Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 41441

 1                           Thursday, 18 July 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Harvey.

 8             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  May I

 9     introduce Eoin Murphy, who is a graduate of Trinity College, Dublin, and

10     will be attending Leiden University next year doing a masters in public

11     international law.  He's been with the team since February.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  Please proceed.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Your Honour,

15     before the start of the cross-examination, I wish to note that

16     Mr. Mitchell and I, we will share the cross-examination responsibility.

17     Mr. Mitchell will address the Srebrenica portion of the expert evidence,

18     and I will deal with all other chapters of the expert report.  And,

19     Your Honour, when we asked for five hours of cross-examination time, we

20     did this with the caveat that the outstanding decision of the

21     Trial Chamber on the exclusion of parts of the report may have an impact

22     on the time needed, and now that we have the decision, Mr. Mitchell and I

23     are likely to need more than five hours that we requested in the

24     beginning and that you allotted to us.

25             We're not asking the Trial Chamber to make a decision until the

Page 41442

 1     moment it actually arrives, what we don't know, but I would like to

 2     foreshadow now that we have finalised our preparation and have now -- we

 3     believe that it may be more than five hours, rather in the -- in the

 4     period of six hours perhaps, but even if we very judicially and even if

 5     we attempt to narrow the scope of the cross as much as possible, but it

 6     is more likely that we will need something like six hours.

 7             We may well be requesting, therefore, some additional time in the

 8     course, but we will see how it goes.  I just want to foreshadow this.

 9                           WITNESS:  RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

11                           Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

12        Q.   Good morning, General.

13        A.   Good morning.

14        Q.   General, we have limited time.  Therefore, I would kindly ask you

15     to co-operate by giving short answers to the questions and very focused

16     on the questions as such.

17             Let me -- let me first turn to your CV that was admitted

18     yesterday, and I just have a few additional points.  In your capacity in

19     relation to the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence position that you had, you

20     also participated in sessions of the Supreme Defence Council in the years

21     1992 and 1993; is that correct?

22        A.   I attended several sessions of the Supreme Defence Council, but I

23     can't tell you exactly which ones.  However, I was not a member.  I was

24     not a member even ex officio.  I was occasionally invited to provide an

25     analysis.

Page 41443

 1        Q.   And Dr. -- General, you accompanied Prime Minister Milan Panic on

 2     missions including a visit to Sarajevo in July-August 1992; is that

 3     correct?  Do you remember?

 4        A.   Yes, I remember.  On that journey a US reporter, Mr. Kaplan, was

 5     killed.  It was in August 1992.  On that mission that escort of ours was

 6     killed.

 7        Q.   Dr. -- or, rather, you prefer to be called General instead of

 8     doctor; right?  That's my understanding.

 9        A.   I was primarily a soldier, a general, and I appreciate that more

10     than my doctorate but I don't mind whichever way you wish to address me.

11        Q.   General, you toured the entire front lines during the event, did

12     you not?

13        A.   You mean when I travelled with Prime Minister Panic?

14        Q.   No.  I mean in relation -- in the time period in particular in

15     Bosnia you toured the front lines not with Mr. Pantic but for other

16     reasons; correct?

17        A.   Not at the time when front lines were active.  Later on a study

18     trip.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25278 on the

20     screen, and as it is coming up, it is an interview you gave to the "Nin"

21     magazine on the 22nd of April, 1994.  You remember that you gave that

22     interview, General, but --

23        A.   I gave numberless interviews.

24        Q.   Now, we look at this year, and we look at the end of the very

25     first paragraph.  You say here:

Page 41444

 1             "I toured the Krajina.  I was at every part of the front.  I've

 2     been around the whole Bosnia, talked to people and have completely

 3     assured myself that this is an historic battle which the Serb people is

 4     fighting for its survival.  If we miss this chance, we will not get

 5     another one like it ever again."

 6             I understood that you went through the area during the events,

 7     that means before you gave this interview; correct?

 8        A.   I travelled on a study trip during that crisis, especially in

 9     Krajina, because there was a group that edited the magazine "Vojno Delo,"

10     was writing about Krajina, and I occasionally contributed to that

11     magazine, and we made study trips to the Republic of Serbian Krajina

12     while it existed, and on the way we also toured some front lines or parts

13     of front lines that were along the way.  After I was retired in 1993, I

14     found a job at the institute for economic studies in Belgrade, and

15     working to revitalise the military industry we toured Republika Srpska,

16     and we also visited the Main Staff of the VRS.  So I was able to

17     familiarise myself with the situation at front lines in

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina too.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I suggest that in Serbian we

20     show the actual page.  This is not that page.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It should be.  Sorry, it is actually the

22     first page, and it is -- I can't read the -- no.  I see --

23             THE ACCUSED:  Trust me, this is interview with Oskar Kovac, who

24     is an economist.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, and it's "ekonomija."

Page 41445

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Then we have actually uploaded the wrong --

 2     the wrong document, I'm sorry.  In the English it's correct, but we have

 3     uploaded the wrong document.  Thank you for alerting me.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we come back to this later on?

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  But I can still ask a question.

 6        Q.   When you -- General, when you went through Bosnia-Herzegovina on

 7     these various visits, you came across devastated villages and settlements

 8     in Serb-controlled areas, did you not?

 9        A.   Yes.  Yes.

10        Q.   And these devastated settlements would be Muslim or Croat

11     villages; correct?

12        A.   There were also Serbian devastated villages.

13        Q.   Yes.

14        A.   But there were the other kind, too, Muslim and Croat.

15        Q.   Yes.  Thank you.  And I just quoted to you something that you

16     said, and unfortunately you cannot see the Serbian right now, but what

17     you said is -- you speak of a historical chance for the Serbs that will

18     not come again.  General, the historical chances for the Serbs you speak

19     about here, that was a state for all Serbs on all lands considered

20     Serbian; right?  That's what the historical chance was, isn't it?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.

24             JUDGE KWON:  What is the basis of your objection, Mr. Karadzic?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, your suggestion to

Page 41446

 1     return to this when we have the original, and also from our experience

 2     with translations, we need to be cautious.  We need to see the original

 3     too.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I have actually here a hard copy that we can

 5     put on the ELMO that will solve the situation because I don't know why it

 6     is so difficult to upload this.  Here is the article.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And we have the first page.  Please put the

 9     first page on the ELMO, and then we will use also a few other -- other

10     ones.

11        Q.   And, General, if you look -- if you look at the bit -- we need to

12     see the end of the first paragraph.  A bit -- now we can't see anything.

13     We need to see the -- yes.  So if we look at the -- you have to take away

14     the paper.  We need to see the -- yes, so if we look at the -- you have

15     to take away the paper.  We need to see the -- can you move the document

16     a bit up, but we move the shadow.  Yes.  That's -- that's it.

17             If you look at the last lines here in this first paragraph, it

18     says:

19             "I've toured Krajina.  I was on every part of the front.  I've

20     been around the whole Bosnia, talked to people and have completely

21     assured myself that this is a historical battle which the Serb people is

22     fighting for its survival.  If we miss this chance we will not get

23     another one like it ever again."

24             And my question to you was, General, the historical chance for

25     the Serbs you speak about is the state for all the Serbs on all lands

Page 41447

 1     considered Serbian; right?  That's what you meant?

 2        A.   No.  I meant exactly what I said, for their survival.  And

 3     "survival" means physical existence, saving your life.  And once you've

 4     managed to save your life, then you see what you can do.

 5        Q.   And the territory that the Serbs would need for surviving, that's

 6     defined by the six strategic goals, is it not?

 7        A.   At that time I don't think anybody knew about those strategic

 8     goals except the people who discussed them.  I didn't know anything about

 9     the strategic goals.

10        Q.   We are talking about an article of the 22nd of April, 1994.  By

11     then you knew the six strategic goals, did you not?

12        A.   No, I didn't know because I wasn't involved with this.  I learned

13     about the strategic goals only when I started working on this case.

14        Q.   By working on this case you learned that -- what the six

15     strategic goals were, and they were actually pursued by the Bosnian Serb

16     leadership and also by General Mladic as commander of the VRS Main Staff.

17     They all shared -- shared these six goals; right?

18        A.   Well, I can suppose they were, but I wasn't involved in that, so

19     I don't know.  I don't know that first-hand.  I learned about it later.

20        Q.   But by studying the documents you learned that, that they were

21     all pursuing these goals?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   The dispute between Karadzic and Mladic you referred to in

24     paragraph 6 and 101 and 113 of your report was not about these war goals,

25     was it?

Page 41448

 1        A.   No.  It's not a discussion of war goals.

 2        Q.   The two at times had different views on whether certain

 3     concessions in negotiations were advisible in relation to the military

 4     strategy and the militarily -- military situation; correct?  That's where

 5     they had different views at times; correct?

 6        A.   I think the differences between them were not about that.  There

 7     was no conceptual difference.  The difference lay in the perception of

 8     the role in the system of strategic command, the decision to establish

 9     the army, appointed General Mladic commander, and starting with him down

10     to the last soldier, everyone considered him the operative commander

11     whereas the president of the republic --

12        Q.   Let me interrupt you.  General, that is all discussed already in

13     the examination-in-chief and also very rightly explained in your report.

14     I would rather come to this a bit later.  My question was very specific,

15     and you have answered this.

16             You mentioned yesterday during your testimony, and that is at

17     page 41382, line 17 to 25, that the army is supposed to warn the

18     Supreme Commander about the consequences of carrying out an order when

19     they see danger in relation to the military position.  That's right, yes?

20        A.   If he's the one who gave them that order.  If the

21     Supreme Commander gave them that order, and that has negative

22     consequences.  It would be natural to warn him.  But if he didn't order

23     it and they got their order from their own command, then, no, but he

24     issued -- if he issued the order and that has negative consequences for

25     the status of the troops or the army, then, yes, they would warn him.

Page 41449

 1        Q.   And -- and --

 2             THE ACCUSED:  Transcript is catastrophe.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE ACCUSED:  [Interpretation] First of all, in line 7 on page 8,

 5     the witness said that all in the army considered that the supreme

 6     operative commander is General Mladic, and the answer as recorded is

 7     completely incorrect, incorrectly interpreted.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think it was incorrectly translated.  And

 9     next one?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The problem is only with that

11     answer.  The last answer.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The transcript reflects that everyone considered

13     him, being Mladic, the operative commander.  I don't see any problem with

14     it.

15             THE ACCUSED:  Supreme operative commander.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Yes.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the answer after that beginning

19     with line 17 on is not correctly recorded or interpreted.

20              "[In English] But if he didn't warn them and they got the

21     order ...,"  this is all -- "... the order and that has negative

22     consequence for the status of the ... army ..."  senseless.  Witness said

23     "if he ordered them" and not "warned them."

24             JUDGE KWON:  I leave it to you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

Page 41450

 1        Q.   General, when I asked you about whether it would be the right

 2     thing to do for the -- for General Mladic to -- to warn the

 3     Supreme Commander that a certain order would endanger the position of the

 4     army, then he would have actually had the duty to do so; right?

 5        A.   Yes, if he got the order from Karadzic.  But if Karadzic didn't

 6     give him that order, then he's not supposed to warn him.  He needs to

 7     correct that decision himself.

 8        Q.   And when the Supreme Commander decided against the warning, to

 9     take it on board, then the VRS carried out the orders, correct?

10        A.   I don't understand the question really.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Just leave it there.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The document is now uploaded in e-court.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Sorry.  Yes.  Thank you.  I didn't see that.

14     Sorry.  Yes.  Now we can look at the electronic copy, because I want to

15     continue now.  The English has to be -- I think the English has to be

16     slightly moved up.  Yes.  And the B/C/S is fine.  Here in --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, you gave up your last question?

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The question was actually answered,

19     Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  He said he didn't understand the question.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, sorry.  Sorry.

22        Q.   General, what I meant is if the Supreme Commander Mr. Karadzic

23     had given an order and General Mladic would have advised and warned him

24     against this order and opined that it would be harmful to the army, when

25     Supreme Commander then decided that the order should be carried through

Page 41451

 1     the VRS acted and did that.  They carried through with the order, did it

 2     not?

 3        A.   It's a hypothetical question.  If you told me specifically what

 4     this is about, I would be able to answer, but now we can speak only in

 5     general terms, in hypothetical terms, and I'll give you a hypothetical

 6     answer.  If Karadzic had ordered something to be done and that was not

 7     contrary to the rules of warfare, then that would need to be carried out,

 8     but if it's contrary to the doctrine and rules of warfare, then that must

 9     not be carried out.  It's not carried out regardless of the consequences,

10     personal consequences to the person who would refuse to carry it out, but

11     this is like playing hide and seek.  It's all hypothetical.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13        A.   Let me just --

14        Q.   No.  Thank you very much, but we have very limited time, so I'd

15     rather want you to stop here.  And as you are here as an expert,

16     hypothetical questions and hypothetical answers are actually what is

17     done.

18             Here I would like you to look again at your interview, and on the

19     same page, exactly the next paragraph after the one we spoke about, here

20     you speak of the importance of Gorazde.  You refer to the at least 70.000

21     people living there at the moment, the geostrategic importance for

22     installing a Muslim state in what you refer to as former

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina and you speak of the exceptional significance of

24     Gorazde.  That is one the most important points and it represents a

25     natural link between Sandzak and Bosnia.

Page 41452

 1             General, Sandzak is an area in Serbia inhabited mostly by

 2     Muslims; right?

 3        A.   Not only Serbia but Montenegro as well, because that's an area

 4     between Montenegro and Serbia.  It is indeed populated by Muslims, but

 5     there's also a large number of Muslims and Serbs as well.  To tell you

 6     the truth, I can't give you the exact demographic pictures, but there are

 7     entire villages and towns that are majority Serb and Montenegrin and, on

 8     the other hand, others that are majority Muslim.

 9        Q.   And if we move one paragraph down a bit in both languages in

10     relation to the significance of Gorazde for the Serbs, what you say is:

11             "What is important for us is that the Muslims do not achieve this

12     goal, that is the so-called Green Transversal be severed.  It is

13     important to us that the FRY border to what's the former

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina be as secure as possible, and it will be more secure

15     if this section of the border is in the possession of the, I hope, new

16     Serb state."

17             General, that was your view and also that of the Bosnian Serb

18     leadership; correct?

19        A.   Well, that was a natural aspiration and desire.  However, how

20     much realistic it was is a different question.  I know that in all maps

21     that provided divisions Gorazde was never part of Republika Srpska.  It

22     was always in the Muslim part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, probably due to the

23     geostrategic objectives that I mentioned here in this article.

24        Q.   The elimination of the Gorazde enclave was something you found

25     reflected in the command documents, did you not?

Page 41453

 1        A.   The elimination is a natural aspiration by anyone who is engaged

 2     in war and that is to control an area, but it is up to politicians to

 3     decide, and in this instance the politicians decided that this would not

 4     to be the case.  The army wanted Gorazde to be within Republika Srpska.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the reference, please?

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I'm coming to this.  I'm actually showing

 7     the General now two orders.

 8             Your Honour, we will come back to this "Nin" article.  Therefore,

 9     I will not ask to have it admitted right now but a bit later.

10             Can we now please have Exhibit P00854 on the screen.  It is an

11     order dated 18 April 1994.  And when you look at point 4 of this order,

12     it says:

13              "The president is ordering and kindly asking Hercegovina Corps

14     commander to engage all available forces from TG Visegrad and to take

15     over the part of the town on the right bank of the Drina River at any

16     costs and push the enemy forces to the left bank by the above -mentioned

17     dead-line before UNPROFOR -- before UNPROFOR forces enter the left bank,

18     the left bank part of the town."

19             General, the -- the Supreme Commander is here actively involved

20     for the same -- is he actively involved, right, on the ground?

21        A.   One cannot see what his order is from this.  It only says that it

22     has been ordered by him, but one cannot see the very order itself.  It

23     says here he is ordering and kindly asking.  They two things cannot go

24     together.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now please have P01645 on the screen.

Page 41454

 1        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an order coming from the TJ

 2     Visegrad command of 11th of April, 1994, regarding its participation in

 3     the attack on Gorazde, and under point 7 -- can we see point 7?  Yes.

 4     Under point 7 is a message forwarded by General Mladic who visited the

 5     zone of combat operations on the 10th of April, 1994, saying:

 6             "Keep pushing energetically onwards.  Pay no attention to what is

 7     going on around us.  The Turks must disappear from these areas."

 8             General, you're aware of this document, are you not?  You looked

 9     at command documents, so you have seen that before; right?

10        A.   I have seen a great deal of documents.  At this point I can say

11     that it looks familiar but I'm not sure whether I dealt with it.

12        Q.   And when you look at the two documents that we just looked at,

13     the Main Staff and the Supreme Commander, Mr. Karadzic, are actively

14     involved for the same military result; correct?

15        A.   But I didn't see a document issued by Karadzic.  Somebody's just

16     making reference and at the same time ordering and kindly asking.  If I

17     were to see what Karadzic wrote, I could tell you more.  The only thing I

18     can say is to comment what I see written here.  So this is not about an

19     order issued by Karadzic, but, rather, one of the commanders is making a

20     reference to it and at the same time ensuring an order and kind request,

21     and this cannot go together.  A commander can either order or kindly ask,

22     but not the two at the same time.

23        Q.   I cannot show you this order because the Prosecution did not get

24     all the orders that Mr. Karadzic submitted during the events, but the

25     fact that the order is not here in front of us doesn't mean it doesn't

Page 41455

 1     exist, does it?

 2        A.   I'm almost certain that it doesn't exist because there was no

 3     need at all for Karadzic to issue any order with regard to this

 4     situation, but, rather, there was a need for Karadzic to halt this

 5     operation because of the outcome that he considered to be the task of the

 6     military.

 7        Q.   General, you also agree with me that orders can be issued orally;

 8     correct?  Then there is a paper, except for a reference in a other

 9     command document?

10        A.   The Supreme Commander doesn't issue verbal [Realtime transcript

11     read in error "commercial"] orders.  He issues all his orders in writing,

12     and they are properly registered so that everybody knows what the Supreme

13     Commander is ordering.

14             THE ACCUSED:  Line 3.  Oral.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oral orders.  You said "oral orders" not

16     "commercial orders"; right?  Yes.

17             Can we now please go back to the "Nin" article and that was

18     65 ter 25278, and we move now to page 5 in the English.  Page 5 in the

19     English and page 2 in the B/C/S.

20        Q.   And, General, you speak here of the striving of the RS delegation

21     to have a state and the power leaders of the world striving to prevent

22     that by dividing Serb ethnic territory in former Bosnia-Herzegovina into

23     enclaves that were not interconnected.  And you are saying this in --

24     in -- at that point in time.  That point in time, General, the RS

25     territories were connected through corridors, were they not?

Page 41456

 1        A.   Yes, they were connected, but the corridor was constantly cut

 2     off.  During my trips I often had to travel between salvos of fire, and

 3     it could easily be fired upon, and that happened very often and people

 4     were killed in this corridor.

 5        Q.   But you also stated in your report at paragraph 10 that by the

 6     time the VRS was established, the strategic goals were achieved except

 7     for goal 6, the access to the sea; correct?  So in May 1992, according to

 8     your words -- yes.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And you further also state --

11        A.   But on the 30th of May --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please repeat the date again.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

14        Q.   The interpreters could not follow you, so you would have to start

15     again with "But on the 30th of May," and then they lost you.

16        A.   On the 30th of May, the forces of eastern group Posavina where

17     headquarters in Croatia occupied Movica -- Modrica and severed the

18     corridor.

19        Q.   But you devote an entire section of your report to the corridor

20     connecting the Krajinas and other parts of the RS and the FRY, and that

21     this operation started in May and was, in fact, successful at the end;

22     correct?

23        A.   Yes.  It was successfully accomplished in October 1992.

24        Q.   And a bit -- a bit further down you state in this article:

25             "All those games," referring to the negotiations, "were

Page 41457

 1     eliminated by the wartime victories of the Serb people and its army."

 2             General, you were all in favour of achieving results on the

 3     battle-field and established facts on the ground; right?  That's more

 4     helpful than, as you say, games during negotiations?

 5        A.   Either I didn't understand you correctly or maybe I didn't

 6     understand the question.  This is a figure of speech.  When I made

 7     reference to the games in negotiations, can offer you more or can offer

 8     you less, when they offered less and the Serbian side was dissatisfied,

 9     if they could eliminate these games through military victories then it

10     was all right.  That was my view.  I'm not in favour of military victory

11     as a option.  I was championing a justified solution, and if you have an

12     unjustified solution you have to resolve it through a military victory.

13        Q.   If we look at the last bit in this article in the English and in

14     the B/C/S you would have to look at the next column in -- on this page.

15     When journalists ask you about the cities such as Brcko and Zvornik which

16     were not predominantly Serb before the war you say the following, and now

17     I quote:

18             "The matter at hand is that it has to be acknowledged that a

19     state cannot continue to exist if it has no essential prerequisites, and

20     one of them is territorial connectedness of the entire entities populated

21     by an ethnic majority.  In the final demarcation too, an injustice will

22     have certainly been done to different localities, but this can be

23     balanced out through a certain exchange of territories."

24             Giving what you said here about Brcko and Zvornik, your

25     conclusion and arguments in paragraph 103 and 204 of your report that the

Page 41458

 1     Serbs took only the territory where they were in the majority is not

 2     correct; right?  It doesn't apply to Zvornik.  It doesn't apply to Brcko.

 3     It didn't apply to Foca either; right?

 4        A.   As you can see from this article, I said that there cannot be an

 5     absolutely justified solution.  There is no absolute justice.  There will

 6     always be a chunk of territory populated by another ethnic community that

 7     would suffer some kind of damage, and that can be rectified in a

 8     reasonable way by an exchange of territories, and you can see that I was

 9     in favour of a balanced solution.  That the Serbs establish their entity

10     only in the territories where they were a majority?  That is true.

11     However, there were some exceptions.  But the key issue was that a

12     territory must be a single and a unified one, without that there can be

13     no entity.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can this article be admitted, Your Honour.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6446, Your Honours.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19        Q.   General, to complete your CV in relation to military duties, you

20     also functioned as the president of the prisoner exchange commission for

21     the FRY in the years 1992 and 1993; is that correct?

22        A.   That was not my main duty.  That was something that I did

23     alongside my regular job.  It was an ad hoc duty.  But the answer is yes.

24        Q.   As the president of the exchange commission, you were aware that

25     there were camps all over Bosnia-Herzegovina and civilians were detained

Page 41459

 1     and used in exchanges, were you not?

 2        A.   That is not within the scope of my responsibility, not

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I was the chairman of the commission for exchange of

 4     prisoners between the JNA and Croatia.

 5        Q.   You received lists showing that women and children were among

 6     those detained and exchanged from Bosanski Samac, did you not?

 7        A.   No.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25213 on the

 9     screen.

10        Q.   And as it is coming up, we have here prisoner exchange records

11     for various areas, including Bosanski Samac, submitted by a certain

12     Miroslav Tadic from July 1992.  That's not here on the first page, but we

13     need to look at page 5 in the English and page 9 in the B/C/S.  At page 9

14     only very briefly.  And then you see -- only very briefly on the bottom,

15     on the bottom, please, in B/C/S page 9 on the bottom, and then we move

16     over to page 10 in the B/C/S.

17             Mr. Miroslav Tadic is a member of the Crisis Staff of

18     Bosanski Samac, according to this document, and sends records related to

19     a prisoner exchange for the prisoner exchange commission of the

20     Ministry of Defence in Yugoslavia speaking of hundred prisoners.  And the

21     president of the commission he's sending this to, that's you; right?

22        A.   To tell you the truth, I don't remember that, but we didn't have

23     any jurisdiction over Bosnia.  They did exchanges on their own.  My

24     commission was involved in the exchange of prisoners between the JNA and

25     Croatia.

Page 41460

 1        Q.   What it shows here is that you, General, forwarded this

 2     documentation that you received from Mr. Tadic to UNPROFOR.  That's what

 3     it says here in this document.  You remember that.

 4        A.   I really don't remember.  It was a long time ago.  I don't

 5     remember.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we now have page 3 in the English and

 7     page 5 in the B/C/S.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I point again to an error in

 9     interpretations, and it says -- actually in translation which says that

10     we are forwarding this for your jurisdiction, whereas the jurisdiction

11     was that of UNPROFOR.  The translation says competence.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this is not an appropriate

13     intervention.  I can pick it up in his rewrite -- redirect.  It is clear

14     that I simply asked him that he forwarded it to UNPROFOR, and he

15     basically says he doesn't remember that anymore.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I take it Mr. Karadzic should have understood it.

17     Jurisdiction and competence does not make much difference.  We can -- as

18     long as we follow the flow of the evidence.  I would like you to refrain

19     from intervening.  You understand I'm very -- I mean, the Chamber has

20     been very lenient as far as translation is concerned.  Yes, the Chamber

21     is aware of the various issues regarding the interpretation and

22     translation, but at the same time flow of evidence is also important.

23             Shall we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

25        Q.   When you --

Page 41461

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say just one word?  The rest

 2     of the answer or the continuation of an answer during cross-examination

 3     can be adversely affected by errors of this nature.  That's why

 4     interventions are necessary.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But take -- this example, the competence or

 6     jurisdiction, does not make much difference, Mr. Karadzic.  I'm not sure

 7     if it is my English, but shall we continue.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 9        Q.   What you see here and we see here is a list of the Bosanski Samac

10     commission for exchange of prisoners of war and detained civilians, and

11     it is a list of 52 women to be exchanged; correct?

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We have the -- the B/C/S has -- the lower

13     part, please, in the B/C/S.

14        Q.   Now, when you look at the names, it's all women; right?

15        A.   Yes.  It seems to be correct.

16        Q.   Yes.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we now have page 8 in the English

18     and page 13 in the B/C/S.

19        Q.   And we again have a list of detained women for exchange; correct?

20        A.   These are Croatian words, but I suppose that the prisoners are of

21     the Serb ethnicity.

22        Q.   It says here -- don't we have page 8?

23        A.   These are Croatian officers.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Don't we have page 8 in the English and page

25     13 in the B/C/S?  Sorry.

Page 41462

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All these last names are Serbian

 2     ones.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  What does the stamp say?

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The stamp is actually -- I'm looking at the

 6     lower -- the lower --

 7             THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please speak into the

 9     microphone.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Radinovic, if you do not speak to the

11     microphone, the interpreters have difficulty understanding you.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a stamp that bears the

13     insignia of Croatia in Bosnia-Herzegovina because there's a Croatian

14     flag, although it's rather blurred.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

16        Q.   We have to move in the -- in the B/C/S one page further.  I think

17     there is obviously a mistake, because it should -- it should be a list

18     from Republika Srpska, Serbian municipality of Samac.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, let's find out what this

20     document is about.  Shall we hear the explanation of the witness about

21     page 2.  There are three stamps, one of which seems to be Croatian.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

23        Q.   Perhaps I can clarify something, Your Honour.  This document, we

24     left it in the original version how we got it, but it is a mix of

25     documents coming from various areas, and I'm only talking about the

Page 41463

 1     Bosanski Samac ones.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But let's take a look at page 2.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  If I'm may, I think it falls in the framework of

 4     68 Rule, and we should have had it disclosed.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this was disclosed to the

 6     Defence.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Could you read out the last part.  Yes, we have

 8     English translation.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, but that is a document that does not

10     relate to the materials sent by Mr. Tadic from the Bosanski Samac.

11             JUDGE KWON:  This 44-page document is just one document.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It was how we received it, as one document,

13     but it's obviously a mix of various submissions, and the ones that we

14     were -- that I am talking about with the General is just the few pages

15     that relate to Bosanski Samac.  And you can always see it by -- by the

16     stamps on that particular page.  We just discussed it in relation to

17     page 3 in the English, and we discussed it in relation to page 8 in the

18     English, and now we have -- so we should look at page 8 in the English

19     and page 13 in the ...

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If this is what I have here, all of

21     these stamps are those of the HVO.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Could we then please have page 9 in the

23     English and page 15 to 16 in the B/C/S.  Page 15 to 16 in the B/C/S.

24        Q.   And here we have the Republika Srpska Serbian municipality of

25     Samac, commission for exchange of prisoners and detained civilians, and

Page 41464

 1     we have here again a list of exchanges and -- so according to this

 2     document at least you saw on your desk materials relating to the exchange

 3     of prisoners of war and civilians and among them women; correct?

 4        A.   I don't know.  I don't remember that.  It wasn't my commission

 5     that was carrying out the exchange.  There was just information to the

 6     effect that an exchange had taken place.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

 8     speak into the microphone, and could all other microphones be switched

 9     off when he's speaking.  Thank you.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11        Q.   Sir, you have to move a bit closer to the microphone so that

12     the -- the interpreters can hear you better.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can these two -- these three

14     pages that we've just discussed be admitted?

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I would ask that only page 5 be

16     admitted because the other pages which -- hasn't been demonstrated that

17     they were forwarded to General Radinovic, so they're not relevant.  All

18     he sees is that in July 1992, there's an exchange proposed for 100

19     prisoners for 100 prisoners.  Whether they're women or anything else

20     isn't among the information that is provided him, and there is no

21     evidence that any of those other pages of this compilation of documents

22     were provided to him.  So we would ask only that page 5 be admitted.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I disagree with this

24     interpretation, and that is actually a matter for the closing argument.

25     What I had proposed to admit is the letter from the Bosanski Samac

Page 41465

 1     commission and then a few extra pages related to that letter of the

 2     Bosanski Samac exchange commission, and whether the -- the general saw it

 3     or not is then base -- is a matter of circumstance and argument rather

 4     than of admission.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the page where Mr. Radinovic's name

 6     appears.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Page 3 in the English and page 5 in the

 8     B/C/S.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Page 5 in the English.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Sorry.  I misspoke.  Thank you very

11     much.  Yes.  That's a letter -- that's a letter from the Bosanski Samac

12     committee, and then we have underneath the -- this forwarding of the

13     matters to UNPROFOR.  So my proposal would be to admit page 5, page 3,

14     and page 9.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can we have the letter that was

16     sent to me in Serbian?

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Sorry.  Yes.  That is page 9.  Page 9,

18     but only very -- at the very bottom, very bottom, a small reference and

19     then the next page.  The next page, yes.  This is the rest of this

20     letter.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I'd also like --

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is not my signature.  This is

23     not my signature.

24             JUDGE KWON:  What was the date of the document,

25     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

Page 41466

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The date of the document is --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  1996.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 4        Q.   The date of the document is unclear.  It's only becoming clear

 5     from the Bosanski Samac lists that it's related to July and August 1992,

 6     and that would be the time of the corridor 92 operation, General; right?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  But was he part of VJ army at the time?

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  He was actually the president of the

 9     prisoner exchange commission of the Ministry of Defence of the

10     Yugoslav Army.  And we see here that his --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Was he posted in Belgrade?

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13        Q.   You were posted in Belgrade, General?

14        A.   I don't know whether I was in Belgrade then or whether I was in

15     Geneva at the negotiations.  I really don't know.  But this is not my

16     signature.  I was not there.  This information of the Crisis Staff of

17     Bosanski Samac is being forwarded with a view to facilitating this

18     exchange, so that is not really within my purview.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Somebody could have signed for you.  Can you not see

20     "za," "for"?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it says president of the

22     commission of the Ministry of Defence of the Army of Yugoslavia for

23     exchange of prisoners didn't signed for me.

24             JUDGE KWON:  But I see handwritten "for" in Serbian, "za."  Shall

25     we zoom in to the stamp?

Page 41467

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I see.  It's covered by

 2     the stamp.  I do apologise.  But obviously I was not there at the time.

 3     I am not challenging that I held that position of the chairman of the

 4     commission.  Obviously this was not within my purview, though, and that

 5     is why I'm sending this to UNPROFOR to get this done.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  The Chamber will admit those three pages.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I also wanted to point out that

 8     page 9 and page 8 also relate to August of 1992, which is apparently not

 9     the same as what is being sent to him in July of 1992.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I think that's still argument.

11     It goes to weight.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6447, Your Honours.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

15        Q.   General, you know that an expert has to provide truthful and

16     objective evidence and should not be biased in any way with respect to

17     the parties to the conflict in Bosnia; correct?

18        A.   When I speak as an expert absolutely, but as an author I can be

19     partial, as a public figure, but not otherwise.

20        Q.   An expert should not misrepresent the facts to the Judges of the

21     Tribunal even if he or she would very much resent the work of the

22     Tribunal; right?

23        A.   I really do not understand the question.  I am trying to be as

24     objective as I possibly can be and to the best of my ability and

25     knowledge.

Page 41468

 1        Q.   I thought the question was simple.  An expert should not

 2     misrepresent the facts to the Judges here, even if he or she would resent

 3     the work of this Tribunal.  That was a simple question.

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Actually, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, it wasn't a

 5     question at all.  It was a statement.  Do you simply want the witness to

 6     agree with your statement?

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I want him simply to agree that an expert

 8     should not be biased against the work of this Tribunal, and I thought

 9     that was a question.  That's at least -- but I move on.

10        Q.   General, you very much resent the work of the Tribunal, do you

11     not?

12        A.   I don't know why that would -- well, I have my position on

13     everything, including this, but that is my personal view, my personal

14     position.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25279A on the

16     screen.

17        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is a speech you gave at the conference

18     on legal and political aspects of the indictment of the ICTY against

19     Dr. Vojislav Seselj held in Belgrade on the 23rd of June, 2005, and

20     Mr. Seselj had actually published this in a book.  You attended this

21     conference; is that right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And on the first page the second paragraph in English and in

24     B/C/S, the last bit, you were asked the question why Mr. Seselj was

25     arrested and -- give the answer yourself -- were it simply because Seselj

Page 41469

 1     is a metaphor for Serb patriotism and the Serb identity.  And a few lines

 2     further down in the English and in the B/C/S it's on the next page, you

 3     say:

 4             "I would just like to underline a few of my personal impressions

 5     on The Hague, that is The Hague Tribunal where I was misfortunate enough

 6     to have occasions to be several times trying to testify in defence of the

 7     Serbian generals.  So further to what I believe must -- deeply and what I

 8     have learned.  The Hague trouble is a powerful means of the West's

 9     extended aggression against our country."

10             General, that's your view on the Tribunal; right?  At least how

11     you expressed it then.

12        A.   That is my view to this day.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can this be -- please be

14     admitted.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

16             JUDGE KWON:  This page?

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, this excerpt.  It's actually two

18     pages --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  -- in the B/C/S, and -- yeah.  Can we now

21     please have --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We'll admit this.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6448, Your Honours.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Could we please have now 65 ter 25363A on

25     the screen.

Page 41470

 1        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an excerpt from your book, "Lies

 2     about the Sarajevo battle-field."  You remember that you wrote this book,

 3     right, and it was published in 2004; correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   By then you had already testified in the Kunarac case and the

 6     Galic case; correct?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Can we first look at the first paragraph in the foreword of the

 9     book, and you say here:

10             "Can the Serbs accept without checking being named the guilty

11     party for all the evils that have befallen these territories and these

12     people in the last decade of the 20th century."

13             And you say:

14             "I can't accept this but I don't know about the rest."

15             And a few lines further down you say:

16             "These are precisely the motives that have steered the author in

17     his ungrateful task to straighten a corrupt Drina."

18             And a few lines further down in the English and it would be the

19     next page in the B/C/S:

20             "I was simply unable to bear all the knowledge I gained of the

21     guilt of the Muslim side and the so-called international community for

22     the destructive hate and obliteration that had occurred on both sides of

23     the line of conflict on the Sarajevo battle-field."

24             That's also your view today?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 41471

 1        Q.   Can we move to the next page in the English, please.  The B/C/S

 2     is still the right -- the right one.  And you say here:

 3             "I didn't call this book the way I did because I believed the

 4     Serbs are not to blame or because I believe that Sarajevo residents

 5     deserved the suffering by such destructive civil war or because I wanted

 6     to diminish the victims and the suffering."

 7             General, you agree with me that Sarajevo's residents suffered and

 8     that crimes were committed against them by the VRS?  Do you agree?

 9        A.   I agree relatively, but it's not only the fault of the

10     Army of Republika Srpska.  It's also the fault of the BH Army that

11     misused civilian buildings, civilian facilities.  They did not protect

12     civilians.  They provoked operations from areas where civilians were, and

13     in that way they contributed to the suffering of civilians.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Microphone not activated] Can we please move

15     to page 3, the last --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Sorry.  Yes.  Can we please have page 3, the

18     last bit in English and page 4, middle in B/C/S.

19        Q.   Dr. Radinovic, you speak here of the partial confessions from

20     frightened and blackmailed Serbian detainees at Scheveningen, and my

21     question is:  Is it your position that none the Serb accused that

22     admitted their participation in crimes here before this Tribunal did so

23     because they felt remorse?  They were all blackmailed and threatened?  Is

24     that your position?

25        A.   Well, no, that is not my position.  This is the position of an

Page 41472

 1     author who has the right to value an act as he perceives it at that point

 2     in time.  At that point in time some confessions seemed like redemption

 3     to me rather than true -- an act of truly repenting.  So had they done

 4     that, it wouldn't have -- it would have been better had they not done it

 5     in the first place rather than confess and repent.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 4 in the English and

 7     page 6 in the B/C/S.

 8        Q.   And you remember your book probably very well, and you have here

 9     a discussion on the use of the term "aggressor."  And you say

10     international factors but also The Hague investigators have fallen for

11     the same lie even though they should not be entitled to such bias.  And a

12     few lines down you state in English and then continuing into page 4:

13             "It is also only rational to assume that witnesses were coached

14     how to testify by the Prosecutor and instructed to qualify the Serbian

15     side as the aggressor," and so on and so forth.

16             Is that your view, that the evidence collected by the ICTY

17     Prosecutor was manipulated in this way?

18        A.   There certainly were manipulations.  To this day I'm convinced of

19     that, because an old lady who testifies says that she was hit by a

20     sniper.  How can she tell what the difference is between a sniper and an

21     ordinary bullet from a rifle?  She was instructed that it was a sniper.

22     Nothing else would work, because it's not even easy for a military expert

23     to tell the difference between a sniper bullet and a bullet that was

24     fired from a regular rifle.

25             And then "aggressor forces."  How could she know what aggressor

Page 41473

 1     forces are?  If you're listening to an ordinary person using language

 2     like that, "aggressor forces are over there, but not over here," that has to

 3     look like instrumentalisation.  That is how it impressed me.  And this is

 4     a book that is authored by me, and it is my right to write that way, and

 5     I am not equally proud of each and every part of my CV.  You know, there

 6     are parts of one's biography that are emotional too.  Some are rational,

 7     and then sometimes one exaggerates, but basically the fundamental views

 8     expressed in this book I wrote all hold.  We can discuss the book on

 9     another occasion, not necessarily today only.

10        Q.   General, for a victim of a gunshot wound, it isn't really a

11     difference being shot by a sniper rifle or by -- and a sniper of special

12     training or a marksman, a good shot; right?  For the victim, it doesn't

13     make a difference; right?

14        A.   Of course it doesn't matter.  It doesn't matter at all for the

15     victim.  That's not what I'm talking about.  I'm saying that the victim

16     was instructed to say that it was the result of sniper fire.  That's the

17     point.

18        Q.   General --

19        A.   I have full compassion for that victim.

20        Q.   You are -- General, you are aware that people use all sorts of

21     terminology in relation to people shooting from a far away distance;

22     right?

23        A.   Well, yes.

24        Q.   And the ordinary person would not be able to say what in military

25     terminology and in relation to training sniper is.  That means a

Page 41474

 1     highly-trained person; right?

 2        A.   Well, an ordinary person cannot.

 3        Q.   But still they would use the term "sniper" in their everyday

 4     language, would they not?

 5        A.   They say sniper shooters because they were instructed to say

 6     that.  It would be more natural if they said they were hit by a bullet,

 7     not sniper.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can we have the few pages

 9     admitted, please, of the book that we discussed.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit them.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6449, Your Honours.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13        Q.   General --

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please, I'm sorry.  I

15     was waiting for this to finish.  On page 32, line 12 it says,

16     [In English] "... that I wrote adheres to all my fundamental values."

17     [Interpretation] The witness said that everything that is written is

18     based fundamentally on facts, not his fundamental values.  Fundamental

19     values.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Do you agree with Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Radinovic?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Thank you.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24        Q.   General, during your testimony yesterday and also in paragraph 38

25     of your report, you described the tasks you were given by the Defence,

Page 41475

 1     and you namely stated:

 2             "It was analysis of the control authority of Mr. Karadzic within

 3     the system of command and control of the VRS."

 4             That's your task; right?

 5        A.   Then that is a question of bad translation.  I said that I was

 6     supposed to analyse control responsibility of Radovan Karadzic in the

 7     role of Supreme Commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that yet again it is

10     wrong.  [In English] "Leading competence" would probably be more

11     accurate.  Again, it's "control responsibility."

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, we are going now into a debate

13     about what terminology was right.  I think we have his expertise.

14        Q.   And we see there it's about the control authority of Mr. Karadzic

15     in the VRS; right?

16        A.   No.  Well, that is what is written in the heading.  That is the

17     title in Serbian, but I don't know how it was translated.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19        Q.   I can -- I can simply read it again.  The control authority of

20     Dr. Radovan Karadzic in the strategic command system of the VRS.  That

21     was the task; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And who gave you the task, any specific person?

24        A.   I got that task through the lawyer, Sladojevic.

25        Q.   Did you discuss the preparation of the report with the Defence

Page 41476

 1     team during various stages the progress of the report or only in the

 2     beginning?

 3        A.   At that first meeting we discussed that basic task, and after a

 4     while I asked to be given some time to study that task, to think about

 5     it, and to propose a conceptualisation of my own of my work on that

 6     report, and then I met up with Mr. Sladojevic.  I cannot say exactly

 7     whether it was five, six, or seven days later.  We talked about this, how

 8     I thought this should be done, how I perceived this task, whether that is

 9     what he thought was needed, he agreed in principle, and from them onwards

10     we did not discuss this at all except for the fact that they sent me

11     documents.

12        Q.   Did you receive all the documents that you used for your report

13     by the Defence or did you do your own research in archives and through

14     the materials from the Tribunal without their assistance?

15        A.   All the documents that are attained to this case I received from

16     the Defence team, whereas some documents that I knew of and about which I

17     had my own notes that pertained to the situation around Sarajevo -- well,

18     I had some of them, I mean my notes.  When I studied documents for the

19     Galic trial, then I had some notes, and then I mentioned some sources,

20     but I was absolutely certain that this existed in e-court, and I thought

21     that it would be no problem to find that, that these were documents that

22     were opted for in that trial.  Which ones they were exactly I really

23     cannot say at this moment.  I would have to be reminded in order to say

24     which documents these were exactly.

25        Q.   Did you explain the repeated use of the word "we" and "our"

Page 41477

 1     throughout the report?  And I refer here to just a few paragraphs.

 2     That's 15, 46, 64, 69.  That's --

 3        A.   I would have to see the context.  In published works, one often

 4     says "we" meaning the author.  That's a convention in published work.  I

 5     don't think it's used in other contexts.  So could you tell me which --

 6        Q.   Yes.  It says --  when I read it I thought, Who is "we."  When

 7     you say "we found," "we saw," I was wondering, did someone -- is -- do

 8     you have co-writers in relation to the report?

 9        A.   No, no.  It's really the convention.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I note the time.  Perhaps this

11     is a point to have a break.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll resume at 3 past 11.00.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I would like to address you on

18     one particular issue.  Page 33 today at line 11 to 23, Mr. Karadzic made

19     an intervention in relation with the transcript, and you find it here and

20     it says -- it relates to the transcript reference that I wrote here to

21     "all my fundamental values."  And then Mr. Karadzic said the witness said

22     that everything that is written is based fundamentally on facts, not his

23     fundamental values.

24             I have been informed by a B/C/S speaker that that is not correct,

25     that the witness had, in fact, spoken of his fundamental values and the

Page 41478

 1     word "fact" wasn't said at all.

 2             The fact that Dr. Radinovic ready agreed to this change is at

 3     least a very remarkable issue, and it needs to be clarified.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  But why do we have to discuss it in the absence of

 5     the witness?

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Because I think he should not now be tainted

 7     even further.  Because I wan to make two requests in relation to this.

 8     The first I would like an order by the Trial Chamber to the Registrar to

 9     compare the audiotape or video-tape with the transcript to verify whether

10     the intervention of Mr. Karadzic was correct or not.  And I think also

11     for the rest of the -- this testimony, I would request that in case the

12     witness doesn't speak English, he could simply take off the headphones

13     and Mr. Karadzic could make his intervention in English or the witness

14     would have to leave the room, because we cannot really check immediately

15     now whether what I was told is correct or what Mr. Karadzic had said is

16     correct.  So I see no other way at the moment to proceed with these --

17     these new procedures in relation to transcript interventions.

18             THE ACCUSED:  May I?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is true that the witness did not

21     mention fundamental facts, but I explained that he said based on

22     fundamental values general, not his own, and I noted that it means based

23     on fundamental facts, not on his fundamental values.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Then it's not an appropriate intervention on your

25     part, arguing that it's a translation issue.

Page 41479

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  One extra word was added, "my

 2     fundamental values."

 3             JUDGE KWON:  It will be checked, and we will come back to this

 4     issue after having received the report from the CLSS.

 5             I will consult my colleagues with regard to the second issue.

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will rise for five minutes.

 8                           --- Break taken at 11.14 a.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 11.39 a.m.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  The Chamber is not restricting

11     you to raise any issue in relation to the translation, but the Chamber

12     urges you to be prudent and discreet in raising such -- making such

13     interventions.  With that said, we'll continue.

14             Shall we bring in the witness.

15             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you, Excellency.  I will do my best.  And

16     whenever it is possible I will ask not to be translated and address you

17     in English.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Further, I can add this:  It is improper to add your

19     comment or supplement the witness's evidence by way of intervention

20     regarding the translation.  I take it you understand that.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  With regard to the portions referred to by

23     Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, the Chamber still wishes to see the report from the

24     CLSS.

25                           [The witness takes the stand]

Page 41480

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And please try your best to be able to finish in the

 4     originally allotted time.  Do your best, please.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 6        Q.   General, do you agree with me that transparency of the expert's

 7     opinion in relation to facts, methodology and sources used is of great

 8     importance for the Trial Chamber?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And, General, as an expert when drawing your conclusions you

11     would consider all material, weigh the value and credibility so that your

12     report would be objective; correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Would you also agree with me that the quality of your opinion is

15     only as good as the information upon which it is based?

16        A.   And also it depends on how well I know the matter.

17        Q.   Yes.  When you came across -- first of all, did you come across

18     information that contradicted your conclusions while you researched

19     materials?

20        A.   If I had come across documents that would be contrary to my basic

21     evidence, I would quote it.

22        Q.   In -- in preparation of your earlier report in relation to

23     Sarajevo, you mention already that you had notes and that you reviewed

24     the notes.  These notes included interviews of members of the VRS that

25     you yourself conducted; right?  Is that right?

Page 41481

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And, in fact, you confirmed in the Galic case that you

 3     interviewed 34 members of the VRS, including commanders and -- of the top

 4     level; right?

 5        A.   And I turned over those notes to the Court.

 6        Q.   And you relied on those interviews in your Sarajevo report in the

 7     Galic case, did you?

 8        A.   Not too much, but I took them into account.

 9        Q.   And you incorporated portions of the Galic report into the

10     Karadzic report; correct?

11        A.   Not directly, but I did use that report, certainly.

12        Q.   And did you in preparation for this report here interview any

13     members of the SRK since then?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   And any other Defence witnesses?

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   General, you agree with me that it is important for transparency

18     to proper reference the report so that the Trial Chamber can evaluate the

19     credibility of your report or, rather, the credibility of the sources;

20     right?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   The Krstic -- you may remember the Krstic Trial Chamber in front

23     of whom you also testified discussed this with you, this particular

24     point; correct?

25        A.   I don't remember, but I suppose so.  That's part of the

Page 41482

 1     discussion before any appearance before the Court, if you mean the

 2     credibility of sources, et cetera.

 3        Q.   But despite this guidance, you state in paragraph 54 that some of

 4     the author's views and arguments will often not be supported by relevant

 5     references because they form an accepted part of military doctrine and

 6     the doctrine of command and control.  And I would like to address some

 7     examples.  In paragraph 78 [Realtime transcript read in error "58"] you

 8     referred to the fact that before the 16th April 1992, that is the

 9     decision to set up the Serb TO, Mr. Karadzic had no authority over parts

10     of the TO that were formed on the local level, and in paragraph 75 you

11     refer to village guards basically being formed in local communes for Serb

12     defence, and, General, you do not provide any reference for these acts;

13     right?  There's no reference in these paragraphs.

14        A.   No.  That was common knowledge.  I thought there was really no

15     need for a reference in that respect.

16        Q.   And it was actually not -- you did not research this early period

17     because it was not really the task, included in the task, because that

18     was about the VRS; right?

19        A.   It did not relate to the VRS or the direct command authority of

20     Dr. Karadzic, but in my earlier studies I got such information about the

21     existence of those armed groups, parts of the disintegrated

22     Territorial Defence, I learned that working on other cases.  I knew that.

23     It was just common knowledge.

24        Q.   General, you know that Mr. Karadzic as president of the SDS had

25     hierarchical structures of authority other than military chain of command

Page 41483

 1     but de facto authority; correct?

 2        A.   I have no expertise in that line of work, but the SDS was the

 3     strongest party.  It had won the elections, and it was the ruling party.

 4     It was in power.  But he did not have the vertical of command, which is a

 5     prerequisite for him to have command competencies.  The chain of command

 6     had not been established all the way until the army was established.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, it may be minor, but in your

 8     previous question, in paragraph 58 General Radinovic stated Karadzic had

 9     no authority before 16th of April 1992 over the TO, but I couldn't find

10     that passage in para 58.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I must have misspoken.  I'm sorry.  I

12     said -- I meant to say 78.  Sorry.

13             JUDGE KWON:  And you said --

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I misspoke.  It's in 78.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, you referred to 78 with respect to the latter

16     part of your question.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

18             JUDGE KWON:  But it's all 75.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Next is 75.  That's about the village guards

20     and how they were established.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Where do you have the passage that Karadzic had no

22     authority over TO?

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  That's in paragraph 78.  Before the --

24             JUDGE KWON:  78.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  78, yes.

Page 41484

 1             JUDGE KWON:  So you meant 78 --

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON: -- not 58.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, not 58.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  But there's reference -- oh, yes, in the

 6     latter part.  Yes.  Shall we continue.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you.

 8        Q.   In paragraph 81 of your report you explained the reasons why the

 9     Bosnian Serb Assembly appointed General Mladic as commander of the VRS

10     Main Staff, and you concluded that the Assembly sought to limit

11     Karadzic's control authority over the VRS.

12             You do not provide any sources here for the reasoning in the

13     Assembly; right?

14        A.   I cite the decision to establish the army from which we can see

15     that his authority is limited, because the Main Staff was appointed and

16     Mladic was appointed commander of the Main Staff, and that's how his

17     authority was directly limited.  The Main Staff did not remain the

18     Main Staff organ but a command organ.  By virtue of appointing Mladic

19     commander of the Main Staff, Karadzic's role in the operative command the

20     of the army was considerably limited.  That was my position.

21        Q.   In paragraph 105 you claim that Karadzic believed that he should

22     be on the top of the decision-making pyramid while Mladic and his

23     generals thought that Mladic was the top person in military

24     decision-making.  That claim of yours is not supported any reference;

25     right?

Page 41485

 1        A.   By the nature of things the head of state is also

 2     Supreme Commander.  At the same time, there is nobody above him in the

 3     hierarchy.  Those are general points that need not be corroborated by any

 4     references.  But when the Assembly appointed Mladic commander of the

 5     Main Staff, it disputed thereby that Karadzic was at the top of that

 6     pyramid.  It introduced dual authority, dual powers.

 7        Q.   You know -- General, do you know the book of General Milovanovic,

 8     "My view of the war in Bosnia in 1992 and 1995?"

 9        A.   No, I haven't read Milovanovic's book.  I hope I will have the

10     opportunity.

11        Q.   In this book - and this book is, in fact, in front of this

12     Trial Chamber as D825 - in this book at page 23 in both languages in the

13     context of his criticism of Supreme Command, establishment of

14     Supreme Command, General Milovanovic stated there could not have been no

15     reason for such a decision apart from the excessive self-assurance of the

16     inner circle of the RS political leadership convinced they could

17     completely do anything.  In practice, the peace of Josi [phoen] created a

18     situation unique in the world in which the Main Staff could not be at the

19     same time the Supreme Command staff.  And in that same context he

20     underlines it could be said that the Main Staff willingly obeyed the

21     command staff anxious as it was to achieve the strategic objectives of

22     the war and internal strife among Serbs.  In this, we were successful.

23             General, in the view of General Milosevic, who was in fact on the

24     ground and contact -- in contact with the Supreme Commander Karadzic, the

25     authority of the Supreme Commander was not at all limitless -- limited,

Page 41486

 1     at least as he says it.  Would -- would he not know better than you?

 2        A.   I'll have to take some time answering this.  If this is in

 3     evidence, I should have received this exhibit.  I don't know why I

 4     didn't.  It's very hard to respond to such a serious matter off-the-cuff

 5     quickly, to answer your question.  But if you put the direct question to

 6     me whether Milovanovic knows that better than I, then the answer was no,

 7     I was the one who taught Milovanovic how these things are done.  I was

 8     his professor.  There are, of course, examples when pupils outdo their

 9     teachers, and that's always nice to see, and I hope that's the case of

10     Milovanovic.  However, facts are relentless.  Even Milovanovic is part of

11     the group of generals who refused to obey Karadzic.  So he showed,

12     indeed, that what he says there is not right.  Karadzic was not fully

13     able to put his ideas into practice vis-a-vis the Main Staff.

14             In the decision to establishment the army, it is stated that the

15     Main Staff is the command of the army, not a staff organ.  It was the

16     operative command of the army.  And in Karadzic' decision on the

17     organisation of the army, it says the operative command over the army

18     lies in the hands of the Main Staff.  That's also written in the

19     Law on the Army.  There's no need for interpretation.  These are explicit

20     positions.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness was speaking much too fast.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not all is recorded.  The witness

24     also said that it's not that they were undisciplined, it's that they

25     understood their role in that way.

Page 41487

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  The witness added at the same time:  "That's

 2     also --" the witness needs to repeat this.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Because of your overlap, the interpreters were not

 4     able to hear your -- your words as well as Mr. Karadzic's words.  Please

 5     do not overlap.  Please put a pause if you want to make a -- if you'd

 6     like to make any comment immediately following Mr. Karadzic's comment.

 7     But at this time we can continue.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 9        Q.   General, in paragraph 1 of your report you conclude that the VRS

10     was effectively established on the 15 June 1992.  Is it your position

11     that until this date Karadzic -- Mr. Karadzic had no command and control

12     authority over the VRS?

13        A.   The army was established on the 12th of May, 1992, under the

14     decision of the Assembly, and on the 15th of June, Karadzic made his

15     decision on the organisation and structure of the army, and he empowered

16     the Main Staff to command the army.  That means operative command in

17     combat operations.  Up to the 12th of May, he certainly did not have any

18     control authority, because the army did not exist.

19        Q.   General, you yourself in the corridor operation, Corridor 92, and

20     also this morning you mentioned that the VRS, despite having this command

21     structure and paperwork, was already conducting operations in relation to

22     the corridor; correct?  So de facto it was already conducting operations,

23     was it not?

24        A.   Well, Operation Corridor began in early June, not before.  The

25     forces that carried out Operation Corridor were in Western Slavonia, and

Page 41488

 1     only when the United Nations established UNPROFOR they started

 2     withdrawing, and from those units forces were made up for the

 3     Operation Corridor.  That was in the month of June.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we -- can we please have D428 on the

 5     screen.

 6        Q.   And I assume you have seen this document.  It is -- it are the

 7     minutes of the 4th -- of the 4th session of the RS extended

 8     War Presidency of 9 June 1992, and I assume you know this document

 9     because you reviewed minutes; right?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And we see here that Generals Mladic and Gvero and

12     Colonel Tolimir are reporting about the situation, and the

13     Supreme Commander makes decisions on military matters, and that is before

14     the date that you mentioned; right?

15        A.   This is the 9th of June, and --

16        Q.   You spoke about 15 of June.

17        A.   -- the army was formed on the 12th of May.

18        Q.   But you said it was not operational until the 15th of June

19     because there was no structure, but here we have actually the generals

20     reporting to the Supreme Commander, at that time the Presidency of which

21     Karadzic was a member, and then decisions are made.  So that is before

22     the date that you put it, 15th of June; right?

23        A.   You must have in mind the fact that the establishment of the army

24     is not about one document in one day.  It's a process.  And the army did

25     not start to be established before the 12th of May.  There were armed

Page 41489

 1     units that would later become part of the army.  Until then, there was

 2     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on the 12th of May, the

 3     Army of Republika Srpska started to be established, and this process of

 4     formation was supported by the decision of the 15th of June prescribing

 5     its organisation, it's structure, et cetera, et cetera.  But it started

 6     on the 12th of May, and normally on the 9th of June they are discussing

 7     the state of army, like a cross-section of the situation as of the

 8     9th of June.

 9             On the 22nd of May, for instance, the 1st Krajina Corps was

10     formed.

11        Q.   General, I was actually addressing the difficult situation on the

12     ground.  Between -- after the withdrawal of the JNA combat operation took

13     place.  It was the VRS that existed already, and despite the paperwork

14     not yet matching the situation de facto they conducted operations.  Is

15     that not how it worked?

16        A.   Before the 12 of May, no.

17        Q.   I was speaking about the situation between the 12 of May and the

18     15th of June.  That was -- that is the period that I'm actually

19     discussing with you.

20        A.   Yes, yes.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have Exhibit D325 on the

22     screen.

23        Q.   And as it is coming up, General, it is the analysis of the combat

24     readiness and activities of the VRS for the year 1992.  Are you aware of

25     this report?

Page 41490

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And it is an important command document, is it not?

 3        A.   It's not a command document.  It's an analysis of the situation.

 4     Based on that analysis of the situation, one discusses the good and bad

 5     sides.  Measures are taken to address it.  It is an important planning

 6     document, but not as important as it is taken to be in these processes.

 7        Q.   You did not refer to it at all in your footnotes; right?  At

 8     least I didn't find any reference.

 9        A.   No, I didn't.  I didn't mention it in my footnotes, because it

10     doesn't address the issue of control authority of Mr. Karadzic, but I did

11     say that Mr. Karadzic may have exert influence on the situation in the

12     army concerning the combat readiness, but at various meetings or

13     workshops, et cetera.  This is what I spoke about.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 7 in the English and

15     page 8 in the B/C/S.

16        Q.   And paragraph -- if you look at paragraph 5 on this page, in the

17     fourth paragraph, Chief of Staff General Milovanovic writes:

18             "We carried out individual and concerted battle operations

19     according to a single design and plan entrusting SUP [indiscernible]

20     commands with details or overall missions as appropriate."

21             General, that is how all armies do it; right?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And implementation of decisions of the Supreme Commander down to

24     the military chain of command of the lower level, that is how it works;

25     right?

Page 41491

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And it says here further:

 3             "During the past year the Army of Republika Srpska has been under

 4     a single command -- control and command structure despite the fact that

 5     initially we had a large number of different armies and paramilitary

 6     formations.

 7             General, there is no mentioning of any dual or parallel systems

 8     of command.  It's not in here.

 9        A.   Here he is speaking about operational command, so there is no

10     mention of duality.  They were indeed authorised to conduct operational

11     control.

12        Q.   There is also a reference on -- can we please move to page 69 in

13     the English and page 62 in the B/C/S.  And in the fourth paragraph there

14     is a reference to what the -- in the third paragraph is a reference to

15     the Serb TO units established under the leadership of the SDS party.  Do

16     you see that?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And that is basically also a de facto chain of command then;

19     right?  So the SDS channel.

20        A.   Yes, but it goes on to say as a form of self-organisation of the

21     Serbian people for the purpose of defence from -- I think it says

22     pro-fascist aspirations of the Ustasha and Muslim organisations and

23     formations.  So the issue here is the people who is being self-organised.

24        Q.   And in the next paragraph there is a reference to what these

25     early forces could achieve, and it says here:

Page 41492

 1             "They failed to achieve these strategic objectives of the armed

 2     struggle of the Serbian people in for former Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They

 3     failed to open the corridors through the Sava river valley between the

 4     Krajina and the FRY or a corridor which would link Herzegovina," and so

 5     on and so forth.

 6             Sir, according to this document of the Main Staff of the VRS, the

 7     VRS did not just inherit what the previous troops had achieved as you

 8     state in your paragraph 10, is it not?

 9        A.   All I'm saying and claiming is that the Army of Republika Srpska

10     inherited the achievements of the JNA.  It was the JNA who opened the

11     corridor that was operational until the 13th of May when the eastern

12     group of Posavina -- rather the Operational Group Posavina took

13     possession of it and cut it off.  But initially the corridor was

14     established by the JNA.

15        Q.   And at the bottom of the page is a reference to the withdrawal of

16     the JNA as is said here, and I quote:

17              "The pull-out of most of the combat hardware together with the

18     personnel, the FRY nationals, was prevented."

19             General, the VRS took over the hardware from the JNA and the

20     soldiers from the JNA that were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

21        A.   Yes.  These elements remained as members of the

22     Army of Republika Srpska.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 152 and -- first 152

24     and then 153 in English, and then page 132, 133 in the B/C/S, one after

25     the other as we move.

Page 41493

 1        Q.   And as this is coming up, these are concluding remarks of the

 2     Supreme Commander, Mr. Karadzic, on the 5th of April, 1993, regarding the

 3     previous year, and looking at paragraph 3, Mr. Karadzic refers here to

 4     combat operations involving offensive and defensive operations or

 5     concerted engagement of tactical units whose achievements have had

 6     results of operation and even strategical significance.

 7             You agree with this?

 8        A.   Yes, I do.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I please ask for the reference.

10     Where can one confirm or find that these are actually my words, that it

11     was I who said this?

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It's actually if we look at a few pages

13     further, you sign that document.  You sign this particular document.

14     Concluding remarks of the Supreme Commander.  It's your signature.  We

15     can look at it at the end when we have dealt with the other references I

16     want to address from this part of the document.

17        Q.   So, General, when you wrote in your conclusions, and I refer here

18     to conclusions -- paragraphs 13, 201, 210, 211, 214 regarding the

19     defensive character of operation, that is here, the Supreme Command,

20     Mr. Karadzic, speaking of both, offensive and defensive operations;

21     right?  So your conclusions are not entirely correct, are they?

22        A.    My conclusions are completely accurate.  However, Mr. Karadzic

23     is not familiar with these matters and he tends to call certain things

24     operation which actually is not an operation.  An operation means that it

25     involves forces involving corps and other high-ranking units, and when he

Page 41494

 1     said operation, he probably had in mind an operation with tactical

 2     intentions.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.  This is a

 4     very complex issue.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Radinovic, when you are using technical and

 6     professional language, it's very difficult for the interpreters to

 7     precisely follow.  Could you speak more slowly, and kindly repeat your

 8     answer, please.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Karadzic used to speak about

10     offensive operations, but he did not bear in mind that this type of

11     actions and activities that he spoke about cannot be qualified as an

12     operation.  In the military doctrine, forms of combat operation are

13     divided into operations, battles and struggles.  The lowest --

14     lowest-ranking operations are conducted by lowest-ranking units and goes

15     on in the same manner toward higher levels.  And when Mr. Karadzic spoke

16     about operations, he probably had in mind actions taken by lower-ranking

17     units.  Concept of defensive strategy can be composed of a series of

18     small size tactical operations, and it basically can, despite of that

19     remain as a defensive one.  These are very technical issues and I hope

20     you can follow me.  I cannot make it more simple.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

22        Q.   You have actually addressed this also in your report, so we don't

23     need to repeat it.  Under point 4 Mr. Karadzic states that the

24     Supreme Command as a whole, as well as every individuals member of the

25     Supreme Command were informed of the objectives of planned operations and

Page 41495

 1     concerted battles and of their results frequently in great detail.

 2             So that is an important factor of the command authority -

 3     right? - to be informed and involved in the planning of such matters;

 4     right?

 5        A.   Yesterday during examination-in-chief, I said that Mr. Karadzic

 6     regularly received combat reports from the Main Staff briefing him about

 7     the progress of activities.  I did not dispute that, and it goes without

 8     saying.  But the point is that in the process of planning and conducting

 9     operations that are not strategic by nature, the Main Staff does not

10     require an authorisation from the Supreme Commander.  This is their

11     inherent authority, and they can do it independently.  They only have an

12     obligation, and I mean the Main Staff, to inform him.

13        Q.   Mr. Karadzic continues here to state that control and command of

14     the VRS is united and that it is based on a high degree of concurrence

15     and unity in selecting the targets of each individual operation or battle

16     and in assigning tasks to individual operation and tactical formations.

17     General, according to Mr. Karadzic there was a fully functioning command

18     and control from the Supreme Commander down to the units on the ground,

19     is it not?

20        A.   Well, not from the Supreme Commander.  There was no chain of

21     command from that level to the lowest ranking units.

22        Q.   Let me refer you to the next -- to the next paragraph that makes

23     it even clearer.  Mr. Karadzic says here the relationship between the

24     command structures and the organs of the government and the

25     Supreme Command made it impossible for the Main Staff to make decisions

Page 41496

 1     absolutely on his own; rather, every operational battle was politically

 2     endorsed on the basis of the interests of the Serbian people and approved

 3     by the highest authority of Republika Srpska.

 4             General, the authority of the Supreme Commander is not diminished

 5     at all.  He is functioning as the Supreme Commander and the army; the

 6     Main Staff is functioning as it should and as it does in other armies.

 7     Is that not what he's saying here?

 8        A.   What he says here is that the army was functioning and God forbid

 9     that the army was dysfunctional.  I never claimed that the army was not

10     functional.  We had remarkable commanders, and we had excellent officers

11     who joined the VRS and they were fully capable of discharging their

12     duties.  But in the operational sense in terms of command they were not

13     obligated to seek approval for their decisions.  They planned them, they

14     carried them out and only informed the superior organ.  This is what I

15     claimed.  I never said that they were not doing their job properly or

16     that they did not conduct the operations in an appropriate manner.  All I

17     wanted to try was to define the position and the place of

18     Radovan Karadzic in the system of the strategic command of the army, and

19     he retained his position as the highest ranking politician who is

20     ensuring the government control over the army.  This was basically my

21     assertion.  I never said they were doing their job badly.  I never said

22     that.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have now page 154 in the

24     English and page 134 in the B/C/S, and it is again a section of this

25     combat readiness report signed by Mr. Karadzic, and what we have here is

Page 41497

 1     the setting of tasks for the VRS; correct?

 2        A.   Yes, yes.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 155 in the English

 4     and 135 in the B/C/S, and then we have to turn over both.

 5        Q.   We find here tasks for the various course detailed, and if you

 6     look at -- and you know this document, as you said, and the Judges know

 7     it and the party knows it.  What we find here in this part of the combat

 8     readiness report are tasks that are in line with the six strategic

 9     objectives; right?  Except for -- at least for the first five; correct?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have P1388 displayed on the

14     screen.

15        Q.   It's also mentioned in your -- sorry, no.  That's a mistake.

16     Sorry, ignore that.  As it is coming up, it is the 39th RS Assembly

17     session on the 24th and 25th of March, 1994, and you reviewed this

18     document in preparation of your report?

19        A.   Yes.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have page 84 in the English,

21     and it is 68 in the B/C/S so that we can see that Mr. Karadzic is

22     speaking.  It is the lowest in the B/C/S, in the B/C/S.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation]  I don't have Mr. Karadzic's

24     contribution in the B/C/S.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can you then -- can we -- 68.  Is that 68 in

Page 41498

 1     the B/C/S?  Next page in both, please.  Next page in both languages.  And

 2     we -- at the bottom in English.  We look at the bottom in English, and in

 3     the middle in the B/C/S.  And Mr. Karadzic is saying here:  I report to

 4     you and to the people, commanders report to me, the commander of the

 5     General Staff, GS, commanders of corps and brigades.  And I established a

 6     Supreme Command so that I do not make decisions by myself.  I did not

 7     establish it to use it as a cover.  I'm the one who signs, who decides,

 8     and I will be responsible for each decision.

 9             That's reflecting effective control, does it not?

10        A.   I'm not denying that Karadzic had control over the army.  All I'm

11     disputing that he had operational control over the army.  This is what I

12     keep insisting on.  The operational command over the army was within the

13     jurisdiction of the Main Staff.

14        Q.   But I just read to you that Mr. Karadzic himself says that

15     commanders of corps and brigades report to him.  That's for -- much below

16     the General Staff; right?

17        A.   Corps commanders, well, so far when reviewing the documents I

18     never saw any report submitted to him by a corps.  His reports came from

19     the Main Staff, and that's the standard procedure.  Although it is

20     possible that it pertains to a significant situation, a corps or even a

21     lower unit may send a report to him, but this is out of the ordinary.

22     This happens only in exceptional circumstances, and I myself never came

23     across such a report.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 41499

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was omitted from the transcript

 2     that lower-ranking units may send reports provided it is requested by the

 3     Supreme Command, and this is under the concept of exceptional

 4     circumstances.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Do you agree having said so?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  If it is convenient, shall we take a break?

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will resume at 1.20.

10                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 1.23 p.m.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Can we please have

14     P3039 on the screen.

15        Q.   And, General, as it is coming up, it is directive number 6, a

16     document you are familiar with and that Mr. Karadzic signs as

17     Supreme Commander on the 11th of November, 1993; correct?  Do you

18     remember that?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And yesterday you -- during the testimony you highlighted the

21     fact that the Chief of Staff drafted the directive that Mr. Karadzic

22     signed.  That is standard procedure, is it not, that someone in the

23     Main Staff drafts directives for these command documents?

24        A.   I said the chief of operational administration, not the

25     Chief of Staff.

Page 41500

 1        Q.   And the -- this drafting is not only done for Mr. Karadzic.  It

 2     was also done for General Mladic; right?  He did not draft his directives

 3     that he signed either; right?

 4        A.   Well, most probably it's correct.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can, please, the word "drafting" be

 6     translated differently to the witness, not by using the word "writing."

 7             JUDGE KWON:  But in light of the answer, he must have understood

 8     it.  Shall we continue.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Can we please have page 15 in the

10     English and the last page in the B/C/S.

11        Q.   Reference is made under command and control to two command posts,

12     including the one for the Supreme Commander in Pale.  So in relation to

13     this directive, there are two command posts with the Supreme Commander

14     commanding the operation from Pale and the Main Staff executing whatever

15     he decides in Han Pijesak; correct?

16        A.   Well, I don't see any reference to an operation being executed by

17     a Supreme Commander.  A directive is a document of general nature.

18        Q.   You also made a point of the fact that the two -- the two that

19     they are not together in one command post would show that Mladic has more

20     authority or basically is the one running the army.  I'm just puzzled

21     about this, because isn't it right that during wartime any corps

22     locations of government bodies and commands should be avoided for safety

23     and security reasons?  Is that not the typical situation?

24        A.   This is not a typical situation.  What we have here is the fact

25     that the Supreme Commander is separated from the Main Staff command.  In

Page 41501

 1     all armies across the world the staff organ and the commander are always

 2     at the same location because the staff organ provides support to the

 3     Supreme Commander in the process of preparing decisions.  This is not the

 4     case here.  In other words, it means that the Supreme Commander never

 5     prepared himself to draft decisions.  Rather, it was done by the

 6     Main Staff.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 4, to work on operational

10     decisions.  Not to draft but to take or make operational decisions.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

13        Q.   Just a bit further down under point (a) is a reference to

14     reporting giving the exact dates.  That is a regular practice; correct?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And you have no evidence to the contrary or documentation to the

17     contrary it didn't happen with the Supreme Commander Mr. Karadzic; right?

18        A.   But you have point (a) that I mean works in favour of my

19     assertion.  The decisions of corps commanders are to be submitted to the

20     commander of the VRS Main Staff for approval seven days before a planned

21     operation.  You see that in point (a)?

22        Q.   Yes, but that is the normal practice, is it not, that the chain

23     of command is -- his chain of command has different levels of

24     decision-making?

25        A.   Approval is requested from the person who was supposed to grant

Page 41502

 1     it.  Obviously in this situation it is the Main Staff, not the

 2     Supreme Commander, and that is why corps commanders are duty-bound when

 3     they're carrying out operations to submit their plans for approval to the

 4     commander of the Main Staff of the VRS, not the Supreme Commander.  I've

 5     been trying all the time to make that difference.  I'm not saying that

 6     the Supreme Commander does not have any control and that he should not

 7     have any control and that he's not receiving information about what the

 8     army is doing, no, of course not.  But operational command is in the

 9     hands of the Main Staff.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

11     be asked to speak slower, thank you.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13        Q.   Can you please speak a bit slower for the sake of the

14     interpreters.  And, General, I just noticed again you always speak about

15     control when it comes to Mr. Karadzic.  But he was not just the

16     controller, he was the commander; correct?

17        A.   Command and control and control is part of that function.

18        Q.   General, you mentioned in paragraph 102 that there was continuing

19     disagreement between Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic and that

20     Mr. Karadzic wanted to replace Mladic as early as 1993, and there's no

21     reference for this.

22             I would -- I would ask that -- I don't think we have to actually

23     call up the -- this exhibit.  You are aware -- are you aware that

24     Mr. Karadzic promoted General Mladic on the 28th of June, 1994 - and that

25     is in front of this Court as P3046 - and it is, in fact, an exceptional

Page 41503

 1     promotion?  Do you know this document?

 2        A.   Yes, but it's not that this disagreement was there because Mladic

 3     didn't know what to do or because he was working poorly.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We could not hear the

 5     first sentence.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 7        Q.   Can you repeat the first sentence, please.

 8        A.   There was no reason for him not to be promoted, because Mladic

 9     was a very capable and successful commander.  Disagreement was not there

10     because Mladic did things wrong.  The disagreement was there because

11     Mladic, on the basis of the decision on the establishment of the army,

12     had this dualism, this dual authority within the army.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 261 and 280 of your report in relation

14     to Sarajevo, you state --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Can I intervene.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  If there was no problem of so-called dualism, the

18     operational control should have belonged to who?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Operational control was in the

20     hands of the commander of the Main Staff, but the president of the

21     republic had the authority for the army to be used in accordance with a

22     set strategic concept, that is to say to defend the territory of

23     Republika Srpska and to carry out that concept.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Let me understand your observation about the dualism

25     correctly.  You said since Mladic as the commander of the Main Staff or

Page 41504

 1     commander of the VRS exercising his -- the operational control of the

 2     army, it caused the problem of dualism.  Am I correct in so

 3     understanding?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  So if such dualism would not have -- had not existed

 6     at all, who should exercise that operational control over the VRS, corps

 7     commander or Supreme Commander?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Supreme Commander was supposed

 9     to have Supreme Command and control over the army, whereas in depth at

10     all levels of decision-making others.  The Main Staff was supposed to

11     carry out staff and professional work for preparation and for army use.

12     That is the definition for any staff organ, the Main Staff included; that

13     is to say professional and staff matters to prepare the army and to plan

14     its use, and these plans should be approved by the Supreme Commander.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Your Honour, I move now further to

17     Sarajevo.

18        Q.   In paragraphs 261 and 280 of your report in relation to Sarajevo,

19     you state that civilians and civilian buildings were not deliberately

20     targeted by firing with the primary purpose of terrorising them and

21     inflicting unnecessary suffering, but such firing with strikes on

22     military targets.

23             General, you studied the indictment against Mr. Karadzic; right?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And in relation to the incidents charged in the indictment, the

Page 41505

 1     very incidents of shelling and sniping, you cannot state with any

 2     certainty what the circumstances at that moment were and whether the

 3     strikes were legitimate; right?  That was not your expertise and the

 4     task; correct?

 5        A.   That was not my task but that is the conclusion I reached on the

 6     basis of the existence of numerous documents that I studied that show

 7     that the combat elements of the 1st Corps of the Army of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina were deployed in civilian facilities.

 9        Q.   You know that Mr. Karadzic is charged with the shelling of a

10     waterline of civilians in Dobrinja on 12 June 1993, killing 13 people and

11     wounding 14, and that's a scheduled incident G5.

12             There's evidence before this Court that the -- the victims were

13     hit by 182-millimetre mortar round.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And that is, Your Honour, in P1437.  It's

15     report at pages 8 to 9 and also in P1438.

16        Q.   You cannot point us to any specific source of evidence that fire

17     was opened by the BiH forces from the immediate vicinity of this

18     waterline at that point in time prompting the VRS to fire back; right?

19     You cannot say that.

20        A.   Well, I didn't deal with that specific example.  I assume you

21     discussed that with that expert who provided that expertise.  I just

22     assert that it was a regular phenomenon for facilities and civilians to

23     be misused for military purposes.  Practically there was no need to

24     target civilian targets because all of them had been turned into military

25     facilities.  That is my assertion.  As for this specific case, I don't

Page 41506

 1     know.

 2        Q.   In relation to this particular point, I want to direct you to

 3     paragraph 312 and footnote 198, and, General, in this paragraph you refer

 4     to a sniper platoon stationed in the Blagoje Parovic school.  And I would

 5     like to have D3526 on the screen, and it is an order of the

 6     1st Motorised Brigade of 2nd October 1993.  And in -- it refers in

 7     point 3 not, as you say in your report, the Blagoje Parovic school, it

 8     refers to the former Blagoje Parovic school.  In fact, this location was

 9     right on the front line.  Do you know?

10        A.   I do.  That's a civilian facility, a school, the Blagoje Parovic

11     school.  That is a civilian facility.

12        Q.   General, a corps blockaded in a city as you referred to with very

13     few original military installations would have to find facilities such as

14     schools, factories, and the like and turn them into military facilities;

15     right?  They had no other choice.

16        A.   But they didn't have to be in town.  Why were they in town?  Why

17     are they exposing the population to unnecessary casualties?  Why don't

18     they leave town?

19        Q.   I just told you that this school or, rather, former school was on

20     the front line, and isn't it logic that in the moment when the military

21     take over a building and install their units in there, it ceased to be a

22     civilian building.  It's a military building, is it not?

23        A.   No.  It is still a civilian building, but the military is

24     misusing it and it becomes, thereby, a legitimate military target.  The

25     military is not supposed to be there.

Page 41507

 1        Q.   And, General, whether a given building is military or a civilian

 2     object depends on the use of this building, is it not?

 3        A.   No.  Its primary use is that of a school, a civilian facility.

 4     The fact that it became a military object is misuse.

 5        Q.   General, yesterday at transcript page 41421, line 19, you

 6     explained your calculation of the number of military targets in Sarajevo,

 7     and you arrived at the number 2.200.  In paragraphs 287 to 289 of your

 8     report, you arrive at the number of 2.000 legitimate military targets in

 9     the city of Sarajevo; correct?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And you concluded that the whole of Sarajevo was one big military

12     target; right?  That's also there.

13        A.   Put in figurative terms, it is as if all of Sarajevo was a

14     target.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpret's note:  Could the witness please be

16     asked to speak into the microphone.  Thank you.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

18        Q.   Could you please speak closer to the microphone.  It's difficult

19     for the interpreters.

20        A.   It's put in figurative terms that it was all of Sarajevo.  I

21     don't think that all of Sarajevo was a target, but almost.  If you take

22     all of these localities all over town, it would be hard to draw that

23     without all of it being a single colour when you're colouring military

24     targets.

25        Q.   General, your calculation that let you alive at number 2.200 as

Page 41508

 1     you said yesterday in the transcript and 2.000 as said in the report, you

 2     arrive at this figure in relation to -- on the basis of the number of

 3     brigades of the 1st Corps of the Bosnian Army as the starting point;

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Not only on the basis of that but also on the basis of all other

 6     elements of the establishment of the 1st Corps of the BH Army and the

 7     strategic deployment of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, their command

 8     posts, their Supreme Command post, Main Staff, workshops, military

 9     production, police forces.  So it's not only brigades, but the brigades

10     were the bases.

11        Q.   In paragraph 51 and in footnote 151, you refer to a decision -

12     and that is 1D1192 - to show how you arrived at the figure of 15

13     brigades.  Can we please have 1D1192 on the screen just to confirm.  If I

14     count correctly, it's 13, not 15, in the first place, and it's only

15     formed in August 1992; right?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And you do not know how many brigades were there before this

18     date; right?

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We cannot hear the witness

20     at all.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

22        Q.   The interpreters could not hear you.

23        A.   Before that date I don't know how many brigades were there,

24     because we don't have information about that.

25        Q.   Before this Court is already a list of the 1st Corps command of

Page 41509

 1     the 30th of April, 1993, and that's D496.  You referred to this document

 2     also in footnote 182, and that lists ten brigades.  And there's also a

 3     document from the SRK command of the 20th January 1994 - and that is

 4     P5968 - and there on page 2 it speaks of 12 brigades.  And we have

 5     another one before this Court - that's D292 - an attack order of the

 6     1st Corps of the 11th June 1995, listing nine brigades.  So would you

 7     agree with me that the number of brigades changed over time and was never

 8     at the level of 15 brigades?  Would you agree with that?

 9        A.   I would agree with you on the number of brigades changing and

10     that they became bigger, but the number of targets did not change

11     significantly.  So that number of targets in any establishment, in any

12     unit, it can be calculated approximately.  I've already said that this is

13     not exact arithmetic but it is approximate.  Sometimes --

14        Q.   General, looking at your Galic testimony about the number of

15     legitimate military targets --

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honour, that is 65 ter 25415,

17     transcript pages 20995 to 21001.

18        Q.   You arrive based on such calculation at the figure of 1.500

19     targets.  Do you remember that you had in the Galic case that number?

20        A.   Yes.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And we have -- could we please have

22     65 ter 25363A.  It is actually now a P number, but I forgot which one.

23        Q.   That's your book, your book on Sarajevo.  And we need to have

24     page 13 in the English and page 11 in the B/C/S.

25             And here you again make such a calculation, and here you have

Page 41510

 1     1.800 military targets.  So that clearly shows that calculations based on

 2     theory do not match reality; right?

 3        A.   No.  The calculations are approximate, not exact.  Let me just

 4     illustrate this for you.  A battery, for instance.  A battery can be one

 5     military objective, but it also can be 20.

 6        Q.   Let me stop you.  I'm just wondering how can it be that in a few

 7     years even actually from your report writing to giving testimony the

 8     numbers change from 1.500 to 2.200.  How is that possible if there's any

 9     value in such a calculation?

10        A.   These calculations are not there for measuring something exactly.

11     Rather, it is supposed to indicate the problem that there was a host of

12     military targets within a settlement.  The calculations are approximate.

13     So the difference -- well, if we were to calculate it each and every

14     time, we could have the number change because we would pay more attention

15     to detail, to the actual establishment of a brigade.  So the figures

16     would vary.  But none of these figures are inaccurate, incorrect.  It

17     just depends at the point of time when it was done.

18             We also had the organisational establishment of the corps after

19     Galic's term, and then there were a lot more elements for the corps and

20     the Supreme Command in Sarajevo than during Galic's service because this

21     group.  Galic's term was over in August 1994.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please now have page 18 in the

23     English and 16 in the B/C/S.  And on this page and the six -- the six

24     following pages, if you could scroll to them, please, Mr. Registrar, to

25     just so that it is a list of altogether 222 legitimate military targets.

Page 41511

 1        Q.   And if I understood your evidence in Galic case properly, it's

 2     based on 24 military documents of the SRK and the

 3     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

 4        A.   Yes, this is a sample of documents on the basis of which --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the end of the

 6     sentence.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 8        Q.   Could you repeat the end of the sentence, please.

 9        A.   This is a sample of documents from the entire compilation of

10     documents in the Galic case.

11        Q.   And the documents, the list is based on -- they're not all from

12     the same day; right?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   So you cannot claim that these 222 targets existed throughout the

15     time period this Trial Chamber is concerned with; right?

16        A.   Since documents do not bear the same date, you are right, but

17     since these brigades were always in town, then one could say that I'm

18     right too.  These brigades did not change their location.  They were

19     there in Sarajevo.  Sometimes they were within divisions, sometimes they

20     were within groups, but they did not change their locations.

21        Q.   General, if we look at the targets included, there are many

22     targets which are temporary positions like observation posts, sniper

23     positions, firing positions, machine-guns even; correct?  You nod, but

24     you have to say yes so it is on the record.

25        A.   Yes, yes, yes.  You're right.

Page 41512

 1        Q.   And highly mobile weapons frequently changed their positions?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   That means the existence of a sniper position or moving mortars

 4     on a truck at a certain location is only valid for a specific target

 5     list.  It would -- for a specific date and not for the entire period;

 6     right?

 7        A.   Yes, but they are going to reappear elsewhere.

 8        Q.   Yes, but if a sniper or a mortar moved to another location and it

 9     is mentioned in another of the documents that you review, it would be

10     double counting of that one firing instrument, whatever it is, would it

11     not?  You would count it, got also [indiscernible].

12        A.   You would be right, only if it had to do with the organisation of

13     the establishment of a single unit.  However, I'm not doing that.  I am

14     working on the basis of documents of certain units.  So if this sniper

15     appears in location N, then some other day it's going to reappear

16     elsewhere unless it had been destroyed.  That was my logic.  I don't know

17     if I'm right, but that is the only way I could see it.

18        Q.   General, the question whether you are allowed to fire on a

19     military target is a question of whether at that point in time when you

20     fire that particular building is, in fact, in use for military purposes,

21     would it not be?

22        A.   Yes.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  [Microphone not activated] Can we now have

24     page --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

Page 41513

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Sorry.  Can we now turn to page 15 in

 2     English, first paragraph, and 13 in the B/C/S.

 3        Q.   You mentioned -- you discussed with Mr. Karadzic yesterday the

 4     rules book in relation to 82-millimetre mortars, and we have already just

 5     a few minutes ago discussed a certain incident involving an 80-millimetre

 6     mortar.  And if Mr. Karadzic needs a reference, it is at T41416.

 7             In the book you explain the following:  The 82-millimetre mortar

 8     rule state that an enemy target can be neutralised 25 per cent.  This is

 9     considered the lowest acceptable militarisation rate.  If one fires 24

10     shells on each target, which is 96 shells per target for an average

11     militarisation rate of 50 per cent.  And for the 120-millimetre mortars

12     it would be less.  And it goes into very -- in many specifics, and you

13     have already dealt with that yesterday.

14             General, do you recall that you also explained these figures in

15     the Galic trial, where you also speak about -- how many shells need to be

16     fired?

17        A.   I don't remember any.

18        Q.   But would you agree with me that firing a single round would not

19     serve any military purpose?  Would you agree?

20        A.   Firing one single mortar projectile does have a military purpose.

21     It's called observation fire, methodical fire that warns of danger and

22     puts the enemy on notice so he takes steps.  So such a thing exists as a

23     single round of fire.

24        Q.   General, the single round that hit the people in the waterline,

25     that cannot have had a military purpose.  It was hitting people wanting

Page 41514

 1     to get water; right?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this question appropriate?  We

 3     did not deal which this case which we challenge and no evidence has been

 4     led to prove that it was indeed so.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, first of all it is -- evidence

 7     was led.  We have it in P1437, his report.  I've already mentioned that.

 8     And also P1438, investigative file, and also I make a very particular

 9     point here, and it doesn't really matter whether it was charged or

10     whether it was covered with evidence.  That's in addition the fact.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the witness said he was not

12     aware of that case.  He's talking in general terms about doctrines.  He

13     does not know the details of the individual case.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff was asking about a

15     specific incident.

16             Can you answer the question, General?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't know about this

18     specific incident, because I didn't analyse it, and I don't know.  But

19     what was the question?

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21        Q.   I was actually putting to you that the shelling was a single

22     round of a water line of civilians in Dobrinja on that particular day

23     could not have had any military purpose, firing a single round on a

24     ground of people.

25        A.   I'm absolutely not sure that it was fired at a group of people.

Page 41515

 1     It would have been fired at an active military target, missing that

 2     target and hitting instead the column, the water line.  Of course

 3     civilians should not be targeted.  If that's what you're saying.  I

 4     agree.

 5        Q.   Let me move to one last topic in relation to Sarajevo.  Control

 6     of forces.  In paragraph 24 and 247 in your report, you state that the

 7     Sarajevo situation is such that it is impossible for Mr. Karadzic and the

 8     command officers at all levels to exercise effective control over the

 9     conduct and combat operations of their subordinate units and commands.

10             General, the ability to control troops is not a geographical

11     exercise, is it?

12        A.   No.  It's not only defined by geography.  It's defined by the

13     situation on the battle-field.

14        Q.   General, the ability to control and command troops is first and

15     foremost an existing system of command and control.  Would you not agree

16     to that?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And the SRK had such a control system in it; right?  It was a

19     professional officer, professional command system; right?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   General, you also state in paragraph 17 of the report that the

22     report does not confirm any wrongdoing in relation to the Sarajevo

23     charges, but in any event, it would have been instances of insufficient

24     control of the command on the ground.  That means unauthorised activities

25     of the ground troops?  Is that what you mean?

Page 41516

 1        A.   Not only that, but there was no possibility of effective control

 2     of the conduct of all the possible renegades on the battle-field,

 3     offenders.  And I could explain more if you allow me.

 4        Q.   At this point in time I would rather move on, because we have

 5     very little time.  I was just wondering about this, because as you have

 6     looked at the command documents in -- in this case, we have before this

 7     Trial Chamber several documents related to SRK command orders for the use

 8     of air-bombs.  Do you remember having seen those?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   So the use of air-bombs were ordered by the SRK command and not

11     by the local ground unit or brigade or whatsoever; correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   When researching the materials for your report, did you come

14     across the evidence of Witness Pyers Tucker?

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honour, that is P4203,

16     paragraph 37.

17        Q.   Do you recall seeing something like this?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   Mr. Tucker described a co-ordinated military attack on the

20     31st of October, 1992, by the VRS from the north and south of the centre

21     of Sarajevo with the apparent objective of cutting the city into an

22     eastern and western half.

23             Such an observation and such an activity would not be an activity

24     of a lower-level unit; right?  It would come from the RSK command; right?

25        A.   If that is so, yes.

Page 41517

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I forgot and I just remembered.

 2     I had -- I wanted to tender the additional pages from the book.  I

 3     just -- I just remembered it.  I didn't ask for that.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll add those pages.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, as you have said, we should

 6     stick to the five hours.  I will now hand over to Mr. Mitchell, but I

 7     still have a few topics like the six strategic objectives and a few

 8     matters related to incorrect citations, but I can do this if time allows

 9     after Mr. Mitchell has finished.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11                           Cross-examination by Mr. Mitchell:

12        Q.   Good afternoon, General.

13        A.   Good afternoon.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff and Mr. Robinson, about the book.

15     I was told that we have dealt with almost 20 pages out of 23 pages, so we

16     will admit them all in its entirety.

17             MR. MITCHELL:

18        Q.   General, before we get to Srebrenica, just a couple of quick

19     points about your testimony so far today.  You've read the RS Law on the

20     Army, haven't you?

21        A.   Yes.

22             MR. MITCHELL:  If we could have Exhibit P2603 in e-court, page 24

23     in English and 17 in the B/C/S.

24        Q.   What you're about to see here, General, is chapter 11 of the

25     Law on the Army, which is entitled "command."  Now, you talked earlier

Page 41518

 1     today about dual authority.  I just want you to take a look at

 2     Article 173 there, which says:

 3              "Command in the army shall be founded on principles of a unified

 4     command regarding uses of forces and means, single authority, obligations

 5     to enforce decisions, command and orders issued by superior officers."

 6             General, it's there in black and white.  The command system in

 7     the VRS is based on unity of command; right?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   If you go down to just Article 174, just below that, you've

10     talked a lot about the control authority of the president, and we see

11     your report is about control authority.  Article 174 says:

12             "The president of the republic shall be commander-in-chief of the

13     army.  The president of the republic shall command the army in compliance

14     with the constitution and the law."

15             Just to be very clear, the Supreme Commander commands the army;

16     right?

17        A.   Yes, but the Supreme Commander commands the army as the head of

18     state, not as the operational commander.

19        Q.   Let's talk about Srebrenica, General.  You've made a lot of

20     factual assertions in your report which aren't supported by a citation,

21     and I've just picked five examples which I want to ask you about right

22     now.  If you have a look at paragraph 320 of your report.  This is

23     Exhibit D3864, page 122 in the English and 140 in the B/C/S.

24             You'll see there, General, you refer to a conversation between

25     Dr. Karadzic and General Zivanovic that you say occurred on the

Page 41519

 1     10th of July.  Now, there's no citation there, but I want to show you the

 2     conversation that I believe you're referring to.  If we could have P4484

 3     in e-court.

 4             Now, General, you say this conversation took place on the

 5     10th of July.  The Prosecution's military expert Richard Butler testified

 6     at length about this conversation and established that it occurred on the

 7     8th of July.  Mr. Karadzic, who is one of the participants in the

 8     conversation, has also accepted in this trial that this took place on the

 9     8th of July.  So can we agree that that's just an error and this

10     conversation actually happened on the 8th of July?  Do you accept that?

11        A.   Well, obviously it's a mistake, because the conversation took

12     place before Karadzic allowed the entry into Srebrenica.

13        Q.   Well, you say at paragraph 320 of your report that

14     President Karadzic during this conversation simply made inquiries without

15     making any comments or issuing any instructions or orders.  Now, you talk

16     about this again at paragraph 348, and you say in the course of this

17     conversation, Karadzic does not issue any orders.

18             General, I can count at least six separate instructions or orders

19     from President Karadzic in this conversation.  He says the blue guys

20     should be treated properly; that if General Zivanovic needed

21     reinforcements he should call President Karadzic via the Main Staff; to

22     have someone prepare instructions for the journalists; for

23     General Zivanovic to tell Krle - that's General Krstic - that

24     President Karadzic couldn't get to him right now, General Zivanovic

25     needed to go ahead with his own forces.  And then you'll see if we go

Page 41520

 1     over to the last page, crystal clear, an order from the president where

 2     he says:  "All right, General.  Full speed ahead.  Tell Krstic to go full

 3     steam ahead."

 4             General, would you agree that paragraph 320 of your report,

 5     that's another mistake where you say that President Karadzic simply made

 6     inquiries without any comments or issuing any instructions or orders?

 7     That's a mistake; right?

 8        A.   No, it's not a mistake.  He didn't issue a single order in terms

 9     of employing the forces.  He didn't say use this and that unit for this

10     and that task.  Carry out a new task, capture a new goal.  He assessed

11     the situation in general.  There is not a single military order there

12     that implies a new use of forces, different from the current one,

13     different from what the corps commander had decided.  And in that sense,

14     I believe my report is correct.

15        Q.   General, your report doesn't say President Karadzic didn't issue

16     a new -- a new order relating to a new goal.  It just says he didn't make

17     any comments or issue any instructions or orders.  We can see he very

18     clearly does issue instructions and orders in this conversation; right?

19        A.   The thing is he wasn't issuing new operational orders about the

20     use of forces here.  That's the essence, not whether he talked or whether

21     he commented on the situation.

22        Q.   Let's go to the second example I want to ask you about at

23     paragraph 370 of your report, and this is on page 140 in the English, 161

24     in the B/C/S.  It's D3864.

25             If you can just focus on point 4 in this paragraph.  Have you

Page 41521

 1     found that, General?

 2        A.   Concerning vehicles.  Is that it?

 3        Q.   Yes.  And you say that the operational order of the VRS

 4     Main Staff and the Drina Corps to obtain the means of transport for this

 5     operation was only issued on 12 July 1995, after the last meeting in the

 6     Fontana Hotel and the consent of the representatives.  So just to

 7     clarify, your argument is that the removal of the Muslim population

 8     couldn't have been planned because the buses weren't ordered until after

 9     that last Hotel Fontana meeting; is that right?

10        A.   No.  I'm not maintaining that the population -- in fact, the

11     evacuation couldn't have been planned because of the buses.  The planning

12     of the moving out of the population could not have been carried out

13     because that was not the expected consequence of the operation that had

14     been planned on the 2nd of July, 1995.  That operation was of limited

15     scope, and it could not have been expected that it would result in

16     consequences based on which it would be necessary to move out the

17     population.  That was an operation geared at separating the enclaves, and

18     it wasn't possible to expect the moving out of the population.

19        Q.   I understand that, General, but your report here says the

20     operational order was only issued after the last meeting at the

21     Fontana Hotel; right?  That's what your report says.

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Okay.

24             MR. MITCHELL:  Can we look at Exhibit P4533.

25        Q.   And while that's come up, General, you'd agree that the third

Page 41522

 1     meeting at Hotel Fontana happened at 10.00 on the 12th of July, 1995?  I

 2     don't think there's any dispute about that?

 3             If you can just focus in on the stamp of this document which is

 4     General Zivanovic's order to get buses.  You can see the time there is

 5     8.35 in the morning which is before the third Hotel Fontana meeting;

 6     right?

 7        A.   All right.  The third meeting was planned with the idea of having

 8     authorised representatives come, and there were talks with the

 9     representatives of the Muslim population at previous meetings and the

10     moving out was agreed, but General Mladic insisted on authorised

11     representatives so that there shouldn't be talk later about the agreement

12     being made with unauthorised people.  That's this meeting schedule at

13     10.00.

14             At 8.35 on at that day, it was known that there would be a moving

15     out of population only approval was awaited from the authorised

16     representatives of the civilian population.

17        Q.   But we can agree that paragraph 370 of your report is inaccurate

18     where it says that the orders were only issued after the third

19     Hotel Fontana meeting.  We can agree that that's a mistake.

20        A.   All right.  Well, it relates to the 12th.  It's not a mistake.

21     It's still the 12th at 8.35 or at 10.00.  Those half -- those 30 minutes

22     don't make any difference in terms of the fact that I'm explaining here

23     that the evacuation could not have been planned.  That hour and a half

24     doesn't mean anything.

25        Q.   Let me take you to another example that I want to show you,

Page 41523

 1     paragraph 401.  This is page 150 in English.  It's 173 in the B/C/S.  And

 2     we see you in paragraph 401 say that the testimony of foreign witnesses

 3     in this case has confirmed that all those captives, they're talking about

 4     prisoners captured on 12th and 13th of July regardless of when they were

 5     captured were first brought to the collection point at Bratunac.  That's

 6     not right, is it General, that all captives were taken to Bratunac.

 7     You've forgotten the men who were executed at Kravica, haven't you?

 8        A.   No.  Well, we've said that of course those who were executed in

 9     Kravica did not come to Bratunac.  The collection at Bratunac does not

10     apply to the people who were executed at Kravica, because Kravica was in

11     the evening of the 13th, whereas the collection in Bratunac was in the

12     night between the 13th and the 14th.

13        Q.   If we keep reading down that paragraph, we can see you say:

14             "Miroslav Deronjic reported on 13 July 1995 that 2.000 of them

15     were already gathered there."

16             Who was Deronjic reporting to, General?

17        A.   To tell you the truth, I can't remember this minute, whom he was

18     reporting to, but normally he should be reporting to President Karadzic.

19        Q.   You can't remember as you sit here today that Miroslav Deronjic

20     was reporting to President Karadzic about the prisoners?

21        A.   I'm telling you I can't remember that specific case, but in the

22     nature of things he should be reporting to Karadzic.

23        Q.   And Deronjic should be reporting to Karadzic in his role as

24     civilian commissioner of Srebrenica.  That's right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 41524

 1        Q.   If we can look at paragraph 408, General.  That's page 153 in the

 2     English and 177 in the B/C/S.  And here we see you say there's no

 3     reliable information or tangible evidence about who decided to move the

 4     prisoners of war from Bratunac to Zvornik.  And then a few lines down you

 5     say President Radovan Karadzic ordered Deronjic to move the prisoners to

 6     the Batkovic camp.  And we can see you cite to a document there, P --

 7     it's actually P02994.  If we can have that in e-court.

 8             Have a look at the document on the screen, General, that you've

 9     cited to.  It doesn't say anything about moving the prisoners to Batkovic

10     camp, does it?

11        A.   Batkovic camp, no, it doesn't speak about it, but the Batkovic

12     camp was a well-known place as a camp for that part of the front line,

13     and this is where the prisoners were taken.

14        Q.   I understand that, General, but you've made a factual statement

15     that President Radovan Karadzic ordered Deronjic to move the prisoners to

16     the Batkovic camp, and you've cited to this document and this document

17     says nothing the sort; right?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It doesn't exist in this document,

20     but to put it simply, this is common knowledge.

21             JUDGE KWON:  But is it true that you cited document as a

22     reference to your statement that Mr. Karadzic ordered Deronjic to move

23     the prisoners to Batkovic camp?  Have you seen that sentence and the

24     footnote?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I saw it in the report, and

Page 41525

 1     now when I'm looking at this order, I don't see that sentence there.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's exactly the point,

 3     your Excellency.  In footnote it is P02944.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the second

 5     number.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters didn't follow you.  Could you

 7     repeat.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Radinovic is referring here

 9     to P02944, whereas the Prosecutor called up 2994.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Hmm.

11             MR. MITCHELL:  That's right, Mr. President, because what he's

12     actually citing to is the order of the RS president on the establishment

13     of the SJB in Srebrenica, which is P2994.  I think you'll see P2944 is

14     something completely different.  It's a video.  I think it's very clear

15     that this was a typo, and it was P2994 that the General was intending to

16     cite to which contains nothing about an order to go to Batkovic.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It's clear from the text General Radinovic

18     made reference to the order of Mr. Karadzic on the establishment of the

19     SJB in Srebrenica.

20             We can continue.

21             MR. MITCHELL:

22        Q.   Okay.  General, just one more.  The fifth example I wanted you to

23     take a look at, paragraph 389.  It's page 146 in English and 168 in the

24     B/C/S.

25             You say in this paragraph:

Page 41526

 1             "We know that there were a few opportunistic killings in Potocari

 2     but that after some of the killings the perpetrators hid in the woods

 3     which speaks volumes about their fear of the VRS officers."

 4             First of all, General, who were the perpetrators that you were

 5     referring to here?  Can you give us a unit, a name?

 6        A.   No, no.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Well, can you give us any foundation for your statement

 8     that the perpetrators hid in the woods after those killings if you don't

 9     even know who the perpetrators are?

10        A.   No.  No.  During the trials before the court in Sarajevo, there's

11     been reference to this and that's why I said it, but I have no specific

12     knowledge about it.

13        Q.   Let's move on.  I want to ask some questions about directive 7

14     now.

15             MR. MITCHELL:  We can have in e-court Exhibit P838.  It's page 10

16     in English and 15 in the B/C/S.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must intervene.  The witness

18     should have been shown the second page of the previous document, item 4.,

19     from document P2994.

20             MR. MITCHELL:  Mr. President, I think if Dr. Karadzic wants to

21     readdress that on redirect, he can.

22        Q.   Now, General, you can see directive 7 in front of you on the

23     screen and you're very familiar with the language:  "By planned and

24     well-thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of

25     total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the

Page 41527

 1     inhabitants of Srebrenica."  And you say at paragraph 323 of your report

 2     that you don't wish to defend this sentence.  The reason you don't want

 3     to defend this sentence is because it's an illegal order, isn't it,

 4     General?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And you agree that a specific reference to no hope of further

 7     survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa means it's

 8     not only that those towns will be captured but the population's going to

 9     be moved out as well; right?

10        A.   Well, one could expect that if the measures envisaged here were

11     implemented.  However, there were a number of mechanisms that could have

12     prevented it.

13        Q.   Let me just read you what you said in the Krstic case on this

14     point.  And the question that was put to you from the Prosecutor was:

15             "General you would agree with General Dannatt's assessment of

16     this order when he stated in respect of this particular portion of the

17     directive that we're discussing General Dannatt said I think what is

18     intended here is that Srebrenica and Zepa should be captured and I assume

19     that the reference to no hope of further survival or life for the

20     inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa meant that not only were the towns to

21     be captured but the existing population shall be removed."

22             And then you were asked:

23             "So based on what you've just said you agree with that assessment

24     of this particular portion of the directive?

25             And your answer was:

Page 41528

 1             "Yes."

 2             So you agreed in the Krstic case that that language meant remove

 3     the existing population; right?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             MR. MITCHELL:  Can I have in e-court 65 ter number 18970.

 6        Q.   You may not have seen this document before, General, so just take

 7     a moment and read it.

 8        A.   This is the covering letter from General Milovanovic.  And I've

 9     seen it, yes.

10        Q.   Okay.  And this document means when you see General Zivanovic's

11     signature down at the bottom that the Drina Corps received directive 7;

12     right?

13        A.   Yes.

14             MR. MITCHELL:  Can I tender that, Mr. President?

15             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6450, Your Honours.

18             MR. MITCHELL:

19        Q.   General, in your testimony yesterday at transcript page 41393,

20     you said that if a directive contained orders that amounted to a crime,

21     all such features had to be discounted and dismissed in preparing

22     operational documents based on that directive.  I just want to show you

23     one more document, Exhibit P3040, page 6 in the English and 3 in the

24     B/C/S.  And you'll see just under point number 2 the same language by

25     planned and well-thought-out combat operations --

Page 41529

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we show the witness what document this is

 2     about.

 3             MR. MITCHELL:  Yes, Mr. President.  If we can go back to the

 4     front page.

 5        Q.   Now, you can see, General, this is an order from the Drina Corps

 6     to all of its subordinate units entitled "Order for defence and active

 7     combat operations, operative number 7."  If we can go to the very last

 8     page.  Second last in English.  You can see that's General Zivanovic's

 9     signature, isn't it?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And you can see that it's drafted by Colonel Milenko Lazic.

12     Colonel Lazic was the Drina Corps Chief of Operations and training in

13     1995, wasn't he?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   If we can go back to page 6 in the English and 3 in the B/C/S.

16     You can see the language there under point 2:  "By planned and

17     well-thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of

18     total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the

19     inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."  So the commander of the

20     Drina Corps, General Zivanovic, has taken the illegal language from

21     directive 7 and he sent it out to every single one of his subordinate

22     units; right?

23        A.   Yes.  I must admit that I didn't have this document.  I didn't

24     have this document.

25             MR. MITCHELL:  Mr. President, that might be a good place to stop.

Page 41530

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I informed the parties by

 3     e-mail earlier, but because we have subpoenaed General Andric for

 4     tomorrow, we propose to interpose his testimony so that he would begin

 5     his testimony at 9.00, and we would interrupt the testimony of

 6     General Radinovic, and we would expect General Radinovic to continue his

 7     testimony at around 1.15 tomorrow hopefully.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  General Radinovic, have you been informed about

 9     this?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I haven't.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Given the circumstances, the Chamber will hear

12     Mr. Andric's evidence tomorrow morning and continue with your evidence

13     when his evidence is over.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I ask something?  Does that

15     mean that it might happen that I am not finished tomorrow?  That would be

16     very unfavourable for me if that were to happen.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, that's very likely.  It depends upon

18     how much time Mr. Karadzic is going to use as his redirect and how much

19     it will take for Mr. Andric's evidence.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  It seems like it will be unlikely that he

21     would complete his evidence, General Radinovic would complete his

22     evidence tomorrow, but perhaps through the Victims and Witnesses Section

23     we can inquire and try to solve the problem.  Perhaps if it's something

24     very significant with respect to General Radinovic, we can try to

25     complete his testimony and maybe General Andric can stay, but as I was

Page 41531

 1     under the impression that -- I wasn't aware that General Radinovic had a

 2     problem to stay until Monday.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah.  We were just going to suggest the same thing.

 5     Now that General Radinovic has raised that problem it seems like it would

 6     be prudent to -- to check whether or not, in fact, we can do what

 7     Mr. Robinson just suggested might be done, and that is complete the

 8     General's testimony and then move forward with Mr. Andric to be completed

 9     on Monday once he's appeared before the Court and acknowledged that the

10     subpoena has been complied with.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Shall I endorse --

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Before you make a decision, may I

13     explain what my problem is?  My wife is seriously ill, and I had

14     difficulty leaving her this time.  If there is any possibility for me to

15     finish tomorrow, I would highly appreciate that, but if that cannot be

16     accomplished, then I'll stay.  What else can I do?

17             JUDGE KWON:  If General Andric's testimony could start later

18     on -- later tomorrow, I would prefer to continue General Radinovic's

19     evidence, but I will leave it to you, parties.  So I will allow you to

20     contact the witness, so for that purpose, and liaise with the victim and

21     witness section.  So please sort it out the best way in the interests of

22     the witnesses.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, we'll do that, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE KWON:  We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.  The

25     hearing is adjourned.

Page 41532

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 19th day

 3                           of July, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.