1 Thursday, 31 October 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. Yes, Mr. Harvey?
7 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Your Honours. May I introduce
8 Marialejandra Moreno Mantilla, who is from Colombia and who has been
9 assisting my team for the past five months. She is a lawyer who
10 graduated from El Rosario University in Bogota. Thank you.
11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Ms. Pack, please continue.
12 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 WITNESS: MILENKO ZIVANOVIC [Resumed]
14 [Witness answered through interpreter]
15 Cross-examination by Ms. Pack: [Continued]
16 Q. Now I'd like to remind you of your evidence yesterday in response
17 to my question about Mladic's words at the meeting on the 1st of July,
18 1994, at the Drina Corps command, which you attended. In answer to my
19 question which related to that, to his words, "the enclave is not to
20 survive but to disappear," one of the things you said was this, and I'm
21 quoting from page 42626 of the transcript. You said:
22 "I personally made efforts for them," and this was the Muslim
23 civilian population in Srebrenica, "I personally made efforts for them to
24 get water. I did that personally, myself. I made sure that people had
25 water because I know quite well how much and what exactly that means."
1 Do you remember your testimony to that effect yesterday?
2 A. Yes, that's true.
3 Q. You made sure, did you, that the Muslim civilian population in
4 Srebrenica got their water?
5 A. That Srebrenica get water, the civilians and the army both.
6 MS. PACK: Can I have, please, P05147?
7 Q. Now, as it's coming up let me explain what this is. It's a
8 document dated the 31st of May, 1993, after Srebrenica was declared a
9 safe area. And you can see there, it's from your deputy,
10 Milutin Skocajic and it's to the TG 1 command, for the attention of
11 Colonel Vukota Vukovic or Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Urosevic [phoen].
12 It's marked urgent, to be submitted immediately. I'm going to read that
13 first paragraph. You can follow it in B/C/S.
14 "Lieutenant-Colonel Urosevic received a verbal order from the
15 commander Colonel Milenko Zivanovic to demolish the water-tower and tank
16 in the area of Zeleni Jadar (water supply system for Srebrenica). Since
17 this has not been done so far, this task is to be executed immediately by
18 June 1, 1993, at the latest, and it is to be presented to the public as
19 if the Muslim forces did it."
20 Reading on:
21 "During the execution of the task, strictly take care of safety
22 of personnel and our forces in order to prevent any consequences. Upon
23 the execution of the task, inform this command in writing."
24 You issued an order, General, to demolish the water supply system
25 for Srebrenica, didn't you?
1 A. Not the water supply system. Just the water-tower, which was in
2 a ruinous state and served Muslims to supply Zeleni Jadar, whereas the
3 pipes and water supply installations remained intact. That's my answer.
4 And finally, this is not my order. Because you can't perceive
5 this element, this water-tower, which was out of order anyway, and served
6 as an observation point for various sabotage groups. The water supply
7 installations themselves were in operation, which you can verify in the
8 record because late Nikola Koljevic visited to see about that issue. So
9 this is not an ad hoc story. A man from our top leadership came. This
10 was settled, and he personally went to Jadar. There are probably records
11 of that visit, but the point is that Srebrenica was not without water.
12 Besides, Srebrenica has another reservoir which also could have
13 been destroyed if anyone had wanted to destroy it, and that's on the
14 Bojna hill. That's a supply of high quality fresh water, which went from
15 the Serbian village of Viogor, that water installation was always
16 carefully guarded, and I repeat there was not a single day that
17 Srebrenica went without water. That's my response to this text you've
18 shown me, which you can see has been abused.
19 Q. Did you issue a verbal order "to demolish the water-tower and
20 tank in the area of Zeleni Jadar (water supply system of Srebrenica)"?
21 A. No, no, no, no, no. Just to stop the water-tower from being used
22 as an observation point by sabotage groups. And the water supply system
23 had to be preserved, which was confirmed by the constant presence of
24 water in Srebrenica.
25 Q. Your aim, wasn't it, was to pass off responsibility for this
1 action on to the Muslim forces and then to pass them off as deceitful
2 when they came to blame you; isn't that right?
3 A. That could not be accepted that way, especially since I did not
4 draft this text and did not sign it, and it's very awkward to discuss
5 these details that were decided by two different people.
6 Q. Well, let's see how you followed it up, shall we?
7 MS. PACK: Can we have P05148?
8 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Two different people
9 who are both dead.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Right, right.
11 MS. PACK:
12 Q. This is an order, very urgent, signed by you, dated the
13 21st of June, 1993, and it's to Colonel Vukota Vukovic. You remember him
14 from the last order. And it's to submit the data on the Muslim DTG that
15 demolished the water supply system in Zeleni Jadar.
16 "Since we need to inform highest UNPROFOR bodies about the
17 barbaric act of the Muslim DTG when they demolished the water supply
18 system in Zeleni Jadar and on this occasion directly confronted our
19 forces, inform me about the following."
20 And then you list the various things you need to -- the
21 details -- wait, the details, wait, that you have to be provided in a
22 false report by Vukovic; right? You required Vukovic to provide you with
23 the means to deceive international actors, in writing, as to which party
24 to the conflict was responsible for the destruction of the water supply
25 at Zeleni Jadar; right?
1 A. Please, the water-tower of the water supply system which went
2 from Zeleni Jadar to Srebrenica is far from the industrial complex,
3 1.7 kilometres. The industrial zone in Zeleni Jadar, the timber
4 industry, the wood processing industry, that section was extremely
5 threatened because we were not controlling it at that point and the truth
6 is, and this is really a coincidence, that there was a rupture in the
7 pipeline caused by a sabotage group.
8 With all due respect, you should have read out this order in its
9 entirety, see what I wrote: Submit identification data for these
10 persons, if you are in possession of any. So that's really how it
11 happened. We made an urgent intervention in order to let it be known
12 that the water supply has to continue operating. If it had not been in
13 our interest for the water supply system to continue operating, it would
14 not have operated. You have different positions, but this is the real
15 truth. Why? Because UNPROFOR, with all its forces, in addition to all
16 its other tasks, had the task to control this axis. However, especially
17 in the beginning, they did not move around much, and one day I even asked
18 them to provide me with information as to their ability to deploy and to
19 accomplish their missions.
20 MS. PACK: Let's go to P05148 -- 49, please.
21 Q. Now, very shortly after you sent your order to Vukovic, you get
22 the following manufactured report, the lie; right? Dated 21st June,
23 timed at 1715 hours. Can you see that?
24 A. It's not legible but I can make it out. Now -- now I can read.
25 Q. You can see it's addressed to you. And in the first paragraph,
1 on 26 May at 2058 hours the Turks launched surprise violent attack and so
2 it goes on.
3 MS. PACK: And let's turn over, please, to the second page in the
4 English, still the first page in the B/C/S, and we are looking at -- it's
5 the third paragraph from the bottom, for the B/C/S, we are just looking
6 at the third and fourth paragraphs.
7 Q. "On 27th May, the following day, during the meeting with
8 UNPROFOR, I protested," and it goes on, "saying that they served as a
9 shield to the Muslim terrorists to destroy the facilities without
10 disturbances only to accuse us before the world for the so-called
11 vandalism, just like they always do."
12 And then at the end of the paragraph:
13 "They replied positively to my claims, disgusted by Muslims'
15 Next paragraph:
16 "During the two following meetings with UNPROFOR," in the context
17 of criticising Muslims, et cetera, then he says, "I reiterated and
18 emphasised that they are so cunning and evil" --
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
20 MS. PACK: Sorry.
21 JUDGE KWON: Documents are missing on the screen.
22 MS. PACK: [Overlapping speakers] --
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We don't have the picture.
24 JUDGE KWON: They are coming. Just to confirm, this set of
25 documents were admitted through bar table motion?
1 MS. PACK: I'll have to check, Mr. President. They are certainly
3 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Pack.
4 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President. I was reading the
5 penultimate paragraph. I think I got to the last phrase:
6 "... I reiterated and emphasised that they are so cunning and
7 evil," the Muslims that is, "that they will commit the most horrible
8 sabotages on structures, let alone what they would do to us Serbs."
9 Q. So this, General, this is Vukovic reporting that he has already
10 used the attack that you ordered to deceive UNPROFOR to communicate the
11 lie that Muslim forces destroyed the water supply system for Srebrenica
12 so that they could falsely accuse Serb forces of doing so; right?
13 A. First of all, please, if you are using official reports of my
14 subordinate commanders to portray them as false, in my view that's
15 inappropriate. This UNPROFOR, those are not fictitious people. They
16 were real people who confirmed that this was destroyed by the Muslims.
17 Check with people who were there on the spot and who met with Vukovic, my
18 representative, who was supposed to facilitate UNPROFOR's work. Let's
19 not play games with these things. And how can you say that what my
20 subordinate is writing to me is false? How could it be false when there
21 was an official meeting between my representative and people from the
22 UNPROFOR who were in charge of the Jadar area? Why don't you look for
23 some evidence from UNPROFOR itself?
24 Q. General, you --
25 A. Because this is -- this leads nowhere.
1 Q. General, you issued the order. We've seen -- we've seen that.
2 You don't deny that you issued the order to demolish the water system.
3 A. But we also see this order, where the sabotage had already been
4 carried out in that area. We see that order which you say is false. We
5 can't work this way. We can't accept this manner. You show one order
6 and treat it as false and another one that suits you is okay. But the
7 truth is that a Muslim unit went through UNPROFOR lines and carried out
8 this sabotage action, and at the same time, we were talking about the
9 demilitarisation of that whole territory, whereas they went on launching
10 attacks one after another. That's my answer.
11 Q. We'll move on.
12 MS. PACK: Mr. President, yes, these documents were admitted via
13 the Srebrenica bar table motion.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, let's move on for the moment. Thank you,
15 Ms. Pack.
16 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 Q. The enclave is not to survive --
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Ms. Pack, do we have evidence when
19 that water-tower was demolished?
20 MS. PACK: The only evidence, and I'll stand corrected if any of
21 my colleagues inform me otherwise, but the only evidence we have related
22 to that are these three documents that I have shown to the witness.
23 JUDGE KWON: But the first document says that it had to be
24 demolished by 1st of June.
25 MS. PACK: That's right.
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Let's continue.
2 MS. PACK: And the subsequent documents follow on in time.
3 JUDGE KWON: 21st of June.
4 MS. PACK: They then say -- ask for the report on the action,
6 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: I will do it in redirect. It will be clear.
8 [Prosecution counsel confer]
9 MS. PACK: We have one more document that I didn't appreciate we
10 had. I will deal with it later, if I may, Mr. President.
11 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, yes.
12 MS. PACK: Thank you.
13 Q. So 1994, the enclave is not to survive but to disappear. Let's
14 go to 1995, to Directive 7, which you're familiar with, you received.
15 You received Directive 7?
16 A. Yes, I see it. Can I see on the screen what it is?
17 MS. PACK: P00838. Can we have that up, please?
18 Q. You talk about it in your statement at paragraph 26.
19 MS. PACK: Has the witness got a copy of his statement in B/C/S?
20 If not, I have a copy.
21 JUDGE KWON: General, do you have your statement with you now?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If it could just be zoomed in a
24 MS. PACK: So far as the witness statement is concerned, I do
25 have a hard copy and it might be easier for the witness to see that, if
1 my friends don't mind. It has my markings with the exhibit number at the
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 MS. PACK: Can this be passed to the witness? Thank you.
5 Q. You can just hold on to your statement now, there is no need to
6 refer to it quite yet. This is Directive 7. You remember it, of course.
8 A. Yes, yes.
9 MS. PACK: We are going to go, please, to page 11 of the English
10 and page 15 of the B/C/S.
11 Q. Just want to remind you of the language to which you've referred
12 in your statement. And we are looking at the heading, Drina Corps, which
13 you can see. I hope you have that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Now, I'm not going to read out the first part of the paragraph,
16 you can see it, and it's on the record, so I'm taking it up halfway
17 through to save time. The sentence begins:
18 "As many enemy forces as possible should be tied down by
19 diversionary and active combat operations," et cetera.
20 And then it says:
21 "While in the direction of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves,
22 complete physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried
23 out as soon as possible, preventing even communication between
24 individuals in the two enclaves."
25 And then I'm going to ask you to -- about this sentence:
1 "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an
2 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
3 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
4 And then it goes on.
5 MS. PACK: The following page in English, please, same page in
6 B/C/S, page 11 in the English -- sorry, 12 in the English.
7 Q. "In case the UNPROFOR forces leave Zepa and Srebrenica, the DK
8 command shall plan an operation named Jadar with the task of breaking up
9 and destroying the Muslim forces in these enclaves and definitively
10 liberating the Drina valley region."
11 A. And what are you asking?
12 Q. "... create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no
13 hope of further survival or life ..."
14 You agree that that does not express, does it, a lawful military
16 A. As you can see here, there is a reference to the defeat of the
17 Muslim forces, not the defeat of the Muslim people. Now, how come Muslim
18 forces after an official signing of the cease-fire on the
19 demilitarisation of the area? That is the substantive problem. We are
20 not going to let them make incursions, come every now and then, kill all
21 the inhabitants of a Serb village, et cetera, et cetera, and also to be
22 protected by UNPROFOR forces at that. Please, do not link Muslim
23 formations that stayed there on their own, deceiving the world. Please
24 do not link that to the Muslim people. And it wasn't that the Muslims
25 were only in Srebrenica. In Srebrenica there were a lot of refugees from
1 various territories where our counteroffensive was launched as we
2 liberated areas in Podrinje. So indeed, if the population are not in
3 their homes, at their fields, in their barns, who is keeping them in
4 Srebrenica? What is the objective? The answer lies there.
5 Q. Can you answer my question? "Create an unbearable situation of
6 total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the
7 inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa," does not express, does it, a lawful
8 military objective?
9 A. Oh, please, what is meant here is that the existing enclaves
10 cannot be linked up. Further on, they cannot extend to Kladanj. Further
11 on, they cannot extend to Tuzla. That has to do with the prospect of
12 bearability of living, not living in the enclave. I repeat, and I'm
13 going to repeat for the 100th time, we were at war then, there was a
14 state of war then between warring parties, but do not keep inserting the
15 Muslim people into each and every one of your questions. Do understand
16 that the Muslim people were never my enemy nor can they ever be my enemy.
17 The people, I repeat, the people.
18 But in all fairness, someone who wants to destroy the Bajina
19 Basta hydroelectric power plant, who wants to procure weapons and
20 ammunition to destroy half of Belgrade, those who say that I am occupying
21 territory that is my very own village of Ratkovici, you know that the
22 main command, Rasim Delic signed that in his own hand, you have these
23 documents, and he says that we have temporarily occupied a territory and
24 that's where we are. For heaven's sake, I was born there. How can
25 I come to this temporarily occupied territory? I never said that for any
1 particular point that the Muslims held. That it was temporarily
2 occupied. I am pleased if that is their home, just like I'm pleased that
3 my home is my home. But temporarily occupied territory, you're never
4 going to find that in any one of my documents and I never allowed anyone
5 to say anything like that in my presence either.
6 Yet again I'm asking you, please, let us not tire ourselves out
7 with this. Please do not drag the long-suffering people into this. Do
8 not confuse them with the army. The army is something completely
9 different. Especially the leadership that ignored the key document and
10 that is the document regarding the enclaves and the demilitarisation of
11 the territory.
12 MS. PACK: Let's go, please -- let's go further forward in this
13 document to English page 14 and to the B/C/S, please, page 19. We will
14 have to go over to page -- I apologise -- page 20 in the B/C/S. And it's
15 the second paragraph down in the B/C/S I want to read, and in the English
16 the bottom paragraph.
17 Q. "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with
18 UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and
19 unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the
20 logistic support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material
21 resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our
22 goodwill, while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the
23 international community and international public opinion."
24 So, General, Directive 7 requires that the starving of the Muslim
25 population and restriction of support to UNPROFOR be unobtrusive; right?
1 A. Do take a look at this, how much food they received, how much
2 equipment, how much medicine, all the things they needed. They got more
3 than they could have manufactured even in the days of the Socialist
4 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in that territory. So please take a look
5 at this. They are saying how much goods they received and what my
6 reaction was, vis-à-vis this population. You cannot separate me from
7 that population. Please take a look at this. Look at the convoys that
8 passed and when. We treated this so seriously that at brigade level,
9 close to the enclaves, we had a liaison officer for communicating with
10 UNPROFOR. You have reports to that effect. That's accessible to you.
11 And this is specifically referred to, all the goods that were sent to
12 these enclaves in order to keep life going. Food supplies were sent and
13 also other supplies that were needed. This was a respectable quantity.
14 There couldn't have been hungry people there. But, please, why did you
15 not say that these same Muslim authorities abused these supplies and
16 turned their own people into paupers, hungry paupers? I have documents
17 to that effect, Muslims in Srebrenica. That's the truth.
18 Q. That's right, they were hungry, weren't they?
19 A. That is the truth, that is the truth. No, no. No. But they
20 weren't hungry because of me. Again, please, don't just remember half of
21 my sentence, remember my entire sentence. I told you look at the
22 contingents of the supplies that arrived in the enclave. Look at the
23 food, and look at the ratio vis-à-vis the population. I've already said
24 that is more than they could have produced or manufactured themselves in
25 peacetime. And I'm pleased that there was that much.
1 The first convoy that was allowed to pass in November 1992,
2 I stated officially that we do have a soul, that they are going to feed
3 their children and feed their elderly, and help their frail people. What
4 was the result? Three days later, three Serb villages were killed off in
5 a monstrous way. And now we are talking -- oh, please, please, now we
6 are talking about what Mother Teresa? Come on, are you telling me that
7 the Muslim leadership did not resell these goods that was received from
8 the world on the basis of noble decisions?
9 Q. General, your strategy was to let some convoys in, wasn't it,
10 enough to cause a humanitarian crisis but not to expose the VRS to the
11 condemnation of the international community that was visited upon you
12 because of your actions under directive 4 in 1992 and 1993; right?
13 A. That's not right. That is not right. Why is it not right?
14 Which convoy was returned? In order to make you right, do tell us which
15 convoy was returned, ever. Which convoy arrived in the area of
16 responsibility of our units that were facing the enclave, there are
17 reviews of impressive results there. As far as I know, not a single
18 convoy was returned from our check-points because we would not allow them
19 to pass through. Yes, they were kept there so that they could be checked
20 but we never returned them, and we were always very careful so that all
21 the goods would be kept intact and that all the people would be properly
22 taken care of there. You have to communicate to this Court that I was
23 even commended for that.
24 Q. Let me just deal with something quickly.
25 MS. PACK: Can we have P05084? I'm just going to deal with this
2 Q. I'm afraid it is only available in English so I'm going to have
3 to read it. It's a communication to Dr. Karadzic. Let me just read it
4 to you. 15th of June, 1995.
5 "We write to convoy to you our profound concern about the
6 developing disasters in Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa
7 due to obstructive actions by forces under your control, humanitarian
8 supplies and relief personnel are prevented from reaching their
9 destinations. Warehouses are empty, whole families are crying out for
10 food, and there is little water, gas, electricity or medicine in any
11 enclave. International humanitarian law and, indeed, human decency
12 entitles civilians even in the midst of armed conflict to unhindered
13 access to humanitarian supplies. The rules of international humanitarian
14 law appear to be observed only in the breach by the Bosnian Serb
16 That's right, isn't it? You observed the rules of international
17 humanitarian law only in the breach, General Zivanovic.
18 A. Please, I'm answering this question once again. Which convoy was
19 ever returned from a check-point? From a check-point of ours? Our
20 check-points were not in Hungary or in Germany or in Holland, our
21 check-points are 15 or 20 kilometres away from the enclave itself. Let
22 us make a distinction there. There may have been convoys, I don't know
23 where, but I'm talking about the convoys that reached me. Those convoys
24 passed through. Please. There are reports to that effect. Also, there
25 are signatures involved. There are lists that the leaders of convoys
1 had. They were protected. It was not easy to get a convoy through such
2 areas. Please, we all have to understand that. May this never happen
4 Please don't ask me to consider these people to be my enemy. I'm
5 going to say that for the umpteenth time. When did I ever return a
6 convoy that reached one of my check-points? That never happened. To the
7 best of my knowledge. And I repeat, perhaps somewhere else at a far away
8 destination, a convoy was returned. Please don't read that out to me.
9 Heaven forbid that any convoys were abused in any way. Those that were
10 heading to Srebrenica, that I even took a pack of cigarettes for myself.
11 No way. The convoys had to get through. This was our unambiguous
12 position, and it was obvious. Thank you.
13 Q. General, you tell us in paragraph 26 of your statement that
14 Directive 7 was never implemented in practice, the tasks -- the -- I'll
15 quote you:
16 "The controversial portion of the directive that deals with the
17 tasks of the Drina Corps was never implemented in practice."
18 That's at paragraph 26, penultimate sentence. Right? Two days
19 later, you issued an order, didn't you?
20 MS. PACK: Could we have P3040? Dated 20 March 1995. And this
21 is the Drina Corps command order issued pursuant to Directive 7.
22 Q. You recognise your order? Yes?
23 A. Well, I recognise all orders. Don't ask me if I recognise
24 orders. If it's my order, of course I recognise it. It's not just
25 anything. It is part of my work. How would I not recognise it if it is
1 mine? If it is not mine, then I would not recognise it.
2 MS. PACK: Can we have page 5, please, of the English, and
3 page 10 of the B/C/S? And we are looking under the heading, "The tasks
4 of the Drina Corps." Forgive me, I think it's page 3 of the B/C/S --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I haven't got that in front of me.
6 MS. PACK: Page -- 3 of the B/C/S.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes, yes.
8 MS. PACK: And we can go over in the English, please, to the
9 following page.
10 Q. And we will pick it up, please, from part way through that first
11 paragraph, this is you setting out the tasks of the Drina Corps.
12 "In the direction of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, complete
13 physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried out as soon
14 as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two
15 enclaves. By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an
16 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
17 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa. In case the UNPROFOR
18 forces leave Zepa and Srebrenica, the DK command shall plan an operation
19 named Jadar with the task of breaking up and destroying the Muslim forces
20 in these enclaves and definitively liberating the Drina valley region."
21 So you --
22 A. Sorry, we've already discussed that. We've already answered that
23 question about ten minutes ago. Absolutely the same words, the same
24 text, everything.
25 Q. Yes. That's right. You repeat the tasks assigned to the
1 Drina Corps by Directive 7; is that right?
2 A. Yes, yes, and what's bad about that? It's not that I made the
3 Srebrenica or Gorazde or Zepa enclaves. They were determined by the
4 international factor, who would be where. As for some communication,
5 making it impossible to live in villages, Serb villages, in Zeleni Jadar,
6 Pribojevici, Derventa, many others, these are Serb villages where they
7 killed all their Serb neighbours, as far back as 1992, and then what? Am
8 I supposed to build them a highway so that they can go out and do
9 whatever they want? Do you understand that we are dealing with an enemy
10 that is killing us and that is calling my stay in my village temporarily
11 occupied territory. Do not forget that the latent danger that existed
12 there day and night was the destruction of the Serb population. In the
13 presence of the international forces. If somebody were to pass by a
14 check-point and go back, what more can I add to that?
15 Please find these orders where I asked UNPROFOR to withdraw these
16 sabotage groups that freely entered the territory, to control them. They
17 were supposed to leave their weapons and become free citizens. That's
18 what the document about Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa say. It's not that
19 they laid down their rifles. They got mortars, as a matter of fact, and
20 they got whatever they wanted, and then they want to get me out of this
21 temporarily occupied territory as if I did not know what land surveys
23 Q. Making it impossible to live, make life impossible. These are
24 words you had heard before. Let me just ask you about a meeting you
25 attended on the 8th of March, 1995.
1 MS. PACK: Can we have up 65 ter 21898?
2 JUDGE KWON: When do you expect your cross-examination to be
3 concluded, Ms. Pack?
4 MS. PACK: I do apologise, Mr. President. I hadn't asked in
5 advance for some more time. I'm afraid I got -- I lost track of the time
6 for the last ten minutes, and I would ask for another 30 minutes, with
7 your indulgence, Mr. President. I'm --
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: 30 minutes seems to be a bit too much. Could you
10 try to conclude in 20 minutes?
11 MS. PACK: Yes, Mr. President, and I do apologise for not asking
12 for more time in advance.
13 Q. 65 ter 21898. Now, this is another of your notebooks, it's the
14 notebook from August 1994 to 13 July 1995. You recognise the notebook,
16 A. Well, I do recognise it because it was taken away from me by
18 MS. PACK: Can we have, please, page 1 -- 111, in both B/C/S and
20 Q. Now, this is your note of a meeting on the 8th of March, 1995,
21 and it's at the Main Staff. Mladic is present, as are Generals Tomic,
22 Skrbic, Colonel Beara, Lieutenant-Colonel Ognjenovic. You remember that?
23 A. Yes, yes.
24 Q. And I'd like to take you, please, to the following page, 112,
25 this is the date, we remember, of course, that Directive 7 was issued.
1 And you've noted down what Mladic is saying at this meeting. I'll just
2 read a bit of it. From halfway down the page, your lines at halfway down
3 the page, the UNPROFOR authority in Srebrenica is limited, that's Mladic.
4 Is that what Mladic says? Yes?
5 A. I cannot see it, sorry. I cannot see it.
6 Q. It's where you have a box --
7 A. Thank you, thank you. Thank you, thank you, thank you. Yes,
8 yes, yes. I have noticed that, yes. Because we expected UNPROFOR to
9 have the main say, not Naser Oric, and that's that. That's that.
10 UNPROFOR is subordinated here. I wish you'd ask me more about that.
11 UNPROFOR was subordinated here, and they had to be defended by Zivanovic.
12 They were brought into that position. We always regarded UNPROFOR --
13 Q. Let me read the rest of the entry.
14 A. You told me to look. I've seen it now. Thank you.
15 Q. Yes, it goes on. Enemy aircraft towards Srebrenica, bring down.
16 That's Mladic. In Srebrenica details control. That's Mladic.
17 MS. PACK: And on the following page, please, in the English,
18 page 113 and B/C/S.
19 Q. Still continuing with Mladic, make life impossible. That's what
20 you understood to be your task, isn't it? Make life impossible for the
21 civilian population in Srebrenica?
22 A. No, no, no. Then I would prohibit the entry of convoys, then we
23 would attack the protected enclave or fire on it, and it was strictly
24 forbidden to fire from any sort of weapons. One of the soldiers got a
25 son and he fired a burst of fire because he wanted to celebrate, and he
1 was sentenced to a month in prison by me because he violated his word and
2 my word by firing. If we had had taken this literally, make life
3 impossible, then life would have been made impossible, but it was a far
4 cry from that. These are flexible thoughts. It cannot be applied,
5 because how would the army make life impossible with weapons, not with
6 decrees but by weapons. Have I done that? No. Not in the least.
7 MS. PACK: Mr. President, I'd ask for those pages, that entry of
8 the diary, just that entry on that date, to be admitted in evidence.
9 JUDGE KWON: Together with the cover page?
10 MS. PACK: Yes, please. I'm grateful.
11 JUDGE KWON: We will admit them.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6483, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Just, Ms. Pack or General Zivanovic, whether the
14 general was ever investigated as a suspect or witness?
15 MS. PACK: Yes, he was.
16 JUDGE KWON: Ah, yes. Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, by all means.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you,
20 Mr. President. From the first day, when the OTP expressed the need to
21 meet me, I welcomed them. That was full 12 years ago. They conducted
22 interviews with me that stretched over several days. Ms. Irene Willis
23 and Peter McCloskey and other teams as well. We spent days and hours on
24 end together because not for a single second did I allow myself to be
25 unavailable to the said services. In a wish to express all my pain, the
1 burden, the sadness, which I had lived through and experienced and saw,
2 I simply wanted to help them with their work. For me, this is something
3 that is elevated as a goal and as an institution, and if anyone expects
4 salvation in all this, then it's me, because I had gone through a lot of
5 this personally. That was why I was always available to these people,
6 I always welcomed them properly as guests are to be welcomed, and I hope
7 that by now they have become my friends, and I expect that from Ms. Pack
8 as well, that everything will be fine between us as people.
9 JUDGE KWON: Have you ever testified before this Tribunal,
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Ms. Pack.
13 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. I'd like to play you a video. Could we have the first Sanction
15 clip, please? Just before we start, this is footage from a celebration
16 at Zvonko Bajagic's house on the 12th of July, 1995. You were
17 celebrating the fall of Srebrenica. I'd like to play you a bit of that
19 [Video-clip played]
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the question is?
21 MS. PACK: I gather that something is wrong with the sound.
22 Q. I don't know if you heard it. Did you hear it?
23 A. No, no, I can see myself when I was younger. I can see
24 Zvonko Bajagic, I can see one of our high priests. I see that this is in
25 Zvonko Bajagic's house, one of the rooms of his house in Vlasenica, on
1 the 12th of July. Please, may I answer?
2 MS. PACK: Let me just -- just so that we know what passage we
3 are talking about, just to refer, this is P -- from P04201, the trial
4 video book, and I'm going to refer to the transcripts since we didn't
5 have it orally transmitted. P04202, and I'm going to ask, please, to
6 help us to have in e-court page 256 in English and B/C/S 355, which is
7 the transcript from that speech.
8 Q. I'm just going to read to you what was just played and you can
9 follow in the B/C/S.
10 A. Thank you, thank you.
11 Q. I'm taking it --
12 JUDGE KWON: This will not be counted as your time. While we are
13 waiting for this transcript, General, could you tell us who was this
14 Mr. Bajagic and what the relation with Mr. Karadzic was, as far as you
15 understood at the time? What did he do in Vlasenica? And indeed in the
16 Drina Corps? And what was his relation, yes.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. First of
18 all, it has not been said very precisely, it said celebration, and the
19 fall of Srebrenica. We as the Orthodox Christians have our patron
20 saint's days. The patron saint's day, or Slava in B/C/S, in Vlasenica,
21 they exist for particular households and also for populated places. The
22 patron saint's day of Vlasenica is the 12th of July, St. Peter's day or
23 Petrovdan, which has been celebrated since the beginning of Christendom.
24 That's Petrovdan, the day dedicated to St. Peter. This holiday, it's not
25 a celebration but it's a patron saint's day so these are two different
1 notions. A celebration is something else. It's an ad hoc events. And
2 this is a holiday, a patron's saint's day, a religious approach to
3 feelings we have for a saint who is believed to be a patron saint of that
5 JUDGE KWON: Please be brief in answering the question. My
6 question was about Zvonko Bajagic, not that the -- yes, please.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I was about to tell you
8 that Zvonko Bajagic, as a respected host, was the host of the celebration
9 of this patron saint's day and the guests were invited to his private
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zivanovic, I was not asking about this
12 gathering. I was -- my question was just related to Mr. Zvonko Bajagic
13 individually, what was he, what was he doing in your Drina Corps, and
14 what was his relationship with Mr. Karadzic. Simply that's the question.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I shall answer immediately.
16 Zvonko Bajagic was engaged in the logistics department of the
17 Drina Corps, and I believe that he was on excellent terms both personally
18 with Dr. Radovan Karadzic and the other members of the leadership in
19 Pale. This is my conclusion which I drew on the basis of the insight
20 that I had in everything that was going on at the time. So that was
21 Zvonko Bajagic.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I'll leave it at that. Please continue,
23 Ms. Pack.
24 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 So the clip that was played, it's the bottom paragraph in the
1 English. And in the B/C/S it's halfway down the page.
2 Q. I'll read it:
3 "At the beginning of June, more precisely at the end of May, we
4 started to carry out preparations and then took Zeleni Jadar and tested
5 what the expulsion of UNPROFOR with weapons looks like."
6 So you're talking here, aren't you, General, about the expulsion
7 of UNPROFOR from Zeleni Jadar, which you ordered; right?
8 A. Who was I saying this to? Who was I telling this to, please?
9 Was it to Mladic or to Karadzic, to brigade commanders or to the priest?
10 I was conversing with the priest and this is an abuse of this story. I'm
11 not going to say before a priest that I paid the UNPROFOR members to
12 move. This was a simple conversation between me, as the ex-commander
13 already because I was many kilometres away from Srebrenica. On the
14 11th of July, Srebrenica was included in the Serbian territory. This was
15 the 12th of July. I was in Vlasenica in a private visit at
16 Zvonko Bajagic's house and talking with the priest, who was very much
17 interested to hear what happened with the church in Srebrenica. So that
18 was the point of the whole story.
19 MS. PACK: Mr. President, I think we should play the tape.
20 Unfortunately what's happened, as I understand, there is something wrong
21 with the sound and -- which hasn't been resolved quite yet.
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I don't understand, Mr. Zivanovic,
23 that this is an abuse of this story. Did you mean that you lied to them?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. There is no lying. It
25 wasn't lying, nor was it an official report or debriefing. It was just a
1 conversation between me and the Orthodox priest. It's not an official
2 report to anyone, to my superiors or those who were my equals or those
3 who were my subordinates. It was a conversation. I could have told the
4 priest this differently because the priest was a person who did not take
5 any part in combat activities. There was no reason. I mean, why? This
6 would have no impact on -- what we told each other would not have an
7 impact on anyone, what I told the priest and what he replied to me. So
8 I was not directing my subordinates or sending false reports to my
9 superiors, God forbid.
10 JUDGE KWON: Please listen to the question carefully. The
11 question was whether it was an official -- a report or a private
12 conversation. Yes, irrespective whether it's official or private, the
13 question was whether the content is true. So you do not deny having said
14 these kinds of word at that gathering on the St. Peter's day.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. I'm not denying. It's the
16 truth. What is there to deny? Of course, I'm not denying it.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Back to you, Ms. Pack.
18 MS. PACK: Perhaps then I don't need to play the tape. Let me
19 just go on to another portion of the transcript, if I may.
20 So we'll go on to page 257 of the English, B/C/S, please,
21 page 355 and we will quickly go on to 356.
22 Q. This is still your speech, again about Zeleni Jadar.
23 A. I can't see it, I'm sorry, but I can't find it.
24 MS. PACK: Bottom of the page in B/C/S, bottom of the page in
25 B/C/S, please, and it's from the paragraph, "However, we knew," in
1 English. Let me start reading the bottom of the page in the B/C/S --
2 sorry, it's page 355 in the B/C/S and it's the bottom of the page.
3 I think there might be -- there is one last sentence there that you --
4 you can't see, it just needs to be scrolled down a bit. There we go.
5 Thank you.
6 So we are going to go quickly over in the B/C/S to the following
8 "However, we knew that the main strike would be on the
9 already-built asphalt road Jadar-Srebrenica as was done, our forces
10 physically and mentally well prepared, thank heaven, this also
11 emotionally matured in the Serbian soldiers, the commanders not
12 regretting any effort, the Chief of Staff, you know very well that the
13 man is practically without one leg." That's Krstic. "But he was in the
14 field non-stop. And that upon permission of the Main Staff commander, we
15 established a forward command post, organised a capable command and were
16 ready to carry out what we attempted with forceful strikes of the army.
17 Taking into account every single soldier and the smallest of his fingers,
18 we managed in a short time to take the dominant facilities, putting the
19 liberation of Srebrenica at risk."
20 Q. So there you are, when celebrating the victory on the
21 12th of July, you were saying clearly that the early attack on Zeleni
22 Jadar, preparations for which were started in May, that was a test, and
23 that you already knew that the attack on Srebrenica would come from the
24 Jadar road; right? Is that what you're saying?
25 A. The attack on Srebrenica was never prepared or designed in my
1 mind. That can be confirmed, and it's recorded in a thousand places,
2 that I strictly forbid my subordinate officers and my own command to
3 attack Srebrenica. However, I did advocate, and I stand by that to this
4 day, that the Jadar valley, which separates the Zepa territory from the
5 territory of Srebrenica, roughly speaking, separates or divides them,
6 that it should officially be under our control, all of it, because that
7 would prevent the two enclaves from linking up, and that's true. So if
8 we held those facilities, which as a soldier I had to know, then with few
9 forces, we could survive in such -- in this area and on those features,
10 but there was some work in order to take hold of them. When we took hold
11 of the dominant features, on the 10th of July, a Muslim killed a Dutch
12 soldier from a six-metre distance. I'm a ballistics expert by
13 profession, so on 10 July at 10.00 a.m. from six-metres distance. Why?
14 Because he believed that this UNPROFOR APC and the UNPROFOR soldiers were
15 his reconnaissance men, and this is incontrovertible. That's what it is.
16 And that's my answer to you.
17 Q. Well, we haven't much time so I'm going to take you to two
18 further sections of this speech --
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. General, you do not deny having said
20 that, again? This is your words?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no. But just to be clear,
22 that dominant features are to be held, which would not allow the military
23 contingents from Srebrenica and Zepa to link up. That was my natural
24 response to their planned offensive. So I ask you to see a document that
25 says how much new ammunition the 28th Division from Srebrenica was asking
1 for. So please, I beg you, have a look at that document. What was
2 I supposed to do, to allow them to hold the vital features, in military
3 terms, to allow them to hold them? Was I supposed to do that?
4 JUDGE KWON: You can go on to the end of this session, if
5 necessary, Ms. Pack.
6 MS. PACK: Mr. President, I wondered if I could ask if we could
7 perhaps take the break earlier so that we could resolve the situation of
8 the video.
9 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
10 MS. PACK: And it will be so much quicker, in my submission, if I
11 can just play the General the video and then I won't have to go through
12 the individual portions of the transcript.
13 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough. We will have a break for half an hour
14 and resume at 10 to 11.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Ms. Pack.
18 MS. PACK: Thank you, Mr. President. And thank you for the early
19 adjournment. The video issue has been resolved. And if I can have that
21 [Video-clip played]
22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Going on the road to Srebrenica,
23 I saw the most Turkish mosques that one can imagine and I guess that
24 those enemies of ours wanted it to be higher than the church, and
25 therefore they took down half of the belfry to make the minaret a bit
1 higher. However, they asked me this morning, General, has this famous
2 mosque been finished? I told them I think that they finished it, so
3 I said that it was finished this morning. And further on" --
4 MS. PACK: Just pausing at 00.40.31.6.
5 Q. You're talking about one of the mosques in Srebrenica there, are
6 you? Yes?
7 A. Yes.
8 MS. PACK: We can go on, please.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The town as such was not crowded as
11 you can hear on the radios, no, no it was not like that. They had
12 fantastic weaponry and Motorolas and scared, gullible units. It is best
13 to listen to the Turks as little as possible and one should not listen to
14 some Serbs either. Take a sword in your hands. Our forces came towards
15 Potocari. The police forces were introduced from Bratunac. One wing of
16 our army went towards Viogor. Viogor is the crest of the hill towards
17 Milici and Srebrenica and so, God willing, we will get to Derventa from
18 Srebrenica. This is our task. And yesterday with the fall of -- not
19 from Milici to Derventa, from Srebrenica to Derventa. Yes, from
20 Srebrenica to Derventa. Let me tell you that with yesterday's dusk, any
21 organised Muslim life to the left of Jadar ceased existing. Meaning
22 nothing of Kutuzero, nothing of Bucje, nothing of this old story, all of
23 it is over. They left their cannons, rifles. And really, yesterday in
24 Srebrenica I saw cooked beans but no household. The pie is hot but
25 nobody left to eat it. That means they were there just very, very
1 recently. And here we come."
2 MS. PACK: That's at 00.42.10.1.
3 That last extract is at page 259 of the English e-court, P04202.
4 So, General Zivanovic, any organised life, Muslim life to the
5 left of Jadar ceased existing. This is similar, isn't it, to the
6 language of Directive 7, create an unbearable situation of total
7 insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants,
8 the inhabitants, not the enemy, of Srebrenica and Zepa. Would you agree?
9 A. I don't agree. And why not? Because all the population was
10 moved away from the line between the units. I mentioned the left bank of
11 the Jadar. The dominant features with military views show that whoever
12 holds these features would either join up or separate the enclaves. As
13 this was the area where the Serbian army had already entered, to my
14 happiness, then and now, the population was not affected by the combat.
15 It moved to Susnjari and Milacevici area and no one fired at this area
16 with anything. We could have fired with rifles and cannons but we didn't
17 because the population was there. And that's my answer.
18 MS. PACK: Mr. President, I'm at the end of my time. I have no
19 further questions. Thank you.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 Yes, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies. Good
23 morning, Your Excellencies. Good morning, everyone.
24 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
1 A. Good morning.
2 Q. Let me begin with the freshest points. Can you tell us about the
3 circumstances concerning the mosque? What did you mean? Why was the
4 mosque destroyed or shortened? What was this talk about the church and
5 the mosque? What did you mean?
6 A. Srebrenica had four mosques and one Orthodox Church in town, and
7 one Orthodox Church between Srebrenica and Potocari, at the Orthodox
8 Serbian cemetery of Srebrenica. From the positions that we held around
9 the enclave, Srebrenica, of course, was visible, and we saw, even before
10 we entered Srebrenica, I mean the scouts saw that the cross was taken off
11 the church, the bells were taken down, and the tower was cut in half.
12 When I talked to the people who were very pained over this, they
13 said it will be destroyed completely. I said no, it won't be. Why?
14 When this church was designed -- because I consider Srebrenica as my own
15 town, that's where I grew up, that's where I finished high school, I was
16 president of my class, I spread literacy among young people, both Serbs
17 and Muslims, I participated in the foresting effort, quite simply I love
18 Srebrenica. I have many, many friends there. And when this new mosque
19 was supposed to be built, with a very big, big minaret, there was a lot
20 of debate when they were making models for the mosque. Their desire was
21 to make the minaret higher than the cross, but since I am a topographer I
22 know about altitudinal differences. So willy-nilly, the mosque had to be
23 lower than the church because it was laid on lower ground. If they had
24 wanted out of some rivalry to make it higher, they should have put it
25 atop a hill.
1 So what happened? When we entered Srebrenica, around 5.00 p.m.,
2 on the 11th of July, in the portal of the church, I saw, and not only
3 I but anybody who was willing to look, I saw Muslim cattle coming out of
4 the barn. I went up to the church and I saw a horrific sight. The bells
5 were on the ground by the entrance. The ropes from the bells were tied
6 to the cattle, to keep them on a leash. It was very humiliating. And
7 when I talked to the priest, and you showed a bit of this conversation,
8 I can't remember anymore what we said to each other, anyway, I talked to
9 this priest, Kacavenda, and I told him: Just clean up, never mind the
10 ropes and the cattle, just don't let them turn our church into a barn, as
11 they did. Every soldier had to be distressed when he saw that sight, and
12 I knew very well that they would destroy the mosque and there was no
13 chance of preventing them after they saw the church the way it looked.
14 Q. Did anyone issue orders to destroy the mosque?
15 A. There was no order, especially since I returned from Srebrenica
16 on the 11th, and as the whole world knows and the Office of the
17 Prosecutor, to whom I gave extensive statements, I was no longer engaged
18 in that area. You saw from the recording that I was in Vlasenica.
19 Later -- and Vlasenica is 50 kilometres away from Srebrenica.
20 I was away when all this was going on. But even a lay person
21 would expect that mosque to be destroyed in view of what had happened to
22 the church.
23 Q. Did the Drina Corps and the VRS in general deal with civilian
24 aspects of life, the right of civilians to return? Whose job was it in
25 the system of Republika Srpska?
1 A. It was within the purview of the authorities. Yesterday, and
2 earlier today, attempts were made to pretend that I was some sort of
3 commissioner for either the Serbs or the Muslims. You know, as the
4 accused here, that you were at the top of our government. We had a
5 regulated political governmental life at the level of municipalities, and
6 public utilities were in operation, schools were in operation, hospitals
7 as well. Everything was functioning. And I have to tell you this as
8 well: We did everything so that the school in Srebrenica could continue
9 working. Not a single shell fell in its vicinity. Why doesn't the world
10 hear more about that? We were only waiting patiently for
12 Q. That's what I wanted to ask you, General. What does the army
13 mean when they say that you should abolish enclaves? Does that refer to
14 civilian life or to military aspects? What was the attitude of the
15 Drina Corps, and what would it have been if the enclaves had really been
17 A. I regret to this day that peace did not come on that day, because
18 of all the supplies that were requested by Srebrenica, they never
19 requested a single agricultural machine, any tools necessary for work in
20 the factory. They didn't ask for anything that was necessary to revive
21 economic life. Look at the last paragraph in the order that came from
22 your level about demilitarisation. I believe it was the 23rd or the
23 24th of March, 1994. It says in the last paragraph that Muslim soldiers
24 who had laid down their arms become civilians and free citizens, and that
25 was an opportunity, a chance, and it also says that they have the right
1 to free movement. If that had happened, the corps would not have any
2 role with regard to them anymore. Every demobed soldier has the right to
3 go home, the way it happens today. Nobody would have prevented a man who
4 used to be a soldier in Srebrenica from going home.
5 That was the firm position, and I'm full of regret to this day
6 that demilitarisation never happened, and I'm not sure that the places of
7 deployment for UNPROFOR were the best possible solution. They should
8 have said, "Muslims go 500 metres back, Serbs go 500 metres back. The
9 politicians should now come and deal with the situation."
10 Q. When the term "mopping up" a certain area is used in the army, or
11 clearing a certain area, my learned friend added to this term, ethnic
12 cleansing. Could you tell me what the army means, clearing?
13 A. It means clearing from enemy troops and weapons, so that our
14 personnel be safe. But the opposing party did not accept that for a
15 moment. They destroyed and stole all my property. To this day, nobody
16 apologised to me, nobody said, "I'm sorry."
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the document 04075 be shown
18 to the witness, document on the briefing.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Yesterday, on page 89, it was suggested that we wanted -- or,
21 rather, that Mladic said on that occasion that Muslims should disappear
22 from that area. Could we please look at that document? Did the army
23 have any plans to prevent civilians from returning to their homes after
24 the fighting was over?
25 A. No. I never wanted that. I, as a commander, always wanted
1 everyone to come back to their home. Yesterday, I tried to give a more
2 extensive answer to that question but, unfortunately, Madam Prosecutor
3 cut me off.
4 When Skelani fell, as the last point, that was the
5 17th of January, 1993, where they had killed students and teachers
6 together, where they had caused a lot of suffering and pain and death,
7 I'm saying this not because I'm your witness here, but I, without you
8 knowing or Mladic knowing, I established a direct line with the Muslim
9 side, knowing that you would approve. I didn't allow Naser Oric to come.
10 I wanted people of some sobriety to come, such as the hodza from
11 Srebrenica. I wanted to invite people of that kind, to discuss what we
12 should do.
13 Our basic task was - it could be a harsh sentence to me - and
14 that was that Muslims, and that was before the offensive started, they
15 had before that burned down Serb villages, I, myself, came into a Serbian
16 village that had been destroyed and collected mortal remains of some
17 bodies and got them autopsied later by Dr. Stankovic from the military
18 medical academy. So our position was that they should stay at home and
19 work on their farms, on their estates, and leave politics to others, and
20 I would invest my own authority, telling them that they would be safe if
21 they stayed at home. And these peasants, if they had stayed in their
22 homes as free citizens, then my own refugees would come back to their
23 villages more easily.
24 I have 50 photos where you can see me working together with these
25 people after, to rebuild my own house that Naser Oric had razed to the
1 ground, whereas I had spared his own house. Unfortunately nobody
2 listened to me. Do you know what answer I received from the Muslim side?
3 That they were stronger. And what came later? The counteroffensive, and
4 what happened happened.
5 Q. General, you see the second paragraph in point 1, where it refers
6 to the cutting of trees and undergrowth. Is it a defensive or offensive
8 A. That's a classic part of defensive activities. You see, one word
9 here changes all the meaning. Cut through. That means cut down the
10 growth and the trees to enable visibility, observation. To cut off, on
11 the other hand, means to disable a certain communication, to prevent it
12 from being used, whereas cutting through, that means cleaning the
13 undergrowth, just as is normally done, because in -- in the woods, you
14 can't see anything from the trees.
15 Q. Can you tell the Chamber whether setting mines before one's
16 forward line is a defensive or an offensive action?
17 A. Cutting through, as the first defence action, makes way for fire
18 protection, and what is important about setting these mines? It's
19 important to set them according to the solutions decided by the
20 commander, and these mines must be protected. There must be strict
21 protocols and records so that later on, when these mines are no longer
22 needed, they could be efficiently and easily removed.
23 I'll give you a very graphic example. A girl found herself in a
24 minefield, running from the Srebrenica units. This girl, this Muslim
25 girl, of course, was saved thanks to the fact that I was close. We
1 managed to get her out of the minefield and we took her -- and believe
2 me, the priest was not so pleased with me, because I knew his car was
3 very good and had enough fuel. I told the medical people: Put the girl
4 in the priest's car. We took her to Uzice and I even found the time to
5 go and visit her. Why? Because she was the daughter of
6 Zulfo Tursunovic, who, in 1984, killed her father by cutting his throat.
7 These are very complex life stories. It was very complex work. And of
8 course, the girl was very grateful to me later for saving her life and
9 for bringing her to the hospital.
10 Q. You now just confirmed that you did not foster any ideas about a
11 permanent removal of the Muslim population from the enclave?
12 A. No way, not for a minute.
13 Q. Next page, please. This was discussed yesterday at page 89 of
14 the transcript. Now I'm going to read this out. It's the last paragraph
15 under number 2. So it's the subparagraph before paragraph 3:
16 The life of the enemy has to be made unbearable and their
17 temporary stay in the enclave should be made impossible --
18 A. Of course.
19 Q. -- so that they leave the enclave en masse as soon as possible,
20 realising that they cannot survive there.
21 A. That's right.
22 Q. What is meant when it says "enemy" and "temporarily"?
23 A. What is meant is the armed force that abused, did not honour the
24 agreements on demilitarisation. Believe me, I am so sorry, and it pains
25 me to think that these people there were used as a mask, and then when
1 day-time comes, then they say good morning. To this day Muslims call me
2 to build houses with them together. I don't know, but they keep inviting
4 Q. Thank you. Yesterday, you mentioned that Srebrenica was full of
5 people from other municipalities, and then the Prosecutor suggested to
6 you that we had expelled these people. Can you tell the Trial Chamber
7 where, during which operation, the Army of Republika Srpska came into
8 physical contact with civilians and affected their behaviour? How did
9 that happen? Where were the civilians and where was the Army of
10 Republika Srpska?
11 A. Please, this is the truth. And may all survivors say, whether
12 they were in civilian activities and whether I was involved in military
13 activities, civilians were always taken behind the lines, and we clashed
14 with a division, a division is quite big. There are military rules
15 involved. That's the way it is. In America, France, China, wherever.
16 However, this is the essence. If you will believe me, we really did our
17 very best to spare civilians in combat operations. Please, nobody asked
18 me what I saw. As for the population, as for Srebrenica, if you'll allow
19 me to say just for one minute, when we went from Pribicevac, from the
20 command post there, I did -- my driver did not go with me. The -- my
21 escort was driving, it was only three of us, my brother, I and the
22 driver, when we came to Kvarc trig 3.013 metres, it's the most important
23 feature there, from Kvarc you can see clearly from Jadar to Bratunac, and
24 the part of Srebrenica that leads to Solotis [phoen] and Potocari is
25 particularly visible, to Milacevici, Ravni Buljim, et cetera. Now,
1 Susnjari, Milacevici, Lokotosa [phoen], so it's a Serb village, it was
2 emptied already in the beginning of May 1992, totally destroyed, not to
3 mention Susnjari, that it was even earlier on, and we saw with our very
4 own eyes, columns, columns of civilians, soldiers, men, women, who were
5 marching along those roads. You could fire any which way you wanted at
6 such columns. However, I claim with full responsibility, and thank God
7 this has been proven by time, no one dared fire at these columns and no
8 one did fire at these columns. That's how Srebrenica was emptied,
9 emptied, and soldiers entered Srebrenica without any combat involved, as
10 far as Srebrenica is concerned.
11 Some people were even teasing me, they were saying how could I as
12 a professor from the military academy, for 12 years I was a professor, a
13 professor of ballistics, how come I'm not firing at the road but this way
14 or that way. But my order was -- and nobody keeps showing these orders.
15 My orders were that I banned any kind of fire at any formations that were
16 not part of the combat disposition. So especially because there were
17 civilians there, men, women, there was a mix of people there, and they
18 managed to leave unhindered. While I was in that area, Srebrenica was
19 not torched, all the inhabitants of that municipality left, I went
20 further on and I know as much as you do. That would be my answer.
21 Q. Thank you. General, sir, were you at your command post when
22 civilians, in 1993, from Cerska, Kamenica and all the other villages, set
23 out to Srebrenica? Were these columns visible to you and how many times
24 was fire opened at these columns?
25 A. First of all, I have to answer your question about the atrocities
1 committed in Serb villages -- sorry, did you hear what I said?
2 Q. I'm reading, yes, yes.
3 A. I'll repeat. First I have to talk about the atrocities in the
4 Serb villages between Vlasenica and Cerska in 1992. It's not one
5 village. All the Serb villages were destroyed and everybody was killed.
6 And such atrocities were committed, such crimes were committed, that
7 people who do not have a good stomach or a good nervous system should not
8 look at those photographs. It is terrible. Now, since this Cerska was
9 indeed quite a stronghold, I have to remind you that we were warring
10 parties, it's not that we were involved in farming work together. We
11 set -- they set out towards Srebrenica and they had these points of
12 resistance, Koglici [phoen], and these other points where you can defend
13 it. As you enter the valley of Konjevic Polje, there was no fighting.
14 Yesterday, we saw that Pandurevic said that it should not be destroyed,
15 torched, and there were people who were homeless. So these columns
16 mainly went towards Srebrenica.
17 Now, I have information because a Muslim came to see me in
18 Vlasenica, and he beseeched me not to allow -- how did he put this?
19 Well, let me put it this way: That I should not allow suspicious
20 individuals to be in positions of authority. The man came to see me --
21 Q. Thank you. You, your troops, could you see this column of
22 civilians? Actually, first of all, did your troops have physical contact
23 with civilians from Kamenica, Cerska?
24 A. Not with civilians, exceptionally those who slaughtered those
25 Serb villages, with them, yes. And civilians of course left.
1 I have to tell you this. The terrain is such, it is so hard to
2 have combat in areas like that, and especially to be on the move, the
3 enemy can suffer terrible losses in such terrain, but I keep repeating
4 that it was not my aim to have people killed. These poor people did not
5 have enough to eat and they did not have the right kind of clothing but
6 then I could not help anyone with that.
7 Q. Thank you. Do you remember in the world media and in UNPROFOR
8 what was stated about what our army did vis-à-vis the civilians in Cerska
9 in 1993?
10 A. I have to tell you something else. This is an entire
11 conglomerate, has to do with news, and it's hard to say everything in one
12 answer. Actually, these reports were not only unfavourable but they were
13 unsincere because nobody really wanted to muddy their boots and go out
14 into the terrain and see what the situation was like. They received
15 reports from one office to another, and really, on the ground itself,
16 well, very few people got to the right information there. And people say
17 somebody called me from Zvornik on the 12th or on the 13th and some
18 officer of theirs called me and said, There are 5.000 Turks, even more
19 people -- more than the inhabitants of Zvornik. And I said, Who said
20 that to you? And he said, The colleague from the office next door. And
21 I said, Well, just tell him to forget it. So we cannot just take things
22 at face value.
23 So this was the time when people were trying to brag in
24 newspapers and make these bombastic statements, but hardly anyone got to
25 the core of the matter.
1 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether General Morillon visited
2 Cerska to see for himself, as you said, put on his own boots and go out
3 and see what is happening, and were the allegations concerning the
4 massacre correct?
5 A. What do you mean massacre? I asked this same Morillon,
6 I beseeched him, well, Hayes is still alive, let him say, and I wanted
7 them to say -- well, I told them let people live. Forget about this
8 silly business of yours. People were so indoctrinated and it was hard to
9 think in normal terms, in terms of normal life. Well, let me tell you,
10 Morillon had to be -- how do I put this? He had to be far more diligent
11 if he had this kind of statesmanly responsibility. He should have been a
12 lot more vigilant but he wasn't.
13 Q. Thank you, General. You were asked about convoys yesterday, the
14 difficulties involved and the reasons. So there was resistance among the
15 Serb population, but sometimes, in some areas, were there military
16 reasons for postponing convoys, if you will?
17 A. Of course. And why? Because in convoys there were goods that
18 did not match the lists provided. There were even weapons there. I was
19 never at a check-point myself so I didn't do the counting. But there was
20 this kind of abuse.
21 Please, I'm not saying that somebody had planned this, somebody
22 who wanted to cheat with the convoys. So even those people who wanted to
23 help sincerely were cheated because things were sent through these
24 convoys that were not really supposed to assist the population. Sorry,
25 I mean if they are sending rifles, then it's different. I'm a soldier, I
1 have to put it that way. Do not fill a sack with ammunition and say that
2 you're taking that sack to feed the children. How can anyone even think
3 of that?
4 Q. Thank you. What I really meant was whether there were any
5 military developments involved? Did the convoys have to go through the
6 front line itself?
7 A. No way.
8 Q. What did you do when there was fighting on the ground where the
9 convoy was supposed to pass?
10 A. Several times, the convoy would be checked and then it would move
11 on. However, what happened? The front part of the convoy would already
12 enter the area where there was combat. Oh, please, please. Combat was
13 already underway. So what? Stop convoys? Stop, stop? So it's not that
14 they were stopped for just any old reason. They were stopped because
15 there was fighting going on. So until you created conditions for seeing
16 which way people were going, I mean how could I know whose intentions
17 were whatever?
18 If a convoy was allowed to go towards Srebrenica, then quite
19 simply they had to get there safely. Truth to tell, it's better for them
20 to wait for a certain period of time and for the convoy to arrive so that
21 no one would get killed from that convoy, heaven forbid. I would
22 consider that to be a terrible defeat of my own.
23 Q. Thank you. I hope that we are going to get to documents of this
24 nature if we have enough time. However, I would like to dwell on the
25 claims made by the Prosecution today. It was alleged that the
1 Drina Corps had the task of causing a humanitarian disaster by
2 restricting humanitarian aid and weakening the military power of UNPROFOR
3 by imposing restrictions on them.
4 First of all, tell us, the entire population of the municipality
5 of Srebrenica, did all of them live in the small town of Srebrenica
6 itself or, rather, did they live in villages and was there a rural
7 production there?
8 A. When they refused my offer, in 1993, to hand over weapons and to
9 remain as free citizens in their own households, when they responded that
10 they were stronger, of course we launched a counteroffensive and there
11 were organised Muslim formations facing us. The population kept
12 withdrawing, retreating, and they got into an area, the municipal centre
13 of Srebrenica, and I personally did the measuring, 5 kilometres by 1 and
14 a half kilometres, and there is nothing in Srebrenica except for houses
15 and the municipality. The very entering of the population into
16 Srebrenica that way is quite a problem. I know each and every part of
17 Srebrenica. I used to live there as a tenant in Muslim families, Serb
18 families. So this was a bad idea.
19 And, sir, there was no production, not any rural production.
20 Srebrenica does not have a single hectare of arable land. Let us look at
21 each and every plot of land there on the basis of the land register, if
22 you will.
23 Q. Thank you. What about UNPROFOR? Did they have drills or
24 exercises, target practice? Did UNPROFOR ask for fresh ammunition
25 supplies, and if so, where could they use this ammunition?
1 A. First of all, I secured UNPROFOR movements. I was their rifle
2 and ammunition for as long as they were in my territory, if I can put it
3 that way. When I said "my territory," I meant where I was commander and
4 where my units were present. There were no weapons that were needed, no
5 rifles, no nothing, as I've already said. Their main rifle was their
6 UNPROFOR insignia on their sleeves and their blue helmets. Those were
7 their weapons. There would be one observation post and then seven
8 kilometres away there would be another one. I don't even know whether
9 they had radio communication, let alone any other kind of communication.
10 So it's not that they had any kind of target practice or whatever. There
11 weren't any training grounds there at all. After all, we communicated
12 with them, socialised with them. Let many of these UNPROFOR people say
13 how much time they spent with me, and had proper inter-human
15 Now, whether somebody abused this and whether they gave the
16 military formations of the Muslims ammunition, well, you have to ask them
17 or, rather, they have to ask themselves, not me. Because no one ever
18 told me or announced that there would be military exercises of UNPROFOR
19 carried out.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D3313, could we briefly take a look
22 that in e-court? This is a Muslim document. The state security sector
23 from Tuzla.
24 That's not the document. Could we then, please, have a look at
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, this is Prijedor. It's not
2 the Drina area. Drina and Prijedor are not together.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D92081, then, please. This is it.
4 Let's have a look. First, the document dated the 23rd of November, 1995,
5 the state security sector Tuzla. Can we please look at page 10, first?
6 I'm sorry that it's not translated but I didn't know that that would
7 be ...
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Can you please focus on what it says here, the overview of
10 available information about murders, criminal activities, prostitution
11 and other committed in the area of Srebrenica --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Going into the detail, given that we
13 do not have English translation, please let us know what this document is
14 about, with the witness.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't see. I can't see it. I'm
16 sorry, I apologise, I can't see anything here.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Can we please zoom in and can you read out for us what the
19 subject of the document is? It's up here. Whose document is this? Can
20 we show the heading, please?
21 JUDGE KWON: Let's go to the first page, first.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a set of documents,
23 Your Excellency, and this document is independent. It's a set of
24 documents under the same number but this document has its own heading and
25 its own date.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then go back to the page you want to
2 show us.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 10, please.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, sir, if we can zoom in on to the heading first, would
6 you agree with me that it comes from the state security in Tuzla, the
7 Muslim side?
8 A. I can't see, unfortunately. It's not marked. Yes, that's right,
9 correct. Their security service of their corps command. It's their
11 Q. What does it say about the subject? What's the subject?
12 A. Overview of available information about committed murders,
13 criminal activities, prostitution, et cetera, in the area of Srebrenica
14 in the period up until the occupation of this protected zone. This is
15 the --
16 MS. PACK: Your Honour, I object. I really don't see how this
17 comes out of my cross, a document about whatever topics this is that
18 I can't read. But just from the summary, I don't see how this arises out
19 of my cross-examination.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is just identifying the
22 document and on page 15 is what follows from --
23 JUDGE KWON: Having viewed this title, could you assist us how
24 this arises out of the line of cross-examination of Ms. Pack?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, in the
1 cross-examination it was claimed that the Drina Corps restricted --
2 JUDGE KWON: Can we hear that in the absence of the witness? Or
3 could you tell us in English briefly?
4 THE ACCUSED: Yes, yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zivanovic, could you kindly take off your
6 headset for the moment? Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
7 THE ACCUSED: Excellency, since this title hadn't been read and
8 translated entirely, it is about the criminal activities in Srebrenica
9 and it is concerning humanitarian aid, abuse, stealing and trading
10 humanitarian aid with a lot of -- lot of those aid -- this aid that was
11 on the black market.
12 MS. PACK: [Overlapping speakers] --
13 JUDGE KWON: How is it related to Ms. Pack's cross-examination?
14 THE ACCUSED: Excellency, Prosecution alleged that
15 General Zivanovic and Drina Corps restricted flow of humanitarian aid in
16 Srebrenica, while General Zivanovic said that they did have enough, they
17 abused it, they used to sell it, and so on. And this Muslim document is
18 exactly talking about that. So all of our --
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue. We will allow the question.
21 Yes, please, yes, I'll use the body language. He understood.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Page 15, please.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please look at the paragraph, the 7th from above, which says from
25 humanitarian aid, a large quantity of goods were set aside for the needs
1 of the 28th Division, of which a significant part intended for Oric were
2 sold at the market by Hamdija Fejzic, Suljo Konakovic, Amer Mehmedovic
3 and so on. Did you know this and how does this fit with your knowledge
4 about the situation with regard to food and the destiny of the
5 humanitarian aid which you let pass through?
6 A. Are you asking me?
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. This confirms my evidence and proves that the humanitarian aid
9 which was transferred to Srebrenica was improperly distributed, because
10 it wasn't given out to the homeless people and refugees, to them
11 primarily, to children and everyone else, but, as the document itself
12 says, even Naser's market was functional. They sold the same goods
13 there. So there were not only 20 or 50 Muslims who were armed so that
14 you couldn't see them. The formations were somewhat stronger than that.
15 Q. Do you want to say that the 28th Division, the food for them,
16 that they were giving humanitarian aid to their army? Wasn't it so?
17 A. That was how they kept their army. It was fine for the army.
18 They had everything. Why not?
19 Q. Could we just be as brief as possible, General? Could we look at
20 item 2, lower down - if we can scroll up - Hasanovic Suljo, the former
21 chief of the Secretariat of People's Defence in Srebrenica took food and
22 food items from the humanitarian aid depot, sold one part of it at the
23 market, by using unidentified persons, and he used to make his own brandy
24 by using some of the food items. How does that fit into your knowledge?
25 A. That was the abuse of humanitarian aid, and we turned everyone's
1 attention of that in November 1992. You should look at my statement
2 which I said after the first convoy passed through, when I was removing
3 Serbian women who were dressed in black from the road so that the convoy
4 could pass through, I had to discuss this with the soldiers, I had to
5 move the rifles aside, as bullrush so that the convoy could pass through.
6 So I exposed myself to some risks, and it's unjust that this should be
7 minimised, so what would happen? Three or four new Serbian villages
8 would cease to exist.
9 Q. And how do you connect the passage of humanitarian aid with
10 subsequent torching of Serbian villages that occurred soon after this?
11 A. Well, that's what any normal man would find despicable and
12 astonishing. You help someone and he returns by firing and using rifles.
13 I told you, I sent you a document, saying that such conduct -- we acted
14 in a cosmopolitan way. The aid has to pass through, the people are
15 threatened because those were our neighbours, we grew up with them, we
16 went to school with them, we built houses with them, we created
17 everything with them, we fought with them, we learned together with them,
18 and now suddenly there were some people, let me call them men, who turned
19 everything upside down. I made my house in Ratkovici together with
20 Muslims with a wish to grow old together with them.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see the next page,
23 now? Item 5 at the bottom of the page, please.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. It says here, Dr. Avdo Hasanovic, the head of the war hospital in
1 Srebrenica, medication at the hospital was sent at the price of 100 to
2 200 Deutschmarks which caused the deaths of many people, mainly the
3 soldiers of the BH Army. If you had said this rather than having your
4 document from the Muslim secret service, would you be believed?
5 A. I would be a perjurer officially and probably also a fool, if you
6 will excuse me.
7 Q. All right.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, please?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As if I didn't know what they were
10 doing. Oh.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page, please?
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
13 Q. Item 7, Zulfo Tursunovic, former commander of -- former brigade
14 commander in the 28th Division. From the depot containing humanitarian
15 aid, goods, the members of the command staff of the 28th Division could
16 take away significant quantities of goods. Tursunovic did not need an
17 approval to be allowed to enter the depot, whenever he visited the depot,
18 the goods were issued to him regardless of what he requested and how
19 much. A little bit down, under item 9, it says that this one Mehoric had
20 a batch of horses and that he fed them with wheat and sugar at the time
21 of the greatest want. And that he was organising the reselling of
22 humanitarian goods through a racketeer called Sirhan, who is currently in
23 the free territory. Did you know how the humanitarian aid was used?
24 A. I knew personally the men whose names you've listed, the one who
25 is called Mehoric, who had his horses, that was in the Luka village,
1 close to village -- Luka and Krusev Do belong to Srebrenica, the
2 Srebrenica municipality even though they are far away from Srebrenica,
3 eight hours on foot. That was why some honourable men, the Muslims,
4 requested from me -- but the enemy side called me to be their commander
5 because they said, The people on our side have stolen everything and the
6 people have gone to the dogs. So if you'll allow me I told them, Look,
7 this is ridiculous, how can I be a commander to one side until noon and
8 then the commander of the other side from noon onwards?
9 Q. All right. Thank you, General. On the occasion of the directive
10 number 7, the Prosecution made the claim that the Drina Corps and you
11 personally starved the people by restricting the passage of humanitarian
12 aid convoys. I would like to show you now two documents, one by one.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So if we could show D3947 on one
14 part of the screen, that's the overview of the delivered humanitarian aid
15 that was delivered to the enclaves in 1994, and on the other part of the
16 screen, 1D5406. No translation, but we'll manage. For 1995, immediately
17 after directive 7.
18 Could we also admit the previous document to have it MFI'd?
19 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Pack?
20 MS. PACK: Marked for identification but not admitted.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: It will be MFI D3956, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, only those two pages. We will admit only those
24 two pages shown to the witness. I meant marking it for identification.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid, Your Excellency, that I
2 have shown more than two. We had page 10, page 15, page 16, and page 17.
3 JUDGE KWON: I should stand corrected. Yes, those four pages.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. General, sir, please help us. If necessary, we can lower the
7 upper document so that we can see that it refers to 1994. Can you read
8 out --
9 A. No, I can see it. The upper one. I see it. As you see, the
10 first 14 items are in tonnes.
11 Q. Just a moment. Can you please read for us the titles of the one
12 that's up and down?
13 A. The overview of humanitarian aid delivered to the Srebrenica
14 enclave in 1994. Each kilo, each item here is noted by our officers,
15 liaison officers in charge of contact with UNPROFOR.
16 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Can we just be as focused as possible so
17 that we would spend as little time as possible. So up there, in 1994,
18 can you please slowly read out the title of the lower document?
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could you slow down both of you and
20 put a pause between the question and answer.
21 MS. PACK: Your Honour, I don't see how this newly arises out of
22 my cross-examination because it's dealt with in the witness statement.
23 This is what -- why he was cross-examined on the topic because he gave
24 evidence in his witness statement, not least at paragraph 26 and then
25 again in the addendum, the new bit, on the topic of humanitarian aid.
1 It's been addressed in direct and, in my submission, doesn't arise from
2 my cross.
3 JUDGE KWON: Let me see the title of the document that was not
4 dealt with in his statement? Could you read the title again, please?
5 Lower one.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The lower one, survey of
7 humanitarian aid to Muslim enclaves for March and April 1995. The unit
8 of measurement is again tonne, and you can see the breakdown by month and
9 quantity. These amounts of food, looking at the number of the
10 population, and the capacities of production before the war, the
11 production could not provide these quantities of food. I say this with
12 full responsibility.
13 JUDGE KWON: That's sufficient. Just a second.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: I'll allow you -- I'm sorry, the Chamber will allow
16 you to continue.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, is it correct - I'm talking about the upper document -
20 that flour was delivered, 216 tonnes in October 1994 --
21 JUDGE KWON: Given that the upper document was already admitted,
22 but when you start your question with "is it correct," that always has
23 been leading. Bear that in mind.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. How much flour -- look at line 1 for 1994. How much flour was
2 delivered in October, November and December 1994? And how much in March
3 and April 1995?
4 A. We see in item 1: Month of October, 216; November, 271 tonnes;
5 and December, when we had snow and winter, 1262 tonnes. A total of
6 5051 tonnes. That is an impressive figure that certainly means nobody
7 went hungry.
8 Q. Look at how much flour was delivered in March and how much in
9 April, to Srebrenica. Let's leave Gorazde aside. Just Srebrenica.
10 A. In March, 305 tonnes. And in April, 387 tonnes. And you see the
12 Q. After the 8th of March, and after the issuing of directive 7, did
13 your corps restrict and reduce deliveries of flour to Srebrenica?
14 A. As we see here, not by one kilo.
15 Q. Look at how many beans came into Srebrenica in October through
16 December and in March and April. Tonnes of beans?
17 A. October, 11; November, 12.1 tonnes; December, 1 tonne. Total
18 381 tonnes. That's more than the entire Eastern Bosnia could produce.
19 In March 1995, for Srebrenica, 36 tonnes; April, 44. If these were beans
20 grown in Srebrenica, what joy it would have been. But it couldn't have
21 been grown in Srebrenica.
22 Q. Were some items considerably reduced, in the lower document
23 compared to the upper document, in the last three months of 1994 and the
24 first months of 1995 after the issuing of the directive? Look at
25 indicators for sugar?
1 A. No. Enough was provided so that people could decently live. But
2 I have to say that when Muslims reported their numbers, these numbers
3 could only be explained by a double birth rate than they really had. But
4 we always tried to provide as much as we could, especially for the people
5 who were -- the poor people inside Srebrenica itself. Of course, most of
6 the Serbs had been expelled from Srebrenica long before.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document be MFIed
8 pending translation?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI D3957.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. General, today on page 2, when you were asked about the
13 water-tower, you said that the water-tower was almost in ruins already
14 when the order was given to destroy it, and you said that it was
15 destroyed because it had been serving a military purpose. Can you
16 remember on what date Mr. Skocajic wrote that letter where he interprets
17 your words and on what date was the first demolishing of the tower?
18 A. I cannot give you the exact date after such a long time.
19 Q. Let's say it's March [as interpreted].
20 A. But I can answer the main point.
21 Q. Go ahead.
22 A. May I? The tower --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 23, I didn't mention March.
24 I said let's call up the document, the one written by Mr. Skocajic.
25 P05148, I believe. I'm not sure.
1 JUDGE KWON: 5147.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we make this larger? It's
3 too small to read. 31st of May, 1993.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Thank you. Could we look again now at P5149, your document. The
6 document is dated 21st of June. Please look at the first paragraph,
7 discussing the day when this water-tower was damaged. Which date do we
8 see in the first paragraph concerning the attack?
9 A. 26th of May, that's before the order to destroy the tower. It's
10 simply unbelievable the troubles we faced. This combat action took place
11 before, and this tower served no other purpose but for observers to make
12 sure that nobody approach or damage the water supply. And now people are
13 saying that I cut off water to the Muslims, whereas I brought Koljevic
14 himself into inspection. Muslim people have never been my enemies.
15 Let's make that clear.
16 Q. Just confirm what came first?
17 A. First there was a sabotage against the water supply section that
18 was in the vicinity of the UN check-point. They passed by past the
19 check-point, damaged the water supply, and then they started using the
20 water-tower for military purposes, as an observation point, and that's
21 when I said let's put a stop to this.
22 Q. What did you know about my position concerning the use of water
23 supply and other utilities for military purposes? That is concerning the
24 abuse of such installations.
25 A. I must say very sincerely here or anywhere else, your position
1 concerning the preservation of economic resources and human resources and
2 reducing tensions between the warring parties was of inestimable value.
3 There is no dilemma about that.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I just show D104 to the
5 General for a moment.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before you go on, I would like the witness to read
7 out this document in its entirety.
8 Do you remember this document, General Zivanovic?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What?
10 JUDGE KWON: You can collapse the English for the time being.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Of course. This was sent by
12 Colonel Vukota Vukovic, who was one of the commanders subordinated to me,
13 who was in that area with the primary task of --
14 JUDGE KWON: Just I would like you to read out the contents of
15 the document first and then I will ask you a question. If you remember
16 the content of this document, then I will put the question right now.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know the essence of this
18 document, yes. You can go on.
19 JUDGE KWON: It's talking about the Muslim attack on the 26th,
20 and -- correct, General? And the protest made on the 27th.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. That's right, as far as I
22 can see.
23 JUDGE KWON: But what was the date of the report?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the 21st of June, 1993, at
25 1715 hours, written by Vukota Vukotic. On the 26th of May at 2058 hours,
1 a Muslim sabotage group made an incursion into the area with a clear
2 objective of carrying out a sabotage action.
3 JUDGE KWON: So my question to you, General, is that if the
4 attack was on 26th of May, and the protest to the UNPROFOR was made on
5 the 27th of May, why is this Colonel Vukovic making his report to the --
6 to you a month later, i.e. on the 21st of June?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, sorry, Your Excellency, it was
8 not a month later. It must be a mistake. About such things we
9 communicated within the same day. It would have been completely useless
10 to report it so much later because there were wounded. There had been an
11 armed clash. I needed to know immediately. It must have been some sort
12 of mistake.
13 As for the functioning of reporting, we were always receiving
14 reports in a timely manner and I immediately reported upwards to my
15 superiors. Such incidents had to be notified to the superior command as
16 well. It must have been a mistake in the date, but that's the essence of
17 the document. That's my answer.
18 JUDGE KWON: If such incident had taken place, it should have
19 been reported immediately following the events? That's what you just
20 said now, General?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.
22 JUDGE KWON: So can we go back to the previous document, P5147?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, if I may be of
24 assistance you should ask the witness --
25 JUDGE KWON: You have ample opportunity.
1 This document -- we can collapse the English so that the witness
2 can read it.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I see it.
4 JUDGE KWON: This is an order from Skocajic to demolish the
5 water-tower by 1st of June, and it also says it should be presented to
6 the public to have been done by Muslims, and it was dated 31st of May.
7 So having -- having seen the document, one may view that the last -- the
8 previous document we saw by Vukovic, Vukota Vukovic, was a fake one to
9 present that it was -- it had been done by the Muslims. What do you --
10 what is your observation? Do you have anything to say to such
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I have to tell the
13 truth, and that is: This is not a triangle, Skocajic, Vukovic,
14 Zivanovic, this is, rather, Vukovic's conversation and the protest he
15 made to the UN personnel who made a record and that is proof of the
16 truthfulness of these events because people are named here, the exact
17 location, and the reaction of the UNPROFOR commander.
18 About the dates, this confusion about the dates, the transmitter
19 where Vukota was is located in the mountains and it was powered by a
20 generator. It could have malfunctioned, but the action itself is crystal
21 clear because he really made a submission with the UNPROFOR command and
22 reported up to us what was going on. I see the decision in the UNPROFOR
23 document which was drafted, and it proves every word I said, because my
24 subordinates did not dare deceive me. I was not a man who sat in his
25 office and just took people's word for it. I -- although I was very
1 seriously wounded and in pain, I constantly moved around and inspected
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, when a regular combat report is sent to you, is it sent
6 on the same day? Do you request it by writing your own dispatch or is it
7 sent to you automatically?
8 A. Even in peacetime, when we, military personnel, are not involved
9 in a war, there is a perfectly regulated system of reporting based on
10 subordination. Of course, the superior command does not need to request
11 a report because the subordinate command knows exactly what they have to
12 report on, item by item, and if there is no change in a certain area,
13 they just write, "No change." But they know perfectly well that the
14 superior command has to be notified about the situation in the
15 subordinate unit. If, however, a sudden change occurs, such as an
16 assault of enemy forces against our positions, then an interim report is
17 sent immediately, immediately, and the superior command will have to
18 decide then whether to accept engagement with the available forces or
19 they will make an alternative decision, whatever is best.
20 I remember there was a similar question from those who
21 interrogated me a few years ago or, rather, ten years ago, they asked me
22 about a similar document, who signed it, and it so happened that it was
23 Krstic who signed his report for the 13th --
24 Q. Thank you. I just wanted to ask you: Did the superior command
25 ask -- does a superior command ask for an interim report or is it sent
2 A. That is sent automatically, in particular because if a problem
3 can escalate, then things have to be dealt with urgently, even by the
4 command above that one, even the president, you.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us in which situations the higher
6 command asks by way of a dispatch for a report subsequently?
7 A. To see whether something had been done, what is new, what is not
8 new, and it is -- and what is important for the level of the superior
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we return the previous document
12 on the screen, please? The previous document.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, I'm trying to finish before the break so that we don't
15 keep you longer and that's why I'm hoping for shorter answers. Can we
16 zoom in on the upper part, General, sir, can you tell us what this means?
17 Your dispatch related to your dispatch.
18 A. This is an answer.
19 Q. And do you remember what was requested by this dispatch?
20 A. Of course. To see what happened, to receive a report what
21 happened. I asked for an explanation of the content of the activity that
22 occurred. It was a serious problem. Sabotage groups. And we had
23 casualties, fatalities. It's not only water. We'll get water. But what
24 is dangerous is if a sabotage group comes and kills your family.
25 Q. Thank you. So on which date did you ask for these answers and
1 when did he answer?
2 A. Well, not to go into dates, a response has to be instantaneous,
3 that's done very quickly. If it is an extraordinary situation, requiring
4 an extraordinary interim report, then there has to be urgent action and
5 you cannot postpone things. But when we say interim report,
6 extraordinary report, people make big mistakes, sometimes they treat this
7 as sort of a decision on another side.
8 Q. Thank you. Could you just tell me what my official position was
9 in relation to the abuse of food supplies, water works, et cetera?
10 A. You were a striking example of respect for humaneness and respect
11 for people and humanity as such. It is a great tragedy that you were
12 president in wartime. You were supposed to be president in peacetime so
13 that we could develop like the civilised world. That is my answer.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D104, please, could that be shown
15 to the witness?
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Please focus on the date, March 1993, the 11th of March, 1993, to
18 the Main Staff. Could you read paragraph 2? Actually, all of it.
19 Number 1 has to do with the civilian population as well.
20 A. That's right. That's right. That is you, no interpreters needed
21 here. President, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, this is you.
22 Q. And did the Main Staff send this on to the corps?
23 A. Of course, of course. And we discussed this at meetings, of
24 course. Well, what would that be like if the Main Staff would forget
25 what you wrote to them? I remember several things, your instructions,
1 how to guide commands and their subordinate units. With such positions
2 of yours, we managed to save ourselves from the paramilitaries, save
3 ourselves, that's true, because this regulates command and control,
4 people know what their responsibility is, and that is indeed important
5 for professional soldiers. All the rest is hearsay.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 3850? You were
8 asked or actually your intentions were challenged, the intentions of the
9 corps that you commanded vis-à-vis the enclaves. So can you tell us, can
10 you tell us whether this document is a regular combat report of your
11 deputy, especially paragraph 2, line 2? What is the objective of the
12 Drina Corps, paragraph 2, the first and second lines? To successfully
13 hold the lines reached and continue with preparing the stabilisation of
15 A. That's right. That means that we should take up the features
16 that are dominant from a military point of view.
17 Q. Thank you. Can we take a look at the date up there? Is that the
18 16th of May, 1995?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Thank you. How big was the area of responsibility? How long was
21 the front line towards central Bosnia? You spoke about that.
22 A. About 200 kilometres, including Pilica and Donji Podrinje and
23 then including the municipalities of Zvornik, Sekovici.
24 Q. Thank you. How many forces did you have around Srebrenica and
25 how many would be engaged and had it been demilitarised?
1 A. Had it been demilitarised there wouldn't have been a single
2 soldier there, quite literally. I got carried away and there is this
3 order where I said, Let us all embark upon production. That is to say
4 that these people start working. I claim that with full responsibility,
5 full responsibility.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the last page? Let us
8 see what the decision is.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. This decision, this last part, can you tell us -- actually, you
11 don't have to read it out. What is the essence? What is the objective
12 of the Drina Corps on the 16th of May, 1995? Is it the liquidation of
13 the enclaves and the takeover of the enclaves, or what is written here?
14 A. Not in our wildest dreams, takeover, no way, really. To have a
15 separation of the enclaves, and to stop all of these movements,
16 Srebrenica, Zepa, because it wasn't only Srebrenica, Zepa, because then
17 further on it went on to Kladanj and so on. That is the essence of all
18 essences. I said this a hundred times, I'm going to say it now and I'm
19 going to say it tomorrow: Never, never, did I ask for soldiers to enter
20 Srebrenica in a military way. Features were supposed to be taken. So
21 the commander of the Muslim 28th Division would think that he would need
22 500.000 bullets, he asked for so much, that that couldn't even fit into a
23 depot. It's a good thing he didn't get that. It's a good thing he
24 didn't get that.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3958, Your Honours.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Since I don't know how much time I have, today you were quoted as
5 having said to the left of Jadar there was no presence of Muslim forces.
6 What is to the left of Jadar?
7 A. Serb villages. It's part of Orahovica, Borovac, Kiprova [phoen],
8 Jasenova, and all the way to the bauxite mine, towards Podravno. Let us
9 take the land register and land survey and see.
10 Q. Thank you. The town of Srebrenica, is it --
11 MS. PACK: It's a misquotation of what was said. Just to clarify
12 that the -- the -- the quote was from the speech and the speech was this:
13 "Let me tell you that with yesterday's dusk, any organised Muslim
14 life to the left of Jadar ceased existing, meaning nothing of Kutuzero,
15 nothing of Bucje, nothing of this old story and nonsense. All of it is
17 Just to be clear about what was put -- what was said during the
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you tell us where the town of Srebrenica is in relation to
22 Jadar, to the left or right?
23 A. Srebrenica is on the right, if you look at Jadar, 11 kilometres
24 is the nearest point, roughly.
25 Q. Who held the villages to the left of Jadar before the
1 12th of July?
2 A. Muslims for the most part. Muslims for the most part.
3 Q. And what --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We are not limiting your time.
5 Shall we take a break now?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll finish in about five minutes,
7 ten minutes, we can take the break and then --
8 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
9 JUDGE KWON: I'm told that we have only ten minutes of tape
10 that's left. If you can finish in less than ten minutes, we can go on.
11 Otherwise we need to take a break.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, I don't do very well
13 when I'm pressed for time. I'm not very efficient. Perhaps it's better
14 to take the break now and then we can continue after the break and be
15 done within 10 or 15 minutes.
16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We shall take a break and resume at
17 20 past 1.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.24 p.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
21 THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Excellency.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, sir, we saw in that previous document --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can I tender that
25 document of 16 May?
1 JUDGE KWON: I think we have admitted it as D3958.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. We saw what the intentions were of the Drina Corps in mid-May.
5 Can you tell us what the situation was on the front line in
6 Republika Srpska, especially in your area, especially in June 1995?
7 A. In the month of June 1995, we had an imminent threat of
8 escalation from these enclaves, that of Srebrenica and that of Zepa, and
9 Gorazde. So there was that fear. Not to mention attacks from the main
10 front. The information we received indeed consisted of warnings that
11 there would be an all-out offensive of Muslim forces against our units
12 and our areas. That is the essence of all documents.
13 Q. Thank you. It was not a "yes" or "no" question but your answer
14 was very nice.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D7924, could that document now be
16 shown to the General?
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
18 Q. Your information about the situation in the area.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, 97, maybe I made a
20 mistake, 9724.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Can you tell us whether you remember this report of 15 June 1995?
23 A. Yes, yes, of course, I remember, and this confirms the thoughts
24 I expressed a few minutes ago.
25 Q. You said that this was still going on, and when did the spring
1 offensive start in your area?
2 A. It can be stated freely that the 14th of June can be taken as the
3 critical date, in terms of intensified combat activities against our
4 areas. However, one should never lose sight of the permanent incursions
5 by sabotage groups in our territory, and that makes it difficult to focus
6 on command and control and fighting on the front line, because this
7 simply never went down on their side, and that is why the enclaves were
8 so good. We have an analysis of their activities in documents and this
9 is absolutely accurate, to the letter. That's my answer.
10 Q. Thank you. And what about the situation in other theatres of
11 war, Sarajevo and others?
12 A. Continuous operations, continuous preparations. Our units were
13 in contact with the Serb forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. They
14 also conveyed to us that attacks became more and more frequent, attacks,
15 I repeat, because combat in defence is one thing, sabotage is another,
16 but attacking front lines, that is a serious matter.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now? I
19 believe in both languages.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. The second paragraph, ten wounded, four fatalities that day. Can
22 you help us with that? Some of our soldiers were massacred. Can you
23 take a look at this?
24 A. If, heaven forbid, one of our combatants would fall into their
25 hands, then he would be massacred. I wish I could put it differently but
1 unfortunately that was the truth.
2 Q. Thank you. At this moment, mid-June, do you still -- are you
3 still involved in a counteroffensive or are you just defending yourself?
4 A. We soldiers call that active defence. That is to say, repelling
5 enemy forces where they cannot threaten you, at least not in the first
6 stage of combat activities. That's very important. That's the military
7 task involved. New attacks cannot be carried out without more
8 preparation and without more forces involved. That is the essence.
9 Q. Thank you, General. Without taking into account renegade
10 behaviour by individual members of the army, can you tell me, was there a
11 single unit, even the smallest one under the rules of your service, that
12 committed a criminal act according to the rules of planning, decision
13 making and issuing of orders?
14 A. Just when I was talking to Mr. Peter McCloskey, Mrs. Irene Willis
15 and other esteemed ladies and gentlemen who covered these subjects with
16 me, I raised something that is the answer to your question. Not a
17 single, not the lowest ranking smallest unit, not a squad, a battalion, a
18 company or a corps, ever received a single order that goes beyond the
19 framework of well-known conventions that regulate the rules of warfare
20 and conduct in war. I asked them to show me such an order, if it exists,
21 but to this day, nobody has ever been able to produce one.
22 Q. Did your troops live inside barracks, in barrack conditions and
23 where did your troops live and sleep when they were not on duty?
24 A. It's well known that from Milici to Tuzla, from Sarajevo to
25 Valjevo, there were no orderly military installations. It was a
1 territory without any military installations, without any military
2 barracks, et cetera. The fighting men who were granted leaves of
3 absence, not long ones, just five, six days, to visit their families, to
4 get a proper bath, a change of clothing, et cetera, all of them went
5 wherever they could get some rest. And the fighting men whose houses had
6 been burned down, they went into collective accommodation or to the
7 houses of their friends and improvised facilities. For instance, there
8 was one such facility in the administration building of the mine.
9 Q. What about your control over the free time of soldiers? To what
10 extent were you able, you in the command, were you able to control how
11 they spent their free time?
12 A. To be quite honest, there should have been strengthened control
13 measures but we did not have enough staff and we were constantly under
14 pressure to provide more personnel to the front line, more personnel for
15 logistics, to provide the basic prerequisites for a normal life. So the
16 soldiers were not really supervised all the time or lined up regularly,
17 but there was discipline. They had to return to the unit on the date
19 Q. How precise were the weapons and the artillery that you had
20 available to you around June 1995, before you entered Srebrenica?
21 A. You put this question to me as a civilian and I have to answer as
22 a soldier. The weapons were of extremely high precision, but that
23 precision was not abused. I've already said in my evidence earlier
24 today, we did not target roads, we did not target columns of people, we
25 did not target anything other than the combat disposition of enemy
1 formations, and I am a professor of ballistics after all. Our precision
2 was such that we simply couldn't miss. First of all, this is an easily
3 visible terrain. Distances were not great. Artillery weapons were
4 extremely precise. And all our military equipment and technology was
5 extremely precise. Great advances have been made, science has
6 contributed a lot to the military arts, and technology, so if somebody
7 wants to use the full power of such weapons, the losses inflicted are
8 enormous. Nobody should fool themselves that a weapon can miss. People
9 are well-trained now. The weapons are of high quality. And God knows,
10 if somebody gave an improper order, the losses inflicted could be huge.
11 MS. PACK: I'm sorry to interrupt the translation but --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Please put a pause before you
13 intervene but I know -- I understand the difficulty, but in particular,
14 Judge Lattanzi has a problem when you intervene --
15 MS. PACK: My apologies. I was trying to get in before the next
16 question just to say that the matters that have been elicited in the
17 answer to that question go well out of the areas which I dealt with in
18 cross-examination, and just to say that any further questioning on the
19 topic of precision of weapons and so on, I object to.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, would you like to respond to
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies, absolutely
23 not. The Prosecution raised the matter of the destruction of houses.
24 They claimed, alleged, that the Drina Corps destroyed houses. I asked
25 General Zivanovic if they had T54 tanks, whether they used them, how many
1 houses in Srebrenica they hit. Can a T84 tank hit a window on a house?
2 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
3 MS PACK: My questions were about 1993 in relation to that
4 topic --
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes --
6 MS. PACK: -- and the question asked was about June 1995, so
7 I would object to that characterisation of my cross. And the question
8 that was put by Dr. Karadzic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, it's the same corps,
10 the same man, and the same doctrine. Why would he be hitting something
11 in 1993 and not hitting the same thing in 1995? There is the singleness
12 of personality and formation.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber agrees with Ms. Pack. The Chamber
16 recommends to you move on to another topic.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no other topics. I would
18 finish here with General Zivanovic, with my expressions of gratitude, but
19 I want to know whether he was able to hit windows and to what extent he
20 used his fire power. But if you're not interested, he doesn't have to
22 JUDGE KWON: We will admit this last document.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3959, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, General.
25 JUDGE KWON: I don't think you are interested in
1 recross-examining on the accuracy of weapons.
2 MS. PACK: Certainly I'm not. Thank you, Mr. President.
3 JUDGE KWON: Well, unless my colleagues have a question for you,
4 General, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the Chamber, I thank
5 you for your coming to The Hague to give it. You are free to go.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, with your leave,
7 I would like to express my best wishes to you, to the Prosecution and
8 everyone else in this courtroom, to wish you every success in your work,
9 to reduce the antagonisms in our region and to enable our people to live
10 a life worthy of man. Thank you.
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 MS. PACK: Mr. President, may I ask for two or three minutes for
13 my colleague to replace me?
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. While the -- we will wait for the next witness
15 to be brought in, the Chamber will issue an oral ruling on the
16 Prosecution motion for testimony of Vujadin Popovic to be viva voce,
17 filed on the 21st of October, 2013. In this motion, the Prosecution
18 requests that Vujadin Popovic be led live rather than pursuant to
19 Rule 92 ter, on the basis of his position at the relevant time of the
20 indictment and the significance of his anticipated evidence.
21 The accused filed his response on the 28th of October, 2013,
22 opposing the motion and arguing that Popovic's proposed statement is
23 clear and comprehensible and that Popovic's connections to the accused
24 was, and I quote, "non-existent as compared to those persons for whom
25 viva voce testimony has been ordered."
1 Having reviewed Popovic's proposed Rule 92 ter statement, which
2 is 13 pages with no associated exhibits, as well as having considered
3 Popovic's position as chief of security of the Drina Corps, the Chamber
4 finds that it is appropriate to receive Popovic's evidence pursuant to
5 Rule 92 ter, as originally proposed, and thus denies the Prosecution's
6 request in this respect. However, given the significance of Popovic's
7 testimony, the Chamber has decided to grant the Prosecution's request for
8 three and a half hours for cross-examination.
9 [The witness entered court]
10 [Witness's counsel entered court]
11 JUDGE KWON: If the witness could take the solemn declaration,
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
14 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
15 WITNESS: TOMISLAV KOVAC
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr Kovac. Please be seated and make
18 yourself comfortable.
19 Could the counsel assisting Mr Kovac introduce himself for
21 MR. LAZAREVIC: Good afternoon, Your Honours. My name is
22 Aleksandar Lazarevic, and I will assist Mr Kovac in today's proceedings.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Lazarevic.
24 Before you commence your evidence, Mr Kovac, I must draw your
25 attention to a certain Rule of Procedure and Evidence that we have here
1 at the International Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E). Under this rule, you
2 may object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor,
3 or even from the Judges, if you believe that your answer might
4 incriminate you in a criminal offence. In this context, "incriminate"
5 means saying something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a
6 criminal offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you
7 might have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that
8 an answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer
9 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to
10 compel you to answer the question. But in that situation, the Tribunal
11 would ensure that your testimony, compelled in such circumstances, would
12 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence,
13 save and except the offence of giving false testimony.
14 Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr Kovac?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
17 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General -- Mr Kovac.
19 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.
20 Q. I'm just trying to see if I can see you directly, and also I'd
21 like to remind you to leave a short pause between questions and answers
22 so that everything can be correctly and completely interpreted.
23 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure I'm following you when you said you
24 could see him directly. Shall I ask Mr. Lazarevic to move his chair?
25 Yes, please continue.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. General, did you give a statement to my Defence team?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we pull up in e-court,
6 please, the redacted version of 1D09754?
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. With the Chamber's leave, General, I'd like to ask you, do you
9 have your statement in front of you, in the Serbian language, and if you
10 don't, do you want to have one?
11 A. Well, I have it on me.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we offer a hard copy to
13 Mr Kovac? 1D09754, the redacted version.
14 THE REGISTRAR: It hasn't been released, Mr. Karadzic. We're
15 just awaiting -- it hasn't been released. We are awaiting its release.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. The paper you have in front of you, is it your statement?
18 A. Yes, that is the statement.
19 Q. Have you read it and signed it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can you see it on the left side of the screen?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show the last page in
25 e-court, the one with the signature?
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Is it your signature?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said
5 to the Defence team?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. If I were to put to you the same questions here and now, would
8 your answers be essentially the same as those given in the statement?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I tender this 92 ter
12 statement, both the redacted and the unredacted versions. Oh, excuse me,
13 we redacted it on the Chamber's order.
14 JUDGE KWON: We shall deal with the associated exhibits
15 separately. Do you have any objection, Mr. Nicholls, to the admission of
17 MR. NICHOLLS: Good afternoon, Your Honours, no.
18 JUDGE KWON: We will admit it.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, 65 ter number 1D9754 will be
20 Exhibit D3960.
21 JUDGE KWON: And the associated exhibits, are they all of them on
22 the 65 ter list?
23 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
24 JUDGE KWON: Any objections, Mr. Nicholls?
25 MR. NICHOLLS: No, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has a couple or three observations.
2 First, 1D698, referred to in paragraph 13, Chamber has question about its
3 relevance and its nature that relates -- it's indispensable and
4 inseparable from the statement. And -- just a second. With respect to
5 two appointment documents, i.e. 1D9800 and 65 ter 18495, given that his
6 positions were not challenged, I'm not sure if the Defence need those
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We always like to have them
9 to corroborate the witness, but you, in the past, have found them not
10 necessary so we leave it up to you.
11 JUDGE KWON: So except for those three documents, all the other
12 associated exhibits will be admitted and assigned numbers in due course
13 by the Registrar.
14 Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Do you want my position
16 concerning this first document about food and the two appointment-related
17 documents? Just to explain why we tendered them?
18 JUDGE KWON: If you find it necessary, you can deal with it live,
19 showing the relevance. I leave it to you. Please continue.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will now read the short summary
21 of General Tomislav Kovac's statement - he's a police general - in
23 [In English] General Tomislav Kovac was a professional police
24 officer in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He worked in the Ministry of Interior in
25 Sarajevo, prior to the outbreak of the war, and then served as chief of
1 the police security section in Ilidza. After the war began, he rose in
2 the ranks of the Republika Srpska Ministry of Interior and became a
3 minister in September 1995. As the police commander in Ilidza,
4 Tomislav Kovac personally witnessed the activities of the Green Berets
5 and the Patriotic League. These organisations targeted Serbs and Serbian
6 residences before the war. On April 22nd, 1992, Ilidza was attacked from
7 the three directions by Muslim forces. The medical rehabilitation centre
8 was seized and 13 Serbs were killed in open fire.
9 Tomislav Kovac never knew of any plan to expel Muslims or Croats
10 from Serb-controlled territory.
11 After the establishment of the Serbian authorities, Muslims and
12 Croats remained in the area of Ilidza and were not disturbed.
13 Following the attack on Ilidza, however, many individuals
14 including Serbs left voluntarily. While there were cases of abuse of
15 Muslim paramilitary groups, the police did not support this and attempted
16 to prevent it. When the Ministry of Interior was consolidated and grew
17 stronger, it reduced the activity of paramilitary groups and investigated
18 crimes against the non-Serbs, all with the support and encouragement of
19 President Karadzic.
20 In July 1995, Tomislav Kovac was Deputy Minister of Interior.
21 During the period from 9th to 20th of July, 1995, General Kovac
22 participated in several meetings with President Karadzic. The main focus
23 of these meetings was the situation around Sarajevo where the Bosnian
24 Muslims had launched an offensive which threatened Serbian communities in
25 the Sarajevo area.
1 During those meetings, Mr. Kovac never heard anything to indicate
2 that the men from Srebrenica would be, were being, or had been executed.
3 He is not aware of any written reports or documents which
4 indicated that prisoners had been executed.
5 President Karadzic issued a series of orders on 10th to
6 12th July, directing that forces of the Ministry of Interior be engaged
7 in the area of Srebrenica and that a police station be established in
8 Srebrenica to ensure that order and security was maintained there.
9 General Kovac is convinced that President Karadzic had no idea that
10 persons from Srebrenica would be executed.
11 On 14th of July, 1995, General Kovac learned from
12 Ljubomir Borovcanin that an incident had taken place at the Kravica
13 warehouse the evening before, where one policeman had been killed and a
14 detachment commander had been injured in an incident when Muslim
15 prisoners overpowered the policemen who were guarding them. He was also
16 informed that a number of Muslim prisoners were killed in the incident.
17 He never discussed these incidents with President Karadzic.
18 General Kovac was also informed by his subordinates from the
19 Zvornik Public Security Centre that Colonel Beara of the Bosnian Serb
20 Army had requested the assistance of the police with a large number of
21 prisoners from prisoners who were transported to the Zvornik area. They
22 suspected that Beara might want these prisoners killed. When he heard
23 this, Mr. Kovac ordered the police to cease communication with the
24 military security organ and not to be involved in any way in their
1 General Kovac did not discuss this information with
2 President Karadzic. During their meetings in July 1995,
3 President Karadzic never gave any indication that he was aware of the
4 killings of prisoners from Srebrenica. In September 1995, General Kovac
5 tasked some men from the Ministry of Interior to gather information about
6 the allegations that the men from Srebrenica had been executed. He never
7 found any information which indicated that President Karadzic was aware
8 of the existence of a plan to execute the prisoners or had played any
9 role in these executions. General Kovac believes that the crimes in
10 Srebrenica were the worst thing that could have happened to the Serbian
11 people, and he considers the perpetrators of these crimes in Srebrenica
12 as the biggest enemies of the Serbian people itself.
13 And that is short summary. At that moment I will not have
14 additional documents or questions for General Kovac.
15 JUDGE KWON: In the summary, and in the statement itself, witness
16 stated that he was appointed as minister in September 1995. But my
17 understanding is that, from a certain point of time, he was acting as the
18 minister while he -- in the capacity of deputy minister. Could you
19 clarify with the witness from when it was like that?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, Excellency, and explain
21 to you that it was important because the documents about appointments
22 were -- General Kovac was not a politician, a political figure, so it was
23 more difficult, but I can ask.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General, sir, can you tell us, from what point were you on the
1 acting position and why were the appointments late? Were you a member of
2 a political party? What was the basis for you having to wait a long time
3 on many occasions, that you actually held a certain position but you had
4 to wait a long while until you were officially appointed to it?
5 A. I was acting minister for the first time in September 1993, up
6 until January 1994. The position of deputy minister was one I held from
7 1994 until September 1995. I was at the position of deputy minister. In
8 the middle of the year, around the month of July, Minister Rakic simply
9 stopped coming to Pale. He had two offices, one in Banja Luka and
10 another one in Pale. And he simply stopped coming. So I could not state
11 exactly when his function ceased formally. As the deputy minister in
12 operative terms, I had the powers and the authority to manage the MUP in
13 the operational sense. So I cannot even know specifically myself when he
14 ceased to be at this position formally because he was discharging his
15 duty as the minister in two different locations. Perhaps
16 President Karadzic could tell us more precisely when he formally stopped
17 to discharge this duty.
18 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell the Chamber whether or how many
19 ministers you had and how many of them were professionals and how many
20 were civilians? What did that look like? Who was first the minister,
21 who was then the second, who was the third? I mean those to whom you
22 were the deputy and then the acting minister, and then you were the
23 fourth, if I'm not mistaken.
24 A. We had Minister Stanisic, he was a professional. Then we had
25 Adzic, who was not a professional. We had Rakic, who wasn't a
1 professional. So a total of four of us ministers during the war. While
2 doing my work in a continuity I was, in fact, at the head of the
3 department of public security from the month of August, but at certain
4 points I was also appointed the acting minister. I was forced also to
5 discharge the duties of the deputy minister and I had to manage the MUP
6 in the operational sense.
7 Now, why, even though I did not request this position, why did it
8 all happen so? It was because it was difficult for you in the Assembly
9 to appoint me, not just a priority or political issue, but it was more my
10 question about my attitude towards the local communities and the
11 then-SAO regions which had been constituted. I was expressly a man in
12 favour of centralised authority and certainly many of them saw me as
13 someone who disagreed with their positions and local policies, especially
14 as some of them were frequently processed in one way or another by the
15 services of the Minister of the Interior.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I believe that
18 this will satisfy your request.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
21 JUDGE KWON: With respect to Halilovic's book referred to in
22 para 69 of his statement, it will be admitted with respect to only three
23 pages that has been translated, not the entire book.
24 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Mr Kovac, as you have noted, except for the
1 last part, your evidence-in-chief in this case has been admitted in
2 writing, i.e. through your written statement in lieu of your oral
3 testimony. Now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the
4 Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Nicholls.
5 Cross-examination by Mr. Nicholls:
6 Q. Good afternoon, Mr Kovac.
7 A. Good afternoon.
8 Q. We've met before?
9 A. Yes, many times.
10 Q. Okay. I just want to go over quickly your past testimony. This
11 is, if I've got it right, the fifth trial you've testified in; correct?
12 Criminal trial.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You testified in the Medic case, in 2005, in Belgrade. You
15 testified at the BiH State Court in 2007, and in 2010 again. And also in
16 the Zupljanin case, here, in 2012; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And you told the truth in your testimony in all those cases,
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you were a Court witness in the Zupljanin case, in other
22 words, you were called by the Judges, not by the Prosecutor or the
23 Defence; correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And do you remember that you, as a Court witness, you were
1 proofed by the Legal Officers for that honourable Trial Chamber? They
2 met with you before your testimony; correct?
3 A. Yes, briefly, nothing important.
4 Q. Well, it was a little important because what they did was they
5 showed you your OTP interviews up to that point, 2003, 2005 and 2010,
6 three times you'd been interviewed by the OTP, up to August 2010, and you
7 told them in the transcript that other than minor translations, as I say,
8 minor errors in terms of names or dates, you stood by your statements in
9 those OTP interviews; correct?
10 A. Yes, mostly so, but as for the assessments which followed from it
11 and the manner they were presented, I did not always agree.
12 Q. Okay. Well that's one thing that's different but let's just keep
13 it simple. You told the truth to the best of your ability in all of your
14 interviews with the OTP, correct, with the Office of the Prosecutor?
15 A. Yes, clearly, I always spoke the truth, and I am at your disposal
16 today to talk about specific facts. We can discuss them, I can answer
17 your questions, because the previous part was quite long and the
18 approaches of your investigators were different and the relations between
19 you and the Sarajevo Prosecutor's office, so all of these aspects had an
20 impact on the character of my statements. The facts themselves were
21 never a problem.
22 Q. Okay. Let me just point out that that was a much longer answer
23 than necessary and I'm not trying to be rude to you, but you answered my
24 question, I asked if you always told the truth and you said in the
25 beginning: "Yes, clearly I always spoke the truth." That answered the
1 question. You didn't need to add that extra part.
2 One of the things, and just to go back to what His Honour
3 Judge Kwon raised about your status, you were asked about that in your
4 2003 interview, your first interview with the -- my office of the
5 Office of the Prosecutor and you were asked, this is at page 24 of the
6 English, I was deputy -- your answer about your status was:
7 "I was deputy minister so there was no need for me to be acting
8 minister because the legal background gave me the authority to be the
9 minister and act on his behalf in case of his absence and things like
10 that. And since I was always number 1 operative, all of those police
11 officers would always think of me as their real boss. You know, the man
12 in charge, rather than the politician who would be brought to the
14 So that -- that's correct, isn't it, the police viewed you as
15 their boss, not Mr. Rakic, in July 1995?
16 A. Police is not governed in such a way that the leader is elected.
17 I did hold the position of the deputy minister, and in the absence of the
18 minister I had to act operatively because I said that the minister at the
19 time had three seats, one in Bijeljina, for the minister, in Banja Luka,
20 as he was from Krajina, and there was the one that was attached to the
21 government in Pale. So I would not accept an assessment that the police
22 specially elected me. But from the point of view of the law, as long as
23 there was a minister, he was always entitled to be considered as such,
24 and he was entitled to make decisions. Making big political decisions is
25 one thing and running the ministry in the operative sense is something
1 quite different.
2 Q. Okay. There may have been a miscommunication there, but during
3 this time, July 1995, let's say, do you stand by your statement that the
4 police officers would think of you as their real boss, as you told us in
6 A. I cannot claim the right that they considered me their real boss.
7 They accepted me as deputy minister, when the minister was not there they
8 accepted me, that was my legal right and obligation to issue certain
9 instructions and orders, which were, once again in accordance with the
10 law. So it was not on the basis of me being some sort of boss.
11 Q. Okay.
12 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P02981, please?
13 Q. You've seen this document before. In addition to being deputy
14 minister, as of 19 June, you were head of this MUP police staff; correct?
15 A. To be precise, this staff was established for the needs of the
16 Sarajevo-Romanija front, and it was -- it only operated with the aim to
17 help with the defence of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the defence of
18 the Serbian Sarajevo.
19 Q. Stop. I didn't ask you what the purpose of the staff was at this
20 point. I asked if you were head of the staff, as it says here. And you
21 are; correct?
22 A. Certainly, as I was the head of the staff.
23 Q. Now, let's jump ahead a bit. You talk about your meeting with
24 Mr. Karadzic on 9 July in paragraph 110 of your statement, and your story
25 is that Mr. Karadzic was on the phone with General Krstic, on the
1 speakerphone, and he asked General Krstic what was happening in the
2 Srebrenica operation, and that General Krstic told him that Srebrenica
3 was a sure thing, and this is the part, and that General Krstic -- and
4 that Mr. Karadzic told General Krstic that he, Krstic, should send a
5 request to Karadzic to send two police detachments to Srebrenica. Right?
6 A. That's right, but I also said what the reason was; namely that
7 that was needed because we had to maintain the position of the
8 Supreme Commander, to Radovan Karadzic, because he was at that moment in
9 conflict with General Mladic and had no communication with him at all.
10 Q. Yeah. And you said that you objected to this, this is in
11 paragraph 112, because your forces were spread out in a thin line in
12 Sarajevo, and you thought that the forces would have a conflict with
13 General Mladic; right?
14 A. I said I opposed that for two reasons. One were the needs,
15 because objectively speaking, only the Sarajevo front was under threat,
16 and the other thing, it's correct that there would be a conflict of these
17 units or their commanders in the field with General Mladic. I don't mean
18 in military terms but certainly in the manner that the command and
19 control was organised. And I also said that I did not refuse what
20 I never thought or knew that it would happen, that we would have any
21 prisoners of war there and least of all that someone would execute them.
22 Q. Okay. You didn't think there would be any prisoners of war. And
23 that is something you've testified about before. This is in the Mitrovic
24 case in 2007. It's at -- 65 ter 25515 is the transcript, page 22. And
25 were you asked by the Defence lawyer in that case about the 10 July
1 order, and the engagement of the MUP in Srebrenica:
2 "Why were you against the engagement of the members of the MUP?"
3 And your answer was:
4 "I opposed this engagement for purely -- namely for operative
5 tactical reasons because I knew that there was no essential reason for
6 the engagement of police units on the Srebrenica front, while on the
7 other hand, on the Sarajevo one, where they were engaged, it was direly
9 So my question is: Do you stand by that answer that you gave
10 under oath in 2007 in court?
11 A. I certainly do, because I knew that the incidents which occurred
12 around Srebrenica by the Muslim forces were only linking up of different
13 forces because the war goal was to conquer the Serbian part of Sarajevo.
14 Q. All right. So are you aware that as far back as May, VRS plans
15 to liberate, create conditions for the liberation of the enclaves, called
16 for the use of MUP forces? Do you know that?
17 A. As for their plans to liberate the enclaves in May, no, I wasn't
18 aware of that, no.
19 Q. Okay. You didn't know there were Main Staff plans that called
20 for use of the MUP, in May, to liberate, to create conditions for the
21 liberation of the enclaves?
22 A. No. Can you please clarify what form did these plans have? They
23 were never sent to us, nor did I have any opportunity to discuss such
24 plans at Supreme Command meetings that I may have attended.
25 Q. Okay. Let's just move on to July.
1 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have P04484?
2 Q. Now, this is a tape of a conversation between Radovan Karadzic
3 and the person who just testified before you, Drina Corps Commander
4 Zivanovic, on 8 July. Now, if you look on your version, Karadzic says
5 further down, after asking how things are going. Fine. So I can't give
6 any of the - it's unintelligible - to you. Everything is taken and only
7 if you need any large ones. It should be checked through the Main Staff.
8 I know that there is some and where it is, so we could probably reinforce
9 you a little. And Zivanovic says: We will also need that. Karadzic
10 says: Pardon? And Zivanovic says: That will also be much needed. And
11 Karadzic says: All right. Call the Main Staff up there and I know that
12 it came in, and you can call me via Barijera and then we can talk and
14 Then if we go to page 2 of the English, Karadzic says: All
15 right, just tell Krle that I can't get to him right now. Well, the
16 entire MUP is engaged. I really don't have these from Zvornik or the
17 last reserves of these in Sarajevo, at Treskavica, in fact at Trnovo.
18 Zivanovic says: Yes. Karadzic: So there is no other way, you have to
19 go with your own forces. Zivanovic: Yes. And then says that they need
20 to be careful speaking on the phone.
21 So the day before you met with General Karadzic -- with
22 President Karadzic, the Drina Corps commander had requested MUP forces;
24 A. I am not aware of that. He did not ask them from me. I can see
25 from this transcript that he did ask for them, but ...
1 Q. Okay.
2 A. He didn't ask them from me.
3 Q. Okay.
4 MR. NICHOLLS: Let's have P04930, please. This is a Drina Corps
5 command document from 8 July, an urgent regular combat report. Again
6 8 July, from General Zivanovic. Page 2 of the English, please, as well
7 as the Serbian.
8 Q. Look at number 9, Mr Kovac:
9 "Due to the possibility of enemy attacks in the north-west part
10 of the front, particularly from Kalesija, Kladanj, all other directions,"
11 I won't read the whole thing, "please engage MUP forces from Zvornik,
12 their 1st Company, through the RS MUP as reserve forces for the
13 1st Birac Infantry Brigade to help on this endangered axis."
14 So it's not correct, is it, that General Krstic -- that Karadzic
15 came up with this idea, meeting with you on the 9 July, to save face,
16 saying, Please, General Krstic, ask for some units from the MUP so that
17 I look like I'm involved in Srebrenica and get some credit. The
18 Drina Corps had requested these units the day before. You know that now;
20 A. No. That's not right. First of all, I know what
21 President Karadzic told me directly when he asked me to provide two
22 special units to go to Srebrenica. What you are talking about, and what
23 General Zivanovic is requesting, the engagement of police forces, this
24 position is about 150 kilometres away from Srebrenica, so we cannot even
25 join it or link it with their action focused on Srebrenica. This has to
1 do with the overall activities of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, if we know
2 Olovo is certainly 150 kilometres from Srebrenica and Kladanj also
3 120 kilometres, Kalesija is the closest. It's also around
4 120 kilometres. So one cannot connect this with the Srebrenica
5 operation. This is the protection of lines at completely different part
6 of the theatre of war.
7 Q. It's concerned about attacks on the Zvornik Brigade, it says, and
8 enemy attacks in this area on the Zvornik Brigade, and the Zvornik
9 Brigade is asking for the 1st Company from Zvornik. And what the
10 Zvornik Brigade is doing on 8 July is day 2 of the attack on Srebrenica;
11 correct? Day 3, actually?
12 A. Look here, one thing is where the Zvornik Brigade was engaged and
13 their defence lines are something else. The defence lines of the Zvornik
14 Brigade were on average 100 to 150 kilometres away from Srebrenica, where
15 they were in combat engagement in connection with the Srebrenica action,
16 and because these lines were weakened, we had those requests that they be
17 assisted there. Even the town of Zvornik at the time was completely
18 unprotected, which can be seen from a series of dispatches. So let us
19 not mix the defence line of the Zvornik Brigade, which is something quite
20 different, as a position, and their combat engagement, a part of their
21 brigade or most of their brigade, in the Srebrenica action.
22 Q. Nevertheless, 1st Company was engaged and took part in the
23 Srebrenica action; correct?
24 A. The 1st Company was singled out on the president's orders, and
25 resubordinated to Ljubisa Borovcanin, who was subordinated to the army,
1 and they were engaged in the area of Srebrenica. But I think that that
2 was only on the 10th of July.
3 Q. We'll get to that in a minute. And you've also said in your
4 statements and in many of your interviews that at this time you were
5 focused basically exclusively on Sarajevo; right?
6 A. Yes.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the other microphone
8 for counsel please be switched on? Thank you.
9 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 06421, please? Is this P06421?
10 That's better. Thank you. That's the correct document.
11 Q. All right. I think you've seen this document before, Mr Kovac.
12 This is the 6th of July. It's from the RS Ministry of Interior police
13 force headquarters Pale. It's type signed from you, as Staff Commander,
14 and it reports first on what's going on with the Herzegovina Corps and
15 discusses how many enemy soldiers were killed and how many were captured.
16 Then if we turn the page in the English, we get to reporting on the
17 Trnovo area, then we get to reporting on Novi, and then at the bottom you
19 "In the early morning hours of 6 July, the offensive against
20 Srebrenica began and we shall provide you with timely information on all
21 interesting developments in that theatre of operations."
22 This covers all areas of interest to the MUP combat at that time,
23 right, including the attack on Srebrenica?
24 A. No. This is an exchange of information from the front line
25 between the services of the army, the State Security Service, and the
1 Public Security Service. This is a form of information, you can see
2 Herzegovina, Trnovo, Sarajevo, Krajina, you see the fall of the lines at
3 Krajina, and this last information that an offensive started at
4 Srebrenica, this was sent by the State Security Service and this cannot
5 be linked up in any way to any presence of the MUP forces. This is all
6 normal because all the -- all of these activities are reflected on the
7 area where the police is carrying out their duties in terms of securing
8 the areas in depth. That's it.
9 Q. I didn't ask you with regard to Srebrenica about this was
10 engagement or presence of MUP forces. I said this is you reporting on
11 what's happening in Srebrenica and saying that you shall provide timely
12 information on all interesting developments in that theatre of
13 operations. Right?
14 A. Well, the way in which we provide information from the front line
15 has to do with the degree of information that we received from military
16 units, corps or the Main Staff, the extent to which they convey
17 information to us, and what they deem necessary to convey to us in terms
18 of combat operations because this is their line of work, not ours.
19 Q. Right. So we'll get to that in a minute, but these lines of
20 information come to you and as Staff Commander you are reporting it
21 further and saying that you will continue to report?
22 A. Well, most of this -- well, it arrived in functional terms but
23 this was a routine exchange of information, routine information, so this
24 went according to an inertia of daily reporting of the ministry, or,
25 rather, positions, units, that were involved in certain areas, and
1 because of preparations --
2 Q. Yeah. So last time: You, as Staff Commander, are reporting on
3 Srebrenica; right?
4 A. I'm not reporting about Srebrenica. I am conveying information.
5 We are conveying information. We are only conveying information that we
6 received from other services. This is daily information.
7 Q. And you're conveying information that you also received from MUP
8 services like state security; right?
9 A. Well, part of the MUP service, and as far as combat activities
10 are concerned, it's mostly from the Main Staff of the Army of
11 Republika Srpska. This is regular exchange of information.
12 Q. You didn't answer my question at all. I'll read it again: And
13 you're conveying information that you also received from MUP services
14 like state security; right?
15 A. I am not conveying it personally. This has to do with the
16 institution of the staff and the institution of the ministry. So this is
17 a form of methodology of work. By all means, all the information that
18 our service receives is forwarded to those to whom they may be of
19 interest in order to take measures within their own remit.
20 Q. By the staff, this forwarding is by the staff that you command,
21 that you're head of, and it includes information you receive, you, the
22 staff, about Srebrenica. It's plain on the face of your document. Why
23 can't you answer that "yes" or "no"?
24 A. I'm answering clearly to you. You will certainly see a dispatch
25 here that I did not sign. It doesn't really matter whether I signed it.
1 You are accentuating Srebrenica as some special information, and I'm
2 taking it as part of a series of information from the area of
3 Republika Srpska at the time. That is the difference, in terms of my
4 answer, whether I got any special information for Srebrenica. I didn't
5 get it. It's the institution that got it, and we forwarded it, and
6 I don't see anything to be challenged there, that we forwarded that
8 JUDGE KWON: Shall we adjourn here?
9 MR. NICHOLLS: I wasn't sure, if it's three minutes I've got
10 another topic.
11 JUDGE KWON: Before we adjourn, I have a question for
12 Mr. Robinson. It's about Defence motion for order concerning Rule 70
13 documents from Krajisnik case that has been pending since 13th of May
14 this year. According to the Prosecution submission, which was on the
15 2nd of August, rule -- the Rule 70 provider had agreed to disclose to the
16 accused the two filings in question, subject to Rule 70 conditions.
17 What's the current status of this?
18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we received those filings and so
19 the motion is moot.
20 JUDGE KWON: So you will withdraw it?
21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
23 Mr Kovac, we will continue tomorrow morning at 9.00, so I'd like
24 to advise you not discuss about your testimony with anybody else. Do you
25 understand that, sir?
1 MR. LAZAREVIC: Your Honour, I apologise, am I allowed to contact
2 with Mr. Tomislav Kovac while he made his solemn note and he started his
3 evidence? But what I can do, I can just make a promise that I won't
4 discuss the topic regarding this, but he's alone here and I'm the only
5 person that he knows.
6 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has no difficulty as long as you do not
7 discuss about his testimony.
8 Do you understand that, sir, Mr Kovac?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand. I understand.
10 JUDGE KWON: The hearing is adjourned.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.45 p.m.,
12 to be reconvened on Friday, the 1st day of
13 November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.