Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 43731

 1                           Tuesday, 19 November 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, good morning everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, good morning, Mr. President.  I'd like to

 9     introduce to the Trial Chamber Rieneke Boterenbrood, who is a legal

10     intern working with our team.  She is from the Netherlands.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             Before we continue, there's a matter I would like to deal with.

13     In assessing the accused's motion to admit documents previously marked

14     for identification which was filed on the 7th of November, 2013, and

15     noting the Prosecution's response filed on the 18th of November, 2013,

16     the Chamber notes that the accused has not provided sufficient details

17     regarding the prior admission of five intercepts for which he requests

18     that the Chamber take judicial notice of their authenticity.  Therefore,

19     as the Chamber has stated in the past, it instructs the accused, by

20     25th of November, 2013, to provide it with further information regarding

21     the prior admission of the intercepts, including the transcript

22     references or titles and date of the written decision through which they

23     were admitted.

24             Yes, Mr. Tieger.  Please proceed.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 43732

 1                           WITNESS:  MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]

 2                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

 4        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to begin with something that you've

 5     alluded to during your examination-in-chief, and that was your trial and

 6     your conviction.  Now, you were tried on charges related to and convicted

 7     for your participation as a member of a joint criminal enterprise along

 8     with persons such as Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic to forcibly remove

 9     Muslims and Croats from large areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including

10     35 municipalities.  Correct?

11        A.   Yes, yes.  That's the way it was in the first judgement.

12        Q.   Okay.  And those municipalities included Banja Luka, Bijeljina,

13     Bosanski Novi, Bratunac, Foca, Hadzici, Ilidza, Kljuc, Novi Grad,

14     Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, and

15     Visegrad, Vlasenica, Vogosca, and Zvornik?  Those were among the

16     municipalities embraced by the indictment and the conviction; correct?

17        A.   As I've already said, the first indictment did contain these

18     municipalities; however, in the first judgement some of them were dropped

19     and in the second judgement many more were dropped.  So what stayed on

20     were the things that happened in nine municipalities.

21        Q.   Well, the judgement is available for all to see.  In fact, I'll

22     be providing you with a copy of it in Serbian.  I think you'll see that

23     the conviction embraced more than nine municipalities, and we'll talk

24     about some of those specific municipalities during the course of this

25     examination.

Page 43733

 1             Now, in assessing your responsibility, the Trial Chamber found

 2     that your involvement was crucial to the commission of the crimes, and

 3     that's found at paragraph 1158 of your judgement.  For your benefit,

 4     Mr. Krajisnik, I have a copy of the trial judgement in your language.

 5     This is 65 ter 24274, which has also been uploaded in both languages.

 6     And I'm referring to a finding that is reflected at paragraph 1158,

 7     Mr. Krajisnik.

 8        A.   Well, I'm not a lawyer, but as far as I understood this, the nine

 9     municipalities that remained in the conviction are Trnovo, Sokolac,

10     Bratunac, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Prnjavor, Banja Luka, Sanski Most, and

11     Krupa, and there's not a single event that occurred outside these

12     municipalities that I was convicted for in the final judgement.  I'm

13     speaking to you as a former accused person, that is to say, a person who

14     was convicted; but it is possible that from a legal point of view

15     somebody may interpret this differently.

16        Q.   You're welcome to turn to paragraph 1158, but I take it you will

17     confirm that the Trial Chamber found that your involvement in these

18     events was crucial to the commission of the crimes that were charged and

19     for which you were convicted?

20        A.   This is the first judgement and you are right.  There were many

21     municipalities in the first judgement.  I, however, am speaking about the

22     final judgement in which those municipalities were dropped.  I'm telling

23     you again how it is that I understand things.  My participation is --

24        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, excuse me.  Let's -- okay.  You were about to

25     address your -- go ahead.  Finish that thought.  Sorry to interrupt.

Page 43734

 1        A.   Well, then you shouldn't have interrupted me.

 2        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, I will feel free to interrupt you when you are not

 3     answering the question.  In this case you started off on a different

 4     course, talking again about the municipalities, then you began to address

 5     the question I had raised.  So you may continue if you're responsive to

 6     the question I've asked.  Please continue, your participation?

 7        A.   Well, I had to give that kind of response because you made a

 8     mistake.  You said I was convicted for 36 municipalities.

 9        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, please -- will you --

10        A.   It was nine municipalities so I had to correct you.

11        Q.   The question is -- the question is:  The Trial Chamber found that

12     your involvement in the crimes was crucial to their commission?  Yes or

13     no?  And I directed your attention to paragraph 1158.  If you're unable

14     to answer that question, we'll move on.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I think that Mr. Tieger

16     shouldn't adopt that kind of tone with the witness.

17             JUDGE KWON:  You referred to municipalities.  It's fair enough

18     for the witness to comment on that, but let's continue.

19             Mr. Krajisnik, the -- please try to answer the question.

20     Mr. Tieger's question about the passage in paragraph 1158 in your trial

21     judgement in which your role was said to be crucial.  Would you like to

22     respond to that?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to the judgement, the

24     final judgement, my participation in the joint criminal enterprise was

25     significant and I'm not denying that.

Page 43735

 1             MR. TIEGER:

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now, the Judges also included a special section that began

 3     at paragraph 888 on your credibility as a witness or your lack of

 4     credibility; correct?

 5        A.   That is correct.

 6        Q.   In fact, you testified from April to June 2006, for 40 days or

 7     two and a half months on a four-day workweek.  That was the length of

 8     your testimony before the Trial Chamber; right?

 9        A.   Yes, that is correct.

10        Q.   And after watching you and hearing you for that period of time,

11     the Trial Chamber found that you were a witness of "very low

12     credibility."  And that's found at paragraph 888 of your judgement;

13     right?

14        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, you are talking about the first-instance

15     judgement.  Please, that is not what the second-instance judgement says.

16     Out of the 36 municipalities, I was convicted of nine, whereas in the

17     other ones it was not confirmed, that is to say, what the trial judgement

18     said.  And that is what I had been saying all along.

19        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, you are well aware of the fact that you were

20     convicted, whether you want to quibble about the number of municipalities

21     or not, for your participation in a joint criminal enterprise,

22     participation which you disputed for 40 days, for two and a half months

23     of court, as a result of which the Trial Chamber found that you were a

24     witness of very low credibility.  And the Appeals Chamber didn't upset

25     that finding in any way.  They validated the position that your claims

Page 43736

 1     about your participation, your lack of participation in the JCE, were not

 2     true.

 3        A.   Your statement that the first-instance Chamber said that my

 4     credibility was low is correct.  I wish to explain to you that they also

 5     said what they said about the other 28 municipalities, that my testimony

 6     was correct; that's what the second-instance judgement said.  And then

 7     that was proven to be wrong in terms of what the first-instance judgement

 8     had said.

 9        Q.   The Trial Chamber will look at it and I'm not going to quibble,

10     but you know very well -- and we were both there, Mr. Krajisnik, that

11     your Defence is based on the fact that you were not involved in the JCE

12     and you were ultimately convicted and the conviction was affirmed for

13     your participation in the JCE.  That's the bottom line.  You said you

14     didn't substantially contribute to a joint criminal enterprise and you

15     were convicted for that and you served time for that.  Are you unwilling

16     to admit that to these Judges?

17        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I believe it would be useful for me to explain

18     this because your approach is wrong.  I told you, I am not denying that

19     the first-instance judgement found me guilty, that my participation was

20     significant.  Also, I'm not denying that I was convicted as a member of a

21     joint criminal enterprise for nine municipalities, for nine cases --

22     actually, several cases within those municipalities as a member of JCE.

23     Also, I accept the judgement because it's a final judgement; however, I

24     do not accept what happened.  That is why I'm working on the review of

25     that judgement.

Page 43737

 1             If you wish, every part of the judgement where I was found

 2     guilty, I'm going to prove here before this Chamber that your indictment

 3     was wrong and that the then-Trial Chamber had made a mistake.  This,

 4     however, are not review proceedings, and that is why I believe it would

 5     be fair to know the entire truth so that a partial truth would not

 6     mislead the Chamber.

 7        Q.   Well, we'll get to as much of the truth as we can.  Let's just

 8     identify just a very few of the numerous areas where the Trial Chamber

 9     found that you were a witness of very low credibility.  First of all,

10     they found -- well, the Trial Chamber found numerous instances, in fact

11     in excess of 20 as the judgement reflects.

12             One of those, for example, is found at paragraph 890 of your

13     judgement, where the Trial Chamber noted that you denied knowledge of

14     many facts surrounding crimes committed by the Bosnian Serb authorities

15     in 1992.  And in 891 the Trial Chamber indicates that there was a large

16     body of evidence directly proving your intent and knowledge.  So that's

17     one area and we'll address that more specifically during the course of

18     this examination, but that's one thing that the Trial Chamber found;

19     right?

20        A.   Those were the findings of the Trial Chamber, first-instance.

21        Q.   And then paragraph 949 and 948 the Trial Chamber addressed in

22     part your assertions regarding your relative powerlessness and found at

23     paragraph 949 that, to the contrary, you had direct access to the levers

24     of Bosnian Serb state power.  Correct, that was the finding of the

25     Trial Chamber?  And I will be discussing with you during the examination

Page 43738

 1     here some aspects related to your role in the Bosnian Serb authorities.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question?

 3             MR. TIEGER:

 4        Q.   That is -- you confirm that that was another aspect of the

 5     Trial Chamber's findings with regard to your assertions and your

 6     credibility in connection with those?

 7        A.   In order for the Prosecutor not to torment himself, the

 8     Trial Chamber did find that my testimony was of low credibility.  Full

 9     stop.  So that is what is stated by all of these paragraphs and that is

10     the first-instance judgement.

11        Q.   Okay.  One more before I move on to a specific example,

12     Mr. Krajisnik, that I think is illustrative.  At paragraph 1037 of your

13     judgement, 1036 and 1037, the Trial Chamber focused on your testimony

14     concerning knowledge of the detention of civilians in 1992 and found that

15     contrary to your testimony, that many of the facts about detention of

16     civilians were known to you before August of 1992, that is, before the

17     time that there was an international outcry following the entry of

18     international journalists into Omarska.  That's at paragraph 1037.  So

19     that's another aspect of what the Trial Chamber found, specific aspect of

20     what the Trial Chamber found about your credibility concerning those

21     allegations.

22        A.   I say to this day that this is wrong.  And it is correct that

23     that is what the Chamber stated.

24        Q.   Okay.  Now, maybe it would be useful, rather than traversing

25     through the many parts of the judgement that reflect the Trial Chamber's

Page 43739

 1     findings about your assertions and your credibility with respect to

 2     those, that we look to a particular example of your testimony in your

 3     previous case.  And you may or may not recall this, Mr. Krajisnik, but I

 4     want to bring you back to your testimony in response to viewing the video

 5     of the rally that was held in Banja Luka on the 21st of August, 1994, a

 6     rally attended by you, Mr. Karadzic, and persons such as Mr. Radic,

 7     Mr. Kupresanin, and Mr. Brdjanin.  Now --

 8        A.   What was the date of the rally?

 9        Q.   August 21st, 1994.  I'm happy to show you that rally again if you

10     need to see it and I'm happy to show you the transcript of what those

11     persons said or a copy of -- or show you what was said in your trial

12     about that.  So you let me know if you need any of those things along the

13     way.  But at that rally, Mr. Kupresanin and Mr. Brdjanin preceded you at

14     the podium.  And Mr. Kupresanin said:

15             "There can be no Islamic state on land that has been forever

16     Serbian.  There is no Muslim people and the entire world knows this.

17     There are only Serbian people in these parts."

18             And that's at -- found at P00014, English pages 5 and B/C/S

19     page 4.

20             Then Mr. Brdjanin spoke, this is something that the Trial Chamber

21     had an opportunity to see yesterday, saying:

22             "Those leftist forces which are offering us coexistence again

23     must know that it is the obligation of Serbs over the next hundred years

24     to wipe their feet from the foul non-Christians who have befouled this

25     soil of ours."

Page 43740

 1             And then, Mr. Krajisnik, you spoke and you began by saying:

 2             "Dear brothers and sisters, having heard these wonderful words by

 3     my predecessors, I feel great satisfaction at being at this gathering

 4     here today."

 5             And that's found at P00014, English page 8 and B/C/S page 7, and

 6     it was discussed during your trial at transcript page 24946.

 7             Now, in response to that and upon being asked questions about

 8     your praising of these predecessors' remarks, you said that you were

 9     commenting only on Kupresanin's statement; that's found at 24949 of your

10     trial transcript.  You recall that was your position, Mr. Krajisnik?

11        A.   I cannot recall; however, I can give you my comments right now as

12     if I had never said anything before, if you're interested.

13        Q.   No, I'm interested in what you said to the Trial Chamber at the

14     time, what you said the first time you were confronted with this.  So I

15     would like you to confirm or I'll show the transcript that you said

16     despite the fact that you spoke about predecessors, plural, on

17     August 1st, 1994, that you told the Trial Chamber, well, you were only

18     commenting on Kupresanin's statement.  That's the first thing.  If you

19     want to see the transcript and I'll read the transcript to you, we can do

20     that.

21        A.   I believe you that that's the way it was.  There's no need for

22     you to read it out to me.

23        Q.   Okay.  And then you said that you said those were wonderful

24     statements only "in order to gloss over a statement I didn't agree with."

25     So it was your testimony to the Trial Chamber that you didn't agree with

Page 43741

 1     Kupresanin's statement, but you said to the crowd:  Those are -- that's a

 2     wonderful statement, in order to show your disagreement.  That was your

 3     testimony.

 4        A.   That's exactly the way it was, as I put it then.  Today I do not

 5     agree with the negation of the Muslim nation because every person has the

 6     right to declare himself the way he feels.  It is a very well-known thing

 7     that I do not agree with rhetoric that is not well-balanced.  And it is

 8     wrong to say something like that especially at a big meeting like this

 9     one, a big rally like this one, things that were said by these other

10     participants.

11        Q.   Right.  And you noted that Mr. Kupresanin denied the existence of

12     the Muslims, everybody applauded, they applauded all kinds of nonsense.

13     And you said you put your words in the way you did because you couldn't

14     say:  "Kupresanin, you're a criminal."  So you -- that's correct, isn't

15     it?  And that's what you said to the Trial Chamber in your case?

16        A.   Well, the translation is probably wrong.  I would never have said

17     that he was a criminal.  I would prefer to say that he was wrong, that he

18     was doing things in a rather unbalanced way.  So this is probably a wrong

19     interpretation.  I don't agree with those Serbs who deny the right to the

20     Muslims to have a nation, even though there are facts that prove that the

21     Muslims descend from the Serbs, but if they don't want to be Serbs

22     nowadays it's their wish.

23        Q.   Well, whether it was -- whether you considered it criminal or

24     radical, as I believe you modified it to -- a little bit later in your

25     testimony, the bottom line is that you were trying to explain to the

Page 43742

 1     Court that Kupresanin said something very, very wrong that you very much

 2     disagreed with.  And you tried to explain your praise or your seeming

 3     praise of Kupresanin by calling it a wonderful statement by saying in

 4     fact you were very much against it.  That was the position you took when

 5     you were first confronted with this video; correct?

 6        A.   Well, Mr. Prosecutor, I said the same thing then.  If a

 7     politician tries to deny something at a public rally, it has to be in a

 8     mild and moderate way and you start with the word "but" and then you get

 9     to the point.  This rally took place during war time.  It -- of course,

10     it would be politically damaging to get into debates in such a rally.  I

11     say again, I don't think that this was criminal, what he said, that the

12     Muslims were not the same as Serbs, but I thought that at the time that

13     would be politically damaging and I disagreed with that.

14        Q.   Well, Mr. Krajisnik, after you offered this explanation to your

15     Trial Chamber about the motive for your comments and what you purported

16     was your actual disagreement with Kupresanin, you were confronted with

17     the fact that that wasn't the first time that Kupresanin had raised that

18     point, that in fact he had raised that same point in the Assembly in

19     January of 1993 and that not only did you not disagree with him, but you

20     explicitly agreed with him, raised the issue on the agenda on the spot,

21     backed it, and the result was a conclusion that Muslims were not a nation

22     that was adopted at the 24th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly;

23     correct?

24        A.   You are misinterpreting this, Mr. Prosecutor, because you

25     extracted a portion, just like last time, only one portion.  It was not

Page 43743

 1     that I was right.  I'm talking about Mr. Kupresanin.  I made reference to

 2     Mr. Kupresanin's statement about the --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you repeat your answer and

 5     please speak slowly for the benefit of the interpreters and us.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I'll repeat.  I'll

 7     try to repeat my answer.

 8             Mr. Prosecutor is wrong and I'm sorry to say that because he is

 9     entitled to criticise me, not I him.  I would like Mr. Prosecutor to take

10     a look at the comment that I made on Mr. Kupresanin's answer.  It wasn't

11     that I was right, but Mr. Kupresanin was right because my intention was

12     to get involved in this raging debate to the effect that Kupresanin said

13     that Muslims were not Serbs because on the day before at the Deputy Club,

14     some deputies maintained the position that the whole people has the right

15     to oppose the position of individuals.  And the point is that a decision

16     was to be made, although many deputies were against it, to the effect

17     that the Muslims were not Serbs; however, that was not important, that

18     was irrelevant.  And for that reason I said:  All right, I am wrong.

19     You, Mr. Kupresanin, are right.  The Muslims are not the Serbs.  Let's

20     move on.  That doesn't mean that my opinion was that Mr. Kupresanin was

21     right.  If you look at the conclusions, you will not find it anywhere.

22     Just for the rhetoric purposes, I told him:  Mr. Kupresanin, I concede

23     that you are right.  Let's move on.  That's the true meaning of my words.

24             Mr. Prosecutor, please find the place where I said:  I'm wrong

25     and you, Mr. Kupresanin, are right.

Page 43744

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, going back to the speech at the rally,

 2     in order to understand the real context in which Mr. Krajisnik said --

 3     let me see, "wonderful words by my predecessors," probably the Chamber

 4     needs to read what followed that expression, i.e., the remaining parts of

 5     Mr. Krajisnik's speech on that day.  But I note the -- they are redacted.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Well, they weren't -- I originally offered the

 7     entirety of the video.  I'm happy to do that now --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  -- or the entirety of Mr. Krajisnik's remarks, of

10     course.

11             JUDGE KWON:  So probably the Chamber needs to read the remainder

12     of Mr. Krajisnik's speech in order to understand what he meant at the

13     time.

14             Do you agree?  Is there any objection from the Defence?

15             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So that will be pages 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, I don't know

17     until what part is Mr. Krajisnik's words, but I would like to -- the

18     Chamber wants to see the remainder of Mr. Krajisnik's speech on that day.

19     That said, please continue, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21        Q.   Well, Mr. Krajisnik, you say that the Prosecutor has a right to

22     criticise you, but in fact you also assumed that right at the trial and

23     also -- at your trial and also criticised Momcilo Krajisnik.  So when you

24     were -- when you heard and saw the words that you spoke on that date

25     which belie what you're saying now, and let me just point out one portion

Page 43745

 1     of what you said, you said:

 2             "Let me explain why it isn't good.  They want us to say we're all

 3     the same.  They really want to create one nation, that we're all the same

 4     only of different religion.  We must say that we are different" -- by the

 5     way this is found in pages 24966 and 67 of your transcript.

 6             "They are a group of Turkish orientation.  Well, all right,

 7     people, if we accept that they are some kind of group, Turkish or I don't

 8     know who's, then we simply give them aces to their hands to be an

 9     independent nation.  They will be more than happy to claim that they are

10     of Turkish origin, the same as the Siptars developed theories that they

11     are of Iliric origin.  Why, we should tell them who they really are.

12     They are unbelievers, a nation that is not a nation, that is to say a

13     nation that would like to be a nation but has no arguments for a nation."

14             And then you were asked whether or not your comments in response

15     to Mr. Kupresanin's comments in 1994, that is, whether your earlier

16     testimony at the rally was wrong because, in fact, in saying that you

17     didn't disagree with Kupresanin and didn't deny the Muslims their right

18     to be a nation, that was false because that's the position you took at

19     the Assembly almost two years earlier.  And you said at page 24967:

20             "That's correct.  This here is nonsense what Momcilo Krajisnik

21     was saying.  It's detrimental.  I have to say I never thought like this.

22     If I could distance myself from this Momcilo Krajisnik, I would."

23             Do you remember that?  Do you remember talking about the -- how

24     embarrassed you were by what you called the -- that Momcilo Krajisnik and

25     how what he was saying was wrong?

Page 43746

 1        A.   As far as I can remember, that comment of mine referred to one of

 2     my statements and that is that the Turks had occupied my village.  Being

 3     enraged, I used the word "Turks," although it may not be derogatory but

 4     it might sound in this context.  Without having any insight that this was

 5     occasioned by this event --

 6        Q.   Well, let me put this in context for you.  You did, in fact,

 7     offer the testimony that you never used the derogatory term "Turks."  And

 8     then you were confronted -- that's right.  And then you were confronted

 9     with at least one instance, I believe two, where it was obvious that you

10     had done so, and that was another occasion on which you tried to distance

11     yourself from that Momcilo Krajisnik, that other Momcilo Krajisnik,

12     right, and that's what you were just referring to?

13        A.   To my recollection, only on one occasion did I distance myself

14     from Momcilo Krajisnik and that was during the confrontation that you

15     arranged when I said that I don't remember ever using the word "Turks."

16     This is not a word in my vocabulary.  Then, at the request of the

17     Presiding Judge Orie, you put to me the fact that the Turks had occupied

18     my village.  It may also include the event of the 12th of May, and then I

19     as I say that without you informing me that this is about this event, I

20     said that I distanced myself from Momcilo Krajisnik.  And I repeat it

21     today to this Chamber, that there is no the word "Turks" in my vocabulary

22     or any other derogatory word and everybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina can

23     confirm that, not that I'm different from other people, but simply

24     because this is not fair.  If you look at the entire context, you will

25     find out that this was occasioned by the confrontation that was intended

Page 43747

 1     to confirm whether I ever used the word "Turks," and I used it only once

 2     when the Muslim army occupied the village and committed heinous crimes.

 3     And I said that when I was angered and that is why I used that word, but

 4     I don't remember speaking about this in the context of Mr. Kupresanin.

 5        Q.   I'm going to quote from 24967 and --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  If you are going to quote, let us upload it.

 8             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the last answer it was not

10     recorded that witness said:  Even though I said that in a situation when

11     my village was occupied and the crimes had been committed, I'm not happy

12     to have said that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

14             Going back to the 1994 rally transcript, the Chamber may also

15     need Kupresanin's part in its entirety as well.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Please, absolutely.

17             JUDGE KWON:  And I was told that we need also the video part as

18     well.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  Thank you, Mr. President.  We'll take care of

20     that.

21             JUDGE KWON:  If it is short, then please go ahead.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Thanks, Mr. President.  It's 65 ter 25522, and we're

23     talking about page 24967.  And while we're waiting, I can also mention

24     that the Assembly session that's been referenced is P921, the specific

25     sections that were referenced were found at English pages 94 through 96

Page 43748

 1     and B/C/S 64 through 66, but obviously the Court is -- has the entirety

 2     of the session in evidence.

 3        Q.   Again, Mr. Krajisnik, the question that you were asked was:

 4             "When you talked about your comments in response to

 5     Mr. Kupresanin's comments in 1994 by saying that you disagreed with him

 6     and you didn't deny the Muslims their right to be a nation, that was just

 7     wrong, wasn't it?

 8             "A.  That's correct.  This here is nonsense, what

 9     Momcilo Krajisnik was saying.  It's detrimental.  I have to say I never

10     thought like this.  If I could distance myself from this

11     Momcilo Krajisnik, I would ..."

12             If you look down toward the bottom of the page, you continue:

13             "... this speech is absolutely authentic, and I'm very sorry that

14     this Momcilo Krajisnik said what he said."

15             And on the following page you said:

16             "... I know what Kupresanin said but I spoke in a very indecent

17     way because there is no reason why anybody should not be allowed to be a

18     Muslim, a Croat, a Serb, whatever they please ..."

19             So that was, indeed, another occasion on which you distanced

20     yourself from that other Momcilo Krajisnik in response to being

21     confronted with a contradiction between what you were saying in court and

22     what you had said at the time; correct?

23        A.   I have to say that this is a great surprise to me.  I remember

24     that I only commented this due to the event when the Muslim forces raided

25     the village and occupied it.  As for this comment, it's probably related

Page 43749

 1     to this, otherwise why would I distance myself from Momcilo Krajisnik and

 2     my speech?  It turns out from here that I was supporting Mr. Kupresanin

 3     whilst I didn't.  I don't know how this happened.  I had no reason to say

 4     all of this because it wasn't me who used the word "Turks," it was

 5     Mr. Kupresanin.  Therefore, I find it hard to understand, especially

 6     since it's in English, whether I am distancing myself from Mr. Kupresanin

 7     or from myself.  I have no reason to distance from myself because I

 8     didn't say anything inappropriate and bad in my speech.

 9        Q.   Well, whether you now claim you had no reason to do so,

10     Mr. Krajisnik, the transcript is clear.

11             MR. TIEGER:  And I tender those pages, Mr. President --

12             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, Mr. Tieger, the further parts of this

13     page shows that Mr. -- Judge Orie offered Mr. Krajisnik to take the

14     document with him to the Detention Unit so that he could have -- review

15     the document and comment upon later on.  So do you know what happened

16     afterward?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I do, Mr. President, and would be happy to

18     tender those -- the entire -- what happened was Mr. Krajisnik took this

19     position that he is essentially taking today --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Let us ask the witness first whether he remembers

21     what he did --

22             MR. TIEGER:  Well --

23             JUDGE KWON:  -- the result of his review of this document.

24             Do you remember that, Mr. Krajisnik?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't.  I don't remember this

Page 43750

 1     sequence of events because I didn't have any reason to distance from

 2     myself in this particular instance.  I could only have distanced myself

 3     from Mr. Kupresanin.  However, in this first instance, I had a good

 4     reason for that which was prompted by the occupation of my village.

 5     There is obviously some kind of confusion here.  I really don't

 6     understand why I would have distanced myself from the speech if I didn't

 7     say anything inappropriate in it.

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   I want to move on, but to resolve -- to satisfy the Court's

10     inquiry, let me ask you if you're prepared to confirm this.  You came

11     back to court the next day and suggested that, having read this thing,

12     that you were just repeating other people's words.  And then the

13     Trial Chamber looked to some of the previous words that were said, which

14     included Mr. Corda saying:  We also know that Muslims are not a nation.

15     I would always stress that during the negotiations.  They are

16     degenerates.  They are no ethnic community.  They are our outcasts.

17     That's at 24984.  As it happened, you read out that passage to the Court

18     but left out the degenerates quote.  Do you remember that?

19        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, you are confusing me.  You put three things to me

20     at once.  One is a speech in Banja Luka, and if we are talking about my

21     apology regarding this speech, I didn't have any reason to apologise for

22     my speech.  The second event was the Assembly session, where a conclusion

23     was adopted that Muslims were not a nation.  And the third case was my

24     distancing from Mr. Krajisnik when I called them Turks because they

25     occupied my village.  Now, I'm kindly asking you to refrain from this

Page 43751

 1     line of questioning because this will prove that I am not a reliable

 2     witness.

 3             Now, as for Mr. Corda and the Assembly session, I only repeated

 4     the words of various participants in the debate, both at the

 5     Deputies Club and in the Assembly session, just to allow them to reach

 6     this conclusion so that we could move on.  And I didn't distance myself

 7     from myself but rather from the people who reacted in that manner.

 8        Q.   Well, we -- I've tendered those pages to the Court.  I'm going to

 9     tender these pages as well.  Just again to follow -- to assist the Court,

10     then you continued to say that you were just trying to put it to a vote,

11     that in any event the Assembly was not competent to make the

12     determination of whether Muslims were a nation, and that you hadn't been

13     the first to speak those words.  And the Trial Chamber said the issue was

14     not -- the issue was whether you spoke the words, not whether you were

15     the first person in the Assembly to do so; and second, that no one had

16     suggested that the Assembly was competent to do what it did.  And the

17     Trial Chamber said you are more or less engaging in a discussion with an

18     unknown interlocutor; that's at 24988 through 89.

19             Can you confirm that or is it preferable to actually allow the

20     Trial Chamber to see exactly what you said in your trial after you had

21     reviewed the transcript?

22        A.   I know exactly what I said in the trial and what my position was

23     regarding the Assembly.  If you remember, at the beginning

24     Mr. Kupresanin's speech was presented, the one held in Banja Luka.  Then

25     my reaction followed prompted by the occupation of the village.  Now, as

Page 43752

 1     for the Assembly, I still maintain that there was a lengthy discussion

 2     about this issue, both at the Deputies Club on the previous day and on

 3     the day itself, where people said many ugly things; and I reached a

 4     conclusion that this was all nonsensical.  I said, without repeating

 5     their words, that what they did during this whole period produced a

 6     conclusion which was irrelevant.  That's what I said then and I still say

 7     this, and this is what is recorded -- that -- and I remember that

 8     clearly.  There were three things happening at the same time which

 9     probably created this confusion and it affected you as well.

10             JUDGE KWON:  What pages are you tendering, Mr. Tieger?

11             MR. TIEGER:  The pages that I previously identified,

12     Mr. Chairman, and also 24983, where this discussion begins, to 24990.

13             JUDGE KWON:  But in this 65 ter document, 25522, I don't see

14     transcript pages 24984 or 988 and 989.  After page -- transcript page --

15             MR. TIEGER:  I thought the -- there are obviously multiple days

16     of testimony and I don't know exactly how it was uploaded, but I thought

17     it was all uploaded under the same 65 ter number.

18             JUDGE KWON:  After page -- transcript page 24980, which is

19     e-court page 1903, follows the transcript page 24992, skipping some

20     20 pages.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Must be an upload glitch.  We'll take care of that.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Mr. Robinson?

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, I would like to look at it, but I don't

24     think I'll have any -- if I can look at those and get back to you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  But you have no objection admitting the first two

Page 43753

 1     pages 24967 to 8?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll admit them and if you have objections, come

 4     back to the Chamber as soon as possible.  We'll admit them.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6516, Your Honours.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, I want to turn to one more aspect of what the

 8     Trial Chamber found about -- in connection with its findings about your

 9     credibility.  At paragraph 1005 of your judgement, the Trial Chamber

10     examined part of your claims about your -- about the relationship between

11     the leadership, the Bosnian Serb leadership, and the VRS and your claims

12     that it was only logistical, had nothing to do with military operative

13     issues, and found that this represented "another attempt by the Accused

14     to mislead the Chamber into thinking that he was a weak and

15     hierarchically isolated bureaucrat who dealt exclusively with

16     inconsequential matters of administration, such as the supply of food and

17     clothing."  And the Trial Chamber found that this was "so incompatible

18     with the evidence built up against him that it forced him down paths of

19     obfuscation and incoherence."

20             So that was another finding that the Trial Chamber made about

21     your credibility in that instance related to your assertions concerning

22     your relationship with the military and military operative matters;

23     right?

24        A.   I would like you to ask me a specific question and then the

25     Chamber would see that.  There is no reason for you to repeat the wording

Page 43754

 1     of the judgement.

 2        Q.   This was a long trial, Mr. Krajisnik, as I have just indicated.

 3     I'm asking you about the Trial Chamber's findings, findings which your

 4     statement here to this Court -- your testimony to this Court purports to

 5     dispute.  So I'm asking you to confirm at the outset that that is what

 6     the Trial Chamber found or I can tender that portion of the judgement if

 7     you dispute it.

 8        A.   And what did I deny here before this Trial Chamber which is

 9     contained here?  I don't -- I'm not aware of anything that I denied or

10     refuted.  Perhaps it's a misunderstanding and perhaps you are concluding

11     something that I don't understand.  I did not deny anything that is

12     written in the judgement here.  Whatever you have read, I said it's

13     correct.  So I don't see what it is that I am denying what is included

14     here.

15        Q.   Well, let's look specifically at some of the things you testified

16     to previously as well as some of the things you said to this Court in

17     your testimony earlier.

18             First of all, in your own case in 2006 you said specifically at

19     transcript page 25619 that at the meetings with the military, they just

20     thought of the civilian authorities as logistical support and "no

21     discussion of military operative issues."  So that was the position you

22     took in 2006; right?

23        A.   I still claim today that the maximum percentage, let me say

24     practically all the questions, the issues requested by the army was to

25     support them logistically.  All the information that we received then

Page 43755

 1     were general and there was not a single -- or there were just some

 2     indications but no information about crimes reached us.  That was why I

 3     explained then and I'm saying now.  The army came and always raised the

 4     issues about the logistics so that it would be provided so that it could

 5     wage the war, and that was the purpose of the civilian authorities.  The

 6     information that we received at those meetings were general.  Except for

 7     some pieces of circumstantial evidence and criticism against the civilian

 8     authorities, I never heard anything about things that I learned later at

 9     this Tribunal.  So this is the truthful and correct answer and this is

10     what I said then as well.

11        Q.   You mentioned some meetings.  You also mentioned meetings back in

12     2006, in particular a few meetings with General Mladic.  You said at

13     25619 that you didn't attend many meetings, correct, that is with

14     General Mladic?

15        A.   Whether General Mladic was with somebody else, but everything

16     that I learned from these materials, the meetings of the Presidency,

17     where it stated that General Mladic attended them, that's correct.  There

18     were two or three briefings, that's also correct.  Probably there was a

19     series of meetings that he attended but that I didn't attend, but I

20     haven't been informed about them here.  If you mention specifically a

21     meeting, I will tell you whether I attended it or not.

22        Q.   And as you just generally seemed to indicate, you said with

23     respect to those not many meetings with General Mladic that you attended,

24     you mentioned two Presidency sessions; that reference is found at 25736.

25     And you also mentioned two consultations with the military, one at

Page 43756

 1     Bijeljina, one at Pale; and that reference is found at 25684.  So those

 2     were four meetings that you -- meetings at which General Mladic was

 3     present that you referenced when you said you didn't attend many meetings

 4     with General Mladic.  Is that your position here before this Court today,

 5     that that is roughly the number of meetings that you had at which

 6     General Mladic was also in attendance?

 7        A.   I believe it wasn't only that meeting.  There was one with

 8     Mr. Carter and once I was in Crna Rijeka when Mladic was there.  But the

 9     meetings that you mentioned now were a subject of discussion here.  I

10     said that I attended them.  If you mention a different, another meeting,

11     which I did not mention, I will tell you no, I didn't because nobody

12     asked me about it.  Your question is not clear to me.  You probably mean

13     that other leaders were together with Mladic and not myself, which is

14     also true.  Mr. Koljevic as the president of the committee that was in

15     charge of co-operation with UNPROFOR, Ms. Plavsic as well, there were

16     individual meetings that I did not attend.

17        Q.   Okay.  No, I was only trying to find out if your reference to not

18     many meetings and then your specific identification of two Presidency

19     meetings and two consultations generally reflected the limited number of

20     meetings that you had with General Mladic or, if following your

21     testimony, you suddenly recall dozens more.

22        A.   I do not recall, Mr. Prosecutor.  I said then that there were few

23     meetings that General Mladic had with the leadership that I attended and

24     that's correct.  Those meetings which were christened as the meetings of

25     the expanded Presidency, I said that that's correct and that I did attend

Page 43757

 1     them.  And other individual meetings that he had with some individual

 2     leaders or some other meetings that perhaps he may have attended, I did

 3     not attend them.  I may have attended a meeting that is not recorded

 4     here, but we never discussed that, nor did anyone ever ask me:  Did you

 5     attend this meeting or not?

 6        Q.   Okay.  In any event, you also explained that you knew little to

 7     nothing about military matters.  For example, you said you did not know

 8     what goals were being implemented by the military; that's at 25595.

 9     Correct?

10        A.   The army was waging the war.  How was it doing it?  What were the

11     specific tasks?  I didn't know that.  Whether they needed to take a place

12     or not, that was the competence of the army.  I knew that the army had

13     two or three tasks:  To protect the Serbian people, not to allow a

14     genocide to be perpetrated like in Second World War, and to stay

15     militarily on the ethnic lines which armed people had taken in the very

16     beginning.

17        Q.   You were asked whether you recall ever asking at any of these few

18     meetings you say you attended what goals were being pursued by the

19     military, and you -- your answer was at page 25619:

20             "I can't remember what I did.  I don't remember having asked such

21     a question."

22             And that's also what you testified to in 2006; right?

23        A.   Well, I don't remember whether that question was asked, whether I

24     said so in 2006, as it was quite a long time ago.  But if that's in the

25     record, then it must be so.

Page 43758

 1        Q.   Well, I can either tender that or I guess we can address --

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I don't know if you want me to deal with these

 3     sequentially, Mr. President.  That sounds like one where we would

 4     normally actually tender the quote so you could see it.  But let me just

 5     put that on the record and we can resolve that --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We'll add these pages.  But could you be more

 7     specific about the pages you're tendering.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  It was 25619 and 25595.

 9        Q.   You said you didn't know about intentions to issue directives and

10     didn't ask because it wasn't your "interest or competence."  Correct?

11     Now I'm talking about directives, military directives.

12        A.   As an outsider I could become interested about the specific case,

13     but it wasn't within my purview.  I didn't know when the directives were

14     signed or how they had been drawn up.  It was simply the competence of

15     other people.  I could inquire accidentally, but in principle I certainly

16     didn't deal with this nor was that within my purview or within my

17     competence.

18        Q.   Well, when Judge Hanoteau asked you specifically whether you took

19     advantage of the presence of those military figures to ask what was going

20     on, you said:

21             "As for their intentions to issue directives, I never asked about

22     that because it wasn't my province."  That's at 25703 through 04.

23        A.   Perhaps we need to be clearer.  Let me repeat, I wasn't informed

24     about when they did it.  I didn't inquire nor was that my competence.  I

25     may have asked accidentally, I do not rule that out, but it was like

Page 43759

 1     having an outsider coming and inquiring or just attending a meeting.

 2        Q.   Well, I don't know what asking accidentally means, Mr. Krajisnik.

 3     But I note that you said in 2006 that you never asked about that because

 4     it wasn't your province.  That's a correct reflection of what you stated

 5     to the Court in 2006, isn't it?

 6        A.   I want to be precise.  That's why I say it certainly wasn't my

 7     competence.  I didn't inquire about that.  I'm saying now I may have

 8     asked somebody something accidentally if I happened to attend a meeting,

 9     but it was as if you had been present at the meeting rather than myself.

10     It wasn't anything so important.  My attendance, my presence, was not so

11     important that anyone would brief me or report to me about anything.

12        Q.   And that's similar to what you said in 2006, the latter part

13     anyway, you were asked whether the military kept the political

14     authorities apprised of operations that were about to be or that were

15     conducted, and you said:

16             "I don't remember that anybody informed me of actions like this

17     before they happened.  Whether they copied such documents to somebody

18     else, I don't know."

19             That's at transcript 25608 through 09.  That's what you said in

20     2006, right, in response to that inquiry?

21        A.   I assert that the Main Staff had no need or obligation to send

22     information to me.  It's possible that some information or report was

23     sent to me, but everything that I read, even later on, was a sort of

24     information as when a TV presenter reads something in the news, no crimes

25     or anything that would be alarming or important, especially not for this

Page 43760

 1     Tribunal.  That was why I said that I don't remember I was informed.  I'm

 2     convinced that they did not inform me about anything, but I cannot rule

 3     out that perhaps some information may have reached me at some point.

 4        Q.   Well, I don't want us to get confused.  I understand what you --

 5     that you have taken the position that you never received any information

 6     about crimes whatsoever, but you did understand that my question referred

 7     not to being briefed about crimes but to being told about military

 8     operations before they would happen or after they had taken place.

 9     That's the question that was put to you in 2006 and that I asked you to

10     either confirm or dispute.

11             So were you answering a question about operations generally or

12     limiting yourself to information about crimes?

13        A.   Receiving information from the Main Staff may have happened only

14     exceptionally, that someone would inform me about something.  In

15     regularly informing me, as they were obliged to inform somebody else, I'm

16     telling you that that was not usual way that the Main Staff was organised

17     or had an obligation to do it.  If there are any examples, those are

18     individual examples and the contents were benign, without any particular

19     importance.  Some things I learned more from the TV than from the army.

20        Q.   So it's your position that if you happened to be informed about a

21     military operation before it was to be conducted or that after it had

22     happened or while it was happening, that was only inconsequential or

23     accidental?

24        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I'm telling you before this Trial Chamber, the

25     army was organised in such a way that they were not obliged to inform the

Page 43761

 1     Assembly or myself about the beginning of operations or the end of

 2     operations.  It's possible that there were some instances when

 3     information did reach me, but that was not something that the Main Staff

 4     had to do, as far as I remember.  And if you give me a specific example,

 5     I will comment on that.  There was no single information, let me not say

 6     not a single piece of information, but information generally did not

 7     reach me that would describe that they would take certain territory,

 8     expel someone, or anything that would be considered as consequential and

 9     that I should comment on now.

10        Q.   All right.  I'm going to probably tender this, but just to -- one

11     final thing.  Mr. Krajisnik, I am not asking you whether there was a

12     de jure responsibility on the part -- whether you consider that there was

13     a de jure responsibility on the part of the VRS to inform you.  I'm

14     asking you about whether, as you were asked in 2006, the political

15     authorities were apprised of operations that were about to be or were

16     conducted.  And I was simply confronting you with your testimony at that

17     time, that you didn't remember that anybody informed you of actions like

18     that before they happened, but you didn't know whether they copied such

19     documents to somebody else.

20             So your recollection in 2006 was that you weren't informed about

21     actions -- military operations before they happened or after they took

22     place; right?  Whether there was a response -- a de jure responsibility

23     to do so one way or another.

24        A.   Yes, I then said that and I confirm it today.  I only add it's

25     possible that there may have been some individual reports, but I could

Page 43762

 1     not remember it then and I cannot remember it now, unless you present

 2     such reports to me and then I may have -- I may be able to tell you why I

 3     do not remember it.

 4        Q.   Now, in fact, in light of your assertions during your testimony

 5     in your own trial that you didn't have knowledge about military matters,

 6     you repeatedly suggested to the Trial Chamber that if it wanted to know

 7     about such matters, they should ask Mr. Karadzic.  So, for example, when

 8     you were asked about an excerpt from a combat-readiness report - in this

 9     case that's admitted as D325 and the particular reference is found at

10     page 159 in the English, B/C/S 138 - an excerpt that says explicitly that

11     the army carried out the objectives put to it by the political

12     leadership, you said that you didn't issue any orders and:

13             "I don't know anything about that communication.  Mr. Karadzic

14     knows that."

15             That's at transcript page 21669.  That's what you said in your

16     trial; right?

17        A.   Mr. Karadzic had a military office and it's possible that he

18     got --

19        Q.   No, Mr. Krajisnik, first --

20        A.   -- such information.  That's why I said --

21        Q.   First things first.  Did you say that?  And then you can offer

22     the added information you want.  That's what you said in your trial;

23     right?

24        A.   If that is written in the transcript and if it was not objected

25     to, then that's the way it is --

Page 43763

 1        Q.   I'm sorry --

 2        A.   -- I do not recall those words exactly.

 3        Q.   My apologies.  That's what you said when you testified in the

 4     Popovic case, in fact.  I don't know if that helps refresh your

 5     recollection that you said that.

 6        A.   That's what I think to this day, but I don't know if I said that

 7     then.  I think that to this day.  That was not my line of work and no one

 8     was supposed to inform me about that.  That's what I think to this day.

 9        Q.   And similarly, in the Popovic case, you were asked about another

10     section of the combat-readiness report, and we can -- the Popovic case

11     transcript is 65 ter 25523.  And you were asked about a section of the

12     combat-readiness report that says that the strategic objectives of the

13     war were promptly set and served as guide-lines and the Main Staff

14     translated them into operational and tactical formations, et cetera.  And

15     then asked:  So didn't the army strive to achieve the objectives put

16     before it by the political leadership?  And you answered:

17             "Well," this is found at 21668, "well, I was not a supreme

18     commander.  I did not write support," that's how it's written, "I cannot

19     help you.  And you said to ask Gvero or other generals or "Mr. Karadzic

20     when you bring him here."

21             So again, in the Popovic case when asked about the goals put to

22     the army and about operational military issues, you suggested to the

23     Trial Chamber that they ask Mr. Karadzic; right?

24        A.   You want to make me and Karadzic quarrel.  Obviously that's your

25     intention.  You are misinterpreting something.  I wasn't speaking about

Page 43764

 1     Mr. Karadzic as someone who was guilty of that.  Mr. Karadzic was the

 2     supreme commander, and he is best-placed to interpret a directive if he

 3     signed it and if somebody reported to him.  That is what I'm saying today

 4     as well.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  I tender those two excerpts,

 6     Mr. President, from 25523.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Two excerpts?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers] --

10             MR. TIEGER:  21669 and 21668.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  There's no objection, Mr. President.  Also,

13     Mr. President, I've had a chance to look at my own copy of those pages,

14     24983 to 24990, of Mr. Krajisnik's trial, and I don't have any objection

15     to those being added.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             I note the time.  Shall we take a break?

18             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

19             JUDGE KWON:  For half an hour and resume at 11.00.  Just a

20     second.  We'll assign a number for the Popovic transcript.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  65 ter number 25523 will be

22     Exhibit P6517.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

Page 43765

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'd like to introduce

 3     Svetlana Atanasova from Bulgaria who's joining us and she's a legal

 4     intern with our team.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8             Just so there's no mistake.  I'm not sure if -- we tendered two

 9     pages from 25523.  The transcript gives the impression that the entirety

10     of the document was tendered and admitted.  I presume that's the relevant

11     pages, but I just note that for the record.

12        Q.   Now, continuing on the subject of your knowledge of military

13     operations, Mr. Krajisnik, despite your assertions that you knew very

14     little about the planning or realisation of military operations, you

15     nevertheless claimed that there was no planning for military operations.

16     For example, as you said here to this Trial Chamber, at transcript

17     page 44302:

18             "Every ethnic unit took up its ethnic borders with slight

19     corrections.  The army only corrected some things or lost some

20     territories or gave a different physiog nomy to that map."

21             It didn't conquer those territories.  And as you said in your

22     testimony in 2006 at transcript page 25705 with respect to directives,

23     all of them were issued and none were carried out.  It all depended on

24     developments in the field.  There was not much planning in advance.  It

25     would just happen that you would lose a territory or gain a territory.

Page 43766

 1     There was no plan.

 2             So the latter quote is an accurate reflection of what you told

 3     the Trial Chamber in your own case in 2006, right, that there wasn't much

 4     planning in advance, it just kind of happened?

 5        A.   Well, I assume that the military did do some planning, but the

 6     civilian leadership taking part in planning some operations, I do not

 7     recall any such plans and I can stand by what I said then as far as the

 8     civilian authorities are concerned.

 9        Q.   Well, I just want you to confirm or dispute that what you said in

10     2006 that with respect to developments in the field, that is what

11     happened on the ground with the military, that:

12             "There was not much planning in advance.  It would just happen

13     that you would lose a territory or gain a territory.  There was no plan."

14             That's at 25705.

15             So you were saying in addition to the fact as you just mentioned

16     here, that as far as you're concerned it had nothing -- military

17     operations had nothing to do with the civilian authorities, that you also

18     took the position that you were unaware of any -- not that you were

19     unaware, that you took the position that there really wasn't any

20     particular military operation plan, events just happened according to

21     developments in the field?

22        A.   I'm afraid that your question -- or perhaps the interpretation is

23     not good.  I'm going to repeat what it was that I thought then and what

24     it is that I think today.  Most of the territory of Republika Srpska was

25     liberated, as the Serbs put it because this was their ethnic area, during

Page 43767

 1     the first time when the war started.  After the army was established,

 2     later on there were a few major operations but, for the most part, that

 3     was the volume that stayed on with some minor corrections, perhaps.  So

 4     my answer then was with a view to the following:  All the ethnic

 5     communities stood at the beginning of the war at their natural ethnic

 6     boundaries and throughout the war, with some minor oscillations, they did

 7     not change all the way up until the end of the war, when we lost a lot of

 8     our territories and when the Muslim side lost some and the Croat side

 9     lost some, et cetera.

10             MR. TIEGER:  I tender 25705, Mr. President -- or page 25705.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will add that.  It's from the Popovic trial?

12             MR. TIEGER:  This is from the Krajisnik trial.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Krajisnik trial.  Thank you.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   And you also said in response -- in your own trial in response to

16     a comment by the Presiding Judge that it sounded as if you were saying

17     you had no idea of where the army would end up, whether it was somewhere

18     in Bosnia or in Italy, and you said:

19             "The soldiers had only one goal, to hold the front line, and if

20     they took any action in certain areas it would depend on the situation."

21             And you said:  "This was the only goal I was aware of."

22             And that's at 25619 through 25620.

23             Is that a correct -- again, you can see the transcript pages, but

24     can you confirm or do you dispute that that's what you said to the

25     Krajisnik Trial Chamber during the course of your testimony in that case?

Page 43768

 1        A.   I said that to the Trial Chamber, but just a small addition is

 2     required.  All three parties, all three sides, if I can put it that way,

 3     there were armed people on all three sides and everybody was defending

 4     their own ethnic areas where they lived or at first somebody would take a

 5     bit more than they were entitled to, but these were minor corrections.

 6     The task and the wish of the local population was to always take part of

 7     the territory of the other side because in every part of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina there were the fellow countrymen of the people who had

 9     those wishes.  So it was not a wish to extend territory because everyone

10     felt that they had this right, to join their fellow countrymen who stayed

11     on the other side to their own territory.  On the other hand, the Serb

12     army that constituted the armed people was to preserve the front because

13     all of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a front line.  That is the longest part in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina between two parties, between three parties, there was

15     a front line.  So that what I said stands and I add this to that.

16        Q.   And in addition, despite your claims about limited knowledge

17     about military operation, you insisted during your testimony in the

18     Krajisnik case - and as you did here - that the strategic objectives

19     annunciated at the 16th Assembly Session on May 12th by Dr. Karadzic were

20     not military tasks of the army; correct?

21        A.   I absolutely asserted that and I assert that to this day.

22        Q.   In fact, during the course of your testimony in the Krajisnik

23     case, you claimed that the strategic objectives were essentially putting

24     down on paper what had been said to or proposed to Cutileiro?

25        A.   That's correct, but there is just this one small addition.  The

Page 43769

 1     Neretva valley was placed within our strategic objectives on the basis of

 2     the talks held between the Serb delegation and the Croat delegation in

 3     Graz.  As for the rest, all of it is actually copied parts of the map

 4     that we gave to Mr. Cutileiro before the Cutileiro Plan.  As for the

 5     corridor, let me just say that too, that was also the subject of talks

 6     with the Croat side in Graz.  I think it was on the 7th of May, if I

 7     remember correctly, 1992.

 8        Q.   Okay.  So you say that -- you said in the Krajisnik case that the

 9     strategic goals were simply putting down on paper what had been put to

10     Cutileiro, but now you're explaining that strategic objective number 4 or

11     at least part of strategic objective number 4 related to the Neretva was

12     not part of the Cutileiro proposal.  So the strategic objective number 4

13     was not part of the Cutileiro Plan or proposal, that's number one; right?

14        A.   I said that the strategic objectives were actually our requests

15     that were put to Mr. Cutileiro.  We said to Mr. Cutileiro that we wished

16     to have contiguous territory as far as the corridor is concerned.  We

17     said that we needed the Neretva River Valley; however, our strategic

18     objectives followed after the talks held with the Croat side.  As for

19     these two objectives, a preliminary agreement had been reached

20     specifically about the exchange of territories, about us giving

21     concessions at critical points where the Croats needed something and vice

22     versa.  So there was the Cutileiro Plan, but we also reinforced and

23     spelled out in concrete terms our own requests with a lot more certainty

24     after the talks we had with the Croat side.

25        Q.   So those were -- that's with respect to strategic objective

Page 43770

 1     number 4, that's the Neretva, and strategic objective number 2, the

 2     Posavina corridor; right?

 3        A.   Yes, you're right.

 4        Q.   And you also explained in your testimony in the Krajisnik case

 5     that strategic goal number 6, access to the sea, was something else that

 6     the Cutileiro Plan didn't embrace?  That's at transcript page 24200.

 7        A.   Access to the sea was present in all our talks with

 8     Mr. Cutileiro, the representatives of the international community, later

 9     on the Croat side, and later on at conferences.  Our request was for

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina to have access to the sea and if Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina were to be transformed into three ethnic entities, that we

12     should have access to the sea there.  There were combinations later on as

13     well, to the effect that our right in the area of Neum would be replaced

14     through exchanges of territory in the area of Molunat and Prevlaka.

15        Q.   And just to be clear on this, this discussion about exchanges of

16     territory, that took place in bilateral discussions with the Croats,

17     right, between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban?

18        A.   At all conferences, later on too, of course, under the auspices

19     of the international community a proposal was worked out as to how this

20     exchange of territories would take place and this partial agreement was

21     reached in Dayton too.  However, the participants in the talks forgot, if

22     I can put it that way, to insert that and that did exist.  There's also a

23     map and also there is a written document as to how this would be carried

24     out.  It was never a secret that there would be a triple exchange of

25     territories and it was never a secret that the Serbs should get access to

Page 43771

 1     the sea.

 2        Q.   Two things.  First of all, you explained repeatedly in your

 3     Krajisnik testimony or you asserted in your Krajisnik testimony that the

 4     exchange of territories that were contemplated was something that "we

 5     agreed on in Graz," and the Graz -- that's at 25598.  So you explained

 6     that there was going to be -- that there was anticipated the possibility

 7     of obtaining the corridor by an exchange of territories and that's what

 8     was agreed on in Graz.  First of all, that's what you said in your

 9     Krajisnik testimony at 25598; correct?

10        A.   That is correct, because the Cutileiro Plan allowed for that;

11     namely, that the parties, the negotiating parties, had the right to agree

12     on territorial changes.  As for the corridor, we were supposed to give

13     part of the territory around Kupres so that the Croat parts of territory

14     that would be part of the corridor would become Serb territory.

15        Q.   And Graz was a discussion between -- primarily between

16     Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban, but whatever other representatives of the

17     Serbs and Croats participated, it was a discussion between the Serbs and

18     Croats; right?

19        A.   In Graz there were two delegations that participated in the

20     talks.  After returning from a session or conference, when this

21     conference did not end successfully, and then Mr. Cutileiro's proposal

22     was:  Try to resolve problems through bilateral agreements and talks.  We

23     availed ourselves of that opportunity, and then when we returned to

24     Sarajevo -- so it was not only Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban, but there were

25     two delegations that met and discussed all these questions, including

Page 43772

 1     this exchange of territories, Serb for Croat, Croat for Serb, and that

 2     was based on an agreement that had been reached beforehand in the

 3     Cutileiro map.  These were territories that unequivocally belonged either

 4     to the Serb or the Croat side.

 5        Q.   The Cutileiro map, that's the map that you presented, a coloured

 6     map, with the Cyrillic writing that you presented to this Court during

 7     the course of your examination-in-chief by Mr. Karadzic, right?  That's

 8     what you're calling the Cutileiro map?

 9        A.   There's a document here -- actually, it's a photocopy of the

10     "Politika" daily newspaper of the 18th of March or the 17th.  The Defence

11     can find it.  That map is the Cutileiro map that I talked about last

12     time.  It's in colour, as you said, and that is how you are going to see

13     exactly those parts of territory that we were supposed to exchange on the

14     basis of those talks.

15        Q.   You -- we'll come to the Cutileiro discussions and the Cutileiro

16     map, Mr. Krajisnik.  I'll stay on the subject of military operations.

17             You also explained during your Krajisnik testimony what you

18     asserted to be the meaning of the strategic objectives.  So, for example,

19     you explained that strategic objective number 3 was -- which referred to

20     the Drina, was in fact the elimination of a "psychological border through

21     soft border controls."  And that's found at transcript page 24158 and

22     24159.  Is that right?

23             "Our goal was for the psychological border on the Drina not to be

24     there for the Serbs ..."

25             And then -- that's at 24158.  And then you discussed the "soft

Page 43773

 1     border" at 24159.  Something that would be easy to cross, where you

 2     wouldn't need a visa, that's also at 24158.  That's what you claim

 3     strategic objective number 3 was; right?

 4        A.   That's what I claimed and that's what I claim now, and then I

 5     invoked Mr. Izetbegovic's book, his memoir, that is literally what he

 6     wrote in his book, that the Serbs should not feel that they were confined

 7     within boundaries, that there shouldn't be any passports and so on.  You

 8     will be able to find that easily in the evidence that I provided during

 9     my testimony.

10        Q.   Now, you participated in the formulation of the strategic

11     objectives, correct, and that's what you told the Krajisnik

12     Trial Chamber?

13        A.   Well, I even said that I think that I made this proposal or

14     Mr. Karadzic, I don't know exactly which one of us, at this preparatory

15     meeting.  It was either Mr. Karadzic or I that formulated that or several

16     of us, but at any rate I did take part in that.

17        Q.   And you were confronted during the course of your testimony with

18     General Mladic's comments at the 16th Assembly Session, where he said he

19     also participated in the formulation of the strategic objectives.  Do you

20     remember that?

21        A.   Well, I suppose so but I don't know.  I don't remember that

22     quotation, but I do not rule out the possibility that that was said and

23     that he was present when the strategic objectives were being formulated.

24     I don't exclude that.

25        Q.   Well, he didn't -- it's not a question of his presence.  I mean,

Page 43774

 1     first of all, let's be clear on this.  What you said in your Krajisnik

 2     case is -- and you just affirmed right now, you think it was you who had

 3     the idea:  Gee, let's put down what we're saying to Cutileiro, let's put

 4     it into some kind of exposition so that people will know about it.  And

 5     then the people who were presumably participating in the Cutileiro

 6     discussions assisted in drafting the document; right?  That's your

 7     testimony, and it was your testimony for the Krajisnik case as well at

 8     24123 through 24125.

 9        A.   I'm almost certain that it was I who drafted it, but I leave it

10     open that it possibly could have been Mr. Karadzic and myself.  But it is

11     true that I took part in the drafting of the strategic goals.

12        Q.   Okay.  And so then General Mladic stood up at the 16th and said

13     that he -- he talked about setting goals that can be achieved.  He said:

14             "I said this in Nevesinje before the top leadership of

15     Republika Srpska and before an even more select political leadership in

16     Belgrade."

17             That's at P5956 at English page 35 and B/C/S page 26.  And it was

18     raised with you at transcript page 25531.  And then he said at page 36 in

19     the English, page 27 in the B/C/S:

20             "It was discussed in the most select circle of comrades whom we

21     convened the strategic goals that are of substance, which does not mean

22     that they could not be better, richer or more in keeping with our current

23     strength in the present moment."

24             So that -- that seems to be a reflection of General Mladic saying

25     that he participated in their formulation and in the discussion about

Page 43775

 1     their formulation and how they should be said and what kind of goals were

 2     appropriate.  He wasn't a Cutileiro discussion expert like you, was he,

 3     Mr. Krajisnik?

 4        A.   Mr. Mladic did not participate in the discussions with

 5     Mr. Cutileiro.  I'm almost certain that Mr. Mladic hadn't taken part in

 6     formulating the strategic goals.  What we used to call at the time the

 7     Council for National Security was the body that discussed these issues,

 8     and it was at this body that the strategic goals were drafted.

 9             Now, as for the reference to Nevesinje, immediately before that

10     it was recorded that Mr. Mladic and Mr. Ostojic had visited Nevesinje.

11     Although we were not together, Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Karadzic, and I also

12     visited Nevesinje, but we did not meet with them.  We did not discuss any

13     strategic goals with the people from Herzegovina.

14        Q.   And in light of the fact that the strategic objectives, according

15     to you, were strictly political, there would have been no reason for

16     General Mladic, as he said at the 16th Session, to participate in their

17     formulation, and particularly no reason if he knew nothing about the

18     Cutileiro discussions; correct?

19        A.   Before going to the session, he could have familiarised himself

20     with that.  It was not a secret.  We took this list of objectives to the

21     session to present it to the MPs, that was to be done by Mr. Karadzic,

22     and he was to explain what our position in the negotiations was and what

23     we advocated in the negotiations.

24        Q.   Right.  But according to you, that had nothing to do with

25     General Mladic; that was strictly political and his job was military,

Page 43776

 1     according to you?

 2        A.   I assert that it wasn't Mr. Mladic who formulated the goals.  It

 3     was done either by Karadzic or Krajisnik, and it was adopted by the

 4     people who were present there.  I do not rule out the possibility that at

 5     one of the preparatory meetings Mladic was there in order to familiarise

 6     himself with that, but it is highly unlikely because he was not a

 7     commander at the time, he was a member of the military.  He could have

 8     been informed about that at some other meeting.  He did not take part in

 9     formulating the objectives.

10        Q.   Well, in fact, during the course of your testimony in your own

11     case you were asked which members of the political leadership met with

12     General Mladic before the 12th -- before the 16th Session and before his

13     formal ascension to the top position of the VRS.  And your answer was:

14             "I don't know.  I don't remember that I met with him and I didn't

15     speak with him about any strategy or any goals if I did meet with him."

16             That's 25531 through 25532.

17             That's what you said during your testimony to the Krajisnik

18     Trial Chamber, Mr. Krajisnik; correct?

19        A.   I have seen several documents to the effect that there was some

20     meeting, but to this date I don't remember that meeting and I would give

21     the same answer today as the one that I gave at the time.

22        Q.   Okay.  And your answer was:  You don't remember such a meeting,

23     that's what you're saying now.  But if you did meet with him, you didn't

24     speak with him about any strategy or any goals?

25        A.   Well, I reiterate, it is possible that the strategic goals were

Page 43777

 1     drafted as such, that somebody informed Mr. Mladic about them, but the

 2     very drafting of the goals did not imply that we should discuss them.

 3     Rather, we wanted to inform the parliament about our position in the

 4     negotiations.  And we definitely did not discuss the goals with him

 5     because he became the military commander only later; at the time he was

 6     not.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  I tender those pages, Mr. President,

 8     25531 through 25532.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll add those pages.

10             MR. TIEGER:

11        Q.   Mr. Karadzic asked you about a Milovanovic quote in an

12     interview - that's at transcript page 43302 through 03 - in which

13     Mr. Milovanovic was quoted as saying something to the effect that the

14     objectives of the war were to protect the Serbian people from destruction

15     and to stay within Yugoslavia or, alternatively, have their own state.

16     Now, those are fairly broad and I think you would agree those are not

17     exactly the articulation of a specific military objective; correct?

18        A.   The exact strategic goals quoted by Mr. Milovanovic are in the

19     directive.  They are different from these ones.  They're only given the

20     same name.  However, this confirms what you have just said.

21        Q.   Well, let's take a quick look at D2149.  This is a document

22     tendered by Mr. Karadzic to this Trial Chamber and it's excerpts from

23     General Milovanovic's notes on meetings with Karadzic.  And this is

24     English page 27, B/C/S 18 through 19.  This particular note begins that:

25             "On 25 July, the Main Staff ordered me to brief the

Page 43778

 1     Supreme Command on the results of a recently completed second phase of

 2     our offensive, Lukavac 93.  Briefing of the Supreme Command took place."

 3             And then it continues:

 4             "With this I said the VRS had completed five of the six strategic

 5     war objectives and getting RS access to the sea was the only one

 6     remaining but could not be achieved by military means.  Instead, this

 7     should be done using political and legal means."

 8             In contrast to the broad formulations that were quoted to you by

 9     Mr. Karadzic during your examination-in-chief, this reflects

10     General Milovanovic's contemporaneous understanding of the military role

11     in the implementation and attainment of the six strategic objectives,

12     including access to the sea, which is strategic objective number 6, which

13     was difficult to obtain.

14        A.   I don't know what Mr. Milovanovic's understanding was.  You have

15     to ask him that.  All I can say that the strategic goals formulated on

16     the 12th of May were the platform translated into other form of what we

17     discussed with Mr. Cutileiro.  The access to the sea was a goal that was

18     most easily achievable by military means, and the army could have done

19     that because the JNA that was deployed at Prevlaka could just give this

20     space and be replaced by the Army of Republika Srpska.  But obviously

21     that wasn't their goal because they preferred a political solution rather

22     than a military one, and you can glean that from the documents that you

23     have.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The translation of the document is

25     wrong.  There are a few mistakes on this page alone.

Page 43779

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, there's a -- I would like you to deal with

 2     separately if it relates to the document we have admitted.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  The document, if I may add, we admitted, that

 4     tendered by the accused himself.

 5        Q.   We also saw in that excerpt General Milovanovic talking about the

 6     completion of those objectives to a large extent, as he put it there.  In

 7     fact, the army was actively engaged, that's the VRS, in creating a

 8     factual situation that would improve the ultimate negotiations that would

 9     resolve -- ultimately resolve the conflict; right?  And the factual --

10     well, just answer that first.

11        A.   That would have been the logic behind it, but according to this

12     logic there is sharp contrast.  Since 18th of June, when Mr. Karadzic and

13     Mr. Koljevic were in London, they signed a declaration with the

14     then-foreign minister, Mr. Hurd, in which it was stated that the Serbian

15     side undertook an obligation that should a peaceful solution be reached

16     to return certain territories.  Therefore, why should have been any

17     taking of the territory that would then have to be returned to a much

18     larger extent?  Always, we wanted to achieve what we wanted to achieve

19     with regard to territories at the negotiating table rather than on a

20     battle-field.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Date of this briefing, year is 1993, Mr. Tieger?

22             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Are you saying, Mr. Krajisnik, that the Bosnian Serb leadership

24     never asserted that the new reality created by the demographic changes

25     should be the basis for the -- at least part of the settlement and that

Page 43780

 1     Serbs claimed certain territories on the basis of a so-called right that

 2     came out of that new reality?

 3        A.   There was only one opinion.  There were a variety of publicly

 4     expressed opinions.  Everybody wanted to be a general or a politician.

 5     Even politicians used this kind of rhetoric in order to appease or to

 6     alleviate certain tones.  I'm telling you what our policy was and what

 7     was laid down in the documents as our obligation and what was eventually

 8     achieved.  We had always been prepared to cede a large chunk of the

 9     territory just to reach a peaceful solution.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the last part

11     of his answer.

12             JUDGE KWON:  You were too fast.  Could you repeat from where you

13     said:  "We had always been prepared to cede a large chunk of the

14     territory ..."

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry for speaking fast.

16     Mr. Tieger, an old acquaintance of mine, inspires me to speak fast.

17             At all times the Serbian policies and politicians were ready to

18     cede a part of territory in order to achieve a peaceful solution.  This

19     policy was contained in a series of official documents.  One of those

20     documents was in a map in Mr. Owen's book that I presented to this

21     Chamber, where 30 per cent of the territory that was either liberated or

22     occupied by the Serbian army that we were prepared to return.  Therefore,

23     it is illogical for our army to go and conquer new territory so that we

24     must return more.  The year of 1993 was the year when our army was most

25     successful.

Page 43781

 1             MR. TIEGER:

 2        Q.   We've seen examples of -- you spoke about everybody having an

 3     opinion, everybody wanted to be a general or a politician.  We've seen

 4     examples of Dr. Karadzic saying that he said to the international

 5     community when asked:  Who gives you a right to Zvornik, which of course

 6     had been the majority Muslim municipality before the conflict, we said,

 7     according to him:

 8             "The right which comes out of a new reality," that's at the

 9     46th Session, "explain if you want to give Zvornik to the Muslims, then

10     you need a new war to expel the Serbs back to Zenica.  "We requested

11     Zvornik according to this right."

12             That was addressed to you in your own trial at transcript

13     page 24932.  You know that Dr. Karadzic said it.  You know from your

14     participation in the 46th Assembly.  You know from talking about it at

15     your own trial; correct?

16        A.   That was mentioned at my trial.

17        Q.   Dr. Karadzic wasn't the only one who talked about the factual

18     situation and the impact of the military results.  General Mladic --

19     General Mladic said at the 34th Assembly Session that, first, the people

20     and the army have carried out most of the tasks and strategic goals set

21     to them.  And then further:

22             "You have started from the most favourable position in Geneva.

23     You had the military result in your hands.  You and the people and the

24     army and the forces of the MUP have created it."

25             So General Mladic took the position that the VRS established,

Page 43782

 1     through its military operations, the most favourable position which could

 2     be exploited in negotiations.

 3        A.   There's a big difference between what Mr. Mladic said and what

 4     Mr. Karadzic said.  Mr. Karadzic wanted to appease the Serbs who,

 5     according to the maps, remained within the Federation.  For example, in

 6     Zenica and other areas as well as the central parts of Sarajevo.  There

 7     were many more Serbs there than in the eastern part of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He said:  This is the factual situation.  At this

 9     moment we cannot give Zvornik to the Muslims because, quite simply, the

10     Serbs will not return, they will be refugees, and that would be unjust.

11             As for Mr. Mladic, you cannot expect a general who is a

12     professional soldier who wages war, it is only to be expected that his

13     achievements and the job that he is assigned to is something that he was

14     going to praise and magnify.  And the tradition is whatever you occupy

15     you can keep.  But look at other excerpts from Mr. Karadzic's speeches.

16     We are ready to return some of the territories and we are ready for a

17     peaceful solution.  And I say that there is a big difference between the

18     two.  The one is speaking as a soldier, who is enhancing the importance

19     of his job, whereas the other is speaking as a politician who realises

20     that some people, according to the maps, had been left in the Federation.

21             This is what we discussed with people, with the international

22     community, including Mr. Owen.  We told them:  This is a factual

23     situation which requires new crimes or a new war in order to return the

24     Serbs from where they fled and do the same for the Muslims.  Let us wait

25     for the end of the war and then everybody will have the right to return

Page 43783

 1     to their original places of birth.  And we always sustained the position

 2     that upon the cessation of war operations, everybody should be given a

 3     right to return from where they had come.

 4        Q.   So General Mladic came up with this on his own, notwithstanding

 5     the comments by Dr. Karadzic reflected in the 46th Session?  And the

 6     Bosnian Serb leadership did not suggest to him that it would be a good

 7     idea to enhance the factual situation so that the negotiations -- the

 8     final negotiating position would be better for the Serbs?

 9        A.   Well, it is easy to establish that this is not correct.  We had

10     70 per cent of territory.  Should we ask for 90 per cent in order to gain

11     a better --

12        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, excuse me.  I don't --

13        A.   -- position so that we can later claim 50 per cent of the

14     territory --

15        Q.   I'm not asking you to establish it by logic.  To the extent you

16     were a participant in these events, I want to know if, irrespective of

17     what you claim to be the logic of the situation, whether the Bosnian Serb

18     leadership talked to General Mladic about enhancing the factual situation

19     through military operations?

20        A.   No, they didn't ask for it.  But of course, if you have a bigger

21     territory, you are at an advantage.  But nobody aspired to occupy a

22     larger territory in order to achieve a better negotiating position.

23        Q.   Now, we just saw at the 34th that General Mladic stated that the

24     army had carried out most of the tasks and the strategic goals set to

25     them.  So again, there he's taking the position that he's implementing

Page 43784

 1     goals put to him and talking to the political leadership.

 2             At the 50th Assembly Session, which is P970, we see at pages 21

 3     through 22 of the English and 17 through 18 of the B/C/S, General Mladic

 4     in the course of a long speech talking about the military objectives, he

 5     said:

 6             "Among other things, the basic objectives of all the mentioned

 7     operations are to break and destroy as much of their forces as possible,

 8     and thus impose by the force of arms the final settlement of the war on

 9     the enemy and place the international community in a position of having

10     to recognise the actual situation in the field and end the war.  To

11     ensure as favourable conditions as possible for the state and political

12     leaderships to conduct peace negotiations and achieve the strategic aims

13     of the war."

14             And he continued:

15             "The tasks of the war in this war" -- excuse me, "the task of the

16     army in this war stem from the known six strategic objectives adopted by

17     our Assembly which have not been carried out to the full due to the lack

18     of material and other support."

19             Now, that appears very clearly to be another reflection of

20     General Mladic's express stated position that the army was tasked with

21     implementing the strategic objectives and that it was to achieve as much

22     as possible so that the -- and enhance the actual situation in the field

23     so that the ultimate result for the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Serb

24     political negotiators would be improved.

25             It's still your position that the Bosnian Serb leadership had

Page 43785

 1     nothing to do with this perception by General Mladic?  They didn't talk

 2     to him about implementing the strategic objectives, they didn't encourage

 3     him to improve the factual situation through military operations; is that

 4     your position?

 5        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I am telling you and I'm repeating and claiming

 6     that at the time when Mladic held such sizeable territory, we had

 7     70 per cent of the territory.  There was no reason for the civilian

 8     leadership to issue tasks to the army to occupy additional territories in

 9     order to improve our position.  The situation was already good.  As far

10     as the political leadership is concerned, they persistently maintained

11     the position that the solution had to be reached through negotiation.

12     Now, whether the factual situation was a trump card in our hands, it

13     definitely was, but it was not an imperative given to Mladic to create

14     that.  He did create it and ultimately we had a better position than if

15     we had been losers, but he wasn't tasked with military operations in

16     order to achieve a better negotiating position.

17        Q.   And he wasn't tasked with implementing the strategic objectives

18     and the Bosnian Serb political leadership didn't repeatedly encourage him

19     to implement the strategic objectives or repeatedly remind him about the

20     strategic objectives in the context of upcoming military operations; is

21     that your position?

22        A.   The strategic objectives were a platform for the negotiations and

23     all of our people were aware of the strategic objectives and so did

24     Mladic.  He certainly could contribute to the implementation of the

25     strategic objectives in his own way, but the goal of the political

Page 43786

 1     leadership was not to take the territory and to force a solution on

 2     someone.  We couldn't do it and we didn't want to do it.  We couldn't

 3     because the international community was the mediator and we didn't want

 4     to because we knew that in Bosnia, whatever kind of war there was, peace

 5     had to be signed among the three sides.  Without the agreement of the

 6     three sides, it could not be implemented.

 7        Q.   And you yourself -- we looked at what Dr. Karadzic said, we

 8     looked at what General Mladic said on a couple of occasions, and you

 9     yourself said that the Serbian goal of a united and unique state is

10     something that had to be achieved and that you had a plan which would be

11     realised by political, military, and other means; right?

12        A.   I have to say that the interpretation was quite confusing.  It's

13     not a complaint against the interpreters, but I'm afraid that I might

14     make a mistake and lead you on a wrong trail.

15             One thing is this:  If Mladic's goal was to achieve the strategic

16     objectives, he would have taken Sarajevo and the Neretva Valley, he would

17     have reached the sea.  None of the goals that we stated, he did not

18     achieve except the corridor, I mean Mr. Mladic.  Spontaneously some of

19     that was implemented.  Some other areas were liberated, other than those

20     where the strategic objectives were focused.

21        Q.   Well, in your own trial, Mr. Krajisnik, you were confronted with

22     your remarks at the 18th Session of -- in 1992, when you said:

23             "There is no Serb who doesn't want to live in a united and unique

24     state.  It is politically impossible now but we must achieve it.  We have

25     our own plan and we shall realise it by political, military, and other

Page 43787

 1     means, depending on the situation."

 2             And that was put to you at transcript page 25519 through 20 of

 3     your trial, and you answered that:

 4             "Well, we were at war so, of course, I had to mention war, but I

 5     didn't think we had to do this by means of war."

 6             And you said:

 7             "It's not the factual situation that's important."

 8             Correct?  That was a position that you took at your own trial.

 9     That's what you told the Trial Chamber there, that the factual situation

10     simply wasn't important and your mention of military means to realise the

11     plan was only because the war was in progress?

12        A.   There is not a single Serb today in Republika Srpska, or rather,

13     at least 90 per cent of Serbs wanted and still want to live together with

14     Serbia.  It was like that before and then and always.  What is a

15     compromise is Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is today.  This leadership tried

16     to pursue realistic policy that was supposed to achieve a compromise, and

17     I said correctly then it's true that the Serbs want to live with Serbia.

18     That was a wish expressed as a sort of plebiscite, but that was not

19     realistic policy.  This leadership does not want to pursue unrealistic

20     policy and to oppose the will of the other two ethnic groups and the

21     international community, but wants to achieve a solution.  We did realise

22     that through special connections, so it was a compromise rather than the

23     maximum that our people wanted.

24        Q.   All right.  Mr. Krajisnik, I asked you about the factual

25     situation and your claim that it wasn't important and that your explicit

Page 43788

 1     reference to military means of attaining the plan was only because of the

 2     happenstance that there was a war on.  And in your answer you focus

 3     exclusively on the goal.  I'm focusing on the means of achieving that

 4     goal.

 5             So is that what you told the Trial Chamber, that the factual

 6     situation wasn't important to you and the Bosnian Serb leadership?

 7        A.   I have to say that I do not understand the question because

 8     you're quoting, its translated twice.  I'll tell you what I meant and you

 9     can fit it wherever you please.  War, many MPs and many people believed

10     that something could be gained by war, and we said the factual situation,

11     that's the balance of powers and relations in the world, there are other

12     peoples too.  We cannot achieve anything by force; we have to do it

13     through negotiations.  That was our policy, nothing else.

14             MR. TIEGER:  I tender 25520 and 25521.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, they will be added.

16             MR. TIEGER:

17        Q.   Well, in light of your comments about the role of the strategic

18     objectives, the factual situation, your knowledge of military operations,

19     I think it will be instructive to turn to a contemporaneous account,

20     contemporaneous journal, of meetings that took place between the

21     political and military leadership at that time.

22             MR. TIEGER:  And I want to call up 1477.  That's one of the war

23     journals that General Mladic kept between 1992 and 1995, and I want to

24     look first at a meeting that took place on the 6th of May, that was just

25     a few days before the 16th Assembly Session when the strategic objectives

Page 43789

 1     were annunciated, and that's found at page 256, moving on to -- and 262

 2     in the Serbian.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Before we continue, I would like the parties to

 4     discuss with the Registrar to identify the correct pages that have been

 5     tendered.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  At the end of his testimony.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, of course.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Not now.

10             MR. TIEGER:  P1477.

11        Q.   This reflects talks with Mr. Karadzic, yourself, General Adzic,

12     and so on.  And we see Mr. Karadzic speaking first at what appears to be

13     quite some length, but the portion I wanted to direct your attention to

14     in particular appears toward the bottom of page 258.  Incidentally, it

15     appears just after he mentions that:

16             "We were in Graz today for negotiations with the Croats."

17             And he says:

18             "It would be good to carry out the demarcation:  (a) in order for

19     us to separate; (b) for us to form a corridor; (c) for the Drina not to

20     be a border; and (d) to reach the coast."

21             So in a meeting with General Mladic and General Adzic and a group

22     of generals, doctor -- along with you, Dr. Karadzic annunciates most of

23     the strategic objectives that will be fully articulated to the

24     Bosnian Serb parliament in a few days; right?  And he explains to these

25     generals what at least four of those strategic objectives will be?

Page 43790

 1        A.   This is an example of Mr. Karadzic presenting our future

 2     strategic objectives at this meeting.  He informed them about it, so not

 3     all but just one part, and that followed after the talks with the Croats,

 4     as I recently testified, in Graz.

 5        Q.   He's explaining to the military what it would be good to do, how

 6     to carry out the demarcation.  That's what he's explaining to them, isn't

 7     he?

 8        A.   At the meeting with the Croats, we agreed how to carry out the

 9     demarcation between us and them.  We agreed on that, so it wasn't a task

10     for the military and then told to the Croats.  He is presenting what we

11     agreed with the Croats, how to carry out this demarcation between the

12     Croats and us after these talks, in the corridor by an exchange of

13     territories and in the Neretva valley.  We also talked about that, where

14     to draw the demarcation line between them and us, the Croats and the

15     Serbs.

16        Q.   And that had nothing to do with General Mladic's remarks at the

17     34th, the 50th, and elsewhere, that the strategic objectives were set out

18     to the military and that they indeed accomplished most of them and put

19     the Bosnian Serb leadership in the best negotiating position?

20        A.   But they did not achieve most of them.  Sarajevo, the

21     Neretva valley, and getting out to the sea, this is what they did not

22     accomplish.  But it's normal as the military representatives were at the

23     Assembly.  They heard about the objectives, they were announced.

24     Everyone knew that that was our platform for negotiations.  There was

25     nothing secret about that.  You will remember the Popovic trial where I

Page 43791

 1     presented the genesis of the strategic objectives, how they came into

 2     being.  I submitted it to you and the Tribunal, so I believe that it's

 3     not difficult to find them, how the six strategic objectives came into

 4     being in the first place.

 5        Q.   We've heard your account of how the strategic objectives came

 6     into being, Mr. Krajisnik.  And now we're pursuing their role in military

 7     operations.  The reality is that from the outset, as we see reflected

 8     here, the Bosnian Serb leadership told the military what the objectives

 9     were and then continued over and over again to remind the military that

10     those were the objectives in the context of upcoming or upcoming military

11     operations or military operations that had taken place?

12        A.   The army did not work towards accomplishing the objectives.  I've

13     told you of the six strategic objectives, they never accomplished three.

14     At the same meeting, the session, the 16th one, Mr. Karadzic said:  We

15     envisage certain enclaves in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So

16     when the army could liberate territory, it did.  And of course, you

17     cannot expect from soldiers not to cherish that.  That was their job and

18     they would boast about it, of course, so they would say that that was

19     accomplishing goals, but they didn't accomplish them.  Here,

20     specifically, these three objectives were something that they never even

21     tried to accomplish.

22        Q.   Right.  And your testimony is they were just boasting about goals

23     that they came to on their own initiative; it wasn't put to them by the

24     Bosnian Serb political leadership?

25        A.   The six strategic objectives were read out publicly by

Page 43792

 1     President Karadzic at the 16th Assembly.  On the 9th of June, where

 2     Mr. Mladic was, that was a meeting of the Presidency.  And then it was

 3     said that the strategic objectives should be sent to international

 4     representatives, the mediators, as well as our map, and published.  So

 5     there was no secret about that.  And of course, Mladic was aware of the

 6     six strategic objectives, but I'm telling you specifically, he liberated

 7     the territories he could but he wasn't taking into account the strategic

 8     objectives nor were they any kind of obligation for him.

 9        Q.   We -- well, let's look at a meeting the next day, on May 7th, and

10     in particular, let's -- I want to remind you of your testimony in the

11     Krajisnik case, that you didn't remember meeting with General Mladic, and

12     if you did, you certainly didn't discuss any goals with him.  So let's

13     turn now to page -- that's 1477 again, page 260 -- sorry, 262 in both

14     languages.  This is yet another meeting with you and Dr. Karadzic and

15     General Mladic.  And there -- I'm sorry, it's B/C/S page 270.  Generally

16     these conform.

17             Meeting of 7 May at 1600 hours, right.  At that meeting,

18     Mr. Krajisnik, you annunciated in full the strategic objectives to

19     General Mladic, to separate from the Croats and Muslims forever, to make

20     a corridor from Krajina to Serbia, to establish a link with Serbia on the

21     Drina and cut off the Muslims' link, a natural border with the Croats on

22     the Neretva, Sarajevo, and passage to the sea.

23             So for two days, you and Dr. Karadzic met with General Mladic and

24     on both days ensured that he was fully conversant with the strategic

25     objectives?  And you -- correct?

Page 43793

 1        A.   Well, you have just forgotten that I said here that we do not

 2     want to live alone.  I'm not sure if I said that too, but here this is

 3     correct -- I mean correct.  I want to say that -- I want to confirm that

 4     what I'm reading here is correct.  Now, whether this is just what he

 5     wrote, I don't know.  He says that Krajisnik enumerated the strategic

 6     goals and there are seven goals here, like in the near future we must --

 7     I'm not sure what follows then after that.  And during my testimony here

 8     I said that perhaps I or Mr. Karadzic may have formulated it, but you can

 9     see from what was said on the previous day was that Mr. Karadzic actually

10     listed some goals.  So he may have put that it was me and it could have

11     been our joint agreement or it's possible that he attended a meeting on

12     which the strategic goals that would be prepared for the Assembly were

13     presented, and the Assembly was to be held in the next several days.

14        Q.   First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, there are not seven goals listed.

15     You can see that he's got a line identifying the six goals and then he

16     moves on with an asterisk to talk about the discussion:  We do not want

17     to live alone.  In the near future, you are recorded as relating to him,

18     we want to establish links with the RSK.  The latter point of which was a

19     continuing point of interest by the Bosnian Serb leadership, to unite

20     with the RSK.

21             In fact, Mr. Krajisnik, this entry reflects the obvious, that

22     Mr. Mladic -- that General Mladic, as he's about to assume his

23     responsibilities, is being told what his objectives are to be?  And one

24     more thing -- you answer that and I'll ask you the next one.

25        A.   This is not giving tasks to Mr. Mladic by telling him the goals

Page 43794

 1     because he was not yet the commander.  We didn't know when he would

 2     become the commander.  This is probably, though I don't know, a

 3     conversation with a number of participants where the strategic objectives

 4     were conceived as a platform for talks, a platform that we would advocate

 5     and that would be announced to the Assembly.  So these were not tasks

 6     issued to General Mladic.  He was still to become the commander.  These

 7     were talks.  The talks could have been held with anyone else in this

 8     period.

 9        Q.   So it doesn't -- this could have been anybody.  The fact that

10     it's General Mladic is irrelevant or coincidental.  That's your position;

11     is that right?

12        A.   Well, the previous meeting was held with the generals from

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, with Mr. Adzic, so we issued tasks to them too.  They

14     had nothing to do with Mladic and the future Army of Republika Srpska.

15     I'm telling you one thing, these were the political objectives which were

16     conceived here, and Mladic could be aware of them.  Why shouldn't he be

17     familiar with them?  But these were not his tasks or orders issued to

18     him.

19        Q.   And you did not say to General Mladic on the 7th of May with

20     regard to strategic objective number 3:  Our goal is to establish a

21     border control station on the Drina that will not ask for passports, but

22     will accept visas?  That wasn't your articulation of strategic objective

23     number 3 on the 7th of May, was it?

24        A.   Can you please bring it back, the strategic objectives, so I can

25     see how exactly the third strategic objective was formulated.

Page 43795

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Page 270, I believe, in the B/C/S and page 260 in --

 2     excuse me, 262 in the English.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We always advocated that the Drina

 4     should not be a border at which passports needed to be shown, and I

 5     quoted what Mr. Izetbegovic himself had said.  We always applied for this

 6     and it was always approved by international community representatives,

 7     namely, to have special and parallel relations and that exists to this

 8     day.  Today, you don't have to show a passport but only the personal

 9     identity card.  That was the goal, not to have a unification of

10     Republika Srpska and Serbia, but that the border is a soft one which can

11     easily be crossed as people do it today within the EU.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   But that's not what you said to General Mladic on the 7th of May.

14     You didn't say:  We want a soft border that can be easily crossed by

15     people.  You said you wanted to cut off the Muslims' link with Sandzak

16     and establish a link with Serbia on the Drina.  Would a soft border,

17     Mr. Krajisnik, cut off the link with the Sandzak?  It would seem to me it

18     would enhance it.

19        A.   Firstly, the Drina is not the border with Sandzak.  The Drina is

20     the border with Serbia proper, and Mladic could have noted this in the

21     way he wanted to.  He may have included some of his own reminiscences.  I

22     always advocated - I'm not sure about how that's portrayed here - as what

23     we negotiated with the Muslims in the talks with them and also with

24     international community; namely, that it should be a border where we

25     wouldn't have border posts and passports, but one that would be easy to

Page 43796

 1     cross and go over and it exists today.

 2        Q.   Mr. --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, if I may help.  In

 4     line 12, though I see that it's noted, his "reminiscences" is what's

 5     missing.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah, well, I can continue, Mr. President, but it

 8     looks like we're --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

10             It's time for another break.  We'll break for 45 minutes and

11     resume at 1.15.

12                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'd like to introduce

16     to the Chamber Ms. Milica Milicevic, who was originally from Serbia but

17     grew up in the United Kingdom and is now studying here in the Netherlands

18     and working as a legal intern for our team.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Before we continue, I would like to ask -- inquire of the parties

21     about the scheduling.  In the week of 9th of December, whether it would

22     cause a lot of problems if we are to sit from Tuesday to Friday instead

23     of Monday to Thursday?  We are supposed to sit from 9th to 12th.  I'm

24     inquiring whether it would be possible to sit from the 10th to the 13th.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, in the past such requests have not

Page 43797

 1     presented any problems so we will check and get back to you very quickly.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  It won't be a problem for us.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic -- I'm sorry, Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7        Q.   I'd like to turn next, Mr. Krajisnik, to some of the directives

 8     that were issued before military operations.  As we've heard in this

 9     chamber, a directive is a high command document which addresses broad

10     issues of preparation and execution of military operations for an

11     extended period, setting out goals and tasks.  And I'd like to start with

12     the first directive which was dated the 6th of June, 1992, and that's

13     D232.

14             Now if we turn to the second page of the English and we look

15     under the goal of the operation, that appears immediately after 4, you'll

16     see it at the bottom of your page and then continuing on into the second

17     page of B/C/S.  It states:

18             "Secure parts of Sarajevo with a majority Serbian population to

19     ocistiti /mop up or cleanse/ the wider area of Sarajevo airport and

20     ocistiti its wider area of remaining groups and of individuals belonging

21     to the enemy ..." et cetera.

22             And if we turn to the item after item (D), we see that the

23     directive provides:

24             "In the first stage, in duration of 3 to 4 days, use offensive

25     actions to ocistiti the wider sector around Sarajevo airport (Dobrinja,

Page 43798

 1     Butmir, Sokolovic, Kolonija, Mojmilo, Zlatiste), deblock the

 2     communication," et cetera, "Sarajevo-Trnovo and group forces to open the

 3     corridor between Semberija and Bosnian Krajina."

 4             And again immediately below:

 5             "In the second stage, in duration of 4 to 6 days, create the

 6     corridor between Semberija and Bosnian Krajina, reject enemy forces away

 7     from the communications, and in the period to come, extend the corridor

 8     permanently providing secure traffic communication in it."

 9             And again, Mr. Krajisnik, we see here the term "ocistiti" and in

10     English the two possible translations for that, depending on the context

11     in which it appears, are provided and this Court has heard evidence -

12     that's found at 14572 through 14575 - that the term sometimes appears in

13     a military context referring to the mopping up of the terrain, a military

14     term for the final stages of the operation, or may refer to a cleansing

15     which may in context mean the removal of the population.  So it's in this

16     document in the English translation left with both possibilities and the

17     original word in Serbian is inserted.

18             But with respect to the items I identified for you, do we see

19     here in the first directive and in the fairly early stage of the VRS's

20     involvement in the conflict a reflection of two of the strategic

21     objective and an attempt to produce a factual situation which can support

22     various demands during negotiations?

23        A.   I'm not a military expert so it's hard for me to interpret this.

24     Anything that I would interpret would be arbitrary and certainly not of a

25     very high quality.  What I can say now as a lay person is the following.

Page 43799

 1     I can say that at the time our ethnic areas were split up, disjointed,

 2     and it is certain that the actual situation on the ground made it

 3     necessary to link certain things up.  It says here ethnic areas around

 4     Sarajevo where Serbs were the prevalent population.  Also, it has to do

 5     with this linking up by way of communication.  I could not say that this

 6     is linked to the strategic objectives or this strategic objective.  Quite

 7     simply, the situation was such that it made it necessary to link areas up

 8     in the eastern part.

 9             As for this reference to the corridor, you know that -- here in

10     the documents you see that the entire western part of Krajina was

11     isolated because of humanitarian aid, that was a particular problem.  And

12     to this day there is a monument to 12 babies that died due to a lack of

13     oxygen, and there was a lot of pressure then to open this humanitarian

14     corridor towards the western part of Republika Srpska, which was done

15     afterwards.

16             So I don't see anything unusual here in this military document,

17     and I as a layman again, I could not link this up to ethnic cleansing.

18     It is actually the military that is mopping up and it says here "enemy,"

19     and the enemy is the enemy soldiers on the other side.

20        Q.   Those actions that were reflected in the directive were the

21     result of meetings with the Bosnian Serb political leadership, including

22     yourself; correct?

23        A.   Well, if this is the 6th of June, as far as I can remember, the

24     first meeting of the expanded Presidency was on the 9th of June, that is

25     to say, it was later.  I don't know whether there was a meeting before

Page 43800

 1     that, say an informal meeting, unrecorded.  But as far as I can remember,

 2     the first meeting with Mr. Mladic was on the 9th of June, that is to say,

 3     three days before this directive was issued.

 4        Q.   Take a look at P1478, page 92, a meeting held on the

 5     5th of June, 1992, involving General Mladic, yourself, Koljevic, Plavsic,

 6     and Djeric.

 7        A.   I can't see the date here.  Can you tell me where the date is,

 8     please?

 9        Q.   This is a meeting that took place at 1600 hours, so the date is

10     reflected at an earlier portion of the document and is 5 June.  If you

11     wish to scroll back, we can do so; if you take my word for it, we can do

12     so.  Also on the very next page we see the entry of 6th of June and

13     you'll see that in a moment.  So you'll see that it moves from 1600 hours

14     on this date to the 6th of June on the very next entry.

15             And General Mladic writes down "demands" as after -- that arise

16     from his meeting with the political leadership.

17             "To liberate the road going through Zlatiste;

18             "To occupy the border in the city and to reinforce it;

19             "The issue of our objective in SarajevoSarajevo has to be

20     resolved politically while acting quietly inch by inch" --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

22             Next page, please.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry.  We move to the next page.

24        Q.   And "ocistiti," mop up or cleanse, "Butmir, Hrasnica, Dobrinja,

25     and Sokolovic Kolonija, and in the town of Hrasno in the direction of

Page 43801

 1     Mojmilo hill."

 2             Here, Mr. Krajisnik, we see the demand, as it says here, arising

 3     from the meeting of the state and political leadership, and in particular

 4     you and Dr. Karadzic, to do precisely what is reflected in the -- in

 5     directive 1 on June 6th; correct?

 6        A.   Well, this exactly is confirmation that it has to do with

 7     communication, I mean this talk.  I didn't know that there would be a

 8     directive afterwards, I certainly didn't know, but I do not exclude the

 9     possibility of this meeting being held and this being discussed.  I don't

10     remember exactly whether the meeting was a meeting of the Presidency or

11     some other meeting, but I do not rule out the possibility of such

12     problems being discussed because it says here "Sarajevo has to be

13     resolved by political means," but of course; Zlatiste, where the road had

14     been cut off; also at the airport where they're firing at those who are

15     bringing in humanitarian aid; and then Trnovo, all of this is discussion

16     about communication.  It is only natural that a directive would follow

17     after certain talks.  I don't remember this being said.  I don't see

18     anything strange here and I allow for the possibility of this kind of

19     meeting having been held.

20        Q.   We'll check the transcript, but perhaps I misunderstood you

21     earlier when you were telling this Chamber over and over again that the

22     operations of the VRS had nothing to do with the political leadership.

23     So now I understand from you that it's natural that specific military

24     operations and military directives would arise immediately in the

25     aftermath of the meeting with the political leadership and based on what

Page 43802

 1     the political leadership said about what needed to happen.

 2        A.   Well, I don't understand what it is that is not understandable.

 3     I'll try to explain, and if that is not in accordance with what I had

 4     said, then you have the possibility of saying that I haven't been

 5     consistent.  I said --

 6        Q.   What I want to know from you is specifically now whether or not

 7     it's your position that military operations were the result of meetings

 8     with and instructions from the Bosnian Serb political leadership?

 9        A.   Well, Mr. Prosecutor, you want to get an answer through this play

10     of words.  I am telling you that if you get that, that is wrong, and I'll

11     try to explain things if something is unclear to you.  I said that there

12     were very few meetings with the military, and for the most part what was

13     discussed was logistics.  There was information, certain information, of

14     course, and we discussed certain problems too, but that was not

15     obligatory in terms of issuing orders to the military.  From the ground

16     there were certain requests, certain wishes, but it wasn't demands of the

17     civilian authorities.  The planning of the military was autonomous and

18     nobody had to tell them what to do and how to resolve things because they

19     would see the situation on the ground specifically here.

20             If this conversation did take place, and I assume that it did

21     take place, it is only natural that we had this discussion with Mladic

22     about the problems related to Sarajevo, for example, this and that and

23     the other thing is a problem, and then after that what he's going to do

24     and whether he's going to do it.  That was not a request.  That was

25     simply a discussion about problems that have to do with the situation on

Page 43803

 1     the ground.  If it is not clear from this, then you can put additional

 2     questions to me and I can give you an answer.  This is a meeting that did

 3     not have to be a pretext for the directive.  It could have been so but it

 4     was not obligatory for the military.  There's going to be another

 5     meeting, say, there was a meeting on the 9th of June, and I don't know

 6     whether there was a directive that followed.

 7        Q.   Let's look at a meeting that took place the next day, June 6th.

 8     There we see consultations on the military and political situation,

 9     that's the date of the issuance of the directive.  Item 4 is:

10             "The political and military doctrine for upcoming war

11     objectives."

12             And Dr. Karadzic speaks and, as we see toward the bottom of the

13     page on 94, Dr. Karadzic "reiterated the strategic objectives with

14     comments and explanations."

15             And he ends by saying:

16             "We have to protect our territories militarily."

17             So now for the fourth time in approximately a month, that being

18     May 6th, May 7th, May 12th, and now June 6th, the Bosnian Serb political

19     leadership is emphasising the strategic objectives to General Mladic,

20     this time in the specific context of a discussion on the political and

21     military doctrine for upcoming war objectives.

22        A.   This is a consultative meeting of soldiers, and it is only

23     natural that politicians were present there.  Mr. Karadzic is saying what

24     the political objectives are.  It is the Assembly that adopted these

25     political objectives.  I don't know whether what Mr. Mladic said here is

Page 43804

 1     correct, verbatim.  He said that the army is supposed to protect our

 2     territories.  I don't see that he said:  Let's take somebody else's

 3     territories.  Well, of course, what do we need an army for if it's not

 4     going to protect our territories?

 5        Q.   So you don't see a reference to Dr. Karadzic saying:  Let's take

 6     somebody else's territories or let's conquer somebody else's territories?

 7     That's what you're saying that this meeting is about only?

 8        A.   Well, I'm saying I don't know what the content is of what Mladic

 9     wrote down.  I know that at such consultative meetings it is a particular

10     subject matter that is discussed.  It says here that we have to protect

11     our territories in a military way --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all other

13     microphones please be switched off.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And he says here the situation is

15     very unfavourable.  You see that that's what he wrote down.  I don't know

16     whether what he wrote down is correct, but I'm telling you what it is

17     that I am reading right now.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   Well, let's look at who did state that what needed to happen was

20     that the army had to conquer what the Bosnian Serbs considered theirs.

21             MR. TIEGER:  If we can turn to page 108, please.

22        Q.   That reflects your contributions to this meeting toward the end

23     of the meeting and you say the following:

24             "The goal was to form and unite the Birac-Romanija area.

25             "To draw the borders of this area and to include:  Hadzici,

Page 43805

 1     Ilidza, Vojkovici, and Novo Sarajevo.

 2             "Dobrinja, if we can take it.

 3             "Those who liberated Hadzici, Vogosca ... this should be

 4     defended, that will be ours.

 5             "The border has to be defended and held".

 6             And we turn to the next page, 108.

 7             "As of tomorrow we have to conquer what is ours and be prepared

 8     to defend our state ..."

 9             So that's what the Bosnian Serb leadership was telling the VRS,

10     immediate -- yes, contemporaneous with the issuance of directive 6?

11        A.   Everything I said then I would say today as well, all of these

12     areas are Serb areas, and I did not say that a single foot of Muslim

13     territory should be taken.  I said that our territory should be

14     protected, and that is the views of the participants in a particular

15     meeting.  It would be very naive to say that Momcilo Krajisnik in this

16     way gave a task, an order, to the military.  I said, as a participant, I

17     said what should belong to us around Sarajevo.  Our territory, to take up

18     lines and to defend it.  I did not say that Bascarsija should be taken.

19     I did not say that Butmir should be taken.  I did not say that the inner

20     city of Sarajevo should be taken.  Rather, only that that belonged to the

21     Serb people ethnically.  I followed that, that we had already charted as

22     our areas with Mr. Cutileiro on the maps there.  This is not a directive,

23     this is not a proposal; this is the opinion of a participant, the Speaker

24     of the Assembly, addressing a broader forum.

25        Q.   So your words were that:  "As of tomorrow we have to conquer" --

Page 43806

 1     you weren't saying to take or liberate territory that was not then being

 2     held by the Bosnian Serbs, you weren't saying conquer territory already

 3     had.  You were saying conquer territory that was held by the Muslims, but

 4     that you considered to be -- that you considered the Serbs entitled to;

 5     right?

 6        A.   That is not right.  Do read this.  I don't know whether that's

 7     the word I uttered, but it says here exactly "our territories," "our,"

 8     and they're listed too.  I did not say "our Butmir."  I did not say "our

 9     Bascarsija."  That would mean that we were aspiring for something that

10     was held by the Muslims and that was their own.  The Muslim side held

11     some of our territory, so what we are alluding to is that these

12     territories should be freed because that's where Serbs are.  According to

13     the maps they belonged to us and they belong to us today on the basis of

14     the Dayton Agreement, too.

15             As for the word "conquer," I don't know why that word was used.

16     Maybe he put that, if that's a military term.  I may have used the word

17     "osloboditi," to liberate, but why would I say "conquer"?

18        Q.   And once again we see the -- in your words, desires or wishes of

19     the Bosnian Serb leadership reflected in the directives guiding military

20     operations.

21        A.   I would have been honoured if anyone took heed of my wishes, any

22     wishes, let's say in inverted commas.  There were several participants

23     they -- and it doesn't mean that what Krajisnik said we are going to

24     incorporate in the directive and then we move on.  It might have happened

25     accidentally that I mentioned something that I wouldn't say today.  I

Page 43807

 1     said that we need to liberate the Serbian areas, they need to be

 2     connected and linked up, because somebody had occupied these areas.  I

 3     didn't say these territories had to be cleansed, but I said that they

 4     needed to be liberated because they had been occupied by someone and it's

 5     only logical.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Let's turn next to directive 3 issued in August.

 7     That's D235.  And -- and perhaps before we look at that in detail, maybe

 8     we can look at a couple of documents that indicate what happened between

 9     directive 1 on June 6th, 1992, and the directive 3 on the 3rd of August,

10     1992.  So if we could turn to directive 2 on -- which is D593 first,

11     please.  And sorry to the Registrar for jumping.

12        Q.   This is dated July 22nd, 1992, and it indicates in the

13     informative section of the directive at the beginning in one of the

14     two items indicated as item 1, the second of those two items:

15             "We liberated the territories we consider ours and created

16     conditions for political and military leadership of the Serbian Republic

17     of BiH, so that they could perform all activities and negotiations

18     regarding the future state of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the position of

19     the stronger one in this territory."

20             Item 4:

21             "We have broken through corridors in Eastern Bosnia and

22     Bosanska Posavina and thus made possible the centuries-long aspiration of

23     the Serbian people from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic of

24     Krajina to be joined with the fatherland - Serbia."

25             And item 7:

Page 43808

 1             "We have created conditions for further progress of our army and

 2     state in this territory."

 3             So that document in the latter part of July 1992, directive 2,

 4     reflects, first of all, the attainment of the corridors in Eastern Bosnia

 5     and Bosanska Posavina, those are two of the strategic objectives that

 6     were articulated to General Mladic four times before the first week -- or

 7     by the first week of June; correct?

 8        A.   Yes, the corridor in Posavina was one of the strategic objectives

 9     and the linking up of the area along the Drina was another.

10        Q.   And it reflects the military's understanding that the liberation

11     of territories that we consider to be ours, that is, that the Bosnian

12     Serbs consider to be theirs, created conditions for the political and

13     military leadership so that they could perform all activities regarding

14     the future state and be in the position of the stronger one on the

15     territory; right?

16        A.   Yes, I -- that is how I think that the army understood, as it is

17     written in this directive.  Of course they were familiar with those

18     objectives and they interpreted them as they saw fit.  Nobody told them

19     explicitly what to do.  The entire nation was in favour of opening up the

20     Krajina in order to get medical supplies in, in order to prevent the

21     death of infants.  It wasn't necessary to tell them anything.  If anyone

22     did tell them, though, it just was consistent with the situation.  It has

23     nothing to do with the objectives, which was dictated by the prevailing

24     situation.

25        Q.   All right.  I wanted to turn to directive 3 which was the

Page 43809

 1     previous document, D00235.  So now we have some understanding of what

 2     happened in the interim, and we see in directive 3, first, there is a

 3     general political background provided in paragraph 1, and it notes in --

 4     at page 2 that the army has achieved significant results in protecting

 5     the Serbian people and their centuries-old home.  But let's look at the

 6     objectives for the future and the tasks which are provided by

 7     directive 3.

 8             First of all, it seeks to keep Sarajevo firmly under blockade and

 9     prevent its breaking.  It, once again, mentions - this is page 3 in both

10     languages - advancing to the left bank of the river Neretva, the right

11     bank of the river Sava, and border areas of Serbian territories, capture

12     Jajce and Gorazde, take hold of dominant features and ensure the most

13     favourable possible position in the negotiations with the Croat-Muslim

14     alliance on demarcation.  Now --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Next page in English.

16             MR. TIEGER:

17        Q.   Then the document continues to make specific assignments to

18     various corps in the pursuit of these objectives.

19             Now, once again, Mr. Krajisnik, we see reflected in this

20     directive, the reference to the Neretva, the reference to the Sava, the

21     reference to liberating remaining parts of Serbian territory, reflections

22     of strategic objective number 4, strategic objective number 2, strategic

23     objective number 1, general separation, in the guiding documents for

24     military operations by the VRS; correct?

25        A.   Well, first of all, it's not correct.  Let me tell you why.

Page 43810

 1     Because the strategic objectives were not made up.  They rely on

 2     realistic foundations to what we were entitled to, and we had the right

 3     to each of these strategic objectives.  So if something is realistic and

 4     if none of these objectives were adopted, then the Serbian army had --

 5     would have had a right to liberate the areas where the Serbs had been

 6     living.  I don't know how it all went on, how these directives were

 7     formulated, but I can say that the six strategic objectives was a

 8     political document known to everyone, including the army, and anyone was

 9     free to invoke them.  Everyone had the right to defend themselves.  There

10     is not a single objective that aspires to grabbing somebody else's

11     territory; it was not incorporated in our objectives.  We only claimed

12     what we thought we had a right to, the access to sea, the Neretva Valley

13     where the Serbs used to live and were subjected to genocide.  So we

14     aspired to everything that was allowed by the Cutileiro Plan.

15             It was only natural for the army to know what the objectives were

16     and what they were supposed to do as part of their task.  But it was not

17     that the leadership said:  Let us do this in a military way, although we

18     don't have a right to do that, in order to gain a better negotiating

19     position.  Our position was very favourable and we continued the

20     negotiations.  Precisely on the 7th of August, Mr. Karadzic and

21     Mr. Koljevic signed a declaration with Mr. Hurd in London, where it said

22     that all the areas that are taken by force was something that we were

23     opposed to and each such territory had to be returned.

24             Now this is construed in a different way, that we are trying to

25     occupy territories in order to improve our political position.  We were

Page 43811

 1     constantly striving for a political solution and the policy-makers said

 2     we want something that we're entitled to.  The Serbs can claim

 3     65 per cent of the territory, mostly rural territory, not urban

 4     territory.  And this was publicly made known.  However, we did not

 5     achieve everything because the Dayton Accords provided different

 6     solutions, so it was not feasible.

 7        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, you said:  "I don't know how it all went on, how

 8     these directives were formulated," and then you went on to offer the long

 9     explanation about strategic objectives that you just did.  So in

10     connection with how this directive came about, let's look first at P3068,

11     which was a meeting of the Presidency one day before directive 3 was

12     issued.  And we see that the second item on the agenda is the assessment

13     of the military situation.

14             And if we turn the page we can see that General Mladic briefed

15     those present on the assessment of the military situation in Serbian

16     Bosnia and Herzegovina, describing the situation in each combat sector,

17     the necessary tasks, and the connection between ensuring material

18     potentials and financial resources, and the necessity of adopting a

19     decision on general mobilisation due to security considerations, and the

20     detailed nature of the information, the conclusions, and alternatives

21     adopted were not put on record.  And this is another meeting with

22     General Mladic that you participated in, as we see from the notation

23     indicating who the session was attended by.  Okay?

24             So this was, as it states here, a briefing on the situation in

25     each sector and what needed to be done next; correct?

Page 43812

 1        A.   Well, this is exactly what I have been saying all the time.  Read

 2     this item consistently.  Mr. Mladic briefed the president about the

 3     situation on the ground, and we all know that from TV.  Then he spoke

 4     about the material support that was required for the army to be capable

 5     of combat, and that was the point of every meeting that I attended where

 6     Mr. Mladic was present.  There was not a single meeting where some

 7     different issues were discussed.  What they discussed was something that

 8     I saw on TV as well.  Of course he provided more detailed explanations

 9     and he said in order for us to be able to continue our activities, and

10     every soldier is proud of what he is doing, he would say:  We need

11     ammunition, we need food, we need uniforms, et cetera, et cetera.  So

12     that was our activity.  And although these meetings were far and few

13     between, whenever I was present this is what Mladic talked about.

14        Q.   So what you all knew from TV had to not be put on the record due

15     to security considerations; that's the first thing, right?  That's what

16     the record of the meeting reflects, that what you say everybody could see

17     on TV was not put on the record due to security considerations; right?

18        A.   Mr. Tieger, we all served in the army.  Whenever an army wants to

19     do something significant, they say:  This is a military secret.  This is

20     a state secret.  In order to create in the minds of people who are

21     present there that they were keeping something to themselves.  I never

22     heard in any of the meetings anything that could be treated as a special

23     military secret.  Many people didn't know what was happening on the

24     ground during the war, and I'm telling you that that is the real truth

25     and it's wrong to see that somebody was making a mystery of the whole

Page 43813

 1     situation.  Of course, soldiers are the most important factor in war and,

 2     of course, they try to give more importance to themselves, but I really

 3     convinced you that I never heard anything that was top secret, that there

 4     was a crime that had been committed and somebody tried to cover it up.

 5     All of us who served in the army know that this is the truth.  The army

 6     always tries to say that there is something very important and that

 7     shouldn't be disseminated among the people and that it should be

 8     publicised only on a need-to-know basis.

 9        Q.   Let's turn to another reflection of the meeting on the

10     2nd of August and that's found at P --

11             JUDGE KWON:  But, Mr. Krajisnik, this is not a military document,

12     is it?  This is a minute from the Presidency meeting, probably kept by a

13     civilian.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it says here what

15     was said at that time.  Maybe Mr. Mladic said:  Don't put that on paper,

16     but if something important was said - and I don't remember that there was

17     anything important - wasn't important enough to be put on record.  You

18     can see that there are so many things that are contained in the minutes

19     because they were more important.  There were many security issues during

20     the war.  This culture of security awareness did not exist too much among

21     us because it is possible that he didn't write everything down, so I

22     conclude that if he omitted to write it down, it wasn't significant

23     enough.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 43814

 1             Let's turn next to P1479, English pages 16 through 23 -- well, in

 2     this case both languages.  As a general matter, the Serbian and the

 3     English will track in this document.  Okay.

 4        Q.   This is a reflection of that same meeting, a meeting on the

 5     2nd of August, 1992, with the Presidency, as reflected in

 6     General Mladic's diary.  We see essentially the same agenda:

 7             "Briefing on the talks in London (Karadzic).

 8             "Assessment of the military situation.

 9             "Plan for future activities."

10             And as we continue through the document, we see a fairly lengthy

11     discussion of various aspects.  We see at the end something that will

12     come up in another document.  Mr. Koljevic saying:

13             "To take Sarajevo.

14             "To launch a sabotage operation," that's on page 23, "and

15     eliminate the political leadership."

16             So toward the end of this discussion on the assessment of the

17     military situation and plan for future activities, Mr. Koljevic offers

18     that contribution.  And prior to that we see on page 22, let's go to

19     page 21 first, look at the bottom.  After you say:

20             "We must raise the issue of our access to the sea ..."

21             Then on the next page, page 22, we see that Dr. Karadzic says:

22             "The European Community will accept the factual state of affairs,

23     and that is why we should not make a single concession in military

24     terms."

25             So that's another reflection --

Page 43815

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Is it Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Krajisnik?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I understand the confusion, Mr. President, but you

 3     see -- look immediately to the right and upwards, it looks like the

 4     reference for Karadzic and in the -- as you can see in the Serbian, it's

 5     less confusingly listed.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

 7             MR. TIEGER:

 8        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, that's another reflection of the Bosnian Serb

 9     leadership saying to General Mladic exactly what he said at the

10     34th Assembly Session and the 50th Assembly Session and in any number of

11     military directives that we've seen, is that he understood the role of

12     the military in part to be obtaining a factual situation on the ground

13     that would enhance the negotiations?

14        A.   Very often information from the West, from our conferences, came

15     that an agreement cannot be reached, that representatives of the

16     international community wanted certain area to be given over to another

17     ethnic community, and that created chaos because huge areas became

18     vacant.  Why should any territory be conceded to another ethnic

19     community?  People who liberated certain area and the political

20     leadership, which was particularly emphasised by Mr. Karadzic as the

21     president of the party, used to say that whatever we occupied, the

22     international community must acknowledge that.  For example, we took

23     Gorazde, somebody said Gorazde will be given to the Muslims and people

24     just packed and left.  Some of them were slaughtered.  Only three or four

25     days later Mr. Karadzic signed a paper which said that we were ready to

Page 43816

 1     make territorial concessions only with a view to reaching a political

 2     solution.  If he says that publicly in an international conference, then

 3     the ordinary people say:  Look, they're bargaining there.  Why should we

 4     wage war?  Why should we liberate areas that are going to be given to the

 5     other side anyway?

 6             It is only natural that there are talks during a war with the

 7     military and some other people, but these were not directives.  These

 8     were not orders.  This was just a discussion that every civilian was

 9     involved in.  The army was doing its job professionally, and in view of

10     the factual situation they acted accordingly.  If they can liberate

11     something, they resorted to that.  As I said, they didn't take the

12     Neretva Valley, they didn't take Sarajevo.  It was mentioned a hundred

13     times, but it was not a goal.  They didn't take Sarajevo, but they did

14     take Jajce, though, although we said it's not going to be ours.

15     According to the maps, it should have belonged to the Muslim-Croat

16     Federation.

17             I understand what you are trying to prove here, that is to say,

18     that the political leadership in the meetings that I attended was

19     involved in the discussions about the problems, and the only real problem

20     was the war, the people being killed, the refugees, et cetera.  We

21     discussed that, but these were not orders, these were wishes.  They were

22     suggestions passed on to the army that waged the war as best they could.

23     They were sometimes successful, sometimes unsuccessful.  I don't say that

24     there were no directives that the Commander-in-Chief issued and he

25     co-ordinated that with his Main Staff, but I don't know anything about

Page 43817

 1     these directives.  Some things happened spontaneously and chaotically on

 2     the ground.  I can give you a hundred examples of things that took us by

 3     surprise.

 4        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik --

 5        A.   -- if you look at the balance of powers in certain municipalities

 6     and if you see that people native to that area took part in the action.

 7        Q.   Well, Mr. Krajisnik, let's look at two more documents to see how

 8     spontaneous or chaotic this directive was.  So first let's look at P3069,

 9     another session of the Presidency two days later on August 4th.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the previous answer it turns out

13     that -- it was omitted that there were municipal armies, and I'm talking

14     about line 8 onwards.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Okay.  There we see, on the 4th, the Presidency considered the --

17     and again, this is a meeting which you attended, as we see reflected at

18     the outset of the meeting.  The document also reflects that the

19     Presidency considered the situation at the front and discussed

20     undertaking certain activities at the front.

21             Now, those activities at the front meant directive 3, and that's

22     what the Presidency considered and that's, in fact, what was approved by

23     the Presidency; correct?

24        A.   I don't see here that directive 3 is mentioned anywhere.  Can you

25     please tell me where you can see that.

Page 43818

 1        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, you were present at that meeting.  So I'm asking

 2     you when we see the reference to what the Presidency considered and

 3     discussed at that meeting, that that's a reference to directive 3 and

 4     that, in fact, the Presidency approved directive 3?

 5        A.   Well, it didn't, Mr. Tieger.  I never heard that I needed to

 6     adopt a directive at the Presidency.  I don't remember that.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Let's turn to P1479, English pages -- beginning at

 8     page 24.

 9        Q.   And this is another entry in General Mladic's diary, this time

10     reflecting the same meeting with the Presidency that was held on the

11     4th of August -- or reflecting a meeting with the Presidency on the

12     4th of August, 1992.  And as we can see at the very beginning:

13             "Directive accepted without objections, except for Koljevic who

14     requested the following:

15             "(a)," and that's the same thing he talked about on August 2nd,

16     "a sabotage operation in Sarajevo.

17             "(b) the taking of Sarajevo."

18        A.   I don't remember that it was presented like this and that someone

19     mentioned the directive.  Perhaps we talked about some -- the meeting was

20     held, we discussed, but that somebody said:  Let us adopt a directive

21     now, I never heard something like that.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the previous document.  Was Mladic noted

23     as one of the participants?

24             MR. TIEGER:  I don't believe he's listed as a participant in that

25     particular meeting.  I will note -- could ask Mr. Krajisnik this

Page 43819

 1     question, in fact, if I can find the particular transcript page -- no,

 2     he's not listed as attending that particular meeting.  So I -- I will

 3     note that -- and I'll find the reference and ask Mr. Krajisnik about it,

 4     that he made a point in his previous testimony of noting that not every

 5     participant in the meeting was always listed on the Presidency session

 6     minutes.

 7        Q.   I'd like to turn next, Mr. Krajisnik, to directive 4 and that's

 8     dated November 19th, 1992.  That's P00976.  And I'd like to look at that

 9     before turning your attention to some other meetings.

10             Now, if we look at page 2 in both languages, we can see, among

11     other things, that the 1st Krajina Corps has preserved and expanded the

12     borders of Republika Srpska.  It also indicates at item 6 that the

13     Drina Corps was formed.  It indicates, on the third page in English, the

14     tasks from directive 3 that have not yet been carried out; that is, that

15     the towns of Gorazde, Gradacac, Maglaj, Bugojno, Olovo, and Orasje have

16     not been liberated.  It indicates that the Posavina corridor has not been

17     substantially widened.  Enemy groups in the wider area of Gorazde, Zepa,

18     Srebrenica, and Cerska have not been totally routed.

19             "The Herzegovina Corps has failed to reach the left bank of

20     Neretva river and secure access ..."

21             Looking down on the paragraph below that, in item 4 we again see

22     the instruction to:

23             "Create conditions for the state leadership of Republika Srpska

24     to participate equally in resolving the Crisis Staff in the former BH

25     with other international factors."

Page 43820

 1             So just in this brief review of those portions of directive 4, we

 2     again see reflections of the focus on the Posavina corridor, the

 3     Neretva River, access to the sea, among others, that is, numbers of the

 4     strategic objectives; right?

 5        A.   What's mentioned here is a number of towns, Orasje, Bugojno, and

 6     so on.  None of these towns are included in the strategic objectives.  It

 7     was simply that the army, depending on the terrain -- the army included

 8     it in the directive.  And the three strategic objectives that you

 9     mentioned, the corridor, Sarajevo, and coming out to sea and Neretva,

10     those were the political goals that we were entitled to and they were

11     familiar to anyone.  And of course the army mentions them too.  I don't

12     see anything strange in that, but none of them were accomplished.  The

13     corridor was but it was not expanded.  It remained 3 kilometres

14     throughout this time.

15        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, didn't the Bosnian Serb leadership prior to the

16     issuance of this directive - and by the Bosnian Serb leadership, in

17     particular I mean Dr. Karadzic and you - remind General Mladic and the

18     VRS of the strategic objectives?

19        A.   If we -- I apologise.  May I?  May I answer?

20        Q.   And of course, by that I mean in the context of discussions about

21     upcoming military operations.

22        A.   It's quite possible that in some conversation the strategic

23     objectives were mentioned, at a meeting or at a parliament session,

24     because they were generally known.  Those were the political objectives

25     that were an obligation for all the people because we would accomplish

Page 43821

 1     that politically if we talked and negotiated and so on.  The army at the

 2     local level, as everyone else, had its own wish to liberate a part of the

 3     territory where other members of our people lived and no one could deny

 4     them that if they had enough power.  But the political goal and objective

 5     was not to take other people's territories but only those spaces where

 6     ethnic Serbs lived.  So it's possible that it may have been mentioned,

 7     but it wasn't an order or a threat to the effect that if you don't do

 8     that, there will be sanctions against you; or if you fail to do it as a

 9     soldier, you will not accomplish the strategic objectives.  That's simply

10     not correct.

11        Q.   I'm not talking about some incidental or peripheral mention of

12     the strategic objectives.  I'm talking about focusing on the need to

13     apply military resources to the political -- to the strategic objectives

14     and, indeed, let's say to certain strategic objectives as opposed to

15     others.  That's what the Bosnian Serb leadership did, isn't it?

16        A.   100 times there was discussion about the need to come out to the

17     Neretva or to the sea or that we should get a part of Sarajevo, but that

18     was a political objective that we mentioned in negotiations.  No one

19     said:  Let us take all of Sarajevo.  Let us take -- or where are the

20     borders of Neretva or let us take all of Neum, no.  What we once

21     presented at international community negotiations is what was mentioned

22     after that.  It is completely normal that we said wherever it was:  Look,

23     those are the strategic objectives.  It is not Gradacac or Tuzla, which

24     are not ours, but those are the strategic objectives where the Serbs live

25     and where the international mediators have an understanding about this

Page 43822

 1     whenever we had negotiations and contacts with them.  And that's the

 2     whole truth.  And the army was supposed to hold the lines reached, which

 3     the local units had liberated because we didn't have the solutions.  If

 4     we did, we would have applied immediately the map we had where we were

 5     supposed to return 30 per cent of territory.  You have documents about

 6     that.  I cannot tell you this on top of my head.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  If we can go to item 5(d) of this directive, that's

 9     the third-to-the-last page in Serbian and the fifth page in the English.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can you just scroll down a bit,

11     please, because I don't see anything.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   It's the paragraph that begins with "Drinski Korpus ..."

14        A.   If someone could read it out because I really can't read what's

15     written here.

16             THE ACCUSED:  Not right page in Serbian.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I'm told that there is a better or more readable

18     version of this attached to the same document --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Let's see the correct page first.

20             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  I'm told if we go to the back of the -- the

22     third-to-last page of this entire document, it contains a more readable

23     version in Serbian of the portion in question.  You can see it here, it's

24     not that hard to read, but I'm told it's better to -- there you go.

25     Thank you.

Page 43823

 1        Q.   Now, that particular section of directive 4 reads as follows:

 2             "The Drina Corps:  From its present positions, its main forces

 3     are to defend with utmost persistence Visegrad (the dam), Zvornik, and

 4     the corridor, while the rest of its forces in the wider Podrinje region

 5     are to exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses on them,

 6     and force them to leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas with the

 7     Muslim population ..."

 8             Now, that's a criminal order, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?

 9        A.   You asked me such a question during my trial, and by your

10     suggestion, I confirmed this when reading this.  However, later on I

11     talked with the author of this directive, Mr. Miletic, who said that he

12     didn't know how such an error could have crept on him.  I don't think

13     that it's decent for me to interpret somebody's thoughts.  There are

14     people here who can interpret what they wrote.  I have seen a hundred

15     times that when something is written, perhaps one single word which would

16     allow a different interpretation may have been omitted.  So I cannot

17     confirm what I said once when you suggested to me whether this is

18     correct, yes.  If someone said that somebody should be cleansed from a

19     territory, I would say that it is criminal, but I'm not sure if this is

20     correct.  You should ask Mr. Miletic or whoever else wrote this in the

21     directive.  He didn't tell me that it was criminal, but he told me he

22     wondered that it was formulated as this.  He told me in the DU while I

23     was there, and I asked him because I commented on this very vehemently

24     when this was presented to me, just like now, by Mr. Tieger.

25        Q.   Well, in fact, Mr. Krajisnik, I didn't present that to you,

Page 43824

 1     Judge Orie did.  And what happened at pages 25605 to 25607 is that you

 2     read this portion of directive 4 and then you started explaining, as you

 3     were discussing the directive, that you were deeply against ethnic

 4     cleansing.  And so Judge Orie asked you:

 5             "Well, do you consider this to be an order for ethnic cleansing?"

 6             To which you said:

 7             "Absolutely, yes."

 8             So your characterisation of, your interpretation of, your

 9     understanding of this directive was not at my suggestion.  It was based

10     on a question of the Judge, prompted by your assertions regarding ethnic

11     cleansing.  And that's the truth of what happened, isn't it?

12        A.   I'm sorry if I blame you and you are not to blame because it

13     turns out that in my case you are only to blame, I mean the Prosecutors.

14     I'm sorry if Judge Orie did that.  But anyway, my answer would be the

15     same.  I'm sorry that now I have to object against him.

16             I was interpreting what I see written here, and later I talked

17     with Mr. Miletic and I saw that I really took it on myself to interpret

18     something where I was not right because I took it at face value.  And I

19     could see this happen in many other instances where you suggested

20     something, probably it was just an extract, and then the one who provided

21     an answer gave a wrong one because the person was not qualified enough to

22     interpret something.  What he meant by "cleanse" or not, the one who

23     really wrote it should interpret it.  It's really indecent for me to say

24     literally that it is so, and I did say that previously in my own case, I

25     did say:  Yes, you are right there.

Page 43825

 1        Q.   Directive 4, and in particular the portions of directive 4,

 2     including this instruction to the Drina Corps, didn't come out of the

 3     blue to General Mladic.  It came after he was repeatedly reminded by the

 4     Bosnian Serb leadership of the need to separate from Muslims, of the risk

 5     that Muslims might otherwise become a majority, and of the insistence

 6     that clearing the Drina area was the most important task.  That's the

 7     case, isn't it?

 8        A.   Mr. Mladic never received a request from us to ethnically cleanse

 9     the Drina and this area, that's not correct.  And you can see how many

10     public statements of Mr. Karadzic you have here and other leaders, to the

11     effect that they oppose ethnic cleansing.  And in every agreement we took

12     on us the obligation that everyone should return to their homes.  And

13     since the 27th of March, before the war, Mr. Karadzic was saying:  We

14     allow for enclaves to exist in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

15     the Muslim enclaves, and our policy - I'm telling you what our policy

16     was - it was to establish our own Republika Srpska.  And according to the

17     Cutileiro Plan, it meant an internal demarcation within

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to form three ethnic constitutive units.

19        Q.   I know you want to talk about what was publicly said.  Right now

20     I'm interested in what was said to General Mladic in meetings that

21     weren't available to the public.  So I asked you if it wasn't the case

22     that General Mladic was reminded of the need to separate from Muslims,

23     the risk that Muslims might otherwise become a majority if that

24     separation didn't take place, and of the -- and reminded and indeed of

25     the Bosnian Serb political leadership's position that clearing the Drina

Page 43826

 1     area was the most important or among the most important of upcoming

 2     tasks, not what was said to the public.

 3        A.   I understand this question as several questions.  I will try to

 4     answer as I have understood it.  Ethnic cleansing was not our policy.  No

 5     one ever issued Mladic the task to ethnically cleanse Eastern Bosnia.

 6     Secondly, as for separation, separation was one of the main principles of

 7     the Cutileiro Plan and all other plans, in order to form constituent

 8     units.  That was normal.  And thirdly, in each plan there was an

 9     obligation for all parties, all sides, including the Serbian one, with

10     regard to refugees who had left their areas, that they are to be able to

11     return, and we all opposed the idea that territories taken by force could

12     be a final solution in any plan nor would we acknowledge that.  You will

13     find it in the platform dated at 22nd of April, 1992, issued by

14     Mr. Karadzic and on many other occasions it was stated publicly.

15             What is secret, as you said?  I really don't know if there was a

16     meeting.  I want to be precise.  A secret meeting at which someone said:

17     Let us now expel these people from such and such an area.  I don't know.

18     You've seen how many telephone conversations were recorded.  It should

19     have been mentioned in some telephone conversation if it was unlawful

20     that Momcilo Krajisnik or Radovan Karadzic said:  Let's expel somebody,

21     or somebody may have been angry because we are temperamental, we are such

22     people, but you cannot find it anywhere.  So this would be my answer to

23     your long question.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Let's turn to P01479, page 131.

25        Q.   I want to look at two of the meetings which preceded the issuance

Page 43827

 1     of directive 4.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 19 what is missing:  [In

 5     English] But you cannot find it anywhere to be part of policy.

 6             [No interpretation].

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   This is a military political consultation meeting held on the

10     2nd of September, 1992, with a briefing by the commanders of the corps,

11     various corps.  And as we go through the document, page 132, we see

12     the -- one of the corps commanders talking about weaponry, a briefing by

13     the 2nd Krajina Corps on page 134; the Eastern Bosnia Corps on 135; the

14     Herzegovina Corps on 136.  And beginning on page 140, you speak.  And

15     first you express a concern with criticism of the SDS, what you call the

16     movement which brought people together.  And then you go on at page 143

17     to explain:

18             "Our aim is to divide with the Muslims.  If the Muslims were to

19     capitulate, we would remain with them.  If they remained with us, they

20     would soon be the majority."

21             And then on the next page, once again, you remind the military

22     figures, the VRS, the corps commanders in this case and General Mladic,

23     of the strategic aims:

24             Number 1, "dividing with the Croats and Muslims."

25             Number 2, "the corridor."

Page 43828

 1             Number 3, "Sarajevo divided."

 2             Number 4, and these are now out of order, "Serbs in the Drina

 3     Valley."

 4             "5, border on the Neretva and exit to the sea."

 5             So once again in the context of a military meeting at which the

 6     corps commanders were explaining the situation in their sectors, you took

 7     it upon yourself to again remind them of the strategic objectives;

 8     correct?

 9        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, it would be good if that were so because I recall

10     that we didn't need to go to take Tuzla, Gradacac or Bugojno or

11     territories --

12        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, sorry, I don't want the explanation why you would

13     or wouldn't have, according to you.  I want to know if you dispute this

14     entry and say you didn't describe the strategic -- annunciate the

15     strategic objectives to the military on September 2nd, or if you confirm

16     that you did?

17        A.   I don't know, but I believe I did.  I don't know that now, but I

18     believe I did.  And I don't think it's anything bad nor did I divulge a

19     secret.  Everyone knew that because the strategic objectives were public,

20     public knowledge.  Each soldier knew it because it was publicly announced

21     and given to the international community, those objectives.  I don't see

22     why I wouldn't say:  Those are the objectives, don't do the other things.

23     They wanted to take the towns which were not ours.  Those were the

24     objectives and not this other thing.  Republika Srpska, it needs to be

25     divided, the corridor, these were all the objectives that we had a right

Page 43829

 1     to, so I don't see why I wouldn't say that at a meeting.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Turning quickly to 65 ter 06305, English pages 37

 3     through 41 and B/C/S 33 through 37.  This is an extract of the war diary

 4     from General Simic from August 1992 to December 1995.  And his entry for

 5     the same date.  If we could continue through the document.  Next page,

 6     please.  Sorry, if we could see the -- I know it's difficult to show

 7     both, but the entirety of the page in English.

 8        Q.   There we see reflections of the same information reflected in

 9     General Mladic's diary.  Your expression of concern about criticism of

10     the SDS and your defence of the SDS, and then your annunciation of the

11     strategic goals.  So at this meeting with the military on September 2nd,

12     Mr. Krajisnik, it's clear that, once again, the Bosnian Serb leadership,

13     this time through you, reminded the military of the goals?

14        A.   I'm really trying to understand your question.  The strategic

15     objectives were used a hundred times during the war because that was a

16     public document, our political platform for negotiations with foreigners.

17     And on this occasion I know precisely there was a heated discussion

18     between the civilians, the civilian leadership, so to speak, and the

19     army, where they criticised the Serbian Democratic Party and local

20     municipal authorities and they had a hundred objectives and complaints

21     against the civilians.  And they requested that some -- their plans about

22     the division of Bosnia down the valley of Usora River should be applied,

23     like half of Bosnia would be Serbian and half Croatian, and Tuzla should

24     belong to Serbs.  And then we said:  Look, wait, the strategic objectives

25     that we have are that all three sides have the right to this Bosnia.

Page 43830

 1     Bosnia is not only Serbian.  And the army wanted -- it says here the

 2     alliance of communist movement for Yugoslavia.  These were the communists

 3     who idealised the situation and wanted to establish a new Yugoslavia

 4     which was completely unrealistic.

 5             So whatever I said was I recall their megalomaniac objectives so

 6     this would be put into perspective and that they would pursue the policy,

 7     which they didn't want to.  Instead they were criticising the policy and

 8     believed that the army should resolve everything in the way that it saw

 9     fit.  That was the objective, rather than the objective was:  Gentlemen,

10     here are the war objectives, go into the war and take the Muslim

11     territories.  Each strategic objective was our right.  To what in

12     accordance to the agreement with Cutileiro and everybody else, we --

13        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, you don't need to explain each time.  I want to

14     turn to a meeting of November 8th, this is yet another meeting that took

15     place before the issuance of directive 4.

16             MR. TIEGER:  That's found at P1481 beginning at page 141.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. Tieger, are you minded to tender that

18     portion --

19             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, thank you, Mr. Robinson.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  We don't object to pages 37 through 40 which is

21     that particular meeting.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6518, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Did General Simic testify in this case?

25             MR. TIEGER:  No.

Page 43831

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, he died.  We would

 2     have liked to apply 92 quater but we didn't ask for that.

 3             MR. TIEGER:

 4        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, this is a meeting of the 8th of November with the

 5     corps commanders, and as we can see, the various corps commanders

 6     submitted their reports first.  So it's a very exacting military

 7     briefing.  First General Talic, the commander of the 1 KK; then

 8     Colonel Boric, the commander of the 2nd Krajina Corps; Colonel Lisica,

 9     commander of the Doboj Operations Group; Colonel Simic, commander of the

10     Eastern Bosnia Corps; Colonel Zivanovic, commander of the Drina Corps,

11     and so on.  And at page 145, Dr. Karadzic states that:

12             "The army and our courageous officers contributed enormously to

13     the results that we have achieved to date."

14             We notice -- next page, he notes at page 146 that there is some

15     political concern about operations.  The West finds the fall of towns

16     frightening, but then notes:

17             "Maybe it would be good if we solved:

18             "The issue of the Drina."

19             And then you speak, Mr. Krajisnik, and you say:

20             "I admire the military successes.

21             "It is very dangerous to seize their territories.

22             "The Drina and the Neretva ..."

23             And then you state that:

24             "We," meaning the Bosnian Serbs, the political and military

25     authorities, "have a disproportionate engagement of the army in relation

Page 43832

 1     to the strategic objectives."

 2             And as it notes in the other page, you state:

 3             "We have not achieved:

 4             "The Neretva, the sea, and the Podrinje area."

 5             But note that:

 6             "We have achieved:

 7             "The corridor and separation with the Muslims."

 8             And you continue that:

 9             "The most pressing thing is to mop up Orasje and then to solve

10     the problem of the Podrinje area and the Neretva River Valley as soon as

11     possible.

12             "The Muslims must not stay with us and they should not be given

13     any kind of autonomy.

14             "The most important objective is the task assigned to

15     Zivanovic - the ciscenje of the Drina.

16             "The most important task is separation from the Muslims."

17        A.   Can you just go back to the page before that, the previous page,

18     and then could we go back to this one.  Please, just the Serbian version.

19     This is a confirmation of what I said a moment ago.

20             "It is very dangerous to take their territories."

21             And then I said the Drina and the Neretva, it's probably our

22     strategic objective.  I'm saying that:

23             "We have this disproportionate engagement of the army in relation

24     to the strategic objectives."

25             Can we now go back to the previous page, or rather, the next

Page 43833

 1     page.

 2             Here also:

 3             "Separation with the Muslims," all right.

 4             "The most important objective is," I saw that somewhere, is to

 5     end the war as far as I can remember.  It says so somewhere.  Ah, yes,

 6     "we must bring the war to an end."  That is probably what the situation

 7     was.  It is not written there.  Soldiers presented different proposals

 8     and I mentioned some; that is to say, Tuzla should be in

 9     Republika Srpska.  You saw a moment ago Gradacac, Bugojno, and so on.  I

10     said there:  Gentlemen, there are political objectives.  You cannot take

11     something that is our policy and ours.  The war should be brought to an

12     end as soon as possible.  It was not my opinion; it was the opinion of

13     the political leadership.

14             And what is mentioned here, separation, all the time, separation

15     is the establishment of our own constituent unit.  And our objective was

16     the following:  If we could not remain in Yugoslavia, if somebody kicked

17     us out, then we reached this compromise with the international community.

18     You will get your constituent unit within Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And

19     national homogenisation should be applied or, rather, the ethnic key to

20     establish your constituent unit.  So that is the basic objective, a

21     replacement for Yugoslavia.  We lost our state and got our constituent

22     unit.  That's what I'm highlighting here.

23             I don't know how he interpreted this and how he refers to it, but

24     I recognise that those are exactly the traces, or rather, the paths as

25     set by the political leadership in the war, to reach peace as soon as

Page 43834

 1     possible even by conceding territory, but not by taking the territory of

 2     others.

 3             The large territory that was liberated by our army, and that is

 4     5 or 6 per cent more than we had, according to the land register, that

 5     created problems during the negotiations.  That's a problem when you have

 6     too much territory, you cannot chart a proper map, you cannot reach

 7     agreement, and you don't know which territory should be returned.

 8     Everybody at local level wants to have other territories returned, not

 9     theirs, so that was a disadvantage for us rather than an advantage.  Of

10     course it's not an advantage to have a very small territory like at the

11     very end, but 70 per cent of the territory was a problem for us.  It had

12     to be reduced to 49 per cent and that is difficult.

13        Q.   And so in order to reduce the territory, according to you, you

14     said:  Here's what we've achieved so far, the corridor, that was achieved

15     by the military, right, Operation Corridor?  That was a military

16     achievement, wasn't it?

17        A.   I've already said that we had agreed with the Croats on how this

18     could be resolved politically.  Of course, when it is not possible to

19     resolve it politically and people were dying there because there was a

20     humanitarian disaster, then the military made a corridor there, very

21     small, 3 kilometres, no more, so that a truck could pass through.  Didn't

22     take Orasje, didn't take Gradacac, didn't take a larger territory,

23     although they did leave part of Serb territory on their side.  So this

24     was a humanitarian necessity, the army had to take that.  There didn't

25     have to be a task involved.  If 12 babies died at a maternity ward, of

Page 43835

 1     course people felt:  Yes, we should all break through this corridor so

 2     that we could have humanitarian aid provided.  Also, the Neretva, we did

 3     not manage to achieve that.  Our army was on the Neretva river when the

 4     JNA was there, when they were leaving.  But, quite simply, they withdrew

 5     from an area that was ours.

 6        Q.   Three of the strategic objectives that hadn't been achieved by

 7     that date were the Neretva, access to the sea, and the Podrinje area.

 8     You pointed out the disproportionate allocation of military resources to

 9     the overall strategic objectives and said:  Right now the most important

10     task -- the most important objective is the task assigned to Zivanovic,

11     the commander of the Drina Corps, and that is the "ciscenje" of the

12     Drina, and that objective was reflected in directive 4 which was issued

13     on November 19th.  That's what happened.

14        A.   My participation in the discussion had nothing to do with the

15     directive.  I did not know what kind of directive had been made and I did

16     not quote these directives.  I just said at that meeting -- I remember

17     that meeting very well.  The situation was tense at that meeting between

18     the civilian and the military representatives.  They had different ideas

19     of their own as to what should be done.  I was just trying to channel

20     things and to say what our political objective was, and the objective was

21     not to cleanse the Drina.  Of course, there were a lot of hostilities

22     there and a lot of blood was shed on both sides.  So I was just saying

23     what the strategic was and that was the corridor.

24             You saw our map, corridor, contiguous territory, and the enclaves

25     should remain in the eastern part of Republika Srpska, of course, in the

Page 43836

 1     western part, Serb ethnic territory should remain.  So we did lose that

 2     afterwards, so we ultimately, in the final solution, got things that did

 3     not involve a majority Serb population and we lost others that -- where

 4     Serbs were not the majority population, but that was not our objective

 5     throughout the war.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These last lines, it seems that we

 9     lost what was ours and we got what was ours.  The witness said that we

10     lost something that had been purely Serb and we got something where the

11     Serbs were not a majority.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

13             Shall we continue tomorrow, Mr. Tieger?

14             MR. TIEGER:  Of course, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Hearing is adjourned.

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 20th day of

18                           November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.