1 Monday, 17 February 2014
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Could the witnesses make the solemn declaration.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 WITNESS: KW586
11 [Witness answered through interpreter]
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, sir. Please be seated and make yourself
14 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, can we just have a transcript
15 correction, that's not the witness.
16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for your reminder, Ms. Edgerton.
17 Sir, I take it you understand you have the protective measures so
18 that you will be called by a pseudonym instead of your real name, and you
19 will not be viewed by the people outside the courtroom. Do you
20 understand that?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.
22 JUDGE KWON: Before we proceed, Mr. Witness, I must draw your
23 attention to a certain rule that we have here --
24 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
1 MS. EDGERTON: I don't mean to interrupt you. If I could just
2 have your indulgence for a moment, but I think there was a revision to
3 the --
4 JUDGE KWON: All right.
5 MS. EDGERTON: -- 90(E) notification that we provided you with
6 that was sent by Mr. Reid earlier in the week. Yes, Mr. Reid advises me
7 there was a revised notification sent last Friday.
8 JUDGE KWON: Probably it didn't reach me or I just missed it.
9 Thank you. Very well.
10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
12 Your Excellency. Good morning, everyone.
13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness.
15 A. Good morning.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we call up in e-court,
17 please, 1D49080 without broadcasting it.
18 [In English] Not to broadcast.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Witness, may I ask you to tell us, is your real name and surname
21 below this number?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this under seal.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it under seal.
1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4372 under seal, Your Honours.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Witness, have you given a statement to my Defence team?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you. I see you observe a pause, as you should, and I thank
6 you for it.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show the witness 1D2321 in
8 e-court. 1D23231 without broadcasting.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you see before you on the screen the first page of your
11 statement? Certain passages in which the Trial Chamber was not
12 interested have been redacted. I believe this is the redacted version.
13 MS. EDGERTON: Well, it's not, actually, not on the one that I
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.
16 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we did make the redactions, Mr. President,
17 but perhaps they didn't make it into e-court, but they have been made and
18 I think the statement that was distributed shows the redactions in hard
20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Shall we continue on that basis,
21 Ms. Edgerton? Yes.
22 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Have you read and signed this statement?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show the last page.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. And in the bottom of this page there's also your signature. Is
6 this your signature?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you have said to the
9 Defence team?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you. If I were to put to you the same questions here in
12 the courtroom today, would your answers be essentially the same?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this statement under
16 92 ter.
17 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
18 MS. EDGERTON: No.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, are you tendering only the
20 confidential version or are you tendering also redacted version -- public
21 redacted version?
22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, I think we can tender a public
23 redacted version.
24 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
25 Shall we admit them.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, 65 ter number 1D23231 will be
2 Exhibit D4373 under seal, and the public redacted version will be
3 Exhibit D4374.
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 I will now read out in English a short summary of the -- of this
7 witness's statement.
8 [In English] Witness KW586 was a member of a unit of the Bosnian
9 army called Biseri. The task of the unit was to protect the Presidency,
10 its members, and their families. During his shifts, KW586 was constantly
11 with President Izetbegovic and he was present during many of the secret
12 meetings held in the basement of the National Bank. These meetings were
13 attended by military and political leaders as well as by Izetbegovic's
14 son, Bakir; Izetbegovic's son-in-law, Jasmin; and Reis-ul-ulema Ceric,
15 who had the biggest influence on the president because he was a believer
16 and he held the Reis-ul-ulema in deep respect.
17 From the first meeting he attended as a security guard, KW586
18 heard that the goal of President Izetbegovic and the other leaders was to
19 get the international community militarily involved in BH on the Bosnian
20 side. To achieve this goal, they decided to apply the tactic of causing
21 the mass suffering of the Bosnian population and of engaging in
22 provocations in order to cause the shelling of buildings such as
23 hospitals and the like. They agreed to provoke the Serbs who had a lot
24 of artillery on positions around Sarajevo, so they would engage in
25 shelling which in turn would be used against them before the
1 international community. Whenever shelling was provoked in the places
2 where civilians would be hurt, the TV crews and journalists would be
3 close by.
4 Furthermore, smaller units were to make incursions into
5 Serbian-populated areas, where they would attack the civilian population
6 in order to get a reaction from the Serbian forces. This strategy
7 involved the engagement of units of the local commanders with a criminal
8 past such as Juka Prazina, Caco, Celo Bajramovic, and others. These men
9 were supposed to do as much dirty work in Sarajevo against the Serbs as
10 possible before the regular units with a joint command were formed so
11 that their actions would be qualified as crime and revenge and
12 President Izetbegovic could not be held responsible.
13 The truce agreed between the Muslims and the Croats just before
14 the Washington Agreement was a condition for a large quantity of weapons
15 intended for the Muslims and located in Split on the Adriatic coast, to
16 cross Herceg-Bosna on trucks and get to Sarajevo. In addition to the
17 weapons transported from Croatia to Bosnia with trailer-trucks, weapons
18 were also normally packed into food and clothing which was supplied as
19 humanitarian aid.
20 In the spring of 1994, President Izetbegovic and
21 Reis-ul-ulema Ceric met Naser Oric in order to remind him of the
22 importance of provoking the international intervention in BH. They
23 suggested Oric to organise smaller combat groups which would leave the
24 safe area without the knowledge of the UNPROFOR and engage in combat
25 actions against civilians in Serbian-populated communities as to provoke
1 the Serbian forces into retaliating and shelling the safe areas. The
2 victims were not important. As Reis-ul-ulema Ceric often repeated: They
3 are dying for a just cause and on the part of the Lord.
4 Soon after KW586 heard this conversation, news started arriving
5 that the Srebrenica had been shelled by the Serbian forces. In some of
6 those cases there was even talk that Muslim forces had shelled parts of
7 Srebrenica to point the finger at the Serbs. The implementation of the
8 agreed tactic to constantly provoke the other side and have the
9 international community blame the Serbs included the staging of incidents
10 before or during the visits of international officials.
11 As for the first Markale incident, Witness KW586 personally heard
12 President Izetbegovic, Reis-ul-ulema Ceric, and others present in the
13 bank talking what could have happened if a shell were to fall on Markale
14 because the market was full of people. Two or three days after this
15 meeting a shell impacted at the Markale market.
16 And that is short summary. Now I would like to pose several
17 questions to the witness.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown without
20 broadcasting 1D8841.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Witness, could you tell us what we have before us?
23 A. This is an official ID, probably mine, I don't know. The police
24 of BH, the official ID of the BH police.
25 Q. You mean the secretariat for internal affairs?
1 A. Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please, without
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Help us with this, please.
6 A. Yes, this is my name and surname and my photo on the ID.
7 Q. Is it sometimes renewed or its validity extended?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this under seal.
11 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?
12 MS. EDGERTON: No.
13 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 JUDGE KWON: Do we need the translation? Yes, we'll mark it for
16 identification under seal.
17 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4375 under seal, Your Honours.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 Could the witness be shown 1D8842 without broadcasting.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. And what is this?
22 A. That's my accreditation to the company for the protection of the
23 Presidency. This was issued to members of my unit attached to the
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the reverse of this
1 ID. The next page.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This is the flip side of the ID?
4 A. Yes, and that is the coat of arms of the police.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this under seal to be
6 MFI'd pending translation.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D4376 under seal, Your Honours.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D8840 is the next document I would
10 like to show the witness. No broadcast.
11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Witness, tell us what this document is.
13 A. This is an ID of the American humanitarian organisation where I
14 went to get fuel, food, and supplies for our unit. This ID was given to
15 several members of our unit.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. This is a translation, the text above corresponds to the text
19 below in our language?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document under seal.
23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.
24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4377 under seal, Your Honours.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Witness, can you tell us from when until when were you a member
3 of this protection unit, unit for the protection of the Presidency and
4 the members of the Presidency and their families?
5 A. Two years, from April or May 1992 until May 1994.
6 Q. Thank you. Until when did President Izetbegovic use the shelter
7 at the bank?
8 A. As far as I know, the whole period I was there he was also at the
9 bank. I didn't notice that he was moved during my tenure.
10 Q. Thank you. We have received a document from the Presidency --
11 sorry, from the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina which says he used the
12 bank premises until June 1993. Which information is correct, what you
13 have just told us or what is written in this letter?
14 A. As far as I know, he was not moved as long as I was there.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 1D8845.
16 No broadcast until I say something can be broadcast.
17 THE REGISTRAR: It's not released, Mr. Karadzic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. While we're waiting, can you tell us, Witness, after the war did
21 you suffer any health problems; and if so, what kind?
22 A. I had a stroke in the year 2000 or perhaps 2001.
23 Q. Were there any consequences; and if so, what kind?
24 A. I have this tremor still in my hand and in one foot, but no other
1 Q. Thank you.
2 The ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we don't have this in e-court,
3 could this document be placed on the ELMO?
4 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
5 We have it in e-court now.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. I will now read out to you, it says, pertaining to your request
9 for assistance - please do not broadcast this - I will read it out in
10 English so it can be interpreted to you.
11 [In English] The witness "is a qualified driver. During
12 20th of May, 1992 - 12th of May, 1994" this witness "was a member of the
13 Protection of People and Objects ... of the Interior Ministry of the
14 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the basis of the decision made by
15 the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of," with
16 this date, witness "was a reserve policeman of the Protection of People
17 and Objects Sector - Police Unit for the Protection of People and Objects
18 and he was a sergeant beginning with 1st September, 1993 ..."
19 [No interpretation]
20 [In English] "... a member of the Fifth Police Department in the
21 Interior Ministry of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina beginning
22 with the 12th of May, 1994.
23 "Finally" this witness "was a member of the unit 'Biseri'
24 throughout the war in B and H, and the unit was responsible for the
25 protection of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
1 [Interpretation] Is this information consistent with what you
2 know? Is it true, in other words?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document under seal.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I just add something?
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Certainly, please.
9 A. Biseri existed a bit earlier. While we established the unit, it
10 took 20 days. This was all before the time it took us to set up a base
11 and the time it took for new people to join. What I'm trying to say is
12 that the unit Biseri existed 20 days before this, but this is the
13 official date of its inception.
14 Q. Thank you for the explanation.
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive this.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4378 under seal, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 I have no further questions for the witness at this time.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
21 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
22 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
5 Q. Mr. Witness, we met on Saturday; right?
6 A. [Interpretation] Yes.
7 Q. And I want to ask you about some of the things that you told us
8 on Saturday and maybe get you to confirm some of that information, but
9 maybe I can get you to close that thing that's on the desk in front of
10 you so you're not going to be distracted. All right? Great. Thank you.
11 Now, first of all, since you had this stroke that you told
12 Dr. Karadzic about, you've had a little bit of trouble with your memory,
13 right, because you told us on Saturday you have problems with dates?
14 A. No, no. Not that. Generally speaking, during the war we weren't
15 sure what the date was at which particular time. We weren't watching the
16 news on TV and we weren't able to keep track of the dates in that sense.
17 It has nothing to do with my health. Even when I was there in that
18 period of time, I didn't know what the date was. The only thing of
19 paramount importance was to survive.
20 Q. To survive what?
21 A. The shelling, sniping. You know yourself, everything that the
22 war brings.
23 Q. All right. Now just to go back to my question. It's true, isn't
24 it then, what you told us on Saturday. On Saturday you said: I don't
25 remember any date. If someone were to ask me dates, I don't remember.
1 That's true; right?
2 A. But only the dates during the war, not after. This is not a
3 consequence of my stroke. I had my stroke in 2001.
4 Q. Did you work after your stroke?
5 A. Do you mean in the company I was working for?
6 Q. Did you -- after you had a stroke you were off work for a while;
10 however, I didn't continue working after my stroke. I was retired.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have lines 7 and 8 redacted,
13 JUDGE KWON: Well, just in case, let's do that.
14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
15 Q. So you haven't had a job since at least 2001; right?
16 A. Right. I have never worked again after 2001. I was retired.
17 Q. Okay. And you've been watching this trial, haven't you? You
18 told us that on Saturday. You've been watching it on the internet and
19 you've been watching it on TV; right?
20 A. That's not right. I only said that through BN TV one can follow
21 the trial regularly. I didn't say that I myself followed it. What I
22 meant to say was that the people over there are fully familiar with
23 everything that is happening here.
24 Q. Well, when we asked you how you got in contact with
25 Dr. Karadzic's Defence team, you said that you knew who they were because
1 you spent a lot of time watching the trial, that the trial was being
2 broadcast constantly on BN TV. And so that's how you recognised who the
3 Defence counsel of Dr. Karadzic were. That's actually what you told us
4 on Saturday; right?
5 A. No, I didn't. I said that I watched it occasionally, I mean the
6 trial. Besides, all of us know who the counsel are and we know about the
7 accused. There are TV shows discussing what somebody's guilty of or not,
8 so it's a thing that one necessarily has to know. It's not that I was
9 following the trial regularly; it was occasionally that I would watch
10 what was happening. There was no need for me to follow it.
11 Q. And that's how you knew who the counsel were and that's how you
12 went and contacted Mr. Petronijevic, who's here in court; right?
13 A. Yes. Mr. Petronijevic is always featured on one of these TV
15 Q. So he didn't find you to testify; you went to find him. Right?
16 A. Yes.
17 MS. EDGERTON: Could we go into private session, please?
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
19 [Private session]
11 Page 47198 redacted. Private session.
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
14 [Private session]
11 Pages 47201-47204 redacted. Private session.
4 [Open session]
5 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
6 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
7 Q. You explained to us now on Saturday that when you went to Germany
8 after leaving Sarajevo, you stayed there for only around a month; right?
9 A. A month or two, I don't know. I don't know if it makes any
10 difference, but that's correct. I wasn't able to obtain any rights so I
11 moved to Belgium.
12 Q. So you -- in Germany you never claimed asylum as a refugee?
13 A. As far as I'm aware, no, but it was all in the hands of my
14 sister. She took charge of it all. She was trying to obtain papers for
15 me to stay there. I don't know what she resorted to, but she was going
16 through all the ways and means of keeping me in Germany.
17 Q. So you're not able to confirm whether or not you claimed asylum
18 as a refugee; is that what you're telling us?
19 A. Yes, I don't know what she applied for, whether it was for asylum
20 or merely for a permit of residence. I know that she went to several
21 municipalities filing applications in order to keep me there. They were
22 very reluctant to accept refugees at the time. The war was nearing its
23 end and they were already thinking of sending the refugees they already
24 had back.
25 Q. Well, this is -- you know, if what you say is true, this is a
1 pretty important story about a conspiracy that could have affected -- if
2 it broke could have affected the conduct of parts of the rest of the war.
3 And it could have affected your stay in Germany, and you never told this
4 story to the authorities in Germany, did you?
5 A. I never discussed the war with anyone in Germany, not with the
6 authorities, not with the civilians.
7 Q. Well, the story you're giving us today is kind of like the
8 ultimate conspiracy about the war involving everybody from the political
9 leadership to the military leadership to the media. If what you say is
10 true, that story could have stopped more people from dying in Sarajevo,
11 it could have stopped more people from dying in Srebrenica, and you
12 didn't think it was important enough to tell as soon as you landed in
14 A. Well, no. It's always this question of to be or not to be. At
15 first I did not consider that I should say anything at all because it was
16 the same on both sides, and they were doing what they were doing while we
17 were doing what we were doing. And I thought there was a balance to it
18 all. But when I saw after the war that the same gang is ruling Sarajevo
19 just as it did during the war, although the war had ended, while other
20 people are being held accountable for what they had done, then I saw
21 there was no balance in it after all. If one who is liable is held to
22 account, then another one should be held to account as well. And when I
23 saw that injustice, then I changed my mind. And even then, it's very
24 difficult to say things against your own people. I wouldn't wish it upon
25 anyone, but sometimes you have to do it.
1 Q. If it could have saved lives of your own people, wouldn't it have
2 been worth saying 20 years ago when you first landed in Europe?
3 A. I just told you. Whether it is right or not, I don't know, but
4 at that time I was still not certain that I should do it. I wasn't even
5 thinking of doing it. I wasn't even thinking of whether I should. It
6 was all fresh in my head and my only thought was to get away from it, to
7 find shelter with my family, to get as far away as I could from the war.
8 I didn't think about it at all. And at that time the Hague Tribunal
9 still did not exist anyway, so it didn't occur to me to do anything
10 further with that story. I just didn't think about it. I simply wanted
11 to find some peace of mind, to get some rest from all of that, to find my
12 own spiritual peace and then to get better physically, to recover my
13 weight. I wasn't thinking really, if you can understand, whether what
14 was right and what was not, not during those years. And only later when
15 I saw that some people are being judged for crimes that they hadn't done
16 while others were not being judged for crimes they were responsible for,
17 then -- then it came back.
18 Q. Well, a month or two after you got to Germany, you left for
19 Belgium; that's what you told us Saturday, right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you lived there for five years, four and a half or five
22 years, not even 200 kilometres away from this Tribunal, and you never
23 told the Belgian authorities this great conspiracy story, did you?
24 A. No, no, no. But I'm telling you now. At that moment -- well,
25 I've already told you, I was just looking at my own personal interest, to
1 get some rest, to come to. You can condemn me all you want, but it never
2 really crossed my mind.
3 Q. And --
4 A. But, but, there is this other reason, what I said just now, let
5 everybody be responsible. That's my opinion. Nobody was accused then.
6 These judgements came later. Everybody should be responsible for
7 everything; Mr. Karadzic too. If he's guilty for anything, let him be
8 held accountable, but don't make him guilty for the things he didn't do.
9 That's it. As for these years, I never thought of testifying, saying
10 things. And then when these judgements were being passed, then I sort of
11 thought about it. I saw that over all of those 20 years that gang is
12 still in power over there, no one can touch them. So that led to it too,
13 but that came only later --
14 Q. Well --
15 A. -- it wasn't at first.
16 Q. Well, so if what you're saying is true, you weren't thinking
17 clearly - because that's what you said - for the whole five years you
18 were in Belgium --
19 A. No, no, no, no. No, it's not that I wasn't thinking. I wasn't
20 thinking about war, The Hague. I just wanted to distance myself from all
21 of that, to be as far away from it as I could.
22 Q. And sacrifice the people that you left behind when you fled
23 Sarajevo; that's what you did, right?
24 A. Well, I guess you have to say that. I couldn't have changed
25 anything, just like anybody else. But anyway, if that's what you're
1 saying then ...
2 Q. So two months after you left Germany there were people on the
3 ground here in The Hague at this Tribunal. The whole time you were
4 living in Belgium, we were operating. And you would have seen that
5 Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic, while you were living in Belgium, were
6 indicted for killing and terrorising civilians in Sarajevo, by shelling
7 and sniping, and for the killings in Srebrenica, and you just stayed
8 there; right?
9 A. Yes, just stayed there.
10 Q. You didn't think this story was important enough to get on the
11 train for an hour and a half and come speak to an investigator here, did
13 A. First of all, I'm saying now I did not follow the news very much,
14 either this way or that way. So it wasn't that I was informed about
15 The Hague -- well, even if I had been informed, during that first time I
16 wasn't really interested in that until these wrong judgements started
17 coming in. Well, then, I saw that one was being held accountable but not
18 the other one, and in my view both should be held accountable but I saw
19 that only later when I came to Bosnia that none of those bandits of ours
20 are being held accountable and others are. Well, call it what you will.
21 While I was in Belgium, it never crossed my mind that I should go and say
22 something to someone. I just tried to forget all of that. It was only
23 when I returned to Sarajevo and when I saw that those same people that
24 were looting, that had a free hand then, it is only then that I felt this
25 revolt again. Now, whatever you say to that, however you may interpret
1 this, that's the way it was. But in Belgium, it never crossed by mind.
2 Q. Well, when you went back to Sarajevo, as you told us on Saturday,
3 in 1999, these people who you mention in your statement - I'll give you
4 two examples - Sefer Halilovic, he was put on trial in this Tribunal in
5 2005 and you didn't come forward. Naser Oric, who you talk about a lot
6 in your statement, was put on trial in 2006 and you had a story that
7 could have changed the course of his trial and you didn't come forward.
8 That's because, Mr. Witness, you were only thinking about yourself, just
9 like you're only thinking about yourself in coming forward now after
10 20 years. That's really what's going on, isn't it?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Well, then you --
13 A. I don't know how come. Thank you. That's not the way it is. In
14 order to understand all of that, you have to live in Bosnia for a while.
15 Roughly around 2000 I wanted to come here for the first time, and I said
16 that to some people, that I intended to make a statement against that
17 scum over there. And then, as we talked, quite a lot of people agreed
18 with that but very few would come and dare testify. The main reason is
19 that they all have their families there, they have children, and nobody
20 dares because they know that there would be a lot of retaliation. I --
21 Q. Mr. Witness, I'm not asking about other people; I'm asking about
22 you. You didn't come forward -- Mr. Witness, you have protective
23 measures. Please, let's try and not talk over one another. You didn't
24 come forward to testify in the trial of Naser Oric because you're making
25 this up.
1 A. No way, no. You can interpret that any which way you want,
2 whether I'm right or wrong, but what I said is the truth. And if you
3 allow me, I will continue saying what I tried to say a moment ago. I
4 wanted to come here roughly in 2000, and as I talked to all these other
5 people who were not interested, they all agreed that there's been an
6 injustice but nobody dares testify. I hope that after my testimony
7 perhaps one or two more people will come and there will be some purpose
8 in all of this, otherwise nobody can get rid of that gang over there. I
9 did want to come in 2000 and I confided (redacted)
10 (redacted) I said that I would testify. He said that to them. The
11 very next day, the very next day around the apartment there were jeeps,
12 there were threats: What are you doing, you ape? What are you doing,
13 playing with your life? Where do you think you're going, you fool?
14 Things like that. And this was going round and round.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The name in lines 9 and 10, could
16 that be redacted?
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 MS. EDGERTON:
19 Q. Mr. Witness, you can't even get your story straight between
20 Saturday and today. On Saturday you told my colleague who was
21 interviewing you exactly this same story, but you said it happened in
22 2012 and not in 2000.
23 A. Obviously you misunderstood all of that. I know exactly what it
24 was that I said, and I spoke about the first time, about that which is
25 now. As for the rest, the story that coincides with 2012, I know exactly
1 what I said. I wanted in 2001 to testify, but they prevented me from
2 doing so. And then came that stroke, and that's why I couldn't
3 afterwards. But once I recovered from this stoke and when I saw that I
4 could -- and you see that it's a bit hard for me to walk even now. Again
5 I spoke up. And that's why this testimony of mine did not arrive on time
6 for Oric and Halilovic, that's the only reason. I know full well what it
7 was that I said because that's the way it is.
8 Q. On Saturday we didn't ask you about 2000 or 2001; we were asking
9 you about Halilovic and Oric in 2006. And you said on Saturday that you
10 told this great story only in 2012 to your one cousin, so you told one
11 person, and you thought that he must have told someone because
12 immediately afterwards jeeps showed up. And then I asked you, I asked
13 you, who he told, and you had absolutely no idea. You can't tell me who
14 he told, you can't told me where he spoke to them, you can't tell me even
15 if he told someone because it never happened, Mr. Witness; isn't that
17 A. That's not right. You've twisted it. Perhaps I misunderstood
18 you there, but I know what I'm saying now and that is the way it is. It
19 did happen. That is contained in my statement, and you did not allow me
20 to say a bit more. When I wanted to tell you more on Saturday, you just
21 said: Okay, okay, let's move on and so on and so forth.
22 Q. Then tell us who your cousin told.
23 A. Who he told? How could I know? I just know that this gang is
24 very well organised and that very quickly they got these yes men of
25 theirs, probably somebody who's in cahoots with the people that I'm
1 testifying about. Only a day before that there weren't any jeeps and the
2 very next day there were jeeps and threats, and I hadn't told anyone but
4 Q. You know, Mr. Witness, since the 1990s this Tribunal has had an
5 office in Sarajevo open to the public in a protected facility. The
6 people in our office in Sarajevo include staff who have specific witness
7 protection skills and training, and you never in all the 13 years you
8 were living in Bosnia showed up with this huge conspiracy story; right?
9 You never went to them?
10 A. I never did, never did. Should I comment upon that or ... ?
11 Q. I want to go to another thing -- another area that we talked
12 about on Saturday. You confirmed on Saturday, didn't you, that you were
13 not one of President Izetbegovic's body-guards; right?
14 A. Well, this word, "body-guard," that would be wrong. I was just a
15 guard, an escort -- well, "body-guard," wow.
16 Q. And the president, he had a lot of meetings, didn't he, meetings
17 that you wouldn't have known about; right ?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. That's because you weren't with him all the time; right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you know that if he was really concerned about information
22 leaking out about something sensitive, he would have closed-door meetings
23 that nobody could overhear. You know that, don't you?
24 A. That's not right.
25 Q. Well, well --
1 A. That room --
2 Q. -- Mr. Witness, you know that because you talked about a meeting
3 like that in your statement. That's what the president did. If he
4 didn't want -- if he was discussing highly sensitive information, he
5 would have closed-door meetings, just like the one you talked about that
6 he had with President Tudjman.
7 A. Tudjman never came to that room in the bank. Tudjman was at the
8 Presidency, and that's completely different. You're confusing things.
9 In this room where Izetbegovic lived, in the basement of the bank, there
10 were these persons who were mentioned here that came, starting with the
11 Reis and Bakir and Sefer Talijan. The meeting with Tudjman was an
12 official visit. However, they within the Presidency had their meeting
13 somewhere up there at the Presidency. This has nothing to do with this
14 thing over here. There's nothing for me to say there. Whereas over here
15 in the basement of the bank, well that is where they decided what they
16 decided. Whether they hid that from me, no. I guess they trusted me or
18 Q. Let's get --
19 A. But I could hear every word. Tudjman has nothing to do with this
20 whole story. He was just mentioned because of the weapons. Later when
21 that meeting was held with him -- well, seven days later, those weapons
22 were released from Split -- well, that's the only context for Tudjman.
23 Q. We'll leave that conspiracy aside and get back to my question.
24 You would agree, would you, that the president would have closed-door
25 meetings where he didn't want to have anybody overhear; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And you wouldn't describe yourself as a close confidant of
3 Sefer Halilovic, would you? You weren't Sefer Halilovic's closest friend
4 or in his inner circle, were you?
5 A. God forbid.
6 Q. The same with Ismet Dahic, you weren't a close confidant of
7 Ismet Dahic?
8 A. No.
9 Q. And the same goes, doesn't it, for Avdo Hebib, Stjepan Kljuic,
10 Mustafa Hajrulahovic, even Reis-ul-ulema Ceric, Bakir, Izetbegovic? You
11 are not a close confidant of any of those people and you weren't at the
12 time, were you?
13 A. Well, I was nothing with them. I hadn't known these people from
14 before. Quite simply, I was carrying out my duties and it so happened
15 that in the course of my work I would be close to the president. As for
16 this man, I can only say the best and even later, and you can see that
17 from my statement. I think even -- since he's a religious man, had
18 somebody asked him -- I think he would have repeated that here too, but
19 there you go. I was no friend of theirs. I hadn't known anyone from
20 before. I mean, we weren't friends or enemies. Quite simply, I was on
21 this guard duty 3 or 4 metres away from them, and as far as I know the
22 late President Alija was always very nice to me. He'd bring me a cup of
23 tea and sometimes we'd even exchange a word or two, in a friendly way
24 really. (redacted) so probably
25 that's why I had that duty too. It wasn't for Sefer or anybody else, it
1 was just Ari Slupovac [phoen] as commander of the president's guard and
2 the Presidency. He's the only one who would decide who would go where.
3 No one could interfere with that, Sefer or this person or that person.
4 Q. And you would agree with me that an explicit instruction to
5 Naser Oric to attack Serb civilians to provoke the Serbs into shelling a
6 safe area and Sefer Halilovic openly saying that he had fired a shell at
7 the market-place and was going to do so again would be incredibly
8 damaging to the interests of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
9 wouldn't it? If that came out, that would be incredibly damaging. It
10 would turn world opinion against them, wouldn't it?
11 A. That requires a broader explanation. Will you allow me?
12 Alija Izetbegovic was convinced that he could not win this war
13 because he had a lot of men but less weapons. And the point was always
14 to somehow provoke an international intervention in this or that way,
15 according to the motto: All's fair in war. That's what was aimed at, to
16 cause an international intervention even at the cost of one's own
17 victims. The first time we expected international intervention,
18 President Mitterrand of France came and nothing happened. There was no
19 intervention. Then after that there would be a few casualties here, a
20 few casualties there, but it was never even remotely enough for the
21 international community to intervene.
22 Now, on the basis of all of that, because these two towns were --
23 well, Srebrenica was a protected area and Gorazde was a protected area,
24 and then there's Sarajevo. They were the ones that the media wrote about
25 the most, abroad as well. And also according to that thing, everything
1 goes in war, just win the battle, I know when the Reis said that, well I
2 saw that. Daily we're losing 50 to 70 people and no use, whereas this
3 way if we managed to provoke an international intervention they will all
4 go to paradise, they will all be martyrs on God's path. Those are his
5 words. So that was the point of all of that, to provoke an international
6 intervention and that could be done only through the protected areas. In
7 Gorazde they didn't succeed in that because they didn't have a man they
8 trusted there who would obey them the way Oric did.
9 Q. You haven't answered my question --
10 A. Let me finish.
11 Q. No. My question was: If this news, if your story had leaked
12 out, that would have been incredibly damaging and turned world opinion
13 against the Bosnian people, yes or no?
14 A. Probably. If that is just -- if -- well, if it's possible to
15 answer just that way -- well, yes, yes, that would be right.
16 Q. So -- but your evidence -- and it would be pretty basic to have
17 these conversations actually behind closed doors, just like the president
18 did with President Tudjman; right?
19 A. Again, I'm saying Tudjman is a completely different story and the
20 president had a meeting, a real meeting, with Tudjman in a real building,
21 the building of the Presidency of BH, where these decisions were made;
22 whereas these other meetings were held in the basement of the bank - do
23 you understand that? - where Alija lived temporarily because over there
24 his apartment had been shelled. And those decisions that were made at
25 the Presidency had nothing to do with these decisions taken at the bank.
1 It's just that some chosen people came to the bank. When Oric came, he
2 never stopped at the Presidency building, never. I remember three times
3 when he was there and once I brought him by car from Dobrinja to the
4 runway, to the Holiday Inn, and over there he never went to the
5 Presidency building but he always came to meetings at the bank. I want
6 to tell you to make a distinction between the two, and over here, it was
7 only these six or seven men who came to the bank, at first Kljuic. After
8 that he didn't come, when he realised what was going on there he said: I
9 don't want anything to do with that, whereas those people came non-stop.
10 Do you understand that? Where can you have a greater conspiracy than the
11 bank basement? There was no journalists there, secretaries, no one, just
12 six or seven men talking.
13 Q. And you; right?
14 A. And I.
15 Q. And your evidence -- and your evidence is that they discussed
16 these plans that could turn world opinion against them over and over and
17 over again in front of you; right?
18 A. If that's what you say, that's the way it is. I don't know what
19 could turn out, but there you go.
20 Q. And you're the first one to come forward with this story that
21 they discussed, not behind closed doors, you're the first one to come
22 forward with this story in 20 years; right?
23 A. I don't know whether I'm the first one or which one I am. I just
24 know that that's the way it is.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I note it's actually past the break.
1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue after a break?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me just add one more thing.
3 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue after the break.
4 We'll resume at five past 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.08 a.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.
8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.
9 Q. Mr. Witness, I want to talk about some of these shelling
10 provocations you described in your statement, your written evidence. And
11 you said, with respect to those incidents:
12 "The agreement was that whenever shelling like this was provoked
13 in the places where civilians would be hurt, TV crews and journalists
14 would be close by."
15 So as I understand that, it's your position that these incidents
16 were all pre-planned in arrangements with TV journalists; that's your
17 evidence, right?
18 A. No. The journalists didn't know anything about it. Our people
19 just made sure that they would be close by when an incident would happen
20 so they could report in time, and since Sarajevo was encircled it was
21 never far away from the Presidency to the Dvor, to Kosevo, to all these
22 addresses, and the journalists were always at the ready to go there. Of
23 course the journalists had nothing to do with it. They just wrote about
24 what they saw, and our people served them up what they should see.
25 Q. Well, do you mean you? You've just said:
1 "Our people made sure they would be close by when an incident
2 would happen ..."
3 How would you know if you weren't a part of it?
4 A. I could neither decide anything nor was I able to -- I was just
5 close by when somebody discussed it.
6 Q. Well, then how do you know that your people made sure that
7 journalists would be close by when an incident would happen? Tell me
8 what they did to make sure that happened?
9 A. First of all, I don't know what they did later because I wasn't
10 there after. I only know when they talked amongst themselves how to take
11 care of the journalists, and generally speaking, Avdo Hebib took care of
12 journalists while he was there. That was his assignment, to enable all
13 the journalists to go whenever they wanted to, that access not be denied
14 to them. But, first of all, our people were supposed to clean things up
15 so the journalists shouldn't see what they shouldn't see, the military
16 hospital and all the other things.
17 Q. Oh. But --
18 A. -- the buildings of all the institutions, but not for a moment
19 did I say that journalists were pre-advised or involved in it.
20 Q. So this arrangement, this agreement that you're talking about, if
21 it's true, that would involve, I would say probably at a minimum, some
22 senior police officials, some senior military officials, probably some
23 brigade officials, probably some traffic cops from different parts of the
24 city of Sarajevo, probably the crew who was driving the truck that the
25 weapon was launched on and the crew that fired it, and you're the first
1 one from inside Sarajevo to come out and talk about this; right?
2 A. All these who were enumerated probably should have known, but all
3 these people were just executing orders without asking why. You
4 understand? I don't know about what came after. I only know what I saw
5 and heard at these meetings. What happened later at the execution stage
6 I was not able to know because I wasn't there. I could only know when
7 they said: Oh, this job was well done or that job was well done. And I
8 know who was in charge of what. A moment ago you said Sefer Halilovic
9 fired that shell; Sefer Halilovic didn't, the Italian did, Mustafa
10 Hajrulahovic, on the orders of Sefer Halilovic and those others in the
11 basement. That's the small error you made.
12 Q. Oh, so now when you talk about Markale I, you've pulled
13 General Hajrulahovic into the story. Were you there? Because that's the
14 only reason you would know about any order that General Hajrulahovic
15 might have given. Did you see him give the order?
16 A. When we were in the building of the Presidency and when the
17 planning was done for that, then Alija told Sefer: This and that needs
18 to be done. Sefer turned towards the Italian and said: No problem, the
19 Italian will take care of it. That's the sentence.
20 Q. Right --
21 A. And similarly, when the first attempt was made - there were two
22 attempts - the first attempt with that shell ended in the shell landing
23 on a roof near the market. The same thing was said: No problem, we'll
24 repeat it. We just have to wait for the same conditions to meet, for the
25 same group of UNPROFOR to be near. That's how I know it was the Italian,
1 not Sefer.
2 Q. Right. So let's leave the media conspiracy and let's go on and
3 talk about the Markale conspiracy.
4 A. No, no, no, no. No, there was no media conspiracy, no media
5 conspiracy at all. The media just covered and broadcast what we served
6 them, and I include myself in that army.
7 Q. Let's talk about Markale I. You're saying that the shell that
8 fell on the market-place in Sarajevo in February 1994 was fired - because
9 this is how I read your evidence - it was fired from Bosnian army
10 positions under Mrkovici by Mustafa Hajrulahovic at the order of
11 Sefer Halilovic and with the knowledge of an entire UNPROFOR team; right?
12 A. No, no. No, I did not mention the UNPROFOR in that context.
13 That UNPROFOR team was chosen perhaps because they were less attentive in
14 listening for the shells or because they were drunk. I don't know why
15 they were chosen by our people. But after that one visit of the UNPROFOR
16 our people knew who and what they were. There was no UNPROFOR
17 conspiracy. I don't know why they needed that particular team, by that,
18 that crew of people who were counting the shells. For the rest, you are
19 correct, everything apart from the UNPROFOR.
20 Q. Well, you said in your statement why they needed that UNPROFOR
21 team. You said that they had some kind of agreements with them that they
22 wouldn't register the firing of missiles from our positions, so UNPROFOR
23 was part of the conspiracy you're alleging in your own words?
24 A. I never said that, and if it's written somewhere then it needs to
25 be corrected. I never said that the UNPROFOR was part of the conspiracy;
1 UNPROFOR wasn't. It's just that one crew, I don't know whether they were
2 a bit careless or less attentive, but nobody ever said that UNPROFOR was
3 part of the conspiracy.
4 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have the witness's statement in his own
5 language so he could have a look at that sentence that he seems to be
6 having trouble with.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I look at it?
8 JUDGE KWON: Of course, by all means, but shall we upload it.
9 MS. EDGERTON: And it's at paragraph 8, B/C/S page 10.
10 THE ACCUSED: Not to broadcast. Not to broadcast, please.
11 JUDGE KWON: No.
12 Last page in both versions.
13 MS. EDGERTON:
14 Q. And in your language, it's --
15 JUDGE KWON: Page 10 --
16 MS. EDGERTON:
17 Q. I think it's about seven lines up from the bottom. And it says,
18 and I quote:
19 "They had some kind of agreements with them," referring to
20 UNPROFOR," that they would not register the firing of missiles from our
22 A. Yes, but the crew of the UNPROFOR, not the whole UNPROFOR. And
23 these two or three men could be drunk, they could be inattentive, they
24 could be whatever, not the whole UNPROFOR but just one team. The way you
25 put it, it sounds like the whole UNPROFOR conspired against the Serbs.
1 It was just one crew, two or three men. I don't know how many there are
2 in one crew.
3 Q. So this third or fourth conspiracy that you're alleging would
4 involve Halilovic, Hajrulahovic, at least one subordinate officer, a
5 mortar crew, police who would make sure that no one who was living in the
6 area saw what was going on, or civilians in Sedrenik who were living just
7 hundreds of metres from where you say this shell should have been fired,
8 and the UNPROFOR team; right? That's who would have been involved in
9 this scenario that you're putting to us today.
10 A. Mrkovici village was chosen because it was known from before that
11 there were mortar positions there, and it was important to occupy a
12 couple of positions covering certain axes. And since the separation
13 lines were very close, it's very difficult to decide whether a missile
14 targeted a place here or 2- or 300 metres away. And for the inhabitants
15 of Sedrenik --
16 Q. This scenario potentially involves the conspiracy of dozens of
17 people from all walks of life, right, the scenario that you're putting to
18 us today; right?
19 A. Wait a minute. Let me explain this scenario and then we'll see
20 how we go on. You can't just ask me to say yes or no. Will you let me
22 Q. You explain what you want.
23 A. The direction of Mrkovici village was chosen because a number of
24 times during the war shelling came from that side. The distance between
25 separation lines was very small so it's very difficult to decide whether
1 it was fired from Mrkovici or not in the direction of Markale. And I
2 believe the inhabitants of Sedrenik didn't pay attention at all. What
3 they cared about was that the shell didn't fall on them because there
4 were shells non-stop falling, so they are certainly not part of the
5 conspiracy. As for the rest, I can only tell you what they discussed at
6 their meetings. I did not go out into the field and check any further.
7 I know that it was agreed when they talked amongst themselves that
8 Mrkovici village would be chosen. It would be good because there had
9 been firing at the city from that village before and because they knew
10 there were mortars there.
11 Q. Mr. Witness --
12 A. And whether those others down there were part of the
13 conspiracy -- no, they didn't have to know what was going on.
14 Q. Mr. Witness, this account, just like most of your statement and
15 every single conspiracy you allege, is pure fiction because you would
16 know that at the time you said these discussions were going on,
17 Sefer Halilovic wasn't even in the army. He had been ostracised months
18 before. He had been dismissed from the army at the time this was going
19 on. You made it up, just like every other conspiracy you've alleged to
20 try and get yourself a better deal with the people who are protecting you
21 now. That's what's going on, isn't it?
22 A. No, no, regardless of how you want to present it. I know that
23 with time you will get that other information. And I'm sure you already
24 know a lot that would make you believe what I'm saying. I said that
25 Halilovic was ostracised because of certain things he did vis-a-vis the
1 Croats and the honest officers insisted he be removed. Alija, under
2 pressure, removed him but could not dismiss him from the army. Alija
3 knew that he had to do because of the other members of the Presidency,
4 and under the strong pressure of the officers who were not in on all of
5 this, he removed him. He brought in Rasim Delic instead, a person who
6 was not from Sarajevo, to be commander in Sarajevo. And Sefer continued
7 to hold the rank he did before when he was the Commander-in-Chief. But
8 they explained to him nicely that they had to replace him. And I didn't
9 say that he was in Sarajevo all the time. But whenever he was in
10 Sarajevo, he would come by. Sometimes he was outside Sarajevo, sometimes
11 not. They didn't always attend all the meetings in full compositions.
12 Kljuic came the first few times, but when he saw it was going on he said
13 he would not be a part of it anymore. And I think if you called him, he
14 would confirm what I'm saying. I know that this is the way it happened.
15 Now it's up to you to prove.
16 MS. EDGERTON: Nothing further, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one, Excellency.
19 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Witness, the issue just discussed about
21 Sefer Halilovic, on what terms were Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Halilovic
22 before and after he stepped down from his position as the
24 A. Well, it was the same, it didn't change. Alija appointed
25 Halilovic as the Commander-in-Chief precisely because he could do with
1 him whatever he wanted. Sefer, as one of the most junior officers, was
2 the least-deserving of being appointed as the Commander-in-Chief. But
3 Alija appointed him precisely for the fact that he could manipulate him
4 as he wished. Halilovic was rubbish and he was very ambitious. And
5 as -- he was really a scumbag, and there was stories that I heard about
6 crimes being committed by our army. So under the pressure from Croats,
7 Alija simply had to remove Sefer. So he was set aside but let alone to
8 do exactly what he had been doing up to that point.
9 Q. Thank you, Witness. I have no further questions.
10 A. May I add something?
11 JUDGE KWON: No. Thank you, Mr. Witness.
12 That concludes your evidence, sir. On behalf of the Chamber, I
13 would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now you
14 are free to go. Shall we adjourn for how many minutes?
15 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
16 JUDGE KWON: For five minutes.
17 [The witness withdrew]
18 --- Break taken at 11.33 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 11.40 a.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, the Chamber would like now to
21 address an issue stemming from the accused's motion to admit testimony of
22 Borivoje Jakovljevic pursuant to Rule 92 quater filed on the
23 21st of January, 2014, and the Prosecution's response to the motion filed
24 on the 3rd of February. In the motion, the accused submits that the
25 witness is unavailable to testify before the Chamber due to the fact that
1 he underwent brain surgery in July 2013 and no longer has a good memory
2 about the events to which he testified in a prior case before the
3 Tribunal. While the accused attaches to the motion a report from the
4 witness's family doctor, noting the witness's unavailability to testify,
5 the Chamber notes that such a report is based on other medical
6 documentation also attached to the motion, and nowhere in such
7 documentation has the Chamber been able to find a reference to a medical
8 condition which would support for the witness's unavailability to
9 testify. It is therefore the Chamber's position that it requires
10 additional medical documentation before being able to rule on the motion.
11 The Chamber notes the accused's suggestion in the motion that if the
12 Chamber decided the need for the witness to undergo further medical
13 examination, he should order it at the Chamber's own expense. However,
14 it is not for the Chamber but for the relevant party, in this case the
15 accused, to obtain all the supporting material for his requests.
16 Let's bring in the next witness.
17 The next witness is Mr. Jankovic?
18 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President, it's Mr. Glamocic.
19 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.
20 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. Jankovic has been fixed tomorrow morning for
21 9.00, and we thought it was not good to have him waiting in detention
22 here. So we may finish a little bit early today.
23 MR. TIEGER: Sorry.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: I'll communicate with Mr. Robinson about the
1 schedule. That's generally true. I was considering the possibility of a
2 slight adjustment. I'll communicate with him by e-mail.
3 JUDGE KWON: And I forgot to mention and put on the record that
4 the Chamber conveyed the -- its order to redact certain parts of the
5 previous witness's statement via e-mail. I just wanted to confirm it,
6 but I forgot that.
7 MR. ROBINSON: And also, Mr. President, the upcoming witness's
8 testimony you have ordered the redaction of paragraphs 3 through 11,
9 which we've done.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE KWON: Could the witness make the solemn declaration.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
14 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 WITNESS: VLADIMIR GLAMOCIC
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Glamocic. Please be seated and make
18 yourself comfortable. I take it that you understand my words in your
19 language that you understand?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.
23 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Glamocic.
25 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
1 Q. Let us please wait for the interpretation to finish and you will
2 be able to observe that on your screen. Have you given a statement to my
3 Defence team?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown 1D08850.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Is this the first page of your statement that you see on the
9 screen? Do not be confused by the fact that some of the paragraphs have
10 been struck off. It's because the Chamber did not feel that they were
11 relevant. Is this the first page of your statement?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed this statement?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the last page be shown so that
17 the witness may identify his signature.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Is this your signature?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully convey your words.
22 For your information, the paragraphs 3 up to and including paragraph 11
23 have been excluded from your statement. Does this statement faithfully
24 reflect your words?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. If I were to ask you about the same things and put
2 the same questions to you, would your answers be essentially the same?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender the statement
6 into evidence under Rule 92 ter.
7 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Mr. File?
8 MR. FILE: Good morning, Your Honours. No objection.
9 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
10 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4379, Your Honours.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will now read out in
12 English a short summary of the statement of Mr. Vladimir Glamocic.
13 [In English] Vladimir Glamocic was elected chairman of the
14 Executive Committee of the Knezevo Municipal Assembly, Skender Vakuf
15 known as early -- in 1991. He held this position until 1993 when he went
16 to work at the directorate of roads of the Republika Srpska.
17 In 1990, Serbs made up about 70 per cent of the population of
18 Knezevo municipality --
19 MR. FILE: Pardon the interruption --
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 MR. FILE: -- Your Honour.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 MR. FILE: I believe that Dr. Karadzic would save time as well by
24 skipping the second and third paragraphs of the 65 ter summary which were
25 excluded from the statement.
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic would appreciate it.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise. I kept the old one.
3 [In English] From the beginning of the conflict in Slovenia and
4 later in Croatia and BH, civilian and military convoys were often
5 travelled through the territory of Knezevo municipality. No one ever
6 notified the local government when the convoys would pass and where the
7 people in it were from. From the beginning of this term the -- of office
8 of the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Knezevo municipality,
9 Mr. Glamocic tried to establish good relations with the neighbouring
10 municipalities of Travnik and Jajce mainly inhabited by Muslims and
11 Croats and succeeded in it to a significant degree. The municipal
12 authorities in these municipalities were headed by the elected
13 representatives of Croats and Muslim population. The municipal leaders
14 of Knezevo enjoyed the full support of President Karadzic in terms of
15 maintaining good relations with the neighbouring municipalities.
16 President Karadzic phoned Mr. Glamocic in the early hours of
17 23rd of August, 1992, after being informed of the incident that occurred
18 at the Koricanske Stijene on the 21st of August. On the same day
19 Mr. Glamocic went out to the scene with the chief of the civilian
20 protection and the VRS in order to investigate the situation and take
22 Since during the war members of the civilian protection were
23 mostly older men unfit for military service, the municipality did not
24 have either the human or financial resources to deal with the problem of
25 pulling out the dead bodies and burying them. That is why the president
1 of the municipality Assembly got in contact with the authorities of the
2 ARK in order to find a solution at the regional level, while Mr. Glamocic
3 was responsible for mobilising the forces of the municipality.
4 Mr. Glamocic participated in a meeting held at the Banja Luka
5 Security Service Centre, CSB, and chaired by Minister of Defence,
6 General Subotic. The meeting was dedicated to the solving of the problem
7 at Koricanske Stijene because Knezevo municipality was unable to solve it
8 alone. During the meeting, the president of Prijedor municipality,
9 Mr. Stakic, pointed out that the conflict created a state of absolute
10 mistrust and the civilian authorities were unable to guarantee the full
11 safety of all citizens. For the reason -- for this reason they had
12 approved requests for relocation of some parts of BH inhabitants abroad,
13 wherever people asked to go.
14 During the meeting, it was agreed to put Prijedor municipality in
15 charge of the clearing up of the terrain because it was known that the
16 perpetrators of the crime were from its territory. It was also concluded
17 that the bodies should be identified at the scene and that the cause of
18 death should be determined for each person. Furthermore, representatives
19 of the prosecutor's office and the police were to investigate the event.
20 The work of clearing up started on 4th of September, but were suspended
21 when the crane used for lifting up posthumous remains broke down.
22 Mr. Glamocic is not aware that anyone, either before, during, or
23 after the meeting in Banja Luka, influenced the municipal authorities of
24 Knezevo to hide anything in connection with the incident. On the
25 contrary, everyone condemned the crime and demanded the punishment of the
1 perpetrators. When the meeting finished, all the participants visited
2 Knezevo and Koricanske Stijene. On that occasion, the commander of the
3 22nd Infantry Brigade of the VRS refused to receive the delegation from
4 Banja Luka since the VRS did not accept or recognise Subotic as a
5 minister of the defence. As a result, the relationship between the local
6 civilian authorities and the command of the 22nd Infantry Brigade of the
7 1st Krajina Corps was rather poor.
8 And that is short summary, and at that moment I do not have
9 additional questions for Mr. Glamocic.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Glamocic, as you have noted your evidence
11 in chief in this case has been admitted in writing, that is, through your
12 written witness statement in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you will
13 be cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.
14 Yes, Mr. File, please proceed.
15 MR. FILE: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 Cross-examination by Mr. File:
17 Q. Mr. Glamocic, you first learned about the Koricanske Stijene
18 massacre from Radovan Karadzic; right?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. He called you at 4.00 in the morning on the 23rd of August;
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So this phone call took place approximately two days after the
24 massacre which had happened on the 21st of August; right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. You immediately went to see the president of the
2 Knezevo Municipal Assembly, Milan Komljenovic; right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you told him that Radovan Karadzic had just called you about
5 the incident at Koricanske Stijene; right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, Mr. Komljenovic testified here in this case and he gave a
8 statement or he said the following, and that's P3768 at page 3:
9 "Three or four months ago Vlado Glamocic admitted to me the
10 following story which I heard for the first time. On the night of the
11 massacre, Glamocic received an enraged telephone call from
12 Radovan Karadzic demanding answers about the massacre and who was
13 responsible for it ..."
14 Now, Mr. Komljenovic's comment was made in December of 2009, so
15 his evidence is that you related this story about the Karadzic phone call
16 to him sometime in mid-2009. So my question to you is: Is it possible
17 that your recollection regarding when you first told Mr. Komljenovic
18 about the call from Karadzic is faulty and that you actually told him in
19 2009, not when you first saw him after the massacre around the
20 23rd of August, 1992?
21 A. No. It was for that reason that I visited Milan Komljenovic who
22 resided in a village between 12 and 15 kilometres halfway from Banja Luka
23 to Knezevo. On that same morning I told him that the president had
24 called me and asked me about the incident at Koricanske Stijene. At this
25 point he told me that on the previous day he was in the Prijedor
1 municipality and the Banja Luka Municipal Assembly and that he discussed
2 the incident at Koricanske Stijene with some people. This is definitely
3 how it happened and the reason why I went to see Mr. Komljenovic was that
4 I had received that call from Mr. Karadzic.
5 Q. You gave a sworn statement to the BiH prosecutor in 2008 in
6 connection with the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of the
7 massacre; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And did you tell the whole truth in that statement?
10 A. I did.
11 MR. FILE: Could we see 65 ter number 22096, please.
12 Q. Mr. Glamocic, does this look familiar to you as a copy of that
13 sworn statement that you gave?
14 A. Yes.
15 MR. FILE: Could we look at English page 4 and B/C/S page 3,
17 Q. We're going to look at the middle of the first paragraph in both
18 the English and the B/C/S. Here you'll see that you say:
19 "I think it was around 22/23 of August when I came back to
20 Knezevo and when I learnt from Milan Komljenovic that on the location of
21 Koricanske Stijene the Prijedor police, who escorted this convoy, singled
22 out a certain number of men from the convoy and killed them on that
23 spot ..."
24 So in 2008 in your sworn statement to the BiH prosecutor, you
25 didn't mention anything about receiving an angry phone call from the
1 president in the middle of the night, but rather that you learned of the
2 massacre from Mr. Komljenovic himself; correct?
3 A. Yes. But nobody had asked me whether Mr. Karadzic had called. I
4 learnt about the incident at Koricanske Stijene from Milan Komljenovic.
5 I don't know if Mr. Karadzic knew about everything that had happened at
6 Koricanske Stijene, but he was probably familiar with the events. After
7 my visit to the home of Milan Komljenovic, I heard from him what had
8 happened and who had done it and what he had done on the previous day to
9 attend the scene and to have these people buried.
10 MR. FILE: I would tender that document, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit that page.
12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6672, Your Honours.
13 THE ACCUSED: Transcript.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 2 at page 55, the witness
16 said: I learnt about the course of events at Koricanske Stijene from
17 Milan Komljenovic, not about the incident, but about the course of the
19 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm having said so, Mr. Glamocic?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MR. FILE:
23 Q. Okay. As of 23 August 1992, when you spoke to Mr. Komljenovic,
24 you had learned that the perpetrators of the Koricanske Stijene massacre
25 were members of the Prijedor police; correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, I want to turn your attention to a meeting. I didn't see it
3 mentioned in your statement, but before you attended the large meeting on
4 the 30th of August, 1992, that was chaired by Bogdan Subotic, you
5 attended an earlier meeting around the 24th of August in
6 Stojan Zupljanin's office in the Banja Luka CSB; correct?
7 A. No. Milan Komljenovic attended the meeting, that particular one.
8 I attended only one meeting which was chaired by Mr. Subotic.
9 Q. Okay. Both Mr. Komljenovic and Nenad Krejic discussed this first
10 meeting in the evidence that they've given here, and both of them say
11 that you were there as well. That is, for the record, Komljenovic's
12 amalgamated statement which is P3768, pages 2 to 3, paragraph 4; and
13 transcript 20914 to 15 in his testimony. And for Nenad Krejic it's
14 P3760, e-court pages 21 to 23, which is his testimony from the Stanisic
15 and Zupljanin case.
16 Now, I just want to focus on a couple of details from
17 Nenad Krejic's testimony, just to see if that might jog your memory about
18 this meeting. He specifically mentions you being there, and then he says
19 that you and Komljenovic nearly had a physical fight with Simo Drljaca
20 over the issue of who would be responsible for removing the bodies,
21 that's at page 23 of his testimony. Do you recall that?
22 A. We did experience conflicts in communication with the
23 municipality of Prijedor, in particular with Simo and Stakic, but I
24 recall our conflicts and misunderstandings happening at this meeting
25 chaired by Mr. Subotic. And this had a bearing on our visit to
1 Koricanske Stijene and all the other things that Simo Drljaca did
2 together with his people at Koricanske Stijene.
3 Q. Mr. --
4 A. I don't remember this meeting. As for the other meeting that was
5 chaired by Mr. Subotic, I kept notes for the part of the -- for a part of
6 the meeting and conclusions were formulated by Mr. Komljenovic and we
7 used the same notebook for that.
8 Q. Okay. We'll get to that meeting in just a minute. Nenad Krejic
9 also said at the same page that Drljaca and Stakic admitted that the
10 Prijedor police had committed this crime and that Drljaca was bragging
11 about it. Do you recall ever hearing something to that effect?
12 A. Well, I don't believe that he was bragging about it. It was not
13 a thing to brag about. What Simo insisted on and opposed our suggestion
14 and demand that they clear out the terrain and that they remove the
15 bodies, so they opposed this idea because the Knezevo municipality didn't
16 have either the human or material resources to do the job. Simo Drljaca
17 would at times attack our people from the civilian protection,
18 Mr. Barisic, who was the chief, with some very strong language.
19 Q. Okay. At paragraph 32 of your statement you say:
20 "During my encounters with Drljaca, I gained an impression that
21 he was furious because this crime had happened ..."
22 But isn't it possible that Drljaca was angry instead that your
23 municipality was not willing to clean up the site of the massacre?
24 A. Well, first of all, I think Drljaca was angry with the
25 perpetrators of the crime. He was, second of all, probably angry because
1 we weren't able to do the job and this was our unambiguous position as
2 was of the command of the 22nd Brigade as well as the population of the
3 Knezevo municipality in general. I don't believe that Simo was angry at
4 us, but rather I think he was angry with the perpetrators of the crime.
5 Q. Okay. Let's move on to the 30th of August, 1992, meeting that
6 was chaired by Subotic. One of the conclusions of that meeting you say
7 in your statement at paragraph 28 is:
8 "It was agreed to put Prijedor municipality in charge of the
9 clearing up of the terrain because it was known that the perpetrators of
10 the crime were from its territory."
11 Now, that is understating what was known at the time, right,
12 because everybody in that meeting knew that it wasn't just that the
13 perpetrators were from the territory of Prijedor, they were members of
14 the Prijedor police; correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, another conclusion of this meeting is at paragraph 28 of
17 your statement. You say:
18 "It was also concluded that the bodies should be identified at
19 the scene. Pathologists engaged to determine the exact cause of death
20 for each person ..."
21 And then at paragraph 33 of your statement you say:
22 "As far as I know, a crane was set up on the road and it was to
23 be used to lift up posthumous remains ..."
24 Now, I'm going to show you a video that will last for just over
25 3 minutes and I'm going to ask you a few questions about it.
1 MR. FILE: This is going to be 65 ter 40573D which is time-code
2 55.30 to 58.48.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 MR. FILE:
5 Q. Now, this video depicts Koricanske Stijene; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And in this video you can see the recovery of three bodies using
8 the crane that you described in your statement. Now, you would agree
9 that this does not look like people who are under instructions to
10 preserve bodies for a pathologist to examine them for the cause of death
11 or for them to be identified; right? This looks more like disposing of
12 garbage, doesn't it?
13 A. Yes.
14 MR. FILE: Your Honour, I would tender that video.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.
16 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6673, Your Honours.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, may I just make a
18 comment? It's an ugly sight. Your question that this looks more like
19 disposing of garbage, you have to understand that the terrain is
20 extremely difficult. There was just this narrow path from the access
21 road from where this crane was operating, and also the depth from which
22 the bodies were being taken out.
23 MR. FILE:
24 Q. I'm going to move on to another topic. In your statement at
25 paragraph 30 you describe how the commander of the 22nd Infantry Brigade,
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Bosko Peulic, who was the local VRS commander, refused
2 to receive the delegation from Banja Luka in the brigade because the VRS
3 did not accept or recognise Bogdan Subotic as minister of defence.
4 And then in paragraph 31 you describe how:
5 "The relationship between the local civilian authorities and the
6 command of the 22nd pbr of the 1st Krajina Corps of the VRS was rather
7 poor as a result of the poor relationship between the brigade commander
8 and the civilian authorities ..."
9 You go on to describe how the brigade commander Peulic was
10 difficult to work with. And then you say:
11 "In addition to these disagreements, there were purely
12 ideological matters which were, in my opinion, none of his business."
13 MR. FILE: I'd like to bring up 65 ter 26025, please.
14 I'm just going to show you three small portions of testimony that
15 Colonel Peulic --
16 JUDGE KWON: I think I would like you to speak more slowly.
17 MR. FILE: Yes, Your Honour.
18 Q. I'm going to show you three small portions of testimony that
19 Colonel Peulic gave in one of the BiH court trials of perpetrators of the
20 Koricanske Stijene massacre, and then I'm going to ask you a question
21 about it.
22 MR. FILE: If we could have English page 14 and B/C/S page 20.
23 Q. We're going to focus on the middle of the English page and the
24 top of the B/C/S page. Here you'll see a question from the Prosecutor to
25 Mr. Peulic:
1 "Did you receive such an order," he's referring to the minister
2 of defence, Subotic, "for clearing up from the Minister, as a military
4 And Peulic answers:
5 "No, no, I think that I promptly let him know, I didn't on
6 principle honour such orders ever, especially not when such a difficult
7 matter was at issue. I knew that any order which represents a crime
8 pursuant to the Rules of Service in the JNA, a commander and indeed any
9 serviceman can refuse such an order, namely, an order which represents a
10 crime. Participation in such a serious matter would mean my
11 co-perpetration in a crime and so on and consequently it fell on stoney
12 ground with me ..."
13 The next passage I want to show you is on the next page in both
14 versions. In the middle of both pages.
15 Here he's describing -- the prosecutor's asking about a meeting
16 that Peulic attended that took place in the Alumina factory approximately
17 three days after the massacre. He says it was attended by you as well as
18 Komljenovic, Stakic, and Drljaca. And the witness says:
19 "Well, the meeting set off in a somewhat non-parliamentary
20 manner, as I'd call it. It began with an exchange of information about
21 what should be done and so on. Suddenly this other stouter man
22 Simo Drljaca banged his fist on the table and said: 'We did our part and
23 what did you do?'"
24 And if we can continue on to the top of the B/C/S page 22. When
25 he's asked what he understood this to mean, he said: Well, that he
1 meant: Well, we killed them, you clear it up.
2 First of all, do you remember that meeting?
3 A. I do.
4 Q. And do you remember it roughly as Mr. Peulic described it?
5 A. Yes.
6 MR. FILE: If we can just go to English page 24, B/C/S page 35.
7 We're going to focus on the lower half of both pages.
8 Q. This part of the testimony refers to a telegram that Peulic had
9 sent on the night of the massacre, 21st August, 1992, to the 1 KK command
10 intelligence security department. That telegram is in our case in
11 evidence as Exhibit D2040. You'll see the judge asks:
12 "Do you agree that you wrote what it says in there that night
13 that genocide had been done?"
14 The witness says:
15 "That's it."
16 The judge says:
17 "All right."
18 And then the counsel asks:
19 "Mr. Peulic, what I would like to know is, at that -- at that at
20 that moment, I don't know what your function in the army was, did you
21 know what the word 'genocide' meant?"
22 And if we go to the top of page 36 in the B/C/S.
23 Peulic answers:
24 "I did."
25 Then he's asked:
1 "You knew what it meant?"
2 He answers:
4 And then he's asked:
5 "And you found that it was genocide?"
6 And he answers:
7 "I still do."
8 So my question to you is: Do you think that it's possible that
9 Colonel Peulic may have proven difficult to work with and may have had
10 what you call ideological differences with civilian authorities because
11 he thought this was a case of genocide and he felt he was being pressured
12 to participate in some form of cover-up and he wanted to have nothing to
13 do with it?
14 A. No, this statement of mine did not pertain only to the problem of
15 Koricanske Stijene when I spoke about this difficult co-operation with
16 the army, it had to do with the number of persons involved. At the time
17 the economy was functioning and the army was asking for a lot of
18 resources, material, technical. Mr. Peulic attended a meeting with us in
19 Banja Luka and the conclusion of that meeting was that we should all go
20 to the location of Koricanske Stijene. All of the attendees from the
21 meeting went to Koricanske Stijene. It was agreed that in the meantime
22 we should meet at the command of the 22nd Brigade that was commanded by
23 Peulic. Peulic didn't want to wait for us at the command of the
24 22nd Brigade. We organised that meeting at a different location, at the
25 command of the light brigade. It is correct that Peulic didn't want to
1 hear of any participation of the military in the sanitisation of the
2 terrain, or rather, recovering the corpses, things that the army would
3 deal with in that situation. He knew who the perpetrators were. So he
4 did not dream of using the assets that the army had available. I want to
5 say that the area of Koricanske Stijene did not belong to the
6 municipality of Knezevo. The area of Koricanske Stijene belonged to the
7 municipality of Travnik, so this was a war zone of this 22nd Brigade.
8 And we, as the civilian authorities, when we would go to the command of
9 that brigade, we would have to be announced to the command of that
10 brigade. So it was a war zone. This territory did not belong to the
11 municipality of Knezevo.
12 Q. Okay. The last topic I'd like to explore with you relates to
13 paragraph 33 of your statement. You say:
14 "At one point when the crane was working an ambulance
15 transporting wounded people came up but could not get past the crane.
16 While the crane was being removed from the road, it broke down, and
17 despite all the efforts it could not be repaired. As a result, work on
18 the removal of posthumous remains was suspended ..."
19 And then that's the conclusion of your witness statement. But it
20 seems like an odd point to end the story in your statement because there
21 were frequent complaints of the smell and possible water contamination -
22 you acknowledge that in paragraph 21 of your statement - animals and
23 birds were depositing human remains on the roof-tops of nearby residents
24 of Koricani village - that's in P3760 at page 39 - the situation in this
25 area was intolerable and it was imperative to make this problem go away.
1 So what happened to the bodies afterwards? They weren't just left out
2 there to continue decomposing; correct?
3 A. As far as I know, the civilian protection department of the
4 municipality of Knezevo buried four mortal remains that were identified
5 and that was done in accordance with the conclusions of the CSB
6 Banja Luka.
7 Q. Right. But there were 150 to 200 bodies out there, so what
8 happened to those?
9 A. I don't have the exact information on this. All I know is what
10 was written in the press in "Nezavisne Novine" from Banja Luka. Because
11 with regard to all of these activities it was the investigating judge who
12 was in charge as well as the prosecutor and the crime inspector from the
13 CSB, and with Simo Drljaca they were in charge of these activities.
14 Q. As chairman of the executive committee of the Municipal Assembly,
15 the IO SO, by law you were the commander of the civilian protection, or
16 CZ, in the municipality; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And you were able to give orders and instructions to the chief of
19 the civilian protection of Knezevo municipality?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So this is a horrific mass crime as well as a potential public
22 health crisis in the municipality where you're the chairman of the
23 Executive Committee. The police from another municipality have caused it
24 and now they are tasked with cleaning it up. My question is: Under
25 those circumstances, don't you just want to make sure they're doing their
1 job properly? All you had to do was to tell Barisic, the head of the CZ,
2 to go over there and see what they're doing and report back to you;
4 A. Barisic was at Koricanske Stijene with the civilian protection
5 unit several times. He did not have enough manpower. He did not have
6 enough material resources and he was not able to do anything more
7 meaningful than what he had done. He always had a problem with
8 Simo Drljaca. As a matter of fact, he was even chasing them away from
9 the scene. The civilian protection of Knezevo was supposed to provide
10 accommodation for the people from Prijedor. We did that at the school in
11 Limeni [phoen] and that is our only obligation in addition to the
12 obligation from the Banja Luka meeting, namely that the civilian
13 protection from the municipality of Knezevo should dig graves and bury
14 all the persons who are identified.
15 Q. According to Komljenovic, some of your civilian protection people
16 were always present on the site during the clean-up operation, that's in
17 P3768 at e-court page 11. He says that the Prijedor team had brought
18 some equipment from the Prijedor mines, tried to do the job, the crane
19 broke down, they couldn't do the job. Then he says: Those are the
20 things that we heard indirectly about what had been going on up there
21 because even some of our own people from civilian protection were always
22 present there, so to some extent we were able to see what was going on.
23 So regardless of whether civilian protection had difficulty
24 working with Drljaca or had limited responsibilities there, you still had
25 a source of information for what was going to happen to these bodies;
2 A. Barisic could convey only what he knew.
3 Q. In your statement at paragraph 29 - this is my last
4 question - you said:
5 "I'm not aware that anyone, either before, during, or after the
6 meeting in Banja Luka, influenced the municipal authorities of Knezevo to
7 hide anything in connection with the incident. On the contrary, everyone
8 was repulsed and condemned this crime and demanded that those responsible
9 be punished."
10 But if that was really true, if everybody was repulsed by this,
11 if everybody condemned the crime and wanted to assure accountability, if
12 nobody wanted to hide anything, don't you think that at a bare minimum
13 there should have been public information about where the bodies had been
14 buried for the families of all these victims?
15 We found out about the location of the burial site in 2009 from a
16 perpetrator in a confession. We shouldn't have had to wait that long;
18 A. Well, the media did inform the public. That was in two articles
19 in "Nezavisne Novine." There was no wish from any side, least of all
20 from the executive authorities of the municipality of Knezevo, to hide
21 the crime.
22 Q. But we're talking about the burial site -- the mass burial site
23 with more than a hundred bodies, that information never came out until
24 2009; correct?
25 A. I don't know.
1 Q. Okay. Then my last question will be about 65 ter number 26023.
2 This is an article describing the exhumation of a mass grave at
3 Koricanske Stijene from 21st July 2009. It says in the middle of the
5 "Damir Ivankovic was originally among the indictees charged with
6 this crime. He admitted guilt and concluded an agreement with the
7 Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After accepting the agreement,
8 the Trial Chamber sentenced him to 14 years in prison.
9 "Ivankovic testified against the seven indictees charged under
10 the same indictment. After this, a new indictment against two former
11 members of the Emergency Squad was filed.
12 "The locations of mass graves were identified on the basis of
13 Ivankovic's statement."
14 Is this the first time that you're hearing about this,
15 Mr. Glamocic?
16 A. I first heard of the information about the location of the grave
17 from the article in "Nezavisne Novine." I don't remember the exact year.
18 MR. FILE: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, shall we continue after the break?
20 THE ACCUSED: I could have finished within this session if you --
21 JUDGE KWON: How much would you need, Mr. Karadzic?
22 THE ACCUSED: Five minutes.
23 JUDGE KWON: Then please continue.
24 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Glamocic, since the document is here now,
1 where were you, where did you live, and what were you doing, what was
2 your job, in 2009 when this exhumation took place?
3 A. In 2009 I worked in the public company for roads in
4 Republika Srpska.
5 Q. Where did you live and where is this company located?
6 A. I lived and worked in Banja Luka.
7 Q. Thank you. On page 61/62 of the transcript what was put to you
8 was the testimony of Mr. Peulic and what Drljaca said. Was it your
9 understanding that in this way Drljaca stated that he had ordered the
11 A. No, no. Simo Drljaca was embittered because of what had
12 happened. I cannot say whether he approved or not, but he was embittered
13 like all of us. And I never had the impression that it was Simo who
14 ordered or organised that.
15 Q. Thank you. On page 65 you were asked about what your civilian
16 protection did. Did your civilian protection have authority over parts
17 of the municipality of Travnik?
18 A. I've already said that Koricanske Stijene and Koricani did not
19 belong to the municipality of Knezevo. It was just the war zone of the
20 22nd Brigade. So this did not belong to the municipality of Knezevo.
21 Q. What about now?
22 A. Now this area does belong to Knezevo.
23 Q. When were they attached to Knezevo?
24 A. After the Dayton Accords.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 That concludes your evidence, Mr. Glamocic. On behalf of the
4 Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.
5 Now you are free to go, but we'll rise all together. Please have a safe
6 journey back home.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.
9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We don't have any further
10 witnesses for today. The next witness is scheduled to testify first
11 thing tomorrow morning, so if -- I think we have to adjourn for the day.
12 JUDGE KWON: Even the Witness 584?
13 MR. ROBINSON: Witness 584 is from the Croatian government and
14 they've not had any contact with us, so all we can hope for is that he
15 will appear at 9.00 tomorrow as requested; if not, we will be filing a
16 motion that he be subpoenaed but we have no information from him at this
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: Just so there's no misunderstanding on the Court's
20 part, the next witness who Mr. Robinson was referring to is Mr. Jankovic.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 MR. TIEGER: And it's unfortunate he's not here now, but that's
23 the situation, I gather, we find ourselves in.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, unless there's any other
1 matters to raise, the hearing is adjourned for the day.
2 [The witness withdrew]
3 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.41 p.m.,
4 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 18th day of
5 February, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.