Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 47557

 1                           Monday, 29 September 2014

 2                           [Prosecution Closing Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Would the Registrar call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.  And good morning, Your Honours.  This

 9     is case number IT-95-5/18-T, the Prosecutor versus Radovan Karadzic.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Could I have the appearances.  The Prosecution first.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, everyone

13     in and outside the courtroom.  Alan Tieger, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff, and

14     Iain Reid in the courtroom presently for the Prosecution.  We will be

15     joined during the course of presentations by Katrina Gustafson and

16     Melissa Pack.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

18             For the Defence.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

20     Good morning to all.  I am going to introduce only my main legal advisers

21     in court, Mr. Peter Robinson, Goran Petronijevic, and Marko Sladojevic.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We have another legal adviser in the courtroom,

23     Mr. Karadzic, do we not?  Why don't you introduce your -- oh, yes, I

24     missed that.  My apology, Mr. Petronijevic.

25             Yes, Mr. Harvey, for the stand-by counsel, please.

Page 47558

 1             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,

 2     Dr. Karadzic, everyone in the courtroom.  Richard Harvey assisted by

 3     Mirjana Vukajlovic for the stand-by counsel.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Harvey.

 5             Yes, we heard the evidence of the first Prosecution witness about

 6     four and a half years ago, in April 2010, and the Defence case was closed

 7     about five months ago, in May 2014.  We have now reached the stage of the

 8     proceedings in this case to hear the closing arguments of the parties

 9     pursuant to Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the

10     Tribunal.  The Chamber has ordered that the Prosecution and the Defence

11     shall have ten hours each to present their closing arguments and one and

12     a half hours each to present their rebuttal and rejoinder arguments

13     respectively.

14             Before giving the floor to the Prosecution, I would like to state

15     on the record that on Friday evening the Chamber, through its

16     Legal Officer, sent the parties a list of questions via e-mail which the

17     Chamber wanted the parties to consider and incorporate in their closing

18     arguments in the coming days.  I believe that the parties have all

19     received those questions.  In this regard, I would like the parties to

20     identify the questions before answering them for the record.

21             Further, I would also like to apologise to the parties for the

22     fact that these questions were sent late on Friday evening, but the

23     Chamber felt that even such short notice would be better than simply

24     raising those questions in court and potentially surprising the parties;

25     however, that is not to say that the Chamber will not have additional

Page 47559

 1     questions that may arise during the course of the closing arguments.

 2             Now, Mr. Tieger, you have the floor.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             Your Honours, in August of 1992, when one Bosnian Muslim or

 5     Bosnian Croat community after another was being destroyed or terrorised,

 6     the ICRC president explained what the world by that time knew:

 7             "Let me give you the sad picture.  The civilian population is

 8     systematically harassed.  Thousands of civilians are arrested in their

 9     homes, brutalised, or even killed.  Whole minority groups comprising tens

10     of thousands of civilians are systematically transferred by force.

11     Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been besieged for several months

12     in cities such as Bihac, Derventa, Gorazde, Sarajevo.  Detainees, the

13     majority of whom are civilians, are held in conditions of extreme

14     hardship in places of detention which are totally inadequate for that

15     purpose.  They are ill-treated and hundreds of them have been executed."

16             When internationals confronted Karadzic about these massive

17     crimes, he deflected them with claims of Serb victimisation or offered

18     pretextual assurances of his good intentions.  And now, after hundreds of

19     witnesses, nearly 50.000 pages of transcript, more than 10.000 exhibits,

20     the policy of ethnic cleansing is fully exposed.  And Dr. Karadzic

21     revealed, as its driving force and the man who bragged at the time about,

22     the pain-staking steps he had devised and was implementing but now

23     pretends they never existed; who promotes the revisionist history of

24     events that denies thousands and thousands of crimes; who praised and

25     promoted those who implemented his criminal policy but now, anticipating

Page 47560

 1     that his revisionist history is beyond belief, blames those who did his

 2     dirty work; who orchestrated an effort to hide and destroy incriminating

 3     documents and crafted a defence based on falsehoods by his still loyal

 4     and compliant followers in court.  Who falsely asserts that the

 5     indictment against him criminalises all Serbs, thus willingly tarnishing

 6     the representation of the Serb people in order to hide behind them and

 7     who was known as a liar to the internationals with whom he dealt at the

 8     time, Akashi, Owen, Rose, Smith, Vance, Okun, and who continues to

 9     propagate his false stories in court.

10             As we now know, Karadzic told both his victims and followers what

11     would happen and it did, thousands kills, hundreds of towns destroyed,

12     masses forcibly displaced.  The focus on these massive crimes, however,

13     risks losing sight of the individual victims, whose tragedies one by one

14     by one are his responsibility.  The brief accounts that follow of the

15     three victims are a reminder of one unique person after another whose

16     loved ones will never see him or her again, whose contributions to the

17     world will never be realised, or of the many who struggle on a daily

18     basis with physical pain or terror that can never fully be left behind.

19             People such as the late Sulejman Crncalo, who with his family and

20     scores of other non-Serbs from Pale municipality, was expelled from their

21     homes and forcibly transferred to Sarajevo in July 1992.  He and his

22     family lived the rest of the war in constant fear that one of them might

23     be killed by a sniper or a shell.  He burned furniture and books to keep

24     warm and saw people shot before his eyes and corpses which couldn't be

25     collected for burial because of the continuous sniping and shelling.  On

Page 47561

 1     August 28th, 1995, his wife made her way to the market to pick up

 2     powdered milk for their children; she never returned, killed by the

 3     mortar shell in scheduled incident G19.  She was buried at night - by

 4     then a Sarajevo custom so that mourners could pay their respects without

 5     getting shot or shelled.

 6             Or a witness known here only as KDZ69, who in July 1995 was a

 7     17-year-old school boy living with his family in Srebrenica.  As he and

 8     his father sought to join the column fleeing towards Tuzla, they became

 9     separated.  He never saw his father again.  After KDZ69 and many others

10     from the column surrendered, they were forced to run to Sandici meadow,

11     where between 1- and 2.000 captured men were held.  He was loaded on to

12     one of several trucks packed so full with people that his body was numb,

13     held overnight, and refused water.  The next day they were brought to

14     Petkovci school, where they were beaten and abused and waited, soaked in

15     their own urine and parched with thirst, listening to the bursts of

16     gun-fire as men were brought out of the school and shot.  They were then

17     ordered to remove their shoes and clothes to the waist, their hands were

18     tied behind their backs, they were crammed on to another lorry and driven

19     to the Petkovci Dam execution site.  Despite the knowledge that their

20     death awaited, many of the men were so thirsty that they were screaming,

21     Give us water and then kill us.  They were ordered off the trucks five at

22     a time, ordered to lie down, and shot.  Miraculously, despite being

23     repeatedly shot, KDZ69 did not die, but he watched as others were led to

24     their death, watched as a man moaning in agony beside him was shot in the

25     head.  And as he lay in unbearable pain and suffering from immense

Page 47562

 1     thirst, he prayed to die and thought of his mother, who would never know

 2     where he was.  Yet he survived and, once the soldiers had left, rolled

 3     over dead bodies to another survivor so he could untie him and they could

 4     untie each other.  Unable to walk over the course of four days, he made

 5     his way to Muslim territory, crawling and being carried at times by his

 6     fellow survivor.

 7             And just one more of the many heroic stories that cannot be told

 8     here.  Dr. Eso Sadikovic of Prijedor, a doctor who had worked for the UN,

 9     in the Pacific and Africa, became a prisoner in Omarska.  He was widely

10     known as a deeply humane man who helped everyone he could.  After most of

11     the other doctors in Prijedor had been killed, shortly before dawn in

12     early August Dr. Sadikovic was called out and ominously told to bring his

13     things.  Fellow detainee Nusret Sivac recalled those final moments:

14             "Dr. Eso stood up.  He took his nylon bag in which he had a

15     handful of cigarettes that the other prisoners had collected for him.  He

16     brought his dirty shirt and he headed for the door.  We all stood up.  We

17     stood quietly.  And then all of us started -- all of us spoke out loud

18     and we said:  Dr. Eso, thank you.  Thank you so much for everything.  He

19     just turned back and he said:  Thank you, friends, and good-bye.  We did

20     not believe that there was such a criminal person in this world who would

21     be able to kill a man like Dr. Eso."

22             What binds each of these tragedies and countless more is that

23     they are the result of one of four criminal enterprises or JCEs.  First

24     an overarching JCE to forcibly displace Bosnian Muslims and Croats

25     through crimes, including persecution, torture, murder, extermination,

Page 47563

 1     and genocide.  A JCE to carry out a campaign of sniping and shelling

 2     against the civilian population in Sarajevo for the primary purpose of

 3     terror.  A JCE to take hostages to compel NATO to abstain from conducting

 4     air strikes.  And a JCE to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by

 5     killing the men and boys and forcibly removing women, young children, and

 6     elderly.  All distinct, although each broadly in service of the same goal

 7     of achieving a Serbian state on vast territories within

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And what binds those JCEs together is

 9     Radovan Karadzic.

10             I turn now to the overarching JCE.  That JCE was rooted in

11     Karadzic's determination that Bosnian Serbs would not be separated from

12     Serbs in other parts of former Yugoslavia by the borders of a sovereign

13     and independent Bosnia.  As Bosnia moved closer to independence, Karadzic

14     attempted to forestall it through negotiations while simultaneously

15     preparing to unilaterally keep Serbs from becoming a minority in a

16     sovereign Bosnia if negotiations failed.  He began with steps that

17     replicated what minority Serbs had done in Croatia, such as

18     regionalisation and training camps, but by October 1991 Karadzic and the

19     Bosnian Serb leadership had decided to "move on" toward de facto

20     solutions and the establishment of an ethnically separate state.

21             Over the course of the following months, Karadzic led the SDS in

22     the creation of the organs of that state and the establishment of its

23     police and army.  When negotiations failed and Bosnian independence was

24     days away, Karadzic's municipality officials and police, aided by his

25     Serbian collaborators, began a series of take-overs that quickly left the

Page 47564

 1     Bosnian Serbs in control of vast amounts of Bosnia's territory.  These

 2     take-overs were quickly followed by the cleansing and sometimes

 3     destruction of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities, a

 4     process that would culminate in 1995 in the destruction of the Srebrenica

 5     enclave, to which many of those cleansed from their original

 6     municipalities had fled.

 7             I outline the story of some of the masses of victims of the

 8     overarching JCE, particularly Dr. Sadikovic, but whole communities,

 9     distinct and separate parts of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat

10     community, were also victims; for example, Prijedor.  As described at

11     paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Prijedor municipality summary in our brief and

12     contrary to Karadzic's false claim that Prijedor fell outside his

13     influence and control, that's Defence brief paragraph 217, Karadzic

14     personally intervened to ensure that the SDS leadership there was

15     committed to following his policies.  Prijedor authorities received and

16     implemented Variant A and B and indeed acknowledged that the physical

17     take-over of the municipality on April 30th, 1992, was part of the

18     implementation of the second level of A and B.  In his efforts to

19     distance himself from those in the field, Karadzic now claims that the

20     take-over was a reaction to a BiH Presidency order to commence combat

21     operations.  That's para 1534 of their brief.  This is belied by not only

22     the direct testimony from Defence Witness Miskovic but by evidence of the

23     elaborate preparation involved, as described at paragraph 6 of the

24     Prijedor summary, including SDS municipal instructions to commence

25     take-over preparations before the BiH Presidency order.

Page 47565

 1             Prijedor's story is chilling, so let me tell it as clinically and

 2     as simply as possible.  After the take-over, the persecutions of Muslims

 3     began.  To put it in the succinct terms of one witness, it was like they

 4     were in a ghetto, P677, page 10.  As described at paragraph 10 of the

 5     Prijedor summary, Muslims were subjected to travel restrictions,

 6     terminated from employment, even forced to wear white armbands to

 7     identify themselves as Muslims, that's P3478, pages 25 through 26.

 8             As described at para 12 of the Prijedor summary, commencing in

 9     late May 1992, area after area where the Muslims lived were attacked and

10     destroyed by the VRS and the MUP, beginning with the shelling of

11     Hambarine following an armed clash at a check-point.  The VRS and MUP

12     next turned their attention to the large area of Kozarac where thousands

13     and thousands of Muslims lived.  Beginning on the 24th of May it was

14     shelled for two days.  Serb forces then entered the area, rounding up

15     thousands of people and taking them to camps.  Up to 800 people were

16     killed in the shelling and the subsequent attack and, as I say, the

17     remainder were taken to detention facilities.

18             The Defence attempts to characterise this as combat against a

19     fierce adversary, that's found at 1543 and 1545 of their belief, but the

20     evidence reveals that the "Muslim forces" were an ad hoc, poorly

21     equipped, essentially quixotic force against a very powerfully equipped

22     army, as the grotesquely disproportionate casualty ratio of more than

23     100:1 clearly reveals.  That's adjudicated fact 1057.

24             In any event, Your Honours, the evidence is clear that the attack

25     was directed at the entire Kozarac community.  7.000 Muslims were

Page 47566

 1     detained, the majority of whom could not be considered Green Berets, even

 2     based in the army's own inflated estimates.  And compare 5398, a 1KK

 3     report about 7.000 prisoners with D1743, stating that the total strength

 4     of the Green Berets was 1500 to 2.000.

 5             Those houses not destroyed by the shelling itself were completely

 6     devastated over the course of the following months and this destruction

 7     was carried out by the VRS - in the words of one Defence witness - "so

 8     that people would move away and have nothing to come back to," D2265,

 9     pages 56 through 57 and mosques suffered the same fate for the same

10     purpose.

11             Next, the centuries'-old Muslim old town of Stari Grad was

12     destroyed "wiped from the face of the earth," following a quickly subdued

13     one-hour attack by a small group of lightly armed Muslims.  And as

14     described in the scheduled incident charts A10.5, 10.6, and 10.9, in the

15     latter part of July the VRS and MUP cleanse the Brdo and Brisevo areas.

16     The very Defence suggestions that these were legitimate combat operations

17     in which there was some collateral damage are completely untenable.  VRS

18     reports in May and July reflect that there were only a handful of alleged

19     Green Berets with a "insignificant" number of light weapons who were

20     either surrendering or living in the woods or underground shelters in

21     groups of five to ten.  See D1743 or P3317.

22             The evidence is clear, the operation against the Brdo was an

23     operation to expel the population through "intimidation" and see the

24     Prijedor summary footnote 86.  At least 3- to 350 people were killed in

25     the Brdo, and that is known to be only a portion of the total number of

Page 47567

 1     people killed.  Indeed, another independent estimate was 500 to 700.

 2     These bodies were taken to Tomasica mine, and the remainder of those

 3     Muslims cleansed were taken to Omarska, Keraterm, or Trnopolje, where

 4     many died or were killed.  Another 68 were killed that same week in

 5     Brisevo, a Bosnian Croat village.  Over a hundred people were taken from

 6     Miska Glava to Ljubija football stadium, where at least 15 were killed.

 7     In his brief, Karadzic disingenuously asserts that the others were

 8     released the day after, that's para 1558, failing to mention that their

 9     release from Ljubija stadium was being taken to Kipe where over 90 men

10     were executed, their bodies thrown into a hole and covered up with an

11     earthmover.  And see scheduled incidental chart A 10.7.

12             I mentioned the camps to which the survivors of those cleansings

13     were taken.  Those were Omarska, Keraterm, or Trnopolje.  Let me turn to

14     Omarska.

15             As described at para 20 of the Prijedor narrative.  Omarska was

16     set up under Crisis Staff authority by the written order of police chief

17     Drljaca and secured by the police with VRS and Territorial Defence

18     backup.  As described in scheduled incident chart C20.2, thousands of

19     prisoners lived in horrific conditions, crammed together in unhygienic

20     conditions.  Even the commander who testified here acknowledged that a

21     terrible stench pervaded the room into which prisoners were crammed with

22     near starvation rations.  Just patch P6686, a video depicting emaciated

23     prisoners ravenously wolfing down a bean soup that they had been given to

24     impress journalists.  Interrogations were conducted by MUP and military

25     police investigators.  Meetings were routine during interrogations,

Page 47568

 1     sometimes beating people to death.  That's T44225 and 44263.  As the

 2     commander of the camp admitted here, very seldom did a beating not occur

 3     which he knew in part because he heard the screams of the detainees

 4     throughout the day.

 5             Outside interrogations, there were indescribably vicious beatings

 6     or just routine beatings.  For example, when the detainees tried to use

 7     the fetid toilet facilities or go to the canteen for their meager portion

 8     of bread and particularly in the white house where prisoners were held

 9     for special mistreatment.  Women were also held in Omarska, used during

10     the day to clean up the blood and tissue from beatings and raped by

11     night.  On a daily basis in Omarska, bodies lay on the ground, often

12     piled up like garbage to be removed by TAM truck.  Prisoners feared

13     "every second" because they never knew who would be called out and never

14     return.

15             On a single occasion, approximately 180 prisoners were murdered

16     by gun-fire and their bodies loaded on to an excavator for disposal.

17     Even the camp commander, the Defence witness, admitted to over a hundred

18     killed, either in camp or taken away for liquidation and later exhumed.

19     That's T4457 through -59.  In particular, Muslim and Croat political,

20     intellectual leaders were -- and police officials were targeted for

21     liquidation in an organised series of killings, and the bodies, when

22     found, exhumed from mass graves.  In Keraterm, detainees were also held

23     in wretched and inhumane conditions, packed in the bloodstained concrete

24     warehouses with no space to lie down with insufficient ventilation, or

25     access to hygiene, near starvation, dysentery, lice, routine beatings and

Page 47569

 1     killings.  And see scheduled chart C20.3.

 2             Over the course of two particular days, the 24th and the

 3     25th of July, 1992, approximately 150 detainees were massacred in room 3

 4     on the -- on that date.

 5             Trnopolje was used by Serb authorities to gather non-Serbs for

 6     deportation outside RS and to other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and third

 7     countries.  Over 23.000 people had been detained there by the end of

 8     September 1992.  Although conditions were not as barbarous or deadly as

 9     in Omarska and Keraterm, detainees were nevertheless beaten and raped

10     scheduled incident chart C20.4.

11             The Defence assertion that Trnopolje was an open collection

12     centre where people came voluntarily is contradicted by overwhelming

13     evidence as set out in para 23 of the Prijedor summary, including

14     Stakic's Defence witness admission to the contrary.  T45239.

15             By 1993, over 80 per cent of non-Serb villages were largely

16     destroyed and uninhabited.  Virtually all Muslim places of worship had

17     been destroyed and approximately 44.000 Bosnian Muslims and Croats had

18     been expelled.  The Defence claims that the Muslims and Croats left

19     Prijedor voluntarily, citing as an example KDZ26, that's at para 1537,

20     footnote 3463.  This is a man who left Prijedor when he was shipped from

21     Omarska to Manjaca.  Karadzic also ignores the testimony of his own

22     witness Stakic, that in 1992 Muslims were expelled from their homes and

23     compelled to leave out of fear and that the police and army committed

24     mass crimes against Muslims and Croats, including detentions, torture,

25     mistreatment, and killings.  But a large number of Muslims would never

Page 47570

 1     leave.  In 1993 Drljaca informed the Bosnian Serb leadership about the

 2     5.000 Muslim bodies thrown into Tomasica mine for which he sought help in

 3     disposing.  P1483, pages 154 through -55.

 4             Let me turn next to Sanski Most and relate just what the Defence

 5     evidence reveals about what happened at Sanski Most.  For confidentiality

 6     reasons, I will use letters in lieu of witness numbers and then provide

 7     the source in closed session.  The SOS "carried out tasks that the local

 8     SDS leadership required them to do."  They were an "armed formation"

 9     under the command of the SDS.  That's cite A.  This is armed formation

10     blew up Muslim property and remained a paramilitary force until placed

11     under the command of the army, cite B.  Disarming was not aimed at the

12     Serbs but at the Croats and Muslims "the opponents."  By 11 May, Muslims

13     and Croats from most places had already surrendered their weapons

14     voluntarily, either to the police station or the civilian defence,

15     cite C.  Crisis Staff president Rasula issued an ultimatum to the SDA to

16     leave the municipality building or they would be attacked.  The SOS shot

17     a Zolja projectile at the building without knowing whether anyone was in

18     the building or not, and two or three offices were set on fire, cite D.

19     Dismissals, non-Serb judges and court officials were removed before May

20     of 1992.  By then "differentiation," a euphemism for dismissals had

21     already taken place in the police and other organs, cite E.  Before the

22     shelling of Mahala on the 26th of May, 1992, the army informed the

23     Crisis Staff.  And although it was known that civilians, that is,

24     families lived in Mahala, nobody told the army commander Basara to watch

25     out for civilians.  "Naturally" people got killed.  In addition, most of

Page 47571

 1     their homes were destroyed by the shelling or by the military setting

 2     fire to their houses afterwards.  Residents couldn't go back to their

 3     homes because "their houses, the neighbourhood, was destroyed," cite F.

 4     After "ciscenje," that is a cleansing or mopping up, in Vrhpolje or

 5     Hrustovo, people were killed on a bridge or thrown into the water, cite

 6     G.  Following military operations against Muslim villages, the army put

 7     people on buses and brought them into town.  The village was burned,

 8     destroyed, and the army collected the able-bodied military-aged men and

 9     handed them over to the civilian authorities for interrogations, cite H.

10     The army rounded up a large number of persons from Mahala, Muhici, Otoka,

11     Vrhpolje, Hrustovo.  Many people were taken to detention facilities who

12     were "not supposed to be there" because the military did not distinguish

13     between people, "they just imprisoned and arrested only able-bodied men,

14     put them on buses, and then handed them over to the civilian

15     authorities."  People were later transferred to Manjaca who hadn't been

16     processed at all.  "They just put a label on them as being prisoners of

17     war."  They did not differentiate.  That's cite I.  The Crisis Staff

18     created Betonirka, and the warden of that prison was answerable to the

19     Crisis Staff, but all the elements of Serbian authority, the police, the

20     civilian authority, and the military were in charge of resolving the

21     issue of prisoners.  Betonirka was not a remotely suitable place to keep

22     prisoners and conditions were "most definitely inhumane," cite J.  The

23     Crisis Staff was the highest authority.  Rasula was president of the

24     Municipal Assembly and consequently the Crisis Staff, Vrkes, was his

25     deputy.  Rasula went to ARK Crisis Staff meetings and would "convey what

Page 47572

 1     was concluded there."  And the army commander Basara also attended most

 2     Crisis Staff meetings, cite K.  The municipal authorities put members in

 3     charge of resettlement who would compile lists of people who wanted to

 4     relocate, compile transportation lists, and decide where these people

 5     would go.  A "voluntarily" departure meant someone requested to leave

 6     because they didn't feel safe, that's cite L, and they didn't feel safe

 7     given the events I just described.

 8             Communications always functioned from April to December 1992,

 9     although during seven to ten days in May communications were interrupted

10     because of war activities.  And finally, the SDS had absolute power which

11     they exerted through their various bodies and through the Crisis Staff in

12     particular.  That's cite N:

13             "From the SDS line, from the top leadership within

14     Republika Srpska down to the local level of the SDS, because the policy

15     was formulated by the SDS.  So it went from the top, from the president

16     of the SDS Radovan Karadzic down to the local board of the SDS in

17     Sanski Most.  It was at that level that the main policy was formulated

18     and carried out," cite O.

19             Now, as mentioned, this is simply the Defence evidence about

20     Sanski Most.  In addition, the evidence overall reveals such things as

21     the president of the Crisis Staff before the Mahala operation ordered

22     that all with arms were to be killed and that "captured civilians" were

23     to be "used for exchange."  That's P3329, page 33.  Or that one of the

24     categories for detention and expulsion was being a person who was

25     "unwelcome in Sanski Most municipality," P2639, and that the

Page 47573

 1     Crisis Staff's official organ the "Informator," declared that Muslims

 2     were not a people and Croats carried a genetically pathological desire to

 3     kill those superior to them.

 4             It is equally instructed to shift our focus to the other side of

 5     Bosnia where Karadzic's preparation both within Bosnia and with his

 6     benefactors in Belgrade led to an essentially Muslim-free municipality.

 7     As Karadzic said in January 1993, there were sill 50.000 people in

 8     Zvornik, but now "they are all Serbs."  That's P794, page 4.

 9             The Defence depicts Zvornik's take-over and its aftermath as the

10     work of paramilitaries from Serbia outside the control of the Zvornik

11     authorities.  In fact, the evidence shows a carefully co-ordinated

12     operation between paramilitary and Bosnian Serb forces carried out at the

13     behest of and with the full co-operation of the republic and local

14     authorities who worked together with paramilitaries in committing

15     systematic crimes against Zvornik's non-Serb community.  The preparation

16     for take-over began with Zvornik's receipt and implementation of

17     Variant A and B forming a Crisis Staff within two days.  You'll find that

18     at para 4 of the Zvornik summary.  Indeed, immediately before the

19     conflict, Karadzic used Zvornik as an example of how take-overs were to

20     be effected.  That's P961, page 22.  As described in the Zvornik summary,

21     para 6, the Serbian military -- paramilitaries sent in by Karadzic's

22     Belgrade collaborators were welcomed into Zvornik by the local

23     authorities and assigned to TO brigades.  Interim government president,

24     Brano Grujic, confirmed that they -- "I just said welcome.  Go to

25     headquarters, to the command, and you should be deployed and go and

Page 47574

 1     protect our people."  That's T40384.  Together with the Bosnian Serb

 2     police, TO, and the JNA, they effected a brutal take-over in which dozens

 3     of civilians were killed.  See the Zvornik summary at para 12.  As

 4     described in paras 20 through 28, following the take-over, widespread

 5     cleansing operations were carried out, co-ordinated between the

 6     Bosnian Serb forces and civilian authorities.  Non-Serb were arrested and

 7     detained at various detention centres, where they were subjected to

 8     mistreatment and killings.  And again, the Defence tries to lay the

 9     entirety of the blame on paramilitaries, claiming at para 1448 of their

10     brief that these illegal prisons were operated by paramilitaries.  But in

11     fact, the Zvornik authorities were heavily involved in the illegal

12     detention of Muslims at these facilities, including the guarding of the

13     facilities, transfer of detainees between facilities, and even the

14     mistreatment of the facilities, all in full knowledge of the crimes which

15     were occurring there.  For example, Muslim detainees at the Alhos factory

16     were severely mistreated not only by Arkan's men and White Eagles but

17     also by the Serb police.  Moreover, the Bosnian Serb interim government

18     was based in Alhos.  See scheduled incident chart C27.3.  The more than

19     190 men murdered by gun-fire at Gero's Slaughterhouse were brought there

20     by police, following which Serb forces, including guards in JNA uniforms,

21     killed them.  The clean-up of those bodies reflected a level of

22     organisation beyond mere paramilitary involvement.  See scheduled

23     incident chart A 16.3.  And it's described in charts B20.3 and C27.2.

24     Detainees at Karakaj technical school were held on order of the TO

25     commander.  That's KW 317, T39367, and guarded by the Zvornik Brigade's

Page 47575

 1     Karakaj company in addition to paramilitaries.  About 160 men were

 2     interrogated, beaten, and shot at the school.  Another 25 disappeared

 3     after being purportedly being brought for prisoner exchange.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Would you kindly slow down a little for the

 5     interpreters, please.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  The Defence claim at paragraph 1453 that the

 7     leadership was unaware of the crimes at Karakaj technical school is

 8     contradicted by numerous OTP and Defence witnesses, one of whom described

 9     it as a generally known secret - that's cite P - and another who

10     acknowledged it was the talk of the town.  P6405, pages 4 through 5.  As

11     described in chart B 20.2, Celopek Dom Kulture was guarded by reserve

12     police members.  Detainees were sexually mutilated, forced to eat severed

13     body parts and over 25 detainees were killed.  And Muslims were brought

14     to and transferred between detention centres in Zvornik and on to

15     Batkovic camp on interim government or TO orders accompanied by police.

16     That's at para 28 of the summary.

17             Your Honours, the crimes I've just discussed were not aimed at

18     these victims as individuals, but as members of an undesired community.

19     Karadzic's forcible demographic restructuring of Bosnia was to be

20     accomplished by the destruction of substantial parts of the

21     Bosnian Muslim and the Bosnian Croat communities and the proper name for

22     this crime is genocide.

23             Genocide is the commission of certain specified acts with the

24     intention to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or

25     religious group as such.  In short, act plus intent.  The jurisprudence

Page 47576

 1     of this Tribunal reveals that these elements have been established in

 2     this case beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, the actus reus of genocide

 3     is established.  And that includes killings and serious bodily harm and

 4     deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to

 5     bring about its physical destruction.

 6             Now, although the scale and impact of those crimes can play a

 7     role in the determination of intent, there is no requirement that the

 8     underlying acts of genocide reach a particular level.  So there is no

 9     numeric threshold for killing members of the group, there is no

10     requirement that serious bodily harm have a particular impact, and with

11     respect 42(c), conditions of life, you've asked about that, that

12     provision is that deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life

13     calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part is

14     an enumerated genocide act which when combined with the requisite intent

15     constitutes genocide.

16             Now, in response to your question, Your Honour, it is clear from

17     the preamble which distinguishes all these acts from intent that the

18     words "calculated to bring about" do not add an intent element.  Instead,

19     it is a way of defining the nature of the act.  So killing by definition

20     doesn't require any further elaboration and the nature of the bodily or

21     mental harm required is defined by the word "serious."  But simply

22     reciting "serious conditions" would be of little assistance in defining

23     the act.  So the framers identified the nature of the act by its

24     potential to destroy, that is, whether it's sufficiently grave.

25             And as for the finding of the Appeals Chamber that "Bosnian

Page 47577

 1     Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to conditions of life that

 2     would bring about their physical destruction," about which you've asked,

 3     the Appeals Chamber was talking about the nature of the conditions as it

 4     affected individual members of the group, that is, Bosnian Muslims and

 5     Croats, not the Bosnian Muslim and Croat community.  The Appeals Chamber

 6     said that these were clearly enough to destroy individual people which

 7     seems pretty obvious from the conditions like starvation.  And in light

 8     of that, in light of conditions that could kill people, the evidence was

 9     sufficient to show the imposition of conditions serious enough to be

10     considered calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the

11     group, that is, sufficiently grave.

12             Further, the Appeals Chamber was making a factual determination,

13     not attempting to articulate a legal standard, and particularly not one

14     which would entirely subvert the "objective probability standard" used by

15     the Brdjanin Trial Chamber at paragraph 906 relied upon by this

16     Trial Chamber at T28767 and which neither party challenged.

17             Your Honours, in this case where the evidence is so overwhelming

18     that genocidal acts occurred on a massive scale, there can be no question

19     that the actus reus of genocide has been met.  So with that in mind, we

20     turn to intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group.

21             Intent to destroy means the intent to cause the physical demise

22     of a targeted community.  The Tolimir Trial Chamber emphasised that "the

23     physical or biological destruction of a group is not necessarily the

24     death of the group members."  That's at para 764 citing the Blagojevic

25     and Jokic trial judgement at para 666.

Page 47578

 1             Now, this is reflecting in the convention and statute which

 2     expressly encompassed genocide based on acts other than killing members

 3     of the group.  So while the intent to kill all members of the group is

 4     perhaps the classical conception of genocide, these days it may not be

 5     the most paradigmatic and, in any event, is not the only method or form.

 6     Indeed, the Tribunal has identified over time various factors which are

 7     specified in para 574 of our brief that may demonstrate genocidal intent.

 8     You see them on the screen.  What these factors have in common is their

 9     pernicious impact on the foundations of life for the group, the

10     foundations that allow the group to continue as such.  You've asked about

11     forcible displacement.  While not a specified actus reus and while it

12     does not by itself constitute genocide, as our jurisprudence makes clear,

13     it can be a powerful additional means to ensure the destruction of the

14     foundations of life of the group so that the group does not continue and

15     cannot reconstitute itself.  And you'll see that in context in just a

16     moment because all of these factors must be viewed in the context of the

17     totality of the criminal operations against the targeted group, in this

18     case by Karadzic through his participation in the JCE.

19             And when multiple massacres of group members have taken place,

20     when many, if not most, of the individual members have been brutalised,

21     terrorised, and traumatised, when the group has been simultaneously

22     deprived of its leaders, when their homes have been destroyed and razed,

23     when their religious buildings have been reduced to rubble, when the

24     group members have been forcibly displaced, that is, physically separated

25     and scattered, when the familial, community, and historical fabric

Page 47579

 1     binding the group and its most sacred symbols have been destroyed, it is

 2     an inescapable conclusion that the very existence of that community has

 3     been intentionally attacked, revealing the goal to destroy the non-Serb

 4     communities where necessary to be at the heart of the common criminal

 5     plan.

 6             And in connection with the Court's question, I hope you can

 7     therefore see the role that forcible displacement can play in the

 8     destruction of the foundations of life for the group.  Dr. Karadzic's

 9     direct expressions of genocidal intent and his clear intention that the

10     groups would not be able to reconstitute themselves simply reinforce this

11     conclusion.  Let me just return to Prijedor, focus on that by way of

12     example and recall what I've specified before.

13             Up to 800 Muslim civilians killed in the first attacks, an

14     estimated 350 to 700 more in the cleansing of Brdo, 150 men in a single

15     massacre in Keraterm.  Similarly 150 men detained in Omarska after Brdo

16     executed in the course of a single night.  Killings so routine that

17     prisoners feared death every second with bodies piling up every day.

18     Approximately 200 men who survived Omarska or Keraterm massacred at

19     Koricanske Stijene.  68 Bosnian Croats killed, that is, shot or hacked to

20     death, during an attack on Brisevo.  Over 100 Muslim civilians killed at

21     Miska Glava Dom and then later at -- at Ljubija football stadium and then

22     in Kipe.  The Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croat leaders targeted for

23     killings and their bodies dumped in mass graves.  Thousands and thousands

24     separated from their families, taken to Omarska and Keraterm where they

25     were starved, denied medical treatment, beaten, sexually assaulted,

Page 47580

 1     tortured, and often killed.  Thousands more taken to Trnopolje until they

 2     were transferred outside the RS, often outside Bosnia.  And meanwhile, to

 3     make sure that the survivors did not contemplate return, their houses,

 4     mosques, and cultural monuments levelled.

 5             In a few months, just a few months, thousands of Prijedor's

 6     non-Serb civilians had been killed, thousands more brutalised, beaten,

 7     tortured, subjected to sexual violence and degraded.  Their religious

 8     structures and symbols destroyed or badly damaged, their livelihoods,

 9     homes, and properties lost.  They were then scattered around the world.

10     By October 1992 roughly 38.000 members of the targeted groups had been

11     expelled from the municipality, a figure which increased to 44.000 by May

12     1993.  Taken together, these reflect an unmistakable intent to destroy

13     the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities of Prijedor.  No other

14     conclusion can fairly be drawn from the devastation of these communities.

15     Now, it may not have been, as has sometimes been mistakenly claimed as

16     the test, a systematic effort to destroy each and every group member, but

17     it was plainly, plainly an effort and reflected an intention to destroy

18     the community, and that intent is confirmed by Karadzic's own direct

19     expressions of intent.  As I stated, his statements anticipating,

20     threatening, and embracing such acts.

21             Over and over again Karadzic made clear what would happen to the

22     Bosnian Muslims and Croats if they persisted in pursuing independence.

23     Not by force of nature but at the hands of his forces, they would

24     disappear, be annihilated or be up to their necks in blood.  Those are

25     all quotes.  He stood before them, wagged his finger and told them they

Page 47581

 1     were headed for ex-extinction.  Now, he tries to paint himself as a

 2     beneficent visionary who foresaw troubled times, but Karadzic is not the

 3     building inspector who advises someone not to build on -- on land because

 4     it's unstable.  He's the mobster who says:  Don't build there or I'll be

 5     forced to destroy it.  And who does so when his warning is disregarded.

 6             As we explain in our brief at paragraph 580, Karadzic's rallying

 7     cry was that this was a genocidal struggle, that his followers had the

 8     right and duty to use reciprocal force.  He knew full well the kind of

 9     force the Bosnian Serbs would use while a largely helpless Europe was

10     told to go "fuck itself," D279, page 9.

11             And after the conflict was underway, Karadzic acknowledged that

12     the Muslims were vanishing and that it was roused by Europe to eliminate

13     the Muslims, D92, page 86.  In other words, Europe put us in this

14     position and now we have to do this thing.

15             Now, the Defence brief at paragraph 2769 cites Nedic, whose

16     comment triggered Karadzic's remark.  And Nedic came here and insisted

17     that he never advocated the execution of Muslims and he cited his

18     comment:

19             "Let us not kill women and children for wearing Turkish trousers

20     or whatever."

21             And that he told a VRS colonel that he was not for genocide.

22     Now, setting aside why Nedic felt compelled to tell the Assembly that

23     they shouldn't kill women and children or tell the army that he was

24     against genocide, the significance of the exchange with Karadzic lies in

25     the fact that Karadzic agreed that Muslims were vanishing at the hands of

Page 47582

 1     his forces, the army, the police, and the Crisis Staffs.

 2             And, Your Honours, when we return, I'd like to turn to the

 3     meaning of "in part" and the distinct nature of these communities.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  We'll have a break for 20

 5     minutes and resume at 10.20.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 10.00 a.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 10.22 a.m.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Can we continue, Mr. Karadzic?

 9             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, Excellencies.  I have just some -- there is a

10     new problem and I am confused but ...

11             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Then we can continue.

12             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. TIEGER:  As explained in the Prosecution brief, the intent to

14     destroy "in part" means seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group,

15     not a random accumulation of individuals.  And in addition to being

16     distinct, the part must be substantial, significant enough to have an

17     impact on the whole.  Now, impact on the whole refers to such things as

18     demonstrating the "vulnerability and defenselessness" of the overall

19     group.  This impact, in turn, can be amplified by the "emblematic" or

20     strategic nature of the part.  Although, whether the group is substantial

21     will vary according to the particular circumstances of each individual

22     case, our jurisprudence has identified some non-exhaustive factors,

23     including the numeric size of the part and its relative significance as

24     gauged, as I mentioned, by such matters as its emblematic or strategic

25     nature.

Page 47583

 1             In this case, the targeted Muslim and Croat communities within

 2     the municipalities specified in count 1 were distinct entities with a

 3     centuries'-long presence, a specific culture, connected histories,

 4     attachments and identities.

 5             Now, as for numbers, as we know from the Krstic appeal regarding

 6     the approximately 40.000 Muslims in Srebrenica coupled with this

 7     emblematic and strategic significance, was sufficient to render it a

 8     substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group.  The Muslims of Prijedor

 9     were 49.000.  The Croats 6.000 of a significantly smaller whole.  As we

10     noted in our brief, even before the assessment of the emblematic nature,

11     the numbers such as this cannot be easily dismissed when the same ratio

12     of part to group as a whole is applied to larger groups, it translates to

13     shocking numbers that could not possibly be dismissed as insufficient if

14     that part was destroyed.  In the US it translates to New York City.  In

15     the United Kingdom it translates to Birmingham and Glasgow.  No one could

16     suggest that their destruction would not serve as "a potent example "of

17     the overall group's vulnerability, especially if other parts of the group

18     were simultaneously attacked.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just, Mr. Tieger, I would hate to intervene, but you

20     referred to demonstrating the vulnerability and defenselessness.  Could

21     you expand on that, what exactly it means or could you give me such

22     example which demonstrate the vulnerability and defenselessness in simple

23     terms.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Well, by way of the definition, I think best example

25     comes from the source of the citation, which is the Krstic appeal, and

Page 47584

 1     the impact I think the -- the still reverberating impact on the community

 2     as a whole that results from the destruction of a community such as this.

 3     And as the Krstic Appeals Chamber focused on, it wasn't simply the raw

 4     numbers but it was the group's situation at that point, that is, the last

 5     desperate hold-outs in Eastern Bosnia and they symbolise something to the

 6     group as a whole that meant that the resonance of that destruction was

 7     much larger than could simply be assessed by the raw numbers of that

 8     community.  And as I'll come to in a moment, Prijedor is essentially the

 9     mirror -- well, in fact, I'll tell you now.  Prijedor is essentially the

10     mirror image of that circumstance.  Prijedor was emblematic because it

11     was the symbol throughout Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia of

12     brotherhood and unity and we have that in evidence, and brotherhood and

13     unity was the very concept that bound together these communities, the

14     very concept that promised and assured joint life in Bosnia.  So when

15     Prijedor was destroyed at the beginning of the war, it sent a powerful

16     message to the Bosnian Muslim community that -- of their vulnerability,

17     of their defenselessness, that the umbrella concept that had held the

18     groups together before, brotherhood and unity, was shattered, was no

19     longer present and that they were completely at the whim of the more

20     powerful forces arrayed against them.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             MR. TIEGER:  I might add, Mr. President, that you'll be reviewing

23     municipality summaries and will find within them the particular strategic

24     and emblematic nature of the other communities specified in count 1 and

25     will also be aware that the impact of their destruction was magnified by

Page 47585

 1     the simultaneous attacks on other parts of the community.

 2             I want to reaffirm the principles that I've outlined by taking

 3     the Court back to the origins of the legal concept of genocide, to the

 4     words of the man who first conceptualised and named the crime of

 5     genocide.  As Raphael Lemkin stated:

 6             "Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the

 7     immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass

 8     killings of all members of a nation.  It is intended, rather, to signify

 9     a co-ordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of the

10     essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of

11     annihilating the groups themselves."

12             Lemkin made clear precisely what is embodied in our Statute and

13     our jurisprudence, that genocide may be accomplished in ways other than

14     quilling its members and also that the essence of genocide is the

15     destruction of the foundations of life for the group, not the death of

16     its individual members, although that is clearly one method but just one

17     method of destroying the group's foundations.  This --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Once again, Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

20             JUDGE KWON:  You are being requested to slow down by the

21     interpreters.  Please bear that in mind.  Please.

22             MR. TIEGER:  This position is embodied in our jurisprudence and

23     has been since its inception.  The Chamber of this Tribunal adjudicating

24     the Rule 61 proceedings against Dr. Karadzic made that clear.  Referring

25     to evidence of destructive acts targeting the foundations of the group

Page 47586

 1     and concluding in words echoing Lemkin:

 2             "This intent derives from the combined effect of speeches or

 3     projects laying the groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the

 4     massive scale of their destructive effect and from their specific nature

 5     which aims at undermining what is considered to be the foundation of the

 6     group."  And that's the Rule 61 decision at page 53, paragraph 95.

 7             This principle, as I underscored earlier, has found continuing

 8     expression in the case law which affirms the relevance of an intent to

 9     destroy the essential characteristics of the group such as family

10     structures, relations between group members, property and religious

11     symbols, and the capacity of the group to reconstitute itself.  Thus, the

12     Prosecution seeks no expansion or broadening of the law on genocide; we

13     seek only the application of the Statute and the jurisprudence of this

14     Tribunal, which are intended to provide a measure of justice for

15     communities that have been targeted for destruction and a measure of

16     protection for those that might in future.  Such an application to the

17     facts of this case could only conclude that the requisite combination of

18     acts and intent are fulfilled and that Dr. Karadzic's responsibility for

19     the crime of genocide has been established.

20             I turn now to the Defence positions.  Throughout the trial and in

21     his final brief, Karadzic invoked various unfounded, irrelevant, or

22     inconsistent claims to explain away his responsibility.  He falsely

23     claims in his brief that responsibility for these victims lies with those

24     who broke up Yugoslavia, not him; that the Muslims were led by genocidal

25     Islamic fundamentalists who were responsible for all crimes in Bosnia,

Page 47587

 1     not him.  That the steps toward the establishment of the ethnically

 2     separate state over which he presided, such as regionalisation or

 3     Variant A and B and for which he often took credit before and during the

 4     war had little or nothing to do with him.  That the division of the MUP

 5     which he credited formerly with the early phases of "liberation" was

 6     simply the implementation of the Cutileiro Plan, despite the fact that

 7     preparation for an ethnically separate MUP began before the Cutileiro

 8     negotiations commenced and that the Cutileiro negotiations never reached

 9     an implementation stage.  He claims that he had no particular concerns

10     about unfavourable demographics and the allegedly explosive Muslim

11     birth-rate, despite his repeated reminders to his followers of the

12     existence and the risks of that supposed threat.  He claims that his role

13     as party leader was meaningless and that the party over which he presided

14     was filled with "idiots" who didn't listen to anyone, a position

15     contradicted by contemporaneous intercepts and documents as well as the

16     extraordinary deference to Karadzic displayed by those same officials

17     during the Defence phase of trial.  He claims that he was incapable of

18     interfering in the work of state organs both before and during the

19     work -- the war, despite intercepts reflecting precisely such

20     interference before the war and his own admissions during the war.  He

21     claims that his calls for a negotiated solution on his terms meant that

22     he couldn't be preparing for war.  In contrast to his opponent

23     Izetbegovic, whose rejection of Karadzic's proposed solutions meant that

24     he actively desired war.  He claims that once the war began, chaos and

25     anarchy reigned in the municipalities, although they were somehow

Page 47588

 1     simultaneously "states within a state."  He claims that communications

 2     between the municipalities and the republic level were totally cut off,

 3     except for his orders to obey international law which he sent to the guys

 4     over whom he had no control and which somehow made it through the

 5     impenetrable communication barrier.  He claims there was no ethnic

 6     cleansing, that people left their homes voluntarily or due to the

 7     unavoidable pressures of war.  He claims that he had no power over or

 8     little to do with the army which only discussed logistical matters with

 9     him.  He claims that civilians were not held in detention facilities and

10     were not mistreated and he was not informed that civilians were being

11     held or mistreated.  And he claims that whenever he found out about any

12     problem it was immediately investigated.  These assertions, one after

13     another, are false.  Although ostensively supported by evidence, his

14     citations mis-characterise that evidence or cite to evidence that

15     actually contradicts his assertions have nothing to do with the

16     proposition cited or support only the most innocuous aspect of a complex

17     proposition or otherwise do not support the proposition.  And many of

18     them, many of them are grounded on testimony which lacks credibility.

19     The Prosecution has provided credibility charts on most, indeed nearly

20     all, of the Defence witnesses, prompted in part by the pattern of

21     witnesses taking positions that were clearly exposed as false by

22     contemporaneous documents, by the weight of the evidence, by

23     demonstrations of bias or even by simple common sense.  The Chamber will

24     be reviewing those charts.  For now, it's instructive to remind you of

25     just a small sample of the Defence testimony.

Page 47589

 1             For example, Mr. Garic, who in an effort to distance himself from

 2     evidence about what he'd done, insisted he was never called Momo despite

 3     all evidence to the contrary, including that the Defence knew him and

 4     listed him as Momo Garic.  Or Milos Milicic, who proudly claimed that his

 5     entire witness statement was his own words and when confronted by the

 6     fact that his praise of Karadzic repeated verbatim what was in an earlier

 7     witness's statement then claimed that the "author of this text must have

 8     provided his own wording."  Or Nikola Mijatovic, who claimed that a --

 9     modified air bomb trajectories were "predetermined and could be

10     controlled," and when then asked if that meant that the civilian house

11     demolished in G 10 was the intended target of the air bomb launched by

12     the Ilidza Brigade said "no house was destroyed in that area.  It's an

13     enemy lie."

14             Or Slobodan Avlijas, who asserted that central authorities had no

15     communication with Foca until December 1992, despite a visit in June 1992

16     by members of a working group of which he was part.  Or

17     Bozidar Vucurevic, who claimed that no Muslim property was destroyed in

18     Trebinje, confronted with an earlier admission that the mosques of

19     Trebinje had been destroyed he then said, "Well, it was the army."  Or

20     Srdo Srdic, who also denied all knowledge of A and B despite his presence

21     at five separate meetings where it was discussed.  Or Svetozar Stanic,

22     the municipality leader who claimed he never knew the bunker was used as

23     a detention facility in his municipality.  And shortly afterward, Avlijas

24     explained how he and Stanic stood within feet of the bunker as close as

25     this witness box is to the door of the courtroom.  The bunker, a place so

Page 47590

 1     horrific, as Avlijas explained, that he felt horror still 20 years later.

 2             And finally Momcilo Krajisnik, who is relied upon in the brief

 3     for a vast number of propositions and who said he attended a few meetings

 4     with Mladic -- or a few meetings with Mladic while the Mladic notebook

 5     reflects more than 30 meetings in 1992 alone.  Who claimed that he didn't

 6     know what tasks the army was assigned but who was shown to be present and

 7     active in meetings at which Karadzic assigned the army tasks which were

 8     then incorporated into directives.  Who said he never spoke to Mladic

 9     about the strategic goals but who, with Karadzic, explicitly outlined

10     those goals to Mladic in two separate meetings in the week before the

11     strategic goals were announced.  Who claimed that the Bosnian Serb

12     leadership never ordered the army to conquer majority non-Serb areas, but

13     who expressly told Mladic in a meeting that one of the two pressing tasks

14     for the army was to "ocistiti," cleanse or mop-up, Orasje, a majority

15     Croat municipality which was then incorporated into directive 4.  Who

16     claimed that A and B was meaningless and that he didn't know it had been

17     distributed, despite repeated occasions on which it was discussed in his

18     presence or in which he discussed it, including his conversation with

19     Karadzic on the day it was issued about who would monitor its

20     implementation and also including an Assembly session at which a

21     municipality representative reminded him of how he and Karadzic had

22     counselled that representative about the problems of implementing A and

23     B.  And the list goes on and on and on.

24             As we also saw repeatedly, many witnesses were remarkably

25     receptive to Karadzic's leading questions which permeated the written

Page 47591

 1     statements as well.  The compliant's answers often track the outlines of

 2     a defence strategy that Karadzic constructed long ago.  Because in 1998,

 3     as investigations began, Karadzic oversaw from a distance the systematic

 4     culling of documents sought by this institution.  Here is what one of his

 5     associates, Vukasinovic, wrote in February 1998 about the

 6     already-existing defence strategy.

 7             "Maybe I am scared by nature; however, I think that all your

 8     statements are not really favourable ..."

 9             And he gives an example:

10             "In May of 1992, you stated that there is work and law in

11     Republika Srpska and that everything is in normal order and the Muslim

12     part is in chaos; however, our defence strategy for that time-period is

13     that the chaos was here."  P6489.

14             He thus foreshadowed the defence which Karadzic ran 16 years

15     later here in this court and he also identified the problems which to

16     this day expose him as a liar.  That letter followed earlier letters

17     assuring Karadzic that "unfavourable documents had been kept from

18     investigators."  And in this regard, I urge the Court to read P3932, -33,

19     -34, and -35.  And after receiving that letter Karadzic wrote back with

20     further instructions that's P6490.

21             After thanking his associate and urging him to keep going, please

22     keep going in that direction, Karadzic said:

23             "Please do not allow such a mistake to repeat itself with

24     television.  You ought to personally review every segment which will be

25     offered to them and select those favourable to us and detrimental to the

Page 47592

 1     Muslims.  Nothing else exists because the archives have been moved,

 2     destroyed, et cetera."

 3             He also said:

 4             "You are completely right when it comes to the SDS as well.  Tell

 5     Vrkes that you have consulted me and I have asked you to instruct them on

 6     what to do.  The best would be if the archives didn't exist at all

 7     because the party was frozen for a year.  Crisis Staffs were organised by

 8     municipality bodies.  Remember that and stress it firmly to them.  It was

 9     the municipal bodies elected in the 1990 elections and not the party."

10             And then he tells Vukasinovic to show Vrkes the letter and have

11     him do everything to "have the archives in the municipalities cleared

12     out" so that they won't "spoil what's being worked on centrally."

13             Throughout this trial, the same effort to mislead and conceal

14     have been on display, as his still-loyal followers sought to assist by

15     towing the party line on unsustainable defence strategies determined many

16     years ago.

17             Karadzic argues in his brief at paragraph 1348 that it is

18     "ridiculous to argue on the basis of smoke and mirrors" that he hid

19     evidence, thus showing that the bigger the lie in which he's caught, the

20     greater the expression of indignation.  Or as General Rose said:

21             "When he," Karadzic, "came under pressure, he could lie through

22     his teeth with a look of sublime innocence on his face," D162, page 49.

23             I now turn to some of those false claims.  False claim number 1,

24     the broad attempt to shift responsibility onto those allegedly

25     responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia.  As this Trial Chamber has

Page 47593

 1     repeatedly pointed out to Dr. Karadzic, this case is not about who

 2     started the war, jus ad bellum.  Nevertheless, this claim by Dr. Karadzic

 3     is instructive because it reflects the position that the breakup of

 4     Yugoslavia would be met with destructive force in Bosnia.  Or as Karadzic

 5     put it more graphically at the time, you cannot "fuck all of Yugoslavia

 6     up and have Bosnia remain a virgin."  That's D1281.

 7             Karadzic's struggle to shift responsibility continues with his

 8     lengthy depiction of his political opponents, primarily Izetbegovic and

 9     the SDA, as Islamic fundamentalists bent on domination, fratricidal war,

10     terrorization and genocide of the Serbs.  That's at paragraphs 39 through

11     42 of his brief.  Again, as the Trial Chamber has repeatedly underscored,

12     these assertions are irrelevant or marginally relevant except perhaps to

13     the extent they inadvertently expose motive.  But, in any event, the

14     reality, unsurprisingly, does not support this diabolical description.

15     As Croatian SDS founder Jovan Raskovic, who lamented his own role in the

16     creation of the Bosnia SDS stated:

17             "There should be no fear of Bosnian sovereignty.  Maybe Bosnia

18     won't be Serbophile but it won't be genocidal."

19             That's P6617, page 2.

20             As even Krajisnik said, Izetbegovic's ideas expressed in the

21     Islamic Declaration were "a travesty," T43184.  He was instead a

22     pragmatic man.  43184.  Even Karadzic's own contemporaneous

23     acknowledgment of Izetbegovic as a "nice man" is further at odds with his

24     devilish portrayal that he attempts now.  That's P1940.  The desperation

25     of Karadzic's efforts is reflected in his reliance on what he calls the

Page 47594

 1     Nazi-like Vox which allegedly outlined the dire fate awaiting Serbs in

 2     the future Islamic republic.  Paragraph 47 of his brief quotes from a

 3     part of the text of a Vox issue listing terrible restrictions and threats

 4     but it fails to quote from the beginning of the article which reveals

 5     that this list began as a satire on the creation of an alleged Islamic

 6     republic which had then been manipulated by persons unknown into the

 7     pamphlet that they now reproduced in their magazine in order to condemn

 8     it.

 9             Karadzic similarly depicts Izetbegovic and the SDA as someone

10     actively seeking war and desiring Muslim suffering.  He cites Donia in

11     support of his claim at para 43, T3268, when in fact Donia said the

12     opposite, emphasising that his report "did not say what you said it did,

13     that was that he consciously opted for the war option.  He talked about

14     preparation for war, not consciously opting for the war option.  Now,

15     that was a misrepresentation on your part of what that citation said."

16     That's at T3267 through -68.  Karadzic misrepresented it in court and now

17     does so again in his final brief.

18             The reality is that it was Karadzic who had long insisted that a

19     sovereign and independent Bosnia would be met with force, as he told

20     Vance and Okun in December 1991:  Unless the Bosnian Serbs got what they

21     wanted, they would attempt to get it through war.  That's P776, pages 38

22     through 39.

23             As for Karadzic's suggestion that Muslim suffering was

24     Izetbegovic's responsibility, not his, because Izetbegovic desired it,

25     the Court need only review D3716, a session of the Bosnian Presidency in

Page 47595

 1     June, at which Izetbegovic agonising about the dilemma presented by

 2     Bosnian Serb cleansing:

 3             "If we don't accept the ultimatum, these people might actually

 4     perish.  If we accept it, we will be legalising a division along ethnic

 5     lines, that is, an altered demographic situation in Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina, the creation of a Serbian state of sorts in BH, and finally,

 7     the question on the exchange - is it fair and all right?"

 8             While painting Izetbegovic as a man who actively sought war,

 9     falsely, Karadzic paints himself as a man who sought only peace, filling

10     pages of his brief with various pronouncements, see paras 238 through

11     260, 265, through 285, pronouncements intended to reveal that he "at

12     every opportunity tirelessly advocated for peace."

13             Of course, the Prosecution's case is not that Karadzic desired

14     war as an end in itself or that he would not have accepted a peaceful

15     resolution on his terms, but he was explicitly determined that he would

16     not accept a sovereign and independent Bosnia and would go to war to

17     prevent it.  And while his initial efforts were aimed at keeping Bosnia

18     in Yugoslavia, as it became clear that would not happen, he shifted to

19     the establishment of an ethnically separate Serb entity in Bosnia.  When

20     he thought he could get much of what he wanted through negotiations, he

21     was willing to take less as a low-cost option.  But when that failed and

22     he opted for force, he wanted what he considered the Serbs were entitled

23     to.  As Mandic said to an interlocutor who observed that Serb attacks in

24     Sarajevo had left the Muslims with little:

25             "Fuck them, they didn't want to do it nicely through

Page 47596

 1     negotiations, well now they'll get nothing," P1103, page 8.

 2             And that Serb state, Karadzic made clear, had to realise the

 3     "centuries'-old dream of creating our own state without too many internal

 4     enemies," P1477, page 258.

 5             As he explained at the first session of the separate Serb

 6     Assembly:

 7             "This is a step with which the Serbian people are breaking the

 8     last illusions, recognising their enemies and rounding up their being in

 9     such a way that they can never be attacked again from inside," P1343,

10     page 58.

11             When the strategic goals were announced, Karadzic explained that

12     this meant "separation from those who are our enemies and who have used

13     every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who would

14     continue with such practices if we were to stay together in the same

15     state."  Page 956 -- P956, page 9.

16             Those enemies were the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, although he

17     most typically expounded on the Muslim threat in light of their

18     demographic predominance.  As he repeatedly explained to his followers

19     and to internationals:  You simply can't live with the Muslims.  As

20     described in para 28 of the Prosecution brief, Karadzic insisted that "we

21     live together only when occupied or under a dictatorship."  Muslims and

22     Serbs were like oil and water, like a dog and a cat, like plants which

23     cannot grow side by side.  If you put them in one pot, the soup would not

24     mix.  And he emphasised that Serbs' "experience with Islam five centuries

25     long" allowed them to "recognise ancient danger by the toxic

Page 47597

 1     all-destructive Islamic octopus that skillfully takes on various guises

 2     but which is with all its variability and ambiguity constant in its

 3     irreconcilable poisonousness toward the Serbian Orthodox being," P5492,

 4     page 5 through 6.

 5             Now, in the course of describing his allegedly exclusive emphasis

 6     on peace, Karadzic makes one passing reference to the issue of Muslim

 7     demographics and suggests that his demographic concerns were limited to

 8     efforts to "artificially" alter the demographic structure.  This

 9     dismissive mis-characterisation ignores his obsession with the Muslim

10     birth-rate and with Muslim demographics and its purported implications.

11     You can find that at para 29 of our brief.  He insisted to internationals

12     such as Cutileiro that Muslims intended to use their high birth-rate to

13     dominate and it was a recurring theme in his discussions with Vance and

14     Okun that Muslims expected to achieve control of Bosnia through their

15     high birth-rate.  That's P776 and also T4163 through -64.

16             He emphasised before the war to his followers, "They will

17     overwhelm you with their birth-rate and their tricks."  And during the

18     war emphasised that neither Serbs nor Croats together can control through

19     the birth-rate the penetration of Islam into Europe and in five to six

20     years Muslims would make 51 per cent of the population.  And as he made

21     clear, this bore on the percentage of Muslims who were envisioned for the

22     Serb republic, even a safe percentage now would soon be unsafe:

23             "The 23 per cent would rise to 24 per cent the day after, and the

24     day after that one it would be 25 per cent because that is how it is with

25     them."

Page 47598

 1             That's Karadzic at the 37th Assembly, P1385, pages 108 through

 2     109.

 3             Now, given the alleged toxicity of the Muslim threat and their

 4     explosive birth-rate, one might have expected Karadzic and the Bosnian

 5     Serb leadership to claim only areas where Muslims constituted a suitably

 6     small percentage of the population.  Quite the contrary.  His territorial

 7     ambitions were vast and they required various justifications.  For

 8     example, he claimed that the areas where Serbs were a majority before the

 9     genocide of World War II were by rights Serb and should revert to them, a

10     claim that is embodied in their official documents such as P6444, such as

11     the declaration of state and the constitution, and see also P776,

12     pages 32 through 33 and 227.  Or the plebiscite which was conducted in

13     November of 1991, the results of which meant according to Karadzic that:

14             "In all territories where Serbs took part in the referendum

15     regardless of whether they make 5 per cent or 55 per cent of the

16     population, they are the constituent element of that town or that

17     republic and must stay in Yugoslavia if we decide so, "D86, page 38.

18             Karadzic also asserted that Serbs were entitled to approximately

19     65 per cent of the land because they "owned it," a rationale ridiculed

20     even by Slobodan Milosevic, his one-time benefactor who eventually became

21     frustrated by Karadzic's nationalism and greed:

22             "As if someone would believe it, it's known that it was all

23     socially owned property, the meadows, grazing land, mountains were

24     nobody's property.  What owners, for goodness sake?  How can you imagine

25     two-thirds of the population being crammed into 30 per cent of the

Page 47599

 1     territory, while 50 per cent is too little for you?  Is it humane?  Is it

 2     fair?"  And that's at P2604, pages 6 and 9.

 3             And irrespective of whatever justification, places with strategic

 4     significance regardless of how many Muslims and Croats lived there were

 5     claimed.  Referring to places that we've "grabbed for ourselves" where

 6     Serbs were only 30 per cent, Karadzic stated:

 7             "Don't let this get around but remember how many of us there were

 8     in Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, in Rogatica,

 9     how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera.  Due to strategic

10     importance they had to become ours and no one is practically questioning

11     it anymore," P988, pages 68 through 69.

12             It is against this backdrop that Karadzic asks the Trial Chamber

13     to believe that he was not involved in the significant toward separation

14     such as Variant A and B or regionalisation, despite the wealth of

15     contemporaneous documentation reflecting his constant role in that

16     process.  Karadzic acknowledges with respect to regionalisation that it

17     became a "means to fight Alija's state."  He acknowledges that in his

18     brief at para 205.  Or -- or to quote the passage he cited a bit more

19     accurately, "to destroy Alija's state."  Yet he also suggests that it was

20     simply a legal process that was not mono ethnic in design, that it had

21     nothing to do with him, and that in any event it was about the creation

22     of entities like the ARK that were completely independent of Karadzic.

23     In fact, regionalisation was understood by other parties to be precisely

24     what it was:  The formation of a Serbian-dominated region, using economic

25     justifications to cover "the goal of creating a state for only one

Page 47600

 1     nation," as acknowledged by Defence witness Jaksic at T46173.  In

 2     attempting to run from his own responsibility for regionalisation,

 3     Karadzic explicitly backs away from his own claim on the

 4     11th of January, 1992, to have invented regionalisation.  That's in

 5     paragraph 202.  This attempt to distance himself from his own words on

 6     that occasion is undermined by the fact that Karadzic repeatedly

 7     acknowledged that he was responsible for creating regionalisation.

 8     You'll find that at para 112 of the Prosecution's brief.

 9             In fact, regionalisation was one of the steps that Karadzic

10     explained he had lined up to implement at what he considered the

11     appropriate moment.

12             "We had a list of reactions and steps to take but we always

13     waited for the Muslims to make a mistake, and after they made one, we

14     created a union of municipalities and the Serbian autonomous regions

15     next -- areas next, followed by the regions and eventually our Assembly

16     and finally republic," P953, page 3.

17             As for Variant A and B, Karadzic called an array of witnesses who

18     denied knowledge of the existence or significance of Variant A and B, and

19     these included his closest confidant Krajisnik, whose dissembling about A

20     and B I've already mentioned.  Other witnesses fared just as poorly in

21     the face of the extensive documentation from the municipalities about the

22     role and implementation of A and B, but their testimony was consistent

23     with his false claim in opening that Variant A and B was not created,

24     discussed, or adopted within the SDS.  That's at T942 through -43 which,

25     in turn, was consistent with the false defence that he instructed

Page 47601

 1     Vukasinovic to disseminate to municipality authorities in 1998:

 2             "Stress it firmly to them that Crisis Staffs were organised by

 3     municipal bodies, and that it was municipal bodies elected in the 1990

 4     elections and not the party, remember that."  P6490.

 5             When coupled with the equally fraudulent chaos and lack of

 6     communication defence, it attempts to insulate Karadzic for the

 7     accomplishment of his followers whom he once praised for "liberating and

 8     creating the space."  That's at P970, page 316.

 9             In fact, the reality of Variant A and B's importance was

10     explained contemporaneously by Karadzic himself:

11             "Please, remember how we used to work before the war?  Everything

12     was as clear as day in the municipalities where we were a majority and in

13     those where we were a minority.  Do you remember the instruction A and B?

14     We had Crisis Staffs and it was clear that they were the authority.  They

15     could make mistakes but they were still the authority.  The people were

16     not left without the authority because there was a Crisis Staff."

17             That's P1403, page 347.

18             Now, Karadzic argues in his brief that Crisis Staffs were formed

19     because there was a crisis and no government, that's para 964 of his

20     brief.  In tandem with that he argues that there were no laws in place.

21     That's at paras 403 to 413.  Again, this is another reflection of the

22     false defence that he first disseminated in 1998, that Crisis Staffs were

23     only established by the government after the war had begun.

24             Contrary to Karadzic's claim, at the time Crisis Staffs were

25     established pursuant to Variant A and B, the system had not "collapsed"

Page 47602

 1     with "no organised system in place," but at that time there was a concern

 2     among the Bosnian Serb leadership that Bosnia would become independent,

 3     and that's reflected in the preamble to Variant A and B.  Accordingly,

 4     Karadzic took steps to establish the bodies that would effect ethnic

 5     separation in Bosnia.  Those bodies were headed by his officials, whose

 6     capacities to implement ethnic separation were monitored by him and by

 7     his emissaries such as Cizmovic, see paragraph 130 of our brief.  As

 8     Karadzic declared in February 1992, referring in that instance to the

 9     Krajina, there was not a single municipality which was not following his

10     "political line."  D88, page 44.

11             In short, as Kupresanin put it in 2001, there was a chain of

12     command from the municipality presidents to Karadzic, P6510, page 7.

13             As when necessary, Karadzic intervened to protect the positions

14     of his favoured men or to promote them over less-devoted politicians as

15     he did in Ilidza, Novo Sarajevo, and Trebinje, and he actively monitored

16     the composition of local authorities in the other municipalities.  See

17     P3200 page 3 or P5783, page 2.

18             Karadzic made clear:

19             "Whoever makes a mistake I will suspend him and throw him out of

20     the party, I don't give a fuck.

21             "And with one stroke of the pen, I will finish them," P2556.

22             When people on the ground in the municipalities disregarded or

23     disobeyed orders from Pale, some were immediately removed from their

24     positions, while others were subjected to a disciplinary procedure known

25     informally as "ironing, "and which would cause the officials to change

Page 47603

 1     their views.  That's P1 pages 93 through 94.

 2             The coda to Karadzic's assertion that he had no control over

 3     local and regional authorities is a quote from an intercept that

 4     purportedly reflects the attitude of the Prijedor leadership toward

 5     Karadzic:

 6             "Who cares about Karadzic?  We'll do whatever we want.  He can't

 7     impose his will on us."

 8             That's P2571.  This was taken out of context to totally invert

 9     its meaning.  What Karadzic's brief does not tell you is that this was

10     one of Karadzic's officials informing him what some disgruntled

11     individuals in Prijedor had said.  Karadzic then made his position clear:

12             "Let them fuck their mothers.  Let them make their own party.

13     Whoever refuses to obey Sarajevo should resign."

14             That's at page 3.  And then he took the necessary steps bringing

15     in a new man for better leadership, T45357 through -59.

16             Shortly afterward, Cizmovic was able to report to Karadzic that

17     there was no discord in Prijedor:

18             "Prijedor is resolved."

19             P2552.

20             As Karadzic's own witness Miskovic confirmed, this intercept was

21     actually about honouring party hierarchy and party policy, 45357

22     through -59.  As with much of the Defence brief scratch and when the

23     false surface falls away, the real picture is exposed.  From the very

24     outset of the conflict, the municipality subordination and loyalties to

25     Karadzic were clear.  Thus shortly before the conflict began, the

Page 47604

 1     Rogatica Crisis Staff informed Karadzic that "in compliance with our

 2     instructions" the "factual division on the ground should be and is

 3     already there," expressing concern about others moving forward without

 4     sufficient co-ordination with republic-level steps, P6105.

 5             Municipality officials consistently echoed Karadzic's policies on

 6     the ground, sometimes directly invoking him.  For example, in Kljuc

 7     Crisis Staff president Banjac in early July:

 8             I think that life has to be totally ethnically demarcated and the

 9     areas ethnically cleansed of all those who cannot live together in this

10     area."  P6552, page 2.

11             Or Zvornik president Gruic at P6417:

12             "The Turks destroyed the Serbian church that was here when they

13     arrived in Zvornik in 1463.  Now we are rebuilding the church and

14     reclaiming this as Serbian land forever and ever.  This was a Serbian

15     town before Islam existed in the Balkans."

16             Or Vogosca SDS official Koprivica asserting that if Muslims fail

17     to leave Serb lands they were going to be destroyed and were "simply

18     going to disappear," P2344 in paragraphs 59 through 60.

19             Or Bratunac president Deronjic, about whom we'll hear more from

20     Ms. Pack, who told SDA representatives reluctant to agree to division

21     that Karadzic was placing immense pressure on him and then he threatened

22     that if the Muslims did not comply with the demand they would

23     "disappear."  That's P3196, paras 31 through 32.

24             And you can see the same in P965 with Karadzic crony Jovan Tintor

25     explaining that division is imminent whether the Muslims like it or not

Page 47605

 1     and that their share of the division will be a few "islands" in Bosnia

 2     while Serbs will be completely connected territorially and in every way.

 3     As discussed in paragraph 179 of the Prosecution brief, the common

 4     purpose was implemented in municipalities headed by Karadzic's officials.

 5     They co-ordinated round-ups, detentions, and expulsions with Karadzic's

 6     military, police, and with the other municipalities.

 7             At false Karadzic claim is that everywhere in the field there was

 8     anarchy and chaos.  That's Defence brief para 455.  Yet Karadzic's praise

 9     for the achievements of local authorities in securing and cementing

10     Serb-claimed municipalities reflects instead their unity of purpose and

11     their co-ordinated execution.  He expressed his satisfaction with the

12     results and his assurances that those results would be maintained.  For

13     example:

14             "Two years ago we were a group in Bosnia that had some rights and

15     now we are the state and what we hold is 100 per cent ours.  Foca is

16     extremely important to them but it will never be theirs again."  P1385,

17     page 110.

18             As Krajisnik also explained about Foca, speaking to people

19     gathered there, which had by that time been re-named Srbinja:

20             "Today you are not as you were before.  Now I see a true Serbian

21     town and you proudly bear your Serbian name.  You are an example to every

22     Serb."

23             Karadzic commended all his officials for carrying out the ethnic

24     separation from Muslims and Croats.

25             "It was the SDS which organised the people and created the army.

Page 47606

 1     It was an army.  Together with the police, those were the armed forces of

 2     the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they created the space,

 3     liberated it, and created the space."  P970 pages 323 through 324.

 4             Beyond these acknowledgements that local officials achieved his

 5     objectives, the extensive documentation, that is, decisions, conclusions,

 6     reports, produced by the municipalities during that time, at least those

 7     which remained available for discovery, are also incompatible with a

 8     state of anarchy, and for that you need only to review the municipality

 9     summaries to see the wealth of documentation produced.

10             Now, part of Karadzic's attempt to deny his relationship with his

11     subordinates is the claim that ARK authorities were "manifestly

12     independent."  At the central authorities a claim that is manifestly

13     false.  The ARK was run by long-time Karadzic loyalists like the

14     "obedient" Brdjanin, who obsequiously told Karadzic that he -- that

15     Karadzic had 300 per cent popularity, and was so reliant for Karadzic's

16     instructions on every trivial manner that Karadzic chastised him:  I'm

17     not your nanny.  See P2, page 61; D85; and P2549.

18             Any disputes between the ARK and the central leadership related

19     to the timing and tactics of the creation of an ethnically Serb state,

20     D277, P5619, rather than their overall shared goal as evidenced by the

21     very effective implementation of the common plan in the ARK and see our

22     brief at paragraphs 312 through 321.

23             As described at paragraphs 309 through 310 of our brief, Karadzic

24     swiftly and decisively quelled the move toward a Krajina state in

25     February of 1992.  As Defence witness Dodik stated, Karadzic:

Page 47607

 1             "Came to Banja Luka to discipline the Banja Luka organisation,

 2     and after that the organisation came under the direct control of the top

 3     leadership in Pale."

 4             T36888 through -89.

 5             In Karadzic's words in the context of imposing party policy on

 6     Prijedor:

 7             "This is a party which has its top and its bottom and nobody will

 8     fuck about under our name," P2571.

 9             Karadzic's undisputed authority is summed up by Kupresanin's

10     statement at Kukanjac in April 1992 that:

11             "We are waiting for Karadzic to return from Europe and tell us

12     what we are to do next.  Whatever he tells us we will do ...  we have our

13     commander.  It is that man.  We must obey him," P987, page 2.

14             The Prosecution brief details the functioning communications with

15     the ARK, ARK implementation of republic-level policy and decisions, and

16     the implementation of the common criminal plan in the ARK.  At 312

17     through 321 and 506 through 509, the ARK was not a state within a state.

18     And contrary to the Defence claims at paragraphs 1161 through 1165 of

19     their brief, municipal Crisis Staffs were subordinated to the ARK

20     Crisis Staff.  In Brdjanin's words:

21             "Everything in the ARK is done at Crisis Staff level."

22             The Defence points to Prijedor as an example of a municipality

23     over which the ARK purportedly had no control, but Prijedor Crisis Staff

24     implementation of republic and ARK-level decisions on mobilisation,

25     disarmament, dismissals of non-Serbs, and resettlement prove otherwise.

Page 47608

 1     See 314 through 320 of our brief.

 2             The ARK leadership worked together with republic leadership in

 3     the implementation of the common plan.  At a meeting on June 2nd, 1992,

 4     between Karadzic, Mladic, and members of the ARK civilian and military

 5     leadership, Brdjanin informed Karadzic and Mladic of "problem of the

 6     Krajina," 14.500 Muslims, and asked for a position at the highest level

 7     regarding prisoners and refugees.  P1478, pages 55 through 56.

 8             The Defence untenably claims that this request was "because too

 9     many people who participated in the war were not familiar with the

10     Geneva Conventions."  That's paragraph 1150.  Brdjanin was seeking

11     republic-level instructions, not booklets containing the law.  That is

12     made even plainer by the fact that the Defence acknowledged that the

13     14.500 Muslims were prisoners about whom Brdjanin sought a position,

14     which amounts to a Defence admission that Brdjanin lied in court when he

15     deny risibly, that this number meant the per cent of Muslims in

16     Banja Luka at the start of the war.  T43713 through -14.  The absurdity

17     of the Geneva Convention's claim lies also in the systematic flouting of

18     those conventions by the civilian and military authorities in the ARK for

19     months after this discussion.

20             Equally, the Defence contention that it is clear that Brdjanin

21     was referring to prisoners of war ignores the wealth of contemporaneous

22     documents and multiple Defence witness admissions that civilians were

23     detained en masse in the ARK, and see Prosecution brief para 194, P3720,

24     3746, 3723, KW-609, D4246 at 178 -- pages 178 through 180.  Or Stakic at

25     T45238 through -9.

Page 47609

 1             Detained en masse to the great satisfaction of ARK officials.

 2     When on the 15th of July, 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff, including Zupljanin

 3     and Brdjanin toured Prijedor's collection centres, as they called them,

 4     Brdjanin publicly praised the authorities for "a job well done."  That's

 5     P11, page 2.

 6             ARK policy on the expulsion of Muslims also reflected

 7     republic-level policy, beginning with the fact that Karadzic entrusted

 8     power in the ARK to Brdjanin, whose extremist positions were widely known

 9     and who could therefore be entrusted to implement the common purpose.  As

10     described in paragraph 319 of our brief, at a 7 June subregional meeting

11     of ARK municipalities, the common understanding that:

12             "Muslims and Croats should move out of our municipalities until a

13     level is reached where Serbian authority can be maintained, and that this

14     should be implemented on its own territory in each of the

15     municipalities."

16             This was acknowledged and a demand for the immediate

17     establishment of a pathway through, through which the Muslims and Croats

18     could expelled.  That conclusion was sent to the RS leadership and the

19     ARK Crisis Staff.  And contrary to the Defence claim that on 8 June 1992

20     the ARK Crisis Staff "rejected the subregional request for Muslims and

21     Croats to leave because this was contrary to our policy," the minutes of

22     the next subregional inter-municipality meeting record that "most of our

23     suggestions have been accepted and became part of the official position

24     of the Crisis Staff at the meeting held on 8 June 1992."  That's P6437,

25     page 2.

Page 47610

 1             And sure enough, the ARK Crisis Staff's next steps was to

 2     establish an "agency" for population resettlement with "one

 3     representative to deal with the matters of relocation and exchange of

 4     population and prisoners" from each municipality, P2606 and P2732.  When

 5     we return, Mr. President, I'll turn to the other organs.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Before we break, Mr. Tieger, you stated during this

 7     session, that's page 37, transcript page 37, line 12, I quote:

 8             "Of course the Prosecution's case is not that Karadzic desired

 9     war as an end in itself or that he would not have accepted a peaceful

10     resolution on his terms."

11             In this regard, one of the Defence arguments seems to be that the

12     fact the Serbs accepted Cutileiro Plan belies the existence of

13     overarching JCE.  I may be more accurate.

14             Defence final brief 109 reads like this:

15             "Those who accepted the Cutileiro Agreement that envisaged the

16     existence, protection, and equality of minorities and Dr. Karadzic was

17     among the leading supporters of the agreement could not and did not form

18     any joint criminal enterprise with the objective of creating an

19     ethnically pure Serb unit within BiH."

20             I wonder whether the Prosecution addressed this issue in his

21     final brief sufficiently?

22             MR. TIEGER:  I don't know what would be considered sufficient,

23     Your Honour, but let me say two quick things about that, if I may.  First

24     of all, as the Court is aware, the evidence is clear that the Cutileiro

25     Plan -- there was never an agreement on the Cutileiro Plan, merely an

Page 47611

 1     agreement in principle.  And when that agreement in principle was reached

 2     on March 18th, Karadzic said to his Assembly:  We never, never, never -

 3     and I'm quoting those words verbatim - have accepted this document as it

 4     is.  It was basically a foothold for further steps, but it didn't come

 5     anywhere near the critical question which was:  Where was there to be --

 6     where was this agreement in principle to start talking about the

 7     possibility of ethnically -- of separate areas which would not be based

 8     purely on ethnicity, but on a number of factors, where were they to be,

 9     where would that be implemented?  And on that very day Krajisnik said to

10     the Assembly:  Well, it may not be fair but let's start the ethnic

11     separation on the ground as a factual matter, irrespective of the fact

12     they told their followers there is not yet an agreement and there will

13     not be until we get what we want.  So that's a false representation in

14     the first place.

15             And, secondly, insofar as the agreement may have anticipated, as

16     the internationals of course would have demanded, provisions for

17     appropriate treatment of minorities for free movement, Karadzic made

18     clear during and after the cleansing took place how those -- such

19     provisions would be frustrated and, in fact, I'll be dealing with similar

20     claims, that is, his claims to be protecting the Muslim community or his

21     orders to purportedly do so in the context of what actually happened, the

22     massive ethnic cleansing of Muslim areas.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So is then -- it's your case -- is it your case that

24     Mr. Karadzic was not genuine when signing the Cutileiro Plan?

25             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, the Cutileiro Plan was only an

Page 47612

 1     agreement in principle.  First of all, it wasn't signed, and he says so

 2     at the March 18th, 1992, Bosnian Serb Assembly session himself.  He

 3     emphasises that.  What it was was a pretext, at that point, for the

 4     initiation of de facto separation on the ground.  So he was never --

 5     never put to the test on the Cutileiro Plan.  At the same -- by the way,

 6     you can also see at the co-ordination council meeting on January 21st,

 7     1993, what was to happen at certain points.  And that's when Jovanovic

 8     tells Karadzic:  Look, that's enough ethnic cleansing.  We're fine where

 9     we are.  There are ways to achieve homogenisation without ethnic

10     cleansing at this point.  And Karadzic happily says:  Well, Zvornik --

11     that's fine because Zvornik used to be 50.000 half and half.  Now it's

12     all ours.  And what he then talks about is putting pressure on people in

13     more subtle fashions to get them out.  In every single document aside

14     from those intended as window dressing or fig leafs for the international

15     community, where it really matters you can see Dr. Karadzic's commitment

16     to homogenisation, to ethnic separation and to not allowing the results

17     of the ethnic cleansing to be undone.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             We'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at ten to 12.00.

20                           --- Recess taken at 11.27 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 11.52 a.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24             I'd like to turn briefly to the Defence position on the Assembly

25     and the government.  Karadzic argues that the Assembly was not

Page 47613

 1     essentially a party body but very independent in its thinking and that

 2     all MPs from all parties enjoyed equal free speak.  That's at paras 900

 3     through 901 of their brief.  In fact, the Assembly was founded by the

 4     SDS.  Despite the reference to "all parties" the fact is that only six

 5     deputies were not SDS.  That's P2536, page 151.  And deference to the

 6     party president, Dr. Karadzic, was apparent in virtually every session

 7     where he was invariably the key speaker.  As a deputy once noted in the

 8     context of an anticipated regional Assembly:

 9             "I know that Karadzic as the president of the SDS is truly the

10     leading figure among the Serbian people and five of his sentences are

11     enough to change the course of the -- the entire course of the session."

12             Now, that's at D88, page 65.

13             The Assembly actually carried out its legislative powers in

14     accordance with the policy charted by the party leadership.  As a deputy

15     noted in 1994:

16             "In these two years my memory has not yet registered a case when

17     the whole Assembly of esteemed people's deputies has stood up against

18     something that our political and state leadership strictly targeted as

19     something that has to be respected."  P5525 page 25.

20             Now, Karadzic relies on Krajisnik's claims that the deputies were

21     very independent, the Bosnian Serb leadership sometimes intervened to

22     tone down extremist talk and that the Bosnian Serb leadership was unable

23     to impose their views on these independent persons.  All of these claims

24     from an already-discredited source in any event are negated by just one

25     moment in the Assembly when Krajisnik turns a random extremely thought

Page 47614

 1     into conclusive legislative action at his whim.  So at the 24th Assembly

 2     in January 1993, after a deputy mentioned that "we threw out the Turks,"

 3     this is a Serb country and the Muslim nation is not a nation at all,

 4     Krajisnik told the Assembly:

 5             "We really should take a stand concerning whether the Muslims are

 6     a nation ... we should tell them what they really are.  They are

 7     unbelievers, a nation that is not a nation ... shall we now take the

 8     Muslims out of Serbism forever?  We do not accept this artificial

 9     nation."

10             Krajisnik them put those conclusions to a vote.  The result:

11             "Gentlemen, thank you.  We adopted the conclusions unanimously."

12     P921, pages 94 through 97.  All in the space of about three minutes.

13             Krajisnik lied under oath when first asked about this in court,

14     and when confronted with this record, he then said:

15             "If I could distance myself from this Momcilo Krajisnik, I

16     would."

17             T43739 through 43751.  So much for the independent Assembly.

18             As for the government, Karadzic challenges that the Djeric,

19     Lukic, or Kozic-led governments and particularly the government's most

20     powerful ministers in 1992 were subject to the authority of Karadzic and

21     Krajisnik, para 904.  Karadzic claims that former

22     Prime Minister's Djeric's "recollection" that this was the case is faulty

23     and that he came up with this assertion many years after the fact.  Now,

24     this false claim is made by citing pieces of what Djeric said at the time

25     in relation to his resignation, but Karadzic omits what Djeric said to

Page 47615

 1     the Assembly in November 1992, that "his hands were tied," and that

 2     someone else "insists on appointments of certain ministers."  Djeric then

 3     made clear that the someone else was Karadzic and Krajisnik:

 4             "When we are dealing with the minister of justice, the minister

 5     of the interior, they are not even members of the government.  They don't

 6     attend government meetings.  They meet with the president of the republic

 7     and the chairman of the Assembly.  Not a single one of them ever appeared

 8     before the people or on TV and said they were responsible for their work

 9     and what they were doing, thereby releasing the Prime Minister of any

10     liability."

11             P1105, pages 11 through 12.  There was thus no problem with

12     Djeric's memory when he explained the same circumstances to this

13     Trial Chamber.

14             And at the same session, the Deputy Prime Minister Trbojevic

15     confirmed that Stanisic reported to Karadzic rather than Djeric.  That's

16     at page 12 of that session.  While Stanisic defiantly acknowledged the

17     view that he was Radovan's man, page 17, and proudly confirmed that "I as

18     a man" have always followed the policies of the SDS Presidency.  That's

19     at page 15.

20             Karadzic also relies on Lukic's claim that he "never had any

21     problems with Dr. Karadzic with regard to my independence or the

22     independence of the government."  That's at D3563, para 27.

23             In part, the absence of discord may be the result of Lukic's

24     views on how to handle non-Serbs, a view reflected in his advice to FRY

25     officials to ethnically cleanse and kill their Muslims as soon as

Page 47616

 1     possible because they could not be trusted.  That's at T34543

 2     through -44.

 3             In fact, Lukic knew there was no room for discord because he knew

 4     who was boss.  In 1993 when he attempted to set up a personnel

 5     commission, the SDS reminded him firmly that his task was to "implement

 6     the policy of the SDS party."  P6337.

 7             Shown a document from the SDS reflecting Karadzic's approval or

 8     instructions regarding appointments, Lukic agreed that Karadzic's role

 9     "as president of the SDS and president of Republika Srpska" was

10     "absolutely the highest level."  T38762 through -63.

11             As Djeric explained, the "party structure outweighed the rule of

12     law aspect of the state.  Ministers would be in the circle of the party

13     president.  Everything would happen there."  P4982, paragraph 14.

14             Or as Karadzic himself put it:

15             "Believe me, the government is mine.  I am responsible for its

16     functioning."  P1379, page 255.

17             Turning to non-indictment municipalities.  Karadzic denies the

18     systematic expulsion of non-Serbs because, according to him, the

19     municipalities selected by the Prosecution are not a representative

20     sample and that the policies pursued in the other municipalities more

21     accurately reflect his policy.  Now, apart from the fact that this

22     acknowledges his control of municipalities and his position in the

23     hierarchical relationship, the argument mis-characterises the evidence

24     concerning other municipalities which also revealed evidence of the

25     common purpose.  For example, Karadzic called Milincic of Srbac

Page 47617

 1     municipality to show what was the purportedly the actual tolerance --

 2     actual policy of tolerance and protection of non-Serbs.  Now, as

 3     discussed at para 189 of our brief, Srbac was a municipality more than

 4     95 per cent Serb -- actually, more than 99 per cent Serb if I recall

 5     correctly.  Even the most vehement proponents of ethnic cleansing such as

 6     Brdjanin allowed for the possibility of 3 to 5 per cent non-Serbs.  Srbac

 7     was already at that point.  As Karadzic in fact told Srbac authorities:

 8     If Srbac's 21.000 Serbs were bothered by it's 1.000 non-Serbs, "you are

 9     mere cunts," at T44947.

10             Yet, even in Srbac crimes against Muslims were not properly

11     punished, leading to more crimes against Muslims, a situation which in

12     fact Milincic misrepresented to the Krajisnik Trial Chamber when he

13     testified in that case, T44962 through to -67.

14             More importantly, although not much was needed to be done in

15     Srbac, Milincic admitted that he was aware that in the municipalities

16     around him the Muslim population was reduced through massive forced

17     expulsions, P6564, pages 120, and T44988 through -89.

18             Other indictment municipalities similarly reflected the general

19     implementation of the common purpose.

20             When Karadzic announced the strategic objectives in May 1992

21     Bosanska Krupa president, SDS president Vjestica explained that all the

22     Muslims from the right bank of the Una had been evacuated and then said:

23     Will they have a place to return to?  I think it is unlikely after our

24     president told us the happy news that the right bank of the Una is the

25     border.  T46868.  Deeper into the war, Vjestica opposed a proposed peace

Page 47618

 1     plan which he understood meant that Muslims will be returning and

 2     therefore "we will have to compensate everything we destroyed and burned

 3     and 17 mosques that we flattened."  P1379, page 25.

 4             Karadzic Defence witness Klickovic also from Krupa tried to

 5     defend his order to selectively remove Muslims from a mixed Muslim-Serb

 6     area as temporary measures for their safety.  That false attempt was

 7     exposed by his contemporaneous statement to Banja Luka TV, explaining

 8     that:

 9             "The river Una is the boarder of the Serbian state.  And the

10     arrival of the Muslim population to this area is not a possibility any

11     longer.  There is not even a possibility of co-existence and let alone us

12     living together."

13             P6665.  Klickovic admitted that this reflected his views at the

14     time.  T468-- 46876 through -77.

15             Klickovic also called in the army to "destroy as many residential

16     and other buildings as possible on the Una's left bank," that's 46872

17     through -73, in order to establish a permanent border on the Una river in

18     accordance with the strategic objectives.

19             Similarly Bozidar Vucurevic from Trebinje was called to show

20     there was no pattern of and policy of cleansing and his evidence also

21     revealed the opposite.  The Bosnian Serb police and the army were active

22     in the intimidation and violence against the Trebinje Muslims.  The

23     mosques of Trebinje were destroyed by the army and Vucurevic granted

24     terrified Muslims permission to leave on the precondition of abandoning

25     all their property rights.  As representatives of an international group

Page 47619

 1     concluded:

 2             "The exodus of Muslims from Trebinje can and should be described

 3     as ethnic cleansing."

 4             And be treated as such P6223.

 5             The Defence also called Kovacevic from Celinac, another

 6     non-indictment municipality with a negligible number of Muslims, in that

 7     case 8 per cent.  He admitted that non-Serbs posed no threat to the

 8     security of Serbs in Celinac.  T45142.  And considering that admission,

 9     that Celinac order on screen in a moment, giving Muslims a "special

10     status tells you a great deal about the policy in Republika Srpska

11     towards non-Serbs.  As you can see pursuant to this special status,

12     Celinac Muslims are forbidden to do such subversive things as lingering

13     in public places, bathing in the river, hunting, fishing or using cars,

14     P2638.

15             Finally, Karadzic asserts at paragraph 967 of his brief that

16     Predrag Radic of Banja Luka "constantly tried and did everything possible

17     to protect the non-Serb population."  What he doesn't tell you is what

18     happened to Radic for doing so.  Now, by way of backdrop Radic had seen

19     non-Serbs deported from municipalities in cattle cars and was aware that

20     they had been expelled from municipalities such as Prijedor, Kljuc, and

21     Sanski Most, murdered on a large scale during operations conducted by

22     Bosnian Serb police and army forces and detained in concentration camps.

23     That's P1, pages 75 through 76.

24             Radic also stated that any public acknowledgement of assistance

25     to non-Serbs jeopardised both one's job and physical well being.  That's

Page 47620

 1     P1, pages 94 through 95.  He gave an example of a police officer removed

 2     from his position and replaced because he was trying to minimise the

 3     evictions or expulsions of non-Serbs.  P1, page 105.

 4             Karadzic would have you believe that Radic's efforts to protect

 5     non-Serbs reflected his policies.  The precise opposite is true.  Radic

 6     testified that Karadzic blamed and criticised him for not having expelled

 7     non-Serbs as Serbs had been expelled from other territories.  P1,

 8     page 131.  In addition, Radic was criticised for allowing mosques to

 9     stand up until the point when they were destroyed in 1993 P1, page 107

10     through 108.  Radic testified that this criticism came from "the highest

11     authority all the way down to the lowest" and that while Karadzic and

12     Krajisnik were "wise enough not to say it out loud," they had their

13     "emissaries who said it all the time," including one Velibor Ostojic, the

14     Republika Srpska minister of information who was "especially persistent."

15     P1, page 111.

16             The Defence claim that the authorities did not persecute

17     non-Serbs through the destruction of their sacred sites is also false,

18     ignoring the incontrovertible evidence of the destruction in municipality

19     after municipality across the RS.  See P4068, 4069, 4070 and -71, as well

20     as the municipality summaries and scheduled incident charts.

21             As described in para 185 of the Prosecution brief, in many

22     localities mosques and churches were not only destroyed, but the ruins

23     razed, the sites levelled and desecrated and the rubble deposited in

24     garbage dumps.  This fact alone undermine the Defence assertions that the

25     destruction was a result of random acts of revenge or the use of some

Page 47621

 1     buildings for military purposes or claims that the authorities did

 2     everything in their power to protect those sites and prevent their

 3     destruction.  But the Trial Chamber need not rely on those facts and

 4     documents alone, as municipality officials gave evidence as to the

 5     reasons behind the destruction.  Radic testified that in 1992 mosques

 6     were being destroyed for the same reason that churches were being

 7     destroyed in municipalities across the Krajina:

 8             "To wipe out the existence of the peoples whose churches they

 9     were," and "to destroy the spiritual basis and they won't be coming

10     back."  That's at P1, pages 105 to 107.  Sokolac Crisis Staff president

11     Tupajic explaining why all the mosques in Sokolac had been destroyed by

12     the VRS, stated that:

13             "There is a belief among the Serbs that if there are no more

14     mosques, there are no Muslims.  And by destroying the mosques the Muslims

15     will lose a motive to return to their villages."

16             P5238, page 109.

17             Another municipality official testified that the destruction of

18     the mosques is to delete all traces of Muslim influence in this area and

19     to intimidate the remaining Muslims into leaving the area.  The ethnic

20     cleansing was the reason for the destruction of the mosques, meaning once

21     they were removed they did not want to give the Muslims any reason to

22     return.  See footnote 565 of the confidential brief.

23             Mladic's words before the Assembly in October 1993 also make this

24     intention clear.  Quote --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down, please.  Thank you.

Page 47622

 1             MR. TIEGER:  "We cannot allow leaving the mosques with two

 2     minarets there and we have to sort it out because of our children who

 3     have perished.  To teach them never to encroach our daughters, sisters,

 4     brothers, and mothers."  P1379, page 72.

 5             Contrary to Karadzic's false claim, the systematic destruction of

 6     Muslim and Croat sacred sites was an integral element of the common plan

 7     to ensure that non-Serb communities coveted by the Bosnian Serb

 8     leadership were -- were left without Muslims.  Muslims and Croats did not

 9     return.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, while we are on the issue of mosques,

11     what is the Prosecution's submission with respect to the accused's

12     suggestion that the use of mosques for military purposes in some cases

13     made them legitimate military targets?

14             MR. TIEGER:  Well, as -- thank you, Mr. President.  I tried to

15     indicate a moment ago that claim is utterly belied by the systematic

16     destruction of the mosques, by the fact that -- by the testimony of

17     witnesses who identified the underlying purpose of that destruction and

18     by the treatment of -- of the mosques after their initial destruction,

19     that is, eradicating totally any evidence of their existence.  And when

20     you put those factors together, including the wholly pervasive nature of

21     this destruction, there is only one possible conclusion.  Whether or not

22     there were individual incidents about which we have very little evidence

23     of mosques in the municipalities being used for such purposes, both the

24     systematic destruction after Muslims had left, after there was no longer

25     any threat, as I say, belies any claim that this was the consequence of

Page 47623

 1     legitimate military action.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please continue.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Let me turn to paramilitaries, Mr. President.

 4             Karadzic claims that paramilitary units from -- and this is, by

 5     the way, a question that the Court has posed and we will be responding to

 6     the Court's question in the course of the next few minutes.

 7             He claims that the paramilitary units from Serbia and elsewhere

 8     "had come" to RS and taken over towns such as Zvornik, Bijeljina, and

 9     Brcko and that local authorities were powerless to control them.  This is

10     an inversion of reality.  Paramilitaries did not mysteriously appear and

11     then overwhelm poor municipality authorities, but instead came at their

12     behest and worked collaboratively with them to achieve take-overs and

13     cleansings.  And at the time, Karadzic received reports from his

14     municipality officials reflecting that collaboration, reporting, for

15     example, that Arkan made a "significant contribution," that's P2888, page

16     4, or "enjoyed exceptional success, P1478, page 252.

17             From the republic to the local level, paramilitaries were welcome

18     to do what needed to be done, notwithstanding the risk that their

19     criminal propensities, indeed their genocidal tendencies as reflected in

20     the July 21st, 1992, Tolimir document ultimately might turn in unwanted

21     directions.  Considerable attention in the Defence brief is devoted to

22     Arkan, who the Defence would have you believe was law-abiding ethnically

23     blind and who had little or nothing to do with Karadzic.  But the

24     evidence reveals a different Arkan.  Before arriving in Bosnia, Arkan was

25     known as a leader of a particularly vicious paramilitary group that had

Page 47624

 1     been active in Croatia.  He was subordinated to the Serbian MUP, and you

 2     can look at our final brief at paragraph 463.  And throughout 1991 and as

 3     Bosnia moved closer to independence, Karadzic collaborated with Milosevic

 4     and Jovica Stanic who led the parallel structure including paramilitaries

 5     in Croatia.  That's at paragraphs 103 through 104 of our brief.

 6             So unsurprisingly Arkan did not appear unilaterally in

 7     Eastern Bosnia at the beginning of April; it was authorised in Belgrade.

 8     You heard that from Seselj.  But even at the time everyone knew it.

 9     Vance confronted Milosevic about it immediately and Milosevic initially

10     claimed that Arkan was "privately in Bijeljina," only to back down in the

11     face of Vance's challenge and admit:  "Only at the beginning ..." T1513

12     through -14.

13             Karadzic similarly tried to distance himself from Arkan, and he

14     denied to Vance that he had ever seen Arkan, that's P780, page 38, a

15     claim which was contradicted by reports from Serbian state security

16     services of Arkan and Karadzic gambling together in Belgrade in March of

17     1992.  That's T33610 through -12 and 618 through 619.  And he claimed

18     that somebody invited Arkan after a problem in a cafe.  And yet, that

19     same day that he was denying all this, a MUP, that's April 16th, an RS

20     MUP representative spoke to Arkan over the phone, during which Arkan

21     explained that he had left Zvornik in the control of the Bosnian Serbs,

22     the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff, had spoken to Mico Stanisic and had all

23     the Pale phone numbers, P1109, pages 3 through 6 and 8.

24             Once Arkan was in Bosnia, he went from municipality to

25     municipality at the invitation of both local leaders and the Bosnian Serb

Page 47625

 1     leadership.  Recall, for example, Plavsic's request by phone that Arkan

 2     come to Sarajevo, P1106; and Karadzic's acknowledgement to Davidovic that

 3     the Bosnian Serb leadership had arranged for him to come, Prosecution

 4     trial brief -- final brief 467.

 5             Arkan remained at Karadzic's disposal, as reflected in his letter

 6     of April 16th, 1994, P2854 and it's not 1992, as erroneously indicated in

 7     para 11 of the Bratunac summary.  He was summoned by Karadzic in 1995 and

 8     ultimately honoured by Karadzic for his achievements.  That's at

 9     paragraph 474.  The Defence claims at para s 1085 of their brief that

10     there is no evidence that Karadzic knew of any crimes by Arkan before

11     that award ceremony, but that is simply untrue.  For example, Mladic told

12     Karadzic that Arkan had liquidated loyal Muslims.  And that's at P3056,

13     page 2.

14             The Defence also points to Karadzic's handling of the

15     Yellow Wasps as a reflection of his opposition to paramilitaries and the

16     Defence would have the Trial Chamber believe that the Yellow Wasps were

17     not arrested until August 1992, after the commission of horrific crimes,

18     because the MUP did not have the capacity to deal with them.  That's in

19     their brief at 1090.

20             This claim is deceitful in at least two respects.  First, it

21     attempts to ignore the team-work that existed between Karadzic's

22     officials and the Yellow Wasps until their particular brand of violence

23     was no longer needed.  Contrary to the Defence contention and is detailed

24     in paragraphs 16 through 19 of the Zvornik summary, paramilitaries were

25     part of the military and civilian structure in Zvornik.  From the very

Page 47626

 1     beginning the Yellow Wasps were treated as a TO unit.  They received TO

 2     salaries and logistical support from the authorities, unit members

 3     reported to the Crisis Staff on a daily basis.  The TO commander had a

 4     close relationship with Yellow Wasps' commander Zuco.  And both of them

 5     had offices where the Crisis Staff was headquartered.  Then the

 6     Yellow Wasps were incorporated into the VRS, armed, tasked, and paid by

 7     the Zvornik Brigade.  Subotic confirmed that all those who received

 8     orders from the Zvornik Brigade, including Zuco's unit were part of the

 9     regular VRS.  He also acknowledged that Zuco visited him in Pale in the

10     second half of July, that's D3695, para 205, visited him long after the

11     Bosnian Serb leadership was first informed of Zvornik crimes and after

12     the point where Karadzic himself was aware of the Yellow Wasps'

13     predations, P6414, 7 through 8; and P1478, page 270.

14             Second, although Karadzic claims credit for arresting the

15     Yellow Wasps, he ignores the fact that it was not their participation in

16     the thorough cleansing of the municipality that triggered the action

17     against them, but instead their "overstepping the limit" with Ostojic, as

18     discussed in the final brief at paragraph 478.

19             As the 8 August 1992 charging document against the Yellow Wasps

20     including unit commander Zuco outlines, they had "participated in the

21     liberation of Zvornik municipality" and "all took part in the defence of

22     the Serbian land in the broader area of Zvornik."  It then says that the

23     fighting lasted until 28 June 1992, following which "they did not place

24     themselves under a joint military command of the Serbian armed forces of

25     the SRBiH but instead established a check-point in the village of

Page 47627

 1     Karakaj, Zvornik municipality, on their own initiative, P2882.  In short,

 2     having successfully completed their cleansing tasks, they began to

 3     attract negative attention for their activities at the checkpoint

 4     triggering the charges.  And you can see a more elaborate discussion at

 5     para 39 of the Zvornik summary.

 6             The Defence also ignores the fact that the punishment of the

 7     paramilitaries was wholly inadequate, including totally failing to punish

 8     Zuco for his crimes against Muslims and incorporating many paramilitaries

 9     into the VRS as described in paragraph 478 of our brief and para 39 of

10     the Zvornik summary.

11             Let me turn to the formal military body of the Republika Srpska,

12     the VRS.  After insisting at the time to his followers and to the world

13     that he was the supreme commander and in charge of the army and after

14     exhibiting little reticence at invoking his command authority in various

15     contexts.  For example, I'll quote, "I'll teach everyone who fucks around

16     a fucking lesson," P5792.  Karadzic now takes refuge as depicting himself

17     as an impotent, bumbling, ineffectual empty suit to the extent of calling

18     a witness to say he couldn't even control his own wife.  That's T42454.

19     This false claim is grounded on four basic false premises:  First, that

20     the strategic objectives were purely political and were not intended to

21     be implemented militarily; second, that Karadzic did not direct the VRS

22     through directives; third, that he was never informed of what the army

23     was doing because they only spoke to him about logistics; and, four, that

24     he had no control over General Mladic who operated independently of

25     Karadzic.

Page 47628

 1             First, the claim that the strategic objectives were not military

 2     tasks of the army.  Everybody knew that that was not true.  Karadzic,

 3     Krajisnik, Mladic, Milovanovic, the members of the Assembly, everyone.

 4     As detailed in paragraph 152 of the Prosecution final brief, the

 5     strategic objectives were formulated in the period immediately preceding

 6     the creation of the VRS and Mladic's appointment.  In the week before

 7     Mladic's formal appointment, Karadzic and Krajisnik met with him twice

 8     and explicitly outlined the strategic objectives on both occasions.  When

 9     Mladic accepted his position at the 16th Assembly, he discussed his

10     participation in formulating the goals.  That's P956, page 32.  Hardly

11     his role or indeed even possible if they were, as Krajisnik claimed,

12     merely the articulation of the Cutileiro stance.  That's T43769

13     through -70.

14             Mladic later explicitly confirmed to the Assembly that:

15             "The tasks of the army in this war stem from the known six

16     strategic objectives adopted by our Assembly P970, page 22.

17             Members of the Assembly knew.  At the 17th Session, Kupresanin

18     said, that's D92, page 70 through 71:

19             "At the last session in Banja Luka, we said that the northern

20     border of the Serb republic of BiH was the right bank of the Sava River.

21     We ordered the army to realise that goal."

22             Or just look at the VRS combat-readiness report which stated,

23     that's D325 page 159:

24             "The strategic objectives of our war which were promptly defined

25     and set before the Main Staff of the Army of RS, the commands and units,

Page 47629

 1     served as a general guide-line upon which we planned the actual

 2     operations and concerted battles."

 3             And then it goes on to indicate that Karadzic also orally

 4     assigned a number of tasks of "general and vital significance."

 5             Karadzic cites Milovanovic for the proposition that they were not

 6     military tasks because Milovanovic spoke about the broader ambition of

 7     protecting the Serbs from genocide.  But Milovanovic explicitly confirmed

 8     that the six strategic objectives were the VRS's military objectives,

 9     that's at D825, page 13, referring to the strategic military objectives

10     emerging from the 12th May, 1992, session, and at D2149 at page 27,

11     referring to the achievement of five of the six military objectives with

12     just access to the sea remaining clearly identifying the strategic

13     objectives adopted at the 16th Session.

14             And further, as we'll see in a moment, Mladic was repeatedly

15     reminded by Krajisnik and Karadzic about the strategic objectives as they

16     discussed upcoming operations.  So let me turn to the directives.

17             Karadzic claims that they were only "a general form of command

18     communications."  And he suggests he had little to do with them because

19     the ones he created and signed were short and dealt with humanitarian

20     matters.  In any event, he claims, there was nothing wrong or illegal

21     about any of them.  The reality, as the evidence clearly demonstrates, is

22     that the directives reveal not only the common purpose to forcibly remove

23     non-Serbs, but Karadzic's hands-on and effective control of the army he

24     was one proud to call his.  First, a quick reminder.  As we discussed at

25     paragraph 405 of our brief, directives were the main documents used to

Page 47630

 1     regulate the use of forces.  Seven fundamental directives for VRS

 2     military operations were issued from June 1992 to March 1995.  In 1995,

 3     Karadzic acknowledged his responsibility for those directives, saying

 4     that he had "examined, approved, and signed seven directives," but

 5     distancing himself from the eighth.

 6             The Defence tries to run from this acknowledgement because

 7     Karadzic, who only signed two, gilded the lily, but Karadzic's oversight

 8     and approval of the directives was explicitly confirmed by Mladic at a

 9     non-public meeting of the Supreme Command.  Mladic stated:

10             "We gave you the greatest state secrets for verification.  Every

11     directive went through here for examination.  We did every analysis in

12     your presence."

13             P3149 at page 24.  As dispositive as that is of Karadzic's false

14     claim, let's take a more detailed look of Karadzic's awareness of and

15     role in the directives which also expose as false his claims that the

16     army only spoke to him about logistics or that he had no control over

17     Mladic.

18             Paragraphs 408 through 428 of the Prosecution brief contain a

19     detailed account of how the directives implemented the strategic

20     objectives and other strategic or tactical steps at Karadzic's behest.

21     So I'll focus on them briefly here, following which I will answer

22     Your Honours' question in relation to directives 4 and 7, at least the

23     first part of that question.

24             Directive 1, which is covered in the Prosecution brief at 406

25     through 409.  On the 1st of June, 1992, the VRS Main Staff ordered,

Page 47631

 1     pursuant to an RS Presidency decision, a meeting of the RS political

 2     leadership and of military commanders to be held in Pale on the

 3     3rd of June, 1992.  Corps commanders were to prepare a map showing troop

 4     dispositions, the situation of the units, the composition, manpower,

 5     disposition, and probable intentions of the army, proposals for future

 6     activities, and any problems and requests.  Each commander was to brief

 7     for 10 to 15 minutes.  Two days later Mladic met with Karadzic and the

 8     Bosnian Serb leadership.  Karadzic focused on "the issue of our objective

 9     in Sarajevo" and told Mladic that "Sarajevo has to be resolved

10     politically while acting quietly inch by inch.  "Ocistiti," that is

11     cleanse or mop-up, "Butmir, Hrasnica, Dobrinja, and Sokolovic Kolonija

12     and in the town of Hrasno in the direction of Mojmilo hill."

13             The next day, Karadzic and Krajisnik again met with Mladic.

14     Karadzic reiterated the strategic objectives and stated that:

15             "The birth of a state and the creation of borders does not occur

16     without war."

17             Krajisnik then told Mladic:

18             "As of tomorrow, we have to conquer what is ours and be prepared

19     to defend our state."

20             Directive 1 was issued that same day, and in conformity with

21     Karadzic's emphasis it incorporated operational goals arising from the

22     strategic objectives, secure parts of Sarajevo, open the corridor between

23     the Bosnian Krajina and Semberija, objective 2.  Open

24     Sarajevo-Trnovo-Kalinovik communication line, objectives 4 and 5.  And

25     directive 1 incorporated virtually verbatim Karadzic's instructions

Page 47632

 1     calling on the SRK to "ocistiti," cleanse or mop-up, Dobrinja, Butmir,

 2     Sokolovic Kolonija, Mojmilo, and Zlatiste.

 3             Directive 3 was issued on the 3rd of August, 1992.  The day

 4     before that, Mladic briefed the Presidency describing the situation in

 5     each combat sector and the necessary tasks.  Karadzic demanded that the

 6     VRS "snatch" as much territory as possible before the next peace

 7     conference which was to be on August 24th so that he would have something

 8     to "offer."  He told Mladic "the European community will accept the

 9     factual state of affairs" so no military concessions.

10             And again, consistent with Karadzic's explicit instructions,

11     directive 3 provided that:

12             "Before the conference on BH, reach the left bank of the Neretva

13     river, the right bank of the Sava River, and the outlying territories of

14     Serbian territories, capture Jajce and Gorazde, take over dominant

15     features, and secure the best position possible for the negotiations over

16     demarkation lines with the Croatian-Muslim coalition.  The operation

17     shall be conducted in two phases lasting between 10 and 15 days."

18             Thus satisfying the 24 August dead-line.  And on

19     August 4th, 1992, Mladic once again met with the Presidency, at which

20     meeting "the directive was accepted without objections."

21             Directive 4, which is discussed at paragraphs 414 through 419 of

22     the Prosecution's brief.  Directive 4 which is dated 19 November 1992

23     ordered the Drina Corps to exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest

24     possible losses on them, and force them to leave the Birac, Zepa, and

25     Gorazde areas with the Muslim population.  Karadzic claims that this

Page 47633

 1     directive did not have the aim of forcing the Muslim population out of

 2     Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica or Gorazde, but was instead aimed at forcing out

 3     the ABiH in order to protect the Serb population.  Even Krajisnik

 4     acknowledged in his own case that directive 4 was "absolutely" an "order

 5     for ethnic cleansing."  Testifying in front of you, he attempted to

 6     defend that by first falsely stating that the Prosecution had put words

 7     in his mouth.  Instead, it turned out he had volunteered the term "ethnic

 8     cleansing" after simply being shown directive 4.  And when the

 9     Presiding Judge then asked him if he considered this to be an order for

10     ethnic cleansing said "absolutely."

11             Krajisnik then attempted to suggest to you - and now Karadzic

12     tries to suggest the same - that he was just a layman with no involvement

13     in military matter and therefore his opinion in this matter should be

14     disregarded.  But as we will see in a moment, there was nobody in a

15     better position to know that this was an order for ethnic cleansing than

16     Krajisnik because it was Krajisnik at a pre-directive 4 meeting who

17     articulated on behalf of the Bosnian Serb leadership the imperative to

18     cleanse the Drina.

19             On November 8th, 1992, there was a meeting at which corps

20     commanders, including the commander of the recently formed Drina Corps,

21     Zivanovic, gave operational and situational reports.  Following those

22     reports, the meeting turned to "assignments for future actions."

23     Karadzic noted that "maybe it would be good if we solved the issue of the

24     Drina."  Krajisnik was more detailed.  He expressed admiration for VRS

25     success to date because it's "very dangerous to seize their territory."

Page 47634

 1     But he also had some criticism.  There had been, according to him, a

 2     "disproportionate engagement of the army in relation to strategic

 3     objectives."  They had achieved 3 but had not yet achieved 3 others

 4     including the Podrinje, that is strategic objective number 3.  Therefore,

 5     Krajisnik said:

 6             "The most important objective is the task assigned to Zivanovic,

 7     the ciscenje of the Drina."

 8             Two days later Milovanovic told Karadzic that he would soon

 9     receive objective 4 which, among other things, regulated the activities

10     of the newly formed Drina Corps.  In the following days, Karadzic offered

11     suggestions and verbally approved the directive which was issued on 19

12     November.  But given its importance, Karadzic also called for a seminar

13     with the Drina Corps to be held on the 23rd of November, 1992, at the

14     corps command.  It was to be led personally by him.  At that seminar,

15     Karadzic gave the opening speech, followed by corps commander Zivanovic

16     to speak on the "situation, results, further tasks, and capabilities of

17     the Drina Corps."

18             Karadzic's notes on Zivanovic's report read:

19             "Tasks:  Vitinica, Sapna, Teocak, Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica,

20     Gorazde."

21             The following day, Zivanovic issued his Drina Corps command order

22     "pursuant to directive 4" and "an assessment of the situation."  It

23     reaffirmed the supreme commander's order to force out the Muslim civilian

24     population and the VRS's commitment to implementing his strategy.

25     Zivanovic's order provided that the corps was to "inflict on the enemy

Page 47635

 1     the highest possible losses, exhaust them, break them up or force them to

 2     surrender, and force the Muslim local population to abandon the area of

 3     Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde."

 4             And that is precisely what happened.  As General Morillon's

 5     assistant explained, Muslims were cleansed from village to village in the

 6     Srebrenica enclave like "a broom sweeping dust in front of it," T23201.

 7     The VRS only stopped at Srebrenica in reaction to determined pressure by

 8     the international community, a community appalled by "the desperate

 9     situation in Srebrenica" caused by "the ethnic cleansing" campaign,

10     P2284, paras 37 through 38.

11             Remarkably, Karadzic now argues that his order to the VRS to stop

12     and not enter Srebrenica and his orders to facilitate the passage of

13     humanitarian convoys, D43 of April 16th, 1993, negates the Prosecution's

14     allegation of an attack on the civilian population.  In other words,

15     since the ethnic cleansing he ordered caused such worldwide revulsion,

16     condemnation, and threats of intervention that he was forced to stop, he

17     must never have had the intent in the first place.  That is pure

18     nonsense.  The reality is that immediately before his 16 April order, the

19     VRS was planning to cleanse Srebrenica.  The same day that the UN

20     resolution was issued, a conversation between Mladic and the Drina Corps

21     colonel revealed what was to happen when the VRS entered Srebrenica.

22     Everyone was to be killed, civilians and the wounded were to be removed.

23     P4795.

24             Karadzic's order to cease operations and allow convoys into the

25     town was not driven by humanitarian motives, but forced by circumstances,

Page 47636

 1     and he essentially acknowledged that to the Assembly in July 1993, P1377,

 2     page 31.  So for more details please see the Podrinje summary in

 3     appendix A at paras 7 through 9.

 4             Karadzic also relies on an intercepted conversation between

 5     himself and Lukic in March 1993, in which Karadzic claims he was

 6     expressing his view that Muslims civilians could stay where they are or

 7     go where they want.  That's D3571, pages 2 through 5.  Now, first, giving

 8     its timing the conversation hardly speaks to the attention underlying

 9     directive 4 when it was issued, but more importantly the limited portion

10     of the conversation cited is taken out of context and is misleading.

11     This conversation relates to international coverage of the Bosnian Serbs'

12     activities.  Karadzic is explaining the statement he told Mladic to

13     issue:

14             "Yes, yes, I told Mladic to issue a statement tomorrow and that

15     all Muslim civilians may stay where they are or go where they want, but

16     armed groups must put down their weapons."

17             This proposed statement was nothing more than a fig leaf for the

18     cleansing campaign that had drawn unfavourable attention from the

19     international community.  And it didn't fool the international community

20     which explicitly recognised that Karadzic and his forces were engaged in

21     an ethnic cleansing campaign.  That's D3571.  Yet Karadzic now wants to

22     try it out again with you.

23             The Defence also relies on contradictory interpretations offered

24     by two of Karadzic's officers in his attempt to run from the unmistakably

25     criminal order he approved.  On the one hand he relies on Milovanovic's

Page 47637

 1     testimony, that directive 4 anticipated that the civilian population

 2     would be fleeing ahead of the army and was therefore aimed at forcing the

 3     ABiH to go with them.  But at the same time, Karadzic relies on

 4     Zivanovic's testimony to the contrary, that directive 4 was indeed about

 5     forcing Muslims out, Muslim civilians out, but that it meant Muslims who

 6     "had unlawfully occupied the Serbian villages and farms."  That's D3932

 7     paragraph 15, and also T42596.

 8             Apart from the false cover afforded by contradictory

 9     interpretations, it is noteworthy that they both nevertheless envision

10     the disappearance of the Muslim population from the targeted areas.

11             Directive 5 was dated 25 June 1993 and it detailed operation

12     Lukavac 93.  A month earlier Karadzic had called Milovanovic to Pale,

13     where Milovanovic explained to Karadzic and Krajisnik the VRS Main Staff

14     plan for Lukavac 93 which was intended to connect Serbian Herzegovina

15     with other RS territories.  Planning for that operation was completed in

16     June.  Directive 6, as discussed in paras 421 through 25 of our brief,

17     directive 6 and the addition to directive 6 also reflects specific

18     instructions given by Karadzic as well as more broadly the military

19     implementation of his strategic objectives.

20             Directive 7, as I described a few moments ago, in April 1993

21     Karadzic was forced by international pressure to order an end to

22     operations against Srebrenica.  And while this initial wave of attacks

23     was halted, from 1993 to 1995 the VRS, under Karadzic's command,

24     restricted aid to Srebrenica and other eastern enclaves, resulting in

25     dire humanitarian conditions.  As explained and described at paras 176

Page 47638

 1     through 178 of our brief, during this period the Bosnian Serb

 2     leadership's desire to rid the Drina, including the eastern enclaves of

 3     the remaining Muslim and Croat areas, continued unabated.  In April 1994

 4     Bosnian Serb forces attacked Gorazde with Mladic ordering subordinate

 5     units to "keep pushing energetically forward -- energetically onwards.

 6     The Turks must disappear from these areas."

 7             Although this attack was also halted following international

 8     intervention, Karadzic praised the operation at "successfully and

 9     brilliantly implemented."  Noting that more had been taken than even

10     planned.  In July 1994, Mladic told his subordinates that "we are on our

11     way to ocistimo," cleansing or mopping-up, "the enclaves."  Ordering in

12     relation to Srebrenica that "the enclave is to not survive but to

13     disappear."

14             He was frustrated that the "Turks" in the Podrinje had been

15     protected by UN intervention.  And he stated in August 1994:

16             "In Podrinje we thrashed the Turks.  If the Americans and the

17     English, the Ukrainians and the Canadians in Srebrenica, in the meantime

18     it's the Dutch, would not protect them, they would have disappeared from

19     this area long ago."

20             The efforts to render the Drina in Karadzic's words "clean,"

21     that's at P988, page 68, culminated in Karadzic's March 1995 directive 7.

22     This is another patently criminal order.  It provides in pertinent part:

23             "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an

24     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

25     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

Page 47639

 1             It further provides at e-court page 14, the previous was e-court

 2     page 10:

 3             "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with

 4     UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and

 5     unobtrusively issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support

 6     of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the

 7     Muslim population making them dependent on our goodwill while at the same

 8     time avoiding condemnation by the international community and

 9     international public opinion."

10             This document was signed by Karadzic.  After calling witnesses

11     during the course of trial to suggest that he either didn't sign or that

12     it had been mysteriously altered afterward, he now argues instead that he

13     didn't read the criminal part.  He argues that that criminal part was

14     "buried in the list of tasks for one of the six corps of the VRS" in the

15     "24-page" document and list of tasks.  You'll find that at paras 3309,

16     -10, and 3314 of his brief.

17             Now, for argument's sake, let's just set aside for the moment the

18     fact that the document is not 24 pages but 11 pages.  And let's also set

19     aside the fact that the language about eliminating 40.000 people is

20     hardly "buried" in the document, but is the very first task assigned to

21     the Drina Corps and is smack in the middle of the page.  Unless Karadzic

22     had no plans for the Drina Corps, that is, no plans for Srebrenica, it

23     would be essentially impossible to miss.  But he did have plans for

24     Srebrenica, as he was quick to brag about later.

25             "The time had come," he said, "and I put my mark on directive

Page 47640

 1     number 7 to capture Teocak, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde.  The directive

 2     was signed and we embarked on it ... I was in favour of all the decisions

 3     that we made and I support them.  All the decisions are recorded in the

 4     Supreme Command, I ordered in verbal and written form to push ahead to

 5     Zepa and Srebrenica ..."  That's P412, page 75.

 6             If I can just conclude this, Mr. President, and then we'll break.

 7             If he didn't read the Drina Corps tasks, if he somehow missed

 8     that very first task to the Drina Corps, then what on earth was he

 9     bragging about to Bob Djordjevic when he told him that the attacks on

10     Srebrenica and Zepa were part of "my order number 7," P4512, page 12,

11     because he wasn't telling Djordjevic the attacks reflected his order to

12     consolidate the bridge heads on Krupa, that's page 8 of the order, and he

13     wasn't telling him to prevent the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo,

14     that's at page 11 of the order.  It's crystal clear that Karadzic was

15     talking precisely about his order to the Drina Corps.

16             And in light of the time, Mr. President, I'll stop now and we'll

17     continue with directive 7 when we return.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  We'll have a break for

19     an hour and resume at ten to 2.00.

20                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.51 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 1.51 p.m.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24             Just before we adjourned, I had spoken of how Dr. Karadzic

25     referred to "my order number 7" in circumstances that debunked his claim

Page 47641

 1     that he was not aware of what the Drina Corps had been ordered to do, as

 2     reflected in the directive.  In addition, Karadzic explained to

 3     Djordjevic that the objective of "my directive number 7" had been to

 4     "raise the temperature to the boiling point," that's T25907 through -08,

 5     a neat if macabre description of what that portion of directive 7 was

 6     designed to do:  Make life unbearable.

 7             Karadzic also claims that directive 7 did not restrict

 8     humanitarian aid to non-Serbs.  If the non-Serb population did not

 9     receive the aid, it was because the Muslim army misappropriated it.  This

10     false claim that directive 7 was never applied in practice relies upon a

11     limited number of documents cited in footnote 2783 of his brief.  They

12     provide little support for the assertion.  In a number of instances the

13     cited documents themselves make reference to restrictions.  For example,

14     D2125 or 2115 and in some instances are not related to convoys at all.

15     The reality is that, as was plainly apparent to everyone, the enclave was

16     being strangled and starved.  Harland observed that directive 7's goal to

17     strangle the enclaves was "completely consistent with what we viewed,"

18     T2202 through -03.  Similarly, General Smith referring to directive 7 in

19     the paragraph describing the method of squeezing the enclave, explained

20     that it is what UNPROFOR saw in March and April T11320 through -21.  As

21     Franken said, it was, "Convoy terror."  P4175, paragraph 26.

22             As for ABiH misappropriation, the two documents Karadzic relies

23     upon, D3313 and D3956, are about the period before directive 7 and

24     therefore add little to the understanding of the post-directive 7

25     squeeze.  The documents he cites which are relevant to that time-frame

Page 47642

 1     confirm little more than that food delivered to the enclaves through

 2     convoys was also eaten by soldiers, which in a town under siege is the

 3     only option, a fact reflected in D3308.  Further, the quantities listed

 4     in the documents are relatively modest, for example, 18 tonnes out of 300

 5     tonnes of flour, 70 litres of fuel, and in any event not of a scale that

 6     could have been the decisive factor for the suffering of the Muslim

 7     population.  The reality instead is reflected in P4142, which describes

 8     the horrendous situation in Srebrenica at the beginning of July 1995 with

 9     less than 25 per cent of the enclave's needs being met due to the

10     "persistent refusal by the VRS" or by the BSA" to allow convoys into the

11     enclave.

12             Your Honours, you've asked how directives 4 and 7 relate to the

13     overarching JCE.  I'll answer the first part of that question divided

14     into two parts.  The answer to that question how they relate to the

15     overarching JCE can be found in the first footnote to the Podrinje

16     summary in annex A of the Prosecution's brief, which indicates that the

17     events described include persecution and deportation or forced transfer,

18     as set out in paragraphs 52, 56 through 57, 69, and 72 through 74 of the

19     indictment.  Now, those paragraphs of the indictment reflect precisely

20     the events that I've just related, alleging that, first, the overarching

21     JCE resulted in take-overs in the municipalities in 1992, but that

22     Srebrenica was not taken over until 1995, that's paragraph 52; that

23     although most of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats from the municipalities

24     had been forcibly displaced by the end of 1992, acts of forcible

25     displacement continued with the attacks on Cerska and Konjevic Polje

Page 47643

 1     between January and March 1993, just talked about that, that's at

 2     paragraph 72; that as a result of the cleansing many Bosnian Muslims fled

 3     to Srebrenica which was declared a safe area, paragraph 73; and that

 4     beginning in March 1995 in the continuing pursuit of the common purpose,

 5     a plan was devised to take the enclave and forcibly transport or deport

 6     Bosnian Muslim population.  That's at paragraph 74.

 7             I'd like to move now to a related topic to the VRS, closely

 8     related topic, and that's the discussion about --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  You will be dealing with the second question with

10     respect to that question.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Ms. Pack will deal with that.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The interplay will be dealt with separately?

13             MR. TIEGER:  That's correct, Mr. President.

14             So as explained in the Prosecution pre-trial brief, Karadzic

15     attempted during the course of this case to distance himself from VRS

16     crimes by falsely asserting a dramatic schism between himself and Mladic.

17     Contrary to the evidence reflected both in public statements and in

18     private statements that Mladic, despite tensions, remained committed to

19     the chain of command.  Karadzic distances himself from the VRS

20     achievements from which he proudly took credit by claiming, A, there was

21     no mutual agreement between himself and Mladic on anything, and therefore

22     no JCE; and B, he had no control over Mladic.

23             With respect to the first claim, although Karadzic and Mladic may

24     have disagreed about various issues including operational issues and

25     including Mladic's view that Karadzic's cronies were corrupt, you'll find

Page 47644

 1     that in P1487, P136, P1489, page 79; and P1473, page 47; there was

 2     unmistakably one thing on which they clearly agreed:  The risk posed by

 3     too many Muslims and the need to reduce their number within the territory

 4     of RS.  In support of his corollary claim that he had no control over

 5     Mladic, the Defence brief cites the witnesses whose evidence contains

 6     sweeping generalisations are demonstratively biased or whose evidence

 7     actually demonstrates the contrary.  For example, Krajisnik who, as I

 8     mentioned before, is cited for so many propositions of the brief is cited

 9     in support of the claim that Mladic only provided information about

10     logistical problems and resisted control.  This is another brazen

11     falsehood, as plainly revealed by the record of the meetings I've related

12     preceding the directives.  Instead, Karadzic and Krajisnik told the army

13     what to do and they did it.

14             Subotic is cited as someone who testified about a "vast number of

15     examples of military disobedience."  Now, whether accurate or not,

16     Subotic's examples do not relate to military operations and certainly not

17     to cleansing operations, but to various organisational issues.  To the

18     contrary, when asked by the Presiding Judge in the Krajisnik case to

19     identify any operation in which Mladic went beyond what the political

20     leadership wanted him to do, Subotic was unable to name one.  That's

21     T40047.

22             Mandic is cited, but is also unable to identify any military

23     operations in which Mladic exceeded his authority, which is unsurprising

24     in view of Mandic's acknowledgement that he had no familiarity with

25     military reporting, that's C2 pages 682 through -83.

Page 47645

 1             Ninkovic's alleged claim that Mladic annulled an order based on a

 2     decision of the supreme commander, paragraph 1259, is another

 3     misrepresentation.  It turns out that this was a marginal issue that

 4     Mladic did not annul but Ninkovic himself changed after discussion with

 5     Mladic.  That's D3733, paragraphs 39 through 40.

 6             The Defence also relies on the claim that Milosevic called

 7     Karadzic that "crazy doctor" or that "lunatic from Pale," and told Mladic

 8     that the VRS Main Staff should follow decisions made in Belgrade, not

 9     Pale, which Mladic allegedly accepted.  This is yet another

10     misrepresentation.  Milosevic did claim that Karadzic was a lunatic

11     caught up in epic historical fantasies who was trying to take and keep

12     territory that had never belonged to Serbs in contrast to the more

13     limited territory that Milosevic had willingly helped him grab.  And for

14     that, see P1473, pages 130 through 131 and P2604.  But when Milosevic

15     tried to get Mladic to oppose Karadzic, Mladic demurred, pointing out

16     that attempts to divide the Serbs in Bosnia and to Karadzic's men and

17     Mladic's men, if not stopped, could lead to further divisions.  Mladic

18     emphasised that he had no political ambitions, wished to serve the people

19     as a soldier, and should be perceived solely in that light.  P2567,

20     page 2.

21             Finally, and even more astonishingly, Karadzic cites Milovanovic

22     in support of a much repeated claim that the structure of the Main Staff

23     meant that the supreme commander was not really in control of the army.

24     In fact, Karadzic put that very issue to Milovanovic, who told him it was

25     wrong:

Page 47646

 1             "Command and control of the army during the war was not

 2     two-headed, as it were.  We remained under your personal command,"

 3     T25362.  As Milovanovic made clear at another point:

 4             "War is too serious for generals to be in charge of it.  Politics

 5     has to get involved, the politicians carry out wars," T25494.

 6             Now, the Defence brief also covers exchange commissions, which

 7     the Prosecution brief outlines in paragraphs 243 through 251 and 522

 8     through -24, which discusses among other things the origins and functions

 9     of the exchange commission which had already been contemplated in April

10     to deal with a large number of Serbs already incarcerated and was aimed

11     at civilians, as both Mandic and Subotic admitted.  That commission aimed

12     at civilians was functioning within a week of its formal establishment on

13     8 May 1992, as reflected in the expulsion of 400 Muslim civilians from

14     Bratunac to Muslim territory via Pale, and continued to function as a

15     mechanism for the expulsion of civilians throughout the indictment

16     period.  Karadzic claims that "the exchange commission did not serve as a

17     vehicle for the removal of non-Serbs since it clearly prohibited

18     exchanges of Muslims."  And that Muslim civilians were unconditionally

19     released.  That's at paras 1026 and 1034 of his brief.  The former

20     assertion is based upon a portion of the 6 June 1992 order by the

21     president of the exchange commission, which provides that women,

22     children, elderly, and helpless persons "should be released immediately

23     without conditions or exchange."

24             Now, recognising the obvious problem with this limited

25     formulation, the Defence brief asserts, without any support, that the

Page 47647

 1     fact that the men were not mentioned does not mean that male civilians

 2     were supposed to remain in custody, but according to the then-Minister of

 3     Justice Mandic, that is precisely what it means, that is, that the

 4     express provisions for releasing civilian women, children, and elderly do

 5     not apply to men.  And for that see C2, pages 159 through 160.

 6             Further, as we explained at paragraph 248 of our brief, even the

 7     order to immediately release women, children, and elderly was not

 8     intended to be implemented in light of the contradictory language in the

 9     order itself as well as the fact that thousands of women, children, and

10     elderly continued to be expelled under the auspices of the exchange

11     commission.  Indeed, it was the imprisonment and exchange of prisoners

12     such as teenage girls and elderly men that prompted Defence witness and

13     Kula prison warder Skiljevic to complain to the minister of justice that

14     this process was being applied to civilians, T3691 through -92.

15             The latter assertion made by Karadzic in connection with the

16     exchange commission that Muslim civilians were unconditionally released

17     is based upon two items.  The first is a single exchange in June 1992

18     involving 17 Muslims and a larger number of Serbs.  That item reflects

19     nothing more than a single exchange in contrast to a comprehensive

20     programme of release and in any event appears to reflect an admission

21     that these were civilians who were detained.  And the second basis for

22     the claim that Muslim civilians were unconditionally released is the

23     testimony of Defence witness Slobodan Avlijas, but a more accurate view

24     of the Bosnian Serb's leadership position toward civilian detention and

25     expulsion can be gleaned from Avlijas' consistent disregard of the status

Page 47648

 1     of the prisoners.

 2             When Avlijas, who was according to Mandic the minister of justice

 3     member in charge of exchange at C2, page 160, when he went to Vogosca and

 4     Ilijas in July 1992 because of pressure from the international community,

 5     he found a "truly horrific" situation in Vogosca and a warehouse in

 6     Ilijas "packed" with Muslims in civilian clothing, many of whom

 7     recognised him and begged him for help in getting out of what he

 8     acknowledged was "this hell."  He made no effort to determine whether

 9     there was any genuine basis for their detention, but instead told them

10     that they might be able to get out in an all-for-all exchange.

11             Similarly, when he went to Hadzici in October, he found Muslims

12     who had been "viciously mistreated" when first taken prisoner in May and

13     who were still incarcerated due to a failed exchange.  He knew they were

14     not extremists and he knew that because these people were his neighbours,

15     his son's best friend among them.  They were crying and begging for help.

16     He wasn't told that they were soldiers.  He was told they were people who

17     had been collected in areas where combat was taking place.  But asked in

18     court what he did to get them immediately released, Avlijas said:

19             "You know, at that time whoever said anything they did not fare

20     well.  You needed to be very wise to keep your skin," T35181.

21             As a man who understood what it took to keep his skin, he was put

22     in charge of two of the three government so-called investigations into

23     camps in the aftermath of the international outcry following the exposure

24     of Omarska.  Neither one of which made any effort to do anything more

25     than speak to those who ran the camps and determine how many people were

Page 47649

 1     currently in detention facilities.  So, for example, his report on

 2     Vlasenica's Susica camps where Muslims had been brutally mistreated was

 3     benignly summarised on the basis of information from the police

 4     commander:

 5             "At the beginning of combat activities, a number of people of

 6     Muslim nationality were isolated in this place and were later transferred

 7     to other places (Batkovic) or exchange for people of Serbian

 8     nationality."  P1607, page 2.

 9             Avlijas also testified that a large portion of the population of

10     Hadzici had been imprisoned in Kula.  That "residents of Dobrinja and

11     Grbavica had also been taken there" and the Vrbanja bridge was where

12     "civilians were usually released and exchanged."

13             In short, in contrast to this false Defence claim, Avlijas'

14     evidence made clear that the exchange of civilians was an active part of

15     the expulsion process.

16             I'd next like to turn to the false claim of lack of

17     communications.  The Prosecution's brief at paragraphs 483 through 503

18     details the comprehensive and redundancy-laden communications network

19     available to Karadzic, including the republican communication centre, the

20     RS MUP communications, VRS communications, PTT communications, couriers,

21     state security, and official and unofficial visits.  Municipality

22     summaries similarly reflect communications between the republican and

23     local levels.  The record of contacts between republican level and the

24     field confirm the adequacy of these systems and the existence of ongoing

25     communications, both prior to and during the course of the war.  And see

Page 47650

 1     paragraphs 504 and 509 of our brief for further details.

 2             Against this backdrop, the Defence position veers from complaints

 3     that the system functioned "poorly" or with difficulty, almost invariably

 4     without specification of the particular period, duration or extent of the

 5     difficulties.  It veers from those allegations to misleading, untenable,

 6     and even bizarre overstatements.  For example, the brief asserts that the

 7     state of communications was so bad that not even Sarajevo municipalities

 8     could reach Pale.  That's at paragraph 510.  The purported support for

 9     this proposition?  A conversation in which a Sarajevo official asked for

10     the Pale leadership, is told:  I can't reach Pale.  And then responds

11     that he just reached them last night.  That's D3750, page 1.  Similarly,

12     Karadzic asserts at paragraph 538 that a mere 24 telegrams were exchanged

13     between the Sarajevo area and the regions outside between April and

14     November 1992, a miserable or purportedly miserable communications level.

15     Now, the only problem with this assertion is that the cited document is

16     only a few excerpts from the telegram log-book for April and November,

17     reflecting only a handful of days from that log-book, that is, three days

18     in June and then six days in July and purports to blow it up into the

19     entirety of the communication exchange of telegrams during the April

20     through November period.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could you please slow

22     down.  Thank you.

23             MR. TIEGER:  As it happens, the Defence brief essentially admits

24     communications through its contradictory claims regarding communications

25     and allegedly exculpatory orders, sometimes actually in successive

Page 47651

 1     paragraphs.  Here's some examples.  In paragraph 2951, the claim that

 2     communication between Rogatica and Pale was virtually non-existent,

 3     followed in the next paragraph by:  Following multiple messages from

 4     President Karadzic on the importance of respecting international

 5     humanitarian law, the municipal authorities, Rogatica municipal

 6     authorities, took measures to protect -- to improve the living conditions

 7     of the population.

 8             Now, these juxtaposed claims would suggest the very laughable

 9     proposition that communications were entirely cut off except for

10     exculpatory orders, but astoundingly that is precisely what the Defence

11     brief asserts.  For example, in paragraph 2838 the claim that the

12     breakdown of communication in Vlasenica was the result of the destruction

13     of telephone lines.  And then in the same paragraph, the few

14     communications received by municipal authorities in Vlasenica emphasised

15     the need to respect human rights and international conventions.

16     Similarly, in paragraph 2945, communication between Foca and the outside

17     world was severed in April until September 1992 or even later.  And then

18     the bulk of the communications received in Foca were instructions and

19     warnings from Karadzic regarding the importance of respecting the

20     Geneva Conventions.

21             The facial absurdly of this latter example is only heightened by

22     the Defence brief's assertion elsewhere that Foca was indeed in contact

23     with the outside world and particularly with Pale, and for that see

24     paragraph 570, Ostojic informed the government on the situation in Foca

25     on April 30th; or paragraph 462, the Ministry of Justice sent a

Page 47652

 1     delegation to Foca in June 1992 that reported back to the ministry.

 2     These floundering Defence efforts to dispute the existence and adequacy

 3     of the multiple communication systems only underscores the accuracy of

 4     the Prosecution's case.

 5             Now, let me turn now to a subject touched upon in a question by

 6     the Presiding Judge earlier, and that's the issue of orders issued by

 7     Karadzic in respect of international law, which he spends considerable

 8     time within the Defence brief.  It is clear that any genuine effort on

 9     Karadzic's part to address the rampant, widespread crime being carried

10     out largely by official RS organs, including the MUP and the VRS, would

11     have required him to take concrete, targeted measures to identify, put a

12     stop to, and punish specific violations.  And is mentioned over the

13     course of its brief, the Defence relies upon a number of orders and other

14     documents authored by Karadzic and other members of the Bosnian Serb

15     leadership that at least on the surface suggest his disapproval of those

16     crimes.  However, their contents and the context in which they were

17     issued demonstrate that these documents reflect efforts to create a paper

18     trail to cover up the leadership's own role in those crimes, that were

19     never intended to be implemented and did not reflect any genuine attempt

20     to stop the massive criminal campaign against non-Serbs.

21             Now, two preliminary matters.  First, as I mentioned, these

22     arguments contradict Defence arguments on communication and control,

23     arguing the significance of these republic-level orders related to crimes

24     depend upon and in many instances concede effective communications to and

25     from the field.

Page 47653

 1             Second, the Defence suggestion that orders or even generic

 2     language to comply with international law somehow proves criminal intent

 3     is contradicted by both logic and by the Tribunal's jurisprudence.  It is

 4     clearly open to a Trial Chamber to conclude that an accused's orders to

 5     prevent or punish crimes are not genuine and do not negate intent.  And

 6     for that you can see the Milutinovic trial judgement, paras 454 through

 7     457 and para 1129; Sainovic appeals judgement paras 659 through 662; as

 8     well as Stanisic and Zupljanin trial judgement volume 2 at para 4514.

 9             And as discussed in the Prosecution brief and as I will outline

10     briefly today, this is the only conclusion borne-out by the facts of this

11     case.

12             Now, first with respect to Karadzic's orders --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Tieger, before you continue.

14     What question from the Chamber did you refer to?

15             MR. TIEGER:  You asked me -- sorry, Mr. President.  I apologise

16     for that confusion.  You had asked me earlier about the Cutileiro Plan

17     and the provisions for compliance with international law that were

18     allegedly -- that were contained in the alleged agreement, and in the

19     course of my answer, I referred more generally to any facial agreement

20     with such provisions.  So I -- it was actually in my answer rather than

21     your question.  You had asked specifically about Cutileiro and I

22     broadened it to include these kinds of orders.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             Yes, actually, my question was as you observed, limited to

25     Cutileiro Agreement.  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

Page 47654

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Now, the fact that Karadzic was on the one hand

 2     issuing instructions or appeals or orders to comply with international

 3     standards with respect to prisoners, civilians, or prisoners of war, and

 4     on the other hand propagating a non-punishment policy that encouraged

 5     repeat violations is sufficient by itself to discard such orders and

 6     instructions as either window-dressing exercises or generic and

 7     deliberately ineffective instructions.  And all of that amounts to

 8     intentional inaction in the face of ongoing mass criminality by his

 9     subordinates.

10             Look at some examples.  The 8 June press release cited by the

11     Defence in paragraph 644 of its brief.  Now, that the Defence terms "an

12     urgent appeal demanding that all prisoners be treated humanely and

13     renewing the call for the ICRC to protect civilians and prisoners."  This

14     is a document that is not even an order, it's a press release expressly

15     linked to meetings with internationals.  It contains no actual

16     instructions to any of Karadzic's many subordinates with power and

17     responsibility over prisoners and civilians and it doesn't contain any

18     means of monitoring or ensuring implementation.

19             In this document, Karadzic praises the fact that "we are not

20     driven by hate but by love" and that "justice is on our side."  This

21     self-congratulatory remark should be viewed in light of the fact that by

22     this time Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership had been confronted

23     with numerous reports of crimes from the internationals including

24     allegations of "large-scale detention of civilians," see P1029,

25     paragraphs 101 through 102, "which match the reports that the government

Page 47655

 1     had been providing on a "daily basis" to the Presidency of irregularities

 2     and inhumane treatment in detention facilities.  That's C2, page 278.

 3             This document which couples praise for conduct that he knew in

 4     fact was criminal with an ultimately empty public appeal is nothing more

 5     than a public relations exercise.  Similarly, many orders were issued

 6     simultaneously in both English and B/C/S.  For example, D1754, D109, and

 7     D93, or brought directly to the attention of the international community,

 8     D4720, making their target audience clear.

 9             Equally, the RS Presidencies 11 June 1992 announcement to the

10     citizens of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stating that

11     emigration has to be voluntary, coupled with a false denial that RS

12     authorities were engaged in ethnic cleansing, that's discussed at

13     paragraphs 652 and 653 of the Defence brief is another obvious

14     window-dressing exercise.  Indeed, on that same day at a meeting of

15     senior MUP officials, Zupljanin noted that the army and Crisis Staffs

16     were demanding the gathering of as many Muslim civilians as possible, who

17     were then left in poor conditions in camps guarded by the MUP, D447, page

18     7.  As the Defence brief acknowledges, this information reached the

19     Presidency by way of Stanisic's 17 July report, which again made clear

20     that civilians were being rounded up.

21             Karadzic cites his 13 June instructions regarding general

22     compliance by the army and MUP with international laws of war and its

23     accompanying instructions on treatment of captured persons, those are

24     D434 and P1134, as a reflection of his taking "all possible measures" to

25     prevent crimes against non-Serbs.  Given his awareness that the standards

Page 47656

 1     set out in those documents had been and were being systematically

 2     violated, it is clear that issuing a general set of instructions without

 3     taking concrete steps to put an end to the ongoing violations was an

 4     empty gesture.  The Defence reliance on Subotic's claim that these or

 5     similar instructions were quickly or effectively disseminated to various

 6     organs throughout the RS is of course another contradiction to the

 7     Defence claims about the alleged chaos and lack of communication that

 8     reigned at the time.  But even assuming Subotic's unsubstantiated

 9     evidence on this point were reliable, his supposedly energetic efforts to

10     disseminate such instructions when contrasted with the absence of efforts

11     by RS authorities to implement them is a further reflection of the

12     authority's focus on creating a paper trail rather than genuinely

13     addressing the ongoing mass crime.  The fact that Karadzic reissued these

14     instructions on the 19th of August, a fact pointed to in their brief at

15     paragraph 625, reissued them in the form of an order to the Main Staff

16     and the MUP, points to the predictable response to these toothless

17     initial instructions.

18             The Defence also relies on D95, Karadzic's 14 July order to

19     municipality presidents in the Gorazde area, stating that villages where

20     the Croat and Muslim populations surrender their weapons and do not

21     intend to fight must be protected adding "the responsibility of this must

22     be borne by the presidents of the municipalities."

23             But the Defence fails to mention the response of Sokolac

24     President Tupajic to the telegram, that's P6236, in which Tupajic reminds

25     Karadzic, the man at the top of the MUP and VRS hierarchy, that "all

Page 47657

 1     activities on the area of the municipality on security issues are

 2     conducted by the SJB which was responsible for its work to the MUP and by

 3     the 2nd Romania Motorised Brigade which was responsible to its superior

 4     command and that these activities are outside Tupajic's knowledge and the

 5     knowledge of his closest collaborators and it's the SJB and the 2nd

 6     Romanija Brigade which have to protect the Muslim population because "in

 7     conditions as they are now I cannot take responsibility for their

 8     safety."

 9             This response reveals the disingenuous nature of Karadzic's

10     order, holding municipality presidents responsible for protecting Muslims

11     and Croats from crimes committed by the organs over which Karadzic

12     himself exercised ultimate authority.

13             The Defence also holds up Stanisic's report to Karadzic stating

14     that the army and Crisis Staffs were rounding up Muslim civilians en

15     masse as a yard-stick by which Karadzic's intention be measured,

16     asserting that Karadzic's actions upon learning about the crimes are

17     critical to establishing his mens rea.  That's para 674.

18             Now, setting aside for the sake of argument that Karadzic had

19     ample information about irregularities well before 17 July, at this point

20     if Karadzic had any genuine intention of ensuring his subordinates'

21     compliance with the law protecting Muslim and Croat civilians in the RS,

22     he would have responded immediately with concrete, targeted measures

23     utilising his various sources of authority over the army, the MUP, and

24     civilian authorities to put a stop to this systemic criminal activity

25     being carried out by the army, Crisis Staffs, and MUP.  Karadzic took no

Page 47658

 1     such action.  Rather, his next step, according to the Defence at

 2     paragraph 675, was to issue his 23 July 1992 order, D96.  However, this

 3     order is not addressed to anyone, expressly states that it is issued "in

 4     keeping with obligations undertaken at the London Conference," does not

 5     acknowledge the existence of any criminal activity, let alone the

 6     rounding up of large numbers of Muslim civilians, contains no monitoring

 7     or implementing instructions, and as we know from the voluminous evidence

 8     of continued massive crime was in fact not implemented.

 9             Simply put, this order and others like it was issued for

10     international consumption and to create a paper trail of plausible

11     deniability, a trail that Karadzic is now attempting to exploit.  By any

12     real measure, Karadzic's response to the Stanisic's 17 July report of

13     serious mass crime against Muslim civilians, does reflect his intent for

14     those crimes, crimes that would be repeated in the near future and for

15     three more years.

16             The Defence also points to various statements in which Karadzic

17     purportedly expressed his disapproval for crimes against non-Serbs.  Upon

18     closer analysis, however, these statements do not assist his claim.  For

19     example, the Defence points to extracts from two of Karadzic's speeches

20     at the 17th Assembly in July 1992, that's D92, as remarks which express

21     his "criticism and disapproval of crimes."  The remarks upon which the

22     Defence relies, including his comments about convincing Muslims in Pale

23     to stay and asserting that the state is "big enough for all" must be

24     viewed in light of his assertions at the same session that, one, Serbs

25     cannot allow a state in which they are a national minority, that's page

Page 47659

 1     16; two, we cannot live together, there's no tolerance, they quadruple

 2     through the birth-rate and we Serbs are not up to that, page 86; his

 3     acknowledgement that the conflict had been roused to eliminate Muslims

 4     who were, in fact, vanishing; and the fact that by that time his forces

 5     had ethnically cleansed huge swaths of Serbian-claimed territory.  His

 6     nod towards ethnic tolerance at this session was made in the context in

 7     which significant progress had already been made to eliminate the

 8     demographic threats that he underscored at this session.

 9             The Defence also points to a statement in a June meeting with

10     Mladic that "we must not put pressure to have people displaced."  P1478,

11     page 98, but a closer look at the format and content of this entry in the

12     Mladic notebook reveals this comment came up when the discussion had

13     moved on from Karadzic's concern about demographics and minorities which

14     was echoed at the 17th Session when he described how 33 per cent

15     non-Serbs rendered Serbia non-stable to a new discussion about problems

16     on the Neretva and Karadzic 's expression of concern that if they say the

17     Neretva will not be a border, Serbs will feel pressure to leave.

18             Equally at paragraph 1224, the Defence points to Karadzic's

19     statement in a July 1992 meeting with Mladic and the RS civilian

20     leadership that "we are going to build a law-abiding rather than an

21     ethnically clean state."  However, it is clear from the context of this

22     comment that this relates to a discussion of the international

23     community's view of Bosnia.  "We are intrigued by the idea that perhaps

24     the world may want to divide Bosnia in two.  The West has no desire for

25     an Islamic state, a state ..." et cetera.  And a discussion about the

Page 47660

 1     public stance that the RS should present.  Koljevic was explicit on this

 2     point:

 3             "We should take a stand - discuss law-abiding versus national

 4     state and make our policy known," following which this position was

 5     adopted.  "STAND TAKEN - LAW-ABIDING STATE," in capital letters.

 6             Any contention that the Bosnian Serb leadership genuinely

 7     intended to create a law-abiding state that embraced Muslims and Croats

 8     is undermined by their continued failure to prevent or punish the

 9     widespread and systematic crimes being committed against non-Serbs,

10     crimes of which they were well aware.

11             Now, Karadzic also claims that he acted as soon as he knew, and

12     at paragraph 628 through 629 of his brief attempts to dismiss crimes

13     however -- dismiss reports of crimes from foreign sources as unreliable

14     but at the same time asserting that the republican authorities

15     "immediately reacted" to such information.  In fact, both claims are

16     untrue.  Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership received repeated

17     active reports from international sources from early April onward which

18     they inevitably dismissed or deflected.  For example, in the immediate

19     aftermath of the brutal take-over of Zvornik and the ensuing flood of

20     Muslim refugees, Karadzic was informed of these events by two separate

21     international officials.  That's KD -- well, I'll cite that later.

22             More generally, as Okun explained, he and secretary Vance

23     repeatedly informed the Bosnian Serb leadership that they were aware of

24     widespread ethnic cleansing.  As Okun put it:

25             "In fact, in all the conversations of ethnic cleansing with the

Page 47661

 1     Bosnian Serb leadership, it was highly unusual, almost never the case,

 2     that they denied it.  The almost invariable response was:  Look what

 3     they're doing to our people."

 4             That's T1505 to 1506.

 5             In an example where the Bosnian Serb leadership simultaneously

 6     both acknowledged and denied ethnic cleansing, when an international

 7     official personally informed Karadzic, Koljevic, and Plavsic about the

 8     mass deportation of Muslims from Bosanski Novi in July 1992, they

 9     responded by declaring that it was a very cruel war and everybody was

10     committing crimes before changing tack by claiming that the Muslims

11     wanted to leave and were voluntarily signing documents exchanging

12     properties.  See the Bosanski Novi summary at paragraph 13.  This not

13     only undermines the Defence's claim that Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb

14     leadership "immediately reacted" to information about crimes but also

15     Karadzic's denial that the Bosanski Novi deportations were brought to his

16     attention and you can see that at paragraph 2808.

17             The reason that Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership did not

18     respond to such reports from international officials with concrete

19     remedial measures is not their lack of control over the perpetrators or

20     being "cut off" from the field or any of the other excuses that the

21     Defence now advances.  Their inaction is a result of the fact that these

22     crimes fell squarely within their shared common purpose to permanently

23     remove Muslims and Croats from the territories they sought.

24             And for confirmation of this, one need look no further than the

25     self-congratulatory manner by which crimes were reported to Karadzic and

Page 47662

 1     other members of the leadership by their loyal subordinates and followers

 2     who were implementing the common purpose.

 3             For example, as mentioned earlier when Karadzic announced the

 4     strategic objectives on the 12th of May, 1992, including that the Una

 5     would form a border, Vjestica could not conceal his delight at the happy

 6     news, which meant that Muslims they had "evacuated" from the right bank

 7     of the Una would likely not have a place to return to.  Similarly, on the

 8     30th of June in Zvornik, TO commander Pavlovic bragged to Karadzic and

 9     Mladic that "we were most active in evicting the Muslims," P1468, page

10     253.

11             A few weeks later at the July Assembly session Prstojevic, whose

12     expulsion activities had already reached the top level of the leadership

13     and were causing negative publicity as Mandic would explain to him in

14     June, proudly reported that the Serbs in Sarajevo following "an

15     encouraging visit from Karadzic had been driving the Muslims out of the

16     territories where they had actually been a majority," D92, page 66.

17             At that same session, SDS executive committee president Dukic

18     expressed the hope that the number of Muslims in Bihac had been halved,

19     D92, page 73, Birac being a region in Eastern Bosnia that encompassed

20     Zvornik and Bratunac; Zvornik, where the local authorities had already

21     informed Karadzic about their forced eviction of Muslims in Bratunac

22     where hundreds of Muslims had been expelled through Pale in May and about

23     which Karadzic, Mladic, and Koljevic had been informed on 6 June there

24     were no more Muslims as it had been "fully liberated."  That's P1478,

25     page 101.

Page 47663

 1             In stark contrast to Karadzic's deflective responses to reports

 2     from internationals about such crimes when Vjestica complained that the

 3     proposed agreement would require compensation for "everything we

 4     destroyed and burned and the 17 mosques we flattened," Karadzic reassured

 5     the deputies that this was not the case and that there would be barbed

 6     wire at the borders for a long time, P1379, pages 25 through 26.

 7             When Karadzic's generic orders and appeals to comply with

 8     international law are contrasted both with his acceptance of reports from

 9     his subordinates about their own crimes and his deflections or denials of

10     reports of crimes coming from internationals, it is crystal clear that

11     Karadzic's orders and appeals were nothing more than an order to paper

12     over the criminal campaign that Karadzic himself was overseeing.

13             That effort, nevertheless, proved unsuccessful.  The "clear" and

14     "inescapable" conclusion from the course of events - these are the words

15     of two different internationals - was that ethnic cleansing was state

16     policy.  That's Banbury at T13341 and Kirudja at P3804, paragraph 79.

17             So in late summer 1992, when Karadzic was attempting in vain to

18     convince Vance and Owen that ethnic cleansing was not occurring, and for

19     that see P799, pages 10 and 14, "the fact of ethnic cleansing was even at

20     that point being treated as something that was incontrovertible," as Owen

21     explained, T10096 through 98.

22             And while Karadzic cites a comment by Lord Owen in paragraph 628

23     to support his claim of false media reporting, Lord Owen in fact

24     explained that Karadzic's reaction to international protests about ethnic

25     cleansing, providing excuses, promising action, at times even

Page 47664

 1     volunteering follow-up information was "a clever tactic to keep us

 2     feeling that our representations were having some impact."

 3             And so while Karadzic did not object to human rights safe-guards

 4     being put into negotiations, "all this, however, was a facade to cover up

 5     a deep-seeded commitment to Serbs not living along-side Muslims and to

 6     conducting an ethnic cleansing programme with a bare-faced dishonour of

 7     even greater magnitude than his continued inability to respect or even to

 8     know the truth," P799, page 14.

 9             With respect to orders issued by other members of the Bosnian

10     Serb leadership, the Defence also points to paperwork generated by senior

11     MUP officials in late July, as responsive to Stanisic's 17 July 1992

12     report.  However, in the face of mounting pressure from the international

13     community, this flurry of documents generated by the MUP and RS

14     leadership - you can see D449, P1087 - amounts to nothing more than

15     self-serving finger-pointing, as Mandic testified regarding Kovac's 8

16     August letter.  That's C2, pages 320 through 322, and Mandic at T4595

17     through 96.

18             And none of which, none of which reflected any steps genuinely

19     aimed at ensuring the unconditional release of the civilians or

20     criminally punishing those responsible for their incarceration and their

21     inhumane treatment, and meanwhile the large-scale detention,

22     mistreatment, and killing and the expulsions continued.

23             What is clear from these documents, however, is that all levels

24     of the RS and MUP leadership were well aware of the crimes that were

25     occurring on their watch and by their subordinates.  And none of them did

Page 47665

 1     anything concrete to stop them.  It was not until after international

 2     journalists discovered the Prijedor camps and reported on the appalling

 3     conditions associated with them that Stanisic on 9 August, weeks after

 4     Zupljanin officially reported to him that MUP officials were holding

 5     large numbers of Muslim civilians, finally took the simple and obvious

 6     remedial step of ordering the release of civilian prisoners.  Of course,

 7     by this time for the vast majority of prisoners, Stanisic's promise to

 8     free movement meant in reality expulsion.  Even if given an ostensible

 9     choice to return to their homes, having been attacked, imprisoned, and

10     mistreated, and having those homes destroyed all by the very organs that

11     should have been protecting them, for those people, leaving RS was the

12     only realistic option.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters kindly ask Mr. Tieger to slow

14     down, please.

15             MR. TIEGER:  The other RS government minister that the Defence

16     holds up as a beacon of law and order is justice minister Mandic claiming

17     that he "immediately reacted" to reports of crimes against non-Serbs in

18     Ilidza by calling up Prstojevic.

19             At paragraph 702, the brief quotes these extracts of the

20     intercept, "It has come to our attention and that of the government that

21     you are issuing ultimatums to some Turks, evicting people from certain

22     settlements and people respond badly to it.  Please do not do anything

23     like it.  We cannot ethnically cleanse Ilidza or any other place.  At

24     least that is the attitude of the government and political leadership."

25             Leaving aside that the minister of justice is here referring to

Page 47666

 1     Bosnian Muslim expulsion victims as Turks, this selective citation to

 2     this intercept is misleading.  In its entirety, the intercept makes clear

 3     that Mandic was concerned about the negative publicity surrounding the

 4     expulsions rather than the expulsions themselves.  He stated that the

 5     Muslims and the media are "abusing" the facts of the evictions and that

 6     this is "very bad publicity for us."  He continues that "it has already

 7     reached the top how in some settlements you gave them 24 hours to move

 8     out," and said, "you were not responsible for their safety."

 9             Prstojevic's response?  That he didn't say it in public or write

10     it.  Mandic instructs Prstojevic to talk to a Muslim judge and "place two

11     or three Muslims somewhere so that we can say we employ everyone,

12     Muslims, Croats, Serbs, as long as they are loyal to the Serbian state."

13     Thus, the leadership's reaction to information that Prstojevic was

14     cleansing Ilidza was:  A complaint to Prstojevic about expelling "Turks";

15     focusing on the public nature of his crimes coupled with allegations that

16     it was being abused in the media; an instruction to employ token

17     measures to create a venire of multi-ethnic existence; and no measures to

18     remove or punish Prstojevic for his crimes.

19             The Defence's corollary claim that the information that

20     Prstojevic was evicting Turks was untrue is astounding in light of the

21     fact that Prstojevic was a known extremist whose known criminal

22     activities are clearly laid out in contemporaneous intercepts and his

23     own statement to that effect at the Assembly.  For that, see P1086, pages

24     2 through 3, and P515, page 1 through 2.

25             Finally, on the topic of cosmetic orders, while the Defence

Page 47667

 1     claims that the generic language in Djeric's 26 April instructions to

 2     Crisis Staffs to "act kindly or humanely towards civilians" renders the

 3     Prosecution's case disastrously wrong, it is once again the context in

 4     which those instructions were issued that determines whether they

 5     constitute a genuine preventive measure attributable to the accused.

 6             If I can just provide that context and then we'll break.  That

 7     context is provided, Your Honours, by Djeric's testimony that it was

 8     Karadzic's policy that crimes committed by Serbs should not be punished

 9     and that investigation and punishment of such crimes "could be dealt with

10     later."  And Djeric explained that the two key ministries, justice and

11     interior, led by Mandic and Stanisic, took the same position as Karadzic.

12     You'll see that at our brief, at para 549.

13             Irrespective of a policy involving crimes to achieve a level of

14     ethnic purity, irrespective of the ongoing policy, it goes without saying

15     in an environment in which crimes against non-Serbs are widespread and

16     the president of the state, the minister of the interior, the minister of

17     justice propagate a policy of delaying the prosecution of such crimes,

18     Djeric's instructions were largely meaningless.

19             And, Mr. President, I understand it's time for a break.

20             JUDGE KWON:  The French translation has only now stopped.

21             We'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at ten past 3.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 2.50 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 3.12 p.m.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 47668

 1             Just before we adjourned, I had juxtaposed the claims of

 2     instructions regarding the treatment of Muslims and Croats with the

 3     policy of not prosecuting.  The results of that policy propagated by

 4     Karadzic and his ministers was the failure to prosecute Serbs for mass

 5     crimes against the Muslim and Croats within RS, and that's discussed at

 6     paragraphs 535 through 566 of the Prosecution brief.

 7             This inaction applied at all levels, at the local level, as Kljuc

 8     SJB chief Vinko Pandic reported to the CSB Banja Luka on the SJB's

 9     inaction in the face of "monstrous crimes" against non-Serbs.  "The

10     reason for this is if all these crimes should be made public given the

11     current police situation, the pressure from the international community

12     on how advisable this is at the moment," P2972, pages 1 through 2.

13             Karadzic's policy created an environment of impunity which

14     encouraged the implementation of the common purpose.  In Djeric's words:

15     "Had you punished what was supposed to be punished from day one, later on

16     things would not have happened, worse things."  That's Djeric at T27999,

17     speaking directly to the accused in court.

18             Now, the Defence contends that the total failure to prosecute

19     Serbs for crimes against non-Serbs was the result of a dire situation in

20     the military justice system, that there was no discrimination on grounds

21     of ethnicity of the victims, that the judicial system was independent and

22     impartial, and that any pressure on them was individual and not a result

23     of state policy.  None of these claims hold up to scrutiny.

24             Now, first, as a general matter, apart from some ethnically

25     selective approaches to individual perpetrators and victims, the story is

Page 47669

 1     clear from the systemic unwillingness to confront the massive crimes

 2     against non-Serb communities by the VRS, as reflected in the fact that

 3     the customary provisions for dealing with such crimes were treated as if

 4     they didn't exist, except when used against non-Serbs.

 5             Defence witness Todorovic acknowledged that when challenged,

 6     after he initially claimed to the contrary that there were no cases in

 7     which the VRS military court prosecuted VRS soldiers for war crimes

 8     against the civilian population under Article 142, despite such

 9     prosecutions being brought against non-Serbs.  And those cites are T34076

10     and P3607 at pages 21, 23, and 38.

11             In Karadzic's own words:

12             "We did not discipline our army using any drastic disciplinary

13     measures or punishment because each of our soldiers disciplined

14     themselves with their own state-building enthusiasm."  P953, page 8.

15             Despite claims of "extremely difficult conditions" and a "dire

16     situation," in the military justice system, the Defence accepts at para

17     897 that the RS military courts received 33.000 cases and completed

18     12.000.  In short, the military justice court system was functioning.

19             The Defence cites Todorovic's 1995 report - that's D2987 -

20     claiming that the policy was to prosecute VRS perpetrators of crimes

21     "rigorously," yet that report makes clear that it refers to Serbs killing

22     Serbs.  Its references, omitted by the Defence, reveal concerns about the

23     adverse impact on combat-readiness caused by both the perpetrators and

24     the persons killed or wounded being out of action and the perpetrators'

25     aim to steal and remove weapons from the VRS.  And both passages can be

Page 47670

 1     found at D2987, page 16.

 2             Equally, the Defence claim that with respect to the investigation

 3     of war crimes there was no ethnic bias with respect to the perpetrators

 4     or victims is undermined by a wealth of evidence proving that the

 5     authorities' focus was crimes against Serbs.  In the report for the April

 6     through the December 1992 period, as one example, the RS MUP reported:

 7             "The focus of the operative work in CSBs and SJBs was on

 8     detection, documenting, and reporting members of the enemy army who had

 9     committed acts of genocide against the Serbian people," P2761, page 15.

10             This reflects a theme running through MUP documentation

11     throughout that period; see, for example, P2715, page 3; P2640, page 3;

12     P2759, page 1; D1616; P3302, pages 6 through 7; and P6384.  And this

13     focus is underlined by the establishment by the RS Presidency of a

14     commission for investigating war crimes against the Serbian people in BH,

15     D444.

16             Indeed, this focus continued throughout the conflict.  In

17     November 1995, four months after thousands of men and boys were executed

18     in the Zvornik area, head of the SJB Bijeljina crime administration

19     Goran Macar instructed the Zvornik CJB to "intensify activities in

20     connection with preparing and filing criminal reports against

21     perpetrators of war crimes against the Serbian people."  P6385.

22             The Defence argument is also undermined by the weakness of its

23     cited support.  So at page 787, for example, the Defence asserts that

24     "there were proceedings against the VRS members for crimes against

25     non-Serbs or POWs."  The support cited?  A September 1994 RS military

Page 47671

 1     court report from Todorovic, describing one incident in which a reserve

 2     soldier killed a Muslim prisoner and stating:  "Detention recommended but

 3     the accused has still not been questioned," D29995, page 5.

 4             And while the Defence cites a handful of civilian and military

 5     prosecutions of Serbs for crimes against non-Serbs, the Defence does not

 6     address the mass crimes against non-Serbs which occurred during the

 7     course of ethnic cleansing which were not punished.  The total failure to

 8     prosecute mass crimes against non-Serbs in the military or civilian

 9     justice system both during and after the war exposes the false Defence

10     argument.

11             And in further support of the argument that there was no climate

12     of impunity for crimes against non-Serbs, the Defence mis-characterises

13     Karadzic's marks.  It first cites his 1993 statement to the Assembly

14     while -- that's at paragraph 815, while failing to mention that the

15     context of his remarks was a discussion of stolen Golf cars and black

16     marketing.  The Defence brief then cites Karadzic's proposed measures in

17     1995 for stepped-up work on criminal offences, again failing to mention

18     that none of the more than 1.000 convictions reflected in the document

19     cited were in respect of mass crimes against non-Serbs, which was

20     unsurprising in view of the fact that Karadzic's primary concern was

21     crimes against the armed forces and the effect of non-prosecution of such

22     crimes on combat-readiness.  See D1427, page 1.

23             The Defence asserts at paragraph 850 that the trial of Stankovic

24     alone is sufficient for dismissing the Prosecution's allegations that

25     non-Serbs were denied access to the Republika Srpska's judicial system.

Page 47672

 1     So what happened in the Stankovic trial?  After killing one of the

 2     leading Muslims in the community and being released, as described at the

 3     Prosecution's brief, paragraph 564, Stankovic confessed to killing two

 4     Muslim civilians, two more, and attempting to murder two others in August

 5     1992 but was released prior to trial in February 1993.  Despite being

 6     convicted in October 1993, his sentence was only enforced after he

 7     accidentally shot two Serb children in September 1994, circumstances that

 8     Defence witness Todorovic was unable to reconcile with his claims of

 9     equal treatment.  And that's at T34086 through 87.

10             The Defence cites Todorovic for the proposition that releasing

11     someone from custody does not mean that proceedings have been

12     discontinued.  That's at D2986, paragraph 14.  However, in the very same

13     paragraph Todorovic stated:

14             "However, persons accused of serious crimes which constitute a

15     threat to society such as murder would be remanded in custody until the

16     end of trial."

17             That's discussed in the Prosecution's brief at paragraph 565.

18     While charges against some Serbs released from custody remain pending,

19     even recidivus criminals like Stankovic who confessed to murdering

20     non-Serbs were released.  These circumstances reflected the clear

21     discrimination based on ethnicity of the victims that characterised the

22     system.

23             Similarly, the Defence argument that the judiciary was

24     independent and subject to no interference is undermined by its emphasis

25     on Karadzic's interventions in the work of the military and civilian

Page 47673

 1     courts, including his orders to the supreme military court and

 2     prosecutor.  And you can see that at the Defence brief at paras 782 and

 3     799.  As to Karadzic's pardons of those involved in "association for

 4     hostile purposes" to which the Defence points in its brief at paragraph

 5     783, these pardons merely confirmed, as we learned, that there had been

 6     no grounds to initiate the proceedings and incarceration in the first

 7     place, T21179 through 80.

 8             Now, with respect to the pressure on the judiciary, contrary to

 9     the Defence claim that pressure on the military judiciary could only come

10     from relatives and friends of indictees or from comrades in arms, the

11     evidence of the customary pressure on the authorities and the resulting

12     distortion of justice can be found in such matter-of-fact observations of

13     perpetrators like Kajtez, who wrote to Vrkes in April of 1994 - that's

14     erroneously cited by the Defence as April 1993 at paragraph 827 - stating

15     that his fellow prisoners "who also killed the balija and the Ustasha are

16     being acquitted and helped by their municipalities."  P6556.

17             The expectation of a self-confessed mass killer of non-Serbs that

18     the authorities would intervene on his behalf, as authorities were

19     intervening on behalf of similarly placed persons, shows just how

20     prevalent such intentions were.

21             Another example of official interference in prosecutions is the

22     suspension of proceedings against VRS soldiers suspected of killing

23     scores of Muslim civilians at Velagici school, a suspension "because of

24     the stance of the deputy prime minister of Republika Srpska and the

25     chairman of the Kljuc municipality executive committee."  P3616.

Page 47674

 1             The Defence contention that this intervention was "a case of a

 2     classic force majeure" in which a state of anarchy threatened weak

 3     authorities - that's paragraph 846 - is undermined by the contrary

 4     evidence strong, fully functioning civilian authorities working together

 5     with the military.  For that, see the Kljuc municipality summary in the

 6     Prosecution's brief.  As well as the fact that to date none of the

 7     Velagici accused have been prosecuted.  See T34077.

 8             The almost automatic bending of the judiciary to pressure in

 9     respect of the prosecution of crimes against non-Serbs was yet another

10     reflection of the effective operation of Karadzic's policy of

11     non-punishment of Serbs for such crimes.

12             And, Your Honour, for a few matters raised, I will need to move

13     into private session now.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, shall we move to private session, please.

15                           [Private session]

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 47675

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20                           [Open session]

21             JUDGE KWON:  We are now in open session, Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  At paragraphs 889 through 95, the Defence asks:

23     "What did President Karadzic know about criminal cases for crimes against

24     non-Serbs?"  But its response is silent as to the massive crimes against

25     non-Serbs of which Karadzic was actually informed and which went

Page 47676

 1     unpunished.

 2             Four examples of notorious crimes which Karadzic knew about and

 3     which went unpunished are:  The expulsions and killings in Zvornik, the

 4     massacre at Koricanske Stijene, Vojkan's expulsions in Bijeljina, and the

 5     massive detention of Muslim and Croat civilians all around the RS.

 6             Zvornik.  First, the Defence contends that there was "no

 7     evidence" that President Karadzic was informed of the mistreatment or

 8     killings of Bosnian Muslims in Zvornik.  That's at paragraph 2843.  This

 9     false assertion ignores clear evidence that Karadzic was informed about

10     crimes in Zvornik almost as soon as they began to happen, responding by

11     saying that terrible things were happening in Bosnia and everyone was

12     guilty.  And for that see paragraphs 31 through 33 of the Zvornik summary

13     in the confidential brief.

14             Not satisfied with this false claim, the Defence then asserts

15     that Karadzic was made aware of allegations that the Muslims of Kozluk

16     had been expelled in late June and immediately had it investigated, and

17     that his investigation purportedly determined that the Muslims had left

18     voluntarily and exonerated local officials, thus demonstrating that he

19     did not fail in his duty to punish the perpetrators.  That's at

20     paragraphs 2805 and 2807.  And it is true that this event, more fully

21     revealed than the Defence brief provides, tells you all you need to know

22     about investigation and punishment of crimes against non-Serbs and about

23     Karadzic's allegations in that regard.

24             The Muslims of Kozluk were expelled on 26 June, prompting

25     international concern and inquiry.  Four days later, Karadzic attended a

Page 47677

 1     meeting in Zvornik at which Zvornik officials reported to him that they

 2     had expelled the Muslims of Kozluk and successfully implemented

 3     Karadzic's order to settle Kozluk "with our children."  Karadzic then

 4     declared that he had investigated the matter and determined that the

 5     Muslims left voluntarily.

 6             As I said, this tells you all you need to know about his attitude

 7     toward the investigation and the prosecution of crimes against non-Serbs

 8     as well as the brazenness of his lies, but there is more.

 9             Koricanske Stijene.  As discussed at the Prosecution's brief at

10     paragraph 521, by the morning of 23 August, news of the massacre at

11     Koricanske Stijene, which had taken place two days earlier, reached

12     Karadzic in London.  And as discussed at the Prosecution brief paragraphs

13     554 through 55, Karadzic dispatched Defence Minister Subotic to

14     Banja Luka, who co-ordinated the cover-up, chairing meetings with

15     relevant officials, visiting the scene to supervise efforts to destroy

16     all traces of the crime and reporting back to Karadzic.

17             ARK and RS officials issued pro forma orders to investigate which

18     were never implemented.  The police intervention platoon was disbanded

19     and its members sent on a combat mission to Han Pijesak, while Prijedor

20     police chief Drljaca could blithely claim he could no longer reach them

21     for questioning.  Police, military, judicial, and municipal authorities

22     all refused to take responsibility for the investigation.  Drljaca was

23     promoted by republic authorities and rewarded by Karadzic, as were others

24     involved in the killing and cover-up.  No further investigation was

25     requested until 1999.  RS authorities never held anyone responsible.

Page 47678

 1             In the words of Avlijas who attended a meeting on behalf of the

 2     Ministry of Justice of top RS and Banja Luka officials, including

 3     Subotic, in connection with the Koricanske Stijena:

 4             "The entire RS knows that it was done by members of the SJB in

 5     Prijedor commanded by Simo Drljaca, and it was known on the day of the

 6     meeting.  If it had been a well-functioning state, Simo Drljaca should

 7     have been locked up.  If there is command responsibility in a

 8     well-functioning state, then there can be no discussion about it."

 9     T35187 through 88.

10             Let's next look at another occasion on which Karadzic falsely

11     assured the international community that he was investigating crimes that

12     he was actually supporting and condoning.

13             As described in paragraphs 531 through 33 of the Prosecution

14     brief, in 1993 and 1994 Akashi, the UNHCR, and the ICRC raised the

15     expulsions in Bijeljina repeatedly and directly with Dr. Karadzic, and

16     the United Nations Security Council expressed its grave concerns "at the

17     persistent and systematic campaign of terror perpetrated by the Bosnian

18     Serb forces in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and other areas."  And it demanded

19     "that the Bosnian Serb authorities immediately cease their campaign of

20     ethnic cleansing."

21             And more specifically, as described at paragraphs 556 through 57

22     of our brief, they challenged Karadzic about Vojkan's crimes, Vojkan who

23     was forcefully expelling thousands of Bosnian Muslims from the area of

24     Bijeljina.  That's P5423, page 2.

25             And when they did, Karadzic responded to these repeated concerns

Page 47679

 1     with false assurances, false assurances that he had taken measures to

 2     identify, arrest, and prosecute those responsible.  Nevertheless, weeks

 3     after these assurances, Vojkan was still operating, still expelling, and

 4     the expulsions continued.  As Akashi noted on the 20th of December:

 5     "There would soon be nobody left to forcibly uproot."

 6             And then at a March 1995 meeting of the Supreme Command - that's

 7     incorrectly noted as August in the Prosecution's brief at paragraph 558 -

 8     at that meeting Karadzic made clear why Vojkan had not been arrested and

 9     punished.  After explaining that "Muslims remaining there in any way is

10     disastrous for us" and that "it is a standpoint of our policy there has

11     been a separation of peoples, of cultures, of worlds, birds of a feather

12     flock together," he noted that what Vojkan does "if that were being done

13     by a state institution, we would be accused of ethnic cleansing."  That

14     is why he explained "we turn a blind eye at a private agency which makes

15     these private arrangements.  When a private Muslim and a private agency

16     make arrangements for him to go to Germany, no one can accuse us."  As

17     Milovanovic explained, Karadzic's remarks reflected his view that "it

18     would be good to have as small as possible number of Muslims in

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina."  T25543 through 45.

20             Vojkan was still expelling Bijeljina Muslims in July 1995, and

21     rather than being punished for these crimes, he was publicly honoured by

22     Karadzic.  You have that at T15712 through 13 -- through 15712 through 13

23     and 15715.

24             And finally, camp investigations.

25             Karadzic cites three "commissions" established in August 1992 to

Page 47680

 1     look into detention facilities as a reflection of the so-called resolute

 2     and responsible actions to safe-guard citizens of a "different

 3     nationality."  That's at paragraph 586 of his brief.  Tellingly, he fails

 4     to mention that despite ample information about the incarceration and

 5     treatment of non-Serbs before that, these commissions were not

 6     established until the crime of the camps was revealed to the world in the

 7     first week of August 1992.

 8             The Defence asserts at paragraph 614 that these reports "shape

 9     the states of mind of the republican authorities" and the reactions were

10     the "actus reus."  And these reports can tell you a lot about their state

11     of mind and can in themselves constitute an actus reus because in the

12     face of long-standing awareness that civilians were incarcerated in

13     substandard conditions but triggered by being caught in the act, these

14     reports reflected Karadzic made no attempt to identify the perpetrators

15     of these crimes, but instead maintained the climate of impunity for

16     crimes against non-Serbs, again illustrating his shared intent that they

17     be committed.

18             The August 18 CSB commission report which was D470 which was

19     produced within a three-day time-limit merely summarises reports from

20     local SJB chiefs, the very perpetrators of the crimes the commission

21     purported to investigate.  For example, Drljaca in Prijedor, that's D470,

22     pages 27 through 33; or Vucinic in Sanski Most D470, pages 14 through 16.

23     Indeed, the four-man commission included the CSB Banja Luka official who

24     helped set up the interrogation teams which operated in Omarska.  See

25     KW609 D4246, pages 5 through 10.  And two individuals who worked at

Page 47681

 1     Omarska, one supervising and one conducting the interrogations.  That's

 2     Mijic and Rodic.  See P2640, page 1; and P6536, page 3.  Recall that this

 3     is the camp in which the commander admitted that he heard the screams of

 4     detainees being beaten during interrogations on a daily basis.  That's

 5     T44225-44241.  This did not even remotely resemble the independent

 6     investigation that responsible authorities would undertake.  The

 7     19 August government commission report, P3549, comprises eight pages

 8     cursorily dealing with six different detention facilities with findings

 9     so starkly different from the information already available to the

10     Bosnian Serb leadership from both internal and external sources that its

11     sole and evident purpose was to function as a whitewash.  And as to the

12     third commission report of late August, D3109, there is not even the

13     facial pretense of a genuine investigation, as you can see at a glance

14     from this report reduced by Avlijas.  This is it, report into the crime

15     of the camps.

16             Meanwhile, the survivors of Omarska were transferred for

17     Trnopolje for imminent expulsion or they were transferred to Manjaca

18     camp.  And when Manjaca officials noted the vast number of detainees who

19     were simply civilians and the pressure by the ICRC to enter the camp,

20     Karadzic told them:  Well, pick out the guys who are so sick that they

21     will attract the attention of the international community and ship them

22     out that's found.  And that's found at Prosecution's brief para 536 in

23     the Banja Luka summary at paragraph 9.  Meanwhile, the others languished.

24             Another indicator of Karadzic's shared intent is the promotion

25     and rewarding of perpetrators of crimes were part of the common plan.

Page 47682

 1     The Defence asserts "there is no evidence that Karadzic knew of a crime

 2     and promoted, praised, or rewarded the perpetrator."  In fact,

 3     President Karadzic hardly ever knew who he was promoting, paragraph 1335.

 4     This false claim ignores, among other things, the evidence of multiple

 5     promotions or praise by Karadzic of individuals whose criminality he was

 6     well aware.  For example, those persons mentioned before, Vojkan and

 7     Drljaca, as well as Arkan.  Arkan's notorious criminality and that of his

 8     men was confirmed by both Prosecution and Defence witnesses.  For

 9     example, T34700, T1513 and T46386.  As discussed earlier, when Karadzic

10     brought Arkan back to Bosnia in 1995, Mladic told him that Arkan had

11     "liquidated a certain number of loyal Muslim citizens."  That's found at

12     paragraph 474 of our brief.  Nevertheless, Arkan and his men lined up in

13     front of the town hall in Bijeljina so that Karadzic could reward them

14     for their achievements, stating:

15             "I am deeply thankful and I congratulate you.  You will always

16     have a place in the heart of those you have defended," P2858.

17             That's a still from that.

18             Just one year after the Koricanske Stijene massacre and

19     subsequent cover-up Drljaca was promoted and he and his subordinates

20     received commendations from Karadzic who was represented by Subotic at

21     the award ceremony, P4261.  As discussed at paragraph 568 of our brief,

22     in the face of overwhelming evidence of the crimes committed by the

23     military and civilian authorities at a ceremonial Assembly session in

24     January 1994, Karadzic announced that:

25             "Contrary to all the lies and slander of international propaganda

Page 47683

 1     mongers, the Serbian army maintained the knightly character and military

 2     honour worthy of it," P5525, page 10.  And he proceeded to bestow awards

 3     on individuals who had participated in implementing the common plan.  And

 4     those persons included Stanislav Galic, Radislav Krstic, Rajko Kusic,

 5     Svetozar Andric, Milenko Zivanovic, Nedjeljko Rasula, Mauzer's Panthers,

 6     Miroslav Deronjic, Radoslav Brdjanin.  These are all detailed at the

 7     Prosecution brief at paragraph 567 through 568.  And further illustrating

 8     Karadzic's shared intent, he continued to rely on these individuals to

 9     effectuate his policies.  See our brief at paragraph 569.  The Defence

10     argues at 1339 that:

11             "President Karadzic would not have ordered strict application of

12     the rules of the international law of war and sanctioning of individuals

13     who violated those rules and at the same time decorated perpetrators'

14     crimes.  In fact, as we have seen, violators of international law were

15     not subject to sanction by Karadzic or his fellow JCE members like

16     Mladic, evidencing the wholly superficial nature of his orders to comply

17     with IHL.  Rather than punish, he raised and rewarded the perpetrators

18     evidencing his intent in respect to those crimes and his affirmation of

19     the results, the ethnically clean areas of the RS."

20             Mr. President, I'd like to turn to Count 11, hostage taking.

21             As described in paragraphs 1102 through 1107 of our brief,

22     between 26 May 1995 and 19 June 1995, Karadzic and other members of the

23     Bosnian Serb leadership took over 200 UN personnel hostage to prevent

24     NATO from conducting further air strikes, indeed the Defence concedes

25     that Karadzic agreed that UN personnel should be detained in the wake of

Page 47684

 1     those air strikes.  That's at paragraph 3354.  However, the Defence makes

 2     the extraordinary claim that Karadzic never agreed that threats should be

 3     made against the detained UN personnel.  This is another clear example of

 4     Karadzic's revisionism.  The day the UN personnel were captured, Mladic

 5     threatened UNPROFOR commander Rupert Smith with their televised death

 6     unless the NATO attacks ceased, P2286, page 4.  UNPROFOR was told that

 7     one UNMO would be shot for every additional NATO bomb, P2170,

 8     paragraph 28.  On Karadzic's orders they were used as human shields,

 9     handcuffed to target sites and videos of them.  That's at P2268, page 4;

10     P5013, page 2.  Videos of them were broadcast to the world and we can

11     take a moment to have a look at some of those videos broadcast within

12     hours of the hostages being taken and that's P2024.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             "Again, the Serb's ammunition bunkers at Pale was attacked by

15     NATO jets and this morning four bunkers were taken out.  The Serbs

16     reacted furiously, this time not with shelling but with hostage taking.

17             "This is a time of humiliation for the United Nations.  UNMOs, UN

18     military observers, were held chained and padlocked by the Serbs to

19     points of strategic importance.  This [indiscernible] to an observatory

20     and a [indiscernible] to a bridge telling his captors what they wanted to

21     hear.

22             "Today, we the UNMOs saw that the NATO planes bombed a lot of

23     civilian targets and a lot of civilians were killed.  This is very bad

24     and it's a crime against humanity.  We the UNMOs will appeal to NATO

25     especially the president to be aware that our lives are in danger.

Page 47685

 1             "So more UN officers were shown chained or handcuffed to steel

 2     plates in the arms depot that NATO had attacked.  One was a Russian

 3     another was a Canadian, they were being used as a human shields and

 4     accused quite falsely, the UN said, of having called in the air strikes.

 5     The third officer from the Czech Republic was chained to the door of a

 6     bunker with ammunition still in it.  Six other observers are being held

 7     in similar circumstances.  On the way to the arms depot and already in

 8     the captivity of the Bosnian Serbs, the hostages called their

 9     headquarters.

10             "[Indiscernible] set free, otherwise we will wait.  We will be

11     killed.  Over.

12             "Just to confirm, what you are waiting from General Smith is

13     confirmation that the bombing will stop, over.

14             "If the bombing starts again I've been instructed to tell you

15     that we will die for the sake of NATO, over.

16             "This is BSA soldier.  Three UN observers are now at the site of

17     the warehouse.  Any more bombings, they'll be the first to go.

18     Understood?"

19             MR. TIEGER:  Your Honours, here we heard the hostages giving

20     forced statements and we heard from two of those hostages that those

21     statements were forced.  That's P2525 page 8 and T11126 through -33.

22     Forced statements repeating the demands made by the Bosnian Serbs and a

23     VRS officer threatening that they would be killed if the air strikes did

24     not cease.  This was classic hostage-taking, pure and simple.  And the

25     Bosnian Serb leadership was very pleased with their tactical.  On the

Page 47686

 1     3rd of June, Vinkovic and Krajisnik discussed the purpose behind the

 2     hostage taking.  Vinkovic advising that leadership "hold on to the

 3     hostages.  That's a fantastic card."  And Krajisnik confirming that "yes,

 4     we're doing that, we have an excellent method.  We always have an ace up

 5     our sleeve."  P2271, page 2.

 6             Karadzic was not only clearly aware of and complicity in the

 7     threat to kill or injure the hostages, he directly participated in

 8     putting their lives at risk.  The Defence contention that Karadzic

 9     "expected and ordered that UN personnel who were combatants would be

10     lawfully detained as prisoners of war and not mistreated while in

11     detention," that's at paragraph 3365 of their brief, is patently

12     unsustainable in light of the fact that, one, Karadzic personally

13     approved the use of the hostages as human shields, P2317, page 2,

14     directly and deliberately placing the hostages in harm's way while the

15     air strikes were still being carried out.  Karadzic's adviser and

16     spokesman, Zametica, who Karadzic said "speaks for me," 5607, page 7, and

17     who was cited by the Defence as support for the proposition that no

18     threats to UN personnel were envisaged was quoted by Reuters as saying on

19     26 May the day the first hostages were taken that "if the NATO alliance

20     wishes to continue with air strikes then it will have to kill the UN

21     troops here on the ground, P6474."  That same day Zametica visited the

22     Mount Jahorina radar dome at which Patrick Rechner and other hostages

23     were handcuffed.  And when Rechner asked him to explain the UNMO's

24     mistreatment, Zametica said, "Well, times have changed."  P2170,

25     paragraph 47.

Page 47687

 1             Later that day Zametica stated on Bosnian Serb radio that should

 2     there be any air attacks anywhere in RS, the RS would "treat entire

 3     UNPROFOR, all personnel as enemies" and that while so far the Bosnian

 4     Serbs had a "restrained response", if the attacks continue we shall go

 5     further.  That's D105, page 5.

 6             The Defence's claim that Karadzic did not condition the

 7     conditioned detention of UN personnel on the cessation of air strikes is

 8     also demonstrably false.  As the Defence accepts at paragraph 2722 of

 9     their brief, prior to the hostages being taken, Karadzic threatened that

10     if NATO conducted air strikes "UN forces would be attacked or at least

11     detained."  That's P2265, page 3.  On 25 May, Karadzic ordered

12     Milovanovic to activate the previous year's Supreme Command decision to

13     "arrest everything foreign in RS territory and to treat military

14     personnel as prisoners of war and hold them as hostages until the end of

15     the war."  D2149, pages 56 through 57.

16             Having ordered that the personnel be taken hostage and following

17     the widespread publicity surrounding the use of the hostages as human

18     shields and the threats against them, on the 29th of May, Karadzic

19     explicitly stated that releasing them was "out of the question" unless

20     the Security Council "abolished the use of force, paper 5626.  The same

21     day he wrote the Secretary-General setting out his demands to prevent

22     further escalation, which included guarantees that the UN and NATO would

23     not use force, P5015.  And in an intercepted conversation the following

24     day, P5607, Karadzic agreed that his decision was to hold the hostages

25     "until final solution."  On June 1, he again publicly threatened to

Page 47688

 1     escalate Serb retaliation if the UN ordered more strikes D1056, page 2.

 2     The clear purpose of the detention was to compel NATO to abstain from

 3     conducting air strikes.  As described at paragraph 1108 of the

 4     Prosecution brief, Karadzic was intimately involved with the

 5     hostage-taking from start to finish.  He ordered that they be taken

 6     hostage, he publicly stated that he was changing the location of the

 7     prisoners often and warned that attempts to liberate them by force "would

 8     be a slaughter and only a political resolution was possible."  He

 9     approved a VRS order to place hostages at potential targets to prevent

10     air strikes and he controlled the hostages' release, issuing orders

11     releasing them in stages.  Given his direct involvement throughout this

12     process, it is not tenable, not credible that he was unaware or

13     unsupportive of the threats issued by his subordinates in the VRS.

14     Indeed, he affirmed his involved in and his support for the VRS's actions

15     after the hostages' release in this taped video.  That's P5026.

16                           [Video-clip played]

17             "In hindsight surely, though, surely it was a terrible mistake to

18     allow your people to have captured UN soldiers to -- for the world to

19     have seen them chained up, to see masked men holding guns to their heads.

20     That was terrible.  Isn't that an awful mistake?

21             "Well, one mistake causes another mistake.  One drastic move

22     causes another drastic reaction.  You have to realise that that was a

23     reaction, not action.  And we felt hopeless and helpless and we had to do

24     something that is drastic in order to prevent further strikes and in

25     order to show to the international community that we are cornered and we

Page 47689

 1     being cornered are ready to -- [indiscernible] by all means.

 2             "Because many people in -- in Serbia, for instance, in Bel --"

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Karadzic went on in this interview to insist that he

 4     was the supreme commander and that he was behind everything the army did.

 5     So having made clear at the time that he and his forces were ready to

 6     defend themselves "by all means" and that these "very drastic" measures

 7     were attributable to him, Karadzic once again attempts falsely to disavow

 8     responsibility.

 9             Your Honours, before concluding on Count 11, I'd like to make a

10     few comments on points of law.

11             At paragraphs 2737 --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I will inquire of the Registry how

13     far we can go for today.

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll continue for ten more minutes.

16             MR. TIEGER:  That should be fine, Mr. President.

17             At paragraphs 2737 through 2742, Karadzic repeats arguments which

18     have been consistently rejected by this Chamber and most recently by the

19     Appeals Chamber in paras 19 through 20 of its 98 bis decision.  Karadzic

20     simply repackages his argument that the detainees were not protected

21     because they were prisoners of war and ignores the fact that they were

22     threatened with death or injury.  In question 12, Your Honours have

23     invited the Prosecution to respond to the Defence claim that there is no

24     authority for the propositions that, one, the prior violation of law

25     justifying a reprisal must be a violation of jus in bello, and, two,

Page 47690

 1     reprisals may not involve acts against detained persons.  The Defence

 2     claim is simply mistaken.  The first element of belligerent reprisals as

 3     set out in the Martic Appeals Chamber judgement para 263 requires a prior

 4     violation of international humanitarian law.  Karadzic's argument at 2750

 5     reflects a plain misunderstanding of terms used in international law and

 6     the relationship to each other.  The three terms law of armed conflict,

 7     international humanitarian law and jus in bello are interchangeable.  So

 8     when Karadzic observes in paragraph 2750 that the plain text of the

 9     element set forth in the Martic and Kupreskic cases apply to prior

10     violations of law of armed conflict, he fails to appreciate that this

11     means a prior violation of international humanitarian law or jus in

12     bello, as distinct from the law of -- regulating the resort to force of

13     jus ad bellum.  And when this term logical misunderstanding is corrected,

14     the premise of Karadzic's argument falls away.

15             Furthermore, the accused has not set out any other basis for

16     defence of reprisals against violations of use at bellum.  For instance,

17     when placed in context or quoted in full, the military manuals relied

18     upon by the accused do not provide a basis for reprisals in response to

19     jus ad bellum violations, in other words, defensive reprisals.  And in

20     some instances those same sources explicitly prohibit them.  So see his

21     resort to the US military manual which, in fact, states that the side

22     that is acting in self-defence against illegal aggression does not

23     because of that fact gain any right to violate the law of armed conflict

24     or the Togo manual which states that reprisals, if used, must be

25     proportional to the violation of the law of war committed by the enemy.

Page 47691

 1     That's simply a baseless position that he takes on -- for a number of

 2     reasons.  But in any event, whether defensive reprisals constitute a

 3     lawful basis upon which to violate jus in bello is irrelevant to the

 4     charge of hostage-taking because the Geneva Conventions and customary

 5     international law prohibit reprisals against detained persons.  The

 6     fundamental principle underpinning the laws of war is that of

 7     distinction.  The 1929 Geneva Convention Article 12, the

 8     Geneva Conventions Articles 13 and 33 of the 3rd and 4th

 9     Geneva Conventions and their Common Article 3, customary international

10     law, the ICRC customary international law study, volume 1, pages 519

11     through 520 prohibit reprisals in any form against persons hors de

12     combat.  The absence of a blanket prohibition in Additional Protocol I is

13     irrelevant.  To permit reprisals against such persons for whatever reason

14     would undermine the entire structure upon which international

15     humanitarian law is based.  Even accepting Karadzic's claim that the UN

16     personnel were prisoners of war, which the Prosecution does not,

17     Article 13 of the 3rd Geneva Convention expressly states that "measures

18     of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited."

19             The law on this point is clear.  Reprisals are prohibited against

20     detainees.

21             In conclusion, the brazen taking of UN personnel taking hostage

22     by Karadzic and his fellow JCE members, including handcuffing them to

23     potential targets as human shields and subjecting them to abuse evidences

24     just how far by May 1995 Karadzic and his fellow members of the JCE and

25     his fellow members of the Bosnian Serb leadership considered themselves

Page 47692

 1     beyond the law.

 2             Mr. President, I see we are at time.  When we resume, I will try

 3     to answer some of your additional questions.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 6                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.07 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 30th day of

 8                           September, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.