Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 42837

 1                           Monday, 4 November 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, good morning everyone.

 6             Do we have something before we continue?  Why do we not have the

 7     witness?

 8             Yes, Mr. Harvey.

 9             MR. HARVEY:  Your Honours, I don't know why the witness isn't

10     here, but I just want to introduce, if I may, Shubhangi Bhadada, who is

11     from Delhi, India, and a graduate of the master's programme at the

12     University of Oxford in law.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting for the witness.

14             Mr. Nicholls, I was wondering whether you were not minded to

15     tender the interviews -- the part of interviews you dealt with with the

16     witness.

17             MR. NICHOLLS: [Microphone not activated]

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Is your microphone on?

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honours.  Good morning, Your Honours.

20             Yes, Your Honours, I think I would tender those portions.

21             JUDGE KWON:  How shall we identify the parts?  Do you have any

22     objection, Mr. Robinson, in general?

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I think it would be -- since

24     the parts were read out to the witness that he commented on, I don't

25     think there's any need under your practice to now retroactively go back

Page 42838

 1     and add them to the record.  If there was something at the time that was

 2     covered, they should have been put to the witness or else -- I don't see

 3     any value in repeating what's already in the record by having the

 4     interview itself admitted.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think the interview themselves were read out

 6     in full.  And further, in order to understand the context of the

 7     conversation referred to the witness, I think it's important to -- at

 8     least those parts.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, Your Honour, and I would just at add that at

10     the beginning and in some areas because of time I was summarising parts

11     of a paragraph and to show that I was summarising it accurately, that

12     part of the page it would be useful to have in.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So, I would recommend the parties to communicate

14     each other what parts are to be tendered, and let's see what parts

15     Mr. Karadzic may be also dealing with with the witness, and at the end of

16     the session let's discuss the admission of the parts of those interviews.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Mr. Kovac.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

23     morning everyone.

24                           WITNESS:  TOMISLAV KOVAC [Resumed]

25                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

Page 42839

 1                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

 3        A.   Good morning.

 4        Q.   Later, if we have enough time, I will ask you to clarify a few

 5     things following from a difference in language and the semantics.  But

 6     now I would like to ask you something about the things which the OTP

 7     suggested to you.  It was suggested to you that more was known and I knew

 8     and that I was concealing something.  Can you please tell us this:

 9     According to the knowledge you had, were there any unlawful killings in

10     Srebrenica before the 13th of July, 1995?

11        A.   From what I knew, what I looked into and did, there had been no

12     unlawful killings up until that time.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps I'm rushing.  And it was also suggested

14     during the cross-examination that I sent you with certain intentions to

15     Srebrenica.  Was it because I issued you such a task or was it on your

16     own initiative that you went to Srebrenica in connection with any sort of

17     unlawful killings or any other unlawful activities?

18        A.   I must expand this a bit.  If you will allow me --

19        Q.   If you can just briefly reply and then we may expand.

20        A.   Well, look here, I have told the Prosecution too, answering with

21     a yes or no falsify my entire activity in Srebrenica.  During the 15 days

22     of the Srebrenica action, I physically stayed in Srebrenica on duty only

23     for three hours and I had one telephone conversation with the deputy

24     centre chief.  That was all of my activity during 15 days.  And then to

25     make a complicated construction so as to fit everything in into a joint

Page 42840

 1     criminal enterprise, up until the moment when they got the documents that

 2     show that I never signed a single document with regard to Srebrenica, not

 3     just because I didn't know and knew what I was -- what was going to

 4     happen because I wasn't in the seat of the ministry at the time and I was

 5     only organising the Sarajevo front at the time and I was even a suspect

 6     for a while.  So we should avoid this sort of false construct.  With the

 7     three hours of my stay during the -- a fortnight and one telephone

 8     conversation, this is all of my activity in connection with Srebrenica,

 9     as I've told you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

11             MR. NICHOLLS:  I was going to object as non-responsive, but I

12     think he's done.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue?

14             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   All right.  I will now try to simplify matters so you could

18     answer with a yes or no.  It was suggested to you that I sent you there.

19     Did I send you in Srebrenica at all, and was it my or your or anyone

20     else's initiative by which you sent members of MUP to commit murders in

21     Srebrenica or do anything else unlawful?

22        A.   Neither did I -- I didn't send anyone.  I didn't -- I wasn't, as

23     you well know, involved in Srebrenica at any stage except for the

24     establishing of the police station in Srebrenica.  That was the only

25     official duty that I received, that I was involved in, and that during my

Page 42841

 1     three-hour stay I inspected and made sure that the police station would

 2     be established.  As for all other activities, I was not in charge of them

 3     nor did I want to be involved, not because I knew that something could

 4     happen but because I did not believe that this front was serious enough

 5     at the time and the overall situation.

 6        Q.   Could you first tell us, would it be usual for the minister and

 7     the deputy minister to be resubordinated to the army?  And what did you

 8     mean when you said that you did not consider this front to be serious

 9     enough?

10        A.   Well, look here, Mr. President, from the very first moment when I

11     opposed to being engaged in Srebrenica, I was aware of the much wider

12     activity on lifting the blockade of Sarajevo and I knew that Srebrenica

13     was a bad tactical move, where we would become involved in something and

14     get bogged down and that we shouldn't have done.  But the decision was up

15     to other people and not up to me, and that was the reason why, from the

16     military point of view, I considered Srebrenica not to be such a threat

17     as Sarajevo, not even close.  It was quite clear to serious military

18     experts, but when we look at all this from a different angle and consider

19     the consequences of the events, then the Srebrenica front gains more

20     weight.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure it was your question or the

23     translation.  Your question as translated reads like this:

24             "... would it be usual for the minister and the deputy minister

25     to be resubordinated to the army?"

Page 42842

 1             Is it the minister or the deputy minister that is to be

 2     resubordinated to the army?  If you could assist us.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.  Well, when Mr. Karadzic

 4     said "minister or deputy minister," he actually had in mind the same

 5     function within the ministry.  It's not usual that they can be

 6     resubordinated to the army, only if one of them directly commands a unit

 7     which as a unit is resubordinated specifically that particular unit.  But

 8     as an organ, as an institution, it's not usual, it's not even lawful.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

10             Please continue.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Could you please tell the Chamber what you know from official

14     documents and my activities, what was my position about the treatment of

15     prisoners of war, including this case in its entirety?

16        A.   I can just say in my answer that through my operative

17     investigations, I can only tell you that in this way, through the focus

18     of my operative investigation, if I may.

19        Q.   Yes, but briefly.  So were you aware of my position?  On the

20     basis of documents and my activities, what was my position?

21        A.   I had two periods in work with you:  1992 and 1995.  During 1992,

22     as one can see from the documents, I came, I saw that you directly --

23     then it was collection centres, camps which showed up that directly,

24     through your documents, orders, pleas, you requested that all conventions

25     be honoured and that everyone be treated adequately.  And in 1992,

Page 42843

 1     through a memo of the government, we adopted that all the organs had to

 2     do that in that way.

 3             In the analysis of Srebrenica, you returned to 1996 and it was

 4     again you who requested and asked, in 1995 and 1996, that all conventions

 5     be honoured, that certain tasks be carried out with regard to civilians

 6     and everything else that cropped up at the front, and eventually in 1996

 7     you requested an investigation.  And when I saw this and I said in front

 8     of the OTP investigators, I uttered a sentence that if you were once

 9     again in a situation to launder them, the famous sentence, I didn't mean

10     to launder the situation; but if you were again in a situation where the

11     relevant organs, military prosecutor's offices, courts, security organs,

12     were not doing their work properly, everyone who had to do this by

13     default, by applying the law, so that the final results would be

14     presented to you and that you were the one who requested them to take

15     measures.  And that was a problem of the entire situation.  That was the

16     greatest problem that occurred for us in the Srebrenica area, namely,

17     that the organs who were supposed to do their work did not know how to do

18     it and did not want to do it properly.  I'm sorry that I left my position

19     at the time so I couldn't complete this work as I did it in 1992 and 1993

20     and all other years.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we briefly have a look at

23     P2995, please.  It's a document which the MUP sent on, it forwarded it.

24     P2995, please, in e-court.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We see it, yes.

Page 42844

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   I can read it out to you and others may check it on their screens

 3     because I can't see it on my screen.

 4        A.   I have it.

 5        Q.   Aha, here it is now.  Please have a look at it.  Then you don't

 6     have to read out aloud.  Please have a look at item 4 and tell us how

 7     this relates or how it fits with your experience with the treatment of

 8     the prisoners of war, my position about this, and the state leadership.

 9        A.   I had this item in the evidence.  In 1992 it was formulated, this

10     item 4, in which you ordered -- we cleared this up in 1992, how the

11     civilians and POWs and persons who committed some criminal offences were

12     to be treated.  This is completely clear for anyone who wanted to

13     implement it.

14        Q.   Thank you.  It was suggested to you that I tried, including my

15     orders and the one dated the 1st of April, 1996, that I tried to cover up

16     these events.  Did you understand then or did you understand from this

17     document that its intention was to cover something up?

18        A.   May I expand on this a little bit?

19        Q.   Please be as brief as possible, but you may.

20        A.   A problem here is this:  What I have gone through and from what I

21     have seen, there was this one position in Srebrenica where you had the

22     security organ who was supposed to implement the conventions, participate

23     directly and order to the effect to prevent the commission of crimes.

24     Then there is an organ who was supposed to collect information and send

25     them to you.  It's the same organ.  But there was this decadence, this

Page 42845

 1     blockade, this subordination of a higher organ in relation to the lower

 2     one in carrying out the tasks and lack of respect for higher instance and

 3     the supreme commander in the chain of information leading up to you.

 4     That happened to you.  You were blocked by these organs, the military

 5     security organs.  I established that clearly.  I saw it clearly.  I saw

 6     it clearly.

 7             When you came in the position, in order to be in a position in

 8     the month of April, to send this to all the addressees, the military

 9     investigation organs or police organs, you tell them to take measures,

10     you tell them that you have information and that they should take

11     measures against this war crime, things had to be quite the opposite.

12     Those military organs were not doing their work properly with regard to

13     the state and with regard to you personally.  So this is my view.  I

14     don't think that at any moment you were laundering or covering up

15     anything there.  But you were in a position, just like in early 1992,

16     where you had to request from organs to do something, to do some sort of

17     work, which they were supposed to have done already because that was in

18     accordance to the law.  And here we have an even worse case where the

19     organ who was supposed to do something like that was directly responsible

20     for committing such acts.

21             So I don't think that in any way whatsoever you were covering up

22     anything, but you had opportunistic and incapable organs at that moment,

23     and I think that that's clear.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Nothing, Your Honour.  Sorry.

Page 42846

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   And to that effect it was suggested that Mladic's diary --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at P1490.  The

 4     typewritten version, please, Serbian, page 44; English, page 47.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Could you please read these first two paragraphs and could you

 7     tell us what the reason was for me, on the 22nd of March, to be bringing

 8     up this topic again.  Was it aimed at a cover-up or what was it aimed at,

 9     the first two paragraphs?

10             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  -- I don't think he can comment on what

13     President Karadzic's motivation and what was in mind was at the time that

14     he said this.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, certainly Mr. Karadzic could reformulate his

16     question.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, sir, this meeting, this request of mine in relation to

20     Mladic, what does it tell you?  Is it counting on --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Let's -- let's let him read the passage first.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   You can read it out loud if you want.

24        A.   "A big show was put on for Albright.  She expected they would

25     find 1.200 Muslim corpses at Pilica, but they found some five corpses.

Page 42847

 1             "We met (Koljevic, Biljana ...) and concluded that it was best

 2     for a parity commission to be formed to really investigate all the deaths

 3     and killings around Srebrenica during the war."

 4        Q.   How does that fit into your knowledge, what you knew, about the

 5     treatment of crimes and covering up crimes?

 6        A.   It does not fit into covering up crimes.  In my view, the process

 7     of opening the Srebrenica problem lasted.  A continuity can be seen here

 8     of the Srebrenica problem.  It was supposed to be investigated and

 9     sanctioned at state level, so I see this as an unstoppable continuity, a

10     continuity that was unstoppable.  Now, whether it should have happened

11     earlier, that's a different question.  So I see it as -- I mean, we can

12     see part of the process here already, opening up this problem, and your

13     instruction comes on the basis of the continuity of the knowledge that

14     you received.  That is how I see this.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  But by this time you knew the

16     locations of crime site, didn't you, Mr. Kovac?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the autumn of 1995, I carried

18     out operative investigations and I would not focus on the locations.  I

19     did not deal with the locations in principle.  In global terms after this

20     investigation, I knew; but I was investigating other reasons at the time

21     when I was minister.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So with hindsight on your part, read this first

23     sentence, to say that there were 1200 Muslim bodies in Pilica, it could

24     not have been a big show at all.  It's true.  Do you have any say to such

25     observation?

Page 42848

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot in terms of such a

 2     formulation -- well, I tried to present my point of view.  As for this

 3     kind of formulation and answer, I cannot say what it was that people

 4     specifically saw in Pilica at the time and what was in Pilica.  At that

 5     time, I was not in the area.  Now, in the meantime, whether it had

 6     remained as it had been, I cannot say anything about the time when I was

 7     not minister and when I was not physically present.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Let's put it more directly.  You, as the minister of

 9     MUP or deputy minister of MUP, you knew what happened in vague terms, and

10     you said Mladic should have been arrested immediately.  And then you say

11     Mladic and Karadzic -- Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Mladic didn't know what happened

12     at all by this time?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no.  You see, this

14     conversation here, conveying sentences from a diary, first of all, I have

15     to tell you straight away, as far as Ratko Mladic's diary is concerned, I

16     do not accept it.  I do not recognise it.  I think it is a construct.  I

17     do not think that these are writings of a normal person.  There are quite

18     a few elements of schizophrenia here and I can see that, and I talked

19     about it to experts too.  And as for these formulations, I mean, well,

20     giving an answer, but everything that is here, that is bandied about here

21     before this court concerning Ratko Mladic's diary, I think that any

22     normal person would not want to comment on anything that is contained in

23     this diary.  Knowing what happened and comparing what this diary contains

24     to what I know from before and the distortions and -- I really would not

25     want to comment on anything stated in General Ratko Mladic's diary.  My

Page 42849

 1     friends who are experts clearly established that there are certain

 2     elements of schizophrenia in the way in which events are viewed and

 3     registered in this diary.

 4             So I really wouldn't want to -- I mean, that's why it's not easy

 5     for me to say something about some of the things that he establishes in

 6     this diary because these constructs and these statements -- I mean,

 7     they're quite schizophrenic.  The best thing would be for me to say what

 8     I have to say, but everything that is put in this diary -- I mean,

 9     it's -- it cannot be normally -- I mean, it has to be viewed in a

10     different way, interpreted in a different way.  That is my position in

11     general terms, vis-à-vis all the facts contained in Ratko Mladic's diary.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Well, if you believe this is a

13     construct, then there would be no point on your part answering any

14     question with respect to any passage there.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think there are other

16     things.  I mean, after all, as far as this diary is concerned, on my

17     part, regardless of whether there are some correct statements there, from

18     my point of view there is no point in my responding to anything that is

19     contained in Ratko Mladic's diary.  My mind of a policeman and my mind in

20     general cannot accept this diary of Ratko Mladic's.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Well, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Now that we're on the subject, could you please look at

25     paragraph 5, what that commission is supposed to be like.  I'm going to

Page 42850

 1     read it out.

 2             "If they expand the campaign, then they would form a Joint

 3     Commission (one from civilian security, one from army security, and two

 4     from the United Nations) to investigate the killing of every individual."

 5             Does that look like an intention to cover something up and would

 6     this kind of commission be fair?

 7        A.   This is certainly a correct attitude in terms of the heterogenous

 8     composition.  Certainly there could not have been a cover-up.  This is

 9     serious work on establishing facts, I mean as regards the graves and the

10     factual situation in terms of what happened in the area.  So this is a

11     normal, solid foundation.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now can I ask you --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry.  Is it -- translation -- who are "they" here,

14     Mr. Kovac?  "If they expand the campaign, then they would form a Joint

15     Commission ..."  Who are "they"?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Don't ask me.  This is not my

17     formulation, "they."  I cannot --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovac --

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I mean, I've already said --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovac --

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says here --

22             JUDGE KWON:  If you do not understand this paragraph, how can you

23     answer the question put by Mr. Karadzic, whether it was a cover-up or

24     not?  How did you understand this sentence?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I understood this sentence

Page 42851

 1     and in response to a concrete question about the composition, the

 2     composition of the commission that is supposed to work on that.  So it's

 3     quite clear, heterogenous commission, that's that.  However, "they," for

 4     me the word "they" is a third party, the international factor,

 5     international institutions, there is no other way I can interpret this.

 6     I didn't really go into that.  That's probably what they meant.  I think

 7     they meant the international factor.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   I'd like to ask you, during the cross-examination you were asked

12     about this possibility that Bajagic, Deronjic and others could have

13     informed me.  Did you have any information to the effect that they had

14     informed me about executions of prisoners of war?

15        A.   No, I did not have such information that they informed you

16     directly, no.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Did you see any written report that would contain

18     this information about executions in Srebrenica that would have been sent

19     to me?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   An attempt was made here to explain the wording of "he had to

22     know."  This past participle in the English language, could you explain

23     that?  Actually, could you explain this participle in different terms?

24     Could you --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Could we be more specific?  Shall we upload the

Page 42852

 1     document if you're referring to a specific passage?

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the part that was shown by

 3     the distinguished Mr. Nicholls from the interview, 2003, I believe.  In

 4     response to whether he knew, the answer was:  He had to know or he must

 5     have known --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Let's -- because we are dealing with, shall we

 7     upload 65 ter 25350, e-court page 43, where you said:

 8             "This is crystal clear because he," being Mr. Karadzic, "he had

 9     Bajagic who knew everything ..."

10             What did you mean by that?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no.  I could not have said

12     he and Bajagic knew.  No, no.  I don't have the translation here.  Please

13     let me see this.  I need to see it clearly.  I could not have put

14     Karadzic and Bajagic together, no, no, no.  Give me the translation.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls, do we have another translation

16     referring to that situation?  This is the only one?  I didn't understand

17     past participle, but let's deal with this passage first.

18             Unfortunately, we do not have the Serbo-Croat transcription, but

19     I take it we have audio-tape if necessary.  And this transcript says that

20     you said:

21             "This is crystal clear because he had Bajagic 'who knew

22     everything.'  He had Deronjic, he received all the information that he

23     needed from them ..."

24             And this passage was dealt with in cross-examination by

25     Mr. Nicholls, and you said:  "I absolutely stand by that statement."

Page 42853

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There's a different construction

 2     for all of this.  I said clearly that people came who were in charge of

 3     informing him about Srebrenica, not that they informed him about crimes

 4     in Srebrenica.  And when I stated that it was perfectly clear who the

 5     persons were who were in charge of informing Karadzic about Srebrenica,

 6     he put the names there, meaning Deronjic, I did not have the obligation

 7     to -- or I was not involved in the Srebrenica operation.  It was

 8     perfectly clear that there were people who were in charge of informing

 9     Mr. Karadzic about Srebrenica.  What kind of information they provided

10     and how they provided this information, that I don't know.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, back to you, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Your Honours --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  -- sorry, just you'd asked me earlier if there

15     were any other passages that deal with this.  There's a -- it's also

16     dealt with on the top of page 52 of the same interview, 65 ter 25350.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Was it covered by your cross-examination?

18             MR. NICHOLLS:  No, I didn't bring that one up.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Then let's continue.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   I'd like to ask you to read out your answer from line 22 --

23             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, Your Honours, another part that was covered

24     in my cross-examination was at e-court at page 50 of this same interview,

25     just to answer your question.

Page 42854

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then we're going to call up that

 3     page too.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   But let us just read this answer of yours.

 6             [In English] "If I may say, I don't see any name of any VRS

 7     official.  It would be logical for Tolimir or Beara," and some -- "TK

 8     also said, 'or Salapura or Mladic' or people at these positions to come

 9     Tomo Kovac in fact said, 'to be invited to come' and report to him, but

10     they were not there, Tomo Kovac also said, 'they probably did not want to

11     come, I don't know.'"

12             [Interpretation] Did you know that they had come?  What does this

13     assumption of yours -- I mean, this assumption in terms of logic, where

14     does that come from?

15        A.   What do you mean?

16        Q.   I mean Tolimir, Beara, Mladic, and so on.  On what do you base

17     that assumption, that it would be logical for them to provide

18     information?

19        A.   It would be logical in terms of their obligation on the basis of

20     the law and their function and the establishment of military command and

21     reporting from the front line.  That is quite clear.  That is the route

22     according to the law in Republika Srpska, and that is the way these

23     people who were supposed to inform the supreme commander about that were

24     supposed to work.

25        Q.   Thank you.  On page 80, you tried to say that this was not within

Page 42855

 1     your domain, that it was the domain of investigation and reporting.

 2     Whose domain was that?

 3        A.   You have to clarify a bit.  What do you mean?

 4        Q.   On page 40 you were asked whether you had investigated and

 5     reported.  You said that was the purview or the domain and then you were

 6     interrupted.

 7        A.   I don't know what was meant.  I can answer.

 8        Q.   In one word.  Was the conduct of military structures in the

 9     purview of the police -- military police?

10        A.   In a theatre of war, in a combat zone, the treatment of prisoners

11     of war is in the exclusive purview of the military security service, the

12     military prosecutor's office, and their military judiciary.  So the

13     police force cannot take any action vis-à-vis the army or the military

14     police.

15        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked about the meetings you had at the

16     Presidency during those days, and you maintained that Srebrenica was not

17     a topic, that the topics were mainly centred around Sarajevo.  Can you

18     tell me, regardless of the agenda, did anyone mention the execution of

19     prisoners of war on the 13th of July, when we met one on one?  Was there

20     anything to report on the 13th of July when we met?

21        A.   I did not report to you about Srebrenica at that time, and you

22     know very well that I was focused at that time on the Sarajevo theatre of

23     war.  You know that I expressed my doubts even concerning the Sarajevo

24     theatre and even told you that you did not realise how serious the

25     situation was and how easily it could fall, taking down with it

Page 42856

 1     150.000 people in that area.  I knew that better because I came from that

 2     area.

 3        Q.   On the 14th you saw me alone again and then on the 15th in a

 4     larger group.  I want to ask you about the meeting one on one on the

 5     14th.  Did we discuss Srebrenica and did you tell me about Kravica; and

 6     if not, why not?  What significance did Kravica have for you?

 7        A.   I did not report to you about that.  I did not know about the

 8     weight of Kravica except for the killing of a policeman and the wounding

 9     of another policeman, and I had the report of Ljubisa Borovcanin that

10     several prisoners were killed.  That incident did not give me cause to

11     report to you.  On the other hand, I knew that the appropriate services

12     and Ljubisa had the legal obligation to provide you with all these

13     reports officially, covering all the steps that should have been taken

14     and the law.

15        Q.   Thank you.  What did we discuss?  What was the hottest topic, not

16     only in Sarajevo but the entire Republika Srpska?

17        A.   We had a problem with the war in Krajina.  Our lines were falling

18     already at that time, and that was a topic in addition to Sarajevo, and

19     also my demands for supply of material assets.  And we had reports to

20     discuss about the situation that reached you and the Assembly, although

21     the situation on the ground was something entirely different.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I show 1D71161 to the witness.

23     1D71161.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Could you please take a look.  On the 14th of July, I issued this

Page 42857

 1     order to Municipal Assemblies -- it seems we don't have a translation

 2     yet.  Which municipalities are concerned and what are the problems with

 3     refugees?  What was ordered here to the Ministry of the Interior?  Just

 4     give us your own account.

 5        A.   We see clearly that at that time --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second --

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- there was a loss of territories

 8     and there was --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Since we do not have English

10     translation, first establish with the witness what this document is

11     about.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   May I ask you to tell us what is this document?  When was it

15     issued?  And to what municipalities is it addressed?

16        A.   It was issued on the 14th of July, 1995.  It was sent to

17     Municipal Assemblies of Petrovac, Kljuc, Sanski Most, and Prijedor, and

18     to the Ministry of the Interior.

19        Q.   Thank you.  You don't have to read it all.  What does it concern?

20        A.   Providing assistance to refugees, the population that had fled

21     from municipalities that had fallen under enemy control, and it says that

22     temporary accommodation should be provided to the refugees along with

23     minimal living conditions.  The Ministry of the Interior is to help the

24     competent authorities in executing this order.  And finally, regular

25     reporting on this assignment is required.

Page 42858

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this document?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  The document receives MFI number D3973,

 5     Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show 1D9767 in e-court,

 7     please.  It seems we only have the English version.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   I will read it to you.  13th July:

10             [In English] "Military/political situation in Serb Sarajevo

11     satisfactory.

12             "... at a meeting of the president of the Republika Srpska,

13     Radovan Karadzic and president of the RS National Assembly

14     Momcilo Krajisnik with representatives of Serb Sarajevo, the political

15     and military situation was assessed as satisfactory.

16             "After the meeting, the Serb Sarajevo mayor, Dr. Vojislav

17     Maksimovic said the previous positions on the division of Sarajevo into

18     Serb and Muslim parts is being supported.

19             "'We can easily say that the situation on the fronts changed

20     after the Muslim offensive on Serb Sarajevo was crushed and after the

21     fall of Srebrenica ...'"

22             [Interpretation] What did you discuss with me on that day,

23     because you were with me one on one, whereas these other people came in a

24     group?  Did I need to see you before this meeting?  How is this related

25     to your discussion with me?

Page 42859

 1        A.   Every minute of my discussion with you was the situation in

 2     Sarajevo, apart from the situation in the Krajina theatre.  The first

 3     part of the offensive against Sarajevo was completed, another one was

 4     expected from the axis of Mount Treskavica and Mount Igman, which many

 5     people did not understand properly.  And I insisted with you that all the

 6     structures should take this very seriously and focus on this.  That was

 7     the gist of my discussion with you.

 8        Q.   This document and what I said to the mayor, is it a realistic

 9     view, a realistic description, or was it unwarrantedly optimistic?

10        A.   At that time, optimism prevailed.

11        Q.   I don't think it was recorded that this optimist version was

12     intended for the -- for public use.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D9768.  Can this

14     document be admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it as Exhibit D3974.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D9768.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   This is a summarised report of the SRNA agency news for

19     13th July.  What is the top story?  Which theatre?

20        A.   The Sarajevo theatre, obviously.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   In the first paragraph there is talk about this meeting, but I

24     would like to read out to you the last paragraph.

25             [In English] "Despite previous defeat, the Muslim leadership does

Page 42860

 1     not give up its offensive on Serb Sarajevo.  Partial leader of the

 2     Bosnian Muslims, Alija Izetbegovic, visited Mount Cemer and, together

 3     with the Muslim Army commander, General Rasim Delic, persuaded his

 4     soldiers to again attempt to breach Serb lines in the north-west section

 5     of the Sarajevo front."

 6             [Interpretation] Is this a bit more realistic than those

 7     optimistic statements we'd seen before, and what does this say about the

 8     situation in the Sarajevo theatre?

 9        A.   This says clearly that all the Muslim forces were assigned to

10     attack the Serb-held western Sarajevo and those positions there, and this

11     was obvious to me from day one.  It was clear to me that the beginning of

12     the Sarajevo offensive was that first attack at the command of the VRS

13     from the direction of Srebrenica; however, many people did not understand

14     where the real problem lay so they focused more on trivial combat zones,

15     trivial compared to the western theatre around Sarajevo.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  This document receives number D3975,

20     Your Honours.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   In P2242, which is the agenda of my secretaries, the entry for

23     that day, we see that on the 15th, General, you called on me, together

24     with Mr. Krajisnik and Maksim Stanisic.  Do you know which position

25     Maksim Stanisic held at that time?

Page 42861

 1        A.   I believe he was president of the Executive Board for the city of

 2     Sarajevo.

 3        Q.   Trivko Radic and Tomo Kovac.  That should be page 92.  Did you or

 4     any other participant of that meeting mention Srebrenica on the

 5     15th of July?

 6        A.   No way, certainly not.  We were talking about Sarajevo, the

 7     functioning of the local authorities, the police, the defence lines, and

 8     the provision of material assets and supplies.

 9        Q.   Do you know what Trivko Radic's position was?

10        A.   He was president of the Vogosca municipality or president of the

11     Executive Board or perhaps mayor of Vogosca.  I don't remember exactly.

12        Q.   On the 18th of July, you visited again at noon, Maksim Stanic,

13     Krajisnik, Tomo Kovac.  Can you tell me, if you remember, what was the

14     reason for this visit?  Who was Ninkovic?

15        A.   Ninkovic was defence minister and Stanisic was the president of

16     the city government.  And the discussion at the meeting was about

17     providing material and supplies to the Sarajevo theatre of war.

18        Q.   We need to clarify a few things that remained unclear before.  In

19     cross-examination, Ibran Mustafic was mentioned.  Did he survive --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Do we see that item you referred to

21     on the 18th?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  It should be on the next page, 93.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I see the 18th.  And in line

24     that says "12.00," it's the fourth line for the 18th of July, both in the

25     handwritten and the printed version --

Page 42862

 1             JUDGE KWON:  But Mr. Kovac was not there -- oh, there, I see.

 2     Yes, thank you.  Please continue.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   It's -- it was mentioned on page 24 of the cross-examination that

 6     the DB was collecting information and, inter alia, questioned

 7     Ibran Mustafic.  Did Ibran Mustafic survive this interaction with the

 8     state security?

 9        A.   I cannot exactly -- I think he did, but I cannot -- I cannot say

10     or I cannot exactly tell you at this moment what the state security was

11     doing then and I wouldn't like to speculate.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Let's finish with the question of reporting.  Did you

13     ever intend to report to me that you remained in the position of the

14     minister and at what moment would the conditions be created for you to

15     report to me about this?  What would it be so that it would be necessary

16     for you to report to me?

17        A.   Do you mean Srebrenica?

18        Q.   Yes.

19        A.   Well, I was in the initial stages of collecting information.  I

20     had clear assessments that those who committed the said acts in

21     Srebrenica, specifically Beara and his team, the team from the state

22     security, one whole chain of people, were very dangerous people at that

23     moment, and that the preparation and collection of information for them

24     and everything else that might follow would have to be a very serious and

25     difficult action and that would certainly be carried out upon completion

Page 42863

 1     of the war operations.  At the moment when I prepared -- when I had

 2     prepared everything, just like I used to do in the previous years, with

 3     all groups, you would then have it on your desk sent from me with a clear

 4     request that together with other institutions, as we had no powers --

 5     that with other institutions, the judiciary and everyone else, such an

 6     action should be rounded off.  So with the end of war and demobilisation

 7     of the army after Dayton, that is to say, what would certainly have

 8     followed -- it would certainly follow but -- please, I have this sound in

 9     my earphones, interpreters or someone, I don't know who it is.  I'm

10     having this scrambling noise in my earphones.

11             It's certain that at the end of the war and after

12     demilitarisation of the army, my activity would follow and a certain -- a

13     serious briefing, but it's not a matter of briefing.  When a relevant

14     state organ briefs someone else, they have to have well-prepared evidence

15     and also measures that are to be taken that are already prepared, rather

16     than leave it to the president to prepare the measures because it's a

17     burden for him.

18             So it was a difficult situation and knowing what sort of people

19     these were, what combination of people, because I had had a -- quite a

20     long experience with Beara.  He had -- he was a criminal mind.  He had a

21     problem at the Dubrovnik front earlier in the war.  So considering all

22     that, on the one hand you had the police, on the other you had military

23     security administration, so much greater preparation was needed.  It was

24     impossible during the war because a civil war would have broken out.  I

25     waited for the war to end and, of course, I wanted to collect all the

Page 42864

 1     evidence to round it off.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  First we have to see in lines 16 and 17 on page 26,

 3     you said specifically Beara and his team, the state security team.  Did

 4     you mean the state security or the military security?

 5        A.   No, no, no.  I meant the nomenclature from the military security,

 6     not the state security.  Even if I said it, it was a slip of the tongue.

 7     Military security.

 8        Q.   Thank you --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm not sure whether I understood

10     your answer.  The question was this:

11             "Did you ever intend to report to me ... and at what moment would

12     the condition be created for you to report to me about this?"

13             What was your answer in short -- in brief terms?  Did you ever

14     intend to report to the president, Mr. Karadzic?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if I hadn't, I wouldn't have

16     said that.  As soon as I would get close to the stage where I had more

17     collected evidence, it would have been in December when the war should

18     end and demilitarisation begin, then we would begin the serious -- these

19     were just the stages of operative collection of intelligence.  At the

20     moment when the investigative activities would begin and when we

21     requested for other organs to be involved, that would be the moment when

22     the president would be informed about it, that is to say, the end.  That

23     was about a month, that was according to my plan, it should have been the

24     month of December.

25             JUDGE KWON:  When you had that secret operative investigation and

Page 42865

 1     got the result, you did not want to report that to Mr. Karadzic?  You

 2     said that last week.  Do you remember that?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Look, there are stages when all

 4     services and all police services in the world work secretly on collection

 5     of information, and there is a stage when they report other levels.  The

 6     president of the republic is not an issue of Radovan Karadzic but the

 7     institution of the president of the republic.  Once the information is

 8     collected and verified and you reach the point when there are grounds to

 9     suspect that certain groups of people committed such crimes, then

10     reporting comes into play.

11             But my manner of reporting throughout the war, from 1992 and

12     onwards, towards the president, the reporting system was not to say

13     something, nor did Karadzic accept this, nor did I have such a relation

14     with him that we would speak tete-a-tete, something that would be

15     discussed only between Tomo Kovac and Radovan Karadzic.  No.  I should

16     have the evidence and the information and be ready for a new situation

17     that would arise.

18             I knew quite well, considering the situation, the state of minds

19     among the soldiers on the front lines.  There was a moment when we would

20     have to begin this catharsis, when we would have to inform everyone and

21     take measures.  That could only be done after the end of the war, not at

22     all during the war, because considering the situation that we had at the

23     time, a civil war would have broke out amongst us.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 42866

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             Could we now show to the witness 1D71120.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   From January 1994, in which you request additional information in

 5     order to be able to report to the Presidency.  Do explain to us a little

 6     bit.  You told us recently that throughout the war you waited to have

 7     complete information.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So 1D71120, please.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   I will read it so we don't ...

11             "Reports were submitted only by the CSB Sarajevo and Banja Luka,

12     so we are not in the situation to report to the highest government

13     leaders.

14             "The CSB that did not submit are obliged to submit the reports no

15     later than the 19th of January, 1994, at 10.00 a.m.," then you list which

16     CSBs you mean, "and Sarajevo, they only submitted statistical data and

17     not a description of important events, which is also their obligation."

18             How does this document fit into what you just said, that

19     throughout the war you could only report when you had complete

20     information?

21        A.   It's clear that the Ministry of the Interior, for all information

22     that it would forward to the government and especially the president of

23     republic in war time, would have to have them under certain categories,

24     for the simple reason that it would be clearly separated what sort of

25     events they are.  Was it the commission of crimes or war operations?  If

Page 42867

 1     it's crimes, what category of crimes?  This is part of the methodology of

 2     our work and it's our legal obligation.  It's also the methodology that

 3     we were applying at the time so as not to mix up the qualifications once

 4     such reports reach the presidents and the governments so that they

 5     wouldn't have to try and clear it up and interpret the law.  So in the

 6     items in the reports, these issues have to be identified and legally

 7     defined and clearly treated.  So that's the substance here when we

 8     criticise certain centres and organs and call upon them to provide

 9     top-quality information.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And a bit lower down, just before the last paragraph

11     you say:

12             "You should provide answers only for crimes for which criminal

13     reports were filed or which were committed in a specific time-period, the

14     time, that is to say, the year, when a specific crime was committed."

15             So only for what was reported as a criminal report, not just

16     rumours?

17        A.   Well, essentially the ministry can only register and report about

18     something that has been qualified as a crime or criminal events.  That's

19     the specific role of the ministry.  Whether these are misdemeanours or

20     whatever it is, it has to be qualified as such, so it cannot be

21     arbitrary.  Notes from diaries, what someone may think about something

22     and so on, this is what I don't agree with.  Any kinds of diaries,

23     journals, something that is discovered and later assessments, there are

24     no later assessments, just the registration and qualification of

25     phenomena and situations.  That was the assessment that was requested

Page 42868

 1     from the Ministry of the Interior.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this please be MFI'd?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And if we can also show who signed

 6     this document.  What's its provenance?  Can we please scroll down so as

 7     to show the bottom of the page.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's one of my memos, yes,

 9     Tomo Kovac.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted, please?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  This document receives number MFI D3976,

15     Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   And the last question, just something about language issues,

19     which are great issues for us.  I'm not going to go into the passive

20     form.  They had to report and so on, something else.  The Prosecution

21     asked you how it was possible that someone of your subordinates would be

22     sent to a meeting and that someone like that was present at a meeting,

23     met someone and did not report that to you.

24             Can you please tell the Chamber, do you make a difference, a

25     distinction, between a meeting and then encounter, and what was it that

Page 42869

 1     your subordinate had to inform you about and what he didn't have to

 2     inform you about?

 3        A.   To distinguish the military terms and military relations

 4     vis-à-vis the Ministry of the Interior, here specifically Dragomir Vasic

 5     is whom I had in mind.  He was the chief of the Zvornik security centre.

 6     Certain legal issues from the purview of public security, such as

 7     securing persons and facilities in the area, are not carried out on the

 8     basis of orders.  It's his original legal duty, so he's obliged to act in

 9     accordance with the law at any given moment.  Depending on the situation,

10     he has to react properly.  On the other hand, it's also his right in his

11     own territory to take part in all agreements and discussions that have to

12     do with security and safety of civilians, whether civilians have to be

13     transported or secured in a certain area.  It's his original legal

14     obligation.  He doesn't need an order of Tomo Kovac or the minister or

15     anyone else.  It's his obligation to be involved.

16             The manner in which he needs to report -- he doesn't need to

17     report to me.  He has to make lawful and legal agreements and go through

18     procedures at the lower level, the police stations, their obligations

19     which again have to be in accordance with their original legal

20     obligations.

21             The competences and relations of the work of the police and the

22     way the army is commanded and controlled are mixed up here all the time.

23     The army has strict rules; their duties are quite different.  They have

24     direct reporting and direct orders.  However, the Ministry of the

25     Interior is an organ of administration, an organ which directly

Page 42870

 1     implements the laws, directly provides qualifications, acts in a

 2     preventive manner, pre-emptively, it provides guide-lines, and has a

 3     repressive element also when it needs to secure and take other lawful

 4     measures, all other lawful measures.

 5             It was clear here, I never had the need to issue a document for

 6     Vasic, and as far as I know, you also did not appoint him by any act as

 7     someone who would be involved in the Srebrenica activities in connection

 8     with securing the movement of civilians and so on.  But it was his legal

 9     obligation to show up there, to have information, and to be able to guide

10     and direct the police along the whole axis and also to monitor the

11     civilians and their movement in terms of their security and everything

12     else.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please be asked to slow down a

14     bit.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second.  Mr. Kovac, I think

16     you were speaking too fast for the interpreters to catch up.  Before I

17     ask you to repeat your answer.

18             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  This has nothing to do with the question.  He's

20     going into a defence of Vasic's actions along the road and what Vasic 's

21     duties were.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I tend to agree with that.

23             Yes, I'll leave it to you, Mr. Karadzic.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   I just want to ask you this:  If he encounters someone and it's

Page 42871

 1     not a meeting which is beyond his competences, does he have to ask you

 2     about this encounter or report to you about it?  If it's just an

 3     encounter.  I'm talking about your subordinates.

 4        A.   I'm trying to express this again, precisely because of the

 5     gentleman from the OTP, because they do not understand this part

 6     regarding the police.  It's his legal obligation and he's also entitled

 7     to participate in meetings that come under the purview of his activities,

 8     but it's not envisaged at all that he has to have some contact with the

 9     minister.  Imagine if so many policemen, who were directly doing things,

10     requested powers and authorisation from the minister of the interior to

11     do anything.  It's their obligation to act and work in accordance with

12     the law.

13        Q.   Thank you, General.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,

15     Your Excellencies.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovac, I have one question about the secret

18     operative investigation you conducted in sometime late September 1995.

19     Do you remember you said that?

20                           Further Questioned by the Court:

21             JUDGE KWON:  Could you tell us what was it like?  What did you do

22     in concrete terms and how did you conduct that investigation?  You

23     appointed somebody, in concrete terms, and he did what?  I hope you

24     understood my question.

25        A.   Clearly because I directly participated.  In view of the

Page 42872

 1     complexity and the possibility of having people's lives threatened, the

 2     people who were working on this, so this was done secretly, I mean with

 3     exactly four tasks that were supposed to be dealt with.  So whether there

 4     were any forces of Serbia in the Srebrenica operation, whether any of

 5     their forces participated in the commission of the crimes, who issued the

 6     order to attack Srebrenica, and who issued the order to execute the

 7     prisoners.  Nothing else, not further in depth, not further in breadth,

 8     just these four questions.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I'll deal with it one by one.  You talked about four

10     tasks.  At the end you said:  Who issued the order to execute the

11     prisoners.  So before -- in order to reach that, you have to establish

12     there's -- there was a massacre at the -- does it mean that you already

13     knew at that time there was a massacre, execution of prisoners?

14        A.   We, at the request, that is to say, at the request of our

15     colleagues, the man who was preparing Dayton, we got these clear

16     questions.  So that means that we got these clear questions that I've

17     already mentioned.  I got them from the man who took part in preparing

18     Dayton, in the preparations for Dayton.  That was the end of

19     September/October, so it was just before Dayton.  That was the last part

20     before the Dayton Agreement.  So these were the questions.  Also there

21     can be this question whether Stanisic had already known that -- I mean

22     certain -- well, that certain crimes had been committed, that is.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  And we now have the four tasks you were

24     asked about, and then you told us that it was done very secretly and it

25     was very dangerous.  Please tell us in more detail what you did.  How did

Page 42873

 1     you conduct your investigation?

 2        A.   Well, simply, through talks with people who held the highest

 3     positions in the service of the military security -- well, not to go

 4     further --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovac, please tell us in concrete terms.  You

 6     asked some -- whose -- somebody to have a word with somebody in the

 7     military.  Could you tell us who they were?

 8        A.   Well, no.  I mean, among other things, I directly spoke to these

 9     people from the military, but I would not say now who they were.  I can

10     tell you what kind of things I learned --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  No.  If necessary, we may go into

12     private session to protect the privacy or identity of the person who

13     talked to you, but I'd like to know the real names who you talked to.

14        A.   That we talked to about that situation; is that it?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Who did you talk to, to know the situation, in the

16     military?  You said you investigated, probably you need some -- you must

17     have needed an interview or talk, whatever, in whatever form.  So who did

18     you talk to at the time when you conducted that secret operative

19     investigation?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If -- if you wish to have closed

21     session, say so.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the best thing would be to

23     move into closed session then, and then we will ...

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I see no problem.  We'll go into private

25     session briefly.

Page 42874

 1                           [Private session]

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 42875











11  Pages 42875-42877 redacted.  Private session.















Page 42878

 1                           [Open session]

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             I see the time.  We'll try to finish in five minutes.

 5             Yes, could you repeat what you said about Mr. Mladic's state at

 6     the time, in brief terms.

 7        A.   Well, the statement was, with regard to the mentioned persons,

 8     that from the death of his daughter onwards, Mladic was in a state that

 9     seemed schizophrenic at certain moments.  He was a man who had these mood

10     swings and his capacity was diminished then in his attitude towards

11     events and people.  Ljubomir Beara knew that and how, and he very

12     skillfully manipulated in these events, manipulated Mladic.  And at the

13     moment of one of these states of his and when he was not at certain

14     places, then he gave statements that Mladic had ordered him -- I mean,

15     this is a reference to executions.  He manipulated quickly and issued

16     orders on Mladic's behalf, although I did not find any concrete direct

17     orders issued by Mladic to him.

18             So this entire process of organisation and speed -- because all

19     of this happened within the course of a day.  I must say that I was

20     surprised at the speed.  The bus left -- I mean, it's not that I knew it

21     at the moment, but I investigated this later on.  The buses went in one

22     direction towards the barracks and then they were redirected to another

23     direction and they came to a place where the pits had already been dug.

24     I must say that I was surprised.  I was surprised as far as that is

25     concerned.

Page 42879

 1             But the co-ordination of Beara, I mean parallel co-ordination of

 2     preparation and execution, this decision was made during the day and he

 3     co-ordinated the commission of that crime.  Beara was a man who had very

 4     strong authority from the previous -- from the previous position he held,

 5     everything that he did.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Now I come to my final question.

 7             Upon the request of Jovica Stanisic from -- in Serbia, you

 8     initiated a secret operative investigation and you talked to certain

 9     individuals and you found out what happened.  So this is my question:  So

10     as a -- if you could establish what happened in the capacity of minister

11     of interior MUP, Mr. Karadzic, on the part of Mr. Karadzic, it must have

12     been much easier for him to find out what happened?  If minister could

13     have found out what happened, Karadzic -- Mr. President should have done

14     it much easier.  That's my question.

15        A.   No.  The president cannot do without us.  The president cannot do

16     without us, the organs of investigation.  We are his eyes and ears.  He

17     cannot find out without us knowing.  Without the organs of the military

18     security and the civilian security, he cannot find out.  The ones from

19     the military security, of course they were the perpetrators and they

20     closed the circle.  We from the Ministry of the Interior were not in

21     charge.  We moved slowly with the gathering of information, and if you

22     analyse everything I did during the war, I certainly --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kovac --

24        A.   -- would have completed that --

25             JUDGE KWON:  -- he could have asked you to find out what

Page 42880

 1     happened?

 2        A.   Well, it's not that he could have asked.  It was my duty to do

 3     that and -- well, you know, not to report to him -- there are these

 4     references to reporting here all the time.  The most important things,

 5     revealing, discovering the causes, the facts, everything, everything that

 6     has to do with what happened, full discovery of what had happened, that

 7     was my aim, and he certainly would have received all of that from me, in

 8     a serious form and already prepared.  I mean, the organ of the police,

 9     the -- would have been prepared to react to that newly created situation.

10     I knew specifically during the war what it meant when such things are put

11     on the table before the state organs, what one had to be prepared for.

12     Again, I repeat that demilitarisation was very important for us.

13             And you keep mentioning Stanisic.  Maybe I should explain this to

14     you, the preparation of Dayton.  Stanisic was the man who was in charge

15     of preparing Dayton.  I worked with Stanisic for international

16     institutions for releasing the members of UNPROFOR.  On the other hand,

17     people already knew that it wasn't Karadzic that was going to Dayton but

18     that Milosevic was going, heading the delegation.  So Milosevic headed

19     the Serb delegation for the preparation of Dayton, so certainly he needed

20     information.  At that moment, the problem of Srebrenica cropped up.  Now,

21     whether there was an organised criminal enterprise, where the order came

22     from, who the perpetrators were, how grave this was, and to what extent

23     was all of Serbia involved, that is to say, the country, the government,

24     that is why that was very important.

25             I went into this investigation, to find out, to clarify, who the

Page 42881

 1     exact perpetrators were, not to have the entire Serbian people charged

 2     with this.  So that was one of the requests put forth to me for this

 3     operative investigation, and no one could have done that at the time

 4     except for me or have contact with these persons except -- I mean, the

 5     persons I mentioned a moment ago.  And to have that kind of relationship

 6     so that these persons could and would talk to me that way.  I think that

 7     the situation is clear to you now with regard to this entire event and

 8     this entire investigation.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED:  May I -- would dare, [Interpretation] would dare

11     talk, that is not reflected in the transcript, would dare talk to.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I think that concludes your evidence,

13     Mr. Kovac.  On behalf of the Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your

14     coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go, but we'll rise

15     all together.

16             We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 20 past.

17             I thank you, Mr. Lazarevic, for your assistance.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.49 a.m.

19                           [The witness withdrew]

20                           [The witness entered court]

21                           --- On resuming at 11.26 a.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Could the witness make the solemn declaration.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

24     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

25                           WITNESS:  MILE DMICIC

Page 42882

 1                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Dmicic.  Please be seated and make

 3     yourself comfortable.

 4             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Professor.

 8        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   A reminder to both of us, we should make a short pause between

10     questions and answers so that everything is recorded properly.

11             Could you tell us, did you give a statement to my Defence team?

12        A.   Yes, Mr. President.  I have given a statement and, if I may --

13        Q.   We'll come to that.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we call up in e-court

15     1D09360.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Do you see that statement before you, is that the one?

18        A.   Yes, Mr. President.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Just make a longer pause, please.  Have you read the

20     statement and signed it?

21        A.   I've read and signed it.

22        Q.   Is there anything that was not recorded correctly that you would

23     like to change?

24        A.   In paragraph 9, it has to do with the terminology and the word

25     "killing."  Here it says "killings," and we were actually talking about

Page 42883

 1     two murders.  We were talking about the events in Srebrenica.  So, if

 2     possible, I should like these two words to be replaced by the word

 3     "events."

 4        Q.   I believe the problem is in the Serbian version?

 5        A.   Yes, the Serbian version.

 6        Q.   In English I can't see it.  I will read to you the English

 7     version so that our official interpreters interpret it.

 8             [In English] "I recall two of my meetings with President Karadzic

 9     during the period of July 1995, as reflected in President Karadzic's

10     appointment book.  On 10th of July, together with General Subotic,

11     between 13.45 and 14.20, and on 17th of July, between 8.30 and 8.55

12     [sic], when I spoke with him privately."

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we received -- could we

14     look at -- in the English version it's missing and in the Serbian version

15     "killings" are mentioned.  We should see another version, 1D49000.

16     That's the signed Serbian version.

17             [In English] English should say the same, but ...

18             [Interpretation] Could we take a look at the last page to see if

19     this is the signed version and then we'll come back to --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  This version is different from what

21     you -- we saw earlier on; correct?  So this is the most recent one?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Obviously the old version

23     containing errors had been uploaded and this is the latest version.  We

24     just need to see the last page.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I was just wondering whether I have an

Page 42884

 1     old version.  Very well.  It -- let's continue.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Is this your signature, Professor?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 2 now to see

 7     paragraph 9 and how it reads in this signed version.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   In this version, too, the Serbian version differs from the

10     English one.  What would you like to change here in paragraph 9?

11        A.   The topic of discussion were the events or the developments in

12     Srebrenica.  The rest of the text is consistent with this word.

13        Q.   Could you now dictate this --

14             JUDGE KWON:  No, just -- I'm not sure.  Mr. Karadzic, could you

15     ask -- deal with this matter with the witness live.  I don't know what he

16     is talking about.  So could you lead live in -- with respect to this part

17     later on.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Apart from this paragraph, Professor Dmicic, does the statement

21     faithfully reflect what you have stated to the Defence team?

22        A.   It does.

23        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to ask you now the same questions, would

24     your answers be the same as in this statement?

25        A.   My answers would be identical to the same questions.

Page 42885

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this statement be admitted

 3     with the exception of paragraph 9 which we will deal with live?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  But paragraph 9 is related to the --

 5     all paragraphs following it.  So I would like you to deal with the

 6     witness live what was discussed at those two meetings.

 7             Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             So what is admitted as the 92 ter statement?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Could you ask the witness first before you introduce

13     the remainder of his testimony in the form of summary?  Why don't you

14     just start asking the question.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             Could we remove this statement from the screens.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Professor, could you tell us how many meetings we had in

19     July 1995 and what we discussed?  First of all, explain how these

20     meetings were possible?  Where were your headquarters and how often did

21     we meet, on what occasions?

22        A.   As head of your office, chef de cabinet - and I noted in my

23     statement that the office consisted of two parts, the civilian and the

24     military one - my encounters with the president took place as required by

25     me or by him in my capacity as chief of office.  My meetings with the

Page 42886

 1     president related to affairs which were in the purview of the office.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember when we met around mid-June 1995,

 3     what was the reason for these meetings and what was discussed there?

 4        A.   Two meetings took place on the 10th and on the 17th --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, just a second.

 6             Mr. Karadzic asked about meetings in mid-June.  Is it mid-July?

 7             THE ACCUSED:  July, July.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             Then please continue, Mr. Dmicic.

10             THE ACCUSED:  Pronunciation in our language, "Jun," "Jul," is

11     very similar.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Yes, Professor, please continue.

15        A.   Both times the issues had to do with activities regarding reports

16     about events in Srebrenica and the preparation or, more precisely, my

17     participation in the legal and technical drafting of documents that

18     needed to be drafted at the president's office during those days.

19        Q.   At those meetings, did we have at our disposal any information

20     about crimes and did we discuss crimes, the two of us, or anyone else in

21     our presence?

22        A.   At that time, we did not have in our possession any written

23     reports about the events in Srebrenica, nor did we discuss issues that

24     revolved around the military events in Srebrenica.  I must emphasise that

25     I headed the civilian part of the office, and my purview had to do only

Page 42887

 1     with civilian affairs, that is, the functioning of the executive

 2     authorities, the judiciary, and the legislative powers as opposed to the

 3     military part of the cabinet.  The military side of events happened in

 4     line with what the president always insisted on.  He wanted a strict

 5     observance of the law and the rule of law and such.

 6        Q.   How did you come to serve in my office?  What were the

 7     requirements for that job?  Why did we invite you for an interview?  What

 8     was your previous experience?

 9        A.   Before joining the office of President Karadzic, I spent almost

10     ten years doing various jobs at the Presidency of the then-Socialist

11     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I served as advisor, chief of office of

12     the then-president, deputy general-secretary, and for a while I was

13     acting general-secretary.  At that time, I followed closely the

14     developments in our political life.  I was very familiar with the

15     personality and the work of the president as an intellectual, a literary

16     man, a physician, a very committed man in those difficult times for the

17     Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I held in special esteem everything that

18     in his work spoke to his commitment, his fairness, his commitment to

19     justice and law, his communicative and constructive approach, his

20     visionary approach to the solution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis.

21             I'll mention just a few events from those years.  We were on a

22     quest for a new legal and constitutional model for Bosnia-Herzegovina

23     because it was already clear that the Yugoslav Federation was going to

24     break up.  He maintained a very constructive dialogue with members and

25     representatives of other republics and parties.  A quest was going on for

Page 42888

 1     a solution to the issue of referendum because the referendum was the

 2     trigger for the tragedies that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And

 3     finally, he was in dialogue with representatives of international

 4     organisations and institutions.

 5             Simply, he had a passion for the truth, a passion for the search

 6     for solutions, with a very strong awareness that an error in a serious

 7     matter could sometimes be worse than a crime.  His openness and his

 8     multi-lateral view of all issues led to high-quality solutions, and what

 9     I felt at the time, as a lawyer and an activist with long experience and

10     a long-serving employee of the state authorities and state agencies, gave

11     me a guarantee that his was the right road for preserving the identity

12     and the autochthonous nature of not only the Serbian but all the other

13     peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And taking a synthetic view, a solution

14     that would enable Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain a part of Yugoslavia,

15     while allowing the Serb people and all the others who accepted the Serb

16     people to live together in Republika Srpska or, alternatively, that the

17     Serbian people take a separate way out.  Those were the challenges that

18     we were facing at the beginning --

19             JUDGE KWON:  We can fairly stop here.  The question was how come

20     you served Mr. Karadzic?

21             For saving time, could we go back to the statement?  Can we

22     upload them, both versions, in B/C/S and in English?  Para 9.

23             We want to check the veracity of English translation in this

24     statement.  So could you kindly read out slowly paragraph 9 of your

25     statement.

Page 42889

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "As for the killings of people from

 2     Srebrenica, I can confirm that I remember two of my meetings with

 3     President Karadzic from this period.  The killings of people in

 4     Srebrenica, namely:  On the 10th of July, 1995, together with

 5     General Subotic from 13.45 hours until 14.20 hours, as well as on the

 6     17th of July, 1995, from 18.30 hours until 18.55 hours, when I talked to

 7     him privately."

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Pack, with the witness's explanation about the

 9     correction and the evidence led live so far, we can safely admit his

10     statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter?  Do you have any objections?

11             MS. PACK:  No, I don't, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objection with respect to any

13     associated exhibits?  One item, 1D9362, which was referred to in

14     paragraph 9 -- 18, does not form an inseparable and indispensable part in

15     the view of the Chamber.  Do you have any objection to the remaining two?

16             MS. PACK:  No, I don't, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll receive the statement as well as two

18     associated exhibits.

19             Shall we assign the numbers now?

20             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 1D49000 get the Exhibit Number

21     D3977; the 65 ter number 1D09360 receives the Exhibit Number D3978; and

22     the 65 ter number 1D09362 receives the Exhibit Number D3979.  Thank you,

23     Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  I said 1D9362 will not be admitted, so what we are

25     admitting is 61 and 63.  So that will be corrected accordingly.

Page 42890

 1             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Professor, just to complete this answer to a limited question,

 5     does that mean that you were a chef de cabinet and the general-secretary

 6     and the deputy of the general-secretary in the Presidency of

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina even before the multi-party elections?

 8        A.   That is correct, Mr. President.  I had been that for several

 9     years, between 1984 up until 1992.

10        Q.   Thank you.  After the elections --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic --

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   -- did the SDS --

14             JUDGE KWON:  You can first introduce the summary of his evidence

15     for the benefit of the public, because we admitted his statement pursuant

16     to Rule 92 ter.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  I will

18     now read the statement, or rather, the summary of Professor Dmicic's

19     statement.  I will read it in English.

20             [In English] Mile Dmicic served as chef de cabinet to the

21     president of Republika Srpska from the end of 1993 until after the

22     Dayton Agreement.  He also served as the secretary-general to the

23     president of the Republika Srpska from 1994.  He is presently a

24     constitutional law professor at the University of Banja Luka.

25             During July 1995 he was working in President Karadzic's cabinet.

Page 42891

 1     He recalls that on 10th of July, 1995, he met President Karadzic together

 2     with General Subotic.  During this meeting, President Karadzic informed

 3     them that the combat operations around Srebrenica continued with a view

 4     to completely demilitarising Srebrenica and ordered them to prepare a

 5     decision proclaiming a state of war in the municipality of

 6     Srebrenica-Skelani, which they did.

 7             He had another meeting with President Karadzic on

 8     17th of July, 1995.  During this meeting, they discussed a declaration

 9     signed by Miroslav Deronjic and the representative of the Muslim civilian

10     authorities of the Srebrenica that indicated that the evacuation of the

11     population had been carried out properly.

12             Professor Dmicic also saw President Karadzic on numerous other

13     times during July 1995 and could see him without having an appointment.

14     He never heard any discussion about the execution of prisoners from

15     Srebrenica in July 1995.  He never heard President Karadzic saying

16     anything that would indicate that he was informed about the execution of

17     prisoners.  He never saw anything in any document received by the

18     president in July 1995 that would point to the execution of prisoners

19     from Srebrenica.

20             Mr. Dmicic worked closely with President Karadzic for more than

21     two years.  He knows that President Karadzic would never have been in

22     favour of executing prisoners under any circumstances.  He regarded

23     President Karadzic as a very humane person and someone who cared for

24     people of all religious beliefs and ethnic backgrounds.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42892

 1        Q.   If I can, I would just like to complete by asking whether after

 2     the multi-party elections the SDS requested that someone else be in your

 3     position or was it requested from you to become a member of the SDS?

 4        A.   Mr. President, you selected your associates, including myself, in

 5     accordance with the principle of quality and experience - that was your

 6     choice - also loyalty to general interest, I would say.  You never

 7     requested me, even though someone may have exerted pressure on you, to

 8     become a member of either the Serbian Democratic Party or to sign any

 9     sort of special personal declarations.  That by itself confirms that the

10     attitude, to you, and the general interest was based on a belief which I

11     shared with you as a lawyer.

12        Q.   Thank you, Professor.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Dmicic, as you have noted, the most part of

15     your evidence was admitted in writing, that is, through your written

16     statement, in lieu of your oral testimony.  And now you'll be

17     cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.  Do

18     you understand that?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Pack.

21             MS. PACK:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22                           Cross-examination by Ms. Pack:

23        Q.   Mr. Dmicic, I want to clarify another position which you held

24     prior to serving as head of office for Dr. Karadzic.  You were appointed

25     to the SDS regionalisation staff in September 1991; is that right?

Page 42893

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3        A.   Just, if I may provide a short commentary.  This organisational,

 4     or rather, actional form was tasked with gaining certain insights into

 5     the organisation and life, the social standing, certain processes, not

 6     only among the Serbian population but in those parts of

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the local communities, in which the Serbian

 8     population was predominant.  Considering that for several previous years

 9     before the period that you are talking about, some negative processes had

10     begun in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So the issue was to contribute to a good,

11     high-quality, and legalistic resolution of the situation in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina because those forms of the local organisation of

13     population were not established by the constitution.  It was a pro-active

14     approach, care for the people and the law, regardless of the political,

15     religious, or any other affiliations.  It was all done in a completely

16     peaceful atmosphere.

17        Q.   Fine.  We'll just deal with this quickly.

18             MS. PACK:  Can we have 65 ter 25531, please.  Can we go to

19     page 2, please, in both the English and B/C/S.

20        Q.   Just so we're all clear, this is the decision on the appointment

21     of the regionalisation staff, and I'll just read under the heading 1:

22             "The Staff for monitoring the implementation of the Decision on

23     the proclamation of autonomous regions as inseparable parts of the

24     federal state of federative Yugoslavia and constituent parts of the

25     federal unit of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on the removal of

Page 42894

 1     populated places from one municipality and their inclusion in the

 2     formation of another municipality, is hereby appointed ..."

 3             And then you're listed as one of the members; is that right?

 4        A.   Yes, it's --

 5        Q.   Thank you --

 6        A.   -- true that I was a member, but --

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             MS. PACK:  Can we admit that, please?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  But what, Mr. Dmicic?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wanted to say that this was just

11     a form of response or reaction to the processes that had been initiated

12     by teams coming from the other two ethnicities.  All the members of these

13     boards were employees of the republican organs, that is to say, the state

14     administration organs, government organs.  None of them went out into the

15     field, none of them directly met, none of them produced any documents,

16     none of them established any organisational or other forms.  This

17     actually lasted but briefly.  As far as I remember, it was very brief.

18     This is actually a reflection of the processes which had been going on

19     since the beginning of the 1990s in the Yugoslav Federation, and then

20     also a reflection of the processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  One really

21     needs to be well-versed in the history of the state of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23             Let me just say this:  Not in the last 500 years since the

24     disappearance of the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina which existed in the

25     Middle Ages, these three ethnicities did not have the same position,

Page 42895

 1     either historically or ethnically or regionally or culturally.  They did

 2     not have unity in any of these aspects, a unity on which they could

 3     firmly rely in order to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s.  So

 4     therefore, our -- we strove towards preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That

 5     was the primary task, to preserve it and to have it remain in the

 6     Yugoslav state.  And in the Yugoslav state there were two --

 7             MS. PACK:

 8        Q.   That's -- that's enough, thank you.

 9        A.   -- ethnicities that were dominant, the Serbs and the Bosniaks,

10     judging by the figures from that period --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Please be brief in answering questions as much as

12     possible in the future.

13             THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

14             MS. PACK:  Could I have that document admitted?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  This document receives Exhibit Number P6484,

17     Your Honours.

18             MS. PACK:

19        Q.   We'll go to July 1995, please.  Now you refer in your statement

20     to a statement signed on the 17th of July by Deronjic, Nesib Mandzic and

21     Franken, an UNPROFOR representative.  You're aware, aren't you, that a

22     supposed agreement articulated in this statement wasn't genuine, was it?

23     It in no way reflected, did it, the reality, the reality for the Muslim

24     civilian population in Potocari, which had no alternative but to leave;

25     right?

Page 42896

 1        A.   Madam Prosecutor, I don't know about this nor did I have any

 2     information.

 3        Q.   Well, this is what the UNPROFOR representative who signed the

 4     statement, Franken, this is what he said about it.  I'm just going to

 5     read it rather than ask for it to be shown.  He said this:

 6             "The part of the document stating that the population can remain

 7     in the enclave or evacuate is nonsense because they did not have a

 8     realistic opportunity to stay or to move in any direction.  These people

 9     didn't have a choice.  Staying in a small area with no means to survive

10     controlled by the Serbs, being afraid and lethargic as they were, that is

11     not a choice.  It was ordered that they should go to the Kladanj area.

12     It was not a decision by the representatives but an order of Mladic to go

13     to the area of Kladanj."

14             That's in his statement, P04175, at paragraph 105.

15             Now, this declaration --

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we just clarify with the

17     witness whether this was written in the document, did Franken write this

18     in the document --

19             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, Mr. Karadzic, do not intervene in such a

20     way.  Ms. Pack made it clear that this is part of his testimony.

21             MS. PACK:  Thank you.

22        Q.   This declaration signed on the 17th of July was created to

23     disseminate the lie that the Muslim population had left the enclave

24     voluntarily, wasn't it?

25        A.   That's what you say.  I as a lawyer believe a signed and a

Page 42897

 1     certified document to be a public document.  So anyone, including myself

 2     who had the occasion to see the document, I couldn't doubt its validity.

 3     The statements given after the signing and the announcement, public

 4     announcement of this document, can be the subject of a different sort of

 5     inspection but not of -- a subject of a question directed at me.

 6        Q.   You agree, don't you, Mr. Dmicic, that the civilian population in

 7     Potocari had no alternative but to leave, they had no food, no shelter,

 8     they were scared.  You agree that that was the reality, don't you?

 9        A.   I cannot answer this question because I had no information about

10     that aspect of life in Republika Srpska and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I dealt

11     with completely different issues.

12        Q.   No information?  You are aware that by the 17th of July

13     international news media were reporting, weren't they, that thousands of

14     terrified people had been deported from Srebrenica and that men of

15     fighting age had been taken away for screening by 17th July; you're aware

16     of those reports?

17        A.   Everyone who was watching or listening to the media could notice

18     that that was not just reporting an information, but in terms of the

19     Serbian people in Republika Srpska it was propaganda.  And I suppose,

20     though I cannot claim, I did not do any research about this, the

21     propaganda has quite a different purpose.  It was difficult for everyone

22     in Bosnia-Herzegovina; however, life was not so stark, as you put it.

23        Q.   I'm not talking about supposed Muslim propaganda; I'm talking

24     about international news reporting.  You're aware of press reports in the

25     British newspaper, "The Independent," by a journalist called Robert

Page 42898

 1     Block, on the 14th through the 17th of July and a number of days

 2     thereafter, you're aware of that reporting?

 3        A.   No, I'm not aware of these reports, but looking at the wider

 4     picture we could not hear good news or, to be more specific, objective,

 5     truthful, and proper information that would relate to the people I

 6     belonged to, practically throughout the tragic conflict that existed in

 7     the region.

 8        Q.   Robert Block wrote a report on the 14th of July, just prior -- in

 9     the days prior to this declaration that you've referred to in your

10     statement, and I'll quote what he says.  It's P04396.  He says:

11             "International resolve over Bosnia came under renewed pressure

12     yesterday with reports of new atrocities against Muslim refugees as the

13     Bosnian Serbs deported thousands of terrified people from the Srebrenica

14     enclave in the biggest ethnic cleansing operation of the war," he wrote.

15     And then he said later:

16             "Men of fighting age had been taken away by the Bosnian Serbs for

17     what they said was screening."  This is on the 14th of July.  You didn't

18     hear any of these sorts of reports?

19        A.   No, I didn't hear.  Part of the cabinet staff was also an advisor

20     for public relations or relations with the media.  I did not hear about

21     this.

22        Q.   Well, let's look at your role as head of office and

23     secretary-general.  You told us this morning that you were concerned with

24     civilian as opposed to military affairs.  Your role as head of office

25     included, did it, organising meetings for the president, receiving

Page 42899

 1     visitors, reviewing the mail, preparing responses to mail; is that right?

 2        A.   Yes, it had to do with issues from the civilian life of

 3     Republika Srpska, and I was primarily focused on the constitutional

 4     organs of Republika Srpska.

 5             But just for a moment I will go back to supplement what I said in

 6     one of my previous answers.  The enclave and the demilitarisation of

 7     Srebrenica was supposed to be carried out in two days.  The enclave had

 8     existed for practically two years and several months.  It was the

 9     obligation of the international community to carry out the

10     demilitarisation.  In view of the duties that I was charged with, there

11     was no need for me to remember and I cannot remember the wider context

12     that you are directing my attention to.

13        Q.   Well, you've told us your responsibilities, civilian affairs as

14     opposed to Subotic's area, which was military affairs, and you've agreed

15     with me, haven't you, that you opened mail, reviewed mail, prepared

16     responses for the president; right?

17        A.   Yes, but that is mail within the life of the republic, within the

18     civilian activity of the organs and institutions of Republika Srpska, not

19     the military mail.  If you meant reports, that was not within my purview,

20     within the duties I had on the basis of instructions issued by the

21     president of the republic.  I repeat once again, the office also had

22     advisors for certain activities and I confirm that for the activities

23     that you have just asked me about.

24        Q.   Yes, well, I want to ask you about mail, not military mail.  You

25     would have been aware, wouldn't you, of the letter sent to Dr. Karadzic

Page 42900

 1     by Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,

 2     on the 24th of July, 1995.

 3             MS. PACK:  And can we have it up?  It's P06396.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I did not know about that.

 5     That question can be addressed directly to the advisor for international

 6     relations, for public opinion and so on, and you already had an

 7     opportunity of speaking to him in this very place.

 8             MS. PACK:  Could we have page 3, please, of this document.

 9        Q.   Now, you were head of the office, right, so you would have opened

10     mail, reviewed it, when it came into the office?

11        A.   I agree with you that in peace time it would look that way.  We

12     worked 24 hours, people say even more than 24 hours.  For almost three

13     years I could not be on duty and awake for 24 hours a day.  Nature did

14     not bestow that gift upon me, so I have nothing to say in relation to

15     that letter.

16        Q.   You haven't had a chance to look at it yet.  Perhaps familiarise

17     yourself with it and see if you remember it.  24th of July, 1995.  It's

18     in English, I'm afraid.  Can you understand English?

19        A.   No.

20        Q.   I'll read it to you.

21        A.   I don't remember.

22        Q.   I'll read it to you if you're unable to read it.  It says:

23             "Dear Sir,

24             "I would like to express my deepest concern regarding the recent

25     events in the Srebrenica area which resulted in the forced displacement

Page 42901

 1     of some 40.000 individuals.  It has been reported that as a result of

 2     these events, several thousand individuals are unaccounted for, and there

 3     is fear that many of these have other been killed or detained."

 4             And then it goes on in the last paragraph:

 5             "I would therefore appreciate your co-operation in allowing the

 6     field staff of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights to assess the

 7     human rights situation ..." et cetera.

 8             And then it says:

 9             "... in particular by granting access to those who have been

10     detained during the recent events."

11             Signed by the special rapporteur.  You were aware, weren't you,

12     of July 1995, 24th July 1995, of this letter, this letter to Dr. Karadzic

13     stating that thousands had been forcibly displaced, several thousand or

14     unaccounted for, feared dead?

15        A.   Looking at the text of the letter, I can just conclude that this

16     letter was addressed personally to the president of the republic.

17     Letters addressed this way on envelopes went to the president of the

18     republic directly, perhaps not all of them, depending on the situation.

19     As I've already said, that was not peace time.  Life was a lot more

20     dynamic, a lot more difficult, and a lot more tempestuous than is

21     normally the case.  I really cannot remember even the appearance, let

22     alone anything else.

23        Q.   So your evidence is then that this wouldn't have gone through you

24     to the president; it would have gone directly to him?

25        A.   I can just make an assumption, but I cannot give an answer to

Page 42902

 1     that who gave this.

 2        Q.   You don't deny, do you, the truth of the international reports,

 3     reporting as early as July 1995 that mass executions of Muslim men took

 4     place after the fall of Srebrenica?  You don't deny the truth of those

 5     reports, do you?

 6        A.   I would like you to tell me even more specifically what your

 7     question directed to me actually is.

 8        Q.   You don't deny, sitting here today, do you, Mr. Dmicic, that many

 9     thousands of Muslim men were executed following the fall of Srebrenica by

10     Bosnian Serb armed forces?  You don't deny that?

11        A.   I have no knowledge about that.  At that time I had no knowledge

12     about that, especially at that time.

13        Q.   Gordan Milinic and other of the --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  The question was:  Sitting here

15     today whether you know or not.  You said at that time you had no

16     knowledge.  And now do you deny that many thousands of Muslims were

17     executed?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Even today I don't have any

19     knowledge about that, that I would - as a valid document - take into

20     account as my conviction in terms of what had happened at the time.

21     Independently who -- even if this is the rapporteur of the

22     United Nations, everyone submits reports to those who had actually given

23     instructions to them.

24             MS. PACK:

25        Q.   I'm not asking about then.  I'm now asking you about now, today,

Page 42903

 1     and whether today you accept the truth of the matter, the truth that

 2     thousands of Muslim men were executed following the fall of Srebrenica?

 3        A.   I don't have any knowledge and I cannot accept that.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We have a lot of trouble

 5     hearing the witness.  Could he please be asked to come closer to the

 6     microphone and could all other microphones please be switched off.  Thank

 7     you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Dmicic, could you come closer to the microphone

 9     so that the interpreters can hear you better.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MS. PACK:

12        Q.   Another of Dr. Karadzic's advisors testified here a few months

13     ago and said that the Srebrenica graveyard was a farce, the whole thing

14     was a set-up.  Is that your position too?

15        A.   To a considerable part, yes.  Certainly it is hard to speak about

16     the tragedy of that area at the time with feelings, especially the

17     history of memory in the Balkans is very tragic and dismal.  In recent

18     history, likewise.

19        Q.   I want to ask --

20        A.   But --

21             JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers] -- yes, please continue.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No one is investigating or

23     recording who is being buried in those areas or some other areas.  It is

24     hard to have insight into that, but of course, we have compassion for the

25     tragedy of each and every individual, not only members of a particular

Page 42904

 1     ethnic or religious group in Bosnia-Herzegovina or elsewhere.

 2             MS. PACK:  I'd like to ask about one more document, and that is

 3     P02288.  It's a letter from Mr. Akashi to Dr. Karadzic, dated the

 4     14th of August, 1995.  And it's the second page in English and the

 5     third page in B/C/S.  There's a B/C/S version.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Before you put that question.

 7             A minute ago you said, when asked about the execution of Muslim

 8     men, you said you didn't have any knowledge.  "I don't have any knowledge

 9     and I cannot accept that."  And then you said you felt compassion and

10     then you said about tragedy.  Not knowing what happened, how can you say

11     it was a tragedy?  Can you assist us?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I need to clarify myself, it

13     would be sufficient to see anyone's grave or any graveyard in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina that came into being during these tragic conflicts and

15     to have, therefore, an identical attitude like the one I referred to in

16     my statement.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Pack.

18             MS. PACK:

19        Q.   Well, if you're asking for graveyards, you're aware of this

20     letter to Karadzic dated the 12th of August, 1995.  First paragraph I'm

21     referring to where it says this -- refers to the UN Security Council

22     Resolution of the 10th of August, 1995, and it says:

23             Deep concern, and I'm paraphrasing, at the fact that many of the

24     former inhabitants of Srebrenica are not accounted for, "I'm equally

25     concerned at these reports, especially at the allegation of the existence

Page 42905

 1     of a mass grave identified by the Government of the United States ..."

 2             This is a letter which would have come across your desk of which

 3     you would have been aware, you would have been aware of its contents,

 4     right, August 1995?

 5        A.   No.  Such letters were never on my desk.  There was an advisor

 6     for this field.  An expression of deep concern is the initial sentence in

 7     most of the communications coming from the international community.  Mass

 8     graves in such a small area like the enclave of Srebrenica would cover

 9     practically the entire urban area or the area of the enclave.  You should

10     take into account the size of the enclave in these conditions; that is to

11     say, mass graves could only be -- experiencing all of Bosnia-Herzegovina

12     and Republika Srpska where graves and graveyards are scattered about but

13     of members of all the ethnic communities.  I have no information about

14     the letter that you are referring to.

15        Q.   Well, you're well aware, aren't you, that the Republika Srpska

16     government wrote its own report, set up a commission which carried out

17     its own investigation into the events in Srebrenica in 2004 which

18     concluded, didn't it, that between the 10th and 19th July 1995, several

19     thousands of Bosniaks were liquidated and that the perpetrators among the

20     others -- among others undertook measures to cover-up the crime by

21     relocating the bodies.  I'm paraphrasing a bit, but that's what it

22     concluded.  You know about that report, don't you?

23             MR. ROBINSON:  May we have the reference for that, please?

24             MS. PACK:  Yes.  P06220.  It's not notified but I hadn't planned

25     to bring it up.

Page 42906

 1        Q.   You're aware of those conclusions, aren't you, RS commission?

 2        A.   I know about the work of that commission from the media.  I did

 3     not have an opportunity, and in 2004 I was not in that position to have

 4     that document be made available to me.  I cannot speak about a positive

 5     or a negative attitude, particularly not to say anything about the number

 6     of victims.  But, however, you have to follow in continuity what happened

 7     in the discussions about that report after 2004.  I am not going to

 8     assert anything, but I'm going to present my point of view.  The truth

 9     about the validity of this document cannot be considered a historical

10     fact.

11             MS. PACK:  I've no further questions.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

13             THE ACCUSED:  Very few, Excellency.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Please go on.

15                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Professor, can we start with the most recent

17     matter, this document, the discussions that took place later.  Can you

18     tell us whether this report is uncontested and in which conditions the

19     government signed it?

20        A.   We are talking about knowledge coming from the media.  In the

21     public opinion it is believed that this was done under pressure.  That is

22     why I'm saying, though not claiming full capacity for my statement, that

23     this is still a document that, if I could say, from a procedural point of

24     view, is yet to be proven.  We have read a great many facts, heard many

25     facts, and commented upon many facts.

Page 42907

 1        Q.   Thank you.  What kind of pressure is this under which this report

 2     was made?

 3        A.   The pressure was identified in the public as having come from

 4     some international organisations and associations, but, I repeat, this

 5     number has not -- is not something that I heard from any source in any

 6     structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the government included.  In actual

 7     fact, it would be less than the number referred to in that book.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  These pressures at the time -- well, what kind of

 9     danger were those who admitted this document exposed to?  Were there any

10     sanctions at the time?

11        A.   Sorry, Mr. President.  Precisely in the spirit of what you said,

12     threats of the then-president of the republic and further on.  In the

13     public it was believed that a certain report had to be arrived at.  I

14     don't have much information about that, but I accept your assessment as

15     earmarking the situation concerning that document.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned the president of the republic.  Was any

17     president of the republic dismissed in some way?

18             MS. PACK:  That's a leading question --

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] One was on the 7th of March --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second.

21             Yes, Ms. Pack.

22             MS. PACK:  These are leading questions, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes --

24             MS. PACK:  Another one.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Leading and -- he's just saying he heard from the

Page 42908

 1     public.  I'm not sure whether it has any probative value at all.

 2             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   A moment ago, on page 68, Akashi's letter was shown, the letter

 6     he sent me, and you said that it had not been on your desk.  Can you

 7     remember where you were and where I was at the time when this letter

 8     arrived?  Do you have any recollection of that?  So from the

 9     10th of August onwards.

10        A.   I cannot remember, but my absence could have taken place in

11     Banja Luka only.  That is to say, although I first spoke about myself, I

12     can assume that that was the time of this joint stay in Banja Luka and in

13     that area.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have P4424 -- or 42, and

15     then the 8th of August, that entry.  I'll tell you in a handwritten part

16     it is --

17             MR. ROBINSON:  2242, P2242.

18             THE ACCUSED:  I was convinced that I said the correct number.

19             [Interpretation] Yes, just a moment, please.  Could we please

20     have the entry for the 8th of August.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can you tell us what this means, that at Sokolac, at 2.00,

23     gynaecology operation, technical means, you have both pages.  We can move

24     on to the 10th of August.  So the 8th and 9th, Sokolac and Srbinje.

25        A.   [No interpretation].

Page 42909

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the

 2     witness.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now, the

 4     10th of August.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber what it says for the 10th and

 7     11th of August?

 8        A.   I cannot see anything.

 9        Q.   You see where the cursor is.  Where are we?

10        A.   Ah, Krajina, yes.  That's the Krajina period.  That is Banja Luka

11     and that part of Republika Srpska.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, could we leaf through up

13     until the 18th or 19th of August.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   What does this mean, this empty space for the 16th and 17th?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page now.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That means your absence from the

18     seat of the Presidency in Pale.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   When did we first appear at the office?

21        A.   It's only a few days later.

22        Q.   The 19th?

23        A.   It is the 19th, yes.  The 18th is empty.  It's the calendar

24     that's empty, and then the 19th.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Today, on page 60-something, it was suggested to you

Page 42910

 1     that civilians from Srebrenica were forced to leave and Mazowiecki was

 2     quoted there.  Do you know what kind of reputation Mr. Mazowiecki enjoyed

 3     among our people, to what extent he could be trusted?  If you don't know,

 4     then we'll just move on.

 5        A.   He was not really trusted in terms of facts.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at D3401.  D3401.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This is a telegram from Ambassador Akashi to Mr. Annan, who was

 9     then under-secretary, not yet Secretary-General.  I'll read out

10     paragraph 2 in English:

11             [In English] "Paragraph 5 should take account of the fact that,

12     according to UNHCR, a great majority of the residents of Srebrenica do

13     not wish to remain there.  They are already displaced persons from

14     elsewhere and will wish to move on."

15             [Interpretation] According to your peripheral view of these

16     things, is this comment by Akashi more consistent with the real situation

17     as opposed to Mazowiecki's assertion that these people had been forced

18     out?

19        A.   Mr. Akashi's words reflect the situation more realistically, but

20     speaking of this term, an overwhelming majority or great majority, we

21     have to bear in mind the total population of that enclave.  That number

22     was not as large as it was presented.  That's at least what I think.  I

23     cannot claim anything for certain and I don't know the exact number.

24        Q.   On page 61, you mentioned that the president had an advisor for

25     the media, a media advisor.  Can you tell us his name?

Page 42911

 1        A.   It's Mr. Jovan Zametica, who, in addition to dealing with

 2     international co-operation and relations, talks and receptions, also

 3     covered the media because he is a connoisseur of that area.

 4        Q.   And the last topic:  You are a professor of constitutional law.

 5     Could you tell the Chamber, from the legal point of view, were there any

 6     constitutional possibilities for the creation of new municipalities, for

 7     moving one local commune from one municipality to another, and what was

 8     allowed or not at the time when regionalisation plans were being made by

 9     all three ethnic groups?

10             MS. PACK:  Objection.  This doesn't arise from my cross and I

11     don't see why the legal opinion of this witness is relevant.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Agreed.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I'm just laying

14     the groundwork for showing a document from the international community

15     from that time.  If I don't need to do this, then could we place on the

16     ELMO because I don't believe it's in e-court, I didn't know it would come

17     up, could we put this document on the ELMO.

18             Could we see the top of the page first.  It's a monitoring

19     activity of the European Community Monitoring Mission.  [In English] The

20     very top.  [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Could we see the passage in the box now.

22             MS. PACK:  Your Honour, just before Dr. Karadzic proceeds to

23     question on this section of the document which I can just -- I've just

24     skimmed, I really don't see how it's relevant to the issues with which

25     this witness dealt either in cross or in direct, but certainly it doesn't

Page 42912

 1     arise out of any of my cross-examination.  Just looking at what -- the

 2     portion which has been marked.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not relevant to the content of P6484,

 4     regionalisation staff?  I'm -- not knowing the document, I have no clue.

 5             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I shall respond, Your Excellencies.

 7     You are right because the Prosecution suggested that Professor Dmicic had

 8     been caught-out in some party activity, otherwise why would I have put

 9     that document forth --

10             MS. PACK:  Can I just ask that -- something to be dealt with in

11     private session --

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- those are people who worked on

13     behalf of political parties --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Please, please don't overlap.

15             Yes, Ms. Pack.

16             MS. PACK:  It's a private session matter, if I might just quickly

17     ask to go into private session.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             MS. PACK:  Could we --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

21                           [Private session]

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 42913











11  Page 42913 redacted.  Private session.















Page 42914

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9                           [Open session]

10                           --- On resuming at 1.48 p.m.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, before we continue, our Registrar has something

12     to announce for the record.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  For the transcript record, I would like to note

14     that we were in open session at the moment when we took the break at

15     12.44 [sic].  Thank you, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             Could we show the redacted version of this document,

19     65 ter 25592.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   While we're waiting, Professor, were there any constitutional

22     possibilities for internal reorganisation of municipalities or the

23     formation even of associations of municipalities and the movement of

24     local communes to whatever ethnic community they belonged?

25        A.   In the constitutional system as established in 1974, that is to

Page 42915

 1     say, the last Yugoslav constitution, municipalities were able to

 2     associate themselves along the lines of self-management or to form

 3     associations.  The first type was voluntary and the second one was

 4     firmer.  They would form associations for economic reasons and interests

 5     and to develop certain industries, et cetera.

 6             Later on, in the period when regional communities were formed,

 7     precisely that model was used because in Bosnia-Herzegovina there were

 8     22 such regional associations of municipalities and they were established

 9     on the basis of so-called self-management agreements and socio-economic

10     agreements based on joint interests.  However, when we in the republic

11     realised that it was not necessary because the system of operation of

12     these communities has reached such a level of development, that system of

13     regional organising was abolished because it was no longer necessary.

14     Because its first purpose was to provide us mutual assistance and

15     protection, all those things that were destroyed with the dissolution of

16     Yugoslavia.  And to repeat, that was a legitimate way of solving some

17     common issues on smaller territories through organisation and association

18     within the regional system.

19        Q.   Thank you.  I will now read the part in the box in this document

20     of 17 December 1991.

21             [In English] "The team today visited the village of Dobretic,

22     4.800 Croatian inhabitants, within the Serbian-dominated municipality of

23     Skender Vakuf.

24             "... the President of HDZ and the president of the local

25     community expressed the wish to leave the municipality of Skender Vakuf

Page 42916

 1     and join either the municipalities of Jajce or Travnik, or be an

 2     independent municipality.

 3             "The Mayor and Assembly of Skender Vakuf have no objections

 4     against this plan.

 5             "The necessary procedures will be started up in the next months."

 6             [Interpretation] Is this action, this expression of Dobretic's

 7     will to change its status legitimate and was it legitimate on the part of

 8     Skender Vakuf to give its consent?

 9             MS. PACK:  Objection.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, how does it arise from the line of

11     cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, in my

13     understanding, the Prosecution has tried to suggest that

14     Professor Dmicic, who at that time served as the deputy general-secretary

15     of our common state --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speaker slow down, please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you repeat.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In its cross-examination, the

19     Prosecution showed a list of experts and civil servants nominated by the

20     SDS, suggesting that they worked on the regionalisation and they

21     suggested that Professor was engaged in party work, and we see from the

22     indictment that the work on the territorial reorganisation of Bosnia is

23     held against me.  This document shows that even before the war it was

24     both allowed and widely accepted that local communes changed their

25     affiliation to municipalities.  This group of experts, although nominated

Page 42917

 1     by the SDS, was not necessarily a party organisation of the SDS.  It

 2     consisted of people who occupied positions of authority throughout

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 4             And here, Your Excellencies, I want to show that this could be

 5     done and was done in peace time without any mention of war.

 6             MS. PACK:  Your Honours, I still don't see why the legal

 7     opinion --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  The content of the appointment decision contains the

 9     passage like removal of populated places from one municipalities and

10     their inclusion and et cetera.  We'll allow the question to -- and this

11     is your last question.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is, Your Honours.

13             That is precisely the case, one local commune from a Serbian

14     municipality wants to move to another municipality and the Serbian

15     municipality does not oppose it.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just put your question.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Professor, according to all you know about our constitutional

19     system, was this activity lawful and legitimate before the war and

20     without any war?

21        A.   Transfers of local communes from one municipality to another was

22     completely lawful and legitimate.  Under those circumstances, all that

23     was sought were not only possibilities for the system to function, but

24     also to better meet local interests.  It was done throughout

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina and it is still being done today.  But we have to note

Page 42918

 1     that decision-making about reorganisation in one municipality was up to

 2     the local population.  They made these decisions, and at the level of the

 3     municipality the decision was up to the local Assembly.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Professor, for coming here to testify and thank you

 5     for your co-operation at that time.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 7     document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we go into private session briefly.

 9                           [Private session]

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22                           [Open session]

23             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this as the next Defence exhibit.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  This document receives the Exhibit Number D3980,

Page 42919

 1     Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 3             That concludes your evidence, Mr. Dmicic.  Thank you for your

 4     coming to The Hague to give it.  You are free to go.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6                           [The witness withdrew]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So next witness is Mr. Toholj?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 9                           [The witness entered court]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Could the witness make the solemn declaration.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

12     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13                           WITNESS:  MIROSLAV TOHOLJ

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Toholj.  Please be seated and make

16     yourself comfortable.

17             Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Toholj, I must draw your

18     attention to a certain rule of procedure and evidence that we have here

19     at this Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E).  Under this rule, you may object

20     to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or even

21     from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate you in

22     a criminal offence.  In this context, "incriminate" means saying

23     something that would -- that might amount to an admission of guilt for a

24     criminal offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you

25     might have committed a criminal offence.  However, should you think that

Page 42920

 1     answer -- an answer might incriminate you and, as a consequence, you

 2     refuse to answer the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has

 3     the power to compel you to answer the question.  But in that situation,

 4     the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony compelled under such

 5     circumstances would not be used in any case that might be laid against

 6     you for any offence, save and except the offence of giving false

 7     testimony.

 8             Do you understand that what I have just told you, Mr. Toholj?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Toholj.

15        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

16        Q.   I have to ask you to leave a short pause between questions and

17     answers so that the interpreters have enough time.  Have you given a

18     statement to my Defence team?

19        A.   Yes, I have.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask to call up in e-court

22     1D9756.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Can you see this statement you've given on the screen?

25        A.   Yes, I can.

Page 42921

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed the statement?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   We are still going a bit too fast.  Leave a pause between

 4     question and answer.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show the last page

 6     so the witness can identify his signature.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Is this your signature?

 9        A.   Yes, it is.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             Does this statement faithfully reflect what you have stated to my

12     Defence team?

13        A.   Yes, it does.

14        Q.   If I were to put to you the same questions here today, would your

15     answers be essentially the same as recorded in this statement?

16        A.   They would be essentially the same.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this 92 ter statement.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Any objections?

20             MS. PACK:  No objection, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE KWON:  1D10303, is it being tendered, Mr. Robinson?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Where is it referred to?  It says paragraph 72, but

24     I can't find the passage.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  I also don't see it in paragraph 72.

Page 42922

 1             THE ACCUSED:  I see one -- which one?  Ah -- no, I see 1D26037.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that document was separately requested and

 3     tendered.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  You don't need to admit it, Mr. President.  If I

 5     find it, we'll lead it live.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just bear with me a moment.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Until then, if I may inform the witness that several paragraphs,

 9     in accordance with the rules of the Chamber, have been redacted because

10     they were not necessary, just so that you're not confused by this.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is acceptable for the Defence

12     too.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE KWON:  And with respect to 65 ter 11104, you're tendering

15     in its entirety, para -- referred to 65, paragraph 65?

16             And the Prosecution has no objection?

17             MS. PACK:  I've no objection, but it seems that the document to

18     which the witness is referring is at pages 3 to 5 of that uploaded

19     document.  But I have no objection to the other decision.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Where do you find 3 to 5?

21             MS. PACK:  Well, it's just in the upload, the document to which

22     the witness is referring is at pages 3 to 5 of e-court, that's simply my

23     observation, this is in reference to the decree 11104.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             MS. PACK:  I have no objection to that document being admitted --

Page 42923

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just -- shall we upload that document?

 2             Ms. Pack, could you repeat what you said?  The witness was

 3     referring to only certain page numbers?

 4             MS. PACK:  Well, he hasn't referred to page numbers but -- in his

 5     statement, of course.  But in e-court, the document, the decree to which

 6     he's referring appears in e-court at pages 3 to 5 of the English and --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 8             MS. PACK:  So that was my only observation in relation to that.

 9     I do have observations in relation to others of the documents which will

10     be tendered.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, looking at the 68 pages uploaded in

12     e-court, I think the pages 3 through 5 is all that's necessary and we can

13     remove the other pages.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for that clarification.

15             Yes, Ms. Pack.

16             MS. PACK:  In relation to the other documents, I would object to

17     the admission of ID 10302 and 10301 and 10300, and the reason why -- the

18     first one is concerned, 02, it's irrelevant and there's insufficient

19     foundation laid in the relevant paragraph, 27, of the statement, in my

20     submission.  Similarly, 10301, there's no translation yet available.  The

21     document itself appearing on e-court is illegible, and I would also add

22     that the article itself doesn't need to be admitted.  There is

23     insufficient foundation laid in paragraph 25 of the statement.  The same

24     applies for 10300.  There is a translation.  It is legible, but I would

25     oppose its admission for the same reasons I opposed the admission of the

Page 42924

 1     prior document.  And as Your Honour as stated, 10303 isn't referred to in

 2     the statement at all.  Those are my observations.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Let's not spend more time here.  If the Defence is

 4     minded to tender those documents, I would like Mr. Karadzic to deal with

 5     them live.  Otherwise, all the other associated exhibits will be admitted

 6     into evidence and assigned exhibit numbers in due course by the

 7     Registrar.

 8             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             I shall now read in English a short summary of

11     Mr. Miroslav Toholj's statement.

12             [In English] Miroslav Toholj was the editor of "Javnost," the

13     weekly journal of the SDS.  On July the 12th, 1991, he was elected to the

14     Main Board and then to the Executive Board of the SDS, and in

15     August 1990, he became vice-president of the Council for Inter-Party

16     Co-operation at the SDS.  In mid-June 1992, he was appointed director of

17     the centre for investigating war crimes against the Serbs.  In February

18     1993, he became minister of information in the Republika Srpska

19     government and, in October 1996, he was elected deputy at the RS National

20     Assembly.

21             In 1990, after the introduction of multi-party elections in

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SDA party was established by the Muslim

23     intellectuals gathered around Alija Izetbegovic; then-philosophy

24     Professor Muhamed Filipovic; Omer Behmen; Fikret Abdic; and

25     Adil Zulfikarpasic.  Dr. Zulfikarpasic and Dr. Filipovic soon distanced

Page 42925

 1     themselves from the party.  In the meantime, the HDZ was formed.

 2             After the first multi-party elections and the convincing victory

 3     of national parties, Islamisation of society became a constant strategic

 4     goal for the SDA.  The situation in the media became disastrous, and the

 5     Serbian people suffered the greatest damage as a result of the unbalanced

 6     editorial policy --

 7             MS. PACK:  Your Honour, I do hesitate to interrupt when

 8     Dr. Karadzic is reading the summary, but I make the observation that the

 9     summary appears to be of the previously unredact -- the unredacted

10     version of the statement.  That's my only observation.  It's -- as I was

11     listening to it, I heard reference to some of the portions of the

12     statement that are not in evidence.

13             THE ACCUSED:  Maybe we have missed to follow the redaction -- to

14     implement it on the summary, and I appreciate this warning and I would

15     accept any warning.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Pack.

17             Please continue.

18             THE ACCUSED:  As a reaction to Muslim propaganda, the newspaper

19     "Javnost" was launched and eminent Serbian intellectuals initiated the

20     revival of the Serbian cultural and educational society.

21             Realising the danger from the growing distance between the Serbs

22     and the Muslims, the SDS proposed that the institution of the Chamber of

23     People be established before the elections, so that all the crucial

24     matters in BH would be resolved by consensus, which was rejected by the

25     Muslims.  This institution was later introduced in a certain sense by the

Page 42926

 1     Dayton Peace Agreement, which shows that the Serbian request was deeply

 2     justified.  In July 1991, the Serbian political leadership made political

 3     contact with Dr. Zulfikarpasic for the establishment of a broad

 4     coalition.  Unfortunately, the Serbian-Muslim historic agreement was soon

 5     rejected by Mr. Izetbegovic.

 6             The inter-ethnic gap was becoming deeper and deeper, and the

 7     out-voting of the Serbian deputies in the parliament and some

 8     municipalities was regular practice.  In such circumstances, in late

 9     October 1991, the SDS deputies and the other Serbian deputies left the

10     common parliament and established the Assembly of the Serbian people in

11     BH, which nevertheless insisted on the multi-ethnic principle.  The

12     inter-ethnic split culminated on October the 14th, 1991, when the

13     Croatian and the Muslim deputies, disregarding the will of the Serbian

14     deputies, adopted a decision proclaiming the sovereignty of BH.  In

15     response, the Assembly of the Serbian People in BH decided to conduct a

16     national plebiscite, at which the majority of the voters rejected the

17     constitutional change of the republic.

18             The very establishment of the SDS was an expression of the

19     exciting fear -- existing fear from -- among people that what happened

20     from -- in Second World War might happen again.  Before the establishment

21     of the VRS in May 1992, Serbian towns and villages surrounded by

22     non-Serbian population started forming Crisis Staffs of the kind that

23     both Croats and Muslims had been establishing prior to that.

24             Dr. Karadzic never tried to influence Mr. Toholj's work as the

25     editor of the "Javnost" or as the minister of information.  The

Page 42927

 1     Republika Srpska government was taken aback by the news that Srebrenica

 2     had been freed.  At that time, Miroslav Toholj was at the Vatican where,

 3     even before the completion of the military operation, everyone was

 4     already talking about the horrible crimes committed in Srebrenica.  This

 5     media campaign had clearly been prepared in advance.  In July 1995,

 6     Mr. Toholj had contacts with Dr. Karadzic and he did not have the

 7     impression that Dr. Karadzic was aware of any violation of the customs of

 8     war and humanitarian law happening in and around Srebrenica.

 9             And that is a short summary.  I don't have questions for

10     Mr. Toholj at that moment.  I will skip to deal with documents that are

11     excluded.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Toholj, as you understood, your evidence in

13     chief was admitted in writing, that is, through your written statement,

14     in lieu of your oral testimony.  Now you will be cross-examined by the

15     representative of the Office of the Prosecutor, Ms. Pack.

16             MS. PACK:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, did we give the exhibit number for the

18     statement?  Let's do that now, only the statement.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 1D9756 receives

20     Exhibit Number D3981, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             Yes, Ms. Pack, please continue.

23             MS. PACK:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24                           Cross-examination by Ms. Pack:

25        Q.   Mr. Toholj, as a result of the various positions you held during

Page 42928

 1     the war and prior, you were closely involved with the Bosnian Serb

 2     leadership in disseminating propaganda and controlling the RS media; is

 3     that correct?

 4        A.   It is correct that I was closely involved with part of the

 5     Bosnian Serb leadership and the leadership of the Serbs in

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I was not involved in disseminating propaganda,

 7     but rather in informing.

 8        Q.   Well, let's break it down.  On the 13th of September, 1990, you

 9     were appointed by Dr. Karadzic as editor-in-chief of "Javnost"; right?

10        A.   No.  In September 1990, a group of people who were later to

11     become members of the advisory council, the inter-party advisory council,

12     embittered by the conduct of the state-run media or what they had been up

13     until that point, initiated the printing of a daily newspaper which would

14     be published in the Cyrillic script for the first time since the

15     Second World War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and which would also reflect the

16     Serbian positions.  This group of people proposed me as the

17     editor-in-chief.

18             MS. PACK:  Can we have 65 ter 15087, please.

19        Q.   Now, this is a decision of the SDS BH Main Board, and if you --

20             MS. PACK:  Can we have the English and the B/C/S up, please.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  There isn't an English in e-court that we can see.

22             MS. PACK:  My apologies.  Let me just consult with a colleague.

23                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

24             MS. PACK:

25        Q.   Perhaps just look at page 2 of the B/C/S and you can see the

Page 42929

 1     signature of Dr. Karadzic and the stamp.  You can confirm that?  Yes.

 2             MS. PACK:  We'll go back to page 1 in the B/C/S and I am

 3     expecting the English to be uploaded.

 4        Q.   And perhaps while we're waiting for the translation, you've

 5     obviously got the B/C/S in front of you, so you can see and confirm that

 6     this is a decision to launch "Javnost," yes?  And it's dated the

 7     13th of September, 1990?

 8        A.   I can see that, but I see that this is the decision of the

 9     Main Board and the Main Board had around 40 or 50 members, and the

10     decision is signed by the president of the party, Dr. Karadzic.

11        Q.   Yes --

12        A.   This is the decision of the Main Board and those who initiated

13     the founding of this newspaper were sitting in the Main Board.

14             MS. PACK:  I understand it's been uploaded now, the translation.

15     Apologies for that.

16        Q.   There we see in the plain words of the text "decision to launch

17     Javnost," and we see signed at the bottom and just to draw your attention

18     to the second paragraph:

19             "The SDS BH ... shall be the founder and publisher of Javnost,"

20     you can see that.

21             "Funds for the publication of Javnost shall be ensured from the

22     party's special-purpose fund, donations, marketing, and sales of the

23     paper ..." et cetera.

24             This is the decision by which the newspaper was launched; right?

25        A.   Yes, that's correct, because each newspaper has its founder.

Page 42930

 1     Here the founder of the weekly "Javnost" is the Main Board of the

 2     Serbian Democratic Party.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And your bottom paragraph identified:

 4             "The editor-in-chief of Javnost shall be the writer

 5     Miroslav Toholj ..."

 6             THE ACCUSED:  Next page in Serbian.

 7             MS. PACK:  My apologies and thank you to Dr. Karadzic.  It's the

 8     following page in Serbian.

 9        Q.   You can see the last paragraph, penultimate paragraph, yes?

10        A.   I can see that.

11             MS. PACK:  I'd ask for this document to be admitted, please.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  The 65 ter number 15087 is -- receives the

14     Exhibit Number P06485.  Thank you, Your Honours.

15             MS. PACK:

16        Q.   You were also appointed as president of the SDS Commission for

17     Information and Propaganda, weren't you, on 9th of September, 1991?

18             MS. PACK:  Can we have 65 ter 25553 up, please.

19        Q.   Can you answer my question, do you agree with that?

20        A.   Yes, just please let me have a look at this document.  No, that's

21     not a document that I have in Serbian.

22             MS. PACK:  Page 2, please, in the English and can we have in the

23     B/C/S also page 2.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see it.

25             MS. PACK:

Page 42931

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And here is the decision on the appointment of the

 2     Commission for Information and Propaganda, and you can see there under

 3     the list of names, you're on the commission and then it says:

 4             "We appoint herewith Miroslav Toholj the President of the

 5     Commission for Information and Propaganda," and then we see signed by

 6     Dukic, who is the SDS president of the Executive Board.  Does that all

 7     accord with your recollection?

 8        A.   Yes, it corresponds with my statement too, not only my

 9     recollection.

10        Q.   And you were again, weren't you --

11             MS. PACK:  Could I have that admitted, please, just that page?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  This document receives Exhibit Number 6486,

14     Your Honours.

15             MS. PACK:

16        Q.   In 1993, as a member of the SDS Executive Committee, you were

17     again placed in charge of information and propaganda, weren't you?

18        A.   In 1992, at the beginning of the war, the work of the

19     Serbian Democratic Party was frozen, and when it started operating again,

20     people who had been in the Main Board and in the commissions earlier were

21     mostly, in most cases if they had survived the first year of the war,

22     were once again in charge of their duties so that I was once again

23     reappointed to this commission.

24        Q.   For information and propaganda?

25        A.   For information and propaganda.

Page 42932

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, the propaganda aims of the Bosnian Serb

 2     leadership included the dissemination of information, designed to provoke

 3     fear and hatred amongst the Bosnian Serb population of Bosnian Croats and

 4     Muslims; isn't that right?

 5        A.   No, but I would like you to show me some information that would

 6     fit into that kind of characterisation.

 7        Q.   Well, one of the means by which you did this was to invoke

 8     alleged crimes, crimes committed against Serbs during World War II; isn't

 9     that correct?

10        A.   It wasn't intended for that purpose.  Simply, you would have to,

11     if you know the history of that part of the Balkans, you would have to

12     know that it was only around 50 years after the Second World War that

13     some facts from that war and the perishing of some peoples during the war

14     were brought to light.  I had had two victims in my family in the

15     Second World War and that was my own grandfather whose bones were placed

16     in our family tomb only then.  So when you characterised the information

17     of what was happening at the time as propaganda, that was the first and

18     last time that we buried my grandfather.  And in the same year they

19     had -- he had been killed by the Croatian Ustashas.  And the same year we

20     also buried an uncle by whom I got my name.  He didn't have a grave and

21     none of our family members were allowed to visit his grave, otherwise we

22     would have been imprisoned by communists in one of the communist prisons.

23     He has been short by the Partizans.

24             So after a long period of silence which was ideologically caused,

25     it was a period when finally some facts began to surface once again.  And

Page 42933

 1     of course we did inform the public about events at various execution

 2     sites where such things did happen during World War II.

 3        Q.   I'm going to show you an example of the sort of public

 4     announcement that the SDS Executive Board issued.

 5             MS. PACK:  65 ter 15085, please.

 6        Q.   You can see on your screen a document that is generated by the

 7     SDS Executive Board stamped similarly -- in similar manner to the

 8     document we saw previously, appointing you as president of the commission

 9     of propaganda.  You can see that; right?

10        A.   Yes, I can see it, but I don't see some of the lines, they are

11     not legible.  And another thing, I don't know who signed this, who wrote

12     it, who issued it.  It was not issued by the Commission for Information

13     and Propaganda --

14        Q.   It's issued by, as I said to you in introducing this document,

15     you can see it's stamped and signed "BiH SDS Executive Board."  It's the

16     same stamp we saw in the previous document by which the commission for

17     propaganda was appointed.  Now, I'm going to read to you the first two

18     paragraphs.  You can see what they say.  This is a public announcement to

19     the Serb people.

20             "Those who want to destroy Yugoslavia are attacking the Serb

21     people at all points and are endangering its existence and territorial

22     unity.

23             "Genocidal hordes attack Serb villages and cities, Serb homes and

24     Serb babies.  They now want to win the already lost Second World War and

25     to reduce the Serb state to its borders from 1914."

Page 42934

 1             This public announcement by the SDS Executive Board, this was

 2     designed, wasn't it, to communicate to the Bosnian Serb population that

 3     they were in jeopardy of genocide at the hands of Bosnian Muslims and

 4     Croats, genocidal hordes; isn't that right?

 5        A.   Well, first of all, I don't know who wrote this document.  I've

 6     never seen it or read it before, and I see that there is a stamp here.

 7     We had a spokesperson within the party who acted independently, we can

 8     put it that way, on behalf of the Executive Board, maybe it was him.

 9     This document, although it was verified, it was never made public.  I

10     mean, I do not remember that it was published in the paper that I edited

11     as the editor-in-chief.  Secondly, the Serb people didn't have to be

12     reminded in this way, or rather, no suggestions had to be made to them in

13     terms of generating fear because the fear was already there among the

14     people.  This could have been taken as a sign that the party that was an

15     expression of the will of the Serb people also understood that full well,

16     that fear, that is.

17        Q.   But it is this document, you would agree with me, wouldn't you,

18     Mr. Toholj, it's invoking the crimes of World War II as a means of

19     engendering fear and hatred of the Muslim and Croat population in the

20     present; isn't that right?

21        A.   Well, I cannot accept that, that thesis of yours, never.  Because

22     the Second World War was still very vivid in the memories of the

23     families.  I've already said that somewhere.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina it so

24     happened that in the same families there were the same victims like the

25     Second World War and this war, the perpetrators were the same,

Page 42935

 1     executioners as we put it in Serbian.  So you cannot remove this major

 2     historical event as the Second World War was from the consciousness of

 3     the people.  That would have been a miracle had someone succeeded in

 4     doing that.

 5             Even the First World War when, again, some unfortunate things

 6     happened in Sarajevo, after the assassination of Sarajevo and so on.  So

 7     these are very important historical events that cannot be forgotten

 8     within a single generation.  The next generation cannot be in a position

 9     not to have any awareness of that and, therefore, not fear.  And

10     especially when things happen when -- that remind them of the

11     Second World War.  You know when the chequer-board flag was chosen as the

12     official flag of Croatia, the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

13     were indeed reminded of the crimes that were committed in the days of the

14     quisling Independent State of Croatia, and the crimes that were committed

15     then were abominable.

16        Q.   Well, even if it's as you say, the crimes of the Second World War

17     were very vivid still in the memories of families, you understand, don't

18     you, Mr. Toholj, you understood at the time, how powerful, how powerful

19     the invocation of those crimes in documentation such as this, in

20     announcements such as this, how powerful an effect -- what a powerful

21     effect that implication had in generating fear and hatred in the civilian

22     population, the Serbian population, of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims?

23        A.   Madam, I have to ask you why and on the basis of what you are

24     ascribing this to me personally or some influence of mine over the person

25     or people who wrote this.  This is not my language.  I never intoned any

Page 42936

 1     of my writings with this type of vocabulary and in this way, and I really

 2     do not see how you link this up with me.

 3             MS. PACK:  I'd like to admit that document, please.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, we don't have any objection to

 5     the admission, although the witness didn't identify it, but I think it's

 6     relevant to -- for the Chamber to have it so that it can understand the

 7     context of some of the comments.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  The document number 15085 receives the

10     Exhibit Number P6487, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             Shall we continue tomorrow?

13             MS. PACK:  Yes.  Thank you, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Toholj, we'll adjourn for today and we'll

15     continue tomorrow morning.  I will advise you not to talk with anybody

16     else about your testimony.  Do you understand that, sir?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.

18             JUDGE KWON:  The hearing is adjourned.

19                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,

20                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 5th day of

21                           November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.