1 Tuesday, 4 February 2014
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness takes the stand]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies. I
9 would like to hear about your decision first regarding Rule 90(E) that
10 the witness evoked.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the Chamber has decided to compel the witness
13 to answer the question.
14 THE ACCUSED: I don't believe we have translation --
16 JUDGE KWON: I said the Chamber had decided to compel the witness
17 to answer the question.
18 Mr. Stanisic, do you remember the question?
19 WITNESS: MICO STANISIC [Resumed]
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Could it be repeated, please.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We kindly ask the witness
23 to approach the microphone.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could the question be put again so
25 that I can provide an answer.
1 JUDGE KWON: And in light of the submission of Mr. Zecevic, we'll
2 continue in public session. But if you would like to answer the question
3 in private session, please let us know in advance.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With your leave, I will repeat the
8 Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
9 Q. [Interpretation] Minister, did you when and in what way learn
10 about the crime at Koricanske Stijene?
11 A. Yes, I learned of it two or three days after the event. I was
12 informed by the assistant head of the centre in Banja Luka in charge of
13 crime. I sent my instructions to him orally at first, and then in
14 written form by way of dispatch. I sent my instructions to them in terms
15 of what they were required to do.
16 Q. Thank you. The investigating judge, Mr. Jankovic, who was
17 involved in the case, confirmed that he saw your telegram but that it
18 simply disappeared from the file.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown P03763
20 so that we can see whether it is the telegram in question which is then
21 conveyed further by Chief Zupljanin in his own telegram.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. We have the Serb version on the right. It states that he
24 received a dispatch on the 31st of August with the following contents,
25 and your name is cited.
1 Is this the telegram you were referring to?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Minister, according to what you know, were any measures taken at
4 the time conditions permitting by the MUP, because, of course, you cannot
5 address the issue of the judiciary?
6 A. I was informed that the witnesses who were gravely wounded were
7 found on the site and then transferred to the health centre in
8 Banja Luka. I was informed that they were being guarded by members of
9 the CSB Banja Luka so as to prevent any further harm from coming their
11 I was also told that there was an on-site investigation which
12 took some time and needed repeating because it was a very complex event
13 and that the investigating judge and the public prosecutor were also
14 informed and were taking part in the case.
15 Q. Thank you. Can you remind us of what you told us yesterday about
16 how things work once the judiciary is involved.
17 A. I guess I need to repeat once again.
18 As of the moment the investigating judge and the public
19 prosecutor take over the case, the minister of the interior can be
20 engaged only upon their request to gather information and carry out a
21 different procedure that they requested.
22 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether I or anyone else sent you any
23 kind of instructions or suggestions to sabotage the investigation or that
24 the state organs did not want to --
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
1 Yes, Mr. Olmsted.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Objection. Leading.
3 JUDGE KWON: Could you expand why it was leading.
4 MR. OLMSTED: The question should have been just put: Did he
5 send any instructions on this matter. Instead, Mr. Karadzic is
6 suggesting alternatives and therefore putting words into the witness's
7 mouth, or at least leading the witness to respond in a particular way.
8 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to add anything, Mr. Robinson?
9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President.
10 The definition of a leading question is one that suggests an
11 answer, and Dr. Karadzic's question doesn't suggest an answer. The
12 witness could equally answer it yes or no.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber sees the point where there's a part
15 which is technically leading a little bit, but the Chamber is of the view
16 we can go along with this question.
17 Can you answer the question.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No one communicated with me in this
19 regard. What I can say is that I had some indirect knowledge that the
20 Presidency established some kind of commission which was supposed to go
21 on site to assist. I believe it was the Defence Minister Bogdan Subotic
22 who led the submission, although it included other people whose names I
23 do not recall.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Thank you, Minister. Just one more question on the topic.
1 Let me see if this is already in -- no, it's not in.
2 Did the state bodies have an interest in not discovering the
4 A. State bodies should have no interest in not identifying
6 Q. Did they exhibit any such tendency, did they provide such
8 A. I don't know what was in other people's heads, but what I do know
9 is that there was no case similar to that.
10 Q. Thank you, Minister.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions of this
12 witness at the moment.
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes, Mr. Olmsted.
15 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. Olmsted:
17 Q. Mr. Stanisic, you were convicted of war crimes and crimes against
18 humanity by this Tribunal on the 27th of March, 2013, after a
19 two-and-a-half year trial and you were sentenced to 22 years of
20 imprisonment; isn't that correct?
21 A. Yes. By way of a trial judgement.
22 Q. And in particular, you were convicted for your participation in a
23 joint criminal enterprise that came into existence no later than the 24th
24 of October, 1991, and continued through 1992, the objective of which was
25 to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the
1 territory of the planned Serbian state through the commission of crimes
2 on a massive scale; isn't that correct?
3 A. I was no member of any joint criminal enterprise, and that is why
4 I appealed.
5 Q. I'm not asking whether you accept your conviction or the findings
6 against you. But that was, in fact, the findings of the Trial Chamber
7 after your trial; isn't that correct?
8 A. That is what one can read in the trial judgement. I assert it is
9 incorrect and that is why I appealed.
10 Q. And the Trial Chamber in your case also found that besides
11 yourself, the joint criminal enterprise included, among others,
12 Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Ratko Mladic, as well as a number of
13 members of the RS MUP leadership, including Stojan Zupljanin,
14 Predrag Jeseric, Andrija Bjelosevic, Simo Drljaca, Malko Koroman, and
15 others; isn't that correct? That's what they found.
16 A. One can find it in the judgement. But I assert I was no part of
17 any enterprise and that is why I appealed. I still await a decision of
18 the Appeals Chamber.
19 Q. And the crimes against non-Serbs of which you were convicted were
20 perpetrated in 20 municipalities, including Bijeljina, Kljuc, Prijedor,
21 Sanski Most, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Banja Luka, Brcko, Pale, and Vogosca;
22 isn't that correct? That's what the Trial Chamber found.
23 A. Would you be so kind as to show it to me so I can follow.
24 Q. I'll show you --
25 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have 65 ter 25895 on the screen and
1 turn to page 16.
2 Q. Mr. Stanisic, I only have it in English. I don't know if that's
3 going to cause any problems.
4 JUDGE KWON: Does it mean that we don't have translation at all
5 on the part of the Tribunal or it was not uploaded on the -- onto the
7 [Prosecution counsel confer]
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes. If I may be of assistance to the Trial
10 Chamber, the translation of the judgement is still pending I'm --
11 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: [Overlapping speakers] -- afraid, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
14 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
15 Perhaps, Your Honour, at this point I just direct Your Honours'
16 attention to the relevant paragraph in the Trial Judgement; that is,
17 trial judgement paragraph 927, which finds Mr. Stanisic guilty of crimes
18 committed in 20 municipalities, and the municipalities are dealt with
19 throughout the judgement.
20 Q. Sir, the crimes that you were convicted of included persecution,
21 killings, torture, unlawful detention, forcible transfer, plunder,
22 imposition of discriminatory measures, wanton destruction of towns and
23 villages, as well as the willful destruction of religious institutions;
24 isn't that correct?
25 A. Your Honours, if I may, I had no occasion to read my judgement
1 because it still has not been translated. I am familiar with some of its
2 parts, working on my appeal with the Defence team. However, off the cuff
3 I cannot recall many of the things you say. I would really like to be
4 able to follow. You enumerate many things and it's difficult to follow.
5 I apologise. If you put a summary question, I can't provide
6 specific answers. Could we go one thing at a time so that we can discuss
8 Q. At this stage I'm simply having you confirm what the
9 trial chamber found in the case against you. If you're unable to confirm
10 that those were what you were convicted of, I'll move on.
11 MR. OLMSTED: But, Your Honours, I think it'd maybe be best just
12 to admit these excerpts from the judgement into the -- into evidence and
13 Your Honours can review them at your leisure, since this witness is not
14 prepared to confirm them.
15 JUDGE KWON: I think his comment that he hasn't received the
16 translation is a -- fair enough. So why don't we just go on. Would you
17 like to tender the judgement?
18 MR. OLMSTED: Not the judgement. I took out some excerpts here,
19 I think it's 19 or 20 pages, and that would allow the Trial Chamber to
20 take into consideration what this witness was convicted of during the
21 course of his trial.
22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I think that's fair enough, Mr. President. I
24 think it goes to his credibility and it's fair to do that, but it should
25 be limited, so I'd like to have a chance to review the excerpts and we'll
1 see if we can agree on exactly what should be admitted.
2 JUDGE KWON: So if you could identify the part that you mean to
3 tender, Mr. Olmsted.
4 MR. OLMSTED: Perhaps we could just mark it for identification
5 now and can I look at that maybe during the break or sometime in the near
6 future and maybe work with Defence counsel on that.
7 JUDGE KWON: We'll deal with it when you tender that part later
9 Shall we continue?
10 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Q. Mr. Stanisic, you were interviewed by the Office of the
12 Prosecution from the 16th to the 21st of July, 2007. Do you stand by the
13 answers you gave during that interview?
14 A. I stand by each and every answer of mine. If you want me to be
15 more specific, I'm afraid you'll have to remind me.
16 Q. Certainly. And I might do that. But first of all I'd like to
17 ask you, and I understand that you haven't had a chance to read your
18 entire judgement in your language, but you recall that in assessing your
19 criminal responsibility the trial chamber in your case took into
20 consideration that you shared a close relationship with Radovan Karadzic
21 from at least June 1991. That's what the Trial Chamber found; isn't it
23 A. Even without being able to look at the judgement, I claim it was
24 improperly established, and that is why I appealed the decision of the
25 trial chamber.
1 THE ACCUSED: May I ask, your Excellencies --
2 JUDGE KWON: You overlapped. Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic.
3 THE ACCUSED: May I ask the question: Is the acquaintance with
4 me or close relation with me criminal act?
5 JUDGE KWON: That's not a proper intervention, Mr. Karadzic.
6 Shall we continue?
7 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, just while we have a
8 pause in --- I wanted to just call to the attention of Mr. Olmsted since
9 he is -- this is his first time here and make sure there's no
10 misunderstanding, and that's simply that the time of the direct
11 examination has been reported to us as three hours and 17 minutes. So I
12 assume that following our practice, Mr. Olmsted will, instead of the five
13 hours that the Chamber gave him, will now have three hours and 17 minutes
14 for his cross-examination. So I thought I should make that clear at the
15 outset so that he wasn't under any misapprehension.
16 JUDGE KWON: I take it you are aware of that practice.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, I'm sorry. I actually was operating
18 under the assumption that I -- I would have five hours. The reason being
19 is the number of general assertions made by Mr. Stanisic during his
20 direct examination, which are generally the ones that are contained
21 within his 92 ter statement so there really isn't -- not much of a
22 difference between the two. And in order to address those
23 generalisations, I will unfortunately have to be showing the witness a
24 number of documents, and showing documents will take time and therefore I
25 would request that at least the Trial Chamber will take into
1 consideration granting me the five hours that it originally granted me.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: Well, Mr. Olmsted, the Chamber will stick to its
4 practice. You'll be given the same amount of time that the Defence has
5 spent. But as -- as always, if good cause is shown at the end of your
6 cross, the Chamber is minded to consider to allow you some extension.
7 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. By way of example of your relationship with Mr. Karadzic --
9 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have 65 ter 31796 on the screen.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour, just one
11 thing to say. When you speak I receive interpretation in my earphones,
12 and you seem to be rather loud and then I have a problem hearing
13 interpretation since we are relatively close. I'm unable to follow
14 interpretation. You speak rather loudly, and then I have my
15 interpretation interrupted. Perhaps it could be dealt with.
16 Q. Thank you. I'll definitely take that into consideration.
17 A. Thank you.
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Maybe there's an overlap in his
19 microphone -- we'll take a look into that.
20 Yes, please continue.
21 MR. OLMSTED:
22 Q. Now, this is a telephone intercept of a conversation between you
23 and Mr. Karadzic on 12 June 1991, and this was admitted in your case.
24 And in this intercept, we see that Karadzic called you at your home. He
25 referred to you as Mico. You talked a little bit about your son. And
1 then Mr. Karadzic - we might have to go to the next page - invited to you
2 his home. Correct?
3 A. I'd like to see the context. Can you go back to the previous
4 page? I'd like to see the whole conversation.
5 Mr. Prosecutor, at that time, I was a secretary of the Sarajevo
6 SUP. Whatever problems there were with regard to the persons who
7 provided security in town or, rather, who were entitled to security,
8 party leaders, their assistants and other VIPs who were to be protected
9 by the ministry, I, as the secretary of the SUP, i.e., the secretariat,
10 looked after their security and everything that happened in the area. At
11 home, I had a special telephone, a special line, as we call it, that
12 anybody could dial and call me if there were any problems.
13 Q. And during this telephone conversation, you addressed
14 Mr. Karadzic as Mr. President. Were you referring to his position as
15 president of the SDS?
16 A. Yes. That's how I addressed Izetbegovic and Kljujic. They liked
17 to be called that and it was also a matter of courtesy and it was not a
18 problem at all.
19 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, we don't have any objection.
21 But I note that on the subject line of the English translation there is
22 an error, so perhaps that can be revised.
23 JUDGE KWON: It should read "Mico Stanisic" instead of
24 "Milan Babic." Yes, we'll admit it.
25 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6624, Your Honours.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the witness wanted
2 to see the context. We can see the first and the last page, but that's
3 not the entire context. I want to see the context. I want to see it, if
4 nobody else does.
5 JUDGE KWON: I think that's -- of two pages. That's all.
6 Shall we continue?
7 MR. OLMSTED:
8 Q. Yesterday you testified that you were on the initiative committee
9 of the democratic party of BiH. What you didn't mention was that you
10 were, for a period of time in 1990, on the SDS Main Board, weren't you?
11 A. This is a misinterpretation, Mr. Prosecutor. The SDS did not
12 exist in 1990. Initially the party was established as the democratic
13 party of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It changed its name on the eve of the
14 assembly, which happened on the 12th of July in Skenderija, in Sarajevo.
15 As I told you yesterday, I don't know the reasons. I can only speculate
16 because I was not a member of the body that discussed the change of the
17 name. The party was supposed to be led by Professor Kecmanovic. I was a
18 member of the Initiative Board because on that day it was established
19 under the name the Serbian Democratic Party, and that's all can I tell
20 you and that's all I witnessed.
21 Q. I appreciate your willingness to give full answers, Mr. Stanisic.
22 But given my limited time, a simple yes or no would be fine and if
23 necessary a short explanation. You do not need to repeat what you said
25 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have 65 ter 21548 on the screen.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Hasn't been released, Mr. Olmsted.
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I apologise. There's a brief delay
5 Q. Mr. Stanisic, while waiting for this document, I'm going to put
6 to that in 1991 you were still a member of the SDS and that is why you
7 addressed Mr. Karadzic in that last intercept as "Mr. President"?
8 A. No.
9 MR. OLMSTED: Let's have 65 ter 18874 on the screen.
10 Q. This is an invitation to SDS members employed in government
11 ministries and other republican organisations to the session of the SDS
12 Deputies Club.
13 MR. OLMSTED: If we could turn to page 2.
14 Q. We see that your name is listed under number 29 as secretary of
15 the city secretariat of interior. That's the position you held from
16 May 1991 until February 1992; isn't that correct?
17 A. It is correct that I occupied that position. Mr. Prosecutor,
18 these are the people who were appointed to the positions that were given
19 to the SDS when there were negotiations between the HDZ and the SDS on
20 the distributions of posts. I explained that yesterday.
21 When there were negotiations about the distribution of posts
22 between the HDZ, the SDA, and the SDS in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was
23 intended to result in the proportional representation of the ethnic
24 groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At that time, there was a coalition of
25 the SDA, the SDS, and HDZ, and that coalition was in power in Bosnia and
2 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It says here that those were
6 members of the SDS. Not interpretation. In the translation. Which is
7 why Mr. Olmsted may have been misled. The translation is wrong.
8 JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers]
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not the interpretation, the
11 JUDGE KWON: Why --
12 MR. OLMSTED: If we could --
13 JUDGE KWON: Shall we go to the first page.
14 MR. OLMSTED: Yeah.
15 JUDGE KWON: B/C/S as well.
16 MR. OLMSTED: And if -- with the leave of Your Honour, if the
17 interpreters could read the --
18 JUDGE KWON: No, the interpreters do not do that.
19 Mr. Stanisic, could you read out the title of this document,
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "To the Session of the Serbian
22 Democratic Party Group," and that group was made up of the MPs in the
23 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "invite the following cadre of the
24 SDS employed in the government ministries and other republic
25 organisations." This means that the posts were given to the SDS and they
1 were given to the officials from the ranks of the Serbian people which
2 doesn't have to mean -- and I claim that at least 60 per cent of the
3 names that you can see here were of the people who were non-partisan who
4 were not members of any party.
5 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic, if you read that like this, it's very
6 difficult for us to distinguish what is in the document and what is
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I thought I would be
9 of assistance. I apologise.
10 JUDGE KWON: But I leave it at that.
11 Shall we continue?
12 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, was this admitted into evidence?
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.
14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6625, Your Honours.
15 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have now 65 ter 21548 on the screen.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, I'd like to intervene.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Cadres are not translated --
19 JUDGE KWON: I'd like you to raise in your re-examination.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a technical issue. And
21 this is an error on the part of the translation service. I don't want to
22 waste my time on that.
23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic gave his interpretation about this.
24 And then if there's an issue with its written translation, you can raise
25 it in writing.
1 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think the issue is with the oral
2 translation. The word "cadre" was translated where the word "member"
3 appeared in the English. To us, understanding it, "cadre" and "member"
4 seem to be the same. But as what Dr. Karadzic is trying to say is that
5 it has a different meaning and another word should have been used by the
6 interpreters when they were translating what Mr. Stanisic read. So it
7 might be useful to clear that up.
8 JUDGE KWON: When Mr. Stanisic read the document, it was noted in
9 the transcript: "Invite the following cadre of the SDS employed...," so
10 what that means could be clarified with the witness by Mr. Karadzic in
11 his re-examination. He didn't -- it was not translated as "members."
12 MR. ROBINSON: I think Dr. Karadzic is saying that the term
13 "cadre" is also wrong, that that's not correct translation for that term
14 that's used in Serbian. It's --
15 JUDGE KWON: But then that's not a subject to interfere with
16 Mr. Olmsted's cross and in wasting time. He has other means to raise it
17 and properly.
18 MR. ROBINSON: But you've told us to, when we have an
19 interpretation error in court, to raise it -- that he's entitled to raise
20 it at that time so that we don't proceed on a false premise for the rest
21 of the examination. That what's he did.
22 JUDGE KWON: Still, I don't follow. What should be the proper
23 word for this "cadre"?
24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Dr. Karadzic doesn't believe that that's a
25 proper interpretation of the word in Serbian that appeared on the
1 document. "Cadre" to me means the same thing as member, and he says that
2 what's expressed in the document is the people who occupied the post
3 allocated to the SDS, not people who were members of the SDS.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure this "cadre" means a member.
6 But, yes, Mr. Karadzic, could you expand on your reasons? What's
7 wrong with this translation?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, almost nobody on the
9 list was an SDS member and it --
10 MR. TIEGER: [Overlapping speakers]
11 JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers] ...
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- appears that --
13 JUDGE KWON: No, you stick to your meaning of "cadre" in the
14 issue of translation.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "Cadre" in the Serbian means or
16 denotes somebody who was nominated by the party, not that it is its
17 member. The way it is interpreted translated in English, it appears that
18 they are members of the SDS and they are not members of the SDS they are
19 the cadre of the Serbian people. [In English] Not members of the SDS,
20 cadre of the SDS.
21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic made it clear that he was not a member
22 and he explained it. I think we have heard sufficient explanation about
24 You may raise it in your re-examination again, if necessary.
25 Please continue, Mr. Olmsted.
1 MR. OLMSTED:
2 Q. Mr. Stanisic, on the screen we have a document that is --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Tieger switch
4 off his microphone, please.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that.
6 MR. OLMSTED:
7 Q. We have a list of the SDS Main Committee members. And do you see
8 your name under number 19?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6626, Your Honours.
13 MR. OLMSTED:
14 Q. While you were RS MUP minister in 1992, you followed the policies
15 of the SDS Presidency, didn't you?
16 A. No, not the Presidency of the SDS. Please. If you want to refer
17 to a place where I said something, when it comes to the SDS policy, the
18 party establishes that through the laws that it passes as a majority
19 party. I functioned within the framework of the Law on Internal Affairs
20 which was the product of the SDS policy. And it is true that by applying
21 provisions of the law in my work I observed the decisions because I
22 believed that there was nothing incriminating there because the Law on
23 Internal Affairs in the Republika Srpska was copied from the law of the
24 former Bosnia and Herzegovina with slight changes because the communism had
25 disappeared, there was no socialist party etc, but in essence it was a copy
1 of that law. For me that was the policy, which means that the policy was
2 established in the assembly and what was clearly adopted in the assembly
3 was also adopted by me. Everything that was within the framework of the
4 constitution and laws as a product of the SDS policy. I observed that, I
5 complied with all those things, and I did not notice any discrimination
6 either in the constitution or the laws that were passed by the assembly
7 whose members were also members of the SDS.
8 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have P1105 on the screen. And if we
9 could turn to page 15 of the English; page 16 of the B/C/S.
10 Q. Now during the 22nd Session of the RS Assembly on the 23rd of
11 November 1992, you stated:
12 "I as a man have followed policies of the SDS Presidency and our
13 deputies in the former state. I have always followed these policies.
14 Those who want to separate me from them, I will always be with them until
15 it is shown that their wishes an intentions differ from those of their
16 people. Those who want to separate me from that are making a big
17 mistake. I will not allow that even if it costs me my life, let alone a
18 ministerial post."
19 That is a level of dedication that you expressed at the 22nd
20 Session, Assembly Session. Isn't it correct?
21 A. This is precisely the answer that I provided a little while ago,
22 Your Honours, and I emphasised the framework which is provided for by the
23 laws that were passed by the MPs, this is what I complied with. There is
24 nothing discriminatory in those laws. I respected decisions passed by the
25 members of the Presidency. You saw in my requests where I ask that problems
1 be resolved, where I received support, and for as long as things were
2 like that, I said I would comply with everything. That's how things were.
3 Whenever I sensed that something went beyond that framework, I left the
4 territory of Republika Srpska.
5 Q. Again, Mr. Stanisic, I ask you to try to keep your answers short
6 and focused on my question. Now, this same level of dedication to SDS
7 policies was shared throughout the RS MUP, wasn't it?
8 A. The policy, that was formulated through the laws that were passed
9 by the assembly, and its members were mostly members of the SDS, was
10 implemented by the Ministry of Interior through the implementation of its
11 missions and tasks.
12 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could quickly look at 65 ter 18389.
13 Q. And this is a report by CSB Sarajevo on certain political
14 security aspects in the area dated 15 November 1992.
15 MR. OLMSTED: If we could turn to page 2 in both versions.
16 Q. We see towards the bottom of the English that the CSB Sarajevo
17 reports that the SDS had its support primarily in the police. That was
18 the case, wasn't it, Mr. Stanisic?
19 A. Only based on the laws passed by the assembly. That was
20 available to us. The laws were publicised as a result of the work of the
21 SDS MPs, and those laws for us were the framework with which -- within
22 which we functioned. And I told you just a minute ago what I thought
23 about laws in general.
24 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honour, may this be admitted into evidence.
25 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, this is a five-page and
1 pretty dense document which I am trying to read as we go along, and he
2 only put to him one phrase from the document which he read out. I don't
3 think there is a basis to admit the entire document. But we may not have
4 any objection once we have had a chance to assess it, it's -- what the
5 whole thing is. But on principle, I think he's put to the witness the
6 part of the document that he wanted and it doesn't need to be admitted.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to add anything, Mr. Olmsted?
9 MR. OLMSTED: Except for it, Your Honours, that we're tendering
10 this because it goes to the witness's credibility with regard to the
11 issue of SDS.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, the issue is whether to admit this page or in
13 its entirety.
14 MR. OLMSTED: We would want it to be admitted in its entirety so
15 that it can be put into its context, but I'll leave that to Your Honours'
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit only the page shown to the witness.
19 Shall we assign the number.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6627, Your Honours.
21 MR. OLMSTED:
22 Q. Mr. Stanisic, during the 1991/1994 period, it was Mr. Karadzic
23 and Mr. Krajisnik who determined SDS policy. Wasn't that the case?
24 A. Mr. Karadzic was the president of the SDS; whereas, Mr. Krajisnik
25 was the Speaker of the SDS Assembly. And it is true that they were the
1 most responsible people. Now, as to what they did and what kind of
2 relationship they had is something that I can't comment upon because it
3 would be pure speculation on my part.
4 MR. OLMSTED: Well, let's look at 65 ter 25865. And if we could
5 have page 73 of the English version, page 41 of the B/C/S.
6 Q. Mr. Stanisic, this is from your interview back in 2007. And we
7 can see that you stated the SDS policy was run by Karadzic and Krajisnik.
8 Further along you say no individual could influence their policy, not
9 even the deputies in parliament. Further along you say we were, so to
10 say, with them but we were below them or under them.
11 Sir, when you refer to the word "we," you're referring to the
12 Bosnian Serb authorities, aren't you?
13 A. I apologise, Mr. Prosecutor, this is what I just told you. They
14 were the highest organs. Krajisnik was the speaker of the parliament and
15 Mr. Karadzic was the president of the party, and it was only normal that
16 they were the most responsible for the creation of the policy because one
17 of them would become the president of the state and the other one was the
18 speaker of the parliament.
19 Q. And the regional and municipal Crisis Staffs were subordinate to
20 the RS Presidency; isn't that correct?
21 A. There was a War Presidency at the level of the republic and there
22 were presidencies at the levels of the regions and municipalities. And
23 obviously along the line of subordination, bodies at the lower level were
24 accountable to the bodies at the higher level.
25 Q. And the RS Presidency both verified the decisions of the regional
1 and municipal Crisis Staffs as well as the composition of those bodies;
2 isn't that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And, in fact, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik implemented SDS
5 policies through the regional and municipal Crisis Staffs; correct?
6 A. Well, you see, I would just like to add that from the moment when
7 one of them became the president of the republic and the other one the
8 speaker of the assembly, they pursued state policy. And I already said
9 how anywhere in the world parties defined their policies through
10 parliament because Krajisnik and Karadzic could not be beyond the law.
11 But through members of parliament, they could influence the profile of
12 the laws in parliament.
13 Q. Let's quickly turn to page 259 of your interview. That's in the
14 English. Page 139 of the B/C/S. And in the English version, I'm
15 referring to the very bottom where you stated during your interview:
16 "Those Crisis Staffs performed the initiative of national parties ...,"
17 that's correct, isn't it?
18 A. Well, yes. All national parties in extraordinary circumstances
19 or when the war was going on had these Crisis Staffs but through the
20 state organs. As I said a moment ago, they could exercise this control
21 through laws and bylaws that were passed in the assembly. I'm sorry. I
22 cannot speculate in terms of whether somebody did something individually.
23 I am telling you about what I knew and what my view was, how a state
24 should function.
25 Q. When Prime Minister Djeric attempted to regulate the Crisis
1 Staffs in April 1992, Mr. Karadzic prevented him and warned him that the
2 organisation of local self-government is not within the competence of the
3 government but in the competency of the Presidency; isn't that correct?
4 A. Territorial organisation and the establishment of the territorial
5 organisation was under the assembly; and in an emergency, then the
6 Presidency can replace it but inform the assembly. And that's what our
7 Djeric did. And now this instruction, what Crisis Staffs should be like.
8 That was withdrawn the very next day.
9 [Prosecution counsel confer]
10 MR. OLMSTED:
11 Q. Well, to clarify this issue, why don't we turn to the next page
12 in the English. And you stated during your interview:
13 "So on 24th of April, the government tried by means of an
14 institution or instruction or guide-lines to reorganise those Crisis
15 Staffs. However, the Presidency headed by Mr. Karadzic warned Mr. Djeric
16 that the organisation of local self-government is not in the competence
17 of the government but in the competence of the assembly or the Presidency
18 until the assembly is constituted," and that his views were not in line
19 with that of the members of the Presidency.
20 And then you go on and say that this was formulated in a letter
21 and down the road the War Presidencies were established.
22 MR. OLMSTED: If we could turn to the next page.
23 Q. "But" -- and this is what you said during your interview: "But,
24 in essence, nothing changed." That's what you said during your interview
25 and you stand by that, don't you?
1 A. I stand by every word that I uttered. That's the way it was;
2 that was the information that I received at the government. It wasn't
3 only I. The entire government did. Then this instruction with withdrawn
4 on the organisation of the Crisis Staffs. And later on, Presidencies
5 were established. Actually first it was commissioners, I think, and then
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
8 be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic, could you come closer to the
10 microphone when you speak. Thank you.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure that line 12 is
14 correctly typed out. I think the witness said "reorganisation" and here
15 it says "organisation." And also in the interview, it says "redefining
16 Crisis Staffs."
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic, can you assist us on this -- on this
18 one? Did you say "organisation" or "reorganisation"?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, to change the organisation
20 that existed until then. To have certain changes.
21 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
22 Please continue.
23 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, just having a discussion with
24 Mr. Tieger, and I would like to tender some of these portions from his
25 interview. We loaded them, though, as one, the whole -- the whole
1 interview, and I think obviously we just want the extracts. So with your
2 leave what I'll do at the end of his testimony is I will just extract
3 them, send them to the Defence, they can review them and make sure that
4 they're happy with extract, and then we tender them at that stage.
5 JUDGE KWON: But we'll admit only those pages shown to the
7 MR. OLMSTED: Absolutely, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any observation, Mr. Robinson?
9 MR. ROBINSON: No, that's fine, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry. Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
11 MR. ZECEVIC: I know that I have no standing about the documents
12 in this case and that is not my comment.
13 I just wanted to make sure that my learned friend in the future
14 when he refers to something, may we please have the Serbian version on
15 the screen also for the fairness to the witness so he can read what --
16 what Mr. Olmsted is referring to. Thank you very much.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic. I meant to come to that
18 issue. Yes.
19 Please bear that in mind, Mr. Olmsted.
20 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
21 And, Mr. President, I wasn't aware that the B/C/S wasn't keeping
22 up with me.
23 JUDGE KWON: I said I meant to come to that issue. Yes.
24 MR. OLMSTED:
25 Q. Now, Mr. Karadzic exercised control over you as a MUP official,
1 didn't he?
2 A. Mr. Karadzic was president of the republic, and his authority is
3 clearly defined by the constitution and a series of other laws.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, could Mr. Olmsted specify
5 whether he is referring to an official before the war or when he was a
6 minister or, rather, during the war.
7 MR. OLMSTED: I'm meaning the whole period, Mr. Karadzic.
8 Q. Yesterday you testified that Mr. Zepinic and Mr. Mandic told you
9 that they had consent to offer you the position of secretary of the SUP.
10 That consent was provided by Mr. Karadzic, wasn't it?
11 A. I was informed that they had Karadzic's consent. That is not
12 controversial. That is to say that they had agreed that I would accept
13 this position of secretary, so that was this official talk. The one that
14 Mandic conducted with me.
15 Q. And be -- between your two terms as minister of the interior,
16 between 1992 -- after you left in 1992 and before you were reappointed in
17 1994 or the end of 1993, you served as advisor to Mr. Karadzic, didn't
19 A. No. I just -- actually, at that moment when I was relieved of my
20 duties, when I held no post, I went to Belgrade. Then Mr. Karadzic
21 issued a decision stating that I was advisor so that I would not be
22 subjected to mobilisation, otherwise I should have to go out as a
23 soldier. I insisted on that, that I should be free of any obligation
24 towards the army because, after all, I worked a lot there on getting rid
25 of criminal groups, and I certainly exposed my life, well, if I were to
1 come as a soldier into that area. But I was not in Republika Srpska.
2 With my family, I was in Belgrade.
3 MR. OLMSTED: If we could quickly have 65 ter 22032 on the
5 Q. This is a letter from you dated 7 April 1993, and you sign it as
6 republican advisor for domestic politics. And in it you refer to an
7 order by the president of the RS. You sent this document, didn't you?
8 A. No. This is not my signature. I don't know who sent this. This
9 is not my signature. Take a look at this. Compare it. I really don't
10 know. This is the first time I see this. As a matter of fact, it
11 doesn't even say "for," and then a different signature.
12 Q. Mr. Karadzic was behind your appointment to your second term as
13 minister of the interior, wasn't he?
14 JUDGE KWON: But let's see whether the witness agrees whether he
15 was a republican advisor for domestic politics.
16 Do you agree you were in that position?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I received a decision on
18 appointment in order to be protected from mobilisation and from being
19 sent to the front line, because I held no position at that point in time.
20 But I was in Belgrade with my family. In fact, I did not have any job.
21 JUDGE KWON: Back to you, Mr. Olmsted.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, with that answer I would tender
23 this for purposes of impeachment.
24 MR. ROBINSON: Well, since there's no authentication of the
25 document, Mr. President, we would object.
1 [Prosecution counsel confer]
2 MR. OLMSTED: And I -- I actually withdraw my -- my offering
3 initially. I tender it for all purposes, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: The basis upon which we can admit it?
5 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, it certainly goes to
6 credibility. But we submit that it is an authentic document. Obviously
7 the witness claims that he didn't sign it, but it is -- there is no
8 challenge as to its authenticity on a basis of where it came from or its
9 provenance, so we would tender it into evidence.
10 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether witness confirmed that he was
11 in that position at all. Do you have any other evidence?
12 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, that he was an advisor to the
13 Presidency? Yes, we do. I would direct your attention to P1382 which is
14 the 36th Session of the RS Assembly, page 51 of the English, in which
15 Prime Minister Lukic identifies Mr. Stanisic as advisor to the president.
16 JUDGE KWON: Your answer, Mr. Stanisic, was not clear to me. Do
17 you agree you were at one point of time a republican advisor?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, formally yes; but in
19 fact, no, because in that period of time I lived in Belgrade with my
20 family. This document has nothing whatsoever to do with me.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will mark it for identification until
23 the time that the Chamber would be satisfied with its authenticity.
24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be MFI'd P6628, Your Honours.
25 MR. OLMSTED:
1 Q. Mr. Stanisic, Mr. Karadzic was behind your appointment to your
2 second term as minister of the interior, wasn't he?
3 A. I cannot give a short answer because this is rather more complex.
4 It is certain that Karadzic gave his support there because after I left
5 problems cropped up again in the territory of Republika Srpska, and the
6 professional part of the Ministry of Interior insisted that they bring me
7 back because the person who became minister did not really know anything
8 about the interior, and then these para groups started returning, and
9 then crime again was in full sway and they insisted that I come back, and
10 indeed I did come back. That's true.
11 Q. Yes. And I'm not asking for the reasons of your reappointment,
12 but Mr. Karadzic's authorisation was -- was necessary for your
13 appointment, wasn't it? He had to approve it.
14 A. Well, yes. I said that. It is certain that Mr. Karadzic agreed
15 to that because ...
16 Q. And in July 1994, Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik removed you from
17 the position of minister of the interior because you were collecting
18 information about financial crimes committed by them and members of their
19 family; correct?
20 A. It is correct that in July 1994 I was removed and that precisely
21 shows my position of principle; namely, that I just followed the law, not
22 any individual, even if that individual was an official. And that is why
23 I clashed not only with Krajisnik but I think with the vice-premier too
24 and a few members of the government. As for Mr. Karadzic, I held it
25 against him because he stood by them and I was dismissed.
1 Q. Let's turn to 65 ter 25865. This is your interview again. And I
2 want page 171 of the English on, page 95 of the B/C/S.
3 And we see that you stated during your interview:
4 "So when Karadzic and Krajisnik found out that their brothers and
5 the people who were around them were being interviewed, immediately
6 organised for me to be removed from the position."
7 A. I'm not receiving any interpretation.
8 Q. I'll try again. Could you --
9 JUDGE KWON: Do we have that passage before us?
10 MR. OLMSTED: Yes. It's in the first paragraph.
11 JUDGE KWON: I mean the B/C/S.
12 MR. OLMSTED: I believe it's -- I mean, as I don't read B/C/S, I
13 can't confirm, but I was told that it's on page 95. Yes. And I think it
14 is. If you look at the first answer given by Mr. Stanisic, it's -- it's
16 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I can confirm that. Thank you.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
18 Q. During your interview, Mr. -- could you hear? Yes.
19 Mr. Stanisic, during your interview, which is in front of you, you said:
20 "So when Karadzic and Krajisnik found out that their brothers and
21 the people who were around them were being interviewed, immediately
22 organised for me to be removed from the position."
23 That was the case, wasn't it?
24 A. I didn't change anything a moment ago. That's the way it was.
25 Well, it had to do with white-collar crime. And you can see from my
1 behaviour in 1992 towards another member of the Presidency. As soon as I
2 noticed that there were reasons for violating the law, I ordered action
3 regardless of who was involved. And that confirms that my attitude was
4 only professional, even if this were the speaker of the assembly, the
5 president of the state, a colleague, or anybody.
6 Q. And around the time of your removal in 1994, you told
7 Mr. Karadzic that he tried to instill into you the members of the
8 government and members of the Presidency are supposed to be untouchables
9 to the MUP; isn't that so?
10 A. Could you please repeat that for me? It was a very long question
11 and it was not precise enough for me to give an accurate answer. Could
12 you please repeat your question?
13 Q. Certainly. Around the time of your removal in 1994, you told
14 Mr. Karadzic that he tried to instill in you that members of the
15 government and members of the Presidency are supposed to be untouchables
16 to the MUP, didn't you? You had that conversation.
17 A. No, there was this session of the government and Mr. Karadzic was
18 present too. And Krajisnik. And I represented the interests of the
19 Ministry of Interior. And 90 per cent of the others were on the other
20 side. They were against my position. In all fairness, I have to be
21 frank: Mr. Karadzic attacked me more because I made this public in the
22 media, and I did that on purpose so that no one could exercise any
23 influence over me in terms of whether I should be --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
25 start this sentence again.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic, could you repeat from your -- from --
2 where you said "and I did that on purpose."
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On purpose, this level of
4 investigation attained, about white-collar crime. These persons that I
5 mentioned in the previous part of my statement. I stated this to the
6 media on purpose, probably, because it wasn't only Krajisnik. There were
7 four or five members of the government, too. The vice-premier as well.
8 And I knew that an attempt would be made to hush this up.
9 MR. OLMSTED: Let's turn to this interview, page 312 of the
10 English; page 169 of the B/C/S.
11 Q. And we see here in the third paragraph, you state -- at least in
12 the English version:
13 "I told to Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik and other present
14 members: They tried to instill into me that the members of the
15 government and members of the Presidency are supposed to be untouchables
16 to the MUP."
17 And then further up --
18 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are unable to find the
19 reference in the B/C/S.
20 MR. OLMSTED: Perhaps could we turn to the next page, see if it's
21 there. No, I think it's -- if we can go back to the previous page, I
22 think it's there. And I see at the very top it seems to be at where it
23 references Karadzic and Krajisnik. But perhaps Mr. Zecevic can help me
24 with that.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I believe it's the first paragraph of the
1 Serbian version.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
3 Q. So during your interview, you stated that you told Mr. Karadzic
4 and Mr. Krajisnik as well as others present at that session that they
5 tried to instill into you that members of the government and members of
6 the Presidency are supposed to be untouchables to the MUP. And then
7 further on you said during your interview:
8 "And I openly told Mr. Karadzic that he had sided with the
9 criminals. At that very moment I was practically relieved of my duties."
10 Or "my position," I'm sorry. And that continues onto the next page.
11 That's correct, isn't it? Mr. Stanisic, you just have to verify
12 that that is correct.
13 A. That is correct. And it's contained in the minutes from the
14 government session.
15 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I see the time.
16 JUDGE KWON: So this a compilation of several interviews.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, the interview took place over several days and
18 so it is quite large, and what I will do is I will identify the pages --
19 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we admit them as we go back and add the
21 So shall we assign a number now for this interview.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6629, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE KWON: And do you have any objection to admit those pages
24 referred to -- referred to and confirmed by the witness?
25 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.
1 JUDGE KWON: So we'll admit all those pages, and we'll add the
2 pages as we go by.
3 We'll take a break for half an hour and resume at 11.00.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
7 [The witness takes the stand]
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.
9 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 And just for the record, I have been informed that P6624 has
11 been -- the translation has now been fixed and uploaded and it can be
12 admitted fully.
13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That was the intercept.
14 MR. OLMSTED: That's correct, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have P1082 on the screen.
17 Q. Mr. Stanisic, yesterday you testified that you were a member of
18 the Council of Ministers of the Serbian -- or the Bosnian Serb Assembly.
19 And you attended their meetings; isn't that correct?
20 A. Yes, I was a member of the ministerial council as a minister
21 without portfolio. And I believe there was only one meeting.
22 Q. Well, we actually have records of two meetings in evidence in
23 this case, and they both mention you as attending them. Do you dispute
25 A. I do not dispute that. But can you show it to me, please. Can
1 you show it to me.
2 Q. Well, I'll show you the first one for the sake of time. And
3 this -- these are the minutes from the first meeting of the ministerial
4 council held on 11 January 1992. And if we could turn to page 2, it was
5 concluded that the priorities springing from the declaration of the
6 promulgation of the republic of the Serbian people of BH "included the
7 defining of ethnic territory, establishment of government organs in the
8 territory, and the economic dis-empowerment of the current authorities in
9 the socialist republic of BiH." These were the priorities of the council
10 of ministers, weren't they?
11 A. I don't recall it but I presume it was so if it is in the
12 document. I didn't chair the meeting. I told you I did not have a
13 portfolio and, thus, I had nothing to do with this particular topic. In
14 any case, I think it was following the results of the arbitration
15 commission and the negotiations before that for the Serb side to organise
16 its own territory, its own area. I think this is a consequence of the
17 level the negotiations have reached in terms of dealing with the crisis
18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was just putting things on paper.
19 Q. When you refer to arbitration commission, you're not referring to
20 the Cutileiro negotiations, are you?
21 A. No. Even before the Cutileiro commission, there was the Badinter
22 commission which participated in trying to deal with the crisis in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina from a legal standpoint. Cutileiro approached it from
24 a political angle under the umbrella of the European Commission in order
25 to deal with the economic crisis -- sorry, the constitutional crisis
1 which was created in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It came as a result of the
2 breakup of the only internationally recognised state in that area, which
3 was the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
4 Q. If we could just turn to the next page, we see that you were at
5 this meeting assigned to a Working Group to deal with issues regarding
6 the organisation and scope of national security; correct?
7 A. Let me read it first. So which paragraph is it?
8 Q. Paragraph 4.
9 A. That's what I find in paragraph 4. So an analysis had to be done
10 to assess the situation by the group. But the group never met or did
11 anything in that regard.
12 MR. OLMSTED: May we have on the screen P1083.
13 Q. Now, on the 11th of February 1992 you attended a meeting in
14 Banja Luka that was also attended by a number of the members of the
15 Bosnian Serb leadership of the BiH MUP; isn't that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And we see from the minutes of that meeting that after
18 Stojan Zupljanin convened the meeting you were the first to speak, and
19 you informed those present that the position of the Council of Ministers
20 at the last session was that in territories in the SRBiH, which are under
21 Serbian control, that control must be felt. You were advocating the
22 priorities of the Council of Ministers, weren't you?
23 A. Mr. Prosecutor, you misinterpreted this paragraph. I did not say
24 "control." I said that in such parts where the MUP had Serb personnel
25 performing the tasks and duties of the Ministry of the Interior, that
1 they should conscientiously go about doing their jobs so that such
2 authority is felt in the area. The problem by the time was that certain
3 guards were organised and people started taking care of their own
4 security in villages. My line of thinking was that we should try to show
5 to the people that the authorities were still functioning and that it
6 could be felt in the field. It was not about any kind of control.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that there's another
10 misunderstanding because of the translation of the document which, in the
11 English, reads "control." In the original, it is stated as "the presence
12 of authority."
13 JUDGE KWON: Shall we ask the witness to read out the first
15 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour.
16 Q. Mr. Stanisic, could you read out the first sentence underneath
17 your name.
18 A. It is the position of the Council of Ministers during the last
19 session, which I mentioned a moment ago, is that in the territory inside
20 the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, the whole
21 republic, which is under Serb authority, because there were parts where
22 Serb personnel were in the majority and they were in charge --
23 JUDGE KWON: We want to hear the translation. Without adding
24 explanation, just read out the sentence.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I thought you were
1 looking for an answer.
2 "It is the position of the council ever ministers adopted at its
3 last session is that in the territory of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina which is under Serb territory, that authority must be
5 felt," that it exists.
6 MR. OLMSTED:
7 Q. And you further stated at this meeting:
8 "Work has to be done by the organisation of the Serbian MUP
9 starting from the municipal and regional levels up to the Serbian
10 ministry. The Serbian personnel in the MUP must provide the means to
11 strengthen and supply the Serbian MUP ..."
12 You assigned this task to the Serbian personnel, didn't you?
13 A. Can we go to the next page?
14 Q. Certainly, we can turn the page.
15 JUDGE KWON: B/C/S, I mean.
16 MR. OLMSTED: In B/C/S, yes.
17 JUDGE KWON: No, we stay in -- in the English on -- on the
18 previous page.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I conveyed that position which had
20 to do with the level reached in terms of re-establishing the
21 constitutional order in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that position was in
22 the -- in the area where Serbs are in the majority, it would be a Serb
23 entity. Where there are Muslims, it would be a Muslim entity. And with
24 the ongoing negotiations, there was supposed to be a transformation of
25 the MUP in terms of the regional Security Services Centres.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Another objection in terms of the
2 translation. It is stated that Serb -- the assets of the MUP would be
3 distributed proportionally, not equally.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may add, Professor Koljevic
5 who participated in the negotiations conveyed it to us that way, that
6 there was agreement between the Muslim, Serb, and Croat side, under the
7 auspices of the international community, that the transformation would
8 develop in that direction. So I simply conveyed what I heard in terms of
9 further developments.
10 MR. OLMSTED:
11 Q. You said that an agreement had been reached under the auspices of
12 the international community. Which agreement are you referring to?
13 A. Mr. Prosecutor, those negotiations did not happen in one day. I
14 was discussing the level reached as part of those negotiations. There
15 was no agreement yet. The Cutileiro Plan was signed, I believe, on the
16 18th. I'm speculating.
17 In any case, it was later. But I was discussing the level of
18 discussion reached at those negotiations. That is what I had in mind. I
19 wasn't discussing any signed agreements, simply the level that was
20 reached and what direction any future transformation was supposed to
22 Q. You, as you said yesterday, closely followed the Cutileiro
23 negotiations. You were aware that they didn't even commence until the
24 13th of February, 1992; correct?
25 A. Mr. Prosecutor, a moment ago I said that there were different
1 negotiations about how Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be transformed. It ran
2 in parallel with the negotiations concerning the transformation of
3 Yugoslavia. Cutileiro had arrived by that time and he was included by
4 that time as well, as well as Mr. Vance and a number of other
5 representatives. I don't recall them all. The arbitration commission,
6 legally speaking, once we informed that the Serbs intended to create
7 Republika Srpska and were forwarded appropriate documents, we were
8 waiting for their answer. Bosnia had already submitted their request to
9 have Bosnia-Herzegovina recognised as independent, and the arbitration
10 commission provided their opinion, number four, I believe, stating that
11 the request on the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be accepted
12 because there was Republika Srpska in existence, since they had seen our
13 documents. They were sent by our side, that is to say, by the assembly
14 Speaker Krajisnik, and they proposed how things would go from that point
15 on. They didn't say that it was something outside the scope of the law
16 but they simply cited the reasons why Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be
17 recognised as a whole. I was discussing the results of the overall
18 negotiation process.
19 Q. Mr. Stanisic, that was a very long answer to a very short
20 question, as to when the Cutileiro negotiations began. Please, I ask you
21 to keep your answers a little bit shorter, and I think you can.
22 Now, you testified yesterday that the barricades incident in
23 Sarajevo on the 2nd of March, 1992, was a reaction to a killing at a
24 wedding and that your involvement under the instructions of
25 Minister Delimustafic was to use your influence to have the barricades
2 Mr. Stanisic, in fact, you participated in the barricades
3 incident not as a member of the BiH MUP but as a member of the SDS Crisis
4 Staff for Sarajevo; isn't that correct?
5 A. Mr. Prosecutor, first of all, you mis-formulated the question.
6 You said that I was to wield my influence so that they could remove the
7 barricades. It was not only my influence. It was the work of different
8 MUP members from all sides. There were double barricades, Muslim and
9 Croat as well. I was only one of the people working on it. I don't know
10 what it was you wanted me to say. I lost the gist of your question. Can
11 you repeat?
12 Q. Well, I'll show you a document, D3803. This is a document
13 tendered into evidence by Mr. Karadzic. And it's a BiH MUP public
14 security memorandum regarding the barricades incident. It's dated
15 13 March 1992.
16 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could turn to page 4 in the English, page
17 5 of the B/C/S.
18 Q. You are listed as one of the SDS Crisis Staff members who engaged
19 in the barricades incident. That was the case, wasn't it, Mr. Stanisic?
20 A. I see this document for the first time, and it is incorrect.
21 MR. OLMSTED: May we have 65 ter 10752 on the screen.
22 Q. This is a BiH MUP state security report dated 6 March 1992.
23 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could turn to page 3 of the English, page
24 4 of the B/C/S.
25 Q. We see towards the bottom, it states:
1 "A number of active and reserve employees of the BiH MUP of Serb
2 nationality were also directly included in the organising of the
3 barricades and in other activities."
4 That's referring to you, Mr. Stanisic, as well as Momcilo Mandic,
5 isn't it?
6 A. This is not true. Momcilo Mandic led a group of Serbian
7 personnel in charge of removing them. The State Security Service is not
8 familiar with the public security service activities. They may have seen
9 Momcilo Mandic somewhere along the way as the problem was being dealt
10 with. But this is incorrect. The only correct thing is that we did take
11 part on the second day trying to tackle the problem. Ultimately, we made
12 a great contribution on both sides of the MUP to have the barricades
14 Q. And if we go a little bit further up in this document, we see
15 that the report concludes that the barricades were not a spontaneous
16 reaction to the murder of Nikola Gardovic. That's correct, isn't it? It
17 wasn't spontaneous? In other words, it was planned.
18 A. Look, I can only tell you what I know. Not only that he was
19 killed. The problem was also that the perpetrator was being sheltered in
20 the Stari Grad police station, under protection, where there were no
21 members of the Ministry of Interior who were Serb. He was sheltered
22 there. He was hiding on the premises of the Stari Grad police station.
23 It came out and it contributed to the problem of the wedding ceremony
24 member being killed.
25 Q. And barricades were established not only in Sarajevo but in
1 surrounding municipalities; isn't that correct? Ilijas and other
3 A. I can speculate with regard to the rest, but I am positive it was
4 so in Sarajevo.
5 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.
6 MR. ROBINSON: No objection for this page being admitted.
7 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, we would like to tender the entire
8 document. It -- I don't have obviously the time to go through the entire
9 document with this witness, but it is relevant and explains the state of
10 affairs with regard to the barricades.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. This is a ten-page document
13 which contains a lot of contentious information about these events during
14 a period in March, and I think it would be unfair to admit it without the
15 witness being able to comment on those events. So those portions which
16 he commented on we don't have any problem with, but it's as far as we
17 think it should go and we think that's been our practice with documents
18 of this nature.
19 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, if I may. We've heard the
20 witness's evidence regarding his interpretation --
21 JUDGE KWON: I was waiting for the translation --
22 MR. OLMSTED: Oh.
23 JUDGE KWON: -- to be completed. Yes, please carry on.
24 MR. OLMSTED: Sorry, Your Honour.
25 We've heard the witness's evidence regarding this incident and
1 how he interpreted it. This is a document from the BiH MUP which
2 Mr. Stanisic has testified was the one that sent him out to the
3 barricades to resolve -- help resolve the issues, and I think it's
4 appropriate for Your Honours to have the full context of this issue in
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
8 Can the Prosecutor show us where it is stated that he was sent by
9 the state security to the barricades. This document comes from the head
10 of state security.
11 Mr. Stanisic sent -- he was tasked to do so by the MUP, not by
12 the State Security Service.
13 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit the cover page and the page shown to the
14 witness. Shall we assign a number.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6630, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Olmsted.
17 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have P5602 on the screen.
18 Q. And I'm going to show you, Mr. Stanisic, the intercept of the
19 telephone conversation that you had with Mr. Karadzic that -- on the 2nd
20 of March 1992, and you reviewed this yesterday.
21 But if we could turn to page 2, we can see -- and I think in the
22 English version it's beginning towards the bottom. Before Mr. Jovanovic
23 handed the telephone over to you, he tells Mr. Karadzic:
24 "We want to remove the barricades. We've reached an agreement
25 and that's all."
1 And Mr. Karadzic responds:
2 "What's that all about, what they agreed on?"
3 Mr. Jovanovic then tells Mr. Karadzic:
4 "Just what we wanted. There won't be any negotiations with
5 Europe about either sovereign or non-sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina until
6 the parties agree on that one."
7 Mr. Stanisic, BiH sovereignty was the reason for the barricades,
8 not the killing of a wedding. The killing at the wedding was simply a
10 A. That is not correct. If I may clarify. The reason for the
11 barricades was exclusively the incident which had taken place. It is a
12 fact, though, that both political sides, the Serb and Muslim side, wanted
13 to profit from it as politicians do. But it was not within our remit.
14 The only important thing for us was to have the barricades removed
15 without casualties. It is true, though, that later on both sides
16 formulated their positions - the Serb side and the Muslim side - to enter
17 into negotiation. However, I can only speculate as to that. I do know
18 they were engaged in it. I don't think either the Serb or Muslim side
19 organised the barricades. It was when politics became involved that the
20 stakes were raised, but this is how I see the events.
21 MR. OLMSTED: If we could look at P5612. And if we could turn to
22 page 2 of the B/C/S; page 3 of the English.
23 Q. Mr. Stanisic, this is a telephone intercept of a conversation
24 between you and Rajko Djukic on the 2nd March 1992, and you spoke about
25 Mr. Djukic yesterday. And you told Mr. Djukic during this conversation
1 that you have visited the check-points and Sarajevo is ours.
2 Further down, Mr. Djukic stated:
3 "This was a big test."
4 To which you responded:
5 "Definitely. It was a live practice."
6 Mr. Stanisic, you considered the barricades a live practice for
7 implementing the take-overs of the municipalities that followed in
8 April and onwards. Isn't that the case?
9 A. No. Not true. I can explain. Mr. Prosecutor, you see, the
10 service monitored telephone conversations, but you can see that on the
11 following day if somebody had participated in that the service would have
12 removed that. Both conversations took place on the following day after
13 the activities had taken place, and it is true when I answered
14 Mr. Karadzic's questions, we did tour the check-points and everything,
15 and we looked at everything that we thought of some benefit for ending
16 the whole thing. And when you want to gain something, you have to be
17 witty, you have to be humour -- to humour somebody if you want them to
18 help you, and I suppose that that was the context of that conversation.
19 I didn't want to quarrel with people whom I needed to help me. At the
20 time when both conversations were recorded shows that that was on the
21 second day, on the day when we actually inspected the site of the
23 Q. So your evidence is this conversation was just a joke.
24 A. No. It was a very serious conversation. However, there was some
25 witty connotations there because when you want to resolve something --
1 obviously, those of us who attended specialist training courses in the
2 MUP, we also learnt about negotiation techniques that help you to get to
3 an agreement. The other side needs to hear something good if you want to
4 involve them in dealing with the problem and to be on your side.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Stanisic please be asked to speak
6 straight into the microphone. Thank you.
7 MR. OLMSTED:
8 Q. Mr. Stanisic, did you hear message? Please lean forward when you
9 speak so that the interpreters can understand you.
10 And what about your conversation on the 2nd of March with
11 Stojan Zupljanin in Banja Luka?
12 JUDGE KWON: Before you go on.
13 If you read further, Mr. Stanisic, on this intercept, you can
14 see, couldn't you, you said:
15 "I think that we must sit down one day and analyse this
17 And later on you said:
18 "So that we do not make the same mistake next time."
19 Do you see that passage? Which are your words.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just said to his
21 question -- can you please bear with me? Can you direct me to the exact
22 passage? Can you perhaps use the pointer to point it to me?
23 When he says that he did something good and big, that a big thing
24 was done, I added to that, We have to sit down and analyse this big
25 thing, if it was, indeed, big.
1 JUDGE KWON: Do you see the passage where you said: "Da drugi put
2 ne bi kiks"? So it's -- I don't know, but "We do not make the same
3 mistake next time." Do you see that point? Do you see the pointer?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I can see it,
6 Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: What did you mean by the "mistake"?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the whole context and
9 the line of thinking can be seen from the first two or three sentences.
10 First he said that they had done a big thing. Then I interjected
11 and I said, If a big thing has been done we have to analyse it so as to
12 avoid any failures in the future. But I spoke in a humorous way, as it
13 were. I wanted to achieve a goal. I didn't want to dwell upon the
14 matter for too long. I wanted to water down the conversation and come to
15 the way the problem could be resolved by wielding their own influence.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Stanisic. My question was what this
17 same mistake referred to.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To what he previously said, that a
19 big thing has been done.
20 JUDGE KWON: I'll leave it at that.
21 Yes, please continue, Mr. Olmsted.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Well, let's try to have P5597 on the screen. See
23 if this clarifies matters.
24 Q. Now what we're going pull up is a telephone intercept again on
25 the 2nd of March of a conversation between you and Stojan Zupljanin.
1 MR. OLMSTED: And if we can turn to page 2 of the English, page 5
2 of the B/C/S.
3 Q. You told Mr. Zupljanin:
4 "Now be ready and we'll be in touch."
5 To which Mr. Zupljanin responded:
6 "We are waiting for the sign. If a total blockade is needed or
7 the rest, it will be done."
8 To which you responded:
10 A. I don't know what Stojan Zupljanin had on his mind. I know that
11 there was a conversation that they had stopped three or four trucks full
12 of weapons that were entering Banja Luka and were intended for the HDZ.
13 I know that we discussed that in a conversation. And I told him that we
14 had to be very careful and cautious with this regard, but I really can't
15 remember what this -- I believe that in Banja Luka on the 1st of March,
16 there were no barricades at all, as far as I can remember.
17 Q. Are you meaning to tell us that on the 2nd of March, when a major
18 barricade incident is going on in Sarajevo, you were having an entirely
19 unrelated conversation with Mr. Zupljanin down in Banja Luka about a
20 blockade in that town. Is that what you're telling us, Mr. Stanisic?
21 A. Mr. Prosecutor, if there was something specific in here, I could
22 answer your question, but I really can't remember what kind of a
23 conversation I had ten or twenty years ago. I really can't explain my
24 own words uttered at the time. I wish I could help you, but everything
25 would be mere speculation. I don't know what he meant. I remember that
1 there was a conversation about some arms that entered Banja Luka or were
2 supposed to enter Banja Luka. And then I spoke about blocking the border
3 with Croatia because there was a war going on in Croatia. It was topical
4 at the moment when those barricades were erected in Sarajevo, and that --
5 when there was some unrest in Sarajevo, but I don't think that there were
6 any barricades erected in Banja Luka at the same time. I really can't
7 say that for a fact. That was a long time ago. And I really can't make
8 any good and proper inferences from what I see before me.
9 Q. Mr. Stanisic then the answer should be, I don't know or I don't
10 remember. You don't need to go through this thinking aloud for us
11 because we need get through.
12 A. I told you I don't remember.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Let's have P961 on the screen.
14 Q. Mr. Stanisic, what I'm now going to show you is the stenograph of
15 the 12th Session of the Assembly, the Bosnian Serb Assembly, held on the
16 24th of March, 1992. And this session was held on the same day that you
17 were appointed minister of the MUP of the Serbian Republic of BiH?
18 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could turn to page 21 of the English,
19 page 38 of the B/C/S.
20 Q. Mr. Karadzic is speaking and he states:
21 "What is important to us at this moment is the minister of the
22 interior, a regular and reserve police force of the size we would
23 want" --
24 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Next page for the English.
25 MR. OLMSTED: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honour. Your eyes are much
1 better than mine.
2 Q. He goes on to say:
3 "... a regular and reserve police force of the size we would want
4 is also important because no one is limiting us in any international
5 agreement on this point."
6 Further on -- down says:
7 "You with be sure that members of the police are quite
8 sufficient. We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs, we
9 have an insignia, and at desired moment and this will be very soon we can
10 form whatever we want."
11 JUDGE KWON: I think it's next page for the B/C/S.
12 MR. OLMSTED:
13 Q. Mr. Karadzic then continues:
14 "At a given moment in the next three or four days there will be a
15 single method used and you will be able to apply it in the municipalities
16 you represent including both things that must be done as well as how to
17 do them: How to separate the police force, take the resources that
18 belong to the Serbian people, and take command. The police must be under
19 the control of the civilian authority, it must obey it, there is no
20 discussion about that ..."
21 Mr. Stanisic, as the newly appointed RS MUP minister, you were
22 aware, weren't you, of these plans to use the police to take command in
23 the municipalities; isn't that correct?
24 A. Mr. Prosecutor, your conclusions are wrong. Let's go back to the
25 first paragraph and let's take questions one at a time. That's the only
1 way I can answer them. Let's go back to the part where Karadzic mentions
2 the police. I want to be able to explain things to you.
3 Q. Mr. Stanisic, I asked you first to answer my question which is
4 quite simple: The plan he is announcing with regard to taking command in
5 the municipalities --
6 A. I can't --
7 Q. The plan Mr. Karadzic is talking about to take command --
8 A. Please.
9 Q. -- in the municipalities, can you please tell us: You were aware
10 of those plan, weren't you?
11 A. Please. I can't answer a question which contains three or four
12 questions to which answers are different. Please ask one question at a
13 time. You are starting from the first Karadzic's statement and this has
14 nothing to do with your question. Let's go back to the previous page.
15 Your Honours, may I be allowed to explain what that was all
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was an assembly session.
19 There were a lot of MPs present. When entities were being set up - and
20 they insisted that besides the MUP, there should be a military or
21 Serbian Guard or God knows what else - and Karadzic explained that
22 according to the Cutileiro Plan, all we were allowed to have was the
23 police within an entity and that was enough to establish power where
24 entities were functional, that we did not need the military, and that the
25 police was enough for natural disasters and things like that. And that
1 was all that was needed in an ethnic area within a state, that the police
2 would be enough, that we did not need the military or some sort of a
3 guard. Now having said that, we can go on. You can now put your
4 question to me.
5 MR. OLMSTED:
6 Q. My question is simply when Mr. Karadzic speaks about at a given
7 moment in the next three or four days there will be a single method used,
8 et cetera, et cetera, how to separate the police force, take the
9 resources that belong to the Serbian people, and take command, you were
10 aware of these plan, were you not, as the newly appointed RS minister?
11 Yes or no.
12 A. No. No, Mr. Prosecutor. This was not a conclusion. This was a
13 discussion which was taking place at the meeting. This was not a -- a
14 conclusion that I received as a minister, and given to act upon that.
15 This was a discussion, a debate, at an assembly meeting, and there were a
16 lot of proposals heard during that discussion.
17 MR. OLMSTED: May we have P1116 on the screen.
18 Q. This is -- what I'm going to show you is the dispatch from
19 Momcilo Mandic, number 02-2482, dated 31 March 1992. And in this
20 dispatch, Mandic announces that on the 1st of April, 1992, the CSBs and
21 SJBs of the BiH MUP on the territory of the Serbian Republic of BiH are -
22 and this is towards the bottom of the page in the English - "abolished
23 and ceased to function and their authority are taken over by the
24 organisational units of the MUP of the Serbian Republic of BiH." This is
25 it -- the dispatch, Mr. Stanisic, that triggered the ethnic division of
1 the MUP; correct?
2 A. No. Please. Let's clarify one thing. You see, within the scope
3 of two days, first you -- you saw the discussion of Mr. Karadzic, and
4 here the conclusions are completely different. In keeping with the
5 constitution and the Law on Internal Affairs, and based on -- on the
6 levels reached in the Cutileiro Plan, that transformation should have
7 been carried out but within the centres and not in the municipalities as
8 it was claimed just a while ago.
9 In other words, that should have been done in keeping with the
10 Law on Internal Affairs and the organs were supposed to agree on the
11 transformation. It was not left to the municipalities, as we heard from
12 Karadzic. And that's why I'm saying that ...
13 Q. Mr. Stanisic, this dispatch was sent not just to the CSBs but
14 also the SJBs in the municipalities. This dispatch applied to the
15 municipalities, didn't it?
16 A. Please. It says very clearly: Within the scope of security
17 organs and the Ministry of Interior of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and
18 later of Republika Srpska was a centralised body which had nothing
19 whatsoever to do with municipal bodies. There were indeed public
20 security stations but they were under the authority under the services
21 centres, and those centres were under the authority of the MUP if
22 everything was done by the book. And he says clearly here what needs to
23 be done. He doesn't mention municipalities. It had to be done within
24 the spirit of the Law on Internal Affairs.
25 And it is true that on several occasions to all of us in the MUP
1 of the joint state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we were familiar with the
2 levels of agreement reached. We knew that the Cutileiro Plan had been as
3 signed and that the principles of the constitutional organisation of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina would be respected. But since there were tensions,
5 and I told you just a while ago that I don't even like to remember those
6 times, every village, every town had its own Home Guards that were
7 outside of the framework of the Ministry of Internal affairs, and this
8 should have been done in a positive spirit, that the -- everybody should
9 know what the police forces were and that all the paramilitaries should
10 withdraw from all the villages and towns both in the Serbian and in the
11 Muslim part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 Q. Again, Mr. Stanisic, a very, very long answer to a very simple
13 question. Please try to regulate yourself to answer as briefly, as
14 concisely as possible. Thank you.
15 MR. OLMSTED: Let's have 65 --
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I'll do my best, but
17 it's very difficult to use just one word to deal with such complex topics
18 as you're raising.
19 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have 65 ter 25901 on the screen.
20 Q. What I'm about to show you, Mr. Stanisic, is a dispatch from the
21 BiH MUP dated 1 April 1992. And if you could look at the first
22 paragraph, the dispatch notes the absence of a certain number of
23 employees from their posts as a result of Momcilo Mandic's dispatch
24 02-2482 of 31 March 1992 which we just looked at. The dispatch then
25 states that the BiH MUP collegium requires the return of all MUP
1 employees and their involvement in the execution of regular tasks.
2 The members of the collegium signed this, even Momcilo Mandic,
3 with the exception of you; isn't that correct?
4 A. Mr. Prosecutor, this dispatch was a result of another dispatch,
5 i.e., of a collegium meeting that was held before that. I'm sure that
6 you have the minutes of that meeting and its conclusions.
7 At that moment, President Alija Izetbegovic had learned that the
8 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be recognised. He ordered the
9 minister to abort everything, that Cutileiro's Plan should not be
10 accepted, and, as a result of that, this dispatch arrived so Delimustafic
11 was told to give up on Cutileiro Plan, to withdraw his signature, and
12 that that was no longer valid, and then Alija sent this dispatch.
13 Q. Mr. Stanisic my question was simply this was signed by the
14 members of collegium with the exception of you. Yes or no?
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Olmsted, you -- in order to hear the simple
16 answer, you should make your question simple as well.
17 Please continue.
18 MR. OLMSTED: I agree, Your Honour, and I'm -- certainly I'm
19 trying. I appreciate the -- the reminder.
20 Q. And in the first paragraph, it's citing to Momcilo Mandic's memo
21 of 31 March, isn't it? The one we just looked at.
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let's clarify things. I'm just
25 stating a fact, that that's what I'm reading. I don't know what he
1 meant, actually.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6631, Your Honours.
5 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have on the screen, P2745.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask? When it comes to
7 Mandic's and Kosoric's signatures, has their authenticity been
8 established? Zepinic's signature I can perhaps say that it is his
9 signature, but I don't know about the other two.
10 JUDGE KWON: It may go to the weight but we'll continue.
11 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have P2745 on the screen.
12 Q. Mr. Stanisic, this is a dispatch from you dated 3 April 1992. It
13 was sent on the same date that you claim you met with Jusuf Pusina in
14 your testimony yesterday. And if we could look at the first paragraph,
15 it is evident that -- this is your response to the BiH MUP collegium
16 dispatch that we just looked at; correct?
17 A. I don't understand. What has my meeting got to do with this
18 dispatch? This is a dispatch which I -- will you allow me to comment?
19 Q. No. Let me clarify my question for you so we can simplify this.
20 My question is simply -- we see the first paragraph and it
21 references a dispatch that was sent out with Momcilo Mandic's signature.
22 First of all, it says -- in the English translation it says sent out on
23 behalf of the Serb Republic of BiH MUP. In fact, it's the Socialist
24 Republic BiH MUP, isn't it, SRBiH?
25 A. Please bear with me. I need to read this. It's the second
1 paragraph, isn't it?
2 Q. No. No, it's just the first paragraph, I believe. And there's a
3 reference to -- it says in the original that you're looking at: "MUP
4 SRBiH." That stands for the Socialist Republic of the BiH MUP; isn't
5 that correct?
6 A. It's highly unlikely, because the name was the Serbian Republic
7 and it could be confused with the socialist republic, so we need to ...
8 look at it more carefully.
9 Q. And the reason I suggest that is if you read on further --
10 A. I know, yes. Go ahead, yes.
11 Q. Yes. Because if you read on further, you reference that the
12 dispatch spoke about the return of all MUP employees -- yeah, to return
13 to their regular jobs and tasks. That was the dispatch that we just
14 looked at from the collegium; isn't that correct? That's what you're
16 A. You see, this dispatch was a result of the information that was
17 sent to me by Momo Mandic. He told me that the dispatch had been sent to
18 the units in -- on the ground as -- alleging him as the author and he had
19 nothing whatsoever to do with that dispatch. He said, "I just warned
20 them to adhere to the regulations and laws. I wanted to keep the order.
21 I wanted to told them not pay attention to all this -- all sorts of
22 political disinformation and various connotations that were addressed to
23 various organs, not only the Ministry of Interior." I told him not to
24 pay heed to any dispatches or instructions which were not official but
25 rather that they should act in keeping with the laws and regulations.
1 That was the gist of that message.
2 Q. If we look at the second paragraph it's quite clear that you're
3 telling your subordinates, the CSBs and SJBs, to essentially disregard
4 the dispatch, the collegium dispatch that we just looked at, the one that
5 was signed by the collegium with exception of you; isn't that correct?
6 A. Please. It's not about the dispatch. It says here, "We inform
7 you that on the 3rd of April, 1992, on behalf of Serb Republic of BiH
8 MUP, a dispatch was sent on behalf of Momcilo Mandic, inviting all OUP
9 employees to return to their regular jobs and tasks." I repeat, this was
10 just a common way people were being disinformed. Momo Mandic was called
11 by somebody and informed about that dispatch, and he told me that he had
12 never sent a dispatch of that kind. That's the gist of my message, that
13 there was lot of disinformation and that they should adhere to the
14 constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the laws and
15 regulations, and the orders that the Serbian part of the ministry
16 received from me. This was to avoid any possible disinformation and to
17 avoid instilling unrest among the personnel.
18 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, just for the record, it's our
19 position that the SRBiH MUP that's referenced in the first, that stands
20 for Socialist Republic --
21 JUDGE KWON: We are following that.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you.
23 JUDGE KWON: We saw many similar mistranslation like this.
24 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 May we have D4272 on the screen.
1 Q. What you're going have before you, Mr. Stanisic, is your letter
2 that you were shown yesterday from the 18th of April, 1992. And this is
3 the letter that you testified that you wrote because you felt you were
4 duty-bound to do so.
5 MR. OLMSTED: Now, if we could turn to page 2 of the English. We
6 can stay where we are on the B/C/S.
7 Q. In this letter you write:
8 "Although only 18 days have gone by since the establishment of
9 the MUP, it employs 4.000 active workers and several tens of thousands of
10 reserve policemen who are controlling nearly 70 per cent of the territory
11 of the former BiH."
12 So, Mr. Stanisic, approximately a month before the establishment
13 of the Bosnian Serb army, your police were already controlling most of
14 the territory that became the Republika Srpska; correct?
15 A. First of all, please, let me clarify one thing.
16 This is still -- well, for the most part. Perhaps there was an
17 incident or two. But the situation was peaceful.
18 What I wanted to say here was that in a territory that was nearly
19 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that's where the
20 Serb people live, which does not mean that there are lots of them in that
21 area. I proceeded from the following: Almost 70 per cent of the
22 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is land held by Serbs and that's what I
23 meant, this territory, almost 70 per cent is in -- well, that's the Serb
24 MUP, and then there's no information on radio or TV about that MUP, and I
25 asked for co-operation. That was the essence. There was no war at the
1 time in this period when I wrote this.
2 Q. And in the weeks leading up to the creation of the VRS, which, I
3 believe, was on the 12th of May, 1992, the police continued to play a key
4 role in taking control of the area that was to become the
5 Republika Srpska in municipalities such as Vlasenica, Ilijas, Kljuc, and
6 other municipalities; isn't that correct?
7 A. It is not correct. May I explain?
8 Q. If you can do so briefly.
9 A. You know very well that there was no Army of Republika Srpska but
10 there was the Territorial Defence of Republika Srpska and that grew into
11 the Army of Republika Srpska. So these were reserve soldiers from the
12 area of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the function of the Territorial Defence and
13 they had already been mobilised by the JNA; and that is to say, that they
14 were the army in that area. And, that is to say on 14th, 15th of April,
15 I think, when Republika Srpska, after -- I'm sorry. In
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think it was the 9th of April that a state of
17 emergency was declared, then Republika Srpska declared it on the 15th of
18 April, a state of emergency, and ordered that the Territorial Defence be
19 mobilised as an armed force in Republika Srpska. That is the same Army
20 of Republika Srpska where Commander Mladic came and some other generals.
21 Q. You mention mobilisation and yesterday you mentioned that
22 Mr. Karadzic, in a state of emergency, had powers to determine the use
23 and numbers of the police. It's correct, isn't it, that Mr. Karadzic
24 ordered the mobilisation of the police force in April 1992?
25 A. The government makes proposals and the president of the state --
1 well, in 1992 in April there was a presidency. Karadzic wasn't president
2 yet. It was Biljana and Koljevic. I just spoke about the institution of the
3 president, that that is the institution that has the authority to state
4 the number of active-duty and reserve policemen in a state of emergency
5 and to order how they would be used. I spoke of the institution of the
6 president. And in May, until May in Banja Luka, it was only Biljana and
7 Koljevic, and it was only in Banja Luka that Radovan was made president.
8 Q. That may be the case. But, in reality, Mr. Karadzic is the one
9 that made these decisions, isn't that correct, and not Ms. Plavsic or
10 Dr. Koljevic?
11 A. No. I -- well, until the month of May. Now I remember. Now I
12 remember a decision on the establishment of prisons. It was made by
13 Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic. I mean, the system of the judiciary was
14 falling apart and then they decided that in the territory of
15 Republika Srpska prisons be established and they signed that. I remember
16 that because in my defence, I ...
17 Q. Well, let me show you your interview.
18 MR. OLMSTED: 65 ter 25865. This is --
19 Q. And I want to go to page 389 of your interview. That's English.
20 Page 236 of the B/C/S. And when you were asked whether Dr. Koljevic
21 considered Karadzic to be the public leader of the Bosnian Serbs, you
22 responded --
23 A. May I please take a look?
24 Q. Certainly, I apologise.
25 I think it is -- yes, the one that's been zoomed in.
1 And you were asked whether Dr. Koljevic considered Mr. Karadzic
2 to be the public leader of the Bosnian Serbs, and you responded:
3 "I know that was Karadzic and Krajisnik who made the decisions
4 and actually had the final word."
5 That was the situation throughout the existence of the Bosnian
6 Serb Republic, isn't it?
7 A. Mr. Prosecutor, a moment ago by way of a foundation of your
8 question, you asked me about the declaration of emergency, whether it was
9 Karadzic. I said it was the president. Anybody. Whoever may be
10 president irrespective of the name concerned. And nobody asked me here
11 about the president. They asked me here about leaders. The state
12 function of the president is one thing and a leader is another thing. It
13 is true that the socialist democratic -- no, the Serb Democratic Party
14 was then the party in power and the leader of that party was
15 Mr. Karadzic, not Koljevic.
16 Q. Your Honour --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I? Objection. Now, in the
18 Serbian please could it be clarified with the witness. Does it say
19 "zavladao" or "zalago" [phon]? So if the Serb transcript is wrong, then
20 that is really something. Could that please be clarified.
21 So it is line 3 and line 5. It says "zavladao" and obviously it
22 was "zalago."
23 JUDGE KWON: Where are we in terms of English?
24 MR. OLMSTED: I think he is referring to the -- well,
25 Mr. Karadzic will have to point us in the right direction, but I think
1 it's at the top of the page.
2 JUDGE KWON: In B/C/S. But in English? Who is VK? I don't ...
3 No, top of the page in B/C/S, we see.
4 MR. OLMSTED: I think VK is the interpreter. Well, I might be
5 wrong. I'd have to look at the bottom.
6 JUDGE KWON: But where do we have it in the English? Previous
8 MR. OLMSTED: Well, let's look at the previous page, if we could.
9 And then go to the bottom. I don't see it there. I don't see VK.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it's there. Yes.
11 JUDGE KWON: Is it translated as TS: Established? I don't
13 MR. OLMSTED: And, Your Honour, that wasn't the page I was
14 referring to.
15 JUDGE KWON: No, it was not referred to by you.
16 MR. OLMSTED: Yes. And I seek to tender the page that I did
17 refer to.
18 JUDGE KWON: Page 359.
19 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, I believe so.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We will add that page.
21 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
22 JUDGE KWON: 389, yes.
23 Please continue.
24 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. Is the Serbian page
1 also following this? Because the transcription is wrong.
2 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether correct B/C/S page was shown to
3 the witness.
4 MR. OLMSTED: I think the one that's currently on the screen is
5 the one because -- well --
6 JUDGE KWON: Where do we have it?
7 MR. OLMSTED: Actually, let me check.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What? Which part? I don't know.
9 MR. OLMSTED: I think the part that I read out was towards the
10 bottom. We see AT, that's Mr. Tieger. And it starts out with Koljevic
11 and then it continues, and then Mr. Stanisic gives his answer. I think
12 that's the part I read out.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I can confirm that the part which was a part
15 of Mr. Olmsted's question is the -- is the ultimate paragraph from this
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
18 MR. ZECEVIC: But what Mr. Karadzic is talking about is the very
19 first and the second line on -- on this same page. And the problem
20 appears to be that in the English text that is the previous page.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MR. ZECEVIC: The first and the second line are on the previous
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add this page.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 If we could have 65 ter 10838 on the screen.
4 Q. This is the interview for the Javnost that you provided on 30th
5 of October 1992 which was tendered through you yesterday. And if you
6 could look -- and I'll do my best at this. But it's page 2 of the
7 English, and I believe it's the first column towards the bottom of the
8 page. And I'm interested in the part where you state:
9 "Fortunately, the Ministry of Interior indeed functions as a
10 centralised organ ... also it has not happened yet that anyone in the
11 whole territory of the Republika Srpska ever refused to carry out any of
12 my orders, issued, of course, in accordance with the law."
13 MR. OLMSTED: Then if we could go to page 3 of the English, and
14 this is, I think, at the bottom of the second column --
15 THE ACCUSED: Could the page be put down, because this part, in
16 Serbian, is not visible.
17 MR. OLMSTED: And if we can look at the second column at the
18 bottom, I believe, of the B/C/S, and we're on page 3 of the English.
19 Q. You stated during this interview:
20 "The burden of defence was carried by the milicia," presumably
21 meaning the police, "and the Serbian people. Thanks to a good
22 organisation and commitment we then managed to set up most of the borders
23 as they are today."
24 Mr. Stanisic, that was your description of the organisation of
25 the RS MUP in 1992, wasn't it?
1 A. Could you just show me the dates so that I could see when this
2 interview took place?
3 May I explain? This is an interview on the 30th of July, 1992 --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that is to say --
6 JUDGE KWON: Is it not 30th of October?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I think it's 07 ... or October.
8 October. I don't see it here. But the essence is -- let me just say
9 this: I gave this interview to a newspaper and, you see, rather late in
10 1992 regardless of what the date is. After the arrest of paramilitary
11 units from Serbia in the territory of Republika Srpska and, how do I put
12 this, through my interview, I wanted to issue a threat saying that we
13 were strong, that they should not come, that we would deal with all of
14 those who would come. The essence is the organisation and everything
15 that was there, but I felt duty-bound after rather successful operations,
16 because criminals don't know whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
17 helped us or not, and that is why I presented all of this as if it were
18 our own, that were organised, that we would arrest everyone, that
19 everything would be in accordance with the law. If any crimes are
20 committed, nothing else would be done but that. And most of the members
21 of the Ministry of Interior at first did take part in various combat
22 operations. However, they were resubordinated to the Territorial Defence
23 or the Army of Republika Srpska or even in a certain part the JNA, if
24 they were present. You see, there is not a single document of mine that
25 has to do with ordering combat operations, activities, et cetera,
1 because, after all, I'm not knowledgeable about that at all. And it is
2 true that most members did take part. There were quite a few casualties
3 but in the way that I explained it just now.
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Olmsted, did the witness agree with your
5 interpretation that milicia meant police?
6 MR. OLMSTED: Well, let's clarify that, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 Q. When you referred to milicia you meant police; correct?
9 A. I meant members of the Ministry of Interior. Somebody calls them
10 milicia, somebody calls them policija.
11 MR. OLMSTED: Let's have 65 ter 26979 on the screen.
12 THE REGISTRAR: It hasn't been released, Mr. Olmsted.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Then I'm going to move on.
14 Q. Mr. Stanisic, one of your first acts as minister --
15 MR. OLMSTED: And in fact, if we could pull up on the screen
16 65 ter 25902.
17 Q. One of your first acts as minister was to appoint your five CSB
18 chiefs: Mr. Zupljanin, Mr. Jesuric, Krsto Savic, Andrija Bjelosevic, and
19 Mr. Cvijetic, isn't that correct? That was one of your first acts as
21 A. All of those whose names were mentioned were members of the
22 Ministry of Interior until then and almost all of them held the same
23 positions, and I just issued decisions to link up years of service. Many
24 people I did not even know, the persons that I issued this to.
25 Q. We're looking at Mr. Jesuric's appointment. You knew him;
2 A. Mr. Jesuric was chief of the public security station in Bijeljina
3 and it was Alija Delimustafic who appointed him. I just issued a
4 decision in order to have continuity so that his service would not be
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. I believe that it would
7 be very helpful if the Prosecutor would put complete questions. If the
8 question has to do with appointments, he should say temporary appointment
9 because that is what it actually does say.
10 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted?
11 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure it matters at all, but -- yes.
12 MR. OLMSTED: I'm sorry for interrupting. Yes. If I misspoke --
13 the document speaks for itself, let's say that. If this may be admitted
14 into evidence.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I explain? May I clarify? If
16 it is in the interest of ...
17 JUDGE KWON: Whether it's temporary or not, why does appointment
18 matter at all at this stage? I don't think it's challenged at all.
19 We'll admit it.
20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6632, Your Honours.
21 MR. OLMSTED:
22 Q. Early in the conflict you organised the police into war units;
23 isn't that correct?
24 MR. OLMSTED: Let's look at P2966.
25 Q. And what's going to be on the screen is an order by you dated
1 15 May 1992, and I'll repeat my question: You established -- you
2 organised the police into war units; isn't that correct?
3 A. Your Honours, my obligation according to the law, the law of the
4 former Bosnia-Herzegovina, is based on the Law on National Defence. I
5 think it is paragraph 3, where there's a reference to the tasks of the
6 police; milicia, in war time. So we were supposed to make a plan of
7 defence preparations within our ministry. Since all members of the
8 Ministry of Interior had served in the military, there was no
9 professional army before the war. All men of military age had to do
10 their military service. So then, according to that law, they were
11 members of the army. So a member -- every member of the Ministry of
12 Interior had to have done his military service before that, and this was
13 still the situation, when necessary. When the president is supposed to
14 order the use, then the ministry has to be organised according to their
15 military assignments, the VS, et cetera. How they are organised in
16 peacetime, I mean.
17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic, this time your answer could have been
18 simply yes.
19 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could turn --
20 JUDGE KWON: Just wait. There's a translation all the time.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise.
22 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue or shall we take a break?
23 MR. OLMSTED: Yes. Your Honour, perhaps this is a time to take a
25 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at
1 quarter past 1.00.
2 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.30 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Olmsted. Please continue.
5 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 If we could have on the screen 65 ter 18287.
7 Q. And, Mr. Stanisic, before the break we were talking about the war
8 units that were established within the RS MUP police force.
9 And what have you in front of you is a 6 July 1992 document
10 issued by you regarding some basic principles of the MUP when applying
11 war-time procedures.
12 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could look at page 2 in both versions.
13 Q. Under Roman numeral III, you wrote: "Conditions for successful
14 operation while implementing war-time procedures ...," and you included
15 "organisation of the police and other MUP services into war units, some
16 of which carry out regular duties and carry out specialist operative
17 duties on the ground (neutralising sabotage and terrorist groups,
18 organised criminal activities of the armed individuals, and so on, in
19 co-operation with the Serbian army) ..."
20 That's correct, Mr. Stanisic, isn't it, that these war units
21 functioned both in combat operation but also as special police units?
22 A. Would you please show me what you are alluding to. I'd like to
23 read it, because I didn't. What paragraph do you have in mind?
24 Q. It's under Roman numeral III, and I believe it is the...
25 MR. ZECEVIC: If I can be of assistance. It's the -- it's the
1 very last paragraph.
2 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, once again, Mr. Zecevic.
3 JUDGE KWON: No, I don't think -- previous page. The last
4 paragraph on the previous page.
5 MR. OLMSTED:
6 Q. And, Mr. Stanisic, I just read it out to you, and my question -
7 and I'll repeat for you - is, that these war units that --
8 A. Could this please be blown up just a little? The letters are
9 just too tiny. Go ahead then.
10 Q. My question to you is: That these war units that you established
11 within the police force, they performed both combat operations as well as
12 specialist operative duties which fall within the typical duties of a
13 special police force; isn't that correct?
14 A. Your Honours, when those units were not engaged in military
15 tasks, they were engaged on the tasks pertaining to the Ministry of
16 Interior. As can you see here, none of these are military tasks. At the
17 moment when an order was received to resubordinate them to the military,
18 then, together with the military, they were engaged on military duties.
19 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Before doing that, I didn't follow your
21 question. What's the distinction between combat operation and specialist
22 operative duties? What you did mean when you put that question?
23 MR. OLMSTED: Mr. President, I was actually reading from the
24 document, but I think it will be appropriate for the witness to explain
25 the difference.
1 JUDGE KWON: Where do you have combat operations?
2 MR. OLMSTED: Oh. We've already talked about war units and that,
3 as the witness has mentioned, that they did perform combat operations.
4 That's not in dispute. What I asked the witness is -- is that in
5 addition to combat operations they also performed specialist duties, as
6 described in this document.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Stanisic, do you like to add anything?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may help you to
9 understand, I'd like to say that those were members of the Ministry of
10 Interior. When they were under the authority of the ministry and when
11 they were performing tasks pertaining to the Ministry of Interior, they
12 were also under the authority of the minister of the interior officers.
13 They could be engaged in combat on the order of the
14 Supreme Commander or a person designated by him, and then they were
15 resubordinated. But then they were also under the authority of those
16 commanders who were in charge of the planning and the implementation of
17 combat operations.
18 Thank you very much. I hope I was of some assistance with this.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 We'll receive this.
21 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6633, Your Honours.
22 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have P2760 on the screen.
23 Q. This is the RS MUP performance report for the period of
24 April through June 1992. Mr. Stanisic, to whom were these reports
1 A. On every report, there should be a list of addressees.
2 Q. Would they be -- would they be submitted to the presidency?
3 A. They contain a lot of information. And I suppose that some of
4 the reports did if there was something interesting in the report or where
5 the information might be of some interest to the presidency because they
6 could be instrumental in dealing with the problems mentioned in the
8 MR. OLMSTED: If we could turn to page 9 of the English, page 15
9 of the B/C/S.
10 Q. And it's reported in this performance report that measures have
11 been taken to ensure that all employees of Serbian nationality join the
12 MUP? That's correct, isn't it, Mr. Stanisic, that measures were taken in
13 that regard?
14 A. I don't understand. Join? To the largest extent, Serbian
15 nationals joined the MUP. That's true. I don't know what the author
16 meant. This is not my document. But it is true that most of the Serbian
17 cadre did join the Ministry of Interior of Republika Srpska.
18 Q. You said this isn't your report, but you as RS MUP minister would
19 have had to see this report and approve it; isn't that correct?
20 A. It doesn't mean that. Reports were written by different people
21 and sent to different bodies. If I was one of the designated addressees,
22 then I must have received it or perhaps reports were sent to police
23 administrations or particular Security Services Centres. They did not
24 necessarily have to be addressed or sent to the minister.
25 Q. So you're asserting that you, as minister, wouldn't have received
1 the performance report of the RS MUP necessarily, that you wouldn't
2 necessarily receive it? Is that what you're saying?
3 A. Please. It doesn't say that anywhere here. I can see one page
4 with a text. I'm telling you that there were various reports and they
5 were sent to the designated addressees. If they were sent to the
6 minister, it was also received by the minister but there were reports
7 sent to various other levels. For example, police stations received
8 them. If one of the addressees was the minister, then, of course, I
9 would have received such a report, but I really can't remember. It was a
10 long time ago. It is -- if it is indicated that this particular report
11 was to be sent to the minister, then, yes, the minister did receive it.
12 This page that we have on the screen does not help me in making the right
14 Q. Now, the report continues to state that except for six employees
15 of Muslim nationality - five in Kalinovik and one in Ljubinje - all other
16 employees are of Serbian nationality. That is information that was
17 available to you at the end of June 1992, wasn't it?
18 A. Please. Could you show me? I want to see which organisational
19 unit drafted this report. I want to be able to give you a precise answer
20 and then I can answer you.
21 Q. Perhaps we can turn to the first page and you can look at the
22 cover page.
23 A. I can see the heading: "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
24 Ministry of Interior, Performance Report," but who is the author? Which
25 organisational unit drafted this report? I can't -- I can't see that.
1 And also, I can't see a list of addressees, who it was sent to.
2 Q. Regardless of who made this document, it states in it that except
3 for six employees of Muslim nationality, all other employees are of
4 Serbian nationality. And my question to you is: That's the information
5 that you had at the end of June 1992. Putting aside this report, that's
6 the information you had.
7 A. Based on this alone, I cannot affirm that I was privy to this
8 information. If you have something else, maybe this is just about one
9 police station in Kalinovik or perhaps somewhere else. This does not
10 reflect the entire situation in the MUP. That's why I need to know more
11 than this.
12 Q. All right.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Let's look at 65 ter 25903. And if we could turn
14 to the last page.
15 Q. You can see that you received this one; correct, Mr. Stanisic?
16 A. I don't see that. It doesn't say that I received it. But if you
17 show me the entire document, if I see the contents, maybe I will
19 Q. Well, under "delivery" it says minister of the interior, does it
21 A. What you're alluding to, I don't know. It does say so, but it
22 doesn't say that I ever received it. Perhaps you can give me a moment to
23 read the entire document. Or, actually, what is your question?
24 Q. Well, first of all, I'm simply establishing that this was
25 delivered to you as -- it says in the English version at the very bottom,
1 it says: "Delivery" --
2 JUDGE KWON: We are repeating the same. It says it is addressed
3 to the minister.
4 MR. OLMSTED: Right.
5 JUDGE KWON: It doesn't say minister received this.
6 MR. OLMSTED: No.
7 JUDGE KWON: We heard that here.
8 MR. OLMSTED: Okay. Is that --
9 JUDGE KWON: That's the answer.
10 MR. OLMSTED: Okay.
11 Q. And if we turn to page 2 of the English, and I believe it's page
12 1 of the B/C/S, it states: "All employees are Serbian except six who are
13 Muslim." And that's at the top of the page. And I'll repeat,
14 Mr. Stanisic, that is the information that you had in June 1992; correct.
15 A. Please. Let me read the first paragraph. According to
16 inconclusive and imprecise indicators, i.e., records that I maintained in
17 the personnel affairs in the Ministry of Interior affairs -- internal
18 affairs of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina of age -- in 1992,
19 the ministry has 1.831 employees, and this information does not contain
20 data on the Banja Luka centre, so I can't give you that answer.
21 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, I'd like to tender this into
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive this.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6634, Your Honours.
25 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could have P2761 on the screen.
1 Q. And this is the RS MUP annual report on the work in period of
2 April through December 1992.
3 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could go to page 27 of the English, page
4 38 of the B/C/S.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please. I apologise. When was
6 this report drafted?
7 MR. OLMSTED:
8 Q. Well, I believe at the bottom it says January 1993.
9 A. In 1993 I was not in office. I was not minister. However, if
10 you allow me to read the contents of the document, maybe I will be able
11 to help you with the document. I didn't receive it because at the time I
12 was no longer in office. But I'm willing to help you, if I can.
13 Q. I appreciate that and let me ask you a question. I think we have
14 page 27 up on the screen. It says: "In implementing personnel policies,
15 the starting points were primarily Serbian patriotism and
16 professionalism ..." Now, we'll talk about professionalism in a minute.
17 But listed first as a criterion of personnel policy of the RS MUP was
18 Serbian patriotism; isn't that correct?
19 A. Yes, that's what I'm reading.
20 MR. OLMSTED: Let's have P1105 on the screen.
21 And this is returning to the 22nd Session of the RS Assembly on
22 23rd of November, 1992. And if we could turn to page 17.
23 Q. Where somewhere in the midst of your speech at this session, in
24 which you state:
25 "In the beginning, we did that because there were reserves in the
1 police. We wanted the country defended, so they took on thieves and
2 criminals because I tell you not a single doctor picked up a rifle to
3 defend his country. Not a single intellectual. Our priority, our
4 intentions were good, and maybe that is where we went wrong. Maybe that
5 is where I went wrong. Agreed. But in that case, I should be told
6 clearly that is where you went wrong, sir, you can't do that. This is no
7 longer a job for you."
8 Mr. Stanisic, it wasn't the SDA or HDZ that brought the thieves
9 and criminals into the police force of the RS MUP, as you suggested
10 yesterday. They made it into the police force because you wanted them
11 there; isn't that correct?
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
13 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, I must object. And I'm -- I'm -- I
14 have to intervene at this point, and I would like -- like you to compel
15 Mr. Stanisic to answer this question. Because the issue is very alive
16 in -- in the appeals proceedings against him. And -- and there is a
17 reasonable probability that he might incriminate himself. Thank you.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Stanisic, do you agree with Mr. Zecevic, that
20 you are going to refuse to answer this question on the ground that it
21 might incriminate you?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
23 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, may I be heard on the
24 issue on whether you should compel the witness to answer?
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 MR. ROBINSON: It's our position that you should not compel the
2 witness to answer this question. As the Appeals Chamber has said, you
3 have to balance the right of the parties to have sufficient information
4 concerning this case with his own right in his case. And I think,
5 therefore, that only the most central issues relating to this trial and
6 the witness's credibility ought to be those which you use to compel his
7 testimony. And I don't think, given what's already in the document, that
8 asking him about whether he approved reserve police officers who were
9 less than qualified is so central to the case that you should compel him
10 to answer.
11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Olmsted, do you like to add anything?
12 [Prosecution counsel confer]
13 MR. OLMSTED: Nothing from us, Your Honours.
14 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may be heard, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Zecevic.
16 MR. ZECEVIC: I disagree with my learned friend, Mr. Robinson, on
17 this matter because the -- the essence of the Rule 90(E) is to protect
18 the interests of the witness. Therefore, whether this issue is -- is
19 central to this case has no -- no relevance in respect to the witness's
20 interests, which are protected by 90(E).
21 Therefore --
22 JUDGE KWON: But what -- I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Zecevic.
23 What -- which is -- is interests of the witness? To compel him
24 or not compel him?
25 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, the interest --
1 JUDGE KWON: He refused to answer the question.
2 MR. ZECEVIC: The interest is to compel him to testify, Your
3 Honour, to answer that question.
4 JUDGE KWON: Respecting his refusal is also -- would also be in
5 the interests of the witness.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: Absolutely it will be. But I -- it is my
7 understanding that -- that the witness -- that the witness will be --
8 will be willing to provide Your Honours, to assist Your Honours, with the
9 answer, if he is guaranteed the protection by 90(E), yes.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Stanisic, the Chamber has decided to compel
12 you to answer the question.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
14 Can you then put your question to me?
15 MR. OLMSTED:
16 Q. Mr. Stanisic, I read what you said during the 22nd Session of the
17 RS Assembly. And I put to you that it wasn't the SDA or HDZ that brought
18 criminals into the RS MUP reserve police force, which is what you
19 suggested yesterday during your testimony. Rather, I put to you they
20 made it into your reserve of police force because you wanted them there.
21 Isn't that correct?
22 A. Your Honours, it is not correct. As I stressed already, when I say
23 "we," on occasion, I mean the Serb side, but I say here specifically that they
24 took on thieves and criminals, I would have said "we took them," but I said
25 "they" took them on board, including thieves and exactly what I said yesterday.
1 In any case, I do not exclude the possibility that in certain
2 war-time police stations, crisis staffs and the like, they took such people
3 on board, but it was not under MUP control. I had sent clear instructions
4 out into the field as to who could become a member of the MUP.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 16 -- 15, actually. As I
8 stressed before, when I say they brought them on board, not we, as the
9 Serb side. The sentence should have a different meaning. Lines 15 to 17.
10 JUDGE KWON: The transcript say "we as Serbs," meaning Serbs
11 are addressed as "we," and "they" didn't mean to be Serbs. That's my
13 Do you agree, Mr. -- but could you assist us, if you could repeat
14 your answer, Mr. Stanisic.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let me cut it short
16 to make it clear.
17 This should be read -- well, I read in the Serbian what I said.
18 I said they brought in thieves and criminals too. That is what I
19 mentioned yesterday. I do not exclude the possibility -- actually, there
20 were specific cases where Crisis Staffs, in the war-time police stations
21 they had established, employed people contrary to my instructions. And
22 we had to fight that as well, to get rid of them, and can you see that in
23 a whole number of orders I issued.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
25 MR. OLMSTED:
1 Q. But it also says or you also said during the speech:
2 "That is where I went wrong. Agreed. But in that case, I should
3 be told clearly."
4 Unlike today, Mr. Stanisic, back then you were taking
5 responsibility for that, weren't you?
6 A. Your Honours, following this complete thought, there's a comma,
7 and then I say perhaps there is my fault in some of it too. Because it
8 didn't only touch upon that specific topic. We discussed a number of
9 things, and then I asked if there's anything that would be my fault,
10 please tell me what it is. This was not the only thing discussed at the
11 session. That is why the comma. Then I stressed well perhaps some of
12 the blame may be mine, and if it is, do tell me.
13 MR. OLMSTED: Let's bring in -- up on the screen, P1478.
14 Q. And, Mr. Stanisic, this is one of the diaries by General Mladic.
15 And it was admitted into evidence in your case.
16 MR. OLMSTED: If we could turn to page 337 of the English, page
17 371 of the B/C/S.
18 Q. Now this describes a meeting on the 27th of July 1992 --
19 A. I'm sorry, it's not before me.
20 MR. OLMSTED:
21 Q. This is -- describes a meeting on the 27th of July, 1992, that
22 you attended along with General Mladic, as this is his diary, and
23 Milan Trbojevic. And during this meeting it's recorded in his notes that
24 you stated: I had to take everyone into the police, but the army has now
25 taken over all the lines.
1 Mr. Stanisic -- do you see that, Mr. Stanisic? Do you see where
2 it is written --
3 A. I see that is what it reads. Sorry. This was copied from
4 Mladic's diary as you mentioned, I believe.
5 Q. Exactly. This is from Mr. -- or from General Mladic's diary.
6 Now when you refer to "everyone," you were including thieves and
7 criminals; correct?
8 A. No. No, these are not my words. I told Mr. Mladic the very same
9 thing I said at the assembly, but he cut it short. There are only a few
10 words here, and he was probably interested in what I was trying to
11 achieve rather than something else. But I told him the very same words I
12 uttered at the assembly meeting. These are not my words.
13 This is what Mr. Mladic noted down. It is correct that there
14 were all sorts of people in the Ministry of Interior at the beginning of
15 my mandate, but it wasn't the Ministry of Interior. It was the very
16 inceptions of a ministry, and we had to clean up the mess we found. That
17 is what I told Mladic. He simply summarised it and it turned out this
19 What I was trying to warn him here was what the situation was
20 like; whereas, the situation at the moment was quite clean. Things were
21 tidied up, and we could responsibly approach our tasks and duties in our
22 fight against unlawful conduct and their perpetrators -- and its
24 Q. Now this reserve police force that included thieves and
25 criminals, it was used to a significant extent to round up and detain
1 large numbers of non-Serbs throughout the RS in 1992; isn't that correct?
2 A. Your Honours, I received some initial information during the
3 collegium meeting in Belgrade in terms of who was included as stated in
4 the report I sent to the president, pertaining to the meeting of the
5 collegium. Probably there were some, although I didn't know who there
6 was at the time, but probably there were and for that reason my first
7 measure was to tidy up the MUP so that it can go about its own work. If
8 someone has criminal intentions and is a criminal, I can't ask them to do
9 police work. That is why there's a number of orders of mine which were
10 implemented by my inspectors whom I sent in the field. We tried to clean
11 things up first in order to be able to approach our job properly because
12 one can't work with such people.
13 Q. And it wasn't just the 11 July 1992 collegium meeting at which
14 this issue of police being employed at these detention facilities arose,
15 but also --
16 MR. OLMSTED: If we could P1097 on the screen.
17 Q. It was also raised in Mr. Zupljanin's dispatch to you which we'll
18 look at in a moment.
19 This is the dispatch and he writes that the representatives of
20 the army and police arrested great number of citizens of Muslim and Croat
21 nationality who were, depending on the number and the circumstances in
22 the field, sent to various buildings.
23 And he goes on to say, Mr. Stanisic, that among these detainees
24 were persons of no security interest who can be treated as hostages.
25 And if we look at, I think, the next page, he also mentions that
1 among the detainees were elderly invalids and minors.
2 Returning to the first page, he states that a large number of
3 active and reserve policemen are engaged in securing these persons.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry. Sorry. Let's stay with
5 this page. Where does it say "hostages"? I need to remind myself.
6 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may be again of assistance, it's the first
7 paragraph on the -- on this page, which is -- which we have on the -- on
8 the screen.
9 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you, once again, Mr. Zecevic.
10 Q. Do you see that, Mr. Stanisic?
11 A. Let's clear one thing up. It doesn't say that they should be
12 used as hostages, given that this seems to be the basis of your question.
13 It is stated that they cannot be treated as hostages. One cannot treat
14 people as hostages if there is no security-related information concerning
15 them. There's no basis to hold them any longer. That is why I wanted to
16 see it myself. Now I can proceed to your question.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Well, Your Honours, this is the first time this has
18 ever been raised. This document was used in -- in Mr. Stanisic's case.
19 I think this is an important issue, whether it says "can" or "cannot."
20 It's our position it says "can" be treated as hostages.
21 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you ask the witness to read to out the
23 MR. OLMSTED: Because the paragraph is quite long.
24 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
25 MR. OLMSTED:
1 Q. Mr. Stanisic, could you read -- it starts with, "The third
2 category is composed..." Can you read that full sentence, from "the
3 third category"?
4 A. "While the third category comprises adult males for whom the
5 service, until now, has not gathered any security-related information,
6 due to which they can be treated as hostages."
7 So the meaning was that they couldn't be treated, as such, until
8 now. Not in the future. So the issue was how to treat them, since they
9 were there, and, yet, there was no security-related information which
10 concerned them.
11 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I really believe this is an issue
12 that needs to be submitted to CLSS to get an accurate translation. We
13 still disagree with what the witness has read out, and it's a very
14 important issue that will need to be clarified.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 [Prosecution counsel confer]
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I would like the CLSS to take a look into this
19 and report back as soon as practicable.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I add something else? There
21 seems to be something missing just before the word "hostages." Maybe
22 there's a word missing. Something seems to have been erased.
23 MR. OLMSTED:
24 Q. Now, the next paragraph, Mr. Stanisic, writes:
25 "A large number of active and reserve policemen are engaged
1 securing these persons."
2 That was the case and you had that information, didn't you,
3 Mr. Stanisic?
4 A. Mr. Prosecutor, a moment ago, when I told that I received initial
5 information on the 11th of July, you say that there was information I had
6 had previously sent by Mr. Zupljanin. This is my response to the
7 collegium conclusion and I asked for additional information so as to have
8 a full picture to be ready for the meeting with the army commander,
9 General Mladic, and the minister of justice, so that it can be dealt
10 with. This is dated the 20th of July, whereas the collegium meeting was
11 on the 11th. This is a response to the conclusion which I raised at the
12 collegium meeting when I requested additional information. What they
13 told me at the collegium meeting was insufficient in order for someone to
14 gather all of them and -- all of it and submit it.
15 Q. Yes, Mr. Stanisic. And if I indicated this was sent to you
16 before the collegium meeting, I did not intend that. But my point being,
17 is that Mr. Zupljanin is alerting you that these detention facilities are
18 a significant drain on police resources, isn't he?
19 A. Mr. Prosecutor, these are our overall activities and efforts
20 after the collegium meeting to deal with the problems. It is correct
21 that there were problems and that we gave it our best at the time to deal
22 with it, to the extent our competencies allowed.
23 MR. OLMSTED: And if we may have P1096 on the screen.
24 Q. Mr. Stanisic, this is the report that you conveyed to
25 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Djeric in which you provided some information
1 regarding the police role in the detention facilities, as well as the
2 inhumane conditions at those facilities. First of all, will you agree
3 that nowhere in this report do you advocate that the detention facilities
4 should be closed down?
5 A. Mr. Prosecutor, a moment ago I explained there's a conclusion
6 from the collegium meeting. This information is a result of the
7 collegium meeting. I was tasked with sending that initial information to
8 the prime minister and the president, although that information was
10 In the conclusions of the collegium meeting, I requested that
11 additional information be sent in so as to -- as for the presidency to
12 undertake its own measure within its competence and the MUP to do its own
13 work. At the collegium meeting, some urgent measures were indicated as
14 well which could be tackled immediately. So this a result of overall
15 activities to have those centres eliminated. If you recall that order of
16 mine, I called them informal camps and I wanted us as the police to do as
17 much as we could. And President Karadzic tried to exert his influence on
18 the army. Irrespective of the fact that part of the reserve force
19 provided security, if there was army personnel involved it fell under the
20 competence of the army and we couldn't deal with it. That is why I sent
21 such initial information to the addressees.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I'm cognizant of the time. And at
23 this time, perhaps I should make an application of additional time --
24 JUDGE KWON: How much do you need? How much more do you need?
25 MR. OLMSTED: Well -- yes, let me see if I can calculate that
1 very quickly. I would like -- I would ask for an hour and 15 minutes and
2 let me tell you why, Your Honours. I have a number of topics I need to
3 cover, finishing up with the detention facilities but also dealing with
4 what the witness has testified generally about investigation of war
5 crimes, as well as, you know, the priorities of his police to investigate
6 crimes regardless of the ethnicity of the victims or perpetrators. And I
7 did also want to touch on Koricanske Stijene as well as a couple of
8 other, I think can be, fairly short matters, including paramilitaries
9 which was also raised during direct examination in a very cursory manner,
10 but nevertheless the witness did provide some general assertions
11 regarding paramilitaries and how he was dealing with the problems.
12 And one of the reasons I believe that -- this -- this case --
13 it's warranted as I have been receiving some fairly long answers here.
14 I've really attempted to ask as precise questions as possible, and maybe
15 I haven't succeeded in that in every capacity, but I have received a lot
16 of long answers that I could not have anticipated. And I've also had to
17 go -- resort to this witness's interviews and other documents that I
18 didn't necessarily anticipate that I would have to in order to clarify
19 matters. And so that has taken a lot more time than I anticipated.
20 And I believe that in order for the Trial Chamber to fully
21 understand this witness's evidence, that I need to cover these additional
22 topics, and therefore I very respectfully request that I be given an hour
23 and 15 minutes to wrap up.
24 THE ACCUSED: May I ask? Is it a mistake? Is it 15 minutes or
25 an hour and 15 minutes?
1 MR. OLMSTED: I'm asking for an hour and 15 minutes.
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE KWON: Your time will be up in five minutes and then you
4 will have an extra hour, from then. So you have an hour and five
6 MR. OLMSTED: I appreciate it, Your Honours.
7 Q. Mr. Stanisic, it was the case, wasn't it, that Mr. Karadzic
8 received information about the facilities -- the detention facilities
9 from the military; isn't that correct?
10 A. I can suppose so. I wasn't included in the chain of passing
11 information. The military chain. We were a separate chain in the
12 Ministry of Interior. In any case, they were duty-bound to inform their
13 Supreme Commander, but I don't know to what extent they did so and
14 whether they did in the first place. I can't go into that. In any case,
15 they should have respected their chain.
16 Q. Well, let's look at your interview.
17 MR. OLMSTED: This is 65 ter 25865. And if we could have page
18 427 on the screen. And that page number is in the English version. In
19 the B/C/S version, if we could have page 263.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Olmsted, could you kindly repeat the English
21 page number, please.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, the English is page 427.
23 Q. Now, Mr. Stanisic, during the interview, you were being asked
24 about the information you were providing pursuant to the requests of
25 Mr. Kalinic who was the minister of health for the RS regarding detention
1 facilities. And you state --
2 JUDGE KWON: Are we on the same page? I mean B/C/S.
3 MR. OLMSTED: I believe so. Because I see Kalinic's name there
4 as well.
5 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, it is. If I can anticipate, that -- that it's
6 line 20 in Serbian. That's where it starts.
7 MR. OLMSTED: Yeah, I believe so. Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
8 Q. And you answered:
9 "Because they were in possession of information from the army
10 that the Presidency received on a regular basis. And what they wanted
11 was to cross-compare, cross-check that information with any other source
12 of information that they could obtain from the area.
13 "Only that the army was fulfilling its obligation and was
14 informing the Presidency on a regular basis which I can see from the
15 documents submitted to me."
16 That's correct, Mr. Stanisic, isn't it, that the army was
17 supplying Mr. Karadzic with information regarding the detention
18 facilities and the police were simply cross-checking that information or
19 supplementing it?
20 A. Not that sense. If I may, I'd like to clarify.
21 Q. If you can do so briefly, please.
22 A. You see, it is the minister of health and Biljana Plavsic as a
23 member of the presidency who were in -- who were tasked to communicate
24 with the Red Cross, sign agreements, and make arrangements - the
25 International Red Cross, that is - asked the MUP to carry out checks in
1 the field, to provide additional information so that they would not
2 provide incorrect information in their contacts. I accepted it because
3 it was in our interest to gather that information for the police to do
4 intelligence to the extent possible and I sent out orders. I did stress,
5 however, that it was not within the competence of the MUP and the
6 information provided needed to be cross-checked. I supposed the army was
7 duty-bound to regularly report the -- to the Presidency, including
8 Ms. Plavsic. So I discuss Kalinic and Mr. Plavsic here. And I still
9 hold the opinion I was duty-bound to forward the information I had and so
10 the army had to do the same. Anything beyond that is difficult for me to
11 say. It would be speculation. That is why the ministry was included.
12 And although it was not within our competence, within our authority, I
13 ordered the state security members of the MUP to gather their own
14 information so as to arrive at the truth. It was a difficult time.
15 There was some incorrect reporting from all sides, and that is why it was
17 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I'd like to tender this into
18 evidence, but if we could have pages 426 to 427 be admitted, I think that
19 will give a little more context to Your Honours when you're reviewing it.
20 JUDGE KWON: If you like. You can show the document -- those
21 pages to the witness. Otherwise we'll admit this page -- we'll add this
22 page only at this moment.
23 MR. OLMSTED: Well, let's just turn back one page then in the
24 English and I suppose also in the B/C/S.
25 Q. And, Mr. Stanisic, my question is simply is: This line of
1 questioning was relating to information concerning the various detention
2 facilities throughout the RS; correct?
3 A. I don't understand. What is the line of questioning? What you
4 are asking me or the interview or?
5 Q. In the interview at this point in time, I just want to make sure
6 it's clear that what you were answering was a question concerning
7 information concerning detention facilities. And we can see this on this
8 page where Mr. Tieger is asking about gathering data on captured Muslims.
9 A. Yes. It can be seen from my order that this is not under our
10 authority but that they should do their best to collect intelligence in
11 order to send this to the addressees that were read out here a moment ago
12 so that they could compare what they have to this in order to be able to
13 give information to the Red Cross that would be as accurate as possible.
14 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, if we could tender those two pages.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will add them.
16 MR. OLMSTED: Thank you.
17 Now if we could have 65 ter 32824 on the screen.
18 Q. Now, Mr. Stanisic, you were a ware that non-Serbs were being
19 arrested, held, and mistreated at detention facilities as early as
20 April 1992, weren't you?
21 A. Show me. I don't know. I cannot remember such a case. Or
22 perhaps there were was some individual case I cannot remember. Show it
23 to me. Show me where you are getting this from, and then we'll see.
24 Q. So we have in front of us a telephone intercept of a conversation
25 between you and Radomir Kojic from 18 April 1992. What position did
1 Mr. Kojic told in the RS MUP at the time?
2 A. Mr. Kojic was in the Territorial Defence of the municipality of
3 Pale. I cannot remember exactly now. I know that later he was battalion
4 commander in the Army of Republika Srpska.
5 Q. Now, Mr. Kojic tells on page 1 that Zoka is in Sokolac. He
6 arrested all of those who were messing up with the weapons up there. And
7 if we look on page 2, you respond:
8 "So be it."
9 Mr. Kojic then informs you:
10 "He is arresting them and I, actually we agreed that he brings
11 them to Vrace and hand them over there. They can beat them, they can do
12 whatever they fucking want, and then we will move them, because we have
13 no space here."
14 To which you respond:
16 Mr. Stanisic, this conversation relates to non-Serb prisoners,
17 doesn't it?
18 A. Where does it say that? Read it out to me that the detainees are
19 non-Serbs? What is the foundation for that question of yours? I
20 haven’t read that anywhere here that there were non-Serb
22 Q. I -- Mr. Stanisic, I'm putting it to you that these were non-Serb
24 JUDGE KWON: Does the witness have the -- that page?
25 MR. OLMSTED: It should be page 2.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I can confirm he does. It's on the screen,
2 Your Honours.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What's the question?
4 MR. OLMSTED:
5 Q. My question is, Mr. Stanisic, I acknowledge that there's no
6 mention here of the ethnicity of the persons arrested, but I'm putting to
7 you that they were non-Serb prisoners. Isn't that correct?
8 A. That is not correct. And you're probably claiming that
9 incorrectly because you do not have -- well, Your Honours, I can explain
10 what this is all about, if the Chamber is interested.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Sokolac, the
13 municipality of Sokolac is 95 per cent Serb populated, especially in the
14 inner circle of Sokolac. This is what this is all about. From a
15 barracks, Pofalic, that was close to the separation line. The weapons of
16 the Territorial Defence of Sokolac there were, and then these weapons
17 were withdrawn into Sokolac because it had been unprotected. Until then,
18 it was the JNA that had secured that. When they brought that to Sokolac,
19 then this -- these weapons were being abused and stolen, by the Serbs at
20 that. These Serbs were arrested, taken to prison. I think they were
21 prosecuted; I don't know. This was later handled by the public security
22 station of Sokolac. So this really has nothing do with prisoners of war
23 or non-Serb population.
24 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I tender this into evidence.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 JUDGE KWON: So you are tendering this intercept between
2 Mr. Stanisic and Kojic?
3 MR. OLMSTED: Yes, Your Honour. Did I miss something else?
4 JUDGE KWON: There are other conversations, so we'll admit this
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6635, Your Honours.
7 MR. OLMSTED: If we could have P1087 on the screen.
8 Q. Mr. Stanisic, you were a member of the National Security Council;
10 A. When? Which period?
11 Q. Well, I believe the National Security Council came into existence
12 around the -- in April of 1992 and continued until about June 1992, if my
13 memory serves me.
14 A. Yes. On the basis of the office I held, and on the basis of the
15 decision made by the assembly at the end of March, beginning of April,
16 the minister of the interior was a member of the council.
17 MR. OLMSTED: And if we can stay on page one of the English but
18 turn to page 2 of the B/C/S.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Stanisic, what you have in front of you is the minutes
20 from the National Security Council and government meeting held on 24
21 April 1992. And I want to draw your attention to the decision that
22 states: "The Ministry of Justice shall take over the exchange of
23 prisoners once the organs of the interior have completed their work." Do
24 you see that?
25 A. I can't see that. Where is it? I haven't found that.
1 MR. ZECEVIC: If I can assist again. It's -- it's the second
2 paragraph on -- on the page in the Serbian version.
3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is what is written there.
5 MR. OLMSTED:
6 Q. And my question for you, Mr. Stanisic, is that that was the
7 procedure that existed at the time. First, the minister -- Ministry of
8 Interior completed their work with prisoners, and then they turned them
9 over to the Ministry of Justice for exchange; correct?
10 A. May I explain? I think this is a concrete decision. We've
11 talked about Vrace when two policemen were killed. These are responsible
12 persons who organised that, and they were supposed to be interviewed in
13 the context of the murder of these two policemen and then handed over to
14 the Ministry of Justice. The intention was to have them exchanged
15 because of tensions. However, the court was supposed to initiate
17 Q. So it's your position, Mr. Stanisic, that this decision related
18 only to two prisoners. Is that what your position is?
19 A. To the best of my recollection. I don't remember anything else
20 because at that time there weren't any others except for the persons that
21 I'm talking about. Not that I know of, that is. These were not
22 prisoners of war. These were suspects, murder suspects, for the murder
23 of two policemen. Do you have something else that could remind me? It
24 really was a very long time ago, and I cannot ...
25 Q. And you're asserting that these murder suspects were simply
1 exchanged in a population exchange; is that correct?
2 A. Not the population. The Ministry of Justice took over, took
3 over, continued proceedings. Where does it say "population"? Where is
4 that written? I cannot see that.
5 Q. The decision - and correct me if I have it wrong - states that
6 the Ministry of Justice shall take over the exchange of prisoners once
7 the organs of interior have completed their work. And I'm focusing on
8 the word "exchange of prisoners." This deals with exchanging of
9 prisoners of war.
10 A. I don't know how it was defined here, but I know of that single
11 case only. How they were treated at that moment. So it was the
12 principal of the school and a few other suspects, murder suspects for the
13 murder of those policemen. And then the Ministry of the Interior was
14 supposed to conduct those preliminary interviews and then hand them over
15 to the Ministry of Justice; that is to say, the prosecutor's office, the
16 judiciary, and the Ministry of Justice as such.
17 MR. OLMSTED: Let's have 1D50020 on the screen.
18 Q. This is a report from SJB Novi Grad to the RS MUP under-secretary
19 for public security dated 20 May 1992.
20 Mr. Stanisic, who was the under-secretary for public security in
21 May 1992?
22 A. Cedo Kljajic.
23 Q. And it's reported to the RS MUP under-secretary that 156 persons
24 are detained in KPD Butmir who were taken in custody on varies grounds by
25 TO and JNA and preliminary operative interviews were conducted. And if
1 we look on page 2 of the English, it is noted "the inadequate conditions
2 of accommodation, food, hygiene, and state of health of detainees."
3 Mr. Stanisic, the RS MUP had information about the inhumane conditions at
4 detention facilities in May 1992, didn't it?
5 A. Please. But this was not only submitted to Cedo, the
6 under-secretary, but also to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of
7 Justice too. Because they -- I mean the Territorial Defence, there was
8 fighting going on, and during the fighting, as far as I can see here,
9 these persons were taken prisoner and they were put up in the Kula
10 prison, that is very close to Sarajevo, and the Ministry of Justice was
11 informed about that and the under-secretary for public security was
12 informed about that too. But -- I mean, it was the Territorial Defence
13 that was involved in the fighting. And then they brought these persons
14 into custody. However, adequate conditions existed only at the
15 already-existing prison at the time.
16 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, may this be admitted into evidence.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6636, Your Honours.
19 MR. OLMSTED:
20 Q. Now, at the beginning of August 1992, you saw on television the
21 international footage of the Prijedor detention facilities; correct?
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is it possible that this is already
24 admitted as P1126?
25 JUDGE KWON: We will check. Thank you.
1 MR. OLMSTED:
2 Q. Mr. Stanisic, let me repeat my question.
3 At the beginning of August 1992, you saw on television the
4 international footage of the Prijedor detention facilities, didn't you?
5 A. Mr. Prosecutor, correct. But at the time, since we did not have
6 electricity most of the time, on one occasion during the evening news
7 there was a report but, of course, it was very brief, just by way of
8 information. I think it was CNN or something.
9 MR. OLMSTED: And if we could have D467 on the screen.
10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
11 MR. OLMSTED: And I'll repeat. If we could have Exhibit D467 on
12 the screen.
13 Q. Mr. Stanisic, despite all the information that was available to
14 you regarding the detention facilities, the first and only order you
15 issued to your police subordinates with respect to operating detention
16 facilities at which non-Serbs were being detained was this 10 August 1992
17 order; isn't that correct?
18 A. Your Honours, this is not correct. I sent several orders. That
19 is to say, after the collegium in Belgrade, after the 11th of July, as a
20 matter of fact, I repeated some. And I pointed out again, again,
21 again -- probably not quite literally. I didn't just copy everything
22 out. But energetically, I tried to exert pressure so that members of the
23 MP would not have anything to do with the prisoners. In terms of persons
24 who were brought into custody, they should only be treated on the basis
25 of the Law on Criminal Procedure and the Law on the Interior. If there
1 is a suspicion that they had done something, they can be kept for three
2 days and then the prosecutor should be notified immediately as well as
3 the investigating judge. That was the procedure at the time. And it is
4 in that direction that I sent these orders.
5 Q. Well --
6 A. I'm sorry let us read paragraph 2:
7 "The security of collection centres shall be the direct
8 responsibility of the Serbian army and if they do not have enough --
9 again, if they do not have enough personnel and they have involved
10 reservists, then immediately they should be returned."
11 And then the Secretariat for National Defence can deploy them in
12 the army because we have no use for them. They are listed as members of
13 the MUP and they are involved as members of the military and I pointed
14 that out here, and we are not carrying out our duties and orders and that
15 is why this order was sent.
16 Q. Yes, Mr. Stanisic, we don't need you to repeat what the order
17 says. But I put to you that your other orders or instructions regarding
18 detention facilities, for instance, D450, which is the 19 July 1992
19 dispatch requesting information regarding detention facilities, D469
20 which is your 17 August 1992 dispatch regarding information about
21 unofficial prisons which you looked at yesterday, and D475, which is your
22 24 August 1992 dispatch requesting information on behalf of the Ministry
23 of Health, those all pertain to obtaining information. They were not
24 orders with regard to what to do with the detention facilities; isn't
25 that correct?
1 A. That is not correct. Mr. Prosecutor, you know that all these
2 centres, I cannot be very specific now, but up until mid-September, the
3 end of September, all of that was disbanded except for two POW camps that
4 were under the control of the military. I think it was Manjaca and
5 somewhere else. I don't know exactly. So the result of all of this
6 pressure was the disbanding of these camps and indeed they were
8 Q. Mr. Stanisic, you never ordered the disbandment of any detention
9 facility at which non-Serbs were held; isn't that correct?
10 A. Mr. Prosecutor, never was a single such centre established on the
11 basis of any decision of mine or from the ministry. So those who set up
12 the centres would have to disband them, and it was the Army of
13 Republika Srpska that was involved in all of that. And that is why I
14 informed the president, and through the army he did exert pressure and
15 the Crisis Staffs that established these centres and then that was
16 disbanded. I as minister of the MUP could not issue orders to the army
17 or to the president of the municipality. As for that which was in my
18 domain, that is to say, the Ministry of Interior, was separated from all
19 of that on the basis of my orders and they managed. We managed to a
20 large degree to set up a ministry of interior when we got rid of all of
21 this municipal deadweight that was there.
22 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, just one last document, then I'm done
23 with detention facilities. If we could have on the screen 65 ter 25981.
24 Q. Mr. Stanisic, this is a dispatch from SJB Bosanski Samac to the
25 RS MUP dated 28 November 1992. It's correct, isn't it, Mr. Stanisic,
1 that as late as the end of November 1992 the police still had custody
2 over non-Serb detainees; isn't that correct?
3 A. Once again, I repeat: We did not manage to integrate the public
4 security station until the end of 1992, and this was precisely in the
5 context of establishing the public security station which was established
6 by the MUP. And Andrija Bjelosevic, the chief of the centre, did have a
7 lot of problems there. And we even sent a special unit from the MUP to
8 help him in that. And it is true there were problems but they were
9 resolved. And from then onwards once we established control over the
10 public security station in Samac, these problems were no longer there.
11 MR. OLMSTED: Your Honours, I tender this into evidence.
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive this.
13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6637, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE KWON: I checked the record and I confirm, Mr. Karadzic,
15 that Exhibit P6636 is a certified copy of Exhibit P1126. Therefore, we
16 don't need to admit it separately and we'll vacate the number.
17 We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.
18 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
19 JUDGE KWON: We will assign this number P6636 to the Samac SJB
20 document; i.e., 65 ter 25981.
21 Hearing is adjourned.
22 [The witness stands down]
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 5th day of
25 February, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.