992 for the Yellow Wasps. And in this document
19 it is all about stealing cars and goods -- and goods at the check-points
20 and using false papers for stolen cars. And what I was missing in this
21 charging document were the crimes that -- the crimes against the Muslims
22 in Celopek. That is why I was thinking you were concentrating on robbery
23 and stealing only. Why is that not in here, the murder of the Muslims at
25 A. I must tell you this and it can be verified. Given that many
1 people fled from the state of Serbia, during our action many of them fled
2 back to Serbia, and as a result we passed over many documents to the MUP
3 of Serbia and based on which Zuco's brother - I think his last name was
4 Repic - was tried and he was convicted by a court in Sabac in -- or
5 Valjevo to ten years in prison on the basis of the documents that we
6 provided to the court. I'm not saying that our documents were a decisive
7 factor in filing a criminal report against Repic. So you are right in
8 the first part of your question, but I wanted to say that since certain
9 individuals were in Serbia at the time, we provided the documents
10 relating to them to the Serbian authorities.
11 THE ACCUSED: Transcript.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 3, it has been erroneously
14 recorded that they fled from Serbia, whereas the witness said that they
15 originated from Serbia and then fled back to Serbia once the campaign of
16 arrests started.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I will also like to add that
18 the prosecutor's office in Bijeljina, after a certain period of time,
19 released all of them and they went back to Serbia. I think that we
20 provided the MUP of Serbia with a list of individuals who had come from
21 Serbia for whom we asked a ban on their entry to Republika Srpska. So
22 after they had returned to Serbia, we provided them with the documents
23 which ended in trials. One of them was Repic and he was sentenced to a
24 prison term.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
1 Q. But that was in -- after the war, correct, in 1996?
2 A. No, no, no. I don't know when he was convicted, but I can
3 categorically say that we provided the documents in 1992. Whether they
4 processed Repic at a later stage by following him and applying all the
5 regular police measures ending in a criminal report, but if you say that
6 it was in 1996, then you must be right. All I know is that whatever
7 documents we had available, we passed them on.
8 Q. Yeah, thank you.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have D1 -- 01581 on the
11 Q. And before we look at the document in more details, I -- I just
12 want to remind you that in your testimony - and that starts at
13 21499 - you describe the situation of the Muslim population in Janja and
14 the measures that you took to protect them. And we do not need to repeat
16 Just one question in this regard. The Muslims in Janja, they
17 needed protection against Serb soldiers and the Serb formations that we
18 just spoke about, correct, like Mauzer and Arkan's and those?
19 A. I know that upon Mr. Davidovic and I arrived in the area, our
20 assessment was that the remaining Muslim population in Bijeljina deserved
21 to be protected. We even offered an alternative. There was a man whom
22 we helped to leave Janja. He was working in the police and we offered
23 him to be a deputy chief of the police station in Janja because we set up
24 a police station there. He refused that offer and instead asked us to
25 help him cross over to Serbia and further on into Europe. Before we
1 came, Arkan had been in Janja and I can say that with full responsibility
2 and that he collected his dues - if I may put it that. There were
3 constant attacks on civilian populations - and I mean Muslims or
4 Bosniaks - who remained in Janja. In order to protect these residents,
5 we set up a police station there and we provided command personnel and
6 their permanent task was to provide protection of the property and the
7 personal belongings and the lives of the citizens there.
8 Now, as far as that period is concerned, I can say that we did it
9 rather successfully. Now, whether any member of Mauzer's unit was in the
10 area attempting to do something, I don't know. I told you about Arkan.
11 I told you that I know that he had been there before our arrival and that
12 he collected the valuables there, and after that we established regular
13 authorities and restored law and order and provided the protection for
14 the residents.
15 Now, let me tell you something else. I do not hold Mr. Mauzer in
16 high regard, but I'm unwilling to speak about something that I don't know
17 about. If you put some specific questions about his activities, I will
18 tell you what I know. Although I don't appreciate him too much, I would
19 rather not talk about something relating to him that I don't know about.
20 Q. Yes. And when we look here at that document, here it's a report
21 you submitted to the Ministry of Interior on the 18th of July, 1992. And
22 if we focus on the lower part, the lower part of the first page, you
23 refer -- you refer here to areas where combat operations are not being
24 conducted and the looting and war profiteering is taking place. I mean,
25 you have already mentioned it here. That relates -- that's a pattern you
1 saw in Brcko, Bijeljina, and Zvornik repeated; correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And do you know whether that was also repeated in other areas in
4 the Republika Srpska, or rather, under control of the Bosnian Serbs?
5 A. I know that we or I specifically in the latter part of August
6 1992, due to the worsened security situation and, so to speak,
7 inappropriate vandalising of paramilitary formations, was supposed to
8 establish a team and to go to Foca in order to re-install the legitimate
9 authorities. I didn't go there for the reasons which are well-known, and
10 I can tell you that if you wish me to do so --
11 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
12 A. Very well.
13 Q. Thank you. That's actually in your testimony. Therefore we do
14 not need to go there. And other areas, you were not concerned, you never
15 went or got information from the other areas under Serb control that this
16 was a pattern, a general pattern?
17 A. Well, I wouldn't put it that way, that it was a pattern. But
18 there were municipalities where security was compromised. As far as I
19 can remember, there is mention of Bosanski Sabac, Foca, and when you
20 interrupted me a minute ago this partly pertained to Lopare as well,
21 where some of Manda's Chetniks were deployed. There was an instruction
22 issued by the minister of the interior to set up a team that would
23 intervene in all these "crisis" areas, where practically it was the
24 paramilitaries who were governing the municipalities instead of
25 legitimate organs. I was supposed to be the leader of one such team and
1 I'm sorry that I didn't do that, although I could have risked my life,
2 but I'm sorry that we did not restore law and order in the situations
3 that it required.
4 Q. Mr. Andan, looking again at this document here, and in the
5 English we would now need the second page while you have still the same
6 page, you write here about -- that:
7 "Despite the great efforts of members of the Security Service,
8 the situation in Semberija at Majevica is being hampered by various
9 political actions and trends, the effects of which are manifested through
10 various attitudes towards the Service and the position of the Muslims,
11 et cetera."
12 The political trends and attitudes towards the service you have
13 described in great detail in your testimony, and we leave that aside.
14 The political action and trends and attitudes towards the position of the
15 Muslims, what do you mean by that?
16 A. I'm going to make the following comment. Having read this last
17 sentence, I'm not sure whether I would repeat it in the same way. But I
18 think I put it correctly. The position of the Chetniks of
19 Mirko Blagojevic who called upon the Muslims over the radio, asking them
20 not to be afraid, et cetera, I can tell you that that was a
21 counter-productive message because the very symbol of Chetniks, which was
22 shown in every movie made after the Second World War, was a symbol of
23 something dirty and something irregular. And this is what frightened the
24 Muslims most, the people with long beards and cockades. And at that
25 point in time, we assessed this to be counter-productive, because instead
1 of stabilising their state of mind, they became more stressed and it
2 worsened the situation on the ground. If I were to write this now, I
3 don't know if I would have phrased it in the same ...
4 Q. You were aware that ethnic cleansing took place in April 1992 in
5 Bijeljina, were you not?
6 A. I wasn't in the area. You have to know that I came to Bijeljina
7 in early June of Bijeljina [as interpreted], and after that I was
8 transferred to Brcko. I can confirm that the population did move out.
9 There were even some murders. Later when we arrived in Bijeljina,
10 Mr. Davidovic and I had established that there was some relocation of the
11 populations, not to say that there was some ethnic cleansing but people
12 were leaving.
13 Q. Your efforts to improve the security of the Muslims in Janja so
14 that they would not have to leave, that was taken against you; right?
15 You were blamed of protecting the Muslims and arresting Serbs. Is that
16 not what happened and how it developed in Bijeljina?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the reference? Who
18 accused Mr. Andan and what is the source of this assertion?
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: This is what Mr. Andan can actually tell us
20 himself, and you know full well -- we all have read it in the testimony
21 how he was removed. It's throughout the testimony, but I have asked
22 Mr. Andan and there is no reference at the moment.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will answer your question in
24 specific terms. Nobody from the then-government of Bijeljina
25 municipality had anything against the way I operated. We had problems,
1 the most serious problems, with Mauzer, Ljubisa Savic, Mauzer. We had
2 problems with some Serbs because we wanted to abide by law to the letter.
3 When we protected the Muslims of Bijeljina - and I reiterate that nobody
4 from the government ever came and told us not to do that, instead there
5 were people who lauded this method - but people started talking that
6 Davidovic and Andan came to provide protection for the Muslims and they
7 were arresting Serbs for stealing some small items. That was, if I may
8 call it, a sort of propaganda war, especially against Mr. Savic [as
9 interpreted], and it was being waged by Mr. Mauzer because the two had
10 some unsettled problems dating from before the war. The problems started
11 when Mr. Mauzer came from Belgrade and when I started doing my job - I
12 don't want to repeat this - but I can say that this propaganda was being
13 pursued by Mauzer against us and the groups who disagreed with the way
14 things were done in Bijeljina.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, in line 25, it was not
18 recorded that -- in his last answer as well it was not recorded what
19 Mr. Andan said that, "We had problems with Serb criminals," not "Serbs."
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] People with the propensity to crime
21 and criminal records.
22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just also be reminded by my
24 colleague here that in line 6 there is "Mr. Savic." It should be "Mr.
25 Davidovic." It was definitely said in English, but the -- maybe it's a
1 translation error.
2 Q. So the conflict was with Mr. Davidovic and Mauzer and not Savic
3 with Mauzer basically so --
4 A. Especially -- especially this conflict involved Mr. Davidovic due
5 to some earlier disagreements and unsettled accounts between the two.
6 Q. And, Mr. Andan, after you and Mr. Davidovic were removed from
7 Bijeljina, the assaults against the non-Serbs, the murders and the
8 looting, started up again. You're aware of this; correct?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get the reference as to how
10 Davidovic was removed and how Mr. Andan was removed? Davidovic ended his
11 career and left his own republic --
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we stop -- that is something that we can
13 leave to the cross-examination [sic]. I'm not going to ask this because
14 it's --
15 JUDGE KWON: Probably Mr. Karadzic was challenging your statement
16 that Davidovic was removed.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, but he can take it up --
18 THE ACCUSED: Exactly.
19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But he can call it up. I call it that. I
20 put it to the witness that Mr. Davidovic and he were removed, and that is
21 actually what the witness described in great detail in his testimony.
22 That's why I used this term and the witness can answer the question.
23 [Trial Chamber confers].
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please answer the question, Mr. Andan.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The then-federal secretary
1 General Gracan issued an order and Mico Davidovic was transferred to
2 Serbia due to the problems that he had with a Chetnik Vojvoda in
3 Montenegro, the so-called Ceko. Together with his unit he was first
4 transferred to Belgrade and then he was sent down there. And now if you
5 want me to repeat, as far as I am concerned I --
6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
7 Q. Let me interrupt you --
8 JUDGE KWON: No, the question was whether it was a removal or
9 transfer, whether the assaults against non-Serbs, the murder, and the
10 looting started up again. You were aware of this? This was the
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that the interpretation
13 was wrong. I'm sure you're not talking about the attacks against Serbs
14 but against Bosniaks. What I received in the interpretation was "attacks
15 against Serbs." I don't think that that's what you asked me.
16 I have to say that at the beginning of September I was removed
17 from the MUP because of the alleged taking of poker machines for private
18 purposes. In my previous testimony I clarified that, so I don't want to
19 repeat what happened. I joined the military and I went to Han Pijesak.
20 I can't say whether the campaign of persecution of Bosniaks or Muslims
21 continued in that area. I left very soon thereafter. Some people didn't
22 even want me to stay in Bijeljina for any time, and I repeat that there
23 was some people prone to crime, including Mr. Mauzer, who were at the
24 forefront of that.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
1 Q. We have evidence before this court - and I refer here to
2 P5483 - that a huge number of Muslims were expelled from Bijeljina in
3 August 1994 by the Serb authorities. Are you aware of this?
4 A. I apologise. Can you tell me what period are you referring to?
5 What part of August? Was it in the first half or the second half?
6 Q. It's actually continuing throughout August and also in
7 September 1994. So it's a rather extensive campaign and, as we have seen
8 in documents and heard also from Witness Davidovic, people were taken
9 away -- taken forcibly from their houses and stripped of their
10 belongings. They even had to pay large sum of money for transport. Are
11 you aware of any such kind of things happening in 1994?
12 A. Again, in the interpretation I heard the year 1994. I suppose
13 that you're asking me about 1992. In the interpretation I heard the year
14 1994, but I don't think that that's what you meant. Was that a good
15 interpretation, 1994, is that what you had in mind?
16 Q. Yes, I was asking you about 1994. I'm aware that you were not
17 there anymore, but it was widely known. So that's why I'm asking you.
18 You either know or don't.
19 A. No, I don't know. During that period, I didn't even pass through
20 Bijeljina for certain reasons. One of them was the reason of principle.
21 If Davidovic said that, he lived there, he had a house there, so you
22 should have clarified that with him. I really don't know.
23 Q. Mr. Andan, do you know a certain Vojkan Djurkovic? Did you come
24 across him in Bijeljina in 1992?
25 A. Vojkan is not Djokovic but Djurkovic, if that's the person you
1 have in mind. Mr. Davidovic and I came across him in 1992 in Brcko.
2 He -- or rather, I was the first one who saw him there. Let's leave
3 Mr. Davidovic aside. I arrived in Brcko to help the consolidation of the
4 MUP or the public security station there. One day Mr. Djurkovic came to
5 my office, Vojkan Djurkovic, and another person. I remember that he
6 supported -- sported a moustache. He was a bit older. They introduced
7 themselves as members of Arkan's unit. He, or rather, the two of them
8 asked me to share with them the intelligence that I was privy to at the
9 time. I don't know whether Mr. Vasiljevic was with me or not. I believe
10 that he was. I told them that they didn't have any sort of legitimacy
11 and that I sent my work reports to the Ministry of the Interior and that
12 they did not have a legal basis to ask for any reports from me. That was
13 when I met Mr. Djurkovic. I believe that I saw him once or perhaps two
14 times when I was in Bijeljina, but those encounters were of no
15 significance when it came to Mr. Djurkovic.
16 Q. Are you aware of criminal activities of Mr. Djurkovic, such as
17 extorting money from people for transferring them elsewhere?
18 A. I heard that indirectly. I heard that he was the number one man
19 in Janja, that he forcibly took money and gold from Muslims. I
20 personally didn't know about that. I didn't have first-hand knowledge.
21 I could only hear about my friends or colleagues. I don't know when, but
22 I suppose that it could have been in 1994, which is the year that you
23 have -- kept mentioning. I can say that I did not have any first-hand
24 knowledge about such activities of his. I did hear it from other people,
1 Q. Thank you. Mr. Andan, this morning you mentioned the -- how you
2 got Mr. Vidovic released from Batkovic, and I was just wondering -- you
3 said his name is not Anto but Avdo. Does that mean that he is a Muslim?
4 A. No. Actually, in the interpretation I heard the name Avdo and
5 then I corrected that and I said that his name was Anto. I believe that
6 even Mr. Karadzic intervened when he heard the name Avdo in the
7 interpretation. It is not Avdo but Anto.
8 Q. Okay. I just wanted to confirm that. And Mr. Anto Davidovic --
9 Vidovic, he was not a criminal; right? And he was detained in Batkovic
10 for the mere fact of being a non-Serb; right?
11 A. No. He was a prominent athlete, a football player. His brother
12 Zelimir Vidovic, who played for the Sarajevo football team, was even
13 better known while Mr. Karadzic and I were in the club management. He is
14 an older brother from Brcko. He remained living there, and when I asked
15 certain people who were in Brcko at the time as to why he had been taken
16 away from Brcko and put in the camp, they shrugged their shoulders and
17 they said there was no reason. His wife was a Serb, but it seems that
18 the only reason for that was the fact that he was a Croat. I don't even
19 know who took him to Batkovic.
20 He was a Croat and I invested a lot of effort, I used my personal
21 connections, and I pleaded with the commander of the East Bosnia Corps
22 for Vidovic to be released. He was released. I took him to Brcko and he
23 found employment with the MUP of Brcko as an electrician. Now he lives
24 in America. I found him employment in the MUP of Brcko. I told
25 everybody that he was a good man, that he was good at what he did, and he
1 stayed in Brcko until the end of the war as an employee of the Brcko MUP.
2 Q. We do not need to go into many details of Mr. Mauzer and the
3 conflict that ensued. I just wanted to refer you to a document that is
4 in front of this Trial Chamber and it's P2897. That is a report that you
5 wrote in relation to an event on the 7th of July, 1992, at a celebration
6 of St. John.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we briefly have that document, P2897, on
8 the screen.
9 Q. And in paragraph 2 you refer to Mauzer, Mauzer's forces, Serbian
10 National Guard. And in the next paragraph you say:
11 "Some people came to these areas. They were pro-Communist
12 orientation ..."
13 And then he says:
14 "They are terrorising and mistreating the Serbian population on
15 the territory of the Bijeljina municipality ... the police stop our
16 warriors, they search them and confiscate worthless things and in this
17 way abuse them."
18 That is what was said by Mauzer, and Mauzer was actually an
19 authority in Bijeljina; correct?
20 A. Well, he was not a member of authorities there, but he was in
21 charge of a very significant unit that was deployed there. Everything
22 that you have just read out is correct. Some people came, allegedly
23 they're communists, and that is reference to Mico Davidovic and myself.
24 Let me repeat that they were not happy with the restoration of
25 law and order, at least not fully. I'm sure that they swam best in that
1 state of chaos and they could amass wealth. One night, an ambush was set
2 up and in that ambush Mr. Davidovic and I were supposed to lose their [as
3 interpreted] lives after we had visited Mr. Ilic in the command of the
4 East Bosnia Corps. I'm sure that there are documents to that effect.
5 Q. Yes, indeed. This Trial Chamber has seen such documents. And --
6 but Mr. Mauzer -- or rather, Mr. Savic, what his real name is, he was the
7 head of the TO staff in Bijeljina, was he not? That's quite a high
9 A. I don't know, to be honest. I remember him as the commander of
10 that unit of theirs. He was so dominant that he actually ruled all the
11 segments of power and social life in Bijeljina. That's how I perceived
12 his role. I don't want to speak ill of dead people, but let's say that
13 his education was very modest, that he found himself in that place at
14 that moment, and he wanted to cover all the bases. He wanted to be in
15 charge of the complete situation there. That's the way I would put it.
16 Q. And we have evidence before this Trial Chamber - and that is the
17 evidence of Mr. Davidovic, P2848 - that Mr. Savic and his men functioned
18 as an escort to Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik when they visited
20 Mr. Andan, were you aware of this? Was he escort?
21 A. To be honest, I should be aware of the date. If that happened
22 around the 17th or the 20th of August when I was removed from the
23 position -- but I don't remember that it happened at that time. I really
24 don't remember that during that period of time Mr. Karadzic and
25 Mr. Krajisnik arrived in Bijeljina, let alone who their escort was. I
1 was in position up to the 17th of August and I have no reason not to tell
2 you that I was aware of the situation if I had been.
3 Q. Thank you. We have also a document here in -- before this
4 Trial Chamber, and that is P2855, in which Colonel Tolimir,
5 then-Colonel Tolimir, in a report of the 28th of July, 1992, described
6 the paramilitary formations as criminal elements doing all sorts of
7 crimes. I do not want to go into all these details with you, but I want
8 to quote one paragraph from this document.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 285 -- P02885 -- 2855,
10 sorry, on the screen. And we need page 5 in the English and page 5 in
11 the B/C/S. And if we look at what is page 5 in both languages, and he
12 goes into details about the Serbian -- yes, it's in the middle of the
13 English and -- right in the middle and it is where you find Mauzer being
14 mentioned in the B/C/S. Yeah, it's at the lower part.
15 Q. And it says here:
16 "The Serbian National Guard in Bijeljina has formally joined the
17 so-called Special Brigade. The Serbian National Guard was formed by the
18 Bijeljina SDS, and the Presidency of the Bijeljina Municipality Assembly
19 decided that this would be the army of Bijeljina which would defend
20 Bijeljina should it be attacked, and appointed self-styled Major
21 Ljubisa Savic ... Mauzer, as the commander."
22 And then he writes - and that is in July 1992:
23 "The greater part of the municipal authorities in Bijeljina still
24 back the Guard."
25 So Mauzer was not alone doing what he wanted. The greater part
1 of the municipal authorities in Bijeljina still backed him; right?
2 A. There is no doubt about the fact that he was very close to the
3 authorities. We attended a meeting, Mr. Davidovic and I, and we informed
4 about the situation in the Ministry of Defence. He came with two or
5 three hand Motorolas. He contested our reports. I must confess the
6 power structures did not support us, but they didn't even also provide
7 comment about Mauzer's conduct at that moment. I believe that he should
8 have been interrupted and that we should have been -- continued to go on
9 informing the authorities about the situation.
10 It is clear that he was close to the authorities, and about the
11 first part, the SDS, I can't say anything about that. But I know from
12 that meeting that he was close to the structures of power and that he
13 behaved very badly towards Mr. Davidovic and myself when we came to
14 inform the authorities about the situation in Bijeljina based on the
15 information that we were privy to.
16 Q. You have described your activity against the various paramilitary
17 forces, and in particular the Yellow Wasps. And I'm just -- wanted to
18 refer you to something that you said in your testimony, and that's at
19 page 21868. You speak about that in relation to these Yellow Wasps,
20 these persons, it went -- it was going round and round in circles. So
21 you arrest them, they get released, they are expelled, and they come
22 back, they are not prosecuted in Bosnia, or rather, Republika Srpska,
23 they are not prosecuted in Serbia for a long, long time, and they roam
24 around on both sides of the Drina River. Isn't that how it was for a
25 long time?
1 A. Yes, that was the situation and that situation prevailed for a
2 long time. The people whom we expelled from Republika Srpska and handed
3 over documents about them to the MUP of Serbia were banned from
4 re-entering, but something else happened. They were intrigued by war and
5 war developments and the loot that they were able to bring from the
6 theatre of war. New such people appeared. We expelled one group, a ban
7 was put on their re-entry, and then new people arrived which just picked
8 up from where their predecessors left off. So, yes, things were going
9 round and round in circles. And you're right when it comes to that. It
10 was very difficult to control the situation. You complete one job, you
11 process people, you transfer them across the Drina, you put a ban on
12 their re-entry, but new people are recruited and appear. And that all
13 lasted until the end of 1992. At least that's how I see that vicious
14 circle of developments.
15 Q. But that this vicious circle could develop, that's a matter of
16 lack of political will to stop it, isn't it?
17 A. You see, there is an expression for us police officers and those
18 who speak our language will understand. I'm a policeman. My job is to
19 catch the thief, to investigate the thief, and to hand him over to the
20 court. And I believe that with that my part of the job is over. The
21 moment when I hand them over to the prosecutor or to the court, my job is
22 done. I'm not defending anybody; I'm here to tell the truth under oath.
23 We learnt about war from books in peace time. What I learnt from
24 books at the university was absolutely different from what I experienced
25 in war time. We learned about the authorities that had -- have to be set
1 up, about the police, about the military, but in our books there was no
2 reference to any paramilitaries.
3 When it comes to politics and political will, I know that the
4 minister of the interior who was in office at the time and who was a
5 political figure, we received very specific dispatches ordering us to
6 investigate, to ban, and so on and so forth. It all depended on the
7 chiefs of police in particular areas. They were in charge of
8 implementing those dispatches and of their own willingness and initiative
9 to prevent some things. I'm not talking about the government and the
10 president because my minister was supposed to inform them about the
11 situation. They were not supposed to receive information from elsewhere.
12 And from my minister, who was also a political figure, we received
13 dispatches with instructions, but then it all depended on the
14 professionals on the ground, whether they would actually implement those
15 dispatches, whether they would put words into action, whether they had
16 the willingness and the initiative to do that.
17 Q. It was my understanding - and we have heard that here in the
18 courtroom and we have read it also in your transcript from the
19 testimony - that you and Mr. Davidovic were such professionals who
20 actually achieved results in very short time, but instead of letting you
21 continue, you were stopped doing this, removed or taken elsewhere. Would
22 you not think that's a lack of political will, to let the people continue
23 who were doing a good job?
24 A. Let me just provide a very short explanation. First of all,
25 there were certain antagonisms within the top echelons of the
1 Ministry of the Interior. I discharged duties as the chief of police in
2 a municipality in Sarajevo, amongst other things, and that municipality
3 was considered the most difficult from the security aspect, that was
4 Stari Grad. At that time, Mr. Kovac was the deputy commander of the
5 police station, and then I became the chief inspector at the republican
6 MUP and he was still there. During the war something else happened. He
7 was appointed first the chief of that police station and then the chief
8 of administration, and I believe that in that situation he didn't like
9 me. He was bothered by me being in that position. I was a professional
10 and he didn't like that.
11 So my removal or my departure from the ministry was the result of
12 Mr. Kovac's personal attitude towards me. I had to be removed and
13 replaced by one of his yes-men. The municipality of Bijeljina is on the
14 border with Serbia. It's a transit municipality and gives a lot of room
15 for a lot of things. And since I have to have -- I had -- didn't have
16 blinkers, I wanted to do my job professionally, I bothered some people
17 who were my superiors. That is the answer to your question.
18 They made up some poker machines that I allegedly took and,
19 luckily enough, I had ample documents to prove that the allegations were
20 false. And this is all I can say about that.
21 But to be honest, I have to tell you that I really regret that I
22 didn't stay in the ministry as a professional. In 1993, or rather, in
23 1994, when Mr. Stanisic returned to the ministry, I was invited to set up
24 a unit which would fight against crime. I'm sure that you're aware of
25 that; you have documents to that effect.
1 Q. Yes, we actually have it also in the testimony.
2 Let me speak with you about the Yellow Wasps in relation to one
3 aspect --
4 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue after the break?
5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, I also can already see
8 that I'm probably not able to -- I think I have used one and a half
9 hours -- oh, I have one -- one hour left. That is sufficient, yes.
10 Sorry. I just thought I had only half an hour left.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume
12 at 1.25.
13 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.40 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 1.27 p.m.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Please continue.
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Mr. Andan, this morning you gave a few details on the transfer of
18 Malko Koroman and why it was done and how it was done. I would like to
19 ask you a few questions in this regard. In your previous testimony you
20 mentioned that the Yellow Wasps received weapons from Malko Koroman at
21 some point in time; correct?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. And if I understand your evidence correctly, it was in relation
24 to a deal for Golf cars that the Yellow Wasps had confiscated at one of
25 their check-points; correct?
1 A. Yes, it was a service -- a favour for the fact that the Wasps
2 returned these vehicles and in exchange for that favour he gave them some
3 sort of weapons, Koroman did.
4 Q. And these Golf cars, that was something, let's say, irregular.
5 Transferring the Golf cars to Serbia, that's not proper, was it?
6 A. I don't know details concerning this case. There were quite a
7 few Golfs that were transferred from Vogosca, the TAS there, to Serbia
8 irregularly. It was done by individuals or groups who stole the
9 vehicles, had them transported to Serbia, and sold them there.
10 As for this case involving Malko Koroman, I cannot state for a
11 fact that these were stolen vehicles. At any rate, they chased the
12 drivers away and took the vehicles for themselves. Malko Koroman came to
13 see them, persuaded them into returning the vehicles, and in exchange for
14 that he provided them with an amount of ammunition.
15 Q. And in your --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Weapons, interpreter's correction.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
18 Q. And on the occasion when the Yellow Wasps collected the weapons
19 in Pale, they were received by Ms. Plavsic; correct? That's what you
20 stated in your previous testimony.
21 A. This was a misunderstanding. When we prosecuted the
22 Yellow Wasps, or rather, we collected information that we forwarded to
23 the prosecutor's office, after a period of time since they were released
24 from detention and no proceedings had been initiated against them, they
25 went to Pale and that was when Mrs. Plavsic received them.
1 Q. Thank you for this clarification. You said that Koroman was not
2 involved in anything criminal this morning, if I correct -- remember
3 correctly, but Koroman was involved in this Golf car business and he
4 provided weapons to Yellow Wasps at a time the authorities were aware of
5 their criminal conduct. So there was a legitimate reason of the minister
6 of interior to remove him; correct?
7 A. I cannot claim this with any certainty either. I don't know who
8 the vehicles belonged to. Perhaps it was on behalf of some of his
9 friends or relatives that he interceded to have these vehicles returned.
10 I can confirm, however, that once these vehicles were given back, these
11 individuals went to Pale and were given a certain amount of weapons from
12 Mr. Koroman. So I cannot claim that he was involved in any criminal
13 activities surrounding these Golf cars because I don't know the
14 background. I don't know who they belonged to. The fact of the matter
15 remains that they received a certain amount of weapons from Mr. Koroman
16 who had to take these weapons from the TO depot in order to be able to
17 give them to him -- to them.
18 Q. My question was actually whether -- if someone, leaving out the
19 Golf cars, if someone provides weapons to a criminally active group,
20 that's a legitimate reason to remove him from the police; right? It is
21 not just a matter of not being effective; correct?
22 A. Look, the fact that you have knowledge of this is the basis of
23 the information we had. When he left the -- when I left the post in
24 Bijeljina, it was up to Kovac to decide whether to file a criminal report
25 and have Mr. Kovac prosecuted -- have Mr. Koroman prosecuted. So that
1 question should have been put to Mr. Kovac. Because at any rate, we had
2 to launch this initiative in the direction of Mr. Mico Stanisic. He
3 could not have done it himself. He was at the top of the pyramid. It is
4 up to these levels further down to launch this initiative up the chain
5 since we weren't able to do it, but it was up to Mr. Kovac and
6 Petko Budisa to launch this initiative to have him removed.
7 Q. Mr. Andan, to solve and calm down the situation in Pale at that
8 point in time, it may be practical to remove him from the scene for a
9 while, but to promote him and give him a position in the Ministry of
10 Interior, that is not a proper way to deal with someone who has failed
11 his job, his professionalism, isn't it?
12 A. Look, after all this was not peacetime. There was a war. I
13 heard somewhere of an English term for this. When you went to get rid of
14 someone, when you want to kick him in the back and just to do it that
15 way. I think this is how the situation unfolded with Mr. Koroman. The
16 situation calmed down and there was no conflict between the two factions,
17 one of which protected Mr. Koroman. And he was, conditionally speaking,
18 given some sort of promotion by being sent to Pale. But the basic idea
19 was that he should be removed from there. I think that was the objective
20 and the whole purpose of his removal.
21 Q. When you just said to be removed to Pale, that's probably a
22 mistake, Bijeljina you mean?
23 A. No, he was at Pale.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. He was the commander at Pale and was removed and went to
2 Q. Yes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that he should be
6 removed from Pale so that he may have no influence over the police
7 station in Pale, and that bit about the influence over the police station
8 in Pale was not reflected at all.
9 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm, sir, having said so?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's what I said.
11 Mr. Karadzic rightly intervened.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25230 on the
15 Q. And that's again the transcript of the taped interview that you
16 gave to the OTP in Banja Luka.
17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I would like to have e-court page 3 in
18 English and we look at middle and below, and e-court page 4 in the B/C/S
19 and we look at the top of the page.
20 Q. And I only address this very briefly for context. You refer here
21 to the fact that you were removed from your position because somebody did
22 not like you -- your work and you mention Ljubisa, Mauzer, as the primary
23 person wanting this and you also mention Tomo Kovac. We do not need to
24 address these two people because you have spoken about them in your
25 testimony. You have spoken about them today. I only show it to you for
2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move the -- we need to move in the
3 English to page 4 and we -- the B/C/S is correct. We can stay with
4 page 4 in the B/C/S.
5 Q. And we look at the top part of the English and we look at the
6 first half in the B/C/S. And here you say the following:
7 "I also think that I stood in the way of a few politicians who
8 also did not like such a situation. I think that this went all the way
9 to the very top of the political leadership of Republika Srpska, to
10 Radovan Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik ..."
11 That is what you said in 2006. It was your belief then that it
12 was also the Serbian -- Bosnian Serb leadership who wanted you to be
14 A. Another name is mentioned here, Ratko. I don't know who that
15 would be. I can see Mr. Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik if I'm reading
16 this correctly, the transcript in the first passage.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. "Mr. Radovan Karadzic, Ratko ... and Momcilo Krajisnik"; right?
19 Q. Yes, correct.
20 A. Correct. I did say that but that was within a context, and if
21 you want to you can review that transcript. I said that the leadership
22 itself was not timely informed of certain things. So the impression
23 gained was that the top leadership was not dealing with these problems
24 adequately, including the problems that I was confronted with.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Microphone not activated]
1 Sorry, can these two pages be admitted?
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this will be -- these two pages will be added
3 to the exhibit.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
5 Q. We come back to this point a little bit later --
6 JUDGE KWON: But I see some difference between the B/C/S and
7 English. In English at the end of -- after "Krajisnik," I read "that
8 their duplicity."
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes --
10 JUDGE KWON: But it's in the B/C/S before "Karadzic," because I'm
11 not reading --
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour, I can explain this --
13 JUDGE KWON: Since probably "Ratko" is missing, could we ask the
14 witness to read out the last sentence?
15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Duplicity is here.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first passage, right, the first
17 paragraph? "From the very top of Republika Srpska," is that what you
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "From the very top of
21 Republika Srpska I think that it is to do primarily with the duplicity of
22 Radovan Karadzic and Ratko ... and Momcilo Krajisnik."
23 And that's what the document that I have reads.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, just to explain something.
1 What we have here and looking at here today are the two transcripts that
2 were prepared, one in the English language and one in the B/C/S. There
3 are sometimes slightly different wordings and that is how it was done at
4 that time.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I understand that. It's a transcription made
6 on the audio recording.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Correct, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue.
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25181 on the
11 Q. And as it is coming up, it is an article, or rather, an interview
12 you gave entitled "Sting of the 'Yellow Wasps,'" and this interview was
13 spoken about in your testimony in quite many details.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And, Your Honour, that is at page 21796 in
15 the transcript.
16 Q. And we do not need to go in many details. I just want to address
17 two small aspects.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have page 2 in the English and
19 we look at the right column, second paragraph. And page 2 in the B/C/S
20 and we are looking in the B/C/S at the left column, second paragraph.
22 Q. And you are stated as saying that the direct cause for the
23 operation in Zvornik was the fact that Velibor Ostojic had been stopped
24 and humiliated. Mr. Andan, if I remember correctly, he was not only
25 humiliated but his car was also taken from him, or is my memory failing
2 A. This was not the direct cause for the operation, what Mr. Ostojic
3 experienced in Bijeljina at the time. We had been out in the field by
4 then for some ten days gathering intelligence, perhaps even longer, about
5 the whereabouts and activities of the members of the Yellow Wasps. This
6 may have accelerated the whole process.
7 Was his vehicle taken? Was it a Golf? I don't know. At any
8 rate, he was humiliated at that check-point. I know that Rade Tanaskovic
9 had a rifle, a pump shot-gun, I think, and he forced him to graze grass
10 at that point. This was information we received from Velibor Ostojic and
11 from Rade Tanaskovic's statement that we took later on.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Interpretation.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The trigger or reason, whereas in
15 line 11 it says "reason" or "cause." But what is the trigger or
16 something that prompts something into action is not the same as the cause
17 or the reason, which may be deeper. So it is true that this was not a
18 reason but a trigger. This is what Mr. Andan said.
19 As an illustration, the trigger for the breakout of World War I
20 was the assassination on the archduke but that was not the reason --
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. What line are you referring to?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 11 on page 75 [In English]
23 "The direct cause of the operation" --
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The original does not say "direct
1 cause," it says what triggered or occasioned, et cetera.
2 JUDGE KWON: I think his answer sufficiently tells itself.
3 Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:
5 Q. But, Mr. Andan, it is a fact that one or two days after this
6 incident with Velibor Ostojic your operation against the Yellow Wasps was
7 given the go-ahead, you could do it; right? There is a time context, is
8 there not?
9 A. You must understand that every operative plan of the sort had to
10 be approved by the MUP leadership. Perhaps it was the case that
11 precisely in the days when Velibor Ostojic was being mistreated at the
12 check-point, that we sent the plan operation for Bijeljina to Pale to
13 receive approval for it. It is true that a day or two after the incident
14 with Mr. Ostojic the operation was carried out in the manner already
15 described and the individuals concerned were processed the way it was
16 already said.
17 Q. Yes.
18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And if we move to page 3 in the English and
19 we're looking at the left column and page 2 in the B/C/S stays and we are
20 looking at the end of the paragraph that we just had before.
21 Q. And you refer here to the fact that you processed the case
22 against the Yellow Wasps, but that no court verdict was known. And to
23 say this in 2002. So again my question: There is -- there was no proper
24 will to prosecute the Yellow Wasps of both sides of the Drina River at
25 least for a long time; correct?
1 A. I've already answered the question. I said that those of us from
2 the ministry had done our part of the job. All the other measures and
3 actions were in the hands of the prosecutor's office. It was up to them
4 to act upon it. We were banned from interfering with other agencies'
5 work and it was not our intention at the time or otherwise to interfere
6 with the work of the prosecutor's office.
7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25203 on the
8 screen -- oh, Your Honour, I forgot. Can we have this article be
9 admitted? It was addressed many times in various fractions in the
10 previous testimony, but for some reason it was never tendered into
11 evidence and I would like to do this now.
12 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If it is being admitted, can the
14 translation be revised, please?
15 Secondly, the witness did not give his approval of what is stated
16 in this interview. That's what he said. He didn't confirm it.
17 JUDGE KWON: That's a matter you may take up in your
19 We'll admit the -- this in its entirety, given that it is only
20 seven pages. And then if there's a translation issue, there's a step you
21 may take. Yes.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: Shall we assign the number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6435, Your Honours.
25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.
1 Can we now have 65 ter 25203 on the screen.
2 Q. And as it is coming up, it is the interview that Dusko Vukovic --
3 Vuckovic, aka Repic, gave on the 4th of August, 1992. It's taken by the
4 military police, but I assume you are aware of this document, are you,
5 Mr. Andan?
6 A. Firstly, this isn't an interview, it's a statement. The
7 interviews that we had would result in an official note, whereas this is
8 an official statement that is noted down. This is the first time I'm
9 seeing this document.
10 Q. In this interview, or rather -- yeah, in this interview, in this
11 official note of this interview, Dusko Vuckovic basically gives all the
12 details of the crimes he committed in the Celopek camp. It's detailing
13 the murders he committed and why he did it. You were not informed about
14 this, this interview, and how he actually confessed?
15 A. No. I'd be happy to receive this document. For my own sake, I'd
16 like to have it.
17 Q. I'm sorry, that's not possible for us to do. Okay. Then when
18 you don't know it, I'm not tendering it, of course.
19 I would like to move on to another topic that you basically
20 addressed this morning, and that is the murder of Mr. Kulic in Bijeljina,
21 and we also saw the information and the file that you prepared and the
22 documents you prepared to investigate and prosecute this particular
23 murder. And you also mentioned that the perpetrators were detained. But
24 there were -- and you told us they were prosecuted only in 2006. I'm
25 just wondering, who got them released and when? Why?
1 A. I apologise, you said Kulic. Either interpretation was bad or at
2 any rate it was Salko Kukic that this was about.
3 Q. Oh, I misspoke. I -- I mean this person, yes. The questions
4 pertain to him.
5 A. I've already explained it. I said that we finished that part of
6 the job, the police part of the job, very professionally. And I can tell
7 you now, with the lapse of time, that I'm very proud of the job we did.
8 We processed these individuals and handed them over to the prosecutor's
9 office. They were taken into custody for 72 hours under the previously
10 applicable Law on Criminal Procedure no longer valid. And the whole
11 matter was handed over to the prosecutor's office. And this is where any
12 further jurisdiction of a public security centre ceases. Why they
13 weren't prosecuted, I don't know. I may have been mistaken about the
14 year, but at any rate, I can tell you that based on that criminal report
15 from 1992, these prisoners are today serving their sentence either in
16 Bijeljina or in Banja Luka. I don't know where.
17 Q. Mr. Andan, what surprises me, most police officers - and we have
18 a lot of them in our office - they care about the cases they investigate
19 and they want to know what happens, what happens with their work. Are
20 you saying you are not caring when you give it to the prosecutor's
21 office, it's over for you, you don't bother anymore to inquire what
22 happened with your file? Are you telling us that?
23 A. No, no. Of course I do care about having the individual in
24 question prosecuted. There are records based on which one can check that
25 indeed the prosecutor's office took into their jurisdiction the file and
1 the individual, but since I left, I no longer had an opportunity to
2 inquire and find out how far the case had gone. It would have been
3 logical for me to do so had I continued working for the MUP in Bijeljina.
4 In that case you could have rightly asked me, "Why didn't you send a
5 single memo to them to inquire about the stages to which the case
6 progressed?" But for the various reasons that I have already said - I
7 will not repeat them - I no longer had the ability to inquire about these
8 cases, just as I didn't have the opportunity to inquire about the case
9 involving Yellow Wasps. Those who took up the position after I left had
10 those case files on their desk and could have dealt with them, or rather,
11 could have inquired about how far they progressed.
12 Even in the communist regime we were banned from putting any
13 pressure on the prosecutor. It was believed that once a case is put
14 together and handed over to the prosecutor's office, the powers of the
15 MUP cease. We could have answered questions that the prosecutor may have
16 had of us and supplemented the case file if required to do so.
17 Q. Did you ever inquire informally with your former colleagues or in
18 your position at the security administration in the VRS? I mean, there
19 are ways. You didn't do that?
20 A. The very manner in which I left the MUP put an end to all my
21 concerns and my interests. To put it simply, I just didn't want to
22 inquire about any case that I dealt with previously. I didn't want to
23 have any contact whatsoever with the MUP because I left the MUP feeling
24 very irritated and that is when my interest stopped.
25 Q. Let's move on to Zvornik in relation to the planning of the
1 operations against the Yellow Wasps, and I do not want to go into any
2 details because you have given so many details in your testimony and
3 there's no need for that and we also have your reports. I'm -- I only
4 want to clarify one point. In your testimony at page 21473 you basically
5 said that you planned and carried it out -- carried the operation out
6 against the Yellow Wasps, and when you use the term "we," you sometimes
7 use the term "we go" when you explained what was going on, and I think
8 that -- is it correct that you mean Mr. Davidovic and you planned it and
9 executed it with of course --
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. Correct. Mico Davidovic and I. And the forces with which he
13 came to Bijeljina and the forces of the Ministry of the Interior of
14 Republika Srpska, that was a joint operation, a joint plan and
15 implementation, and our assessment was that we needed the support of a
16 special unit led by Mr. Milenko Karisik and we informed the Main Staff of
17 the VRS who also provided some forces, but the latter forces did not take
18 part in the operation.
19 Q. I ask you this because Milenko Karisik, in his written evidence,
20 at paragraph 31 of his statement under D3749, claims that he prepared the
21 operation and he completed it successfully. What do you say? You smile,
22 so what do you say to this?
23 A. I wouldn't like to use some abusive and foul words, but what he
24 says is not correct. The whole operation was prepared by
25 Mr. Mico Davidovic, Dragomir Andan and Goran Zugic who was the then-chief
1 of national security in Zvornik. Due to the complexity of the situation,
2 we invited a special unit led at the time by Milenko Karisik who did not
3 take part in the operation, which I can confirm with full responsibility,
4 and I would tell them the same thing to his face if we were -- if we were
6 Q. Yes, thank you. I would now like you to see Exhibit P00036 on
7 the screen. And it is your report dated 20 July 1993 in which you report
8 on three paramilitary groups commanded by Zuco, Pivarski, and Niski. And
9 you go into details of their strengths and the locations, the weaponry,
10 and so on and so forth, but we do not need to go there because you have
11 provided all this in your previous testimony.
12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I just want to go to page 5 in the English,
13 second paragraph, and page 5 in the B/C/S, also second paragraph.
14 Q. And you say here that:
15 "Zuco carries out all his criminal acts in return for larger
16 amounts of money exclusively with assistance of respective members of the
17 Government of Serb Municipality Zvornik ..."
18 To whom are you referring here? Who is in the boat with this
20 A. You have to make a correction. It's not the 20th of July, 1993.
21 I think it should read 20th of July, 1992.
22 Q. Yes. I definitely meant to say "1992." I'm sorry when I said
23 "1993." Of course 1992. But my question.
24 A. We have established beyond doubt that Mr. Zuco had direct
25 contacts with the chief of the legal administration department and that
1 the two of them were involved in some [indiscernible] with driver's
2 licences and licence plates for vehicles. Secondly, whether his name was
3 Marko Pavlovic or is it his alias, I don't know. He was the commander of
4 the TO staff at the time in Zvornik. Zuco had a close relationship with
5 him. This is the two names that I remember at the moment who were
6 members of the Zvornik authorities and Zuco was closely connected with
7 them and involved in illegal transactions.
8 Q. Just let me ask you, maybe I just forgot the name, but who is the
9 chief of the legal administration department?
10 A. I can't remember, but to be honest, I must admit that I
11 overstepped my authority to a certain extent during his arrest because I
12 was very much affected in a bad way by seeing a policeman being involved
13 in such transactions. So I must admit that I overstepped my authority by
14 using physical force against him, but anyway I cannot remember his name.
15 Q. Marko Pavlovic, you arrested him also, correct? "You" meaning
16 you and Mr. Davidovic and the troops. You arrested him?
17 A. That is correct. We arrested him and we handed him over to the
18 national security service and he was driven to Sokolac by car. When I
19 made some further inquiries about him, I received information that he was
20 sick, that he had epilepsy, and that he had a seizure during detention in
21 Sokolac, as a result of which he was driven to Serbia and hospitalised
22 somewhere. That's all I know. But it is true that we did arrest him
23 because we established that he was directly linked with Zuco. And I also
24 omitted to mention the chief of the police station, I think his first
25 name was Marko, and he was another person who was closely connected to
1 Zuco. Maybe he still is called Marko. He might still be alive.
2 Q. Do you know about the expulsion of the Muslims from Kozluk in
3 June 1992?
4 A. I personally have no information about that, but I believe that
5 in preparation for these activities we heard some fragments of the story,
6 but not the entire story, about the expulsion of Muslims from Kozluk.
7 Therefore, I cannot give you a proper answer. I did hear some
8 insinuations about that, but I have no specific information. It was in
9 the month of June; is that what you said?
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. No, no. At the time I was in Brcko and therefore I cannot give
12 you a complete answer.
13 Q. Then I will not address this with you.
14 In relation to Brcko, I wanted to ask you about a particular
15 document, and let me just see --
16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry, Your Honour. Yes, I have it now.
17 Q. It is a document that's already before this Trial Chamber and it
18 is P02889 and it is a report of Captain Cuturic from the Eastern Bosnian
19 Corps command of the 29th of September, 1992. And as you co-operated to
20 a certain extent with the Eastern Bosnia Corps and co-ordinated, did you
21 meet Captain Cuturic? Would you know him?
22 A. No, this is the first that I hear of him.
23 Q. We do not need to go into many details. He basically, in this
24 document, shared the same views on certain paramilitary groups that you
25 also had spoken about. I just want to refer you to -- one question. He
1 refers to a Major Gavrilovic. Do you know this person, do you know who
2 that is?
3 A. There was a Gavrilovic, a commander of a Semberija Brigade, but I
4 don't know his first name, whether it was Nedjo or not, I don't know.
5 Anyway, I do know that there was a Gavrilovic, the commander of either
6 the 1st or the 2nd Semberija Brigade. And if it is the one and the same
7 person, I don't know.
8 Q. Because here this captain refers to Mauzer and Major Gavrilovic
9 with Arkan's men led by Peja came to Brcko at some point in time in May.
10 You don't know that?
11 A. No, no.
12 Q. Okay --
13 A. I cannot speak about the month of May because I came to Brcko on
14 the 12th of June or 15th of June. Anyway, the date can be checked in the
16 Q. And in the last paragraph on this page here, he refers to the
17 testimony of an Orthodox priest, Slavko, who described how Muslims and
18 Croatian people were taken out and killed in front of their houses. And
19 I quote, he says:
20 "Such liquidations were committed unprofessionally and publicly
21 and were available to everyone."
22 Did you hear about this massacre that he is referring here to?
23 A. No, I didn't. In one of my testimonies when I was asked about
24 Jelesic, I said what I had learned about him. And during my stay there
25 two or three days later, due to the measures that we undertaken, Jelesic
1 fled to Bijeljina.
2 Now, as for these public executions, this is the first time that
3 I hear about it. My primary task was to consolidate the police station
4 in Brcko and hopefully I managed to do that and other people can confirm
5 the same, and I am glad that it happened that way.
6 Q. And while you were in Brcko, did you ever investigate mass graves
7 of Muslim victims being murdered or Croats being murdered? Was that not
8 one of your tasks?
9 A. That would have been one of my tasks had I remained in Brcko, but
10 we say you build a house starting from the foundation. So my first task
11 was to set up the police station, to fill the vacancies, and to fill the
12 gaps that were left by the departure of Croats and Muslims, and only
13 after that could I proceed with this procedure. So two or three weeks
14 while I was there wasn't at all enough for me to investigate murders,
15 rapes, and other dishonourable acts that were committed during that
17 Q. Mr. Andan, considering your written evidence and the reports and
18 that we have heard also from other witnesses about the events in Brcko,
19 Bijeljina, and Zvornik you were involved in, your activities and your
20 achievements in such a short time, one could have expected that you be
21 rewarded during the events and not dismissed. Correct?
22 A. I explained this a while ago. I told you what the main reason
23 was, and that was Mr. Kovac's antagonism which was publicly displayed
24 towards me. I tried to distance myself from that because of the
25 strategic position of Bijeljina and the greater possibilities offering
1 opportunities to those people to trade in oil and other goods. So the
2 reason was not my inefficiency, and the documents show that both
3 Mr. Davidovic and I did a good job there and there was no other reason
4 except for the one I already mentioned. They even used as an excuse this
5 poker machine. But they were just looking for something that would give
6 them an excuse to remove me from my position.
7 Q. And instead of rewarding you, a criminal like Ljubisa Savic,
8 Mauzer, was rewarded by Mr. Karadzic. You're aware of this?
9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And I refer here -- Your Honour, I refer
10 here to P2856, a video-clip.
11 Q. Are you aware of this?
12 A. What kind of reward are you talking about?
13 Q. We have a video-clip where he's basically praised for his conduct
14 and his achievements. You are not aware of this?
15 A. No, I'm not. Trust me.
16 Q. And the criminal Arkan parades his unit before Mr. Karadzic in
17 Bijeljina and he's also praised, and I refer here to P2858. Are you
18 aware of this?
19 A. No, I didn't know about that. I read about it only after the
21 Q. Koroman was kept in the police, even promoted, while you were
22 removed. Zuco and this Branko Pavlovic were received by Ms. Plavsic.
23 Would you agree that your establishment of law and order that allowed the
24 Muslims to stay safely in Bijeljina and elsewhere and to arrest and
25 remove the criminals, that was not appreciated by the Bosnian Serb
1 leadership, and that's not just Mr. Kovac, it's the Bosnian Serb
2 leadership. Isn't that the reality?
3 A. Look, first of all, I don't know why several dismissals of
4 ministers of the interior took place at all. It's not up to me to say
5 why. I knew Mr. Stanisic even before the war. I had him in high regard
6 as a professional, but he was succeeded by some people who never in their
7 life were even near a police station. So one has to take all these
8 circumstances into account.
9 People who are leading an organisation need to know at least
10 basic things about the Ministry of the Interior, and the policy-makers in
11 the ministry are the most responsible for all the implementation of all
12 measures on the ground. And that is what I see as a problem because all
13 of a sudden an XY person comes, he had had no connection with the
14 ministry before that, and he is now expected to create the policy of the
15 ministry. I believe that had we had more professionals leading the
16 ministry, the things in the -- on the ground would have been different.
17 The policy-maker in the ministry is the minister, and he decides
18 in which direction the ministry would go. Mico Stanisic - and I have no
19 reason to defend him - during the most difficult period of lawlessness
20 managed to establish certain structures of authority and managed to put
21 out the worst fires in that period. I suppose that he would testify here
22 and I suppose that you're going to ask him why he was dismissed. I don't
23 know that, but in my view, some people who came after him, such as
24 Ratko Adzic or this Rakic person, were persons who did not have proper
25 training or skill and had no concept of what the MUP was and that's why
1 we had problems on the ground.
2 I cannot deal with the situation if I don't have any support from
3 the leadership. During my tenure, I enjoyed the support of Mr. Stanisic,
4 and not only I, everybody else. Just take a look at the dispatches sent
5 by Mr. Stanisic during his term of office concerning the screening of
6 criminals and other matters.
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Andan.
8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, no further questions.
9 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do, Your Excellency. If I
11 receive short answers, I hope we'll be able to end before the end of the
12 session; if not, then we'll have to ask Mr. Andan to stay here over the
13 weekend and come back next week. I would very much like you to ask him
14 that, whether he would be bothered if he were asked to stay over the
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I arrived here to testify. I'm at
17 your disposal, and you finish whenever you can.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 Given that we started a bit -- ten minutes later, could we go on
20 until 3.00 if possible?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
23 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Andan, I'll start with last things first,
24 those things which are freshest in your memory. Could you please tell
25 us, when it comes to Mauzer, after the war was he certified by the
1 international police? Did he have a position and what kind of position
2 did he have?
3 A. Not only Mr. Mauzer. All of us active members of the Ministry of
4 the Interior were vetted by international organisations and we were
5 certified by them. Mr. Ljubisa Savic, Mauzer, were also under the
6 certification process and he was the assistant minister for the policing
7 matters after the war. I believe that it was in 1998 but I'm not sure.
8 Q. Thank you. Could he become that, if we leave aside his character
9 and nature, if he had been a proven criminal?
10 A. Well, without a conviction, he could not have not been certified.
11 He should have been sentenced first.
12 Q. Would you say that Mauzer and his fighters were absolutely equal
13 to Arkan and his fighters? Were the units the same as their commanders
14 or perhaps you can tell us something different about those units?
15 A. No, I wouldn't say that the two were completely equal. I can't
16 say that Mr. Mauzer equalled his unit. As far as I know, his unit was
17 most active when Mauzer was not there, when his deputy was in charge.
18 What I know about his unit is that his unit was successful in war time,
19 on missions, but when his deputy was in charge they were even more
20 successful than when he was there.
21 Q. Thank you. On page 87 it says that you were supposed to be
22 rewarded rather than dismissed. That's how the question was worded by
23 Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. From the first report that you sent to the
24 liquidation of those situations in Brcko, Bijeljina, and Zvornik, were
25 you demoted or promoted in service?
1 A. In objective terms, I would say that when I arrived in Semberija
2 and Majevica it was as a senior inspector. My activities, particularly
3 those activities that I carried out together with Mr. Davidovic, prompted
4 the under-secretary Mr. Cedo Kljajic to promote me into the acting chief
5 of the public security centre in Bijeljina. I perceive that as promotion
6 because it was based on selfless and honest work.
7 Q. Thank you. When it comes to the planning of operations, you said
8 that you planned these operations together. Would the commander of a
9 unit have to plan that part of the operation that pertains to his unit?
10 A. Yes, one part of the operation, yes.
11 Q. Thank you. You were shown an interview and you said that you
12 didn't authenticate it. Would you repeat such an interview under oath?
13 A. Mr. Karadzic, I have to provide several explanations before I
14 officially answer your question. In Sokolac, the chief of security
15 centre Zeljko Markovic was killed. On behalf of the ministry, I went to
16 Pale to -- where -- or rather, I was supposed to go to Pale to be in
17 charge of the complete investigation. 100 kilometres away from
18 Banja Luka my superior told me to go back because I was told that they
19 couldn't guarantee my safety in Sokolac if I arrived there and if I were
20 put in charge of the investigation. I entered a verbal conflict with the
21 minister of the interior, Mr. Dragomir Jovicic, and I asked from him to
22 tell me why I had been returned. How could somebody call the minister of
23 the interior and tell him that they did not guarantee safety for an
24 official arriving in Sokolac. I was irritated by the minister's answer,
25 which was very brief. I went to report it and I gave an interview of my
1 own will, mind you. I said in my previous evidence that nobody had ever
2 asked me to authenticate the interview. You can check that. This is
3 correct. If I were to give the same interview today, I would
4 authenticate half of it and I wouldn't authenticate the other half
6 Q. Thank you. When it was said that you were supposed to be
7 rewarded, do you remember whether we tried to talk to the minister of
8 defence and the minister of the interior and to all the civilian
9 ministers and that we failed with the ministry, and were you invited to
10 come back to the MUP together with Minister Stanisic?
11 A. I just tried to explain that a little while ago --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just before you further continue.
13 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.
14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think that is a very leading question to
15 say: Do you remember whether ... and so on and so forth. That's
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Andan, you mentioned that Adzic and Rakic were not successful
20 as ministers. Were they civilians or were they appointed as ministers by
21 the MUP?
22 A. Mr. Karadzic, I said before the Trial Chamber that that was my
23 personal opinion. They were civilians. As a professional I would like
24 to share my opinion with you. I don't think that they were successful
25 ministers, although they joined the ministry as civilians.
1 Q. Did you and Minister Stanisic receive invitations to return to
2 the MUP? Did you return after those two civilians?
3 A. In 1994, Mr. Stanisic was reinstated. He took over the Ministry
4 of the Interior again. I don't know during what part of her mandate that
5 happened, whether in the first half or the second half. I was invited in
6 the Kikinda villa or Kikinda hotel at Pale. Mr. Stanisic invited me
7 there and the chief of national security, Mr. Dragan Kijac was present
8 during that conversation. I was offered an opportunity to re-join the
9 Ministry of the Interior and Mr. Stanisic told me that he wanted me to
10 set up a unit which would comprise about 120 men, that I should be in
11 charge of that unit, and that I should set up an operations department
12 and an analytical department which would counter all forms of crime and
13 war crime, and he had in mind the crimes that were committed between 1992
14 and 1994, and that there is money for that unit and for all the
16 I was supposed to select men. I was supposed to select the
17 facility that we would occupy and that we would -- under the authority of
18 the Ministry of the Interior and the chief of national security. I was
19 taken by surprise. That was my prime feeling. But I was also very glad.
20 At first I even -- I agreed. I believe that that was during the second
21 half of Stanisic's mandate. I agreed. I consented to that proposal on a
22 condition that I was allowed to choose my personnel, that nobody could
23 impose people on me, that the national security vetted every person that
24 was supposed to be a unit member, that they made sure that they didn't
25 have a criminal record, and after that I was supposed -- I would have
1 been ready to launch that unit's activities. Unfortunately, very soon
2 after that Mr. Stanisic was removed. He returned to Belgrade and that
3 unit never took off the ground. It was never even established.
4 Q. And what about that proposal for setting up such a unit, did it
5 have anything to do with your mission in Brcko, Bijeljina, and Zvornik?
6 A. I suppose that that was indeed the case because Mr. Stanisic knew
7 very well how we behaved and what we did in those three municipalities.
8 Obviously being aware of all that, he invited me and he offered me the
10 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us, we heard in this courtroom
11 that Minister Ostojic was ill-treated. We heard evidence that the
12 civilian authorities in Zvornik were also abused. What was your
13 conclusion? Why did -- the Yellow Wasps and militaries were so adamantly
14 against the civilian authorities? It has been suggested here that they
15 were arrested because they were against the legitimate authorities. Do
16 you have your professional opinion about that?
17 A. No, no, they were not arrested only because of that. I told you
18 that some of the authorities were directly connected to Zuco and I've
19 even given you their names. But the main objective of ours was to
20 neutralise the paramilitary unit which was involved in plunder, rapes,
21 murders, and the expulsion of Muslims, and that was all proven by
22 investigations. When Muslim houses could no longer be plundered because
23 there were none to be plundered, they started robbing Serbian houses.
24 They were not there in order to help Serbian fighters on the front lines.
25 They were there to get rich. They destroyed the few factories that still
1 worked and existed, and they created a situation of hopelessness in
2 Zvornik so that both Serbs and Muslims were afraid to walk through the
3 town at day and at night.
4 Q. So who was the first to turn against whom? Was it them that
5 turned against the authorities or was it the authorities that turned
6 against them?
7 A. They opposed the legitimate authorities. According to some
8 information, they wanted to replace the legitimate president of the
9 municipality by somebody loyal to them. They also wanted to remove the
10 president of the Executive Board. They even entered the structure of the
11 police structures in Zvornik. The commander reported to Zuco more than
12 he did to us, although he was supposed to be accountable to us and nobody
14 Q. Thank you. When operative plans are drafted and when an
15 operation is prepared, how long did that last? It was an operation after
16 all, wasn't it?
17 A. Yes, it was. Under normal war-time conditions -- rather,
18 peace-time conditions, we were supposed to open a file. We were supposed
19 to do all the checks for all the persons. We were supposed to gather
20 evidence in respect of those persons. Due to war-time situation, we
21 couldn't do that. We did a shortened procedure as it were. We met with
22 the chief of national security, Mr. Davidovic, and I met with the late
23 Goran Zugic who was already in Zvornik and he already had a lot of
24 information, intelligence, and then we agreed. And that was perhaps
25 10 or 12 days before the operation started. Then we agreed that I
1 personally with three operatives would change into civilian clothes, that
2 we would enter Zvornik, and that we would take stock of all the
3 facilities where those paramilitaries were billeted. We even crossed
4 over the river Drina because they had certain houses and facilities where
5 they stayed in the territory of Mali Zvornik.
6 When we gathered all the intelligence that we needed, we embarked
7 on the drafting of the operation plan, and it had to be comprehensive.
8 It didn't have to include only the forces and equipment that we had at
9 our disposal, but rather all of the other relevant information that was
10 necessary in order to neutralise them without any major consequences.
11 Fortunately enough, there were no consequences and those people were
13 Q. So it took some time; right?
14 A. Yes, that's right.
15 Q. In the light of those circumstances, how do you see the
16 humiliation of Minister Ostojic? Because it was suggested that that was
17 the reason.
18 A. I said, when the Prosecutor asked me that, that that was not the
19 key reason. Mr. Ostojic was at the check-point perhaps two or three days
20 before we started the operation. I think that that may have sped things
21 along. Maybe we should have spent some more time on planning, but we
22 started implementation much sooner. But that was not the main reason,
23 the ill-treatment and humiliation of the minister at the check-point was
24 not the reason.
25 Q. When it comes to providing security, did you know my security
1 detail? Do you know who my security detail members were and whether they
2 were MUP employees?
3 A. When it comes to that matrix, if I can call it that, we adopted
4 that matrix from the republican MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Obviously
5 your security detail had to be operative, i.e., you had a team who
6 collected intelligence about risks threatening your person. There was
7 also the so-called physical security and those were your body-guards.
8 Those lads that I knew were policemen even before the war.
9 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you this: When a president was attending
10 a meeting of sorts and he had his security along, who would be securing
11 the event itself. Would that be the host of the event or would the
12 president have his security do that?
13 A. Well, in addition to your close protection, your personal detail,
14 there were those who had to secure the route. This was done by the
15 relevant municipal MUP. Now, as for the venue where the president and
16 his associates would be, the chief of security centre would be the one in
17 charge of making sure that security's provided for that venue and its
18 immediate vicinity.
19 Q. Thank you. On page 50 it was suggested to you that the Muslims
20 needed protection from Serbian soldiers and formations. Let me ask you
21 this: These Serb "soldiers" and these Serb formations, did they have
22 legality and legitimacy, as it were? Were the authorities firmly behind
24 A. Well, firstly, the Muslims were unable to seek protection from
25 the army. That part of the job fell upon the Ministry of the Interior.
1 The army was at the front line and the police was in the town. I don't
2 know which formations you had in mind specifically. If you meant
3 paramilitary formations, they had no legitimacy whatsoever nor were they
4 able to provide protection to the Muslim people.
5 Q. I may have been unclear. The idea was that they needed someone
6 to protect them from the Serb formations and soldiers. So this is my
7 question: These people who endangered the Muslims, did they have the
8 legality and the legitimacy that goes along with the Serbian soldiers?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Were you the Serb forces and those who co-operated with you?
11 A. Well, figuratively speaking I represent the state. The state has
12 delegated me to carry out law enforcement jobs out in the field and I was
13 doing that and members of the Ministry of the Interior were doing
14 precisely that.
15 Q. At page 36, at the start of cross-examination, it was suggested
16 that agreements were reached between the various parties for appointments
17 and positions. Can you tell us, did I interfere with the staffing policy
18 or was it simply that I would receive information and it would be the
19 Serb collegium that would propose candidates for these posts?
20 A. Had that been the case you would have needed six more lives to
21 allow you to solve all these problems. I know that you with
22 Mr. Izetbegovic and, who was it, was it Kljujic, you of course arranged
23 only for what was to be the Serb personnel and now it was the personnel
24 services further down the line, your line, that would be dealing with
25 these issues specifically.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Andan. Apparently I don't have any more questions
2 for you, as these are not pertinent. Thank you for your testimony.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.
4 Unless my colleagues have a question for you, Mr. Andan, that
5 concludes your evidence. On behalf of the Chamber and the Tribunal as a
6 whole, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.
7 Now you're free to go.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will have to seize
9 this opportunity to ask once more that measures be taken with regard to
10 Milan Lukic, your detainee, from whom I keep receiving threats, myself
11 and my family. Yesterday when I visited Mr. Karadzic, I was again
12 threatened by Mr. Lukic, that he would liquidate myself and my family,
13 and I'm appealing once more to you that measures be taken that
14 Milan Lukic be prevented from telephoning my family in Belgrade.
15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will take a look into that with very
16 much concern.
17 We'll continue on Monday morning at 9.00. The hearing is
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Monday, the 8th day of
21 July, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.