1 Tuesday, 1
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.36 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario
8 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would take
10 the declaration, please.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
12 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
14 WITNESS: SIR MARTIN GARROD
15 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
16 Examined by Mr. Nice:
17 Q. I think you are General Sir Martin Garrod,
18 who, when you finished your first career as the Officer
19 Commanding the British Royal Marines, a three-star
20 General; is that correct?
21 A. That is correct, yes.
22 Q. Not embracing the notion of retirement, you
23 obtained employment for the ECMM and succeeded
24 J.P. Thebault as the head of the centre in Zenica?
25 A. That is correct, yes.
1 Q. In April '94 you were appointed Chief Of
2 Staff of the European Union Administrator in Mostar?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you were subsequently an European Union
5 Special Envoy in Mostar until December of 1996?
6 A. Yes, that is so.
7 Q. Since then, you have been working in Kosovo?
8 A. Just recently in Kosovo. I spent some more
9 time in Bosnia with the Office of the High
10 Representative, but the last six months in Kosovo, yes.
11 Q. May the witness, incidentally, have a copy of
12 his summary before him. And there are small stacks of
13 exhibits. May he have one of those before him as
15 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with the summary
16 first. Is there any objection?
17 MR. SAYERS: No, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
19 MR. NICE:
20 Q. From your years in Bosnia, how did the
21 Bosnian Croats regard President Tudjman of Croatia?
22 A. Well, they regarded him in great -- with
23 great honour. They referred to him as "our
24 President." The Croats carried the Croatian passports,
25 they voted in the Croatian elections, and they sang the
1 Croatian national anthem. So in other words, as far as
2 they were concerned, President Tudjman was their
4 Q. And was there a crossover from post-holders
5 in one entity to another; for example, Susak?
6 A. Yes, indeed, there were a number of
7 Herzegovinian Croats in the Croatian Government, and
8 most notably, of course, the Defence Minister, Gojko
9 Susak. But there were a number of others.
10 Q. Dario Kordic, in summary, what was his
11 position? As you understood it.
12 A. My understanding was that Dario Kordic then
13 was Vice-President of the HDZ, and also Vice-President
14 of the HVO. He was, as far as I was concerned, the
15 leading Croat political figure in Central Bosnia.
16 Q. Just one word about the -- one sentence about
17 the HVO. Responsive to this two-part question, was the
18 HVO completely a military organisation? And if the
19 answer is no, is there any analogous organisation
20 better known to those of us in other countries that you
21 can liken it to?
22 A. Well, the Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane, the Croat
23 Defence Council, was by its name the Defence Council,
24 but it did have wider responsibilities. For example,
25 Jadranko Prlic, who is the de facto Prime Minister of
1 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, was the
2 President of the HVO, and his Deputy, Kresimir Zubak,
3 was the Vice-President of the HVO. So while it was
4 essentially a Defence Council, it did have wider
5 governmental responsibilities. Later on, the HVO came
6 synonymous with the Croat Army.
7 Q. For those of us, for example, from Western
8 European countries, is there any analogous body
9 typically to be found in our States, or not?
10 A. No, I don't think so. Not in the initial
11 days. I don't think there is any -- I can't see any
12 really comparison with an organisation in any other --
13 in any Western European or western country. But, as I
14 say, eventually it became purely synonymous with the
15 Army, the defence side, the HVO. But in the early days
16 it had wider responsibilities, as I've explained, with
17 Jadranko Prlic being President of the HVO, and also de
18 facto Prime Minister of the Croatian Republic of
20 Q. I can deal with paragraph 6 very briefly.
21 You got to know or know of Anto Valenta, you saw him in
22 his office, which had maps, and you knew about the book
23 he had written?
24 A. Yes. I'd had several meetings with Anto
25 Valenta, mainly in his office in Vitez, and he was --
1 he was an expert on ethnic breakdown in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and indeed had written at least one
3 book, maybe more, which he was delighted to discuss
4 with anyone who would listen about his views on how
5 Bosnia should have been divided up into three ethnic
7 Q. During your time in Central Bosnia, did you
8 form a view about how Central Bosnian Croats may have
9 viewed their Herzegovinian neighbours, and compared
10 their lot, one with another?
11 A. There was certainly a view, which was
12 expressed to me more than once and sometimes with a
13 degree of bitterness, that the Central Bosnian
14 Croats -- and after all, there had been a larger number
15 of Croats in Central Bosnia than down in Herzegovina --
16 had been somewhat forsaken by their Herzegovina
17 colleagues for the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.
18 Yes, I had that view on a number of occasions.
19 Q. And in which sector of Croats was there more
20 enthusiasm for the Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
21 A. Well, the feeling was definitely down in the
22 south, certainly in the Mostar area and spreading right
23 throughout the southern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
24 it was there that the feeling for -- the enthusiasm for
25 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was the
2 Q. Now, on the 20th of October of 1993, did you
3 receive a report from William Stutt about six ABiH
5 A. Yes. I received a report that six ABiH
6 soldiers had been arrested near an HVO checkpoint near
7 Stupni Do. Stupni Do had been a Muslim enclave south
8 of Vares which had been, up until then, virtually
9 untouched by the fighting in the war.
10 Q. I'll take paragraph 10 first for
11 generalities. How many times altogether did you meet
12 Kordic, at his headquarters, do you calculate?
13 A. It's hard to be precise. It must have been
14 at least four or five times, maybe more. My meetings
15 with Dario Kordic were mainly in Busovaca, in his house
16 there, which was colloquially known as the Eagle's
18 Q. Was that a place in the town or out in the
20 A. It was about two or three kilometres south,
21 south-east -- wrong -- yes, south-east of Busovaca,
22 along a small road in a wooded area.
23 Q. When you met him, was he typically alone or
24 typically accompanied, and if so, by whom?
25 A. He was -- there was always HVO guards in the
1 area of the house. He was -- I don't recall him ever
2 being alone, and the person who was -- invariably lived
3 with him was the secretary of the HVO, Ignac
5 Q. How was Kordic dressed when you met him?
6 A. As far as I can remember, he was invariably
7 dressed in a camouflage uniform, but I do not recall --
8 if he was badges of rank, I do not recall what badges
9 of rank he might have been wearing. But it was
10 invariably a uniform.
11 Q. Did it ever occur to you to ask him about
12 rank and matters of that sort?
13 A. Strange enough, the subject of rank never
14 really occurred to me as a question. At that time, of
15 course, not only in the HVO but also in the Bosnian
16 Army, the civil side and the -- the political side and
17 the military side were very, very much intertwined, and
18 so one was dealing with political leaders on military
19 matters and military leaders on political matters. And
20 so rank did not -- was not of great significance. The
21 important point was the influence and stature that a
22 man held.
23 MR. NICE: May the witness now have a pile of
24 exhibits, as may the Chamber. Perhaps the usher could
25 have a separate pile to lay on the ELMO for the public
1 to read, as appropriate. If the witness can simply
2 have the pile himself. If the Usher could have a
3 separate pile, then.
4 There may be, I think, some three exhibits
5 already produced that I will ask the witness about, and
6 if the Registrar hasn't got the numbers, we'll provide
7 the numbers to her for them to be extracted.
8 Q. The first document, 1255, a Zenica daily
9 report for the 21st of October. Does this record on
10 the second page, in the middle of the page, a meeting
11 that you had with Dario Kordic and also Anto Valenta?
12 A. Yes, yes. It was a meeting first with Anto
13 Valenta and then a second meeting with Dario Kordic.
14 Q. And this one occurred in that same mountain
15 or hillside or hilly --
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. -- chalet, which I think was --
18 A. The chalet in Busovaca.
19 Q. Called what?
20 A. The Eagle's Nest, it was known as.
21 Q. Right. We can see from the report that --
22 JUDGE MAY: Which bit are you referring to,
23 please, Mr. Nice?
24 MR. NICE: Second page, middle of the page.
25 JUDGE MAY: Whereabouts?
1 MR. NICE: "He then went on to say the Croats
2 could leave Zenica."
3 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
4 MR. NICE:
5 Q. He first of all said that a military solution
6 was not in the interests of the state, as both sides
7 were equally matched. He said that he expected a major
8 offensive in the Lasva Valley, aimed at seizing the
9 explosives factory in Vitez. He went on to say the HVO
10 defenders were well armed and then said, we see in the
11 middle of the page, that the Croats would leave Zenica
12 and start their lives again, as they do not feel
13 protected there.
14 Did you ask him whether the people would
15 return if a peace plan were to be agreed?
16 A. Yes, I did ask whether he thought the Croats
17 would return to Zenica. But he said he thought that a
18 few would, but once one had left one's area of one's
19 own free will, it's difficult to return. Some would
20 remain if a peace plan would be agreed, but fewer than
21 before the war, and it would depend very much on how
22 they were treated by the Serbs and the Muslims.
23 Q. I'm not going to take you through all the
24 entries here, but at the very foot of this page that
25 we're looking on, looking at, he said that he deplored
1 the fact that the Muslims used the supply of water and
2 power as weapons of war and said that the Croats would
3 never do such a thing?
4 A. Yes, that is so. We were having considerable
5 difficulty in the Vitez and Novi Travnik/Nova Bila area
6 about the supply of water and power which was being
7 used. At that time, the Croats were suffering in Vitez
8 from a lack of power and water, and this was a constant
9 problem that we were facing.
10 Q. Do you have any comment on the protestation
11 that he made, that the Croats would never do such a
13 A. Well, yes. Of course, inevitably in Bosnia I
14 found that one of the biggest problems that we faced
15 was linkages, linkages. One side would not do this
16 until the other side did that. And this question of
17 power and water and so on was all part of this linkage
18 business, and it was a battle that we were continually
19 fighting, to try to get rid of the linkages from
20 unravelling difficult problems.
21 Q. If you would go, please, to the last page of
22 this exhibit, the second paragraph, or first fresh
23 paragraph, it may be. Did you summarise or was there
24 summarised from this meeting this passage: "The
25 meetings with Mr. Valenta and Mr. Kordic today were of
1 interest, as they reflect the views of the two most
2 influential Croat civil leaders in Central Bosnia"?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. I am just waiting --
5 A. Sorry.
6 Q. "Although it is not, perhaps, surprising,
7 their views were remarkably similar on a number of
8 topics. As they must undoubtedly see each other
9 regularly and discuss these and similar subjects
10 together, they could almost have been speaking with one
12 Did that judgement hold good just for this
13 meeting, or for all your time there?
14 A. No. I think, throughout my time there, I
15 realised that there was, or I appreciated that there
16 was an extremely close link between Mr. Dario Kordic
17 and Mr. Anto Valenta. And there is no doubt about it;
18 they probably -- because they discussed these things on
19 a very regular basis, and indeed with higher levels in
20 the Croat hierarchy. But their views were absolutely
21 in line throughout.
22 Q. We now move to the information that you first
23 received about the massacre of Stupni Do. When did you
24 receive that, if you can remember?
25 A. We -- I think it was on the 24th of October
1 we first started receiving reports of a massacre, a
2 possible massacre in Stupni Do. But at that stage it
3 was not confirmed, because the HVO commander of the
4 Bobovac Brigade, in Vares, Emil Harah, had denied entry
5 to Stupni Do to all international agencies, including
6 UNPROFOR, which in that area was the NordBat, the
7 Norwegian battalion.
8 Q. Did you hear reports of changes in people of
9 authority in the Vares area?
10 A. Yes. We received reports on the 25th that
11 Emil Harah had been replaced by Kresimir Bozic, but
12 that Ivica Rajic appeared to be in charge in Vares. So
13 it would appear as though there had been a change in
14 the HVO command on the 25th.
15 Q. And on that day, did you have a meeting with
16 Dario Kordic about something else?
17 A. Yes. I'd already planned a meeting with
18 Dario Kordic to discuss a particular problem that we
19 faced, and this was the seizure of two Medivac
20 helicopters belonging to the ABiH, which had been
21 seized down in Medugorje. So I had a meeting with him
22 on that day, specifically to discuss the helicopters,
23 but of course, in the light of the circumstances, I, of
24 course, raised the subject of Stupni Do.
25 Q. Did you express an attitude at that meeting
1 about linkage, and if you can't remember --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. -- tendered, 126 --
5 A. Right. Right.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the
8 MR. NICE: Perhaps this one can be laid on
9 the ELMO, and then the witness can see it as well.
10 Q. This is a document that's been produced by an
11 earlier witness. If we look towards the foot of the
12 first page, we see, as part of your report on the
13 meeting, that Kordic said he fully agreed there should
14 be not any linkage between Medivac flights and
15 prisoners of war?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, let me just raise
18 one objection to the phraseology of that question. The
19 question was: This was Sir Martin's report.
20 Apparently, this report was prepared by a gentleman by
21 the name of Jeff Beaumont. It's not actually Sir
22 Martin's report at all.
23 MR. NICE: Quite right.
24 Q. When a report is prepared by someone else,
25 how, if at all, would you have contributed to its
2 A. The way I would contribute was, for example,
3 if I went to a report like this, if I went to a meeting
4 like this, I would then go to my own room afterwards
5 and type up a copy of the report on my laptop computer,
6 transfer it to disk, hand it over to my Deputy, who was
7 Jeff Beaumont. Then that would be inserted into the
8 main report.
9 So I would have an input, as required, into
10 our main daily report and, when necessary, I would
11 produce what were called HRC's, comments, at the end of
12 the report, if I felt there was anything particular I
13 wished to bring to the attention of our headquarters in
14 Zagreb. So a report like this would have been typed by
15 me, and then -- almost certainly typed by me, and then
16 put on disk, to be inserted into the main report.
17 Q. Very well. And so we see, at the foot of the
18 first page, the reference to there being no linkage,
19 and Kordic agreeing to that?
20 A. Yes. He agreed there should be no linkage
21 between the Medivac flights and the POWs. And he said
22 he would take -- use his authority, telephone Mate
23 Boban, General Praljak, who was then the Commander of
24 the HVO, Military Command of the HVO, and Petkovic, who
25 was his Chief Of Staff immediately after I had left,
1 with a view to getting the helicopters released. To
2 him, clearly, the continual evacuation from the Nova
3 Bila hospital was most important.
4 Q. Was he then questioned about Stupni Do, in
5 light of the suspicion of atrocities? Did he say that
6 he had telephoned General Petkovic? The second page,
7 please, of the exhibit --
8 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I would
9 appreciate it if the Prosecution would not lead on this
10 particular matter.
11 JUDGE MAY: Well, it's in the report. So
12 they can't be criticised for reading out what's in the
13 report, and then asking the witness whether it's
16 A. Sorry, can you repeat your question, please.
17 MR. NICE:
18 Q. I can, General. And one thing: The long
19 pause reflects the fact that if one listens to the
20 French around one's neck, then we can ensure that we
21 don't burden the interpreters too much.
22 A. I'm sorry.
23 Q. Not at all. So if we look at the document,
24 the foot of the first page. Questioned about Stupni
25 Do, did he say that he had telephoned General Petkovic
1 in Kiseljak and that General Petkovic had told him
2 nothing bad had happened; a lot of houses were burning,
3 and a lot of soldiers, in and out of uniform, had been
4 killed, but most of the civilians had moved out and
5 were now in Vares?
6 A. Yes. He responded immediately and said that
7 as soon as he had heard about Stupni Do, he had
8 telephoned General Petkovic, who I understand at that
9 time was in Kiseljak, and who he said had told him what
10 you have just -- what you have stated. That is so.
11 Q. Turning to the next paragraph, looking at the
12 first part of the next paragraph. Did he say that
13 Muslim allegations had to be checked and that they were
14 making a lot of excuses for their attack on Kopjari,
15 while at the same time accusing the HVO of the attack
16 on Stupni Do? And did he say that he did not believe
17 there had been a deliberate attack on civilians,
18 although there may have been some who stayed in their
19 houses and did not want to surrender?
20 A. Yes, that is so. He referred to a village
21 called Kopjari. We had checked out Kopjari, and
22 nothing of significance had happened in Kopjari. He
23 stressed that he used the words, "Speaking as a
24 soldier, and a human being, I severely condemn
25 atrocities committed by any side." And I think that's
1 all I can say about that at the moment.
2 Q. And then, finally, his comment on Vares was
3 that in Vares there were good relations with two BiH
4 corps, and he suggested that there were Muslims who
5 didn't like that and were determined to stir up enmity
6 between the HVO and the BiH?
7 A. Yes, that was certainly a view. Certainly in
8 the north in Tuzla, in the Tuzla area, with the two BiH
9 corps, there were good working relationships between
10 the Armija of Tuko [phoen], commanded by a Bosniak
11 general and the HVO in the Tuzla region. Yes.
12 Q. Just to reinforce what you explained to us
13 about the form at of these reports. If we go to the
14 last page but one, we see, under HRC's assessment, your
15 overall assessment being made on this day. And if we
16 then turn over to the last page, where you've
17 summarised matters, you end in this way. Speaking of
18 linkages, in the last sentence you say:
19 "At least Dario Kordic today deplored such
20 linkages, promising to use his authority to unblock the
21 helicopter issue. We will see if his authority carries
22 sufficient weight."
23 A. Yes, it was a very clear statement by Dario
24 Kordic that he himself, after our discussion, deplored
25 these linkages, linking one issue with another, so that
1 there was a complete log jam. And he promised to
2 unblock, do his best to unblock the helicopter issue.
3 Q. The next document is the -- the next document
4 in the stack --
5 JUDGE MAY: Will you just pause a moment,
6 please. Yes.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. Before we come to the next document: Despite
9 the promises, how long was it before the helicopters
10 were released?
11 A. It took a good five months before those
12 helicopters were released.
13 Q. The next document, 1266, is the daily report
14 for the 26th of October, again prepared by Jeff
15 Beaumont, and if we turn to the second page of this
16 document, do we see an entry at the foot of the page
17 built on a report to you from William Stutt?
18 A. Yes, and this particularly concerned the
19 report that General Petkovic had apparently sent two
20 documents to his subordinate units, declaring a
21 ceasefire in the Vares area and directing that three of
22 the Croat officials in the Vares area were to be
23 replaced: Ante Pejnovic, the President of the HVO;
24 Zvonko Duznovic, the Chief Of Security; and Ivica
25 Gavran, Commander of the Civilian Police and member of
1 the Presidency. And we had already discovered that the
2 Commander of the Bobovac Brigade had already changed.
3 Q. Was there any suggestion or implication that
4 these changes of appointments may have been connected
5 to what happened in Stupni Do?
6 A. It is not -- it was not actually stated as
7 such, but there is no doubt at all that that was the
8 clear inference, that these changes were made as a
9 result of the Stupni Do incidents.
10 Q. But, in fact, did you have any other evidence
11 that those named people who were being replaced were,
12 in fact, connected to what had happened at Stupni Do?
13 A. No. At that stage, I did not, no. I did not
14 have those particular names, no.
15 Q. If you turn over the page just to check that
16 there's nothing else that we want to raise.
17 The report goes on to say: "Even if these
18 documents turn out to be authentic, it still leaves
19 doubt over aims and objectives and how high up the
20 military chain of command orders were given for the
21 attack on Stupni Do"?
22 A. Yes. That was the feeling that we had at the
23 time. It was unclear to us where -- how high up the
24 chain of command orders had been given for that attack.
25 Q. I can deal with paragraph 19 briefly. We've
1 heard evidence about it already. I think on the 27th
2 of October, Nordbat gained access to Stupni Do. They
3 found the burnt village, bodies -- men, women and
4 children -- and indications of torture; is that
6 A. That is correct. It had taken some time to
7 get into Stupni Do, but, as you say, on the 27th
8 finally NordBat did gain access. And one of our teams,
9 Victor 4, I think it was, went in with them to discover
10 these terrible scenes in Stupni Do itself.
11 Q. The next document, then, is 1284.1. Now,
12 this is a report dated the 3rd of November, but the
13 entry to which it relates occurred on the -- or the
14 incident to which the entry relates occurred on the
15 30th of October, and this is a report of your own, I
17 A. Yes. The reason why it was dated two or
18 three days after the event was because, as you can see,
19 it's a fairly long report, and life was busy and it
20 took two or three days to actually type it all up.
21 Q. If we go to the second page, at the top of
22 the page, in capital letters, we can see that there was
23 a meeting between -- who is HOM?
24 A. That's the Head Of Mission, Head Of Mission
25 of the EC Monitor Mission based in Zagreb. At that
1 time, it was the Belgian Presidency of the EU, and the
2 Head of the Mission was Ambassador de Baans.
3 Q. You were present at the meeting?
4 A. I was present at all these meetings, yes.
5 Q. I'm not going to go through all of it --
6 sorry, I must stop. I'm not going to go through all of
7 it because the text is available to be read, but at the
8 foot of the second page, paragraph 5, did Kordic say
9 that the victims of Stupni Do had become the
10 aggressors? I beg your pardon. Did he say the victims
11 had become aggressors, and was then asked about Stupni
12 Do by the Head Of Mission, asked if what had happened
13 would not damage the image of the Croats, to which he
14 replied that the CRHB would condemn any atrocity, but
15 added that Muslim Radio was believed, whatever it said,
16 and that no one took notice of Muslim atrocities, going
17 on to say some houses had been burned, that there might
18 have been people in those houses, but that he couldn't
19 believe the HVO would have deliberately killed
20 civilians, adding that suitable action would be taken
21 after an inquiry or the inquiry was completed and that
22 no one would be protected? Was, to your knowledge, any
23 inquiry ever completed, that you learned about?
24 A. Well, we had similar assurances, both from
25 Mate Boban and from Jadranko Prlic, but to my knowledge
1 no inquiry was conducted by the Croat authorities and
2 no one was ever brought to justice for the attack and
3 massacre in Stupni Do. Nor did I ever see a report
4 from Croat sources stating what they believed had
5 actually happened.
6 Q. On the same page we see, at paragraph 8,
7 Kordic deploring the fact that Muslims were using power
8 and water for military purposes, explaining the
9 position about Nova Bila hospital and shortages of fuel
10 and food, and saying, on the subject of the
11 helicopters, that he had made telephone calls, giving
12 an explanation for why, perhaps, they hadn't been
13 released and saying they were going to be released; is
14 that correct?
15 A. That is so, that is so. Yes, I believe that
16 even he -- I believe that he himself, suddenly from his
17 turn, was optimistic that these helicopters would be
18 released, which were, of course, crucial to the medical
19 evacuation system -- reciprocal medical evacuation
20 system that had been set up between the Croats and the
21 Bosniaks from Nova Bila down to Mostar.
22 Q. Perhaps I also ought to draw your attention
23 to paragraph 6 on the same page, where he expressed
24 certain views about -- and the Chamber can read it
25 themselves -- the Islamic fundamentalist direction of
1 Izetbegovic and saying that the religious leaders stood
2 for a Jihad and were forcing him, that is, Izetbegovic,
3 to seize as much territory as he could, including
4 Vitez, Busovaca, Travnik and Novi Travnik?
5 JUDGE MAY: Are you moving from that
7 MR. NICE: I've got one other short passage
8 to go through and then I am, yes.
9 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to deal with
10 that, and then I've got a question.
11 MR. NICE: Yes.
12 Q. On page 9 of the document, we see, at the
13 foot of the page, something of your meeting with Mate
14 Boban. Is this a report of the meeting with Boban?
15 A. Yes, this is a report of a meeting that I
16 attended together with Ambassador de Baans, with Mate
17 Boban and his close advisor, Vladislav Pogarcic.
18 Q. And then we see paragraph 6 on the topic of
19 Stupni Do, you being told that all those who were
20 killed were soldiers and that anyone found guilty of
21 misconduct would be disciplined, at the same time being
22 told about the village of Kopljari which had apparently
23 been wiped off the face of the earth, the Muslims
24 planning to attack Vares?
25 A. Yes, yes. This was -- he stated that his
1 information was that all those who had been killed were
2 soldiers, and of course this was manifestly not so, but
3 that disciplinary action would be taken against anyone
4 found guilty. And he again raised the subject of
6 JUDGE MAY: General, would you go back,
7 please, to that meeting with HOM, pages 2 and 3 of the
9 One of the matters you may be able to help us
10 about -- I don't know -- is the relationship between
11 Messrs. Kordic, Kostroman and Valenta. Now, it
12 appears, from your report of the meeting, that
13 Mr. Kordic was the one doing the talking on the
14 Croatian side. Would that, in fact, be right?
15 A. Oh, absolutely, Your Honour. Mr. Kordic was
16 the prime figure. Anto Valenta was considerably
17 older. He was more or less, shall I use the word, a
18 father figure, whereas I would guess Dario Kordic then
19 was in his early 30s. Anto Valenta must have been in
20 his 60s, at least. He was a different generation and
21 had a different, really, advisory role, whereas the
22 leader was Dario Kordic, so it was inevitable that he
23 would take the lead in the discussions with Ambassador
24 de Baans.
25 JUDGE MAY: And was that what happened at the
1 other meetings that you went to, Kordic taking the
3 A. Yes. Oh, yes, certainly. I did not go to
4 many meetings where both Kordic and Valenta were
5 present, but when I did, it would be Kordic who would
6 be leading, and, indeed, leading also at a meeting that
7 I recall with Blaskic, the General. So Kordic was in
8 the driving seat.
9 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
10 At some stage, it would be helpful to know
11 the age of Mr. Anto Valenta. No doubt you can get some
12 evidence on it.
13 MR. NICE: Yes. I'm sure we'll be able to
14 establish that, probably from his book, but we'll be
15 able to deal with it.
16 Q. One other thing from this document which we
17 can summarise. It's on page 9, paragraph 7. Boban
18 also dealt with the helicopters and promised to have
19 them released; is that correct?
20 A. I'm sorry, yes. Boban, yes, he was clearly
21 somewhat irritated about being tackled about the
22 helicopters, but he said that he would, and he said
23 that he would go down to Medjugorje personally to get
24 them released. But, of course, it took another five
1 Q. There is a reference, actually, in paragraph
2 7 -- I don't know if you can help with this -- to his
3 saying that when 12,000 Croats were forced to leave
4 from Kakanj to Vares, they received no help from the
5 ECMM, UNPROFOR or the ICRC, and had to pay the Serbs to
6 escape to the south.
7 And then there is a quotation about the
8 helicopters that had brought the HOM to the meeting.
9 Can you just give us the setting for that?
10 A. Yes. I'm afraid I cannot give details about
11 the move of the -- of the Croats from Kakanj to Vares,
12 because I am not certain as to when that actually
13 happened, but he was certainly in a very difficult mood
14 that day, and he produced this barb against the Head Of
15 the Mission by saying that it was only because of the
16 helicopters that we had gone to see him at all, which,
17 of course, was manifestly not so.
18 Q. You also, I think, saw Prlic. We can see
19 that in summary. Did he tell you -- that's at the last
20 pages of this document. Did he tell you that the
21 government had suspended all possibly involved HVO
23 A. Yes. Yes. And he said they had suspended
24 all the Commanders and had ordered General Petkovic to
25 carry out an investigation. And he also said the
1 Minister Of Law had been instructed to start a special
2 commission, looking into all crimes, possible crimes,
3 including Stupni Do.
4 Q. The top of page 10, paragraph 2. We've
5 already dealt with paragraph 23 of the summary. And I
6 can go on to the next document, 1275, which relates to
7 the 31st of October. This document is prepared, I
8 think, by William Stutt. And is it a report, a daily
9 summary report from him for you?
10 A. That is correct. Yes.
11 Q. We can see that he, I think, met Bozic,
12 Kresimir Bozic. And was that with you as well?
13 A. No. That was himself meeting Bozic
15 Q. He's said to be nervous, this is the first
16 page, and saying that he had been promoted to take over
17 a new position. The comment there is that this was
18 believed to be a piece of scene-setting or serious
19 scene-setting. Was that Mr. Stutt's judgement or
20 yours, or a collective judgement?
21 A. This is Stutt's comment in his report, but I
22 would agree with the sentiment in that it seemed
23 strange that this sudden new appointment had been
24 effected the day after the massacre in Stupni Do. The
25 coincidence seems considerable.
1 Q. Turn over to the second page, paragraph 5.
2 You see: HCC was given the transcript of evidence
3 taken by a NordBat military policeman of a Muslim taken
4 prisoner in Vares, two days before the Stupni Do
5 massacre, and the contemporary assessment that was
6 built on that source, and maybe others, from NordBat.
7 Is that correct?
8 A. Yes. Yes. From NordBat.
9 Q. And that assessment, in summary, was that,
10 prior to the massacre, Muslims in Vares were arrested
11 and taken to the schools, that the massacre was by the
12 HVO extremists from Kakanj, although intelligence was
13 certainly required; there were reports of HVO Vares
14 soldiers assisting Muslims and helping some of them to
15 escape. Is that correct?
16 A. Yes, that is correct. The clear
17 understanding that we had was that the attack was done
18 by the HVO from Kakanj and Kiseljak, not the HVO from
19 Vares. And there clearly was a difference between the
20 two, between the HVO from Kakanj and Kiseljak, and
22 Q. The contemporary analysis went on to reveal
23 that in the days following the attack, Vares was
24 controlled by Kakanj HVO troops, and incarcerated
25 Muslims were beaten and subjected to the forced singing
1 of Croatian songs; and that following the massacre,
2 three senior civilians in the Vares Government were
3 replaced, although the Muslims remained prisoners; and
4 NordBat, on their investigation, found some 22 badly
5 beaten prisoners, who they moved to another location.
6 A. That's right. Yes.
7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, according to
8 Valenta's book, his date of birth is the 28th of
9 January, 1937.
10 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
11 MR. NICE:
12 Q. Just before we part from document 1275, I
13 think Bozic made it clear, this is on the first page,
14 that his brigade, or the brigade of which he was then
15 in charge, might have to withdraw further south, but
16 that Vares would be defended to the last man. Is that
18 A. Yes. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Yes, that is
19 so. That is correct.
20 Q. Go then to the summary, paragraph 26. Were
21 you informed by NordBat of their evacuation of Muslims?
22 A. Yes. They informed us that they were
23 evacuating about 40 Muslims daily to the Breza area,
24 which is further south, and around 200 Muslims in Vares
25 had sought refuge in NordBat because raping and looting
1 was a nightly occurrence in Vares.
2 Q. Can you remember the date of that information
3 from NordBat?
4 A. To the best of my knowledge, it was the 2nd
5 of November.
6 Q. And on that day were you due to have a
7 meeting with Kresimir Bozic?
8 A. I was not, but the head of the co-ordination
9 centre, William Stutt, was due to meet Bozic. But he
10 was in fact told he should deal with Zvonko Dusnovic,
11 who was the Chief Of Security, who was supposed to have
12 been dismissed by General Petkovic following the Stupni
13 Do massacre.
14 Q. The effect of that, on your attitude towards
15 these dismissals and replacements, was what?
16 A. Well, it certainly cast doubt on the
17 seriousness of the HVO leaders to replace the
18 Commanders, and to undertake the investigations that
19 they had promised.
20 Q. The 2nd and 3rd of November. Please tell us
21 what happened, in summary.
22 A. On the 2nd of November, the ABiH attacked
23 Vares. It was a bloodless operation, because the HVO
24 had departed rapidly and headed north to Dastansko.
25 And on the 3rd of November, we stated that the HVO had
1 abandoned Vares, released all prisoners, set the
2 headquarters of the HVO on fire, and heading to
3 Dastansko, which is just about one kilometre west of
4 the border with the Bosnian-Serb-Army-controlled
5 territory, to the north-east of Vares.
6 Q. You go to Vares soon thereafter?
7 A. I went up with William Stutt the next day to
8 find the ABiH fully under -- fully in control of the
9 whole Vares area. It was -- my guess is there was a
10 lot of alcohol, because there was a lot of wild and
11 indiscriminate machine-gun firing throughout the town.
12 And we met the Commanding Officer of the Armija, who
13 told us that the occupation of Vares was a direct
14 result of Stupni Do. Though, of course, there was
15 considerable strategic gain, as far as the Armija was
16 concerned, because, with the capture of Vares, they
17 could now travel from Tuzla to Gornji Vakuf without
18 passing through any HVO pockets. So it was a
19 considerable strategic advantage to them.
20 Q. Did you receive a report later that concerned
21 a man called Ivica Rajic?
22 A. Yes. On the 7th of November, one of our team
23 attended a tripartite meeting in Kiseljak to discuss a
24 refugee problem. Following a half-an-hour propaganda
25 speech by the HVO Commander, Ivica Rajic, the UNHCR
1 representative walked out of the meeting, which
2 prompted Rajic to threaten him by saying, "Don't ever
3 show up in Kiseljak again."
4 Q. May the witness, please, see the exhibit
5 that's already been tendered, 1293.1. This document,
6 dated the 9th of November, is prepared by, if you look
7 at the last page, is it Aage Terp and Gerard van der
9 A. Those are the -- yes, the Operation Officers
10 of the Headquarters.
11 Q. Insofar as relevant, on the first page it
12 deals with the report of a meeting with Dario Kordic.
13 This was Stutt's meeting, I think?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What we see there, two-thirds of the way down
16 the page under paragraph number 2, is that Kordic said
17 that Rajic had given way to stress. Your understanding
18 of that was what?
19 A. My understanding of that was that what Kordic
20 was saying was that Rajic, by attacking the UNHCR
21 representative of the meeting, had given -- had been
22 overcome by stress, which was the reason why he
23 threatened him by saying, "Don't ever show up in
24 Kiseljak again." That was my understanding.
25 Q. So he was, if not apologising for, in any
1 event, seeking to explain the behaviour of this man,
3 A. That is right. Yes.
4 Q. Did you receive, shortly thereafter, reports
5 of a change in Rajic's position?
6 A. Yes. On the 11th of November, we heard that
7 Rajic was no longer in command in Kiseljak, and had
8 been temporarily replaced, following instructions by
9 General Petkovic. We also, although I didn't see it
10 myself, one of our team reported that the Croatian
11 press had said that Ivica Rajic had been removed on the
12 orders of Mate Boban.
13 Q. Your Honour, the next paragraph 34 is capable
14 of being supported by an exhibit already tendered, but
15 I don't need to call for it.
16 Is it right, General, that on the 16th of
17 November, you recall a meeting between Philip Watkins
18 and Slobodan Lovrenovic, Boban's press advisor?
19 A. Yes. This was at a time when the Croatian --
20 there were a lot of changes in the hierarchy of the
21 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and the
22 establishment of a Presidential Council, and,
23 therefore, a number of the Vice-President positions
24 disappeared. But to me it did not, in any way, affect
25 my estimation of the significance and important role
1 which Dario Kordic played in the hierarchy of the
2 Croats. There were many changes, and it was an
3 evolving situation; the Croatian community of
4 Herceg-Bosna, and then the Republic of Herceg-Bosna,
5 the Councils, House of Representatives, and so on. But
6 these various changes did not really matter to me so
7 much. What mattered was the significant part that
8 individuals had played or were still playing.
9 Q. And that same day did you learn of a change
10 in the position of Praljak?
11 A. Yes. General Slobodan Praljak, we heard that
12 day, had been relieved by General Ante Roso. And I, at
13 the time, assessed that General Praljak's departure was
14 due to a -- well, the lack of military success of the
15 HVO, but also there were other recent factors which may
16 well have played a part, such as Stupni Do, the loss of
17 Vares, and indeed the destruction of the Stari Most,
18 the old bridge in Mostar, which took place on the 9th
19 of November, just one week before this changeover.
20 Q. On the same day, did you have a report of the
21 access or denial of access to Dastansko?
22 A. Yes. One of our teams reported that they
23 were denied access to Dastansko by the HVO, but heard
24 that the Bosnian-Serb Army were supplying the HVO with
25 ammunition and had as many as 8,000 soldiers along the
1 confrontation line. Dastansko was extremely close to
2 the border with the Serb-occupied territory of Bosnia.
3 Q. A little later, did Darko Gelic and Blaskic
4 confirm to Stutt that Kordic's position was different?
5 A. No, they confirmed that Kordic would remain a
6 Vice-President of Mate Boban, though it appeared that
7 Valenta had no position. The explanation was that the
8 appointment of Kordic took time because he could not
9 attend the last assembly meeting. But we concluded --
10 I concluded that Kordic's position remained strong,
11 while Valenta was fading from the scene.
12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, just give me a
14 Q. Again, I think that there's nothing on the
15 next document that's been tendered through an earlier
16 witness that I need trouble the Chamber with in detail,
17 but by the 15th of December, despite what you were told
18 by, for example, Philip Watkins about Kordic's nominal
19 or formal position as a member of the House of
20 Representatives, what was the overall assessment?
21 A. Well, again, I did not take -- read too much
22 into this, because at this stage they were forming the
23 Presidential Council and Kordic subsequently became a
24 member of that council, and so the Vice-Presidents had
25 gone. It was a little bit complicated to follow all
1 the changes and manoeuvrings, but I had no doubt in my
2 mind at all that Dario Kordic's position remained very
3 strong and he had great influence and power within the
4 hierarchy of the Croats.
5 And there was also the additional factor
6 which may be true. The reason given by Lovrinovic,
7 Mate Boban's spokesman, was that a full-time presence
8 in Mostar might be required for a position in
9 government and it might give out the wrong message to
10 use, as he, in his words -- in his words, extracting
11 someone who is a war hero in Central Bosnia and
12 bringing him down to Mostar.
13 Q. On the same day, which the tendered document
14 would, I think, show to be the 15th of December, did
15 you receive information from Maric and also from
17 A. Yes. Maric from Busovaca, HVO President, had
18 said that Kordic had refused a position as a Minister
19 in order better to serve the Croats in Central Bosnia.
20 And Blaskic, who saw Stutt earlier that day, made it
21 clear that, in his mind, there was no doubt at all of
22 Kordic's importance -- Dario Kordic's importance for
23 Central Bosnia.
24 Q. Thank you. Coming to the end of the year,
25 and I think it's on the 28th of December, according to
1 the document tendered by another witness, did Darko
2 Gelic give information about Kordic's position?
3 A. Yes. Darko Gelic, who was the Liaison
4 Officer with the HVO in Vitez, said that Kordic had a
5 new function, and that was of Assistant Chief Of Staff
6 to General Roso, which would have put him directly
7 number three in the military hierarchy, with
8 General Roso at the top; General Petkovic, Chief Of
9 Staff; and then Dario Kordic, Assistant Chief Of Staff,
10 in the straight military hierarchy, yes.
11 Q. Exhibit 1344, please, which is the next one
12 on the stack, this being a document, I think, prepared
13 by Michael O'Donnell. Tell us about him.
14 A. Mike O'Donnell?
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. He was one of our -- he was our Operations
17 Officer for a while, Irish Army.
18 Q. Thank you. And on the first page of this
19 document, we see this entry under the political
20 situation, paragraph 1. It says that:
21 "The ECMM met Ivo Tokic, President of the
22 Municipality of Tomislavgrad, and the status of Boban
23 was discussed. Tokic believed that the European Union
24 was contributing to rumours of Boban's replacement
25 after presenting the 14-point document to President
2 Just tell us about that, if you can.
3 A. Yes, this was Mijo Tokic. I think there must
4 be a slight error here. Mijo Tokic was the President
5 of the Municipality of Tomislavgrad.
6 We were aware that there was a 14-point
7 document which had been put to Dr. Franjo Tudjman. We
8 had not seen it, we had not seen it, but Tokic told
9 Watkins that this document stated that progress in the
10 peace talks depended on Mate Boban being replaced. But
11 as I say, I have never seen that 14-point document, and
12 this is purely information from Mijo Tokic. But he
13 seemed convinced that there were moves ahead to perhaps
14 replace Mate Boban.
15 Q. So far as you were concerned, was there any
16 truth in the suggestion that the European Union was
17 contributing to the rumours or not, or don't you know?
18 A. Frankly, I don't know, I don't know, I don't
19 know. As I say, one tended, I'm afraid, to be, in
20 Central Bosnia, to be slightly out of the information
21 loop as far as international events were concerned, and
22 so I could not say whether that was true or not.
23 Q. Did Zoran Mijic, mayor of Busovaca, make a
24 suggestion on that day?
25 A. Yes. He had suggested that -- or he said
1 that the foreign minister of Croatia, Mate Granic, had
2 suggested that the Lasva Valley might become a
3 protected area. He also said that if the ABiH -- if
4 the Armija continued with the offensive, the Bosnian
5 Croats had no alternative but to force two corridors
6 for survival, from Gornji Vakuf up to Novi Travnik,
7 north to Novi Travnik, and from Kiseljak across to
8 Busovaca, by military or political means.
9 Q. We come now to the end of January of 1994.
10 There are two documents in the stack to look at. One
11 is 1364, and the other one is 1364.6.
12 If we look at 1364.6 and if you just give it
13 a glance first, just explain what you can about this
14 document, which I think you produced yesterday
16 A. The second one?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. Yes, yes.
19 Q. What can you tell us about it? You produced
21 A. Well, the reason why this is a slightly
22 odd-looking document, without any top or tail, is
23 because, as I said before, I used to type out these
24 reports of meetings on my laptop, put them on a disk,
25 and then bring them down to my Deputy to put onto the
1 main reports. Unfortunately, there's a gap in the
2 reports that we can get hold of -- that I've been able
3 to get hold of, and I cannot find the actual report
4 which this forms part of. But in manuscript, I've
5 written at the top "30th of January." I know it is
6 mine because it is certainly my style, and in
7 particular I remember the remark towards the bottom of
8 the second page: When asked if the Croatian Republic
9 of Herceg-Bosna would join Croatia, Kordic replied that
10 if that were to happen, the Serbs would join Serbia.
11 On the other hand, he said, "If the Muslims announced
12 their independence, we would suddenly not join China."
13 So that is a phrase which stuck in my mind. That is
14 certainly my document, but the precise date I cannot
15 confirm. But it must have been the 30th of January or
16 one day either side of it.
17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there is, in fact, a
18 fortnight's period at this time which we, I think, have
19 no ECMM documents ourselves, and I can't therefore help
21 Q. Now, if we come back to the first of the two
22 documents, 1364, and checking first whose report it is,
23 whose report is this? It's not got a name at the foot
24 of it.
25 A. This is a report written from the
1 headquarters in Zagreb. This would have been the daily
2 amalgamation of all the regions' reports.
3 Q. If we go to the second page, paragraph 6, the
4 reference to ECMM DHOM visit, tell us about that,
6 A. Yes. This was the Dputy Head of Mission
7 Operations visited Travnik. By then it was the Greeks,
8 the Greeks were in the Presidency, and we had a meeting
9 with Dario Kordic and -- sorry, do you want --
10 Q. Yes, yes, go on. First of all, were you
11 present yourself?
12 A. Yes, I was present. I was present,
14 Q. And, yes, please do go on, looking at
15 paragraph 6, and tell us what happened.
16 A. Well, we had an interesting discussion.
17 Dario Kordic stressed the historical rights in Central
18 Bosnia, and, well, in fact it was really -- it was not
19 a meeting of enormous substance. It was more the
20 Deputy Head of Mission Operations was obtaining
21 information. But I do remember a long spiel from Dario
22 Kordic about the historical rights of the Croats in
23 Central Bosnia and blaming the Muslims for their
24 current breakdowns. And we had another long discussion
25 about Islamic fundamentalism and an Islamic state in
2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, that would be a
3 convenient moment.
4 MR. NICE: Yes.
5 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now. Half past
7 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.34 a.m.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'm not sure
10 whether you are going to come back to the document
11 1364.6, but I had wanted to ask the witness something
12 more about the origin and the provenance of that
13 document. Do you intend to come back to it?
14 MR. NICE: I am certainly coming back to it.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'll wait until then.
16 MR. NICE: I only raised it at the same
17 time --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Nice.
19 Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.
20 MR. NICE: -- can't be absolutely sure.
21 Right. I have to go through all of that again, for the
22 record. Yes, I am coming back to the document.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: When you do come back to it,
24 I'll raise the issue that I have in mind.
25 MR. NICE: Certainly.
1 Q. We were looking at document 1364, the
2 document of the 28th of January, General, and I think
3 we'd covered pretty nearly all I wanted you to tell us
4 about. But looking at that first sheet. Amongst other
5 complaints that Kordic's reported as making, was the
6 selected distribution of aid organised by UNHCR? Was
7 that a recurring theme on one side or both?
8 A. It was a recurring theme, and the complaints
9 mainly came from the Croat side. His complaints were
10 that the bulk of humanitarian aid was going to the
11 Bosniaks, and that the humanitarian aid was in fact
12 feeding the ABiH Army.
13 Q. Thank you. Well, now, that meeting, although
14 reported by someone else, and in the body of it
15 identifying ECMM DHOM, was in fact a meeting at which
16 you were present?
17 A. Yes. That's right.
18 Q. And you have a direct recollection of that?
19 A. I have a direct recollection of the Greek,
20 the Deputy Head of Mission visiting, and we travelled
21 around and had various meetings, and this was one of
23 Q. We turn now to 1364.6, which you dealt with
24 to a degree already, and which is typed, save for the
25 fact that in the top right corner there's writing. The
1 original's red biro, recording the 30th of January,
2 '94. Whose writing is that?
3 A. That is my writing. That is my writing. And
4 when I ran this document off, I jotted the date at the
5 top. But, as I say, it clearly was an input for a
6 larger report, for probably our daily or weekly report,
7 but, unfortunately, I cannot find a copy of the final
9 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, may I just state
10 for the record that the first time we saw this document
11 was in Court today. Thank you.
12 JUDGE MAY: Well, the Prosecution have said
13 that they were handed it, I think, yesterday. So that
14 explains the matter.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question that I wanted
16 to raise with the witness is whether he can offer any
17 explanation as to why it didn't find its way into the
18 main report, as the other reports did.
19 MR. NICE: Can I deal with that?
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
21 MR. NICE:
22 Q. First, the physical provenance of the piece
23 of paper that you brought to the Tribunal yesterday.
24 Where had that been kept, until you brought it to The
1 A. I had kept some of my papers from Bosnia
2 days, but of course this is a long time ago now. A lot
3 of the reports, and so on, I have not retained. This I
4 did not have when I had my first interview by the
5 investigators, but I subsequently found it in amongst
6 my papers. And, as I say, although it is not part of a
7 larger report, it was clearly an input for a larger
8 report, and was written by me, as I say, because it is
9 my style of writing and, as I say, I particularly
10 recall the remark about China.
11 Q. To make quite clear, the writing, 30 January
12 '94, in red biro, was that something that you wrote or
13 judge you must have written contemporaneously, or
14 something that you wrote later?
15 A. I can't remember whether I wrote it at the
16 time or later on, when I was trying to sort out my
18 Q. Is it something that you wrote in the last
19 few days --
20 A. No, no, no. No. No.
21 JUDGE MAY: So that we understand the
22 position, this was amongst your papers, which you
23 retained after you left Bosnia --
24 A. Yes. Yes. Of course, an awful lot of water
25 has flown under the bridge since those days, and I have
1 not retained all my papers, because there's been a lot
2 of other things going on. But when I was going through
3 my papers, in between my interview with the
4 investigators and coming here, I found this document.
5 And I thought it might be of use, so I brought it with
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can I just ask Sir Martin,
8 were you able to find other documents of this kind,
9 which you had done on your laptop but which didn't find
10 its way into a main report?
11 A. I think, no. I think all the others found
12 their way into the main reports, but, as I said, we
13 appear to have a gap, I think it is about a fortnight,
14 about this time, where we do not seem to be able to
15 find the ECMM reports of that period. Unfortunately,
16 it spans this particular period.
17 MR. NICE:
18 Q. When you are saying it hasn't found its way
19 into a report, or when that's been suggested, is that
20 necessarily the case, or is it possible that it did
21 find its way into a report, but that the report itself
22 simply hasn't been turned up?
23 A. I'm quite certain this would have found its
24 way into a report because it is of sufficient
25 significance. It wouldn't have just been left. It
1 would have found itself into a report, either a daily
2 report or a weekly report, or another document we used
3 to produce, which was called a weekly assessment.
4 MR. NICE: I need hardly add, before I come
5 to the next question, that of course our efforts to
6 find missing ECMM documents continue. We had an
7 example, I think, last week of a particular document
8 that I explained we were seeking from another country.
9 But although they were widely distributed, there do
10 appear to be some gaps that we cannot fill.
11 Q. The next question, General, is this: The
12 document itself has some references that might enable
13 us to fix its date, whether to coincide with the date
14 the 30th of January or otherwise. For example, if you
15 look in the middle of the first page, there's a
16 reference to Kordic spoke about the Dubravica body
17 exchange, which he said he hoped would take place that
18 day. Now, at the moment, have you been able to
19 identify the day or date of a Dubravica body exchange?
20 A. In my appointments diary, appointments diary,
21 I've got down, "Body exchange noted on the 1st of
22 February," which, of course, is two days later than
23 this. Now, that could be the date on which it was
24 postponed to or it could have been about the date on
25 which it was originally planned. So I cannot explain
1 the difference between the 1st of February, which I've
2 noted down "body exchange," and this date of the 30th
3 of January.
4 Q. If we could explore that just one degree
5 further, you don't actually have your appointments
6 diary with you, but when you produced this document
7 yesterday and issues of its date arose, you telephoned
8 back to England and asked your wife to investigate the
10 A. I asked my wife to dig up my appointments
11 diary, which I still retained, which, of course, has
12 just got -- it doesn't have notes of meetings; it's
13 just got appointments. And she could not find this,
14 but she noted she found "body exchange" noted for the
15 1st of February. But as I say, it is possible that
16 that body exchange might have been the postponed date
17 or it might have been the original date, in which case
18 this "30th of January" may not be 100 per cent correct
19 and it might read "1st of February." I'm afraid I
20 cannot explain the difference.
21 Q. Turning now to your method of preparing
22 documents of this type when you had had an interview or
23 discussion with someone, in this case Kordic, did you
24 make any handwritten notes at the time that you spoke
25 to people, or subsequently in a car or other vehicle,
1 or did you make the -- have the interview or discussion
2 and then come back and type the document up back
3 wherever you were living?
4 A. I would normally make brief notes, but I
5 tried not to be writing continuously because I always
6 felt that detracted from a good exchange. So I used to
7 rely on -- a certain amount on notes and memory and
8 then going back and writing it immediately while it was
9 completely fresh in my mind.
10 Q. And by that method, as we can see from the
11 very first sentence of this typed-up note, Kordic
12 explained himself and his position to you, and perhaps
13 you would tell us what that was.
14 A. Yes. He said he was the -- he was the Deputy
15 Chief Of Staff or Head Of Staff of the HVO and came
16 third in the order of military seniority, i.e., below
17 Roso, who was the head of the HVO, and
18 General Petkovic, who was the Chief Of Staff and
19 Vice-President of the HDZ for the Croatian Republic,
20 which meant Vice-President of Mate Boban. He also said
21 he was a Member of the House of Representatives. And
22 with him, as usual, was Mr. Ignac Kostroman, who was
23 introduced as the General Secretary of the HDZ, and
24 Kostroman was also a Member of the House of
1 Q. We can, of course, read the document in full
2 rather than take time going over it here, but a couple
3 of passages worthy of some note, or perhaps.
4 At the foot of the -- at the end of the
5 second paragraph on the first page, there is a
6 recording of the complaint about the distribution of
7 humanitarian aid, and then on the next paragraph, the
8 Dubravica body exchange, in respect of which Kordic
9 said that the BiH had placed obstructions. Do you have
10 any recollection, one way or another, of an exchange in
11 which there were obstructions or in which it was --
12 A. Yes, these -- this was just outside Vitez,
13 Dubravica. There was a fierce engagement between the
14 Croats and the Bosniaks, allegations of atrocities, and
15 we tried extremely hard, together with the British
16 Battalion, to get into no man's land and clear the
17 bodies and exchange the bodies.
18 There was a delay on the Bosniak side, and I
19 cannot recall -- we did resolve it eventually, but I
20 cannot recall how long it took to resolve, but several
22 Q. If we scan to read the paragraph at the foot
23 of the first page and the second two paragraphs -- the
24 top two paragraphs on the second page, can you, while
25 we are scanning it, perhaps summarise what Mr. Kordic
1 was saying about the influence of Islam and Mujahedin?
2 A. Well, he was -- he was explaining again the
3 concern that the Croats had about the aims of the
4 Bosniaks, and the warnings about Islamic
5 fundamentalism, and the support that the Bosniaks were
6 receiving from certain Arab or Muslim countries in the
7 world, encouraging them to form a Muslim state in
9 Q. Then on the second page again, the
10 second-to-last paragraph is the paragraph that you've
11 already spoken of and which you remembered directly,
12 that is, the statement where he spoke of not joining
13 China. Underneath that, he said that the military aims
14 of BiH was to have a large part -- a large Muslim
15 Republic, as large as possible; is that correct?
16 A. Yes, that is correct. Specifically, he said
17 that the Muslims wanted the Lasva Valley, Zepce,
18 Kiseljak, Makljen Ridge, Prozor, and the Neretva
20 Q. And on the last page, he blamed the Mujahedin
21 for roadblocks on Route Diamond, for the robbing of aid
22 convoys; maintained that an Iranian had been killed the
23 day before at Zepce, and concluded -- or at least the
24 report of the interview concludes with Kordic saying
25 that the Croats wished no harm to the Muslims, but they
1 had a right to defend themselves, he explaining that
2 his own family lived in Busovaca?
3 A. That is correct, yes.
4 Q. Paragraph 44. For what was happening in
5 January and early February of 1994, we actually go to a
6 later document, which is why it's, to this extent, out
7 of date order. It's Document Z1419, the next in the
8 stack. This, General, is, I think, your
9 end-of-tour report, isn't it?
10 A. That is right, yes.
11 Q. It was prepared in April of 1994?
12 A. Yes, and I completed it shortly after leaving
13 Zenica, when I was down in Mostar.
14 Q. The topic I would like you to deal with is
15 January and February '94 and any reports of HV presence
16 in the area. We can find reference to that on the
17 second page of the document at paragraphs 10 and 14.
18 A. Yes. In late January and early February, we
19 started receiving reports of HV, that's Croatian Army
20 forces, moving into Bosnia and Herzegovina to support
21 the HVO. There were many denials, but we had many
22 sightings, and I myself sighted many HV convoys moving
23 up the mountain road from Tomislavgrad to Prozor. They
24 were mostly without number plates, but the HV insignia
25 was clearly visible.
1 Prlic had admitted, in fact, that there were
2 HV troops in Croatia, but he said these were merely
3 some 2.600 volunteers who were born in Bosnia and had
4 returned to defend what he called their country.
5 Q. When you saw these convoys yourself, apart
6 from the lack of number plates and so on, what did they
7 look like? Did they look like vehicles just acting as
8 buses carrying people, or did they look like military
9 units, or what?
10 A. No, many of them were transporters, some were
11 carrying soldiers, some were towing mortars or
12 artillery pieces.
13 Q. Then paragraph 10 on the same page, further
14 up. Just a comment about Praljak and Roso. First of
15 all, what was Praljak's background?
16 A. Praljak's background was mainly in the
17 theatre and in the media, and happened to be a great
18 lover of Shakespeare. He handed over to General Roso,
19 who was a soldier's soldier, and had served for many
20 years in the French foreign legion.
21 Q. Praljak's nationality, insofar as you knew
23 A. Croatian.
24 Q. I think, paragraph 45, you learned of the
25 election of Ivan Bender, and also of others to the
2 A. Yes. Philip Watkins, who by then was down in
3 Mostar as the head of the coordinating centre down
4 there, attended a Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna
5 parliamentary session on the 17th of February, when
6 Ivan Bender was elected President of the parliament,
7 and Dario Kordic was elected one of the three
9 Q. Thank you. The next document, 1385, which is
10 a daily report for the 21st of February, and it's
11 signed off Eric Bailo?
12 A. Yes. He was acting then as our Operations
13 Officer, responsible for compiling the daily report.
14 Q. The second sheet, with lots of underlining on
15 it, speaks of a visit by a Commanding Officer of
16 BritBat to discuss -- with the head of UNHCR and
17 others, to discuss the question of freedom of movement
18 of UNHCR and UNPROFOR convoys. We can again scan read
19 the underlined passage, maybe, and you can tell us,
20 because you were there, what the meeting was about and
21 who conducted it.
22 A. Yes. It was a meeting which was instigated
23 by the CO, Commanding Officer of the British Battalion,
24 in conjunction with the head of UNHCR. And the main
25 aim was to protest strongly about the action of the
1 Croat authorities in Central Bosnia, with increasing
2 restrictions on UNHCR and other convoys and movement.
3 And so it was fundamentally a strong protest about
4 freedom of movement and restrictions and obstructions
5 to the UNHCR convoys coming up into Central Bosnia.
6 But it also raised the subject of the movement of
7 casualties from Stari Vitez, and complained about the
8 linkage between the movement of casualties from Stari
9 Vitez to the supply of water to Novi Travnik.
10 Q. Now, who was present on the --
11 JUDGE MAY: We had evidence about this
13 MR. NICE: Very well.
14 Q. Kordic's position, in your judgement, in this
15 meeting, in relation to those with whom he was
17 A. It was clear that Blaskic was President, but
18 it was clear that it was Dario Kordic who was leading
19 on the Croat side.
20 MR. NICE: As Your Honour said, we've had the
21 detail and we needn't go into that anymore.
22 Q. About this time, did you learn of the
23 resignation of Boban?
24 A. Yes, we heard that Mate Boban had resigned
25 his position, but Dario Kordic was clearly still the
1 man very much in charge in Central Bosnia, although
2 Ivo Lozancic, the President of the HVO Zepce, was
3 emerging into prominence on the political scene, but it
4 was still Dario Kordic as the leader.
5 Q. Next and last document, 1417. The 13th of
6 April of '94. A daily report for the 13th of April,
7 the last sheet. So it shows that it's a report by
8 Mr. Stutt. It deals with a meeting of, I think,
9 Mr. Stutt, is it, with Father Bozo?
10 A. I think it was a meeting -- no, one of his
12 Q. Summarise what happened there.
13 A. He met Father Bozo --
14 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, it seems to me that
15 the document speaks for itself. Obviously, this was
16 prepared by a monitor. Sir Martin has no personal
17 knowledge of it; he is just reciting what the document
18 says, and that appears to me to be a waste of time.
19 JUDGE MAY: Is this a matter in which we may
20 well be getting direct evidence?
21 MR. NICE: You may be getting direct
22 evidence. It's a question of whether it's more helpful
23 to have the context now than later, that's all.
24 JUDGE MAY: Well, why don't we wait until we
25 get the witness here.
1 MR. NICE: Yes.
2 Q. Passing from that document, then to this:
3 Did Mile Plujic at some stage have an exchange with
4 you, that you can tell us about?
5 A. When I was down in Mostar with the EU
6 administration, when the indictments against Dario
7 Kordic and Tihomir Blaskic were issued, I think in
8 November 1994, we had an advisory council meeting. And
9 afterwards, Mile Plujic, who was then the President of
10 the Mostar HDZ, came up to me, and he was clearly very
11 angry about the indictments, protesting most strongly,
12 and he produced a phrase, which I remember, which was,
13 "You have got to remember that Kordic was our
14 Churchill." That, to me, was a very significant
15 remark. It clearly indicated the respect in which
16 Kordic was held by the Croats, but it also indicated to
17 me the stature that he held throughout the Croats,
18 particularly, of course, for his role in Central
20 I always had been of the view that Dario
21 Kordic was extremely close to Mate Boban. I'd always
22 believed that he was related by marriage, but I have no
23 proof of that.
24 Q. Then, I think, although you may have covered
25 this already, throughout the conflict, in your
1 judgement, what, if any, practical or real positions
2 did he have in relation to military matters?
3 A. Well, as I've said, in Bosnia the military
4 and political were extremely closely intertwined. To
5 me, it was quite clear that Dario Kordic was the
6 leading political figure in Central Bosnia for the
7 Croats, but, of course, he did have military
8 responsibilities as well. But, as I say, the political
9 side and the military side were extremely closely
11 Q. Yes. Thank you. You will be asked some
12 further questions.
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. And good
15 afternoon, Sir Martin. My name is Steven Sayers, I am
16 one of the attorneys representing Dario Kordic, and
17 I'll be asking you some questions during the
18 afternoon. Behind me, the attorneys representing the
19 second accused, Mario Cerkez, who is sitting over there
20 to the left. I don't know whether they will have any
21 questions for you. I rather doubt it.
22 Just a few matters of detail to begin with.
23 And to let you know where I am going, I intend to ask
24 some general questions about the institutions that
25 you've identified and whose functions you've described,
1 the personalities that you've mentioned during your
2 direct examination, and then I'll try to take up
3 chronologically, pretty much as the Prosecution has
4 done, and I'll follow on with the meetings that you had
5 with Mr. Kordic, and the other significant events that
6 you've described in your direct examination. Of
7 course, if I ask any questions which are unclear,
8 please let me know. That's my fault, not any lack of
9 understanding on your part, I assure you.
10 Just generally, sir. My understanding is
11 that you were the head of the coordinating centre in
12 Mostar, and that you held that position from June of
13 1993 until the end of -- approximately the end of
14 September of 1993. Is that correct?
15 A. That is right. When I arrived out in Bosnia,
16 I was sent straight to Mostar and spent my first three
17 months in Mostar.
18 Q. And that straddled, if you like, the last
19 days of the so-called Croatian community of
20 Herceg-Bosna, the HZ-HB, and the foundation of the
21 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna on the 28th of August
22 of 1993; is that correct?
23 A. That is right. Yes.
24 Q. Then you became the head of the regional
25 centre of the European Community Monitor Mission in
1 Zenica, taking up your position from your predecessor,
2 Jean-Pierre Thebault, I believe on October the 14th of
4 A. Yes. Perhaps it's just worth adding that the
5 area of which I was responsible covered all the Croat
6 and Bosniak areas of Bosnia; in other words -- Croat
7 and Bosniak areas; in other words, the new area of the
8 federation, except for Sarajevo, Bihac, and the three
9 pockets of Zepa, Gorazde and Srebrenica.
10 Q. Yes. You've just described what your area of
11 responsibility was as HRC or the head of the regional
12 centre in Zenica?
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. You had only been in the area fulfilling your
15 new duties, as the head of the regional centre, for
16 nine days at the time of the Stupni Do incident;
18 A. That is correct, yes.
19 Q. Do you yourself speak Croatian, sir?
20 A. I am a self-taught speaker. Therefore, I am
21 not very professional. But I do understand a lot, but
22 I speak rather slowly.
23 Q. Would it be fair to say that you relied upon
24 the services of interpreters to conduct the exchanges
25 that you had --
1 A. Certainly, yes.
2 Q. -- with various people? Very well.
3 I was going to ask you some general questions
4 regarding the make-up of the European Community
5 Monitoring Mission, but the Trial Chamber's heard more
6 than sufficient evidence on that, so let me pass on to
7 the next question.
8 The general military situation that
9 confronted you, as you assumed your duties as head of
10 the regional centre in Zenica, it would be fair to say
11 that militarily, at least, the Croats were very much on
12 the defensive throughout your time as HRC Zenica; is
13 that right?
14 A. That is largely so. If I could just, perhaps
15 just to help the Court -- the three areas of my --
16 three areas for which I was responsible were very
17 different. Tuzla, the Bosniaks and the Croats were
18 fighting together against the Serbs. In Central
19 Bosnia, the Croats and the Bosniaks were fighting
20 between themselves. And in the southern part, the main
21 fighting was going on in Mostar.
22 Q. You would agree, sir, that this was a fairly
23 complex kaleidoscopic patchwork quilt of shifting
24 alliances and political orientations, wouldn't you?
25 A. Yes, I would.
1 Q. Let me see if I can summarise the situation
2 that the Croats found themselves in, at least from your
3 perspective, when you assumed your duties, sir. Would
4 it be fair to say that by the middle of November of
5 1993, after you had been in the job for some time, the
6 Croats had essentially been squeezed or compressed into
7 three geographically, politically and militarily
8 isolated pockets: the Vitez-Busovaca pocket, the
9 Kiseljak pocket, and the town of Zepce?
10 A. That is so, yes.
11 Q. And the Vares pocket had essentially
12 disappeared as a result of the ABiH onslaught in the
13 very early part of November?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. You made some reference during your direct
16 examination to a conversation that you had with Mate
17 Boban, one of the subjects of which was the departure
18 of 12.000 or so Croats from Kakanj. You mentioned that
19 you were not particularly familiar with the facts
20 surrounding that, but would it be -- would it help jog
21 your memory to suggest that there was an offensive
22 launched by Muslim forces on the town of Kakanj from
23 June the 9th to the 13th of 1993, and that that was
24 what resulted in this huge exodus of refugees?
25 A. Yes, indeed. I would agree. I would agree.
1 But inevitably, because I was so bound up with Mostar
2 at that time, I was not paying detailed attention to
3 Central Bosnia.
4 Q. Well, of course not, Sir Martin. That was
5 someone else's bailiwick, and it didn't become your
6 bailiwick until October of 1993.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. All right. And isn't it true that one of the
9 leaders of the gangs that were controlled by Ivica
10 Rajic, one of the subcommanders, if you like, a
11 gentleman by the name of Dzeljo [phoen], and I believe
12 he is referred to in your November 3rd report, this
13 gentleman what was actually a emigre from Kakanj,
14 having been ejected along with the 12.000 or so
15 refugees in June of 1993?
16 A. That could well be so.
17 Q. All right. Do you recall that the leader of
18 this gang of persons nicknamed the Apostoli, that his
19 parents had actually been killed in Bilalovac by Muslim
21 A. I'm not sure that I knew that. I don't think
22 I knew that, no.
23 Q. You said, sir, that the political and the
24 military components of the warring forces were, I think
25 you used the words, inextricably intertwined. Who was
1 the political commander on the Muslim side in Central
3 A. Well, in fact, in Central Bosnia my main
4 dealings were on the military side. In fact, I used to
5 talk politics to the Bosnian commanders. I did not
6 have so much dealing -- Mirsad Ceman was President of
7 the SDA in the area and I had one or two meetings with
8 him, but the main authority or the main driving force
9 on the Bosniak side was the military side, or those
10 were my main interlocutors for trying to achieve
12 Q. You weren't aware of Mr. Ceman having any
13 military functions, military powers, the ability to
14 issue orders to the Armija forces, were you?
15 A. I never saw him at any meeting involving the
17 Q. I'm just giving the interpreters a chance to
18 catch up.
19 Your principal dealings, I believe, with the
20 leaders of the Muslim forces were, first, with General
21 Enver Hadzihasanovic and subsequently with General
22 Mehmet Alagic; is that right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You found both of these gentlemen to be
25 hard-liners, didn't you?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. In fact, sir, generally you found all of the
3 Muslim military leadership to fall into that category
4 of being hard-liners, in your view; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, they were very single-minded.
6 Q. Indeed, I believe that you reflected that on
7 page 2 of your end-of-tour report, which has previously
8 been marked Exhibit D19/1 and, I think, Exhibit Z1419
9 by the Prosecution this morning.
10 A. Yes. If I could just add that Hadzihasanovic
11 came from Zvornik and Alagic came from Sanski Most, and
12 they both told me several times that they would not
13 stop fighting until they were back living in the places
14 where they were born.
15 Q. Or until they had subsequently resumed
16 possession, militarily, of all of the properties that
17 once they, at least in their view, controlled before
18 the outbreak of the war?
19 A. Yes, but they specifically said that they --
20 you know, Hadzihasanovic in Zvornik, Alagic in Sanski
21 Most, but they were determined to fight on.
22 Q. Indeed, it was your view that the Muslim
23 generals had learned their lessons very well from the
24 Serbs and that, possession being nine-tenths of the law
25 at the negotiation table, that's exactly the policy
1 that they were pursuing; is that correct, sir?
2 A. It was certainly my view that the lesson was
3 not lost at all, that the Serbs had actually
4 demonstrated that territorial possession was
5 nine-tenths of the law when it came to the negotiation
7 Q. Sir Martin, I'll just ask you some questions
8 in connection with the Kakanj offensive from June the
9 9th to the 13th. Perhaps you don't have any individual
10 knowledge of this, but isn't it also true that there
11 was a simultaneous offensive going on in the Travnik
12 area from June the 8th to the 12th of 1993, and that
13 actually produced, we heard a witness testify a few
14 days ago, about 20.000 refugees, Croat refugees?
15 A. Yes, this is so, but I regret I'm not in a
16 position to give detailed answers on those two
18 Q. Then I won't ask you any.
19 It's also true, is it not, that a
20 simultaneous -- actually, not a simultaneous but a
21 subsequent military offensive was launched in Bugojno
22 and in Fojnica, both of those municipalities were
23 captured by Muslim forces, and they also resulted in
24 tens of thousands of Bosnian Croat refugees as well?
25 A. Yes, that is so.
1 Q. And apart from the Vares offensive that
2 resulted in the capture of Vares, there were two other
3 offensives that occurred during your tour of duty. I
4 think they are referred to on page 2 of your
5 end-of-tour report, Sir Martin, and feel free to
6 consult it, if you need. But I believe that the first
7 was on December 22nd, just before Christmas of 1993,
8 before a major attack was launched by [realtime
9 transcript read in error "on"] the Muslim forces on the
10 Vitez-Busovaca pocket. You were familiar with that?
11 A. Yes, indeed.
12 Q. That produced many Croat fatalities; correct?
13 A. That is so, yes.
14 Q. I see that the transcript says "launched on
15 the Muslims," but it's actually "launched by the Muslim
16 forces"; is that correct, sir?
17 A. Sorry, can I --
18 Q. Take a look at line 4 on page 66. The
19 transcript reads, "A military offensive was launched on
20 the Muslims," but it actually should read, "A military
21 offensive was launched by the Muslim --"
22 A. On page --
23 Q. No, on the screen before you.
24 JUDGE MAY: We can see that that's wrong.
25 There's no need to trouble with that.
1 A. Sorry, a major offensive was launched -- line
2 4 --
3 MR. SAYERS:
4 Q. It should read "by the Muslims."
5 A. I'm not quite sure what this page 66 is.
6 JUDGE MAY: Don't worry, Sir Martin. Counsel
7 is confusing the issue by referring to the transcript.
8 A. Right, okay. Well, the major offensive just
9 before Christmas was, of course, launched by the
10 Muslims on the Vitez pocket.
11 MR. SAYERS: Thank you. I think that cleans
12 up the transcript, Mr. President. Sorry for the
14 Q. And then the second offensive, Sir Martin, I
15 take it was in the second week of January, January the
16 9th, to be precise, when a major offensive was launched
17 on the Vitez-Busovaca pocket at Santici, aimed at
18 controlling the main supply route at that location?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. All right. And were you aware that
21 house-to-house clearance techniques were used in these
22 offensives that resulted in the deaths of many Croat
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. All right, sir. Let me stand aside and just
1 ask you, sir, you've made considerable reference to the
2 HVO during your testimony. It's true, is it not, that
3 throughout the period August of 1992 until the
4 foundation of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna,
5 the President of the HVO was Dr. Jadranko Prlic in
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, do you recall any discussions with
9 influential Croats in Mostar, such as, for example,
10 Vladislav Pogarcic, regarding the intention behind
11 setting up the HVO, whether it was permanent, whether
12 it was temporary, or temporary expedient in wartime; do
13 you have any recollection of that?
14 A. I had discussions with Vladislav Pogarcic on
15 a number of occasions, but we certainly never discussed
16 the reason for the establishment of the HVO, which I
17 think by its title was, to me, sort of self-evident.
18 It was their defence council.
19 Q. Defence against the Serbs, who had launched
20 massive offensives throughout the territory of the new
21 Republic which was only founded, I believe, on March
22 the 6th of 1992; is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. All right, sir. Now, did you ever undertake
25 any effort to ascertain for yourself what the powers of
1 a President of the HVO were?
2 A. Not specifically, no, I did not.
3 Q. All right. Let me move on to the next
5 I'll suggest to you, and I don't believe that
6 this is controverted, that there were three
7 Vice-Presidents of the HVO, the first being a man
8 called Stipo Ivankovic, who was appointed to his
9 position simultaneously with the appointment of
10 Dr. Prlic as President. Did you ever see
11 Mr. Ivankovic?
12 A. I don't think I ever met Mr. Ivankovic, no.
13 Q. All right. The Second Vice-President is Anto
14 Valenta, and he was appointed, I believe, on October
15 the 17th, 1992. You did meet him?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And he described to you the fact that he was,
18 in fact, a Vice-President of the HVO; correct?
19 A. Yes. No, wait a minute. I would have to
20 check on that. I think it is likely, but I cannot
21 recall Valenta actually saying to me, "I'm a
22 Vice-President of the HVO."
23 Q. Very well. The Third Vice-President, sir, is
24 a gentleman that you mentioned by the name of Kresimir
25 Zubak. Did you meet him in Mostar before the
1 foundation of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you know that he was a Vice-President of
4 the HVO?
5 A. Yes, yes. In fact, I think I mentioned that
6 in my evidence.
7 Q. Did you know that, in fact, Mr. Kordic was
8 never a Vice-President of the HVO?
9 A. Well, I certainly was convinced that he was.
10 Q. Very well. Let me put it to you that the
11 only official position that he held in the HVO was as
12 one of many members of a personnel committee, to which
13 he was appointed in 1992, in November, I believe.
14 A. As far as the HVO is concerned?
15 Q. Yes. Were you aware of that?
16 A. I was not aware of that, no.
17 Q. And the same question with respect to the
18 powers of a President: Did you ever take any steps to
19 inform yourself or to investigate what the powers of a
20 Vice-President of the HVO may have been, sir?
21 A. I did not go into the terms of reference, no,
22 of Prlic, Zubak and the others, no.
23 Q. Very well. Turning to the political party,
24 the HDZ-BiH, you were aware, I think, that Mr. Mate
25 Boban was the President of this political party at all
1 material times --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. -- that are involved in this case, and I
4 believe that you have identified Mr. Kordic correctly
5 as one of the Vice-Presidents of the political party.
6 Do you know how many Vice-Presidents there were?
7 A. No, I don't.
8 Q. Let me just have one document marked as an
9 exhibit. I would like to ask you if you've ever seen a
10 copy of this before and if you are aware of the other
12 JUDGE MAY: I don't see any point in this.
13 The witness has said that he was not aware and he
14 doesn't know how many Vice-Presidents there were, so
15 there's no point asking him about it.
16 MR. SAYERS: I think that may be correct.
17 Let me just put the proposition to the witness.
18 JUDGE MAY: What is the proposition? What is
19 it, before you put it?
20 MR. SAYERS: That there were five
21 Vice-Presidents appointed in November of 1992, and
22 Mr. Kordic was one of them.
23 JUDGE MAY: Well, Sir Martin, do you know
24 anything about that?
25 A. If I guessed, I would have said approximately
1 six, but I did not know it was precisely five.
2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, you can call evidence
3 about this.
4 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Mr. President.
5 Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Mile Akmadzic, one of
6 the other Vice-Presidents?
7 A. No, I did not know Akmadzic, no.
8 Q. One of the other Vice-Presidents was
9 Pero Markovic. I believe you may have met him.
10 A. Yes, I certainly met Markovic, yes.
11 Q. Mr. Jadranko Topic?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You met him too; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And finally, Mr. Ivo Zivkovic?
16 A. Zivkovic, no.
17 Q. Very well. Thank you.
18 Sir Martin, in connection with the foundation
19 of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna in August of
20 1993, you were aware, I take it, of the progress of the
21 international negotiations starting first with the
22 internationally-sanctioned and approved Vance-Owen
23 Plan, or so-called Vance-Owen Plan, in early 1993 and
24 progressing on to the Stoltenberg-Owen Plan --
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. -- the final incarnation of which was
2 approved, I believe, in August of 1993; correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. All right. And the foundation of that
5 plan -- and the Trial Chamber has heard evidence of
6 this already, but it may be useful to go over this --
7 the foundation of the plan was the establishment of
8 three ethnically-based constituent or so-called
9 constituent republics which would collectively form the
10 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. As I understand the position of the
13 International Community, it was anticipated that each
14 one of these republics would be self-governing, with
15 elected representatives, and in turn there would be
16 superimposed upon the constituent republic structure a
17 central government to which each of the three republics
18 would appoint various representatives?
19 A. Yes. In general terms, yes.
20 Q. Yes. You were aware, sir, that Dr. Prlic was
21 appointed to be the Prime Minister of the Government of
22 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And that there were a number of ministers
25 appointed simultaneously with him?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And Mr. Kordic was not one of those
3 ministers, was he?
4 A. To my knowledge, no.
5 Q. Were you aware, sir, that there were two
6 Deputy Prime Ministers subordinate to Dr. Prlic, the
7 first being Perica Jukic from Zepce and the second
8 being Jozo Martinovic?
9 A. Now that you say it, it does ring a bell, but
10 I would not have been able to remember it off the top
11 of my head.
12 Q. Very well. I take it that you are aware that
13 Mr. Boban was the hold-over President from the HZ-HB.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And he fulfilled that role until, I think
17 you've said, approximately the middle of February of
19 A. That's right, yes.
20 Q. All right. You also made reference to a
21 Presidential Council, sir, that I believe was appointed
22 on the 10th of December. Were you aware of the people
23 who were appointed on this council?
24 A. I cannot recall, but I'm aware that Dario
25 Kordic was appointed at some stage. I'm not quite sure
1 on what date.
2 Q. Let me put it to you, sir, that Mr. Kordic
3 was not appointed to this council until October of
4 1994, well after the close of the war.
5 A. Right, right.
6 Q. Were you aware that appointed to the council
7 on December the 10th, 1993, were Lieutenant-General
8 Ante Roso, who was the Commander In Chief of the HVO
9 Armed Forces; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And one of the gentlemen that you previously
12 described, sir, Ivo Lozancic, who was President of the
13 HVO in Zepce; correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Were you aware that those two gentlemen were
16 on the Presidential Council?
17 A. Now that you remind me, probably, yes. But,
18 again, I wouldn't have had it on the top of my head.
19 Q. And it's true, is it not, that Mr. Kordic was
20 never on the Presidential Council during any time when
21 you were HRC Zenica?
22 A. I knew he came onto the council, but I was
23 not sure -- I could not identify when.
24 Q. Very well. Now, just turning to the
25 government, sir, were you aware that the Government of
1 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna consisted of a
2 President and a House of Representatives, a Parliament,
3 if you like?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. All right. I take it that you were aware
6 that the first convention of the House of
7 Representatives was held on November the 20th, 1993,
8 and I believe you've been asked some questions in
9 connection with Mr. Boban's press advisor, Slobodan
10 Lovrinovic, --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- with whom the ECMM had a fairly continuous
13 relationship; correct?
14 A. A fairly regular relationship, yes.
15 Q. And I believe it was on November the 20th
16 that you identified that General Roso was known by the
17 ECMM to have replaced General Praljak as the new
18 Commander In Chief of the HVO Armed Forces throughout
20 A. Yes. I would have to check the precise date,
21 but it was about -- in fact, I think it was a week
22 after the destruction of the Stari mosque, which must
23 have been the 16th of November.
24 Q. Just one question regarding General Praljak.
25 Did you know that he was actually born in Capljina in
2 A. No.
3 Q. You have previously described conversations
4 you had with the head of the coordination centre in
5 Mostar, sir, Mr. Philip Watkins. He had actually
6 attended the parliamentary session of the Croatian
7 Republic of Herceg-Bosna on February the 17th of 1994,
8 and I think you've described --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- that you found out from him, as a result
11 of his attendance at that session, that Ivan Bender had
12 actually been elected the President at the Parliament.
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. All right. And I think you said, sir, that
15 your impression was that Mr. Kordic had been elected
16 Vice-President of the parliament and that he was one of
17 three such Vice-Presidents.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Or Deputy Chairmen, actually.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. All right. Were you aware that actually
22 there were only two Deputy Chairmen, Mr. Kordic of
23 course being one of them, and Vlado Santic of Bihac
24 being the second one?
25 A. No, I must say I thought -- I was under the
1 impression he was one of three Vice-Presidents.
2 Q. All right. If I could just ask for this
3 document to be marked as an exhibit. Have one put on
4 the ELMO. I only have one question for you in
5 connection with it.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D174/1.
7 MR. SAYERS:
8 Q. Sir Martin, this is a translation of a
9 document published in the Narodni List in March of
10 1994. Did your monitors actually have access to the
11 Narodni List?
12 A. Probably. Probably, but I couldn't say for
14 Q. Very well. Looking at this document, sir,
15 and since you apparently read Croatian, feel free to
16 look at the Croatian original that's attached to this.
17 Does this help refresh your recollection, that
18 Mr. Kordic and Mr. Santic were appointed as Deputy
19 Chairmen of the Chamber Of Deputies by the Chairman of
20 that Chamber, Ivan Bender?
21 A. Yes, indeed. But again I do not recall
22 seeing this document before.
23 Q. Thank you. I'm finished with the document.
24 I appreciate it.
25 You made reference to President Boban's
1 resignation in February of 1994. Isn't it true that
2 the general feeling among Croats was that he had
3 resigned for entirely honourable reasons?
4 A. I think the reaction was somewhat mute
5 amongst the Croats. I expected a more strong
6 reaction. And I think all the Croats accepted his
8 Q. Right. I just refer you to page 15 of the
9 statement that you gave in February 1998. I don't
10 think you are saying anything different. You say that:
11 "At about this time Mate Boban resigned from
12 his post as President of the CRHB. Reaction to this
13 resignation amongst the Croats in Central Bosnia was
14 surprisingly mute. The general feeling seemed to be
15 that he resigned for honourable reasons, as he had
16 other important work to do."
17 And that's still your view today --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- is it not? Thank you.
20 A. Perhaps I could just add a rider to that.
21 Q. Certainly.
22 A. I mean, I do not know. I do not know. I
23 mean, one heard, although I cannot prove it, that
24 pressure was put on Franjo Tudjman, over the peace
25 negotiations, that Mate Boban should go. I cannot say
1 whether that is true or not. So all I can say is that
2 the Croat reaction to his departure was mute,
3 surprisingly mute. The precise reasons why he went, I
4 could not say.
5 Q. Fair enough. Let me move on to one other
6 connected subject. You were aware, from reports that
7 you had received from your associates in Mostar, that
8 in fact there was no position of Vice-President in the
9 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna; isn't that true?
10 A. Well, as I say, I had assumed -- my
11 understanding was that Dario Kordic had been appointed
12 to the Vice-President, but it could be that I was
14 Q. I wonder if I might just ask you, Sir Martin,
15 to take a look at the document that was marked Exhibit
16 Z13310. I believe that's already been marked as an
17 exhibit. We may have to present that to Sir Martin.
18 A. Right. I don't think I've got it.
19 Q. Very well. I wonder if, Mr. Usher, you can
20 just put this on the ELMO, please, another copy of it.
21 Page 1.
22 JUDGE MAY: It's a confidential document; the
23 Registrar says so. It can't go on the ELMO. What is
24 the point, please?
25 MR. SAYERS: A very simple point,
1 Mr. President. Mr. Lovrenovic informs the ECMM that
2 the Presidential Council was formed because the CRHB or
3 the HRHB has no Vice-Presidents, and the Presidential
4 Council is formed as an alternative mechanism that was
5 needed to support the Presidential Office in President
6 Boban's absence.
7 Q. Does that help jog your memory, Sir Martin?
8 A. Yes, indeed. In fact, I think -- in fact, I
9 think I said that in my statement, in fact, because I
10 actually quoted the statement by Lovrenovic about
11 extracting someone who was aware here from Central
12 Bosnia would sent the wrong message. Yes.
13 Q. Yes. All right. And I believe, sir, that
14 you were aware that your HCC in Mostar had been
15 informed, on a number of occasions, that actually, when
16 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was formed, and
17 before his appointment as Deputy Chairman of the House
18 of Representatives, Mr. Kordic was actually just one of
19 a number of ordinary members of the House of
20 Representatives; is that correct?
21 A. Well, I would say more equal than others. I
22 am still convinced, and I was throughout, that Dario
23 Kordic's position was very significant in the hierarchy
24 of the Croats, regardless of what position he might
25 have held at one stage or at another.
1 Q. I understand, sir. The question was, though,
2 that your representatives were actually informed in
3 Mostar that Mr. Kordic was just an ordinary member of
4 the House of Representatives; isn't that true?
5 A. That is true.
6 Q. Very well.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, while we are dealing
8 with these matters, the witness's evidence is that in
9 the HVO the civil and military sides were, as he put
10 it, intertwined, and that he would deal with military
11 leaders about political matters, and political leaders
12 about military matters. Now, we've had evidence much
13 to this effect before, and I don't remember it being
14 challenged. I may be wrong. And it would help us to
15 know what your case is about this.
16 Is it accepted that there was such an
17 intertwining, as it's put, between civil and military
18 matters, or is that disputed?
19 MR. SAYERS: That proposition is in fact
20 disputed, Mr. President. Our position is that
21 Mr. Kordic was a significant political leader in
22 Central Bosnia. Indeed, I think the evidence on that
23 is absolutely --
24 JUDGE MAY: There is no need to argue the
25 point. It's just we want to know what your position
1 is. Your position is that he was a significant
2 political leader. You said that before. The question
3 is: Is it accepted that civil and military matters
4 were in the HVO intertwined, as the witness's evidence
6 MR. SAYERS: The answer to the question, Your
7 Honour, insofar as Sir Martin's testimony is concerned,
8 the time period covered by his testimony is that is not
9 accepted. In the extremely early days of the HVO, when
10 it was originally formed, by decree of Mate Boban on
11 the 8th of April 1992, I think it would be correct to
12 say that there was a significant degree of intermixture
13 between civilian and military functions inside the HVO,
14 because the entity, the organisation, was
15 evolving, but --
16 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with that. Formed in
17 April 1992. How long is it accepted that there was
18 such an intertwining?
19 MR. SAYERS: It's extremely difficult to say,
20 but I would -- if you are seeking my views --
21 JUDGE MAY: It's not your views. It's your
22 case, you see. What are you going to say to us at the
23 end of this trial about this sort of evidence?
24 MR. SAYERS: I think our case is, Your
25 Honour, that the intermingling of functions continued
1 until the military organisation of the HVO was actually
2 established. And that would have been around, I think,
3 July, August of 1992, when Colonel Blaskic was
4 appointed to the position of head of the Central -- or
5 commander of the Central Bosnia operative zone, as it
6 was then known, and it became the third operative zone
7 of the HVO, I believe, when Sir Martin was fulfilling
8 his functions as HRC Zenica.
9 JUDGE MAY: And your case, then, is that
10 thereafter there was not an intertwining of the civil
11 and military?
12 MR. SAYERS: I don't know what "intertwining"
13 means, Your Honour, but our position --
14 JUDGE MAY: It's a perfectly straightforward
15 English word.
16 MR. SAYERS: Our position is, Your Honour,
17 and I think that this has been our position throughout
18 this entire case, that there was a separate chain of
19 command in the military; that Colonel Blaskic reported
20 directly in the chain of command to his Superior
21 Officer, who was the Chief in Mostar --
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. You should give the
23 witness the opportunity of dealing with this.
24 MR. SAYERS: And I intend to do that. I
25 intend to do that, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
2 MR. SAYERS: In fact, this would appear to be
3 as good a time as any to address that subject, with the
4 Court's permission.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
6 MR. SAYERS:
7 Q. Sir Martin, isn't it true that the
8 headquarters of the general staff of the HVO, as a
9 military organisation, was actually located in Mostar?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the Commander In Chief, during your
12 tenure as HRC Zenica, was initially, as you've said,
13 General Slobodan Praljak, followed by
14 Lieutenant-General Ante Roso?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. A soldier's soldier, I think you described
17 him. And isn't it true that the military organisation
18 of the HVO was that beneath the general staff, the
19 military forces were organised into various so-called
20 operative zones, each commanded by a separate
21 individual. In Central Bosnia, for example, Commander
22 Blaskic, him being the commander of the Central Bosnia
23 operative zone, or the third operation zone, as it was
24 later known. Is that correct?
25 A. Indeed, absolutely. But of course with
1 extremely close political control throughout. And in
2 my view, it was the political side which was actually
3 controlling events on the ground, as it should be. As
4 it should be. Because, of course, the military are
5 answerable to the politicians.
6 Q. I understand, sir. Colonel Blaskic never
7 once intimated to you, or any of your monitors, as far
8 as you are aware, that he had to take orders from
9 Mr. Kordic, did he?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Military orders. In fact, there are no
12 reports whatsoever, within the body of the European
13 Community Monitoring Mission, at the most basic monitor
14 level, to the CC level, and the RC level, or in reports
15 sent to the Head Of Mission in Zagreb, that make that
16 contention, are there?
17 A. No. Of course, there is a military chain of
18 command, but that military chain of command is
19 overshadowed by the political control. And that is
20 what I always was convinced was the case in Bosnia, and
21 that would not surprise me at all, because that's how
22 it should be.
23 Q. Of course. But in the chain of command --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Sayers, please slow
1 MR. SAYERS:
2 Q. -- Commanding Officer, as you would expect in
3 any military organisation --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Sayers, you are being
5 asked to slow down for the interpreters.
6 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.
7 Q. Isn't it true that, as you would expect in
8 any organisation, hierarchically, Colonel Blaskic
9 reported directly to his Commanding Officer, who was
10 the Chief Of The General Staff in Mostar?
11 A. I'm sure he did, yes.
12 Q. And, sir, proceeding down the chain, if you
13 like. And perhaps this is beneath the level of detail
14 with which you became acquainted. If it is, just tell
15 me. Isn't it true that within each operative zone, the
16 military organisation was in municipality-based
17 brigades, each commanded by a separate Commander;
19 A. Yes. But I must stress once again that at
20 any stage the political side can overrule the military,
21 as again is quite correct; at any stage in that chain.
22 The military are in support of the politicians.
23 Q. Would it be fair to say that you yourself did
24 not have any discussions with President Boban or
25 Dr. Prlic, or any other politicians, as far as you can
1 remember, concerning the actual military chain of
2 command, the way in which orders were given and carried
4 A. No, I did not discuss that with President
5 Boban, or Mr. Boban, or any other political leaders,
7 Q. Very well, sir. Let me just ask one other
8 question. You never actually saw Mr. Boban and
9 Mr. Kordic in each other's company, did you?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Right. And you've discussed the alleged
12 family relationship between Mr. Kordic and Mr. Boban.
13 I would just like to suggest to you that, in fact,
14 there was no relationship; that just represented the
15 popular wisdom that filtered down to you and others
16 during your tour of duty. Is that right?
17 A. That's right. As I said, I had no proof. It
18 was just an understanding that I had for a long time.
19 Q. Just a few questions in connection with the
20 extent -- of the geographical extent, if you like,
21 Sir Martin, of Mr. Kordic's political influence. You
22 are not suggesting that his political influence
23 extended all the way down to Mostar, are you?
24 A. No. I believe his political influence really
25 covered the areas -- well, as I say, Tuzla, Central
1 Bosnia and then Herzegovina. And I believe his
2 political influence was Central Bosnia, from the border
3 with Tuzla, down to the borders of Mostar.
4 Q. All right. I think you would agree that he
5 had no discernible, political power influence in
6 Mostar, so far as you were aware?
7 A. Except for his very considerable stature in
8 Central Bosnia, I would say that he probably had a lot
9 of say in what went on in Mostar, yes. I would have
10 been surprised if that was not so.
11 Q. But he never took any part in the Government
12 of Mostar, so far as you could tell?
13 A. No.
14 Q. And you never saw him in Mostar at any time
15 during your tour of duty in Mostar?
16 A. When I was in Zenica, no.
17 Q. Okay. Just a few questions on
18 personalities. I think you've already described
19 President Boban sufficiently. Let's go on to
20 Dr. Prlic. In your view, he was the most impressive of
21 all of the Bosnian Croat politicians that you met;
23 A. That's what I wrote in my report, yes.
24 Q. All right. Insofar as Mr. Zubak is
25 concerned, I believe that he was the representative of
1 the Government of the Croatian Republic who actually
2 signed the Washington Agreements that terminated the
3 war; correct?
4 A. Correct. The Dayton Agreement was signed by
5 Prlic, not Zubak.
6 Q. That was a year later --
7 A. A year later, yes.
8 Q. You were asked several questions concerning
9 comments made by Mr. Kordic regarding his views on the
10 progress of Islamic fundamentalism in the Government of
11 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the fears that
12 he expressed in that regard. Wouldn't it be fair to
13 say, sir, that this was a constant theme that was
14 repeated to you by virtually all Croat leaders up to
15 this very day?
16 A. Yes, indeed. And indeed some of them,
17 including the late President Franjo Tudjman, were very
18 paranoid about Islamic fundamentalism. I used to raise
19 this with the -- particularly with the Generals. I am
20 particularly thinking Hadzihasanovic and Alagic, who,
21 more often than not, were sitting there drinking a
22 glass or two of slivovitz and not looking at all like
23 fundamentalists to me. And they both used to laugh me
24 out of Court, and said that, you know, they were
25 absolutely 100 per cent against fundamentalism. But
1 this was a constant theme from the Croats, and indeed
2 from the Roman Catholic Church. It was put to me on a
3 number of occasions. So it was a strong feeling, yes.
4 Q. So would it be equally fair to say that there
5 was nothing particularly significant or eccentric about
6 the views that were being expressed to you by
7 Mr. Kordic, those being views that were familially
8 expressed by representatives of the Croat Government
9 with whom you regularly --
10 A. The views on Islamic fundamentalism were
11 common to, I would say, the majority of Croat leaders.
12 Q. All right. Sir, you described four or five
13 meetings that you had with Mr. Kordic, as far as you
14 could remember, although it may have been more. You've
15 stated that you never asked Mr. Kordic if he held any
16 military rank, but you also never enquired whether he
17 had any power or authority to issue military orders,
18 specifically, did you?
19 A. No, I did not ask that question.
20 Q. And you never actually saw or heard him do
21 that, issue military orders, did you?
22 A. I never heard him give a military order, no.
23 Q. Very well. And you were never told by any
24 Bosnian Croat military commander that he did in fact
25 have that power or authority, were you?
1 A. No.
2 Q. All right, sir. All right. The next subject
3 that I have on my note says Mr. Kordic's positions, but
4 I think we've covered that perfectly well.
5 At this point, Sir Martin, I'd like to
6 progress chronologically with you, if I may.
7 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers. I'm sorry, we
8 were conferring.
9 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, at this point I
10 was going to proceed chronologically with Sir Martin
11 over the meetings and events that he's discussed.
12 JUDGE MAY: That would be a convenient moment
13 to adjourn. We'll adjourn now till half past 2.00.
14 Sir Martin, I must tell you, as I tell all
15 witnesses, don't speak to anybody, please, about your
16 evidence until it's over. And don't let anybody speak
17 to you about it. And that does include members of the
19 Could you be back, please, at half past
21 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.55 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 2.35 p.m.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
3 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President, and
4 good afternoon, Sir Martin.
5 Q. The first event chronologically about which
6 you testified was a meeting or two meetings that you
7 had on October the 21st, 1993, one with Mr. Valenta and
8 one with Mr. Kordic. It would be fair to say, sir,
9 that you were accompanied on this meeting by your V-1
10 monitor, Nick Turnbull; correct?
11 A. Certainly to the meeting with Dario Kordic,
12 I'm not sure whether he was -- yes -- no, it was HCC
13 Travnik that was with me when I met Anto Valenta,
15 Q. That would have been Mr. Watkins at that
16 time; correct?
17 A. Mr. Watkins at that time, yes.
18 Q. All right. Now, Mr. Turnbull was the V-1
19 monitor specifically assigned to be responsible for the
20 Vitez-Busovaca area, amongst others; correct?
21 A. That's right, yes.
22 Q. So at this time when you had been, for less
23 than a week, essentially, in your new position, he
24 would have been the person most familiar with the
25 military and political situation in the area; correct?
1 A. No. Watkins was the one who had been there
2 longest. He had been there for nearly a year, and he
3 was the one who was most familiar with the area.
4 Q. All right. You testified that you visited
5 Mr. Kordic at a house outside of Busovaca referred to
6 as the Eagle's Nest. Whose nickname was that for this?
7 A. I believe it was the nickname -- I don't
8 think -- I'm not sure whether it was called Eagle's
9 Nest by the Croats, but it was certainly the name given
10 it by the International Community.
11 Q. All right. Did you know that the Bobovac
12 Brigade headquarters was also referred to as the
13 Eagle's Nest by the International Community,
14 specifically by NordBat?
15 A. I certainly never heard it referred to as
16 Eagle's Nest, no, no.
17 Q. Now, you say that Mr. Kordic expressed
18 various views on the likelihood of Croats returning to
19 Zenica at the conclusion of hostilities; is that
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now, Zenica at this time, sir, was a
23 Muslim-controlled city; it was controlled completely by
24 armed forces under the Armija. Correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. And you were aware, were you, sir, that the
2 HVO armed forces in that city had been defeated during
3 the April fighting and that the two HVO brigades
4 located in that city had been eliminated?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And the position was, as I take it, that
7 Croats would not necessarily return to the houses from
8 which they had left because, A, they had left of their
9 own free will and, B, they might not feel protected
10 moving back to a city that was not under the control of
11 HVO or Croat forces; correct?
12 A. Yes. There were a large number of Croats
13 still in Zenica, but of course very much fewer than
14 there had been before.
15 Q. And there's no question that those views
16 expressed by Mr. Kordic were perfectly reasonable under
17 the circumstances, weren't they?
18 A. Well, those were his views, and he said that
19 he thought it was unlikely that many of them would
20 remain unless they were being properly treated by the
21 Serbs and the Muslims.
22 Q. Now, you were asked by the investigators for
23 the Prosecution specifically whether these comments
24 indicated to you that Mr. Kordic advocated some sort of
25 permanent division of the Republic of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines; isn't that
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And your response was that there was nothing
5 about these comments that would indicate to you that
6 Mr. Kordic in any way wished to see a division of the
7 three ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that
9 A. I think I said what I -- I think I actually
10 said -- I haven't got my words in front of me -- was
11 that I did not think the words, in themselves,
12 indicated a wish to see three ethnic groups.
13 Q. Right. On page 6 of the statement that you
14 gave to the Prosecutor's investigators two years ago,
15 you said, in response to the question of whether these
16 views expressed by Mr. Kordic would advocate a
17 permanent division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you said:
18 "My reply is that I could not say the words used by
19 Dario Kordic, as such, indicated that he wished to see
20 a division of the three ethnic groups in
22 A. Correct. I hope that's what I've just said;
23 I hope so.
24 Q. And that remained the case throughout your
25 tour as HRC Zenica; is that right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. All right. You were also shown a copy of the
3 daily report, sir, that RC Zenica submitted on October
4 the 21st. That was Z1255. Do you have that before
6 A. Yes, I have.
7 Q. And it was at this meeting that you were --
8 you said on page 2 that Mr. -- you had a meeting with
9 Mr. Dario Kordic, Vice-President, HZ Middle Bosnia;
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And you described him as one of the two most
13 influential Croat civil leaders in Central Bosnia on
14 page 6?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Let me address your attention, Sir Martin, to
17 the Stupni Do incident.
18 I am finished with that document. Thank you
19 very much, sir.
20 A. Right.
21 Q. And I'd like to go fairly carefully through
22 these events. The first thing that I would like to
23 address is events before Stupni Do; the second is
24 issues related to ECMM reports regarding the black
25 market thriving there, apparently; and the third is the
1 investigations that were done by NordBat and others
2 after the incident.
3 Turning to the first subject. Stupni Do is
4 located on a hillside in a small valley that overlooks
5 the main supply route directly into the town of Vares;
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And just to give the Trial Chamber some sense
9 of Vares's physical location, it really stands at the
10 head of a valley, does it not?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. With tall hills and mountains all around the
13 city, and, essentially, the only way into it, and out
14 of it, is the main supply route right past Stupni Do;
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You gave some testimony, sir, regarding
18 events at a village called Kopjari. Were you aware
19 that this village had been attacked by Muslim forces on
20 the 22nd of October, 1993, at about 5.30 in the
22 A. I was aware there had been an attack, but I
23 also was convinced, and still am, that nothing serious
24 had taken place there.
25 Q. Very well. Did you know that, according to
1 NordBat anyway, heavy fighting had been going on in
2 that city, and all of the civilians had been expelled
3 from the -- not the city; from the village, and that
4 all of the civilians had been expelled from the village
5 by Armija forces?
6 A. I am aware that there had been incidents in
7 Kopjari, but I am not aware of any deaths. And of
8 course we did have somewhat more serious matters to
9 deal with.
10 Q. Were you aware that all of the houses and
11 buildings in Kopjari had been burned down and
13 A. I'm aware that there had been destruction,
14 but, by the scale of events compared with Stupni Do,
15 this was comparatively minor.
16 Q. All right. Let me just show you a daily
17 report that was prepared from the regional centre of
18 Zenica on March the 21st of 1994, which, by the way,
19 Sir Martin, was still within your tour of duty;
21 A. March the --
22 Q. March the 21st, 1994, sir.
23 A. I might -- I was sent back to England on
24 medical grounds towards the end of March, and I'm not
25 quite sure when I left.
1 Q. Very well.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D175/1.
3 MR. SAYERS:
4 Q. Thank you. I'd just like to draw your
5 attention, sir -- even though it is not numbered, this
6 is something that we have received from the
7 Prosecution. It appears to be the fourth page in under
8 the subheading "Humanitarian."
9 Put that on the ELMO, please. Thank you.
10 If you can see towards the end of the
11 paragraph that says:
12 "ECMM visited Lipnica."
13 The second sentence says:
14 "ECMM also visited Kopjari and noted that all
15 buildings had been destroyed and the village is
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Does that help jog your memory, Sir Martin --
19 A. I do not recall seeing this report. I cannot
20 remember when I returned to England on medical grounds,
21 but it was certainly the end of March, but I do not
22 recall seeing this report.
23 Q. Very well. Thank you. I'm through with
25 The next document that I would like you to
1 review, if I may, is an exhibit that has previously
2 been marked Exhibit D123/1, which is a military
3 intelligence summary from the Prince of Wales Own
4 Regiment of Yorkshire, dated October the 27, 1993.
5 And if I could just ask the Registrar to turn
6 to page 2, right up at the top. There is a reference
7 to a conversation that the Commanding Officer of the
8 Prince of Wales Own Regiment, 1st Battalion, had with
9 Colonel Merdan relating to Kopjari. And apparently the
10 impression given by Colonel Merdan was that the attack
11 was a punitive action, and did not press a more general
12 attack on Vares itself.
13 Did you have any discussions with any members
14 of BritBat concerning the attack on Kopjari and its
15 depiction as a punitive action on the attacking forces?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. Were you aware that it was a punitive action?
18 A. I was not aware that it was designed as a
19 punitive action, no.
20 Q. Now, when you testified on direct
21 examination, sir, that the ECMM checked out Kopjari
22 and, I think to use your words, "nothing significant
23 transpired," does information that all of the building
24 had been destroyed and all of the members of the
25 population had been ejected from the village, does that
1 change your view that nothing significant had
3 A. Certainly, the way you put it, it sounds
4 serious, but of course there were other more serious
5 incidents going on at the time, and the things taken on
6 a matter of priority in these circumstances.
7 Q. Sir Martin, I fully appreciate that it's a
8 matter of scale. And the fact of the matter is that
9 terrible things were going on on both sides throughout
10 this civil war; isn't that correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. All right. The next subject I would like to
13 address with you is the subject of Stupni Do as a black
14 market gateway. I wonder if I could ask you to be
15 shown the next exhibit. I believe it's already been
16 introduced into evidence by the Prosecution, Z1281,
17 which is a daily report of the regional centre in
18 Zenica on November the 2nd, 1993.
19 Thank you. If you could, Mr. Usher, just
20 place the first page under "CC Travnik AOR" on the --
21 that's it. Yes.
22 Now, sir, this is a document which, of
23 course, you've seen at some point. Did you review this
24 document as you prepared for your testimony today?
25 A. No, not specifically. Not specifically this
1 document, no.
2 Q. All right. Let me just review it with you.
3 Apparently, the head of the coordination centre in
4 Travnik had had a meeting with a Mr. Mahmutovic, who
5 was a member of the Armija operative group in
7 Just for the Trial Chamber's information,
8 Dabravine is actually located a few kilometres south of
9 Vares, on the main supply route; correct?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And is it not true that Dabravine was the
12 headquarters of the war presidency in exile, headed up
13 by a lady by the name of Mervana Hadjimurtezic?
14 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
15 Q. All right. Now, according to the head of the
16 coordination centre in Travnik, who I believe was
17 Colonel Stutt at this time, Stupni Do was the local
18 gateway to BSA-controlled territory, and this made it a
19 most lucrative centre for smuggling and black
21 It's true, is it not, that several ECMM
22 reports relating to black market activity in the region
23 of Stupni Do had been prepared, and reviewed in due
25 A. Yes. And of course I hinted at this in my
1 end-of-tour report.
2 Q. Yes. Unfortunately, we have not been able to
3 locate or been provided with any of those. But this
4 was not a secret, was it? It was a relatively
5 well-known fact that Stupni Do was being located close
6 to the front lines with Bosnian Serb forces; it served
7 as a channel, or funnel, if you like, through which a
8 lot of black market --
9 A. There was certainly allegations that this was
11 Q. And indeed, according to the Armija member
12 communicating this information to your organisation,
13 sir, those who were killed in Stupni Do were executed
14 deliberately for their part in the black market. Were
15 you aware of that?
16 A. As I say, I hinted at this -- I alluded to
17 this in my end-of-tour report, saying that this was a
18 possible cause for the attack on Stupni Do.
19 Q. All right. And, indeed, the information had
20 been communicated to you that shortly before the Stupni
21 Do killings, the local HVO had demanded a higher cut of
22 the black market proceeds and had been given a
23 resounding "no" by the residents of Stupni Do; is that
25 A. There is an allegation by a member of the
1 BiH OG.
2 Q. Could you just turn to page 3 of this
3 document, sir, or page 4, I'm sorry. The document
4 isn't itself numbered, but there's a reference towards
5 the end of this document regarding a discussion of this
6 subject with General Hadzihasanovic. It's just in the
7 first full paragraph, sir. It says:
8 "General Hadzihasanovic told HOM that Vares
9 was known as an area for smugglers, and gangs and
10 groups of smugglers had been sent there to keep up
12 Who was the Head of the Mission to whom
13 General Hadzihasanovic communicated this information,
15 A. Can I just have a look at the report?
16 Q. Absolutely.
17 A. That would be in a meeting with the Head Of
18 Mission, but I can soon check because it will refer
19 to -- no, "HOM" would be-- can only mean Head Of
20 Mssion of the ECMM.
21 Q. All right, sir. The question was: Do you
22 remember, this late removed, who that was?
23 A. Well, at this time in November, it was
24 Ambassador de Baans.
25 Q. Very well.
1 A. But I'm just trying to remember what meeting
2 that was. It must have been the meeting on the 30th of
3 October, where we -- when he came to Zenica and we had
4 meetings with Hadzihasanovic, amongst others. But I
5 can soon check.
6 Q. Do you remember being present at that
7 meeting --
8 A. Yes, I was certainly present at that meeting.
9 Q. And do you recall now, seeing the document,
10 that General Hadzihasanovic actually confirmed these
11 rumours of black market activity in the Stupni Do area,
12 speaking, as he was, as commander of the 3rd Corps?
13 A. Yes. I said in my report that Hadzihasanovic
14 went on to say that gangs and groups of smugglers had
15 been sent to the area to keep the tension high. Yes,
17 Q. Thank you. I am finished with that document
18 too. I appreciate your assistance.
19 Just turning to one of the comments made in
20 the end-of-tour report that you authored, Sir Martin,
21 on the 18th of April, 1994, which is Exhibit Z1419, I
22 believe, your conclusion in paragraph 5 on page 1 --
23 A. Sorry. Can I just get hold of it?
24 Q. Absolutely.
25 A. One minute. On paragraph --
1 Q. Paragraph 5 on page 1, sir.
2 A. Yes, yeah.
3 Q. You say that:
4 "It is likely that the decision to mount the
5 operation in Stupni Do was taken at a fairly low level,
6 and it is possible that the massacre was triggered by
7 the refusal of the Muslims in Stupni Do, so the story
8 goes, to pay more to the local HVO from their profits
9 from smuggling operations."
10 A. Yes, that's what I wrote at the time, which
11 ties in with the papers we've just been looking at.
12 Q. And those, I take it, sir, remain your views
14 A. I had -- I still, to this day, do not know
15 who gave the instructions for the massacre in Stupni
17 Q. Right. But nothing has intervened in the
18 last six years or so to persuade you to reach a
19 conclusion different from the one that's reflected in
20 paragraph 5, and that is, to use your words, "It is
21 likely the decision to mount the operation was taken at
22 fairly low level"?
23 A. I've had -- no, I've had no information in
24 the intervening years which has added to my knowledge
25 of what triggered the massacre.
1 Q. Right, or changed your views in any way --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. -- regarding that conclusion?
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. Thank you. Just one matter of fairly precise
6 chronological detail.
7 My understanding is that following the news
8 that there had been killings of a lot of civilians and
9 others in Stupni Do, sir, an attempt was made by
10 monitors under your supervision or command -- and we've
11 heard from some of them, Colonel Weckesser being one of
12 them -- an attempt was made to obtain access to Stupni
13 Do, and, as I understand it, following the news of the
14 massacre, that access was actually barred to them by
15 the Bobovac Brigade commander, who at that time was
16 Emil Harah; is that consistent with your --
17 A. That's correct. Basically, he was stopping,
18 in fact, even Nordbat. The army unit could not get in,
19 and, of course, we could not get in unless the UNPROFOR
20 unit was going in as well.
21 Q. Yes, thank you. Indeed, the point I was
22 getting at, though, was that the access to the village
23 was actually barred on orders of Emil Harah, who was
24 still the Bobovac Brigade leader at that point?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. Okay. And following that incident, we know
2 from your testimony, and I think it's not controverted,
3 that Mr. Harah was apparently dismissed from his
4 position as Bobovac Brigade commander, to be replaced
5 by Kresimir Bozic, as you've testified; is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. All right. Were you aware, sir, that two
8 days before the fighting at Stupni Do, the civilians,
9 the civilian population of the village, had been
10 ordered to evacuate the village by Mervana
11 Hadjimurtezic, who was the President of the War
12 Presidency in exile in Dabravine?
13 A. No, I don't think I was aware of that, no.
14 MR. SAYERS: All right. I wonder if I could
15 ask the usher to show you the next document. It's a
16 report of the Secretary-General of the U.N. about
17 Stupni Do. I believe it's report S/1994/154, dated
18 February the 10th, 1994, and marked Exhibit D118/1.
19 JUDGE MAY: I can't remember this document
20 offhand. Is that going to refer to the order for
21 evacuation of the village?
22 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
23 JUDGE MAY: Well, the witness has said that
24 he didn't remember that. There's no point going over
25 it again. You can make the point to us in due course.
1 MR. SAYERS: Actually, if I may,
2 Mr. President, there are several points that are raised
3 during the historical recitation contained in that
4 document. I'm happy to tell you exactly what they
6 First, it says that the residents of Stupni
7 Do were warned to leave on October the 22nd; and,
8 second, that there were 36 soldiers in the village;
9 third, that there was an investigation performed by
10 apparently UNPROFOR representatives and that there were
11 193 survivors, all of whom were interviewed.
12 JUDGE MAY: Sir Martin, did you know anything
13 about this?
14 A. I wouldn't dispute -- I wouldn't dispute
15 that, no. I would not have been able to say how many
16 survivors there were, but I'm prepared to accept those
17 figures, if that's in that U.N. report.
18 MR. SAYERS: And I think, just for the Trial
19 Chamber's own reference, Exhibit D118/1 is a fairly
20 short document. It says that precisely.
21 Q. Now, you referred earlier, sir, to two orders
22 that had apparently been issued by General Petkovic,
23 and I think that they were appended to ECMM reports.
24 Let me see if I can jog your memory as to what they
25 were. I have copies of both of them, I believe. One
1 has already been marked, I believe, as Exhibit Z1258,
2 and the second one, which is dated October the 24th,
3 1993, needs a new exhibit number. Thank you.
4 THE REGISTRAR: This is marked D176/1.
5 MR. SAYERS: I wonder if Sir Martin could
6 also be given a copy of Exhibit Z1258, please.
7 Q. Sir Martin, just drawing your attention
8 chronologically to the first of these documents,
9 Exhibit Z1258 appears to be a copy of an order issued
10 by General Milivoj Petkovic on the 23rd of October,
11 1993, and issued to his subordinate, the HVO Vares
12 commander; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And this authorises the commander of the HVO
15 forces in Vares to remove three people from their
16 functions, the first being Anto Pejinovic; the second
17 being Zvonko Duznovic; and the third being Ivica
19 A. Absolutely.
20 Q. In addition, he says, to the HVO commander,
21 that: He must investigate the responsibility for the
22 situation in Croatian and Muslim villages where, in
23 accordance with our incomplete findings, ethnic
24 cleansing of the population occurred.
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Just for the Trial Chamber's information,
3 Mr. Pejinovic, I believe, was the HVO President of
4 Vares municipality?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Mr. Duznovic, apparently, was the Chief Of
7 Military Police in that town?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And Mr. Gavran was the Chief Of Civilian
10 Police, I believe?
11 A. Correct, yes. Absolutely.
12 Q. And the second document, Sir Martin, is
13 another order entered or issued to the Commander of the
14 Bobovac Brigade by General Petkovic, one day later, on
15 October the 24th, 1993, ordering the cessation of all
16 combat activities against UNPROFOR members immediately,
17 and ordering unhindered passage for all vehicles;
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And the other things that it refers to,
21 obviously. All right. Thank you. I am finished with
22 those documents.
23 Obviously, Sir Martin, it goes without saying
24 that General Petkovic, the Chief Of Staff of the HVO,
25 had the capability of issuing such military orders to
1 his subordinates, amongst whom were counted the
2 commanders of the HVO in Vares; correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. All right. He also, evidently, had the power
5 to remove civilian members of government from the
6 government, didn't he?
7 A. Yes. Certainly in those particular
8 circumstances, yes.
9 Q. All right. Turning our attention away from
10 those orders for one second. Were you aware that a
11 full forensic investigation of the Stupni Do killings
12 had been performed by NordBat, and that this
13 investigation involved forensic pathologists,
14 photographers, and military investigators, who
15 interviewed, videotaped and taped statements of the
17 A. I was aware that they had carried out a full
18 investigation, but I do not believe I ever saw the full
19 results of their reports.
20 Q. Very well. Do you happen to know whether the
21 results of any such investigation were shared with the
23 A. That I do not know.
24 Q. Did you ever see an UNPROFOR report dated
25 March the 31st, 1994, sent to Mr. Blewitt, the acting
1 Deputy Prosecutor of this Tribunal?
2 JUDGE MAY: Why would the witness have seen
4 MR. SAYERS: I don't know whether he has or
5 he hasn't.
6 A. The answer is no.
7 MR. SAYERS: In that case, we need not dwell
8 on it.
9 Q. Now, turning, sir, to the conversation that
10 you had with Mr. Kordic on October the 25th, which is a
11 number of days after the killings had occurred. Isn't
12 it true that your monitor, Colonel Weckesser, asked you
13 to raise the subject of Stupni Do with Mr. Kordic,
14 because he knew that you were planning to have a
15 meeting with Mr. Kordic that day?
16 A. I do not recall him mentioning this to me. I
17 was certainly going to raise it myself, in any case.
18 Q. Now, do you recall whether, after being told
19 about the Stupni Do incident, Mr. Kordic then called
20 General Petkovic to find out what had happened, after
21 speaking with you, or is it your view that Mr. Kordic
22 had already spoken with General Petkovic by the time
23 that you raised the subject with him?
24 A. My understanding, from our discussion, was
25 that he had already spoken to General Petkovic. In
1 fact, he told me that he telephoned General Petkovic as
2 soon as he heard about the Stupni Do massacre.
3 Q. And you would find nothing unusual about
4 that, would you, sir, a political leader contacting a
5 military leader to find out the facts involved in a
6 military action?
7 A. Absolutely.
8 Q. And I believe that General Petkovic, you
9 said, was in Kiseljak at the time that Mr. Kordic
10 called him?
11 A. I think so. I think so.
12 Q. All right. And basically what Mr. Kordic was
13 relating to you was what he had been told by the second
14 in command of the entire HVO military armed forces?
15 A. The Chief Of Staff, yes.
16 Q. And he proceeded to condemn atrocities that
17 had been committed by anyone, regardless of what side
18 they were on; isn't that correct?
19 A. Yes, indeed.
20 Q. All right, sir. Proceeding along
21 chronologically. I believe that the next meeting that
22 you had with Mr. Kordic, as you've testified to, was on
23 October the 30th, 1993, along with Ambassador de Baans,
24 the Belgian HOM?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And at this meeting, Mr. Kordic repeated to
2 you that the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna strongly
3 condemned any atrocities, no matter who committed them.
4 Is that right?
5 A. Yes. And also that further action would be
6 taken after the inquiry was complete, and they would
7 not protect anyone.
8 Q. Yes, sir. And on the same date you met
9 President Boban, in Mostar, I believe?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Along with Dr. Jadranko Prlic, the President
12 or the Prime Minister of the HRHB Government; right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Okay. Now, both of these people told you
15 that if atrocities had been committed, the perpetrators
16 would be punished; right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Both told you that the Government of the HRHB
19 would suspend the Military Commanders involved, did
20 they not?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And of course you know that Mr. Harah was
23 suspended; correct?
24 A. Uh-huh.
25 Q. And Mr. Rajic was later suspended too, wasn't
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And I believe, sir, that Mr. Prlic told you
4 that the government had already ordered General
5 Petkovic to carry out a full investigation of the
6 events in Stupni Do?
7 A. That's what he said, yes.
8 Q. And, indeed, he went so far as to tell you
9 that the minister of law had started a special
10 commission to look into war crimes?
11 A. Yes. But, as I said, nothing ever came of
12 these promises.
13 Q. Did you know that just such a commission had
14 actually been set up by the HRHB on the 28th of
15 October, 1993?
16 A. I knew a commission was being set up, but we
17 never were told any results.
18 Q. I wonder if I could just have this document
19 marked as the next exhibit, and see if I can jog your
20 memory as to who may or may not have been a member of
21 that commission.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Document marked D177/1.
23 MR. SAYERS:
24 Q. Sir Martin, I am just showing a document
25 signed by Dr. Jadranko Prlic, who was the Prime
1 Minister of the Government of the Croatian Republic of
2 Herceg-Bosna, reflecting a decision made on October
3 28th, 1993, to appoint a commission for the
4 investigation of war crimes in the territory of the
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Some of the names on this, I'm sure, are
8 familiar to you. Mr. Pogarcic, we've already
9 identified. Mr. Kostroman. Did you know Marinko
10 Skobic, who was the Chairman?
11 A. No.
12 Q. All right.
13 A. In fact, the only two names on that whole
14 list that I know are Pogarcic and Kostroman.
15 Q. Very well. Now, sir, proceeding beyond the
16 fall of Vares on November the 2nd. I believe that you
17 met the commander of the Armija forces in that area,
18 Mr. Avdo Zubak?
19 A. Yes. On the 4th of November.
20 Q. Yes, sir. Precisely. And he instructed you
21 that the fall of Vares permitted the Armija to link up
22 their 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Corps, providing them with
23 an immense strategic advantage; correct?
24 A. Yes, that's what I said there. But, in fact,
25 I think at the time it was my own military assessment.
1 I think he was making the point that it was a direct
2 result of the Stupni Do massacre. And I assessed that
3 the big strategic advantage this gave the Armija was
4 the clear linkage from Tuzla to Gornji Vakuf, without
5 passing through any HVO pockets.
6 Q. And I believe, sir, that in the statement you
7 gave to the investigators two years ago, the
8 investigators for the Prosecution, that is, at page 10,
9 you said that there was no doubt in your mind that the
10 2nd and the 3rd Corps were poised, before the Stupni Do
11 incident, to launch a major assault on Vares to achieve
12 this crucial strategic advantage; correct?
13 A. Yes. Exactly what the military aims were,
14 whether it was to produce this particular strategic
15 advantage, I don't know, but there was certainly
16 indications that they were preparing.
17 Q. And your conclusion was that the Stupni Do
18 incident provided precisely the opportunity for which
19 the Armija military commanders were looking to launch
20 the attack on Vares?
21 A. It certainly gave them a very valid reason.
22 Q. All right, sir. Turning to your November the
23 3rd, 1993 report.
24 A. November the 3rd.
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. Yes, indeed.
2 Q. I'll give you the number. It's 1282.
3 A. Yes. Yes. 1284?
4 Q. It's 1282. At least that's the number I've
5 got up at the top.
6 JUDGE MAY: 1284.
7 MR. SAYERS: I'm obliged, Mr. President.
8 Thank you.
9 Q. If you'd take a look at the second page.
10 There's a meeting between the Head of the Mission --
11 that's Ambassador de Baans; correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And Mr. Dario Kordic, Chief of the dislocated
14 Office of the Presidency of the CRHB?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What was that, Sir Martin? That's a new
18 A. Yes. It was a title -- now, there must have
19 been -- there would have been a good reason why I was
20 using that. I think it was a title that may be -- I
21 can only assume that Dario Kordic might have been using
22 himself, a dislocated Officer of the Presidency of the
23 CHRB; in other words, the presidency's representational
24 office in Central Bosnia.
25 Q. Did you ever find out what that office
1 entailed or what its duties were?
2 A. Well, I mean, this was -- the Mate Boban's
3 representative in Central Bosnia.
4 Q. All right. And turning to page 10 of this
5 November the 3rd, 1993 report. In your discussions
6 with Mr. Prlic, the President of the HVO, as he's
7 described, and Mr. Slobodan Bozic, the Deputy Minister
8 of Defence, once again, they reiterated that General
9 Petkovic had been ordered to carry out an
10 investigation; correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And that this special commission had been
13 appointed to look into all crimes, including Stupni Do,
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. In fact, you were told that the commanders
17 had indeed been suspended after Stupni Do; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Just one question. Do you know whether
20 Mr. Jadranko Prlic was still the President of the HVO
21 as of this date, November the 3rd, 1993, or not?
22 A. I certainly had him down as President of the
23 HVO then. I believe he still was, yes.
24 Q. All right, Sir Martin. Were you aware that a
25 gentleman by the name of Colonel Lucic, an investigator
1 from the HVO headquarters in Mostar, accompanied by an
2 attorney by the name of Mr. Bandic, held meetings in
3 connection with Stupni Do with Lieutenant-Colonel J.W.
4 Koet, K-O-E-T, in G1 legal in Kiseljak?
5 A. No.
6 Q. I take it, then, you have no recollection of
7 ever being informed by UNPROFOR that HVO military
8 lawyers had been consulting with UNPROFOR, requesting
9 assistance in connection with the Stupni Do
11 A. No, I do not recall being informed by them,
12 no. As I said, I never saw any report that came out of
13 any investigation.
14 Q. Let me just show you two documents, and --
15 JUDGE MAY: Well, are these documents which
16 the witness is likely to have seen?
17 MR. SAYERS: I don't know, without asking him
18 now, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MAY: No, but these are matters which
20 you must prove in some other way. It's no good just
21 asking the witness, when he has no recollection,
22 putting a whole lot of documents to him which he can't
23 have seen. Let's move on. You can deal with this in
24 your own case.
25 MR. SAYERS:
1 Q. Were you aware, sir, that the Croatian
2 newspapers had declared that the HVO had taken
3 responsibility for the attack on Stupni Do, and that
4 the name of Ivica Rajic, as responsible commander, had
5 been identified?
6 A. I'm aware that the Croatian papers -- as I
7 mentioned in my report, I had said that Ivica Rajic had
8 been dismissed on the orders of Mate Boban.
9 Q. And there is no question, is there, that
10 Mr. Rajic, insofar as Mr. Rajic was concerned, his
11 immediate Commanding Officer was Colonel Blaskic;
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. In fact, I think shortly before the Stupni Do
15 incident, Colonel Blaskic had given a direct order to
16 Ivica Rajic with respect to roadblocks set up in the
17 Visoko, Kiseljak area. Do you have a recollection of
19 A. I don't have a recollection, but I can see no
20 reason why not.
21 Q. Let me see if I can jog your memory on that
22 with just one document. Thank you. I am interested in
23 the very bottom of the page, Mr. Registrar. Thank
24 you. This is --
25 THE REGISTRAR: Document is number D178/1.
1 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
2 Q. Paragraph 8 of this document, which is a team
3 V3 report dated the 11th of October, 1993. The report
4 is made that: Blaskic, commander, Operative Zone,
5 Middle Bosnia, gave a direct order to Rajic, commander
6 of the HVO in Kiseljak, to repair a road.
7 There is no question, sir, that Mr. Rajic was
8 a direct subordinate of Colonel Blaskic in the military
9 hierarchy, is there?
10 A. No. And therefore I think I can see nothing
11 unusual in this instruction.
12 Q. Absolutely.
13 A. No.
14 Q. Now, sir, do you recall receiving reports --
15 thank you. I am through with the document. Do you
16 recall receiving reports from the HCC Mostar,
17 Mr. Watkins, who had moved down to Mostar from Travnik,
18 about conversations he had had with Mr. Jozo Maric on
19 November the 6th, 1993, regarding Croat investigations
20 into the Stupni Do incident?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. All right. And on page 10 of your report,
23 apparently Mr. Maric had related to the HCC Mostar that
24 the Croat investigations had led to the conclusion that
25 outside elements had precipitated the attack; that is,
1 rogue elements from the towns of Kakanj and Kiseljak.
3 A. Yes, I think that's what I said in my main
4 statement, yes.
5 Q. And in fact those reports were confirmed from
6 other sources available to the ECMM; isn't that right?
7 A. I think there was never any doubt that it was
8 Kakanj and Kiseljak HVO members who were responsible.
9 Q. Now, you related to the Trial Chamber a
10 meeting that Colonel Stutt, Mr. Kordic and a number of
11 others had on November the 8th or the 9th, 1993, where
12 the subject of Mr. Rajic came up, and the comment was
13 made that he had given way to stress. There's no
14 question that Mr. Rajic was removed from command by
15 General Petkovic shortly after that; isn't that so?
16 A. That is so, yes.
17 Q. And, indeed, the Croat press reported -- and
18 I think you said this, but I just want to make sure --
19 the press reported that Mr. Rajic had been dismissed by
20 General Petkovic on the direct orders of the President
21 of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, President
22 Boban; is that --
23 A. That is so. As I said, this was reported to
24 me by my monitors. I never actually saw the Croatian
25 press reports, but I have no doubt at all that it was
2 Q. All right. You gave some testimony, sir,
3 during your direct examination, about two groups of
4 extremists, one called the Maturice and the other
5 called the Apostoli. It's true that the Apostoli were
6 from Kakanj; is that right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And they had basically left Kakanj during the
9 June offensive that we discussed earlier this morning?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the same -- not the same, but the
12 Maturice were a group from Travnik, were they not?
13 A. That's how I understand it, yes.
14 Q. You aware that the Croats had been largely
15 expelled from Travnik in June of '92?
16 A. Yes, indeed.
17 Q. All right. You gave some testimony regarding
18 your views of Croats voting in Croatian elections,
19 Bosnian Croats voting in Croatian elections, sir.
20 Isn't it true that Croats who live in Slovenia,
21 Macedonia, and, for that matter, the United States,
22 Great Britain and Australia, can vote in Croatian
24 A. The diaspora, yes, but those -- I think
25 you're referring probably to Croatians living abroad.
1 What we're talking about here is Bosnian Croats,
2 Bosnian Croats who actually -- whose country is
4 Q. All right. Were you aware, sir, that there
5 was an arrangement with the Republic of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia for there to be dual
7 citizenship on both sides?
8 A. There -- I'm aware that there was -- that
9 that had been accepted, that the Croats -- Bosnian
10 Croats could vote in the Croatian elections, yes. But
11 that was -- I don't think it was really the point I was
12 making. The point I would have been making previously
13 is that the Bosnian Croats regarded Tudjman, not the
14 President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, as their
16 Q. Very well. Now, on the subject of HV troops,
17 it's a fact, isn't it, that you never actually saw any
18 HV troops yourself in Central Bosnia at any time during
19 your six months as Head of the Regional Centre?
20 A. Oh, yes, indeed, I did, on a number of
21 occasions, and particularly on the mountain road
22 between Prozor and Tomislavgrad. You could not miss
24 Q. How about in the Vitez-Busovaca pocket, sir?
25 A. I do not recall seeing any in the
1 Vitez-Busovaca pocket, no.
2 Q. And how about in the Vares pocket?
3 A. No, because these were mainly in the
4 Prozor/Gornji Vakuf area.
5 Q. Let me turn to one other subject, the
6 testimony that you gave regarding Mr. Kordic's supposed
7 appointment as Assistant Chief Of Staff to General or
8 Lieutenant-General Roso.
9 I think you alluded to the fact that
10 General Roso had spent 20 years or so in the French
11 Foreign Legion.
12 A. I'm not sure how many years, but he certainly
13 spent a number of years in the French Foreign Legion,
15 Q. Were you aware that General Roso -- perhaps
16 I've asked this this morning. If I have, please
17 forgive me. But were you aware that he had been
18 appointed to the Presidential Commission on December
19 the 10th, 1993, by President Boban?
20 A. I think you mentioned that, yes.
21 Q. Were you aware of that, though?
22 A. No, not at the time.
23 Q. And as Assistant Chief Of Staff to
24 Lieutenant-General Roso, if indeed he was, did you have
25 any idea of whether Mr. Kordic was performing civilian,
1 political, or military functions, or what functions he
2 was --
3 A. I can only assume a dual role.
4 Q. When you say "assume," the fact is you don't
5 know, do you?
6 A. No, I do not know precisely what his
7 responsibilities were.
8 Q. And you didn't actually ask him what those
9 responsibilities were?
10 A. No, no.
11 Q. Let me just show you one of the final
12 documents I would like you to review. It's a regional
13 centre of Zenica daily report at the end of December,
14 1993. Thank you. Just for the record, this has
15 previously been marked, I believe, as -- no, it has
16 not. Sorry.
17 THE REGISTRAR: The document will be marked
19 MR. SAYERS: Thank you. The part I'm
20 interested in is the CC Travnik area of responsibility,
21 AOR. If you just move it up, Mr. Registrar. That's
22 it, thank you.
23 Q. Now, the comment is made here, in connection
24 with a visit between an ECMM representative and the HVO
25 Liaison Officer regarding this supposed new function,
1 the comment is made that: "It is interesting that
2 Kordic is alleged to have a military function as well
3 as one that is political." Do you see that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And there's also a comment made that: "It is
6 appreciated that there are inconsistencies in the
7 various reports concerning the functions of Kordic and
8 Valenta," and there's no question that there were
9 inconsistencies; isn't that true, Sir Martin?
10 A. Yes, indeed.
11 Q. And isn't it true also that prior to this
12 document, dated December the 28th, 1993, in the view of
13 the ECMM, Mr. Kordic did not have a military function
14 and this was the first time that any note of an
15 asserted military function was made?
16 A. This is the first time, but then, of course,
17 it's coming from the HVO LO in Vitez, who had always
18 proved a very reliable interlocutor.
19 Q. Very well. And equally, sir, the ECMM
20 monitor to whom this was given was a reliable
21 individual himself, wasn't he?
22 A. Yes. But of course this statement about the
23 Assistant Chief Of Staff was repeated to me at the end
24 of January by Dario Kordic.
25 Q. Right. In connection with that document,
1 sir, that's the only document, I believe, which you
2 kept from your personal computer. Is that right?
3 A. I don't -- I've got a number from advanced
4 body days in Mostar, but -- I probably have got a few
5 on some old disks, but I have not gone through them in
6 great detail.
7 Q. Let me turn your attention, and I think we're
8 nearing the end of our chronological tour here, to
9 February the 21st, 1994. Do you know whether there was
10 any document produced relating to a meeting that you
11 had with Mr. Kordic on that day?
12 A. Yes, yes. I think it's been produced as a
14 Q. All right.
15 A. 1385.
16 Q. 1385. I wonder if the registrar would show
17 you a document previously marked as Exhibit Z1383.1,
18 and then if you would put that side by side with the
19 document you've just identified, Sir Martin.
20 A. Yes, certainly.
21 Q. Thank you. Sir Martin, this is a military
22 intelligence summary that was produced to us yesterday,
23 I believe, by Colonel Williams. Turning your attention
24 to paragraph 4, there's a description of the meeting
25 that occurred on the 21st of February, 1994, and the
1 observation is made that even though Mr. Kordic was, of
2 course, chairing the meeting, it was noticeable that
3 Colonel Blaskic was far better informed than he was on
4 issues relating to the pocket, and the observation is
5 made that with Kordic's recent appointment, it has
6 possibly focused his attention slightly away from the
7 pocket. Was that your impression, that --
8 A. Well, of course, Blaskic was based in Vitez;
9 Dario Kordic was based in Busovaca. So it wouldn't be
10 surprising that Blaskic has got a more intimate
11 knowledge of Vitez.
12 Q. And I take it, sir, that that fact didn't
13 surprise you in the least.
14 A. Which fact?
15 Q. That Colonel Blaskic had a more detailed
16 grasp of factual events, occurrences, in the pocket
17 than --
18 A. Indeed. And, of course, he was controlling
19 the day-to-day military operations in the Vitez pocket.
20 Q. Yes, sir. Now, turning your attention, if I
21 may, to Exhibit Z1385 that you mentioned, there's a
22 page numbered "9" right at the bottom. There's a
23 reference made in this document regarding matters that
24 arose between the interlocutors at this meeting, and
25 the observation is made that it finally transpired that
1 the police, according to Rajic -- a different Rajic
2 this time, Mr. Anto Rajic, the Chief of Military
3 Police -- had received instructions from the Minister
4 of Internal Affairs of the CRHB, since the Geneva
5 Agreements, to the effect that humanitarian convoys
6 were to be subject to "control." Do you recall that
7 subject arising?
8 A. Now that I'm reminded of it, having read this
9 report yesterday, yes, I remember that.
10 Q. And that subject of direct instructions being
11 received from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the
12 Republic was raised directly in Mr. Kordic's presence,
13 wasn't it?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And Mr. Kordic ultimately agreed to seek an
16 explanation for these new instructions from Mostar,
17 didn't he?
18 A. Let's see. He -- yes, yes.
19 Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that document,
20 and I appreciate your patience, Sir Martin. And we're
21 reaching the end of this exercise.
22 You make a comment on page 2 of your report
23 that after the fighting ceased following the signature
24 of the Washington Agreements, one of the acid tests of
25 the agreement which was pointed out to you by General
1 Alagic would be whether the HVO and Armija would
2 conduct joint military operations to seize and liberate
3 Maglaj and Tesanje; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And, in fact, that did occur in March of
6 1994, didn't it?
7 A. Well, it was never really a joint operation.
8 There were never really -- I suppose Kupres was the
9 nearest to a joint operation, but even that was not
10 really joint in the true sense. To my knowledge, there
11 were never any really truly joint military operations
12 by the HVO and the Armija following the formation of
13 the Federation.
14 Q. All right. And on the subject of your
15 end-of-tour report, on page 2 once again you conclude
16 that the Croats in Central Bosnia had, for the
17 preceding six months, been desperate for peace; right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And that remains your view today, even after
20 the passage of six years; correct?
21 A. Certainly, that was their feeling at the
22 time, yes.
23 Q. In fact, they had been the first to sign the
24 Vance-Owen Plan without reservations; correct?
25 A. Yes. Of course, you must remember that there
1 were a lot of advantages for the Croats and the -- as
2 far as the allocation of territory is concerned,
3 getting 25 per cent of the territory.
4 Q. Yes, sir. And once again the Croats were the
5 first to sign the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan too, weren't
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Again without reservation; right?
9 A. Yes, indeed.
10 Q. All right. Just a few clean-up questions on
11 these documents that we were shown today, Sir Martin.
12 If I might ask you to take a look at Exhibit
13 Z1275, which is a CC Travnik report dated October 21st,
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. If you would just turn to the second page,
17 you have -- you were asked to comment upon the
18 activities of drunk HVO soldiers from Kakanj in Vares
19 around the time of Stupni Do. There's no question, is
20 there, that there was a general course of harassment of
21 Croats involving -- including, rather, robberies and
22 rapes and murders in the Bugojno area; isn't that
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The second document I'd like --
1 A. Sorry, could you just repeat that? When was
2 this? Could you just repeat that point?
3 Q. Yes. I had asked you: Isn't it true that
4 there was a general harassment of Croats, including
5 robberies, rapes and murders, in the Bugojno area
6 around the time of this report? And that's actually
7 reflected on the bottom of page 2 of Exhibit Z1275.
8 A. Well, yes, and in particular in the preceding
9 months, the preceding summer in Bugojno, summer months.
10 Q. Yes, Sir Martin.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. One other document you were shown is Exhibit
13 Z1364. Now, this document has a rather odd format, and
14 I would just like you to comment on that, if you can.
15 If you take a look on -- it's 1364, not
16 1364.1 --
17 A. 1364. Sorry, one minute. Yes.
18 Q. There's a reference to a coordination file on
19 the bottom there, March the 28th or January dot '94.
20 Do you see that?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do you know where this report came from?
23 A. Yes. If you look at the top, you'll see this
24 is from the headquarters, ECMM Zagreb, so this is a
25 headquarters' report, which explains why it is not so
1 detailed about the area of Central Bosnia. This will
2 be an amalgamation of the various regional reports
3 coming in, and this will be the combined report sent
4 out by the headquarters of the ECMM in Zagreb, covering
5 the whole area: Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, Serbia,
6 Montenegro, et cetera. That's why it's not so detailed
7 as the other reports you'll see.
8 MR. SAYERS: Sir Martin, I'm most obliged for
9 your testimony. I have no further questions. Thank
11 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic:
12 Q. Good afternoon, Sir Martin. My name is Goran
13 Mikulicic. I am an attorney from Zagreb, and together
14 with my colleague, Kovacic, I represent the second
15 accused, Mr. Cerkez.
16 Sir Martin, appreciating your unquestionable
17 experience and your professional expertise, I should
18 like to ask you a few questions, very briefly,
19 regarding some general issues linked to
21 In view of the fact that Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina is a multinational, multicultural and
23 multi-confessional community, to paraphrase what you
24 said, that is, you described the situation in Bosnia as
25 being complex; that is correct, is it not?
1 A. Yes, indeed, yes.
2 Q. We know that in addition to some negligible
3 smaller groups, Bosnia-Herzegovina is composed of three
4 basic ethnic communities: the Croats, the Muslims and
5 the Serbs. Isn't that so?
6 A. That is so.
7 Q. To focus for a moment on the Croatian
8 population. Generally speaking, I hope you will agree
9 that we can say that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 inhabit three main areas. One is in the north-east of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina along the Sava River, which is the
12 border with the Republic of Croatia, the area being
13 known as Posavina. Do you agree with me, Sir Martin?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. A second area is in Central Bosnia, which is
16 a Croatian enclave surrounded with a predominantly
17 Muslim population. Would you agree with me?
18 A. Yes, I will.
19 Q. And the third area inhabited by Croats would
20 be the area of Herzegovina. That is the southwestern
21 part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, bordering on the Republic
22 of Croatia?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Would you agree with me, Sir Martin, that
25 acknowledging these geographic and strategic positions
1 of the Croat population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all
2 these three Croatian communities need not necessarily
3 have had the same interests and goals?
4 A. Yes, I am well aware that their interests and
5 goals certainly did vary, differ. Yes.
6 Q. Sir Martin, you said that during your tenure
7 in Bosnia, there were several types of different armed
8 conflicts. I have in mind the various combinations of
9 inter-ethnic conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. You told
10 us that, in the surroundings of Tuzla, the Croats and
11 Muslims fought as allies against the Serbs. Didn't
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. I assume you will also agree in the view that
15 this situation was similar on Mount Vlasic, overlooking
16 Travnik, where again there was a joint front line held
17 by the Croats and the Muslims against the Serbs?
18 A. Yes, the situation did vary from area to
19 area. Yes.
20 Q. In Central Bosnia, you told us that an armed
21 conflict broke out between the Croats and the Muslims.
22 On the other hand, in Herzegovina we also had a
23 situation in which Croats were fighting the Serbs, who
24 were advancing from the direction of Montenegro, and
25 then again there was the mutual conflict between the
1 Croats and the Muslims, wasn't there?
2 A. Yes, the fighting against the Serbs, the
3 joint fighting, I think it was April to July, '92, and
4 then the fighting between the Croats and the Bosniaks
5 started the following May, on May the 9th, 1993.
6 Q. Would you be so kind, Sir Martin, as to look
7 at document Z1364, which you have already examined in
8 the course of this day, and to look at page 2 of that
9 document, paragraph 4. [No translation]
10 JUDGE MAY: There's a problem, Mr. Mikulicic,
11 with the translation.
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter
13 apologises. The microphone was turned off. Sorry.
14 JUDGE MAY: Can you start again,
15 Mr. Mikulicic, with what it is you want to ask about
16 this document.
17 MR. MIKULICIC:
18 Q. Sir Martin, in paragraph 4 of this ECMM
19 report it is stated that in the surroundings of the
20 town of Bihac, an area called the autonomous province
21 of Western Bosnia, there were conflicts between Muslim
22 factions, and that efforts were being made to sign a
23 ceasefire and to find a political solution. You are
24 familiar with that situation, aren't you?
25 A. Yes, indeed.
1 Q. Could you, Sir Martin, very briefly tell us
2 what these conflicts between Muslim warring factions
3 were about?
4 A. Well, this was really -- this is all about
5 Fikret Abdic, who set up his autonomous province of
6 Western Bosnia, thus splitting away from the main
7 leadership of the Bosniaks in Sarajevo, and, therefore,
8 did not make himself the most beloved of Bosniaks to
9 the Bosnians. And that friction carried on until this
11 Q. Let us remind ourselves. Mr. Fikret Abdic
12 was a Muslim by ethnicity, was he not?
13 A. Yes, indeed. I said, therefore, he made
14 himself certainly not the most popular of Muslims
15 amongst the Muslim community. Correct. This was an
16 inter-Muslim problem.
17 Q. So if we were to summarise the armed
18 conflicts that occurred in the territory of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina during your tour of duty there, is
20 it fair to say that those conflicts occurred in a
21 variety of forms among these three communities that we
22 have referred to: the Croats, Muslims and Serbs?
23 A. Yes. And as I said earlier on today, the
24 situation, even within Bosnia, varied very
25 considerably, stretching down from Tuzla to Mostar.
1 Q. Your experience, I assume, tells you that one
2 cannot have an identical approach to various parts of
3 Bosnia, and that such an approach was not taken?
4 A. No. And of course we, talking about the
5 ECMM, had different approaches in Tuzla, Central
6 Bosnia, and in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 Q. I see. As a point of curiosity, do you know
8 that Mr. Fikret Abdic, at the first elections, after
9 the Communist Government fell in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
10 won the largest number of votes in the Republic for the
11 post of President of the Republic?
12 A. Yes, I am aware of that.
13 Q. Let us pass on now to another issue, and that
14 is the relationship between the Republic of Croatia and
15 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Are you aware of
16 the fact that the establishment of the diplomatic
17 relations between these two states occurred in 1992,
18 and that those diplomatic relations were never broken
19 off; to this day, that diplomatic relations between
20 Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina continued, regardless of
21 armed conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
22 A. Yes, I am aware that the diplomatic relations
23 continued, although at times relations, of course,
24 between the two countries was not good.
25 Q. Of course. Sir Martin, you have seen
1 document Z1344. It is a report of the Zenica regional
2 centre, dated the 30th of December, 1993.
3 A. Yes, I have it in front of me.
4 Q. Would you be kind enough to look at page 2,
5 please. In the upper third of the page, there is a
6 statement to the effect that Mr. Granic, who was at the
7 time the foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia,
8 had suggested that the Lasva Valley be proclaimed a
9 protected area. Do you know whether this initiative
10 bore any fruit at all?
11 A. My only information about this initiative
12 came from this report from the mayor of Busovaca, Zoran
13 Maric. I never saw this proposal in writing in any
14 official form.
15 Q. I see. So we won't go into that any
16 further. Sir Martin, you yourself certainly noticed,
17 and you could see from the report, that when reference
18 is made to the presence of Croatian Army units in the
19 area of Prozor and Gornji Vakuf, and such a reference
20 is made in the report of the regional centre, or,
21 rather, the main centre of the 18th of April, and that
22 is document Z1419.
23 A. My report. Yes. Yes, I've got it in front
24 of me.
25 Q. On page 2, it is stated that Units of the
1 Croatian Army had been sighted near Prozor and Gornji
2 Vakuf. My question is: Clearly, the European
3 Monitoring Mission must have thought about the role of
4 those troops? Would that be right to say?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And I see, from the report, that the
7 reflection was along the lines whether their role could
8 be offensive or defensive.
9 A. That is right.
10 Q. If it is assumed that their role was
11 offensive, then the report says that they could have
12 acted in three directions; that is, from Prozor and
13 Gornji Vakuf, towards Novi Travnik, and from there on
14 to Vitez. The second direction would be towards
15 Slatina and Jablanica; and the third, towards Fojnica.
16 However, no such offensive operations were noticed in
17 the area, were they?
18 A. No. I must stress that this was my own
19 personal report, and that was my own personal
20 assessment. And therefore, these, if it had been
21 offensive in nature, then those I assessed were the
22 three directions in which the offensive could have
23 gone, because all three of those would have given, had
24 they been successful, the Croats considerable strategic
25 advantages. However, the operations ground to a halt
1 because at that time we had an extremely cold winter,
2 and I think it was the cold that actually stopped those
4 Q. But it is true to say that there were no
5 offensive operations?
6 A. It is true to say, yes.
7 Q. Sir Martin, a final general topic, after
8 which I will thank you for your patience. And that
9 topic is actually the political approach taken by the
10 International Community to deal with the conflict in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the outbreak of the conflict
12 in 1992, the International Community showed a high
13 degree of interest to resolve the conflict. You
14 yourself were a witness to numerous peace plans and
16 My question is: Sir Martin, are you,
17 perhaps, familiar with the initiative of Ambassador
18 Cutilliero from the end of 1992, which resulted in a
19 meeting in the Konak villa near Sarajevo, attended by
20 Izetbegovic, Boban and Karadzic?
21 A. I am not familiar. I am aware that this
22 happened, but I am not familiar with any of the details
23 of those discussions.
24 Q. In very general terms, can you confirm that
25 those talks were based on a principle of ethnic
1 grouping of these three entities, which later on led to
2 the Vance-Owen Plan and the division into provinces?
3 A. No, I am not aware of Cutilliero proposals,
4 but I am, of course, aware of the Vance-Owen plans in
5 general and the division into provinces.
6 Q. The Vance-Owen Plan came. After that came
7 the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, the Washington Agreement,
8 and finally the Dayton Agreement, which resulted in the
9 establishment of the present-day Federation, didn't it?
10 A. Yes, that is so.
11 Q. Would you agree with the position that a
12 common trait of all these peace initiatives brought
13 about the formation of the Federation, consisting of
14 the Serb entity, on the one hand, and the Croat-Muslim
15 entity on the other?
16 A. Yes, I would agree.
17 Q. Would you agree with the conclusion that in
18 fact this idea of ethnic grouping, within a
19 multinational community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the
20 dominant approach taken by the International Community
21 in overcoming the conflict and establishing peace in
22 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. I am aware that there are conflicting views
24 on this, particularly, you know, from the Croats' point
25 of view, but the fact is that that -- that was actually
1 agreed by all three sides at Dayton, and brought peace
2 to the country. We're still waiting for the true
4 Q. That brings to an end my cross-examination.
5 Thank you very much for your patience. Thank you.
6 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
7 Q. A few matters, please. General, on what
8 material did you make your judgement that Dario Kordic
9 was a Vice-President of the HVO? What sort of
11 A. This was something that I had fixed in my
12 mind right at the very beginning. I do not -- I cannot
13 say on what factual basis I based my view, but it was
14 certainly in my mind.
15 Q. Was it ever displaced?
16 A. No.
17 Q. After he lost the presidency, do you know
18 what Boban did, what job he was given?
19 A. Boban went off and ran, became the director
20 of -- I think it was Ina Petrol, the big fuel business.
21 Q. Appointed by whom?
22 A. My guess is he was assisted in getting that
23 position by Franjo Tudjman.
24 Q. The possibility of Boban and Kordic being
25 related by family, how widely, or otherwise, was that
1 topic discussed and talked about?
2 A. It was not widely discussed. It is clearly
3 -- the Defence counsel has indicated that I was
4 incorrect in my assumption. It came up in
5 conversations from time to time, but no one -- everyone
6 thought so, but no one actually knew for certain.
7 Well, now I have been told I was incorrect.
8 Q. I think the Judges will have to decide these
9 things. But was it by locals or internationals or
11 A. Mainly from internationals.
12 Q. Thank you. It's suggested that you were
13 never told by a Croat that Kordic had military
14 authority, but in your own document of January 1994, he
15 told you that. It's also been suggested that there's
16 no reported finding or report of his having military
17 authority before January 1994. But how does his
18 telling you that, in 1994, fit with what you'd already
20 A. Well, as we'd already been told a month
21 before by the HVO Liaison Officer in Vitez, that was of
22 no surprise to me.
23 Q. How did it fit with what you generally
24 observed, by way of his power and authority?
25 A. I was not seeing Dario Kordic on a day-to-day
1 basis, and therefore I was not familiar with what his
2 daily activities were and exactly how he was exercising
3 his duties.
4 Q. Thank you. Usher, please. Use this copy of
5 Exhibit 2612.5.
6 You've been asked something about supply
7 routes, or the supply route and its proximity to Stupni
8 Do. Don't guess if you can't remember, but, in fact,
9 Stupni Do is how accessible to and from the supply
10 route; how near or far; how high or low? We can see it
11 on the map, and you can see a pointer if you need to.
12 A. Yes. Well, this is the main supply route
13 going up to Vares. There is Stupni Do. These are
14 one-kilometre squares. So, taking into account the
15 various bends in the road, we are talking about one and
16 a half kilometres from the main road.
17 Q. And is it an easy or difficult road for
19 A. Well, it's a fairly winding road, going up
20 from the main road.
21 Q. Is there a substantial change in elevation?
22 A. As far as I can remember, there is a fairly
23 steep rise.
24 Q. Do you remember one way or another --
25 A. But I never actually went to Stupni Do
1 myself, so I cannot give you first-hand information
2 about Stupni Do.
3 Q. And you can't assist, therefore, with whether
4 the supply routes are inside of Stupni Do or not?
5 A. No. Looking at the map -- no, I cannot.
6 Q. Thank you. D175.1. May the witness have
7 that document, or at least the Chamber just cast their
8 eyes over it. It's a Defence Exhibit. Thank you very
10 This is a document put in for one purpose.
11 The Chamber will see -- and I am not going to go
12 through the artificial exercise of reading everything
13 out to the witness, but the Chamber will see, at the
14 foot of the first page, that there are comments about
15 Dario Kordic in relation to the period of time, 21st of
16 March, 1994. At one place here there is reference --
17 if you look at the foot -- just cast your eyes over the
18 foot of the page, with what is said there about Dario
19 Kordic, please, and his use of the title, HVO Colonel.
20 Now, this was a report which may or may not
21 have been submitted when you were on medical leave.
22 But how does what's set out there compare or contrast
23 with what you yourself were having by way of reports
24 that you know you received?
25 A. Yes, there is nothing there that surprises
1 me. I do not recall seeing this report, and I must --
2 I believe I must have been away at the time. But there
3 is nothing there that surprises me.
4 Q. The suggestion that Stupni Do was connected
5 to black market allegations was said in the report
6 never to have been substantiated; the reasons were said
7 to be unclear. Was it ever, in any sense,
9 A. Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge.
10 Q. I'm so sorry. Hadzihasanovic, his
11 confirmation was of what; of black market activity
12 going there?
13 A. He said that there was black market activity
14 going on there, yes.
15 Q. Ivica Rajic came from where?
16 A. Ivica Rajic was -- where he came from
17 originally, I do not know, but he was Kiseljak based.
18 Q. Was Kiseljak in Blaskic's area of
20 A. I'm quite certain it was, yes.
21 Q. Was Vares?
22 A. That, I am slightly less certain. I believe
23 Vares might have come under the command of the Tuzla
24 forces. I don't think it went up as far as Vares.
25 Q. You've had one possible theory for Stupni Do
1 put to you. Just yes or no: Were you aware of any
2 other theories circulating at the time?
3 A. I was not aware of any other theories, no.
4 Q. The Court will know that other theories have
5 been spoken of in evidence. There's no point in
6 putting them to this witness.
7 As to Harah's replacement, do you know
8 precisely when --
9 A. If I can just say. Stupni Do, no. No other
10 theories, no. Sorry.
11 Q. As to Harah's replacement, do you know
12 precisely when it occurred; before or at or after the
14 A. I believe it is difficult to know precisely,
15 but I think it took place the day after the massacre.
16 Q. Thank you. The passage from the United
17 Nations report was put to you incompletely. What was
18 actually set out in the United Nations report was that
19 there were -- there was a defence force of 36 local
20 Armija soldiers mobilised to guard the village during
21 the night, and there has been evidence to the Court of
22 people simply defending the village. Does that fit or
23 otherwise with what you know of this event?
24 A. That would certainly -- that would not --
25 that would -- I can understand that. I was not aware
1 of the detailed numbers, but that would not surprise me
2 at all.
3 Q. Z1258, the document where Petkovic dismissed
4 Pejinovic, Duznovic and Gavran. How does that fit, if
5 at all, with your exposition of the intertwining of
6 military and political activities?
7 A. Well, I'm quite sure that the political side
8 must have been fully involved in this. I'm quite
9 certain this went up, as we heard subsequently and
10 during our discussions, to as far as Prlic, Boban, and
11 so on. And my guess is that some of the instructions
12 that came down, down the military net, were coming from
13 Boban, Prlic, at that level.
14 Q. And what you said about the potential for
15 political intervention to occur anywhere in a chain of
16 command, would that be true for somebody seconded or
17 moved from his area of responsibility to another area
18 like Vares?
19 A. I would say that any political leader can,
20 even if he cannot give military instructions, he has
21 got the ability to go right to the top, on the
22 political side, and bring the attention of his
23 political masters to what is going on, and give his
24 strong recommendations on what action should or should
25 not be taken.
1 Q. Two more questions on Stupni Do, then I'm all
2 but done. Kordic said he had spoken to Petkovic and
3 had obtained from Petkovic an account of what had
4 happened and what had been found at Stupni Do. But did
5 you ever confirm, one way or another with Petkovic,
6 that he had that information and provided it to Kordic?
7 A. No. I did not see Petkovic on a regular
9 Q. Was there any other evidence pointing to
10 Blaskic's involvement in Stupni Do?
11 A. Not to my knowledge.
12 Q. The Croats' enthusiasm for peace, apart from
13 the matters you've already referred to, which was the
14 advantages to them of the existing plans, was there, by
15 the time you are speaking of, was there a disparity of
16 power in the area?
17 A. They were under a lot of pressure and they
18 were clearly losing ground in Central Bosnia, and they
19 saw their pockets dwindling and diminishing, such as
21 Q. One question arising from what you were asked
22 by Mr. Mikulicic. The incoming Croatian forces that
23 you saw, you say were stopped from offensive operation
24 by the cold. Do you know if and when they returned
25 from Bosnia?
1 A. What I said, actually, was I think that I
2 said that partly it might have been the absolute
3 freezing cold of that very cold winter, but also I said
4 that it is also possible that the threat of sanctions
5 against Croatia may have given them second thoughts
6 about any major military involvement in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So it may have been the very
8 bitter winter conditions, it may have been the threat
9 of sanctions against Croatia.
10 Q. Roughly, how long must they have been in the
11 area before they stopped doing whatever they were
13 A. I think -- I cannot remember precisely, but I
14 think they were disappearing in the March period. I
16 Q. They had been there, in your judgement as a
17 military man, for such a period of time that there
18 would have to be documents recording where they had
19 been and what they had been doing?
20 A. Certainly on the military side, yes. Yes.
21 MR. NICE: Nothing else of this witness.
22 JUDGE MAY: Sir Martin, thank you for coming
23 to the International Tribunal to give your evidence.
24 It is concluded and you are released.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much indeed,
1 Your Honour.
2 MR. NICE: May I detain the Chamber for just
3 a couple of minutes for administrative matters?
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 MR. NICE: The Chamber will have or will very
6 soon have reports from John Elford, who produces the
7 maps. The attachments to the report are being copied
8 this afternoon and will be available this afternoon.
9 I understand that tomorrow there is a very
10 good chance that the two witnesses we wanted will be
11 here. The only obstacle was not their departure from
12 Bosnia but the incoming formalities of Holland which
13 were proving to be the difficulties on that occasion,
14 and we think they've been overcome. So there will be
15 the two witnesses, and that would make tomorrow a
16 convenient time to deal with the argument in relation
17 to the tape on the basis of the one witness who's here
18 and can give evidence, if that's necessary, for that
19 purpose, and the other statement being taken as read
20 for these purposes. I understand that Mr. Stein is
21 probably happy with that. In any event, the argument
22 on the admissibility, as the Chamber said, has to be
23 dealt with this week.
24 JUDGE MAY: The Chamber had intended to take
25 a Chamber afternoon tomorrow, but -- and that is
1 subject really to the exigencies of this case. I don't
2 quite follow who you would like to have.
3 MR. NICE: One is the witness whose double,
4 as it were, we brought up last week, and the other one
5 is the witness who produces the tape, says it's the
6 tape that he actually made a copy of, and in light of
7 the latest objections raised by the Defence to the
8 tape, as I've suggested, it may be necessary to hear
9 him on the question of admissibility.
10 JUDGE MAY: So it's proposed to have the
11 first witness you mentioned?
12 MR. NICE: That's right.
13 JUDGE MAY: How long is he likely to be?
14 MR. NICE: I can't immediately remember, but
15 he's a local witness. I would not think particularly
16 long. Half a morning, perhaps.
17 JUDGE MAY: Half a morning for him. And then
18 it's proposed to deal with a witness in relation to the
19 tape; is that the point?
20 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly if it's judged
21 necessary to have the witness. If the argument can be
22 dealt with without having the witness, then we'll just
23 have the argument on admissibility, and if the evidence
24 is ruled to be admissible, then we can take the witness
25 tomorrow or on Thursday to produce the tape.
1 JUDGE MAY: We’d better be prepared to
2 sit tomorrow afternoon. The other witnesses for the
4 MR. NICE: The other witnesses for the week
5 are Jeremy Fleming, and I think that's all. I'll just
6 check with Ms. Verhaag.
7 JUDGE MAY: When is he due?
8 MR. NICE: Coming in tomorrow for Thursday.
9 JUDGE MAY: For Thursday.
10 MR. NICE: And there will be other arguments
11 we can deal with -- just give me one moment. The only
12 other witness we were holding as a witness we could use
13 to fill a gap would be John Elford, the producer of the
15 JUDGE MAY: He's available, if necessary?
16 MR. NICE: He's certainly available, if
18 JUDGE MAY: I mean, he could be done on,
19 perhaps, Friday morning if we finish the other witness
21 MR. NICE: Can I just draw to your attention
22 one other matter: the thorny problem of the
24 The Chamber will recall -- I think
25 Judge Robinson will have had to learn of this, I think,
1 secondhand, but the Chamber will otherwise recall that
2 experience in other cases was of documents being
3 stamped by local courts as to the authenticity of the
4 signature. Exploration of that practice in Bosnia
5 shows that, yes, it can be done, but it relates only to
6 documents for use in non-criminal cases, so that if we
7 did it and produced to you a document, it would be open
8 to the objection, "Well, that, in the law of the land,
9 is of no value."
10 We understand after, I have to say, months of
11 negotiation and pressing, that it may be possible that
12 a request to the Federation authorities for the
13 appointment of a judge to authenticate signatures for
14 the purposes of this trial is a request that will be
15 dealt with in a routine way and that such a judge may
16 be appointed; further, that it may be possible to have
17 appointed a judge from the Muslim side, which will
18 overcome the difficulties to which I've previously
20 That's the present position, and I mention it
21 now so the Chamber knows about it, and my learned
22 friends have only been brought up to date very
24 If we take that course, it would involve
25 releasing witness statements along with the request to
1 the state, which is arguably outside some of the
2 protective measures, but we would seek relief in
3 relation to that. It seems to me, without having
4 discussed the matter in great detail, and certainly not
5 with my learned friends, that a request going from the
6 Court for the appointment of a judge might carry more
7 weight and might be a swifter procedure than one simply
8 going from us, but I'll take that no further at the
9 moment than to tell you where we've got and perhaps to
10 revert to it before the end of the week, if I can.
11 Finally, the Chamber will recall the various
12 issues arising from material seized in Mostar. I
13 suggested to my friends opposite that they might like
14 -- that is, those representing Kordic, that they might
15 want to see what was revealed in the pleadings in the
16 binding order litigation, which descends into some
17 detail on that topic. It's in the pleadings in
18 relation to the State of Croatia, and the Chamber will
19 remember that our attitude was from the beginning that
20 these might as well be proceedings that were
21 participated in by all, but a different view was
22 taken. The proceedings were open, but the full
23 pleadings were not gone into in detail; that is, our
24 report wasn't gone into in detail.
25 Might we have the Chambers leave to extract
1 those parts of the document that deal with the Mostar
2 material simply for the purpose of serving on the
3 Defence so that they can be informed of what's passed
4 on that topic?
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you have leave.
6 MR. NICE: Thank you. That's all.
7 MR. STEIN: So not to surprise anyone, and I
8 will be less than a minute, relative to the map and
9 Mr. Elford, though, I've just been handed a brief
10 report. We will review it, but, frankly, it's filled
11 with footnotes, indicative that the report is based on
12 testimony in the Blaskic case, including
13 General Blaskic's testimony. So it creates some
14 problems which we will have to work out.
15 As to the affidavits, let us have an
16 opportunity to think about that and respond.
17 JUDGE MAY: The only point about the
18 affidavits is the time is getting short.
19 MR. NICE: Indeed it is, and it's been
20 something we've been pressing the authorities for now
21 for, I suppose, a year.
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Half past 9
23 tomorrow morning.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
25 4.25 p.m., to be reconvened on
1 Wednesday, the 2nd day of February,
2 2000, at 9.30 a.m.