1 Thursday, 11 July 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 11.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Today we will be sitting
7 pursuant to Rule 15 bis, with Judge Morrison being away due to his urgent
8 matters. Yes, Mr. Robinson?
9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Before the witness is sworn in if I could
10 just introduce Joseph Sadon, who is a law student at
11 Georgetown Law Centre in the United States. He will be joining us this
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Harvey?
14 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. May
15 I introduce Amanda Soraiz, who is a second-year law student at
16 Case Western Reserve Law School in the United States who has been with us
17 for the last three months. Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Ceklic. Do you hear
19 me in the language you understand, Mr. Ceklic?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, yes, I do.
21 JUDGE KWON: If you could make the solemn declaration, please.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
23 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
24 WITNESS: SAVO CEKLIC
25 [Witness answered through interpreter]
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Ceklic. Please be seated, and make
2 yourself comfortable.
3 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
4 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Just one thing before
5 we proceed. There is one loose end from Mr. Pasic's testimony.
6 Yesterday morning, Ms. Sutherland advised that she no longer objected to
7 the admission of 1D9291 and we never actually admitted that document or
8 marked it for identification so if we could do that, that would be
10 JUDGE KWON: It was marked for identification.
11 MR. ROBINSON: Well, it's not recorded as having been marked for
12 identification. It was offered to be marked for identification and it's
13 in -- still recorded in with a 1D number and without a D number.
14 JUDGE KWON: I will come back to it after having taken a look at
16 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please proceed.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning Excellencies. Good
18 morning to everyone.
19 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Ceklic, Professor Ceklic. Let
21 me be precise in addressing you.
22 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
23 Q. Professor, have you given a statement to my Defence team?
24 A. Yes, I have.
25 Q. Thank you for pausing before answering. It seems that you have
1 an experience as a witness.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have in e-court
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Can you please look at one of the screens in front of you. Can
6 you see your statement?
7 A. Yes, I can, Mr. President. This is the statement that I gave and
9 Q. Thank you. Does it accurately reflect what you told the Defence
11 A. Entirely.
12 Q. Thank you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can witness please be shown the
14 last page so that he can identify his signature?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. On 7 July of this year,
16 I signed this statement.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today as
19 the questions put to you during the interview, would your answers
20 essentially be the same?
21 A. Mr. President, they would be entirely the same. However, there
22 is a time limitation at this Tribunal that doesn't allow me to provide
23 extensive explanations. However, whatever I said is recorded in the
24 paper that I see in front of me.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this statement
2 into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 ter.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, any objections?
5 MS. GUSTAFSON: No. Good morning, Your Honours. No, thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: We will receive it.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3854, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'm now going to read a
10 summary of Professor Savo Ceklic's statement in English.
11 [In English] Savo Ceklic was one of the founders of the SDS, a
12 member of its Main Board and also a member of the Executive Committee of
13 the party.
14 The SDS was founded as a response to the SDA and HDZ parties in
15 order to represent political interests of the Bosnian Serbs. In
16 September 1990, the SDS council for interethnic and interparty
17 co-operation was founded -- was formed and when the council became the
18 SDS political council, Savo Ceklic was appointed general --
19 secretary-general. President Karadzic demanded that all council members
20 do their utmost to create conditions for compromises and discussion with
21 the leaders of the two other parties. When the ministerial council was
22 formed on 21st of December, 1991, Savo Ceklic was appointed minister for
23 international co-operation. Haris Silajdzic was the secretary. Without
24 the knowledge of others, in the ministry Silajdzic travelled mostly to
25 Islamic countries and was illegally buying weapons with a view to arming
1 the paramilitary Muslim and Croatian units in BH.
2 On 31st of March, 1991, the SDA established its own armed unit,
3 the Patriotic League, while the Croats formed HOS and HVO units in the
4 areas where they were in the majority.
5 Aware of the danger of the war, the Serbian people and their
6 leadership saw the JNA as the only force that could prevent it. In the
7 autumn 1991, Muslim and Croatian armed units ruled the city of Sarajevo.
8 They checked IDs and searched Serbian citizens. Serbian houses and
9 apartments were raided and looted while the Serbs were physically
10 maltreated, arrested and killed. Serbian women and girls were raped.
11 The Muslim and Croats put the city of Sarajevo under blockade, as it is
12 shown by the fact that Savo Ceklic had to illegally pay a Muslim in order
13 to pass through the blockades and find shelter in the territory under the
14 control of the Serbs. Dr. Radovan Karadzic always tried to negotiate a
15 peaceful solution to the problems in BH. Dr. Karadzic never proposed
16 removing the Muslim -- Bosnian Muslims and Croats from the area under the
17 control of the Bosnian Serbs. On the contrary, he always insisted to
18 co-existence with the other people in BH.
19 And at that moment I do not have any questions.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr. Ceklic, as you have noted, your
21 evidence-in-chief in this case has been admitted in writing, that is
22 through your written witness statement in lieu of your oral testimony.
23 Now you will be cross-examined by the representative of the
24 Office of the Prosecutor. Do you understand that?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I do. May I just make one
1 correction? Mr. Karadzic, I was an under-secretary in the
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Silajdzic was the minister.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. This is just a summary.
4 This is not an exhibit so probably we made this error, thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the correction, Mr. Ceklic.
6 Yes, Ms. Gustafson.
7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:
9 Q. And good morning, Mr. Ceklic.
10 A. Good morning.
11 Q. You explained in your statement that you were one of the founders
12 of the SDS and a member of the SDS Main Board and Executive Board. With
13 respect to the Main Board, it's correct, is it not, that you were a
14 Main Board member during 1990 but you were not re-elected to the SDS
15 Main Board at the SDS assembly in July 1991?
16 A. That is correct. May I clarify why it happened that way?
17 Q. If the -- if Dr. Karadzic is interested in more details, he can
18 ask of that of you in redirect. So it's correct that from July 1991
19 forwards, you were no longer a member of the SDS Main Board?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. And similarly, from July 1991 forwards, you were not a member of
22 the SDS Executive Board either; is that right?
23 A. Correct as well.
24 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could have D1277 on the screen, please.
25 Q. Now, Mr. Ceklic, the document on the screen are the minutes from
1 the 11th of March, 1992, joint meeting of the Main Board, Executive Board
2 and political council. And in your statement you mentioned that you were
3 the general secretary of the political council. So I'm wondering whether
4 you were present at this meeting on the 11th of March, 1992, through your
5 work with the political council.
6 A. I cannot remember exactly, but before I ceased to be a member of
7 the Executive Committee, our policy was to avoid assigning too many
8 officers to one person, both in the political wing of the party and the
9 executive branch. When I became an under-secretary in the Ministry
10 of Foreign Affairs I thought that was sufficient for me, as far as duty
11 goes, but I believe that it was necessary for me to remain the
12 secretary-general of the political council because, in my view, members
13 of the political council, and that was the opinion shared by the public,
14 were the greatest Serbian intellectuals, members of the academy,
15 professors of university, writers, and other prominent people, and
16 I remained with them for as long as the council existed. After that,
17 I thought that new people should come, especially people --
18 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I was simply asking whether you
19 were present at this meeting and your answer was "I cannot remember," and
20 that's sufficient. And if I could ask you to try to focus.
21 A. I don't remember.
22 Q. Thank you. If we could look at -- I'd like to show you a couple
23 of passages from this meeting. The first one is about halfway down the
24 second paragraph, roughly in the middle of the page. And it says, it has
25 been established that the party leadership at the republic level leads a
1 very good policy and that it represents the will and choice of the Serb
2 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if we could look at the fourth
3 paragraph, which is at the bottom of the page, where they point out some
4 weaknesses in the political work and field organisation, and it says:
5 "Namely there are some cases of inactivity, non-resourcefulness
6 or non-execution of the established party policy in the field."
7 And then on the next page in the B/C/S, and at the bottom in the
8 English it says:
9 "Therefore, as it has been stated, problems and serious
10 difficulties in execution of the agreed and established opinions occur.
11 A question should be raised as soon as possible," if we could turn in the
12 English, "regarding the responsibility of those personnel since the party
13 placed them at those working positions."
14 And skipping to the -- not the next paragraph but the following
15 one, it says:
16 "Furthermore, it has been stated in the field," it lists some
17 locations, "there are serious problems which are the result of inactivity
18 and non-execution of the agreed policy. Therefore, an energetic approach
19 in overcoming the arisen problems should be taken and the agreed policy
20 should be executed through all available mechanisms.
21 And then there is a request that the party president more firmly
22 exercise his statutory and other authorisations while tackling this
24 And then two more paragraphs down there are, apart from insisting
25 on a firmer political unity and a stronger centralised policy and other
1 party powers, the strongest questions raised by all present at the
2 meeting, asking for a firmer political unity and a greater political
3 centralisation of the party shall stop, as it was emphasised, any
4 eventual straying of particular persons from the global policy.
5 Now, Mr. Ceklic at paragraph 4 of your statement you said that
6 the SDS party was not centralist and that the SDS bodies at the republic,
7 regional city and municipal levels made all political decisions at their
9 But this document, these minutes, reflect, do they not, the SDS
10 leadership's insistence that the SDS policies established by the party
11 leadership, are executed by party officials at all levels?
12 A. The party was not centralistic. It was the party of the centre.
13 It was neither a left-wing or a right-wing party, but it was truly a
14 centre party. At the time when war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started, many
15 enclaves were cut off from the central office. For example, it happened
16 that for several months the region of Banja Luka and other regions were
17 completely severed from Sarajevo. Due to that, it was impossible to
18 reach any agreements. That is why it is mentioned here that in that
19 case, leaders of municipal boards and presidents of regional party
20 branches should make their own agreements and take their own decisions,
21 that would be in line, what was laid down by the Main Board; because it
22 was physically impossible to establish a connection, for example, between
23 Banja Luka and Sarajevo, or between Banja Luka and Gorazde and other
24 places that were besieged by Muslim or Croatian forces in Posavina and
25 that is why this happened. So in a nutshell, we had a communication to a
1 certain extent or, rather, an understanding that if the people on the
2 ground had to take certain decisions based on the agreements that were
3 made at the time when the party was established, which was that the party
4 should never be a centralistic one, that there should be a centre
5 oriented party, then all decisions should be made in agreement with
6 municipal boards. Mr. Karadzic kept insisting on both at the Main Board
7 and Executive Board meetings and in the political council, and he used to
8 say, I quote, It is better to talk and negotiate with Muslims and Croats
9 for a hundred years rather than to spill a single drop of blood. I must,
10 please, I must finish my sentence, please allow me to do that.
11 Q. Mr. Ceklic, I'm very sorry to cut you off. But again you're
12 straying quite far from the answer and my time is very limited.
13 JUDGE KWON: If necessary, Mr. Ceklic, Mr. Karadzic may take up
14 the issue.
15 Yes, please continue, Ms. Gustafson.
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.
17 Q. Mr. Ceklic, you made several comments about what happened after
18 the outbreak of the war and communication capabilities. Which is
19 interesting because in your statement you say that you left Sarajevo on
20 the 9th of May, 1992, and in November 1993 you moved to Bijeljina and
21 there is no indication in your statement of what you were doing in
22 between those dates, which is a relatively important period of time in
23 relation to this case. And it's right, is it not, that when you left
24 Sarajevo you went to Serbia, to Novi Sad?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And while you were in Novi Sad you joined Mr. Seselj's SRS party
2 and you were appointed as an SRS member to the Novi Sad government, were
3 you not?
4 A. Yes. But what does that have to do with the situation in
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: If I could have 65 ter 25362, please.
7 Q. Mr. Ceklic, this document is an article from "Slobodna Bosna"
8 from October 2003 and it discusses, among other things, your candidacy
9 with the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It's connected to the
10 indication in your statement that you served previously as an ambassador
11 for Bosnia. And the gist of the article is that there were some things
12 that you left out of the biography that you provided to the
13 Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I'd like to direct you to a
14 couple of passages. So if we could go to page 2 in the B/C/S and the
15 bottom of the page in the English, and this is at the very bottom
16 right-hand corner of the B/C/S, if we could expand that portion of the
17 article. And right at the bottom, the second last paragraph, it says:
18 "Ceklic, however, left out many details from his biography. He
19 forgot among others to put down that he was sentenced by the municipal
20 court in Secanje [phoen] in 1967 for the criminal offences of falsifying
21 an official document, fraud and defrauding. The Court established that
22 from December 1965 to August 1966, Ceklic falsely claimed," this is on
23 the next page in the B/C/S, in the middle left-hand side, "Ceklic falsely
24 claimed that he had graduated from the faculty of natural sciences and
25 mathematics in Sarajevo, and on the occasion of being taken on in the
1 employ of the Vuk Karadzic gymnasium in Loznica and subsequently when
2 being taken on by the gymnasium in Secanje he presented a forged copy of
3 a university degree diploma."
4 Is that correct, Mr. Ceklic, that you were convicted for
5 falsifying documents?
6 A. It is not correct. Could you show me that document, please?
7 Q. I'm asking you the question, Mr. Ceklic, whether it's correct
8 that you were convicted in the 1960s for falsifying a document and fraud?
9 A. No. Show me that document, please.
10 Q. You've answered the question. I'd like to show you one other
11 passage which is on page 2 in the English and it's at the far right-hand
12 side towards the bottom in the B/C/S.
13 So towards the bottom of page 2 in the English and onto page 3 it
14 says: Savo Ceklic also forgot to put down that he was secretary for
15 culture and education in Novi Sad during the war year 1993. He was
16 selected for this position as a member and candidate of Vojislav Seselj's
17 Serbian Radical Party. In June of the same year, the Novi Sad paper
18 "Novosti" published a text entitled, "The minister, an official forger"
19 revealing details from the court proceedings against Ceklic after which
20 he was fired.
21 You've already confirmed that you were in Novi Sad working in the
22 government as a member of Seselj's party, and is it correct that you were
23 removed from that post --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- afterwards? Is it correct that were you removed from that
1 post after the Novi Sad newspaper published a text -- published an
2 article about your prior court proceedings?
3 A. No. I resigned and I returned to Bijeljina. I landed a job as a
4 professor at the school for teachers. The school for teachers was opened
5 in Bijeljina at the time and that's where I started working.
6 Q. Now, Mr. Ceklic, at paragraphs 14 and 15 of your statement, you
7 discuss the records of the third and fourth Bosnian Serb Assembly
8 sessions. And you claim that the Bosnian Serb leadership was seeking a
9 peaceful solution and that the Muslim and Croat leaderships ignored and
10 rejected those efforts. The fact is, Mr. Ceklic, whatever peaceful
11 solution the Bosnian Serb leadership was willing to agree to, their
12 bottom line was their refusal to accept a unitary, independent Bosnia in
13 which the Serbs would be a minority, and the leadership made clear they
14 would use force to prevent that, if necessary; isn't that right?
15 A. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was an under-secretary, and
16 during that time while I was in office, I met with the minister on five
17 occasions. He was independent in the decision making process. In the
18 assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian MPs were always voted over and
19 they were outvoted but I have to go back into history just for a brief
20 moment. In 1941 Croats and Muslims stood under the flag of the Nazi
21 Croatia and we will -- and they wrote a letter in which they said, Fuhrer
22 will always be with you, and together with Croats we will destroy the
23 Serbs. Having learned that lesson, the Serbs had to organise themselves
24 in order not to relive 1941 and concentration camps. All the decisions
25 that were made by the Serbs were just reaction to somebody else's action.
1 Serbs would not have made any of those decisions if the
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims and Croats had not made their decisions which
3 were contrary to the interests of the Serbian people.
4 Q. You haven't exactly answered my question, Mr. Ceklic, so I'll try
5 a little more concretely. You discussed the 4th assembly session record,
6 that's --
7 A. I will answer.
8 Q. I'll ask the question in a different way and you can answer then.
9 And that's D86. So you may recall at that session, Mr. Vukic stating,
10 this is at page 27 -- I'm just going to -- It's not on the screen,
11 Mr. Ceklic, I'm just going to read it to you:
12 "If the EC goes on with its threat to recognise
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state or as part of a future
14 independent state of Croatia or the independent state of Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina, there will be another Serbian uprising and there will be
16 massive blood shed in which some nations that have been subsequently
17 created will disappear."
18 Now, that speech reflects the bottom line for the Bosnian Serb
19 leadership, that they will use force to prevent becoming a minority in an
20 independent Bosnia; right?
21 A. When it comes to blood, this is a very metaphorical answer.
22 However, in order for the Serbs to respond to the Croats and Muslims and
23 their violence, they obviously needed to do what we did. You are
24 expecting a certain type of answers from me, so I will answer all of your
25 questions because I see that you're very tendentious in your intentions.
1 Allow me just one minute. In 1945 or 1946, a man was walking through
2 Sarajevo. He was sporting a long beard. A policeman asked him, Do you
3 know, comrade, who sports a beard, and he says, I know, Marx and Engels.
4 The policeman expected him to say, The Chetniks. You expect me to tell
5 you what suits you. I can't do that because I'm here to tell the truth
6 and nothing but the truth.
7 JUDGE KWON: No, you're -- she does not expect you to tell us
8 what suits her. We like to hear your answer, but if you could focus on
9 answering the question.
10 Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.
11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. Now, it's true also, Mr. Ceklic, that the Bosnian Serb leadership
13 claimed large areas of Bosnia including certain areas where Serbs were a
14 minority as territories that must either stay within Yugoslavia or become
15 part of a separate Bosnian Serb entity in the event of Bosnian
16 independence; right?
17 A. That's not correct. The Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina had their
18 own land, their own territory, and that was over 80 per cent of the
19 territory or rather over 70 per cent of the territory, and they should
20 not have been deprived of that. Where the Serbs had a majority they had
21 their own authorities and the same applied to the Muslims and the Croats.
22 None of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian Serbs did not want to impose their own
23 will on any of the other peoples. It even happened in those
24 municipalities where there was a minority of Muslims and Croats, that
25 they organised, they tied their flags together, they walked under the
1 same flag and they fought against the Serbs, and that struggle, and that
2 was a political struggle, and that struggle had a very uncertain outcome.
3 So wherever the Serbs did not have a majority. They didn't want to
4 subjugate anybody. Where they did have a majority they tried to deal
5 with all the matters in the most democratic way possible.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: If I could have 65 ter 15404, please.
7 Q. This is an extract from the Official Gazette of the Bosnian Serb
8 entity. And if we could go to page 2 in the English, and as well in the
9 B/C/S, and towards the bottom left-hand side in both languages, there are
10 large capital letters a declaration on the proclamation of the
11 Republic of the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And under
12 Roman numeral I it says: On the territories of the Serbian autonomous
13 regions in the area and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina, including areas in which the Serbian people is now a
15 minority due to the genocide carried out against it in World War II, and
16 on the basis of the plebiscite held on 9 and 10 November 1991, at which
17 the Serbian people decided to remain in the joint state of Yugoslavia,
18 the Republic of the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina is formed
19 and proclaimed.
20 Now, Mr. Ceklic, I asked you whether it was correct that the
21 Bosnian Serb leadership claimed territories that included areas where
22 Bosnian Serbs were a minority, you said that's not correct, but this
23 document, official document, states exactly that, doesn't it, that the
24 Bosnian Serb Republic will include areas in which the Serbs are now a
25 minority due to the genocide carried out in World War II; right?
1 A. Well, not territories, but the people, and these are two
2 different terms. They will protect their own people in those areas. The
3 Serbs did not want to occupy those territories. They wanted to protect
4 the Serbian people in that territory. Am I being clear enough? To
5 protect the Serbian people on the territory where they were a minority.
6 For example, if there was a municipality and if 80 per cent were Croats
7 and Muslims and if there only 10 per cent of the Serbs, obviously the
8 Serbs wanted to protect the Serbian population in such a territory. Let
9 me share an example with you. Kalinovik municipality where I hail from
10 had a Catholic family. I personally said that nobody should touch them,
11 that they should remain living there and they did throughout the war, and
12 nobody ever touched that Croatian family.
13 Q. Mr. Ceklic --
14 A. I answered you very --
15 Q. Mr. Ceklic, you said that this was about protecting the Serbian
16 people in the territory. This document does not -- is not about
17 protecting people, it's about proclaiming a Serbian, Bosnian
18 Serb Republic on certain territories and those territories are explicitly
19 defined to include certain areas where the Serbs are a minority; isn't
20 that right?
21 A. No.
22 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender this document.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6444, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: While we are discussing the exhibit, with respect to
1 1D9291, Mr. Robinson, I just noted that the number hasn't been assigned
2 yet while it was marked -- noted as marked for identification pending
3 English translation, so shall we assign a number for that?
4 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D3855, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.
6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. Mr. Ceklic, at paragraph 21 of your statement you assert that
8 Dr. Karadzic always insisted on co-existence with the other peoples in
9 BH. I'd like to ask you if you ever heard Dr. Karadzic say anything
10 along these lines:
11 "What I am telling you, whatever Bosnia we have one day, no
12 Muslim foundation will ever be laid in Serb areas and Serb villages,
13 whether or not you import Turks because we will instruct Serbs not to
14 sell land to Muslims. The first foundations that are laid will be blown
15 up and all foundations that are laid will be blown up. They are
16 implementing a demographic policy here but we will be implementing one
17 too, and the whole world will understand that. The world will understand
18 when we tell them that we will not allow demographic picture to change
19 either naturally or artificially. No way. Our territories are ours. We
20 may be hungry but we will be there. It's not always good to disclose
21 one's plans but it is not bad to say that we will not give them up
22 because we will proclaim you must not sell land to Muslims, you must not,
23 because this is a fight to the finish, a battle for living space."
24 And that's P958. Did you ever hear Dr. Karadzic say anything
25 like that?
1 A. No, never. I never heard him say that. What I heard in
2 conversations with President Karadzic was always this: We should deal
3 with problems in a peaceful way, without any conflicts, without any
4 tears, without any blood. What you have just read out is something that
5 I've never heard. Let me share my opinion with you. I have land in
6 Herzegovina. I would never sell it to a Muslim. I would not sell it to
7 anybody for that matter.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Ceklic. I have no further questions for you.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, just a few, Your Excellencies.
11 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] If that declaration is still on the screen, can
13 we look at it? If not, I would like to have it brought back.
14 Professor Ceklic, are we duty-bound to accept the demographic
15 consequences of a genocide where we remained a minority and where that
16 happened, not in a natural way but through the process of genocide,
17 according to international laws, are we duty-bound to accept?
18 MS. GUSTAFSON: This is a very leading question with all these
19 concepts built into it.
20 JUDGE KWON: Now we have the document. Probably next page for
21 English. The same goes for the B/C/S, I'm not sure. Yes. What is your
22 question, Mr. Karadzic?
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. I would kindly ask the professor to look at the first sentence
25 and to tell us what territories are referred to and how Serbs became a
1 minority there?
2 A. I understand the question and, first of all, this is not a
3 leading question.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ceklic, it's for the Chamber to find whether
5 it's leading or not. And please, please put a pause before you start
6 answering the question. Yes. Please answer the question.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise. I'm
8 reading the document which is before me. It says here in the territories
9 of the Serb autonomous provinces including those territories where the
10 Serbs are a minority due to the genocide that was committed during the
11 Second World War.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Thank you. This suffices.
14 A. Very well. Look, due to the genocide which was committed during
15 the Second World War, I have to remind you that in my neck of the woods,
16 in 1941, every house was ablaze, no Serb remained living there. But
17 there are Serbs living there now because these are their territories,
18 their lands, their houses, their property, their graveyards and the rest;
19 Therefore, there are many such places. In 1941, the Serbs were destroyed
20 and then in 1943 and 1944 they returned to their homes. These are their
21 areas, their territories.
22 Q. Thank you. Could you tell the Trial Chamber which means we used
23 during negotiations before the war and throughout the war. How did we
24 want the territorial issues to be dealt with?
25 A. Only peacefully. On several occasions I was with you when you
1 talked to Alija Izetbegovic and other political representatives of the
2 Muslim people. We thought that we had a deal but on the following day,
3 nothing came out of it. They would start all over again and they would
4 never honour any of the things that we had agreed. It was always our
5 objective to deal with all the problems in a peaceful way and in no other
6 way but that.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at the newspaper
8 article from "Slobodna Bosna," 25362 on the 65 ter list.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
10 Q. While we are waiting for the document, Professor, despite the
11 campaign in "Slobodna Bosna" and this text, did you land a diplomatic
13 A. Yes, I did. This was all blatant lies. Whatever political
14 party, Muslim, Serb, or Croatian, when they want to blacken somebody's
15 name, they start a media campaign. Since I was from a different
16 political party, the other party, the opposition party, a Muslim or a
17 Croat party did everything that they could to tarnish my good name.
18 I'm -- I'll ask him for the document. Show me where it says that I had a
19 history. If I had had such a history I'm sure that I would not have
20 become an ambassador. I would not have become a full-time professor. I
21 would not have been sent to Macedonia to represent my state. Is this a
22 good enough answer for you?
23 Q. Yes, it is. And can we now move to the following page.
24 Professor, when did you authenticate your doctorate?
25 A. In November 1979. I obtained my Ph.D. at the University of
1 Prague and my doctoral dissertation was authenticated at the University
2 of Sarajevo. Immediately thereafter members of that comission were
3 Professor Nijaz Durakovic, Professor Vojislav Maksimovic, because that
4 was his area of expertise, and Professor Zukovic [phoen], because that
5 doctoral dissertation had a lot of elements of myth and popular culture.
6 And the comission unanimously authenticated my doctoral degree.
7 Q. What year?
8 A. 1979.
9 Q. Can we have the next page, I think.
10 A. In the years mentioned by Madam Prosecutor, when I was at the
11 University of Belgrade, because prior to that I graduated from the
12 faculty of theology. They even tried to deny the authenticity of that
13 diploma as well, but at the time I was the student of the faculty of
14 theology in Belgrade.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the column to the
16 far right? Can we enlarge it, please. The right lower paragraph.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see it, Mr. President.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Can you please read the last paragraph and can you tell us
20 whether it's correct and to what extent.
21 A. Could we have the proper English page, please.
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I continue?
24 JUDGE KWON: We are having some technical difficulties, if you
25 could bear with us for a minute.
1 Could you read again the last paragraph requested by
2 Mr. Karadzic? But in the meantime, can you find the passage in the
3 English as well?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please?
5 In English. No, no, no. It's here. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Put it back,
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It's here. It was only 1986,
8 that's where it begins.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but when we have it here, what's the point of
10 asking him to read it? What's your question, Mr. Karadzic?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. But I believe that this
12 wasn't tendered and wasn't admitted.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Is it true, Mr. Ceklic, Professor Ceklic, that the SDS existed in
15 1986 and that I had anything to do with your Ph.D.?
16 A. None whatsoever. It is well known that the Serbian
17 Democratic Party was established on the 12th of July, 1990, which means
18 four or five years later. At the time, there was communist rule and
19 there was no mention of the Serbian Democratic Party at the time. Nobody
20 can say that the SDS is older than everybody else by ten years. I may
21 have met Mr. Karadzic at the time at the writers' association because we
22 were both in that field. Now, as for these people, Nikola Koljevic and
23 Vojislav Maksimovic, I met only later while they were university students
24 in Sarajevo while I studied in Belgrade, so it has nothing to do with the
25 validation. The request for and application for validation may have been
1 submitted even earlier. In order to have a diploma validated, a teaching
2 committee has to be established made up of professors and you are not
3 going to tell me that Nijaz Durakovic was a member of the SDS, and he was
4 one of the members of this commission.
5 Q. Professor, tell us this: You were asked whether you were in the
6 government of Novi Sad. Can you tell the Trial Chamber the composition
7 of the population in Vojvodina? Are there any people there who had come
8 from Bosnia-Herzegovina and was the government of Novi Sad helping and
9 providing humanitarian aid to the people during the war?
10 A. Well, I was in the government more as a representative of the
11 Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was indeed a secretary for education and
12 culture because this is my area of expertise. A huge number of people
13 were coming over from the Serbian Republic of Krajina and the Serbs from
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of them were accepted. For example,
15 Djordje Stjepanovic [phoen], whom I met by chance, he had some
16 disagreement with his son-in-law or brother-in-law, because his
17 brother-in-law was killed somehow, and his flat whose owner that man was,
18 he rented this flat to me and my family. We left Bosnia during the war,
19 and we had to find a way of surviving.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D1277.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
23 Q. At the end of this article it says that you were both a communist
24 and a Seselj man and God knows what else. So that's on the next page in
25 English. A hardened communist and a proven Chetnik.
1 A. I have nothing to do with communism whatsoever. I come from a
2 family -- am I allowed to speak about this?
3 Q. Briefly, please. To what extent is this article accurate?
4 A. It is completely inaccurate. It is blatant untruths.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]Can we now please have D1277.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Professor, please, since you are a writer and linguistics is a
8 science close to your heart, can you tell us the article of this document
9 both in the Serbian and in the English language? No, that's not it.
10 I need the notes from the meeting.
11 JUDGE KWON: You said D, Exhibit D1277, correct, Mr. Karadzic?
12 THE ACCUSED: Yes. [Interpretation] Page 6, line 18. There is a
13 number to be called up.
14 Can the interpreters please translate the word "zabeleska"?
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's interpretation: "Notes" or "a
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. It is interpreted as "notes" or "a note."
18 Please continue.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could they please now translate the
20 word "minutes" into Serbian?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's interpretation: "Zapisnik."
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are you asking me?
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. No, I'm asking the interpreter. Is it correct to translate the
25 word "note" as "minutes"?
1 A. Linguistically, no. A note is something which I jotted down
2 while I was sitting here at this honourable court. It is a note that
3 most often is valueless. As for minutes, that is something that is
4 official and is kept in archives.
5 Q. Professor, could you be of assistance? There was a discussion
6 between the Prosecutor and you concerning the centralisations. Now, what
7 is the president asked here to do, whether to -- to alleviate the very
8 strict attitude. Can you see what the president is asked to do?
9 A. When the Prosecutor said that the party was centralistic,
10 I understand that to mean that it was the party of the centre. There was
11 no centralism or centralistic approach during the time that I was a
12 member of the Executive Board. It was not anything that one could
13 notice. I repeat that it was the party of the centre, it was neither the
14 left or the right. Let me just add this. Dr. Karadzic, when a party
15 emerged within the SDS called Mlada Bosnia, to be led by Milan Nikolic,
16 aka Crebro and Bosna Nenadovic [phone] in the meeting where nearly 200 of
17 us were present, we automatically expelled them from the party because we
18 didn't want to have people in our party who would use an iron fist, as
19 they used to put it, which was totally at variance with the principles of
20 the Serbian Democratic Party. And one more thing, on one occasion,
21 Dr. Karadzic asked me to go and see Nenad Kecmanovic, who was the rector
22 or the dean of the university. Dr. Karadzic, being a democrat, wanted to
23 concede the leadership of the party to and the Serbian people to
24 Dr. Kecmanovic. All these facts speak to the fact that we are talking
25 about a person who has nothing to do with the allegations of being a
1 nationalist. I have finished. Mr. President, please go on.
2 Q. Thank you. I'm trying to find the exact spot where the president
3 is being requested to use all his powers. Do you remember that I was
4 asked to reinforce the centralistic orientation or to make it more
6 A. Well, your wish was to solve things in the best possible way,
7 that is to say in a peaceful way, both within the party and in contacts
8 with other parties. If you take the very fact that we established a
9 committee for interparty co-operation, it was a council that was not
10 partisan. It had no members of the SDS. It was made up of prominent,
11 respectable persons and they were members of that council. If we had
12 wanted something else, if we wanted to establish the party like this
13 person Nikolic, they would have been expelled.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps, Ms. Gustafson can help us,
15 the document has two pages. Was this on the first or the second page?
16 MS. GUSTAFSON: I think the passage Dr. Karadzic wants where
17 the -- where the president is requested to act in a certain way is on
18 page 2, towards the middle of the page in the B/C/S, and a little above
19 the middle in the English.
20 THE ACCUSED: Page 2 in Serbian too.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The insistence and so on, look at the second paragraph from the
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What is being insisted upon, whether to strengthen the
1 centralisation or to make it more moderate?
2 A. No centralisation.
3 Q. If they are asking me to use my powers and to introduce order
4 within the party, did this mean that I was overstepping the line or not
5 using my powers enough?
6 A. I believe that you didn't use your powers enough. Had I been in
7 your shoes, I might have been more rigorous. As for you, I can say that
8 you didn't use all the powers vested in you on the basis of all the roles
9 and principles of the Serbian Democratic Party.
10 Q. Thank you, Professor. The last question: You said that this was
11 a tit for tat or reaction to an action. Had this attitude towards
12 secession not been existent, which was not favourable for us, what kind
13 of party would we have formed and what our policy would have been?
14 A. It would have been formed --
15 MS. GUSTAFSON: That's a speculative question of really no value,
16 neither the question nor the answer.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Ms. Gustafson.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I agree. I withdraw
20 that question.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Professor, could you please look at the third or the fourth
23 paragraph from the bottom? Could you please read it or perhaps tell
24 us --
25 A. Take an urgent position on the Yugoslav People's Army as --
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ceklic, please pause before you start answering
2 the question. Could you read again?
3 THE INTERPRETER: May it be noted that the interpreters don't
4 have that in front of them.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is an express request to take
6 the standpoint on the Yugoslav People's Army as a very sensitive issue.
7 The priority is their own army with our own insignia, especially in view
8 of the fact that Croats and Muslims have introduced their own armies into
9 their areas with their own insignia. We fully trusted the people,
10 Yugoslav People's Army, because our position was to stay in Yugoslavia.
11 If the Muslims and Croats had not done what they did, which is they set
12 up their own military and paramilitary units, we would not have done what
13 we did. We had our army, which was a joint army, it was the Yugoslav
14 People's Army. The Muslims and the Croats fought against their own army
15 within our state. They fought against another people. That means that
16 within a common state, they fought against everything that was common to
17 all of us. This gave rise to everything that happened, and that was an
18 interparty conflict. Let's repeat: A tit for tat reaction to an action.
19 If they had not done what they did, I'm sure that the war in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina would have never happened.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Thank you, Professor Ceklic. I have no further questions.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Mr. Ceklic, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the
25 Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give
1 it. You are free to go.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: We will adjourn for the week and resume next week on
4 Tuesday, 9.00. The hearing is adjourned.
5 [The witness withdrew]
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.17 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 16th day of July,
8 2013, at 9.00 a.m.