Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 45428

 1                           Thursday, 16 January 2014

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 6             I wish everyone a very good -- a very happy and healthy new year.

 7             The Chamber has a number of pending matters it wishes to deal

 8     with orally before starting with the testimony of the witnesses scheduled

 9     for today.

10             The Chamber would first note that the Tribunal shall be closed

11     for operations on the 24th and 25th of March due to the holding of the

12     Nuclear Security Summit at the World Forum.  While the Chamber expects

13     the Defence case to be completed by then, in the event that it is not,

14     any hearing scheduled for these two days would have to be rescheduled.

15             Next, On the 14th of January, 2014, the Chamber was notified of

16     an e-mail of the same day sent to its legal staff by the accused's legal

17     advisor communicating a request from Predrag Banovic, a prospective

18     witness to be called by the Defence at the end of January, for the

19     assignment of counsel for the purposes of his testimony at the Tribunal.

20             The Prosecution indicated via e-mail of the same day that it did

21     not wish to respond.  The Chamber has considered Article 5 of the

22     directive on the assignment of counsel, which provides for the assignment

23     of counsel to three categories of individuals:  i.e., suspects, accused

24     persons, and any persons detained under the authority of the Tribunal.

25     Banovic was released in 2008 and is therefore no longer covered by

Page 45429

 1     Article 5 of the directive.  The Chamber sees no exceptional

 2     circumstances warranting that the Chamber order the Registrar to assign

 3     counsel to Banovic for the purpose of his testimony in these proceedings.

 4             The Chamber now turns to the accused's motion for advance notice

 5     of questions to be posed to Colonel Ljubisa Beara filed on the

 6     23rd of December, 2013 wherein the accused requests that the Chamber

 7     order the Prosecution, pursuant to Rule 54 and 73, to provide advance

 8     written notice of the questions it intends to put to Ljubisa Beara during

 9     its cross-examination scheduled for 22nd January of 2014.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  The accused submits that the given Bera's special

12     circumstances as an appellant in Tribunal proceedings, who is being

13     subpoenaed to testify in this case, this would serve to ensure that his

14     rights are safe-guarded.  The Prosecution responded on the

15     7th of January, 2014, opposing the motion.  The Prosecution contends that

16     the motion amounts to a subversion of the truth-seeking process, has no

17     basis in the Rules, and would be inconsistent with the practice applied

18     in this trial.

19             During cross-examination, Bera will be assisted by counsel who is

20     fully acquainted of the charges against Beara and his case on appeal.  As

21     he did during examination-in-chief, counsel for Beara will be in a

22     position to object if it deems that a particular question put to Beara

23     may incriminate him.  As it did on direct, the Chamber will consider that

24     objection and render its ruling.  The Chamber, therefore, sees no reason

25     to grant the motion and request that the Prosecution submit its questions

Page 45430

 1     in advance of testimony.  The Chamber also recalls that now that Beara's

 2     testimony has started and he has taken the oath, he may no longer discuss

 3     the contents of his testimony with anyone.  He would therefore not be in

 4     position to consult his counsel on the substance of the questions

 5     communicated by the Prosecution which would consequently not serve the

 6     purpose put forth by the accused.

 7             The motion is therefore denied.

 8             The Chamber will now turn to the accused's request for order to

 9     commander of the UN Detention Unit filed on the 8th of January, 2014, in

10     which the accused requests that the Chamber direct the UNDU commander to

11     provide a report on the behaviour of the accused since his arrival at the

12     UNDU at 2008.  The UNDU commander has previously informed the accused

13     that he would not provide such a report unless ordered by the Chamber.

14     On the 9th of January, 2014, the Prosecution indicated via e-mail that it

15     did not wish to respond to the request.  Given that the accused intends

16     to use this report for the purpose of sentencing submissions, the Chamber

17     hereby grants the request and orders that the UNDU commander provide the

18     accused with a report of his behaviour since his arrival at the UNDU in

19     2008 as soon as practicable, and in any event, by no later than

20     28th of February, 2014.

21             Finally, the Chamber would like to receive expedited responses to

22     motions related to Mladic's testimony in this case.  First, both the

23     accused and the Prosecution should respond to Mladic's urgent motion for

24     reconsideration of decisions -- decision on motion for certification to

25     appeal filed on the 14th of January, 2014, before Friday, 17th January,

Page 45431

 1     close of business.

 2             And, second, the accused should respond to the urgent Prosecution

 3     motion for reconsideration of decision on Mladic request for

 4     certification to appeal subpoena decision filed on the

 5     15th of January 2014, also no later than Friday, 17 January, close of

 6     business.

 7             That said, unless there's anything further, we'll bring in the

 8     next witness.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, while we bring in the witness, I

10     can just advise the Chamber that this morning we did file our responses

11     to those two motions concerning General Mladic.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13                           [The witness entered court]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

16     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

17                           WITNESS:  VINKO NIKOLIC

18                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Nikolic.  Please be seated and make

20     yourself comfortable.

21             Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Nikolic, I must draw your

22     attention to a certain Rule of evidence that we have here at the

23     international Tribunal.  That is, Rule 90(E).  Under this Rule, you may

24     object to answering any questions from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor, or

25     even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate

Page 45432

 1     you in a criminal offence.  In this context, incriminate means saying

 2     something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal

 3     offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might

 4     have committed a criminal offence.  However, should you think that an

 5     answer might incriminate you and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer

 6     the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

 7     compel you to answer the question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal

 8     would ensure that your testimony compelled under such circumstances would

 9     not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence

10     save and except the offence of giving false testimony.

11             Do you understand that, sir?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

16     Your Excellencies.  Good morning to all.

17                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Nikolic.  And I would like to

19     wish everyone a happy new year, and season's greetings.

20        A.   Thank you.

21        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, did you give a statement to my Defence team?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Please, let us pause between my questions and your answers so

24     that we would have a proper transcript.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please call up in e-court

Page 45433

 1     1D09650.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Please, take a look on the left-hand side of the screen.  Can you

 4     see that statement of yours?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Have you read and signed this statement?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the last page please be

10     displayed with Mr. Nikolic's signature.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Is that your signature?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Thank you.  This statement, does it faithfully reflect what you

15     said to the Defence team, exactly as you had put it?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today,

18     would your answers basically be the same as those contained in this

19     statement?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this Rule --

23     this statement into evidence according to Rule 92 ter.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objection, Ms. McKenna?

25             MS. McKENNA:  No objection, Your Honour.  Although the

Page 45434

 1     Prosecution does note that this statement contains multiple leading

 2     questions; for example, questions 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 24.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll receive it.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D4214, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Now I'm going to read

 7     out in the English language a brief summary of Mr. Vinko Nikolic's

 8     statement.

 9             [In English] Vinko Nikolic lived in Sanski Most when the war

10     broke out in BH.  For a time he was a member of the Sanski Most

11     Crisis Staff.

12             Before the beginning of the war, the Muslims were arming

13     themselves especially in those villages where they formed a majority of

14     the population.  The first incident in Sanski Most was the killing of a

15     Serb, Predrag Dobrijevic, a member of the 6th Sana Brigade.  The next

16     incident was at the check-point set up by Muslim residents of the village

17     of Trnova.  The Muslim extremists stopped two civilian policemen who were

18     on regular patrol and disarmed them.

19             The crisis in Sanski Most arose primarily because of the breakup

20     of the former SFRY.  After the breakup of the SFRY and the secession of

21     Slovenia and Croatia, some of the young, demobilised soldiers and columns

22     of soldiers, the JNA vehicles passed through the municipality of

23     Sanski Most.  They did not provoke anyone, as they passed through without

24     weapons, but these innocent soldiers were still called Chetnik murders

25     and other insulting names.

Page 45435

 1             In order to preserve the peace and avert the conflict, the

 2     representatives of the Serbian authorities offered a division of the

 3     municipality of Sanski Most into two parts, two municipalities.  The

 4     Muslims did not accept the offer and instead opted for the conflict and

 5     war.  The Serbian political leadership and the leadership of the

 6     Sanski Most public security station offered the all Muslim and Croatian

 7     professional policemen a chance to remain in the police force.  Only one

 8     policeman of Croatian ethnicity accepted while all the others tried to

 9     set up a Muslim police station in the Sanski Most municipality, occupying

10     the Sanski Most municipality building.  Since they ignored the ultimatum

11     to leave the building and surrender their weapons, the Serbian police

12     disarmed them and liberated the building.

13             Since the Muslim side did not accept the proposal for a peaceful

14     solution to the crisis and clearly wanted complete control over

15     Sanski Most, there were major incidents that night caused by individuals

16     and groups.  These people used this period of chaos for their own ends.

17             On 25th of March 1992, the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most

18     was proclaimed, but all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, were

19     allowed to remain in their jobs if they respected the constitution of the

20     Republika Srpska BH.  From 1992 to 1995, more than 8.000 Muslims

21     continued to live in Sanski Most municipality.

22             After the first incidents and as the situation deteriorated, most

23     of the Muslim population, probably on the instruction of their own

24     political party, moved out their families along before -- before

25     March 1992.  Before the fighting started, some of the Muslim families

Page 45436

 1     sent their children to places in BH which had Muslim majority, or to

 2     Croatia or Slovenia.

 3             When people decided voluntarily to leave, the Red Cross and the

 4     Civilian Protection had an obligation to help them to do that.  They

 5     secured the convoys and tried to ensure that there were no incidents.

 6     The Sanski Most Crisis Staff issued an order that all property was to be

 7     looked after and temporarily allocated as needed to the Serbian refugees.

 8             Anyone who had broken the law, possessed weapons, threatened the

 9     safety of citizens and did not respect the Republika Srpska constitution

10     had no right to work in the municipality.  These people had to answer for

11     their actions and their proceedings, and taking of statements was mainly

12     done by members of the civilian and military police.  The investigation

13     centres were used to question them.  The officials of the military and

14     civilian police forces performed their duties in the best possible

15     professional manner.  No one was allowed to mistreat or beat the people

16     from whom the statements were taken.  On one occasion, a policeman was

17     caught mistreating a Muslim and immediately removed from the

18     investigation duty.

19             The political leadership tried to protect all civilians of

20     Sanski Most who had not broken the constitution or the laws.  The

21     civilian authorities, the civilian police and the army did not plan,

22     instigate, or order the permanent removal of the Bosnian Muslims from the

23     area, as it is shown by the large number of -- who continued to live in

24     Sanski Most right up until 1995.

25             And that is the summary of statement.  And at that moment, I do

Page 45437

 1     not have additional questions for Mr. Nikolic.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             Mr. Nikolic, as you have noted, your evidence in-chief in this

 4     case has been admitted in writing.  That is, through your written

 5     statement.  And now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the

 6     Office of the Prosecutor.

 7             Do you understand that?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand that.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. McKenna.

10             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you, Your Honour.

11                           Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:

12        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, in your statement, you explain that you were for a

13     time a member of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff and you were also a member

14     of the SOS, or the Serbian Defence Forces.  I'd just like to clarify

15     various roles.

16             So it's true, isn't it, that you were a member of the

17     Crisis Staff from its creation on the 14th of April, 1992?

18        A.   Yes.

19             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see P3329.

20        Q.   Now, Mr. Nikolic, while this is coming up this is the diary of

21     Nedjeljko Rasula, who you will recall was the Crisis Staff president.

22     That's correct, isn't it?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And do you recall that on the 14th of April, an extended session

25     of the Municipal Board of the SDS was held in the Serbian Orthodox

Page 45438

 1     church?

 2        A.   No, I don't remember that.

 3        Q.   Just look at notes of this meeting.

 4             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see page 11 of the English and page

 5     10 of the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   This may refresh your recollection.  And I'm interested in the

 7     section which states:

 8             "Course of action in taking over power and establishing the

 9     Serbian municipality of Sanski Most?"

10             And a little further down it says:

11             "14 April 1992 a session of the Municipal Board of the

12     Serbian Democratic Party with increased attendance was held and the

13     following decided..."

14             MS. McKENNA:  And if we could move to the next page in the

15     English, please.

16        Q.   If we look at item 4 it states:

17             "The Crisis Staff, consisting of the following members, shall be

18     in charge of all actions?"

19             And the last name in this list of members is Zvonko Nikolic.  Now

20     that should be a reference to you Vinko Nikolic; isn't that correct?

21        A.   Yes, I'm Vinko Nikolic.

22        Q.   This reference -- just to be clear, this reference in

23     Mr. Rasula's diary relates to you, Vinko Nikolic?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Now, at this meeting, you were appointed as the SOS

Page 45439

 1     representative on the Crisis Staff, weren't you?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And then at a later meeting, on the 30th of May, 1992, you were

 4     formally appointed a Crisis Staff member, and you were the member of the

 5     Crisis Staff in charge of vehicles.  That's correct, isn't it?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And then as of 18th of June, you were no longer a permanent

 8     member of the Crisis Staff but, rather, you were appointed a commissioner

 9     for transport.  That's correct, isn't it?

10        A.   No.

11             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see P3666.

12        Q.   And, Mr. Nikolic, you'll see that these are the conclusions from

13     the Crisis Staff meeting of 18th of June, and it states that the -- it

14     lists the permanent members of the Crisis Staff, beginning with

15     Mladen Lukic, and then it lists the commissioners of the Crisis Staff.

16     And at number 3, you'll see your name, Vinko Nikolic, commission for

17     transport.

18             So does that refresh your recollection?  You were appointed the

19     commissioner for transport?

20        A.   No.  Because sometime around the 1st of June, I belonged to the

21     6th Sana Brigade, and I was on the front line that entire month, together

22     with other SOS members.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And we'll come back to your activities during that

24     period.

25             But just as a preliminary, the SOS worked together with the

Page 45440

 1     Sanski Most Crisis Staff.  That's true, isn't it?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And prior to its subordination to the VRS, the SOS acted on

 4     Crisis Staff instructions?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   Well, the SOS worked together with the Crisis Staff in the

 7     implementation of republic level and ARK level instructions from the SDS.

 8     That's the truth, isn't it?

 9        A.   Yes.

10             MS. McKENNA:  And could we please see P3397.

11        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, this is a report on the work and the activities of

12     the SOS acting as intervention platoon within the 6th Krajina Brigade

13     between the 1st of May and the 6th of September, 1992.

14             Do you recognise this document?

15        A.   No, I've not seen it before.

16             MS. McKENNA:  Could we go to the signature page, please, of this

17     document.  It's the last page in both versions.  And if we could focus on

18     the signatures in the B/C/S, please.

19        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, do you recognise these signatures?

20        A.   Yes.  But this document was issued by the SOS, not by the

21     6th Sana Brigade.  It is not a report by the 6th Sana Brigade but,

22     rather, by the SOS.

23        Q.   Thank you for that clarification.  And can you -- can you read

24     out the signatures of this document?

25        A.   Dusan Savic, who was the commander of the SOS, that's one

Page 45441

 1     signature; my signature; and also Cankovic's signature.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MS. McKENNA:  And at this stage, I'm interested in a passage at

 4     page 3 of the document in both the B/C/S and the English versions.

 5             And it's the third paragraph down in the English and at the very

 6     bottom of the page in the B/C/S, and it states:

 7             "Remember the meeting we had on the premises of the Serbian

 8     Orthodox church where we particularly warned about the slow

 9     implementation of the conclusions reached by the Bosnia-Herzegovina SDS

10     and the Bosnian Krajina..."

11        Q.   So my question, Mr. Nikolic, is:  This is an example of the SDS

12     or, excuse me, the SOS encouraging the implementation of the conclusions

13     reached by the republic level SDS and the ARK level SDS, as you've

14     previously acknowledged?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Now I'd like to turn to the events of the 19th of April and their

17     aftermath.  In your response to question 9, you discuss how the Serbian

18     police force and the TO liberated the Sanski Most Municipal Assembly

19     building and in your response to question 29 you state that the

20     6th Krajina Brigade was not involved until the early hours of the

21     morning.

22             You will agree, will you, Mr. Nikolic, that this was a

23     significant military operation involving a large show of strength between

24     or -- or by the Serb TO, the SOS, and the JNA in and around Sanski Most

25     town?

Page 45442

 1        A.   No.  The JNA did not participate in the action to liberate the

 2     municipality.

 3        Q.   However, the JNA assisted you in the immediate aftermath of

 4     that -- of that operation.

 5        A.   Yes.  The JNA arrived and took over the facility and secured it.

 6     They did everything to prevent chaos that night.

 7        Q.   Well, you said -- and that reflects what you said in your

 8     statement in your answer to your question 15 where you say that

 9     General Talic visited Sanski Most to see for himself the security

10     situation and to try and prevent conflict and to save all of Sanski Most

11     citizens.

12             Now, General Talic visited Sanski Most the day after the

13     take-over on the 20th of April, didn't he?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And he met with SDA and HDZ representatives.  Were you present at

16     that meeting?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Well, Mr. Nikolic, there's evidence before the Trial Chamber that

19     at that meeting, General Talic told the Muslims not to ask for help or

20     otherwise they would have another Kupres, Bosanski Brod or Vukovar.

21             Now, this kind of threat to the Muslims and the Croats doesn't

22     suggest a desire on General Talic's part to protect all the citizens of

23     Sanski Most, does it?

24        A.   I don't know what General Talic said to the Muslims, but I know

25     that an order was issued to the effect that the situation had to be at

Page 45443

 1     peace at all costs in order to avoid any further skirmishes or fire being

 2     opened, or things like that.

 3        Q.   Well, we'll come on to the skirmishes, but during this -- well,

 4     you state in question 10 that after the liberation of the municipality

 5     building, this period of chaos ensued in which roads were blocked and

 6     telephone lines were down.  Do you agree, however, that the Sanski Most

 7     authorities continued to be in contact with the ARK authorities and the

 8     republic level authorities?

 9        A.   I suppose so, probably.

10        Q.   Now, you also state that in this period of chaos there was

11     looting, burning of houses, and other chaos before the authorities got

12     the situation under control.  Now, we'll come back to the burning of

13     houses and the destruction of buildings.  But it's true, isn't it, that

14     stealing was -- or looting, rather, was not the only stealing of goods

15     that was taking place, but there were also check-points set up by the

16     military police and the SOS confiscated goods and vehicles at these

17     check-point, didn't they?

18        A.   The military police did set up check-points but the SOS could not

19     confiscate anything.  We didn't have that much power.

20        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, you personally were responsible for the

21     appropriation of trucks and other vehicles from a company called

22     Agrokomerc, which was headquartered in the Muslim controlled area of

23     Velika Kladusa; isn't that correct?

24        A.   No.  Those trucks were stopped by the Territorial Defence on the

25     highway that by-passed Sanski Most.  An order from the Crisis Staff was

Page 45444

 1     to place those trucks in a safe place which is why I received that order,

 2     and we placed the trucks at the stadium of the Podumic [phoen] football

 3     team, only a fence separated from the police station.  That's where they

 4     were safe, and that's how we prevented the stealing of the goods that

 5     were on the trucks or the fuel that was in them.

 6        Q.   Let's look at a document relating to these trucks.  That's

 7     65 ter 25825.

 8             You'll see that this is a letter from the Sanski Most SJB chief,

 9     Mirko Vrucinic, to the president of the municipality enclosing a report

10     on the condition of the trucks seized from Agrokomerc.

11             MS. McKENNA:  If we could go to page 2 in the English and the

12     B/C/S.

13        Q.   And the first paragraph states that a total of 29 vehicles were

14     seized as you've described.  And it states that at the beginning of the

15     war, these vehicles were used for the transport of Agrokomerc vehicles to

16     Zenica, Zavidovici, and Sarajevo.

17             MS. McKENNA:  Now if we could move to page 3 of the English and

18     the B/C/S.  At the bottom of the page in the English, it states that:

19             "When they were seized they were parked -- all vehicles were

20     parked in the grounds of the Sip which was put in charge of guarding them

21     following an order of the Crisis Staff.  Vinko Nikolic, a staff member,

22     was in charge of the vehicles on behalf of the Crisis Staff."

23        Q.   So I ask you again, you personally were responsible for the use

24     and the distribution of these vehicles that were seized on behalf of the

25     Crisis Staff?

Page 45445

 1        A.   Yes.

 2             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see page 4 in the English.  It's

 3     the same page on the B/C/S.

 4             And this discusses the distribution of these vehicles.  It states

 5     that it was established that during that time trailer trucks were given

 6     for use to the following entities and individuals.  And it goes on to

 7     list the 6th Brigade, a number of trucks, including two of the

 8     refrigerated trailers and one with a tarpaulin, the corps command or

 9     corps police, again, a truck with a refrigerated trailer, and the SOS

10     sabotage platoon, who was -- which was issued with a number of vehicles,

11     including one freight vehicle, with a semi-automatic gun mounted on top.

12        Q.   So it's true, isn't it, that you distributed these vehicles to

13     the 6th Brigade, to the military police, and to the SOS?

14        A.   Yes, on the order of the Crisis Staff.

15        Q.   Now, the truck with the semi-automatic gun mounted on it, this

16     was used by the SOS in mop-up operations in Sanski Most; that's correct,

17     isn't it?

18        A.   Only in the Vrhpolje and Hrustovo operations.

19        Q.   And some of the trucks that you appropriated were also used to

20     transport Muslims out of the municipality; that's correct, isn't it?

21        A.   Yes.  Since there were no other vehicles, we took the vehicles

22     that were more suitable to transport people to Manjaca than the old ones

23     that we had.

24             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honour, I'd like to tender this document.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

Page 45446

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6554, Your Honours.

 2             MS. McKENNA:

 3        Q.   Now moving to a different topic, Mr. Nikolic.  After -- in your

 4     response to question 12, you state that all citizens of Sanski Most,

 5     regardless of their ethnicity, were allowed to remain in their jobs if

 6     they respected the constitution of the Republika Srpska.  But it's true,

 7     isn't it, that even before the Serb take-over of the municipality

 8     non-Serbs were being removed from their jobs.  And, in fact, on the

 9     28th of February, the SOS, your group, together with the SDS president

10     Vlado Vrkic, forcibly removed the Croatian director of the SDK, that's

11     the public auditing service; that's true, isn't it?

12        A.   That was not forcibly.  That was pursuant to an agreement with

13     that lady who was a director.  She was getting on.  She was married to a

14     Serb.  And together with the president of the party, two or three of us

15     wanted to take the keys of the strongholds, and they were kept by the

16     three people who worked in the SDK.  We went to fetch those keys and to

17     bring them to the SDK building.

18             MS. McKENNA:  Could we see P3397 again.  And I'm interested this

19     time in page 4 of the English and page 5 of the B/C/S.

20        Q.   And if we look towards the second half of the last paragraph in

21     the English, and again it's towards the bottom of the page in the B/C/S

22     also.  It states in your document that you signed:

23             "We must also mention how we resolved a previous problem of the

24     SDK."

25             And it continues:

Page 45447

 1             "Despite Alija's police, they weren't all Alijas but that's what

 2     we now call them, so you Serbs won't hold it against me.  We, fellow

 3     Serbs, carried out a raid on the Sanski Most SDK, took away the keys from

 4     the stubborn Croatian woman-director who refused any form of co-operation

 5     or agreement, and continued according to plan."

 6             So it's not true, is it, as you've just told this Court that this

 7     was pursuant to the agreement of the Croatian director.  According to

 8     your own document, Mr. Nikolic, there was no agreement but, rather, you

 9     took over the SDK by force?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Interpretation.  We are having

11     problems with interpretation.  The word that was used was "attack" where

12     it should have been "a forcible entry," so I'm not sure about the -- the

13     interpretation.  Perhaps the word that should have been used is "raid" or

14     something.

15             [In English] Original, third line from the bottom of this

16     paragraph, "upad."

17             JUDGE KWON:  I take it the witness should have understood in

18     B/C/S correctly and then there should be no problem.

19             Can you answer the question?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can.

21             At that time, which was in the month of February, I believe, in

22     Sanski Most we had a joint police and joint authorities.  The commander

23     of the police was a Muslim.  We couldn't carry weapons without being

24     noticed by police officers of other ethnic groups and we could not stage

25     any raids without being reported.  We couldn't do anything of that kind

Page 45448

 1     by force.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But before we go further, Ms. McKenna, if you could

 3     ask the witness what this document was about.  This titled as -- entitled

 4     as report, but it sounds like a speech.

 5             Mr. Nikolic, can you help us?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was a report about the work of

 7     the SOS in the months of January and February, as far as I can

 8     understand.  And this was drafted by the SOS commander, the late

 9     Dusan Savic.

10             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honour, if you would like us to clarify as

11     we'll be referring to this document quite a bit, if we can go to the

12     first page, it's evident that it's a report on the activities of the SOS

13     between the 1st of May and the 16th of September, 1992.  And as the

14     witness has previously confirmed, it was signed by Dusan Savic himself

15     and Goran Cankovic, all three of whom were the members of the SOS.

16        Q.   Can you confirm that?

17        A.   Yes.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And this report starts with this:

19             "Fellow Serbs, patriots, gentlemen..."

20             It looks like an address in a public gathering.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  This is a form of address.

22     This is the usual form of address for this kind of document, and it

23     refers to anybody who is going to read it.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the transcript, line 17, I'm not

25     sure whether Madam McKenna said that that pertained to May 1991.  It's

Page 45449

 1     September 1992.  Either she omitted to say so or the transcript did not

 2     reflect her words.  This refers to a period starting with May 1991.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  From -- between May 1991 and September 1992.

 4             I leave it there.  Please continue, Ms. McKenna.

 5             MS. McKENNA:  I'm grateful, Your Honour.

 6        Q.   Let's turn to discuss the dismissals which took place after the

 7     events of 19th of April.

 8             MS. McKENNA:  And could we please see P3400.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, I'm sorry.

10             Take a look at the first paragraph here.  I'm not sure if it's

11     legible on your part.  The first paragraph, following, "Fellow Serbs,

12     patriots, gentlemen," the first paragraph says:

13             "You have chosen a bad time to argue and separate - do not look

14     for a culprit where there isn't one."

15             Who was "you" there?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, I can't see ...

17             JUDGE KWON:  Well, I'll leave it there again.

18             Please continue, Ms. McKenna.

19             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you.

20        Q.   We'll come back to this document, Mr. Nikolic, but I'd like it

21     look at another document, which is P3400.

22             And this, as you'll see are -- these are conclusions from a

23     meeting of the Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Sanski Most

24     held on the 24th of April, 1992.

25             At the bottom of the page, at number 8, it states:

Page 45450

 1             "Mladen Lukic, Vinko, and Boro are tasked with preparing the

 2     appointment of the acting director of the health centre in Sanski Most."

 3             Now, this Vinko, this is a reference to you, isn't it?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And this position had formerly been held by a Muslim; that's

 6     correct, isn't it?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And you and your colleagues filled this position -- filled it

 9     with a Serb within a matter of days; that's correct, isn't it?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   Now, let's look at another meeting, which is P3649.

12             These are conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff, the

13     meeting held on the 29th of April, 1992.  And the first conclusion is

14     that:

15             "Changes be made and all officials at the municipal court of the

16     Serbian municipality of Sanski Most be appointed as acting official

17     (Vrkes, Vrucinic and Nikolic are in charge of this)."

18             Again, this is a reference to you, isn't it?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Now there's evidence before the Trial Chamber that this resulted

21     in the replacement of all non-Serbs in the court, including

22     Judge Nedzad Muhic, Azra Ubegovic [phoen], and Adil Draganovic.  That's

23     true, isn't it, they were all replaced?

24        A.   We just replaced the president of the court, Mr. Draganovic.  And

25     he, because he was a member of the SDA party, was a nationalist,

Page 45451

 1     according to the evidence we had; whereas, the other judges probably left

 2     after he was dismissed from the service, of their own will.

 3        Q.   One of these judges who you claim left of their own will,

 4     Mr. Nikolic, Judge Nedzad Muhic, he was one of the victims who suffocated

 5     to death en route to Manjaca camp, one of those people who you term

 6     suspects.

 7             Were you aware of that?

 8        A.   I did not call him a suspect.  I said that only about the

 9     president of the court.

10        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, in your statement, when you're discussing the group

11     of people who suffocated to death en route to Manjaca camp, you said that

12     they were all suspects.  There's evidence before this Trial Chamber that

13     one of these people was Judge Nedzad Muhic, one of the judges that you

14     assisted in replacing with a Serb.  That's the truth, isn't it?

15        A.   It's true we replaced only the president of the court.  And as

16     far as Nedzad is concerned, it was probably the police, because the

17     police starts investigations of people who had weapons.  And they must

18     have accused him of that act.

19        Q.   Now these people who suffocated to death during their transport

20     to Manjaca, you say they suffocated due to the great heat and the lack of

21     oxygen.  That lack of oxygen was because they were being crammed into

22     trucks with no ventilation, wasn't it?

23        A.   Yes.  The trucks and the security were probably not ready for a

24     transport of that kind.

25        Q.   And these were the trucks that you had distributed?

Page 45452

 1        A.   Not only those trucks.  There were both buses and trucks in the

 2     transport.

 3        Q.   Trucks for which you were responsible as the member of the

 4     Crisis Staff responsible for vehicles; that's correct, isn't it?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Could you tell us the paragraph number of his

 7     statement wherein he stated about the suffocation.

 8             MS. McKENNA:  It is paragraph 23.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Probably I have an old version.  Please go --

10             MS. McKENNA:  Perhaps it's paragraph 21 in the old version.

11     There were a number of changes to the paragraph numbers.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah.  I -- thank you.

13             MS. McKENNA:

14        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, I'd like to turn our focus to the SOS operations.

15     Now, in response to question 28, you state that the SOS were not armed

16     until April 1992.

17             If we could go back to P3397, which is your report on the SOS

18     activities.

19             And I'd like to see pages 2 of the English and the B/C/S of this

20     report, please.

21             And it's the last paragraph in the B/C/S, and the fourth

22     paragraph down in the English.  And you're discussing in this report how

23     the SOS kept the peace from May 1991, and you continue:

24             "These young men, I'm thinking of the seven lads who tirelessly

25     brought weapons from various warehouses and points and armed the Serbian

Page 45453

 1     people, risking that the weapons fall into the hands of Ustashas and

 2     Green Berets ..."

 3             So, in fact, Mr. Nikolic, the truth is that the SOS helped arm

 4     the Serbian people in Sanski Most before the crisis -- before the

 5     conflict broke out?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And you talk -- excuse me.  You talk in your statement about the

 8     chaos in Sanski Most.  But it's true, isn't it, that the SOS was heavily

 9     involved in creating that chaos?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   It's true, isn't it, Mr. Nikolic, that the SOS blew up buildings

12     owned by Muslims and Croats in order to intimidate the non-Serb

13     population?

14        A.   That's not true.  That was done by people who had explosives.

15     And the only people who could have done that were the fighting men from

16     the 6th Sana Brigade who were coming there on leave.  Members of the SOS

17     were detained by the police several times, and it was never proven that

18     they had done that.

19        Q.   Let's look at the next page in the B/C/S and it's on the same

20     page in the English.  And it's in the second last paragraph in the

21     English.  And in the middle of the second paragraph in the B/C/S,

22     Mr. Nikolic, you state:

23             "Blowing up buildings was not in anyone's interest but we could

24     not crush the Ustasha and Green Berets any other way."

25             So it's true, isn't it, that the SOS was involved in the blowing

Page 45454

 1     up of buildings?

 2        A.   That's not right in that context.  It's different.  Because we

 3     were there to keep the peace to prevent chaos from breaking out.  And

 4     some individuals, taking advantage, probably did things like this.

 5        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, there's evidence before this Trial Chamber of SOS

 6     bombings of Muslim and Croat-owned buildings in 1991 and early 1992,

 7     including law offices and cafe bars.

 8             So it's not true that the SOS was there to keep the peace.  The

 9     SOS, the pre-war role of the SOS, was to create havoc, to raise tensions,

10     and to intimidate the non-Serb population of Sanski Most.  That's the

11     truth, isn't it?

12        A.   I don't agree with you.

13        Q.   Well, do you agree that the SOS assisted the SJB in taking

14     Muslims and Croats into custody?

15        A.   That was only in the time after the Serbian take-over in

16     Sanski Most.

17        Q.   All right.  Well, let's discuss that time.

18             In your response to question 30, you discuss the attacks on

19     Bosnian Muslim neighbourhoods and villages in the municipality,

20     including, in Mahala Hrustovo and Vrhpolje in which the SOS participated.

21     And I'd like to direct your attention to page 5 of the English and page 5

22     of the B/C/S of this document, please.

23             It's very at the bottom of this page in the B/C/S and continues

24     on to the next page, is a discussion of these operations that you mention

25     in paragraph -- or at -- you deal with in response to question 30.

Page 45455

 1             And the document states:

 2             "After that, one combat action followed another, mopping up in

 3     Trnova, Mahala, Hrustovo, Vrhpolje (twice) and Marini.  We caught seven

 4     extremist Ustashas, the corridor, 20 days, constant patrols around town."

 5             And you continue with a list of mopping up and clearing of the

 6     terrain of the last Ustasha and Green Berets?

 7             Now in response to question 28 you state that all -- from

 8     mid-May, all of the members of the SOS were placed under the command of

 9     the VRS.  It's correct, is it, that during these mopping-up operations

10     which we've just mentioned, the SOS was subordinated to the 6th Brigade?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And you state that the operations were not planned in advance,

13     and that during the attack on Mahala residents were evacuated to the

14     sports hall in order to avoid civilian casualties.  And that's in

15     response to question 30 and question 31.

16             In fact, Mr. Nikolic, there's evidence before the Trial Chamber

17     that these operations were part of a planned, co-ordinated effort to

18     attack those villages and neighbourhoods.  And in this regard, I'd like

19     to look at P3313.

20             And this, you'll see, is the order from TO commander

21     Nedeljko Anicic, and if you focus on number 4 which is -- item number 4

22     which is on page 2 of the B/C/S and at the bottom, and page 2 of the

23     English as well.  Anicic says:  "I have decided ..."

24             "After artillery preparations, disarm the settlements of Mahala,

25     Otoka, Muhici, Marija Bursac, the Omladinsko neighbourhood, Aladzica

Page 45456

 1     [phoen] neighbourhood, in co-ordination with the 6th Brigade units in

 2     order to cause the enemy great human materiel and technical losses."

 3             And two paragraphs down it says:

 4             "Stand by for attack at 0500 on 26 May."

 5             And if we could just skip to page 3 of the English and page 5 of

 6     the B/C/S.  At the top of the page in B/C/S and under heading 15 in the

 7     English at the bottom, it states:

 8             "Upon completion of the task, take the prisoners to the sports

 9     hall of the secondary school centre, and hand over the war booty to the

10     Sanski Most Serbian TO staff."

11             So, in fact, this operation was a planned, co-ordinated TO and

12     6th Brigade attack, the aim of which was to cause great human, materiel,

13     and technical losses.  And the plan was not to evacuate civilians to the

14     sports hall for their own safety, but rather to take the prisoners to the

15     sports hall.

16             That's the truth, isn't it?

17        A.   No.  Since the Muslim part of Sanski Most was armed and since the

18     Green Berets had been observed in that part of Sanski Most, most probably

19     the decision was taken to address to them an ultimatum and appeal to them

20     to surrender their weapons.  I believe that within 24 hours an appeal was

21     made to surrender weapons and for these people who had been training

22     those units to surrender themselves.  However, when weapons were being

23     turned over, most of the civilians of their own will left that area and

24     we put them up at the gym, and some crossed the river Sana and found

25     shelter with their families.

Page 45457

 1        Q.   Let's look at another document relating to this operation.

 2     That's P3928.

 3             I'd like you to look at the third paragraph down, and it states:

 4             "On 25th May, 1992, this 'disarming' was followed by a military

 5     action (attack) against the downtown neighbourhood of Mahala, which

 6     resulted in the capture of 2.000 civilians, but no significant amount of

 7     weapons have been found because they had been concealed earlier."

 8             So in the attack on Mahala, contrary to what you've just stated,

 9     no significant amount of weapons were found, and yet, despite this fact,

10     2.000 civilians were taken into custody.

11             So, again, contrary to your contention, these citizens or

12     civilians were not evacuated in order to avoid casualty.  They were,

13     according to this document, captured.

14        A.   I'm not saying that all the civilians came out in time to the gym

15     and the right bank of the river.  It's a settlement with a population of

16     several thousands.

17             As for the weapons, the extreme men escaped to Vrhpolje village,

18     taking their weapons with them.  But we found out about that later, when

19     the operation Vrhpolje and Hrustovo began.

20        Q.   Let's be clear about what happened in the operation at Mahala,

21     Mr. Nikolic.  There's evidence before this Trial Chamber that there was

22     no organised resistance in Mahala, that Serb soldiers forced Mahala

23     residents to gather in a field, Mahala was then shelled, and civilians,

24     including those who were too weak or infirm to move, were wounded and

25     were killed, and then following that shelling, houses were looted and

Page 45458

 1     burnt down.

 2             That's the truth of what happened in Mahala, isn't it?

 3        A.   No.  As far as I know, there couldn't have been any use of large

 4     calibres because this was the centre of the town.  Hand-held launchers

 5     and other infantry weapons were used.

 6        Q.   In your statement, you contend that there was no killing of

 7     civilians in the villages.  That's in response to question 32.  I'd like

 8     to look at P3635 --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Before we move away from this document, does this

10     document itself refers to 2.000 civilians captured?

11             MS. McKENNA:  Yes, Your Honour.  It's in the third paragraph.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Oh yes, yes, yes.  Thank you.

13             Please continue.

14             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you.

15        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, this is a diary of another fellow Crisis Staff

16     member, Nenad Davidovic.  I'd like to look at page 29 of the English and

17     the B/C/S, which is, as you will see in a moment, a record of the

18     Crisis Staff meeting of the 30th of May.

19             Now, on the 30th of May, you were still -- that was the day you

20     were formally appointed to the Crisis Staff, so you would have attended

21     this Crisis Staff meeting; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And let's see what Mr. Davidovic noted.  He -- under 2, it

24     states:

25             "Speeding up restoration in that Mahala, Otoka, and Muhici."

Page 45459

 1             A few bullet points down it states:

 2             "Collect all bodies in a single place.  Exclude those who talk

 3     too much?"

 4             I'd like to turn to the next page, which is continued notes of

 5     this meeting.

 6             It states:

 7             "They will come for the bodies at 0900.

 8             "The Betonirka for identification.

 9             "Discusses measures of pest control.

10             "Nylon cover on the ground."

11             And then it states:

12             "There is a possibility of dressing them in our uniforms."

13             Now, this, Mr. Nikolic, was the Crisis Staff's attempt to cover

14     up the killing of unarmed civilians by making them look like military

15     personnel; that's correct, isn't it.

16        A.   No.

17        Q.   Well, staying with the topic of killing of unarmed civilians,

18     you've discussed how the SOS was involved in mopping-up operations in

19     Hrustovo and Vrhpolje while it was subordinated to the 6th Brigade.

20             There is evidence before the Trial Chamber that in Hrustovo, on

21     the 31st of May -- 1st of May, in a co-ordinated attack by the

22     6th Brigade and local paramilitary formations, multiple civilians were

23     killed, including unarmed women and children who were taking shelter in a

24     garage.  And in Vrhpolje, around that same time in another 6th Brigade

25     attack, soldiers were rounded up -- excuse me, soldiers rounded up the

Page 45460

 1     inhabitants of Begici village, took them in to Vrhpolje bridge, forced

 2     them to jump off and opened fire on them, again killing multiple unarmed

 3     individuals in this operation.

 4             These were the kind of mopping-up operations that you and your

 5     unit and the 6th Brigade were involved in, weren't they?

 6        A.   I wouldn't agree with that description.  The operation at

 7     Hrustovo also began with the surrendering of weapons by Muslim

 8     extremists.  However, the first day, three soldiers from the

 9     6th Sana Brigade were killed and then orders came from the brigade

10     commander to begin with artillery attack at Hrustovo and Vrhpolje, which

11     are two villages outside of Sanski Most.  And it's probably during this

12     artillery action that some civilians were killed.

13        Q.   Let's look at the operations specifically of the SDS -- or,

14     excuse me, the SOS during that period.

15             MS. McKENNA:  So could we please see D1681.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

17             I have a remark to make.  Could the Prosecutor tell us who

18     created the first page of this diary and described Mr. Davidovic as a

19     member of the Crisis Staff of the SDS?  There is no such qualification in

20     the manuscript.

21             MS. McKENNA:  I would refer Mr. Karadzic to P2614, which is the

22     conclusions in which the Crisis Staff members were appointed.

23     Mr. Davidovic is named as number 9 in that document, as the member in

24     charge of municipal medical services.

25             I'll continue.  Could we please see D1681.

Page 45461

 1             JUDGE KWON:  This was -- just a second.  This was admitted

 2     earlier on.

 3             But in that -- what's the answer to the first part of the

 4     question?  Who -- as, i.e., who produced the first page of this

 5     typewritten page?

 6             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honours, I'll have to check that matter.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             MS. McKENNA:  And perhaps -- I note the time.  Perhaps it's

 9     better if -- before I move on to the next document.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Should we take a break?

11             Before that, yes, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It remains unclear.  Was it the

13     Crisis Staff the SDS or the municipal Crisis Staff?  Where does the SDS

14     come from?

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll see as -- first see who created this first

16     page.

17             Shall we take a break for half an hour and resume at three

18     minutes to 11.00.

19                           [The witness stands down]

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Ms. McKenna.

24             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you, Your Honours.

25             And just with regard to the diary that we were discussing prior

Page 45462

 1     to the break, it was seized by the OTP in December 1996 in that format

 2     from the AID, Sanski Most, and it was confirmed by the -- the excerpts

 3     were confirmed by the witness, through him - it was tendered in this

 4     case - a protected witness.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But no information as to who wrote the first page?

 6             MS. McKENNA:  No specific information as to who wrote the first

 7     page.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             MS. McKENNA:

10        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, before we come to the activities of the SOS, your

11     own group, you make various assertions regarding the investigation

12     centres and their professionalism of the officials who were taking

13     statements of those centres.

14             Now, there's -- and you state that no one was allowed to mistreat

15     or beat the people from whom statements were taken.  That's at -- in your

16     response to question 22.

17             There is a wealth of evidence before this Trial Chamber of such

18     mistreatment and beatings.  That includes Witness Mirsad Karabeg, who

19     described being beaten at the SJB by prison guards on his head, his

20     shoulders, back, the soles of his feet and his legs, and using their

21     fists, feet, electric cable, wooden poles, and being given to civilians

22     in order for the civilians to beat him as well.  We also have evidence of

23     witnesses who were subjected to the same kind of beatings at the

24     Betonirka facility, including beatings with police batons, wooden chairs,

25     and with sticks.

Page 45463

 1             So this is the reality of what was going on in Sanski Most,

 2     wasn't it?  There were systematic beatings taking place at the detention

 3     centres and no one was being punished or prosecuted for them?

 4        A.   As far as I know, the Crisis Staff order the police not to resort

 5     to coercive measures.  Now I know, I believe that there were certain

 6     situations, and I remember that a policeman was dismissed because he beat

 7     a detained person.

 8        Q.   Let's turn to the activities of your own group, the SOS.

 9             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see D1681.

10        Q.   This, as you'll see, Mr. Nikolic, is a 5th of August, 1992 report

11     from the SJB Sanski Most to the SJB Banja Luka.  We're going to look at

12     the first three paragraphs in some detail.

13             The first paragraph states that:

14             "In the last two months in Sanski Most municipality, there has

15     been a great deal of activity by certain paramilitary groups that have

16     broken free from the command of the army and conduct their own private

17     operations that can be seen in the planting of explosives, the torching

18     of houses, killings, lootings, and other types of crime against the

19     Muslim and Croatian population, all aimed at acquiring material profit

20     and putting pressure on them to move out."

21             It continues:

22             "In the last two months, 45 explosions have been set off at

23     Muslim houses and business premises, two mosques have been destroyed,

24     five buildings have been torched and four killings have been carried

25     out."

Page 45464

 1             And the next paragraph states:

 2             "It is mostly small groups involved, primarily soldiers, and they

 3     operate outside the knowledge of their commands.  To date, we have

 4     registered four such groups, among which there is the so-called SOS

 5     group, a former paramilitary group with a strength of around 30 men,

 6     which was formally placed under the command of the local military unit as

 7     a sabotage platoon but it is not under full control."

 8             Now, this is the group that you were a leading member of, a group

 9     known to be committing systematic crimes against non-Serbs, including the

10     destruction of buildings, plunder, and killings in order to pressurise

11     them to leave the municipality.

12             This is your group, isn't it?

13        A.   Can I just say this:  This document is from the month of August.

14     Our group, SOS, at the beginning of the month of June, went to the

15     corridor, went into combat, so we were not in Sanski Most for a month.

16     So some groups that introduced themselves as SOS at that time and did

17     these things in town are people I don't know.  We were far away from

18     Sanski Most.  We could not have done this.

19        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, your own document that you signed talks about the

20     destruction of buildings in order to crush the Ustasha and the

21     Green Beret.  This contemporaneous document discusses the activities that

22     your group was involved in while it was working under the subordination

23     of the 6th Brigade.  The reality is that while you talk about the fact

24     that individuals who committed crimes being taken off the streets, no

25     members of the SOS were prosecuted for these crimes that they were

Page 45465

 1     committing against non-Serbs.

 2             That's the reality, isn't it?

 3        A.   I am telling you that we were far away at the front line.  And

 4     this report speaks about the months of August and June and July that

 5     year, probably.  We were not in town then at all.  As SOS, we formally

 6     ceased to exist when we went to the corridor, and we were soldiers of the

 7     Army of Republika Srpska.

 8        Q.   Well, let's look at what the Major Brajic, the 6th Brigade

 9     Chief of Staff said at that time, and that's, again, in your document.

10     That's P3397.

11             And could we please see page 5 of the English and page 6 of the

12     B/C/S.  This is the passage after you've described the operations in

13     which you were involved, the various mopping-up operations.

14             And it states:

15             "After we had completed the operation, we were called by

16     Major Brajic who thanked us for our co-operation as though we were

17     mercenaries or at worst a paramilitary formation."

18             So this is the truth, isn't it, Mr. Nikolic, that your SOS group,

19     which was known to be committing systematic and persecutory crimes

20     against the non-Serb population of Sanski Most worked hand in hand with

21     the Crisis Staff and was valued by the military authorities?

22             That's the truth, isn't it?

23        A.   I don't remember when this happened, after which operation.

24        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, you say that in response to question 12 you say that

25     more than 8.000 Muslims continued to live in the Sanski Most

Page 45466

 1     municipality.

 2             Now, according to the 1991 census in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

 3     there are over 28.000 Muslims in Sanski Most municipality.

 4             MS. McKENNA:  And for the parties' reference that's P6548,

 5     English page 6, and B/C/S page 7.

 6        Q.   By February 1995, the Banja Luka State Security Department

 7     reported that 3.350 Muslims remained.  And that's P5449.  So it's not

 8     true, is it, that more than 8.000 Muslims remained?  In fact, of a

 9     population of over 28.000, only 3.350 were left in 1995.  That's the

10     truth, isn't it?

11        A.   Possibly.  I was speaking about -- towards the end of the war,

12     that maybe 8.000 inhabitants of Muslim ethnicity could still be living in

13     Sanski Most.

14        Q.   Mr. Nikolic, repeatedly in your statement you talk about the

15     voluntary nature of the departure of Sanski Most's non-Serbs.  You say

16     that the Muslim chose to leave, that -- in response to question 14, you

17     say that people decided to voluntarily leave and the authorities had an

18     obligation to help them.  And in answer to question 24, you say that the

19     civilian authorities, police and army, did not plan, instigate, or order

20     the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims from Sanski Most.

21             MS. McKENNA:  I'd like to briefly go back to the diary of

22     Mr. Davidovic.  That's P3635.  And I'm interested in pages 42 of the

23     English and the B/C/S.

24        Q.   And these are Mr. Davidovic's notes of a Crisis Staff meeting of

25     the 8th of June, 1992, and if you could focus on conclusion number 4, it

Page 45467

 1     states:

 2             "Move the Muslims and Croats to the extent which would provide

 3     for a steady control of power."

 4             So this plan that was set out in early June, it clearly doesn't

 5     relate to a voluntary transfer, does it?

 6        A.   No.  Most Muslims came to ask for transportation and for an

 7     escort in order to be able to get to Bihac or Jajce or across the

 8     Croatian border.  That's why the Crisis Staff made such a decision, that

 9     the Muslims should move out but escorted by our army and police.

10        Q.   Well, let's look at meeting notes from two days later.  And

11     that's at English page 49 and B/C/S page 48.

12             And these are the meeting notes of -- or notes of a meeting of

13     10th of June, and they state:

14             "The job of deportation of a part of the Muslim population

15     failed.  Lot of mistakes.

16             "Proposal: ... appoint a person for the deportation of part of

17     the population ..."

18             So, again, I put it to you that this deportation was clearly not

19     voluntary.  Whether or not the Muslims agree with it, Sanski Most

20     Crisis Staff was requiring that these Muslims leave.

21        A.   I would not agree.

22        Q.   You continue to assert, Mr. Nikolic, that the voluntary -- that

23     the departure of non-Serbs from Sanski Most was entirely voluntary.

24     Today, we've discussed the destruction of Muslim villages in Sanski Most

25     municipality by Serb forces, including the VRS, the TO, and your own

Page 45468

 1     group, the SOS, from late May.

 2             We've discussed how these villages were attacked, buildings were

 3     destroyed, and civilians were killed.

 4             We've seen evidence of the mass detention of civilians, we've

 5     talked about people being crammed into trucks and suffocating to death

 6     en route to their detention in Manjaca camp, and we have seen evidence of

 7     the systematic crimes that your own group, the SOS, committed against

 8     non-Serbs in order to pressurise them to leave the municipality, both

 9     before and during the war.

10             So in the face of this evidence of persecuting and systematic

11     abuse that non-Serbs living in these circumstances were subjected, there

12     is no way in which their departure could be considered voluntary, is

13     there?

14        A.   Well, probably under these circumstances and in fear for their

15     lives, most of them decided to ask us to secure their journey so that

16     they could go to their own territory, Muslim-held territory, that is.

17        Q.   Thank you Mr. Nikolic.

18             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honours, I have no further questions.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. McKenna.

20             Do you have any re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.  Thank you.

22                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

23        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Nikolic, let us start with the latest.

24             In line 3, it was stated that Muslim villages in Sanski Most were

25     destroyed.  Can you tell us roughly how many Muslim villages there are in

Page 45469

 1     Sanski Most?

 2        A.   Well, I think about 15 or so.  Over 15.  I don't know the exact

 3     number.  But there are quite a few of them.

 4        Q.   If you allow me, I'll try to put the question this way:  Brdari,

 5     is that a predominantly Muslim village, or perhaps the number is equal,

 6     Serbs and Muslims?

 7        A.   Yes, yes, the number is equal.

 8        Q.   Was Brdari destroyed?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Caplje, is that a predominantly Muslim village?

11        A.   It is.

12        Q.   Was Caplje destroyed?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Demisevci, is that an almost purely Muslim village?

15        A.   It is the purest of them all.

16        Q.   Was it destroyed?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Now, Dzevar, is that a predominantly Muslim village?

19        A.   Yes.  Muslims and Serbs and Croats live there.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Was Dzevar destroyed?

21        A.   As far as I know, no.

22        Q.   What about Fajtovci, is that a predominantly Muslim village?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Was it destroyed?

25        A.   No.

Page 45470

 1        Q.   Gorice, is that a predominantly Muslim village?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Was it destroyed?

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   Now, there is Gornji Kamengrad and Donji Kamengrad.  Are most --

 6     are both of them predominantly Muslim?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Was there any fighting in either one of the Kamengrads?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Was any one of them destroyed?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   What about Hrustinovci?  That is --  Hrustinovci is mixed, and

13     Hrustovo is Muslim; right?

14        A.   Hrustovo is Muslim, predominantly Muslim.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Krkojevci, is that predominantly Muslim?

16        A.   All three ethnicities, all three religions are there.

17        Q.   Was it destroyed?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   Is Modra predominantly Muslim?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Was it destroyed?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   What about Okrec?

24        A.   It is predominantly Muslim, a predominantly Muslim village.

25        Q.   Was it destroyed?

Page 45471

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   Podbrijezje?

 3        A.   That's a neighbourhood, a suburb of Sanski Most --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters did not hear the end of the

 5     answer.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Similar to Mahala?

 8        A.   A bit further away from the centre, but it's similar.

 9        Q.   We'll have to pause.  Please do pause.

10             So you say it's similar to Mahala but a bit further away.  Was

11     Podbrijezje destroyed?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, then, Podvidaca.  What's that like?

14        A.   Part of it is Serb.  And just before you enter Podvidaca, there's

15     a Muslim hamlet.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Skucani Vakuf, what about that?

17        A.   Predominantly Muslim.

18        Q.   Stari Majdan?

19        A.   Predominantly Muslim, but there were Serbs and Croats there too.

20        Q.   The ones that I mentioned, Skucani Vakuf, Stari Majdan, were they

21     destroyed?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   Sehovci?

24        A.   Sehovci, well, a few houses were torched, as far as I heard, but

25     it wasn't that there was any combat there or destruction.

Page 45472

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you explain to the Trial Chamber now what the

 2     difference is between these that were not destroyed and where there was

 3     no fighting and Hrustovo, Vrhpolje, Trnova, and these other ones, and

 4     Mahala?

 5        A.   Well, to the best of our knowledge, Mahala, Vrhpolje, and

 6     Hrustovo had about 900 persons of Muslim ethnicity who were armed.  And

 7     the Green Berets came for training there.  They came from Bihac and

 8     Sarajevo.  And that is probably why there was fighting there.  And that's

 9     why these Muslim forces there were disarmed.

10        Q.   Thank you.  From when did these armed formations exist?  When did

11     you find out about that?  And when did you find out that they were armed?

12        A.   Already at the end of 1991, around September 1991, the army, the

13     then-army of the SFRY and the 6th Sana Brigade, went into combat in

14     Croatia.  Since there were Muslims and Croats and Serbs there at the

15     time, the next day, all the Muslims and Croats left the brigade and

16     returned to Sanski Most with their weapons.  And probably, from that time

17     onwards, they started arming themselves intensively.

18        Q.   [No interpretation]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

21     D5 which is a Defence exhibit.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Why were the Serbian Defence Forces set up?

24        A.   The entire 6th Sana Brigade was on the front line and all the

25     combatants were of Serb ethnicity.  Several people of Serb ethnicity from

Page 45473

 1     Sanski Most went to the brigade and only old and infirm Serbs remained in

 2     town.  That's why a decision was reached to set up the SOS to protect the

 3     remaining population.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Please look at the document which was drafted in

 5     March 1992.  On the 7th of March, 1992, was the MUP still united, and was

 6     the state security still one?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Please look at the text in the Serbian on the left-hand side to

 9     see what the state security learned.  You don't have to read it aloud,

10     but please look at the names.  It says that they are very impertinent and

11     aggressive.  People who are mentioned are Arif and Izet Huranovic from

12     Vrhpolje, about 500 armed civilians and about 3.000 Muslims who own long

13     barrels.  Could you please read the names of those who were involved in

14     the activities as the main players?

15        A.   The mainly responsible for the SDA were Ismet Sarcevic, a lawyer.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. McKenna.

17             MS. McKENNA:  Objection.  Putting the document in this way and

18     asking him to read from it is clearly a leading way of conducting

19     Mr. Karadzic's cross-examination.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Further, I don't see the point.  Just ...

21             Could you not put your question first, Mr. Karadzic, without

22     asking the witness to read out the document?

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Did you know the names of the prominent extremists in

25     Sanski Most?  You were already asked about that during the

Page 45474

 1     cross-examination.

 2        A.   Yes.  I learned that from the state security and the crime

 3     prevention police in Sanski Most.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  What about their conduct?  Was it very public and

 5     visible?

 6        A.   Yes.  They requested money from other Muslims to buy weapons from

 7     their -- for their units.  There were a lot of examples of Muslims who

 8     wanted our protection because they were threatened and they didn't want

 9     to give them money, and they didn't want to participate in those

10     organised activities.

11        Q.   Were there prominent Muslims who were different and who are not

12     on this list?

13        A.   Yes, yes.

14        Q.   Could you please read the names of those who were recognised in

15     March as the key players in the exercise to arm the 3.000 Muslim

16     citizens?

17        A.   Ismet Sarcevic, a lawyer; Suad Sabic, a lawyer; Adil Draganovic,

18     president of the court; Revzid Kurbegovic, president of the SDA board;

19     Mirzet Karabeg, chairman of the Sanski Most Executive Committee; and

20     Enver Burnic, commander of the Sanski Most police station.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And when it comes to his Excellency's question about

22     the purpose, I would like to remind you that some of the people on this

23     list came to testify against me as OTP witnesses.  They testified as if

24     they were neutral witnesses.  Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  That's a useless comment.

Page 45475

 1             In asking -- he just read out this document.  So how does it help

 2     us?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I -- my question is still pending.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   The fact that the state security which was still a joint

 6     institution, how did it tally with your experiences on the eve of the

 7     war?

 8        A.   We knew all that because the state security monitored the

 9     situation closely and they knew who it was that armed the Muslims, who

10     organised the purchase of the weapons, and obviously since I knew a lot

11     of people and I was friends with many of them, they told me about that,

12     and that's how we learned that they were preparing themselves for a

13     showdown with the Serbs, as it were.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Just a while ago, you accepted the possibility that

15     there were individual cases of ill-treatment, although Madam McKenna

16     suggested that that ill-treatment was systematic.

17             According to what you know, what was the attitude of the

18     authorities towards the abuse of power during interrogation?

19        A.   As far as I know, at all the meetings, it was demanded from the

20     police to comply with the law when interrogating Muslim extremists.  As

21     far as I know, that's how they, indeed, behaved.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And what was the attitude of the authorities towards

23     the perpetrators of such crimes?

24        A.   I remember a situation when a policeman was removed from his job

25     and transferred to another job once it was learned that he had ill

Page 45476

 1     treated a prisoner.

 2        Q.   And what was the position or attitude towards expulsion and

 3     intimidation.  A little while ago, we saw in the diary that the

 4     deportation failed.  What was the position of the authorities towards the

 5     intimidation and expulsion of the non-Serb population?

 6        A.   At the meetings that I attended at the Crisis Staff, the emphasis

 7     was always placed on protecting all the civilians, irrespective of their

 8     ethnic affiliation.  It was also emphasised that houses should not be

 9     burned or destroyed and that Muslims should not be killed.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

11     D1680.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Will you agree with me that these are minutes?  Please look at

14     the document.  We now have the translation as well.

15             So this is the Executive Committee, which means that the

16     Crisis Staff no longer existed at that time?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Can we now look at page 3 in Serbian or, rather, page 4 in

19     Serbian and page 3 in English.

20             Please pay attention to the second paragraph in the Serbian.

21     Kalacun says:

22             "I would like to ask the chairman of the Executive Committee to

23     inform us of the general position of the AR Krajina government on the

24     exodus from the Serbian state."

25             Kalacun -- can we see it in English as well?  Yes, we can.  It is

Page 45477

 1     the fourth paragraph from the top of the page.  And now can you see

 2     Rasula's response?  First of all, is it the position of the government at

 3     Pale that is requested or the position of the government of the

 4     autonomous region?  What is Kalacun requesting here?  Please look at the

 5     second paragraph.

 6             MS. McKENNA:  Objection.  Once again, Mr. Karadzic is just

 7     getting the witness to read from the document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, yes.

 9             Do you follow the point raised by Ms. McKenna, Mr. Karadzic?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   And now I would like you to read - you don't have to do it

13     aloud - what Mr. Rasula said in respond both, Rasula and Lukic, as a

14     matter of fact.  And could you please tell us how this tally with your

15     experience and what you knew about the position of the government.

16        A.   This is precisely what we in the Crisis Staff wanted to protect

17     the Muslim civilians and to prevent further exodus.  We wanted the

18     Muslims to remain living in the Serbian state, and I believe that the

19     same thing is said here in this document.

20             The position of the Crisis Staff was always that as few Muslims

21     should move out and for a majority of them to remain living in

22     Sanski Most.

23        Q.   And how does this tally what you know?  It says here that the

24     authorities don't have the money for the fuel.

25        A.   Well, it's only normal.  There was no fuel.  There was a war

Page 45478

 1     going on.  There was no forceable removal of the population.  If somebody

 2     wanted to forcibly remove them, conditions would have been put in place

 3     for that.

 4        Q.   In paragraph 10 of your statement, you say that the phone lines

 5     were down, that the roads were blocked, and so on and so forth.  When it

 6     comes to those meetings, either of the Crisis Staff or the SOS, did you

 7     receive an instruction from either Pale or the government or the

 8     Presidency?

 9        A.   No.  On the day or during the night when the municipality was

10     liberated, all the communications were down.  The commander of the

11     1st Krajina Corps, General Talic, arrived with his subordinates into

12     town, and that's the only thing that happened.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I'd like to call up page 5

15     in English and page 7 in Serbian, in the same document.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   At the top, it says that you and the public security station are

18     tasked with something.  What is it?

19        A.   At that time, I was a member of the 6th Sana Brigade.

20     Mladen Lukic was the president of the executive board at the time, and he

21     tasked us with establishing the number of Agrokomerc trucks that had been

22     on loan and participated in the activities to transport goods.  He wanted

23     us to take stock of all the trucks that were missing and their

24     whereabouts.

25        Q.   Could you please tell the Trial Chamber what Agrokomerc is, where

Page 45479

 1     it was based, and whether we were at war with the entity at the time?

 2        A.   Agrokomerc was based in Velika Kladusa, in the Cazin region, with

 3     a majority Muslim population, Bihac was its centre, and all the arming

 4     and all the Green Berets started from there in the direction of

 5     Sanski Most and other Serbian villages.

 6        Q.   Could you please speak up.  Could you please speak more slowly.

 7     And I would like to remind both myself and you that we should pause

 8     between my questions and your answers.  Thank you.

 9             So how were the movable assets belonging to Agrokomerc treated?

10     Were they treated as private, as war booty, or what?

11        A.   It was considered war booty.

12        Q.   When it comes to war booty, was it regulated by the law?

13        A.   Yes, it was.

14        Q.   And now could you please look at the second paragraph -- or,

15     rather, the second half of paragraph 3.  The resettlement for any persons

16     who express wish and have the necessary documents or telex message in

17     which they are guaranteed accommodation should be made possible.

18             Could you please tell us -- or interpret this paragraph for us,

19     rather.

20        A.   I can give you my opinion.  At that time, I was deployed on the

21     front line.  I suppose the idea was to know where those Muslims are

22     headed and what their destination was.

23        Q.   This is from the month of August.  I believe that you already

24     returned by then.

25        A.   I was probably on furlough.

Page 45480

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now could we bring up

 2     65 ter 1569 in e-court.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  But before we move on, could you expand on -- on

 4     your understanding of this paragraph, which says:

 5             "For any person who expresses the wish and has the necessary

 6     documents ... voluntary resettlement will be made possible."

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please ask the witness to

 8     read the document?  Because the interpretation is, again, not good -- or,

 9     rather, the translation is not good, because the English translation is,

10     again, not good, and I would like the interpreters not to refer to it.

11             JUDGE KWON:  But could we go back to page 3.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In Serbian, I believe it's 4.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, correct.

14             Do you see the words of Mr. Stojinovic after Lukic's

15     intervention?

16             Could you read out aloud?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "To enable the people who wish to

18     leave our republic, and the competent authority should continue working

19     on the issuance of loyalty."

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's go to the last page.

21             Yes.  If you could read aloud the paragraph we discussed earlier

22     on.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Enabling voluntary moving out for

24     all persons who expressed their desire to do so and are in possession of

25     the necessary documentation, i.e., have a telex guaranteeing their

Page 45481

 1     accommodation."

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And now you could tell us how you understood

 3     this.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a reference to voluntary

 5     moving out, not forced evacuation.  It says:

 6             "Those who expressed the desire to leave town."

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I'll leave it at that.

 8             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Can you just tell us, one of the requirements is for people to

11     show that they have some accommodation guaranteed for them somewhere.

12        A.   They were supposed to show that somebody in the Muslim-held area

13     will provide them with accommodation.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?  Oh,

15     it has been admitted.  So I asked for 55 -- 65 ter 5169.

16             5169 is the one I wanted.  I don't think this is it.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Is it 1D number?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, 5169.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, now we have the English

21     version.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   We have to wait for the Serbian version, but I'll read to you ...

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So the Registry is obviously facing

25     constraints of the same kind that I do all the time.

Page 45482

 1             Now we have the Serbian version without the English.  Okay.

 2     They're both here now.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can you tell us what is this document?  What is it about and

 5     what's the date?

 6             Let me help you.  At the top we read:  The Co-ordinating

 7     Committee of the Sanski Most --

 8        A.   Municipal Assembly, 4 November 1992.

 9        Q.   Look at item 2.

10             MS. McKENNA:  Objection.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             MS. McKENNA:  Before Mr. Karadzic begins to potentially lead the

13     witness with this document, it would be good if he could lay a foundation

14     for the use of the document.  I don't believe he has done so yet.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I agree.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe I did when I asked the

17     witness what the attitude was towards intimidation, persecution of

18     non-Serbs.  That was the basis for my questions on several documents on

19     this topic.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let us see how it goes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Could you please look at item 2:

24             "Report on the measures taken in the course of the investigation

25     linked with a murder of Croatian civilians in Kruhari and Skrljevita."

Page 45483

 1             Are these Croatian villages, Kruhari?

 2        A.   Kruhari was mixed Serb/Croat.  And Skrljevita is a Croat village.

 3        Q.   Item 5 related to what?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  But you should ask the witness whether he himself

 5     attended this meeting or not.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Could you look at the passage after point 5, the participants.

 8     Do you know them?  I don't see your names here.

 9        A.   The Executive Board had been already established by that time,

10     and these people were capable of dealing with things under those

11     circumstances:  Nedeljko Rasula, as president of the municipality;

12     Vlado Vrkes was president of the party; Mirko Vrucinic was chief of the

13     police station; Boro Tadic was in the Territorial Defence, I believe;

14     Milenko Delic was the public prosecutor; Rajko Stanic was president of

15     the court.  These are the names.

16        Q.   Thank you.  So in item 2, do you see towards the bottom, they

17     discuss the events in Skrljevita and Kruhari.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page in

19     Serbian.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just what -- could you not put your question first

21     to the witness about this murder of Kruhari and Skrljevita before showing

22     the document to the witness.  That was your point, Ms. McKenna, I take

23     it.

24             MS. McKENNA:  It was, Your Honour.  The witness wasn't confirmed

25     that he was at this meeting, and so showing him document is simply

Page 45484

 1     leading him.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I really disagree.  The witness has

 3     already testified about efforts made by the authorities to prosecute and

 4     arrest people for murders of non-Serbs so he said that that was their

 5     policy.  Now Dr. Karadzic is entitled to show him documents --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  He could have asked about the murders of these

 7     individuals, in particular, whether the witness knew or not.  And then

 8     depending upon the answers, he made proceed to put this document to the

 9     witness instead of just feeding him with this document.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  But even if the witness didn't know anything about

11     those particular murders, he is entitled to put a document to the witness

12     and ask him whether this -- how this tallies with his belief of the

13     attitude towards to authorities whether he was present at the meeting or

14     not.  I agree that those things are relevant to the weight, but the way

15     he is going about doing it, there's nothing leading about it, just to

16     simply show a document to a witness and ask him to comment on it.

17             JUDGE KWON:  But the way Mr. Karadzic put his question was a bit

18     different from the way you suggested so far.

19             Please continue, bearing in mind what we just discussed now.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did you know the participants of this meeting whose names you

23     read out a moment ago?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   What was their attitude as representatives of the authorities

Page 45485

 1     towards crimes and intimidation?

 2        A.   They worked for reducing the incidents of intimidation and

 3     murders in Sanski Most.  I know that because I knew personally the

 4     president of the court and the public prosecutor.

 5        Q.   Did you hear about that killing of civilians in Kruhari,

 6     Skrljevita?

 7        A.   Yes, it so happens that I was on sick-leave that month because I

 8     had been wounded, and I heard about some killing involving several

 9     victims in these villages which were several kilometres away from the

10     town.  The police searched and I think they found the perpetrators.

11        Q.   Do you know any of the names of those who were arrested?

12        A.   I knew this man Kajtez is his last name.  I knew him.

13        Q.   Before we finish with this, you were asked on page 24 -- no, 25,

14     or something like that, about how the police treated a certain group that

15     held themselves out to be the SOS.

16             Did the SOS expel anyone for a certain type of conduct?

17        A.   Yes, of course.  There were members of the SOS and others who

18     didn't want to go to war and did everything to avoid it.  And the brigade

19     command, of course, expelled such people, took their weapons away, and

20     they remained in Sanski Most.  And such groups called themselves SOS

21     because that made it easier for them to do certain things around town.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now show page 3 in both

23     Serbian and English.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Look at items 11 and 12, and tell us if you know anything about

Page 45486

 1     this.

 2             How does this fit in with your knowledge and your experience

 3     concerning the way the authorities treated such things?

 4        A.   Some people were using Muslim cafes and businesses that had been

 5     abandoned, and that caused a lot of problems among citizens and the army

 6     and incidents of shooting, so the municipality authorities decided to

 7     deal with it in this way, by prohibiting the leasing of such businesses

 8     to minimise the incidents of such situations in Sanski Most.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the next page be shown in

10     both versions.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Look at paragraph 6.  What is paragraph 6 about?  And is it

13     consistent with your knowledge about the way the authorities treated such

14     incidents?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Before you [Microphone not activated]

16             MS. McKENNA:  One second --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. McKenna.

18             Let's collapse the document for the moment.

19             Yes, Ms. McKenna.

20             MS. McKENNA:  Once again, in asking the witness to read the

21     paragraph and then comment on it, Mr. Karadzic is leading the witness.

22     He is feeding the answers to him.

23             JUDGE KWON:  However, are we not on the same topic still?  It's

24     continued?

25             I think it's okay.

Page 45487

 1             Shall we continue?

 2             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Again, look at paragraph 6, the first part, and tell me is it

 5     consistent with what you know and what was the attitude of the

 6     authorities towards incidents of looting, et cetera?

 7        A.   I said already talking about the session of the Crisis Staff

 8     there were constant efforts to protect Muslim property from arson and

 9     from looting.  And you see in this paragraph that this work continued,

10     when the municipal authorities had been established and started to

11     operate.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. McKenna.

15             MS. McKENNA:  No objection, Your Honour.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D4215, Your Honours.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   The last document on this topic, the treatment of non-Serbs,

21     65 ter 5180.  The last document on this subject.

22             So this is dated 9 December 1992.  Look at paragraph 2 of item 2,

23     where it is noted that in the territory of our municipality, problems are

24     starting to be dealt with and the rule of law has been established.

25             When did this happen?

Page 45488

 1        A.   All that the Executive Board did in October and November was

 2     towards imposing the rule of law and avoiding nationalist excess on both

 3     sides, and these people whom I know to be honest, these members of the

 4     Executive Board, have probably contributed to this.

 5        Q.   How does it tally with your experience that these families who

 6     wished to leave may do so and the return of those who wished to return is

 7     also allowed?

 8        A.   The decision was clear, that they may return on the condition

 9     that they observe the laws of our republic.  Those who wished to return,

10     may return, and their property would be protected.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next page.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Look at paragraph -- or, rather, item 4 to broadcast this

14     decision at Radio Sanski Most.  Look at items (a) and (b); to protect

15     non-Serb settlements, and the public security station is made responsible

16     to develop a protection plan to organise village guards and patrols.

17             Mr. Mile Dobrijevic testified here that every Muslim village,

18     each one of these, was assigned a policeman --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, what is the point of referring to the

20     other witness's evidence here at this moment?  Reading out this sentence

21     and referring to other witness's evidence, where are you heading?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just wanted to see whether the

23     witness knew about that and whether that is in line with this document,

24     whether this was well known as a stand, and whether it was implemented.

25     I thought that perhaps it wasn't phrased properly.

Page 45489

 1             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question to the witness?

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   What is your knowledge about the protection of villages, Muslim

 4     and Croat villages, in Sanski Most?

 5        A.   As I said, I was in Sanski Most at the time, and I knew about a

 6     great many things, and I knew that the police did everything to protect

 7     villages that had a predominantly Croat or Muslim population.  They

 8     organised patrols, they brought them things that they were lacking for

 9     personnel hygiene and flour, and they protected them, and the

10     municipality said that they should be assisted in every possible way.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Could we go back to the first page of this document.

14             If you could read out -- read aloud the first sentence in

15     paragraph 1, item number 1.  It ...

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can barely see this.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Can -- can you read now?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

19             "It is allowed for the population to move out in an organised way

20     from the areas of Trnovo, since they do not have conditions for

21     continuing to live in this settlement, as well as families of extremists

22     in this war.  Other citizens who wish to leave the municipality may" --

23             JUDGE KWON:  That's sufficient.  It says that there are no

24     conditions for further life in that settlement, i.e., Trnovo.

25             So one can say they are forced to leave.

Page 45490

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Trnovo is a smallish local

 2     commune that was poor even before the war, and probably -- I mean, people

 3     did not have the bare necessities, and they asked to move out.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Do you have any objection, Ms. McKenna?

 6             MS. McKENNA:  No objections, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D4216, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Did the authorities make life poor in Trnovo or did they make it

13     more difficult in any way?

14        A.   No.  As far as I know, the village was a poor one before the war,

15     and the authorities helped as much as they could during those months of

16     war operations, and probably these inhabitants did not have enough or

17     they were afraid of something; so, quite simply, they had to move out.

18        Q.   Thank you.  It was suggested on page 24 of today's transcript

19     that the SOS participated in explosions and that explosions happened at

20     facilities owned by the non-Serb population.

21             What is your knowledge?  Where did explosions take place?  When

22     did they start?

23        A.   As far as I can remember, there were explosions in Serb, Muslim,

24     and Croat properties.  I think that this started in October and

25     November 1991.

Page 45491

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D3906.  Could that please be shown

 3     to the witness in e-court.

 4             Thank you.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Could you please take a look at this.  This is the

 7     6th of December, 1991.  The public security station.  1991; right?

 8        A.   1991.

 9        Q.   "Request to publish a statement on explosions in the Sanski Most

10     municipality."

11             Can you tell us about this?  For instance, the first one.  On the

12     3rd of November, 1991, a rifle grenade from some distance on the Laro

13     catering establishment owned by Nenad Majkic.  What is his ethnic

14     background, Majkic's?

15        A.   He is a Serb.

16        Q.   The next one is owned by Marko Beljic.  What is his ethnicity?

17        A.   It's not Bejlic, it's Reljic.  And this is also a Serb who had a

18     restaurant, an exclusive restaurant at that.

19        Q.   Line 15 should not be Q, it should be A.

20             What about the next one, Kaurinovic, Marko?

21        A.   Kaurinovic, he's a Croat.

22        Q.   And for Veljic, it didn't say Nenad Majkic, Serb.  Now, Reljic?

23     Reljic.

24        A.   Reljic, Marko.

25        Q.   You said?

Page 45492

 1        A.   That he's a Serb.

 2        Q.   So from -- chronologically, we first have a Serb then another

 3     Serb and then a Croat?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page now.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Again, could you not put your question first instead

 7     of showing the content of this document?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I think that I've

 9     already put my question.  When did this start and whose shops exploded

10     and now see a document, an authentic document that first it was the

11     Christians, the shops owned by Christians, two Serbs and a Croat.  You

12     can see that chronologically.  So obviously the police --

13             JUDGE KWON:  What you asked ahead of this document to the witness

14     was about the participation of SOS in explosions and explosions that

15     happened at facilities owned by non-Serb population.

16             So you could have asked the witness whether he knew any incident

17     which happened in the facilities owned by Serbs, et cetera.  You're just

18     feeding the witness with this document, which is very leading and of low

19     probative value, if at all.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, I am

21     leading this.  I'm saying in whose shops.  And the witness said those

22     owned by Serbs, Croats and Muslims.  And now I'm trying to see whether

23     the police said that the SOS were the perpetrators.  But I cannot deal

24     with that until we've had a look at all of this.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 45493

 1        Q.   Or, actually, I will ask you.  Did the police accuse the SOS for

 2     these explosions?

 3        A.   No, they were interviewed, but there was no proof --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters did not hear the end of the

 5     sentence.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please repeat your answer but loudly and slowly.

 8        A.   The police brought in for questioning two of three of us from the

 9     SOS and told us that there had been explosions.  However, we did not take

10     part in that.  They had no proof against us, and we were released.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Were any of the perpetrators identified?

12        A.   Well, as far as I heard, a few were arrested because a bomb or

13     grenade was thrown in front of the shops, and these were drunken

14     soldiers, former soldiers who came there.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Now that we're on the subject I'd like to ask you

16     about a document which was shown to you.  It is P3397.

17             Was the value of the SOS being challenged?  Were there any

18     arguments provided?  Or, rather, were there any arguments in the sense of

19     quarrels about that?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this please be called up for

21     the witness, P3397.

22             MS. McKENNA:  I think the witness can answer the question without

23     reference to document.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I didn't follow the question itself.

25             Could you put your question again.

Page 45494

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will, yes.

 2        Q.   Were there any challenges concerning the value of the SOS?  Did

 3     anyone bring it into question before it became the intervention platoon,

 4     or after that?  Did that kind of thing happen?  Were you in a position to

 5     defend the reputation of the SOS?

 6        A.   No.  The authorities did not challenge us in any way because what

 7     we did was aimed at protecting the population.  I already said that the

 8     6th Sana Brigade was at the front line.  They weren't in Sanski Most.

 9        Q.   Page 4 now, please.  I'm actually trying to follow up what

10     His Excellency Judge Kwon said.  So please take a look at this page, the

11     bottom of the page, where it says, "Dear brothers, do not allow,"

12     et cetera, et cetera, so --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes, Ms. McKenna.

14             MS. McKENNA:  It's the same objection.  If Mr. Karadzic is

15     seeking to elicit evidence from the witness, he should elicit it rather

16     than --

17             JUDGE KWON:  He -- Mr. Karadzic says he was going to deal with

18     the point I raised.  Let us see what it is.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   "Dear brothers," that's what it says here.  If you cannot see it,

21     I'm going to read it out for you.

22        A.   You cannot really see this.

23        Q.   Up here it says:  I underline this once again, this is a

24     confidential report and please bear that in mind.  "Dear brothers, this

25     is the beginning of the war and the bullet is still the judge, so do not

Page 45495

 1     permit" --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Where is it?

 3             THE ACCUSED:  "Brothers."  Yeah, at the beginning of -- fifth,

 4     sixth line in the top.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  In B/C/S?  All right.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  Low.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   "So do not permit active-duty officers to go around the streets,

10     and I don't know what state, offering war to whom?  A Serb.  It's unheard

11     of."

12             Now can you tell us what this is?  What this is a reference to,

13     that some officers are offering something that is improper?

14        A.   There was some active-duty officers who offered weapons, even

15     sold weapons.  They did a lot of things that are improper for a Serb

16     officer.  And we wrote that in that context.  Whoever uses such

17     situations for their own material benefit will not be welcome there.

18        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked about dismissals from work.  Was it

19     possible for Muslims and Croats to work in the Serb municipality of

20     Sanski Most -- or, rather, did they have to transfer to the Muslim

21     municipality and why were some of them dismissed?

22        A.   Well, most of the dismissals took place because people found out

23     that Muslim extremists took part in arming and the reselling of weapons

24     and that's probably why they were dismissed, and they were brought in for

25     questioning to the public security station.

Page 45496

 1             Also, quite a few professors, teachers, judges then -- in a state

 2     organisations.  Of course, Muslims just stayed on and worked there.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned that policemen could stay on at the

 4     station.  What about those who did not stay on?  Did they have an

 5     alternative?  Was the Muslim municipality supposed to have the same

 6     organs like the Serb municipality?

 7        A.   Yes, there were negotiations, and an offer was made to the Muslim

 8     SDA to create a Muslim municipality in the offices of Sipad, Sanski Most,

 9     on the left bank of the Sana river.  However, they did not agree to that.

10     Afterwards, they took their weapons from the public security station and

11     they went to the municipality building of Sanski Most.  They barricaded

12     themselves there, and they stayed on there for a while.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In April, on the 22nd of April, 1992, were you a

14     member of the Crisis Staff?

15        A.   I think I was.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

17     D16789.  Actually D.  D, it's D.  D176 -- no.  1D1679.  It's D.

18     [In English] D1678.  Sorry, sorry, 9.  1679.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Please, do take a look at this.  Paragraph 7.  Do you remember

21     this?  Were you at this meeting on the 22nd of April?  And what is your

22     position?  What did know about this position vis-a-vis the Muslims and

23     Croats and their rights?

24        A.   Well, yes, I was present at that meeting.  And Boro and Vlado -

25     Vlado Vrkes as president of the party; and Boro Savanovic, I think that

Page 45497

 1     was his last name, he was on the executive board - they were in charge of

 2     talks with the Muslim delegation.  And they offered them all the rights

 3     that they were supposed to have at the workplace and in town in the

 4     municipality and the police.  However, they did not agree to that.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  What was the outcome of those talks?  Who were the

 6     Muslims that they could talk to?

 7        A.   Obviously they could talk to these, but there was another wing

 8     that did not want to take part in those talks.

 9        Q.   [In English] Obviously they could not talk to these, but there

10     was moderate group.

11             [Interpretation] You said "moderate," did you not?

12        A.   Yes, yes.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now could the witness please be

14     shown P3306.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16        Q.   Please speak up and speak slowly.

17             So P3306.  Do you remember whether you attended this meeting of

18     the Crisis Staff on the 30th of April?

19        A.   I don't think so.

20        Q.   Look at the first paragraph where it says that the talks were

21     interrupted with extremists and that talks will continue with honest

22     Muslims.

23             How does this tally with what you --

24             MS. McKENNA:  Objection.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 45498

 1             MS. McKENNA:  The witness has just said he didn't attend the

 2     meeting.  So now Mr. Karadzic is just telling him what happened at the

 3     meeting and leading him in his questions.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I'm asking the witness whether

 5     he knew anything about that.  He did not have to attend the meeting.

 6     What was the position of the authorities vis-a-vis.  He just said a while

 7     ago that they couldn't talk to the extremists but that they could talk to

 8     those who were moderate.  And he said that without being prompted by

 9     either my question or the document.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   And what about the end of the first paragraph?

12             MS. McKENNA:  I'm not sure that the witness is -- that the

13     transcript is clear as to what the witness said in relation to who he

14     could talk to.  It says -- the witness says:  Obviously they could not

15     talk to these, but there was a moderate group that did not want to take

16     part in these talks.

17             Perhaps the witness could clarify.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The problems lies in the

20     transcript --

21             JUDGE KWON:  I didn't hear the accused's intervention while

22     conferring with my colleagues.

23             The Chamber saw no problem with the accused's way of proceeding,

24     in this case.  But I'm about to read what Mr. Karadzic said.

25             Probably you could repeat your question, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 45499

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, on page 66, we had a

 2     problem with the transcript.  And I understand and I see where

 3     Ms. McKenna is coming from.

 4             On line 4, it was misrecorded.  The witness said that they could

 5     not talk to those people but there was a moderate wing, and that was not

 6     recorded.  The moderate wing was not recorded and it was also not

 7     recorded that those people could not be talked to.  That's why I wanted

 8     to correct the transcript at the time.

 9             And now I have just asked the witness --

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Or, rather, do you confirm that this is correct?  Who were the

12     people who were ready to talk with the Serbs and who weren't?

13        A.   I confirmed that the leadership of the SDA could not be talked to

14     about peace but there was another group of people who were more moderate

15     and it was possible to talk to them, but their decision would not have

16     meant anything to the rest of the Muslims.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And now just to finish this paragraph off, what about

18     the talks with the Catholic parish priest, the effendi, and the Serbian

19     Orthodox priest?

20        A.   Those were the talks involving all the three religious groups in

21     order to try and calm the situation down, to calm down the population in

22     order to avoid murders, killings, and chaos in general terms.

23        Q.   The word "effendi" was not recorded, but you did say all the

24     three religious groups?

25        A.   Yes, I did, all the three religious groups.

Page 45500

 1        Q.   Now the last question with regard to something Ms. McKenna asked

 2     you about:  Mahala.

 3             Could you please tell us what was the position of the

 4     authorities, the police, and the armed forces vis-a-vis the population,

 5     including the enemy, the wounded, and the prisoners of war?  Were there

 6     any --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  But before that -- before that, Mr. Karadzic --

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   -- attempts to cover things up?

10             JUDGE KWON:  What was your question with respect to this

11     document, Exhibit P3306?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question was and the witness

13     answered.  I just wanted to show whether the contents of the document

14     confirm what the witness said, that the talks with the extremists were

15     abandoned and that the authorities opted for talks with others, including

16     religious leaders.  And he answered to that effect even before I

17     displayed the documents.  I just wanted to corroborate his words with the

18     document and the document has already been admitted.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more document.  And before

21     that, a question.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Were things covered up, the abuses of power covered up, or

24     perhaps crimes or breaches of discipline that happened during the

25     operations against Mahala?

Page 45501

 1        A.   No.  The police did as best as they could at the time.  They

 2     wanted to protect the population and their property, their apartments and

 3     houses, in that part of the town.  That's how it was.  All the police

 4     could do was enter that part of the town and protect the facilities.  The

 5     civilian population could only return a few days later because there were

 6     the corpses of dead animals that had been killed or died, so the

 7     sanitisation had to be taken first.

 8        Q.   What happened to those who were killed or wounded from the enemy

 9     side?

10        A.   I know that few were killed and that they were buried according

11     to their religious rites in attendance of their families.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Were any of the incidents or crimes covered up?

13        A.   No.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown

15     D1810.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   This is a report issued by the municipal civilian protection

18     staff on the 1st of May about the field inspection in Mahala and it says

19     here that those who were wounded were attended by medical personnel, that

20     a male corpse was found and identified as Dr. Alagic and buried, under

21     eight.

22             How does that tally with what you know?

23        A.   Everything was done to end the situation in the best possible way

24     and to avoid any controversial situations.

25        Q.   Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Nikolic.

Page 45502

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions for

 2     this witness.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not at all.

 4             MS. McKENNA:  Your Honour, I have one very brief point, to

 5     clarify an issue that you raised yourself in --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7                           Further cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:

 8        Q.   And it's on the issue of the documentation for departure,

 9     Mr. Nikolic.

10             MS. McKENNA:  Could we please see P3307.

11        Q.   Now, in your re-examination, you stated that documentation was

12     required in order to show that departing Muslims had somebody to stay

13     with or somebody in the Muslim-held area that would provide them with

14     accommodation and that was the documentation that was required.

15             I'd just like to show you -- you see that this is a decision on

16     the criteria for the possibility of departure from the municipality dated

17     the 2nd of July, 1992.  And the first paragraph it states that voluntary

18     departure from Sanski Most municipality shall be allowed to families and

19     persons who give a statement, that they are permanently leaving the

20     municipality and that they are leaving their real property to Sanski Most

21     municipality.

22             And if you turn your attention to article 4, it states that:

23             "The municipal Secretariat for People's Defence shall give such

24     peoples -- persons, the necessary permit to leave Sanski Most

25     municipality on the basis of a statement or contract, if there are no

Page 45503

 1     legal obstacles."

 2             So this is the documentation that was being discussed in that

 3     meeting of the Crisis Staff, wasn't it, the documentation that was given

 4     when people who were leaving their municipality signed over their

 5     properties to the Sanski Most Serb municipality?

 6        A.   No.  This is a document which was issued by the Crisis Staff, and

 7     it predates the other document by three or four months.  And that

 8     document was issued by the Executive Board of the

 9     Municipal Assembly of Sanski Most, and we're talking about two completely

10     different bodies here.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to seek clarification.

12             When it comes to handing over property in this way, was it

13     actually ceding ownership of that property?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Why don't you leave it here.

15             MS. McKENNA:  Thank you, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That concludes your evidence,

17     Mr. Nikolic.  On behalf of the Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your

18     coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

19             Since we're going to have a lunch break, we'll rise all together.

20             We'll resume at 22 past 1.00.

21                           [The witness withdrew]

22                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.38 p.m.

23                           [The witness entered court]

24                           --- On resuming at 1.26 p.m.

25                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

Page 45504

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, would the witness make the solemn declaration.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 3     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 4                           WITNESS:  PRVOSLAV DAVINIC

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Davinic.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Please be seated and make yourself comfortable.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Dr. Davinic.

13        A.   [No interpretation]

14        Q.   If you're going to answer my questions in Serbian, I would kindly

15     ask you to make a pause after my question to give the interpreters enough

16     time to interpret our words.

17             Did you provide a statement to my Defence team?

18        A.   [No interpretation]

19        Q.   Again, please make a pause.  You understand Serbian and you

20     answer in English.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

22     1D09816.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, as you can note from the transcript, which is

24     in front of you, since you gave your answer while Mr. Karadzic's question

25     was being translated, your answer was not noted.  So please bear that in

Page 45505

 1     mind.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Yes, I have given

 3     statement to your Defence team.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

 7     1D09816.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Do you see that statement in front of you on the screen?

10        A.   Yes, this is my statement.  I see it in both languages, in the

11     Serbian language and also translated into English.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did you read the statement and did you sign it?

13        A.   Yes, I have.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be reminded to pause

15     after Mr. Karadzic's question.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

17     the last page.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that is correct.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Is this your signature?

21        A.   I signed only the Serbian version, not the English, but I presume

22     since Serbian is my native language that is the one that has correct

23     importance to the Court.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We're still too fast, both of us, and I again remind

25     you to pause after my question.

Page 45506

 1             Dr. Davinic, does this statement accurately reflect what you said

 2     to my Defence team?

 3        A.   Yes, it does.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today as

 5     were put to you when your statement was given, would your answer be the

 6     same?

 7        A.   Yes, very much so.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

10     statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

13             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive this.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D4217, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             And now I would like to read in English a short summary of

18     Dr. Prvoslav Davinic's statement.

19             [In English] Dr. Prvoslav Davinic was a United Nations official

20     responsible for disarmament and security issues from 1976 till 1999.

21     During the period 1992 to 1995, Dr. Davinic headed the

22     United Nations Centre for Disarmament.  He later served as minister of

23     Defence for Serbia and Montenegro during the years, 2004 and 2005.  He is

24     now retired.

25             Mr. Davinic learned of the 28th of August, 1995, shelling of the

Page 45507

 1     Markale marketplace during a morning briefing at the United Nations

 2     headquarters in New York head by Under-Secretary General for

 3     Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding.  From that briefing, a subsequent

 4     report and a conversation with an UN colleague, Dr. Davinic believed that

 5     for political reasons, the United Nations wanted to ensure that the

 6     investigation concluded that the attack came from the Serb side.

 7             Mr. Davinic first met President Karadzic in March 1993 and met

 8     him for a second time in the first half of 1996 in Pale.  In that 1996

 9     meeting, President Karadzic was adamant that the Serbs had not fired the

10     shell which landed on the Markale marketplace on 28th of August, 1995,

11     and said that General Mladic had assured him that the UN and the Serb

12     side had not fired -- assured him and the UN that Serb side did not fire

13     that shell.

14             And that is a short matter.  At that moment, I do not have

15     additional questions for Dr. Davinic.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Davinic --

17             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

18             JUDGE KWON:  As you have noted, sir, your evidence in chief in

19     this case has been admitted in writing, that is through your written

20     statement.  And now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the

21     Office of the Prosecutor.

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I understand, thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

25                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

Page 45508

 1        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Davinic.

 2        A.   Good afternoon.

 3        Q.   I just want to confirm that my understanding from your statement

 4     is that over the last 20 years, you've only met Dr. Karadzic twice -

 5     right? - the first time for about half an hour, and the second time after

 6     he was actually indicted for the crimes that he is now in custody on;

 7     right?

 8        A.   I had an opportunity to meet him a few more times in the interim.

 9     But at that time he was a fugitive, and I did not publicise the -- the

10     fact that I had an opportunity to meet him during that period of time.

11        Q.   So even though you didn't say it in your statement, you've

12     actually met Dr. Karadzic far more than just two times, just the two

13     times that you disclosed in your statement?

14        A.   That is correct.  But it was not relevant to my testimony which I

15     am about to give today.  Therefore, I didn't think it was relevant and

16     this was the reason why I didn't mention it.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment, Your Honour.

18                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   Well, since we have this new information, actually, I -- I'd like

21     to give you an opportunity to tell us about these meetings with

22     Dr. Karadzic at the time he was a fugitive.

23             So tell us when your first meeting with Dr. Karadzic was after he

24     was indicted?

25        A.   The first meeting was actually in June 1996 in Pale, and I think

Page 45509

 1     that I referred to this in my written statement, and I confirm it now to

 2     you, and I met him in his home.  There was no particular problem in

 3     accessing him.  It was at his invitation through a mutual friend who knew

 4     him, and that friend knew, of course, me, and Dr. Karadzic expressed an

 5     interest in meeting me because he wanted to follow up on our meeting

 6     which took place in -- in the UN at the time when he was attending a

 7     peace conference there.

 8        Q.   All right.

 9        A.   And I referred to this in my statement.  He visited my office.

10     We spent one hour discussing various issues of relevance to what was

11     happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12        Q.   Now this meeting in 1996 --

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   -- took place at a period of time where you were actually still

15     serving as head of DDA; correct?

16        A.   That is correct, but this meeting with Dr. Karadzic had nothing

17     to it with my official function at that time.  I was actually en route to

18     Sarajevo for total different purpose and I passed through Pale, and it

19     was then possible to see him in accordance with a prior arrangement

20     through this friend of ours.

21        Q.   And who was that mutual friend?

22        A.   It was Dr. Predrag Stevanovic, medical doctor.

23        Q.   All right.  And when was the next time you met Dr. Karadzic while

24     he was a fugitive from justice?

25        A.   I think it was later that year, I believe, September or

Page 45510

 1     October of that year.  I was, again, going to a meeting in -- in

 2     Sarajevo, and on the way to Sarajevo, I again made a stop-over and I saw

 3     him briefly.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

 5     approach the microphone, please.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Do you want me to repeat what I said, or you

 7     managed?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think so.  Let's continue.  Thank you,

 9     Mr. Davinic.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

11        Q.   And at that time, you met him at his home?

12        A.   Yes, that is correct.

13        Q.   And what did you discuss during that second meeting with

14     Dr. Karadzic?

15        A.   This was a relatively short meeting and we did not really discuss

16     much at that time because I was in a hurry to reach my destination.  He

17     was already in the situation in which he was, and we simply greeted each

18     other, I wished him well, and I went off to my final destination.

19        Q.   And when was the next time?  So that would be the third time you

20     met with Dr. Karadzic.

21        A.   But that's about it.

22        Q.   So you've only met him, then --

23        A.   Three times.

24        Q.   Three times all together --

25        A.   I would say so, yes.

Page 45511

 1        Q.   -- while he was a fugitive from justice?

 2        A.   No, once I met him in New York and twice as he was fugitive.

 3        Q.   And knowing that Dr. Karadzic was a fugitive from justice,

 4     knowing and keeping in mind that you were at that time a senior-level UN

 5     official, knowing that Dr. Karadzic's surrender to this Tribunal would

 6     have the potential for great economic and other effects in the region,

 7     you must have advocated to Dr. Karadzic that he surrender himself,

 8     wouldn't you?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  The question was quite misleading.  Because at the

11     time, 1996, there were not these economic benefits to the region that

12     were being talked about.  So there were elements to that question that

13     were not really very correct.  But since he has answered it, we can leave

14     it.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Shall we continue.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.

17        Q.   And what was Mr. Karadzic's response?

18        A.   His response was that he was considering all options.

19             I might add, ma'am, if you would allow me, Your Honour, that, at

20     that time, the fact that he was fugitive was not widely known.  To my

21     mind, I -- if I recall correctly, he was indicted shortly before the

22     Dayton peace process started, but this indictment was made public much

23     later.

24             I also would like to point out that although I met him in my

25     private capacity, I informed high-level officials in the UN of this

Page 45512

 1     meeting with Dr. Karadzic.

 2        Q.   Where is your report on the meeting?

 3        A.   No, it was oral report because it was private meeting and did not

 4     require usual procedure of writing down such kind of reports.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I might come back to that.

 6             But while we're on the subject of meetings with Dr. Karadzic, in

 7     terms of the two meetings that you described in your statement and even,

 8     in fact, the one you've just told us about, you really just -- your

 9     written evidence, the evidence you've just given, really just repeats

10     what he told you at that time, nothing further; right?

11        A.   In one part it does; in another part, it brings in slightly

12     additional information.  But -- but, say, new information or different

13     from what Dr. Karadzic and I discussed.

14        Q.   You would know, I suppose, because of your very senior position

15     at the UN that Ambassador Yasushi Akashi served as the SRSG for the UN

16     mission in the former Yugoslavia in 1994 and 1995.  You know that?

17        A.   I should know because I replaced Mr. Akashi as the head of the

18     Centre for Disarmament Affairs.  And I was for many years his special

19     assistant.

20        Q.   Absolutely.  And, so, you would have been aware that as the SRSG,

21     Ambassador Akashi was frequently engaged in discussions and meetings and

22     negotiations with the leadership of the warring factions?

23        A.   That was outside the purview of my responsibilities in the UN.  I

24     didn't really follow it closely.  I follow it only to the extent I got

25     information from media and it concerned my country, and that was of

Page 45513

 1     importance to me to know how the peace process was going on.  But I was

 2     not following it directly or in discussions with Mr. Akashi.

 3        Q.   Do you know -- maybe I wasn't clear.  But you would agree with me

 4     that his job was to sit and negotiate with the leaders of the warring

 5     factions; right?

 6        A.   I presume that was his job.

 7        Q.   Well, you said you were his special assistant for many years?

 8        A.   Yeah.  But not at the time when he was in charge of civil

 9     mission, peace-keeping mission in former Yugoslavia.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now I suppose then, though, you don't know that when

11     Ambassador Akashi came here to testify in this trial to give evidence for

12     Dr. Karadzic he confirmed that his experience with Dr. Karadzic was that

13     in negotiations Dr. Karadzic had a tendency to twist the truth rather

14     nonchalantly?

15        A.   No, I don't know about that and I'm not interested in his

16     description of Mr. Karadzic and his behaviour.  I had my own impression

17     which I tried to describe in this statement which you have not come to it

18     yet.

19        Q.   Oh, I'm happy to come to it.

20        A.   I hope you will.

21        Q.   I want to come to my March 1993 and your meeting with

22     Dr. Karadzic.

23             You mentioned that that was in the context of what was happening

24     in Bosnia.

25        A.   Yes.

Page 45514

 1        Q.   And I just want to talk about the context for a minute, and I'd

 2     like to establish it by having a look at what the Security Council

 3     understood was happening at that time, in March 1993, all right?

 4        A.   Yes, please do.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have a look at 65 ter number 01207.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  And I would -- and I would like to see the

 7     reference about the quotation of Ambassador Akashi.  I do not remember

 8     that he said something like that.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  That can be found at Defence Exhibit 3489.  That's

10     in page 80 of the actual book itself.  And we only tendered a number of

11     pages but the whole book has been uploaded for some reason, so that's why

12     I cite to page 80 of the actual book, but D349, and also transcript

13     pages 37757 to 37759 that was discussed.

14        Q.   But now to get to the matter at hand.  Dr. Davinic, just at the

15     bottom of this page that you see, there's a heading that refers to a

16     statement by the president of the Security Council.  And if we -- on

17     25 February 1993.  And if we go over to the next page, please, you see at

18     the top of that -- and if you have trouble seeing it, please say and I

19     can [overlapping speakers]

20        A.   No, I see it.  It's okay.

21        Q.   Thank you.  You see at the top of that page the Security Council

22     issuing a statement of deep concern that in spite of its repeated

23     demands, relief efforts continue to be impeded by Serb paramilitary

24     units, especially in the eastern part of the country and the enclaves of

25     Srebrenica and Cerska and Gorazde.

Page 45515

 1             And if we can go -- just move down to the bottom of this page.

 2     On the 3rd of March, 1993, the president of the Security Council issued

 3     another statement and we see that, that the Security Council indicate --

 4     indicates that it was condemning continuing unacceptable military attacks

 5     in Eastern Bosnia, condemning the resulting deterioration in the

 6     humanitarian situation in the region, and that it was appalled that even

 7     as peace talks are continuing, attacks by Serb paramilitary units,

 8     including, reportedly, the killings of innocent civilians were continuing

 9     in Eastern Bosnia.

10             So, Mr. Davinic, that's the public picture of what was happening

11     in Bosnia at that time - right? - from the words of the Security Council.

12     Fair?

13        A.   Yes, that's what it says in this report.

14        Q.   And -- and -- and you would have known about that, because you're

15     a very senior-level diplomat?

16        A.   That's your presumption.

17        Q.   Well, I'm asking you.  Security and disarmament was at the core

18     of your function in peacekeeping.  That's what -- you gave a statement to

19     that effect?

20        A.   Absolutely.  But then I would have to educate you the difference

21     between what was happening in -- in that part of the world, in any other

22     parts of the world, and my responsibilities.  My responsibilities pertain

23     to international security and disarmament as they relate to international

24     agreements, such as on prohibition of nuclear weapons, on chemical

25     weapons, on ban of conventional armaments, and so on.  And thus my

Page 45516

 1     responsibilities did not deal with issues pertaining to actual conflicts

 2     in any part of the world.  Therefore, I had nothing to do with the

 3     procedures of the Security Council that pertained to my responsibility as

 4     the head of the office for disarmament fairs or the

 5     Centre for Disarmament Affairs.  And therefore, if I knew anything about

 6     what was going on in the Security Council, I knew it as an individual as

 7     any other but not in my official capacity.  I did not attend the meetings

 8     of the Security Council, I did not receive the documents of the

 9     Security Council, and it was up to me to get these documents just for the

10     sake of knowing what was happening in the country to which I belonged and

11     where I wanted to go back to after my service in the United Nations.

12             I hope that you understand what I'm saying and that it's clear.

13        Q.   It does.  Did you know about it?  Did you know that this was the

14     situation, these were the reports of what was going on in Eastern Bosnia

15     at that time in whatever capacity, Dr. Davinic?

16        A.   I -- if you wish me, I will repeat it once again.  It was not

17     part of my responsibilities and therefore I did not follow it officially.

18     If I follow it privately, maybe I followed, maybe I did not.

19        Q.   Well, did you or didn't you?  Did you know that there was a

20     humanitarian tragedy that was unfolding in Srebrenica in March of 1993?

21        A.   No, I did not.  The way you ask me, I had to answer, no, I did

22     not, because you're not really listening to what I am saying.  And if I

23     may say, you're twisting my words.

24             JUDGE KWON:  No, I do not agree Ms. Edgerton ever twisted your

25     words.

Page 45517

 1             Her question was whether you knew or not whether such

 2     circumstances as referred to in this report existed at that time.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, if you allow me, if you please.  I may

 4     answer once again.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE WITNESS:  In my official capacity, I did not know anything

 7     about this, I did not receive documents, I was not aware of that, and it

 8     was not part of my responsibilities.  In my private capacity as an

 9     individual, who was concerned about the future of my country which turned

10     out not to be anymore my country in that size, I may have known or I may

11     have not known.  It was long time ago, and over the period of time there

12     were a lot of reports about crimes, about terrible things happening in

13     that part of the world committed by both side, by all sides, as a matter

14     of fact, in this conflict, and I cannot pin-point, and I say that in all

15     honesty with the intention to help this Court, that I cannot confirm with

16     certainty that at that particular point when Mr. Karadzic came to my

17     office I was fully aware of everything that was going on in the

18     Security Council.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   So when Dr. Karadzic dropped in at your office in March of 1993,

22     whenever he dropped in, you didn't discuss the situation in

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina with him?

24        A.   He had actually a meeting with the Secretary-General on the

25     38th floor.  My office was on the 36th floor of the building, the UN

Page 45518

 1     building.  And as I indicated in my statement he had heard from someone

 2     from the mission or at that time it was not -- it was actually a mission

 3     of Yugoslavia, but suspended from the membership, that there was someone

 4     from Belgrade serving in that high position and he expressed a desire to

 5     drop by and say hello.  So he came to my office with his associates, and

 6     as I said I think in my statement I took the initiative of telling him in

 7     my private capacity of why the implications in the world of what was

 8     going on in the country based on my attendance of various international

 9     meetings in which security issues were discussed in general, and some

10     preferences were made to the situation in Bosnia.  And my talk with him

11     focussed on the consequences that might actually occur after the end of

12     the war for -- related to alleged war crimes and other crimes committed

13     by warring sides in that conflict, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but

14     also in Croatia.  And I believe in my statement I said that he listen

15     with great attention, and I was quite surprised that he did not challenge

16     what I was telling him.  He listened very carefully.  One of his

17     associates - I don't remember his name - I think I mentioned was not

18     particularly interested in listening to what I was saying, but he was.

19             And his comment was basically that this was so because the

20     international community was not properly and fully informed of what's

21     going on and that the international media misled the public opinion

22     throughout the world by presenting the one-sided picture of -- of

23     gruesome crimes and other things which were happening, and he said that

24     that is exactly what he was trying to explain to the Secretary-General,

25     and with these words that he hoped that the situation, that the public

Page 45519

 1     opinion would, as a matter of fact, change its view of Serbian action.

 2     He departed, and he said that he would like to meet me whenever I had

 3     opportunity to visit him and that he would appreciate my views on what --

 4     what was going on with regard to Bosnia and peace efforts that he was

 5     involved in.  And that was the gist of -- of the meeting which lasted,

 6     and I would like to point out once again, to emphasise, that actually I

 7     did most of the talking about international ramifications of what was

 8     going on and that the way things looked to me -- and they didn't bode

 9     well for the leadership of Republika Srpska and that something had to be

10     done, either in terms of reaching peace agreement or changing the

11     perception that the world had about Serbian action there.

12        Q.   Well, looking at what I have just told you about the context and

13     the perception that the world had of Serbian action in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would take Dr. Karadzic's assertion that the world

15     didn't have the a truthful picture of what was happening to mean that he

16     was saying the Security Council's concerns were inaccurate?

17        A.   I believe that this sounds like your -- your conclusion.  Because

18     at that time, as I said, and I will repeat once again, I was not aware of

19     what the Security Council had adopted.  And, therefore, his remarks -- I

20     could not challenge his remarks because I didn't have basis to challenge

21     him.  He simply said what he said and I didn't have any reason to doubt

22     the sincerity of what he was saying.  But I would like to emphasise once

23     again, maybe I did not explain myself clearly, I told him that there was

24     a worldwide perception of gruesome things happening in -- in Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina and most of those things were attributed to the Serb side.

Page 45520

 1     And I told him that -- I say it once again that either he should bring

 2     the truth to the fore, if he could, or that something should be done to

 3     stop these things from happening because there might be a very serious

 4     consequences for those who would be charged later on with committing

 5     these kind of crimes.

 6        Q.   All right.  We'll move on.  I'd like to show you a document that

 7     dates from the 12th of March, 1993, and it's in relation to what you

 8     mentioned in paragraph 4.  You talked about Serbian authorities there.

 9     And I'd like to show you P6161.  It's some excerpts from the stenographic

10     notes of the minutes of the Supreme Defence Council from 12 March, 1993.

11             And I think if we go to the page 2 in your language, Dr. Davinic,

12     and just stay at the bottom of page 1 in English for the moment.  I'd

13     just like to direct you to a reference where Mr. Bulatovic says to the

14     meeting:

15             "We are obliged to understand that we can hardly co-operate with

16     someone who, like the prime minister of the Republika Srpska, advises us

17     to ethnically cleanse Sandzak and kill the Muslims there."

18             And then President Milosevic says:

19             "Who?"

20             And if you flip over to the next page in English, Mr. Bulatovic

21     explains that it's the prime minister of the Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic,

22     who advises the SDC to do this as soon as possible because Muslims

23     weren't to be trusted.

24             Now you talked about concerns about what was going on in Bosnia.

25     It's clear from this, Dr. Davinic, that in March of 1993 the Serbian

Page 45521

 1     authorities actually had serious concerns about the extremist views of

 2     some Bosnian Serb leaders supporting ethnic cleansing; right?

 3        A.   If you say so, because I don't know how you relate this to me.  I

 4     mean, I was UN official.  I had nothing to do with the meetings of

 5     Supreme Defence Council or whatever it was called in Milosevic's areas,

 6     and I had no contacts with them to be informed, so ...

 7        Q.   Well, at paragraph 4 of your statement in the English version

 8     that we have, you talked about the concerns of Serbian authorities about

 9     the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

10        A.   If you would allow me just to remind myself.  I have to read it.

11             I think that if I may, Your Honour, the sentence is very clear.

12     I was referring to discussions in that conference in Japan at which the

13     situation -- the security situation was discussed worldwide with special

14     references to what was going on in the Balkans, and I said that the

15     perception that it created worldwide - let me see once again - were

16     giving rise to concerns both to the authorities in Serbia and also in

17     Republika Srpska.  It is my conclusion based on what I heard, and, as I

18     tried to explain, my impression was that -- concern was so great that

19     eventually the consequences will be followed at one particular point in

20     time when all this is over.  My reference to concerns of the authorities

21     is not based on my knowledge that they were concerned.  I was suggesting

22     that they should be concerned in view of what was happening and it was

23     widely perceived by the international community and also in the UN that

24     Serbia at that time was helping war efforts in Croatia and

25     Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that based on concerns expressed by the

Page 45522

 1     international community, that this was contributing to the war efforts

 2     going on in -- in those two former republics of Yugoslavia that they --

 3     the question would be asked and that therefore it was time to consider

 4     how to rectify this situation.  This is what I was telling Dr. Karadzic.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  That makes -- that amplifies what you said in your

 6     statement and actually makes it much clearer, and it allows us to move on

 7     to what you said at paragraph 5, 6, and 7, and 8 of your statement.

 8        A.   Mm-hm.

 9        Q.   In relation to Markale II, there you were talking about some

10     comments from two colleagues, and one of whose name you couldn't

11     remember, and -- your comments related to the integrity of the Markale II

12     investigation.

13             Now, in the summary of your evidence, Dr. Karadzic said you

14     believed that for political reasons, the UN wanted to ensure that the

15     investigation would conclude that the attack came from the Serbs.  But

16     that's actually not expressed in your statement at all.

17             So was Dr. Karadzic's summary of your evidence correct?  Is that

18     what you believe?

19        A.   Do you want me to say what I believed in, or do you want me to

20     explain the factual situation?  Because I can tell you what I believed

21     in, but it is irrelevant.

22        Q.   I'd like you to -- there seems to be a discrepancies between what

23     Dr. Karadzic understood your evidence to be and read out into the public

24     record and what you said in your statement.

25             So I'd like to clarify what your position was.

Page 45523

 1             Is your position simply that you heard from two colleagues in

 2     New York some observations about the integrity of the investigation, or

 3     is your position that the investigation was specifically targeted against

 4     the Serbs?

 5        A.   In order to respond to your question, if Your Honour would allow

 6     me, I have to give you a more detailed explanation as to what actually

 7     happened, and then we can draw the conclusion as to what my position is

 8     or was at that time, if you would allow me.

 9        Q.   Just to understand, I'm asking you this because of the

10     discrepancy --

11        A.   Yeah.

12        Q.   -- between what Dr. Karadzic said and what you've written in your

13     statement.

14        A.   Yeah.

15        Q.   I'm not asking you to repeat your statement because we've

16     received that evidence --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we see what he wrote in his statement

18     first.  Let's find out whether there's a discrepancy at all.

19             Probably paragraph 6.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8.  So that would be pages 2

21     and 3, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  And if you could repeat Mr. Karadzic's summary.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Dr. Karadzic said that Dr. Davinic believed that

24     for political reasons the United Nations wanted to ensure that the

25     investigation concluded that the attack came from the Serb side.

Page 45524

 1             And that's at temporary transcript page 75.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, the crux of the question was, since we -- we

 3     could not find the exact passage Mr. Karadzic referred to in your

 4     statement, whether it is a consistent summary of your evidence or not.

 5             Can you answer the question now?

 6             THE WITNESS:  My answer could be found in paragraph 8 of my

 7     written statement, which is, I believe, quite clear.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:

10        Q.   Paragraph 8 of your written statement recounts what you heard

11     from a Greek colleague, who you don't identify, who said that the

12     political reasons had outweighed in the investigation on the ground,

13     which had been given the task of proving the attack came from the Serb

14     side.

15             So that's your position, not the position of your Greek

16     colleague?

17        A.   This is the position which I described as the information which I

18     had received from my colleague, who was working, actually, in the

19     Department for Peacekeeping Operations, and, as such, was knowledgeable

20     of what was going on.

21        Q.   Now, we've heard -- the Tribunal has heard, actually, in several

22     proceedings a lot about the investigation of that incident.  It's

23     received evidence of showing an extremely broad UN investigation into the

24     shelling, and there wasn't just one but three technical analyses from --

25     that involved a range of military people from different nations, and that

Page 45525

 1     included people with experience in crater analysis and people who were on

 2     the scene at the time, and they've heard evidence about their

 3     impartiality and their professionalism.  And in those -- that

 4     investigation included crater analysis, ballistics analysis, acoustics

 5     analysis, measurements, photos.

 6             So your colleague, whose name you can't remember, is asserting

 7     that these people who performed this wide investigation were all in

 8     collusion.  That's not your position at all, is it, Dr. Davinic?

 9        A.   I have no position on this issue because I was not involved in

10     investigations in -- in that place where this incident had taken place.

11     I did not have access to reports, technical reports of the UN

12     investigating teams or all other teams.

13             What I'm saying here is that a colleague of mine who was very

14     much involved in the work of peacekeeping operations in -- in the

15     Balkans, upon meeting me in passing, did mention this as something that

16     was much on his mind and that he felt that he should tell me this.

17             However, if you would permit me, Your Honour, I think that

18     this -- what I'm saying here must be seen in conjunction with previous

19     paragraphs in which I explain what preceded this statement of colleague

20     of mine that you mention I can't remember his name, because this, as a

21     matter of fact, would make some sense.  For some, this would confirm this

22     allegation that the instruction was to give -- to put emphasis on the

23     Serbian side, the responsibility; or some would consider that it was

24     conjunctional kind of statement, private statement, and therefore it has

25     no relevance.

Page 45526

 1             If you allow me, Your Honour, and if you don't mind, I will refer

 2     back to few paragraphs earlier than paragraph 8, in which I explained

 3     that that morning and we met --

 4        Q.   I'm sorry, with respect, Mr. Davinic, I don't need you to repeat

 5     your testimony in your written evidence.

 6        A.   Mm-hm.

 7        Q.   I just want to confirm, then, you've never seen any part of the

 8     technical reports into these investigations that I've just alluded to

 9     parts of.  You've never seen it.  I just want you to confirm that.

10        A.   Yes, I can confirm that I have not seen for the very simple

11     reason that it was not within the purview of my responsibility.

12             However, what you're trying to prevent me from saying is that I

13     was privy to political discussions which had the relevance to precisely

14     what you are trying to indicate as casual remark of no relevance to what

15     we are doing here.

16             So you draw your own conclusion, but I'm not happy that you are

17     preventing me from putting things together.  Because I can talk only

18     about political aspects of this case.  I'm not technical expert.  I was

19     minister of disarmament -- of defence but actually not technical expert

20     in weaponry and other things.  I'm expert in political issues.

21        Q.   You weren't privy to anything that was going on, on the ground?

22        A.   In technical terms, no; in political terms, I was.

23        Q.   So you actually -- you don't know that on that day, on the

24     28th of August, 1995, there wasn't just one shell that fell on the centre

25     of Sarajevo.  There were five, 120-millimetre mortars that were launched

Page 45527

 1     and impacted on the centre of the city between 10.50 in the morning and

 2     11.15 that morning.  You don't know that, do you?

 3        A.   I know.

 4        Q.   Oh, you do know now?

 5        A.   Not now.  You never asked me if I knew or I didn't know.  You

 6     asked me if I was privy to technical reports.  I was not privy to

 7     technical reports, but I had information how many shells were fired and

 8     which exploded, which did not explode, and I think that one that exploded

 9     exploded at 11.05 and not 11.15.  But it is immaterial; it exploded, one.

10        Q.   So if you know this, that five shells impacted, do you know then

11     that the primary charges on each of those mortars, that sort of core

12     element of those mortars, bore the marks of having been manufactured in

13     Krusik Valjevo in Serbia.  Do you know that?

14        A.   No, I don't.  And it is not relevant to political discussion

15     which took place I was privy to.

16        Q.   Do you know that that same marking which -- which showed -- which

17     showed that the primary charge was manufactured in Krusik Valjevo in

18     Serbia was also found on a mortar that exploded on the

19     18th of June, 1995, in Dobrinja in Sarajevo on a water-line.  Did you

20     know that?

21        A.   I think it is totally irrelevant to what I am witness to in these

22     proceedings.  I can give you some examples where, for instance,

23     American-made shells were used in various conflicted in the world by

24     terrorist organisations, Al-Qaeda, and so on and so forth.  So --

25        Q.   Dr. Davinic, that doesn't answer my question --

Page 45528

 1        A.   No, it does.

 2        Q.   -- did you know it or not?

 3        A.   No, I --

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I think that is quite

 5     responsive to the question.  He should be allowed to complete his answer.

 6             THE WITNESS:  You're asking me questions which, in my opinion,

 7     are irrelevant to my testimony here.  You're asking me technical details

 8     and I know what is the purpose of this.  I -- I'm -- Your Honour, I'm

 9     ready to oblige and ready to clarify, but if the Prosecution is asking me

10     irrelevant questions that we know for sure --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Davinic, whether it is relevant or irrelevant

12     will be monitored and ruled by us.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  Thank you, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  But if you could answer the question in a simpler

15     manner.  Yes.

16             THE WITNESS:  I did not know the designations of the production

17     or manufacturer of these particular shells or weapons that were used,

18     allegedly used -- or, not allegedly, it appears that according to you

19     that they were indeed used.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   Thank you.  I just want to go on to one other area and it's about

22     your meeting with Dr. Karadzic, the first meeting, in 1996.

23        A.   Mm-hm.

24        Q.   Because in your statement, you -- you note that Dr. Karadzic told

25     you at the time of the shelling the entire Bosnian Serb army refused to

Page 45529

 1     obey his orders.

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   Right?

 4        A.   He told me so.

 5        Q.   Now, on the eve of the air-strikes, actually it was on the

 6     4th of September, 1995, Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic and Mr. Krajisnik

 7     were in telephone contact, and General Mladic recorded those

 8     conversations on dictaphone cassettes, and I want to show you a section

 9     from a transcript of one of those, all right?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  It's 65 ter number 35038 at page 12.

11             And page 12 is the English language reference, please.

12        Q.   All right.  Now, so these three men were in conversation and they

13     were discussing ways to avoid shelling that night.  And at the very

14     bottom of this page in English, General Mladic says to Dr. Karadzic:

15             "You see, let me tell you, I cannot but act in keeping with your

16     decisions, your [sic] directives, and in line with my legal authority."

17             So despite what Dr. Karadzic said to you in 1996, at the time

18     General Mladic was telling Karadzic he was subservient.

19             It doesn't look -- this looks like a functioning chain of

20     command, doesn't it?

21        A.   It doesn't to me.  Since I had experience or have had experience

22     and as minister of defence I know what is the relationship between the

23     minister and chief of general staff and members of General Staff.  I

24     am -- would not interpret it that way, but I'm not saying this in order

25     to defend Mr. Karadzic, I'm simply responding to your question which was

Page 45530

 1     very explicit, asking me whether this was someone subordinate who the

 2     president of -- of -- of -- of the authority or not.  To me, it doesn't

 3     sound like that, but that's my personal view.  You asked for my personal

 4     view, not official interpretation of what transpired.  Because he also

 5     refers here to his legal authority.  When my generals referred to their

 6     legal authority, that meant don't interfere in what we are doing.  And

 7     this is not perhaps the time or the place, but I can tell you what

 8     problems I had with my generals when we were hunting General Ratko Mladic

 9     and I was in charge of these operations when we used foreign aircrafts to

10     chase him in -- in various parts of Serbia, how they responded, and how I

11     had to overrule them by going to even higher top authorities of the

12     country at that time.

13             So, therefore, based on my experience, this legal responsibility

14     of the chief -- of the general -- commander, chief of general staff, gave

15     him a great deal of responsibility.  But, please, I'm responding only to

16     your questions.  I am not taking sides as to who was responsible, who was

17     not responsible.  I'm giving interpretation because you asked me to give

18     you interpretation whether or not this was actually something that is in

19     line with your interpretation.

20        Q.   So you completely discount General Mladic's statement to

21     Dr. Karadzic that he "cannot but act in keeping with your decisions and

22     directives."  You completely discount that.

23        A.   No, I don't.  You ask me whether I -- you asked me for my

24     interpretation.  I said that his reference to his legal authority to me

25     means that he has a great deal of freedom to act on his own within that

Page 45531

 1     legal authority and nothing beyond this.  My interpretation doesn't go

 2     beyond this.

 3        Q.   I'm just going to leave that and ask you one further question,

 4     just to follow up on something you've alluded to in your hunt for

 5     General Mladic.

 6        A.   Yeah.

 7        Q.   Now, you said repeatedly in 2004, particularly, that

 8     General Mladic -- you said in statements to the press, you said:

 9     General Mladic was not on the territory of this country.

10             You said that.

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And -- and that was the time you were defence minister for

13     Serbia and Montenegro?

14        A.   That's correct.

15        Q.   At that time, we all now know that General Mladic was being moved

16     between different rented apartments in Belgrade.  And, Mr. Davinic, he

17     was being moved in military vehicles.

18        A.   The question is?

19        Q.   When you said to the public in September 2004 that General Mladic

20     was not on the territory of this country, that General Mladic wasn't

21     being protected by the army, that was untrue, wasn't it?

22        A.   Well, that's your interpretation.  And I take offence in your

23     words that it is not true.  In other words you're saying I'm lying.  I am

24     not.  And I will, with your permission, Your Honour, explain why you're

25     wrong and I'm right.

Page 45532

 1             You see, General Mladic, according to publicly available

 2     documents, was in public view until year 2002.  When we adopted

 3     Law on Co-operation with the Tribunal, he disappeared.  And he

 4     disappeared from military facility and it was not known where he was

 5     hiding subsequently.  Well, later on, we discovered a lot of things but

 6     that was at the time when I was no longer defence minister.  However,

 7     just to prove that I'm right in what I am saying or what I was saying at

 8     the time, I will then describe, with your permission, how we hunted

 9     General Mladic in September 2004.

10             By the way, I had a meeting with Carla Del Ponte at that time,

11     here in this building, a few days after unsuccessful attempt to apprehend

12     him to discuss further steps.  But that's beyond I believe your interest.

13     The interest at that time was that --

14        Q.   Mr. Davinic, it's correct, isn't it, that he was being moved from

15     place to place in VJ military vehicles?

16        A.   After 2002, I presume it is not.  But you interrupted me at very

17     important point which -- which proves that you are wrong.  Because, you

18     see, at the time when in 2004, Carla Del Ponte informed American

19     authorities that General Mladic would from Bosnia -- or, rather,

20     Republika Srpska cross into Serbia and meet his family in one of the

21     monasteries on the border with Republika Srpska.  And the authorities

22     from Washington through their embassy in Belgrade requested us to permit

23     at her request that their reconnaissance plane --

24        Q.   Mr. Davinic --

25        A.   Yes.

Page 45533

 1        Q.   -- I just asked you about the movement of General Mladic from

 2     place to place in VJ military vehicles.  And you said -- you said that

 3     you presumed that that was untrue.

 4        A.   No.  I didn't say that.  Again, we have problem in communication,

 5     so, therefore, I will be very slow in responding.

 6             I said that until 2002 it was publicly known that he was in

 7     Belgrade, attending football matches, attending concerts, going to

 8     wedding parties, and so on, and then after the adoption of the

 9     Law on Co-operation with The Hague Tribunal, he disappeared.

10             What happened after that was not known to me while I was minister

11     of defence.  However --

12        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  I think then you finally came to the

13     answer of the question.

14        A.   No.  I would ask the Court to add one sentence.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could you make it -- so what is your question?  What

16     is your answer to the question of Ms. Edgerton, whether Mr. Mladic was

17     being moved in Belgrade on VJ vehicles?

18             THE WITNESS:  That I don't know.  I know, however, that --

19             JUDGE KWON:  No, you didn't know at that time.  Do you now know

20     that it was the truth?

21             THE WITNESS:  No, I did not follow this after his arrest.

22             However, I know that he was supposed to come from Bosnia to

23     Serbia in September 2004.  That I know for sure because that was

24     discussed with Carla Del Ponte.  And it was unsuccessful attempt to

25     apprehend him, although we did everything possible, together with

Page 45534

 1     American reconnaissance plane, and special forces which were borrowed

 2     from UNPROFOR.

 3             So, my point is that, at that time in September 2004, he was

 4     supposed to come from Bosnia to Serbia.

 5             I'm not defending, Your Honour, Mladic.  Or I'm not actually

 6     speaking on his behalf.  I, in all honesty, don't know what is the

 7     purpose of questioning me on General Mladic because I'm here as witness

 8     to say what I discussed with Dr. Karadzic.

 9             Nevertheless, I'm very pleased to be able to explain my -- my

10     knowledge of what was going on with regard to General Mladic.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm done, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

16             Do you have any re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps two or three questions.

18                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Davinic, on page 79, there was some

20     insistence on the question concerning your meeting with me while you knew

21     I -- that I was a fugitive in the first half or the second half of 1996.

22             Did you have any knowledge about any kind of agreement that I may

23     have had that I would not be tried?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, Your Honours, no.  Absolutely not as

25     a result of anything to do with the cross-examination.  I normally don't

Page 45535

 1     interrupt Dr. Karadzic, but the witness is speaking rather quickly, and I

 2     just wanted this to be very clear.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I don't think this arises from the line of

 4     cross-examination.  You should have dealt with it in your direct

 5     examination, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I believe there

 7     was a dose of reprimand in the cross-examination in that question

 8     concerning Mr. Davinic meeting with me while knowing that I was a

 9     fugitive.

10             JUDGE KWON:  No, I don't see there was a reprimand there.  So

11     please move onto another topic.

12                           [Defence counsel confer]

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Dr. Davinic, you were shown on page 83 an UN document, describing

15     the conduct of Serbian paramilitaries.

16             Did you understand what my attitude was towards paramilitaries

17     and was it made known to the UN?

18        A.   No, I didn't know your -- your attitude towards paramilitary

19     forces.  My impression is that you had nothing to do with that and that

20     is paramilitary forces were under direct guidance, control of different

21     authorities.  It was widely believed that some of them were controlled by

22     Serbia, and by Milosevic, and that some of them were just rogue sections

23     of the military that were involved in robbery and crimes and other things

24     on their own, and I didn't hear anyone at that time or later attributing

25     or connecting you with this.  I say this based on my knowledge.  I'm not

Page 45536

 1     saying that it was true or not true.  Simply, I didn't have any knowledge

 2     of your connection with these paramilitary forces.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  What, Mr. Davinic, did you have in mind when you

 4     said a group controlled by Milosevic?

 5             THE WITNESS:  It was not my knowledge.  It was widely perceived

 6     by the international community, and you could read in all sort of media

 7     reports that some of those forces were directed and financed by Milosevic

 8     and his State Security Service.  So this is -- this is public knowledge

 9     which is not -- I was not privy to any secret documents or any

10     discussions with anyone that might have disclosed to me something that

11     was not known publicly.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes --

13             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I see that the minutes here do not

14     reflect exactly what I actually said here.  It says 35, 45, whatever it

15     is, I do not have a normal of your connection with this -- I did not have

16     any information of your connection -- or knowledge.  I would say I said I

17     did not have any knowledge of your connection with these paramilitary

18     forces.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for your correction.

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   I just want to show you one letter, D1933 in e-court, please.

24             Dr. Davinic, this is a letter addressed to the UN

25     Secretary-General.  Does it define my --

Page 45537

 1             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... Ms. Edgerton.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  No.  Again -- and I sat through the last session

 3     where Dr. Karadzic did the same thing.  This is re-direct examination.

 4     He can ask the question without showing the witness the document first.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 102, line 11.  I did cite a

 6     foundation.  A document of the UN was shown dealing with the activities

 7     of the paramilitaries that were certainly connected in me.  It was just

 8     shown to Dr. Davinic to ask him whether these paramilitaries that are

 9     said to be somehow involved with me were doing such and such things.  And

10     I'm asking Dr. Davinic how that would be viewed by the United Nations, if

11     they had received this letter.

12             THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Given that witness already answered he didn't know

14     about your position towards paramilitaries, would there be any further

15     point asking further questions in relation to paramilitaries?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe I've grown rusty in my legal

17     skills over the break, but I'll get the hang of it soon.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   All right.  Dr. Davinic, if the Chamber will not allow it -- but

20     with their leave, I would like you to answer on these letters.

21             Was it an isolated opinion of that friend of yours from the

22     United Nations concerning the political wishes to assign blame for

23     Markale 1995?

24        A.   No, it was not, actually.  It was a widespread belief.  And many

25     people in the corridors and in the delegates' lounge were talking about

Page 45538

 1     that, especially a few months later when NATO bombing started and when

 2     Serbian forces were actually pushed back from the siege of Sarajevo and

 3     when the peace process actually got under way.  Many people were

 4     saying -- but, again, I'm just conveying what I heard in the corridors

 5     that that was a very fortunate occurrence in the Markale place which led

 6     then to decisive actions by -- by the NATO forces to stop actually the

 7     fighting and then to initiate the peace process, which resulted in the

 8     Dayton and Paris Peace Accords.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown P150

11     briefly.  P150.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   This is a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Konings.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page.  We

15     need just the English.  Oh, there is a translation.  Next page, please.

16             Could we zoom in on number 3.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Dr. Davinic, I believe you'll be able to make out this

19     handwriting, or I will try, if you wish:

20             [In English] "The investigating team tried very hard to prove

21     that the attack came from the Serb side due to the normal use of heavy

22     mortars that is likely, but there is a hard -- no hard proof on this

23     fact," or something like that.

24             [Interpretation] Is this consistent with what you heard at the

25     headquarters of the United Nations?

Page 45539

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Before there is an answer on this, I just want to

 5     make the point that Dr. Karadzic is being a bit disingenuous with this

 6     document.

 7             There is evidence, the evidence is from the author of this

 8     document who's testified here that the reference to the investigation

 9     team does not refer to the UN investigation team.  The evidence -- and

10     it's Lieutenant-Colonel Konings, and I will be able to find the reference

11     in his evidence very briefly.  But the evidence from

12     Lieutenant-Colonel Konings is that this reference to the investigation

13     team refers to the local team on the ground, not his team which conducted

14     their work impartially and with integrity.

15             So if Dr. Karadzic is going to ask the question, I think it's

16     appropriate for him not to be disingenuous and say what the document

17     really is and take the surrounding evidence into context.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I will check.

19             THE WITNESS:  May I respond, Your Honour, or --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

21             Did Mr. Karadzic refer to this as being the UN investigating

22     team?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  No, he has not specifically, Your Honour.  He says

24     this is a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Konings.  And then he referred

25     immediately to point number 3 without explaining what that remark

Page 45540

 1     referred to.  Hence my point that Dr. Karadzic is being somewhat

 2     disingenuous.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Having heard the intervention, I believe that

 4     witness is now able to answer the question.

 5             Yes, Mr. Davinic.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7             I cannot comment on whether or not this referred to the UN report

 8     or any investigation carried out by somebody else.  I can only comment

 9     that that morning at the meeting with the under-secretary general for

10     political affairs, we got information that an attack had occurred earlier

11     this morning and that the problem with this was two-fold.

12             It created shock at the UN for two reasons.  One was humanitarian

13     because a large number of casualties occurred.  Over 40 dead and twice as

14     many injured.  And that was a civilian target and that created lot of

15     concern.

16             The other concern expressed at that meeting related to a

17     political aspect of this because the report - and maybe this, what I will

18     say, has some -- maybe it has some reference to what Dr. Karadzic

19     referred to now - did not indicate prima facie that one side could be --

20     that -- that -- that this shelling could be attributed to one side, the

21     Serbian side.

22             The first report was inconclusive in terms of who could have

23     committed this crime.  And, therefore, it could be one or the other side.

24     And then serious concerns were expressed as to who could have done it

25     because there was already rather well-established worldwide opinion that

Page 45541

 1     most of these things were done by the Serbian side, and if this could be

 2     proven with further investigation in the field, this would fit into the

 3     general perception.

 4             However, since this first report did not -- was not able to

 5     establish beyond shadow of a doubt that one side was clearly responsible

 6     and that it allowed that either side could have committed this particular

 7     attack, the instruction was issued to carry out investigation to the

 8     fullest possible extent and as -- as neutrally as possible because if --

 9     and this is the part which is rather important.  Because if the

10     investigation were to prove that the other side may have done this, it

11     would have serious political ramifications throughout the world because

12     this other side was perceived for years as the victim in this war.

13             Therefore, the instruction from the UN came, very strict

14     instruction, that every effort must be done to establish the truth beyond

15     shadow of a doubt.

16             Then the second report -- or the report that came both oral and

17     later written -- I'm not privy to the written directly.  I only heard.

18     That this reporting indicated possibility of the shell coming from either

19     side, but in view of everything else and maybe the evidence that the

20     Prosecution pointed to, that it is more likely that it came from the

21     Serbian side.

22             And it is in this context that my Greek colleague - that the

23     Prosecution referred to as unknown; I could not remember the name - told

24     me in passing that political considerations prevailed in giving credence

25     more to the possibility that it was perpetrated by the Serbian side.

Page 45542

 1             Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just explain something.  I

 5     just asked whether what Dr. Davinic heard from this Greek was just this

 6     one sole occasion or whether there were more things said to that effect.

 7             Let's see what General Janvier wrote about that.  P906, please,

 8     could we take a look at that.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I just wanted to let you know the Chamber must rise

10     five to 3.00.

11             THE ACCUSED:  We are done, Excellency.

12             Page 3, please.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   A moment ago, you said, Dr. Davinic, that you hadn't seen the

15     report but that you did here what was being said that.

16             Now I'm going read this sentence to you.  Line 7 or 8:

17             "[In English] The definition of firing positions for mortar

18     rounds is very difficult as it is impossible to determine the level of

19     charged -- charge used to fire the projectile."

20             [Interpretation] Does this correspond to what you had heard about

21     the reports of the UN?  Do you know who General Janvier was?

22        A.   Yes, I -- I know, certainly, who the general was.

23             And, once again, let me make it absolutely clear.  This was talk

24     of the day.  Everybody was talking in the UN corridors and in the

25     conference hall and in the delegates' lounge about this, so it was kind

Page 45543

 1     of a public secret.

 2             I'm saying "public secret."  Let me define what I mean.  That the

 3     issue in the opinion of those -- and I'm just conveying what I had heard.

 4     This is not my opinion.  I'm just saying what I had heard.  That this

 5     whole incident, tragic incident, was not investigated to the fullest.

 6     And that it -- the -- the -- the conclusion that it is most likely -- or

 7     more likely that the Serbian side perpetrated this crime came in rather

 8     handy for the political process that took place subsequent to this

 9     particular incident.

10             And that's what people were talking in the corridors.  I did not

11     discuss with them officially.  I didn't ask them for their opinion.  I

12     simply overheard them talking in the cafeteria, in delegates' lounge

13     having cup of coffee, or in some other informal circumstances.

14             Thank you.

15        Q.   Thank you for having testified, Dr. Davinic.

16             THE WITNESS:  I wish to thank you, Your Honour.  The Prosecution,

17     and Mr. Karadzic --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Unless my colleagues have a question for you, that

19     concludes your evidence.  Yes --

20             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Indeed, on behalf of the Chamber, the Chamber would

22     like to thank you for coming to The Hague to give it.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  You are free to go.

25             THE WITNESS:  It was pleasure.  Thank you.

Page 45544

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Hearing is adjourned.  We'll continue tomorrow

 2     morning.

 3                           [The witness withdrew]

 4                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.53 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 17th day of

 6                           January, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.