1 Monday, 29 September 2014
2 [Prosecution Closing Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Would the Registrar call the case, please.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honours. This
9 is case number IT-95-5/18-T, the Prosecutor versus Radovan Karadzic.
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 Could I have the appearances. The Prosecution first.
12 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, everyone
13 in and outside the courtroom. Alan Tieger, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff, and
14 Iain Reid in the courtroom presently for the Prosecution. We will be
15 joined during the course of presentations by Katrina Gustafson and
16 Melissa Pack.
17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
18 For the Defence.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
20 Good morning to all. I am going to introduce only my main legal advisers
21 in court, Mr. Peter Robinson, Goran Petronijevic, and Marko Sladojevic.
22 JUDGE KWON: We have another legal adviser in the courtroom,
23 Mr. Karadzic, do we not? Why don't you introduce your -- oh, yes, I
24 missed that. My apology, Mr. Petronijevic.
25 Yes, Mr. Harvey, for the stand-by counsel, please.
1 MR. HARVEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours,
2 Dr. Karadzic, everyone in the courtroom. Richard Harvey assisted by
3 Mirjana Vukajlovic for the stand-by counsel.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Harvey.
5 Yes, we heard the evidence of the first Prosecution witness about
6 four and a half years ago, in April 2010, and the Defence case was closed
7 about five months ago, in May 2014. We have now reached the stage of the
8 proceedings in this case to hear the closing arguments of the parties
9 pursuant to Rule 86 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
10 Tribunal. The Chamber has ordered that the Prosecution and the Defence
11 shall have ten hours each to present their closing arguments and one and
12 a half hours each to present their rebuttal and rejoinder arguments
14 Before giving the floor to the Prosecution, I would like to state
15 on the record that on Friday evening the Chamber, through its
16 Legal Officer, sent the parties a list of questions via e-mail which the
17 Chamber wanted the parties to consider and incorporate in their closing
18 arguments in the coming days. I believe that the parties have all
19 received those questions. In this regard, I would like the parties to
20 identify the questions before answering them for the record.
21 Further, I would also like to apologise to the parties for the
22 fact that these questions were sent late on Friday evening, but the
23 Chamber felt that even such short notice would be better than simply
24 raising those questions in court and potentially surprising the parties;
25 however, that is not to say that the Chamber will not have additional
1 questions that may arise during the course of the closing arguments.
2 Now, Mr. Tieger, you have the floor.
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Your Honours, in August of 1992, when one Bosnian Muslim or
5 Bosnian Croat community after another was being destroyed or terrorised,
6 the ICRC president explained what the world by that time knew:
7 "Let me give you the sad picture. The civilian population is
8 systematically harassed. Thousands of civilians are arrested in their
9 homes, brutalised, or even killed. Whole minority groups comprising tens
10 of thousands of civilians are systematically transferred by force.
11 Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been besieged for several months
12 in cities such as Bihac, Derventa, Gorazde, Sarajevo. Detainees, the
13 majority of whom are civilians, are held in conditions of extreme
14 hardship in places of detention which are totally inadequate for that
15 purpose. They are ill-treated and hundreds of them have been executed."
16 When internationals confronted Karadzic about these massive
17 crimes, he deflected them with claims of Serb victimisation or offered
18 pretextual assurances of his good intentions. And now, after hundreds of
19 witnesses, nearly 50.000 pages of transcript, more than 10.000 exhibits,
20 the policy of ethnic cleansing is fully exposed. And Dr. Karadzic
21 revealed, as its driving force and the man who bragged at the time about,
22 the pain-staking steps he had devised and was implementing but now
23 pretends they never existed; who promotes the revisionist history of
24 events that denies thousands and thousands of crimes; who praised and
25 promoted those who implemented his criminal policy but now, anticipating
1 that his revisionist history is beyond belief, blames those who did his
2 dirty work; who orchestrated an effort to hide and destroy incriminating
3 documents and crafted a defence based on falsehoods by his still loyal
4 and compliant followers in court. Who falsely asserts that the
5 indictment against him criminalises all Serbs, thus willingly tarnishing
6 the representation of the Serb people in order to hide behind them and
7 who was known as a liar to the internationals with whom he dealt at the
8 time, Akashi, Owen, Rose, Smith, Vance, Okun, and who continues to
9 propagate his false stories in court.
10 As we now know, Karadzic told both his victims and followers what
11 would happen and it did, thousands kills, hundreds of towns destroyed,
12 masses forcibly displaced. The focus on these massive crimes, however,
13 risks losing sight of the individual victims, whose tragedies one by one
14 by one are his responsibility. The brief accounts that follow of the
15 three victims are a reminder of one unique person after another whose
16 loved ones will never see him or her again, whose contributions to the
17 world will never be realised, or of the many who struggle on a daily
18 basis with physical pain or terror that can never fully be left behind.
19 People such as the late Sulejman Crncalo, who with his family and
20 scores of other non-Serbs from Pale municipality, was expelled from their
21 homes and forcibly transferred to Sarajevo in July 1992. He and his
22 family lived the rest of the war in constant fear that one of them might
23 be killed by a sniper or a shell. He burned furniture and books to keep
24 warm and saw people shot before his eyes and corpses which couldn't be
25 collected for burial because of the continuous sniping and shelling. On
1 August 28th, 1995, his wife made her way to the market to pick up
2 powdered milk for their children; she never returned, killed by the
3 mortar shell in scheduled incident G19. She was buried at night - by
4 then a Sarajevo custom so that mourners could pay their respects without
5 getting shot or shelled.
6 Or a witness known here only as KDZ69, who in July 1995 was a
7 17-year-old school boy living with his family in Srebrenica. As he and
8 his father sought to join the column fleeing towards Tuzla, they became
9 separated. He never saw his father again. After KDZ69 and many others
10 from the column surrendered, they were forced to run to Sandici meadow,
11 where between 1- and 2.000 captured men were held. He was loaded on to
12 one of several trucks packed so full with people that his body was numb,
13 held overnight, and refused water. The next day they were brought to
14 Petkovci school, where they were beaten and abused and waited, soaked in
15 their own urine and parched with thirst, listening to the bursts of
16 gun-fire as men were brought out of the school and shot. They were then
17 ordered to remove their shoes and clothes to the waist, their hands were
18 tied behind their backs, they were crammed on to another lorry and driven
19 to the Petkovci Dam execution site. Despite the knowledge that their
20 death awaited, many of the men were so thirsty that they were screaming,
21 Give us water and then kill us. They were ordered off the trucks five at
22 a time, ordered to lie down, and shot. Miraculously, despite being
23 repeatedly shot, KDZ69 did not die, but he watched as others were led to
24 their death, watched as a man moaning in agony beside him was shot in the
25 head. And as he lay in unbearable pain and suffering from immense
1 thirst, he prayed to die and thought of his mother, who would never know
2 where he was. Yet he survived and, once the soldiers had left, rolled
3 over dead bodies to another survivor so he could untie him and they could
4 untie each other. Unable to walk over the course of four days, he made
5 his way to Muslim territory, crawling and being carried at times by his
6 fellow survivor.
7 And just one more of the many heroic stories that cannot be told
8 here. Dr. Eso Sadikovic of Prijedor, a doctor who had worked for the UN,
9 in the Pacific and Africa, became a prisoner in Omarska. He was widely
10 known as a deeply humane man who helped everyone he could. After most of
11 the other doctors in Prijedor had been killed, shortly before dawn in
12 early August Dr. Sadikovic was called out and ominously told to bring his
13 things. Fellow detainee Nusret Sivac recalled those final moments:
14 "Dr. Eso stood up. He took his nylon bag in which he had a
15 handful of cigarettes that the other prisoners had collected for him. He
16 brought his dirty shirt and he headed for the door. We all stood up. We
17 stood quietly. And then all of us started -- all of us spoke out loud
18 and we said: Dr. Eso, thank you. Thank you so much for everything. He
19 just turned back and he said: Thank you, friends, and good-bye. We did
20 not believe that there was such a criminal person in this world who would
21 be able to kill a man like Dr. Eso."
22 What binds each of these tragedies and countless more is that
23 they are the result of one of four criminal enterprises or JCEs. First
24 an overarching JCE to forcibly displace Bosnian Muslims and Croats
25 through crimes, including persecution, torture, murder, extermination,
1 and genocide. A JCE to carry out a campaign of sniping and shelling
2 against the civilian population in Sarajevo for the primary purpose of
3 terror. A JCE to take hostages to compel NATO to abstain from conducting
4 air strikes. And a JCE to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by
5 killing the men and boys and forcibly removing women, young children, and
6 elderly. All distinct, although each broadly in service of the same goal
7 of achieving a Serbian state on vast territories within
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And what binds those JCEs together is
9 Radovan Karadzic.
10 I turn now to the overarching JCE. That JCE was rooted in
11 Karadzic's determination that Bosnian Serbs would not be separated from
12 Serbs in other parts of former Yugoslavia by the borders of a sovereign
13 and independent Bosnia. As Bosnia moved closer to independence, Karadzic
14 attempted to forestall it through negotiations while simultaneously
15 preparing to unilaterally keep Serbs from becoming a minority in a
16 sovereign Bosnia if negotiations failed. He began with steps that
17 replicated what minority Serbs had done in Croatia, such as
18 regionalisation and training camps, but by October 1991 Karadzic and the
19 Bosnian Serb leadership had decided to "move on" toward de facto
20 solutions and the establishment of an ethnically separate state.
21 Over the course of the following months, Karadzic led the SDS in
22 the creation of the organs of that state and the establishment of its
23 police and army. When negotiations failed and Bosnian independence was
24 days away, Karadzic's municipality officials and police, aided by his
25 Serbian collaborators, began a series of take-overs that quickly left the
1 Bosnian Serbs in control of vast amounts of Bosnia's territory. These
2 take-overs were quickly followed by the cleansing and sometimes
3 destruction of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities, a
4 process that would culminate in 1995 in the destruction of the Srebrenica
5 enclave, to which many of those cleansed from their original
6 municipalities had fled.
7 I outline the story of some of the masses of victims of the
8 overarching JCE, particularly Dr. Sadikovic, but whole communities,
9 distinct and separate parts of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
10 community, were also victims; for example, Prijedor. As described at
11 paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Prijedor municipality summary in our brief and
12 contrary to Karadzic's false claim that Prijedor fell outside his
13 influence and control, that's Defence brief paragraph 217, Karadzic
14 personally intervened to ensure that the SDS leadership there was
15 committed to following his policies. Prijedor authorities received and
16 implemented Variant A and B and indeed acknowledged that the physical
17 take-over of the municipality on April 30th, 1992, was part of the
18 implementation of the second level of A and B. In his efforts to
19 distance himself from those in the field, Karadzic now claims that the
20 take-over was a reaction to a BiH Presidency order to commence combat
21 operations. That's para 1534 of their brief. This is belied by not only
22 the direct testimony from Defence Witness Miskovic but by evidence of the
23 elaborate preparation involved, as described at paragraph 6 of the
24 Prijedor summary, including SDS municipal instructions to commence
25 take-over preparations before the BiH Presidency order.
1 Prijedor's story is chilling, so let me tell it as clinically and
2 as simply as possible. After the take-over, the persecutions of Muslims
3 began. To put it in the succinct terms of one witness, it was like they
4 were in a ghetto, P677, page 10. As described at paragraph 10 of the
5 Prijedor summary, Muslims were subjected to travel restrictions,
6 terminated from employment, even forced to wear white armbands to
7 identify themselves as Muslims, that's P3478, pages 25 through 26.
8 As described at para 12 of the Prijedor summary, commencing in
9 late May 1992, area after area where the Muslims lived were attacked and
10 destroyed by the VRS and the MUP, beginning with the shelling of
11 Hambarine following an armed clash at a check-point. The VRS and MUP
12 next turned their attention to the large area of Kozarac where thousands
13 and thousands of Muslims lived. Beginning on the 24th of May it was
14 shelled for two days. Serb forces then entered the area, rounding up
15 thousands of people and taking them to camps. Up to 800 people were
16 killed in the shelling and the subsequent attack and, as I say, the
17 remainder were taken to detention facilities.
18 The Defence attempts to characterise this as combat against a
19 fierce adversary, that's found at 1543 and 1545 of their belief, but the
20 evidence reveals that the "Muslim forces" were an ad hoc, poorly
21 equipped, essentially quixotic force against a very powerfully equipped
22 army, as the grotesquely disproportionate casualty ratio of more than
23 100:1 clearly reveals. That's adjudicated fact 1057.
24 In any event, Your Honours, the evidence is clear that the attack
25 was directed at the entire Kozarac community. 7.000 Muslims were
1 detained, the majority of whom could not be considered Green Berets, even
2 based in the army's own inflated estimates. And compare 5398, a 1KK
3 report about 7.000 prisoners with D1743, stating that the total strength
4 of the Green Berets was 1500 to 2.000.
5 Those houses not destroyed by the shelling itself were completely
6 devastated over the course of the following months and this destruction
7 was carried out by the VRS - in the words of one Defence witness - "so
8 that people would move away and have nothing to come back to," D2265,
9 pages 56 through 57 and mosques suffered the same fate for the same
11 Next, the centuries'-old Muslim old town of Stari Grad was
12 destroyed "wiped from the face of the earth," following a quickly subdued
13 one-hour attack by a small group of lightly armed Muslims. And as
14 described in the scheduled incident charts A10.5, 10.6, and 10.9, in the
15 latter part of July the VRS and MUP cleanse the Brdo and Brisevo areas.
16 The very Defence suggestions that these were legitimate combat operations
17 in which there was some collateral damage are completely untenable. VRS
18 reports in May and July reflect that there were only a handful of alleged
19 Green Berets with a "insignificant" number of light weapons who were
20 either surrendering or living in the woods or underground shelters in
21 groups of five to ten. See D1743 or P3317.
22 The evidence is clear, the operation against the Brdo was an
23 operation to expel the population through "intimidation" and see the
24 Prijedor summary footnote 86. At least 3- to 350 people were killed in
25 the Brdo, and that is known to be only a portion of the total number of
1 people killed. Indeed, another independent estimate was 500 to 700.
2 These bodies were taken to Tomasica mine, and the remainder of those
3 Muslims cleansed were taken to Omarska, Keraterm, or Trnopolje, where
4 many died or were killed. Another 68 were killed that same week in
5 Brisevo, a Bosnian Croat village. Over a hundred people were taken from
6 Miska Glava to Ljubija football stadium, where at least 15 were killed.
7 In his brief, Karadzic disingenuously asserts that the others were
8 released the day after, that's para 1558, failing to mention that their
9 release from Ljubija stadium was being taken to Kipe where over 90 men
10 were executed, their bodies thrown into a hole and covered up with an
11 earthmover. And see scheduled incidental chart A 10.7.
12 I mentioned the camps to which the survivors of those cleansings
13 were taken. Those were Omarska, Keraterm, or Trnopolje. Let me turn to
15 As described at para 20 of the Prijedor narrative. Omarska was
16 set up under Crisis Staff authority by the written order of police chief
17 Drljaca and secured by the police with VRS and Territorial Defence
18 backup. As described in scheduled incident chart C20.2, thousands of
19 prisoners lived in horrific conditions, crammed together in unhygienic
20 conditions. Even the commander who testified here acknowledged that a
21 terrible stench pervaded the room into which prisoners were crammed with
22 near starvation rations. Just patch P6686, a video depicting emaciated
23 prisoners ravenously wolfing down a bean soup that they had been given to
24 impress journalists. Interrogations were conducted by MUP and military
25 police investigators. Meetings were routine during interrogations,
1 sometimes beating people to death. That's T44225 and 44263. As the
2 commander of the camp admitted here, very seldom did a beating not occur
3 which he knew in part because he heard the screams of the detainees
4 throughout the day.
5 Outside interrogations, there were indescribably vicious beatings
6 or just routine beatings. For example, when the detainees tried to use
7 the fetid toilet facilities or go to the canteen for their meager portion
8 of bread and particularly in the white house where prisoners were held
9 for special mistreatment. Women were also held in Omarska, used during
10 the day to clean up the blood and tissue from beatings and raped by
11 night. On a daily basis in Omarska, bodies lay on the ground, often
12 piled up like garbage to be removed by TAM truck. Prisoners feared
13 "every second" because they never knew who would be called out and never
15 On a single occasion, approximately 180 prisoners were murdered
16 by gun-fire and their bodies loaded on to an excavator for disposal.
17 Even the camp commander, the Defence witness, admitted to over a hundred
18 killed, either in camp or taken away for liquidation and later exhumed.
19 That's T4457 through -59. In particular, Muslim and Croat political,
20 intellectual leaders were -- and police officials were targeted for
21 liquidation in an organised series of killings, and the bodies, when
22 found, exhumed from mass graves. In Keraterm, detainees were also held
23 in wretched and inhumane conditions, packed in the bloodstained concrete
24 warehouses with no space to lie down with insufficient ventilation, or
25 access to hygiene, near starvation, dysentery, lice, routine beatings and
1 killings. And see scheduled chart C20.3.
2 Over the course of two particular days, the 24th and the
3 25th of July, 1992, approximately 150 detainees were massacred in room 3
4 on the -- on that date.
5 Trnopolje was used by Serb authorities to gather non-Serbs for
6 deportation outside RS and to other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and third
7 countries. Over 23.000 people had been detained there by the end of
8 September 1992. Although conditions were not as barbarous or deadly as
9 in Omarska and Keraterm, detainees were nevertheless beaten and raped
10 scheduled incident chart C20.4.
11 The Defence assertion that Trnopolje was an open collection
12 centre where people came voluntarily is contradicted by overwhelming
13 evidence as set out in para 23 of the Prijedor summary, including
14 Stakic's Defence witness admission to the contrary. T45239.
15 By 1993, over 80 per cent of non-Serb villages were largely
16 destroyed and uninhabited. Virtually all Muslim places of worship had
17 been destroyed and approximately 44.000 Bosnian Muslims and Croats had
18 been expelled. The Defence claims that the Muslims and Croats left
19 Prijedor voluntarily, citing as an example KDZ26, that's at para 1537,
20 footnote 3463. This is a man who left Prijedor when he was shipped from
21 Omarska to Manjaca. Karadzic also ignores the testimony of his own
22 witness Stakic, that in 1992 Muslims were expelled from their homes and
23 compelled to leave out of fear and that the police and army committed
24 mass crimes against Muslims and Croats, including detentions, torture,
25 mistreatment, and killings. But a large number of Muslims would never
1 leave. In 1993 Drljaca informed the Bosnian Serb leadership about the
2 5.000 Muslim bodies thrown into Tomasica mine for which he sought help in
3 disposing. P1483, pages 154 through -55.
4 Let me turn next to Sanski Most and relate just what the Defence
5 evidence reveals about what happened at Sanski Most. For confidentiality
6 reasons, I will use letters in lieu of witness numbers and then provide
7 the source in closed session. The SOS "carried out tasks that the local
8 SDS leadership required them to do." They were an "armed formation"
9 under the command of the SDS. That's cite A. This is armed formation
10 blew up Muslim property and remained a paramilitary force until placed
11 under the command of the army, cite B. Disarming was not aimed at the
12 Serbs but at the Croats and Muslims "the opponents." By 11 May, Muslims
13 and Croats from most places had already surrendered their weapons
14 voluntarily, either to the police station or the civilian defence,
15 cite C. Crisis Staff president Rasula issued an ultimatum to the SDA to
16 leave the municipality building or they would be attacked. The SOS shot
17 a Zolja projectile at the building without knowing whether anyone was in
18 the building or not, and two or three offices were set on fire, cite D.
19 Dismissals, non-Serb judges and court officials were removed before May
20 of 1992. By then "differentiation," a euphemism for dismissals had
21 already taken place in the police and other organs, cite E. Before the
22 shelling of Mahala on the 26th of May, 1992, the army informed the
23 Crisis Staff. And although it was known that civilians, that is,
24 families lived in Mahala, nobody told the army commander Basara to watch
25 out for civilians. "Naturally" people got killed. In addition, most of
1 their homes were destroyed by the shelling or by the military setting
2 fire to their houses afterwards. Residents couldn't go back to their
3 homes because "their houses, the neighbourhood, was destroyed," cite F.
4 After "ciscenje," that is a cleansing or mopping up, in Vrhpolje or
5 Hrustovo, people were killed on a bridge or thrown into the water, cite
6 G. Following military operations against Muslim villages, the army put
7 people on buses and brought them into town. The village was burned,
8 destroyed, and the army collected the able-bodied military-aged men and
9 handed them over to the civilian authorities for interrogations, cite H.
10 The army rounded up a large number of persons from Mahala, Muhici, Otoka,
11 Vrhpolje, Hrustovo. Many people were taken to detention facilities who
12 were "not supposed to be there" because the military did not distinguish
13 between people, "they just imprisoned and arrested only able-bodied men,
14 put them on buses, and then handed them over to the civilian
15 authorities." People were later transferred to Manjaca who hadn't been
16 processed at all. "They just put a label on them as being prisoners of
17 war." They did not differentiate. That's cite I. The Crisis Staff
18 created Betonirka, and the warden of that prison was answerable to the
19 Crisis Staff, but all the elements of Serbian authority, the police, the
20 civilian authority, and the military were in charge of resolving the
21 issue of prisoners. Betonirka was not a remotely suitable place to keep
22 prisoners and conditions were "most definitely inhumane," cite J. The
23 Crisis Staff was the highest authority. Rasula was president of the
24 Municipal Assembly and consequently the Crisis Staff, Vrkes, was his
25 deputy. Rasula went to ARK Crisis Staff meetings and would "convey what
1 was concluded there." And the army commander Basara also attended most
2 Crisis Staff meetings, cite K. The municipal authorities put members in
3 charge of resettlement who would compile lists of people who wanted to
4 relocate, compile transportation lists, and decide where these people
5 would go. A "voluntarily" departure meant someone requested to leave
6 because they didn't feel safe, that's cite L, and they didn't feel safe
7 given the events I just described.
8 Communications always functioned from April to December 1992,
9 although during seven to ten days in May communications were interrupted
10 because of war activities. And finally, the SDS had absolute power which
11 they exerted through their various bodies and through the Crisis Staff in
12 particular. That's cite N:
13 "From the SDS line, from the top leadership within
14 Republika Srpska down to the local level of the SDS, because the policy
15 was formulated by the SDS. So it went from the top, from the president
16 of the SDS Radovan Karadzic down to the local board of the SDS in
17 Sanski Most. It was at that level that the main policy was formulated
18 and carried out," cite O.
19 Now, as mentioned, this is simply the Defence evidence about
20 Sanski Most. In addition, the evidence overall reveals such things as
21 the president of the Crisis Staff before the Mahala operation ordered
22 that all with arms were to be killed and that "captured civilians" were
23 to be "used for exchange." That's P3329, page 33. Or that one of the
24 categories for detention and expulsion was being a person who was
25 "unwelcome in Sanski Most municipality," P2639, and that the
1 Crisis Staff's official organ the "Informator," declared that Muslims
2 were not a people and Croats carried a genetically pathological desire to
3 kill those superior to them.
4 It is equally instructed to shift our focus to the other side of
5 Bosnia where Karadzic's preparation both within Bosnia and with his
6 benefactors in Belgrade led to an essentially Muslim-free municipality.
7 As Karadzic said in January 1993, there were sill 50.000 people in
8 Zvornik, but now "they are all Serbs." That's P794, page 4.
9 The Defence depicts Zvornik's take-over and its aftermath as the
10 work of paramilitaries from Serbia outside the control of the Zvornik
11 authorities. In fact, the evidence shows a carefully co-ordinated
12 operation between paramilitary and Bosnian Serb forces carried out at the
13 behest of and with the full co-operation of the republic and local
14 authorities who worked together with paramilitaries in committing
15 systematic crimes against Zvornik's non-Serb community. The preparation
16 for take-over began with Zvornik's receipt and implementation of
17 Variant A and B forming a Crisis Staff within two days. You'll find that
18 at para 4 of the Zvornik summary. Indeed, immediately before the
19 conflict, Karadzic used Zvornik as an example of how take-overs were to
20 be effected. That's P961, page 22. As described in the Zvornik summary,
21 para 6, the Serbian military -- paramilitaries sent in by Karadzic's
22 Belgrade collaborators were welcomed into Zvornik by the local
23 authorities and assigned to TO brigades. Interim government president,
24 Brano Grujic, confirmed that they -- "I just said welcome. Go to
25 headquarters, to the command, and you should be deployed and go and
1 protect our people." That's T40384. Together with the Bosnian Serb
2 police, TO, and the JNA, they effected a brutal take-over in which dozens
3 of civilians were killed. See the Zvornik summary at para 12. As
4 described in paras 20 through 28, following the take-over, widespread
5 cleansing operations were carried out, co-ordinated between the
6 Bosnian Serb forces and civilian authorities. Non-Serb were arrested and
7 detained at various detention centres, where they were subjected to
8 mistreatment and killings. And again, the Defence tries to lay the
9 entirety of the blame on paramilitaries, claiming at para 1448 of their
10 brief that these illegal prisons were operated by paramilitaries. But in
11 fact, the Zvornik authorities were heavily involved in the illegal
12 detention of Muslims at these facilities, including the guarding of the
13 facilities, transfer of detainees between facilities, and even the
14 mistreatment of the facilities, all in full knowledge of the crimes which
15 were occurring there. For example, Muslim detainees at the Alhos factory
16 were severely mistreated not only by Arkan's men and White Eagles but
17 also by the Serb police. Moreover, the Bosnian Serb interim government
18 was based in Alhos. See scheduled incident chart C27.3. The more than
19 190 men murdered by gun-fire at Gero's Slaughterhouse were brought there
20 by police, following which Serb forces, including guards in JNA uniforms,
21 killed them. The clean-up of those bodies reflected a level of
22 organisation beyond mere paramilitary involvement. See scheduled
23 incident chart A 16.3. And it's described in charts B20.3 and C27.2.
24 Detainees at Karakaj technical school were held on order of the TO
25 commander. That's KW 317, T39367, and guarded by the Zvornik Brigade's
1 Karakaj company in addition to paramilitaries. About 160 men were
2 interrogated, beaten, and shot at the school. Another 25 disappeared
3 after being purportedly being brought for prisoner exchange.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Would you kindly slow down a little for the
5 interpreters, please.
6 MR. TIEGER: The Defence claim at paragraph 1453 that the
7 leadership was unaware of the crimes at Karakaj technical school is
8 contradicted by numerous OTP and Defence witnesses, one of whom described
9 it as a generally known secret - that's cite P - and another who
10 acknowledged it was the talk of the town. P6405, pages 4 through 5. As
11 described in chart B 20.2, Celopek Dom Kulture was guarded by reserve
12 police members. Detainees were sexually mutilated, forced to eat severed
13 body parts and over 25 detainees were killed. And Muslims were brought
14 to and transferred between detention centres in Zvornik and on to
15 Batkovic camp on interim government or TO orders accompanied by police.
16 That's at para 28 of the summary.
17 Your Honours, the crimes I've just discussed were not aimed at
18 these victims as individuals, but as members of an undesired community.
19 Karadzic's forcible demographic restructuring of Bosnia was to be
20 accomplished by the destruction of substantial parts of the
21 Bosnian Muslim and the Bosnian Croat communities and the proper name for
22 this crime is genocide.
23 Genocide is the commission of certain specified acts with the
24 intention to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or
25 religious group as such. In short, act plus intent. The jurisprudence
1 of this Tribunal reveals that these elements have been established in
2 this case beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the actus reus of genocide
3 is established. And that includes killings and serious bodily harm and
4 deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
5 bring about its physical destruction.
6 Now, although the scale and impact of those crimes can play a
7 role in the determination of intent, there is no requirement that the
8 underlying acts of genocide reach a particular level. So there is no
9 numeric threshold for killing members of the group, there is no
10 requirement that serious bodily harm have a particular impact, and with
11 respect 42(c), conditions of life, you've asked about that, that
12 provision is that deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
13 calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part is
14 an enumerated genocide act which when combined with the requisite intent
15 constitutes genocide.
16 Now, in response to your question, Your Honour, it is clear from
17 the preamble which distinguishes all these acts from intent that the
18 words "calculated to bring about" do not add an intent element. Instead,
19 it is a way of defining the nature of the act. So killing by definition
20 doesn't require any further elaboration and the nature of the bodily or
21 mental harm required is defined by the word "serious." But simply
22 reciting "serious conditions" would be of little assistance in defining
23 the act. So the framers identified the nature of the act by its
24 potential to destroy, that is, whether it's sufficiently grave.
25 And as for the finding of the Appeals Chamber that "Bosnian
1 Muslims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to conditions of life that
2 would bring about their physical destruction," about which you've asked,
3 the Appeals Chamber was talking about the nature of the conditions as it
4 affected individual members of the group, that is, Bosnian Muslims and
5 Croats, not the Bosnian Muslim and Croat community. The Appeals Chamber
6 said that these were clearly enough to destroy individual people which
7 seems pretty obvious from the conditions like starvation. And in light
8 of that, in light of conditions that could kill people, the evidence was
9 sufficient to show the imposition of conditions serious enough to be
10 considered calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the
11 group, that is, sufficiently grave.
12 Further, the Appeals Chamber was making a factual determination,
13 not attempting to articulate a legal standard, and particularly not one
14 which would entirely subvert the "objective probability standard" used by
15 the Brdjanin Trial Chamber at paragraph 906 relied upon by this
16 Trial Chamber at T28767 and which neither party challenged.
17 Your Honours, in this case where the evidence is so overwhelming
18 that genocidal acts occurred on a massive scale, there can be no question
19 that the actus reus of genocide has been met. So with that in mind, we
20 turn to intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group.
21 Intent to destroy means the intent to cause the physical demise
22 of a targeted community. The Tolimir Trial Chamber emphasised that "the
23 physical or biological destruction of a group is not necessarily the
24 death of the group members." That's at para 764 citing the Blagojevic
25 and Jokic trial judgement at para 666.
1 Now, this is reflecting in the convention and statute which
2 expressly encompassed genocide based on acts other than killing members
3 of the group. So while the intent to kill all members of the group is
4 perhaps the classical conception of genocide, these days it may not be
5 the most paradigmatic and, in any event, is not the only method or form.
6 Indeed, the Tribunal has identified over time various factors which are
7 specified in para 574 of our brief that may demonstrate genocidal intent.
8 You see them on the screen. What these factors have in common is their
9 pernicious impact on the foundations of life for the group, the
10 foundations that allow the group to continue as such. You've asked about
11 forcible displacement. While not a specified actus reus and while it
12 does not by itself constitute genocide, as our jurisprudence makes clear,
13 it can be a powerful additional means to ensure the destruction of the
14 foundations of life of the group so that the group does not continue and
15 cannot reconstitute itself. And you'll see that in context in just a
16 moment because all of these factors must be viewed in the context of the
17 totality of the criminal operations against the targeted group, in this
18 case by Karadzic through his participation in the JCE.
19 And when multiple massacres of group members have taken place,
20 when many, if not most, of the individual members have been brutalised,
21 terrorised, and traumatised, when the group has been simultaneously
22 deprived of its leaders, when their homes have been destroyed and razed,
23 when their religious buildings have been reduced to rubble, when the
24 group members have been forcibly displaced, that is, physically separated
25 and scattered, when the familial, community, and historical fabric
1 binding the group and its most sacred symbols have been destroyed, it is
2 an inescapable conclusion that the very existence of that community has
3 been intentionally attacked, revealing the goal to destroy the non-Serb
4 communities where necessary to be at the heart of the common criminal
6 And in connection with the Court's question, I hope you can
7 therefore see the role that forcible displacement can play in the
8 destruction of the foundations of life for the group. Dr. Karadzic's
9 direct expressions of genocidal intent and his clear intention that the
10 groups would not be able to reconstitute themselves simply reinforce this
11 conclusion. Let me just return to Prijedor, focus on that by way of
12 example and recall what I've specified before.
13 Up to 800 Muslim civilians killed in the first attacks, an
14 estimated 350 to 700 more in the cleansing of Brdo, 150 men in a single
15 massacre in Keraterm. Similarly 150 men detained in Omarska after Brdo
16 executed in the course of a single night. Killings so routine that
17 prisoners feared death every second with bodies piling up every day.
18 Approximately 200 men who survived Omarska or Keraterm massacred at
19 Koricanske Stijene. 68 Bosnian Croats killed, that is, shot or hacked to
20 death, during an attack on Brisevo. Over 100 Muslim civilians killed at
21 Miska Glava Dom and then later at -- at Ljubija football stadium and then
22 in Kipe. The Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croat leaders targeted for
23 killings and their bodies dumped in mass graves. Thousands and thousands
24 separated from their families, taken to Omarska and Keraterm where they
25 were starved, denied medical treatment, beaten, sexually assaulted,
1 tortured, and often killed. Thousands more taken to Trnopolje until they
2 were transferred outside the RS, often outside Bosnia. And meanwhile, to
3 make sure that the survivors did not contemplate return, their houses,
4 mosques, and cultural monuments levelled.
5 In a few months, just a few months, thousands of Prijedor's
6 non-Serb civilians had been killed, thousands more brutalised, beaten,
7 tortured, subjected to sexual violence and degraded. Their religious
8 structures and symbols destroyed or badly damaged, their livelihoods,
9 homes, and properties lost. They were then scattered around the world.
10 By October 1992 roughly 38.000 members of the targeted groups had been
11 expelled from the municipality, a figure which increased to 44.000 by May
12 1993. Taken together, these reflect an unmistakable intent to destroy
13 the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities of Prijedor. No other
14 conclusion can fairly be drawn from the devastation of these communities.
15 Now, it may not have been, as has sometimes been mistakenly claimed as
16 the test, a systematic effort to destroy each and every group member, but
17 it was plainly, plainly an effort and reflected an intention to destroy
18 the community, and that intent is confirmed by Karadzic's own direct
19 expressions of intent. As I stated, his statements anticipating,
20 threatening, and embracing such acts.
21 Over and over again Karadzic made clear what would happen to the
22 Bosnian Muslims and Croats if they persisted in pursuing independence.
23 Not by force of nature but at the hands of his forces, they would
24 disappear, be annihilated or be up to their necks in blood. Those are
25 all quotes. He stood before them, wagged his finger and told them they
1 were headed for ex-extinction. Now, he tries to paint himself as a
2 beneficent visionary who foresaw troubled times, but Karadzic is not the
3 building inspector who advises someone not to build on -- on land because
4 it's unstable. He's the mobster who says: Don't build there or I'll be
5 forced to destroy it. And who does so when his warning is disregarded.
6 As we explain in our brief at paragraph 580, Karadzic's rallying
7 cry was that this was a genocidal struggle, that his followers had the
8 right and duty to use reciprocal force. He knew full well the kind of
9 force the Bosnian Serbs would use while a largely helpless Europe was
10 told to go "fuck itself," D279, page 9.
11 And after the conflict was underway, Karadzic acknowledged that
12 the Muslims were vanishing and that it was roused by Europe to eliminate
13 the Muslims, D92, page 86. In other words, Europe put us in this
14 position and now we have to do this thing.
15 Now, the Defence brief at paragraph 2769 cites Nedic, whose
16 comment triggered Karadzic's remark. And Nedic came here and insisted
17 that he never advocated the execution of Muslims and he cited his
19 "Let us not kill women and children for wearing Turkish trousers
20 or whatever."
21 And that he told a VRS colonel that he was not for genocide.
22 Now, setting aside why Nedic felt compelled to tell the Assembly that
23 they shouldn't kill women and children or tell the army that he was
24 against genocide, the significance of the exchange with Karadzic lies in
25 the fact that Karadzic agreed that Muslims were vanishing at the hands of
1 his forces, the army, the police, and the Crisis Staffs.
2 And, Your Honours, when we return, I'd like to turn to the
3 meaning of "in part" and the distinct nature of these communities.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. We'll have a break for 20
5 minutes and resume at 10.20.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.00 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 10.22 a.m.
8 JUDGE KWON: Can we continue, Mr. Karadzic?
9 THE ACCUSED: Yes, Excellencies. I have just some -- there is a
10 new problem and I am confused but ...
11 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then we can continue.
12 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: As explained in the Prosecution brief, the intent to
14 destroy "in part" means seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group,
15 not a random accumulation of individuals. And in addition to being
16 distinct, the part must be substantial, significant enough to have an
17 impact on the whole. Now, impact on the whole refers to such things as
18 demonstrating the "vulnerability and defenselessness" of the overall
19 group. This impact, in turn, can be amplified by the "emblematic" or
20 strategic nature of the part. Although, whether the group is substantial
21 will vary according to the particular circumstances of each individual
22 case, our jurisprudence has identified some non-exhaustive factors,
23 including the numeric size of the part and its relative significance as
24 gauged, as I mentioned, by such matters as its emblematic or strategic
1 In this case, the targeted Muslim and Croat communities within
2 the municipalities specified in count 1 were distinct entities with a
3 centuries'-long presence, a specific culture, connected histories,
4 attachments and identities.
5 Now, as for numbers, as we know from the Krstic appeal regarding
6 the approximately 40.000 Muslims in Srebrenica coupled with this
7 emblematic and strategic significance, was sufficient to render it a
8 substantial part of the Bosnian Muslim group. The Muslims of Prijedor
9 were 49.000. The Croats 6.000 of a significantly smaller whole. As we
10 noted in our brief, even before the assessment of the emblematic nature,
11 the numbers such as this cannot be easily dismissed when the same ratio
12 of part to group as a whole is applied to larger groups, it translates to
13 shocking numbers that could not possibly be dismissed as insufficient if
14 that part was destroyed. In the US it translates to New York City. In
15 the United Kingdom it translates to Birmingham and Glasgow. No one could
16 suggest that their destruction would not serve as "a potent example "of
17 the overall group's vulnerability, especially if other parts of the group
18 were simultaneously attacked.
19 JUDGE KWON: Just, Mr. Tieger, I would hate to intervene, but you
20 referred to demonstrating the vulnerability and defenselessness. Could
21 you expand on that, what exactly it means or could you give me such
22 example which demonstrate the vulnerability and defenselessness in simple
24 MR. TIEGER: Well, by way of the definition, I think best example
25 comes from the source of the citation, which is the Krstic appeal, and
1 the impact I think the -- the still reverberating impact on the community
2 as a whole that results from the destruction of a community such as this.
3 And as the Krstic Appeals Chamber focused on, it wasn't simply the raw
4 numbers but it was the group's situation at that point, that is, the last
5 desperate hold-outs in Eastern Bosnia and they symbolise something to the
6 group as a whole that meant that the resonance of that destruction was
7 much larger than could simply be assessed by the raw numbers of that
8 community. And as I'll come to in a moment, Prijedor is essentially the
9 mirror -- well, in fact, I'll tell you now. Prijedor is essentially the
10 mirror image of that circumstance. Prijedor was emblematic because it
11 was the symbol throughout Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia of
12 brotherhood and unity and we have that in evidence, and brotherhood and
13 unity was the very concept that bound together these communities, the
14 very concept that promised and assured joint life in Bosnia. So when
15 Prijedor was destroyed at the beginning of the war, it sent a powerful
16 message to the Bosnian Muslim community that -- of their vulnerability,
17 of their defenselessness, that the umbrella concept that had held the
18 groups together before, brotherhood and unity, was shattered, was no
19 longer present and that they were completely at the whim of the more
20 powerful forces arrayed against them.
21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
22 MR. TIEGER: I might add, Mr. President, that you'll be reviewing
23 municipality summaries and will find within them the particular strategic
24 and emblematic nature of the other communities specified in count 1 and
25 will also be aware that the impact of their destruction was magnified by
1 the simultaneous attacks on other parts of the community.
2 I want to reaffirm the principles that I've outlined by taking
3 the Court back to the origins of the legal concept of genocide, to the
4 words of the man who first conceptualised and named the crime of
5 genocide. As Raphael Lemkin stated:
6 "Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the
7 immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass
8 killings of all members of a nation. It is intended, rather, to signify
9 a co-ordinated plan of different actions aimed at the destruction of the
10 essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of
11 annihilating the groups themselves."
12 Lemkin made clear precisely what is embodied in our Statute and
13 our jurisprudence, that genocide may be accomplished in ways other than
14 quilling its members and also that the essence of genocide is the
15 destruction of the foundations of life for the group, not the death of
16 its individual members, although that is clearly one method but just one
17 method of destroying the group's foundations. This --
18 JUDGE KWON: Once again, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
20 JUDGE KWON: You are being requested to slow down by the
21 interpreters. Please bear that in mind. Please.
22 MR. TIEGER: This position is embodied in our jurisprudence and
23 has been since its inception. The Chamber of this Tribunal adjudicating
24 the Rule 61 proceedings against Dr. Karadzic made that clear. Referring
25 to evidence of destructive acts targeting the foundations of the group
1 and concluding in words echoing Lemkin:
2 "This intent derives from the combined effect of speeches or
3 projects laying the groundwork for and justifying the acts, from the
4 massive scale of their destructive effect and from their specific nature
5 which aims at undermining what is considered to be the foundation of the
6 group." And that's the Rule 61 decision at page 53, paragraph 95.
7 This principle, as I underscored earlier, has found continuing
8 expression in the case law which affirms the relevance of an intent to
9 destroy the essential characteristics of the group such as family
10 structures, relations between group members, property and religious
11 symbols, and the capacity of the group to reconstitute itself. Thus, the
12 Prosecution seeks no expansion or broadening of the law on genocide; we
13 seek only the application of the Statute and the jurisprudence of this
14 Tribunal, which are intended to provide a measure of justice for
15 communities that have been targeted for destruction and a measure of
16 protection for those that might in future. Such an application to the
17 facts of this case could only conclude that the requisite combination of
18 acts and intent are fulfilled and that Dr. Karadzic's responsibility for
19 the crime of genocide has been established.
20 I turn now to the Defence positions. Throughout the trial and in
21 his final brief, Karadzic invoked various unfounded, irrelevant, or
22 inconsistent claims to explain away his responsibility. He falsely
23 claims in his brief that responsibility for these victims lies with those
24 who broke up Yugoslavia, not him; that the Muslims were led by genocidal
25 Islamic fundamentalists who were responsible for all crimes in Bosnia,
1 not him. That the steps toward the establishment of the ethnically
2 separate state over which he presided, such as regionalisation or
3 Variant A and B and for which he often took credit before and during the
4 war had little or nothing to do with him. That the division of the MUP
5 which he credited formerly with the early phases of "liberation" was
6 simply the implementation of the Cutileiro Plan, despite the fact that
7 preparation for an ethnically separate MUP began before the Cutileiro
8 negotiations commenced and that the Cutileiro negotiations never reached
9 an implementation stage. He claims that he had no particular concerns
10 about unfavourable demographics and the allegedly explosive Muslim
11 birth-rate, despite his repeated reminders to his followers of the
12 existence and the risks of that supposed threat. He claims that his role
13 as party leader was meaningless and that the party over which he presided
14 was filled with "idiots" who didn't listen to anyone, a position
15 contradicted by contemporaneous intercepts and documents as well as the
16 extraordinary deference to Karadzic displayed by those same officials
17 during the Defence phase of trial. He claims that he was incapable of
18 interfering in the work of state organs both before and during the
19 work -- the war, despite intercepts reflecting precisely such
20 interference before the war and his own admissions during the war. He
21 claims that his calls for a negotiated solution on his terms meant that
22 he couldn't be preparing for war. In contrast to his opponent
23 Izetbegovic, whose rejection of Karadzic's proposed solutions meant that
24 he actively desired war. He claims that once the war began, chaos and
25 anarchy reigned in the municipalities, although they were somehow
1 simultaneously "states within a state." He claims that communications
2 between the municipalities and the republic level were totally cut off,
3 except for his orders to obey international law which he sent to the guys
4 over whom he had no control and which somehow made it through the
5 impenetrable communication barrier. He claims there was no ethnic
6 cleansing, that people left their homes voluntarily or due to the
7 unavoidable pressures of war. He claims that he had no power over or
8 little to do with the army which only discussed logistical matters with
9 him. He claims that civilians were not held in detention facilities and
10 were not mistreated and he was not informed that civilians were being
11 held or mistreated. And he claims that whenever he found out about any
12 problem it was immediately investigated. These assertions, one after
13 another, are false. Although ostensively supported by evidence, his
14 citations mis-characterise that evidence or cite to evidence that
15 actually contradicts his assertions have nothing to do with the
16 proposition cited or support only the most innocuous aspect of a complex
17 proposition or otherwise do not support the proposition. And many of
18 them, many of them are grounded on testimony which lacks credibility.
19 The Prosecution has provided credibility charts on most, indeed nearly
20 all, of the Defence witnesses, prompted in part by the pattern of
21 witnesses taking positions that were clearly exposed as false by
22 contemporaneous documents, by the weight of the evidence, by
23 demonstrations of bias or even by simple common sense. The Chamber will
24 be reviewing those charts. For now, it's instructive to remind you of
25 just a small sample of the Defence testimony.
1 For example, Mr. Garic, who in an effort to distance himself from
2 evidence about what he'd done, insisted he was never called Momo despite
3 all evidence to the contrary, including that the Defence knew him and
4 listed him as Momo Garic. Or Milos Milicic, who proudly claimed that his
5 entire witness statement was his own words and when confronted by the
6 fact that his praise of Karadzic repeated verbatim what was in an earlier
7 witness's statement then claimed that the "author of this text must have
8 provided his own wording." Or Nikola Mijatovic, who claimed that a --
9 modified air bomb trajectories were "predetermined and could be
10 controlled," and when then asked if that meant that the civilian house
11 demolished in G 10 was the intended target of the air bomb launched by
12 the Ilidza Brigade said "no house was destroyed in that area. It's an
13 enemy lie."
14 Or Slobodan Avlijas, who asserted that central authorities had no
15 communication with Foca until December 1992, despite a visit in June 1992
16 by members of a working group of which he was part. Or
17 Bozidar Vucurevic, who claimed that no Muslim property was destroyed in
18 Trebinje, confronted with an earlier admission that the mosques of
19 Trebinje had been destroyed he then said, "Well, it was the army." Or
20 Srdo Srdic, who also denied all knowledge of A and B despite his presence
21 at five separate meetings where it was discussed. Or Svetozar Stanic,
22 the municipality leader who claimed he never knew the bunker was used as
23 a detention facility in his municipality. And shortly afterward, Avlijas
24 explained how he and Stanic stood within feet of the bunker as close as
25 this witness box is to the door of the courtroom. The bunker, a place so
1 horrific, as Avlijas explained, that he felt horror still 20 years later.
2 And finally Momcilo Krajisnik, who is relied upon in the brief
3 for a vast number of propositions and who said he attended a few meetings
4 with Mladic -- or a few meetings with Mladic while the Mladic notebook
5 reflects more than 30 meetings in 1992 alone. Who claimed that he didn't
6 know what tasks the army was assigned but who was shown to be present and
7 active in meetings at which Karadzic assigned the army tasks which were
8 then incorporated into directives. Who said he never spoke to Mladic
9 about the strategic goals but who, with Karadzic, explicitly outlined
10 those goals to Mladic in two separate meetings in the week before the
11 strategic goals were announced. Who claimed that the Bosnian Serb
12 leadership never ordered the army to conquer majority non-Serb areas, but
13 who expressly told Mladic in a meeting that one of the two pressing tasks
14 for the army was to "ocistiti," cleanse or mop-up, Orasje, a majority
15 Croat municipality which was then incorporated into directive 4. Who
16 claimed that A and B was meaningless and that he didn't know it had been
17 distributed, despite repeated occasions on which it was discussed in his
18 presence or in which he discussed it, including his conversation with
19 Karadzic on the day it was issued about who would monitor its
20 implementation and also including an Assembly session at which a
21 municipality representative reminded him of how he and Karadzic had
22 counselled that representative about the problems of implementing A and
23 B. And the list goes on and on and on.
24 As we also saw repeatedly, many witnesses were remarkably
25 receptive to Karadzic's leading questions which permeated the written
1 statements as well. The compliant's answers often track the outlines of
2 a defence strategy that Karadzic constructed long ago. Because in 1998,
3 as investigations began, Karadzic oversaw from a distance the systematic
4 culling of documents sought by this institution. Here is what one of his
5 associates, Vukasinovic, wrote in February 1998 about the
6 already-existing defence strategy.
7 "Maybe I am scared by nature; however, I think that all your
8 statements are not really favourable ..."
9 And he gives an example:
10 "In May of 1992, you stated that there is work and law in
11 Republika Srpska and that everything is in normal order and the Muslim
12 part is in chaos; however, our defence strategy for that time-period is
13 that the chaos was here." P6489.
14 He thus foreshadowed the defence which Karadzic ran 16 years
15 later here in this court and he also identified the problems which to
16 this day expose him as a liar. That letter followed earlier letters
17 assuring Karadzic that "unfavourable documents had been kept from
18 investigators." And in this regard, I urge the Court to read P3932, -33,
19 -34, and -35. And after receiving that letter Karadzic wrote back with
20 further instructions that's P6490.
21 After thanking his associate and urging him to keep going, please
22 keep going in that direction, Karadzic said:
23 "Please do not allow such a mistake to repeat itself with
24 television. You ought to personally review every segment which will be
25 offered to them and select those favourable to us and detrimental to the
1 Muslims. Nothing else exists because the archives have been moved,
2 destroyed, et cetera."
3 He also said:
4 "You are completely right when it comes to the SDS as well. Tell
5 Vrkes that you have consulted me and I have asked you to instruct them on
6 what to do. The best would be if the archives didn't exist at all
7 because the party was frozen for a year. Crisis Staffs were organised by
8 municipality bodies. Remember that and stress it firmly to them. It was
9 the municipal bodies elected in the 1990 elections and not the party."
10 And then he tells Vukasinovic to show Vrkes the letter and have
11 him do everything to "have the archives in the municipalities cleared
12 out" so that they won't "spoil what's being worked on centrally."
13 Throughout this trial, the same effort to mislead and conceal
14 have been on display, as his still-loyal followers sought to assist by
15 towing the party line on unsustainable defence strategies determined many
16 years ago.
17 Karadzic argues in his brief at paragraph 1348 that it is
18 "ridiculous to argue on the basis of smoke and mirrors" that he hid
19 evidence, thus showing that the bigger the lie in which he's caught, the
20 greater the expression of indignation. Or as General Rose said:
21 "When he," Karadzic, "came under pressure, he could lie through
22 his teeth with a look of sublime innocence on his face," D162, page 49.
23 I now turn to some of those false claims. False claim number 1,
24 the broad attempt to shift responsibility onto those allegedly
25 responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia. As this Trial Chamber has
1 repeatedly pointed out to Dr. Karadzic, this case is not about who
2 started the war, jus ad bellum. Nevertheless, this claim by Dr. Karadzic
3 is instructive because it reflects the position that the breakup of
4 Yugoslavia would be met with destructive force in Bosnia. Or as Karadzic
5 put it more graphically at the time, you cannot "fuck all of Yugoslavia
6 up and have Bosnia remain a virgin." That's D1281.
7 Karadzic's struggle to shift responsibility continues with his
8 lengthy depiction of his political opponents, primarily Izetbegovic and
9 the SDA, as Islamic fundamentalists bent on domination, fratricidal war,
10 terrorization and genocide of the Serbs. That's at paragraphs 39 through
11 42 of his brief. Again, as the Trial Chamber has repeatedly underscored,
12 these assertions are irrelevant or marginally relevant except perhaps to
13 the extent they inadvertently expose motive. But, in any event, the
14 reality, unsurprisingly, does not support this diabolical description.
15 As Croatian SDS founder Jovan Raskovic, who lamented his own role in the
16 creation of the Bosnia SDS stated:
17 "There should be no fear of Bosnian sovereignty. Maybe Bosnia
18 won't be Serbophile but it won't be genocidal."
19 That's P6617, page 2.
20 As even Krajisnik said, Izetbegovic's ideas expressed in the
21 Islamic Declaration were "a travesty," T43184. He was instead a
22 pragmatic man. 43184. Even Karadzic's own contemporaneous
23 acknowledgment of Izetbegovic as a "nice man" is further at odds with his
24 devilish portrayal that he attempts now. That's P1940. The desperation
25 of Karadzic's efforts is reflected in his reliance on what he calls the
1 Nazi-like Vox which allegedly outlined the dire fate awaiting Serbs in
2 the future Islamic republic. Paragraph 47 of his brief quotes from a
3 part of the text of a Vox issue listing terrible restrictions and threats
4 but it fails to quote from the beginning of the article which reveals
5 that this list began as a satire on the creation of an alleged Islamic
6 republic which had then been manipulated by persons unknown into the
7 pamphlet that they now reproduced in their magazine in order to condemn
9 Karadzic similarly depicts Izetbegovic and the SDA as someone
10 actively seeking war and desiring Muslim suffering. He cites Donia in
11 support of his claim at para 43, T3268, when in fact Donia said the
12 opposite, emphasising that his report "did not say what you said it did,
13 that was that he consciously opted for the war option. He talked about
14 preparation for war, not consciously opting for the war option. Now,
15 that was a misrepresentation on your part of what that citation said."
16 That's at T3267 through -68. Karadzic misrepresented it in court and now
17 does so again in his final brief.
18 The reality is that it was Karadzic who had long insisted that a
19 sovereign and independent Bosnia would be met with force, as he told
20 Vance and Okun in December 1991: Unless the Bosnian Serbs got what they
21 wanted, they would attempt to get it through war. That's P776, pages 38
22 through 39.
23 As for Karadzic's suggestion that Muslim suffering was
24 Izetbegovic's responsibility, not his, because Izetbegovic desired it,
25 the Court need only review D3716, a session of the Bosnian Presidency in
1 June, at which Izetbegovic agonising about the dilemma presented by
2 Bosnian Serb cleansing:
3 "If we don't accept the ultimatum, these people might actually
4 perish. If we accept it, we will be legalising a division along ethnic
5 lines, that is, an altered demographic situation in Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina, the creation of a Serbian state of sorts in BH, and finally,
7 the question on the exchange - is it fair and all right?"
8 While painting Izetbegovic as a man who actively sought war,
9 falsely, Karadzic paints himself as a man who sought only peace, filling
10 pages of his brief with various pronouncements, see paras 238 through
11 260, 265, through 285, pronouncements intended to reveal that he "at
12 every opportunity tirelessly advocated for peace."
13 Of course, the Prosecution's case is not that Karadzic desired
14 war as an end in itself or that he would not have accepted a peaceful
15 resolution on his terms, but he was explicitly determined that he would
16 not accept a sovereign and independent Bosnia and would go to war to
17 prevent it. And while his initial efforts were aimed at keeping Bosnia
18 in Yugoslavia, as it became clear that would not happen, he shifted to
19 the establishment of an ethnically separate Serb entity in Bosnia. When
20 he thought he could get much of what he wanted through negotiations, he
21 was willing to take less as a low-cost option. But when that failed and
22 he opted for force, he wanted what he considered the Serbs were entitled
23 to. As Mandic said to an interlocutor who observed that Serb attacks in
24 Sarajevo had left the Muslims with little:
25 "Fuck them, they didn't want to do it nicely through
1 negotiations, well now they'll get nothing," P1103, page 8.
2 And that Serb state, Karadzic made clear, had to realise the
3 "centuries'-old dream of creating our own state without too many internal
4 enemies," P1477, page 258.
5 As he explained at the first session of the separate Serb
7 "This is a step with which the Serbian people are breaking the
8 last illusions, recognising their enemies and rounding up their being in
9 such a way that they can never be attacked again from inside," P1343,
10 page 58.
11 When the strategic goals were announced, Karadzic explained that
12 this meant "separation from those who are our enemies and who have used
13 every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who would
14 continue with such practices if we were to stay together in the same
15 state." Page 956 -- P956, page 9.
16 Those enemies were the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, although he
17 most typically expounded on the Muslim threat in light of their
18 demographic predominance. As he repeatedly explained to his followers
19 and to internationals: You simply can't live with the Muslims. As
20 described in para 28 of the Prosecution brief, Karadzic insisted that "we
21 live together only when occupied or under a dictatorship." Muslims and
22 Serbs were like oil and water, like a dog and a cat, like plants which
23 cannot grow side by side. If you put them in one pot, the soup would not
24 mix. And he emphasised that Serbs' "experience with Islam five centuries
25 long" allowed them to "recognise ancient danger by the toxic
1 all-destructive Islamic octopus that skillfully takes on various guises
2 but which is with all its variability and ambiguity constant in its
3 irreconcilable poisonousness toward the Serbian Orthodox being," P5492,
4 page 5 through 6.
5 Now, in the course of describing his allegedly exclusive emphasis
6 on peace, Karadzic makes one passing reference to the issue of Muslim
7 demographics and suggests that his demographic concerns were limited to
8 efforts to "artificially" alter the demographic structure. This
9 dismissive mis-characterisation ignores his obsession with the Muslim
10 birth-rate and with Muslim demographics and its purported implications.
11 You can find that at para 29 of our brief. He insisted to internationals
12 such as Cutileiro that Muslims intended to use their high birth-rate to
13 dominate and it was a recurring theme in his discussions with Vance and
14 Okun that Muslims expected to achieve control of Bosnia through their
15 high birth-rate. That's P776 and also T4163 through -64.
16 He emphasised before the war to his followers, "They will
17 overwhelm you with their birth-rate and their tricks." And during the
18 war emphasised that neither Serbs nor Croats together can control through
19 the birth-rate the penetration of Islam into Europe and in five to six
20 years Muslims would make 51 per cent of the population. And as he made
21 clear, this bore on the percentage of Muslims who were envisioned for the
22 Serb republic, even a safe percentage now would soon be unsafe:
23 "The 23 per cent would rise to 24 per cent the day after, and the
24 day after that one it would be 25 per cent because that is how it is with
1 That's Karadzic at the 37th Assembly, P1385, pages 108 through
3 Now, given the alleged toxicity of the Muslim threat and their
4 explosive birth-rate, one might have expected Karadzic and the Bosnian
5 Serb leadership to claim only areas where Muslims constituted a suitably
6 small percentage of the population. Quite the contrary. His territorial
7 ambitions were vast and they required various justifications. For
8 example, he claimed that the areas where Serbs were a majority before the
9 genocide of World War II were by rights Serb and should revert to them, a
10 claim that is embodied in their official documents such as P6444, such as
11 the declaration of state and the constitution, and see also P776,
12 pages 32 through 33 and 227. Or the plebiscite which was conducted in
13 November of 1991, the results of which meant according to Karadzic that:
14 "In all territories where Serbs took part in the referendum
15 regardless of whether they make 5 per cent or 55 per cent of the
16 population, they are the constituent element of that town or that
17 republic and must stay in Yugoslavia if we decide so, "D86, page 38.
18 Karadzic also asserted that Serbs were entitled to approximately
19 65 per cent of the land because they "owned it," a rationale ridiculed
20 even by Slobodan Milosevic, his one-time benefactor who eventually became
21 frustrated by Karadzic's nationalism and greed:
22 "As if someone would believe it, it's known that it was all
23 socially owned property, the meadows, grazing land, mountains were
24 nobody's property. What owners, for goodness sake? How can you imagine
25 two-thirds of the population being crammed into 30 per cent of the
1 territory, while 50 per cent is too little for you? Is it humane? Is it
2 fair?" And that's at P2604, pages 6 and 9.
3 And irrespective of whatever justification, places with strategic
4 significance regardless of how many Muslims and Croats lived there were
5 claimed. Referring to places that we've "grabbed for ourselves" where
6 Serbs were only 30 per cent, Karadzic stated:
7 "Don't let this get around but remember how many of us there were
8 in Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, in Rogatica,
9 how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera. Due to strategic
10 importance they had to become ours and no one is practically questioning
11 it anymore," P988, pages 68 through 69.
12 It is against this backdrop that Karadzic asks the Trial Chamber
13 to believe that he was not involved in the significant toward separation
14 such as Variant A and B or regionalisation, despite the wealth of
15 contemporaneous documentation reflecting his constant role in that
16 process. Karadzic acknowledges with respect to regionalisation that it
17 became a "means to fight Alija's state." He acknowledges that in his
18 brief at para 205. Or -- or to quote the passage he cited a bit more
19 accurately, "to destroy Alija's state." Yet he also suggests that it was
20 simply a legal process that was not mono ethnic in design, that it had
21 nothing to do with him, and that in any event it was about the creation
22 of entities like the ARK that were completely independent of Karadzic.
23 In fact, regionalisation was understood by other parties to be precisely
24 what it was: The formation of a Serbian-dominated region, using economic
25 justifications to cover "the goal of creating a state for only one
1 nation," as acknowledged by Defence witness Jaksic at T46173. In
2 attempting to run from his own responsibility for regionalisation,
3 Karadzic explicitly backs away from his own claim on the
4 11th of January, 1992, to have invented regionalisation. That's in
5 paragraph 202. This attempt to distance himself from his own words on
6 that occasion is undermined by the fact that Karadzic repeatedly
7 acknowledged that he was responsible for creating regionalisation.
8 You'll find that at para 112 of the Prosecution's brief.
9 In fact, regionalisation was one of the steps that Karadzic
10 explained he had lined up to implement at what he considered the
11 appropriate moment.
12 "We had a list of reactions and steps to take but we always
13 waited for the Muslims to make a mistake, and after they made one, we
14 created a union of municipalities and the Serbian autonomous regions
15 next -- areas next, followed by the regions and eventually our Assembly
16 and finally republic," P953, page 3.
17 As for Variant A and B, Karadzic called an array of witnesses who
18 denied knowledge of the existence or significance of Variant A and B, and
19 these included his closest confidant Krajisnik, whose dissembling about A
20 and B I've already mentioned. Other witnesses fared just as poorly in
21 the face of the extensive documentation from the municipalities about the
22 role and implementation of A and B, but their testimony was consistent
23 with his false claim in opening that Variant A and B was not created,
24 discussed, or adopted within the SDS. That's at T942 through -43 which,
25 in turn, was consistent with the false defence that he instructed
1 Vukasinovic to disseminate to municipality authorities in 1998:
2 "Stress it firmly to them that Crisis Staffs were organised by
3 municipal bodies, and that it was municipal bodies elected in the 1990
4 elections and not the party, remember that." P6490.
5 When coupled with the equally fraudulent chaos and lack of
6 communication defence, it attempts to insulate Karadzic for the
7 accomplishment of his followers whom he once praised for "liberating and
8 creating the space." That's at P970, page 316.
9 In fact, the reality of Variant A and B's importance was
10 explained contemporaneously by Karadzic himself:
11 "Please, remember how we used to work before the war? Everything
12 was as clear as day in the municipalities where we were a majority and in
13 those where we were a minority. Do you remember the instruction A and B?
14 We had Crisis Staffs and it was clear that they were the authority. They
15 could make mistakes but they were still the authority. The people were
16 not left without the authority because there was a Crisis Staff."
17 That's P1403, page 347.
18 Now, Karadzic argues in his brief that Crisis Staffs were formed
19 because there was a crisis and no government, that's para 964 of his
20 brief. In tandem with that he argues that there were no laws in place.
21 That's at paras 403 to 413. Again, this is another reflection of the
22 false defence that he first disseminated in 1998, that Crisis Staffs were
23 only established by the government after the war had begun.
24 Contrary to Karadzic's claim, at the time Crisis Staffs were
25 established pursuant to Variant A and B, the system had not "collapsed"
1 with "no organised system in place," but at that time there was a concern
2 among the Bosnian Serb leadership that Bosnia would become independent,
3 and that's reflected in the preamble to Variant A and B. Accordingly,
4 Karadzic took steps to establish the bodies that would effect ethnic
5 separation in Bosnia. Those bodies were headed by his officials, whose
6 capacities to implement ethnic separation were monitored by him and by
7 his emissaries such as Cizmovic, see paragraph 130 of our brief. As
8 Karadzic declared in February 1992, referring in that instance to the
9 Krajina, there was not a single municipality which was not following his
10 "political line." D88, page 44.
11 In short, as Kupresanin put it in 2001, there was a chain of
12 command from the municipality presidents to Karadzic, P6510, page 7.
13 As when necessary, Karadzic intervened to protect the positions
14 of his favoured men or to promote them over less-devoted politicians as
15 he did in Ilidza, Novo Sarajevo, and Trebinje, and he actively monitored
16 the composition of local authorities in the other municipalities. See
17 P3200 page 3 or P5783, page 2.
18 Karadzic made clear:
19 "Whoever makes a mistake I will suspend him and throw him out of
20 the party, I don't give a fuck.
21 "And with one stroke of the pen, I will finish them," P2556.
22 When people on the ground in the municipalities disregarded or
23 disobeyed orders from Pale, some were immediately removed from their
24 positions, while others were subjected to a disciplinary procedure known
25 informally as "ironing, "and which would cause the officials to change
1 their views. That's P1 pages 93 through 94.
2 The coda to Karadzic's assertion that he had no control over
3 local and regional authorities is a quote from an intercept that
4 purportedly reflects the attitude of the Prijedor leadership toward
6 "Who cares about Karadzic? We'll do whatever we want. He can't
7 impose his will on us."
8 That's P2571. This was taken out of context to totally invert
9 its meaning. What Karadzic's brief does not tell you is that this was
10 one of Karadzic's officials informing him what some disgruntled
11 individuals in Prijedor had said. Karadzic then made his position clear:
12 "Let them fuck their mothers. Let them make their own party.
13 Whoever refuses to obey Sarajevo should resign."
14 That's at page 3. And then he took the necessary steps bringing
15 in a new man for better leadership, T45357 through -59.
16 Shortly afterward, Cizmovic was able to report to Karadzic that
17 there was no discord in Prijedor:
18 "Prijedor is resolved."
20 As Karadzic's own witness Miskovic confirmed, this intercept was
21 actually about honouring party hierarchy and party policy, 45357
22 through -59. As with much of the Defence brief scratch and when the
23 false surface falls away, the real picture is exposed. From the very
24 outset of the conflict, the municipality subordination and loyalties to
25 Karadzic were clear. Thus shortly before the conflict began, the
1 Rogatica Crisis Staff informed Karadzic that "in compliance with our
2 instructions" the "factual division on the ground should be and is
3 already there," expressing concern about others moving forward without
4 sufficient co-ordination with republic-level steps, P6105.
5 Municipality officials consistently echoed Karadzic's policies on
6 the ground, sometimes directly invoking him. For example, in Kljuc
7 Crisis Staff president Banjac in early July:
8 I think that life has to be totally ethnically demarcated and the
9 areas ethnically cleansed of all those who cannot live together in this
10 area." P6552, page 2.
11 Or Zvornik president Gruic at P6417:
12 "The Turks destroyed the Serbian church that was here when they
13 arrived in Zvornik in 1463. Now we are rebuilding the church and
14 reclaiming this as Serbian land forever and ever. This was a Serbian
15 town before Islam existed in the Balkans."
16 Or Vogosca SDS official Koprivica asserting that if Muslims fail
17 to leave Serb lands they were going to be destroyed and were "simply
18 going to disappear," P2344 in paragraphs 59 through 60.
19 Or Bratunac president Deronjic, about whom we'll hear more from
20 Ms. Pack, who told SDA representatives reluctant to agree to division
21 that Karadzic was placing immense pressure on him and then he threatened
22 that if the Muslims did not comply with the demand they would
23 "disappear." That's P3196, paras 31 through 32.
24 And you can see the same in P965 with Karadzic crony Jovan Tintor
25 explaining that division is imminent whether the Muslims like it or not
1 and that their share of the division will be a few "islands" in Bosnia
2 while Serbs will be completely connected territorially and in every way.
3 As discussed in paragraph 179 of the Prosecution brief, the common
4 purpose was implemented in municipalities headed by Karadzic's officials.
5 They co-ordinated round-ups, detentions, and expulsions with Karadzic's
6 military, police, and with the other municipalities.
7 At false Karadzic claim is that everywhere in the field there was
8 anarchy and chaos. That's Defence brief para 455. Yet Karadzic's praise
9 for the achievements of local authorities in securing and cementing
10 Serb-claimed municipalities reflects instead their unity of purpose and
11 their co-ordinated execution. He expressed his satisfaction with the
12 results and his assurances that those results would be maintained. For
14 "Two years ago we were a group in Bosnia that had some rights and
15 now we are the state and what we hold is 100 per cent ours. Foca is
16 extremely important to them but it will never be theirs again." P1385,
17 page 110.
18 As Krajisnik also explained about Foca, speaking to people
19 gathered there, which had by that time been re-named Srbinja:
20 "Today you are not as you were before. Now I see a true Serbian
21 town and you proudly bear your Serbian name. You are an example to every
23 Karadzic commended all his officials for carrying out the ethnic
24 separation from Muslims and Croats.
25 "It was the SDS which organised the people and created the army.
1 It was an army. Together with the police, those were the armed forces of
2 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they created the space,
3 liberated it, and created the space." P970 pages 323 through 324.
4 Beyond these acknowledgements that local officials achieved his
5 objectives, the extensive documentation, that is, decisions, conclusions,
6 reports, produced by the municipalities during that time, at least those
7 which remained available for discovery, are also incompatible with a
8 state of anarchy, and for that you need only to review the municipality
9 summaries to see the wealth of documentation produced.
10 Now, part of Karadzic's attempt to deny his relationship with his
11 subordinates is the claim that ARK authorities were "manifestly
12 independent." At the central authorities a claim that is manifestly
13 false. The ARK was run by long-time Karadzic loyalists like the
14 "obedient" Brdjanin, who obsequiously told Karadzic that he -- that
15 Karadzic had 300 per cent popularity, and was so reliant for Karadzic's
16 instructions on every trivial manner that Karadzic chastised him: I'm
17 not your nanny. See P2, page 61; D85; and P2549.
18 Any disputes between the ARK and the central leadership related
19 to the timing and tactics of the creation of an ethnically Serb state,
20 D277, P5619, rather than their overall shared goal as evidenced by the
21 very effective implementation of the common plan in the ARK and see our
22 brief at paragraphs 312 through 321.
23 As described at paragraphs 309 through 310 of our brief, Karadzic
24 swiftly and decisively quelled the move toward a Krajina state in
25 February of 1992. As Defence witness Dodik stated, Karadzic:
1 "Came to Banja Luka to discipline the Banja Luka organisation,
2 and after that the organisation came under the direct control of the top
3 leadership in Pale."
4 T36888 through -89.
5 In Karadzic's words in the context of imposing party policy on
7 "This is a party which has its top and its bottom and nobody will
8 fuck about under our name," P2571.
9 Karadzic's undisputed authority is summed up by Kupresanin's
10 statement at Kukanjac in April 1992 that:
11 "We are waiting for Karadzic to return from Europe and tell us
12 what we are to do next. Whatever he tells us we will do ... we have our
13 commander. It is that man. We must obey him," P987, page 2.
14 The Prosecution brief details the functioning communications with
15 the ARK, ARK implementation of republic-level policy and decisions, and
16 the implementation of the common criminal plan in the ARK. At 312
17 through 321 and 506 through 509, the ARK was not a state within a state.
18 And contrary to the Defence claims at paragraphs 1161 through 1165 of
19 their brief, municipal Crisis Staffs were subordinated to the ARK
20 Crisis Staff. In Brdjanin's words:
21 "Everything in the ARK is done at Crisis Staff level."
22 The Defence points to Prijedor as an example of a municipality
23 over which the ARK purportedly had no control, but Prijedor Crisis Staff
24 implementation of republic and ARK-level decisions on mobilisation,
25 disarmament, dismissals of non-Serbs, and resettlement prove otherwise.
1 See 314 through 320 of our brief.
2 The ARK leadership worked together with republic leadership in
3 the implementation of the common plan. At a meeting on June 2nd, 1992,
4 between Karadzic, Mladic, and members of the ARK civilian and military
5 leadership, Brdjanin informed Karadzic and Mladic of "problem of the
6 Krajina," 14.500 Muslims, and asked for a position at the highest level
7 regarding prisoners and refugees. P1478, pages 55 through 56.
8 The Defence untenably claims that this request was "because too
9 many people who participated in the war were not familiar with the
10 Geneva Conventions." That's paragraph 1150. Brdjanin was seeking
11 republic-level instructions, not booklets containing the law. That is
12 made even plainer by the fact that the Defence acknowledged that the
13 14.500 Muslims were prisoners about whom Brdjanin sought a position,
14 which amounts to a Defence admission that Brdjanin lied in court when he
15 deny risibly, that this number meant the per cent of Muslims in
16 Banja Luka at the start of the war. T43713 through -14. The absurdity
17 of the Geneva Convention's claim lies also in the systematic flouting of
18 those conventions by the civilian and military authorities in the ARK for
19 months after this discussion.
20 Equally, the Defence contention that it is clear that Brdjanin
21 was referring to prisoners of war ignores the wealth of contemporaneous
22 documents and multiple Defence witness admissions that civilians were
23 detained en masse in the ARK, and see Prosecution brief para 194, P3720,
24 3746, 3723, KW-609, D4246 at 178 -- pages 178 through 180. Or Stakic at
25 T45238 through -9.
1 Detained en masse to the great satisfaction of ARK officials.
2 When on the 15th of July, 1992, the ARK Crisis Staff, including Zupljanin
3 and Brdjanin toured Prijedor's collection centres, as they called them,
4 Brdjanin publicly praised the authorities for "a job well done." That's
5 P11, page 2.
6 ARK policy on the expulsion of Muslims also reflected
7 republic-level policy, beginning with the fact that Karadzic entrusted
8 power in the ARK to Brdjanin, whose extremist positions were widely known
9 and who could therefore be entrusted to implement the common purpose. As
10 described in paragraph 319 of our brief, at a 7 June subregional meeting
11 of ARK municipalities, the common understanding that:
12 "Muslims and Croats should move out of our municipalities until a
13 level is reached where Serbian authority can be maintained, and that this
14 should be implemented on its own territory in each of the
16 This was acknowledged and a demand for the immediate
17 establishment of a pathway through, through which the Muslims and Croats
18 could expelled. That conclusion was sent to the RS leadership and the
19 ARK Crisis Staff. And contrary to the Defence claim that on 8 June 1992
20 the ARK Crisis Staff "rejected the subregional request for Muslims and
21 Croats to leave because this was contrary to our policy," the minutes of
22 the next subregional inter-municipality meeting record that "most of our
23 suggestions have been accepted and became part of the official position
24 of the Crisis Staff at the meeting held on 8 June 1992." That's P6437,
25 page 2.
1 And sure enough, the ARK Crisis Staff's next steps was to
2 establish an "agency" for population resettlement with "one
3 representative to deal with the matters of relocation and exchange of
4 population and prisoners" from each municipality, P2606 and P2732. When
5 we return, Mr. President, I'll turn to the other organs.
6 JUDGE KWON: Before we break, Mr. Tieger, you stated during this
7 session, that's page 37, transcript page 37, line 12, I quote:
8 "Of course the Prosecution's case is not that Karadzic desired
9 war as an end in itself or that he would not have accepted a peaceful
10 resolution on his terms."
11 In this regard, one of the Defence arguments seems to be that the
12 fact the Serbs accepted Cutileiro Plan belies the existence of
13 overarching JCE. I may be more accurate.
14 Defence final brief 109 reads like this:
15 "Those who accepted the Cutileiro Agreement that envisaged the
16 existence, protection, and equality of minorities and Dr. Karadzic was
17 among the leading supporters of the agreement could not and did not form
18 any joint criminal enterprise with the objective of creating an
19 ethnically pure Serb unit within BiH."
20 I wonder whether the Prosecution addressed this issue in his
21 final brief sufficiently?
22 MR. TIEGER: I don't know what would be considered sufficient,
23 Your Honour, but let me say two quick things about that, if I may. First
24 of all, as the Court is aware, the evidence is clear that the Cutileiro
25 Plan -- there was never an agreement on the Cutileiro Plan, merely an
1 agreement in principle. And when that agreement in principle was reached
2 on March 18th, Karadzic said to his Assembly: We never, never, never -
3 and I'm quoting those words verbatim - have accepted this document as it
4 is. It was basically a foothold for further steps, but it didn't come
5 anywhere near the critical question which was: Where was there to be --
6 where was this agreement in principle to start talking about the
7 possibility of ethnically -- of separate areas which would not be based
8 purely on ethnicity, but on a number of factors, where were they to be,
9 where would that be implemented? And on that very day Krajisnik said to
10 the Assembly: Well, it may not be fair but let's start the ethnic
11 separation on the ground as a factual matter, irrespective of the fact
12 they told their followers there is not yet an agreement and there will
13 not be until we get what we want. So that's a false representation in
14 the first place.
15 And, secondly, insofar as the agreement may have anticipated, as
16 the internationals of course would have demanded, provisions for
17 appropriate treatment of minorities for free movement, Karadzic made
18 clear during and after the cleansing took place how those -- such
19 provisions would be frustrated and, in fact, I'll be dealing with similar
20 claims, that is, his claims to be protecting the Muslim community or his
21 orders to purportedly do so in the context of what actually happened, the
22 massive ethnic cleansing of Muslim areas.
23 JUDGE KWON: So is then -- it's your case -- is it your case that
24 Mr. Karadzic was not genuine when signing the Cutileiro Plan?
25 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, the Cutileiro Plan was only an
1 agreement in principle. First of all, it wasn't signed, and he says so
2 at the March 18th, 1992, Bosnian Serb Assembly session himself. He
3 emphasises that. What it was was a pretext, at that point, for the
4 initiation of de facto separation on the ground. So he was never --
5 never put to the test on the Cutileiro Plan. At the same -- by the way,
6 you can also see at the co-ordination council meeting on January 21st,
7 1993, what was to happen at certain points. And that's when Jovanovic
8 tells Karadzic: Look, that's enough ethnic cleansing. We're fine where
9 we are. There are ways to achieve homogenisation without ethnic
10 cleansing at this point. And Karadzic happily says: Well, Zvornik --
11 that's fine because Zvornik used to be 50.000 half and half. Now it's
12 all ours. And what he then talks about is putting pressure on people in
13 more subtle fashions to get them out. In every single document aside
14 from those intended as window dressing or fig leafs for the international
15 community, where it really matters you can see Dr. Karadzic's commitment
16 to homogenisation, to ethnic separation and to not allowing the results
17 of the ethnic cleansing to be undone.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 We'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at ten to 12.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 11.27 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 11.52 a.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 I'd like to turn briefly to the Defence position on the Assembly
25 and the government. Karadzic argues that the Assembly was not
1 essentially a party body but very independent in its thinking and that
2 all MPs from all parties enjoyed equal free speak. That's at paras 900
3 through 901 of their brief. In fact, the Assembly was founded by the
4 SDS. Despite the reference to "all parties" the fact is that only six
5 deputies were not SDS. That's P2536, page 151. And deference to the
6 party president, Dr. Karadzic, was apparent in virtually every session
7 where he was invariably the key speaker. As a deputy once noted in the
8 context of an anticipated regional Assembly:
9 "I know that Karadzic as the president of the SDS is truly the
10 leading figure among the Serbian people and five of his sentences are
11 enough to change the course of the -- the entire course of the session."
12 Now, that's at D88, page 65.
13 The Assembly actually carried out its legislative powers in
14 accordance with the policy charted by the party leadership. As a deputy
15 noted in 1994:
16 "In these two years my memory has not yet registered a case when
17 the whole Assembly of esteemed people's deputies has stood up against
18 something that our political and state leadership strictly targeted as
19 something that has to be respected." P5525 page 25.
20 Now, Karadzic relies on Krajisnik's claims that the deputies were
21 very independent, the Bosnian Serb leadership sometimes intervened to
22 tone down extremist talk and that the Bosnian Serb leadership was unable
23 to impose their views on these independent persons. All of these claims
24 from an already-discredited source in any event are negated by just one
25 moment in the Assembly when Krajisnik turns a random extremely thought
1 into conclusive legislative action at his whim. So at the 24th Assembly
2 in January 1993, after a deputy mentioned that "we threw out the Turks,"
3 this is a Serb country and the Muslim nation is not a nation at all,
4 Krajisnik told the Assembly:
5 "We really should take a stand concerning whether the Muslims are
6 a nation ... we should tell them what they really are. They are
7 unbelievers, a nation that is not a nation ... shall we now take the
8 Muslims out of Serbism forever? We do not accept this artificial
10 Krajisnik them put those conclusions to a vote. The result:
11 "Gentlemen, thank you. We adopted the conclusions unanimously."
12 P921, pages 94 through 97. All in the space of about three minutes.
13 Krajisnik lied under oath when first asked about this in court,
14 and when confronted with this record, he then said:
15 "If I could distance myself from this Momcilo Krajisnik, I
17 T43739 through 43751. So much for the independent Assembly.
18 As for the government, Karadzic challenges that the Djeric,
19 Lukic, or Kozic-led governments and particularly the government's most
20 powerful ministers in 1992 were subject to the authority of Karadzic and
21 Krajisnik, para 904. Karadzic claims that former
22 Prime Minister's Djeric's "recollection" that this was the case is faulty
23 and that he came up with this assertion many years after the fact. Now,
24 this false claim is made by citing pieces of what Djeric said at the time
25 in relation to his resignation, but Karadzic omits what Djeric said to
1 the Assembly in November 1992, that "his hands were tied," and that
2 someone else "insists on appointments of certain ministers." Djeric then
3 made clear that the someone else was Karadzic and Krajisnik:
4 "When we are dealing with the minister of justice, the minister
5 of the interior, they are not even members of the government. They don't
6 attend government meetings. They meet with the president of the republic
7 and the chairman of the Assembly. Not a single one of them ever appeared
8 before the people or on TV and said they were responsible for their work
9 and what they were doing, thereby releasing the Prime Minister of any
11 P1105, pages 11 through 12. There was thus no problem with
12 Djeric's memory when he explained the same circumstances to this
13 Trial Chamber.
14 And at the same session, the Deputy Prime Minister Trbojevic
15 confirmed that Stanisic reported to Karadzic rather than Djeric. That's
16 at page 12 of that session. While Stanisic defiantly acknowledged the
17 view that he was Radovan's man, page 17, and proudly confirmed that "I as
18 a man" have always followed the policies of the SDS Presidency. That's
19 at page 15.
20 Karadzic also relies on Lukic's claim that he "never had any
21 problems with Dr. Karadzic with regard to my independence or the
22 independence of the government." That's at D3563, para 27.
23 In part, the absence of discord may be the result of Lukic's
24 views on how to handle non-Serbs, a view reflected in his advice to FRY
25 officials to ethnically cleanse and kill their Muslims as soon as
1 possible because they could not be trusted. That's at T34543
2 through -44.
3 In fact, Lukic knew there was no room for discord because he knew
4 who was boss. In 1993 when he attempted to set up a personnel
5 commission, the SDS reminded him firmly that his task was to "implement
6 the policy of the SDS party." P6337.
7 Shown a document from the SDS reflecting Karadzic's approval or
8 instructions regarding appointments, Lukic agreed that Karadzic's role
9 "as president of the SDS and president of Republika Srpska" was
10 "absolutely the highest level." T38762 through -63.
11 As Djeric explained, the "party structure outweighed the rule of
12 law aspect of the state. Ministers would be in the circle of the party
13 president. Everything would happen there." P4982, paragraph 14.
14 Or as Karadzic himself put it:
15 "Believe me, the government is mine. I am responsible for its
16 functioning." P1379, page 255.
17 Turning to non-indictment municipalities. Karadzic denies the
18 systematic expulsion of non-Serbs because, according to him, the
19 municipalities selected by the Prosecution are not a representative
20 sample and that the policies pursued in the other municipalities more
21 accurately reflect his policy. Now, apart from the fact that this
22 acknowledges his control of municipalities and his position in the
23 hierarchical relationship, the argument mis-characterises the evidence
24 concerning other municipalities which also revealed evidence of the
25 common purpose. For example, Karadzic called Milincic of Srbac
1 municipality to show what was the purportedly the actual tolerance --
2 actual policy of tolerance and protection of non-Serbs. Now, as
3 discussed at para 189 of our brief, Srbac was a municipality more than
4 95 per cent Serb -- actually, more than 99 per cent Serb if I recall
5 correctly. Even the most vehement proponents of ethnic cleansing such as
6 Brdjanin allowed for the possibility of 3 to 5 per cent non-Serbs. Srbac
7 was already at that point. As Karadzic in fact told Srbac authorities:
8 If Srbac's 21.000 Serbs were bothered by it's 1.000 non-Serbs, "you are
9 mere cunts," at T44947.
10 Yet, even in Srbac crimes against Muslims were not properly
11 punished, leading to more crimes against Muslims, a situation which in
12 fact Milincic misrepresented to the Krajisnik Trial Chamber when he
13 testified in that case, T44962 through to -67.
14 More importantly, although not much was needed to be done in
15 Srbac, Milincic admitted that he was aware that in the municipalities
16 around him the Muslim population was reduced through massive forced
17 expulsions, P6564, pages 120, and T44988 through -89.
18 Other indictment municipalities similarly reflected the general
19 implementation of the common purpose.
20 When Karadzic announced the strategic objectives in May 1992
21 Bosanska Krupa president, SDS president Vjestica explained that all the
22 Muslims from the right bank of the Una had been evacuated and then said:
23 Will they have a place to return to? I think it is unlikely after our
24 president told us the happy news that the right bank of the Una is the
25 border. T46868. Deeper into the war, Vjestica opposed a proposed peace
1 plan which he understood meant that Muslims will be returning and
2 therefore "we will have to compensate everything we destroyed and burned
3 and 17 mosques that we flattened." P1379, page 25.
4 Karadzic Defence witness Klickovic also from Krupa tried to
5 defend his order to selectively remove Muslims from a mixed Muslim-Serb
6 area as temporary measures for their safety. That false attempt was
7 exposed by his contemporaneous statement to Banja Luka TV, explaining
9 "The river Una is the boarder of the Serbian state. And the
10 arrival of the Muslim population to this area is not a possibility any
11 longer. There is not even a possibility of co-existence and let alone us
12 living together."
13 P6665. Klickovic admitted that this reflected his views at the
14 time. T468-- 46876 through -77.
15 Klickovic also called in the army to "destroy as many residential
16 and other buildings as possible on the Una's left bank," that's 46872
17 through -73, in order to establish a permanent border on the Una river in
18 accordance with the strategic objectives.
19 Similarly Bozidar Vucurevic from Trebinje was called to show
20 there was no pattern of and policy of cleansing and his evidence also
21 revealed the opposite. The Bosnian Serb police and the army were active
22 in the intimidation and violence against the Trebinje Muslims. The
23 mosques of Trebinje were destroyed by the army and Vucurevic granted
24 terrified Muslims permission to leave on the precondition of abandoning
25 all their property rights. As representatives of an international group
2 "The exodus of Muslims from Trebinje can and should be described
3 as ethnic cleansing."
4 And be treated as such P6223.
5 The Defence also called Kovacevic from Celinac, another
6 non-indictment municipality with a negligible number of Muslims, in that
7 case 8 per cent. He admitted that non-Serbs posed no threat to the
8 security of Serbs in Celinac. T45142. And considering that admission,
9 that Celinac order on screen in a moment, giving Muslims a "special
10 status tells you a great deal about the policy in Republika Srpska
11 towards non-Serbs. As you can see pursuant to this special status,
12 Celinac Muslims are forbidden to do such subversive things as lingering
13 in public places, bathing in the river, hunting, fishing or using cars,
15 Finally, Karadzic asserts at paragraph 967 of his brief that
16 Predrag Radic of Banja Luka "constantly tried and did everything possible
17 to protect the non-Serb population." What he doesn't tell you is what
18 happened to Radic for doing so. Now, by way of backdrop Radic had seen
19 non-Serbs deported from municipalities in cattle cars and was aware that
20 they had been expelled from municipalities such as Prijedor, Kljuc, and
21 Sanski Most, murdered on a large scale during operations conducted by
22 Bosnian Serb police and army forces and detained in concentration camps.
23 That's P1, pages 75 through 76.
24 Radic also stated that any public acknowledgement of assistance
25 to non-Serbs jeopardised both one's job and physical well being. That's
1 P1, pages 94 through 95. He gave an example of a police officer removed
2 from his position and replaced because he was trying to minimise the
3 evictions or expulsions of non-Serbs. P1, page 105.
4 Karadzic would have you believe that Radic's efforts to protect
5 non-Serbs reflected his policies. The precise opposite is true. Radic
6 testified that Karadzic blamed and criticised him for not having expelled
7 non-Serbs as Serbs had been expelled from other territories. P1,
8 page 131. In addition, Radic was criticised for allowing mosques to
9 stand up until the point when they were destroyed in 1993 P1, page 107
10 through 108. Radic testified that this criticism came from "the highest
11 authority all the way down to the lowest" and that while Karadzic and
12 Krajisnik were "wise enough not to say it out loud," they had their
13 "emissaries who said it all the time," including one Velibor Ostojic, the
14 Republika Srpska minister of information who was "especially persistent."
15 P1, page 111.
16 The Defence claim that the authorities did not persecute
17 non-Serbs through the destruction of their sacred sites is also false,
18 ignoring the incontrovertible evidence of the destruction in municipality
19 after municipality across the RS. See P4068, 4069, 4070 and -71, as well
20 as the municipality summaries and scheduled incident charts.
21 As described in para 185 of the Prosecution brief, in many
22 localities mosques and churches were not only destroyed, but the ruins
23 razed, the sites levelled and desecrated and the rubble deposited in
24 garbage dumps. This fact alone undermine the Defence assertions that the
25 destruction was a result of random acts of revenge or the use of some
1 buildings for military purposes or claims that the authorities did
2 everything in their power to protect those sites and prevent their
3 destruction. But the Trial Chamber need not rely on those facts and
4 documents alone, as municipality officials gave evidence as to the
5 reasons behind the destruction. Radic testified that in 1992 mosques
6 were being destroyed for the same reason that churches were being
7 destroyed in municipalities across the Krajina:
8 "To wipe out the existence of the peoples whose churches they
9 were," and "to destroy the spiritual basis and they won't be coming
10 back." That's at P1, pages 105 to 107. Sokolac Crisis Staff president
11 Tupajic explaining why all the mosques in Sokolac had been destroyed by
12 the VRS, stated that:
13 "There is a belief among the Serbs that if there are no more
14 mosques, there are no Muslims. And by destroying the mosques the Muslims
15 will lose a motive to return to their villages."
16 P5238, page 109.
17 Another municipality official testified that the destruction of
18 the mosques is to delete all traces of Muslim influence in this area and
19 to intimidate the remaining Muslims into leaving the area. The ethnic
20 cleansing was the reason for the destruction of the mosques, meaning once
21 they were removed they did not want to give the Muslims any reason to
22 return. See footnote 565 of the confidential brief.
23 Mladic's words before the Assembly in October 1993 also make this
24 intention clear. Quote --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down, please. Thank you.
1 MR. TIEGER: "We cannot allow leaving the mosques with two
2 minarets there and we have to sort it out because of our children who
3 have perished. To teach them never to encroach our daughters, sisters,
4 brothers, and mothers." P1379, page 72.
5 Contrary to Karadzic's false claim, the systematic destruction of
6 Muslim and Croat sacred sites was an integral element of the common plan
7 to ensure that non-Serb communities coveted by the Bosnian Serb
8 leadership were -- were left without Muslims. Muslims and Croats did not
10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, while we are on the issue of mosques,
11 what is the Prosecution's submission with respect to the accused's
12 suggestion that the use of mosques for military purposes in some cases
13 made them legitimate military targets?
14 MR. TIEGER: Well, as -- thank you, Mr. President. I tried to
15 indicate a moment ago that claim is utterly belied by the systematic
16 destruction of the mosques, by the fact that -- by the testimony of
17 witnesses who identified the underlying purpose of that destruction and
18 by the treatment of -- of the mosques after their initial destruction,
19 that is, eradicating totally any evidence of their existence. And when
20 you put those factors together, including the wholly pervasive nature of
21 this destruction, there is only one possible conclusion. Whether or not
22 there were individual incidents about which we have very little evidence
23 of mosques in the municipalities being used for such purposes, both the
24 systematic destruction after Muslims had left, after there was no longer
25 any threat, as I say, belies any claim that this was the consequence of
1 legitimate military action.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.
3 MR. TIEGER: Let me turn to paramilitaries, Mr. President.
4 Karadzic claims that paramilitary units from -- and this is, by
5 the way, a question that the Court has posed and we will be responding to
6 the Court's question in the course of the next few minutes.
7 He claims that the paramilitary units from Serbia and elsewhere
8 "had come" to RS and taken over towns such as Zvornik, Bijeljina, and
9 Brcko and that local authorities were powerless to control them. This is
10 an inversion of reality. Paramilitaries did not mysteriously appear and
11 then overwhelm poor municipality authorities, but instead came at their
12 behest and worked collaboratively with them to achieve take-overs and
13 cleansings. And at the time, Karadzic received reports from his
14 municipality officials reflecting that collaboration, reporting, for
15 example, that Arkan made a "significant contribution," that's P2888, page
16 4, or "enjoyed exceptional success, P1478, page 252.
17 From the republic to the local level, paramilitaries were welcome
18 to do what needed to be done, notwithstanding the risk that their
19 criminal propensities, indeed their genocidal tendencies as reflected in
20 the July 21st, 1992, Tolimir document ultimately might turn in unwanted
21 directions. Considerable attention in the Defence brief is devoted to
22 Arkan, who the Defence would have you believe was law-abiding ethnically
23 blind and who had little or nothing to do with Karadzic. But the
24 evidence reveals a different Arkan. Before arriving in Bosnia, Arkan was
25 known as a leader of a particularly vicious paramilitary group that had
1 been active in Croatia. He was subordinated to the Serbian MUP, and you
2 can look at our final brief at paragraph 463. And throughout 1991 and as
3 Bosnia moved closer to independence, Karadzic collaborated with Milosevic
4 and Jovica Stanic who led the parallel structure including paramilitaries
5 in Croatia. That's at paragraphs 103 through 104 of our brief.
6 So unsurprisingly Arkan did not appear unilaterally in
7 Eastern Bosnia at the beginning of April; it was authorised in Belgrade.
8 You heard that from Seselj. But even at the time everyone knew it.
9 Vance confronted Milosevic about it immediately and Milosevic initially
10 claimed that Arkan was "privately in Bijeljina," only to back down in the
11 face of Vance's challenge and admit: "Only at the beginning ..." T1513
12 through -14.
13 Karadzic similarly tried to distance himself from Arkan, and he
14 denied to Vance that he had ever seen Arkan, that's P780, page 38, a
15 claim which was contradicted by reports from Serbian state security
16 services of Arkan and Karadzic gambling together in Belgrade in March of
17 1992. That's T33610 through -12 and 618 through 619. And he claimed
18 that somebody invited Arkan after a problem in a cafe. And yet, that
19 same day that he was denying all this, a MUP, that's April 16th, an RS
20 MUP representative spoke to Arkan over the phone, during which Arkan
21 explained that he had left Zvornik in the control of the Bosnian Serbs,
22 the Bosnian Serb Crisis Staff, had spoken to Mico Stanisic and had all
23 the Pale phone numbers, P1109, pages 3 through 6 and 8.
24 Once Arkan was in Bosnia, he went from municipality to
25 municipality at the invitation of both local leaders and the Bosnian Serb
1 leadership. Recall, for example, Plavsic's request by phone that Arkan
2 come to Sarajevo, P1106; and Karadzic's acknowledgement to Davidovic that
3 the Bosnian Serb leadership had arranged for him to come, Prosecution
4 trial brief -- final brief 467.
5 Arkan remained at Karadzic's disposal, as reflected in his letter
6 of April 16th, 1994, P2854 and it's not 1992, as erroneously indicated in
7 para 11 of the Bratunac summary. He was summoned by Karadzic in 1995 and
8 ultimately honoured by Karadzic for his achievements. That's at
9 paragraph 474. The Defence claims at para s 1085 of their brief that
10 there is no evidence that Karadzic knew of any crimes by Arkan before
11 that award ceremony, but that is simply untrue. For example, Mladic told
12 Karadzic that Arkan had liquidated loyal Muslims. And that's at P3056,
13 page 2.
14 The Defence also points to Karadzic's handling of the
15 Yellow Wasps as a reflection of his opposition to paramilitaries and the
16 Defence would have the Trial Chamber believe that the Yellow Wasps were
17 not arrested until August 1992, after the commission of horrific crimes,
18 because the MUP did not have the capacity to deal with them. That's in
19 their brief at 1090.
20 This claim is deceitful in at least two respects. First, it
21 attempts to ignore the team-work that existed between Karadzic's
22 officials and the Yellow Wasps until their particular brand of violence
23 was no longer needed. Contrary to the Defence contention and is detailed
24 in paragraphs 16 through 19 of the Zvornik summary, paramilitaries were
25 part of the military and civilian structure in Zvornik. From the very
1 beginning the Yellow Wasps were treated as a TO unit. They received TO
2 salaries and logistical support from the authorities, unit members
3 reported to the Crisis Staff on a daily basis. The TO commander had a
4 close relationship with Yellow Wasps' commander Zuco. And both of them
5 had offices where the Crisis Staff was headquartered. Then the
6 Yellow Wasps were incorporated into the VRS, armed, tasked, and paid by
7 the Zvornik Brigade. Subotic confirmed that all those who received
8 orders from the Zvornik Brigade, including Zuco's unit were part of the
9 regular VRS. He also acknowledged that Zuco visited him in Pale in the
10 second half of July, that's D3695, para 205, visited him long after the
11 Bosnian Serb leadership was first informed of Zvornik crimes and after
12 the point where Karadzic himself was aware of the Yellow Wasps'
13 predations, P6414, 7 through 8; and P1478, page 270.
14 Second, although Karadzic claims credit for arresting the
15 Yellow Wasps, he ignores the fact that it was not their participation in
16 the thorough cleansing of the municipality that triggered the action
17 against them, but instead their "overstepping the limit" with Ostojic, as
18 discussed in the final brief at paragraph 478.
19 As the 8 August 1992 charging document against the Yellow Wasps
20 including unit commander Zuco outlines, they had "participated in the
21 liberation of Zvornik municipality" and "all took part in the defence of
22 the Serbian land in the broader area of Zvornik." It then says that the
23 fighting lasted until 28 June 1992, following which "they did not place
24 themselves under a joint military command of the Serbian armed forces of
25 the SRBiH but instead established a check-point in the village of
1 Karakaj, Zvornik municipality, on their own initiative, P2882. In short,
2 having successfully completed their cleansing tasks, they began to
3 attract negative attention for their activities at the checkpoint
4 triggering the charges. And you can see a more elaborate discussion at
5 para 39 of the Zvornik summary.
6 The Defence also ignores the fact that the punishment of the
7 paramilitaries was wholly inadequate, including totally failing to punish
8 Zuco for his crimes against Muslims and incorporating many paramilitaries
9 into the VRS as described in paragraph 478 of our brief and para 39 of
10 the Zvornik summary.
11 Let me turn to the formal military body of the Republika Srpska,
12 the VRS. After insisting at the time to his followers and to the world
13 that he was the supreme commander and in charge of the army and after
14 exhibiting little reticence at invoking his command authority in various
15 contexts. For example, I'll quote, "I'll teach everyone who fucks around
16 a fucking lesson," P5792. Karadzic now takes refuge as depicting himself
17 as an impotent, bumbling, ineffectual empty suit to the extent of calling
18 a witness to say he couldn't even control his own wife. That's T42454.
19 This false claim is grounded on four basic false premises: First, that
20 the strategic objectives were purely political and were not intended to
21 be implemented militarily; second, that Karadzic did not direct the VRS
22 through directives; third, that he was never informed of what the army
23 was doing because they only spoke to him about logistics; and, four, that
24 he had no control over General Mladic who operated independently of
1 First, the claim that the strategic objectives were not military
2 tasks of the army. Everybody knew that that was not true. Karadzic,
3 Krajisnik, Mladic, Milovanovic, the members of the Assembly, everyone.
4 As detailed in paragraph 152 of the Prosecution final brief, the
5 strategic objectives were formulated in the period immediately preceding
6 the creation of the VRS and Mladic's appointment. In the week before
7 Mladic's formal appointment, Karadzic and Krajisnik met with him twice
8 and explicitly outlined the strategic objectives on both occasions. When
9 Mladic accepted his position at the 16th Assembly, he discussed his
10 participation in formulating the goals. That's P956, page 32. Hardly
11 his role or indeed even possible if they were, as Krajisnik claimed,
12 merely the articulation of the Cutileiro stance. That's T43769
13 through -70.
14 Mladic later explicitly confirmed to the Assembly that:
15 "The tasks of the army in this war stem from the known six
16 strategic objectives adopted by our Assembly P970, page 22.
17 Members of the Assembly knew. At the 17th Session, Kupresanin
18 said, that's D92, page 70 through 71:
19 "At the last session in Banja Luka, we said that the northern
20 border of the Serb republic of BiH was the right bank of the Sava River.
21 We ordered the army to realise that goal."
22 Or just look at the VRS combat-readiness report which stated,
23 that's D325 page 159:
24 "The strategic objectives of our war which were promptly defined
25 and set before the Main Staff of the Army of RS, the commands and units,
1 served as a general guide-line upon which we planned the actual
2 operations and concerted battles."
3 And then it goes on to indicate that Karadzic also orally
4 assigned a number of tasks of "general and vital significance."
5 Karadzic cites Milovanovic for the proposition that they were not
6 military tasks because Milovanovic spoke about the broader ambition of
7 protecting the Serbs from genocide. But Milovanovic explicitly confirmed
8 that the six strategic objectives were the VRS's military objectives,
9 that's at D825, page 13, referring to the strategic military objectives
10 emerging from the 12th May, 1992, session, and at D2149 at page 27,
11 referring to the achievement of five of the six military objectives with
12 just access to the sea remaining clearly identifying the strategic
13 objectives adopted at the 16th Session.
14 And further, as we'll see in a moment, Mladic was repeatedly
15 reminded by Krajisnik and Karadzic about the strategic objectives as they
16 discussed upcoming operations. So let me turn to the directives.
17 Karadzic claims that they were only "a general form of command
18 communications." And he suggests he had little to do with them because
19 the ones he created and signed were short and dealt with humanitarian
20 matters. In any event, he claims, there was nothing wrong or illegal
21 about any of them. The reality, as the evidence clearly demonstrates, is
22 that the directives reveal not only the common purpose to forcibly remove
23 non-Serbs, but Karadzic's hands-on and effective control of the army he
24 was one proud to call his. First, a quick reminder. As we discussed at
25 paragraph 405 of our brief, directives were the main documents used to
1 regulate the use of forces. Seven fundamental directives for VRS
2 military operations were issued from June 1992 to March 1995. In 1995,
3 Karadzic acknowledged his responsibility for those directives, saying
4 that he had "examined, approved, and signed seven directives," but
5 distancing himself from the eighth.
6 The Defence tries to run from this acknowledgement because
7 Karadzic, who only signed two, gilded the lily, but Karadzic's oversight
8 and approval of the directives was explicitly confirmed by Mladic at a
9 non-public meeting of the Supreme Command. Mladic stated:
10 "We gave you the greatest state secrets for verification. Every
11 directive went through here for examination. We did every analysis in
12 your presence."
13 P3149 at page 24. As dispositive as that is of Karadzic's false
14 claim, let's take a more detailed look of Karadzic's awareness of and
15 role in the directives which also expose as false his claims that the
16 army only spoke to him about logistics or that he had no control over
18 Paragraphs 408 through 428 of the Prosecution brief contain a
19 detailed account of how the directives implemented the strategic
20 objectives and other strategic or tactical steps at Karadzic's behest.
21 So I'll focus on them briefly here, following which I will answer
22 Your Honours' question in relation to directives 4 and 7, at least the
23 first part of that question.
24 Directive 1, which is covered in the Prosecution brief at 406
25 through 409. On the 1st of June, 1992, the VRS Main Staff ordered,
1 pursuant to an RS Presidency decision, a meeting of the RS political
2 leadership and of military commanders to be held in Pale on the
3 3rd of June, 1992. Corps commanders were to prepare a map showing troop
4 dispositions, the situation of the units, the composition, manpower,
5 disposition, and probable intentions of the army, proposals for future
6 activities, and any problems and requests. Each commander was to brief
7 for 10 to 15 minutes. Two days later Mladic met with Karadzic and the
8 Bosnian Serb leadership. Karadzic focused on "the issue of our objective
9 in Sarajevo" and told Mladic that "Sarajevo has to be resolved
10 politically while acting quietly inch by inch. "Ocistiti," that is
11 cleanse or mop-up, "Butmir, Hrasnica, Dobrinja, and Sokolovic Kolonija
12 and in the town of Hrasno in the direction of Mojmilo hill."
13 The next day, Karadzic and Krajisnik again met with Mladic.
14 Karadzic reiterated the strategic objectives and stated that:
15 "The birth of a state and the creation of borders does not occur
16 without war."
17 Krajisnik then told Mladic:
18 "As of tomorrow, we have to conquer what is ours and be prepared
19 to defend our state."
20 Directive 1 was issued that same day, and in conformity with
21 Karadzic's emphasis it incorporated operational goals arising from the
22 strategic objectives, secure parts of Sarajevo, open the corridor between
23 the Bosnian Krajina and Semberija, objective 2. Open
24 Sarajevo-Trnovo-Kalinovik communication line, objectives 4 and 5. And
25 directive 1 incorporated virtually verbatim Karadzic's instructions
1 calling on the SRK to "ocistiti," cleanse or mop-up, Dobrinja, Butmir,
2 Sokolovic Kolonija, Mojmilo, and Zlatiste.
3 Directive 3 was issued on the 3rd of August, 1992. The day
4 before that, Mladic briefed the Presidency describing the situation in
5 each combat sector and the necessary tasks. Karadzic demanded that the
6 VRS "snatch" as much territory as possible before the next peace
7 conference which was to be on August 24th so that he would have something
8 to "offer." He told Mladic "the European community will accept the
9 factual state of affairs" so no military concessions.
10 And again, consistent with Karadzic's explicit instructions,
11 directive 3 provided that:
12 "Before the conference on BH, reach the left bank of the Neretva
13 river, the right bank of the Sava River, and the outlying territories of
14 Serbian territories, capture Jajce and Gorazde, take over dominant
15 features, and secure the best position possible for the negotiations over
16 demarkation lines with the Croatian-Muslim coalition. The operation
17 shall be conducted in two phases lasting between 10 and 15 days."
18 Thus satisfying the 24 August dead-line. And on
19 August 4th, 1992, Mladic once again met with the Presidency, at which
20 meeting "the directive was accepted without objections."
21 Directive 4, which is discussed at paragraphs 414 through 419 of
22 the Prosecution's brief. Directive 4 which is dated 19 November 1992
23 ordered the Drina Corps to exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest
24 possible losses on them, and force them to leave the Birac, Zepa, and
25 Gorazde areas with the Muslim population. Karadzic claims that this
1 directive did not have the aim of forcing the Muslim population out of
2 Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica or Gorazde, but was instead aimed at forcing out
3 the ABiH in order to protect the Serb population. Even Krajisnik
4 acknowledged in his own case that directive 4 was "absolutely" an "order
5 for ethnic cleansing." Testifying in front of you, he attempted to
6 defend that by first falsely stating that the Prosecution had put words
7 in his mouth. Instead, it turned out he had volunteered the term "ethnic
8 cleansing" after simply being shown directive 4. And when the
9 Presiding Judge then asked him if he considered this to be an order for
10 ethnic cleansing said "absolutely."
11 Krajisnik then attempted to suggest to you - and now Karadzic
12 tries to suggest the same - that he was just a layman with no involvement
13 in military matter and therefore his opinion in this matter should be
14 disregarded. But as we will see in a moment, there was nobody in a
15 better position to know that this was an order for ethnic cleansing than
16 Krajisnik because it was Krajisnik at a pre-directive 4 meeting who
17 articulated on behalf of the Bosnian Serb leadership the imperative to
18 cleanse the Drina.
19 On November 8th, 1992, there was a meeting at which corps
20 commanders, including the commander of the recently formed Drina Corps,
21 Zivanovic, gave operational and situational reports. Following those
22 reports, the meeting turned to "assignments for future actions."
23 Karadzic noted that "maybe it would be good if we solved the issue of the
24 Drina." Krajisnik was more detailed. He expressed admiration for VRS
25 success to date because it's "very dangerous to seize their territory."
1 But he also had some criticism. There had been, according to him, a
2 "disproportionate engagement of the army in relation to strategic
3 objectives." They had achieved 3 but had not yet achieved 3 others
4 including the Podrinje, that is strategic objective number 3. Therefore,
5 Krajisnik said:
6 "The most important objective is the task assigned to Zivanovic,
7 the ciscenje of the Drina."
8 Two days later Milovanovic told Karadzic that he would soon
9 receive objective 4 which, among other things, regulated the activities
10 of the newly formed Drina Corps. In the following days, Karadzic offered
11 suggestions and verbally approved the directive which was issued on 19
12 November. But given its importance, Karadzic also called for a seminar
13 with the Drina Corps to be held on the 23rd of November, 1992, at the
14 corps command. It was to be led personally by him. At that seminar,
15 Karadzic gave the opening speech, followed by corps commander Zivanovic
16 to speak on the "situation, results, further tasks, and capabilities of
17 the Drina Corps."
18 Karadzic's notes on Zivanovic's report read:
19 "Tasks: Vitinica, Sapna, Teocak, Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica,
21 The following day, Zivanovic issued his Drina Corps command order
22 "pursuant to directive 4" and "an assessment of the situation." It
23 reaffirmed the supreme commander's order to force out the Muslim civilian
24 population and the VRS's commitment to implementing his strategy.
25 Zivanovic's order provided that the corps was to "inflict on the enemy
1 the highest possible losses, exhaust them, break them up or force them to
2 surrender, and force the Muslim local population to abandon the area of
3 Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde."
4 And that is precisely what happened. As General Morillon's
5 assistant explained, Muslims were cleansed from village to village in the
6 Srebrenica enclave like "a broom sweeping dust in front of it," T23201.
7 The VRS only stopped at Srebrenica in reaction to determined pressure by
8 the international community, a community appalled by "the desperate
9 situation in Srebrenica" caused by "the ethnic cleansing" campaign,
10 P2284, paras 37 through 38.
11 Remarkably, Karadzic now argues that his order to the VRS to stop
12 and not enter Srebrenica and his orders to facilitate the passage of
13 humanitarian convoys, D43 of April 16th, 1993, negates the Prosecution's
14 allegation of an attack on the civilian population. In other words,
15 since the ethnic cleansing he ordered caused such worldwide revulsion,
16 condemnation, and threats of intervention that he was forced to stop, he
17 must never have had the intent in the first place. That is pure
18 nonsense. The reality is that immediately before his 16 April order, the
19 VRS was planning to cleanse Srebrenica. The same day that the UN
20 resolution was issued, a conversation between Mladic and the Drina Corps
21 colonel revealed what was to happen when the VRS entered Srebrenica.
22 Everyone was to be killed, civilians and the wounded were to be removed.
24 Karadzic's order to cease operations and allow convoys into the
25 town was not driven by humanitarian motives, but forced by circumstances,
1 and he essentially acknowledged that to the Assembly in July 1993, P1377,
2 page 31. So for more details please see the Podrinje summary in
3 appendix A at paras 7 through 9.
4 Karadzic also relies on an intercepted conversation between
5 himself and Lukic in March 1993, in which Karadzic claims he was
6 expressing his view that Muslims civilians could stay where they are or
7 go where they want. That's D3571, pages 2 through 5. Now, first, giving
8 its timing the conversation hardly speaks to the attention underlying
9 directive 4 when it was issued, but more importantly the limited portion
10 of the conversation cited is taken out of context and is misleading.
11 This conversation relates to international coverage of the Bosnian Serbs'
12 activities. Karadzic is explaining the statement he told Mladic to
14 "Yes, yes, I told Mladic to issue a statement tomorrow and that
15 all Muslim civilians may stay where they are or go where they want, but
16 armed groups must put down their weapons."
17 This proposed statement was nothing more than a fig leaf for the
18 cleansing campaign that had drawn unfavourable attention from the
19 international community. And it didn't fool the international community
20 which explicitly recognised that Karadzic and his forces were engaged in
21 an ethnic cleansing campaign. That's D3571. Yet Karadzic now wants to
22 try it out again with you.
23 The Defence also relies on contradictory interpretations offered
24 by two of Karadzic's officers in his attempt to run from the unmistakably
25 criminal order he approved. On the one hand he relies on Milovanovic's
1 testimony, that directive 4 anticipated that the civilian population
2 would be fleeing ahead of the army and was therefore aimed at forcing the
3 ABiH to go with them. But at the same time, Karadzic relies on
4 Zivanovic's testimony to the contrary, that directive 4 was indeed about
5 forcing Muslims out, Muslim civilians out, but that it meant Muslims who
6 "had unlawfully occupied the Serbian villages and farms." That's D3932
7 paragraph 15, and also T42596.
8 Apart from the false cover afforded by contradictory
9 interpretations, it is noteworthy that they both nevertheless envision
10 the disappearance of the Muslim population from the targeted areas.
11 Directive 5 was dated 25 June 1993 and it detailed operation
12 Lukavac 93. A month earlier Karadzic had called Milovanovic to Pale,
13 where Milovanovic explained to Karadzic and Krajisnik the VRS Main Staff
14 plan for Lukavac 93 which was intended to connect Serbian Herzegovina
15 with other RS territories. Planning for that operation was completed in
16 June. Directive 6, as discussed in paras 421 through 25 of our brief,
17 directive 6 and the addition to directive 6 also reflects specific
18 instructions given by Karadzic as well as more broadly the military
19 implementation of his strategic objectives.
20 Directive 7, as I described a few moments ago, in April 1993
21 Karadzic was forced by international pressure to order an end to
22 operations against Srebrenica. And while this initial wave of attacks
23 was halted, from 1993 to 1995 the VRS, under Karadzic's command,
24 restricted aid to Srebrenica and other eastern enclaves, resulting in
25 dire humanitarian conditions. As explained and described at paras 176
1 through 178 of our brief, during this period the Bosnian Serb
2 leadership's desire to rid the Drina, including the eastern enclaves of
3 the remaining Muslim and Croat areas, continued unabated. In April 1994
4 Bosnian Serb forces attacked Gorazde with Mladic ordering subordinate
5 units to "keep pushing energetically forward -- energetically onwards.
6 The Turks must disappear from these areas."
7 Although this attack was also halted following international
8 intervention, Karadzic praised the operation at "successfully and
9 brilliantly implemented." Noting that more had been taken than even
10 planned. In July 1994, Mladic told his subordinates that "we are on our
11 way to ocistimo," cleansing or mopping-up, "the enclaves." Ordering in
12 relation to Srebrenica that "the enclave is to not survive but to
14 He was frustrated that the "Turks" in the Podrinje had been
15 protected by UN intervention. And he stated in August 1994:
16 "In Podrinje we thrashed the Turks. If the Americans and the
17 English, the Ukrainians and the Canadians in Srebrenica, in the meantime
18 it's the Dutch, would not protect them, they would have disappeared from
19 this area long ago."
20 The efforts to render the Drina in Karadzic's words "clean,"
21 that's at P988, page 68, culminated in Karadzic's March 1995 directive 7.
22 This is another patently criminal order. It provides in pertinent part:
23 "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an
24 unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival
25 or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."
1 It further provides at e-court page 14, the previous was e-court
2 page 10:
3 "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with
4 UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and
5 unobtrusively issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support
6 of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the
7 Muslim population making them dependent on our goodwill while at the same
8 time avoiding condemnation by the international community and
9 international public opinion."
10 This document was signed by Karadzic. After calling witnesses
11 during the course of trial to suggest that he either didn't sign or that
12 it had been mysteriously altered afterward, he now argues instead that he
13 didn't read the criminal part. He argues that that criminal part was
14 "buried in the list of tasks for one of the six corps of the VRS" in the
15 "24-page" document and list of tasks. You'll find that at paras 3309,
16 -10, and 3314 of his brief.
17 Now, for argument's sake, let's just set aside for the moment the
18 fact that the document is not 24 pages but 11 pages. And let's also set
19 aside the fact that the language about eliminating 40.000 people is
20 hardly "buried" in the document, but is the very first task assigned to
21 the Drina Corps and is smack in the middle of the page. Unless Karadzic
22 had no plans for the Drina Corps, that is, no plans for Srebrenica, it
23 would be essentially impossible to miss. But he did have plans for
24 Srebrenica, as he was quick to brag about later.
25 "The time had come," he said, "and I put my mark on directive
1 number 7 to capture Teocak, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. The directive
2 was signed and we embarked on it ... I was in favour of all the decisions
3 that we made and I support them. All the decisions are recorded in the
4 Supreme Command, I ordered in verbal and written form to push ahead to
5 Zepa and Srebrenica ..." That's P412, page 75.
6 If I can just conclude this, Mr. President, and then we'll break.
7 If he didn't read the Drina Corps tasks, if he somehow missed
8 that very first task to the Drina Corps, then what on earth was he
9 bragging about to Bob Djordjevic when he told him that the attacks on
10 Srebrenica and Zepa were part of "my order number 7," P4512, page 12,
11 because he wasn't telling Djordjevic the attacks reflected his order to
12 consolidate the bridge heads on Krupa, that's page 8 of the order, and he
13 wasn't telling him to prevent the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo,
14 that's at page 11 of the order. It's crystal clear that Karadzic was
15 talking precisely about his order to the Drina Corps.
16 And in light of the time, Mr. President, I'll stop now and we'll
17 continue with directive 7 when we return.
18 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Tieger. We'll have a break for
19 an hour and resume at ten to 2.00.
20 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.51 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 1.51 p.m.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Just before we adjourned, I had spoken of how Dr. Karadzic
25 referred to "my order number 7" in circumstances that debunked his claim
1 that he was not aware of what the Drina Corps had been ordered to do, as
2 reflected in the directive. In addition, Karadzic explained to
3 Djordjevic that the objective of "my directive number 7" had been to
4 "raise the temperature to the boiling point," that's T25907 through -08,
5 a neat if macabre description of what that portion of directive 7 was
6 designed to do: Make life unbearable.
7 Karadzic also claims that directive 7 did not restrict
8 humanitarian aid to non-Serbs. If the non-Serb population did not
9 receive the aid, it was because the Muslim army misappropriated it. This
10 false claim that directive 7 was never applied in practice relies upon a
11 limited number of documents cited in footnote 2783 of his brief. They
12 provide little support for the assertion. In a number of instances the
13 cited documents themselves make reference to restrictions. For example,
14 D2125 or 2115 and in some instances are not related to convoys at all.
15 The reality is that, as was plainly apparent to everyone, the enclave was
16 being strangled and starved. Harland observed that directive 7's goal to
17 strangle the enclaves was "completely consistent with what we viewed,"
18 T2202 through -03. Similarly, General Smith referring to directive 7 in
19 the paragraph describing the method of squeezing the enclave, explained
20 that it is what UNPROFOR saw in March and April T11320 through -21. As
21 Franken said, it was, "Convoy terror." P4175, paragraph 26.
22 As for ABiH misappropriation, the two documents Karadzic relies
23 upon, D3313 and D3956, are about the period before directive 7 and
24 therefore add little to the understanding of the post-directive 7
25 squeeze. The documents he cites which are relevant to that time-frame
1 confirm little more than that food delivered to the enclaves through
2 convoys was also eaten by soldiers, which in a town under siege is the
3 only option, a fact reflected in D3308. Further, the quantities listed
4 in the documents are relatively modest, for example, 18 tonnes out of 300
5 tonnes of flour, 70 litres of fuel, and in any event not of a scale that
6 could have been the decisive factor for the suffering of the Muslim
7 population. The reality instead is reflected in P4142, which describes
8 the horrendous situation in Srebrenica at the beginning of July 1995 with
9 less than 25 per cent of the enclave's needs being met due to the
10 "persistent refusal by the VRS" or by the BSA" to allow convoys into the
12 Your Honours, you've asked how directives 4 and 7 relate to the
13 overarching JCE. I'll answer the first part of that question divided
14 into two parts. The answer to that question how they relate to the
15 overarching JCE can be found in the first footnote to the Podrinje
16 summary in annex A of the Prosecution's brief, which indicates that the
17 events described include persecution and deportation or forced transfer,
18 as set out in paragraphs 52, 56 through 57, 69, and 72 through 74 of the
19 indictment. Now, those paragraphs of the indictment reflect precisely
20 the events that I've just related, alleging that, first, the overarching
21 JCE resulted in take-overs in the municipalities in 1992, but that
22 Srebrenica was not taken over until 1995, that's paragraph 52; that
23 although most of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats from the municipalities
24 had been forcibly displaced by the end of 1992, acts of forcible
25 displacement continued with the attacks on Cerska and Konjevic Polje
1 between January and March 1993, just talked about that, that's at
2 paragraph 72; that as a result of the cleansing many Bosnian Muslims fled
3 to Srebrenica which was declared a safe area, paragraph 73; and that
4 beginning in March 1995 in the continuing pursuit of the common purpose,
5 a plan was devised to take the enclave and forcibly transport or deport
6 Bosnian Muslim population. That's at paragraph 74.
7 I'd like to move now to a related topic to the VRS, closely
8 related topic, and that's the discussion about --
9 JUDGE KWON: You will be dealing with the second question with
10 respect to that question.
11 MR. TIEGER: Ms. Pack will deal with that.
12 JUDGE KWON: The interplay will be dealt with separately?
13 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Mr. President.
14 So as explained in the Prosecution pre-trial brief, Karadzic
15 attempted during the course of this case to distance himself from VRS
16 crimes by falsely asserting a dramatic schism between himself and Mladic.
17 Contrary to the evidence reflected both in public statements and in
18 private statements that Mladic, despite tensions, remained committed to
19 the chain of command. Karadzic distances himself from the VRS
20 achievements from which he proudly took credit by claiming, A, there was
21 no mutual agreement between himself and Mladic on anything, and therefore
22 no JCE; and B, he had no control over Mladic.
23 With respect to the first claim, although Karadzic and Mladic may
24 have disagreed about various issues including operational issues and
25 including Mladic's view that Karadzic's cronies were corrupt, you'll find
1 that in P1487, P136, P1489, page 79; and P1473, page 47; there was
2 unmistakably one thing on which they clearly agreed: The risk posed by
3 too many Muslims and the need to reduce their number within the territory
4 of RS. In support of his corollary claim that he had no control over
5 Mladic, the Defence brief cites the witnesses whose evidence contains
6 sweeping generalisations are demonstratively biased or whose evidence
7 actually demonstrates the contrary. For example, Krajisnik who, as I
8 mentioned before, is cited for so many propositions of the brief is cited
9 in support of the claim that Mladic only provided information about
10 logistical problems and resisted control. This is another brazen
11 falsehood, as plainly revealed by the record of the meetings I've related
12 preceding the directives. Instead, Karadzic and Krajisnik told the army
13 what to do and they did it.
14 Subotic is cited as someone who testified about a "vast number of
15 examples of military disobedience." Now, whether accurate or not,
16 Subotic's examples do not relate to military operations and certainly not
17 to cleansing operations, but to various organisational issues. To the
18 contrary, when asked by the Presiding Judge in the Krajisnik case to
19 identify any operation in which Mladic went beyond what the political
20 leadership wanted him to do, Subotic was unable to name one. That's
22 Mandic is cited, but is also unable to identify any military
23 operations in which Mladic exceeded his authority, which is unsurprising
24 in view of Mandic's acknowledgement that he had no familiarity with
25 military reporting, that's C2 pages 682 through -83.
1 Ninkovic's alleged claim that Mladic annulled an order based on a
2 decision of the supreme commander, paragraph 1259, is another
3 misrepresentation. It turns out that this was a marginal issue that
4 Mladic did not annul but Ninkovic himself changed after discussion with
5 Mladic. That's D3733, paragraphs 39 through 40.
6 The Defence also relies on the claim that Milosevic called
7 Karadzic that "crazy doctor" or that "lunatic from Pale," and told Mladic
8 that the VRS Main Staff should follow decisions made in Belgrade, not
9 Pale, which Mladic allegedly accepted. This is yet another
10 misrepresentation. Milosevic did claim that Karadzic was a lunatic
11 caught up in epic historical fantasies who was trying to take and keep
12 territory that had never belonged to Serbs in contrast to the more
13 limited territory that Milosevic had willingly helped him grab. And for
14 that, see P1473, pages 130 through 131 and P2604. But when Milosevic
15 tried to get Mladic to oppose Karadzic, Mladic demurred, pointing out
16 that attempts to divide the Serbs in Bosnia and to Karadzic's men and
17 Mladic's men, if not stopped, could lead to further divisions. Mladic
18 emphasised that he had no political ambitions, wished to serve the people
19 as a soldier, and should be perceived solely in that light. P2567,
20 page 2.
21 Finally, and even more astonishingly, Karadzic cites Milovanovic
22 in support of a much repeated claim that the structure of the Main Staff
23 meant that the supreme commander was not really in control of the army.
24 In fact, Karadzic put that very issue to Milovanovic, who told him it was
1 "Command and control of the army during the war was not
2 two-headed, as it were. We remained under your personal command,"
3 T25362. As Milovanovic made clear at another point:
4 "War is too serious for generals to be in charge of it. Politics
5 has to get involved, the politicians carry out wars," T25494.
6 Now, the Defence brief also covers exchange commissions, which
7 the Prosecution brief outlines in paragraphs 243 through 251 and 522
8 through -24, which discusses among other things the origins and functions
9 of the exchange commission which had already been contemplated in April
10 to deal with a large number of Serbs already incarcerated and was aimed
11 at civilians, as both Mandic and Subotic admitted. That commission aimed
12 at civilians was functioning within a week of its formal establishment on
13 8 May 1992, as reflected in the expulsion of 400 Muslim civilians from
14 Bratunac to Muslim territory via Pale, and continued to function as a
15 mechanism for the expulsion of civilians throughout the indictment
16 period. Karadzic claims that "the exchange commission did not serve as a
17 vehicle for the removal of non-Serbs since it clearly prohibited
18 exchanges of Muslims." And that Muslim civilians were unconditionally
19 released. That's at paras 1026 and 1034 of his brief. The former
20 assertion is based upon a portion of the 6 June 1992 order by the
21 president of the exchange commission, which provides that women,
22 children, elderly, and helpless persons "should be released immediately
23 without conditions or exchange."
24 Now, recognising the obvious problem with this limited
25 formulation, the Defence brief asserts, without any support, that the
1 fact that the men were not mentioned does not mean that male civilians
2 were supposed to remain in custody, but according to the then-Minister of
3 Justice Mandic, that is precisely what it means, that is, that the
4 express provisions for releasing civilian women, children, and elderly do
5 not apply to men. And for that see C2, pages 159 through 160.
6 Further, as we explained at paragraph 248 of our brief, even the
7 order to immediately release women, children, and elderly was not
8 intended to be implemented in light of the contradictory language in the
9 order itself as well as the fact that thousands of women, children, and
10 elderly continued to be expelled under the auspices of the exchange
11 commission. Indeed, it was the imprisonment and exchange of prisoners
12 such as teenage girls and elderly men that prompted Defence witness and
13 Kula prison warder Skiljevic to complain to the minister of justice that
14 this process was being applied to civilians, T3691 through -92.
15 The latter assertion made by Karadzic in connection with the
16 exchange commission that Muslim civilians were unconditionally released
17 is based upon two items. The first is a single exchange in June 1992
18 involving 17 Muslims and a larger number of Serbs. That item reflects
19 nothing more than a single exchange in contrast to a comprehensive
20 programme of release and in any event appears to reflect an admission
21 that these were civilians who were detained. And the second basis for
22 the claim that Muslim civilians were unconditionally released is the
23 testimony of Defence witness Slobodan Avlijas, but a more accurate view
24 of the Bosnian Serb's leadership position toward civilian detention and
25 expulsion can be gleaned from Avlijas' consistent disregard of the status
1 of the prisoners.
2 When Avlijas, who was according to Mandic the minister of justice
3 member in charge of exchange at C2, page 160, when he went to Vogosca and
4 Ilijas in July 1992 because of pressure from the international community,
5 he found a "truly horrific" situation in Vogosca and a warehouse in
6 Ilijas "packed" with Muslims in civilian clothing, many of whom
7 recognised him and begged him for help in getting out of what he
8 acknowledged was "this hell." He made no effort to determine whether
9 there was any genuine basis for their detention, but instead told them
10 that they might be able to get out in an all-for-all exchange.
11 Similarly, when he went to Hadzici in October, he found Muslims
12 who had been "viciously mistreated" when first taken prisoner in May and
13 who were still incarcerated due to a failed exchange. He knew they were
14 not extremists and he knew that because these people were his neighbours,
15 his son's best friend among them. They were crying and begging for help.
16 He wasn't told that they were soldiers. He was told they were people who
17 had been collected in areas where combat was taking place. But asked in
18 court what he did to get them immediately released, Avlijas said:
19 "You know, at that time whoever said anything they did not fare
20 well. You needed to be very wise to keep your skin," T35181.
21 As a man who understood what it took to keep his skin, he was put
22 in charge of two of the three government so-called investigations into
23 camps in the aftermath of the international outcry following the exposure
24 of Omarska. Neither one of which made any effort to do anything more
25 than speak to those who ran the camps and determine how many people were
1 currently in detention facilities. So, for example, his report on
2 Vlasenica's Susica camps where Muslims had been brutally mistreated was
3 benignly summarised on the basis of information from the police
5 "At the beginning of combat activities, a number of people of
6 Muslim nationality were isolated in this place and were later transferred
7 to other places (Batkovic) or exchange for people of Serbian
8 nationality." P1607, page 2.
9 Avlijas also testified that a large portion of the population of
10 Hadzici had been imprisoned in Kula. That "residents of Dobrinja and
11 Grbavica had also been taken there" and the Vrbanja bridge was where
12 "civilians were usually released and exchanged."
13 In short, in contrast to this false Defence claim, Avlijas'
14 evidence made clear that the exchange of civilians was an active part of
15 the expulsion process.
16 I'd next like to turn to the false claim of lack of
17 communications. The Prosecution's brief at paragraphs 483 through 503
18 details the comprehensive and redundancy-laden communications network
19 available to Karadzic, including the republican communication centre, the
20 RS MUP communications, VRS communications, PTT communications, couriers,
21 state security, and official and unofficial visits. Municipality
22 summaries similarly reflect communications between the republican and
23 local levels. The record of contacts between republican level and the
24 field confirm the adequacy of these systems and the existence of ongoing
25 communications, both prior to and during the course of the war. And see
1 paragraphs 504 and 509 of our brief for further details.
2 Against this backdrop, the Defence position veers from complaints
3 that the system functioned "poorly" or with difficulty, almost invariably
4 without specification of the particular period, duration or extent of the
5 difficulties. It veers from those allegations to misleading, untenable,
6 and even bizarre overstatements. For example, the brief asserts that the
7 state of communications was so bad that not even Sarajevo municipalities
8 could reach Pale. That's at paragraph 510. The purported support for
9 this proposition? A conversation in which a Sarajevo official asked for
10 the Pale leadership, is told: I can't reach Pale. And then responds
11 that he just reached them last night. That's D3750, page 1. Similarly,
12 Karadzic asserts at paragraph 538 that a mere 24 telegrams were exchanged
13 between the Sarajevo area and the regions outside between April and
14 November 1992, a miserable or purportedly miserable communications level.
15 Now, the only problem with this assertion is that the cited document is
16 only a few excerpts from the telegram log-book for April and November,
17 reflecting only a handful of days from that log-book, that is, three days
18 in June and then six days in July and purports to blow it up into the
19 entirety of the communication exchange of telegrams during the April
20 through November period.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could you please slow
22 down. Thank you.
23 MR. TIEGER: As it happens, the Defence brief essentially admits
24 communications through its contradictory claims regarding communications
25 and allegedly exculpatory orders, sometimes actually in successive
1 paragraphs. Here's some examples. In paragraph 2951, the claim that
2 communication between Rogatica and Pale was virtually non-existent,
3 followed in the next paragraph by: Following multiple messages from
4 President Karadzic on the importance of respecting international
5 humanitarian law, the municipal authorities, Rogatica municipal
6 authorities, took measures to protect -- to improve the living conditions
7 of the population.
8 Now, these juxtaposed claims would suggest the very laughable
9 proposition that communications were entirely cut off except for
10 exculpatory orders, but astoundingly that is precisely what the Defence
11 brief asserts. For example, in paragraph 2838 the claim that the
12 breakdown of communication in Vlasenica was the result of the destruction
13 of telephone lines. And then in the same paragraph, the few
14 communications received by municipal authorities in Vlasenica emphasised
15 the need to respect human rights and international conventions.
16 Similarly, in paragraph 2945, communication between Foca and the outside
17 world was severed in April until September 1992 or even later. And then
18 the bulk of the communications received in Foca were instructions and
19 warnings from Karadzic regarding the importance of respecting the
20 Geneva Conventions.
21 The facial absurdly of this latter example is only heightened by
22 the Defence brief's assertion elsewhere that Foca was indeed in contact
23 with the outside world and particularly with Pale, and for that see
24 paragraph 570, Ostojic informed the government on the situation in Foca
25 on April 30th; or paragraph 462, the Ministry of Justice sent a
1 delegation to Foca in June 1992 that reported back to the ministry.
2 These floundering Defence efforts to dispute the existence and adequacy
3 of the multiple communication systems only underscores the accuracy of
4 the Prosecution's case.
5 Now, let me turn now to a subject touched upon in a question by
6 the Presiding Judge earlier, and that's the issue of orders issued by
7 Karadzic in respect of international law, which he spends considerable
8 time within the Defence brief. It is clear that any genuine effort on
9 Karadzic's part to address the rampant, widespread crime being carried
10 out largely by official RS organs, including the MUP and the VRS, would
11 have required him to take concrete, targeted measures to identify, put a
12 stop to, and punish specific violations. And is mentioned over the
13 course of its brief, the Defence relies upon a number of orders and other
14 documents authored by Karadzic and other members of the Bosnian Serb
15 leadership that at least on the surface suggest his disapproval of those
16 crimes. However, their contents and the context in which they were
17 issued demonstrate that these documents reflect efforts to create a paper
18 trail to cover up the leadership's own role in those crimes, that were
19 never intended to be implemented and did not reflect any genuine attempt
20 to stop the massive criminal campaign against non-Serbs.
21 Now, two preliminary matters. First, as I mentioned, these
22 arguments contradict Defence arguments on communication and control,
23 arguing the significance of these republic-level orders related to crimes
24 depend upon and in many instances concede effective communications to and
25 from the field.
1 Second, the Defence suggestion that orders or even generic
2 language to comply with international law somehow proves criminal intent
3 is contradicted by both logic and by the Tribunal's jurisprudence. It is
4 clearly open to a Trial Chamber to conclude that an accused's orders to
5 prevent or punish crimes are not genuine and do not negate intent. And
6 for that you can see the Milutinovic trial judgement, paras 454 through
7 457 and para 1129; Sainovic appeals judgement paras 659 through 662; as
8 well as Stanisic and Zupljanin trial judgement volume 2 at para 4514.
9 And as discussed in the Prosecution brief and as I will outline
10 briefly today, this is the only conclusion borne-out by the facts of this
12 Now, first with respect to Karadzic's orders --
13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Tieger, before you continue.
14 What question from the Chamber did you refer to?
15 MR. TIEGER: You asked me -- sorry, Mr. President. I apologise
16 for that confusion. You had asked me earlier about the Cutileiro Plan
17 and the provisions for compliance with international law that were
18 allegedly -- that were contained in the alleged agreement, and in the
19 course of my answer, I referred more generally to any facial agreement
20 with such provisions. So I -- it was actually in my answer rather than
21 your question. You had asked specifically about Cutileiro and I
22 broadened it to include these kinds of orders.
23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
24 Yes, actually, my question was as you observed, limited to
25 Cutileiro Agreement. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.
1 MR. TIEGER: Now, the fact that Karadzic was on the one hand
2 issuing instructions or appeals or orders to comply with international
3 standards with respect to prisoners, civilians, or prisoners of war, and
4 on the other hand propagating a non-punishment policy that encouraged
5 repeat violations is sufficient by itself to discard such orders and
6 instructions as either window-dressing exercises or generic and
7 deliberately ineffective instructions. And all of that amounts to
8 intentional inaction in the face of ongoing mass criminality by his
10 Look at some examples. The 8 June press release cited by the
11 Defence in paragraph 644 of its brief. Now, that the Defence terms "an
12 urgent appeal demanding that all prisoners be treated humanely and
13 renewing the call for the ICRC to protect civilians and prisoners." This
14 is a document that is not even an order, it's a press release expressly
15 linked to meetings with internationals. It contains no actual
16 instructions to any of Karadzic's many subordinates with power and
17 responsibility over prisoners and civilians and it doesn't contain any
18 means of monitoring or ensuring implementation.
19 In this document, Karadzic praises the fact that "we are not
20 driven by hate but by love" and that "justice is on our side." This
21 self-congratulatory remark should be viewed in light of the fact that by
22 this time Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership had been confronted
23 with numerous reports of crimes from the internationals including
24 allegations of "large-scale detention of civilians," see P1029,
25 paragraphs 101 through 102, "which match the reports that the government
1 had been providing on a "daily basis" to the Presidency of irregularities
2 and inhumane treatment in detention facilities. That's C2, page 278.
3 This document which couples praise for conduct that he knew in
4 fact was criminal with an ultimately empty public appeal is nothing more
5 than a public relations exercise. Similarly, many orders were issued
6 simultaneously in both English and B/C/S. For example, D1754, D109, and
7 D93, or brought directly to the attention of the international community,
8 D4720, making their target audience clear.
9 Equally, the RS Presidencies 11 June 1992 announcement to the
10 citizens of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stating that
11 emigration has to be voluntary, coupled with a false denial that RS
12 authorities were engaged in ethnic cleansing, that's discussed at
13 paragraphs 652 and 653 of the Defence brief is another obvious
14 window-dressing exercise. Indeed, on that same day at a meeting of
15 senior MUP officials, Zupljanin noted that the army and Crisis Staffs
16 were demanding the gathering of as many Muslim civilians as possible, who
17 were then left in poor conditions in camps guarded by the MUP, D447, page
18 7. As the Defence brief acknowledges, this information reached the
19 Presidency by way of Stanisic's 17 July report, which again made clear
20 that civilians were being rounded up.
21 Karadzic cites his 13 June instructions regarding general
22 compliance by the army and MUP with international laws of war and its
23 accompanying instructions on treatment of captured persons, those are
24 D434 and P1134, as a reflection of his taking "all possible measures" to
25 prevent crimes against non-Serbs. Given his awareness that the standards
1 set out in those documents had been and were being systematically
2 violated, it is clear that issuing a general set of instructions without
3 taking concrete steps to put an end to the ongoing violations was an
4 empty gesture. The Defence reliance on Subotic's claim that these or
5 similar instructions were quickly or effectively disseminated to various
6 organs throughout the RS is of course another contradiction to the
7 Defence claims about the alleged chaos and lack of communication that
8 reigned at the time. But even assuming Subotic's unsubstantiated
9 evidence on this point were reliable, his supposedly energetic efforts to
10 disseminate such instructions when contrasted with the absence of efforts
11 by RS authorities to implement them is a further reflection of the
12 authority's focus on creating a paper trail rather than genuinely
13 addressing the ongoing mass crime. The fact that Karadzic reissued these
14 instructions on the 19th of August, a fact pointed to in their brief at
15 paragraph 625, reissued them in the form of an order to the Main Staff
16 and the MUP, points to the predictable response to these toothless
17 initial instructions.
18 The Defence also relies on D95, Karadzic's 14 July order to
19 municipality presidents in the Gorazde area, stating that villages where
20 the Croat and Muslim populations surrender their weapons and do not
21 intend to fight must be protected adding "the responsibility of this must
22 be borne by the presidents of the municipalities."
23 But the Defence fails to mention the response of Sokolac
24 President Tupajic to the telegram, that's P6236, in which Tupajic reminds
25 Karadzic, the man at the top of the MUP and VRS hierarchy, that "all
1 activities on the area of the municipality on security issues are
2 conducted by the SJB which was responsible for its work to the MUP and by
3 the 2nd Romania Motorised Brigade which was responsible to its superior
4 command and that these activities are outside Tupajic's knowledge and the
5 knowledge of his closest collaborators and it's the SJB and the 2nd
6 Romanija Brigade which have to protect the Muslim population because "in
7 conditions as they are now I cannot take responsibility for their
9 This response reveals the disingenuous nature of Karadzic's
10 order, holding municipality presidents responsible for protecting Muslims
11 and Croats from crimes committed by the organs over which Karadzic
12 himself exercised ultimate authority.
13 The Defence also holds up Stanisic's report to Karadzic stating
14 that the army and Crisis Staffs were rounding up Muslim civilians en
15 masse as a yard-stick by which Karadzic's intention be measured,
16 asserting that Karadzic's actions upon learning about the crimes are
17 critical to establishing his mens rea. That's para 674.
18 Now, setting aside for the sake of argument that Karadzic had
19 ample information about irregularities well before 17 July, at this point
20 if Karadzic had any genuine intention of ensuring his subordinates'
21 compliance with the law protecting Muslim and Croat civilians in the RS,
22 he would have responded immediately with concrete, targeted measures
23 utilising his various sources of authority over the army, the MUP, and
24 civilian authorities to put a stop to this systemic criminal activity
25 being carried out by the army, Crisis Staffs, and MUP. Karadzic took no
1 such action. Rather, his next step, according to the Defence at
2 paragraph 675, was to issue his 23 July 1992 order, D96. However, this
3 order is not addressed to anyone, expressly states that it is issued "in
4 keeping with obligations undertaken at the London Conference," does not
5 acknowledge the existence of any criminal activity, let alone the
6 rounding up of large numbers of Muslim civilians, contains no monitoring
7 or implementing instructions, and as we know from the voluminous evidence
8 of continued massive crime was in fact not implemented.
9 Simply put, this order and others like it was issued for
10 international consumption and to create a paper trail of plausible
11 deniability, a trail that Karadzic is now attempting to exploit. By any
12 real measure, Karadzic's response to the Stanisic's 17 July report of
13 serious mass crime against Muslim civilians, does reflect his intent for
14 those crimes, crimes that would be repeated in the near future and for
15 three more years.
16 The Defence also points to various statements in which Karadzic
17 purportedly expressed his disapproval for crimes against non-Serbs. Upon
18 closer analysis, however, these statements do not assist his claim. For
19 example, the Defence points to extracts from two of Karadzic's speeches
20 at the 17th Assembly in July 1992, that's D92, as remarks which express
21 his "criticism and disapproval of crimes." The remarks upon which the
22 Defence relies, including his comments about convincing Muslims in Pale
23 to stay and asserting that the state is "big enough for all" must be
24 viewed in light of his assertions at the same session that, one, Serbs
25 cannot allow a state in which they are a national minority, that's page
1 16; two, we cannot live together, there's no tolerance, they quadruple
2 through the birth-rate and we Serbs are not up to that, page 86; his
3 acknowledgement that the conflict had been roused to eliminate Muslims
4 who were, in fact, vanishing; and the fact that by that time his forces
5 had ethnically cleansed huge swaths of Serbian-claimed territory. His
6 nod towards ethnic tolerance at this session was made in the context in
7 which significant progress had already been made to eliminate the
8 demographic threats that he underscored at this session.
9 The Defence also points to a statement in a June meeting with
10 Mladic that "we must not put pressure to have people displaced." P1478,
11 page 98, but a closer look at the format and content of this entry in the
12 Mladic notebook reveals this comment came up when the discussion had
13 moved on from Karadzic's concern about demographics and minorities which
14 was echoed at the 17th Session when he described how 33 per cent
15 non-Serbs rendered Serbia non-stable to a new discussion about problems
16 on the Neretva and Karadzic 's expression of concern that if they say the
17 Neretva will not be a border, Serbs will feel pressure to leave.
18 Equally at paragraph 1224, the Defence points to Karadzic's
19 statement in a July 1992 meeting with Mladic and the RS civilian
20 leadership that "we are going to build a law-abiding rather than an
21 ethnically clean state." However, it is clear from the context of this
22 comment that this relates to a discussion of the international
23 community's view of Bosnia. "We are intrigued by the idea that perhaps
24 the world may want to divide Bosnia in two. The West has no desire for
25 an Islamic state, a state ..." et cetera. And a discussion about the
1 public stance that the RS should present. Koljevic was explicit on this
3 "We should take a stand - discuss law-abiding versus national
4 state and make our policy known," following which this position was
5 adopted. "STAND TAKEN - LAW-ABIDING STATE," in capital letters.
6 Any contention that the Bosnian Serb leadership genuinely
7 intended to create a law-abiding state that embraced Muslims and Croats
8 is undermined by their continued failure to prevent or punish the
9 widespread and systematic crimes being committed against non-Serbs,
10 crimes of which they were well aware.
11 Now, Karadzic also claims that he acted as soon as he knew, and
12 at paragraph 628 through 629 of his brief attempts to dismiss crimes
13 however -- dismiss reports of crimes from foreign sources as unreliable
14 but at the same time asserting that the republican authorities
15 "immediately reacted" to such information. In fact, both claims are
16 untrue. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership received repeated
17 active reports from international sources from early April onward which
18 they inevitably dismissed or deflected. For example, in the immediate
19 aftermath of the brutal take-over of Zvornik and the ensuing flood of
20 Muslim refugees, Karadzic was informed of these events by two separate
21 international officials. That's KD -- well, I'll cite that later.
22 More generally, as Okun explained, he and secretary Vance
23 repeatedly informed the Bosnian Serb leadership that they were aware of
24 widespread ethnic cleansing. As Okun put it:
25 "In fact, in all the conversations of ethnic cleansing with the
1 Bosnian Serb leadership, it was highly unusual, almost never the case,
2 that they denied it. The almost invariable response was: Look what
3 they're doing to our people."
4 That's T1505 to 1506.
5 In an example where the Bosnian Serb leadership simultaneously
6 both acknowledged and denied ethnic cleansing, when an international
7 official personally informed Karadzic, Koljevic, and Plavsic about the
8 mass deportation of Muslims from Bosanski Novi in July 1992, they
9 responded by declaring that it was a very cruel war and everybody was
10 committing crimes before changing tack by claiming that the Muslims
11 wanted to leave and were voluntarily signing documents exchanging
12 properties. See the Bosanski Novi summary at paragraph 13. This not
13 only undermines the Defence's claim that Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb
14 leadership "immediately reacted" to information about crimes but also
15 Karadzic's denial that the Bosanski Novi deportations were brought to his
16 attention and you can see that at paragraph 2808.
17 The reason that Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership did not
18 respond to such reports from international officials with concrete
19 remedial measures is not their lack of control over the perpetrators or
20 being "cut off" from the field or any of the other excuses that the
21 Defence now advances. Their inaction is a result of the fact that these
22 crimes fell squarely within their shared common purpose to permanently
23 remove Muslims and Croats from the territories they sought.
24 And for confirmation of this, one need look no further than the
25 self-congratulatory manner by which crimes were reported to Karadzic and
1 other members of the leadership by their loyal subordinates and followers
2 who were implementing the common purpose.
3 For example, as mentioned earlier when Karadzic announced the
4 strategic objectives on the 12th of May, 1992, including that the Una
5 would form a border, Vjestica could not conceal his delight at the happy
6 news, which meant that Muslims they had "evacuated" from the right bank
7 of the Una would likely not have a place to return to. Similarly, on the
8 30th of June in Zvornik, TO commander Pavlovic bragged to Karadzic and
9 Mladic that "we were most active in evicting the Muslims," P1468, page
11 A few weeks later at the July Assembly session Prstojevic, whose
12 expulsion activities had already reached the top level of the leadership
13 and were causing negative publicity as Mandic would explain to him in
14 June, proudly reported that the Serbs in Sarajevo following "an
15 encouraging visit from Karadzic had been driving the Muslims out of the
16 territories where they had actually been a majority," D92, page 66.
17 At that same session, SDS executive committee president Dukic
18 expressed the hope that the number of Muslims in Bihac had been halved,
19 D92, page 73, Birac being a region in Eastern Bosnia that encompassed
20 Zvornik and Bratunac; Zvornik, where the local authorities had already
21 informed Karadzic about their forced eviction of Muslims in Bratunac
22 where hundreds of Muslims had been expelled through Pale in May and about
23 which Karadzic, Mladic, and Koljevic had been informed on 6 June there
24 were no more Muslims as it had been "fully liberated." That's P1478,
25 page 101.
1 In stark contrast to Karadzic's deflective responses to reports
2 from internationals about such crimes when Vjestica complained that the
3 proposed agreement would require compensation for "everything we
4 destroyed and burned and the 17 mosques we flattened," Karadzic reassured
5 the deputies that this was not the case and that there would be barbed
6 wire at the borders for a long time, P1379, pages 25 through 26.
7 When Karadzic's generic orders and appeals to comply with
8 international law are contrasted both with his acceptance of reports from
9 his subordinates about their own crimes and his deflections or denials of
10 reports of crimes coming from internationals, it is crystal clear that
11 Karadzic's orders and appeals were nothing more than an order to paper
12 over the criminal campaign that Karadzic himself was overseeing.
13 That effort, nevertheless, proved unsuccessful. The "clear" and
14 "inescapable" conclusion from the course of events - these are the words
15 of two different internationals - was that ethnic cleansing was state
16 policy. That's Banbury at T13341 and Kirudja at P3804, paragraph 79.
17 So in late summer 1992, when Karadzic was attempting in vain to
18 convince Vance and Owen that ethnic cleansing was not occurring, and for
19 that see P799, pages 10 and 14, "the fact of ethnic cleansing was even at
20 that point being treated as something that was incontrovertible," as Owen
21 explained, T10096 through 98.
22 And while Karadzic cites a comment by Lord Owen in paragraph 628
23 to support his claim of false media reporting, Lord Owen in fact
24 explained that Karadzic's reaction to international protests about ethnic
25 cleansing, providing excuses, promising action, at times even
1 volunteering follow-up information was "a clever tactic to keep us
2 feeling that our representations were having some impact."
3 And so while Karadzic did not object to human rights safe-guards
4 being put into negotiations, "all this, however, was a facade to cover up
5 a deep-seeded commitment to Serbs not living along-side Muslims and to
6 conducting an ethnic cleansing programme with a bare-faced dishonour of
7 even greater magnitude than his continued inability to respect or even to
8 know the truth," P799, page 14.
9 With respect to orders issued by other members of the Bosnian
10 Serb leadership, the Defence also points to paperwork generated by senior
11 MUP officials in late July, as responsive to Stanisic's 17 July 1992
12 report. However, in the face of mounting pressure from the international
13 community, this flurry of documents generated by the MUP and RS
14 leadership - you can see D449, P1087 - amounts to nothing more than
15 self-serving finger-pointing, as Mandic testified regarding Kovac's 8
16 August letter. That's C2, pages 320 through 322, and Mandic at T4595
17 through 96.
18 And none of which, none of which reflected any steps genuinely
19 aimed at ensuring the unconditional release of the civilians or
20 criminally punishing those responsible for their incarceration and their
21 inhumane treatment, and meanwhile the large-scale detention,
22 mistreatment, and killing and the expulsions continued.
23 What is clear from these documents, however, is that all levels
24 of the RS and MUP leadership were well aware of the crimes that were
25 occurring on their watch and by their subordinates. And none of them did
1 anything concrete to stop them. It was not until after international
2 journalists discovered the Prijedor camps and reported on the appalling
3 conditions associated with them that Stanisic on 9 August, weeks after
4 Zupljanin officially reported to him that MUP officials were holding
5 large numbers of Muslim civilians, finally took the simple and obvious
6 remedial step of ordering the release of civilian prisoners. Of course,
7 by this time for the vast majority of prisoners, Stanisic's promise to
8 free movement meant in reality expulsion. Even if given an ostensible
9 choice to return to their homes, having been attacked, imprisoned, and
10 mistreated, and having those homes destroyed all by the very organs that
11 should have been protecting them, for those people, leaving RS was the
12 only realistic option.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask Mr. Tieger to slow
14 down, please.
15 MR. TIEGER: The other RS government minister that the Defence
16 holds up as a beacon of law and order is justice minister Mandic claiming
17 that he "immediately reacted" to reports of crimes against non-Serbs in
18 Ilidza by calling up Prstojevic.
19 At paragraph 702, the brief quotes these extracts of the
20 intercept, "It has come to our attention and that of the government that
21 you are issuing ultimatums to some Turks, evicting people from certain
22 settlements and people respond badly to it. Please do not do anything
23 like it. We cannot ethnically cleanse Ilidza or any other place. At
24 least that is the attitude of the government and political leadership."
25 Leaving aside that the minister of justice is here referring to
1 Bosnian Muslim expulsion victims as Turks, this selective citation to
2 this intercept is misleading. In its entirety, the intercept makes clear
3 that Mandic was concerned about the negative publicity surrounding the
4 expulsions rather than the expulsions themselves. He stated that the
5 Muslims and the media are "abusing" the facts of the evictions and that
6 this is "very bad publicity for us." He continues that "it has already
7 reached the top how in some settlements you gave them 24 hours to move
8 out," and said, "you were not responsible for their safety."
9 Prstojevic's response? That he didn't say it in public or write
10 it. Mandic instructs Prstojevic to talk to a Muslim judge and "place two
11 or three Muslims somewhere so that we can say we employ everyone,
12 Muslims, Croats, Serbs, as long as they are loyal to the Serbian state."
13 Thus, the leadership's reaction to information that Prstojevic was
14 cleansing Ilidza was: A complaint to Prstojevic about expelling "Turks";
15 focusing on the public nature of his crimes coupled with allegations that
16 it was being abused in the media; an instruction to employ token
17 measures to create a venire of multi-ethnic existence; and no measures to
18 remove or punish Prstojevic for his crimes.
19 The Defence's corollary claim that the information that
20 Prstojevic was evicting Turks was untrue is astounding in light of the
21 fact that Prstojevic was a known extremist whose known criminal
22 activities are clearly laid out in contemporaneous intercepts and his
23 own statement to that effect at the Assembly. For that, see P1086, pages
24 2 through 3, and P515, page 1 through 2.
25 Finally, on the topic of cosmetic orders, while the Defence
1 claims that the generic language in Djeric's 26 April instructions to
2 Crisis Staffs to "act kindly or humanely towards civilians" renders the
3 Prosecution's case disastrously wrong, it is once again the context in
4 which those instructions were issued that determines whether they
5 constitute a genuine preventive measure attributable to the accused.
6 If I can just provide that context and then we'll break. That
7 context is provided, Your Honours, by Djeric's testimony that it was
8 Karadzic's policy that crimes committed by Serbs should not be punished
9 and that investigation and punishment of such crimes "could be dealt with
10 later." And Djeric explained that the two key ministries, justice and
11 interior, led by Mandic and Stanisic, took the same position as Karadzic.
12 You'll see that at our brief, at para 549.
13 Irrespective of a policy involving crimes to achieve a level of
14 ethnic purity, irrespective of the ongoing policy, it goes without saying
15 in an environment in which crimes against non-Serbs are widespread and
16 the president of the state, the minister of the interior, the minister of
17 justice propagate a policy of delaying the prosecution of such crimes,
18 Djeric's instructions were largely meaningless.
19 And, Mr. President, I understand it's time for a break.
20 JUDGE KWON: The French translation has only now stopped.
21 We'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at ten past 3.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 2.50 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 3.12 p.m.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.
25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Just before we adjourned, I had juxtaposed the claims of
2 instructions regarding the treatment of Muslims and Croats with the
3 policy of not prosecuting. The results of that policy propagated by
4 Karadzic and his ministers was the failure to prosecute Serbs for mass
5 crimes against the Muslim and Croats within RS, and that's discussed at
6 paragraphs 535 through 566 of the Prosecution brief.
7 This inaction applied at all levels, at the local level, as Kljuc
8 SJB chief Vinko Pandic reported to the CSB Banja Luka on the SJB's
9 inaction in the face of "monstrous crimes" against non-Serbs. "The
10 reason for this is if all these crimes should be made public given the
11 current police situation, the pressure from the international community
12 on how advisable this is at the moment," P2972, pages 1 through 2.
13 Karadzic's policy created an environment of impunity which
14 encouraged the implementation of the common purpose. In Djeric's words:
15 "Had you punished what was supposed to be punished from day one, later on
16 things would not have happened, worse things." That's Djeric at T27999,
17 speaking directly to the accused in court.
18 Now, the Defence contends that the total failure to prosecute
19 Serbs for crimes against non-Serbs was the result of a dire situation in
20 the military justice system, that there was no discrimination on grounds
21 of ethnicity of the victims, that the judicial system was independent and
22 impartial, and that any pressure on them was individual and not a result
23 of state policy. None of these claims hold up to scrutiny.
24 Now, first, as a general matter, apart from some ethnically
25 selective approaches to individual perpetrators and victims, the story is
1 clear from the systemic unwillingness to confront the massive crimes
2 against non-Serb communities by the VRS, as reflected in the fact that
3 the customary provisions for dealing with such crimes were treated as if
4 they didn't exist, except when used against non-Serbs.
5 Defence witness Todorovic acknowledged that when challenged,
6 after he initially claimed to the contrary that there were no cases in
7 which the VRS military court prosecuted VRS soldiers for war crimes
8 against the civilian population under Article 142, despite such
9 prosecutions being brought against non-Serbs. And those cites are T34076
10 and P3607 at pages 21, 23, and 38.
11 In Karadzic's own words:
12 "We did not discipline our army using any drastic disciplinary
13 measures or punishment because each of our soldiers disciplined
14 themselves with their own state-building enthusiasm." P953, page 8.
15 Despite claims of "extremely difficult conditions" and a "dire
16 situation," in the military justice system, the Defence accepts at para
17 897 that the RS military courts received 33.000 cases and completed
18 12.000. In short, the military justice court system was functioning.
19 The Defence cites Todorovic's 1995 report - that's D2987 -
20 claiming that the policy was to prosecute VRS perpetrators of crimes
21 "rigorously," yet that report makes clear that it refers to Serbs killing
22 Serbs. Its references, omitted by the Defence, reveal concerns about the
23 adverse impact on combat-readiness caused by both the perpetrators and
24 the persons killed or wounded being out of action and the perpetrators'
25 aim to steal and remove weapons from the VRS. And both passages can be
1 found at D2987, page 16.
2 Equally, the Defence claim that with respect to the investigation
3 of war crimes there was no ethnic bias with respect to the perpetrators
4 or victims is undermined by a wealth of evidence proving that the
5 authorities' focus was crimes against Serbs. In the report for the April
6 through the December 1992 period, as one example, the RS MUP reported:
7 "The focus of the operative work in CSBs and SJBs was on
8 detection, documenting, and reporting members of the enemy army who had
9 committed acts of genocide against the Serbian people," P2761, page 15.
10 This reflects a theme running through MUP documentation
11 throughout that period; see, for example, P2715, page 3; P2640, page 3;
12 P2759, page 1; D1616; P3302, pages 6 through 7; and P6384. And this
13 focus is underlined by the establishment by the RS Presidency of a
14 commission for investigating war crimes against the Serbian people in BH,
16 Indeed, this focus continued throughout the conflict. In
17 November 1995, four months after thousands of men and boys were executed
18 in the Zvornik area, head of the SJB Bijeljina crime administration
19 Goran Macar instructed the Zvornik CJB to "intensify activities in
20 connection with preparing and filing criminal reports against
21 perpetrators of war crimes against the Serbian people." P6385.
22 The Defence argument is also undermined by the weakness of its
23 cited support. So at page 787, for example, the Defence asserts that
24 "there were proceedings against the VRS members for crimes against
25 non-Serbs or POWs." The support cited? A September 1994 RS military
1 court report from Todorovic, describing one incident in which a reserve
2 soldier killed a Muslim prisoner and stating: "Detention recommended but
3 the accused has still not been questioned," D29995, page 5.
4 And while the Defence cites a handful of civilian and military
5 prosecutions of Serbs for crimes against non-Serbs, the Defence does not
6 address the mass crimes against non-Serbs which occurred during the
7 course of ethnic cleansing which were not punished. The total failure to
8 prosecute mass crimes against non-Serbs in the military or civilian
9 justice system both during and after the war exposes the false Defence
11 And in further support of the argument that there was no climate
12 of impunity for crimes against non-Serbs, the Defence mis-characterises
13 Karadzic's marks. It first cites his 1993 statement to the Assembly
14 while -- that's at paragraph 815, while failing to mention that the
15 context of his remarks was a discussion of stolen Golf cars and black
16 marketing. The Defence brief then cites Karadzic's proposed measures in
17 1995 for stepped-up work on criminal offences, again failing to mention
18 that none of the more than 1.000 convictions reflected in the document
19 cited were in respect of mass crimes against non-Serbs, which was
20 unsurprising in view of the fact that Karadzic's primary concern was
21 crimes against the armed forces and the effect of non-prosecution of such
22 crimes on combat-readiness. See D1427, page 1.
23 The Defence asserts at paragraph 850 that the trial of Stankovic
24 alone is sufficient for dismissing the Prosecution's allegations that
25 non-Serbs were denied access to the Republika Srpska's judicial system.
1 So what happened in the Stankovic trial? After killing one of the
2 leading Muslims in the community and being released, as described at the
3 Prosecution's brief, paragraph 564, Stankovic confessed to killing two
4 Muslim civilians, two more, and attempting to murder two others in August
5 1992 but was released prior to trial in February 1993. Despite being
6 convicted in October 1993, his sentence was only enforced after he
7 accidentally shot two Serb children in September 1994, circumstances that
8 Defence witness Todorovic was unable to reconcile with his claims of
9 equal treatment. And that's at T34086 through 87.
10 The Defence cites Todorovic for the proposition that releasing
11 someone from custody does not mean that proceedings have been
12 discontinued. That's at D2986, paragraph 14. However, in the very same
13 paragraph Todorovic stated:
14 "However, persons accused of serious crimes which constitute a
15 threat to society such as murder would be remanded in custody until the
16 end of trial."
17 That's discussed in the Prosecution's brief at paragraph 565.
18 While charges against some Serbs released from custody remain pending,
19 even recidivus criminals like Stankovic who confessed to murdering
20 non-Serbs were released. These circumstances reflected the clear
21 discrimination based on ethnicity of the victims that characterised the
23 Similarly, the Defence argument that the judiciary was
24 independent and subject to no interference is undermined by its emphasis
25 on Karadzic's interventions in the work of the military and civilian
1 courts, including his orders to the supreme military court and
2 prosecutor. And you can see that at the Defence brief at paras 782 and
3 799. As to Karadzic's pardons of those involved in "association for
4 hostile purposes" to which the Defence points in its brief at paragraph
5 783, these pardons merely confirmed, as we learned, that there had been
6 no grounds to initiate the proceedings and incarceration in the first
7 place, T21179 through 80.
8 Now, with respect to the pressure on the judiciary, contrary to
9 the Defence claim that pressure on the military judiciary could only come
10 from relatives and friends of indictees or from comrades in arms, the
11 evidence of the customary pressure on the authorities and the resulting
12 distortion of justice can be found in such matter-of-fact observations of
13 perpetrators like Kajtez, who wrote to Vrkes in April of 1994 - that's
14 erroneously cited by the Defence as April 1993 at paragraph 827 - stating
15 that his fellow prisoners "who also killed the balija and the Ustasha are
16 being acquitted and helped by their municipalities." P6556.
17 The expectation of a self-confessed mass killer of non-Serbs that
18 the authorities would intervene on his behalf, as authorities were
19 intervening on behalf of similarly placed persons, shows just how
20 prevalent such intentions were.
21 Another example of official interference in prosecutions is the
22 suspension of proceedings against VRS soldiers suspected of killing
23 scores of Muslim civilians at Velagici school, a suspension "because of
24 the stance of the deputy prime minister of Republika Srpska and the
25 chairman of the Kljuc municipality executive committee." P3616.
1 The Defence contention that this intervention was "a case of a
2 classic force majeure" in which a state of anarchy threatened weak
3 authorities - that's paragraph 846 - is undermined by the contrary
4 evidence strong, fully functioning civilian authorities working together
5 with the military. For that, see the Kljuc municipality summary in the
6 Prosecution's brief. As well as the fact that to date none of the
7 Velagici accused have been prosecuted. See T34077.
8 The almost automatic bending of the judiciary to pressure in
9 respect of the prosecution of crimes against non-Serbs was yet another
10 reflection of the effective operation of Karadzic's policy of
11 non-punishment of Serbs for such crimes.
12 And, Your Honour, for a few matters raised, I will need to move
13 into private session now.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, shall we move to private session, please.
15 [Private session]
20 [Open session]
21 JUDGE KWON: We are now in open session, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: At paragraphs 889 through 95, the Defence asks:
23 "What did President Karadzic know about criminal cases for crimes against
24 non-Serbs?" But its response is silent as to the massive crimes against
25 non-Serbs of which Karadzic was actually informed and which went
2 Four examples of notorious crimes which Karadzic knew about and
3 which went unpunished are: The expulsions and killings in Zvornik, the
4 massacre at Koricanske Stijene, Vojkan's expulsions in Bijeljina, and the
5 massive detention of Muslim and Croat civilians all around the RS.
6 Zvornik. First, the Defence contends that there was "no
7 evidence" that President Karadzic was informed of the mistreatment or
8 killings of Bosnian Muslims in Zvornik. That's at paragraph 2843. This
9 false assertion ignores clear evidence that Karadzic was informed about
10 crimes in Zvornik almost as soon as they began to happen, responding by
11 saying that terrible things were happening in Bosnia and everyone was
12 guilty. And for that see paragraphs 31 through 33 of the Zvornik summary
13 in the confidential brief.
14 Not satisfied with this false claim, the Defence then asserts
15 that Karadzic was made aware of allegations that the Muslims of Kozluk
16 had been expelled in late June and immediately had it investigated, and
17 that his investigation purportedly determined that the Muslims had left
18 voluntarily and exonerated local officials, thus demonstrating that he
19 did not fail in his duty to punish the perpetrators. That's at
20 paragraphs 2805 and 2807. And it is true that this event, more fully
21 revealed than the Defence brief provides, tells you all you need to know
22 about investigation and punishment of crimes against non-Serbs and about
23 Karadzic's allegations in that regard.
24 The Muslims of Kozluk were expelled on 26 June, prompting
25 international concern and inquiry. Four days later, Karadzic attended a
1 meeting in Zvornik at which Zvornik officials reported to him that they
2 had expelled the Muslims of Kozluk and successfully implemented
3 Karadzic's order to settle Kozluk "with our children." Karadzic then
4 declared that he had investigated the matter and determined that the
5 Muslims left voluntarily.
6 As I said, this tells you all you need to know about his attitude
7 toward the investigation and the prosecution of crimes against non-Serbs
8 as well as the brazenness of his lies, but there is more.
9 Koricanske Stijene. As discussed at the Prosecution's brief at
10 paragraph 521, by the morning of 23 August, news of the massacre at
11 Koricanske Stijene, which had taken place two days earlier, reached
12 Karadzic in London. And as discussed at the Prosecution brief paragraphs
13 554 through 55, Karadzic dispatched Defence Minister Subotic to
14 Banja Luka, who co-ordinated the cover-up, chairing meetings with
15 relevant officials, visiting the scene to supervise efforts to destroy
16 all traces of the crime and reporting back to Karadzic.
17 ARK and RS officials issued pro forma orders to investigate which
18 were never implemented. The police intervention platoon was disbanded
19 and its members sent on a combat mission to Han Pijesak, while Prijedor
20 police chief Drljaca could blithely claim he could no longer reach them
21 for questioning. Police, military, judicial, and municipal authorities
22 all refused to take responsibility for the investigation. Drljaca was
23 promoted by republic authorities and rewarded by Karadzic, as were others
24 involved in the killing and cover-up. No further investigation was
25 requested until 1999. RS authorities never held anyone responsible.
1 In the words of Avlijas who attended a meeting on behalf of the
2 Ministry of Justice of top RS and Banja Luka officials, including
3 Subotic, in connection with the Koricanske Stijena:
4 "The entire RS knows that it was done by members of the SJB in
5 Prijedor commanded by Simo Drljaca, and it was known on the day of the
6 meeting. If it had been a well-functioning state, Simo Drljaca should
7 have been locked up. If there is command responsibility in a
8 well-functioning state, then there can be no discussion about it."
9 T35187 through 88.
10 Let's next look at another occasion on which Karadzic falsely
11 assured the international community that he was investigating crimes that
12 he was actually supporting and condoning.
13 As described in paragraphs 531 through 33 of the Prosecution
14 brief, in 1993 and 1994 Akashi, the UNHCR, and the ICRC raised the
15 expulsions in Bijeljina repeatedly and directly with Dr. Karadzic, and
16 the United Nations Security Council expressed its grave concerns "at the
17 persistent and systematic campaign of terror perpetrated by the Bosnian
18 Serb forces in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and other areas." And it demanded
19 "that the Bosnian Serb authorities immediately cease their campaign of
20 ethnic cleansing."
21 And more specifically, as described at paragraphs 556 through 57
22 of our brief, they challenged Karadzic about Vojkan's crimes, Vojkan who
23 was forcefully expelling thousands of Bosnian Muslims from the area of
24 Bijeljina. That's P5423, page 2.
25 And when they did, Karadzic responded to these repeated concerns
1 with false assurances, false assurances that he had taken measures to
2 identify, arrest, and prosecute those responsible. Nevertheless, weeks
3 after these assurances, Vojkan was still operating, still expelling, and
4 the expulsions continued. As Akashi noted on the 20th of December:
5 "There would soon be nobody left to forcibly uproot."
6 And then at a March 1995 meeting of the Supreme Command - that's
7 incorrectly noted as August in the Prosecution's brief at paragraph 558 -
8 at that meeting Karadzic made clear why Vojkan had not been arrested and
9 punished. After explaining that "Muslims remaining there in any way is
10 disastrous for us" and that "it is a standpoint of our policy there has
11 been a separation of peoples, of cultures, of worlds, birds of a feather
12 flock together," he noted that what Vojkan does "if that were being done
13 by a state institution, we would be accused of ethnic cleansing." That
14 is why he explained "we turn a blind eye at a private agency which makes
15 these private arrangements. When a private Muslim and a private agency
16 make arrangements for him to go to Germany, no one can accuse us." As
17 Milovanovic explained, Karadzic's remarks reflected his view that "it
18 would be good to have as small as possible number of Muslims in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina." T25543 through 45.
20 Vojkan was still expelling Bijeljina Muslims in July 1995, and
21 rather than being punished for these crimes, he was publicly honoured by
22 Karadzic. You have that at T15712 through 13 -- through 15712 through 13
23 and 15715.
24 And finally, camp investigations.
25 Karadzic cites three "commissions" established in August 1992 to
1 look into detention facilities as a reflection of the so-called resolute
2 and responsible actions to safe-guard citizens of a "different
3 nationality." That's at paragraph 586 of his brief. Tellingly, he fails
4 to mention that despite ample information about the incarceration and
5 treatment of non-Serbs before that, these commissions were not
6 established until the crime of the camps was revealed to the world in the
7 first week of August 1992.
8 The Defence asserts at paragraph 614 that these reports "shape
9 the states of mind of the republican authorities" and the reactions were
10 the "actus reus." And these reports can tell you a lot about their state
11 of mind and can in themselves constitute an actus reus because in the
12 face of long-standing awareness that civilians were incarcerated in
13 substandard conditions but triggered by being caught in the act, these
14 reports reflected Karadzic made no attempt to identify the perpetrators
15 of these crimes, but instead maintained the climate of impunity for
16 crimes against non-Serbs, again illustrating his shared intent that they
17 be committed.
18 The August 18 CSB commission report which was D470 which was
19 produced within a three-day time-limit merely summarises reports from
20 local SJB chiefs, the very perpetrators of the crimes the commission
21 purported to investigate. For example, Drljaca in Prijedor, that's D470,
22 pages 27 through 33; or Vucinic in Sanski Most D470, pages 14 through 16.
23 Indeed, the four-man commission included the CSB Banja Luka official who
24 helped set up the interrogation teams which operated in Omarska. See
25 KW609 D4246, pages 5 through 10. And two individuals who worked at
1 Omarska, one supervising and one conducting the interrogations. That's
2 Mijic and Rodic. See P2640, page 1; and P6536, page 3. Recall that this
3 is the camp in which the commander admitted that he heard the screams of
4 detainees being beaten during interrogations on a daily basis. That's
5 T44225-44241. This did not even remotely resemble the independent
6 investigation that responsible authorities would undertake. The
7 19 August government commission report, P3549, comprises eight pages
8 cursorily dealing with six different detention facilities with findings
9 so starkly different from the information already available to the
10 Bosnian Serb leadership from both internal and external sources that its
11 sole and evident purpose was to function as a whitewash. And as to the
12 third commission report of late August, D3109, there is not even the
13 facial pretense of a genuine investigation, as you can see at a glance
14 from this report reduced by Avlijas. This is it, report into the crime
15 of the camps.
16 Meanwhile, the survivors of Omarska were transferred for
17 Trnopolje for imminent expulsion or they were transferred to Manjaca
18 camp. And when Manjaca officials noted the vast number of detainees who
19 were simply civilians and the pressure by the ICRC to enter the camp,
20 Karadzic told them: Well, pick out the guys who are so sick that they
21 will attract the attention of the international community and ship them
22 out that's found. And that's found at Prosecution's brief para 536 in
23 the Banja Luka summary at paragraph 9. Meanwhile, the others languished.
24 Another indicator of Karadzic's shared intent is the promotion
25 and rewarding of perpetrators of crimes were part of the common plan.
1 The Defence asserts "there is no evidence that Karadzic knew of a crime
2 and promoted, praised, or rewarded the perpetrator." In fact,
3 President Karadzic hardly ever knew who he was promoting, paragraph 1335.
4 This false claim ignores, among other things, the evidence of multiple
5 promotions or praise by Karadzic of individuals whose criminality he was
6 well aware. For example, those persons mentioned before, Vojkan and
7 Drljaca, as well as Arkan. Arkan's notorious criminality and that of his
8 men was confirmed by both Prosecution and Defence witnesses. For
9 example, T34700, T1513 and T46386. As discussed earlier, when Karadzic
10 brought Arkan back to Bosnia in 1995, Mladic told him that Arkan had
11 "liquidated a certain number of loyal Muslim citizens." That's found at
12 paragraph 474 of our brief. Nevertheless, Arkan and his men lined up in
13 front of the town hall in Bijeljina so that Karadzic could reward them
14 for their achievements, stating:
15 "I am deeply thankful and I congratulate you. You will always
16 have a place in the heart of those you have defended," P2858.
17 That's a still from that.
18 Just one year after the Koricanske Stijene massacre and
19 subsequent cover-up Drljaca was promoted and he and his subordinates
20 received commendations from Karadzic who was represented by Subotic at
21 the award ceremony, P4261. As discussed at paragraph 568 of our brief,
22 in the face of overwhelming evidence of the crimes committed by the
23 military and civilian authorities at a ceremonial Assembly session in
24 January 1994, Karadzic announced that:
25 "Contrary to all the lies and slander of international propaganda
1 mongers, the Serbian army maintained the knightly character and military
2 honour worthy of it," P5525, page 10. And he proceeded to bestow awards
3 on individuals who had participated in implementing the common plan. And
4 those persons included Stanislav Galic, Radislav Krstic, Rajko Kusic,
5 Svetozar Andric, Milenko Zivanovic, Nedjeljko Rasula, Mauzer's Panthers,
6 Miroslav Deronjic, Radoslav Brdjanin. These are all detailed at the
7 Prosecution brief at paragraph 567 through 568. And further illustrating
8 Karadzic's shared intent, he continued to rely on these individuals to
9 effectuate his policies. See our brief at paragraph 569. The Defence
10 argues at 1339 that:
11 "President Karadzic would not have ordered strict application of
12 the rules of the international law of war and sanctioning of individuals
13 who violated those rules and at the same time decorated perpetrators'
14 crimes. In fact, as we have seen, violators of international law were
15 not subject to sanction by Karadzic or his fellow JCE members like
16 Mladic, evidencing the wholly superficial nature of his orders to comply
17 with IHL. Rather than punish, he raised and rewarded the perpetrators
18 evidencing his intent in respect to those crimes and his affirmation of
19 the results, the ethnically clean areas of the RS."
20 Mr. President, I'd like to turn to Count 11, hostage taking.
21 As described in paragraphs 1102 through 1107 of our brief,
22 between 26 May 1995 and 19 June 1995, Karadzic and other members of the
23 Bosnian Serb leadership took over 200 UN personnel hostage to prevent
24 NATO from conducting further air strikes, indeed the Defence concedes
25 that Karadzic agreed that UN personnel should be detained in the wake of
1 those air strikes. That's at paragraph 3354. However, the Defence makes
2 the extraordinary claim that Karadzic never agreed that threats should be
3 made against the detained UN personnel. This is another clear example of
4 Karadzic's revisionism. The day the UN personnel were captured, Mladic
5 threatened UNPROFOR commander Rupert Smith with their televised death
6 unless the NATO attacks ceased, P2286, page 4. UNPROFOR was told that
7 one UNMO would be shot for every additional NATO bomb, P2170,
8 paragraph 28. On Karadzic's orders they were used as human shields,
9 handcuffed to target sites and videos of them. That's at P2268, page 4;
10 P5013, page 2. Videos of them were broadcast to the world and we can
11 take a moment to have a look at some of those videos broadcast within
12 hours of the hostages being taken and that's P2024.
13 [Video-clip played]
14 "Again, the Serb's ammunition bunkers at Pale was attacked by
15 NATO jets and this morning four bunkers were taken out. The Serbs
16 reacted furiously, this time not with shelling but with hostage taking.
17 "This is a time of humiliation for the United Nations. UNMOs, UN
18 military observers, were held chained and padlocked by the Serbs to
19 points of strategic importance. This [indiscernible] to an observatory
20 and a [indiscernible] to a bridge telling his captors what they wanted to
22 "Today, we the UNMOs saw that the NATO planes bombed a lot of
23 civilian targets and a lot of civilians were killed. This is very bad
24 and it's a crime against humanity. We the UNMOs will appeal to NATO
25 especially the president to be aware that our lives are in danger.
1 "So more UN officers were shown chained or handcuffed to steel
2 plates in the arms depot that NATO had attacked. One was a Russian
3 another was a Canadian, they were being used as a human shields and
4 accused quite falsely, the UN said, of having called in the air strikes.
5 The third officer from the Czech Republic was chained to the door of a
6 bunker with ammunition still in it. Six other observers are being held
7 in similar circumstances. On the way to the arms depot and already in
8 the captivity of the Bosnian Serbs, the hostages called their
10 "[Indiscernible] set free, otherwise we will wait. We will be
11 killed. Over.
12 "Just to confirm, what you are waiting from General Smith is
13 confirmation that the bombing will stop, over.
14 "If the bombing starts again I've been instructed to tell you
15 that we will die for the sake of NATO, over.
16 "This is BSA soldier. Three UN observers are now at the site of
17 the warehouse. Any more bombings, they'll be the first to go.
19 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, here we heard the hostages giving
20 forced statements and we heard from two of those hostages that those
21 statements were forced. That's P2525 page 8 and T11126 through -33.
22 Forced statements repeating the demands made by the Bosnian Serbs and a
23 VRS officer threatening that they would be killed if the air strikes did
24 not cease. This was classic hostage-taking, pure and simple. And the
25 Bosnian Serb leadership was very pleased with their tactical. On the
1 3rd of June, Vinkovic and Krajisnik discussed the purpose behind the
2 hostage taking. Vinkovic advising that leadership "hold on to the
3 hostages. That's a fantastic card." And Krajisnik confirming that "yes,
4 we're doing that, we have an excellent method. We always have an ace up
5 our sleeve." P2271, page 2.
6 Karadzic was not only clearly aware of and complicity in the
7 threat to kill or injure the hostages, he directly participated in
8 putting their lives at risk. The Defence contention that Karadzic
9 "expected and ordered that UN personnel who were combatants would be
10 lawfully detained as prisoners of war and not mistreated while in
11 detention," that's at paragraph 3365 of their brief, is patently
12 unsustainable in light of the fact that, one, Karadzic personally
13 approved the use of the hostages as human shields, P2317, page 2,
14 directly and deliberately placing the hostages in harm's way while the
15 air strikes were still being carried out. Karadzic's adviser and
16 spokesman, Zametica, who Karadzic said "speaks for me," 5607, page 7, and
17 who was cited by the Defence as support for the proposition that no
18 threats to UN personnel were envisaged was quoted by Reuters as saying on
19 26 May the day the first hostages were taken that "if the NATO alliance
20 wishes to continue with air strikes then it will have to kill the UN
21 troops here on the ground, P6474." That same day Zametica visited the
22 Mount Jahorina radar dome at which Patrick Rechner and other hostages
23 were handcuffed. And when Rechner asked him to explain the UNMO's
24 mistreatment, Zametica said, "Well, times have changed." P2170,
25 paragraph 47.
1 Later that day Zametica stated on Bosnian Serb radio that should
2 there be any air attacks anywhere in RS, the RS would "treat entire
3 UNPROFOR, all personnel as enemies" and that while so far the Bosnian
4 Serbs had a "restrained response", if the attacks continue we shall go
5 further. That's D105, page 5.
6 The Defence's claim that Karadzic did not condition the
7 conditioned detention of UN personnel on the cessation of air strikes is
8 also demonstrably false. As the Defence accepts at paragraph 2722 of
9 their brief, prior to the hostages being taken, Karadzic threatened that
10 if NATO conducted air strikes "UN forces would be attacked or at least
11 detained." That's P2265, page 3. On 25 May, Karadzic ordered
12 Milovanovic to activate the previous year's Supreme Command decision to
13 "arrest everything foreign in RS territory and to treat military
14 personnel as prisoners of war and hold them as hostages until the end of
15 the war." D2149, pages 56 through 57.
16 Having ordered that the personnel be taken hostage and following
17 the widespread publicity surrounding the use of the hostages as human
18 shields and the threats against them, on the 29th of May, Karadzic
19 explicitly stated that releasing them was "out of the question" unless
20 the Security Council "abolished the use of force, paper 5626. The same
21 day he wrote the Secretary-General setting out his demands to prevent
22 further escalation, which included guarantees that the UN and NATO would
23 not use force, P5015. And in an intercepted conversation the following
24 day, P5607, Karadzic agreed that his decision was to hold the hostages
25 "until final solution." On June 1, he again publicly threatened to
1 escalate Serb retaliation if the UN ordered more strikes D1056, page 2.
2 The clear purpose of the detention was to compel NATO to abstain from
3 conducting air strikes. As described at paragraph 1108 of the
4 Prosecution brief, Karadzic was intimately involved with the
5 hostage-taking from start to finish. He ordered that they be taken
6 hostage, he publicly stated that he was changing the location of the
7 prisoners often and warned that attempts to liberate them by force "would
8 be a slaughter and only a political resolution was possible." He
9 approved a VRS order to place hostages at potential targets to prevent
10 air strikes and he controlled the hostages' release, issuing orders
11 releasing them in stages. Given his direct involvement throughout this
12 process, it is not tenable, not credible that he was unaware or
13 unsupportive of the threats issued by his subordinates in the VRS.
14 Indeed, he affirmed his involved in and his support for the VRS's actions
15 after the hostages' release in this taped video. That's P5026.
16 [Video-clip played]
17 "In hindsight surely, though, surely it was a terrible mistake to
18 allow your people to have captured UN soldiers to -- for the world to
19 have seen them chained up, to see masked men holding guns to their heads.
20 That was terrible. Isn't that an awful mistake?
21 "Well, one mistake causes another mistake. One drastic move
22 causes another drastic reaction. You have to realise that that was a
23 reaction, not action. And we felt hopeless and helpless and we had to do
24 something that is drastic in order to prevent further strikes and in
25 order to show to the international community that we are cornered and we
1 being cornered are ready to -- [indiscernible] by all means.
2 "Because many people in -- in Serbia, for instance, in Bel --"
3 MR. TIEGER: Karadzic went on in this interview to insist that he
4 was the supreme commander and that he was behind everything the army did.
5 So having made clear at the time that he and his forces were ready to
6 defend themselves "by all means" and that these "very drastic" measures
7 were attributable to him, Karadzic once again attempts falsely to disavow
9 Your Honours, before concluding on Count 11, I'd like to make a
10 few comments on points of law.
11 At paragraphs 2737 --
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. I will inquire of the Registry how
13 far we can go for today.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue for ten more minutes.
16 MR. TIEGER: That should be fine, Mr. President.
17 At paragraphs 2737 through 2742, Karadzic repeats arguments which
18 have been consistently rejected by this Chamber and most recently by the
19 Appeals Chamber in paras 19 through 20 of its 98 bis decision. Karadzic
20 simply repackages his argument that the detainees were not protected
21 because they were prisoners of war and ignores the fact that they were
22 threatened with death or injury. In question 12, Your Honours have
23 invited the Prosecution to respond to the Defence claim that there is no
24 authority for the propositions that, one, the prior violation of law
25 justifying a reprisal must be a violation of jus in bello, and, two,
1 reprisals may not involve acts against detained persons. The Defence
2 claim is simply mistaken. The first element of belligerent reprisals as
3 set out in the Martic Appeals Chamber judgement para 263 requires a prior
4 violation of international humanitarian law. Karadzic's argument at 2750
5 reflects a plain misunderstanding of terms used in international law and
6 the relationship to each other. The three terms law of armed conflict,
7 international humanitarian law and jus in bello are interchangeable. So
8 when Karadzic observes in paragraph 2750 that the plain text of the
9 element set forth in the Martic and Kupreskic cases apply to prior
10 violations of law of armed conflict, he fails to appreciate that this
11 means a prior violation of international humanitarian law or jus in
12 bello, as distinct from the law of -- regulating the resort to force of
13 jus ad bellum. And when this term logical misunderstanding is corrected,
14 the premise of Karadzic's argument falls away.
15 Furthermore, the accused has not set out any other basis for
16 defence of reprisals against violations of use at bellum. For instance,
17 when placed in context or quoted in full, the military manuals relied
18 upon by the accused do not provide a basis for reprisals in response to
19 jus ad bellum violations, in other words, defensive reprisals. And in
20 some instances those same sources explicitly prohibit them. So see his
21 resort to the US military manual which, in fact, states that the side
22 that is acting in self-defence against illegal aggression does not
23 because of that fact gain any right to violate the law of armed conflict
24 or the Togo manual which states that reprisals, if used, must be
25 proportional to the violation of the law of war committed by the enemy.
1 That's simply a baseless position that he takes on -- for a number of
2 reasons. But in any event, whether defensive reprisals constitute a
3 lawful basis upon which to violate jus in bello is irrelevant to the
4 charge of hostage-taking because the Geneva Conventions and customary
5 international law prohibit reprisals against detained persons. The
6 fundamental principle underpinning the laws of war is that of
7 distinction. The 1929 Geneva Convention Article 12, the
8 Geneva Conventions Articles 13 and 33 of the 3rd and 4th
9 Geneva Conventions and their Common Article 3, customary international
10 law, the ICRC customary international law study, volume 1, pages 519
11 through 520 prohibit reprisals in any form against persons hors de
12 combat. The absence of a blanket prohibition in Additional Protocol I is
13 irrelevant. To permit reprisals against such persons for whatever reason
14 would undermine the entire structure upon which international
15 humanitarian law is based. Even accepting Karadzic's claim that the UN
16 personnel were prisoners of war, which the Prosecution does not,
17 Article 13 of the 3rd Geneva Convention expressly states that "measures
18 of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited."
19 The law on this point is clear. Reprisals are prohibited against
21 In conclusion, the brazen taking of UN personnel taking hostage
22 by Karadzic and his fellow JCE members, including handcuffing them to
23 potential targets as human shields and subjecting them to abuse evidences
24 just how far by May 1995 Karadzic and his fellow members of the JCE and
25 his fellow members of the Bosnian Serb leadership considered themselves
1 beyond the law.
2 Mr. President, I see we are at time. When we resume, I will try
3 to answer some of your additional questions.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
5 We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.
6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.07 p.m.,
7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 30th day of
8 September, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.