1 Tuesday, 12 November 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everybody. There are three matters
6 I'd like to deal with before we begin today. Shall we go into
7 private session.
8 [Private session]
11 Pages 43259-43260 redacted. Private session.
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Unless there is a matter to be raised,
6 we will bring in the witness.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Krajisnik.
11 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
12 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, Mr. Robinson, there is a
13 discussion among the parties as to the scheduling of witnesses? Could
14 you put it on the record?
15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, thank you. After the direct
16 examination of Mr. Krajisnik concludes, which we hope will be today or
17 tomorrow morning, we would propose to insert three witnesses who have
18 already arrived here in The Hague to be testifying. That's Mr. Puhalic,
19 Mr. Poplasen and Mr. Kupresanin. Actually Puhalic, Kupresanin and then
20 Poplasen is the order. And then we expect that that would take the
21 balance of the week and then on next Monday, because of commitments by
22 the counsel for the next witness, Mr. Brdjanin, we would propose to
23 interject his testimony and then resume the cross-examination of
24 Mr. Krajisnik either late Monday or Tuesday of next week, when
25 Mr. Brdjanin completes his testimony.
1 JUDGE KWON: Has it been agreed upon with the Prosecution?
2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And has the witness been informed of it?
4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning, your
8 Excellencies. Good morning, everyone.
9 Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.
11 A. [Interpretation] Good morning.
12 Q. I have to ask you once again and remind myself that we have to
13 make sure we make breaks. I wanted to ask you as I'm not sure whether we
14 have established that or not, when did you become a member of the
15 Main Board of the Serbian Democratic Party?
16 A. I became a member of the Main Board in 1991. I think it was on
17 the 12th of July of that year.
18 Q. Thank you. Do you remember my speech given on the
19 15th of October, 1991, before the meeting ended, and the speech had to do
20 with the adoption of a memorandum on the sovereignty by the other two
21 communities, a memorandum which is often quoted and cited here as an
22 example of threat and war mongering on my part.
23 A. Yes, I remember that.
24 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Chamber how did you
25 experience this speech? What was your impression and understanding of it
1 when you heard it live as the parliament speaker at the time?
2 A. I understood it as a warning, and an expression of concern with
3 regard to a process that was then ongoing in which certain issues would
4 be resolved in an unconstitutional manner.
5 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, could we have the exhibit number
6 of that speech, either in terms of page number of the transcript or
7 whatever? If anybody could assist us. But let's continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, we have heard that
9 speech on a number of occasions here. When I said that they should not
10 follow the same highway as Slovenia and Croatia as they would lead Bosnia
11 to hell.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. President, did this speech of mine wish for or encourage the
14 Bosnian Muslim and Croatian side to go to hell and was it an instance of
15 war mongering?
16 A. I can elaborate on this expansively, if need be, but now my
17 answer will be brief. I really understood that this was a speech of
18 warning, actually, and a great wish to reach a solution, but with a
19 warning that unfortunately what did eventually happen could happen, that
20 a war could break out and that unwanted subsequences could occur because
21 the road of secession in an unconstitutional manner, according to these
22 words as I understood them, and as it was explained to me later with
23 regard to this speech, that manner in which the status of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be resolved was not the right one. Nor could
25 it lead to a final solution that would satisfy all the parties. And
1 eventually the aim was also to prevent the war which could be seen
2 everywhere around us at that point as a possibility, a possible outcome.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: D267 is the exhibit number, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].
7 Q. Thank you. I believe that -- I'm trying to stick to the time
8 line, Mr. President, so as to make things easier for you. I think that
9 we are now past January 1992, the proclamation of Republika Srpska, the
10 preparations for holding the referendum?
11 Could you tell us what do you know about barricades which were
12 set up in Sarajevo on the 1st of March, 1992?
13 A. Last time I noted that here, as far as I remember, all three
14 delegations were at negotiations somewhere abroad. I believe it was in
15 Brussels or perhaps Geneva, because these two places were the locations
16 where we held most of the talks. And on our return, I believe that our
17 delegation was in Belgrade when we heard the news about the barricades.
18 And what caused the putting up of the barricades? It was the murder of a
19 member of a Serbian wedding party, actually the bride groom's father was
20 killed in the Sarajevo Old Town, in Bascarsija, which caused a
21 spontaneous revolt on the part of the Serbian people, also great fear and
22 concern, because through history, something like that used to happen in
23 the darkest periods -- actually, could not happen even in the darkest
24 periods of our history in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It happened immediately
25 after the referendum which had been held, and then the barricades and
1 counter-barricades that were later put up practically put all of Sarajevo
2 in a blockade.
3 Q. Thank you. Did you learn then or later in what way and at what
4 point did the Serbian Democratic Party become involved in resolving the
5 problem of the barricades? Was there a Crisis Staff before that and
6 after that, at the central party level? Did it exist?
7 A. I said last time that it was only then, for that occasion, that
8 the Crisis Staff was formed. As far as I remember, Mr. Rajko Dukic was
9 then the self-proclaimed, if I may put it so, president of the
10 Crisis Staff. Ms. Biljana Plavsic was another personality from the
11 Serbian leadership. And at this level, they were attempting in contact
12 with the other side to resolve problems.
13 Your Honours, you can find the minutes from the meetings attended
14 by Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Ejup Ganic, Mr. Dukic, Ms. Plavsic, and there was
15 an attempt to reach and find a solution, so I could say that the
16 involvement of the Serbian Democratic Party was in this spontaneous
17 revolt. At the head of the revolt was the Crisis Staff, which was
18 appointed for that specific occasion.
19 Q. Thank you. Did Bosnia survive this unrest from early March and
20 could you tell us, even though you already spoke about this, what sort of
21 events filled the month of March, in terms of the meetings between the
22 parties and the European Community and also the activities of the Serbian
23 representative bodies?
24 A. The barricades and the problems that followed after the murder of
25 the member of the wedding party and the blockade of Sarajevo, this was
1 all something that I was involved in as well, practically all of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina political establishment was actively engaged in this.
3 And, of course, the key issue was resolved at the level of the three
4 parties which made the partnership: The Party of Democratic Action, the
5 Croatian Democratic Union and the Serbian Democratic Party. The tensions
6 eased off when this crisis was overcome.
7 In fact, what followed was a continuation of negotiations and
8 bilateral and trilateral meetings of the parties, and then we held the
9 first meeting that had to do with negotiations under the auspices of
10 Mr. Cutileiro, and then the second meeting as well. As far as
11 I remember, it was on the 11th of March; and then the second one on the
12 17th of March. Please don't hold it against me if these are not the
13 exact dates. I'm certain about the 17th of March. So March was a period
14 of negotiations and a month in which we managed to come up with a high
15 quality solution which was supposed to bring an end to all the tensions,
16 and we continued the activities aimed at reaching an agreement that would
17 resolve the destiny or, rather, the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
18 Q. Thank you. Mr. President, as for the implementation of this
19 solution, and the realisation of this agreed plan, was war necessary for
21 A. I think that that was the greatest chance for Bosnia-Herzegovina,
22 I think that there was not a single reason to have war, and we can see
23 that best if we compare that solution from the 17th of March with the
24 final Dayton agreement. There are minor differences between the two. If
25 I want to be precise, I think that the side which declined the
1 Cutileiro Plan, I mean the Muslim side, perhaps got less by the Dayton
2 agreement than it would have gotten if Cutileiro's principles had been
4 Q. Thank you. Now, we've come to the moment when I have to ask you
5 something about the indictment against me and also the one against you,
6 about the existence of a joint criminal enterprise that we wanted --
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 MR. TIEGER: I think we've made objections to this kind of
9 question before, because it involves the -- it's an attempt to elicit
10 from the witness legal opinion. It's the underlying facts which are
11 significant, and that's what Dr. Karadzic should be turning his attention
12 to. So before he elaborates this kind of position, I want to again
13 object to efforts to elicit from witnesses legal analysis and legal
14 opinions which do not assist the Court.
15 JUDGE KWON: We haven't yet heard the question. Let us see.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency, I agree.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. My question is whether a joint criminal enterprise existed on the
19 Serb side, with the objective of creating an ethnically pure Serb unit or
20 Serb state?
21 A. It did not exist.
22 MR. TIEGER: I had an objection pending that was a mere effort to
23 circumvent the objection. That's why I made it in advance so it would be
24 clearly on the table. So now the issue is joined. The exact scenario
25 that I anticipated was coming from the introduction of that question was
1 realised and therefore the objection stands.
2 JUDGE KWON: Whether a joint criminal enterprise existed on the
3 Serb side, with the objective of creating an ethnically pure Serb unit or
4 Serb state. So that's a legal formulation, in your opinion, Mr. Tieger?
5 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.
6 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to respond, Mr. Robinson?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. I think simply the words
8 "joint criminal enterprise" could be changed to an "agreement" and it
9 would satisfy Mr. Tieger, but I think everybody understands and by now
10 joint criminal enterprise and a layman's point of view. But if
11 Mr. Tieger objects, then Dr. Karadzic can simply ask if there was an
12 agreement to do this and we can accomplish the same thing.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: That would be a fairer question.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Speaker, now you spoke about the Cutileiro Plan and you said
18 that war was not necessary. Did we have an agreement to create an
19 ethnically pure Serb territory, Serb entity, in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
20 A. We did not have an agreement.
21 Q. Was it possible to create an ethnically pure territory without
22 war and if the Lisbon agreement had been applied?
23 A. The Serb side accepted Cutileiro's principles at the talks on the
24 17th of March. And it is with full responsibility that we wanted to
25 implement these principles. Had we implemented these principles,
1 everybody would have reached a compromise in terms of the requests coming
2 from all sides. There was no reason for anyone of the sides involved to
3 opt for war instead of these principles. Because if we wanted to have a
4 delineation, not borders, among the three national or ethnic units,
5 without war, it is totally senseless for someone not to accept principles
6 based on peace and then say, No, we don't want to do it that way, we want
7 to go to war, and then to have a lot of people killed, which is what
8 actually happened. I'm saying this from the position of the Serb side,
9 and I believe that not a single one of the parties involved should have
10 opted for that, if they accepted Cutileiro's principles truly, in good
12 Q. Thank you. Mr. Speaker, before the war, and without war, did we
13 create any plans about population resettlement or population expulsions
14 of members of any other religious or ethnic community?
15 A. We did not have any such plans. However, may I just add one
16 single sentence or perhaps two? In terms of the review proceedings that
17 I'm working on right now, I collected a great deal of information about
18 my role and the role of the Serb side.
19 These activities show unequivocally that the only task was to
20 find solutions, especially you, as the leader of the
21 Serb Democratic Party. That can be seen from the documents, from the
22 evidence there. At the very beginning of the war - how do I put this? -
23 you made a very conciliatory speech at a session held on the
24 27th of March and you called upon Members of Parliament to find solutions
25 in order to preserve peace. And you said that peace was actually a major
1 interest of our people. So I tried to find a document, as I investigated
2 my own case, to see whether there was a document that was falsified,
3 forged or perhaps misinterpreted by someone. I didn't even find a
4 wrongful document like that. Up until the very last evening I was in the
5 assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Had we had any kind of plan, I would
6 have left the assembly two or three or I don't know how many days before
7 that, and I would have started working on the implementation of this plan
8 that is being imputed now. You can see this from the abundance of
9 evidence before this Court.
10 Q. Thank you. Just a brief question in relation to staying on in
11 Sarajevo. Can you remember until when Professor Plavsic stayed in
13 A. Sorry. Mrs. Plavsic remained in Sarajevo about 15 days after the
14 war broke out, if I remember correctly. I stayed on too, truth to tell,
15 in the Serb area, so to speak. However, she remained in Sarajevo where
16 the Muslim side was dominant.
17 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out -- I beg your pardon. The
18 proposed plans and discussions before the war, did they envisage the
19 existence of other communities in the Serb unit, in the Muslim unit, in
20 the Croat unit, and how were their rights supposed to be exercised? I'm
21 referring to the Cutileiro Plan and also to our negotiations.
22 A. That can be seen easily from the documents. There were several
23 persons who took part in the discussion, especially President Karadzic
24 said on several occasions, invoking tradition, especially Montenegrin
25 tradition, when there is supposed to be an attitude of valour, that is to
1 say to treat with dignity those who are less capable. So all of those
2 who needed to be protected. The Cutileiro Plan and our policy was that
3 there should be reciprocity. If Serbs remain in Muslim-Croat areas they
4 should be protected, and also Muslims and Croats in our area.
5 So everything I'm saying does exist in evidence and it can be
6 found easily in documents. So it's not only that Mr. Karadzic spoke
7 about this. How do I put this? This was a unanimous view expressed by
8 all of those who were in parliament. Those who were belligerent, these
9 were simply emotional outbursts, words that were not well measured.
10 However, if people were to remain as a minority in another area of the
11 sovereign state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they should have all their
12 religious, ethnic and other rights protected. This can easily be found
13 in documents in statements before this Tribunal, evidence before this
15 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out, did we ever envisage that
16 there would be no Muslims and Croats in the Serb Republic of BiH or in
17 Republika Srpska after that? And did we ever envisage that we would not
18 allow refugees to return once there were refugees?
19 A. It can be seen in statements, by way of evidence, that we always
20 envisaged that there would be certain areas in the Serb unit that would
21 be populated by other ethnic groups, as a majority, particularly in some
22 of the enclaves in the western part of Republika Srpska and elsewhere.
23 Because in some of these areas, the absolute majority -- or, sorry,
24 relative majority was members of the other ethnic group, the other
1 Also, there were certain areas in the middle, if I can put it
2 that way, the Muslim ethnic area. And they were supposed to be an
3 enclave, let me call it that conditionally speaking, Serb enclave. Ozren
4 is a good example of that, that was surrounded by many Muslim
5 municipalities, and it was an area where there were 100.000 Serbs. So
6 what we envisaged for Muslims and Croats is what we expected for the
7 Serbs in the Muslim and Croat ethnic areas.
8 Q. Thank you. In the indictment it is alleged -- actually let's do
9 it the other way around so we do not upset Mr. Tieger. When did the
10 Serb Democratic Party come to power and how long did it remain in power?
11 A. The Serb Democratic Party came to power in the elections of 1990,
12 held in November 1990. As far as I can remember, that's when the
13 elections were held. And it had a relationship of partnership with the
14 two other national parties until the 5th or 6th of April, 1992. That was
15 a period of a bit more than a year.
16 Q. Thank you. In the indictment, it is alleged that we -- oh, I beg
17 your pardon. Until when? Until when was the Serb Democratic Party in
18 power in Serb areas?
19 A. Sorry, could you just be a bit more precise? Are you referring
20 to the period before the war or during the war, even after the war?
21 Q. Until when, on the whole, was the SDS in power in Serb areas, in
22 Serb communities? How was there a replacement or, rather, when were new
23 elections held?
24 A. Sorry. All the way up until 1996, the first post-Dayton
25 agreements, there was a war going on and the Serb Democratic Party was
1 there. The first post-Dayton elections held from 1996 to 1998, the Serb
2 democratic power was in -- the Serb Democratic government -- party was in
3 power, in government.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D02173, could we please have that
5 on our screens.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. In the indictment, there is this allegation that I was in charge
8 of a joint criminal enterprise that started with a violent take-over of
9 power in the municipalities that are listed there, ultimately it is less
10 than 20 municipalities. Who was in power and for how long, say, on the
11 31st of March in Bijeljina and who was in power on the 31st of March,
13 A. Bijeljina, as one of the municipalities, from the beginning of
14 the elections, November 1990, all the way up until the end of 1998, it
15 had a government of the Serb Democratic Party.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that's not the number.
17 1D20173. 20173. Thank you. Could we have the English version as well,
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Speaker, this is the 4th of July, 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
21 sent this message to Vasvija Vidovic, who was a delegate before this
22 Court. In this document, there is a description of the way in which the
23 Serb side took power, and please look at the third paragraph that has to
24 do with Bijeljina.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We cannot find the text
1 that is being read out.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Is that correct?
4 A. Banja Luka, just like Bijeljina, from November 1991 onwards, it
5 was the SDS that was in power in the Municipal Assembly, or, rather, a
6 coalition headed by the SDS; whereas in Bijeljina, it was the
7 Serb Democratic Party that had absolute power. So it is illogical that
8 now, when the war started, somebody should take over because power was in
9 the hands of the SDS even before the 4th of April, 1992.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the second
12 page displayed now, or rather, the end that refers to Banja Luka?
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It says in the indictment that we totally cleansed the Serb areas
15 of Muslims and Croats. And now look at the last line here. It says in
16 the territory of the municipality of Banja Luka, there are still about
17 10.500 persons of non-Serb ethnicity left, 7.500 Bosniak Muslims and
18 3.000 Croats. This is Mr. Nedzad Ugljen. The late Mr. Ugljen who was
19 killed later on. He certainly reduced the number. But even according to
20 his dour assessment, would it be true that we had cleansed Banja Luka of
21 Muslims and Croats?
22 A. Well, it's not correct, and I can just add something by way of a
23 small comment. I know from my own proceedings, that there was this
24 report of some people from the MUP.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: As I did last week, I'm going to ask that the
2 accused refrain from commentary during the course of his questions. He
3 certainly reduced the number, according to his dour assessment, this is
4 the accused not only leading but testifying and it's inappropriate.
5 JUDGE KWON: Further, it may reduce the probative value elicited
6 from the witness. Shall we continue?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we have the following
8 page in the English version of the document?
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Before Bosanska Dubica, you can see some figures that we have
11 already discussed. Mr. Speaker, could you please tell us or finish what
12 you have just started about the presence of Muslims and Croats not only
13 in their own enclaves but also in the cities all the way up to the end of
14 the war? And this is the beginning of July 1995.
15 A. First of all, I would like to say that somebody should have been
16 a magician in order to establish how many of the representatives of what
17 population remained in what -- in certain areas. However, some people
18 took it upon themselves to send reports that they imagined to be good,
19 and then Mr. Tieger knows what kind of reports those were, and there was
20 one such report that was totally unrealistic. However, he believed --
21 that person believed that he had to brag about something and say that
22 that was an area where there were indeed Muslims and Croats and that it
23 was a pure area, as he put it. This is an erroneous piece of information
24 that misled many to conclude that a major campaign of ethnic cleansing
25 had been carried out in those areas at the very start of the war. I know
1 for a fact, and documents corroborate that, that a large number of
2 Muslims and Croats, and especially Muslims, remained in Banja Luka even
3 after the end of the war. There were also, in Banja Luka, Muslims at the
4 beginning of the war, throughout the war. So to say the least, this kind
5 of statement was biased, and it was issued in order to meet the requests
6 of some people who wanted to portray the situation as ethnic cleansing on
7 the part of the Serbs or paramilitary units. You will see exactly how
8 many Serbs there are in federation, how many Muslims in the cities and
9 areas in Republika Srpska. I'm sure that we will be able to prove that
10 at the end of this case. I have information that that picture is
11 totally, totally different than is portrayed here before this Tribunal
12 based on such reports.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now look at page 4 in
15 Serbian? We are talking about the municipality of Laktasi. What page is
16 it in English, let's see.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik, while you are saying that other
18 reports may be biased, how could you say that this figure is correct
19 which we see in this document?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I apologise. I
21 don't know about the credibility of any such reports. I am speaking from
22 my own experience and I'm saying that what was happening during the war
23 were magnified eventually. So what I'm saying is that one has to take
24 this report by Mr. Ugljen very cautiously. I know that there were a lot
25 of Muslims and that a small number of them stayed in Banja Luka as well.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
2 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Are you saying that a small number stayed in Banja Luka or,
5 rather, let me put it in a different way: Do you know any town in
6 Republika Srpska which was completely cleansed of Muslims, where Muslims
7 had lived before but were expelled during the war?
8 A. Nothing comes to mind. Maybe they all left. I don't know.
9 I can't remember. Nothing comes to mind.
10 Q. Thank you. Mr. Speaker, do you know of entire settlements in
11 Republika Srpska which are purely Muslim or predominantly Muslim which
12 remained so until the end of the war, and where the Muslim population
13 remained living safely?
14 A. I'm sure that there are such settlements. Documents corroborate
15 that. Members of the Muslim and Croatian peoples were even members of
16 the VRS. As far as I can remember, such things happened in Gradiska and
17 in the western parts of Republika Srpska. Those people lived peacefully
18 and they were members of the army that defended Republika Srpska.
19 Q. Thank you. Let's look at page 4. We are looking at page 3.
20 Mr. Speaker, do you know of a place or a settlement in the
21 Muslim-Croatian federation where the Serbian population survived
22 September of 1992?
23 A. I can say that a certain number of Serbs did remain living in the
24 federation, as ethnic hostages, let me put it that way. There was
25 torture, the conditions of life were very bad and the Serbs wanted to
1 leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, according to the prevalent policies
2 at the time, the departure of the Serbs was big business, and the Croats
3 were those who enabled the Serbs to leave in the direction of the Serbian
4 part of Sarajevo.
5 Q. Thank you. Do you remember what was the destiny of Bradina, the
6 Serbian village in depth of their territory?
7 A. At the Tribunal, that village was part of an indictment, all the
8 people from Bradina and the surrounding settlements were arrested and
9 taken to prisons, and in this Tribunal, those prisons are called camps.
10 The entire families were prisoners, irrespective of the fact whether any
11 one of them had arms. As a matter of fact, they were all -- or, rather,
12 the only criterion for their arrest was whether they were Serbs or
13 perhaps members of the Serbian Democratic Party.
14 Q. Thank you. And what was the ultimate lot of Bradina, do you
16 A. I can't really remember. I don't know what happened, but
17 I learned here, at the Tribunal, that all of the people were either
18 killed or ended up in prisons where they were ill treated. There is a
19 book by Strahinja Zivak who described all those things that happened
20 around Konjic and Bradina where people were mercilessly killed or ill
21 treated or they went missing.
22 Q. Let's look at the logic of this document. Look at the
23 municipality of Laktasi, for example, where it says that there were
24 82 per cent Serbs, 9 per cent Croats and 2 per cent Muslims, and that the
25 others made up 8 per cent and the reference here is to Yugoslav. It says
1 here the political control of the municipality, given its majority
2 Serbian population, was already seized in early April 1992.
3 When was the political control seized over the municipalities
4 with a Serbian majority?
5 A. I already spoke about that. From the elections in 1992, Laktasi,
6 which had an absolute Serb majority, had a Serbian government, and all
7 the way up to 1998, conditionally speaking, although that period of time
8 is moot for this discussion. So it is really not logical to say that the
9 aggressor, which is a derogative word for the Serbs, i.e. that the Serbs
10 took over Laktasi on the 4th of April. Laktasi had already had a
11 government, it had an authority, so it really doesn't make sense if we
12 were to follow the wording of the text that is before us.
13 Q. On the Serbian page, we can see Kotor Varos. I'm interested in
14 just one sentence. Do you have an explanation as to why the conflict
15 started only on the 11th of June, which means nine weeks after the war
16 broke out in Sarajevo? It was only on the 11th of June that the
17 conflicts started in Kotor Varos?
18 A. As far as I can remember, this is an example of a municipality
19 where the local representatives of the three ethnic groups tried to find
20 a solution, either by way of the -- politically dividing the municipality
21 or in some other way, all with a view to avoiding a war. If the local
22 representatives had been able to decide on that in those municipalities,
23 there would never have been a war. As far as I can remember, those
24 municipalities received a dispatch from Sarajevo, and the agreement that
25 had been reached was violated and that's when the conflicts broke out.
1 Croats and Muslims joined a large armed force and then crimes happened.
2 I'm speaking from memory, but I'm almost sure that this was the course of
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I'm tendering
6 this document which will be very instructive in terms of the logic of
7 charging the Serbs. Even Nedzad Ugljen admits that Croats and Muslims
8 existed in all of those municipalities in July 1995.
9 JUDGE KWON: You're not giving evidence, Mr. Karadzic.
10 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: No objection, Mr. President.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We will receive it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 1D20173 receives Exhibit D4002,
14 Your Honours.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I have to word my next question really carefully because I'm
17 talking about taking power and taking over power. Can you explain the
18 Trial Chamber how do you interpret the term "taking power" and "taking
19 over power." In pre-trial brief, paragraph 3, it says that the physical
20 take-over of power took place in a number of municipalities, and so on
21 and so forth.
22 A. In 1990, when the three ethnically based parties won the
23 elections, then the authorities or the sectors were split between three
24 ethnic groups. However, each of the parties was supposed to take power
25 from the previous government, from the communist government. Throughout
1 1991, it was a turbulent year, full of political skirmishes. The
2 Serbian Democratic Party could not take power. The old cadre still kept
3 power and they were representatives of the League of Communists. They
4 fought very hard to keep that power and they wooed the ethnically based
5 Party of Democratic Action promising them to be loyal all in order to
6 remain in their positions. The Serbian Democratic Party was prevented
7 from taking power.
8 Your Honours, you can see that from various telephone
9 conversations, where it was insisted on the members of the
10 Serbian Democratic Party to be assigned their positions. However, it was
11 only done at the very top. At the lower levels it was impossible to take
12 power. And how do I understand the term taking over of power? And the
13 taking over of power is as it is explained in the indictment. It is a
14 violent take-over of something that doesn't belong to them. And that
15 should involve war and armed rebellion or something.
16 For example, you saw the examples of Banja Luka, Laktasi and
17 Bijeljina. There was no need to take over power. The
18 Serbian Democratic Party had power, it took power based on the results of
19 the election, and any take-over of power would have been an unnecessary
21 Q. Thank you. The indictment against me, counts 1 through 8,
22 charges me with pursuing a policy which was aimed at creating a Serbian
23 entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as establishing and leading those
24 political organs that would pursue that policy by way of committing
25 crimes. When it comes to the creation of a Serbian entity, was it
1 envisaged that that entity would be created by war and by committing
2 crimes? Who was it who suggested that we should have a Serbian entity?
3 Who agreed with that?
4 A. In my testimony, I've already talked about that, but let me
5 repeat. The first piece of information that reached me coincided with
6 the information that the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have
7 its ethnic entity in return for giving up on our idea of Yugoslavia, and
8 that came from the representatives of the international community. The
9 information reached Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic, and they, in turn,
10 told me. A few days later, at a meeting in Belgrade, that was elaborated
11 by Mr. Milosevic. Soon after that, Mr. Cutileiro explained his
12 principles and said it clear and loud that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be
13 split into three different ethnic entities, and among those there would
14 be a Serbian entity. This means that from the international community,
15 we learned that we would be given our own ethnic entity or national
16 entity. What we learned was also learned by Mr. Milosevic, and he shared
17 that information with us at that meeting in Belgrade. After that,
18 reluctantly albeit, we gave up on the idea of Yugoslavia and we accepted
19 the only realistic possibility, and that was to be given our own entity
20 within the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us where the first Assembly of the
22 Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina was held, when it was established?
23 A. The first founding session of the Assembly of the Serbian People
24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina was held in the building of the parliament of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina in a hall which was called the blue hall which was
1 assigned when we distributed the space to the Serbian deputies.
2 Q. Thank you. Was it done secretly? Was it a secret session?
3 A. It wasn't a secret session. There were many guests, and some of
4 those who came to check out what that was all about were the
5 representatives of the other ethnic groups, but they only stayed there
6 briefly and then went back.
7 Q. Thank you. Later on, were Serbian political bodies such as the
8 council of ministers, after the proclamation of Republika Srpska, were
9 these bodies established secretly or so that the public could not see
11 A. Everything was done publicly, transparently. I had talks with
12 representatives of the other two ethnic groups, held in the parliament.
13 I explained to them what our intention was. We only advocated that we
14 should set up the organs that we had the right to have according to the
15 Cutileiro Plan, and that was endorsed by all three sides, and that the
16 others would have as well, which was eventually implemented in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina later on through the Dayton agreement.
18 Q. Thank you. Can you remember who made up the council of ministers
19 and was it envisaged for the council of ministers to have the Ministry of
20 the Interior and the Ministry of Defence initially? I'm not talking
21 about the government but the council of ministers.
22 A. The Cutileiro Plan envisaged that there should be joint organs
23 and that there should be the organs of the entities. What we did then
24 was that from the existing ministers or deputy or assistant ministers who
25 were Serbian representatives, were the ones that we used to set up the
1 council of ministers. I would not exclude the possibility that perhaps
2 not all of them were there but I can guarantee that more than 95 per cent
3 were the representatives from the joint organs, those who were appointed
4 to the council of ministers. That was how we understood the Cutileiro
5 principles and how we implemented them in practice. We said there would
6 be joint organs. In the joint organs which we now really have because we
7 had Bosnia-Herzegovina, we would take the deputies from them, like from
8 the parliament, and our representatives from the council of ministers
9 would articulate our requests and our views in the government, just as
10 the deputies or the MPs would define the Serbian interests in the
11 parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the goal, and that was
12 eventually implemented once the council of ministers was established.
13 Q. Do you remember whether the existence of Ministry of the Interior
14 and the Ministry of Defence was envisaged for the council of ministers?
15 A. Yes. It was envisaged. I forgot to answer to that part of your
16 question. It was envisaged.
17 Q. Was anyone appointed to these positions? I'm not talking about
18 the government but the council of ministers, which was envisaged earlier?
19 A. Yes. Later on, in fact, in the council of ministers, the
20 minister of MUP of Republika Srpska should have been appointed, and
21 eventually it was indeed implemented once the war broke out.
22 Q. Thank you. In the joint government, the joint single government
23 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, do you remember who of its members were members of
24 the Serbian Democratic Party and its leadership and who were not its
1 A. Well, I'm not sure if I can be 100 per cent precise but certainly
2 more than 90 per cent. Except for one member of the government, the late
3 Velibor Ostojic, minister of information, everyone else was a member.
4 They may have been former communists or they may have had a neutral
5 political position but the only representative of the government in the
6 council of ministers was Mr. Velibor Ostojic. There may have been
7 somebody else but I can't remember now, perhaps one or two people, but
8 everybody else was a non-member of the Serbian Democratic Party.
9 Q. Thank you. Did you receive information about their positions
10 with regard to the functioning of the joint government and what was their
11 position and the conclusion of the Serbian members of this government?
12 A. Just like the MPs were outvoted in the parliament, the members of
13 the government kept complaining that the positions which were allocated
14 to the Serbian party, the people could not be assigned to them in
15 practice, and that the government was trying to resolve economic problems
16 and problems that were important for the life of ordinary citizens, it
17 was impossible to do that. The government was polarised, there was a
18 great rift within the government, even though I have to say that the then
19 prime minister, Mr. Pelivan, was a man who was really attempting to
20 achieve cohesion and to lead the government forward, but he was
21 unsuccessful in that because there was a tendency to count people, to see
22 who was in which party; therefore, the government was overly politicised
23 and eventually solutions were imposed on the Serbian side.
24 Q. Thank you. Do you know what the situation is like with the joint
25 government in Bosnia now?
1 A. Unfortunately, today, there are still significant rifts within
2 the government. Each part of the council of ministers, as the government
3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina is now called, is a story for itself. Now they
4 take into account who is a member of what party rather than of what
6 JUDGE KWON: How is this relevant?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, it's
8 relevant insofar as this is a standard, that's the character of Bosnia as
9 a state. Outside of the federation, that's how it lives its life. It
10 was not something that was defined by the Serbian Democratic Party in
11 1990 or 1991. The Serbian Democratic Party is not in power at the
12 central level now. It is others who are, but never mind.
13 JUDGE KWON: Please stick to relevant questions. Please
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please call up in e-court
16 1D01402. If there is no translation, I will have to apologise and
17 I apologise to the Prosecution that perhaps I may not have announced this
18 document in advance. Thank you. Could you -- I believe that the
19 translation is available somewhere but I'm not sure in which form.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Could you please tell the Chamber -- have a look at what this
22 document is and then tell us whether at the time you received this
23 document too?
24 A. The title of this document is:
25 "Note from the meeting of officials and leading employees of the
1 republican state organs, the cadres of the SDS BiH."
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we just scroll down so we can
4 see the date, please?
5 THE WITNESS: The 12 of December --
6 THE INTERPRETER: The 12th of September - interpreter's
7 correction - 1991.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Thank you. Did we initiate or request this meeting or was it the
10 initiative of the Serbian ministers?
11 A. Even though there are many things that I don't really remember
12 well any longer, I remember one particular meeting, and I believe that
13 this is a note from that meeting. It was held at the initiative of the
14 ministers who were members of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I
15 know that there was heated discussion, there were many irregularities
16 about the representation of Serbian interests and the interests of the
17 Serbian Democratic Party in the government and all irregularities which
18 existed with regard to appointments and what was happening within the
19 government and what it was doing.
20 Q. Thank you. We have found the translation.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please place it on the ELMO.
22 We have the English translation. Thank you. Can we please see the
23 following page.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. President, do you remember whether Miodrag Simovic, who was
1 the vice-premier of the federal government and who was on the list of the
2 Serbian Democratic Party, was he a member of the
3 Serbian Democratic Party?
4 A. No, he wasn't.
5 THE ACCUSED: Next page, please. Next page in the e-court,
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: I think we'll move more efficiently and certainly
9 more accurately if the accused bears in mind that this is apparently the
10 same document as 65 ter 11295 which has the English translation already
11 uploaded in e-court.
12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Shall we try that?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. Thank you
14 for your kindness. It's really helpful. Can we please show that in
15 e-court. [In English] Next page in English.
16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. And I will ask you to look at the document because I will ask you
18 a question that summarises all this. Were you aware of the difficulties
19 that the Serbian staff in the joint organs complained about, the
20 difficulties with regard to implementing the agreement, appointing
21 Serbian personnel and so on? Were we pressing them with regard to this
22 or were they pressing us and complaining that they could not implement
23 what they were supposed to do?
24 A. Yes, I was aware. Individually, some of the ministers came to
25 see me in the parliament, so I am aware of all the problems which are
1 listed here, at least on this page, the appointment of cadres and so on.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show the following
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excuse me, can you just remove the
5 transcript? Because it's off.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Last page, please, both in English
7 and in Serbian. Perhaps that's not in this document, or it could be two
8 pages earlier, please, two pages earlier, where the conclusions are.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And we can see it here. Let us stay here because we can see who
11 it was sent to: Yourself, Plavsic, Koljevic, Cancar and Dukic; correct?
12 A. Yes. Karadzic, Krajisnik, Plavsic, Koljevic, Cancar and Dukic.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now go back two pages,
15 please. No, two pages forward. Two pages backwards, actually.
16 The following page, where the conclusions are.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Please focus on paragraph 3, in the record, to suggest to the
19 leadership that the following conclusions were adopted.
20 A. Yes, I have seen it. Please.
21 Q. How do you interpret the fact that in September 1991, nine or ten
22 months after the establishment of the joint authorities, the Serbian
23 cadres, who were mostly not members of the SDS, could not discharge their
24 functions and requests from the SDS to implement the agreements with the
25 other two sides?
1 A. This is evidence that throughout the previous period, those ten
2 months, the personnel from the circle of the Serbian Democratic Party or,
3 rather, the Serbian people were not appointed to their positions, which
4 they got after the distribution of positions on the basis of the
5 agreement between the three ethnic communities. But this also tells
6 something else, namely that this was the preparation for the following
7 month, in which the declaration would be adopted by voting and
8 practically any will of the Serbian people to participate in the
9 authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina on an equal footing be disqualified.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.
13 THE REGISTRAR: It's Exhibit number D4003, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a break, Mr. Karadzic?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, please.
16 JUDGE KWON: We will resume at 11.00.
17 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. One of the items contained in the indictment -- or, rather,
23 paragraph 11 of the pre-trial brief, says that Karadzic, as far back as
24 1990, warned that efforts made by the Bosnian Serb -- Bosnian Muslims and
25 Croats to change the nature of the Bosnian state would be responded to by
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Were there legitimate and legal ways of changing the nature of
6 the Bosnian state? Could it have been changed without our consent?
7 A. The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina envisaged the way in which
8 a recomposition could be carried out, if I can put it that way, or the
9 way in which a different fate could be determined for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 That was the only way in which the question of the destiny of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the coming period could be resolved.
12 In the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is what I said in
13 my testimony before, there were -- Serb MPs accounted for more than
14 one-third of the parliament. If I can put it this way, our partners on
15 the other side, those who wanted to secede from Yugoslavia, who wanted
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina to secede from Yugoslavia, could not carry this
17 through in parliament because they did not have enough MPs for a
18 two-third majority. However, the only way in which this recomposition
19 could be carried out, or rather how the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina could
20 be resolved, would be through parliament or through a referendum.
21 Q. Thank you. Let me not enumerate all the persons who are referred
22 to as members of the JCE: Milosevic, Karadzic, high officer -- high
23 ranking officer of the JNA including Mladic, Jovica Stanisic, Seselj,
24 Arkan, not to mention all of them. Can you tell us what you think about
25 this group? Did it act in unison? Did they constitute an enterprise?
1 What were our relations like and what were our political views within
2 this group that is referred to in the indictment?
3 A. Well --
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER: I don't have a -- obviously a particular problem
6 with the question, what was -- what were our relations. I take it that
7 means your relation and my relation as a kind of joint team with any of
8 the individuals involved named in this group. But the introduction which
9 sort of spells out its relationship to some aspect of the pre-trial brief
10 or the indictment is an another reflection of Dr. Karadzic's continuing
11 inability to refrain from signalling the witness what he wants from the
12 projected answers. But as far as just asking about relations, that's how
13 the question could have been phrased in the first place, and that's how
14 they should be formulated in future.
15 JUDGE KWON: I think that's a helpful suggestion. Are you going
16 to reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Speaker, it is being held against me -- it is being stated
20 that I was a member of --
21 MR. TIEGER: Dr. Karadzic can just ask the question without
22 prefatory comments about what the impact of any answer might be or about
23 what his concern about the information at issue or sought is. That was
24 the nature of the earlier objection, which the Court endorsed, and again
25 he can simply ask questions that seek information in an objective way.
1 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber sees no difficulty if you just refer to
4 the indictment, or passage in the statement, but formulated as you did,
5 it may sound as if you are feeding the witness. I think you can simply
6 ask the question.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll do my best.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Can you tell us what the programme-based or political closeness
10 was among these persons who are mentioned as members of the JCE,
11 including president Milosevic, high officers of the JNA, Mladic, Seselj,
12 Arkan and others who are referred to as key participants?
13 A. Well, the programme-based differences or the political
14 differences among the participants who were members of various political
15 parties were enormous, especially the ideological differences that
16 existed. They were quite big. I can say, for example, that members of
17 the JNA were heirs of the communist ideology from the previous period.
18 Mr. Milosevic belonged to that ideology, too, to a large extent.
19 Mr. Seselj was -- how do I put this? The SDS, on first glance, was close
20 to the Serb Radical Party, but it was a political opponent, for winning
21 over this patriotic bloc, if you will. Other participants were people we
22 did not even know. We had just heard of them distantly. I can state
23 with full responsibility that the only common denominator for these
24 persons is that they were all Serbs. It is very hard to find any other
25 common denominator.
1 Secondly, had this been a joint criminal enterprise with the
2 objective of attaining some objective in a time that no one could have
3 presumed would happen, that is to say that war would happen and that
4 certain ethnic areas would be cleansed by force --
5 Q. Thank you. To the best of your knowledge, in order to attain
6 ethnic division, did I intend to destroy the Bosnian Muslims and
7 Bosnian Croats and were those selected for that living in the areas that
8 the Bosnian Serbs had laid claim to?
9 A. I can state with certainty, and I have quite a bit of evidence,
10 or to put it in better terms, I have practical examples, the President of
11 Republika Srpska at the time, Mr. Karadzic, was absolutely far away from
12 any kind of thinking along those lines.
13 I'm just going to give one example and that is present before
14 this Court. The Croat people had been expelled from the area where they
15 had clashed with the Muslim army. It was primarily Mr. Karadzic's
16 decision with the consent of the others who were in the top echelons of
17 power. They passed through our territory without any incidents involved.
18 They were saved from grave, very grave, consequences and they went to the
19 territory that they wanted to go to. As for the Muslims, again, we have
20 many individual examples, not the kind of example that we have in the
21 case of the Croats, except for Western Bosnia where individual cases were
22 being treated with maximum humaneness, in order to protect the
23 unprotected Muslim people. I know that as I studied my own example. And
24 with all due respect to the Office of the Prosecutor, I think that they
25 made a big mistake there, putting this kind of diverse group together
1 into some kind of joint criminal enterprise.
2 Q. Thank you. In the joint assembly, and in the assembly of the
3 Serb people, there was an MP, Miladin Nedic, and he was quoted in the
4 indictment and in paragraph 30 of the pre-trial brief as saying, and that
5 is 65 ter 00028, page 40, so I'm going to quote what is being quoted
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not have the note --
8 the text.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. "As for what is happening in Bosnia, I'm not in favour of having
11 it resolved in haste, just like that. We have to admit that the Muslims
12 were being planted in front of us so that we would be their executioners.
13 I don't want the Serb people to be executioners, but also I'm not in
14 favour of handing over our country, our state, our territory."
15 And then a bit further on:
16 "Therefore without any haste, because we are a people who has now
17 been given this role of executioner in order to do someone a favour."
18 Can you tell me how you understood this statement made by deputy
20 A. In order to correctly interpret this statement, perhaps some
21 experts, linguists, should explain that, those who are familiar with the
22 rhetoric that is resorted to there. And perhaps they should also know
23 the MP in question. He was an epic type of person, Mr. Nedic. When he
24 spoke, he spoke in a certain way but it was a serious statement this
25 time. He usually spoke in a very witty way, but this time he said that
1 somebody had persuaded Muslims to go to war instead of resolving the
2 crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina by peaceful means. And in that way, the
3 Muslims were planted there, if you will, so that somebody would kill
4 them, abuse them. And he said someone gave the Serb side, the Serb army,
5 a particular role to play. And now they are engaged in a battle with the
6 Muslims and they are their executioners, he said. This is his opinion,
7 that someone persuaded the Muslims to go to war, and in that way put them
8 in a position to be killed. And then he says, We should not allow
9 ourselves to be tricked in that way, that somebody gave us a role on
10 behalf of somebody else's interests so that we could behave in an
11 incorrect or inhumane way. That was his view. That is how he viewed the
12 situation, why the Muslims went to war against the Serbs. Because
13 several times he said that we were similar peoples in many ways, and
14 there is no reason for us to kill each other, nationally or
16 He didn't want to be misunderstood because there was a war going
17 on, so it would seem that he was defending the Muslims who were
18 committing crimes against the Serbs because that's what the propaganda
19 said, too. And he said that that does not mean that we should allow
20 Republika Srpska to disappear. That is my view. I'm convinced that that
21 is correct, but perhaps somebody could write a proper paper on this,
22 explaining this kind of situation, knowing who Mr. Nedic is, knowing all
23 the details and knowing how he articulated this. I must say it was not
24 only he. This was a view shared by many MPs and also ordinary people who
25 did not belong to parliamentary groups.
1 Q. Thank you. My position was also quoted; namely, that I said this
2 conflict is there so that the Muslims could disappear, that we fuelled
3 it. What was your understanding of this? Who did we hold accountable
4 for the fuelling of this conflict?
5 A. Well, maybe this answer is just going to be a continuation of the
6 first answer I gave. What you said, what you stated, this was actually
7 an articulation of a far broader opinion, if I can put it that way, that
8 the Muslims, again if I can put it this way, were stimulated to go to war
9 and that because of their interests, somebody was pushing them into war
10 against the Serbs and without any proper grounds because all of this
11 could have been resolved by peaceful means. Now, who is it specifically?
12 Who is the one who was supposed to be the one who was instigating the
13 Muslims to do that? I can give you my opinion now. And I think it is
14 being shared by those MPs who then presented the same views or similar
15 views. There were many external mentors in our situation and we know
16 that that happened on the Muslim side too. The diaspora, the
17 international community, international people in different ways, "great
18 Muslims," under quotation marks, who were charting this course of the
19 Muslims fighting to the last Muslim. I really would not want to speak
20 about people who are deceased, but the then-ambassador of America in
21 Belgrade, Mr. Zimmerman, very often I referred to that example, that he
22 exercised this influence at the crucial moment, for them to refuse the
23 Cutileiro Plan and this led to war.
24 Now, I don't know how correct that is. That should be
25 investigated. But there were such opinions, and that then, in fact, you
1 articulated something that was part of the public opinion, and also of
2 the many debates that were taking place. There was actually the external
3 factor that stimulated this. Although later on, and we knew it at the
4 time too, many people within the Muslim national core, if you will, in
5 positions of high responsibility in their government, they rejected any
6 kind of peace agreement, and in this way, they were seriously
7 pressurising Mr. Silajdzic and Mr. Izetbegovic.
8 The best example is their assembly in Zenica. Sometime in 1993,
9 when the Owen Stoltenberg Plan was rejected, there were several variants
10 there then, and very little was required at that point in time to have
11 the war brought to an end. After all, everything had already been
12 spelled out in the Cutileiro Plan. So my opinion is that there were
13 people from the outside who seriously exercised influence over the Muslim
14 leadership so that they would continue the war rather than work for
16 Q. Thank you. The indictment suggests that the
17 Army of Republika Srpska was responsible for using military means in
18 order to achieve the six strategic goals. What was your position on that
19 or what is it now? And let me quote one of the first interviews given by
20 General Milovanovic. He was interviewed by the OTP. I accept, I accept.
21 First the answer and then --
22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let us see the indictment passage
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe this is paragraph 48 of
25 the pre-trial brief. I transformed this into a word document so the
1 numbering of the paragraphs may have been altered as a result of that.
2 I'll quote:
3 "For the implementation of the strategic goals, it was the VRS
4 and General Mladic who were primarily in charge of that. General Mladic
5 said at the assembly what we are supposed to do. This should be a
6 secret. Mladic and his officers transformed those strategic goals into
7 the operative goals for the VRS and spent the following few months in
8 implementing the plan and liberating the territories that belong to us by
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Speaker, what can you say about this claim?
12 JUDGE KWON: Before you answer, yes, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: It's a continuing objection, and in this guise,
14 I want to not only reiterate it but reinforce it. It's inappropriate, in
15 my judgement, for the accused to bring in his closest crony, present him
16 with selected portions of the pre-trial brief or the indictment, and then
17 seek his opinion or view or position on the manner in which or the
18 evidence which has been marshalled regarding his case. Mr. Krajisnik was
19 a contemporaneous participant in the events, as we know. There is no
20 reason why the accused can't ask him for his information at the time, his
21 observations at the time, about aspects of the case that he considers
22 significant. I think this general objection has been sustained in other
23 contexts and in various forms. I continue to --
24 JUDGE KWON: Let's take a sentence, for example, the first
25 sentence of pre-trial brief, paragraph 48, primary responsibility for
1 implementing the strategic goals fell to the VRS and General Mladic, who
2 told the assembly in the closed meeting that the thing we are doing needs
3 to be guarded as our deepest secret.
4 So asking the witness to make his observation on this sentence,
5 what problem would there be, in your opinion, Mr. Tieger?
6 MR. TIEGER: Well, first of all, had it been done in that way
7 rather than a lingering and continuing practice of identifying portions
8 of materials in the indictment and in the pre-trial brief which
9 Dr. Karadzic is concerned about, and obviously eliciting, trying to
10 elicit from this witness some information to the contrary, then I might
11 not object to the identification of various pieces of information as
12 points of departure for eliciting information from this witness. But in
13 the context in which the accused does it, I don't think it's appropriate.
14 Yes, I don't think there is a tremendous amount of difference between
15 saying, Do you recall what General Mladic said at a particular assembly
16 with respect to X and identifying this particular -- a particular
17 portion, but that's not what's happening. What's happening is --
18 JUDGE KWON: By the way, what he did this time was after reading
19 out paragraph 48, he asked, What can you say about this claim?
20 MR. TIEGER: After contextualising it for this witness's benefit
21 in the manner that he considers --
22 JUDGE KWON: As coupled with his comment that, for example,
23 saying that to the effect the indictment suggests
24 Army of Republika Srpska was responsible for using military means in
25 order to blah, blah. But I -- I just intervened and then I told him to
1 show the exact passage. After that he showed -- he read out paragraph 48
2 and asked what Mr. Krajisnik could say about this claim. On that basis,
3 we can continue, can't we?
4 MR. TIEGER: We can continue at this point, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
6 So for your benefit, I read out the paragraph 48 again:
7 "Primary responsibility for implementing the strategic goals fell
8 to the VRS and General Mladic, who told the assembly in the closed
9 meeting that the thing we are doing needs to be guarded as our deepest
10 secret. Mladic and his commanders turned the strategic goals into
11 operational imperatives for the VRS, moving forward in the coming weeks
12 and months to cement existing gains and move further toward 'liberating
13 territories which by birthright are ours.'"
14 So do you have any observation on this?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can explain the
16 genesis of the six strategic goals. I testified about that in the
17 Popovic case. I handed over all the documents to the OTP, those
18 documents testifying to the way how the six strategic goals were
19 generated. Those were not the military tasks of the army. That is my
20 first observation. Second of all, you can look at the map which was
21 presented to Cutillero and you can compare it with the six strategic
22 goals, and you will see that most of the strategic goals in that map were
23 actually proposed, and if we add to that the agreements reached with the
24 sides in the meantime, we will see that the six strategic goals were our
25 realistic plan -- I beg your pardon, not our plan but our desire as to
1 how they could be achieved by political means. What did Mladic mean?
2 What did he think when he said that that -- they should be kept a secret?
3 He is here. He could explain. At those meetings, he never explained
4 that. He never gave any broader elaboration of the fact. What is
5 correct is that very often during the war, soldiers tried to give a
6 different meaning to their statements. They exaggerated the role of the
7 army in one way or another. That's why he used the word "secret."
8 However, at our meetings, I never heard a secret that would be related to
9 any of the things that are suggested here. And, particularly, you should
10 look at something that happened before the army was set up. Look at the
11 map. Every ethnic unit actually took up its ethnic borders with slight
12 corrections. The army only corrected some things or lost some
13 territories or gave a different physiognomy to that map. The form of
14 Serbian ethnic existence at the beginning and at the end differs very
15 little, so the army protected the areas. It didn't conquer those areas.
16 So my interpretation or position or conclusion, if you will, is that this
17 is an erroneous conclusion. The army did not have a task to implement
18 those goals because those goals were political goals that were
19 publicised, presented to the international community, and there was no
20 reason whatsoever to give them a cloak of secrecy. There is evidence to
21 that effect. There are documents. Many of the documents are part of the
22 case law in this Tribunal.
23 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to call up
25 D01598 in e-court. This is General Milovanovic's interview given on the
1 27 March 2001. I'm interested in page 5 in Serbian. I will also like
2 the relevant page to be displayed in English.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Very well. I'm going to read:
5 "General Milovanovic then said that the Tribunal should not try
6 to prove the character of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina through such
7 trials. At the beginning of the war, the Serbs wanted, above all, to
8 stay in the SFRY. The Muslims wanted to form their Muslim state. And
9 the Croats wanted to access to the Drina River. At the beginning of the
10 war, he asked the leadership at the time to provide objectives of the war
11 which were the following: To protect the Serbian people from destruction
12 in order to avoid a repeat of events that took place between 1941 and
13 1945; and number two, to stay within Yugoslavia, or, as an alternative to
14 this, have our own state."
15 Mr. Speaker, are you aware of any other tasks that we may have
16 given to the army? What do you think about what General Milovanovic said
17 in this interview?
18 A. General Milovanovic's statement is completely correct. I don't
19 know of any other objectives or goals, nor do I think that there were
21 Q. Thank you. Before the establishment of the Supreme Command, you
22 were far from any military developments. Still, can you tell us whether
23 the leadership requested from --
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: I hope it's clear what the problem is. I mean, now
1 he's purporting to testify for this witness. Before the --
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
3 MR. TIEGER: Okay. So I --
4 JUDGE KWON: Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. I wanted to make things
6 easier for the speaker. I wanted to make it clear for him that I know
7 that he doesn't have direct knowledge of any military events. However,
8 do you know that the leadership tasked the army with conquering --
9 JUDGE KWON: You are further complicating the process, delaying,
10 wasting, making us waste time. You are not giving evidence on his
11 behalf, "I wanted to make it clear for him that I know that he doesn't
12 have direct knowledge ..." Inappropriate, an inappropriate comment on
13 your part.
14 Please continue.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Okay. Let somebody say
16 that. Would a legitimate question be this:
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did we, as a leadership, ask the army to occupy those territories
19 where Muslims and Croats made up a majority?
20 A. There were no such examples. However, in order to be more
21 precise, I would like to say that certain areas or certain territories
22 where Muslims made up a relative majority, for example, Gorazde, where
23 there were a lot of Serb detainees, and where there was fighting going on
24 for those areas, but that was not at the request of the political
25 leadership. It was a move that was forced in order to protect the Serbs
1 or allow them to retreat from those areas. So there were no requests
2 made on behalf of the leadership to take Sarajevo. The Serbs had a large
3 armed force, there were a lot of Serbs in Sarajevo, there were a lot of
4 requests by individuals to occupy Sarajevo in order to liberate the Serbs
5 there. The leadership headed by Mr. Karadzic who was the then-president
6 of the republic made it clear that we wouldn't be interested in taking
7 all of Sarajevo. We just wanted to have part of Sarajevo with our
8 settlements and with Serb majority, that was the policy we pursued all
9 over the place.
10 Q. Mr. Speaker, do you remember the 13th of May and what happened in
11 Banja Luka a day after the assembly meeting and the march of the
12 Special Police forces? Did you attend that meeting? Do you remember any
13 of the speeches made at that meeting?
14 A. On the 13th of meeting [as interpreted], it was a day after the
15 first assembly meeting of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, i.e.,
16 in Banja Luka. There was a line-up of the policemen there, and the chief
17 of that centre stated in his speech, and he was one of the speakers
18 there, he said that a lot of their members were Muslims and Croats, and
19 that they were proud of that fact. There was a round of applause and we
20 were all glad to hear that because the Serbs had a majority there but
21 that was what reflected the policy of the Serbian Democratic People and
22 the Serbian people. We wanted to behave correctly wherever we were a
23 majority, and we wanted to protect national minorities in all such
24 places. In that sense, and there are documents to corroborate that,
25 I saw them a long time ago, Mr. President, Mr. Karadzic's speech was
1 along the same lines as well as all the other participants. I believe
2 that the mayor of Banja Luka also spoke at that rally.
3 Q. Did I speak as well, do you remember?
4 A. Yes, you did. You delivered a speech along those same lines, and
5 the message was clear to the Muslim people, that they should feel safe
6 and comfortable, that there was no reason for them to fear anything, and
7 that they should not succumb to the influence of the fundamentalist
8 circles among their people, that she should not commit crimes, that they
9 should lay arms, that they should be loyal to the city and the -- where
10 they lived and the authorities that the city was under.
11 Q. D005 -- 494 is the following document. I don't want to call it
12 up. I'm just going to read a part of my speech on page 4 of the
13 transcript of the video-clip where it says: In Bosnia-Herzegovina, to
14 our greatest sorrow, and against our will, one part of the leadership of
15 the two other people imposed a war on us. We are exterminating ourselves
16 and we are torturing ourselves. And this was also imposed on us. We are
17 trying to take the least part in that as possible. At times, for an hour
18 or so, we do not return fire. We only return fire when we feel really
20 Further on, it says: We have decided to proclaim unilateral
21 truces for the whole world to see who is it who breaches those truces.
22 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we are not in conflict with Croats or Muslims. We
23 are in conflict with the militant leaderships who want to impose their
24 own state on us, where they will dominate and where they will --
25 JUDGE KWON: In the future, I would like you to upload the
1 document for the benefit of the interpreters. It's very difficult to
2 interpret when you read out something without seeing the document.
3 I would like to know the exact reference. What's the exhibit number of
4 this transcript?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D00494, page 4.
6 JUDGE KWON: According to my e-court, it says it's a transcript
7 of testimony somebody in Milosevic trial.
8 MR. ROBINSON: I think -- I'm looking at it in e-court. It says
9 video Banja Luka parade D494, exhibit.
10 JUDGE KWON: Sorry, I looked up the P exhibit. Yes, please
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be uploaded, please, page 4.
13 [In English] In English I suppose it's also page 4.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Here, Mr. Speaker, it's in the bottom, towards the bottom in
16 Serbian, and perhaps the next page in English: We in Bosnia are not in a
17 conflict with Muslims and Croats. We have a conflict with militant
18 leaderships who wants to impose their state where they will be dominant
19 and where we would be second-rate citizens. That is to say an escort
20 people to the leading people which was communicated to us in clear
21 fashion on some of the rallies. But Serbian people is not demanding to
22 be a leader but will not agree to be minor or second-rated.
23 And then it goes on further below: We can say with pride that
24 Muslims and Croats in the territory of the Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina are
25 not in jeopardy and shall not be.
1 Do you remember this was followed by applause? 50.000 people of
2 Banja Luka supported this statement of mine with applause?
3 A. This quotation corresponds exactly to what I just said. I was
4 not so precise, but I know that this was precisely the message sent to
5 the Muslim and Croat people, of whom there was a significant number at
6 the time in Banja Luka, and some of them were at this gathering, and
7 these words you said were approved by an overwhelming majority of those
8 present and most of them were Serbs who had come to greet the leading
9 representatives of the Serbian people.
10 Q. Thank you. From what you know, what was the position of
11 Banja Luka's mayor towards Muslims and Croats? The mayor was Mr. Radic.
12 A. Mr. Radic testified in this case. We can find that information.
13 But also from the documents we have here, we see that he constantly tried
14 to protect the Muslim and Croat people, both, but primarily the Muslims,
15 because the Croats enjoyed protection in some way --
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
17 MR. TIEGER: Well, this does implicate some of the objections
18 I was making earlier, but it's kind of squarely in front of us at the
19 moment that we -- because the witness has repeatedly referred to his
20 study of the documentation and so on. So now he directly refers in
21 response to the question to documents he studied, evidence in this case,
22 and I don't think there is any way of separating what this witness
23 purports to have learned from his alleged study of certain documentation
24 in the case and what he may or may not have known at the time, and if --
25 that may -- and probably is much more of a problem for Dr. Karadzic, but
1 since it's consistent with the objection I've been making throughout,
2 I thought I should make it known now. This -- and here we can see it as
3 a particular problem.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond?
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik, would you try to answer the question
8 instead of giving your opinion? Do you understand the question? The
9 question was the position of Mr. Radic at the time. You can answer the
10 question as you remember, but you testify as if you were an expert after
11 studying all the documents, you are giving your opinion. Do you
12 understand that?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I just explain
14 what my intention was?
15 JUDGE KWON: If you could just answer what the position of
16 Mr. Radic was.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The position of Mr. Radic, from the
18 beginning to the end, was to protect the two ethnic communities and other
19 non-Serbs, and I should like to be given a chance to explain why
20 I testified as I did, if needed.
21 JUDGE KWON: If necessary, Mr. Karadzic will take up that issue
22 further, how; for example, how did you know that, et cetera. Shall we
23 continue, Mr. Karadzic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. How do you know that? Did you have personal experience of
2 co-operation with Mr. Radic or did you find this out from documents?
3 A. From my contacts with Mr. Radic, and also from talking to people
4 who had more contact with him than I had, especially late
5 Professor Koljevic, my opinion was that he was doing everything he could
6 to protect the non-Serb population. And why did I refer to documents and
7 evidence that appeared before? I'm not an expert, but I am aware, as
8 Mr. Tieger said, he believes that I am a friend of Mr. Karadzic's and
9 whatever I state cannot be credible enough unless I refer to some
10 evidence. I wanted to tell the Trial Chamber not only then, during the
11 war, but also during my trial, there appeared evidence that confirmed
12 this view that Mr. Radic was protecting non-Serbs.
13 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what attitude did Nebojsa Ivastanin,
14 president of the Gradiska municipality, take towards Muslims and Croats?
15 A. The same as Mr. Radic. He made maximum efforts to protect
17 Q. Did we punish or otherwise disqualify Mr. Ivastanin, and what
18 positions did he occupy after the war?
19 A. Mr. Ivastanin was appointed ambassador to Russia, I believe,
20 after the war. He was part of the cadre that followed the policy of the
21 Serbian Democratic Party, and that's how he was treated by the personnel
22 policy of the party.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Krajisnik just said that Mr. Radic testified in
24 this case. Was it the case?
25 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: It's a 92 quater submission, Mr. President. But it
2 does beg the question in my mind of just how much information this
3 witness has about the submissions in this particular case.
4 JUDGE KWON: So we admitted pursuant to Rule 92 quater? Yes.
5 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
6 JUDGE KWON: So his testimony in other case?
7 MR. TIEGER: Yes, in the Krajisnik case.
8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
9 Please continue.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Speaker, did you know that this was admitted into evidence?
12 You said he testified. In which case did Mr. Radic testify?
13 A. I said that he was a witness who testified in public, in my case.
14 Q. Thank you. Did you know that his evidence was admitted in my
16 A. No, I didn't know that. I didn't know about that document.
17 I said Mr. Radic testified in my case, and I said that this confirmed
18 what I had known before about the policy Mr. Radic pursued in Banja Luka.
19 Q. Thank you. I will ask you about the attitude to Muslims and
20 Croats and the policy of the SDS towards the other two ethnic
21 communities, Latinovic, president of Dubica municipality; Luka Culic and
22 Veljko Stupar from Mrkonjic Grad; the leadership of Drvar, Bosanska
23 Grahovo, and Glamoc.
24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed the first name.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Milinic also testified in my
1 case. But, regardless of that, I emphasise Mr. Milincic had the same
2 position as Mr. Radic because Srbac was a majority Serbian place. And
3 precisely in that area, as he confirmed before this Tribunal and as I had
4 known before, that area called Kobas, I believe, contained some Croats
5 who had stayed there, although they could have easily crossed the
6 Sava River and gone to Croatia. As for Stupar in Mrkonjic Grad, when the
7 Serbian forces came and took over Mrkonjic Grad, which was always
8 Serbian, they were met by a great number of Muslims which -- who
9 continued to live there until the end of the war. The situation was
10 similar in the other areas you mentioned, where Serbs were in the
11 majority, Croats were in the minority, and care was taken to pursue the
12 policy dictated by the leadership of Republika Srpska, to provide maximum
13 protection to minority populations, other ethnic communities who stayed
14 in our areas and they were protected.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. From what you knew at the time, did we ever voice objections
17 against those presidents of municipalities and local authorities over the
18 fact that they were taking good care of minority populations, or were we
19 happy with them? What was our position towards their conduct?
20 A. I know that always in various announcements and letters and
21 documents are available here, we appealed on them to provide maximum
22 security to the citizens from other ethnic communities. You can find the
23 documents here but I know that we held a number of meetings at the time
24 where the position was voiced to that effect, and as a leader of a party
25 that was in power at the time, Mr. Karadzic, as the then-president,
1 appealed on everyone and asked them to make sure that they protect not
2 just the Geneva Conventions but also the customs which existed in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which traditionally preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina from
4 unrest and conflict.
5 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Chamber according to what
6 you knew at the time, on what did it depend whether fighting would break
7 out in a municipality and whether there would be conflict in a
8 municipality, in some municipalities and not in others? Why in the 17 --
9 or, rather, 17 out of 27 Krajina municipalities they were -- there was
10 fighting only in some of them in the valleys of Sana and Una, not in
11 others where no one touched the Croats and the Muslims? Were these
12 municipalities disobedient and did not implement our alleged genocidal
14 A. I assert this, and you can find evidence about this, that all the
15 conflicts that broke out, in the Sana river valley specifically, resulted
16 from an initiative of the Muslim side. They initiated the conflict.
17 Prijedor is an example. After this attack, and after many killed
18 policemen, everything else that happened in the area followed. The
19 initiators in these areas were unfortunately the militant circles and the
20 militant individuals or groups, mostly Muslims but some Croats too.
21 Q. Thank you. And now a little bit about the first months and the
22 first year of the war. Could you tell us what the communication was like
23 between the central republican organs in Pale and in Sarajevo and the
24 organs in the local authorities, in the ground, primarily in the Krajina,
25 to the west from the corridor, but also in other areas. And I mean all
1 this in political terms.
2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER: Now a little bit about the first months and first
4 year of the war and soliciting information. If the Court thinks that
5 is -- I mean, it's either an invitation for a very compendious answer by
6 the witness tracking periods of time by periods of time, or it's too
7 broad to be of assistance.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. If you could be more specific,
9 Mr. Karadzic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Speaker, the situation with regards to communication during
12 the three years of war, was it always the same and what made it different
13 and in what periods, if so?
14 A. It wasn't the same. Perhaps I might specify. Up until the
15 28th of June, 1992, all territorial links had been torn or they were very
16 bad, I mean the land lines, especially close to Pale where the leadership
17 was seated, the leadership of the Serbian Republic. After the month of
18 June, when the corridor between the western and eastern parts of the
19 republic was established, it was very risky to move through the area of
20 Brcko, but there was some kind of territorial connection. Throughout
21 1992, I might say, the telephone and other communications, the similar
22 ones like fax and printers, worked with lots of difficulties. And the
23 conclusion which exists here, namely that because of this headquarters in
24 Pale informations could reach it from various parts of Republika Srpska,
25 I can explain that if you're interested, why the communication was not of
1 the best quality, nor did we receive full or truthful information.
2 Q. Thank you. In view of our system and in view of your experience,
3 how did the municipalities operate in the former system and on our side
4 during the war, especially during the first year? What kind of
5 communication did we have and what was the influence of the central
6 organs and how could this influence of the central organs be implemented?
7 A. To try to be as illustrative as possible, the municipalities were
8 like small states within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not because they wanted to
9 work in that way but because they were cut off and had no communications
10 with any kind of centre and they were left to their own devices, and then
11 the neighbouring municipalities sometimes linked together in order to
12 resolve certain problems, especially with regard to defence and
13 co-ordination, so that -- so that there was no important or major
14 influence or instructions that were received from the central
15 authorities, simply because due to difficulties in communication and
16 general confusion and the state of war, this was simply impossible.
17 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us what you knew about the
18 developments with regard to arrests of those who committed crimes and
19 arrests of prisoners of war, what was happening on the ground, and how
20 did you learn that this happened? Which prisons were you aware of?
21 A. It was very rarely that you could receive truthful information
22 about what was going on in the field. We were mostly preoccupied with
23 what was happening to the Serbs in Sarajevo because that was closest to
24 where we were, and in other areas from which we received alarming news
25 about horrible crimes committed against the Serbian people. What was
1 very rare, but it did happen, certain information that was unverified
2 reached us and seemed more like a sort of report where someone is
3 accusing somebody else of something. I claim that at our meetings, we
4 never talked about reports that were unverified, and in which there were
5 allusions to certain crimes without appropriate measures being taken.
6 The relevant organs were charged with investigating it. It was always
7 instructed that an investigation had to be carried out and the
8 perpetrators punished. People were sent out to the ground to
9 investigate. Instructions were sent out, too, and it happened like that
10 throughout 1992. I knew that then and even though Mr. Prosecutor
11 criticises me, I know that many such documents existed at the time.
12 I was aware of many of them. I wasn't aware of others. They contained
13 such instructions to people to do their work and act in accordance with
14 their mandate. The greatest efforts to send such a message to the ground
15 and to investigate those rumours were made by Mr. Karadzic, who was the
16 president of the republic -- or, rather, the president of the Presidency,
17 and he was the one who sent most such messages or he gave such messages
18 or announcements to the media in his interviews.
19 Q. Thank you. What was the interest for us and what kind of impact
20 did the crimes that were happening on the ground have on us as the
21 Serbian community, or any other misdemeanours on the ground? Did we
22 order them? Did we tolerate them? And were they something that was to
23 our advantage?
24 A. I assert that whenever there was a report that may have been
25 true, and where any allusion was made to a possible crime, then two
1 institutions, first and foremost, the Ministry of the Interior --
2 THE INTERPRETER: And could the witness please repeat. He's too
4 JUDGE KWON: Probably you were speaking too fast, Mr. Krajisnik.
5 Could you repeat your answer after you said, "... first and foremost, the
6 Ministry of the Interior."
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Ministry of the Interior, the
8 Ministry of Justice, and the army, the military. As far as I remember,
9 there were other separate commissions but these were the three main
10 institutions which were given the task to investigate the issues, to
11 establish the truth, and to punish the perpetrators. Every meeting that
12 I attended ended with such a conclusion being adopted. In the parliament
13 as well, there was report about something, then a conclusion was adopted,
14 and instructions were given to these institutions to investigate this and
15 establish it because they were the only ones who were in charge of doing
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. As for the Presidency and the assembly or the government, these
19 three highest organs of power, did they have their own investigative
20 institutions? And in what manner could they -- who -- or who could they
21 order to investigate this? Or did they have their own organs that could
22 carry out an investigation?
23 A. The Presidency did not have at its disposal any instruments of
24 investigation. The same for the assembly. The government had two
25 ministries that could implement this. There were individual cases, too,
1 when someone would be assigned to investigate this but the only regular
2 avenue was through these three institutions. Of course, also the
3 Prosecutor's office, and so on. But I'm talking about those who were
4 within the government and could verify the truth about certain
5 allegations that we received as reports or information.
6 Q. Thank you. If these organs and the courts did their work, did
7 the assembly or the Presidency have any impact on the outcome of these
8 processes? Did they meddle with this, in other words?
9 A. Nobody outside the government or outside these institutions could
10 have any influence on it. I couldn't influence someone to implement or
11 not implement something. I could ask them, I could wish, or I don't know
12 what else, I could send a letter or a conclusion from the assembly but
13 I couldn't order anything.
14 I can just provide an example where I received an objection from
15 a lady who had been expelled from her apartment in the Zvornik
16 municipality. I sent my personal secretary to establish this and to try
17 to help this unfortunate woman who found herself out in the street with
18 her children. The then-president -- the then-assembly speaker said, Why
19 did Krajisnik do this? We liberated this. We are in power here. What
20 does Krajisnik want to do with it? My secretary returned and said, Let's
21 punish him. How should we do it? Tell me, I asked him, we can help this
22 woman. This one protected witness testified here about this, and this is
23 an example that I know well. It happened to me in my case. And
24 certainly at the level of the Presidency, there were similar cases but
25 they couldn't do it without the instruments of power which I listed.
1 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us who appointed the judges in our
3 A. The assembly of Republika Srpska -- or, rather, the Assembly of
4 the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the proposal of the
5 government -- or, rather, the Ministry of Justice appointed the judges,
6 in the civilian and in the military courts. But in case of military
7 judges and military prosecutors, it was not a proposal of the government
8 but I think it was the proposal of the Ministry of Defence, as far as I
9 know. That was normal. I suppose that there was also a suggestion of
10 the Main Staff. I don't know this exactly, but I know that both kinds of
11 judges and prosecutors were appointed by the assembly.
12 Q. And when the assembly could not meet for an assembly session, who
13 would then appoint the judges up until their nomination was confirmed by
14 the assembly?
15 A. The Presidency did, the then-Presidency, but the assembly had to
16 confirm the decision later on because it was not final until the assembly
17 adopted it.
18 Q. Thank you. Were there any instances in which the Presidency or
19 the assembly, the Presidency at the time, imposed some judges or removed
20 the judges from the list when it intervened with the proposal of the
21 ministry and the government? Do you know of any such instances of the
22 Presidency intervening with the ministry's proposal?
23 A. There were no such proposals but there were proposals to the
24 effect that the assembly rejected the proposal of the Presidency --
25 rather, the decision, not the proposal, but the decision of the
1 Presidency, so it was not upheld.
2 Q. Could you just briefly explain or clarify what you mean?
3 A. There was an example of an instance when the Presidency appointed
4 the judges and prosecutors who were Muslims by ethnicity and that between
5 two assembly sessions when the assembly could not convene, the Presidency
6 accepted that and made the decision, and then it was published in the
7 Official Gazette. And then consequently at one of the assembly sessions,
8 the decision was not rescinded but there was no support for it. It was
9 not supported. That's one example. Perhaps there may have been others
10 when it had to do with the Serbs but this was a drastic example, when the
11 Muslim judges and the Muslim and Croatian prosecutors were at stake.
12 Q. Was it a permanent tendency in the assembly and what was given as
13 the reason? What made the MPs request a different solution?
14 A. Actually, this was done in a sort of vacuum. The MPs did not
15 have anything against appointing the Muslims and the Croats as judges and
16 prosecutors but as this was a period when we had a crisis in the
17 negotiations, a crisis on the ground, when fierce war was being waged and
18 there was awful propaganda from, conditionally speaking, the other side,
19 then the MPs were revolted and they stood up against such a decision.
20 Not because they would reject it permanently but they said that the time
21 was not ripe, that because there was war going on and there were
22 hostilities and the other side would not allow the Serbs to leave, they
23 were being maltreated and killed, and on this side, that is to say the
24 Serbian side, people would be awarded even though they belonged to
25 another ethnicity. And then the then-minister of justice, Mr. Mandic,
1 fought vehemently against freezing this decision. And as far as
2 I remember, Mr. Karadzic tried on several occasions to explain to the MPs
3 and presented to them as a good message to the world, but the MPs who
4 were overwhelmed by emotion because of the day-to-day politics and the
5 war and the situation on the other side did not agree with this. But in
6 order to understand rightly this decision, we should take into account
7 that that was, I think, on the 11th or the 12th of August, and before
8 that, perhaps a month or fortnight earlier, there was an assembly session
9 in Pale, that was the second assembly session held after the outbreak of
10 the war, and there were many hard words which were said with regards to
11 irregularities, crime and so on, and this was the continuation of the
12 session. And on the previous day, the MP club met, Mr. Karadzic was not
13 present, and I fought a hard battle with the MPs trying to persuade them
14 to accept this. And they voiced their arguments. And eventually the
15 conclusion was, Okay, let's not do it now. We'll do it later. That's
16 why at the assembly session itself, Mr. Karadzic, once he arrived, he did
17 not know that we had had that discussion on the previous day and that we
18 had made this agreement. And so I said, No one has anything against
19 those Muslims. On the contrary, however. Please this is not the right
20 time. Let's try to postpone it, so as to preserve the cohesion within
21 the assembly because it was on the edge of a rift because people did not
22 want to pursue any policy. They were just thinking how they needed to
23 say what they were feeling at the time and the emotions are rarely a good
24 ally of wise decisions.
25 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what the position was
1 of the leadership in respect of humanitarian and civilian needs of the
2 population of the other two warring parties?
3 A. The late Nikola Koljevic, as a top official of Republika Srpska,
4 as a member of the Presidency, was appointed by the Presidency to take
5 care of a particular way of helping the Muslim and Croat people by way of
6 making sure that the convoys passed unhindered with humanitarian aid,
7 that is. I know that there are many documents showing what a battle the
8 Presidency headed by Mr. Karadzic waged in order to have this
9 humanitarian aid reach these enclaves. Very often, there were even
10 conflicts, verbal conflicts, between the military structures and the
11 civilian authorities. Because the soldiers, in the view of the civilian
12 authorities, in a way, obstructed the convoys from reaching a particular
13 destination, sometimes. However, the explanation provided by the
14 military was that through humanitarian aid, arms were being smuggled in
15 and other impermissible things. It was really a disaster when that was
16 proven to be true. In some humanitarian convoys, there were weapons that
17 were being smuggled in. Regardless of that, I know, I heard that, I was
18 present, when Mr. Karadzic said, When, for example, an international
19 community member would come to, as a soldier you have to be correct, also
20 to those who are escorting convoys because we should never fight against
21 our enemy in that way because that was never part of the nature of our
22 people and our army. That is my experience. That is my knowledge. And
23 it is easy for you, Judges, to establish that on the basis of documents.
24 Q. Thank you. I would like to ask you briefly to speak about
25 military developments in Sarajevo itself. How far away is Pale from
1 Sarajevo? And from a military point of view, how was Sarajevo
2 structured? The lines, the neighbourhoods?
3 A. With small corrections, Judges, at the beginning of the war,
4 every ethnic community stood in its own ethnic areas. The configuration
5 of Sarajevo, if you look at the inner city, is populated by Muslims, and
6 the periphery, that is to say everything outside the city, are Serb
7 ethnic areas. Most of the Muslims were in town, and also the government
8 was Muslim.
9 In that area, they had a large army of soldiers who, according to
10 the information that we received from our army, very often attacked the
11 areas that were held by our army, that is to say our fighters. Further
12 away from this inner city, these small towns, like part of Vogosca,
13 Ilijas, Rajlovac, all of that was Serb, and they were surrounded by
14 Muslims. There were Muslim sieges there. An expert could tell you about
15 that. But the density of population was less there so then there were
16 these two rings, if I can put it that way. Everybody felt threatened,
17 Serbs by the Muslims from Visoko towards Sarajevo, and Muslims from the
18 Serbs in the urban centre of town. This was this front between the two
19 ethnic communities, although the third ethnic community was a bit further
20 away. So in essence, the ethnic areas made this necessary. You were
21 there, you saw this. There was this border between the Muslim and Serb
22 ethnic parts. It looks as if somebody had blocked someone.
23 However, our soldiers, the representatives of our Main Staff,
24 said that there were at least 30 offensives launched by the Muslims so
25 that they would break through this defence line of the Serb army.
1 I mean, during the war, there were 30 of them.
2 Q. At a political level, did we have orders to take Muslim parts of
3 Sarajevo in military terms? Actually, what was our position towards the
4 Muslim-held parts of town?
5 A. We did not have such a plan. And I'm telling you, as I testified
6 a moment ago, several times foreigners and our soldiers were of the
7 opinion that with the Army of Republika Srpska we could have taken
8 Sarajevo. However, the main protagonist, and the main opponent of taking
9 Sarajevo was precisely Mr. Karadzic, the president. He said several
10 times that that would have been a terrible mistake, that there would have
11 been many casualties, many fatalities, and it would have been a crime
12 against the civilian population and it would be very hard to carry out
13 this kind of operation without a lot of civilian casualties. Also, the
14 policy was not to take Sarajevo but rather to transform Sarajevo into two
15 towns, along with a small Croat municipality where every ethnic community
16 would have its own government.
17 Q. Before the break, just one more question: What was our position
18 vis-a-vis operations in town? The information that we received from the
19 foreign factor, the media, about sniping, about artillery operations
20 against town, was that accurate? Was that correct? And what was our
21 position in that regard?
22 A. Sarajevo was the most difficult problem for the Serb side because
23 many Serbs were in captivity in Sarajevo. No one was allowed to leave
24 freely. Many had to pay bribes in order to get out, and people had to
25 ask for favours in order to get out of Sarajevo. So this was terrible
1 pressure in terms of our leadership and the military. How to help
2 people. No one knew how to help them. The army that was in Sarajevo
3 very often, very often, provoked our army. They would hit them in order
4 to elicit a response, if I can put it that way. This was based on a
5 political decision, I mean the Muslim and Croat side, or rather the
6 Muslim side in this situation. They wanted to represent Sarajevo as a
7 victim and to represent us, our army, as an aggressor, people who were
8 attacking in order to take a territory. I can give you an example. From
9 my family, two women who were at home were killed by sniper. My wife was
10 a victim of the shelling of Sarajevo. My uncle also died. My cousin was
11 killed by a sniper, a woman. And there were many such cases. There were
12 women who were killed in the place where I lived until the end of this
13 war, where I lived during the war and after that. Now I'm a refugee at
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would you suggest a break now?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. One question you didn't answer is the distance
18 between Pale and Sarajevo.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Between 30 and 20 kilometres. I
20 don't know exactly.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. As the crow flies?
23 A. Well, less probably. I cannot say but it's not very far away.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We will take a break for 45 minutes and
25 resume at 1.20.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 1.21 p.m.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
4 THE ACCUSED: Thank you, Excellency.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. When I asked you, Mr. Speaker, about our position concerning
7 humanitarian aid, could you actually give us an expanded answer -- or,
8 no, you did answer it, in terms of allowing them. Actually, what was our
9 position vis-a-vis the Red Cross, the International Red Cross, the UNHCR?
10 Do you remember our positions? Do you remember our documents?
11 A. As early as the beginning of the war, there was this meeting at
12 Ilidza attended by Mr. Cutileiro I think, as far as I can remember, and
13 then there were other people there too. As regards all international
14 humanitarian organisations, our side had a favourable attitude. We
15 appealed to our citizens asking them to honour their function. The
16 leadership had many meetings, supporting their activities, and the
17 leadership was forthcoming, in terms of allowing their activity to go on
18 unhindered, along with a great deal of help from us.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please take a look at
20 1D65260 in e-court? At the 11th of December, 1992, I think -- this is
21 something different, 1D65260. This has already been admitted.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Do you remember this? This is an agreement, a recommendation on
24 the tragic situation of civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed by Trnka,
25 Kalinic, Coric, Kurjak, Popadic, Mujic. Do you remember these documents
1 that were signed regulating the question of providing assistance to
3 A. Yes, I remember this agreement. It wasn't only this one. There
4 were many other agreements. I think that there was one actually before
5 this date.
6 Q. Thank you. Do you remember the agreement of the 22nd of May,
7 1992, that was signed by Kalinic on our behalf, and do you remember what
8 this agreement regulated?
9 A. Yes. I did not know the date concerned but I know that there was
10 an agreement that regulated activities of the International Red Cross.
11 Mr. Kalinic, the then-minister of health and social policy signed that
12 agreement on your behalf with the representatives of -- I think it was
13 exactly these representatives that I see here. I know Mr. Kurjak was
14 there, I think it was Mr. Trnka, but I don't know exactly whether all of
15 those people listed here were there. But I remember this agreement.
16 Q. Thank you. Did I make a mistake or is there another agreement of
17 the 11th of December?
18 JUDGE KWON: But, Mr. Karadzic, if you see the last page, it's
19 dated as 1st of October.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Probably in that document, that
21 document of the 11th is probably there too. Since the witness knows
22 about this, let's move on.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Can you tell us, in respect of -- in respect of --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, has this been admitted? Is
1 there a P -- no, a D document? No. Could we have the first page yet
2 again, please?
3 Could we see the bottom of the page too? This was at the
4 invitation of the Red Cross, the 30th of September and the 1st of October
5 are the dates when it was signed. I believe this must have been
6 admitted. Could we have the last page again? D1141. That's what I was
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Could you please look at number 5? [In English] Areas of origin
10 should benefit as vulnerable group from international assistance, inter
11 alia in conformity with its mandate by the ICRC.
12 [Interpretation] What was our position in respect of the
13 population that had been temporarily transferred? Was our position that
14 this was supposed to go on forever on a permanent basis?
15 JUDGE KWON: Reformulate the question.
16 MR. TIEGER: The damage is done and we know the impact on the
17 probative value of any answers elicited, but I will have to continue
18 making these objections apparently.
19 JUDGE KWON: D1141 seems to be the correct one.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Speaker, what was our official and private position vis-a-vis
23 persons who were displaced from their home towns and villages during the
25 A. Just as expressed in paragraph 5 of this agreement, and as
1 indicated later in many communiques coming from the officials of the
2 ICRC, namely that certain vulnerable groups may be allowed to leave for
3 safer areas with the proviso that it cannot be regarded as ethnic
4 cleansing or their permanent displacement from their home areas where
5 they must have the right to return.
6 Q. In the indictment, it says that it was my objective, and the JCE
7 objective, to permanently remove Croats from the territories which we
8 claimed as ours. What can you say about that?
9 A. Really, this is completely untrue. There was not a single
10 decision, a position taken, or a document issued that advocated such a
11 policy. I am convinced of that, unless somebody perhaps interprets
12 things differently or an individual makes an unauthorised statement
13 otherwise. Our position was exactly as the position expressed by the
15 Q. Since this has been admitted into evidence, it can be removed.
16 Let us come back to the issue of Sarajevo. What did the army
17 explain to us in reply to allegations that they were firing at the city?
18 A. Whenever we asked representatives of the army, the explanation we
19 got was that there had been an attack launched from Sarajevo first, in
20 the form of an infantry attack or infantry fire to break through the
21 lines of the Serbian army, and that would happen when a protest was made
22 by some representative of the international community because we had not
23 been notified about such things before. We had not been notified in
24 advance by those who made the accusations that disproportionate force was
25 used by our army. So these were attempts to break through our lines, the
1 lines of our army, and our army could not respond in a different way
2 because their personnel was ten times less numerous than the enemy. They
3 could only respond with artillery to the fire coming from the city.
4 Q. You talked about sabotage actions in Sarajevo and attempts to win
5 outside sympathy. What do you know about the explosion in the
6 Vasa Miskin Crni Street, Markale I and II?
7 JUDGE KWON: Before we get there, Mr. Krajisnik you just answered
8 that "... our army could not respond in a different way ..." Could you
9 expand on that? What did you mean?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were two types of response by
11 our army. In the city, there was a great infantry force, and the Muslim
12 infantry attacked our areas where our defence lines were stretched thin
13 and undermanned, and the only way was to strike against that greater
14 power coming from the city. But much more often there was artillery fire
15 from certain points in the city, and then our army responded against
16 those areas where the fire originated. Those were the two responses we
17 usually got. And there was no other response. And I can refer you to a
18 telephone conversation between Mr. Abdic and Colonel Gagovic from our
19 barracks. So they are talking and Abdic is defending himself saying that
20 the army is attacking certain neighbourhoods in the city and Mr. Gagovic
21 says, But your people are attacking us from your area and I already have
22 three soldiers killed by your artillery. There are more such examples
23 where the army responded to fire that originated from the city so that
24 somebody would end up killed. Those were the only two explanations,
25 justifications, for the fighting inside the city.
1 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Thank you. Can you remember there was one question; namely, what
4 do you know about incidents involving mass losses of civilian life in
5 Sarajevo? Let me remind you 27 May 1992, Vasa Miskin Crni Street; then
6 February 1994, the incident in Dobrinja, that was 4th February; and the
7 5th of February, Markale I; and in end August 1995, Markale II. What do
8 you know about these massively lethal incidents? And do you know of any
9 other similar incidents that are undoubtedly provoked by Serbs?
10 A. Let me tell you about one thing. I was very often at the
11 airport, together with Haris Silajdzic, accompanied by several people
12 from their side and several from our side and some representatives of the
13 international community. We were trying to come to some agreement to
14 calm down the situation in the city. And very often Silajdzic would say,
15 There has been an incident. I have to leave.
16 And some of these incidents were those you just mentioned. And
17 I remember very well the follow-up activities. There would be a
18 complaint, a protest, then a response from the international community,
19 and our army would immediately respond that the shell had not come from
20 our area. Then our leadership, primarily Mr. Karadzic, insisted on an
21 immediate investigation to find out what exactly happened because we had
22 very strong assurances from the representatives of the Main Staff,
23 Mr. Mladic or somebody else, that it could not possibly be a Serbian
24 shell and that an inquiry needs to be made.
25 Unfortunately, reports would follow rejecting our initiative to
1 conduct an inquiry. It all ended with half-finished steps wherein we
2 would be denying that it was our side, the Muslims would be insisting
3 that it was, and the international reports would be divided, some saying
4 that it might be, others that it couldn't have been.
5 It's a great pity that the truth was never established because
6 other operations and other incidents followed with a persisting
7 accusation that it was caused by our side. Truth was needed not only to
8 establish responsibility but to resolve this status quo in which it was
9 our word against theirs. There was also the warning, oft repeated by
10 Mr. Karadzic, that the army must not attack Sarajevo because that would
11 be used as a pretext to attack our army with air strikes. As I said,
12 unfortunately, the investigation was never completed and doubts remain to
13 this day. One such incident was used to get our artillery to withdraw,
14 and that was the main deterrent for the Muslims to refrain from attacking
15 our positions. So later, they did attack.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just now you said Mr. Karadzic issued an order that
17 army must not attack Sarajevo. Is it consistent with your previous
18 answer that you -- the army could not respond in a different way?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it is consistent.
20 Talking to soldiers -- although I didn't have many such meetings,
21 soldiers were often told how detrimental to us the accusations that we
22 were attacking Sarajevo were. And Mr. Karadzic reacted by saying that
23 even if you are attacked, it has to be proven that you had been attacked
24 first because very often nobody knows who started first, and these
25 accusations are hurting us seriously. The other side persisted in the
1 propaganda, accusing us for things for which we were not to blame. What
2 is certain is that our policy was not attack Sarajevo.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. My question was regarding the earlier issue on page 70 or 71.
6 What explanations did the army give us concerning their fire? What kind
7 of response were you talking about? The military response or the
8 response to our questions?
9 A. Representatives of the army gave us a clear answer, that they
10 were responding to attacks from the city, that they were responding
11 against the neighbourhoods from which fire was opened at the army. That
12 was their explanation for certain army activities. And you, and the
13 leadership, told them that it has to be shown clearly to the
14 international community that the initial attack really happened before
15 our army reacted, instead of justifying ourselves after the fact. So
16 when you asked them, Are these allegations that I heard from the
17 international community true, these are the explanations they gave.
18 Q. Do you remember where you were on the 27th of May, the day of the
19 explosion in Vasa Miskin Street and what did we do and conclude in that
20 respect, and what kind of answer did we get from the army?
21 A. I gave you an example a moment ago. I believe that's precisely
22 that example, although it might have been another incident. But I still
23 believe it's this one. A protest was made, you were informed that the
24 shell had landed there, killing a lot of people, you were informed by
25 some international representatives, and then when you contacted the army,
1 the army clearly said, This is not our shell. After receiving that
2 answer, you immediately sent out a demand to conduct an inquiry involving
3 a ballistics expert to establish the truth.
4 Q. What did you know about the other incidents, primarily Markale I
5 and II and several shellings in Dobrinja resulting in great loss of life?
6 A. It was the same procedure, the same situation as in that first
7 incident. Our military said that it was a frame-up, that it was not our
8 shell, and, Your Honours, what was important was that all these incidents
9 resembled closely incidents in other countries. So it was easy to
10 portray this by saying, you know, this is the same policy as in Beirut,
11 Sarajevo is very much like it, and the explanations we got from our
12 military were always the same.
13 Q. And who benefited politically from these incidents that we
15 A. It was absolutely to the detriment of the Serbian side and to the
16 benefit of the militant circles in Sarajevo. I'm talking only about the
17 militant circles in Sarajevo who wanted to portray Sarajevo as a martyr,
18 as a prison, as a victim.
19 Q. I have to touch upon the issue of the paramilitaries. What was
20 my position and the position of the leadership, regarding armed
21 individuals and groups, that is to say paramilitaries?
22 A. The leadership of Republika Srpska, and also the commander of the
23 Main Staff, were completely opposed to volunteer units that were outside
24 of control and which we christened as paramilitary formations because
25 they were not under anyone's command. Many times it was stated, both by
1 soldiers and directly by Mr. Mladic, that he criticised any wilfulness
2 that appeared, and I clearly said that all soldiers who want to fight for
3 us can do so but under the command of our army, and those who didn't want
4 to do so would have to return from where they had come.
5 Q. Thank you. Did our side prohibit the paramilitaries and arrest
7 A. There are many instances in which, from your part, you sent an
8 order and so did the Main Staff, to the effect that specific paramilitary
9 formations be disarmed and expelled. Some were disarmed and expelled,
10 and others accepted to come under the command of our units and thus
11 joined them. Therefore, there was a very strict order to the effect that
12 no paramilitary formations should exist. When we received reports about
13 units which were out of control, an order would follow for it to be
14 eliminated, and there are such examples among your documents with orders
15 coming from the Supreme Commander, that is to say Mr. Karadzic, who
16 issued such orders on behalf of the Presidency.
17 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us which state was in existence --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the date?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yugoslavia still existed on the
20 31st of March and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federal unit. Republika Srpska
21 did not exist as an internationally recognised entity, even though by the
22 31st of March, namely on the 9th of January, we proclaimed
23 Republika Srpska as our response and the expression of our political
24 position. But at the time Republika Srpska did not officially exist.
25 There were still the official organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina that were in
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. I see that the interpreters missed the date. I was asking you
4 about the 31st of March, 1992. Do you know, and what do you know about
5 the events in Bijeljina? Did anyone from our side invite Arkan and his
6 fighters to Bijeljina, and in what capacity did Ms. Plavsic travel to
7 Bijeljina during that crisis?
8 A. On the 31st of March, I remember the date well, actually
9 I remember the events which had to do with Bijeljina. I was in the
10 office of the parliament speaker of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ms. Plavsic,
11 I think Mr. Jerko Doko, Mr. Abdic and I think Mr. Zepinic, or whoever
12 else, were there as a delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They went to
13 Bijeljina. It wasn't Ms. Plavsic who was there -- she wasn't there as a
14 representative of Republika Srpska.
15 Q. Do you know whether Arkan was invited and was present and fought
16 in Republika Srpska in that period between April 1992 and September or
17 October 1995?
18 A. I may have forgotten to say that none of the authorities in
19 Republika Srpska invited Arkan. He came to Bijeljina at a local
20 initiative on the basis of a local invitation, when the fighting had
21 already ended or almost ended. Now, whether Arkan was present in the
22 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were some units, some paramilitary
23 formations or groups which claimed that they were Red Berets, something
24 similar to Arkan, but Arkan was not present in Republika Srpska. It was
25 those units that created this image that could help to establish a link
1 with Arkan, but I think that Arkan was not present in Republika Srpska
2 almost until the end of the war, or at least I'm not aware of his
4 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 102 of the pre-trial brief claims that in
5 the evening on the 31st of March, 1992, the Serb volunteer guard, that is
6 to say the Arkan's men and the local Territorial Defence forces, attacked
7 Bijeljina, killed at least 48 Muslim civilians and took over the power in
8 this town.
9 First of all, did the crisis break out after Arkan's arrival or
10 did Arkan arrive after the crisis broke out? And who was in power in
11 Bijeljina before and after this? And were all the killed persons Muslim
13 A. Firstly, as I just said, Arkan did not come when the fighting
14 broke out, nor did he participate in the fighting while the fighting
15 lasted. He came near the end or after the fighting had ceased. I'm not
16 quite certain about that. What is true about it is that this incident
17 was provoked by the militant circles and militant groups among the
18 Muslims in Bijeljina. A conflict did break out and then, if I may put it
19 so, the local forces were more powerful. Arkan arrived and he was
20 involved in the final operations or perhaps he got there after the end of
21 the incident. The absolute power in Bijeljina, up until the incident,
22 was held by the Serbian side, so that the definition or the conclusion
23 that the Serbian side took over the power was wrong. It had no reason to
24 do it because it held the power in Bijeljina before that already.
25 Q. Thank you. Can you remember why Bijeljina reacted so vehemently?
1 Was there anything that happened before that in Bosnia-Herzegovina which
2 made them react so vehemently?
3 A. I remember that, and evidence corroborates it. There were two
4 serious incidents in Kupres and in Sijekovac, near Bosanski Brod, wherein
5 in one place it was the Croatian forces and in the other the Muslim
6 forces that attacked on Serbian civilians and committed a crime.
7 And in the chain of events which followed one another, this was a
8 third incident in which once again militant individuals and groups wanted
9 to seize power in Bijeljina. They attacked Serbian civilians, or
10 actually Serbian citizens, which sent a powerful warning to Bijeljina
11 which then defended itself from those men who did this.
12 Q. Thank you. Could you please remember the war commissioners; that
13 is to say, what were the various ways in which the central authorities
14 were trying to exert their influence on the municipalities? Why did war
15 commissioners exist and what was their role?
16 A. Mr. Dragan Djukanovic, the president of a minor political party
17 before the war, the party of federalists, who advocated the preservation
18 of Yugoslavia and that Bosnia should stay in Yugoslavia, came to Pale at
19 the invitation of the late Nikola Koljevic and held talks with you and
20 Mr. Koljevic and proposed that as the local authorities could not operate
21 and as we had no contact with various locations on the ground, to
22 establish commissioners, the commissioners of the Presidency, who would
23 then make tours of the ground and to try to help with establishing
24 powers, establishing authorities, because there were practically no
25 authorities that were operating at the time. They were let me call them
1 Crisis Staffs or the like. Everyone was trying to establish something
2 that would work in one way or another. So as it was the time of war
3 already, these were war commissioners, that was how they were called and
4 then I think they had a different title, there was another one, but
5 decisions followed one another. The task of these commissioners was to
6 go out into the field, to try to see what the situation was like, and
7 help the local population and the local authorities to establish regular,
8 lawful authorities rather than to have Crisis Staffs or some other ad hoc
9 groups. The goal was to establish authorities and power on the ground in
10 that way. Because up until that time, there were no authorities at all,
11 or we received all sorts of unverified reports. We were not sure about
12 the facts.
13 Q. Thank you. In one of the paragraphs from the introduction to the
14 pre-trial brief, under item 7, it is said that Mladic and myself and
15 others formulated and implemented the plan to take UN staff as hostages
16 in order to prevent air strikes against the military targets of the
17 Bosnian Serbs. And it says there those air strikes represented a threat
18 to the military capacities of the Bosnian Serbs, and the ability of
19 Bosnian Serb leaderships to achieve their military and political goals.
20 Mr. Speaker, do you remember whether we agreed to the mandate and
21 the military presence of the UN, and could they be present there without
22 our consent in the first place?
23 A. Representatives of the international community, that was the
24 UNPROFOR at the time, were welcome so that they would help us to reach
25 some sort of solution. Without our consent it would have been very
1 difficult to achieve that at the time. We had good co-operation with
2 UNPROFOR. But at one point, due to the instances that I mentioned, such
3 as Markale and attacks, there was this constant threat to our side that
4 we would be bombed. And we received information that the other side saw
5 the only way out in which they would achieve their goals to have UNPROFOR
6 on its side so that they would bomb Serbian targets and help them to
7 defeat Serbs in such a way. There was a constant activity in order to
8 avoid those threats of air strikes, but outside of any mandate, there was
9 this threat that Serbian positions would be bombed. We considered this
10 to be UNPROFOR taking side with one of the warring parties, which was
11 beyond its mandate at the time.
12 The way I saw this stage, when this thing with UNPROFOR soldiers
13 happened, it was a desperate attempt on part of our army to prevent
14 further air strikes because it was so difficult when towns and
15 infrastructure are being destroyed. It was in no case a wish to harm
16 those young men who were shown on TV. If it was also an intention to
17 deter further air strikes, that was why we showed it on TV. We wanted to
18 deter someone from exposing us to air strikes. We had no wish to destroy
19 these young people. I saw an aircraft going down above Pale and how the
20 locals in Pale held these two or three young men who had been taken
21 prisoner. They treated them as their own children.
22 So in my view, though I must stress I'm a layman and not a
23 soldier, the image that was sent to the public was one of deterrent with
24 the aim of ending the air strikes.
25 Q. Thank you. It says here that they were taken prisoner in
1 accordance with a plan which Mladic, myself and others formulated to take
2 UN personnel as hostages. Did we ask the United Nations not to meddle in
3 the war, not to be involved, and did we inform them that if they did so
4 that they would be treated as enemies?
5 A. Correct. There are a number of statements in which we warned
6 that the UNPROFOR and international community representatives should not
7 meddle. Here is my example: The air strikes at Pale, which is 10 to
8 15 kilometres away, perhaps ten kilometres as the crow flies, it was
9 bombed, and my wife was a victim, and we received information that
10 UNPROFOR was helping in air strikes on Pale, actually. I don't know if
11 this is true, but the Muslim side did not have such power and such
12 artillery because the distance is quite big, so Mr. Karadzic and
13 Mr. Mladic very often warned the UNPROFOR representatives, or the
14 international community representatives, that they should not meddle in
15 the conflict but help for the conflict to be overcome or that unless they
16 did so they would be considered enemies. Documents to this effect exist
17 and this can be easily checked.
18 Q. Thank you. Do you remember until what time the Muslim armed
19 forces existed in Podrinje, from the area south of Zvornik down to Zepa
20 and Srebrenica including Konjevic Polje and this entire area? Up until
21 when did they exist and could the situation in Podrinje be resolved
22 without any fighting?
23 A. I don't remember the exact date. I think that it was up until
24 the end of the war, in fact, or almost. The entire area was occupied by
25 the Muslim forces, I don't remember the exact date, but almost until the
1 end of the war, or close by that time. It was a dappled area, parts of
2 which were occupied by the Muslim forces.
3 Q. Do you remember the Cerska affair and what the media reported
4 about our counter-offensive against Cerska? How was it characterised and
5 how did General Morillon go there to check it? Were you aware of that?
6 You didn't have to be, but were you?
7 A. All of our people were involved in the war so I was following
8 developments too. Some information arrived to the effect that genocide
9 had been committed in Cerska, that many people were killed. A good
10 French general, Mr. Morillon, arrived and went there to see where it was
11 that genocide had been committed. He went to Srebrenica, and from there
12 he tried to check whether something like that had happened, if that is
13 the case involved. I think it is. Then he was a kind of hostage there
14 because the Muslim forces would not allow him to leave, and he stated
15 then that what the propaganda said was not true.
16 Q. Thank you. What is your experience with such media fire works,
17 or, rather, this kind of media representation of certain events? To what
18 extent could that be believed?
19 A. The worst was when you knew about something that had happened,
20 and in the media you see that even the representatives of the
21 international community who had been misled are providing information
22 that is the complete opposite. Then you get a confirmation or, rather, a
23 conviction that other similar information that you had received is of
24 that same nature. There was a lot of information like that. You'd watch
25 television and you'd see the revolt of the people and everyone about
1 this, how this propaganda - how do I put this? - was being used to attain
2 somebody's objectives. For instance, we saw this well-known journalist
3 from a respectable media company, on a particular TV programme. He
4 showed a cemetery with many crosses and he says, Look, look at how many
5 Muslims the Serbs had killed. And only we there know how tombstones are
6 marked in that part of the world at various cemeteries. I'm not blaming
7 anyone but there was a lot of propaganda at the time during the war, and
8 lies became astronomical.
9 Q. Thank you. Can you say how incidents in Sarajevo were treated by
10 the media and how incidents -- or, rather, events concerning Srebrenica
11 were treated in July 1995?
12 A. Well, maybe I will be imprecise because it's hard to be precise.
13 Everybody in the war had their own truth. All the media presented things
14 that happened in a certain way. Muslims - I mean, I'm talking about
15 Muslims in Sarajevo. The Croats were a bit further away so it's hard for
16 me to speak in the plural, therefore, so I'm speaking in the singular, so
17 I'm talking about the army and the people belonging to one ethnic group -
18 they always presented things in a very abrasive way, that they were the
19 victims, that the Serbs were the aggressors attacking and so on.
20 As for Srebrenica, I can just say the following: As far as our
21 side is concerned, no matter who I contacted and that goes for the media
22 too, things were portrayed as Srebrenica being liberated because there
23 was no resistance and this was quite a bit of surprise. And this was a
24 sort of positive thing because before that, we had a lot of failures in
25 the west, in the western parts, so this led to a certain relaxation among
1 the people, or perhaps the better way of putting it is satisfaction.
2 This was portrayed as a victory that one should be happy about.
3 Q. Thank you. Can you remember now in the media, and also in
4 letters written by foreigners, what was stated -- what happened in
5 Srebrenica? Who were the victims in Srebrenica during those days? And
6 could this be believed or trusted?
7 A. In the media on the Serb side - that's what I do know - it was
8 presented in the following way: That the Muslim army, before our army
9 even arrived, started its breakthrough towards Tuzla, and that even
10 Zvornik was in jeopardy. They even could have taken that. And during
11 this breakthrough, there had been quite a few casualties. There was no
12 information whatsoever about the killing of any person or rather that a
13 crime had been committed there. If someone would even ask what happened
14 there, they would always say, They are lying, that's not true. That is
15 roughly what I can remember, given this time distance, what it was like
16 in the media.
17 Q. Thank you. Do you remember whether at the time there was any
18 mention of killing of prisoners of war near Srebrenica, or was it being
19 stated for a long time that in Srebrenica itself, thousands of civilians
20 had been killed, rather boys and men?
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Okay. The witness stated in his previous answer
23 what he could remember, now he's asked for what he -- again what he could
24 remember, and he's being provided helpful, or potentially helpful,
25 details about what he might or might not remember. Let's find out what
1 he remembers, if he's being asked that, rather than guiding the answer in
2 any way. I don't see the need for that.
3 JUDGE KWON: In his previous answer he mentioned primarily what
4 he heard from the Serb side. So we can ask him whether he heard any
5 mention of killing of prisoners of war. Can you answer the question,
6 Mr. Krajisnik?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for certain information from the
8 representatives of the international community, there was some. Even
9 then it was not being said that people had been killed or that there had
10 been an execution. In a way, it was being said as if the Serb forces had
11 taken a safe area without authorisation, and in that respect a certain
12 precedent had occurred or, rather, something impermissible had happened.
13 And of course in that fighting it was stated that there were some people
14 who had lost their lives. However, for a long time, even foreigners did
15 not say -- I mean, international representatives did not speak about any
16 kind of execution. I did not hear from a single foreigner at the time
17 that there was an execution. I did not hear about that at that time.
18 And I think that the representatives of the Serbs did not say to anyone
19 that there had been such an execution during those days.
20 JUDGE KWON: If not execution, could you be more specific as to
21 what you heard from the representatives of international community?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for what I heard, it was being
23 stated that the Serb side had taken a safe area and that there were a lot
24 of refugees and there were images of civilians that were being shown and
25 it was being stated that there was a looming humanitarian catastrophe.
1 And nobody talked about the soldiers who were attempting a breakthrough,
2 or there was no reference to any execution. There was more talk about
3 how these refugees would be taken care of, how the situation in
4 Srebrenica would be normalised, and also there was concern and also there
5 was a threat that Republika Srpska could be bombed because of the taking
6 of Srebrenica. As for crimes, I did not hear about that from the
7 representatives of the international community.
8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Speaker, according to the diaries of my secretaries, we met a
11 few times during those days, mainly in the presence of other people,
12 various delegations. Can you tell us --
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: All right. It was as much a cautionary rising as
15 much, but I mean obviously the accused was about -- was in the process of
16 providing the witness with information that's evidence in this case
17 concerning the question he's going to ask. I don't mind the question
18 going forward at this point, but I was certainly concerned about the
19 continuation of the provision of information before seeking whatever
20 evidence this witness might purport to have.
21 JUDGE KWON: Please be cautious not to put a leading question,
22 Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. P2242. Perhaps we can
24 call that up. And then the pages that have to do with the 13th, the
25 15th, the 18th, the 19th of July. During those days did you see me in my
1 office? Did we meet in my office? And do you remember what the topics
2 were and what the need was for us to meet at the time? If you see who
3 else was there, perhaps that might be of assistance.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the number
5 of the document.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The month of July, please. The
7 13th of July.
8 JUDGE KWON: Page 91?
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Can you see this here, Minister Rosic, Minister Pejic, Kapetina,
11 President Krajisnik and Petra Markovic, Milorad Motika, and
12 Colonel Orasanin on the 13th. Do you remember? And what would these
13 names tell you? What was the topic that was discussed?
14 A. Given this time distance, I cannot remember the details of these
15 meetings. I can just interpret that which is logical. On the 13th and
16 on the 14th, as for the people who are listed here, these were the usual
17 kind of meetings held with different people. Perhaps we could find such
18 meetings on many dates before and after. As far as I can see here,
19 Krajisnik, Bulatovic, and so on.
20 Q. No, no, the 14th -- no, the 13th, please. On the left. On the
21 right, can you tell us about Kapetina, Pejic, Petra Markovic,
22 Milorad Motika, and Colonel Orasanin. What is it that they deal with?
23 If that was that meeting, what was the topic?
24 A. I cannot find that. If we are talking about the 13th I cannot
25 find my name, so I'd like to see that.
1 Q. Look at the handwritten part?
2 A. Ah, Rosic, yes, as far as I can remember, he was minister of
3 justice; Minister Pejic was minister of finance; Kapetina was the deputy
4 or assistant minister of defence; I was the speaker of the assembly;
5 Petra Markovic was -- was in finance. Actually, perhaps Mr. Pejic was
6 not minister of finance at the time. He was in charge of the building of
7 the city of Sarajevo. Petra Markovic was minister of finance. Actually,
8 Milorad Motika and Colonel Orasanin, they were officials from ORAO, a
9 company. So all of this probably had to do with the town of Sarajevo.
10 I really have no other explanation. This meeting, it's quite diverse, if
11 I can put it that way, and it really has nothing to do with the subject
12 matter that we are discussing now. I mean, Srebrenica.
13 Q. Thank you. Motika and Orasanin, do they come from Pretis and
14 ORAO? And what about these people from finance, why are they there with
16 A. Mr. Motika was --
17 MR. TIEGER: I don't know how many times this witness has to say
18 he doesn't remember this meeting and that it has -- and all that he
19 considers the number of participants to have a kind diverse background.
20 But the accused persists in trying to elicit from him --
21 JUDGE KWON: The witness said they were from ORAO, a company, and
22 I take it Mr. Karadzic was trying to clarify what that meant when he said
23 Pretis. Shall we continue?
24 Please continue, Mr. Krajisnik.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Precisely, Excellency, because ORAO
1 doesn't mean a thing to someone who doesn't know that this is a factory
2 that makes aircraft engines. Pretis and ORAO, both, but all right.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. At that time, between quarter to 7.00 and 9.30, was there any
5 mention, a single word, regarding Srebrenica and crimes in Srebrenica?
6 A. I claim with full responsibility that at that meeting, at that
7 time, in my presence, no one spoke about what happened in Srebrenica and
8 that is why I claim that at this meeting, there was no such discussion
9 because I certainly would have remembered that. Now, why am I in a
10 position to interpret this? Perhaps Mr. Tieger will be sorry to hear
11 this but just like in other trials, witnesses interpreted somebody's
12 speech. I can say with a great deal of certainty what could have
13 happened at this meeting. This meeting could only discuss the protection
14 of Sarajevo because there were large-scale offensives against Sarajevo at
15 the time, so with a view to protecting the people there. So it was with
16 a great deal of certainty that I can say that these people could have
17 discussed that only.
18 Q. Thank you. According to this same diary - and if it's necessary
19 we can take a look at this - you came to see me on the 15th, 18th and
20 19th of July. I believe that it was always as part of some group.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. I see the 14th here. Can you see that? Line 4, there is
23 Deronjic, and the delegation of Srebrenica, from 14.25 to 18.25. At the
24 time, were you present? Or did you go to a press conference? I thought
25 I saw that somewhere. Ah, yes. President Krajisnik says -- just a
1 moment, please. From 14.10 to 16.15, do you remember that? It's down
2 here. Yes. Yes. It's right there.
3 JUDGE KWON: Have you heard about the format of this diary,
4 Mr. Krajisnik, who wrote this and in what method she was keeping this
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All our secretaries noted down all
7 the parties that came to call on us in their own way. I found out later,
8 because originally I didn't know about there agenda, the secretary of
9 Mr. Karadzic noted this down and I have no reason to doubt it's correct.
10 JUDGE KWON: You heard this. Do you see your name in the middle
11 of 14th, President Krajisnik, 14.10 to 16.15 hours? Do you see that?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see that.
13 JUDGE KWON: And do you see a plus in front of your name?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
15 JUDGE KWON: When there is an appointment it will be just a
16 minus, when the people shows up then it will turn into a plus. Do you
17 understand that? So it shows that you met president at 14.10. Do you
18 agree so far?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I must say that I don't know
20 whether it works that way. I suppose so. But I really have no
21 recollection whatsoever of this meeting. It might have happened. I
22 don't know.
23 JUDGE KWON: That's in our evidence. So if you see -- how
24 many -- four lines above your entry, you see Miroslav Deronjic. Probably
25 he was -- he had an appointment at 11.00 hours but probably -- but he
1 showed up as a delegate at 14.25 while you are meeting Mr. Karadzic. So
2 Miroslav Deronjic and a delegation from Srebrenica met Karadzic from
3 1.425 to 16.25. So while you are meeting with president, I take it this
4 delegation arrived. Do you remember such incident?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I repeat: I don't remember the
6 meeting. But looking at this, Milos Culafovic was there at the time, at
7 two different times, and I see Mrs. Tereza Guld was received by
8 Krajisnik. It's possible that I spent some brief time with
9 Mr. Culafovic, maybe it's the same time as I met briefly with Karadzic,
10 or maybe I left to attend another meeting in the middle of this, but
11 I saw a recording showing Mr. Deronjic and his delegation with Karadzic,
12 and I don't remember that at all. But if the recording shows me there,
13 that must have been -- then I must have been at that meeting with
14 Karadzic, Deronjic and the delegation. I don't know how long, though.
15 JUDGE KWON: Ver well. Back to you, Mr. Karadzic. Please
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Look, please, Bob Djurdjevic was there from 17.00 hours until
19 19.15. That means that he was there for an hour and a half at the same
20 time as Miroslav Deronjic. Did Bob Djurdjevic sit in the same room as
21 the delegation of Srebrenica? In other words, can you remember all the
22 rooms where activities took place in the building of the Presidency?
23 A. In the building of the Presidency, there were several offices and
24 auxiliary offices where various talks intertwined, all combinations were
25 possible. It's possible that I first met with Culafovic, and then
1 I briefly left to see Deronjic, and then I joined another meeting, and
2 then somebody would move to a different office, so Mr. Karadzic would
3 leave a meeting for a while to receive somebody else. All these
4 combinations are possible. I cannot claim anything with any certainty
5 now. I can just look at the same paper as you are looking at and reflect
6 on all the possibilities. What is certain is that it very often happened
7 that somebody would come in the middle of a meeting we had, one of us
8 would temporarily leave the meeting, receive that person in another room,
9 then rejoin the meeting, and sometimes they would end up joining the
10 meeting again when it was almost over. So everything is possible. I can
11 only tell you general things that may be of use to this Chamber.
12 Q. On that day, the 14th, was there any talk with me, with Deronjic,
13 with people from Skelani and Srebrenica? Was there any talk about
15 A. If I was at that meeting, as the footage shows me, I can only say
16 that nobody talked about any negative aspect of the events in Srebrenica,
17 in my presence. I remember there was no talk of any crimes. No matter
18 what evidence is produced, I am absolutely sure there was no such thing.
19 Q. Look at the entry for the 15th, please.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see it in e-court.
21 [In English] Next page, I suppose.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. You see, there is a minus next to Stoltenberg's name. He had
24 announced himself and didn't come. Drago Simic, the same. It says call
25 President Krajisnik, plus. And then a meeting, President Krajisnik,
1 Maksim Stanisic, Trifko Radic, and Tomo Kovac. If you don't remember the
2 meeting, tell us who these people are and what could they have discussed.
3 A. Maksim Stanisic was president of the Executive Board of the city
4 of Sarajevo; Trifko Radic was an MP and deputy mayor of the Serbian
5 Sarajevo; Tomo Kovac, I'm not sure if he was the minister of MUP at the
6 time, but he was a representative of the MUP, also from Sarajevo. I
7 don't recall this meeting either after so many years. But the only thing
8 this gathering could have discussed was the city of Sarajevo and the
9 defence of the Serbian city of Sarajevo because an offensive was going on
10 at the time and there was a great danger that the front line held by the
11 Serb army might be broken through.
12 Q. Could we look at the entry for 18 July, that's two pages further.
13 While we are waiting, at this meeting, was there any mention of
14 Srebrenica and crimes in particular?
15 A. My reply is the same. In my presence, there was never any talk
16 about crimes in Srebrenica. That applies to this date and I can assert
17 the same in relation to other dates as well, if you show them to me.
18 Q. We see the 18th July now, the fourth line from the top,
19 President Krajisnik, Tomo Kovac, Minister Ninkovic and M. Stanisic. If
20 you can't remember the meeting, judging from the people, what could have
21 been discussed?
22 A. Well, the discussion could have been identical, to do with
23 Sarajevo issues. I was from Sarajevo, Stanisic was minister of defence,
24 and Tomo Kovac was president of the Executive Board of the
25 Serbian Sarajevo.
1 Q. Could we see the next page, please? Can you find yourself on the
3 A. Yes. I can see it. I found the entry General Milosevic and
4 President Krajisnik, 134.0 to 15.40. This seems to indicate, because
5 General Milosevic was commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, and since
6 I was interested very much so in the defence of Sarajevo, it seems that
7 the discussion was about the defence of Sarajevo. I don't recall the
8 meeting, but judging from the participants, I think it could only have
9 been about Sarajevo, nothing else.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, if we could
11 extend the session a little, I would like to try to finish today.
12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Can you tell us anything about the last talks with
14 Ambassador Holbrooke regarding my withdrawal from any public offices and
15 my party positions? What was agreed and what were the time frames?
16 A. In that period, I played the part of the main Serbian
17 representative vis-a-vis international players, and regarding your
18 withdrawal from the position of head of state and party positions,
19 I spoke to Mr. Steiner and Mr. Holbrooke. And I am privy to all the
20 details concerning that issue.
21 But if we stop just at this meeting and the agreement with
22 Mr. Holbrooke, this is the truth: Before Mr. Holbrooke's arrival, we had
23 dealt with all the problems involved in the withdrawal of Mr. Karadzic
24 with Mr. Bildt. Mr. Karadzic would hand over to Mrs. Plavsic, would not
25 run at the next elections, and he would remain head of the party, head of
1 the political party, because that was not a public office. That was our
2 agreement with Mr. Bildt. Mr. Bildt then made a very unusual suggestion
3 to me, but it was very true. He said Mr. Karadzic should go underground,
4 he should disappear from public life. He would cease to be interesting
5 to the international community and that would be the best indication that
6 the implementation of the Dayton Accords is successful. Mr. Holbrooke
7 didn't come to see us. He came to see Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Aleksa Buha
8 and I were invited to join them in Belgrade. I don't think anyone else
9 was invited. Mrs. Plavsic was in Pale, and Mr. Karadzic was also in Pale
10 or somewhere else. And then, the demand came that Mr. Karadzic should
11 also withdraw as president of his political party, to alleviate the last
12 misgivings about the implementation of the Dayton Accords. All these
13 talks lasted until the small hours, and what is true is that the
14 agreement was reached at that point, Mr. Karadzic gave up on all his
15 positions, and Mr. Holbrooke then said, As far as Mr. Karadzic is
16 concerned, the Tribunal is --- in The Hague is history.
17 The agreement was that the indictment would be withdrawn or it
18 would be dealt with in some other way, and Mr. Karadzic would keep a low
19 profile and would cease to be president of his party. And then we talked
20 about how to make this agreement. The agreement was prepared in the
21 sense that he was leaving all his positions and posts. But the other
22 part was kept quiet, the part that concerned Mr. Karadzic's demands. And
23 the reason it was kept quiet was that it was very unpopular and
24 Mr. Holbrooke told us on the telephone that he, or the United States,
25 should be seen as working against the Tribunal that had received
1 international recognition. And everybody who was there can confirm what
2 I'm saying. Why did we trust them without requiring anything on paper?
3 First of all, we understood that secret diplomacy is one thing and public
4 diplomacy is another thing; and the second reason is that we had great
5 trust, great confidence, in Mr. Holbrooke. Because until that time,
6 Mr. Holbrooke had honoured every commitment he had ever made towards us.
7 And in his dealings with the Muslim side, he was very efficient, he
8 settled problems very effectively, and he earned our respect. And
9 Mr. Karadzic said, How can we not trust the man who achieved the lifting
10 of the sanctions even before we signed anything?
11 JUDGE KWON: What time frame are we talking about? When was it?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was going on after the first
13 post-Dayton elections, June or July 1995, after Dayton and before the
15 JUDGE KWON: June or July 1995?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think so. But I'm confusing
17 years now. They are blending together in my mind. It was before the
19 JUDGE KWON: After the Dayton?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, how much more time do you have in
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems I won't be able to finish
24 now, after all, and I will have to ask Mr. Krajisnik to come again
25 tomorrow. But I would like to you look now at this document 1D05920.
1 This document that deals with these meetings and then I would finish.
2 But we can deal with this tomorrow, if you wish.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Although it's short, we can just
5 identify the document.
6 JUDGE KWON: We will continue tomorrow morning. Hearing is
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.49 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of
10 November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.