1 Thursday, 7 November 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, there are a couple of matters I
7 would like to deal first. Good morning, everyone, first.
8 The Chamber will first turn back to the accused's "Motion to
9 preclude the questioning of Momcilo Krajisnik on statements made in
10 parliament," filed on the 4th of November. The Chamber notes that,
11 having heard the parties' further oral submissions yesterday, it
12 considers it important to give its position on the motion prior to the
13 start of Mr. Krajisnik's testimony. The Chamber considers that the
14 accused has failed to demonstrate in the motion and the further oral
15 submissions that while immunities and privileges may protect
16 parliamentary statements in domestic jurisdictions, this applies in
17 international criminal proceedings. The Chamber, therefore, denies the
19 Second, Mr. Tieger, while -- although Mr. Nicholls is not with
20 us, I raised with the parties as to the admitting or tendering some parts
21 of witness interviews with Mr. Tomo Kovac. Where are we in terms of that
23 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, Mr. Nicholls sent me that
25 afternoon a list of proposed excerpts. I objected to several of them. I
1 copied the Chamber on my e-mail back to him, indicating which ones I
2 objected to and why, and we haven't had anything since then.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: As the Court impliedly noted, it may be preferable
5 to have Mr. Nicholls join us for this discussion. But I was aware that
6 Mr. Nicholls sent the proposed list to Mr. Robinson virtually
7 immediately. I was also aware that Mr. Robinson had raised certain
8 objections. I reviewed quickly some of those objections which I
9 considered to contravene the practice of this Court and the directions
10 insofar as it appeared that -- and I thought they were also factually
11 inaccurate in that he objected supposedly to material that had been read
12 out even though it had not been read out in full. But more importantly,
13 the practice of this Court to my --
14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I'm sorry to interrupt. Shall we deal
15 with it after the break, first thing after the break?
16 MR. TIEGER: I think that's fine. Thank you, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE KWON: So I would like to deal with it while our memory is
19 Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, could you make the solemn declaration.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
21 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
22 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK
23 [Witness answered through interpreter]
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself
1 Mr. Robinson, the Chamber requested your -- granted your request
2 for Mr. Krajisnik's counsel to be present today. What happened to that?
3 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, Mr. Krajisnik was not among the
4 witnesses for whom we had made that request. Since he's not detained, he
5 falls into the category of people that you previously held are not
6 entitled to have counsel present for their testimony.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I should stand corrected.
8 Mr. Krajisnik, before you commence your evidence, I must let you
9 know about this. You heard that the Chamber denied the motion to
10 preclude the questioning on the statements made in parliament, and I take
11 it you are well aware of this but I'd like to explain about the rule of
12 evidence that we have here at the Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E). Under
13 this rule you may object to answering any question from the accused,
14 Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor, or even from us, the Judges, if you believe
15 that your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence. In this
16 context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an
17 admission of guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that might
18 provide evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.
19 However, should you think that your answer might incriminate you and, as
20 a consequence, you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know
21 that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question.
22 But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony
23 compelled under such circumstances would not be used in any case that
24 might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the offence of
25 giving false testimony.
1 Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr. Krajisnik?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. Thank you.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
6 Good morning, everyone.
7 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.
9 A. Good morning.
10 Q. I cannot avoid these basic initial questions, so please tell us
11 your full name, your father's name, date and place of birth.
12 A. My name is Momcilo Krajisnik, born 22nd January 1945, in Zabrdje
13 near Sarajevo. My father's name is Sretko, mother's name Milka, and I
14 lived in Zabrdje until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after
15 which I lived as a refugee in Pale, which is a small place near Sarajevo.
16 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us, equally concisely, about your
17 education and career.
18 A. I finished primary school, secondary school, and the school of
19 economics, as well as my post-graduate studies in Sarajevo. After
20 graduating from university in 1968, on the 15th of October that year I
21 found a job in a large company called Energoinvest, and in two sections
22 of that company I worked until the end of 1990 when I was elected MP to
23 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was elected Speaker of the
24 Assembly by a majority vote of all parties from all ethnic communities,
25 and stayed in that post until the end. I was actually not occupying that
1 post from the beginning of the war.
2 On the 24th October 1991, I was elected Speaker of the Assembly
3 of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which later changed its name
4 to the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, and I remained in that
5 position until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the end
6 of the war, I was elected member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 from Republika Srpska, and in -- my first term was after the signing of
8 the Dayton Accords. In 1991, my tenure finished and then I engaged in
9 private business. At that time I started my doctoral thesis.
10 However, on the 3rd of April, 2000, I was arrested, sent to the
11 prison in The Hague, where I spent a little more than nine years. And
12 after the final judgement I was transferred to a jail in the UK. In
13 February 2013, by decision of the President of this Tribunal, I was
14 released. But during my stay in prison I worked actively to collect
15 evidence for a review of my judgement, and I'm very grateful to this
16 Chamber as well because they enabled me to get hold of a large number of
17 documents as well as other services, including the OTP, who are my
18 opponent in these proceedings. They also enabled me to get a large
19 number of documents.
20 Now I live as a refugee and I'm waiting to the great day when I
21 will finally hear the words "not guilty." I see the best two Prosecutors
22 in this Tribunal in my mind's eye, Mr. Tieger and Mr. Kremer, raise the
23 white flag.
24 Q. Thank you. Were you at any point president of the Presidency of
1 A. I'm sorry, I know I need to leave a pause. In my two-years'
2 term, although I was one of the three equal members of the Presidency, I
3 was never the president because the decision was that the president may
4 be only a representative of the Muslim people.
5 Q. And what is the practice now?
6 A. The practice now is rotation in the Presidency; however, during
7 my term of office this principle did not apply.
8 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Trial Chamber briefly since when we
9 have known each other, how we met, and the course of our friendship until
10 1990 when the Serbian Democratic Party was established?
11 A. One day, a friend asked me for an explanation as an economist how
12 loans can be obtained and used from banks. I asked: Why? And he said:
13 I have a friend who needs this information because he wants to start a
14 private business. And he didn't understand my explanation well obviously
15 because he's a poet, so he asked me to find some time and explain it
16 directly to his friend and that friend was Dr. Radovan Karadzic. That
17 was my first encounter with you, Mr. Karadzic. And talking to him, I
18 found out that Dr. Karadzic is part of Sarajevo's intellectual elite and
19 I had an interest in these people, but I didn't know them. And through
20 various private encounters and celebrations of our patron saint's day I
21 got to know many of these people in the elite.
22 I spoke to Mr. Karadzic and those other people about topics that
23 were very interesting at the time. Everybody in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
24 into politics at that time. We talked about various topical issues and
25 inter-ethnic relations, et cetera, and we got to know each better. We
1 became closer. Also because in one trial in Bosnia-Herzegovina we were
2 indicted together and chased out. After four and a half years we were
3 acquitted, however. It was a relapse of one policy in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereby political opponents were persecuted and
6 When the process began to organise ourselves politically and set
7 up the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we split briefly because I
8 didn't want to engage in politics. And Dr. Karadzic, too, did not agree
9 to lead a political party. My desire was to help as much as I can from
10 the sidelines, so I was not directly involved in those first early days
11 of the Serbian Democratic Party. I remained an observer. But later I
12 got involved in a peripheral way and it so happens that I was one of the
13 candidates for a member of the Assembly and later I was elected MP.
14 Q. How did you first start as a back-up candidate and how did you
15 find your way into the Assembly eventually?
16 A. The people who knew me believed that, with my approach, I can be
17 of assistance in organising the situation in a rather disorderly
18 municipality where I lived, which is Novi Grad. And after public
19 appearances on radio and television, I went to the Municipal Board, where
20 human relations were very disturbed. I managed to reconcile the parties,
21 and the ratio in the government was 30 per cent Serbs and 70 per cent
22 others. Since I didn't want to be actively involved in politics, I first
23 refused to be a candidate; however, pressure was exerted on me and I
24 found a compromise solution. I suggested that Professor Unkovic be the
25 first candidate and I was the back-up candidate.
1 When our ticket was discussed at the personnel committee, they
2 didn't know him, Professor Unkovic, but they knew me because of some
3 articles that had appeared in newspapers. So I was better known, and
4 eventually I was put on the ticket for the Sarajevo-Romanija region.
5 Five or six candidates were elected first, and in the early stage I was
6 not. Since many parties did not find their way into the parliament, when
7 the remaining votes were split among other parties, I got one of those
8 spots in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 Q. Thank you. How did it come about that you were elected by all
10 parties, by majority votes, Speaker of the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament?
11 A. Well, the answer is very short: I was elected as Krajisnik, a
12 man from Krajina, from Sarajevo. Why? Because one region in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina is called Krajina, and a candidate of the Serbian
14 Democratic Party, candidate for Speaker, was Milan Trbojevic. However,
15 people from Krajina demanded Krajisnik and people from Sarajevo wanted it
16 to be a man from Sarajevo, so it had to be one of the two. And after a
17 very long debate, a solution was still not found, and finally I was
18 elected as a Krajisnik from Sarajevo and that is the only real truth.
19 Q. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber what your last name means so
20 that we can understand what you just said?
21 A. My last name, Krajisnik, originally means a soldier defending the
22 border, which in Serbian is also called "kraj," boundary. At the time of
23 the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, these two great empires kept
24 Serbs on the border who guarded the borders of the empire. And the Serbs
25 who were manning the border as defenders since they were on the edge of
1 the empire, again kraj, edge, border, and my family was one of those,
2 they were named Krajisnik. And I was accepted, approved, by both those
3 who wanted it to be a Krajisnik and those who wanted it to be a man from
4 Sarajevo as a Speaker.
5 Q. Thank you. How did you understand, how did you see, the
6 strategic options of the Serbian Democratic Party and what were the
7 strategic options of other parties before the elections, before we came
8 into power?
9 A. All the parties, except those with a communist orientation,
10 wanted a multi-party system in order to introduce democracy in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because communism had prevailed for a long time and
12 it had many shortcomings and people wanted change. The Serbian
13 Democratic Party of which I was a member and the Party of Democratic
14 Action, SDA, which was a Muslim party, wanted Yugoslavia to continue.
15 And they wanted democracy to be introduced. They wanted a reasonable
16 Federation, and we all worked for Bosnia-Herzegovina to obtain as many
17 privileges and rights as possible because that's where we lived. The
18 Croatian party was HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union, and it was more
19 geared towards the interests of Croats in Croatia than those in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But when it came to our internal inter-party
21 relations, we were rather close to them.
22 Q. Thank you. How did the first democratic elections in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina run and who won seats in the parliament?
24 A. After a long communist rule, the parties were nation-based. At
25 that time there were no nationalist parties. Nation-based parties
1 received maximum support of their ethnic communities. Roughly speaking,
2 all three nation-based parties received an overwhelming majority of the
3 votes from their ethnic bases.
4 Q. How was the first democratic government in Bosnia-Herzegovina
5 formed? Who wanted what and who got what in that joint government?
6 A. Since the main opponent of all these three nation-based parties
7 were the communists, these three parties did not differ much in anything,
8 the HDZ, SDA, and the SDS. So they decided to create a partnership
9 between them, with the main objective of politically restoring the entire
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And senior posts were divided between them. I know
11 when I already became Speaker of the Assembly, the Serbian Democratic
12 Party wanted to achieve an economic revival. It was my dream and it was
13 our policy that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be Switzerland in the Balkans.
14 And on our side, although I did not participate in the negotiations about
15 the division of senior posts, I know that we were supposed to receive
16 security ministries. We wanted the economy, finances, and some other
17 areas that would help us achieve our goals. So we ended up with a
18 parliament which was neutral, whereas executive branches got assigned to
19 the other two parties, the Muslim representative became prime minister --
20 sorry, president of the Presidency; and the Croatian one became prime
22 In the events that followed, we realised it was a great
23 shortcoming that we only got the post of Speaker of the parliament, but
24 we realised that too late. And eventually it led to a deterioration of
25 the situation.
1 Q. Which part of this division of posts do you consider as a
2 shortcoming, as a failure?
3 A. I believe the greatest failure was that the Ministry of the
4 Interior and similar departments were given to the Muslims, to the Muslim
5 side. You have seen, Your Honours, how many intercepts there are,
6 completely unauthorised. I could never have imagined that a Speaker of
7 the Assembly would be kept under surveillance or wire-tapped. I couldn't
8 imagine that they would keep tabs on us if we were not doing it to them.
9 That was the beginning of a conspiracy that began very early on against
10 the Serbian side.
11 Another important department was Territorial Defence and the post
12 of president of the Presidency, although he was primus inter pares, he
13 practically acted as the president of the republic, not one among equals.
14 Q. Thank you. After the government was established, were there any
15 changes in terms of the strategic orientation of the leading three
17 A. What was shocking at the very first parliament session was that
18 the oath was at issue. Simply, I was the parliament Speaker and there
19 was a president of committee where we decided about this, the Chamber of
20 Citizens, where Professor Konjicija was trying throughout one whole day
21 to harmonise the conditions because, conditionally speaking, the Muslims
22 and the Croatians didn't want "Yugoslavia" to be mentioned anywhere in
23 the oath. And eventually the Serbian Democratic Party wanted to avoid a
24 rift at the first parliament session and it eased off, and some sort of
25 compromise was achieved. I can't remember it, but I'm sure that it
1 wasn't accepted in the form that it should have been and as it had been
2 originally proposed.
3 Q. Thank you. As for the text of the hymn, was it regulated by
4 anything, the constitution or the law, and did we violate it -- text of
5 the anthem, we changed the text of this oath once we changed it against
6 the procedure?
7 A. The insistence on the change of the formulation of the oath was
8 completely unlawful, and, Your Honours, it can be most easily seen if you
9 look at the video recording of this very long parliament session when we
10 struggled to find joint solution.
11 Q. Thank you. What did it mean and how did it further develop the
12 attitude of those parties towards a joint state?
13 A. From that moment until the end of the functioning of the
14 parliament before the war, there was continuously a coalition of two
15 against one, so that to be a Speaker of the parliament from the ethnic
16 community against which you had two others was very difficult. It was
17 very difficult to stand this rift because each new parliament session was
18 an attempt to impose the majority of votes on the Serbian MPs.
19 Q. Thank you. After the distribution of positions in the central
20 and peripheral organ, were you in a position as the parliament Speaker to
21 monitor the implementation of inter-party agreements on appointments of
22 people to positions which had been allocated to their respective parties?
23 A. Certainly so, not just I as the parliament Speaker, but any
24 representative of the authorities, even the lowest ones in municipalities
25 were faced with impossibility to implement the partnership agreement
1 about the distribution of positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the
2 highest level to the lowest one in entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I can
3 tell you this from the point of view of the Serbian Democratic Party.
4 You had the right to appoint your staff somewhere. There were continuous
5 obstructions. And just to recall you can see there how many important
6 telephone conversations there were in which it was continuously mentioned
7 how our staff were being obstructed from appointing other staff. Those
8 were personnel from the communist times who transformed as turncoats and
9 they started serving their new masters again.
10 So the SDA accepted them because they would discharge their
11 duties and wouldn't allow such personnel to be removed even though a
12 specific position belonged, according to the agreement, to the
13 Serbian Democratic Party.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik, could you speak a bit slower. Please
15 bear in mind.
16 Yes, please continue.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Can you please tell us what were the main subjects of discussion
20 and the main duties in the parliament, especially taking into account
21 what you just recently said, namely, that at every parliament session
22 there were attempts to out-vote the Serbian people. What were the issues
23 in which the Serbian people were out-voted and what was the most
24 sensitive issue in the parliament life?
25 A. By the end of January 1992, the position of the Muslim Party of
1 Democratic Action and the Serbian side had harmonised their positions,
2 namely, that both sides advocated Yugoslavia, were in favour of
3 Yugoslavia. And if you look at the parliament session held in late
4 January, the president of the Presidency who was involved in the talks
5 between the presidents of the republics of the then-Yugoslavia presented
6 his exposé and he said what we should all be advocating and what was the
7 position of the Party of Democratic Action. The Party of Democratic
8 Action, just like the Serbian Democratic Party then advocated the
9 preservation of Yugoslavia and a rational, reasonable Federation.
10 Mr. Izetbegovic was then applauded by everyone present. From my seat of
11 the parliament Speaker, I could not see whether the HDZ, that is to say,
12 the Croatian MPs, applauded him, but the maximum majority supported this,
13 that the parliament should advocate and that Bosnia-Herzegovina should
14 advocate this reasonable Federation.
15 Only a month later, in the very same room, Mr. Izetbegovic, on
16 behalf of the Muslim side, said that the previous time we had not
17 properly understood him and that he believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina, or
18 rather, that Yugoslavia, let's say, conditionally speaking, should be
19 transformed and that Bosnia-Herzegovina should secede from Yugoslavia.
20 And he then said something that was an astonishing statement, namely,
21 that he would sacrifice peace in order to achieve a sovereign state of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. But no one understood that in a tragic sense then
23 because there were all kinds of statements going around at the time.
24 There was no reaction of the MPs after that nor did I react because I
25 thought that it was something said in order to make a presentation for
1 his voters who would understand him in a specific way. But now from this
2 point of view, as this happened a hundreds times later, it was very
3 problematic actually.
4 Later on, that was a constant topic that was on the parliament's
5 agenda, namely, the destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslim and the
6 Croatian sides were in favour of a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. They
7 were in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina seceding from Yugoslavia in an
8 unconstitutional way. And on the Serbian side, we advocated honouring
9 the constitution and finding a compromise, so that each parliament
10 session was a new stress for me.
11 Q. Thank you. And putting aside what you know today, did you
12 receive any information or data at the time as to whether those words
13 about sacrificing peace were followed by any practical, organisational
15 A. I did receive information that I did not believe, that the
16 Patriotic League was being formed, that paramilitary formations were
17 being established, but as an idealist I believed that this was a matter
18 of exaggerations because, honestly speaking, I did not trust the security
19 people. But later on, reading documents, I could see that precisely at
20 the time when Mr. Izetbegovic stated this, in the book of
21 Mr. Sefer Halilovic, who was at that time the commander of their
22 paramilitary formation, said that at the time he briefed Mr. Izetbegovic
23 and said that he had 200.000 soldiers under arms. And then
24 Mr. Izetbegovic said: No problems. Now I can talk with the Serbian side
25 on an equal footing. Someone had tricked Mr. Izetbegovic into changing
1 his position, and I think that those who tricked him are more to blame
2 than Mr. Izetbegovic himself.
3 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether you and, according to what
4 you knew, whether I also believed that this was really Mr. Izetbegovic's
5 position. Initially you just said that someone pushed him or forced him
6 to change his policy.
7 A. Well, Mr. Karadzic, you had a different role than me. You were a
8 leader of a party which participated in the power. You were a leader of
9 one ethnic group or people, and each time you were reserved and you
10 warned that there could be a transformation, a big change, because it was
11 your duty to warn in this way. Many information that I received, you
12 received too, and you looked at that as the president of the party which
13 had a duty to warn the people against what could happen. And eventually
14 it turned out to be correct later on, so I wasn't right, but we played
15 two different roles. And I understand the role of a leader who had to
16 say something that he wouldn't like to believe would happen, simply as a
17 politician. Everything seemed to point that the SDA policy would change.
18 I still believed that it wouldn't happen, and that was why until the very
19 beginning of the war I remained in the parliament as the Speaker.
20 Q. Thank you. Did it turn out that the information that you
21 received with regard to practical preparations for the war that you
22 didn't believe turned out to be true?
23 A. Unfortunately, it turned out to be completely true.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show in e-court
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. President, can you remind us, please, from which book does
4 this page 95 come?
5 A. I've read this book. It's the book of -- the memoirs of
6 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. I remember this article because during the
7 preparation for my testimony I think I proposed this article as evidence.
8 Q. Thank you. May I then ask you to read out for us the second
9 paragraph about two brave moves, the second and the third paragraphs out
10 aloud, please.
11 A. "However, during the summer," I apologise.
12 "However, during the summer of 1991 we made two brave moves.
13 Firstly, the SDA formed the National Defence Council, from which the
14 Patriotic League would later be formed, and from it, during further
15 development, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was on the 10th June
16 1991, after a rally in the local police centre which was attended by
17 around 400 representatives from all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Yugoslav
18 army was aware of this rally, but it did not react to it, it did not feel
19 strong enough to react. Later on, in talks with the head of the
20 counter-intelligence service in March 1992, I learned that they were
21 aware of this.
22 "The other move was our decision not to send the conscripts from
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina to the JNA. That was in 1991 when the war in Croatia
24 was in full swing. When I heard the disturbing news that
25 General Nikola Uzelac, the commander of the army corps in Banja Luka,
1 mobilised our young men and sent them to the front, I requested from the
2 Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to make the decision
3 that our young men should not respond to the call-ups for mobilisation.
4 This decision was adopted by a majority of votes (the Serbian members of
5 the Presidency voted against it)."
6 Q. Thank you. Could you then tell us whether you concluded that
7 Mr. Izetbegovic himself was aware that this bravery had to do with the
8 unlawful and illegal nature of these moves?
9 A. That's completely true.
10 Q. Thank you. Even though he mentions the 10th of June, 1991, as
11 the date when the Muslims National Defence Council was established, did
12 you learn since when are the years of service counted for the service in
13 the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or membership in the Patriotic League?
14 A. The document exists. I cannot be very precise, but I know that
15 it dates from March or April 1991 or thereabouts.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would ask for this page to be
18 admitted into evidence and we will also attach the title page of the
19 book. Just to be MFI'd until we receive the translation into English.
20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: I don't have any objection, Mr. President, but let
22 me just note, I was slow to get on my feet, that -- just a caution about
23 leading questions such as: "Can you tell us whether you concluded
24 that ..." And then Dr. Karadzic provided an answer to which the witness
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
2 Mr. Karadzic must have noted it.
3 We'll mark it for identification, this excerpt, together with its
4 cover page.
5 THE REGISTRAR: This document receives MFI number D3996,
6 Your Honours.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. What were our intentions with regard to the duties of the
10 parliament? What was the parliament supposed to deal with as its
11 priorities and what did it actually do in fact, in real life, during
12 those first months of 1991, or rather, throughout that year?
13 A. The Serbian side wanted a democratic transformation of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the introduction of a multi-party system. The
15 economic situation that existed at the time should be changed as soon as
16 possible because there was social unrest, a difficult situation, and a
17 war-mongering atmosphere which slowed down the normal course of life. Of
18 course, the Serbian side also wanted for Serbian personnel to participate
19 in power and to assist with improving and changing certain things that
20 were wrong during the communist period, especially that the areas of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina that were rural and economically backward where Serbs
22 lived should be protected in a way and to begin to develop and prosper
23 once again.
24 However, from the very beginning, the parliament, and up until
25 the end of its one-and-a-half-year mandate, only dealt with one problem,
1 and that was the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is to say, whether
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina should secede in an unconstitutional manner or should
3 it remain in Yugoslavia and in what way would the political crisis in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina be resolved.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what you mean when you say "in an
6 unconstitutional way"? What about the question of secession? How is it
7 regulated in the constitution of Yugoslavia and the constitution of
9 A. Both in the constitution of Yugoslavia and in the constitution of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was exactly spelled out how the republics, or
11 rather, the peoples could separate from Yugoslavia and how that could be
12 prevented from happening. The constitution of Yugoslavia had to be
13 respected and the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to
14 protect the peoples - and there were three main ethnic communities, the
15 Serb, Croat, and Muslim communities - then a council for the equality of
16 nations, or something like that, was established and everyone could lodge
17 a complaint with that council. That could be discussed and then that
18 question could be resolved with a two-third majority, only in that way,
19 in that council, and in parliament. That is what had to be observed and
20 that is what the Serbian side insisted upon.
21 Also, two-thirds of the voters were not in favour of secession
22 from Yugoslavia, so the other two sides insisted on somehow avoiding the
23 council for national equality of rights because this was an
24 unconstitutional path. That we were right is demonstrated by the current
25 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is this Chamber of Citizens, if I
1 can put it that way, and Chamber of Nations, and each constituent people
2 had the right of "veto," I say that under quotation marks, if they
3 disagree with a particular matter that threatened the national equality
4 of rights of the three peoples.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether you were aware of the
6 constitutional provisions and who the president of the constitutional
7 commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina was?
8 A. According to the rules of procedure and according to the practice
9 that prevailed until then, the president of the parliament, that is to
10 say, I, was the president of the constitutional commission. And
11 therefore, we had to look into all the unconstitutional ways that were
12 being resorted to to resolve that matter.
13 Q. Thank you. You said a moment ago that in parliament they did not
14 have a two-third majority. What about the Serb side, especially the Serb
15 Democratic Party, and other parties, too, that opposed secession, how
16 many members of parliament did they have in the Assembly of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina out of a total of 240?
18 A. 240 MPs all together in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As
19 for the Assembly of Republika Srpska, 84 separated from that Assembly.
20 So the Serb side had one-third that could dispute anything that was
22 Q. Thank you. We saw here that on the 10th of June, a council for
23 defending Muslims was established. Could you tell us how this affected
24 parliamentary life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, life in general as well, or
25 rather, the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia on secession, how did that
1 affect life in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 A. As soon as secession happened, this automatically spilled over
3 into Bosnia-Herzegovina and that was a very bad thing for peace in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some people felt insecure, others felt buoyed by it,
5 felt that they could take the same path like Slovenia and Croatia. The
6 Serbs were worried, and the Muslims and Croats wanted to follow the road
7 taken by Slovenia and Croatia.
8 Q. Thank you. What about the first attempt in -- made in the
9 Assembly to adopt a declaration on sovereignty? When was this attempt
10 made and how did it fare?
11 A. At the beginning of 1992 -- no, sorry, 1991, after
12 Mr. Izetbegovic's statement that he would sacrifice peace for a sovereign
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was this proposal to adopt the declaration on
14 sovereignty. It came from the Croatian side, as far as I can remember,
15 and it was supported by the Muslim side, and then there was this lengthy
16 debate where arguments for and against were confronted. And finally,
17 according to strict procedure, 20 Serb MPs lodged a complaint - and this
18 was a type of veto - and they invoked the council on the equality of
19 rights of nations. And it was my duty then to conclude the debate and to
20 refer the matter to the council for national equality.
21 Since the sponsors of the bill reacted violently, then I called
22 Avdo Campara, the late Avdo Campara, a Muslim, he spoke and explained
23 this and he said President Krajisnik has the right to do that. That
24 ended the debate. The council then dealt with the issue. We could not
25 agree at the council because they did not want to honour the decision of
1 the council and, quite simply, because the Muslim side opposed that and
2 the Croat side, that question never came back to the Assembly, but
3 procedurally that was necessary, that was a procedural obligation. It
4 was supposed to be sent back to us so that we could express our views in
5 the Assembly and in the council. So this proposal, this declaration, had
6 it got a two-third majority, then it would have been valid. Of course,
7 the Serb side would have had the right to refer the matter to the
8 constitutional court, but these activities never took place because,
9 quite simply, the Muslim side and the Croat side never wanted to go
10 through the constitutional procedure that is envisaged in such cases.
11 Q. Thank you. Do you know what the reaction of the Serb side was in
12 terms of their political moves, what were the political moves made and
13 what were the activities of the Serb side in relation to developments in
14 political life and the efforts made by the other two sides?
15 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, sorry. I was following the question until it
16 broadened out so enormously. If we're still talking about this
17 time-period in early 1991 and that's what Dr. Karadzic is soliciting
18 information about, fair enough. But if this is as broad as he may
19 perhaps inadvertently made it, it needs to be narrowed.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. I agree.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. The end of June 1991, we're still in that period. You have
23 kindly presented the main topics involved and the main contentious
24 issues. Tell us what the main moves of the Serb side were in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina up until the end of June 1991. You told us about the
1 Assembly, but basically, on the ground, you said that they opposed
3 A. The Serb side, and that can be seen from documents, or rather,
4 the leaders or people who held high office in the municipalities and also
5 coming from you directly, the Serb side always appealed for pacification
6 and not to go into conflicts on the ground. People were worried on the
7 ground, there were different reactions, especially after a statement that
8 was made in haste, if you will, by Mr. Izetbegovic. When the declaration
9 was refused, then after the agreement reached between and among the
10 presidents of the republics of Yugoslavia he said in Split: The
11 declaration would be adopted with the Serbs or without the Serbs, it's
12 all the same.
13 There was a tempestuous reaction on the ground; people were
14 alarmed. Paramilitary formations appeared. People were saying that the
15 Muslims were preparing an attack on the Serb Krajina and that they would
16 attack Bosnia and Herzegovina. You will see from the documents - and I
17 remember this - many appeals made by the Main Board and by the president
18 of the party to have the situation calm down and at that time an
19 initiative was launched. I can't remember whether it was the MBO, the
20 Muslim Bosniak Organisation, or whether it was Mr. Karadzic directly, to
21 reach a historical agreement between the Muslims and the Croats, because
22 these two peoples had a lot more in common than the Croats with the other
23 two peoples. So then these activities started with regard to the
24 historical agreement. Then there was a relaxation of tensions. The
25 newspapers and TV stations were reacting to this favourably. People were
1 trying to accommodate each other because they really did want to have
3 During these activities, I had two meetings at Mr. Izetbegovic's
4 office. He was not in charge of that action and it wasn't the SDA, and
5 then there was one meeting in my office. So I know that this was a major
6 positive turn and most of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina reacted to
7 that favourably, irrespective of the ethnic community they belonged to.
8 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. We will go back to that. I would like
9 to ask you to tell us -- you said that there were pressures on the
10 ground. Did the Serb side do anything? And if you remember the
11 community of municipalities, could you please first explain that to us.
12 Were there communities of municipalities? How were they regulated? And
13 how and in which way could they be changed, the composition of the
14 communities of municipalities?
15 A. Communities of municipalities are a constitutional possibility of
16 bringing together municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That existed
17 before the war, in the communist times, and since we still had that
18 constitution in force, then municipalities could be joined in a perfectly
19 lawful manner. Several municipalities could unite several functions at
20 the level of a community of municipalities. It wasn't only economic,
21 although it was primarily economic, economic requirements, if you will,
22 because in communism, in the former system, nobody thought about war or
23 anything like that or uniting on a national or ethnic level. So it was
24 economic parameters that were of primary importance.
25 Q. Thank you. How did you understand the question of the
1 establishment of regions? What was the reason for the regions to be
2 established? In the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what was adopted as
3 a document in relation to these regions?
4 A. At the time, unfortunately, everything in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
5 politics because everybody was disturbed, old men, old women, children,
6 women, everybody, this spectacle of our disagreement was all over the
7 place. However, the regions were established because traditionally
8 certain areas had been neglected in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately,
9 since the Serbs had most of the territory, it was these Serb territories
10 that were neglected the most. We were aware of that problem, and in the
11 former system there was this antagonism between Banja Luka and Sarajevo,
12 there was this antagonism or objections because many ethnic Serb areas
13 were basically being emptied. So what we wanted was to have this
14 programme, if everything would be normal and nobody gave a thought to
15 war, to have balanced development in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 In this balanced development, communities and municipalities
17 would play an important role. So that was the initial reason. Economic
18 links was the first reason, and secondly, this was possible on the basis
19 of the constitution and everything that was derived from all of that and
20 that perhaps assumed a different connotation later, all of that was a
21 result of efforts made to impose solutions on the Serbian people.
22 Q. Thank you. What was the Serb side prepared to do and sacrifice?
23 Do you remember what a concession was on the Serb side in favour of the
24 historic Serb/Muslim agreement? What did the Muslims want in return in
25 order to have this Muslim/Serb agreement come into being?
1 A. The Muslim/Bosniak organisation - it's a smaller political party
2 and these are high-level intellectuals - they wanted to avoid war at all
3 costs just like the Serb side, so then there was this compromise.
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain in Yugoslavia, and automatically the Serb
5 side would give up on regionalisation which made others a bit
6 apprehensive. So our maximum concession was to have a decentralisation
7 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that there should be nothing that would
8 resemble Serb homogenisation. So the concession was for
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain in Yugoslavia but to be a reasonable
10 federation -- a reasonable federation -- rather, Yugoslavia should be a
11 reasonable federation and there should be maximum privileges for
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Serb side would not ask for any kind of
13 regionalisation that would have any kind of political overtones.
14 Q. Thank you. You said a moment ago that it was welcomed with
15 relief or delight - I cannot remember what you said exactly. Could you
16 tell us what the reactions were of the Muslim and the Serb sides to this?
17 A. If you look at the TV footage from the time, and I will remind
18 you of what I know, all citizens could see that on the spot, on the
19 ground, and on television and over the radio too, in companies, in
20 municipalities, there was general delight, celebration, because everybody
21 wanted that to happen, all citizens.
22 Q. Thank you. The Party of Democratic Action, when did they
23 withdraw support to that initiative and how was it experienced at that
24 point of view and how did things develop further?
25 A. I know that, and this was best described by one of the
1 then-participants, Professor Muhamed Filipovic, who said that
2 Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Professor Nikola Koljevic, I think, appeared on
3 television to declare that this historic agreement had been reached. And
4 during the TV programme itself, somebody said to Mr. Zulfikarpasic to
5 come out, and then he was told that the Party of Democratic Action did
6 not support that and that this was a private affair of
7 Mr. Zulfikarpasic's and Mr. Radovan Karadzic's, which was completely
8 incorrect because I took part in these talks at Mr. Izetbegovic's office
9 and he supported that, he gave it a green light, as I did, to continue
10 negotiations and to have this agreement reached.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg the indulgence of the
13 Prosecution because I did not announce this material, but I should like
14 to put on the ELMO this statement made by Mr. Izetbegovic in Split.
15 First, the front page, to see the date, and then the rest of it.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. While we're waiting, Mr. President, did the Assembly impose a ban
18 or adopt another measure concerning these regions?
19 A. I remember the talks that preceded this enactment by the
20 government, because it was the government that made the decision, and the
21 prime minister, Mr. Pelivan, came to see me with his deputy, Mr. Cengic,
22 and in the talks, they told me they will not impose a ban but they will
23 make a recommendation to defuse the tensions. So the government proposed
24 that the establishment of regions be put on hold until the spirits calm
25 down. So they did not say no to the regions, but since the political
1 situation was getting more complicated, it was put on hold, and of
2 course, the effect achieved by this government measure was soon
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we have any problems with the
5 ELMO? Can we switch it on? [In English] So please show the first page
6 to see the date --
7 JUDGE KWON: I don't think the ELMO is working at the moment.
8 Yes, it's now working.
9 It's up to you, Mr. Karadzic, how to use your time, but are you
10 not spending too much time on this historical background? Please
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, that's year 1991.
13 This is not the historical background. This is the peak of the events,
14 preparation for war. [In English] First page, please. Yeah, okay, okay.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can you tell us what is the date and what is the
18 A. It's newspaper "Politika," as far as I can see 30th March 1991, a
20 Q. What is the heading about? It's a report from where?
21 A. It's a report from Split. The heading is: Press conference held
22 by the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics. And the subheading is:
23 Great difference but also -- great differences but also a desire to
24 bridge them.
25 THE ACCUSED: Right corner of the second page.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. May I ask you to read out Izetbegovic's statement.
3 A. [No interpretation]
4 THE ACCUSED: That's okay. That's okay. Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that's precisely the
6 statement I referred to a moment ago. Alija Izetbegovic says:
7 "I will immediately answer the second question. The declaration
8 on sovereignty is already before the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
9 will most probably be endorsed. If it is not endorsed with the consent
10 of the SDS, it will be endorsed without them. At the end of the day,
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign republic and the declaration is just
12 one document. Bosnia does not become sovereign by the virtue of this
13 document. It is a declaration of an already-existing fact."
14 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Karadzic needs to wait for the
15 interpretation to finish before starting his new question.
16 JUDGE KWON: You overlapped with the interpretation. Could you
17 repeat your question.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Were they able to adopt this declaration without the consent of
21 the SDS in terms of the constituent position of the Serbian people and
22 also in terms of the two-third majority rule?
23 A. They could not adopt this without the participation of the
24 Serbian representatives in the parliament, either in theory or in
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could both pages please be admitted
3 into evidence pending the translation of this statement? Or if you
4 believe that what we have on the record is sufficient ...
5 JUDGE KWON: Are you tendering it or not?
6 THE ACCUSED: I am tendering, yeah.
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Obviously I'm not quite sure what else is on those
9 pages, but barring -- and what else is proposed to be translated, but --
10 which I presume is the entirety of what he's tendering, though, the page
11 on which the question and the answer appear and the cover page of the
12 document, then I have no objection particularly to those.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct.
14 MR. TIEGER: But, it will be MFI'd, and as is the case with all
15 of these things, given its - as Dr. Karadzic noted - his late notice and
16 the fact that our ability to examine on this is obviously limited, I will
17 obviously reserve any further comment on this until we see the
19 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark those parts referred to by Mr. Karadzic
20 for identification.
21 THE REGISTRAR: It receives MFI number D3997, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. President, can you remember, what was the reaction of Serbian
25 authorities at the grass-root level to this cancellation of the
1 historical -- the historic, rather, Serbian/Muslim agreement, especially
2 in the Krajina of Banja Luka?
3 A. The reaction was fierce. And the leadership of the Serbian
4 Democratic Party had huge problems because urgent action was needed to
5 unify the two Krajinas, the Serbian and the Bosnian Krajina, and there
6 were major objections voiced to the leadership of the SDS, that their
7 policies were not realistic because the other side does not wish for
9 Q. Thank you. Do you remember when and on what occasion the
10 association of municipalities from the Banja Luka region was proclaimed
11 as the Autonomous Region of Krajina?
12 A. I don't know when it was proclaimed exactly, but I know that it
13 was only towards the end of the year that we finally verified or approved
14 the creation of the regions, including that one, because new political
15 factors had cropped up by that time. It was quite clear that there was
16 no consensus, the declaration was passed by a majority vote, and the
17 request for international recognition was submitted to the European
18 community. So I think it was on the 10th of December that the regions
19 were approved, but even then it was said that if the request for
20 unilateral recognition is not taken back, we would come back to the
21 historic principles, whereby Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within
22 Yugoslavia and the Serbian side would not continue the course towards
23 political regionalisation although it would continue with economic
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, D3997, that "Politika" article we
2 looked at, is already in evidence as D00258.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. And thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: If it is confirmed by the Defence, we'll strike out
6 the marked for identified part, but shall we continue.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Concerning the failure of the historic Muslim/Serbian agreement
9 and the tensions on the ground, what did the Assembly that you presided
10 over do in early September?
11 A. Since the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was being tested to
12 the limit, there were talks within the Assembly. And then in early
13 September, Mr. Izetbegovic proposed the conclusion at one of the sessions
14 that the future arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina be decided by
15 taking into account all proposals at an equal footing without imposing
16 anything on the others and that the final solution for Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina should be found in a democratic and constitutional way. And
18 I believe he proposed that conclusion on the 13th or 14th of September.
19 Q. When you said proposals should be considered on an equal footing,
20 what did that imply?
21 A. Maybe I misinterpreted it, but I meant to say that all proposals
22 for the solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina should be treated equally.
23 We already knew from our talks that we disagree on many things, even
24 every political party had its own vision for Bosnia and Herzegovina. So
25 the idea was that all MPs present their proposals in parliamentary
1 debates, that they all be debated democratically, and that a solution be
2 found after considering all these proposals and after all these debates
3 in keeping with democratic principles and the constitution.
4 Q. Do you remember when the first ideas appeared about the
5 transformation of Bosnia along ethnic lines, based on its ethnic
6 structure, and who voiced these ideas first?
7 A. Since we were constantly in contact with representatives of the
8 other two sides, I myself in the Assembly and others in their
9 departments, I heard from Mr. Izetbegovic and others that the best
10 solution would be to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina. However,
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina is a leopard skin when you see it on an ethnic map.
12 So it should be done by creating three parts in which as few Croats would
13 remain in the Serb and Muslim parts, as few Serbs in the Croat and Muslim
14 parts, et cetera. And Izetbegovic said: Let's try to make a map wherein
15 as few of us would be on your side and as few of you as possible on our
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue. Please try to put a pause as
18 much as possible.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. How did late Mr. Izetbegovic view the possibility of establishing
22 a Serb entity and the possibility that the Serb entity would remain
23 within Yugoslavia and become independent?
24 A. As you can see from his own book and the book of
25 Mr. Sefer Halilovic and the book of Muhamed Filipovic, Mr. Izetbegovic
1 was always in favour of creating a new Bosnia and Herzegovina,
2 transformed, where nobody would impose solutions on others. That was in
3 the early days, because he was a pragmatic politician. If you look at
4 his book, you will see that he says: Late Arafat made this suggestion to
5 me and I fought over this with Sefer Halilovic, and a few years later I
6 described one declaration where he proposed, and Owen and Stoltenberg
7 supported it, proposing that the future Republika Srpska would have the
8 option of organising a referendum within five years to join Serbia.
9 I remember one discussion in 1993, in Geneva, where Izetbegovic
10 and Silajdzic came to see us and said: Give us 33 per cent of Bosnia.
11 Let us create three entities and then you are free to go and join Serbia.
12 This entire policy was conducted, and you will see, Your Honours,
13 the transcripts of the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were
14 thinking about dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a way that each
15 nation would have its sovereignty. That was the policy. I'm not
16 defending Mr. Izetbegovic, but I believe that that was his sincere,
17 honest, policy. However, he had too many people around him who had this
18 idea affixed that Bosnia should be unitarian, that, if necessary, it
19 should be achieved by war, et cetera. And that is the problem. His
20 early idea expressed in the declaration and many other documents and
21 proposals was travestied.
22 THE ACCUSED: Excellencies, I see the time. If you decide for
23 the break.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break for half an hour and resume
25 at 11.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, to save time the Chamber is of the view
4 that it is able to give its ruling without hearing the parties any more
5 about the interviews of Mr. Kovac. Would you like to --
6 MR. TIEGER: I was going to say that we -- Mr. Nicholls, of
7 course, was duly suited up and prepared to come down, but it appeared to
8 us that if we met with Mr. Robinson at the lunch break, we might be able
9 to narrow the range of disagreement, and thereby reduce the number of
10 issues the Court needed to deal with. But if the Court has already made
11 its -- taken its position, there's not much I can say.
12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber was of the view that it tended to agree
13 with Mr. Robinson's observation that those parts that were fully read out
14 and those parts the witness didn't answer are not to be -- were not to be
15 admitted. And -- but if the parties are minded to have further
16 discussion --
17 MR. TIEGER: Well, the --
18 JUDGE KWON: -- the Chamber has no observation.
19 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Thanks. I guess the discussion was, yes, to
20 the extent we may -- we may -- that the -- that there is agreement that
21 where a passage is fully read out and the witness affirms it, the
22 practice has been - and we agree with that - then the documentation is
23 superfluous because the witness has adopted it. On the other hand, where
24 the witness disputes it, then it serves as impeachment; or,
25 alternatively, where the passage is merely paraphrased, then the entirety
1 of the impeachment should come in. Now, whether or not the application
2 of those principles will lead to full agreement by the parties, I won't
3 know until the lunch break.
4 JUDGE KWON: I think that can be dealt with after Mr. Karadzic's
5 examination-in-chief is over. So I would like to hear from the parties
6 at that time.
7 Yes, Mr. Robinson.
8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. With respect to
9 Exhibit D3997, we appreciate the Prosecution bringing to our attention
10 that it was admitted under D259. However, the English version doesn't
11 include the comments by Mr. Izetbegovic, and so if we could submit that
12 for translation and add it to D259, that would be okay.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll do so.
14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. How did these conclusions of the joint Assembly, from the first
18 week or the first third of September 1991, about not imposing a solution
19 accepted by the public and how long did this obligation last, namely,
20 that nothing would be imposed?
21 A. Just like in any similar situation, the people relaxed. The
22 tensions subsided and a general positive feeling reigned. Unfortunately,
23 after only a month another shock followed and a very problematic item was
24 on the agenda, once again a declaration in some other form, and then a
25 rift took place in the parliament.
1 Q. Could you please briefly tell the Chamber what was put on the
2 agenda, how did the session progress in its regular part, and then
3 afterwards to the end?
4 A. On the 10th of October, and then up until the 14th, practically
5 every day the session was in progress or between the sessions, various
6 meetings were held in order to resolve the repeated attempt of the Muslim
7 side to put the declaration on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
8 an unconstitutional way on the agenda in a different form. In these
9 periods between sessions, the positions got closer together in various
10 ways, solutions were adopted, compromises were made, but eventually the
11 situation became the same as it had been in March that same year, that is
12 to say, 1991.
13 After a long and exhausting discussion - and it was exactly the
14 same as when the declaration was rejected - the Serbian deputies from the
15 Serbian Democratic Party and Serbian Renewal Movement once again
16 submitted a request with 20 signatures that this item of the agenda
17 should be delegated to the council for inter-ethnic equality. And then I
18 ended the session. The procedure was the same; however, when I declared
19 that the session was finished and when we left, I actually said that we
20 were going on a break and the session was scheduled for the next Monday
21 and also in hope that there would be certain improvements after that.
22 According to the constitution, the session could not continue in
23 any way after that, but the Muslim/Croatian coalition which had already
24 been in existence waited ten minutes and, contrary to the constitution,
25 the deputy Speaker, who did not have the same powers as myself, continued
1 the session. They adopted the conclusions, a resolution, adopted the
2 documents which now had a different title but they were identical to the
3 declaration for which we had once concluded that it was contrary to the
4 constitution and that it should be dealt with by the inter-ethnic
5 equality council.
6 Q. Thank you. Here in the indictment and in some documents as well,
7 it is stated that the Serbian deputies left or walked out of the session
8 and the Assembly, depending on the document. Did the Serbian deputies
9 leave the joint Assembly or the session?
10 A. No, they didn't leave it or walk out. I ended the session and
11 after that it could not have been continued.
12 Q. Thank you. And did the Serbian deputies leave the joint
14 A. No, they did not join -- they did not leave the joint Assembly or
15 walk out of it. What followed was an invitation, I even scheduled the
16 continuation of the session, but none of the other sides responded to
17 that. Then certain political activities began, the invitations of the
18 Serbian side to rescind the unconstitutional decisions which they
19 believed to be valid and the Serbian side didn't. We wanted to bring our
20 positions closer to one another in order to resolve this difficult
21 political issue.
22 Q. Thank you. What was the next move of the Serbian side after
23 these invitations that the unconstitutional decisions be withdrawn?
24 A. As far as I remember, it was on the 17th or on the
25 19th of October. The Serbian side sent a public invitation, both to the
1 population and to the other sides, to rescind the decisions, and unless
2 they were rescinded, the Serbian side would then pass a decision on
3 proclaiming the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina
4 which would be a substitute for the inter-ethnic equality council which
5 had not been established because we couldn't find a satisfactory solution
6 together with the Muslim and Croatian sides.
7 Q. Thank you. What was the following move of the Serbian side, the
8 Serbian deputies?
9 A. On the 24th -- I apologise. On the 24th of October, the Serbian
10 side proposed or called on the ethnic Serbian deputies from the Assembly.
11 That was actually a general initiative, and the Assembly of the Serbian
12 People in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established.
13 Q. When you talked about the conclusions from the 19th of --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The 11th of
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. -- 1991 that they would not be imposed on anyone, I would like to
18 recall that it was an excerpt from the Official Gazette of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's already an Exhibit, D265. The conclusions
20 which eased off the political situation are quoted there. Thank you.
21 Mr. President, can you tell us if by establishing their Assembly,
22 which as you said had the importance of the chamber of nationalities
23 which was missing by that time, did the Serbian deputies leave their
24 deputies' places in the Assembly or did they continue to work?
25 A. They did not leave their places. They did not cease to be
1 members of the parliament, but they in a way froze their participation.
2 At the proposal of all the deputies, I myself continued to discharge my
3 duty as the parliament Speaker in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
4 order to seek a political solution and in order to overcome the crisis.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what was the next move of the Serbian
6 Assembly -- actually, the Assembly of the Serbian People in terms of
7 collecting the opinions and views of the entire Serbian community?
8 A. After the attacks in the media to the effect that one political
9 party, the Serbian Democratic Party, was articulating its own policy
10 rather than the will of all of the Serbian people, the decision was made
11 at the session when we established the council of the Serbian people, the
12 Assembly of the Serbian people, to organise a plebiscite where all the
13 Serbian people could vote because we wanted to have an expression of the
14 will of the Serbian people about this issue, the issue of the future of
16 Q. Thank you. It was said here that we made it possible for Croats
17 and Muslims and everyone else to state their mind, but specifically on a
18 yellow piece of paper. The suggestion was that we had racially
19 discriminatory attitude toward them. Can you remember how this
20 progressed and why these specific papers were of yellow colour?
21 A. The goal and the duty which followed from the objections of the
22 other side was to establish the will of the Serbian people, because the
23 Serbian people, their representatives, had the right to send a question
24 to the council for inter-ethnic equality. And because it wasn't done,
25 then the objection was that this was not the will of the people but the
1 will of the party which was represented in the parliament. So the goal
2 was to establish the will of one people and we had to know how many Serbs
3 were in favour or what was their opinion about this issue, and then it
4 was made possible to the others to do it too because it's not true that
5 only Serbs were in favour of Yugoslavia. There were pro-Yugoslav parties
6 seated in Sarajevo which also wanted to have Yugoslavia preserved and
7 protected the interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their own way, but
8 that was almost identical to the way that the Serbian Democratic Party
9 was doing it. That was why there were different voting papers without
10 any discriminatory intention. In particular, we tried to make sure that
11 no one would object and compare that to what was happening in
12 World War II, when the Jews, the Serbs, and the Romas were maltreated and
13 discriminated in our part of the world. So it is completely excluded,
14 this possibility of interpreting it as a wish to discriminate someone.
15 It was just in order to determine how many people from which ethnic group
16 voted. I don't actually remember which colours were used, but I know
17 that we did take that into account and our commission emphasised that in
18 its report.
19 Q. Thank you. What was the situation like in Croatia at the time?
20 A. Beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, towards Croatia and the
21 west, the war was in full swing so that every minor incident in this area
22 was reflected on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 Q. Thank you. From the position you were in, did you have any
24 insight into the situation with regard to the arming of the ethnic groups
25 in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did you have any information about this, and what
1 was the impact of the war in Croatia on Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 A. Yes. Very frequently we received various information. There is
3 a well-known incident with illegal arming via Hungary. I think that the
4 minister of the interior of Yugoslavia was the one who organised it at
5 the time, and I believe that that was Martin Spegelj. That was known to
6 everyone. We had other information too to the effect that Croatia and
7 Slovenia were arming themselves, and also individual reports, both
8 official and unofficial, that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina were
9 also being armed.
10 Q. Thank you. Did you know, did you receive any information, how
11 far the Patriotic League was developed in terms of organisation and
12 obtaining weapons, their military organisation, I mean both the
13 Green Berets and the Patriotic League. At that moment in mid-October,
14 what did you know about the arming of the Muslim side?
15 A. There was a lot of information, least of all official, but
16 through various channels there were these reports that paramilitary
17 formations were being formed among the Muslims, in the Muslim community.
18 And as for the Croats, certain things were happening, in particular in
19 western Herzegovina, where the paramilitary formations or perhaps even
20 lawful formations from Croatia, I mean formations belonging to the
21 Croatian state, were present in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So
22 there was a continuous flow of this information that we received to the
23 effect that the preparations for war and for arming were ongoing.
24 Q. Thank you. What were the following moves of the Croatian/Muslim
25 part of the authorities and what were the moves of the Serbian side; that
1 is to say, when was the next parliament session of the Serbian Assembly
2 held and what were the measures or the counter-measures that were taken
3 at the time?
4 A. The session on the 24th of October. Our session when we
5 established the Assembly of the Serbian people did not much concern the
6 Muslim side. They continued going along their own way, and we kept
7 receiving information that their aspiration was to have
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina secede by force and, contrary to the constitution,
9 from Yugoslavia. In addition to the invitations to begin negotiations
10 which were never accepted, on the 22nd there was another session of the
11 Serbian Assembly, and then the next one on the 21st of December. Namely,
12 it was clear that our partners didn't want to have constitutionality back
13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They wanted to continue doing what they did
14 previously, which was unconstitutional. So that on several occasions we
15 insisted on re-establishing constitutionality, on having negotiations,
16 and when that yielded no fruit and it didn't -- because the then-European
17 community called on Bosnia-Herzegovina and other former Yugoslav
18 republics to ask for their independence to be recognised. When that
19 happened, the government which was not authorised to do this and the
20 Presidency which was not authorised to do this, by out-voting the Serbian
21 members of the Presidency, adopted the conclusion to send this request
22 for the recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When that
23 happened, I think it was on the 15th of December, we scheduled a session
24 for the 21st of December, at which we clearly said: Unless you rescind
25 these unlawful decisions and unless you withdraw the request that the
1 independence be recognised, then the Serbian people and the Serbian
2 deputies will pass a decision on the proclamation of the republic of the
3 Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And namely, in the meantime there
4 were meetings with a number of representatives of the international
5 community where we were clearly told that negotiations would follow, that
6 we would discuss the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that if we
7 accepted this international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina that we
8 would be entitled to having our constitutive unit within
10 I did not participate in negotiations with international
11 representatives. These were Mr. Vance, Mr. Carrington, and others also
12 came. You were the one who talked with them at the time, Mr. President,
13 and so did the Deputy President, Mr. Koljevic, and I know that this was
14 something that you were the first to learn. And then I learned that we
15 would have our constitutive unit, an ethnic one. I received this
16 information around the New Year's Day at a meeting that was held at the
17 invitation of the late Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade. Wherever --
18 whatever we heard directly later on from Mr. Cutileiro, we heard then
19 first from him. Our proposal is that you should accept independent and
20 internationally recognised Bosnia and that you would get your ethnic unit
21 within Bosnia, and our policy was corrected a bit in a way. Publicly we
22 had to stick to our view that we wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, but we
23 accepted and later on confirmed this in the Assembly that we would accept
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina but we wanted to have our own entity within it.
25 Q. Thank you. Did you react to the decisions of the government of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim/Croat part of the government of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, you as president of the Assembly, when they asked for
3 independence? Do you remember, did you communicate with anyone in that
4 period of time?
5 A. As far as I can remember, I wrote a letter and I sent it to the
6 representatives of the international community, as far as I can remember,
7 that is. The Assembly did react, that is correct, and I on behalf of the
8 Assembly informed the international community, the European community,
9 that the decisions of the Presidency and the government were
10 unconstitutional and that they should bear in mind that there is a
11 special situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it's not a sort of normal
12 situation like in other republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because
13 politically there are three different views and they have to be taken
14 into account. And the proposal that they are receiving, namely, to
15 recognise the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is not in
16 accordance with the constitution and it goes against the will of the Serb
17 people who have the right to challenge that kind of decision because it's
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again, asking the other side for
20 their understanding, 1D02136, could that document be shown to the
21 witness. And again, I'm sorry that I haven't notified the other side of
22 that. There is no Serbian version, so could we please blow up the
23 English version?
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Could you tell us what the document is and could you tell us what
1 it says in the heading.
2 A. That's correct. This is a document that I signed, although my
3 signature is not there. I remember that. This is the Assembly of the
4 Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 22nd of December. That is to
5 say, a day after this session, this was sent to Lord Carrington and
6 Henry Wijnaendts, Van den Broek, Christian Braun, then Mr. Janssen, the
7 UN general-secretary, the UN Security Council, the embassies of 12 in
8 Belgrade, the embassy of the USSR in Belgrade, the embassy of the USA in
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please show us the last
12 page of this document.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. I believe that we can see your signature there.
15 A. I believe it's only written in the English language. Somebody
16 wrote that up and I signed it. That's right. This is my signature at
17 the bottom of the page, and perhaps that is the first page of this
19 Q. I'm going to read out part of first and second paragraph what it
20 was you wrote to these respectable people.
21 [As read][In English] "By illegal demand for independency of
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina, you have once again drastically overthrown the
23 constitutional and law order and endangered peace which relies only on
24 goodwill and sense of our citizens. With this act you have violated
25 taken oath and disqualified yourselves in front of the present and the
1 history for further managing affairs of state why people placed trust in
2 you but with completely different election programmes."
3 [Interpretation] What did you mean by this?
4 A. Precisely what I said a moment ago. As far as I can remember,
5 although I cannot see it here, this is a letter that is addressed to the
6 Presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina and the others persons were CC'd,
7 the persons I mentioned a moment ago. I said that -- actually, this was
8 an illegal move, the one that they took, and in this way they betrayed,
9 actually, the trust of the citizens who voted for them. And, in fact,
10 they made a turn-around which seriously jeopardises peace. And peace is
11 actually being maintained just through the goodwill of citizens not
12 through a wise policy conducted by politicians.
13 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether you remember Badinter's
14 reaction? Perhaps he didn't write to you directly, but how did he react
15 in the recommendations for Bosnia-Herzegovina? Why did
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina not win his approval straight away? Rather, in
17 opinion number 4, Badinter set some prerequisites.
18 A. I think, as far as I can remember, maybe I'm wrong, I remember
19 that Mr. Badinter did write to me and it was a similar letter and it can
20 be found in the documents. A reaction did follow and it was stated that
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina is not an ordinary state, if I can put it that way,
22 and that there are certain specific characteristics involved, and that it
23 is necessary to see the will of the citizens and that these special
24 characteristics have to be borne in mind. That is the reason why, in
25 this first stage, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not recognised; rather, time was
1 given to carry out other activities so that these remarks could be
2 checked in a way and so that a climate could be created that would make
3 it possible for war to be avoided.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the participants, this opinion
5 of Badinter that President Krajisnik is referring to is D1279. It has
6 already been admitted, D1279.
7 Thank you. Can this document be admitted?
8 JUDGE KWON: Can I see the title of this page, the upper part of
9 this page. This is a warning, to who? SR B. and H. Presidency. What is
10 SR? Is it Socialist Republic or the Serbian Republic?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, the Socialist Republic of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency and the government.
13 JUDGE KWON: Very well. It's a compilation of several documents
14 which was sent to the Secretary-General and Mr. Carrington?
15 THE ACCUSED: Yes, Excellency. [Interpretation] Yes,
16 Mr. Krajisnik is indicating the basis on which he is writing to them, and
17 then he CC'd the others.
18 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. Tieger?
19 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President, I didn't have an objection,
20 but you mentioned the word "compilation," maybe I missed that. I'm just
21 seeing --
22 JUDGE KWON: If you see first page is the cover page, second page
23 is a letter to the SG of the United Nations, and third page is a letter
24 sent to Carrington which contains several documents.
25 MR. TIEGER: I don't have any objection in principle. I'd like
1 to look at the specific documents. But let's -- I'll raise -- if I
2 encounter anything that is worth raising, I will raise it quickly;
3 otherwise, no objection.
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it. Shall we use the previous number?
5 Exhibit D3997.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Did I hear this wrong or did you skip the session of the Assembly
9 of the Serb People that was held on the 11th of December? It is
10 important for me because of a particular document. Before the
11 21st of December, was another session of the Serb people held on the
12 11th of December?
13 A. That's correct. On the 11th of December, a session of the
14 Assembly was held and I did not mention it a moment ago.
15 Q. Do you remember that a recommendation was adopted then to the
16 effect that where conditions are right Serb municipalities should be
18 A. That is correct. On the 11th of December a decision was passed.
19 But there's just a small correction there. To establish Serb Municipal
20 Assemblies, that is to say, bodies like the Assembly of the Serb People.
21 Q. I do apologise. So not municipalities but Assemblies of
22 municipalities, parliaments, Serb parliaments in these municipalities; is
23 that correct?
24 A. Yes, that's right.
25 Q. Thank you. Was this obligatory, mandatory, or was this a
1 recommendation; namely, that if they felt the need to do so, they could
2 establish that?
3 A. The stenographic notes readily show that after a long debate,
4 yielding to pressure coming from people from the grass roots, this
5 recommendation was adopted, because we thought that this Assembly that we
6 established at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina at one point in time would
7 simply cease to exist.
8 Q. In which conditions would these Assemblies, these Serb
9 parliaments at central level and at local levels, cease to exist? What
10 would have to happen for them to cease to exist?
11 A. The first requirement was to go back to constitutionality and to
12 discuss the future set-up in Bosnia-Herzegovina on a constitutional
13 basis. Once that would happen, the decision on the establishment of the
14 Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina would no longer be in
15 force as well as these Municipal Assemblies; and their task was just to
16 intervene at first, just to intervene at that moment when the
17 constitution would be violated to the detriment of the Serb people at any
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1183, could we please have that in
21 e-court. In English we first have the preamble and then the rest is
22 probably on the next page.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you see the upper right-hand corner, is that that
1 A. Yes, that is that recommendation.
2 THE ACCUSED: Next page in English, please. [Interpretation]
3 Thank you.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. President, here in the indictment there is a reference to a
6 certain paper that is called Variant A and Variant B here. Are you aware
7 of the existence of such a paper and how does this paper relate to this
8 recommendation to establish municipalities?
9 A. As for Variants A and B, I testified in my own trial so
10 everything I'm going to say now is contained there. There was no need to
11 pass this document that was called Variant A and B if we had this
12 recommendation that was adopted earlier on. There is no causal
13 relationship between the recommendation and the subsequently adopted
14 paper entitled: "Variant A and B." So on the basis of this
15 recommendation, every municipality, every group of Assemblymen could
16 establish a municipality, a Municipal Assembly, a parliament, and satisfy
17 the things contained in Variants A and B. I stated that in my own
18 testimony - you can find it there. I did not know when it was
19 distributed, this document. Allegedly it was distributed during one
20 session. Now was it a session of the Main Board or a session of the
21 Assembly at the Holiday Inn, somebody could have distributed that just in
22 passing, by the by, but it's not that I know that it was being
24 Q. Thank you.
25 As for this recommendation, was it discussed at the Assembly and
1 was a decision passed?
2 A. A moment ago I mentioned this. If you look at the stenographic
3 notes from that session, you will see that the initiative came from some
4 members of parliament at that session and there was a great deal of
5 hesitation. We hesitated to make a decision. And then a compromise was
6 reached to give a recommendation, that on the ground, on the spot, each
7 and every municipal parliament, or rather, Serb MPs in municipalities
8 could decide whether they felt that was necessary or not. Many did, many
9 did not.
10 Q. Thank you. Mr. President, what does the Assembly produce or what
11 does a Assembly produce? And if an Assembly produces something, does it
12 first have to be on the agenda? Does it have to be debated first before
13 being adopted? Could you tell us what kind of documents are adopted by
14 an Assembly and what has to be on the agenda in the debate and then in
15 the conclusions.
16 A. In the rules of procedure of the Assembly, it is obligatory to
17 allocate time for presenting documents which would be included in the
18 agenda. These documents are then discussed, conclusions are made,
19 decisions are made. In fact, documents are passed which are within the
20 purview of the Assembly, those are decisions, conclusions, laws,
21 declarations, et cetera. And all these documents that are discussed and
22 that must be presented in advance, all the conclusions made have to be
23 promulgated in the Official Gazette of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Assembly
24 cannot pass anything without promulgating it. A moment ago you saw one
25 of the conclusions. There were many conclusions, but conclusions were,
1 in fact, groundwork for a different document. Once debate is concluded,
2 a decision is made, et cetera.
3 There was a conclusion of 11 September that was so important that
4 it was promulgated in the Official Gazette too. Nothing can be passed by
5 the Assembly without it being published in the Official Gazette, at least
6 according to the law it shouldn't be. And because the rules of procedure
7 prescribed that one had to announce in advance what would be discussed in
8 the Assembly, the Party of Democratic Action once wanted to interrupt the
9 session in order to include a new item in the agenda. I stopped it and
10 the lawyers cautioned all of us that the Assembly may not work in that
12 Q. Here we have some general documents from the Assembly admitted
13 into evidence, transcripts and records of Assembly sessions. Can you
14 tell us if there is any difference between transcripts and records, is
15 there any essential difference?
16 A. In the Serbian language, a transcript produced by shorthand is a
17 kind of record produced by shorthand, and if something was missing the
18 audiotape would be checked, whereas a record would include only the main
19 points of the session. A record is not a verbatim reflection of the
20 session, whereas the transcript shows exactly the course of the debate
21 word for word.
22 Q. Can the record include something that was not adopted or vice
24 A. Well, if that happens that can only be by human error, that
25 somebody missed something. The record reflects the conclusions that were
2 Q. What was the fate of some extreme or angry discussions that
3 happened in the Assembly that we can see in transcripts but we cannot see
4 them in the records? How did that happen?
5 A. In records you will see almost no reflection of any discussions,
6 just the conclusions, and that's important. Deliberations are very
7 elaborate, very detailed, but the record will reflect only the end
8 result, the conclusions. It's important for a journalist or anybody who
9 wants to read about it, but for me and various services in the Assembly
10 it's also important to have a correct record.
11 Q. Thank you. When we were talking about Serbian Assemblies in
12 municipalities, that is to say, Serbian parliaments - and we will discuss
13 it also later in connection with Serb territories - here in my case there
14 is an adjudicated fact number 1932 which is that the SDS was prepared to
15 separate Serbian territories from Bosnia-Herzegovina if that was the only
16 way of keeping them within Yugoslavia. Is this true according to what
17 you know? And did we stand firmly by our priority objective of staying
18 within Yugoslavia?
19 A. As I stated previously, the Serbian side until the end of 1991
20 had a priority task of staying within Yugoslavia; however, we then had
21 talks with various representatives, and I know from talking to
22 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic as well as with Mr. Vance and
23 Lord Carrington and later Mr. Milosevic as well, we realised that if we
24 wanted to pursue a realistic policy on a global level we had to work
25 towards staying within Bosnia and Herzegovina even if we can't stay
1 within Yugoslavia. So this conclusion is not correct. That territory
2 was part of Yugoslavia at that time anyway, and all the way up until the
3 time when the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina is resolved, it would remain
4 within Yugoslavia.
5 Q. Another adjudicated fact, 1946, claims that our Assembly of the
6 Serbian People proclaimed its territory as the territory of the
7 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in January 1991, including all the
8 populated areas, municipalities, et cetera, which declared at the
9 referendum that they wanted to stay as a part of Yugoslavia. Did we
10 indeed have the intention to proclaim our territory a part of Yugoslavia
11 and did we need anybody's approval or consent for that in November 1991?
12 A. I don't know the exact wording of that, but the aim of the
13 plebiscite was for the Serbian people to declare their will, whether they
14 were for a united Bosnia-Herzegovina or for staying in Yugoslavia. So we
15 obtained a map in which certain areas responded differently. There was
16 no point for us in claiming that these areas are part of Yugoslavia, but
17 we did want to show in which areas the Serbian people declared that they
18 were for Yugoslavia. It was not our objective to say Yugoslavia is from
19 here and up to here it's not. As long as the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue
20 was open, that was not the case. But for the Serbian Democratic Party it
21 was a basis for drawing maps later in negotiations when we were
22 negotiating with the other side.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: If we're going to engage in this exercise,
25 Mr. President, of purporting to recite the witness adjudicated facts and
1 asking for his -- or trying to elicit a response from him on it, then two
2 things need to occur. Number one, the adjudicated fact needs to be
3 correctly recited. Here I see the question was:
4 "Another adjudicated fact ... claims that our Assembly of the
5 Serbian People proclaimed its territory as the territory ..." et cetera,
6 et cetera. The adjudicated fact in fact states:
7 "On November 21st, 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed as
8 part of the territory of federal Yugoslavia," et cetera.
9 So if we start in the proposition that it's difficult to elicit a
10 response of any assistance to the Court, and then secondly, there
11 apparently was no interest on the part of Dr. Karadzic in actually
12 eliciting an answer responsive to that question because the response
13 seemed to address the plebiscite and other aspects rather than the terms
14 of the adjudicated fact itself.
15 I won't intervene in this way in future, but I will make a marker
16 that such questions and answers have no impact on the adjudicated facts
18 JUDGE KWON: One point, be precise in referring to the
19 adjudicated facts. It's important to read out correctly. Shall we
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I
22 wanted to save time, but as usual, I end up wasting more time in this
23 way. I will leave aside the adjudicated facts until I obtain the correct
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Speaker, after the 11th of December, which was the next
2 session of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina
3 and what was the occasion?
4 A. The date was 21st December, and the occasion was the unlawful
5 request of the Muslim and Croat part of the Presidency and the
6 Muslim/Croat government to apply for international recognition with the
7 European community.
8 Q. Two days before that, on the 19th of December, did you attend the
9 plenary session of the Serbian Democratic Party?
10 A. I believe so.
11 Q. You've already discussed this. Was there any debate about papers
12 A and B, debate and decision?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Thank you. If a session of a Municipal Assembly would include in
15 its agenda those instructions or recommendations that were adopted at the
16 meeting of the 21st December, would that be party instructions or
17 Assembly instructions?
18 A. I have to be precise. When I said it was not discussed at the
19 plenary session, at the same time there was also a club of MPs of the
20 Serbian Assembly, where I dealt with preparations for the 21st December
21 session. So I did not really participate much in the plenary session.
22 Could you clarify your question?
23 Q. If in an agenda of a Municipal Assembly we read: "Consideration
24 of the recommendations adopted by the Assembly of 21st December," would
25 it be a reference to the plenary session of the party or the Assembly
2 A. Assemblies, Municipal Assemblies, discussed decisions of state
3 authorities, state agencies, whereas the party discussed its party
4 affairs. So if it was a document of the Assembly of the Serbian People,
5 then it could be a subject of discussion at the municipal level. If it
6 was a party document, then it would be discussed by party organs at the
7 municipal level.
8 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us something about Crisis Staffs. When
9 were they established? Was there a Crisis Staff at the level of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Were there any Crisis Staffs in Croatia? And what
11 is a Crisis Staff in essence?
12 A. Crisis Staffs were presented before this Court, Your Honours, as
13 an important document. In the former communist regime, in every
14 situation of natural disaster, any extraordinary circumstances called for
15 the establishment of a Crisis Staff. There was one Crisis Staff at the
16 level of Bosnia-Herzegovina headed by Ejub Ganic. The Presidency had its
17 own Crisis Staff. So it was not a -- something prohibited. It was
18 something that was triggered by certain circumstances.
19 When I was Speaker of the Assembly, a Crisis Staff was formed at
20 the time of the barricades in Sarajevo, when a member of a wedding party
21 was killed in Sarajevo; a Crisis Staff was formed then. The leadership
22 was away in Geneva at negotiations and neither Mr. Karadzic nor
23 Mr. Koljevic nor I were there. It was a one-off Crisis Staff.
24 Crisis Staffs did not exist then on the Serbian side.
25 The first instruction to establish Crisis Staffs came in the
1 speech of Mr. Karadzic on the 27th March, at the last pre-war Assembly
2 session, when he said: Form Crisis Staffs, engage people from your own
3 territories, and you will see from the records that it was the first
4 mention of Crisis Staffs on our side.
5 Whether some people formed Crisis Staffs at municipal level, I
6 don't know, perhaps they did. In any case, they were able to because
7 they didn't need any approval or instruction. It was quite a normal
8 thing in the socialist system. If a river flooded, if there was any
9 natural disaster or an extraordinary occurrence, Crisis Staffs were
11 Q. You just spoke about municipal Crisis Staffs. Was a political
12 party able to form Crisis Staffs without you knowing, considering that a
13 political party is not a state authority? Were there any party
14 Crisis Staffs before the 27th March?
15 A. I believe I would have known if the party had done that.
16 Q. Who, and based on what criterion, became a member of the
17 Crisis Staff?
18 A. I remember that in your speech of 27 March you said that a
19 leading person in the municipality should be the president of the
20 Crisis Staff. That was the initial instruction. I don't know if
21 anything was done about it, but very soon, the government of
22 Republika Srpska issued some sort of instructions along those lines as to
23 who should be on the Crisis Staff, the president of the Executive Board
24 or maybe the chief of police, et cetera.
25 Q. Did it specify personalities or titles, posts?
1 A. Exclusively posts.
2 Q. At that Assembly session of the 21st December, did the Assembly
3 adopt a decision to establish the Serbian Republic of BH and did it set
4 any conditions? Was the establishment of the Serbian Republic of BH
5 inevitable? What demands were made from the other two sides?
6 A. Your Honours, as you will see in the transcript and in the
7 record, it was said clearly: You, gentlemen on the other side, withdraw
8 your unlawful decision, take back your request for international
9 recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if you do that -- if you don't do
10 that, by new year we will have established the Serbian republic. And
11 that was in accordance with the indications given by the international
12 community that we will get our own entity by the Serbian new year, which
13 is the 13th/14th January. That was the dead-line they had to take back
14 their unlawful decision and their unlawful request for recognition.
15 Q. Thank you. And how much time did we give them? That is to say,
16 when was Republika Srpska proclaimed and did it begin to operate
17 immediately? When did it begin to operate?
18 A. I had in my possession some documents, and, Your Honours, you can
19 find them too, this declaration or the proposal of a decision, where we
20 requested that it should be conditional. Once again, you'll see that it
21 was a proposal and conditional that, on the 9th of January, we would set
22 up Republika Srpska, but if the unlawful decisions were withdrawn, we
23 would withdraw this too because we wanted to give one more chance. There
24 was much pressure from the deputies, and eventually Mr. Karadzic,
25 Mr. Koljevic, and I, we were in the minority even because the deputies
1 said: Here's the interview saying -- showing what Mr. Izetbegovic said a
2 few days ago, and those from the other side, they will never withdraw it.
3 They want to go towards independence, and any request of yours is even
4 comical. You are knocking at an open door and you know that nothing will
5 come of this.
6 Q. Thank you. Could you now try to remember the events of the
7 9th of January, the proclamation of Republika Srpska, and whether its
8 organs began to operate immediately or when did that happen?
9 A. The 9th of January was actually a ceremony. We wanted to
10 announce this so that it would be clear that we didn't agree with the
11 unconstitutional decisions. We were hoping that the positions would get
12 closer. You'll see that on the 25th and on the 26th of January, with
13 much insistence from Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Vuka, and myself, we
14 managed to persuade the deputies to attend the joint session of the
15 parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, hoping that there would be a
16 reconciliation. And automatically, everything that had been previously
17 formed was annulled. And then there was a comical situation where
18 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Cengic stood on the platform at the same time. I
19 tolerated that too just to achieve the reconciliation.
20 So there was no implementation at all because we were hoping that
21 negotiations and a political solution that would be in accordance with
22 the constitution would ensue and would take into account the will of all
23 three ethnic groups.
24 Q. Thank you. You now told us what was going on in the joint
25 parliament on the 24th and the 25th of January, 1992. Could you please
1 tell the Chamber what was it that Mr. Muhamed Cengic and I agreed on and
2 kept agreeing for two or three hours? What was his proposal and what was
3 my reaction to it?
4 A. As we kept insisting on the following - the Serbian side, I
5 mean - if we wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to be recognised as an independent
6 country and for us all to vote at a referendum, then Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 would need to be transformed, decentralised. A number of autonomous
8 areas should be established where our and their and all other requests
9 would be met at a minimum and no one should rule any other ethnic group.
10 There should be no out-voting. We had long discussions about this, and
11 at one point we were actually discussing more outside of the parliament
12 session than at it.
13 So when we were in these other rooms, an agreement was reached
14 between Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Cengic was present, so was I,
15 and there were other representatives too from all three ethnic groups. I
16 have to be honest, the Muslims and the Serbs were there. As the Croats,
17 they did not want to be involved then for some reason, I don't know what.
18 It was more a conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims. And
19 Mr. Izetbegovic then agreed. He said: I accept. We should implement a
20 quick regionalisation in a short time and then we would all vote at a
21 referendum. In late January or in March we would have a referendum.
22 Once we conducted the referendum with our recommendation that Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina should be an independent country, then the tensions would
24 ease off.
25 And Mr. Cengic then entered the main hall and presented to the
1 parliament what agreement was achieved in the other office. While he was
2 speaking, simultaneously Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Cengic were on the
3 platform. Cengic had stepped down from the platform and Karadzic
4 remained on it, and Karadzic said: I'm happy, and whatever Mr. Cengic
5 says is correct. Our positions have become close now. We should
6 implement the regionalisation. And then Cengic came to Karadzic on the
7 platform, you can see it from the video recording, and then both of them
8 said: Look, the situation is relaxed now. There is no need for tensions
9 now. The government will implement the regionalisation quickly and the
10 problem will be solved. I could see everyone in the hall relax and I was
11 really happy.
12 At that moment there were reactions of some of the deputies to
13 the effect: Who did you agree with, Mr. Cengic, who entitled you to do
14 that? And then he said: Well, here Mr. Izetbegovic agreed to that, and
15 he pointed his finger at Izetbegovic. Then the president of the
16 Deputies Club from the SDA requested for a break. They went to the
17 break. He talked again with Mr. Izetbegovic and he said: This is not
18 true. I do not accept this. And he cancelled what Mr. Izetbegovic had
19 said. And then there was another chaotic situation, another rift. Once
20 again we submitted the 20 signatures, once again the decision was
21 adopted, and so everything started going downhill though we were close to
22 find positions that were close to each other.
23 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that as early as in 1991, Mr. Vance and
24 Lord Carrington and Mr. Wijnaendts came and others that you wrote to.
25 Can you remember when it was that agreement was achieved in principle
1 that there would be three Bosnias and that the work on harmonisation of
2 the document began?
3 A. I won't be specific. Whether it was during January or in
4 February, early February, but immediately after this a meeting was
5 organised at which it was told to us that we would have our own
6 constitutive entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina. So immediately it was
7 middle -- in the middle of January or late January or early February and
8 then the negotiations and the conference were continued.
9 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether you attended the plenary
10 session of the Serbian Democratic Party held on the 14th of February,
11 1992, when we announced that there would be three Bosnia and
12 Herzegovinas? And do you remember my recommendations what our leaders
13 should take into account vis-à-vis the Muslims and Croats in the areas
14 where we had the majority population?
15 A. From this distance in time, I just remember what is positive. I
16 very often tend to and try to forget what is negative. You can find that
17 in the transcript; it's easy to establish. Mr. Karadzic appealed on
18 everyone to protect -- if there is a demarcation line drawn between the
19 three entities, if one of the ethnic groups is a minority in our entity,
20 the Muslims or the Croats, we wanted to have a rule of law, we wanted to
21 have the minorities protected with all rights to be enjoyed. And if
22 anything like that happened, it could only be by somebody's will if
23 anyone wanted to leave. Nobody should be forced to leave.
24 Whatever was said then was easing the tensions. People were
25 relaxed and it was the basis for the next session of the conference where
1 we would advocate the position taken by the members of the plenary
2 session, and their position was that now we had to adjust to new goals
3 which were no longer Yugoslavia but rather Republika Srpska, a Serbian
4 entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 Q. Thank you. I do not have your judgement. Is it true that it
6 contains the adjudicated fact which is more or less to the effect that on
7 the 14th of February, Karadzic said that Serbian political leaders should
8 make sure that there was no exodus from our areas, and that the
9 conclusion of your Chamber was that at the time I still made sure that
10 the interests of the Muslims and the Croats would be protected?
11 A. That's true. It's correct you appealed on everyone to prevent an
12 exodus and that no one had the right to force anyone out.
13 Q. Thank you. So that was two weeks before their referendum was
14 held. Can you please remind us and tell the Chamber, what was our
15 position with regard to this referendum and whether we would vote in it
16 or not, and also what we thought about their right to state their mind?
17 A. Everything that I'm going to say can be found in documents. The
18 clear position of the Serbian Democratic Party was that this referendum
19 was, for us, a referendum of the Croatian and Muslim peoples. The
20 Serbian people had voted at the plebiscite and said what they believed.
21 Those who wanted to vote at the referendum, even Serbs, should not be
22 obstructed. Everyone was entitled to vote because no one prevented us
23 from holding our plebiscite.
24 It was rather a written document sent out to the field so that
25 people would know that no one had the right to obstruct anyone in the
1 areas that was solely populated by Serbs if this referendum was to be
2 organised there, if it was to be slated by the Muslim and Croatian
3 communities, because it was not like a parliament session, it was slated
4 in an unlawful manner.
5 Q. Thank you. Can you remember, of the 109 municipalities, from how
6 many municipalities did we have deputies in the Chamber of Citizens, or
7 rather, in how many municipalities did we have absolute majority?
8 A. I could not say what the percentage was, but I know that in many
9 of the municipalities the Serbs had absolute or relative majority. And
10 why? Because the Serbs possessed land in big areas, and where
11 municipalities were centred in urban environments, there the Muslims and
12 the Croats had the majority, so that in a great number of municipalities
13 the Serbs were dominant. I think, but whatever I say will be
14 speculation. But I know that it was a huge number of municipalities.
15 Q. Is it correct that in the Chamber of Municipalities we had more
16 than a simple majority, that is to say, 37 deputies? And who was the
17 president of the Chamber of Municipalities?
18 A. That's correct. In the Chamber of Municipalities we had the
19 majority because -- and that was why we also had the position of the
20 president. A Serb, Mr. Petko Cancar was the president of the Chamber of
22 Q. Thank you. In view of the fact that you were the parliament
23 Speaker and also the president of the constitutional commission, can you
24 tell me whether this referendum of theirs would be considered successful
25 if in the 37 municipalities we prevented its -- prevented it from being
2 A. All decisions are made autonomously in one and the other chamber,
3 and if we were to look at municipalities separately, first the decision
4 will have to be made in the Chamber of Municipalities, then in the
5 Chamber of Citizens, and then such a decision would be passed at the
6 level of the parliament as a whole. The Muslim/Croatian coalition could
7 not even in theory secure for itself a two-thirds majority if all the
8 Serbian deputies were to vote in the Chamber of Municipalities.
9 Q. Thank you. Perhaps I was not precise enough. This legality of
10 the referendum, what it would look like if in the 37 municipalities and
11 in -- I don't know which percentage of the territory, the Serbian side
12 prevented the referendum from being held where it was capable of
13 preventing it? Would the referendum then be considered successful?
14 A. For the international community which expected to get the results
15 of the referendum, it certainly wouldn't be acceptable and legal because
16 there would be more than 51 per cent of the territory where the results
17 of the referendum would not exist because the citizens would not be able
18 to vote.
19 Q. Thank you. Immediately after the completion of the referendum,
20 as you noted, one member of the Serbian wedding party was killed in
21 Bascarsija. This was followed by unrest and the barricades were put up.
22 Where were the two of us at the time? I believe that you mentioned that
23 we were in Brussels; however, it seems to me that we were at the
24 preparations for Brussels in Belgrade. Do you remember this?
25 A. As far as I remember, we were at a session in Brussels or in
1 Geneva, and on the way back from that meeting to Belgrade, we heard about
2 the barricades being put up and the murder of this member of the wedding
3 party. We may have been in Belgrade, I don't know, but when this was
4 happening we were in Belgrade in any case.
5 Q. Thank you. That was the beginning of March. Can you tell us how
6 did the conference develop and who presided?
7 A. In March, Mr. Cutileiro was very active and very busy. He was
8 the Portuguese ambassador who at the time, I believe, was in charge of
9 the European community. At the time, Portugal was the presiding country.
10 And March is the month of the finalisation of negotiations when we were
11 about to achieve some results. Unless I'm mistaken, we had two meetings
12 and we reached an agreement on the principles in accordance with which
13 the final agreement about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be based.
14 Q. Thank you. Do you remember what was the first map of
15 Ambassador Cutileiro where he established who had the majority where?
16 A. I remember that well. All three sides in the negotiations with
17 Mr. Cutileiro mainly kept asking this question, but the map, the map, the
18 map, and the map, because territorial issues were the most important for
19 reaching an agreement because three constitutive units were to be set up.
20 And then the late Mr. Darwin drew a map where he identified certain areas
21 with relative or absolute majority of -- for one ethnic group. So, to
22 give an example, you have a bigger enclave --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D03931 called
24 up because it will be easier for the witness to present this for us,
25 1D03931. Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Can you recognise this? Is this the map you spoke about? Can
3 you tell us what it depicts?
4 A. During my trial, I tendered this map to the Prosecutor present
5 here and he tendered a different map to me. This map was after the
6 meeting on the 31st of March or around that date. As far as I can
7 remember, after Brussels. That was the first time that the border was
8 marked on the Una, which was the basis for our six strategic objectives.
9 Q. I beg your pardon. Could you please show the Una River to the
10 Trial Chamber here?
11 A. I'll try.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could he please be assisted with an
13 electronic pen.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I can manage.
15 This is the border on the Una --
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. You can mark it, yes.
18 A. I beg your pardon. That is the border on the Una. The green is
19 Muslim territory and the blue is Serb territory. You see this here --
20 Q. I'm sorry.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could that please be erased.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Could you precisely mark the Una River using that pen.
24 A. [Marks]
25 Q. Now could you please mark the Una River very precisely all along.
1 A. This is the Una River. Sorry, yet again -- I haven't really
2 managed. Sorry about that. I do apologise. I'm not very precise.
3 The border between the green and the blue is the Una River. The
4 Una River flows this way, as far as I can remember. This is the first
5 time within Bosnia-Herzegovina that a demarcation was set between the
6 Muslim - this is the Muslim area - and the Serb area.
7 Q. I'm sorry. The Cyrillic S.
8 A. Sorry.
9 Q. It looks like Croatian.
10 A. Sorry.
11 Q. Sorry. Can you go all the way down the Una to its confluence to
12 the Sava.
13 A. This is the Sava, this. This is the Sava up here, and the Una
14 flows into the Sava, you see.
15 Q. Thank you. In anticipation of the six strategic objectives, who
16 was here on the Una River, on the right bank of the Una and the right
17 bank of the Sava?
18 A. What is marked here in blue --
19 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: All right. I have refrained from repeated
22 objections to leading questions, but I'm going to be more rigorous now.
23 In anticipation of the -- I mean, this is a clear leading question and
24 building in commentary as well. Dr. Karadzic has to refrain from that
25 and just keep his questions open-ended to this witness, please.
1 JUDGE KWON: What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Let me not mention the objectives. Can you tell me -- actually,
4 can you extend the border along the Sava, and could you tell us who is on
5 the right bank of the Una River and on the right bank of the Sava River
6 on the basis of what was established by the team of the
7 European Commission?
8 A. I'm going to start from here, when the Una enters
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that's this here. So the Una flows --
10 Q. You've already said that. Could you place number 1 there.
11 A. It is this here. From there, from that place, the Una flows
12 towards the Sava. On the right-hand side --
13 Q. Sorry, number 2, could you mark the confluence with a number 2.
14 A. That is number 2.
15 On the right bank of the Una River, this is the Serbs, S, Serb
16 ethnic area marked in blue. And on the left side, the green colour,
17 that's where the Muslims are. This here is an enclave, if I can call it
18 that, right here. One-third is brown or red and two-thirds are green.
19 Croats are where it is brown. So this is where the Croats are. And
20 these are the Muslims here. So I'm going to place number 3 there and the
21 Muslims will be 4.
22 The representative of the European community envisaged the
23 following. Within a larger ethnic area, there can be enclaves of the
24 other ethnic community. Of course, if you look at the principles, what
25 is envisaged is even exchanges of territory, if I can put it that way, in
1 order to satisfy a particular geographic or economic entity.
2 Q. Thank you. Could you mark the Drina River for us now, where it
3 flows into the Sava River, so that you don't have to deal with all of it.
4 A. Here, right here. Sorry about that. Number 5, that's what I'm
5 going to put there now.
6 Q. Could you extend it a bit, the Drina, so that we see where the
7 Drina is there?
8 A. I'll try yet again. This is where the Drina flows. The Drina
9 flows here. I think -- well, I don't know exactly. I think it's like
10 this. Now I don't know if I'm being very precise, but I think it's
11 something like that. Actually, I beg your pardon, it does enter
12 Montenegro, the Tara and the Piva rivers.
13 Q. Thank you. Number 6 for the Drina.
14 A. I will place number 6 there.
15 Q. Thank you. Can you mark the Neretva River approximately?
16 A. The Neretva should be here roughly. I think that it's something
17 like this.
18 Q. Thank you. Can you --
19 A. Sorry, this is number 7.
20 JUDGE KWON: What is number 5?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Number 5 is where the Drina flows
22 into the Sava.
23 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Please could you initial this or sign this and place the date
2 A. Only if I knew what the date was today.
3 Q. The 7th of November.
4 A. [Marks]
5 Q. Before the break, bearing the break in mind and for as long as we
6 still have the map there, could you tell us whether the paper called "Six
7 Strategic Objectives" has anything to do with these boundaries of the
8 Serb ethnic area?
9 A. This map is a basis for rounding off or for creating the six
10 strategic objectives.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into
13 evidence. Actually, another question.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. We see here close to Banja Luka there should be a canton, or
16 rather, an enclave Muslim/Croat. What about the Drina valley, Podrinje,
17 who is there?
18 A. If you look at Podrinje, the Drina River valley, it is this
19 entire eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The green colour are the
20 Muslims here. These are the Muslims and these are the Serbs. So maybe I
21 should put some numbers there. I don't think it's necessary. Then green
22 is a rather large area in the Drina valley and it was supposed to be
23 divided between the Muslims and the Serbs. The Muslims would have these
24 enclaves, so to speak, and the Serbs would have these areas that can sort
25 of visually be linked, Semberija, Romanija, and Herzegovina.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted and can we
3 take the break then?
4 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit Number D3998, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at
7 25 past 1.00.
8 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.37 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 1.28 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.
12 Once again could we have the map, please, 1D03931. This time an
13 unmarked one.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. President, we saw the decision, or rather, the recommendation
16 of the Serb Assembly, the Assembly of the Serb People, to establish Serb
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be
19 assisted with the electronic pen.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Can you tell us whether these ethnic boundaries, the boundaries
22 of these ethnic areas coincide with the municipalities of the -- with the
23 borders of municipalities or is there a difference?
24 A. These ethnic areas do not coincide with the borders of
25 municipalities in the areas where the two colours, if you will, of ethnic
1 areas - how do I put this? - where they meet. I can give you an example.
2 Right here --
3 Q. Please do draw what I'm going to ask you to draw. Do you see the
4 municipality of Bihac?
5 A. I see it, it's right here.
6 Q. Could you please draw all the areas that are encompassed by the
7 Bihac municipality.
8 A. I hope that I will do this right. This is the municipality of
10 Q. Thank you. If a Serb municipality of Bihac is established, what
11 does it include?
12 A. If a Serb municipality of Bihac were to be established, it could
13 include -- well, I'll try now, this area that is blue. Right here,
14 that's one.
15 Q. What about a Muslim municipality of Bihac, what would that
17 A. This area. Muslim municipalities. So what is marked in green
18 and that is within the boundaries of the overall municipality of Bihac.
19 Q. Thank you. What about the southern part that is left out, is
20 that the municipality of Bihac as well, to the south?
21 A. Well, possibly. I'm not very precise, am I? Maybe this part is
22 included by Bihac too? I was not precise.
23 Q. Green, green.
24 A. Possibly. Possibly. All of this might be Bihac, that is to say,
25 this area, green, that's Bihac, just like the blue one over there. But
1 of course, the blue denotes the area populated by Serbs, whereas the
2 green denotes areas where the majority population is Muslim, so not the
3 entire population, the majority population is Muslim.
4 Q. Thank you. Could you mark the boundaries of Bosanska Krupa now.
5 What does it include?
6 A. Now, Bosanska Krupa, I think that this is Bosanska Krupa.
7 Actually, could it be blown up a bit, this map. I'm so sorry.
8 Q. No, Mr. President. We lose the drawing. However, perhaps no
9 harm done in blowing it up and having the drawing repeated so that it
10 could be more precise.
11 A. Maybe I could take the liberty of saying -- well, sorry. Maybe
12 this could be Bosanska Krupa, maybe this, so this part here, if my
13 drawing is right.
14 Q. Thank you. Was Bosanska Krupa on the left bank of the Una as
16 A. Certainly. Well, this is a free drawing because I'm not precise,
17 but it was on the left side too. Maybe I can do this free drawing and
18 then there is part on the right bank of the Una too. One were Serb areas
19 and the other Muslim areas, and the Una went through the municipality of
20 Bihac and the municipality of Krupa.
21 Q. Thank you. If Serbs establish a Serb municipality of Krupa and
22 if Deputy Vjesnica [phoen], after the beginning of the war, says: In the
23 Serb municipality of Krupa there is not a single Muslim and I hope that
24 there never will be one for as long as the fighting is going on, which
25 part of Krupa is he referring to?
1 A. He is referring to the Serb part of Krupa, which is predominantly
2 populated by Serbs, or rather, Serbs are an absolute majority. So in
3 that part of the municipality where the Serbs are a majority.
4 Q. Thank you. Now, please, this Muslim enclave, do take a look at
5 it. Does it include Kljuc, Sanski Most, and part of Prijedor? Which
6 municipalities are we sharing with the Muslims and Croats in the
7 Sana River valley? Could you please mark this in blue -- no, red, red.
8 Could you mark the Sana River from Novi Grad to Prijedor to the south.
9 A. I think here, because you cannot really see it so well, I assume
10 that the Sana River, Novi Grad, that Sana is here.
11 Q. Mr. President, it has to pass through Prijedor, so can you please
12 take a look at that.
13 A. Well, I can't see it. Yes, it does flow through Prijedor and
14 then enters Novi Grad -- ah, excuse me, Sana is here from what I can see.
15 I think that's it. It passes through Prijedor. This is Prijedor here;
16 isn't that right?
17 Q. And were these municipalities ethnically homogenous or have
18 ethnically homogenous parts and were thus divided between the Serbs and
19 the Muslims?
20 A. This image shows that there was a division of these
21 municipalities between the Muslims and the Croats, Krupa, Prijedor, and
22 Bihac, these ones that we mentioned.
23 Q. And the Croats?
24 A. Yes, the Croats. It's just this part. This area marked in brown
25 is Croatian, this brown area here.
1 Q. Thank you. Can I now please ask you to draw in the outlines of
2 the Zvornik municipality and to tell us what made up the municipality of
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Krajisnik.
5 I'm not sure whether -- if we would be assisted if we look at
6 this marked map later on. Why don't we re-draw it. Just zoom in on the
7 western part and then let's draw these three drawings again.
8 MR. TIEGER: And --
9 JUDGE KWON: And let's do it separately with Zvornik.
10 MR. TIEGER: Yes, and as long as the Court has stopped this for a
11 moment to ask about its utility, may I ask what precisely is the
12 underlying utility of having this witness guess at municipal boundaries
13 which can be identified on a number of much more reliable documents that
14 we have.
15 JUDGE KWON: I don't think that this is -- the purpose of this
16 exercise is not to find out exact border of municipality, but -- let's
17 zoom in it first on the western part. We can ...
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
19 Q. His Excellency, Judge Kwon, is right. We can just sketch it. It
20 doesn't have to be precise. All I'm interested in --
21 JUDGE KWON: Let's zoom it one further. Further. Upper part.
22 Yes. First, could you draw the border-line of Bihac first.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. Now this is
24 much more easy to see. This is Bihac. I will try to indicate that. I
25 think this too. This is Bihac.
1 JUDGE KWON: Number 1 for Serbian part.
2 THE WITNESS: Number 1, yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: Number 2 for Muslim part.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes.
5 JUDGE KWON: And now with black pen, could you mark the
6 Bosanska Krupa.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is Krupa from what I can see,
8 this is Krupa. I don't know whether it's that part at the top, but from
9 what I can see, Krupa is this part here. Probably it's like this as
10 well. This is Krupa, 3 is the Muslim area, and 4 is the Serbian area.
11 JUDGE KWON: And what did you ask, Mr. Karadzic, to
12 Mr. Krajisnik, Sana River? What did you ask next?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked him to mark the Una River,
14 but you can see it exactly. It's where these two lines or these two
15 colours meet.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Can you please draw that line between that -- the Sana and then
18 going through the Prijedor enclave. Perhaps you can draw that line as
20 A. Well, I think this is the Sana. The Sana flows through
21 Novi Grad, it passes through Prijedor.
22 Q. Does it pass through Sanski Most and close to Kljuc?
23 A. It passes through Sanski Most. This is Sanski Most. And it
24 passes through Kljuc, yes, it passes through Kljuc. Yes, this is Kljuc.
25 Q. Thank you. And now can you please mark in blue, let's say,
1 Sanski Most, the municipality of Sanski Most, its borders, because it's
2 already partly marked.
3 A. This is Sanski Most. This is Sanski Most. Sanski Most.
4 Q. Thank you. Can you please mark the Serbian part with the number
5 5 and the Muslim part with the number 6.
6 A. Well, perhaps we could mark Prijedor first because I marked that
7 as well. Well, all right, 5 is the Serbian part and 6 is the Muslim part
8 of Sanski Most, that is.
9 Q. Thank you. Could you please indicate the boundaries of the
10 municipality of Prijedor and mark that.
11 A. Sanski Most --
12 Q. And Prijedor.
13 A. Ah, Prijedor. Well, from what I can see, I think this is like
14 this -- no, no, excuse me. This is Prijedor. I don't know if I'm
15 precise enough. Perhaps I went too far a bit this way, but more or less,
16 this is the area of Prijedor.
17 Q. Could you mark the Croatian part with a number 7, with the number
18 8 the Muslim part, and with the number 9 the Serbian part of Prijedor.
19 A. 7 is the Croat part, 8 is the Muslim part, and 9, 9 is the
20 Serbian part.
21 Q. Thank you. Since we're unable to zoom in and out, could you
22 please date and sign this map. And could you please tell us if there was
23 a recommendation or the possibility -- it's not 2011, I'm sorry, it's
25 A. I apologise.
1 Q. If there was a recommendation to form two municipalities, could
2 you please tell us what one of them would consist of and what the other
3 would consist of. Could you use Bihac, Krupa, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and
4 Kljuc as examples, please.
5 A. According to this map, those who would be forming the Bihac
6 municipality would go out and make the boundaries out in the field, but
7 the normal thing would be that this part marked in green, that part would
8 be a Muslim municipality of Bihac. This part marked in blue should be
9 the Serbian part of this municipality. Since Una flows through Bihac,
10 then it would be normal for the right bank settlements -- the area to the
11 right of the Una belonged to the Serbs and the area to the left of the
12 Una would belong to the Muslims.
13 Q. All right. Thank you. And what would remain as common territory
14 at the level of the town of Bihac; i.e., how many of our towns are parts
15 of different municipalities and how many of them are just in one
17 A. Well, I could say that a large number of municipalities could be
18 formed like this. There are examples, though, where it was just the area
19 of one municipality where the authorities, the power would remain in
20 power because it was made up of representatives of citizens who are
21 inhabiting that area. Here everybody would have their own territory but
22 there would be joint functions as well. The best example would be Bihac
23 where the joint power or municipal structure could remain intact, but
24 also it could be separate, it could be divided, if that is what they
1 Q. If one were to say or make a recommendation that Serbs, Croats,
2 and Muslims in Prijedor formed their own municipalities within that
3 single town, what would be part of one, the second, and the third
5 A. Well, this is the Prijedor area, if I was precise enough. So
6 that area, let's say, of the Prijedor municipality could be that area
7 coloured in brown. And number 7 could be used to form the Croatian
8 municipality. This area marked in the colour green would be the area
9 where a Muslim municipality would be formed. The area in blue is where a
10 Serbian municipality could be formed. As you can see here, at the edges
11 of this brown-coloured and the blue-coloured territory we can see
12 Prijedor. Therefore, it's possible that the boundaries of the
13 municipalities would be in the town itself. There would be no walls or
14 anything like that, but on one side of the street would be one
15 municipality and another on the other. But there would be no formal
16 boundaries. So each of the sides could establish power in that area
17 inhabited by members of one ethnic community.
18 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us, after the war how the
19 Dayton Agreements resolved the territorial issues in the municipality of
21 A. The municipality of Kljuc is a small part of the municipality --
22 actually, a small part of the municipality was assigned to the Serbs,
23 that is, Ribnik, a smaller area. The bulk of the municipality, including
24 the town itself, was assigned to the Muslims or to the Federation of
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina. The boundary was drawn quite imprecisely. There
1 are some areas that were assigned to one or the other entity, but that's
2 how the border was drawn, whereby municipality of Kljuc was divided into
3 two municipalities.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move the image a little bit
6 towards the east, please.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this image as Exhibit D3999.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 And can we now have the same map but can we look at the eastern
10 part of it around the Drina River.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. While we're waiting, Mr. President, are you able to tell us
13 whether it was unusual to have several municipalities in one town or not.
14 How many municipalities are there in Sarajevo before the war?
15 A. It's quite usual. All towns, especially large towns, have a
16 number of municipalities. The town of Sarajevo itself had ten
17 municipalities before the war, and today on the Serb side there are seven
18 or eight and also more or less the same number on the Muslim side.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move towards the east,
21 please, towards the right. This is fine. I think we can stop here.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Could you please look at the municipality of Brcko, please, and
24 tell us the territories that comprise that municipality, the municipality
25 of Brcko. And could you please tell us how many municipalities were
1 formed during the war and after the war in the district of Brcko, that's
2 what it's called today?
3 A. Well, there's a problem here because there are no municipal
4 boundaries shown here, but I will do my best. All right. I'm going to
5 try to do this now. I think that Brcko is here, the town of Brcko, and I
6 think that the municipality -- there are no boundaries. Tuzla is towards
7 the south. I think that it was like this, but this is just a very
8 roughly drawn map. There were three municipalities: A Croat one, a
9 Muslim one, and a Serb one.
10 Q. Thank you. And was this something that was proposed even before
11 the war or did this just turn out like that and was formed like this
12 during the war?
13 A. There were proposals for that before the war, but during the war
14 it was actually implemented in practice, if I can put it that way.
15 Q. Thank you. Do we see the entire municipality of Zvornik here so
16 that we don't have to move the map? Can you roughly indicate the
17 territory of the municipality of Zvornik?
18 A. The town of Zvornik is here, and now I'm going to just make an
19 estimate. I can roughly indicate that it was like this even though it's
20 a rough estimate. I think this is how the boundaries of the former
21 municipality of Zvornik lay.
22 Q. And which territories comprised that municipality?
23 A. This municipality comprised Muslim and Serb inhabitants.
24 Q. Thank you. And who controlled these green areas of the Zvornik
25 municipality during the war, to the west of the town?
1 A. I think that almost at the very boundary or at the outskirts of
2 the city, more or less here, was where the border was. A part was
3 controlled by the Muslims and the other part was controlled by the Serbs.
4 So this was controlled by the Serbs and this other part by the Muslims.
5 This is the area controlled by the Serbs. I'm going to mark this. This
6 would be the area controlled by the Serbs, this would be the area
7 controlled by the Muslims, this would be the area controlled by the
8 Serbs, and then this would be the area controlled by the Muslims.
9 Q. Thank you. Since we don't want to move the map so that we don't
10 lose the markings, I would just ask you to sign and date this map,
12 A. [Marks]
13 Q. And what was the name of this area around Bijeljina before the
14 war and during the war?
15 A. This area here, this entire area, I can mark it, is called
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document,
19 please, this is document 4000, a landmark.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Yes, we'll admit it, Exhibit D4000.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Can we now scroll up so that we could see the mid-Drina area and
23 the boundaries of the municipalities' ethnic areas. A little bit more,
24 please. Very well. This is good.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. The Serbian territories are not clearly indicated in Bratunac so
2 we won't dwell on that, but could you please look at the municipalities
3 of, let's say, Visegrad, Gorazde. Perhaps you could look at the
4 municipality of Visegrad and that area, then Rogatica, Gorazde, and
5 Srbinje or Foca.
6 A. Yes, I can see it well. Do I need to mark anything?
7 Q. Yes, please. Mark both territories.
8 A. Visegrad municipality, if I can see this well, should be here.
9 The border, the boundary is not marked here, but since this is Rogatica,
10 then the boundary should run this way. It's not very precise, but that's
11 roughly it because this is Visegrad -- I think this is a bit imprecise.
12 Rogatica should be -- and I apologise for my imprecision again. This
13 could be -- I'm not sure. I think this could be Rogatica, this.
14 Q. What about Gorazde?
15 A. Gorazde could be like this. Maybe it's even here on the other
16 side. So this is Gorazde.
17 Q. I beg your pardon, just a moment. Does Gorazde cross over to the
18 Serbian part?
19 A. Yes, I'm sorry, maybe. This is Cajnice. I'm saying this with a
20 grain of salt because I'm not entirely sure. Gorazde is on both sides of
21 the Drina River, the Drina River being here.
22 Q. And tell us what territory's covered by Srbinje, or rather, the
23 name before and the name now is Foca?
24 A. This is Srbinje. I think the boundary runs like this. This is
25 Srbinje. So this is not Gorazde, after all, this is Srbinje. I can't
1 see the boundaries clearly.
2 Q. Mr. Speaker, in these municipalities on the Drina, were the
3 conditions in place for establishing two municipalities?
4 A. In all of these municipalities, all of the prerequisites were
5 there for forming both Muslim and Serb municipalities.
6 Q. How did the Dayton Accords deal with the Gorazde municipality?
7 A. We can see very easily that Gorazde is a place where part of the
8 territory went to the Serb entity and another part to the Federation of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. A part of other municipalities was attached to
10 Gorazde, actually, to create a corridor to Sarajevo, to create a bypass.
11 Q. Srbinje municipality, or rather, Foca, did part of Foca remain
12 within the Federation? Was it divided like Gorazde?
13 A. Yes. It too was divided, and to this day there is a Muslim
14 municipality of Foca, although the town of Foca went to the Serb entity.
15 Q. And what was envisaged before the war? Without a war, how much
16 would Muslims and Serbs hold respectively in Foca itself?
17 A. The municipality would be divided into two --
18 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: It's not -- I mean, it's a little too -- what was
21 envisaged before the war? By whom? By what? This is kind of a
22 free-floating abstract concept that can be lifted and applied anywhere.
23 So more specificity is going to be necessary for this to be meaningful in
24 any way.
25 JUDGE KWON: I'm wondering what is the point of this exercise.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will rephrase.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Mr. Speaker, before the war, were there any negotiations about
4 transforming these municipalities into two municipalities each and what
5 did these negotiations have in mind for Foca?
6 A. There was several representatives from both ethnic communities in
7 the Assembly, and I have information that they conducted negotiations
8 between them about dividing the municipality into two municipalities,
9 wherein the Serbian territories would go to the Serb municipality and the
10 Muslim neighbourhoods to the Muslim municipality.
11 Q. To what extent did Dayton Accords verify that? Did Ribnik really
12 go to the Serbs? Did Sanski Most go to the Muslims? Did part of Zvornik
13 remain in the Muslim municipality? And what about a part of Pale? Can
14 you give us municipalities which the Dayton Accords sanctioned as
16 A. Looking at the map we can see that very easily. Most of the
17 municipalities were divided along ethnic lines. I'll give you a graphic
18 example. Before coming here to testify, I was departing from the
19 Sarajevo airport. I was passing through the part of Serbian Sarajevo,
20 and the taxi-driver told me: This is the ethnic boundary, and that's one
21 street. On one side of the street is one ethnic community and the other
22 ethnic community has the other side of the street. And I said: How
23 come? And he said: Nobody really thinks twice about having it divided
24 along one street. That's one example, but you have examples of another
25 kind, like in Zvornik. Similar examples can be found in Kljuc, in parts
1 of --
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I'm really at a loss where we are
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, I have
5 been charged by this indictment that I wanted municipalities to be
6 divided, that is, charged against me as a crime, that I proposed or that
7 it was effected by the war that Muslims were divided, as had been
8 suggested before the war. I am looking into how the United Nations dealt
9 with this same problem in Dayton, when they didn't have to shoot and all
10 they held in their hands were pencils --
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, I don't think you were charged for
12 wanting municipalities to be divided, but I'll leave it to you. It's up
13 to you how to use your time. Please continue.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. But as part of the
15 joint criminal enterprise, one reason, although it's a contradiction, one
16 part of the JCE for the removal of Muslims and Croats is the division of
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. May I ask you, Mr. Speaker, to put a date and signature here.
20 You don't need to put in numbers because it's obvious from the colour of
21 different areas.
22 A. [Marks]
23 JUDGE KWON: This will be next Defence exhibit.
24 THE REGISTRAR: D4001, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I shall now cite several adjudicated facts from your trial, from
4 your trial judgement. Adjudicated fact 1915:
5 [In English] "However, among the functions" --
6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Adjudicated facts in our case cited
7 from Mr. Krajisnik's case? Very well.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the Krajisnik trial judgement,
9 paragraph 49:
10 [In English] "However, among the functions, the SDS assigned to
11 the Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities was the organisation of
12 its defence in times of war or imminent threat of war."
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Did the Serbian Democratic Party have any possibility or the
15 right to grant this competence to the municipality of the Bosnian
16 Krajina? Is this adjudicated fact accurate?
17 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER: All right. I considered whether or not to object to
19 presenting the witness with the adjudicated fact rather than the basic
20 issue and having him provide information about that in a non-leading
21 fashion but decided, okay, we'll let the adjudicated fact be presented.
22 But then I don't think the accused should start answering the question
23 for the witness in the course of the alleged question proposed by
24 suggesting reasons why, in his view, the adjudicated fact can be attacked
25 by the witness. Let's try to keep it if -- I mean, it's already
1 problematic under the circumstances, but to lead the witness in this
2 fashion is unacceptable.
3 JUDGE KWON: This adjudicated fact says SDS assigned certain
4 tasks to Bosnian Krajina communities of municipalities, and he questioned
5 whether SDS has any possibility of the right --
6 MR. TIEGER: [Overlapping speakers] --
7 JUDGE KWON: -- to the municipality.
8 MR. TIEGER: Right. I mean, the question is not asking the
9 witness to comment on that one way or another; it's focusing -- directing
10 his attention to particular alleged aspects of the situation that the
11 accused thinks can bear on the accuracy of the adjudicated fact. Given
12 the fact that we're already presenting him with a fact rather than
13 eliciting -- we're already presenting a witness who, for various reasons
14 we know, identifies with the accused. Now we're presenting him with a
15 fact that the accused -- it's basically telling him: I would like you to
16 attack, if possible, and on top -- which I let go by, and now he's
17 essentially telling him how to do that.
18 JUDGE KWON: And then, in your view, how should the question have
19 been formulated?
20 MR. TIEGER: He can always say something to the effect of: Can
21 you shed any light on this adjudicated fact? He could have started from
22 the proposition: Can you tell us about the nature of the Bosnian Krajina
23 community of municipalities and what its organisational components were,
24 et cetera. I mean, there are various ways to do it.
25 JUDGE KWON: Now I see your point, yes.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could do that, but I'm only
2 interested in the defence function of Krajina. Did it derive from powers
3 granted it by the SDS as stated in the judgement? In fact, is this
4 adjudicated fact accurate --
5 JUDGE KWON: But -- that's correct, but --
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- however, the issue is much
7 broader and I'll come to the other part as well.
8 JUDGE KWON: -- by putting your previous overture, it may be
9 viewed as if you are feeding the answer to the witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll put it simply.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Is this adjudicated fact correct or not? And in either case,
13 explain why.
14 JUDGE KWON: Because he did not have the adjudicated facts before
15 him, could you read it again. I will read it for you.
16 "... among the functions of the SDS assigned to the Bosnian
17 Krajina community of municipalities was the organisation of its defence
18 in times of war or imminent threat of war."
19 Is this not correct?
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid it was not interpreted
21 correctly and it's not correct in the transcript either. It's not "among
22 the functions of the SDS," it should be -- [In English] "Among the
23 functions that" -- it doesn't say "that," but "among the functions the
24 SDS assigned to the Bosnian" --
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'm sorry.
1 "... among the functions the SDS assigned to the Bosnian Krajina
2 community of municipalities was the organisation of its defence in times
3 of war or imminent threat of war."
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judges, this adjudicated fact is
5 not correct and I will explain why it is not. The Law on All People's
6 Defence stipulated precisely that all municipalities are entitled to
7 organise All People's Defence. The municipalities having that power --
8 another law which stipulates that they may associate, or rather, join
9 into associations, by virtue of that law all the powers that one
10 municipality has can be conjoined at the level of the association of
11 municipalities. Now, in our case several municipalities decided to join
12 the association of the Krajina municipalities, and you can see exactly
13 from these laws why this adjudicated is not correct.
14 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I asked you about the associations of municipalities. Based on
17 whose will they were formed and were they established once and for all or
18 were they subject to modification?
19 A. In the times of socialism, communism, associations of
20 municipalities were formed by virtue of directives and many
21 municipalities were unhappy with the choice of association to which they
22 were assigned. And their interests were not necessarily best served by
23 that particular association. And generally speaking, there was always a
24 desire to make associations based on economic interest. And even before
25 the war, all these legal possibilities were used for political purposes.
1 And had there been no war, these associations would never have acquired
2 another dimension that can be misinterpreted and abused.
3 Q. Adjudicated fact 1913:
4 [In English] "During the first months of 1991, the SDS began to
5 organise Serb-majority municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina into
6 communities of municipalities, in some cases severing ties with
7 pre-existing communities of municipalities."
8 [Interpretation] Was this taken to be a sin of yours? Was this
9 lawful? Were we allowed to do that? Could the municipality change the
10 community it belonged to?
11 A. Less than a minute ago I said that many municipalities wished to
12 join either one community or the other. This was certainly always a wish
13 that was being expressed, but not a single municipality could leave a
14 community and join another one without the consent of the
15 Municipal Assembly. So everything that happened had to be based on a
16 decision by the Municipal Assembly of a particular municipality. So this
17 certainly cannot be ascribed to the SDS, that the SDS initiated that. It
18 was people from that municipality, members of parliament, assemblymen,
19 citizens, they could articulate their requests in a certain way. That
20 was quite permissible, but there was a procedure involved for leaving one
21 municipality -- one community of municipalities and joining another one.
22 Q. [No interpretation]
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. "SDS party leaders justified the associations" of municipalities
2 "in terms of economic necessity."
3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I'm not sure --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure --
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure Mr. Krajisnik heard the question.
6 But before we come to 1914 adjudicated fact, what was wrong with
7 the previous adjudicated fact? The adjudicated fact did not deal with
8 legality of that forming communities of municipalities. You said -- I'm
9 asking Mr. Krajisnik.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon. Could you
11 please repeat your question. How did you understand this? Maybe I've
12 made a mistake.
13 JUDGE KWON: I'll read the adjudicated fact, and then you tell us
14 what was wrong with it.
15 Adjudicated fact 1913 from your trial judgement, paragraph 48:
16 "During the first months of 1991, the SDS began to organise
17 Serb-majority municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina into communities of
18 municipalities, in some cases severing ties with pre-existing communities
19 of municipalities."
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly these former communities
21 of municipalities were being severed, but it was because of the will of
22 the citizens on the ground. They couldn't have done that without a
23 decision taken by a Municipal Assembly. If there was will to do that on
24 the ground, then they could do that. It could be severed as is stated,
25 or actually they could cut through one community. They could join
1 another one. How do I put this? At first the entire municipality would
2 have to move on to another community if there is a decision to that
3 effect taken by the Municipal Assembly.
4 JUDGE KWON: I still do not understand what was wrong with this
5 adjudicated fact as I read it to you.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it wasn't a
7 municipality that was being split, or rather, it wasn't a community that
8 was being split. One municipality could separate from one community and
9 join another community.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. What about the SDS --
12 JUDGE KWON: This adjudicated fact does not mention a split at
13 all or separation.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, maybe then the translation is
15 not good. It says here "split."
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The severing of ties.
17 JUDGE KWON: Oh, severing ties. Oh, yes.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. That's one. And the other thing I'm interested in is whether it
20 was the SDS that started this and ordered that and organised that.
21 A. It is very easy to establish who it was that did that. The SDS
22 could not have done that, although that was a party that articulated Serb
23 interests. It was people on the ground who decided depending on their
24 situation right there where they lived. Different parties, different
1 Q. Thank you. From a legal point of view, how do things stand if
2 there is a republican law and a federal law which is applied if they are
3 not harmonised? Which one has priority?
4 A. Federal law had priority.
5 Q. Now I would like to draw your attention to adjudicated fact 1918.
6 I don't need to read out all of it. I can recount what it says. At any
7 rate, municipal authorities were supposed to make sure that only Yugoslav
8 laws were being applied, suspending the implementation of republican
9 regulations, thus creating legal foundations for communication,
10 co-operation, and the like between these municipalities and the
11 Federation and its organs, like the Socialist Federative Republic of
12 Yugoslavia -- actually, the Assembly of that Yugoslavia and the Federal
13 Executive Council and so on and so forth.
14 So can you tell us what our legal system had envisaged and
15 whether this was impermissible.
16 A. In the former system, republican and federal laws were
17 harmonised. Federal law could not be suspended by applying only
18 republican laws. That would have been unconstitutional, so federal law
19 had to be abided by. It could only be changed at federal level. It
20 could not be suspended by the republican Assembly or republican organs.
21 Q. Thank you. A while ago I already asked you whether we could
22 declare territories, Serb ethnic territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be
23 an integral part of Yugoslavia. That is adjudicated fact 1946. Could we
24 or were we supposed to declare that to be Yugoslavia? You said that that
25 already had been Yugoslavia and was Yugoslavia.
1 A. At that moment, in 1991, Yugoslavia did exist and all of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina was within Yugoslavia. We did not have any need to
3 say: This is Yugoslavia now and the others who have not expressed their
4 views are not Yugoslavia. Perhaps this has been misinterpreted. Perhaps
5 this has been written erroneously. In this area where the plebiscite was
6 carried out, these people have voted in favour of Yugoslavia and actually
7 that was the basis to show where the citizens had voted for a political
8 solution within which Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain within Yugoslavia.
9 Q. Thank you. Our solutions and our proposals, did they imply that
10 what we were asking for ourselves --
11 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me --
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. -- was something that we were denying others --
14 MR. TIEGER: Objection.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. TIEGER: I mean, again we're heading towards a leading
17 answer. I mean, if he wants to know what the implication was of a
18 particular solution and proposal, he can ask that and find out what the
19 witness has to say instead of continually suggesting to the witness the
20 answer he wants.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, sustained.
22 Could you reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. One adjudicated fact, and I'm going to read it out to you,
1 suggests that we were denying others what we had envisaged for
2 ourselves --
3 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, excuse me, that's a very transparently
4 backdoor way of doing the same thing that I just objected to and that was
5 sustained. So now he's interpreting the adjudicated fact for the benefit
6 of the witness. Anyway, you can see what's going on. I object again.
7 JUDGE KWON: What adjudicated fact are you referring to?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1947. It would be best if I were
9 to read it out. I wanted to link it up to the municipalities.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Did we deny them the right to establish a municipality of their
12 own in places where we established our Serb municipalities?
13 A. We did not deny that. And there are so many statements of mine
14 and of other top people from the Serb leadership who said at the time
15 everything that we are proposing, suggesting, actually we are allowing
16 the others the right to do that. We are not imposing anything on others.
17 You can check my statements and you will see that that was our policy.
18 Q. If the Trial Chamber allows me to do so, I'm going to read out
19 verbatim adjudicated fact 1947 which speaks to the contrary. It will be
21 JUDGE KWON: "Which speaks to the contrary" was leading. But
22 please read out verbatim adjudicated fact 1947.
23 THE ACCUSED: "If the majority in one municipality had voted to
24 remain within Yugoslavia, the whole of that municipality would remain.
25 Municipalities where the majority of the people had not participated in
1 the plebiscite (and were, thus, presumably, non-Serb-majority
2 municipalities), the SDS proposed to look at single communes or
3 settlements; if local communes voted to remain, then only that community
4 would be considered part of Yugoslavia, while the rest of the territory
5 of the municipality would be allowed to join an independent Bosnia and
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So let me explain. What they are saying, this adjudicated fact
9 suggests --
10 MR. TIEGER: Wait --
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
12 Q. -- that we would not have allowed a local --
13 MR. TIEGER: Objection. I'm sorry, I shouldn't say "wait."
14 That's astonishing --
15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Yes, I will intervene. It's your
16 trial judgement, paragraph 74. I don't think you need explanation from
17 Mr. Karadzic. Can you tell us whether that part of adjudicated fact is
18 correct or not.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judges, that is not correct and I
20 can explain why it is that it's not correct.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please go on.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Two things are being confused here.
23 One is stating one's views during a plebiscite, that is to say, the
24 number of citizens from municipalities -- from a municipality that voted
25 for remaining in Yugoslavia. This was not viewed in a territorial way
1 because in one municipality, say, 60 per cent of the citizens can vote in
2 favour and all of them can be within the city itself, whereas the other
3 areas may have voted in favour of having a Bosnia-Herzegovina. Later on,
4 like this map, that was a basis where you could see exactly where certain
5 citizens lived, Serbs and Muslims. That was a basis for - how do I put
6 this? - demarcation within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Out of 1.300.000,
7 700.000, how many were there, Serbs, together with Yugoslavs, the
8 plebiscite just showed what the will of the Serb people was, how willing
9 they were to stay in Yugoslavia.
10 Now, what is creating confusion here and which perhaps - how do I
11 put this? - contributed to this confusion was that subsequent activities
12 in a way caught up with the plebiscite. Now, what are these activities?
13 We know that 60 per cent from one municipality voted in favour of
14 remaining in Yugoslavia, and then what is being spelled out in very
15 precise terms is where the Serbs live, where the Muslims live, and
16 independently of the vote a demarcation is made. So this fact actually
17 sublimated two activities that have nothing to do with one another.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Do you remember that in peace time,
21 before the war, some minority local communes voted in favour of joining a
22 neighbouring municipality and that we always approved of that?
23 A. That did happen. I know, for example, in Skender Vakuf there was
24 that kind of example. One local commune said: I don't want to be in one
25 municipality, I want to be in another municipality. And these two
1 municipalities actually agreed on that. This Dobratic, the one that
2 would -- they would leave and the other one where they would go. For
3 example, in Bijeljina also, Janja and Bijeljina, there would be two
4 municipalities, if that's what we can call this initiative which was in
5 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it was not carried through.
6 Q. Now I'm going to stop with the adjudicated facts because that
7 subject matter was already dealt with during the negotiations.
8 Now, could you please tell us about this 18th of March, when part
9 of the Lisbon Agreement was being discussed between the three parties?
10 A. Between the 17th and 18th of March, three delegations, the Serb,
11 Croat, and Muslim delegations, had a meeting at a residence called Konak
12 in Sarajevo. Then under the chairmanship of Mr. Cutileiro they agreed on
13 the principles for resolving the crisis. Let me paraphrase by saying
14 that, the crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We agreed on the basis of these
15 principles that we transform Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina be reorganised into three entities on the basis of the
17 census. There was a proposal for 1981 and for 1991, when other
18 principles would be involved, geography, transportation and some other
19 criterion that would supplement this first basic ethnic criterion. Then
20 all three parties accommodated their views, and immediately on the next
21 day, the 18th, we went before the Assembly and we asked our members of
22 parliament to agree to the consent expressed by our delegation in view of
23 these principles.
24 Q. Can you tell us what was accepted at that Assembly and what
25 remained outstanding?
1 A. The principles were accepted and what remained was to work on the
2 maps, and on specifying the authority exercised at central level and
3 local levels. So the principals say that these principles and that map
4 are the basis for further talks in order to reach a final solution.
5 Q. Thank you. Now I'm going to put to you 2004, another adjudicated
6 fact, from paragraph 124 of your trial judgement. I'm going to read it
7 out verbatim.
8 [In English] "In response to an invitation from Jose Cutileiro,
9 international mediator, to continue the multi-party negotiations, the
10 Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously rejected a draft of the constitutional
11 arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
12 [Interpretation] Is that correct?
13 A. That's not correct. It's a very well-known fact.
14 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us, in both our indictments it is
15 alleged that you, on the 18th of March, said: Now we are going in -- now
16 go into the field - and maybe it's I who said it - now go into the field
17 to put into practice what we had agreed. Tell me, what had we agreed?
18 What was it about?
19 A. That's a reference to an agreement made the day before and no
20 conspiracy is involved. I'll explain very briefly because that's a basis
21 for my involvement in the JCE. I am collecting new evidence to prove
22 that I was not a member of the JCE and that my participation was not
23 substantial, and I found that evidence. It's video footage from that
24 session where there is a difference between the transcript and what I
25 actually said. I hired an agency that made an expertise, providing an
1 expert report, establishing that I was talking about a previous meeting
2 and not some underhand play. The word used was "fortify," and the
3 Chamber concluded that I was calling people to arms to fortify our
4 territories, whereas in our language "fortify" can also mean
5 "consolidate," "determine," "establish." I was talking about
6 consolidating an agreement, not calling people to arms to fortify our
7 territories. And experts in the area determined that this was absolutely
8 not a reference to what was concluded it was a reference to in my
9 judgement, and I will be able to provide that evidence.
10 Q. So who made an agreement about what before our 18th of March
11 session? Did Serbs agree on anything amongst themselves?
12 A. Three delegations, Muslims, Serbs, and Croat, and the
13 representative of the international community had agreed about principles
14 on the basis of which they would make a future agreement. There was no
15 separate agreement of ours on any issue. I was referring to the
16 agreement made the previous day with Mr. Cutileiro.
17 Q. Thank you. Mr. Speaker, you told us what remained to be agreed.
18 Was it necessary to reconsider the already agreed things, such as
19 constitutional principles, the principle of transforming Bosnia into
20 three entities and such? Could we apply that on the ground or did that
21 have to wait as well?
22 A. What had been agreed at that meeting was agreed, and the
23 principles were not subject to change. We could see that, you know,
24 people can always go against an agreement but they were not supposed to
25 be changed. We were supposed to continue work at grass-root level to see
1 which peripheral areas would end up in which entity. The map that you
2 will see in the transcript I referred to was based on the proposal of the
3 Muslim representative who said that it's better to go into the field to
4 see which territory belongs to whom rather than do that in an office. So
5 establishing territories -- identifying, perhaps is the best word,
6 identifying territories on the ground. Finding an arrangement that would
7 enable Serbs to end up in the Serb entity and Muslims to go to the Muslim
8 entity. It was allowed to make adjustments for villages in peripheral
9 areas to join one entity rather than another.
10 Q. Now it was interpreted as "establishing territories," not
12 Do you remember what Lord Carrington used to say very often:
13 Stick to the principles. And he said it very often whenever somebody
14 showed a willingness to go back on the principles.
15 A. My English is not that good, but I know that he meant if
16 something has been agreed, you can't start discussions from scratch. We
17 can only continue from the point where we left off.
18 Q. Thank you. At that session of the Assembly, the words "take
19 power" were also uttered. Do you distinguish in our language between the
20 words "take over power" and "take power"?
21 MR. TIEGER: Wait, wait -- what --
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Continually leading questions, and an obvious
24 reflection of the fact that this -- the accused can't trust this
25 witness -- even this witness to provide him with the answers he wants,
1 but has to tell him those in advance here in court.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely not. I want to point
3 out some linguistic problems because what was said there was "take
4 power," whereas the indictment says "the Serbs took over power." I just
5 want to ask the witness what was understood by "take power."
6 JUDGE KWON: You could simply ask the witness what's the meaning
7 of "to take power" in the transcript.
8 But before we go there, in relation to the previous question
9 about the 18th of March session, was it referred to in the indictment?
10 THE ACCUSED: Many times.
11 MR. ROBINSON: I think he's speaking of Mr. Krajisnik's
13 JUDGE KWON: Not -- but he -- Mr. Karadzic also referred to his
14 indictment, both of our indictments. I couldn't find it.
15 THE ACCUSED: Many Serb -- [Interpretation] I am often admonished
16 that I recommended the take over of power at that Assembly session and
17 that the Serbs later took over power in these municipalities --
18 JUDGE KWON: No, no, no. I was simply asking whether it appears
19 in the indictment, 18th of March session, or the agreement the day
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it is stated in the
22 pre-trial brief that I --
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes --
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- asked or demanded that our
25 people take over power on the ground.
1 JUDGE KWON: No, I thought you were referring to the indictment.
2 Shall we take a break or shall we adjourn for today.
3 Mr. Krajisnik, we'll continue next week. As you know well,
4 please do not discuss about your testimony with anybody else. Is it
5 Tuesday or Monday? Yes, Tuesday. We'll resume on Tuesday morning at
7 The hearing is adjourned.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of
10 November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.