1 Wednesday, 8
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario
8 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
9 WITNESS: SULEJMAN KALCO [Resumed]
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kovacic.
12 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Kovacic [cont'd]:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kalco.
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. I hope you had a good rest.
17 A. Well, yes, I did.
18 Q. Mr. Kalco, you mentioned Mr. Marko Lujic
19 yesterday, and a document was produced seemingly
20 showing that he was a member of the brigade sometime in
21 the early days of the conflict.
22 Could the usher or the registrar please get
23 the document Z1009.1.
24 When you get the document, you will have a
25 look at it. But as we are waiting, perhaps -- Nihad
1 Rebihic, he was an intelligence officer in your staff,
2 wasn't he?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you know that he wrote several reports to
5 the 3rd Corps about the security, of course, but also
6 about individuals considered responsible for crimes in
7 the Lasva Valley; is that so?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Will you please look at item 1 on this
10 document? "Marko Lujic, son of Marko," and here will
11 you look, please, to the end of the document. Is that
12 "Rebihic"; will you agree with that? This is a
13 document which has already been tendered and admitted.
14 Now, if you look at this description, Marko
15 Lujic's activity described here does not seem to
16 indicate in any way at all that he was a member of the
17 brigade. Have you ever seen this report?
18 A. I have.
19 Q. You know about it?
20 A. I do.
21 Q. Would you then agree with what I'm putting to
22 you, that this description, written by your men, has
23 nothing to do with the person who would be a gunner in
24 the field?
25 A. Let me tell you, this act is dated the 2nd of
1 June, 1993, and Marko Lujic was a gunner, an
2 artilleryman, at the time of the first conflict in
3 Ahmici, when we prevented the HVO forces to pass on to
4 Novi Travnik. Yesterday, I said that we recorded, on a
5 tape, the conversation between Marko Lujic and Mario
7 Q. Mr. Kalco, you know that Marko Lujic has a
8 son whose name is Mario?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Wasn't perhaps that conversation between him
11 and that son?
12 A. No, only with Marko Lujic.
13 Q. No, I'm sorry, perhaps I was not clear
14 enough. Was it perhaps a conversation -- or at least
15 we put it to you that it was a conversation between
16 Marko Lujic and his son Mario.
17 A. No, no.
18 Q. Very well. Yesterday, you told us quite a
19 lot about that car bomb on the 18th of April in Stari
20 Vitez which went off.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. But there are certain perplexities about
23 this. Some say 18th, some 19th, but we shall agree it
24 was the 18th.
25 A. It was the 18th at half past 5.00.
1 Q. And not to go back to various papers anymore,
2 in your statement to the investigators on the 15th and
3 16th of July, 1995, that is, at the time when your
4 memory was much fresher, you told them, and I shall
5 read it out: "On the 19th of April, 1993, on the third
6 day of the attack at 1300 hours in the British
7 Battalion compound in Bila, a meeting was held between
8 the BiH and the HVO. Sefkija Djidic was present, and
9 Mario Cerkez and Brkovic. Blaskic and General Merdan
10 were high military officers." And the last sentence:
11 "In the course of the meeting, at 1700 hours, from the
12 direction of the Catholic Church, a cistern filled with
13 four tonnes of explosives was driven by a driver tied
14 up in the truck."
15 First, I suppose that it was a confusion when
16 you say the 19th of April.
17 A. Yes, it is an error. Perhaps it was a
18 translation mistake.
19 Q. And at any rate, it describes it here,
20 because it says "three days after the attack," so we
21 agree with that.
22 It also transpires from this that at this
23 time, Mario Cerkez and your commander, Djidic, was
24 either at the BritBat or on his way back.
25 A. I agree with this, except that at the time
1 when the explosion took place --
2 Q. Mr. Kalco, Mr. Kalco, may I ask you to try to
3 go through my questions, and then my learned friend for
4 the Prosecution may ask you additional questions.
5 A. No, but may I simply add something about
7 Q. No.
8 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.
9 Mr. Kovacic, what is it that you want to ask
10 this witness about the incident? We'll get on more
11 quickly if we deal with it in an orderly way. What is
12 it that you want to put to the witness?
13 MR. KOVACIC: [Microphone not activated]
14 Djidic and Cerkez were in BritBat and on the meeting.
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, the witness wanted to
16 add something to his answer, in relation to that.
17 Yes, Mr. Kalco.
18 A. Yes. Thank you. At a meeting at the British
19 compound, first came Sefkija in Stari Vitez, when the
20 Warrior opened, and which were both Mario and Sefkija
21 Djidic. I told Sefkija Djidic about the car bomb, and
22 at that moment Mr. Mario laughed cynically. That is
23 all I wanted to say.
24 Q. Thank you very much. I was about to ask you
25 whether they had arrived in a Warrior. And as for this
1 cynical smile, could you see his face well?
2 A. Oh, yes, indeed.
3 Q. And that is how you saw it?
4 A. Yes, that is how I saw it.
5 Q. Mr. Kalco, yesterday you told us a great deal
6 about a certain Miroslav Bralo; Cicko, rather. You
7 were asked a number of questions about him. Pursuant
8 to the JNA concept -- and you say that you took it
9 over, and that you also supposed that the HVO had done
10 the same -- who was responsible to initiate
11 disciplinary proceedings and ordering disciplinary
12 detention for military? Is it the direct superior of
13 that particular military?
14 A. The commander, the commander of a unit turns
15 the individual over to the relevant prosecutor.
16 Q. I shall ask you to look at a document.
17 Indeed, we can all see documents.
18 Mr. Kalco, the first document that you have,
19 you have the English version, and then below it the
20 Croat original. It says "85" on the Croatian version.
21 Are we looking at the same document?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Could it be placed on the ELMO, please. So
24 this is the document of the military police in Vitez of
25 the 3rd February 1993. And could we get a number.
1 JUDGE MAY: Put it on the ELMO. Yes.
2 THE REGISTRAR: The document will be numbered
4 MR. KOVACIC: The one from 3rd February.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kalco, will you please
6 look at the heading and the signature. This document
7 seems to show that the detention of Miroslav Bralo, and
8 disciplinary detention at that, rather, military
9 detention, immediately after the act had been
10 committed, was ordered by Pasko Ljubicic. In view of
11 what you just told us, I believe that this indicates
12 the hierarchy, that is, who is vested with the
14 A. No, it does not show that.
15 Q. Right. Tell me, then, this. The reasons
16 indicated here for ordering the detention said that
17 Bralo planted an explosive in Esad Salkic's house. You
18 mentioned him already, didn't you? So will you agree
19 with me, this is a document of the 4th Battalion of the
20 military police, and that the person is Pasko Ljubicic,
21 whom you also mentioned in your conversations?
22 A. May I answer?
23 Q. No, but first answer me just this. Is this
24 the Pasko Ljubicic that you mentioned yesterday?
25 A. He is. Yes. His signature. But for Pasko
1 Ljubicic to issue an order on the detention, he had to
2 get the order from the unit commander that such and
3 such an individual was being turned over, that is,
4 Miroslav Bralo was being turned over to the military
5 police on such and such date.
6 Q. But who is Pasko Ljubicic's superior?
7 A. I don't know. All I know is that Mario
8 Cerkez was Cicko Bralo's commander.
9 Q. And what if Pasko Ljubicic was commander; in
10 that case who would be issuing such a warrant?
11 A. The superior commander, I presume.
12 Q. Right. Will you then look at the next
13 document dated 11th February. You also have the
14 English version first and then the Croatian version.
15 This is a decision of the relevant District Military
16 Court in Travnik ordering detention during
17 investigation. So this is court detention for Bralo
18 while the investigation is underway. Have you ever
19 seen a document of this kind?
20 A. No. This is the first time.
21 Q. Thank you. Do you, perhaps, know the judge
22 who signed there?
23 A. Oh, very well. He is my friend.
24 Q. Zeljko Percinlic, did he hold this same
25 position as then, that is a judge in the District
1 Military Court?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Thank you. And will you now look at the
4 third document, the 26th of March, 1993.
5 JUDGE MAY: Number for the second.
6 THE REGISTRAR: The number for the second
7 document is D63/2.
8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. And the third document of the 26th of March,
10 the judge extends the detention during -- pending the
11 completion of investigation, the same judge. Have you
12 ever seen this document?
13 A. Yes, the judge is the same.
14 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, it is not the same judge.
15 It is already the trial judge, because an indictment
16 had been issued, so it is after the investigation.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And do you know this judge?
19 A. Yes. Maric, yes.
20 Q. And he was a judge at the time?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE REGISTRAR: D64/2.
24 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And yet another document to do with Miroslav
1 Bralo. Carry Spork testified about 2483.2, and tab 23
2 are some documents related to Miroslav Bralo. And
3 there is a document marked Z1465.4.
4 Maybe, to save some time, Your Honour, could
5 I just show the witness my document, because that is
6 coming from the binder, and I don't know how that is
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Put it on the ELMO,
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. It was on this document, a report on the
12 wounding, signed by the commander of the battalion
13 that, first, somebody wrote the period of service of
14 Miroslav Bralo with the brigade, and then it was
15 amended by hand, and that amendment was initialled. It
16 transpires from this document that Bralo was with the
17 brigade between the 7th of August 1993 until the 19th
18 of September 1993. Have you ever seen this document or
19 heard about it?
20 A. No. Neither heard nor seen. All I know is
21 that this is an invalid document.
22 JUDGE MAY: The witness has not seen it
23 before. This is pointless, showing it to him. Return
24 it to counsel, please.
25 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, could I ask for
1 the signature, does he know the person?
2 JUDGE MAY: Look. Why don't you get this
3 evidence confirmed by your own witnesses?
4 MR. KOVACIC: That is Prosecution evidence.
5 I just want to ask the witness whether he knew anything
6 about that, because there was some indication that he
8 JUDGE MAY: How is it going to help us?
9 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, it's a long story,
10 but there are a couple of documents relating to Bralo.
11 They are very conflicting amongst them.
12 JUDGE MAY: You can put it to the witness to
13 see if he recognises the signature, "yes" or "no".
14 Yes, put it back.
15 MR. KOVACIC: I'll just ask him the name.
16 There is no need to --
17 JUDGE MAY: I thought you wanted the witness
18 to identify the signature.
19 MR. KOVACIC: Not really the signature, Your
20 Honour, but the name of this commander.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Kalco, will you please tell us, if you
24 can read the name, Vlatko Matosevic, did you know him?
25 A. I did. But above that is Mario's signature
1 as well.
2 Q. But I'm asking you about Matosevic. Did you
3 know him?
4 A. I did.
5 Q. Was he a soldier in that brigade, as far as
6 you know?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you're saying that Cerkez initialled that
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you very much. Let's move on to
12 another subject.
13 Yesterday, you spoke about an incident when
14 Ivan Sucic, your colleague and a member of Cerkez'
15 team, was detained by the military police of the army.
16 You said that actually he turned out to be drunk, and
17 you said that obviously he got drunk because of the
18 holiday. It was during Easter.
19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Yesterday, we
20 were shown Document Z462. Could we please have a look
21 at it? The witness saw it yesterday, actually.
22 [In English] No, no, it's Z462. Yesterday, it was
23 given. Sorry, it is my lapse. 642. Good. Sorry.
24 JUDGE MAY: Let the English go onto the
25 ELMO. Let the witness have the -- if it's possible, to
1 have the original.
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Witness, please, I would like to draw your
4 attention to the beginning of section 4. This is
5 Cerkez' letter. You saw it yesterday?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And in section 4, in paragraph 4, it says
8 that Slavko Mlakic, a judge in the military court in
9 Travnik, and Ivan Sucic were going back from the Easter
10 mass. Do you agree that it was during Easter?
11 A. I don't know, I don't know. I can't
12 remember. I don't know. I can only say that they were
13 not detained by the military police or the authorities
14 of the BH army in Vitez.
15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could the
16 registrar please show the witness Document D54/2.
17 Q. Mr. Kalco, could you please have a look at
18 this document, and please pay attention to the
19 signatories. The contents of this document show that
20 this was one of the meetings where attempts were made
21 to continue with some kind of cooperation; is that
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Another thing, by the way, now that we've got
25 this document in front of us. In the introduction,
1 where those who are present were mentioned, your name
2 is there too, you were present, and also there was the
3 representative of the staff of Vitez, Marijan
4 Skopljak. Did he take part in that meeting?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Very well. Thank you. Let us proceed.
7 Yesterday, you spoke to us quite a bit about
8 the Vitezovi. Yesterday, you saw a document from the
9 Prosecutor, Z661. Could you please have a look at it
11 Two things, please. First of all, in the
12 middle of the last paragraph, the last paragraph on the
13 first page, and it starts with the word "DEMAND" in
14 capital letters, Kraljevic spoke about extremes on both
15 sides, as far as I understood it; that is to say,
16 people who were acting to the detriment of both
17 peoples. Do you agree that both parties had their own
19 A. Well, let me tell you. When one party acts
20 in extremist fashion, then the other one tries to
21 respond. However, it was the Croat side that was
22 always the first to start, and they had more
23 extremists. This document relates to Kraljevic before
24 the conflict.
25 Q. Very well. Could you please look at the
1 stamp next to his signature. It's quite legible, and
2 it says: "PPN Vitezovi, The Defence Department." Can
3 you conclude, on that basis, who this unit belongs to?
4 A. No, I cannot.
5 Q. Let me continue. Just an additional question
6 related to these extremists that you confirmed, in a
8 Mr. Kalco, can one say that during 1992 in
9 your municipality, there were actually frequent
10 incidents, regardless of who caused them, and then the
11 other side would return, and then there would be peace,
12 and then this would happen again, and then the
13 politicians would act; is that a correct assessment for
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Very well. Let us move on to another
18 You mentioned your visit to the cinema
19 yesterday, that is to say, your visit to the detainees
20 and the meeting. It wasn't said specifically. Perhaps
21 it should be put into a context. These meetings or,
22 rather, this visit on the 30th of April, wasn't it the
23 result of the ceasefire agreement that was signed at a
24 higher level and then here at the Petkovic-Halilovic
1 A. I don't know whether it was signed at a
2 higher level. I just know that Petkovic and Sefer
3 Halilovic signed an agreement on ceasefire.
4 Q. Obviously, this visit was aimed at the
5 implementation of this agreement, wasn't it?
6 A. Yes, but in a very short period of time.
7 MR. KOVACIC: All right. Usher, I have no
8 need for that document anymore. You can remove it.
9 Q. [Interpretation] Cerkez and his command had
10 some offices in this same cinema building near the
11 hotel; is that correct?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. On the first floor?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. On that occasion, you visited him?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You saw him?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Mr. Kalco, a certain number of Bosniak
20 Muslims were detained in the school in Dubravica. Did
21 you visit that school?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Which did you visit? You visited the cinema,
24 didn't you?
25 A. Yes, the cinema and the public accounting
2 Q. Mr. Kalco, did you notice which services or
3 which units were securing, guarding these buildings?
4 A. HVO soldiers.
5 Q. Could you not see that they belonged to the
6 military police? Didn't they have such insignia?
7 A. Well, very little. Mainly it was the HVO
8 from Vitez.
9 Q. Very well. Do you know who held the school
10 in Dubravica, who held that detention centre?
11 A. I knew -- I found out later that it was the
13 Q. Thank you. Do you know anything about
14 Kaonik, which is outside our municipality?
15 A. No, no.
16 Q. Thank you. The next subject that I wanted to
17 ask you about, and we would just like to clarify what
18 you said in this connection, the offensive of the HVO
19 against Stari Vitez on the 18th of July, 1993. That is
20 the one that happened during the summer. There is no
21 doubt that Darko Kraljevic was in charge; wasn't he?
22 A. Darko Kraljevic was in charge of this action
23 which started from the direction of Princip.
24 Q. All right.
25 A. From the direction of the garages, Novi
1 Vitez. Nakic was in charge, and I don't know who was
2 on the other side from the church, from the Rajic/Bilic
3 houses. I don't know who was there. I just know there
4 was Nakic and Dario Kordic.
5 Q. I imagine that Dario Kordic is a slip of the
7 A. Yes, I apologise. It was Kraljevic. I
8 really apologise.
9 Q. Darko Kraljevic?
10 A. Yes. Yes.
11 Q. As a soldier, I believe that you agree that
12 this action was coordinated from several directions.
13 As you said, it had to have a commander, didn't it?
14 A. Yes, it wouldn't have been carried out
16 Q. In your last interview at the OTP on the 5th
17 of March, you said that Darko Kraljevic on his own was
18 in charge of this action?
19 A. Perhaps the translation was not good. He was
20 in charge of that action that took part -- that took
21 place from the direction of Princip.
22 Q. And there is another Nakic, isn't there?
23 A. Yes, there is this other Nakic who was in the
24 military police. Not Franjo Nakic.
25 Q. Oh, I see. So Nakic from the military
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And then you said, in connection with the
4 action concerning the collection of the dead bodies,
5 the soldiers' dead bodies, and you said that Boro left
6 15 bodies and said, "These were not ours. They were
7 not from Vitez."
8 A. At first we did not know how many soldiers
9 there were. We ascertained this only later. Boro
10 Jozic said, "These are not soldiers of the Viteska
11 Brigade or, rather, from Vitez." Later, as I said, we
12 realised that they were from Osijek, Daruvar, because
13 we found their documents, their military IDs and their
14 family photographs, et cetera. We handed that over to
15 the authorities in charge in Zenica. I don't know what
16 happened to this afterwards.
17 Q. Well, okay. Let's leave that. Mr. Kalco,
18 tell me about these IDs of these soldiers. Did you see
19 this personally?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Did you perhaps notice on these IDs and these
22 documents, at least on some of them, that they were
23 issued by the HOS?
24 A. By the Croatian army. Not the HVO. The
25 Croatian army.
1 Q. I am not sure whether we have understood each
2 other. I am asking you whether the HOS had issued some
3 of these documents.
4 A. No.
5 Q. The HSP party?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Can you tell us anything about the time when
8 these documents were issued? Do you, perhaps, remember
9 some of them?
10 A. 1991, 1992.
11 Q. All right. And as for the birthplaces of
12 these persons, were these persons from Bosnia?
13 A. No. No. Perhaps their parents were. All of
14 them were born there, in Osijek, Daruvar, et cetera,
15 the places I already mentioned.
16 Q. Apropos, since we've already mentioned Boro
17 Jozic, you know that he was killed in front of his
18 house in Vitez?
19 A. I don't know. Boro Jozic does not have a
20 house in Vitez. He has an apartment there.
21 Q. Well, that's what I meant when I said house,
22 in front of the apartment building where he lived. And
23 you didn't know this?
24 A. No.
25 Q. You knew him?
1 A. I knew him very well.
2 Q. And you never heard that he was killed in
3 front of his building that faces Old Vitez, in front of
4 the hotel?
5 A. Yes, I heard about it, but the question is
6 who killed him, the BiH army or the HVO, because there
7 is the possibility of either side having killed him.
8 No one is ever going to establish that.
9 Q. Is there any reason why you think that the
10 HVO did it? Do you think that this was a bullet that
11 went astray or what?
12 A. I don't know. I just know that at that time
13 the army did not fire at the apartment buildings, the
14 Kolonija, towards that part of Vitez.
15 Q. But there was a similar incident when Marko
16 Prskalo, a negotiator from Blaskic's staff, was hit in
17 front of the hotel?
18 JUDGE MAY: Now, what has this got to do with
19 the examination-in-chief or this trial? It seems to me
20 that we are going off on a chase, on a totally
21 different topic. And we really must concentrate on the
23 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour. I will not
24 go further.
25 Q. [Interpretation] Let us move onto another
1 subject, Mr. Kalco. The question relates to the
2 military model of subordination or, as you military men
3 like to say, the resubordination, the attachment of
4 units. You said that according to the JNA concept a
5 unit that came to a certain territory would have to be
6 subordinated to the highest unit in that territory.
7 A. Absolutely. And that is the model that the
8 army and the HVO abided by.
9 Q. So you agree with that, unless the order
10 specified otherwise?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I would like you to have a look at some
13 documents, two or three of them, but the first one by
14 way of an example. Could the Registrar give the --
15 give Document 91/1 to the witness, please.
16 Mr. Kalco, I would like to use this document
17 by way of an example.
18 A. I had that particular one that had -- let me
19 tell you one thing. I can't read half of this. Do you
20 have the Croatian text?
21 Q. I have the Croatian text, but it's a poor
22 photocopy. But I'm sure you can see one thing there.
23 Please look at this signature, the bottom of the other
24 page. Is that Blaskic? Do we agree on that?
25 A. Yes, we do.
1 Q. And it also says who copies were sent to.
2 Just look at this, to all the formation in the
3 operative zone of Central Bosnia. Then it says:
4 Bruno Busic, Ludvig Pavlovic, Vitezovi, Travnik Police
5 Department, the 4th battalion of the military police in
6 Vitez. So four units were mentioned. If you can see
7 that just tell me what the date is.
8 A. It is the 16th of January 1993.
9 Q. So when an order is issued in this way, can
10 you see any kind of subordination or resubordination
11 amongst the above-mentioned?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Who are they subordinated to?
14 A. To the unit that is operating in that
16 Q. But the order is issued by the commander of
17 the operative zone?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is it true that, first and foremost, they are
20 all subordinate to him?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And then, if you look at the order further,
23 you will see whether there is coordination or
24 subordination; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Let us not waste too much time. Jon Elford,
2 witness Jon Elford, there is a document in the binder
3 related to him. There is also an order issued by
4 Blaskic, where he sends this order to the Viteska
5 Brigade and the Zrinjski Brigade, and the 4th Battalion
6 of the military police. So it's three units
7 altogether. It's not really important which units they
8 are. He says, explicitly in this order, that it enters
9 into force immediately, and: "The commanders of the
10 above-mentioned units shall be held responsible by me
11 for the execution of this." Is this subordination or
13 A. I think it's the other.
14 Q. Oh, you mean coordination?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Because it was specifically said so?
17 A. Yes.
18 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you very much. Your
19 Honour, it was part of the Elford binder and it was not
20 registered under separate --
21 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's not waste any
22 more time on this. Let's move on.
23 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes,
24 quite. This document was not officially admitted by
25 the Chamber.
1 JUDGE MAY: No. But we'll not spend any more
2 time on it.
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. In connection with this subject, just one
5 question. The light artillery rocket division, you
6 know that within the set-up of the operative zone of
7 Central Bosnia there was such a unit?
8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not
9 hear the witness's answer.
10 Q. Theoretically, according to the JNA concept,
11 it belongs directly to the commander of the operative
13 A. Yes, but it can also be given to the
14 commander of the unit that is carrying out this
15 particular action, depending on the nature of the
16 operations concerned.
17 Q. However, if nothing is said specifically,
18 then it belongs to the organisation of the operative
20 A. Yes, that's it.
21 Q. Thank you. Now, we are going to play a tape
22 to you --
23 JUDGE MAY: Well, you are not going to. You
24 are going to ask the Trial Chamber whether you can do
25 that. What is it you want to play? What is it that
1 you want to play, Mr. Kovacic?
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,
3 I have a tape here. Of course, I have a copy for the
4 Prosecutor. It was recorded by the intelligence
5 service of the HVO during the war. I have the
6 transcripts as well. And I would like to ask the
7 witness to do two things in this regard.
8 JUDGE MAY: Has it been admitted into
9 evidence so far?
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] No.
11 JUDGE MAY: This is something from the other
12 side. Now, if you want to call evidence about it, you
13 can do that, but you can't ask this witness about it.
14 You are merely asking him to comment.
15 Now, let's get onto something else.
16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] With all due
17 respect, Mr. President, I am just seeking permission
18 for him to recognise whether he is the person speaking
19 on this tape, to see whether the tape is authentic in
20 terms of the persons whose voices are taped, because he
21 is the only one who can recognise his own voice.
22 JUDGE MAY: Have you made preparations for
23 this to be played?
24 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] The technical
25 booth has the tape, and we have the transcripts here.
1 JUDGE MAY: Very well. But you are not to
2 take a lot of time with this.
3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour,
4 may I just suggest that we hear the first part -- only
5 10 or 15 seconds, so that the witness can say whether
6 it is him or not. We are going to play the tape then,
7 and I am going to put four or five brief questions
8 related to the transcript to him, and that will have
9 concluded what I had to do.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters now --
11 interpreters did not receive copies. The interpreters
12 ask for a copy, please.
13 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, could I ask the
14 director to put the sound on.
15 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let the
16 interpreters have a copy.
17 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Can we see
18 the transcript, Mr. President?
19 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry, who should see the
21 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] We don't
22 have the transcript.
23 JUDGE MAY: The Prosecution should have a
25 MR. KOVACIC: We don't need it for the other
1 Defence. They have one. There were enough copies.
2 Something was wrong. There were three for Judges --
3 JUDGE MAY: Take one. We'll share.
4 MR. KOVACIC: I'm sorry. I'm sure there
5 was. Something was missed out. Could we now play the
6 tape, Your Honour?
7 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
8 [Audiotape played]
9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
10 Voice 1: Hello. Hi, how are you? What's
12 Voice 2: Nothing.
13 Voice 1: Everything is fine. Super - the
14 only thing is that that Smajic from Bila called around
15 9.00 and he says that he heard that there was shooting
16 in Travnik and he was only checking. The officer on
17 duty in the Travnik headquarters said that there
18 allegedly had been some skirmishes, something about
19 flags or whatever, I don't know.
20 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Kalco, shall we continue listening to the
22 tape or can you identify your voice?
23 A. I think it's not me.
24 Q. Could the director please play another
25 conversation from this tape, please.
1 [Audiotape played]
2 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
3 Voice 1: I don't know, it's not the flag. I
4 don't know. It's a placard or something. I don't
5 know. I don't know.
6 Voice 2: Well, whatever, I can do it
7 myself. I was born on my own. I grew up on my own.
8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could we please
9 hear the beginning of the second conversation, because
10 that's where the tape is better, and then we are
12 [Audiotape played]
13 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
14 Voice 1: How are things? Fine?
15 Voice 2: Nothing.
16 Voice 1: All quiet. What do you say, is
17 there any shooting where you are?
18 Voice 2: Says who?
19 Voice 1: Nobody is shooting. Nobody is
21 Voice 2: It's the usual thing, Ustashas are
22 celebrating, you know.
23 Voice 1: That means that nothing is going
25 Voice 2: No, nothing.
1 Voice 1: What about there.
2 Voice 2: Nothing.
3 Voice 1: Are you all right?
4 Voice 2: Yes.
5 Voice 1: When are you going to come here?
6 Voice 2: Come on. Drop by.
7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. At the beginning of the third conversation,
9 again your name is being used. It was not heard very
10 well in the first conversation or the second
11 conversation, we couldn't hear it well. Could you
12 please listen to this carefully.
13 [Audiotape played]
14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
15 Voice 1: [Inaudible] called.
16 Voice 2: Just wanted to see what was going
18 Voice 1: What are you doing?
19 Voice 2: Well, I've got a few men here.
20 We're on duty, whatever.
21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Mr. Kalco, do you recognise your voice here
23 or not?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I
1 would like to tender this into evidence, please, the
2 tape and the transcript, then.
3 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, what is there
4 significant in it --
5 MR. KOVACIC: [No interpretation]
6 JUDGE MAY: Let me finish, Mr. Kovacic. What
7 is significant in this document? Is there anything
8 which you say this witness said or was said to him on
9 which you rely?
10 MR. KOVACIC: It mostly shows -- indeed,
11 there are a couple of incidents mentioned which are
12 either very directly or indirectly within the picture
13 of what the witness said, and I will be very, very
14 brief on that. Indeed, out of those nine discussions,
15 nine separate discussions, I would put the question on
16 three or four just to identify whether the subject is
17 what I would presume from the discussion in reality
19 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Do that.
20 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, sir.
21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kalco, do you have the
22 transcript in front of you?
23 Just a brief question up there. It says, the
24 first conversation, conversation 1, it is the person
25 who is on duty at the headquarters with you, and I
1 presume you must have called from outside to check --
2 A. This is in English. I don't understand
4 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the
5 transcript in Croatian.
6 In the case of the first conversation, I
7 think the witness said he didn't recognise his voice,
8 as you allege it to be. Yes.
9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Kalco, the first conversation, there is
11 mention of these flags here, and it doesn't really
12 matter who said it. I believe it was you. But you
13 talk about a flag, and you say, "Whoever did that, that
14 is, hoisted it up, to take it down tomorrow, because we
15 don't know what it is, whose it is. It's not a flag.
16 It looks like a banner or something like that."
17 To begin with, this is Eastertime, as the
18 preceding sentence shows. Can we agree that it was
20 A. I don't really remember anymore.
21 Q. But do you remember that a huge, I mean an
22 enormous flag -- I mean one was never seen before or
23 after like that, huge, a huge green flag which was
24 spread over the road next to the tyre repair shop at
25 Bengir's in Stari Vitez, do you remember that?
1 A. Yes, yes, I do.
2 Q. And you were not particularly happy about
3 that either, were you?
4 A. I wasn't.
5 Q. Why weren't you happy about it?
6 A. Well, because it was a provocation for the
7 other people.
8 Q. By "the other people", you mean Croats?
9 A. Yes, yes.
10 Q. And, in fact, in Travnik a few days before
11 that, some people got into fisticuffs and were injured
12 because of the flags, and that is why you did not like
13 that in Vitez?
14 A. Quite so, quite so.
15 Q. Is it true that it was put up by some
16 Mujahedins, by some extremists?
17 A. To tell you the truth, I do not know what you
18 mean by "Mujahedin". To begin with, in Stari Vitez,
19 there was not a single Mujahedin.
20 Q. But perhaps it was some extremists who put up
21 that flag?
22 A. Very likely.
23 Q. Right. Do you know if at that time a group
24 of extremists -- sorry. Thank you.
25 Now, the next conversation, I should also
1 like to ask you something about that, conversation
2 number 2 -- the third conversation, conversation number
3 3. I apologise. Conversation number 4, and you have
4 it marked there, the fourth conversation.
5 Here, at the bottom -- first, you are taking
6 part in this conversation. Let us try to identify.
7 This Neric who takes up the call, is that Hakija
9 A. Neric was not a member of the BH army in
11 Q. Yes, but is it Hakija Dzalilovic? Could you
12 tell us who Neric is?
13 A. I don't know.
14 Q. Thank you. And towards the end of that
15 conversation in some place somewhere, he says:
16 "The fire place is gone. Kamin has left.
17 When did he leave?"
18 "He left an hour ago."
19 And I should like to tell you that at 21.30
20 some days before that, a very popular restaurant in
21 Vitez called Kamin was blown up. It was owned by
22 somebody called Slavko Jukic. Do you remember that?
23 A. I remember that.
24 Q. Do you -- does this person mean that Kamin?
25 A. No.
1 JUDGE MAY: There is an objection, which I
2 will hear.
3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] This is
4 merely a comment. I really do not understand what are
5 the conversations that the witness remembers having.
6 Mr. Kovacic is addressing him as if he owned up to all
7 these conversations. I think we should really
8 establish which conversations the witness recognises as
9 his own and accepts as his own amongst this large
10 number of conversations which are shown here.
11 JUDGE MAY: So far, there is nothing of any
12 significance in anything here. If there is and if
13 necessary, it will have to be replayed to see whether
14 the witness accepts it or not. But time is going, so
15 let's move on.
16 Yes, Mr. Kovacic.
17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. In conversation 6, in the beginning we have a
19 dialogue. Would you agree that it is you talking to
20 Zahid Ahmic?
21 A. No.
22 Q. No? You say it wasn't you?
23 A. No, it wasn't me.
24 Q. Very well, thank you.
25 Conversation 7, and this should be the
1 conversation between you and Sifet Sivro, and you
2 introduce yourself at the beginning. Will you please
3 have a look at it to see what it's all about, and then
4 I'll have one question.
5 Are you referring to the disarmament of
6 guards at the SPS, when somebody first tried to disarm
7 some guards who were Croats, because at that time
8 guards were still of mixed ethnicity, and after that
9 the Ustasha, and it says here, their special troops
10 came and disarmed the Muslim guards so that only Croat
11 guards remained? Do you agree that the conversation is
12 about that?
13 A. I do not know that it is that incident when
14 the HVO came, but the HVO did come and disarm the
16 Q. But before that, some Croats had been
17 disarmed, and that is what then led on to --
18 A. No, nobody was disarmed by the BH army. They
19 may have disarmed themselves so as to have a reason to
20 do what they did then.
21 Q. And then conversation 9, which is the last
22 page, also in the beginning we hear clearly that it is
23 you, because you give your name here, and you are
24 asking for a certain Almir, and in the beginning you
25 say, "Listen. We have some complaints from below that
1 Besim Trako and Petak --" is this Senad Petak whom you
2 mentioned yesterday and who was killed in the hotel on
3 the 21st of May?
4 A. Petak was --
5 Q. No. The person who was with him, yes, I'm
7 A. There were two Petaks. I do not really know
8 who does this refer to. There were two brothers.
9 Q. Is it the other brother, the one who is
10 mentioned here? I can't find the right word, but were
11 they rather quarrelsome persons, rather, short-tempered
12 people before the war?
13 A. Yes, there were.
14 Q. And this shows -- this also says about some
15 incident, that they seized somebody's pistol, didn't
16 they, some Kulices [phoen]?
17 A. Yes, yeah, right.
18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
19 [In English] Your Honour, I have no further questions.
20 [Interpretation] Mr. Kalco, thank you.
21 JUDGE MAY: Are you asking for the
22 transcripts to be put into evidence?
23 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour, I am. Sorry
24 for that on the end.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
1 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
2 Mr. President, you are talking about the admission of
3 the transcript. Could we know the source of this
4 transcript, and can the Prosecutor's office check the
5 authenticity and the reliability of the translation?
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Has the tape been given to
7 the Prosecutor yet?
8 MR. KOVACIC: I just gave it. I gave it to
9 the Registry, and I see they distributed it.
10 JUDGE MAY: The next point is this: Where
11 does it come from, Mr. Kovacic?
12 MR. KOVACIC: It comes from the HVO
13 municipality services in Vitez. From time to time,
14 they were trying -- as you have heard in other
15 testimonies, they have heard to listen to each other.
16 Indeed, Witness Kalco mentioned that yesterday.
17 JUDGE MAY: We will admit it on this basis:
18 that, of course, the Prosecution can have the tape and
19 can test it and can also, if need be, comment on the
20 translation. But at the moment, it can be admitted.
21 What's the number?
22 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, of course. The tape is
23 there. Your Honour, if I may just add, I'm planning to
24 bring a witness, a technician who was working on that
1 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
2 THE REGISTRAR: The audiotape will be number
3 D65/2 and the transcript D65A/2.
4 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. There is a matter I
5 want to raise with Mr. Kovacic.
6 Mr. Kovacic, you haven't challenged, in the
7 witness's evidence -- and we should be plain what your
8 case is about because you're obliged under the Rules,
9 if you're going to dispute something, to put it to the
10 witness -- first of all, in the October post office
11 meeting, that Mr. Cerkez said that the municipality
12 would burn down. Now, is it disputed that Mr. Cerkez
13 said that?
14 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,
15 yes, of course I dispute it, and I thought it clearly
16 transpired from my question. Somebody said that there
17 would be a fire, not a threat.
18 JUDGE MAY: If that was the item that
19 followed that, we will get it straightened out.
20 Mr. Kalco, it's suggested that somebody said
21 that Mr. Cerkez didn't say the municipality would burn
22 down but somebody said there would be a fire. Is that
23 true or not? Just answer in a word, if you would.
24 A. I'm not getting the interpretation. I'm not
25 getting the interpretation. I can hear His Honour, but
1 I am not getting the interpretation.
2 JUDGE MAY: The question was this:
3 Mr. Cerkez, you said, said at the October meeting in
4 the post office that the municipality would burn down.
5 It is suggested by the Defence that that was not said
6 and that somebody said there would be a fire. Now, did
7 somebody say there would be a fire or not? Would you
8 tell us what the truth is?
9 A. Your Honour, I think it is the former, that
10 Vitez would be butchered and that the Bosniaks -- and
11 that the blame would rest with the Bosniaks, that is
12 the BiH army.
13 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Now, the next matter,
14 Mr. Kovacic, was this: that dealing with the 16th of
15 April, the witness's evidence was that he had
16 intercepted an order from Mario Cerkez to Marko Lujic
17 to fire at religious objects at Kruscica. And Lujic
18 subsequently asked for a break, said that they could
19 have breakfast and that the guns could cool down.
20 Now, is that conversation challenged?
21 MR. KOVACIC: That was challenged, Your
22 Honour, because I asked the witness whether that was a
23 discussion between Marko Lujic and his son, Mario
24 Lujic. And the second -- that was the first document
25 which I introduced to the witness, which shows that
1 this person, Marko Lujic, was far beyond --
2 JUDGE MAY: That's a separate point. It's a
3 separate point. So that I can understand your case,
4 are you saying that this conversation was not with
5 Mr. Cerkez, but was with somebody else? Is that the
7 MR. KOVACIC: Exactly. Mario was another
8 person. And if I may, Your Honour, this other person,
9 Mario, was with the HVO.
10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kalco, you've heard what's
11 suggested, that this was not a conversation with Mario
12 Cerkez. Was it or not?
13 A. Yes, it was with -- between Mario and Marko
15 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, thank you,
16 Mr. Kovacic.
17 MR. KOVACIC: I just want to refer on that
18 subject witness --
19 JUDGE MAY: This is all a matter of argument.
20 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I also challenge
21 when we were talking about the meetings on or before 20
22 October. There are some mixed up on places and
23 orders. Some persons were not here, but we do have
24 already exhibits in the case, so it is obvious.
25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. All that is a matter
1 for comment.
2 Yes, Mr. Lopez-Terres.
3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I should
4 simply like to comment on the witness's answer, looking
5 at the transcript. Mr. President, when you asked if
6 the conversation was between Mario Cerkez and another
7 one, he said, "Yes, the conversation was between Mario
8 and Marko Lujic." I believe it would be important to
9 say that it was Mario Cerkez. It was said that Mario
10 and Marko Lujic were talking, but to avoid any
11 ambiguity, perhaps we should make it -- perhaps we
12 should seek further precision, because the witness said
13 only "Mario."
14 JUDGE MAY: It's perfectly fine. He was
15 talking about his earlier evidence in which he said it
16 was Mr. Cerkez.
17 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Very
18 well. Thank you.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
20 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
21 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kalco.
22 A. Good morning.
23 Q. I introduce myself, sir. My name is Stephen
24 Sayers, and together with my colleague, Mr. Naumovski,
25 we represent Dario Kordic. You've been asked a lot of
1 questions today and yesterday, and I'll try to be as
2 brief as I can, sir, and not go over territory --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Sayers, will you please
4 slow down. Yes, thank you.
5 Q. -- and not go over territory that we have
6 already been over, sir.
7 The first question. You were the deputy
8 commander of the 325th Mountain Brigade, the second in
9 command to Sefkija Djidic; is that correct, sir?
10 A. I was Sefkija Djidic's deputy. Sefkija
11 Djidic was the commander of the TO staff of the
12 municipality of Vitez, and I was his deputy.
13 Q. Very well. Now, in your direct testimony you
14 gave some descriptions of the takeover, essentially, of
15 the Vitez municipal government by the HVO. And I
16 believe, sir, that that was on June the 20th of 1992,
17 that that occurred; is that correct?
18 A. I did not say anything about when the
19 government was taken over, but it is that date.
20 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
21 Mr. President, this was -- this subject was not
22 broached in the examination-in-chief of this witness.
23 JUDGE MAY: Let's move on.
24 MR. SAYERS:
25 Q. You gave some testimony, sir, about dealings
1 with the Croat political and military leaders in
2 Vitez. And I believe that the people with whom you
3 dealt principally were Ivica Santic; correct?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You also dealt with Mr. Skopljak, both Pero
6 and Marijan Skopljak?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And you also dealt with Mr. Anto Valenta;
10 A. It is.
11 Q. And Mr. Valenta was a school teacher who
12 taught at the high school in Vitez; correct?
13 A. Yes, he was a teacher at the secondary
15 Q. All right. And the leaders of the Muslim
16 community were, I believe, Dr. Muhamed Mujezinovic, for
17 one; correct?
18 A. Correct.
19 Q. (redacted)
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. I believe the chief of the military police
22 was Mr. Saban Mahmutovic; right?
23 A. Civilian police.
24 Q. Civilian police. And then the military
25 leaders were Mr. Djidic and yourself?
1 A. The military police was under our command.
2 Q. Did you have any meetings with Mr. Kordic in
3 the spring or summer of 1992, and speak to him
4 personally, so far as you are aware, sir?
5 A. No, I did not.
6 Q. And just one final question on this, while --
7 before I move onto another subject. The negotiations
8 between the Muslim side and the Croat side of the civil
9 and military authorities in Vitez, if you like,
10 continued on, really, until the outbreak of the war in
11 April of 1993; isn't that right? Or at least the
12 outbreak of the fighting between the Muslims and the
13 Croats in the Lasva Valley.
14 A. Yes, it was on the 30th of April, when a
15 military delegation of the HVO and a delegation of the
16 BiH army came.
17 Q. Thank you very much, sir. Let me skip over
18 some topics that I was going to cover, and let me turn
19 straight to the blockade at Ahmici on the 18th of
20 October 1992.
21 There seems to be some uncertainty, sir, in
22 the actual date of the blockade. Was it October the
23 18th, 1992, or the 19th or the 20th? Can you recall,
24 at this remove of time, seven years or eight years
1 A. Well, it was at that time. I do not have a
2 document with me. I believe it was the 20th.
3 Q. All right. This was the first time, though,
4 would it be fair to say, Mr. Kalco, that a troop convoy
5 had been stopped at gunpoint in the Lasva Valley?
6 A. Quite so.
7 Q. Now, you say, sir, that the troop convoy was
8 stopped, and it was stopped because it was carrying
9 troops from a variety of municipalities to Novi
10 Travnik. But isn't it true, sir, that Jajce had been
11 under prolonged and heavy attack by the Bosnian Serb
12 army forces at this time?
13 A. I think that Jajce was taken one of those
14 days and that there was a disarray between the BiH army
15 and HVO on one hand, because the Serbs were pushing
16 forward so that both the ABiH and the HVO began
17 retreating from Jajce. I said yesterday that the HVO's
18 objective was, because they had the explosives factory
19 in Vitez, and they also wanted to take the ammunition
20 factory in Novi Travnik, because of the artillery
22 Q. Thank you, sir. You would agree, though,
23 that the town of Jajce actually was captured by the
24 forces of the Bosnian Serb army about ten days after
25 the blockade had been erected at Ahmici; isn't that
1 right? I don't think there is any dispute about that.
2 A. Yes. But there were some indications, there
3 were some signs, and the units were withdrawing from
4 Jajce, were pulling out of Jajce, because, of course,
5 they could not pull out overnight. It was clear that
6 Jajce was about to fall.
7 Q. What you are telling us, then, Mr. Kalco, if
8 I understand you correctly, is that the units of the
9 Muslim forces were withdrawing from Jajce because they
10 saw the writing on the wall, so to speak, and that the
11 HVO was doing the same thing; is that correct?
12 A. Both. Both forces. Yes. Except that the
13 HV, that in Jajce the command was in the hands of the
15 Q. Thank you, sir. And, Mr. President, I just
16 draw the Trial Chamber's attention to Exhibit 151/1,
17 the entry for October 31st, 1992, which actually
18 contains a date that Jajce fell.
19 Let me just move onto another point, sir.
20 You related to us that instructions had been received
21 by your headquarters to erect the blockades at Stari
22 Bila and at Ahmici shortly before they were actually
23 erected; is that correct?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And I think and you said in your statement,
1 five years ago, that Ahmici was selected because it was
2 a natural choke point; the HVO forces could not pass
3 from any other direction, if they were stopped there.
4 Is that right, sir?
5 A. Quite. Because that is the boundary between
6 the Vitez and the Busovaca municipalities.
7 Q. All right. Now, you only went to Ahmici
8 after the fighting had already occurred; is that right,
9 Mr. Kalco?
10 A. After the fighting ended. No, not during the
11 fighting, but when the passions abated somewhat, it is
12 then that they went.
13 Q. That's what I thought you said. Now, let me
14 turn your attention to the first of the four items that
15 I would like to concentrate upon particularly.
16 You mentioned some negotiations that occurred
17 between the two parties on the opposite sides of the
18 dispute, let's say. And in your statement, five years
19 ago, you said that on October the 20th, at about 7.00
20 a.m., you received a telephone call from Ivica Santic,
21 requesting permission to come to the army headquarters,
22 your army headquarters, for a meeting. All these years
23 later, sir, do you actually recall what the date was,
24 or not?
25 A. Well, let me tell you. This was the 20th.
1 Not at 7.00, but at 7.00 in the evening, at 1900
2 hours. Not in the morning.
3 Q. All right. And you are certain it was on
4 October the 20th, 1992, right?
5 A. I think so.
6 Q. Very well. And, as I understand it, sir, a
7 delegation of people arrived in your headquarters
8 consisting of, amongst others, Ivica Santic, Pero
9 Skopljak, Mr. Marijan Skopljak, and Mr. Cerkez; is that
10 accurate to say?
11 A. Santic, Ivica was there, and Mario Cerkez.
12 Q. No others?
13 A. No.
14 Q. All right. Now, were there any
15 representatives of the civilian side, from the
16 Muslims? Mr. Kajmovic, for example, was he there?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. Kajmovic was there, Mujezinovic. There were
20 some others from the Muslim civilian authorities and
21 from the command of the BiH army.
22 Q. All right. If this is the meeting that I
23 think it is, Mr. Kalco, the Trial Chamber's already
24 heard a lot of evidence about this, and I don't want to
25 spend too much time on this. But let me just ask you,
1 was Mr. Kaknjo there?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And two other names, Mr. Sivro Bahtija and
4 Mr. Salkic Suad, were there too, as far as you can
6 A. I am not sure about Sivro, but Suad Salkic
7 was a member of the BiH army staff, and he was there.
8 Q. All right. And was it the next day, sir,
9 that you received a call from Dr. Franjo Tibolt, trying
10 to act as a mediator between the two parties, a nascent
11 to the dispute?
12 A. On the same day, after the meeting, we heard
13 from Dr. Tibolt that a meeting should be organised
14 between the army and the HVO at the medical centre.
15 And we came to that meeting, as I already said.
16 Q. Thank you indeed, Mr. Kalco. So as I
17 understand it, the chronology is that you had the
18 meeting with Mr. Santic and Mr. Cerkez first, and then
19 after that meeting you received a call from Dr. Tibolt,
20 in another attempt at mediation, and that was followed
21 by yet a third meeting that you had with Mr. Cerkez,
22 following which the fighting broke out; is that
23 accurate to say?
24 A. Precisely.
25 Q. Good. Thank you. And the meeting that you
1 had with Mr. Cerkez and -- at which Mr. Djidic was
2 present, that occurred at 6.00 a.m., the morning after
3 the first two conversations that you've talked about;
4 is that right?
5 A. 5.55 a.m.
6 Q. All right. Now, sir, the paragraph 23 of the
7 offer of proof that you apparently reviewed and signed
8 yesterday, contains a reference to a telephone
9 conversation that supposedly occurred between Ivica
10 Santic and Mr. Kordic. There was no mention of that
11 conversation at all in your statement five years ago.
12 Do you have a clear recollection of
13 Mr. Santic making a telephone call to someone, and him
14 telling you who that telephone call was being made to
15 or not?
16 A. It is correct that Ivica Santic, as president
17 of the HVO and mayor of Vitez, called. And after that
18 conversation, he said that he had talked to Mr. Kordic,
19 who was in Novi Travnik, and he received orders that
20 they had to be released, that units were to go from
21 Busovaca to Novi Travnik. Those were his orders,
22 because he was the man in charge in Central Bosnia,
23 Boban and him. And he was in charge of Central
25 Q. Sir, as the deputy commander, did you report
1 that to your intelligence officer, Mr. Nihad Rebihic?
2 A. He was there.
3 Q. Do you know whether any contemporaneous note
4 or memorandum was made of that discussion, sir?
5 A. A note was made about the talk between the
6 two components. I don't know where the note is.
7 Q. All right, sir. Do you know whether that
8 note was passed up your chain of command to the 3rd
9 Corps in Zenica?
10 A. Yes. Yes.
11 Q. All right, sir. But since we don't have that
12 note, the only thing we have is your recollection of a
13 conversation that occurred eight years ago, or
14 seven-and-a-half years ago. Now, how long did that
15 conversation last, sir?
16 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Let the witness
17 comment on that. It said that this all happened eight
18 years ago. Do you remember it, Mr. Kalco?
19 A. Yes, I remember well, because I didn't know
20 who he had been talking to. Mr. Santic said that he
21 called Mr. Kordic, and I remember that Mr. Kordic said
22 that he was in Novi Travnik. That's for sure; one
23 hundred per cent. If he talked to someone else and
24 just told us this, that's another matter. That's not
25 for me to say.
1 JUDGE MAY: It's time now for a break. If
2 you are moving onto the next topic.
3 MR. SAYERS: I have a couple of questions
4 about that.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
6 MR. SAYERS: I have just a couple of comments
7 about that conversation, but we can take a break now,
8 Your Honour. It's just as good as any time.
9 JUDGE MAY: And how long do you expect to
11 MR. SAYERS: As I related yesterday, I would
12 think not more than half an hour total. I would
13 anticipate, realising that we have other witnesses
14 here, by 11.15 or 11.20.
15 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll break for half
16 an hour.
17 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
18 Mr. President. Mr. President. May I have this pause
19 to let the witness examine this transcript of the tape,
20 and then say whatever he has to say about this, because
21 he will be leaving today.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, he can do so.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 11.11 a.m.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
1 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President. May I
2 just say that there is a fairly urgent matter that we
3 need to take up following the conclusion of this
4 witness's testimony and before the next witness
5 testifies. That will take about five minutes, I would
7 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
8 MR. SAYERS:
9 Q. Mr. Kalco, let us continue on chronologically
10 over the items that you talked about, insofar as they
11 concern Mr. Kordic, anyway. And as I said, I'll try
12 not to detain you here not more than another 15 or 20
14 Now, you made no mention of this conversation
15 between Mr. Santic and Mr. Kordic in your statement
16 five years ago. The first time that we heard about it
17 was yesterday. Did you actually see Mr. Santic make
18 the telephone call that you've testified about, sir?
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
20 A. I saw it, because the telephone was on the
21 desk. There were 12 of us sitting there, and I saw
22 that somebody made a call to somebody. We did not know
23 whom. And after the conversation, he said what he
24 said. I don't want to repeat what I already have said.
25 Q. The point is, though, and I just want to
1 underscore this, you said during your direct
2 examination that you don't know what was said, you
3 weren't able to hear the conversation, and that's true,
4 isn't it?
5 A. Yes, quite. Nobody could hear -- nobody
6 could overhear the conversation. Santic was talking.
7 He was the only one who could hear, and he told us
8 about it.
9 Q. Thank you, sir. Let's move on to the next
11 You do recall attending a meeting on the 22nd
12 of October, or shortly after the fighting broke out at
13 Ahmici, with the politicians in Vitez and your
14 commanding officer, Mr. Djidic, as well as
15 representatives from UNPROFOR, Captain Sajmon Elis, I
16 believe, and a representative of the ECMM, Mr. Anders
17 Levinsen. Do you remember that meeting, sir?
18 A. I do.
19 Q. And it would be fair to say, wouldn't it, and
20 I think you'll agree with this, that Mr. Kordic was not
21 involved in any way in the negotiations that led to the
22 reduction in tensions following the fighting in Ahmici
23 and the resolution of that situation that had occurred
24 just a few days before; is that right?
25 A. Quite right, he did not, because we talked to
1 relevant military and civilian authorities in the
2 municipality of Vitez, and Mr. Kordic comes from
4 Q. Right. You did not consider Mr. Kordic to be
5 one of the relevant military or civil authorities in
6 the region, in your municipality, did you?
7 A. We did not consider him to be that in Vitez
8 itself. But in the region, yes, we did perceive him as
9 such, as he was the main personality in Central Bosnia,
10 from Kresevo to Kiseljak down to Kaonik.
11 Q. Have you ever spoken to Mr. Kordic, sir?
12 A. No. I already said that. No.
13 Q. Now, you gave some brief testimony about
14 members of a unit that wore oak leaf patches. I
15 believe they were called the Ludvig Pavlovic Brigade.
16 Do you remember that?
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 Q. And it's true, sir, that this brigade came to
19 Vitez, I believe you said in your statement five years
20 ago, around September of 1992 and caused all kinds of
21 problems; right?
22 A. Yes. It was when they arrived that the
23 problems culminated in Vitez, as against the previous
24 period, because they were teasing, provoking people,
25 beating people. When out in restaurants and coffee
1 shops, their behaviour was improper, and I suppose that
2 they were the ones, with HVO extremists in Vitez
3 itself, who were responsible for the blowing up of
4 Muslim facilities.
5 Q. All right, sir. Just three final points with
6 respect to this brigade.
7 Your troops reported to you that several
8 members of this brigade were actually killed in the
9 fighting at Ahmici on the 20th of October, 1992; is
10 that right?
11 A. We had received reports that some HVO
12 soldiers had been killed, but we did not know which
13 brigade it was or who were those soldiers; that is,
14 whether they came from Vitez, or perhaps from Ludvig
15 Pavlovic, or perhaps some other unit. I don't know.
16 Q. You said in your statement five years ago, on
17 page 4, that:
18 "Members of the Territorial Defence at
19 Ahmici told me that some of the dead HVO soldiers at
20 Ahmici on 20 October, 1992, were members of this
21 brigade. They knew this because of the oak leaf patch
22 on their uniforms."
23 Now, does that help you remember -- I know
24 it's a long time later, sir, but does that help you
25 remember whether there were members of this brigade
1 that your troops reported to have been killed in the
2 fighting in Ahmici on that date?
3 A. That is what I said in my statement, but I
4 did not see any one of them. And I believed what I was
5 told by the soldiers, by men of the BiH army who had
6 been at that front. I did not see them.
7 Q. No criticism intended at all. Following this
8 incident, though, you insisted to your immediate
9 superior, or the second in command of the 3rd Corps,
10 Colonel Merdan, that all HVO units, not from Vitez, had
11 to leave the municipality. That was one of the
12 conditions upon which you insisted during the ceasefire
13 negotiations and peace negotiations; is that right?
14 A. It is.
15 Q. And they did in fact leave the municipality
16 of Vitez around the 25th of December 1992; is that
17 right, sir?
18 A. Yes. Yes. Towards the end of the year. I
19 don't know the exact date.
20 Q. Thank you very much. Now, were you aware
21 that there had been an outbreak of fighting between HVO
22 or Croat forces and Muslim forces in the Busovaca
23 municipality in January of 1993?
24 A. Yes. Yes. The refugees from Kovacevac
25 arrived in Vitez from Vranjska, and then they were
1 transferred to Zenica.
2 Q. In analysing the tensions that gradually
3 increased between the Muslim residents of the Lasva
4 Valley and the Croat residents, sir, were you aware
5 that there had been a series of executions and murders
6 outside of Busovaca in the villages of Dusina, and the
7 villages around Kacuni, Oseliste, Gusti Grab, Donja
8 Polje, places like that?
9 A. I did hear those stories, but I wasn't
10 showing much interest for them because they were
11 outside of my area of responsibilities.
12 Q. So let me move on immediately, sir. You
13 don't know very much about that fighting at all; is
14 that fair to say?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Now, you talked about artillery assets and
17 artillery commanders. You became aware yourself of the
18 arrival of certain pieces of artillery ordnance in the
19 Vitez area in the spring of 1993, didn't you?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. In fact, you were aware that two
22 155-millimetre howitzers had arrived in the area, one
23 based at Mali Mosunj, the quarry; is that right?
24 A. Yes. And Prahulje, Nova Bila.
25 Q. Yes, sir. Could you give us your best
1 estimate of the distance between the quarry at Mosunj
2 and the second location that you've identified,
3 Prahulje near Nova Bila?
4 A. I don't know what you mean.
5 Q. Well, would you agree that the quarry at Mali
6 Mosunj is about two kilometres away from Prahulje?
7 A. Thereabouts, yes.
8 Q. Just one question, sir, in connection with
9 the testimony that you gave surrounding Mr. Miroslav
10 Bralo. Were you aware that Mr. Bralo had actually been
11 imprisoned at the Kaonik military detention facility
12 and that he was in gaol in March of 1993, as a result
13 of the unfortunate murder of Mr. Esad Salko -- Salkic.
14 I'm sorry.
15 A. We knew that he had been detained, but he
16 spent a very short time in prison. He moved about. He
17 was quite free. And I presume he was allowed to go
18 free after the investigation. And I really don't feel
19 like talking about Bralo any more, because he used to
20 boast that he had killed over 50 Bosniaks, and so on
21 and so forth. The gentlemen in the HVO know that.
22 Q. Mr. Kalco, I don't blame you in the least.
23 The last question I have on the subject of this
24 unsavoury individual is you never saw him at liberty
25 yourself in March of 1993, did you, with your own eyes?
1 A. Yes, I saw him in Vitez on a couple of
2 occasions in a luxury car. He was loaded at the time,
3 when people did not work. And when we survived only
4 owing humanitarian aid, he was loaded with German
5 marks, he was spending Croatian dinars. I don't know
6 where he got them. But I know that he wasn't poor.
7 Q. All right, sir. I appreciate you may have
8 seen him, but did you see him in March of 1993, to the
9 best of your knowledge?
10 A. I know it was March. After that event, I did
11 see him. It was after those incidents that I saw him.
12 Q. Thank you for clearing that up, sir.
13 Now, in connection with the testimony that
14 you gave about the alleged assassination attempt upon
15 Mr. Darko Kraljevic. Do you know whether any reports
16 were made of that event, and your conclusions to your
17 intelligence officer, Mr. Rebihic, or passed on up your
18 chain of command to the 3rd Corps in Zenica?
19 A. Yes, a report was made, a proper, good
20 report, and sent to the 3rd Corps. Where that report
21 is now, I don't know. I suppose it is somewhere in the
23 Q. Very well. It would be fair to say, sir,
24 that you, as the second in command, wanted to ensure
25 with your intelligence officer, Mr. Rebihic, that
1 accurate, contemporaneous records were made of any
2 significant event in your area of responsibility; is
3 that right?
4 A. Yes, quite. That is right. So that people
5 should know who did what, where they did it, what are
6 the consequences of that, and so on.
7 Q. Yes, sir. And, in fact, that was one of your
8 duties and one of the duties of your intelligence
9 officer, Mr. Rebihic; right?
10 A. I was his superior, and he did his job when I
11 ordered him to do so.
12 Q. All right, sir. Now, with respect to the
13 kidnapping of Commander Zivko Totic on the 15th of
14 April. You were aware of that incident; correct?
15 A. I was attending the celebration of the army
16 day in Zenica, and that is when I heard that. But it
17 is again outside our area, that is the territory of the
18 Vitez municipality. It is Zenica, so that is where I
19 heard about it, at that particular meeting, at the
21 Q. Were you able to see the televised press
22 conference that was held in the morning of the 15th of
23 April, showing video footage of the circumstances under
24 which Commander Totic had been kidnapped and his four
25 escorts slaughtered?
1 A. A part of it, yes. I don't really remember
2 any detail, but I did see some of it.
3 Q. And do you remember seeing Mr. Kordic give a
4 speech during that press conference at all, sir?
5 A. Yes. Yes. Let me just tell you, if I may.
6 The press conferences held by Mr. Kordic could not be
7 followed in Zenica, could not be taped in Zenica, so
8 that we tape-recorded all these press conferences and
9 sent tapes to the 3rd Corps in Zenica.
10 Q. Oh, I see. Any time that there was a
11 significant press conference containing either
12 political or military information of interest to your
13 commander and you, you would make a videotape of the
14 conference and send it up the chain of command in due
15 course to your superiors at the 3rd Corps; is that
16 accurate to say?
17 A. Yes, quite.
18 Q. All right. Mr. Kalco, do you know a
19 gentleman by the name of Fuad Berbic, the former TO
20 commander in Ahmici?
21 A. I do. We served in the JNA together.
22 Q. He was a professional soldier; is that fair
23 to say as well?
24 A. No. Reserve.
25 Q. Thank you for correcting me. What did he do,
1 sir, for a profession, for his job?
2 A. He was a commander of the unit in Ahmici --
3 Q. And --
4 A. -- and member of the local staff in the
6 Q. All right. Would it be fair to say that he
7 was extremely critical of the way that the entire
8 barricade incident had been organised in October of
10 A. No, as far as I know. Perhaps, but I don't
11 know anything about it.
12 Q. Very well. I'll move on to one question
13 concerning the fighting that broke out in Stari Vitez
14 on the 16th of April.
15 It's true, isn't it, that in the first wave
16 of the fighting that broke out there, your forces
17 killed 11 HVO soldiers and suffered three fatalities on
18 your side?
19 A. Yeah, we had three dead on the first day of
20 the conflict.
21 Q. Yes. And --
22 A. There were HVO soldiers killed. I don't know
23 how many.
24 Q. In your statement five years ago, sir, maybe
25 your memory was fresher then than it is now, but let me
1 just read you a statement on page 9 and see if it
2 refreshes your recollection. You said there: "In the
3 first attack, three BiH soldiers were killed, but we
4 killed 11 HVO soldiers." Does that help you remember
5 what happened in the first attack there on the 16th of
6 April, 1993?
7 A. Yes, true. We knew that it was about 11, and
8 we also think that there were more.
9 Q. All right. Just a couple of questions in
10 connection with the Stari Vitez truck bomb explosion.
11 Are you sure of the date of that explosion,
12 sir, whether it was the 18th, or the 19th, or is that
13 not clear to you at this point?
14 A. True, at half past 5.00, and it was a
15 Sunday. On Friday, they attacked Vitez. The 16th,
16 17th, that is, Friday, Saturday, and then it was
17 Sunday, so it must have been the 18th.
18 Q. Was the electricity still working at that
19 time, sir, on the 18th or the 19th when the truck bomb
20 exploded; yes?
21 A. Yes. Yes, there was still electricity on the
22 18th or, rather, on the 16th and the 17th, and after
23 the explosion, it was cut off, there was no more
25 Q. Now, you related certain comments made by
1 Mr. Kordic allegedly in a television programme that
2 evening. Let me just ask you, were you the only person
3 to see that programme, sir?
4 JUDGE MAY: How can he answer that question?
5 MR. SAYERS: There may have been other people
6 with him in the room, sir.
7 JUDGE MAY: That's a different matter. Did
8 you see it alone or were there others with you?
9 MR. SAYERS: Thank you indeed, Mr. President.
10 A. Well, it was at the command. I don't know
11 how many officers of the command were there. But since
12 there was no electricity, we had a battery-powered TV
13 set, and we would charge batteries for our stations all
14 the time. After that, it was 15 or 16 days without
15 electricity after that, so that we had our radio
16 stations, and we had light, and we had also a TV set,
17 that is, so we could watch it and listen to it.
18 MR. SAYERS: Very well.
19 Q. Let me just ask you, were you alone in the
20 room where the TV programme was broadcast or were there
21 other people there with you, and if so, who were they?
22 JUDGE MAY: He's answered that question.
23 A. I said that already.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Do you know the names of
25 anybody who might have been there or not, Mr. Kalco?
1 A. Well, I have it written down here in that
2 notebook of mine. I know that the signals men were
3 with me, two or three of them, and I could not say
4 right now who else from the staff members was there.
5 MR. SAYERS: All right.
6 Q. Just two lines of questions. First, did you
7 make a videotape of this television broadcast and send
8 it up your chain of command, as was your normal
10 A. Well, yes. We recorded that conversation as
11 well. We could not send it up immediately because it
12 was closed. However, when negotiations took place on
13 the 30th of June or, rather, on the 30th of April, when
14 the ceasefire was in place, we gave this tape to our
15 officers, who handed it over to the 3rd Corps in
17 Q. Thank you very much indeed, sir. Now a
18 follow-up question from that. Have you ever seen a
19 videotape of that press conference, or news
20 announcement, or whatever it was from that day to this?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You have. And when did you see that?
23 A. When we taped it, then I watched it again.
24 We watched it again, the command. We watched this tape
25 to see whether it turned out all right.
1 Q. And I take it that the tape quality was good,
2 you could hear what people were saying.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And the image quality was good as well; is
5 that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, you're quite correct, Mr. Kalco. In the
8 question that I asked you, that was the correct
9 answer. But let me ask you this: From the time that
10 you turned over the videotape that you made to your
11 superior officers in the 3rd Corps after June of 1993,
12 until today have you seen that videotape or that
13 programme rerun on TV?
14 A. No, no, no.
15 Q. All right. Let me turn to another subject.
16 This --
17 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, is it disputed
18 that Dario Kordic said that the ammunition depot had
19 been activated, there would be more explosions of the
20 kind, and the ABiH members should surrender?
21 MR. SAYERS: It is disputed, Mr. President,
22 yes. My client has no recollection of making any such
23 a statement on the 19th and really no recollection of
24 being informed that there had been an explosion in
25 Stari Vitez.
1 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
2 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
3 Q. If I may, Mr. Kalco, let me turn to the
4 conversation that you had with Colonel Blaskic on the
5 30th of April.
6 Now, you told us yesterday that
7 General Petkovic was in attendance with Colonel Blaskic
8 at this meeting that you had with them. But in your
9 statement five years ago, you said that it was actually
10 Colonel Blaskic, Colonel Filipovic, and Commander
11 Totic. Let me just read you a statement that you
12 made. On page 10, it says: "On 30 April 1993, I
13 attended a meeting in Stari Vitez with Blaskic,
14 Filipovic, and Totic." Let me just ask you, sir, was
15 Commander Totic present at this meeting or wasn't he?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. SAYERS: I just refer the Court to
18 Exhibit 79/1, Annex C, which shows that Commander Totic
19 was not, in fact, released from custody in Zenica, as a
20 captive of the Mujahedin, until --
21 JUDGE MAY: That's all a matter of comment.
22 MR. SAYERS: Maybe I should put it to the
24 Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Kalco, that, in fact,
25 Commander Totic was not present at this meeting because
1 he was still a captive of the Mujahedin in Zenica and
2 was not released until May the 17th, 1993?
3 A. He was at the meeting in Vitez.
4 Q. That's as best you remember it, sir, is it?
5 JUDGE MAY: No need to answer that.
6 A. Yes.
7 MR. SAYERS:
8 Q. All right. Now, did you, in conformity with
9 your normal practice, make contemporaneous notes and
10 memoranda, or memorandum, about this conversation that
11 you'd had with Colonel Blaskic and send it up your
12 chain of command to the 3rd Corps in Zenica?
13 A. Well, let me tell you, there was Sefer
14 Halilovic, there was Rasim Delic, there was Vehbija
15 Karic. They made notes. I only made a report for
16 internal purposes, and I informed the staff in Vitez.
17 And they probably made a report for the 3rd Corps or,
18 rather, the Supreme Command of the BiH army. We didn't
19 do that.
20 Q. All right, sir. You would agree that it was
21 a very important event for you, to receive visits from
22 the Commander in Chief of the Armija of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Commander in Chief of the
24 HVO; right?
25 A. Yes, precisely. And we thought that the
1 ceasefire achieved then would stay on, and that there
2 would be no war. And it went on only for a few days,
3 and then the conflict started again. Fortunately,
4 people were released from prison.
5 Q. Well, let me just ask you, what is true,
6 sir? Is it that Colonel Blaskic, Colonel Filipovic,
7 and Commander Totic were present at this meeting, as
8 you said five years ago, or is it true that General
9 Petkovic, General Halilovic, and Colonel Blaskic were
10 present at this meeting, as you said yesterday and
12 A. Well, let me tell you. When I stated this
13 five years ago, it was true. And also what I said
14 yesterday, that's it. There was this broader meeting.
15 Not to repeat all of that. At any rate, Petkovic led
16 the HVO team, and Sefer Halilovic was the Chief of
17 Staff of the Supreme Command of the BiH army, and he
18 led the army delegation. It was the three of them, and
19 I was the fourth one from Stari Vitez.
20 Q. All right. Let me pass onto my two final
21 topics. Firstly, you gave some testimony about seeing
22 someone that you identified as Mr. Kordic on the 8th of
23 August of 1993. Now, sir, you were actually standing
24 inside a building in Stari Vitez, weren't you?
25 A. It was not a building. It was ruins, the
1 remains of a building that had been shelled. I was
2 touring the lines, and in the village of Krcevine I saw
3 what I spoke of yesterday, and that is correct.
4 Q. All right. Now, how far away were the ruins
5 of this house from the southern bank of the Lasva
6 River, sir?
7 A. I think about 500 or 600 metres. You can see
8 it well with binoculars. You can even discern
9 features, faces.
10 Q. All right. Perhaps I misunderstood you,
11 sir. Did you say that you were about 500 metres away
12 from the southern bank of the Lasva River, at the place
13 that you were standing, looking for your binoculars?
14 A. I don't know. The distance between myself
15 and this HVO line in Krcevine was 500 to 600 metres,
16 approximately. That is the northern side, Krcevine.
17 And I was on the southern side.
18 Q. All right. Yes. In other words, you were on
19 the southern side of the Lasva River, and Krcevine, as
20 the Court can see from the map, is over on the northern
21 bank of the Lasva River, isn't it?
22 A. Yes. Or, to put it better, I was on the
23 right bank of the Lasva River, and they were on the
24 left bank of the Lasva River.
25 Q. All right. Now, you couldn't hear a word
1 that was being said, could you, during the --
2 A. No. No. No. No way.
3 Q. All right. And you say that Mr. Kordic was
4 in plain view, along with all the other military
5 commanders, looking through your optical instruments at
6 them 500 metres or so away; correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And in plain view of anybody who was standing
9 in the area that you were, with optical instruments as
11 A. Yes. Yes. Yes.
12 Q. All right.
13 A. Sure.
14 Q. Now, you also gave some testimony about
15 Mr. Kordic appearing on TV later that night or the next
16 day. Did you make a videotape of that news conference
17 or announcement, sir?
18 A. Yes, we recorded that too. And we kept it in
19 our headquarters until the ceasefire. After the
20 ceasefire, we gave it to the 3rd Corps in Zenica.
21 Q. Yes, sir. I take it, that you also made a
22 contemporaneous note or a memorandum or a report
23 yourself, or your intelligence officer did, and that
24 that was passed up the chain of command?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. All right.
2 A. My intelligence officer made a report based
3 on the data that I gave him. He made a report to the
4 3rd Corps.
5 Q. Right. Final subject, sir. Helicopters.
6 You gave some testimony on this subject. Isn't it true
7 that the helicopters that you saw were generally small,
8 non-cargo helicopters, the first being a Galeb model,
9 and the second being a French Gazelle model helicopter;
11 A. They were small helicopters for the most
12 part. They had two or three flights one evening, even
13 four. Sometimes they would actually land, and in other
14 places they would just parachute the parcels that they
15 were transporting. We benefited from that too, because
16 sometimes we got the parcels containing ammunition and
17 other things that were meant for the HVO.
18 Q. Yes, sir. I think you said that yesterday.
19 Here is my final question. In connection with the
20 assault that was launched upon Stari Vitez in the
21 middle of July of 1993, the 18th, I think you said,
22 isn't it true that the bulldozer that -- or the
23 converted bulldozer that you described, was actually
24 halted, having been struck by a shoulder-launched
25 missile fired by one of your troops fired from Stari
2 A. Correct. Correct. Yes. Thank God it was
3 hit. Had it not been hit, I wonder what would have
5 MR. SAYERS: Thank you indeed,
6 Mr. President. No further questions.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, so that we understand
8 your case, is it disputed that Mr. Kordic was on the
9 front line on the 8th of August 1993?
10 MR. SAYERS: I enquired of my client
11 yesterday on that subject, Mr. President. And if
12 you'll bear with me for just 30 seconds. He believes
13 that the incident that Mr. Kalco may have been
14 referring to is a visit that he made to that village,
15 many civilians had been killed in the village, and he
16 came to visit their families. And what was related as
17 to what was supposedly said on TV the next day is
19 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.
20 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
21 Re-examined by Mr. Lopez-Terres:
22 Q. Before I ask you some questions, in order to
23 specify things, I should like to go back to the tape
24 that was produced this morning. Mr. Kalco, during the
25 break you had an opportunity to go through the contents
1 of the conversations which appear on that tape. There
2 were nine conversations, all in all. And you
3 recognised your voice in five of these conversations,
4 and they are one, two, three, eight, and nine. And you
5 put your signature, as I asked you, to each one of
6 these conversations. Is that so?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. A photocopy of this transcript, in the
9 Bosniak language, has been submitted to the Chamber,
10 together with the signature of the witness. It is
11 D65/1, and it was submitted to you.
12 JUDGE MAY: It should be added to the exhibit
13 which we already have. And I'll be reminded of the
14 number. I think -- was it 65/2? That document which
15 the witness has signed, if you would hand it in now,
16 can be marked D65/2.A. If you'll hand it in, unless
17 there is something you want to ask about it.
18 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have two
19 questions regarding these conversations, but not as to
20 the document as such.
21 JUDGE MAY: Let the document go in.
22 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] The copy
23 in question is the one which was handed to us by the
24 Defence a moment ago. We do not have any other.
25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kalco, is that your signature
1 on the document?
2 A. It is.
3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Hand it in now,
4 please, to the Registry, and it can be marked.
5 Is there any difficulty about marking it
7 THE REGISTRAR: The transcript was marked
8 D65/A.2. Maybe mark this one D65/B.2.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's get it marked -- no,
10 don't hand it to the witness. Hand it to the Registry,
12 Now, Mr. Kovacic, what point can you be made
13 to make?
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, microphone for
15 Mr. Kovacic.
16 MR. KOVACIC: I just wanted to point out,
17 since it was not really standard procedure, but we do
18 accept the discussion -- the taped discussion under
19 number 4 was recognised by the witness during his
20 cross-examination, so he either did not recognise that
21 when going through those materials or he changed his
23 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
24 MR. KOVACIC: That is the one, if I may
25 remind, where I put the questions about restaurants.
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well.
2 Yes, Mr. Lopez-Terres.
3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Kalco, the conversations which were shown
5 to you this morning, could you tell us, what were the
6 telephone lines on which they could have been recorded?
7 A. PTT telephones, regular PTT telephones,
8 because the post office was held by the HVO and they
9 probably recorded all of it. Well, of course they
10 recorded it. I'm sure that even now they have my own
11 telephone bugged at home.
12 Q. And these conversations, there were nine of
13 them, and you recognised five of them. Do you have any
14 idea as to when they were taped? Was it over a long
15 period of time or was it much shorter?
16 A. It was mostly the second half of 1992 and
17 until the conflict in 1993. There were probably other
18 conversations as well, but they are not here.
19 Q. And the telephone lines was the line that you
20 used from your office, that is, from the headquarters
21 of the Territorial Defence; is that so?
22 A. Precisely. We had that telephone line, and
23 we also had a radio link with the units that were on
24 the ground.
25 Q. Thank you. This is all regarding telephone
2 Yesterday, Mr. Kovacic asked you some
3 questions about BH army soldiers who were going to the
4 front against the Serbs, and it is this subject that I
5 should like to address now. The BH army soldiers, at
6 the time that we are referring to, that is, in '92/'93,
7 did they all -- did each one of them have a weapon?
8 A. Well, let me tell you. When we ended our
9 conflicts with the HVO, we had 70 per cent of weapons,
10 and when we finished the war with the Serbs in Bosnia
11 and Herzegovina, we had armed the entire army, at least
12 we in Vitez, because we did not have any weapons.
13 Q. In other words, as the soldiers were coming
14 back on a leave, on a week leave, as you said, did they
15 bring their weapons back home with them?
16 A. I think that only officers brought their
17 weapons home, their rifles, and the soldiers who had
18 their own pistols. All other weapons remained at the
19 front line for the shift that was taking over the front
21 Q. To your knowledge, Mr. Kalco, how many
22 soldiers from the Vitez municipality, and especially
23 the Vitez Brigade, were deployed on the front against
24 Serbs in April 1993?
25 A. I think one detachment, 100 to 200 men from
1 Vitez; up to 200 men, not more.
2 Q. In April 1993; we agree on that?
3 A. In April.
4 Q. Do you know where they were deployed? I'm
5 referring to the Vitez Brigade.
6 A. Probably at Vlasic, in the Turbe/Vlasic area,
7 over there. I don't know that they were anywhere else.
8 Q. To your knowledge, did those soldiers come
9 back to Vitez prior to the 16th of April, or in the
10 days following the 16th of April, or did they stay at
11 the Serb front?
12 A. They returned before the conflict, before the
13 16th of April, 1993.
14 Q. If I understand you, the 16th of April, 1993,
15 on that day there were no more Vitez soldiers or
16 soldiers from the Vitez Brigade on the Serb front any
18 A. No, no.
19 Q. Yesterday, Mr. Kovacic also mentioned various
20 units which were in the Vitez municipality, and he
21 asked several questions about the military police. Was
22 there a military police unit within the Vitez Brigade?
23 A. Every brigade had its own platoon of the
24 military police. It consisted of at least 30 men and
25 perhaps even more.
1 Q. And who was the commander of the military
2 police unit in the brigade?
3 A. The commander of the brigade. He had a
4 commander of this military police unit, but he was the
5 commander of all units within his brigade.
6 Q. In other words, Mr. Mario Cerkez was the
7 superior officer of the military police unit which was
8 part of his brigade?
9 A. Absolutely.
10 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I think that that
11 was not the issue on the direct, that we are entering a
12 new area.
13 JUDGE MAY: Let's keep moving.
14 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
15 Q. On the 18th of April, that was the day of the
16 car bomb explosion. You confirmed today that it was,
17 indeed, the 18th of April. After the explosion, you
18 said that it was followed by an infantry attack?
19 A. Yes. There was an attack coming from all
20 sides, from the eastern side, from the new part of
21 Vitez, from the garages, from Princip, from the church,
22 across the Lasva River from the Rajic/Bilic houses;
23 that is to say, an all-out attack coming from all sides
24 of Vitez.
25 Q. And this attack practically came on top of
1 the car bomb explosion, did it?
2 A. Precisely. That is when people were so
3 frightened, they didn't know what was going on. That's
4 when the infantry attack started, along with artillery
6 Q. In view of the scope of the attack, the
7 Vitezovi could not have launched it by themselves
9 A. I think had they had five times as many men
10 as they did have, they could not have done it on their
11 own. There had to be other units involved as well.
12 May I mention another thing in this context
13 to the Court. If one looks at the entire conflict or,
14 rather, the encirclement of Vitez, there were these
15 so-called improvised bombs. We called them babies.
16 They were made of weapons that were highly
17 destructive. They were filled with iron scraps and
18 then concrete too. So after they would explode,
19 soldiers or the population in general would be wounded
20 terribly, all of those who would be injured by this.
21 Q. You also spoke of the second attack on the
22 18th of July, 1993, on Stari Vitez, when there were at
23 least 27 dead on the HVO side, and this also was a
24 coordinated attack, that is, different forces of the
25 HVO in Vitez, including those of the brigade?
1 A. Precisely. From Princip, the Vitezovi; from
2 the garages --
3 Q. You don't have to go into details. I only
4 wanted you to confirm it.
5 Mr. Borislav Josic, who took over 12 bodies,
6 also came from the Vitez Brigade, didn't he?
7 A. Yes, yes. He was an officer, and he took
8 over the dead HVO soldiers from me.
9 Q. And as for Miroslav Bralo, he was also
10 mentioned before, this morning he was shown documents
11 according to which he had been taken into custody and
12 detained, at least for a while. To your knowledge, was
13 Mr. Bralo ever brought to court and did he receive a
14 sentence for the murder of Mr. Salkic?
15 A. There was no trial, because he would be
16 detained and then he would be released, and I abide by
17 the statement I made yesterday and today. I don't want
18 to repeat it, once again.
19 Q. As to the documents that were shown to you
20 this morning, you noted that Mr. Bralo was indicated as
21 the person appearing in the military registry of the
22 municipal headquarters in Vitez. Did you say that?
23 A. Right. That's right. You are right.
24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lopez-Terres, I think we must
25 bring this examination to an end. This witness has
1 been giving evidence for more than a day.
2 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] There was
3 a new document that was adduced this morning,
4 Mr. President. I thought we should go through that,
5 but I shall turn to some other points.
6 Q. Mr. Sayers also asked you some questions this
7 morning and in this regard. You were asked as to the
8 date when the meeting at the post office took place.
9 And was it the 19th or the 20th of October? And you
10 said that the attack on Ahmici had taken place in the
11 morning of the 20th of October, and that the meeting at
12 the post office preceded it. So it must have been the
13 19th of October, in the evening?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You were shown a document, which was Colonel
16 Blaskic's order on the 16th of January 1993, and that
17 was 811, and it said that Ludvig Pavlovic -- I think
18 you were shown this morning. You were shown the
19 document this morning. It is of the 16th of January
20 1993. Colonel Blaskic issues orders to this brigade
21 saying that it is -- which means that it was still in
22 Vitez, on the 16th of January 1993, and this brigade
23 was still in Vitez.
24 A. I think that at that point in time it was
25 leaving Vitez, in January. In January 1993. I don't
1 know the exact date.
2 Q. But you recognise that that unit could still
3 have been in the region of Vitez on the 16th of January
5 A. Yes. Yes.
6 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have no
7 more questions, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kalco, that concludes your
9 evidence, and you are free to go. Thank you for coming
10 to the International Tribunal to give your evidence.
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you too, sir.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
13 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President. Very
14 briefly, if I might just hand up to the Trial Chamber
15 some documents that were delivered to us today. They
16 concern Witness AO, a witness who testified, I believe,
17 yesterday and the day before.
18 MR. NICE: Probably better at this stage if I
19 can interrupt, to deal with this in private session at
20 this stage, I would have thought.
21 MR. SAYERS: It can certainly be dealt with
22 in private session.
23 JUDGE MAY: Before we go into private
24 session, is this a matter which has to be dealt with
25 now, or can it be dealt with when we at least finish
1 the next witness, who needs to get away?
2 MR. SAYERS: Yes, it can be dealt with after
3 that, sir.
4 JUDGE MAY: We'll see what this is and
5 consider that then. Let's call the witness.
6 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, with respect to
7 this next witness, we received an offer of proof late
8 last night, and without prejudice to our position that
9 generally this isn't the right thing to do, we would
10 not be adverse to having the witness statement taken as
11 read, in the interests of saving time.
12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Kovacic, are you
13 involved in this witness?
14 MR. KOVACIC: No, we don't have objection,
15 Your Honour.
16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I am grateful for
17 that. And I will confine myself, I think, to three
18 topics, which I'll ask for some clarification.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. As far as timing is
20 concerned, we started this session rather later than
21 normal, so we'll go on till 12.40. We'll adjourn for
22 lunch until ten minutes past 2.00.
23 [The witness entered court]
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the
1 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
2 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
4 THE REGISTRAR: If you would like to take a
6 WITNESS: GUY DE VERE WINGFIELD HAYES
7 Examined by Mr. Nice:
8 Q. Brigadier Hayes, you have signed a summary of
9 your evidence, I think, prepared over the last day or
10 so; is that correct?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. And do you sign it on the basis that it's an
13 accurate account of evidence that you could give?
14 A. I do.
15 Q. That summary sets out your involvement in
16 affairs into which we are inquiring, starting on the
17 6th of April of 1993, when you went to Kiseljak?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The 11th of April, when there was the attack
20 on Srebrenica?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Followed by the incident at Ahmici, which
23 perhaps changed the focus of attention, and led to your
24 making one or two trips in that area. Is that correct?
25 A. That is correct.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could a pause be made,
2 please, between question and answer.
3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, the interpreters are
4 asking you to pause.
5 MR. NICE: My apologies to the interpreters.
6 Q. Just deal briefly, please, if you may, with
7 the 8th of May joint statement by Mladic and Halilovic
8 about the ceasefire. Just in a sentence or so, what
9 was the effect of all of that?
10 A. This was a meeting in the airport at Sarajevo
11 where a Bosnia-wide ceasefire was signed between
12 General Mladic and General Halilovic, a bilateral
13 ceasefire. The result of that was an increase in
14 fighting in Central Bosnia and particularly in Mostar.
15 And it was the perception of the headquarters that I
16 worked in that the Croats perceive the possibility of
17 some modified peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a
18 result of which they were intent on seizing as much
19 land as they could get. Any ceasefire at that time
20 froze the front lines where they were, and
21 consequently, if you were not in possession of a
22 certain piece of ground, you would lose it.
23 Q. A brief comment on paragraph 10, the mixed
24 military working group meeting on the 9th of June. And
25 just explain what the role or the relationship was
1 between Petkovic and Siber, and why?
2 A. On the 9th of June, we had a mixed military
3 working group meeting in Kiseljak at the United Nations
4 headquarters there. General Petkovic was representing
5 the HVO as the commander in chief, Colonel Siber, or
6 Mr. Siber, was representing the Bosnian army. General
7 Petkovic refused to negotiate with Mr. Siber, on the
8 grounds that it was not a Bosnian army, and Siber,
9 therefore as a Croat, could not represent that army.
10 It was, in General Petkovic's eyes, a Muslim army.
11 This was not unusual. The same attitude
12 would quite often be taken by the Serbs if Colonel
13 Divjak represented the Bosnian army.
14 The result of it was that the negotiations
15 could not be held, and we had to delay until General
16 Delic came from Sarajevo to represent the Bosnian
18 Q. I want you now, please, to just give us a
19 summary of your involvement in the Convoy of Joy, so
20 far as in particular it involved the defendant, Dario
21 Kordic, your judgement of his involvement in that, and
22 also Anto Valenta.
23 A. When General Delic arrived in Kiseljak, the
24 meeting took place between Petkovic and himself, with
25 the aim of establishing a bilateral ceasefire between
1 the Croats and the Muslims, to build on the ceasefire
2 that had been agreed between Serbs and Muslims on the
3 8th of May. We had heard about the Convoy of Joy; a
4 convoy organised by a Muslim from Tuzla to bring
5 supplies from the coast up to Tuzla, that were needed
6 in the Tuzla enclave.
7 General Petkovic undertook to try to secure
8 the safe passage of the convoy through Vitez. We
9 believed that there could be some trouble at Vitez. He
10 contacted the HVO in Vitez by using HVO communications
11 from their own headquarters in Kiseljak, but was unable
12 to secure the safe passage of the convoy.
13 He asked if United Nations could escort the
14 convoy, but it was explained to him that as it was not
15 an UNHCR sponsored convoy, we were not able to do so.
16 He left Kiseljak to go to Mostar at the end
17 of the meeting, and undertook to go personally to Vitez
18 to try and secure the safe passage of the convoy. He
19 failed to do this. And my opinion was that although he
20 was the commander-in-chief of the HVO, his authority
21 within the Vitez pocket was somewhat limited.
22 Shortly after this, we heard that the convoy
23 had in fact been attacked, some drivers had been
24 killed, some vehicles had been hijacked, and the rest
25 of the convoy had been scattered.
1 The British Battalion in Vitez was trying to
2 gather the remains of the convoy together into a quarry
3 where they could guard them, and then escort them out
4 of the pocket. In view of what had happened, this
5 seemed to be the only sensible course of action, which
6 would avoid any further loss of life.
7 I decided that I would go to Vitez to see the
8 situation for myself. I travelled there, and on
9 arrival, I was briefed by the British Battalion on the
10 situation. During this briefing, the Muslim who had
11 organised and was leading the convoy was brought into
12 the British camp, and I had a chance to speak to him.
13 He was a man on the verge of a breakdown. It was clear
14 to me that he had been extremely shocked by what had
15 happened to the convoy, and that it had been totally
16 unexpected. He was very distressed. He was very
18 I went out onto the ground to see the
19 situation for myself, and at the eastern end of the
20 Vitez pocket I came across a series of vehicles that
21 were being hijacked by uniformed Croats, HVO and
23 At some point during this time, I met with
24 Ambassador Thebault. Nobody on the ground, on the
25 Croat side, appeared to be making any attempt to stop
1 the hijacking. I asked who had the authority to
2 prevent this sort of action, and I was directed to
3 Dario Kordic. After about an hour, we found Dario
4 Kordic in a wood yard, which is to the west end of the
5 pocket. Ambassador Thebault and I spoke to him. We
6 complained about what had happened to the convoy, and
7 that the -- it had been attacked and that vehicles had
8 been looted, and were still being looted.
9 Kordic said that he was doing his very best
10 to gather the convoy together, that he had about 80
11 vehicles that he needed to collect. In fact, I think
12 eventually about 40 vehicles were retrieved from the
14 Despite what he was saying, I got the
15 impression that he was not being entirely truthful, and
16 that he was not actually doing his best to stop the
17 looting or collect the convoy remnants together,
18 despite the fact that he very clearly did have
19 authority within the pocket and, in my opinion, it was
20 within his gift to have stopped the looting and
21 collected the convoy together.
22 We went back out onto the ground to go to the
23 quarry where the vehicles were being gathered under the
24 guard of the British Battalion. Anto Valenta was
25 leading us to this quarry. On the way, we passed a
1 line of vehicles which were quite clearly from the
2 convoy. They were being looted by HVO soldiers. In my
3 opinion, it would have been impossible for Mr. Valenta
4 not to have seen what was happening, but he chose not
5 to stop. Rather, he ignored it and carried on.
6 Ambassador Thebault and myself stopped. We managed to
7 prevent the looting, but unfortunately there were no
8 more Muslim drivers who could collect the vehicles and
9 take them to the quarry. We continued on to the
10 quarry. We saw the situation there.
11 And towards the end of that day, we again saw
12 Dario Kordic and again complained about what was
13 happening on the ground. Once more, he assured us that
14 he was doing his best to collect the convoy together,
15 but once more I was less than reassured that he was
16 actually doing his best. I felt that his attitude and
17 the attitude of the HVO in the Vitez pocket was one of
18 indifference to the convoy, to the individuals, to the
19 hijacking of the vehicles, and to the looting that was
20 going on.
21 Q. Just three matters of detail. So far as
22 Petkovic is concerned, did you think his efforts were
24 A. I did.
25 Q. And should a general at that level have been
1 in a position to have control over people at the level
2 of the Vitez pocket?
3 A. Certainly, as commander-in-chief of the HVO,
4 he should have been able to have authority over the HVO
5 in the Vitez pocket. They should have reacted to the
6 orders and instructions that he gave them. And I have
7 no doubt that he was genuinely trying to secure the
8 safe passage of the convoy.
9 Q. In your talks with Kordic, did he identify
10 anyone as superior, as subordinate, or collateral to
11 him who had either been responsible for stopping the
12 convoy or who would have had authority and power to
13 release it?
14 A. He did not.
15 Q. Was the occasion when you went there with
16 Valenta in broad daylight?
17 A. It was. It would have been at about 2000.
18 It did not get dark until 2200 at that time of year in
19 Central Bosnia.
20 Q. Two other things.
21 Paragraph 18. On the 19th of June of 1993,
22 were there some Muslim families, who were close to the
23 U.N. camp in Kiseljak, who were evicted?
24 A. There were. There was a certain amount of
25 intimidation of Muslim families in the town of Kiseljak
1 going on at the time. This family came from houses
2 that were opposite the camp, very close by. It was a
3 group of women, children, and at least one youth.
4 Numbers were in the region of ten, I believe. We
5 admitted them to the camp because they were too
6 frightened to return to their homes. They stayed in
7 the medical centre, where we accommodated them.
8 Vinko Lucic, who was the HVO-UNPROFOR liaison
9 officer in Kiseljak, whom we knew quite well, came to
10 speak to them to try to persuade them to return to
11 their homes, but they refused to go. They were too
12 frightened. We subsequently transported them to
14 Q. Finally, on your summary and on the question
15 of linkage, can you tell us just a little about the
16 Muslim hospital and the incident there in August and
17 September of 1993?
18 A. Towards the end of August and beginning of
19 September, General Briquemont, as commander of the
20 UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, was attempting to negotiate
21 further ceasefires in the evacuation of wounded
22 civilians from certain locations.
23 I was in East Mostar at the time. I visited
24 the Muslim hospital that was there, and having seen the
25 conditions, I went to the HVO headquarters on the west
1 bank to try to negotiate the evacuation of the wounded
2 from this hospital. The evacuation was refused on the
3 grounds that in Nova Bila, in another hospital, Croat
4 wounded were not being allowed to be evacuated by the
5 Muslims. We were told that once the Nova Bila wounded
6 had been evacuated, then the Muslim wounded from the
7 east bank could be evacuated.
8 We achieved the evacuation of the wounded
9 from Nova Bila and the evacuation of the wounded from
10 the hospital on the east bank of the river in Mostar
11 was also partially successful.
12 There was clear linkage between the two, but
13 again at this time this was not an unusual situation.
14 Q. A linkage between two different parts of
15 Bosnia; is that right?
16 A. Right, a linkage between what was happening
17 in Mostar and what was happening in Central Bosnia
18 around the area of Vitez.
19 MR. NICE: May the signed summary become
20 Exhibit 2815, please. Two exhibits, both distributed
21 to Defence and also to the Chamber. But one needs to
22 be replaced, because a missing page has now been
23 inserted. So first 1097.1, which is the replacement
25 MR. SAYERS: Let me just register an
1 objection to these documents Your Honour, in
2 principle. They have not been delivered to us by the
3 January the 20th deadline that this Court imposed, and
4 I have not seen the third page to which counsel refers,
5 and so we object.
6 JUDGE MAY: Let the Defence have the new
8 MR. NICE: Here they are. Sorry.
9 I can now turn to --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please,
12 Mr. Nice.
13 JUDGE MAY: Microphone.
14 MR. NICE: Thank you.
15 Q. If I can turn to Exhibit 1097.1, you're not
16 named on this document, but this comes from your
18 A. Yes, it does. It comes from Mr. Viktor
19 Andreev, who is the head of civil affairs. I'm sorry,
20 it comes from Albert Benabou, who was the civil affairs
21 representative in Mostar, to Viktor Andreev. I am, in
22 fact, named on the one that I'm looking at, Brigadier
23 Hayes, chief of staff.
24 Q. Thank you. And the only passage I want you
25 to deal with on this particular document is at the
1 first substantive page after the cover sheet,
2 Mr. Boban's declared positions, where it reads that:
3 "The Vance-Owen Plan is subject to
4 modifications, and those changes must be acceptable to
5 the Croats.
6 "Relations with Mr. Izetbegovic.
7 Izetbegovic must give up the idea of a Muslim state.
8 In the field, there is another reality.
9 "I will never agree to the establishment of
10 a Muslim state," emphasised Mr. Boban.
11 "Fikret Abdic, a Muslim member of the
12 presidency, is considered, according to Mr. Boban's
13 advisors, capable of naming someone who will replace
15 And then over the page:
16 "Alija Izetbegovic is my enemy. His
17 declarations in Ankara, Madrid, Paris, and London are
18 against the peace process," specified Mr. Boban.
19 Does that match the sentiments being
20 expressed more generally at the time on your
22 A. It does. I should perhaps point out that I
23 was looking just now at the wrong document. I
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. My name does not appear on this particular
2 document, but it did go to the headquarters, and I
3 would have seen it. Yes, it does.
4 And as regards the relations with the
5 UNPROFOR paragraph, it would be incorrect to say that,
6 as is stated there, the Croats were the only ones to
7 accept the presence of UNPROFOR. The Muslims had -- or
8 the Bosnians had UNPROFOR stationed. Visoko was an
9 area within their control, and of course Sarajevo
10 itself was an area within their control, so we were
11 stationed on territory which they controlled.
12 Q. The second document I want you to look at is
13 provided necessarily in its complete form, 1145.3, but
14 I want it for one sentence of one of its attachments.
15 But it has to come to you in its complete form.
16 The document, dated the 18th of July, does
17 have your name on it, and if we go in four pages, we
18 come to a very poorly-photocopied, just-readable
19 document from Pogarcic. Have you found that document?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And in the middle of this letter, which is
22 itself in English, do we see a reference to the milk or
23 the milk convoy; is that right?
24 A. Yes, powdered milk for the children of
1 Q. And we see here that the president of the
2 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, it must be
3 Mr. Boban, has instructed all HVO commanders that upon
4 something -- and it goes on. So here is reflected, in
5 this letter, an instruction from the president, Boban,
6 down to the HVO commanders at a local level. Would
7 that be something that you might expect or not expect?
8 A. One would normally expect such direction to
9 go to the commander-in-chief and then be passed on down
10 the military chain of command to the commanders in the
11 field. It's slightly unusual for it to be passed
12 direct, in this manner, to the commanders at a lower
13 level. It perhaps indicates that the
14 commander-in-chief did not exercise complete authority
15 in the manner which one would expect.
16 Q. And, indeed, in the manner which you didn't
17 find in Petkovic when he tried to exercise authority in
18 relation to the Convoy of Joy?
19 A. Correct.
20 MR. NICE: Thank you. That's all.
21 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
22 Q. Brigadier, good afternoon. My name is
23 Stephen Sayers. Together with my colleague,
24 Mr. Naumovski, we represent Mr. Kordic.
25 I understand that you have to be out of here
1 by 4.00 today, and we will make sure that that
3 The first question: With respect to Exhibit
4 Z1145.3 about which you've just spoken, have you ever
5 spoken to Mr. Pogarcic about this document or about the
6 document that is contained in this exhibit?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Have you ever spoken to Mr. Pogarcic at all?
9 A. Not as far as I know.
10 Q. Did such orders ever go out, as apparently
11 Mr. Pogarcic relates in his 16th of July 1993 letter?
12 A. I can only say if he instructed it. I
13 surmised he did. I could not state categorically that
14 I knew such orders had been passed.
15 Q. It remains in the realm of surmise?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Have you ever spoken directly to Mr. Boban?
18 A. No.
19 Q. All right, sir. You met with the
20 investigators who worked for the Prosecution and gave
21 them a statement over a three-day period in November of
22 1996; correct?
23 A. I did.
24 Q. And in that statement you referred to a
25 diary. Did you maintain this diary contemporaneously?
1 A. I did.
2 Q. Have you reviewed the diary in preparation
3 for your testimony today?
4 A. No, I haven't, because it is in storage in
5 the United Kingdom. I am actually posted in Africa at
6 the moment.
7 Q. Very well. Now, before you took up your
8 position in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you did not receive any
9 specific training, did you?
10 A. I did not.
11 Q. You just took a media course at the senior
12 staff college, I believe?
13 A. That's correct. But I have had a
14 considerable amount of training before that, having
15 completed both the army staff college, the higher
16 commanding staff course, and something called the Royal
17 College of Defence studies, which is a year long
19 Q. Absolutely, Brigadier. Please forgive the
20 halting delivery, but since we speak virtually the same
21 language, the interpreters often are challenged, and we
22 can create some serious problems if we overlap. So I'd
23 appreciate it if you'd just have a small delay after
24 each of my questions, and I'll try to do the same,
25 after --
1 A. I apologise. I should have learnt, after six
2 and a half months in Bosnia.
3 Q. Would it be fair to say, sir, that before you
4 went to Bosnia-Herzegovina, you knew very little about
5 the country or, indeed, about the former Yugoslavia?
6 A. That would be correct.
7 Q. All right. And I believe, sir, that you
8 received some briefings from the Ministry of Defence
9 before you took up your duties regarding the British
10 military perspective on Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that
11 fair to say?
12 A. Yes. They were in the form really of
13 documentation that I was required to read.
14 Q. But it would be accurate, wouldn't it, to say
15 that you actually received no formal briefing from any
16 United Nations organisation in connection with the
17 duties that you assumed as the second in command of
18 UNPROFOR in Kiseljak?
19 A. That would be correct, but I was not second
20 in command. I was the chief of staff. There was a
21 commander, there was a deputy commander, and then there
22 was the chief of staff. The chief of staff's
23 responsibility is to run the headquarters.
24 Q. All right. So you were number three in the
25 chain of command, if you like? Would that be fair to
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And without dwelling on that, I take it your
4 immediate predecessor was Brigadier Cordy-Simpson?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Now, I believe that you made a short
7 reconnaissance visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina just for
8 informational purposes in mid-March of 1993?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. And took up your position of chief of staff
11 to the United Nations command or of the United Nations
12 command on April the 6th of 1993?
13 A. I think I arrived in Kiseljak on the 7th.
14 Q. All right. And just so that we all
15 understand your tour of duty, I believe that you handed
16 over to your successor --
17 A. Brigadier Ramsey.
18 Q. -- Brigadier Ramsey, on the 13th of October?
19 A. 13th or 14th, yes.
20 Q. All right. Now, you dealt primarily with
21 military matters, I take it, sir, and you had in your
22 office, or within your headquarters, a civil affairs
23 office that was headed by a career diplomat,
24 Mr. Andreev; is that right?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. What you tried to do was to complement each
2 other's functions, depending upon whether the
3 particular issue at hand was military or civil?
4 A. We were always talking to each other to make
5 certain that whatever we were doing was -- there was a
6 synergy between us.
7 Q. All right. And I believe -- just two or
8 three days after your arrival, you had the opportunity
9 to meet with President Izetbegovic; correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And discuss three things, I believe:
12 Necessary repairs to the sanitary system in Sarajevo;
13 unauthorised crossings into Sarajevo airport, in
14 violation of agreements relating to the airport; and
15 thirdly, your request to President Izetbegovic to allow
16 ethnic Bosnian Serb residents residing in the city of
17 Tuzla to be able to leave and travel to a Serbian
18 enclave, Zvornik, if they wished to; is that right?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. And despite, ostensibly, agreement on all
21 three issues, you noticed very little progress on any
22 of these issues throughout your six month tour in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that right?
24 A. That's correct.
25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, when you come to a
1 suitable moment.
2 MR. SAYERS: This would be a convenient
3 moment, Your Honour. Just for the Trial Chamber's
4 information, in the interests of expediency, I've
5 prepared a binder of exhibits that I intend to use with
6 Brigadier Hayes. And for everybody's easy reference,
7 I've actually highlighted the points which I want to
8 refer to, so we don't have to flip through papers. And
9 I'd like to distribute those just at the beginning of
10 the session this afternoon.
11 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
12 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
13 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, would you be back,
14 please, at ten past 2.00, when we will continue your
16 I must warn you not to speak to anybody about
17 your evidence, until it's over, and don't let anybody
18 speak to you, please. Thank you. Ten past 2.00.
19 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.40 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 2.13 p.m.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
3 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President, and
4 good afternoon, Brigadier Hayes.
5 Q. Before we broke for lunch, I was just about
6 to turn to the question of the Vance-Owen Plan, about
7 which you made some comments in the statement that's
8 been identified as your evidence today, and I believe
9 that you said, sir, on page 3 of your statement, that
10 on April the 15th, 1993, which was the day before the
11 fighting broke out in the Lasva Valley, your
12 headquarters started work on the military aspects of
13 the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan. Is that
15 A. That's correct. We were doing contingency
17 Q. I wonder if you could just tell us and the
18 Trial Chamber exactly what it was that you were doing
19 in connection with preparing for the military aspects
20 of the implementation of this plan, sir.
21 A. The plan involved certain -- well, the
22 division of the country, and there was some areas of
23 mixed population which were going to different ethnic
24 groups. And it was in those areas that we believed
25 there would be a requirement for a U.N. presence to
1 ensure that there was no violence. That's what we were
2 looking at, and we were assessing the strength that we
3 had against the requirement that might come up if the
4 Vance-Owen Plan was implemented.
5 Q. Was it your view, sir, as a high-ranking
6 officer in UNPROFOR, that the Vance-Owen Plan actually
7 called for the ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 and for those divisions to be essentially homogeneous
9 areas; ethnically, that is?
10 A. I don't think so. As I remember, there were
11 areas which were still mixed which were to be passed or
12 were to fall under the jurisdiction of either Serbs or
13 Croats or Bosnian. I had no perception of there being
14 what might amount to an ethnic division of the country.
15 Q. Would it be fair to say that you did not pay
16 a great deal of attention to the political details of
17 the Vance-Owen Plan and the way in which political
18 power was to be distributed and shared in each of the
20 A. That would be correct.
21 Q. In that case, there's not a lot of sense in
22 taking up too much time on this subject, other than to
23 say the following thing, sir.
24 Your primary focus at this time, in the
25 middle of April of 1993, and very understandably, was
1 upon the terrible situation that was occurring in
2 Srebrenica; correct?
3 A. That is correct. That was the focus of the
4 United Nations Security Council at the time, and the
5 resolutions that they were passing obviously required
6 work from us for them to be implemented.
7 Q. Yes, sir. And on April the 16th, when the
8 fighting in the Lasva Valley broke out, your attention
9 was consumed, if you like, with negotiations between
10 Mr. Radavan Karadzic, on the one hand, and Ratko Mladic
11 on the other and -- well, actually between those two;
12 isn't that correct?
13 A. Well, they weren't negotiating between
14 themselves, no. My attention was focused on
15 discussions at Sarajevo Airport between
16 General Halilovic of the Bosnian army and
17 General Mladic to get a ceasefire around the Srebrenica
18 area, as was called for in United Nations Security
19 Council Resolution 819, I think it was.
20 And subsequently to that and once that
21 ceasefire had been agreed, I was directed by General
22 Volgren and General Morillon to work out the details of
23 it to ensure that humanitarian aid was allowed through
24 to Srebrenica, and a U.N. presence was established
1 Q. So there were active negotiations under way
2 is what you're saying, I believe, between General
3 Halilovic, on the one hand, the commander of the ABiH,
4 and General Mladic, the commander of the BSA. Is that
6 A. That was the high-level negotiation. Later
7 on, both those commanders-in-chief delegated
8 responsibilities for negotiations to -- General Mladic
9 delegated it to General Gvero, and General Halilovic
10 delegated it to Mr. Siber, Colonel Siber.
11 Q. One matter of detail concerning the
12 Vance-Owen Plan, and then I'll move on to another
14 It's true, is it not, as far as you
15 understand it, that Mr. Karadzic signed the plan on May
16 the 2nd on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, but it was
17 subject to ratification by the Bosnian Serb assembly or
18 parliament in Pale?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. And I believe, sir, that the plan was
21 rejected by that body on May the 6th of 1993.
22 A. I cannot remember the exact date, but it was
23 rejected by them, correct.
24 Q. All right. Let me turn to the fighting that
25 occurred in April, sir, and the negotiations that led
1 to a ceasefire.
2 We know that fighting broke out on April the
3 16th, and we also know that a ceasefire agreement was
4 negotiated at high level about four days later between
5 General Morillon, Ambassador Jean-Pierre Thebault,
6 Generals Halilovic and Petkovic, and also
7 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart from BritBat was there, and
8 this ceasefire agreement was negotiated in Zenica. Do
9 you know anything about that ceasefire agreement?
10 A. I'm afraid I don't. I was not involved in
11 those negotiations.
12 Q. All right. You were asked some questions
13 during your brief direct examination here today
14 concerning the chain of command and the way in which
15 orders filtered down from the supreme commander of the
16 HVO, who was Mate Boban, to subordinate military
17 commanders. Let me ask you -- let me ask to have
18 distributed the booklet of exhibits that I have put
19 together and, for the Court's information, these have
20 already been distributed both to the Prosecution and to
21 the co-defendant and to the interpreters, Your Honour.
22 I wonder if we could have this marked as a
23 collective exhibit. It has separate tab numbers.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Document marked D201/1.
25 MR. SAYERS:
1 Q. Brigadier, just for your information, this is
2 an assembly of ten exhibits in total, and I have
3 highlighted the portions which I want to draw your
4 attention to. If you would just turn to Tab 1 on pages
5 3 and 4 of that tab. This tab is a milinfosum number
6 170 from the 1st Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment,
7 dated April 18, 1993. And attached to this milinfosum
8 is an agreement reached between President Izetbegovic
9 and Mate Boban for a ceasefire on April the 18th,
10 1993. Have you seen this document before?
11 A. Not that I can recall.
12 Q. All right. I wonder if I could just ask the
13 usher to place two previously marked exhibits on the
14 ELMO, and this subject need not detain us for very
15 long, sir.
16 The first document, sir, has already been
17 marked D84/1, and it is a copy of an order signed on
18 the same day as the ceasefire agreement negotiated at
19 the very highest level, signed by Brigadier Milivoj
20 Petkovic, and carrying into force the four points that
21 were agreed upon by President Izetbegovic and President
23 Now, speaking from your perspective as a
24 military man, this is the way that you would normally
25 expect the chain of command to work; the supreme
1 commander passes an order down, and then the commander
2 in chief of the armed forces distributes the order to
3 his subordinate operative zones; isn't that right?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. All right. And if you would look at the
6 second document, Brigadier, previously marked Exhibit
7 Z715. This is an order entered the same day, or issued
8 the same day by Colonel Blaskic, the commander of the
9 Central Bosnia operative zone, to the brigades and
10 forces under his command, and carrying into force the
11 order previously issued by Brigadier Petkovic, his
12 commanding officer, and by President Boban.
13 Once again, sir, would you agree that that's
14 the way that you would expect the chain of command to
16 A. I would.
17 Q. Thank you very much. That completes the
18 questions I have for that.
19 The next question, Brigadier, concerns the
20 mixed military working group about which you testified
21 today. Would it be fair to characterise the fixed
22 military working group as the only extant form, on a
23 formal basis, that existed for an ongoing dialogue
24 between the three warring factions in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian
1 Muslims, and the Bosnian Serbs?
2 A. Yes. But there were mixed military working
3 groups at all levels. The one that I used to attend
4 was the one at the highest levels, between the
5 commanders in chief, and if they delegated to their
6 immediate subordinates, then I would chair those
7 negotiations as well.
8 Q. And as I understand it, sir, for the Muslim
9 contingent, if I may characterise them that way,
10 General Halilovic initially was the highest -- was
11 initially the commander in chief of the ABiH, to be
12 replaced in the middle of June, I believe, or at the
13 beginning of June, June the 8th to be precise, by
14 General Rasim Delic; is that correct?
15 A. I believe General Halilovic was replaced
16 earlier than that, because it was General Delic who
17 came to Kiseljak as commander in chief to negotiate
18 with General Petkovic, when General Petkovic refused to
19 speak to Siber, and that was at the beginning of --
20 Q. Yes, you've already said that was May the
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Very well. But you would agree that General
24 Halilovic was replaced at some point in May by General
25 Rasim Delic, as the commander in chief?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Very well. And occasionally their deputy,
3 Colonel Siber, would negotiate in the mixed military
4 working group, if his immediate commanding officer was
5 not available; is that right?
6 A. Either Colonel Siber or Colonel Divjak.
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. One of those two.
9 Q. And for the Croats it was always General
10 Petkovic who was negotiating while you were present
11 with the mixed military working group, or his
12 subordinate, Colonel Lucic, from Mostar. Is that
13 right, as far as you can remember?
14 A. That is correct. Though on many occasions --
15 well, several occasions in Sarajevo, when we were
16 having meetings, it was the commander of the HVO
17 brigade in Sarajevo, whose name I cannot remember at
18 the moment. But he represented the Croats, and Colonel
19 Lucic was always on hand with him.
20 Q. All right. And for the Bosnian Serbs it was
21 General Ratko Mladic, who was the principal negotiator,
22 or his deputy, General Gvero; is that right?
23 A. That's correct. I did not negotiate in
24 Sarajevo Airport with anyone other than General Gvero,
25 though, on the ground I made several or had several
1 negotiations with General Milanovic, the Serbian chief
2 of staff.
3 Q. Now, it's true, is it not, that Mr. Kordic
4 never attended a single one of the mixed military
5 working group meetings that you attended?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. No one contended that his attendance was
8 essential, did they?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Or even necessary, important or helpful, for
11 that matter; is that right?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. All right. In fact, it would be fair to say
14 that his name did not crop up, as far as you can
15 remember, during the mixed military working group
16 meetings over which -- at which you were present; is
17 that right?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. All right. Now, you say, sir, at page 5 of
20 your statement, that at some point following the
21 concerns or your involvement with the Srebrenica
22 matters, you turned your attention to the fighting in
23 Central Bosnia, and that you received a briefing from
24 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart on the 26th of April. You
25 said that on page 5 of your statement.
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. All right. Basically, the subjects that you
3 were discussing, and the briefing that you were
4 receiving from your subordinate, was the question of
5 how UNPROFOR could react to dampen down the fighting
6 that was going on in that area; is that right?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. All right. And you both agreed that this was
9 difficult to do, because UNPROFOR had no mandate to
10 become involved in the fighting, one way or the other;
11 is that right?
12 A. That's correct. But by continuing to operate
13 framework operations, as we called them, and
14 establishing an U.N. presence in the area, it was
15 possible to deter attacks on civilians and also,
16 obviously, it helped to secure the area for the
17 delivery of humanitarian aid. But principally the
18 presence helped to deter attacks on civilians. But you
19 could not be everywhere at the same time, obviously.
20 Q. You would agree that the principal mission of
21 BritBat, anyway, was to facilitate UNHCR aid convoys,
22 the delivery of humanitarian aid to those people that
23 needed it?
24 A. That was the mandate as stated, but the
25 mandate was always being stretched.
1 Q. All right. Now, you were briefed, that the
2 military commander in the Vitez-Busovaca pocket was in
3 fact Colonel Tihomir Blaskic, the commander of the
4 Central Bosnia operative zone, under General Milivoj
5 Petkovic; isn't that correct?
6 A. I can remember Blaskic's name coming up. I
7 am sure that I knew he was a commander in the region,
8 but I honestly can't remember the exact detail of what
9 I was told.
10 Q. Perfectly understandable, sir. It was a long
11 time ago. Now, to the best of your recollection, the
12 name Dario Kordic did not arise during your briefing by
13 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, did it?
14 A. Not to the best of my knowledge.
15 Q. Very well. Now, you gave some testimony,
16 sir, surrounding a joint ceasefire agreement covering
17 all of Bosnia that was negotiated on May the 8th of
18 1993, between Generals Halilovic and Mladic. And I
19 believe that a joint statement was prepared and signed
20 by the two Generals and issued -- sort of announced in
21 front of TV cameras. Is that consistent with your
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And this agreement announced the arrival of a
25 ceasefire for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I take it?
1 A. That's correct. Between the Serbs and the
2 Muslims. And it was -- it was a bit of a surprise.
3 Q. And, frankly, it didn't come to pass, did
4 it? The Muslims and the Serbs did not cease fighting
5 from May the 8th onwards?
6 A. No ceasefire lasted a great length of time,
7 but that was one of the earliest ceasefires, and there
8 was certainly a great deal of hope attached to it, an
9 expectation that for once we might succeed.
10 Q. All right. Now, Brigadier, no criticism is
11 intended by this comment, but on page 8 of your
12 statement you said that on June the 8th Halilovic was
13 removed from his seat as commander in chief of the
14 Bosnian army and was replaced by General Delic. You
15 may have had a clearer recollection three years ago
16 than you do -- well, three-and-a-half years ago than
17 you do today. Is that consistent with your
19 A. I remember that General Halilovic had been
20 attending the negotiations. There was a dispute
21 between himself and President Izetbegovic about his
22 attendance at a meeting in Sarajevo. He refused to
23 attend the meeting. He was ordered to attend the
24 meeting. He had to get there in very quick time. He
25 was not able to take the Mount Igman route and pass
1 through the tunnel under the airport. We offered to
2 take him, under UNPROFOR escort. He was an extremely
3 frightened man, but he was ordered to attend by
4 President Izetbegovic, and he came with us. And I
5 believe that is when we negotiated the 8th of May
7 After that, General Halilovic was no longer
8 on the scene, and the next time that we had a
9 negotiation at commander in chief level, it was General
10 Delic who came along. And my understanding was that
11 General Halilovic had handed over command or, perhaps,
12 been removed from command of the Bosnian army, and
13 General Delic had taken over.
14 Q. Very well, sir. It's the timing of the
15 removal that is of interest to the Defence. And you
16 did say that it was around June the 8th of 1993. Let
17 me just suggest to you that one day after that,
18 actually, on that day, June the 8th, a major offensive
19 was launched by the ABiH in the area of Travnik, and
20 then one day later another major offensive was launched
21 against the HVO by the ABiH in the area of Kakanj.
22 Does that sound consistent with your recollection of
23 the course of the fighting, sir?
24 A. I remember that there were Bosnian offensives
25 taking place and the fighting there certainly did flare
1 up at about that time. I can remember there being
2 attacks in Travnik. I can remember there being attacks
3 in Kakanj.
4 Q. All right. Now, in your statement, on page 8
5 you refer to a meeting of the Joint Operations Centre
6 in Vitez on June the 6th of 1993. Is it your
7 understanding that this was a joint forum established
8 pursuant to the ceasefire agreement negotiated in
9 April, earlier in the year, for Muslims and Croats to
10 list their grievances and to resolve those grievances
11 without fighting?
12 A. On the 6th of June?
13 Q. Yes. Just to --
14 A. If you would.
15 Q. Yes. You just said, on page 8 of your
16 statement: "On the 6th of June --" and I appreciate
17 dates are difficult to remember so many years
18 afterwards, but you said in your statement:
19 "On the 6th of June, I attended a Joint
20 Operation Centre meeting at Vitez. The meeting,
21 attended by the Muslims and the Croats, was used to
22 list violations of the ceasefire or problems that they
23 were having with the other side."
24 Maybe you have no recollection of that.
25 A. I'm sorry, but at this stage I have no
1 recollection of that. I do remember, though, that
2 meetings that occurred at lower levels were quite often
3 used as a forum in which to put forward grievances.
4 The bones of contention were normally the recovery of
5 bodies or the evacuation and exchange of wounded.
6 Q. All right. Let me just ask you, sir, were
7 you aware that General Enver Hadzihasanovic, the
8 commander of the 3rd Corps, had, for several weeks
9 prior to the launching of the Travnik offensive and the
10 Kakanj offensive, been refusing to meet with his
11 counterpart, Colonel Blaskic, the commander of the
12 Central Bosnia Operative Zone, to negotiate an amicable
13 resolution of differences without open warfare?
14 A. I do have recollections of there being
15 difficulty in being able to establish meetings at that
16 level, yes. The exact details of it, I cannot
18 Q. If I could ask you to turn to Tab 2, sir, of
19 the documents. We'll go through these fairly quickly.
20 It's the last page that I'm interested in. There,
21 BritBat's intelligence officer makes the observation
23 "Our CO's continued attempts to talk
24 constructively with command at 3rd Corps have fallen on
25 deaf ears, and the command appears to be sidestepping
1 the issue."
2 This is a milinfosum from the 1st Battalion
3 of the Prince of Wales Own, number 43, dated the May
4 the 21st, 1993. Does that refresh your recollection a
5 little bit about the problems that were occurring in
6 trying to establish a constructive dialogue between the
7 ABiH commander and the HVO commander?
8 A. I can recall at the time that the ABiH had
9 the upper hand, and that having the upper hand, they
10 were reluctant to enter negotiations which would have
11 required a cessation of hostilities. They kept going
12 with their offensives. And my recollection of it is
13 that the HVO were getting quite desperate because they
14 were taking a bit of a beating from the BiH, and that
15 whilst they were very keen to have the negotiations and
16 to stop, the BiH, having the upper hand, were not happy
17 to let them off the ropes.
18 Q. All right. And we can travel through the
19 next few exhibits very quickly, sir.
20 At Tab 3 is a milinfosum from the very next
21 day, number 23, dated May the 22nd, 1993, and the
22 observation is made by BritBat that:
23 "Blaskic has been keen to attend meetings
24 that the commander of the 1PWO PWO," Lieutenant-Colonel
25 Duncan at that time, "had been trying to arrange."
1 And then the milinfosum goes on to say:
2 "But Hadzihasanovic has stated that while he
3 is personally happy to attend, he must first consult
4 with Halilovic, the comment being that it would appear
5 that the commander of the 3rd Corps is prevaricating
6 for some reason, as it is hard to believe that he is
7 unable to contact his next higher command."
8 Were you informed by Lieutenant-Colonel
9 Duncan that these difficulties in establishing a
10 constructive dialogue were occurring?
11 A. I was well aware that within the BiH, the
12 requirement to pass orders down the line was -- the
13 reason that orders were not passed down the line or
14 appeared to be ignored at levels was always put down to
15 the lack of communication that the BiH had, and that
16 from their headquarters in Sarajevo, it was not always
17 possible for them to reach their commanders on the
18 ground. Personally, I found that hard to believe.
19 Q. Very well, sir. Could you just turn to
20 Tab 4. This is another milinfosum four days later, as
21 June is approaching, milinfosum 27, where it's noted
22 that it has been Hadzihasanovic who has proved to be
23 unwilling to attend the meetings that the commanding
24 officer of BritBat was trying to put together.
25 I take it that you received copies of these
1 milinfosums, or extracts of them, on a fairly regular
3 A. All these milinfosums would have been passed
4 into the milinfo or the G2 cell at the headquarters.
5 They would have been consolidated, and a summary of
6 these milinfo summaries themselves would have been
7 passed around the headquarters. I would not have seen
8 each one of these individually unless there was
9 something of particular significance or particular
10 importance in them.
11 So I would have known about it, and it would
12 probably have been presented, in the daily morning
13 briefing that we had, in the summary of the milinfo
14 that was given out at those meetings. I was aware of
15 the difficulty, certainly.
16 Q. Thank you very much, Brigadier.
17 If I could ask you to turn to the next
18 milinfosum, number 5 -- Tab 5, rather, milinfosum 37,
19 dated June the 5th, 1993.
20 Before we cover what's on page 2, would you
21 agree that the offensive that was launched in Travnik
22 and Kakanj was an offensive that would have required
23 considerable advanced logistical preparation and
24 involved many thousands of troops?
25 A. I don't think necessarily it would have
1 involved considerable logistic preparation.
2 Very briefly, the situation, in a simplistic
3 way, was that the Serbs and, to a lesser extent, the
4 Croat military had heavy weapons and firepower,
5 artillery, tanks. The Muslim strength or the Bosnian
6 strength was in infantry. And in areas where firepower
7 could predominate on the -- could dominate the
8 battlefield, then Serbs and Croats always had the upper
9 hand. In areas where infantry could dominate the
10 battlefield, then the Muslims or the Bosnians would
11 have the upper hand. Consequently, urban areas were
12 the favoured area for the Bosnians to operate in, and
13 wooded areas. It doesn't take a great deal of logistic
14 preparation to get an infantry offensive going. You've
15 got to get the men there, but there are not a
16 tremendous amount of supplies. So from a sort of
17 professional military point of view, logistic
18 preparations would not have been very lengthy for it.
19 Q. All right. And in your professional military
20 opinion, Brigadier, wouldn't you agree that the Lasva
21 Valley area was a pretty much ideal battleground for an
22 infantry battle, if you like, with large amounts of
23 wooded, hilly areas overlooking the Lasva Valley, if
24 you like?
25 A. Yes, there was certainly plenty of
1 opportunity for infantry to dominate areas of the
2 battlefield, particularly the urban areas.
3 Q. All right, Brigadier, thank you.
4 Let's just move on to this milinfosum number
5 37 in Tab 5, the exhibit at which you're looking.
6 Apparently Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan met General
7 Hadzihasanovic, who adopted an extremely hard-line
8 attitude throughout, and left after only 25 minutes to
9 attend another meeting. Apparently, he began the
10 meeting with the assertion that fighting would soon
11 begin in Kakanj, and then goes on to explain why, and
12 then makes the observation that negotiation with the
13 HVO was not an option. Then he also makes the
14 observation that:
15 "Hadzihasanovic and Suvalic," who I think
16 should be "Dugalic", but I stand to be corrected on
17 that, "were disparaging of the international political
18 attempts to resolve the situation in Bosnia, and that
19 the General stated, when informed of impending troop
20 increases, that he had little faith in diplomacy and
21 the political process."
22 And then the observation is made, sir, that
23 the BiH were no longer prepared to restrain themselves
24 and were likely to take the military initiative in the
25 Lasva Valley, where they enjoy a tactical advantage
1 over the HVO, which I think is broadly consistent with
2 what you have just said. And there's nothing
3 surprising in these comments to you, as you read them
4 seven years later, is there?
5 A. No. No surprise at all.
6 Q. If you would turn to the next milinfosum,
7 sir, June the 6th, which is two days before the BiH
8 offensive started. The last page contains the comment
10 "The prospects for the ceasefire holding in
11 Travnik look remote, with both sides demonstrating
12 little faith in the motives of the other."
13 And then the observation is made that:
14 "3rd Corps, judging by the attitude of its
15 commander, seems poised for further military action,
16 having clearly rejected the concept of negotiation."
17 And then the observation is made that:
18 "The restraining influence at present may
19 well be the progress north of the large convoy destined
20 for Tuzla."
21 At the time that you were discussing with
22 General Petkovic some arrangements regarding this Tuzla
23 convoy, sir, were you aware that a large offensive had
24 been launched in the Travnik region, around Travnik and
25 Novi Travnik?
1 A. Yes. We knew that there was an offensive and
2 there was fighting there, yeah.
3 Q. All right. The next tab, sir, continues the
4 story, and on the third page -- it's actually marked
5 with a "5" at the bottom. 00273938 is the number. It
6 says that:
7 "1PWO," presumably Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan,
8 "met Enver Hadzihasanovic last week. He remarked that
9 Kakanj would be the next town to experience fighting.
10 Similarly, two independent visitors to 3rd Corps HQ
11 today were told that fighting was taking place in the
13 And that's the 9th of June, sir.
14 A. What page are we looking at?
15 Q. It's page -- it's stamped on the bottom
16 "00273938". Are you with me?
17 A. Yes. It's paragraph 17, isn't it?
18 Q. Yes.
19 A. I see, yes.
20 Q. And if you could just turn to the last page,
21 sir, this milinfosum is dated two days before the
22 Convoy of Joy incident, about which you testified and
23 which we'll cover in just a minute, but the observation
24 is made that:
25 "It would appear that Enver Hadzihasanovic
1 and 3rd Corps are orchestrating a carefully-planned and
2 phased attack against the HVO in the areas of Travnik
3 and the western Lasva Valley. In this context,
4 Hadzihasanovic's constant refusals to meet Blaskic and
5 his failure to attend negotiations concerning the
6 situation in Travnik during that phase of the current
7 fighting perhaps receive explanation."
8 Other observations are made on that page, and
9 we can all read them. There's no point in belabouring
10 the issue. But there is no question, sir, that the BiH
11 were militarily dominant in the Lasva Valley and that
12 they were actually prosecuting their advantage at the
13 beginning of June of 1993. Would you agree with that?
14 A. I would.
15 Q. All right, sir. Now let's turn to the Convoy
16 of Joy.
17 On June the 11th, the ABiH offensive had been
18 going on for three days. Were you aware that large
19 numbers of refugees -- it's been estimated by the
20 European Community Monitoring Mission that there were
21 as many as 20.000 Bosnian Croat refugees as a result of
22 that fighting -- were you aware that large numbers of
23 refugees had flooded into the Lasva Valley just shortly
24 before the Convoy of Joy arrived?
25 A. Again, I cannot remember exact details, but I
1 would not be the least bit surprised if refugees had
2 been -- well, people had been displaced by the fighting
3 and would be moving to areas that they considered to be
4 areas of safety.
5 Q. All right. And these were, just so the
6 record is clear, because I think there's been an
7 omission, these were Bosnian Croat refugees, weren't
9 A. They would be, yes.
10 Q. Would you agree, sir, that it would really be
11 suicidal to route a convoy, organised by Muslims to
12 provide aid to the beleaguered and besieged town of
13 Tuzla, to route that convoy straight through the middle
14 of an active war zone?
15 A. I don't think it's suicidal. Convoys were
16 going through the whole time, because UNHCR convoys
17 were going through, NGO convoys were going through. So
18 suicidal, I think, is a bit of a strong term.
19 Q. I agree with you, but this was not an UNHCR
20 convoy, was it?
21 A. No, nor were some of the NGO convoys that
22 went through. This was not an isolated convoy that
23 didn't have UNPROFOR protection. There were other
25 Q. But it was a private convoy, wasn't it?
1 A. It was organised by the Muslims in Tuzla.
2 Yes, it was, if you like, a commercially organised
3 convoy, and a large one.
4 Q. And so this convoy organised by the Muslims
5 was routed right up through the main supply route that
6 led to Novi Travnik, intended to take a right turn on
7 the main Travnik to Vitez road, go right through Vitez
8 to Zenica, on its way north, in the middle of a very
9 large ABiH offensive?
10 A. I can't remember the exact route that it was
11 due to take, but it was certainly coming up into the
12 Vitez pocket, traversing through the Vitez pocket and
13 then north to Zenica.
14 Q. You would agree, sir, would you not, that a
15 purely private convoy was not within the mandate of
16 BritBat to protect?
17 A. I've already said that it wasn't an UNHCR
18 sponsored convoy, therefore, as I said to General
19 Petkovic, the United Nations could not escort it. What
20 we did do, because we anticipated that there could be
21 difficulty, that's why we were asking General Petkovic
22 to ensure its safe passage, the British Battalion did
23 have its Warrior armoured vehicles out on positions
24 throughout the route, almost to picket it, if you
25 understand that sort of old fashioned expression.
1 Q. All right. One final question on this
2 subject, on this particular aspect of the subject. In
3 this picket duty, as you phrased it, British soldiers
4 opened fire on the HVO and actually killed three --
5 JUDGE MAY: We've had evidence about this.
6 There is little point in going over it again.
7 MR. SAYERS: I agree, Mr. President, but only
8 insofar as this witness provides an identification of
9 the number of HVO soldiers that were killed. There is
10 some fuzziness in the evidence in that, and I believe
11 the Brigadier puts it at three.
12 Q. Is that correct, sir?
13 A. I honestly -- again, I can't remember. The
14 number does seem to strike a chord, but the British
15 certainly only opened fire after the convoy had been
16 fired on itself.
17 Q. All right.
18 A. And that would be within the mandate.
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. A stretched mandate, admittedly, but
21 protecting civilian life.
22 Q. Very well. Let's move onto your involvement
23 in the events of June the 11th. Were you aware that
24 there had been a serious incident the night before you
25 arrived in the area in which eight small children had
1 been killed when an artillery shell exploded in a
2 playground in which they were killing?
3 A. I was not.
4 Q. Now, sir, do I understand it to be the case
5 that you had not spoken to Mr. Kordic ever, prior to
6 June the 11th of 1993?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. And you've never spoken to him after that
9 date, I take it?
10 A. No. I spoke to him twice, when I was down
12 Q. Twice on one day. Right. But from June the
13 12th to this very day, you've never spoken to him
14 again, right?
15 A. I have not, no.
16 Q. All right. So you only met him on two
17 occasions on one day, in your entire six-month tour of
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. All right. Now, do you know what his
21 position was?
22 A. I understood, from talking to the people on
23 the ground, not exactly what his position was, but that
24 he did have the authority within the pocket to ensure
25 that the convoy would be going through, and could go
1 through safely. And from what I had learnt from
2 General Petkovic, as I have already said, his authority
3 appeared to be limited in that area. And I was told,
4 when I asked the question, that the man who did have
5 the authority, who could guarantee the safety of the
6 convoy, was Dario Kordic.
7 Q. All right. Let's take that one at a time.
8 You had dealt with General Petkovic fairly regularly
9 before this incident; correct?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And he was a military man, a professional
12 military man who spoke your language; is that right?
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. All right. What did he tell you about
15 Mr. Kordic's authority in the Vitez-Busovaca pocket, if
17 A. I never asked him, and it was never
19 Q. All right. Well, who did you speak to, to
20 determine exactly what Mr. Kordic's position was, and
21 what the parameters of his powers were, if any?
22 A. I believe that we -- when I was briefed in
23 BritBat, his name may have come up, but I cannot
24 guarantee that. All I can tell you is that when I went
25 out on the ground, and the looting was happening, and
1 the vehicles were being hijacked, that the people on
2 the ground, when I asked with Ambassador Thebault, how
3 we could stop this, who had the authority, I was
4 directed to go to Dario Kordic.
5 Q. All right. And who directed you to go to
6 Mr. Kordic?
7 A. The individuals who were on the ground. They
8 would have been HVO soldiers, officers probably. I
9 cannot remember exactly. But it was no surprise to --
10 Q. Were they or weren't they officers or
11 soldiers, or don't you know?
12 A. I cannot remember at this time.
13 Q. I take it, that you didn't make any notes as
14 to whom you spoke?
15 A. No, not -- if it's not done in the statement,
16 as exactly to whom I spoke on the ground, no. But
17 Ambassador Thebault was there and it seemed to be no
18 surprise to him.
19 Q. Do you know whether these people were members
20 of the home guard, or members of the HVO?
21 A. They were members of the HVO, as far as I
22 could ascertain.
23 Q. All right.
24 A. I had no doubt in my own mind that I was
25 talking to people on the ground who, having hijacked
1 vehicles -- that there was a chain of command there.
2 The people on the ground were not prepared to stop it.
3 And when I asked them, they passed me up the line
4 metaphorically to Dario Kordic.
5 Q. All right. It wouldn't be particularly
6 surprising, in an area thronged by refugees, sir, for
7 the political figure to be pointed to, in a time of
8 turmoil such as this. Wouldn't you agree?
9 A. No, I wouldn't agree.
10 Q. You wouldn't?
11 A. No. I wouldn't agree because it wasn't a
12 political matter. It was a straightforward matter of
13 indiscipline by soldiers on the ground; soldiers and
14 policemen, for that matter, on the ground.
15 Q. Did you ever see Mr. Kordic give any orders
16 to military people, sir?
17 A. No, I didn't. Because when I spoke to him,
18 he assured me he was doing his best, and that he would
19 gather the convoy together; that there were no -- no, I
20 could not -- I could not swear that there were people
21 there to whom he could have passed the order, when I
22 spoke to him.
23 Q. And it's true that you didn't engage him in
24 any dialogue at all, as to what his military power was,
25 if any, did you?
1 A. No, I had no reason to engage him in any
2 military dialogue, as you put it. I was merely there
3 with Ambassador Thebault, because he was the person I
4 was directed to, by people on the ground, involved in
5 the looting, involved in the hijacking of the vehicles,
6 clearly acting in an undisciplined way. I was directed
7 to him as the person who could put a stop to that and
8 who could gather together the remnants of the convoy
9 and get them under the protection of the British
10 Battalion in the quarry.
11 Q. All right. Was there anybody else at this
12 meeting, other than you and Ambassador Thebault?
13 Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, for example?
14 A. No, Colonel Duncan was not there. He was out
15 on the ground, as far as I can recall, commanding his
16 battalion and getting the vehicles -- getting the
17 lorries from the convoy that were scattered in the
18 pocket, shepherded as far as he could into the quarry.
19 There were some other people there. I cannot remember
20 who they were. I would surmise that Anto Valenta was
21 there, because subsequently he led us to the quarry.
22 But I could not again swear that he was present during
23 these discussions.
24 Q. Nothing wrong with that. You just can't
25 remember. It was a long time ago. As far as you
1 remember, it was Ambassador Thebault, you, Mr. Kordic
2 and maybe some others?
3 A. And I suspect -- or I believe, if it was not
4 Anto Valenta who was there, he certainly came to the
5 area because he was the one who undertook to take
6 leaders to the quarry. We had a certain amount of
7 difficulty in finding where Mr. Kordic was.
8 Q. [Microphone not activated]
9 A. No. He was a political figure, I believe,
10 but I don't know exactly.
11 Q. There is not, sir, is there, a single
12 reference in your statement of three years ago, given
13 to the Prosecution's investigators, to the effect that
14 you made an inquiry as to who you should see, and you
15 were directed, by persons unknown, to go and see
16 Mr. Kordic?
17 A. If there isn't, then it should be in there,
18 because I can remember full well asking on the ground.
19 Q. All right. Let me just ask you, see if I can
20 jog your memory on this. Had you been briefed that
21 Mr. Kordic was the vice-president of the presidency of
22 the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna?
23 A. I understood that he had links with
24 Mr. Boban, but at what stage that information came to
25 me, I honestly again don't know. At this stage of the
1 time that I was in Bosnia, what was happening in
2 Central Bosnia was very much new territory to me. I
3 had been entirely focused on Srebrenica, on the
4 problems between Muslims and Serbs. What was happening
5 in the Lasva Valley was very largely left to the
6 British Battalion, as a very effective organisation,
7 which again almost had its own chain of command down to
8 the British Brigadier, who was the senior British
9 officer on the case. And indeed, they were more likely
10 to pass information and answer to them than they were
11 to the United Nations. So this was new.
12 I do know that I was told at some stage that
13 Dario Kordic had links to Mr. Boban. I understood at
14 some stage that -- I understood them to be Mr. Boban's
15 deputy and a political military figure, but at what
16 stage I was told that, I'm afraid I could not tell you.
17 Q. All right. Do you recall whether you were
18 told that he was one of the vice-presidents of the
19 Croat political party or the principal Croat political
20 party, the HDZ-BiH?
21 A. I don't recall that. I mean, when you say he
22 was a vice-president, it does strike a chord in my
23 mind, but again, at what time? I wouldn't -- I
24 honestly could not say. I mean, when I -- I can only
25 go back to saying, in regard to all of this, that I had
1 not seen Dario Kordic before, I had not had dealings
2 with Colonel Blaskic. Indeed, it wasn't until right
3 near the end of my time that I met Colonel Blaskic.
4 When I went into the pocket, it was to assess
5 the situation, give direction to the British Battalion,
6 who were under pressure, who had stretched the mandate,
7 in the action trying to protect the convoy. When I saw
8 the looting happening on the ground, I enquired as to
9 who had the authority to stop this, because nobody on
10 the ground appeared either to have the authority or the
11 inclination to stop it. And I was directed to Dario
13 Q. All right. Did you ever subsequently discuss
14 this incident, the Convoy of Joy incident with General
16 A. No, I don't think I saw General Petkovic. I
17 don't know when I next saw him. General Petkovic, at
18 some stage, almost vanished from the scene. I have a
19 feeling that shortly after this time we didn't actually
20 see him again. I cannot say that I spoke to General
21 Petkovic about it.
22 Q. You've described the attitude that you saw in
23 Mr. Valenta, in the HVO troops regarding this convoy,
24 as one of indifference. You can certainly understand
25 why the attitude would be one of indifference, given
1 the offensive that was taking place against the HVO
2 simultaneously, can't you?
3 A. Yes. You can understand it in that context.
4 But indifference to the convoy does not give you any
5 reason or any right to kill drivers, to hijack
6 vehicles, to loot vehicles. Indifference is not a
7 strong enough reason to let actions like that continue
8 under your very nose, if you are a military force.
9 Q. Very well.
10 A. And the convoy was civilian. There were no
11 military in the convoy. They were civilian. And the
12 drivers were pulled out of the cab, as I understand it,
13 and they were shot. Indeed, I think some were killed
14 in other rather more unpleasant ways.
15 Q. All right. You met Mr. Kordic the second
16 time on June the 11th, later in the evening, I believe,
17 and he told you that he was doing his best to try to
18 repacket or repackage the convoy; right?
19 Would you just turn to Tab 8 of the exhibit,
20 where the observation says that: "The restrictions on
21 the free movement of the Convoy of Mercy would appear
22 to have been lifted in accordance with Dario Kordic's
23 instructions of yesterday. The dispersed vehicles had
24 been repacketed and moved relatively unmolested to the
25 Zenica mountain road where BiH control begins."
1 Just one question, sir.
2 A. Paragraph 2, is it?
3 Q. Yes, it is. The highlighted language there.
4 Do you know what Mr. Kordic did or to whom he spoke to
5 try to resolve this situation?
6 A. No, I don't.
7 Q. All right.
8 A. I don't remember seeing any vehicles come
9 into the quarry while I was there, other than escorted
10 by the British Battalion. I did not see any vehicles
11 that were brought in by HVO. The only vehicles that I
12 saw in possession of the HVO were ones that were
14 Q. All right. Brigadier, we are making very
15 good progress. I don't have very much for you. Just
16 one question in connection with paragraph 17 of the
17 statement that you signed relating to the town of
19 You say that despite an agreement signed on
20 the 13th of June 1993, on the 2nd of July, fighting
21 spread to -- fighting which had been north of Kiseljak
22 spread to Fojnica. You were instrumental in
23 discussions that were directed to having the town of
24 Fojnica declared a safe area, or a safe haven?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And you met all of the Croat Muslim
2 political, religious, and military leaders, right? And
3 they all agreed to try to cooperate to avoid a conflict
4 and to avoid interethnic tensions; is that right?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. And, in fact, the agreement, so signed on
7 June the 13th, supported, I believe, by the local
8 military commanders, made Fojnica a so-called "peace
9 area," is that right?
10 A. That's right. They wished to see it
11 established as a safe area, in the same way that other
12 areas had been so designated by the U.N. Security
13 Council. That was not possible, and they then opted to
14 make Fojnica an area of medical importance, I think was
15 the phrase that was used, under the Geneva Convention,
16 because there were some hospitals there, and which
17 particularly specialised in rehabilitation of the
19 Q. I wonder if you would just turn to Tab 10 in
20 the package, which is an European Community Monitoring
21 Commission background report concerning the condensed
22 history of events in Fojnica, and it's dated October
23 the 6th, 1983.
24 Just by way of background, Brigadier, I
25 believe that on June the 30th, your commanding officer,
1 General Morillon, came down to Fojnica and held up
2 Fojnica to the world as an example of what could be
3 achieved, if the two sides and their leaders genuinely
4 wanted to live in harmony, right?
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. All of the international press was there, so
7 far as you are aware?
8 A. -- was there, certainly. Fatal.
9 Q. And then two days later the ABiH attacked
10 Fojnica and basically displaced approximately 6.500 of
11 the Croat population that lived in that town; isn't
12 that right, sir?
13 A. I don't know how many people were displaced.
14 Certainly fighting began, and subsequently I learned
15 that it was, or I was told that it was a Bosnian army
16 attack, probably the 7th Muslim Brigade. They were not
17 people who were involved in the town itself or in the
18 agreement. They were forces that came from outside,
19 which was the one thing that both sides in Fojnica
20 feared would happen.
21 Q. Would it be fair to say that in your
22 experience in your six month tour, the 7th Muslim
23 Brigade could regularly be expected to be seen whenever
24 there was fighting going on?
25 A. There was so much -- I know what you mean,
1 but when there was fighting going on in Central Bosnia,
2 there was always the talk of the 7th Muslim Brigade
3 being used. It was as much a psychological ploy as
4 anything else. Certainly, they were effective
5 infantry, shock troops, if you like. Quite often, the
6 7th Muslim Brigade was announced as being on its way,
7 with the psychological -- to give a psychological
8 impact and to actually create fear in people. They
9 certainly could not have been in as many different
10 places as they were alleged to have been.
11 Q. Very well. If you would just turn to the
12 second page of Tab 10, sir, right at the bottom.
13 Observations are made by the ECMM to the effect that
14 only 150 Croats were left in town, that before the
15 fighting began, 41 per cent of the population, or 6.600
16 people were of Croat ethnicity, and that the majority
17 had left for Kiseljak. And that prior to their
18 departure, they had been subjected to discrimination
19 and the other things that this report goes into.
20 Is that consistent with your recollection of
21 the events that occurred in Fojnica?
22 A. I can remember the fighting. The fighting
23 split the population. The town, I believe, fell into
24 the hands of the Bosnians. The Croat front line moved
25 to the east -- the far side of actually a handicapped
1 childs hospital. Whether the Croat population of
2 Fojnica was subject to intimidation or not, I don't
3 know. The two communities did want to live together.
4 I expect, when people are coming from inside,
5 particularly if the word is that it's the 7th Muslim
6 Brigade, the sensible would leave in fear of their
7 lives and would have gone to the nearest perceived safe
8 area, which would have been Kiseljak.
9 Q. Thank you. I am now through with the package
10 of exhibits. So you can close that up. I just have a
11 few subjects to touch upon before I close.
12 Would it be fair to say, sir, that following
13 the Convoy of Joy incident, you turned your attention
14 immediately to higher level affairs, if you like, at
15 Sarajevo Airport, and that you presided over
16 discussions between Generals Mladic, Delic, and
17 Petkovic on June the 15th at a mixed military working
18 group meeting?
19 A. I can't remember the date, but certainly
20 attention switched back to Sarajevo, which at that
21 stage was again becoming the centre of the
22 International Community's interest; and the beginning
23 of the American desire to use aircraft to destroy or
24 contain the Serb artillery was beginning to hit the
25 headlines, and also the whole saga of the siege of
1 Sarajevo was beginning to capture everybody's
3 Q. All right. You also --
4 A. That's not to say, though, that the fighting
5 in Central Bosnia was not important. There was a lot
6 of fighting going on there. And there were certain
7 things that did focus our attention. One was the
8 plight of the refugees in Kakanj. We ended up with a
9 group of them living with the French battalion.
10 Q. Those were Bosnian Croat refugees?
11 A. That's correct, yes.
12 Q. All right. Well, let me try to conclude this
13 fairly quickly. You talked in your statement about
14 some problems that occurred in Kiseljak in July of
15 1993, in Visoko, where Mr. Lucic and Ivica Rajic
16 attended a party given by the Canadian Battalion in
17 Visoko, and the base was surrounded, because the
18 Bosnian Muslims wanted to arrest these two gentlemen;
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. Now, your base of operations, unless I am
22 much mistaken, was, in fact, in Kiseljak, wasn't it?
23 A. That's where the United Nations headquarters
24 was, the headquarters for the United Nations protection
25 force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes.
1 Q. Would it be fair to say that you never,
2 throughout your six month tour of duty, ever saw
3 Mr. Kordic actually in Kiseljak itself?
4 A. No. It was not that easy to move from Vitez
5 to Kiseljak, because anybody would have to go through
6 the territory that was controlled by the Muslims and
7 cross over at least two if not more front lines.
8 Q. Yes, sir, and I'm not sure about what the
9 answer was, but I think the answer was that you never,
10 in fact, saw him in Kiseljak. Is that right?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. All right. And as far as you're aware, what
13 political influence he had, if any, you never saw any
14 manifestation of that in Kiseljak or the Kiseljak
15 pocket because it was completely surrounded by that
16 time during your six-month tour of duty as the third in
17 command of UNPROFOR; would that be fair to say as well?
18 A. I didn't see him in Kiseljak at all. The
19 only -- or the person we dealt with for most of the
20 time in Kiseljak was Vinko Lucic.
21 Q. Yes. But no one ever said that if a problem
22 cropped up, for example, that needed a swift solution,
23 or any kind of a long-term solution, for that matter,
24 that it would be Mr. Kordic that you would have to see?
25 A. Not in Kiseljak, no.
1 Q. Who would that person have been?
2 A. In Kiseljak?
3 Q. Colonel Lucic; is that --
4 A. Colonel Lucic was the UNPROFOR -- the liaison
5 officer, and if there was a problem there, we would
6 have spoken to him. He would have probably spoken to
7 the local commander, Rajic. But to be honest, the
8 position that Vinko Lucic actually held, the degree of
9 authority and power he had was never entirely clear to
10 me. Rather more than he professed, I think.
11 Q. You were asked some questions about the
12 linkages between evacuations of wounded in Eastern
13 Mostar and the hospital at Nova Bila. Isn't it true,
14 sir, that General Hadzihasanovic was a thorn in your
15 side, if you like, and caused you great difficulty by
16 refusing to allow the Nova Bila evacuation?
17 A. Certainly the Nova Bila evacuation was
18 blocked, yes, and he, as the commander there, would
19 have had a hand in that.
20 Q. And in fact, sir, he informed you that if you
21 tried to move the wounded out of Nova Bila, forces
22 under his command would open fire on any BritBat
23 vehicles moving the wounded; isn't that true?
24 A. I seem to recollect some threat like that,
25 yes. At the same time, no one was being allowed to be
1 evacuated from East Mostar.
2 Q. You said on page 11 of your statement:
3 "In particular, 3rd Corps Commander
4 Hadzihasanovic refused to allow the evacuation from
5 Nova Bila and threatened to fire on any BritBat
6 vehicles moving wounded."
7 Does that jog your memory?
8 A. Yes, that's correct. We did eventually
9 achieve the -- that again is an example of the
10 linkage. He refused to allow them to be evacuated
11 because of what was happening in East Mostar. It
12 wasn't just a Serb who linked things. All three sides
13 would link activities in various areas.
14 MR. SAYERS: Brigadier, I'm much obliged for
15 your testimony today. Thank you very much.
16 That concludes my questions, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Mikulicic.
18 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
19 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic:
20 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Brigadier. My
21 name is Goran Mikulicic, and together with my
22 colleague, Mr. Kovacic, I'm Defence counsel for the
23 second accused. I am going to put a few questions to
24 you simply to clarify some of the points that you spoke
1 Let us go back to the convoy for a few
2 minutes, please. If I understood your testimony
3 correctly, the convoy was stopped in the area of Novi
4 Travnik, and you described that as the Vitez pocket in
5 a broader sense; is that right?
6 A. That's correct. It was stopped, as I
7 understand it, in the area of the front lines on the
8 edge of what I describe as the Vitez pocket, but it was
9 to the west of it, yes.
10 Q. In an effort to work out this situation, you
11 conducted certain meetings, you talked to people. You
12 already explained this to us. Brigadier, were you
13 aware of the fact that in the town, Vitez, the command
14 of the Operative Zone for that area was located and
15 that Colonel Blaskic was the top military person in
16 that area; were you aware of that fact at the time?
17 A. I knew that Colonel Blaskic -- I knew
18 Colonel Blaskic by name as the Croat -- a Croat
19 commander, the Croat commander in the area, yes.
20 Q. Although you were aware of that, nevertheless
21 you did not even try to talk to Colonel Blaskic in
22 order to resolve the situation regarding the convoy; is
23 that right?
24 A. That's correct, because when I went out on
25 the ground, it was not to Colonel Blaskic that I was
1 directed by people on the ground to get what was
2 happening to the convoy stopped; it was to Dario
3 Kordic, not to Colonel Blaskic.
4 Q. However, there was another high-ranking
5 military officer there, and that was General Petkovic;
7 A. No. General Petkovic at that time had left.
8 General Petkovic had been in Kiseljak with us, carrying
9 out some negotiations as I have explained. He
10 contacted Vitez, the HVO in Vitez, about the convoy
11 using the communications of the HVO in their Kiseljak
12 headquarters. This failed to secure the release of the
14 General Petkovic then had to leave to go to
15 Mostar to carry out some other duties; I believe in
16 relation to the fighting that was going on there. He
17 undertook to go via the Vitez pocket. Indeed, that was
18 probably the only way that he could go. He personally
19 went to the scene where the convoy was being held,
20 attempted to secure its release, but again failed. He
21 then left the scene.
22 General Petkovic was not there when
23 subsequently I went to Vitez. He had left the scene.
24 Q. I understand. However, you do know that
25 before you came, General Petkovic was in the area where
1 the convoy was stopped; is that right?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Brigadier, to the best of your knowledge and
4 according to the chain of command that exists in an
5 army, when a top-ranking military person is in a
6 certain area, does that person then exercise total
7 authority over the entire military in that area?
8 A. When General Petkovic was there, his
9 authority should have been supreme, to use a rather
10 grand phrase. Yes, as the senior commander, his
11 authority would supersede the authority of other
12 commanders on the ground, though I do not know who
13 Colonel Petkovic -- General Petkovic actually met.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,
15 Brigadier. No further questions.
16 MR. NICE: A couple of things, please,
18 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
19 Q. Such convoys as this, how common were they?
20 A. This was, from the size of it and the way
21 that it was organised, unique. But there were other
22 convoys that went through -- from non-governmental
23 organisations that went through unescorted by UNPROFOR,
24 unorganised by UNHCR.
25 Q. To reach the Vitez pocket, would this convoy
1 have passed over other territory that was
3 A. Yes. It did start from the coast, from
4 Split. It traversed or moved north through
5 Croat-controlled territory. It would have followed, as
6 far as I know, the only route that would have been open
7 to it, which was known as Route Diamond, which went --
8 it went through the Gornji Vakuf area and so would have
9 gone through Croat-controlled territory predominantly
10 and small areas where the Muslims controlled the
12 Q. On reaching the Vitez pocket, would it have
13 confronted a checkpoint of some kind?
14 A. There would have been a checkpoint on the
15 road on the front lines, yes.
16 Q. Which, I suppose, would there have been the
17 option of turning it back and refusing it entry?
18 A. There is always that option. I suspect that
19 physically it would have been quite difficult to turn
20 the convoy around. But, yeah, the option would have
21 been there.
22 Q. Was there any suggestion that the
23 Croat-controlled checkpoint had said "No"?
24 A. "No" to the passage of the convoy?
25 Q. Yes.
1 A. Yes. I mean the convoy was blocked. It was
2 not allowed to move forward at all.
3 Q. And then it was hijacked?
4 A. There were, as I remember it, there were --
5 they were there for quite some time. The situation got
6 quite heated. There was then some shooting. Some
7 drivers were killed. And at that stage, vehicles were
8 hijacked and the convoy scattered, as it were, rather
9 like a flock of frightened birds. It scattered
10 northwards, and it was almost a case of each driver for
11 himself to try and get through Vitez and on up to
12 Zenica and safe territory.
13 Q. How were the other drivers killed who weren't
15 A. I understand that they were actually taken --
16 pulled out of the vehicles and killed by women using
18 Q. You spoke of the distress of the man in
19 charge of the convoy. Were you able to judge whether
20 his expectations of success with this convoy had
21 initially been genuine?
22 A. Very genuine. I don't believe he had any
23 suspicion that he would not be allowed to travel
24 through to the north. He might have had a fear that he
25 would be stopped and would have to hand over some of
1 the goods that he was carrying by way of a bribe, if
2 you like, or a levy to get through. But for the
3 vehicles to be hijacked and for people to be killed was
4 totally and utterly shocking and surprising to him, and
5 as I say, he was on the verge of a breakdown.
6 Q. Was there any other route to bring food to
7 the civilians in the area to which he was taking this
9 A. No, it was the only route that the convoy
10 could have followed.
11 Q. Was that known generally to everyone at the
13 A. I'm sure it was.
14 Q. You've been asked about your knowledge or,
15 more particular, your ignorance of Kordic before this
16 incident. You've told us, and we needn't go into it
17 again, of the judgement you formed of him. But does it
18 follow from what you've told us that you didn't
19 approach this issue with any prejudgement of the man
20 because you knew very little about him?
21 A. That would be correct. I had not met him
22 before. I knew very little of him. I went to the
23 person to whom I was directed, believing that this was
24 the man who could guarantee the safe passage of the
25 convoy or get the vehicles collected back together that
1 had been scattered, but I was not reassured by the
2 meeting with him. I didn't have any faith in his
3 words. When he said that he was doing his best, I
4 regret that I did not believe him.
5 Q. You've been asked about why you didn't press
6 him, perhaps, for his identified authority, but tell
7 us, how was he dressed?
8 A. He was dressed in a camouflaged uniform.
9 Q. With or without insignia or with anything
10 else around his neck, that you can recall?
11 A. I can't recall that.
12 Q. And two other things, different topics.
13 Yes, Petkovic. Did Petkovic suggest that you
14 should turn your attention to Blaskic?
15 A. No. No. General Petkovic went to the area
16 to exercise his own authority. It was never suggested
17 that we should speak to Blaskic.
18 Q. Two other general questions, each very
20 You've been asked about the comparative
21 success of the BiH as opposed to the HVO at the time
22 you were in the area, and the use of the word
23 "dominant" was made. But can you give us any comment
24 on the comparative weaponry of the two sides or not?
25 A. Yes. As I alluded to in what I was saying,
1 the strength of the Serbs and, indeed, the Croats was
2 that they had greater access to heavy weaponry than did
3 the Muslims. The Bosnian army or the Muslim army was
4 predominantly infantry and would have used small arms
5 and mortars.
6 Q. And finally you've been asked about authority
7 in and communication from Kiseljak. Did you know, one
8 way or another, by what means, if any, people were
9 communicating from Kiseljak to other parts of the Lasva
10 Valley by telephone and/or by means of transport?
11 A. There were telephone lines. I believe that
12 the HVO had its own radio net, and I believe there were
13 radio communications from Kiseljak to Vitez, a normal
14 military communication network.
15 Q. And any transport communication of which you
16 were aware?
17 A. Not that I was aware of. If somebody -- if a
18 Croat wanted to travel from Kiseljak to Vitez, he would
19 normally ask to travel with us. I mean you could go
20 there, but it was quite dangerous.
21 MR. NICE: That's all. Thank you very much.
22 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, that concludes your
23 evidence. You are released. Thank you for coming to
24 the International Tribunal to give it.
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
1 [The witness withdrew]
2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, there are one or two
3 administrative matters before we break. The first is
4 something which we want to raise about the
5 international armed conflict.
6 Judge Robinson.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice and Mr. Sayers, it
8 seems to me that the essential questions relating to
9 this issue are questions of law and, in some cases,
10 fact, mixed law and fact. The exhibits, in my view,
11 would generally be admissible, the Chamber being left
12 to determine what weight to attach to them. For that
13 reason, I don't think it is necessary to have any
14 prolonged hearing on this. In fact, I think a hearing
15 could be obviated and replaced by written submissions
16 on this question, highlighting the important areas,
17 areas that are important to each party.
18 MR. NICE: I suppose Mr. Lopez-Terres, who I
19 think has charge of those particular binders at the
20 moment, may be pleased to know that an oral submission
21 would not be required at the moment. We, of course,
22 would be only too pleased to put in a written
23 submission. I don't know whether it's thought that
24 it's appropriate now, before the ending of the
25 Prosecution's case, or if, like all other submissions,
1 it should come simply in due course.
2 JUDGE MAY: In due course.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I think it can come in
4 due course. That would be in order.
5 Mr. Sayers.
6 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I had anticipated
7 that the international armed conflict documents would
8 be treated pretty much identically with the other
9 documents. I think that with the exception of the
10 objections which we've noted on our charts to illegible
11 documents, documents that aren't signed and so forth,
12 most of those objections -- actually, the illegibility
13 objections, I think, are valid. The other objections
14 pretty much go to weight, as the Trial Chamber has
15 stated in the past, and, frankly, I don't see that a
16 hearing on the issue would be particularly necessary
17 because we would simply be ventilating the same
18 arguments that have already been made.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I'm glad to see we're
20 ad idem on that.
21 JUDGE MAY: We will consider whether we
22 should exclude any of the documents. If there are
23 illegible and that sort of documents, that would have
24 to be attended to. But that apart, we'll admit the
25 documents and order submissions, the Prosecution
1 certainly to put in a document explaining what they
2 rely on in the exhibits; Defence, if they wish to
4 MR. SAYERS: I'm almost certain that we would
5 wish to respond, and with the Court's permission, we
6 would like to do so in due course, having seen the
7 arguments of the Prosecutor.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, within two weeks of
9 the close of the case.
10 MR. NICE: I'm sure we can do that.
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, and two weeks for the
13 MR. SAYERS: That seems fair, Your Honour.
14 Thank you.
15 MR. NICE: Although in light of
16 Judge Robinson's observation about it being a matter
17 for the Chamber to decide, I think the presentation
18 will be a summary and general, rather than laborious
19 and specific.
20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
21 MR. NICE: Now, I know Mr. Sayers wants to
22 raise something, and I know what it is, but there's
23 also another witness. Now, that witness, Mr. Hamill,
24 has been here since the weekend. I think his time for
25 getting away this afternoon to catch a plane is half
1 past 5.00. He won't actually be very long in chief.
2 His summary, I hope, has already been
3 distributed. But even if it hasn't, his presentation
4 will not take very long. I don't know if there's any
5 way that the Chamber can at least try to accommodate
7 JUDGE MAY: I would hope so, if he's been
8 here since the weekend. Is there extensive
10 MR. SAYERS: The next witness is an artillery
11 ballistics expert witness. We have not previously been
12 provided with a written report, as I understand, as
13 required by Rule 94 bis, but we're prepared to go ahead
14 with this cross-examination anyway.
15 Just as with the previous witness, in the
16 interests of time, I've prepared a highlighted binder
17 of exhibits that I would distribute, which we should be
18 able to go through fairly quickly. But I doubt that
19 we'll be through in one hour, Your Honour, I really
21 JUDGE MAY: It may be, if the Prosecution are
22 quick, an hour and a quarter will be available. It may
23 be convenient to take the adjournment now and begin a
24 few minutes before 4.00.
25 We'll deal with this question about the
1 statement when we've got time tomorrow.
2 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, we regard that as a
3 fairly serious matter, as I'm sure the Court can
4 understand, and we would like to be heard on that.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, certainly.
6 We'll adjourn now until five to 4.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 3.37 p.m.
8 --- On resuming at 4.00 p.m.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
12 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
14 WITNESS: JOHN GERARD BRENTON HAMILL
15 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a
17 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, if I might just
18 jump in. It seems to me that in order to utilise the
19 time most efficiently, we could take this statement as
20 read, since it's essentially an expert report, and jump
21 immediately into cross-examination.
22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
23 MR. NICE: Perhaps I can just clarify a few
25 Examined by Mr. Nice:
1 Q. Full name, please?
2 A. John Gerard Brenton Hamill.
3 Q. We can see you've done over 25 years in
4 gunnery in Bosnia, elsewhere around the world, and
5 you've also been an instructor. One point of
6 amplification, is calculating the place from which
7 artillery fires a practical skill used by soldiers on
8 the ground?
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. The reason being, that if you are being fired
11 at, and you can't see where the guns are firing from,
12 you actually need to work it out?
13 A. You need to work it out in order to return
15 Q. Is that a skill, therefore, in which
16 artillery officers are trained?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And were you so trained?
19 A. I was.
20 Q. Next point, just to deal with what's
21 contained in your summary, and indeed in your
22 statement, because the Judges don't have the full
23 statement, necessarily. You are concerned here with
24 the shelling of Zenica, but you didn't go and conduct
25 an examination at Zenica until the 6th of April 1997,
1 or thereabout?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. I think you spent how many days conducting
4 your examination?
5 A. I spent a full week, at that time, between
6 here and Zenica itself.
7 Q. There is a video, which is cued to be played,
8 of Zenica at the time. It's exhibit number -- I'll
9 come to the exhibit number. 2258. I am not going to
10 ask that it all be played, but just a small portion of
11 it, or a portion of it so that we can see what this
12 video amounts to.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. NICE:
15 Q. If you find anything you want to comment on.
16 This was a contemporaneous video of Zenica shelling.
17 Apart from showing people who had been killed, does it
18 from time to time shows sites of and even some detail
19 of where the shells landed?
20 A. Yes, it did.
21 Q. Unhappy details. More for the general
22 quality of the film and the sort of detail it was
23 showing. Right. I am going to pause there, because of
24 want of time.
25 Did you see the whole of this film, which
1 is --
2 A. I did.
3 Q. -- available? Were you able, although you
4 didn't see the film at the time, to compare what that
5 contemporaneous film showed of the scene and of where
6 the shells fell with your own examination conducted in
8 A. Yes, I was able to do a comparison. And
9 also, I had photographs taken at the time, which I also
10 used to compare to the ground, as I saw it, with
11 documentary data.
12 Q. Those photographs are 2281, I think you'll
13 find -- I must be incorrect. The three pictures from
14 2281. Thank you. Two pictures from 2281. Take mine.
15 That won't do. To save time, can you use my
16 photographs, and we'll just use those and we'll make
17 sure we get the right numbers attached to them later.
18 Thank you very much. Just look at these three
19 photographs in sequence and tell us the sort of things
20 of significance that you can see on those photographs.
21 They will be placed on the ELMO.
22 A. This was the scene of the sixth shelling.
23 You can see where the crater has been formed underneath
24 the bus shelter.
25 Q. Right. Next photograph?
1 A. This was the second shell that fell in Zenica
2 to that day, at 1210 hours.
3 Q. We can see on our screen, somewhat
4 indistinctly, marks going out from the central
5 position. Are they of significance in working out the
6 origin of a piece of artillery shelling?
7 A. They certainly are. They are what we use.
8 They are called strikes, and we use the direction of
9 the strikes to fix the direction that the round is
10 coming from.
11 Q. Using this photograph, explain that general
12 technique, please, to the learned Judges.
13 A. In general terms, although it can't be seen
14 from a photograph, and it's not possible to do crater
15 analysis, per se, from a photograph, the pattern of the
16 shells is very distinctive, particularly when it falls
17 on hard ground like this, asphalt, concrete or
18 whatever. And by laying sticks along, or taking
19 compass bearings along the strikes, particular strikes,
20 which are the widest, you then work out, by having the
21 angle, the direction to the gun in question. So in
22 general terms with this, because the strikes are mainly
23 this way and this way, the round would have come in
24 from that side. But that's very general. It can't be
25 specifically done from a photograph. It must be done
1 on the ground.
2 Q. Yes. Is there a hemispherical distribution
3 of these strikes, or semicircular distribution of the
5 A. More or less semicircular, yes.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness wait for
7 the end of the question, please.
8 Q. -- half round plastic compass, as it were,
9 plastic --
10 A. Protractor.
11 Q. Protractor. And the flat bit, is that the
12 direction from which the shells come? The other bit.
13 The round bit.
14 A. [No audible answer]
15 Q. Last photograph, please. Just to give a
16 general --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please pause
18 between answer and question.
19 JUDGE MAY: You are being asked to pause
20 between question and answer.
21 MR. NICE: And I will do so.
22 A. Once again, we have a photograph of the 6th
24 Q. Will you please now lay on the overhead
25 projector -- when you went to examine the scene.
1 JUDGE MAY: We are getting the B/C/S on our
3 THE INTERPRETER: It should be okay now. The
4 interpreter apologises.
5 JUDGE MAY: All should be well. Yes, thank
7 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, the objection is
8 this. We think it's unbelievable that one day before
9 the close of the Prosecution's case we should be
10 getting brand new exhibits which have never previously
11 been produced to us before, especially exhibits which
12 were apparently prepared in 1997. It's all the more
13 remarkable --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Slow down, please,
15 Mr. Sayers. Slow down.
16 MR. SAYERS: -- witness who has not prepared
17 a report that's been provided to us, and this exhibit
18 is now going to be introduced through this expert
19 without a report. We simply haven't been given this
20 before. I think it's too late now. The order that the
21 Court has entered, requiring delivery of all exhibits
22 to us by the 28th of January, is as clear as a bell,
23 and there is just no excuse for late delivery. So we
24 object to it under these circumstances. Thank you.
25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice.
1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I gather that, as a
2 matter of fact, the map is in the Zenica binder. But,
3 in any event, it's referred to in the witness
4 statement. And I am sorry if it didn't go out with the
5 witness statement, as I discovered today. It could
6 have been asked for. It could have been found in the
7 Zenica binder. In any event, the statement, which the
8 Defence have had now for months or a year or so or
9 whatever it is, provides the source information that is
10 being plotted on this plan, and so, of course, it's
11 less than ideal, and I wish that they had had it
12 earlier. It's going to save time rather than do
13 anything else to use the map. The map is the best
15 JUDGE MAY: Does it say anything new?
16 MR. NICE: No. It says what's -- it says
17 what's in the statement, so far as I know.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE MAY: We will admit this document,
20 first of all, because we are told it was -- it had been
21 part of the Zenica binder. In any event, it is merely
22 stating what the evidence says in sketch form. The
23 Defence can, of course, cross-examine upon it.
24 MR. NICE:
25 Q. Mr. Hamill, will you please explain, rather
1 than me going through questions and answers, the plan
2 and the markings on it dealing with the craters, in the
3 order in which they were formed.
4 A. The first two craters were formed at 1210 by
5 shells falling in this area here [indicates]. The
6 letters "MPI" stand for mean point of impact, which is
7 the spot between the two shells. The second pair fell
8 here [indicates] and here. Again, within a very short
9 period of time, at around 1224. And the final two
10 shells fell here and here, at approximately 1229. And
11 that concluded the shelling on that day.
12 Now, what I can say about them, that for the
13 first and this third pair, as such, there was a
14 distance between them of between 14 and 30 metres.
15 There was a considerably greater distance between the
16 3rd and the 4th, which were also almost
17 contemporaneous. This has been explained in the
18 report. My reading of it was that there was a slight
19 error on the third round, an error of range or
20 elevation, because the bearing is consistent with the
21 1st and the 5th rounds.
22 Q. Let's, to avoid any confusion of technical
23 language, pick up first the bearing, that is the
24 direction from which the shells had come. Did you have
25 two sources of information: One, your observations on
1 the ground of the actual shell craters, where they were
2 left; and two, information coming from ECMM monitors,
3 some of whom we've heard, who conducted their own
4 calculations of bearings at the time?
5 A. Yes, I did. I initially had a report from
6 the ECMM, a crater analysis. When I examined the
7 craters on the ground, I found no reason to disagree
8 with their analysis, although some -- quite a
9 considerable time had passed. The craters in most
10 cases were still clear enough to get the general
11 direction, not a specific direction in mils, but
12 certainly the general direction within a few degrees
13 left or right of the direction of fire.
14 Q. So if we look at the numbers one and two on
15 the bottom of the three pairs, just remind us again how
16 close were they together?
17 A. They were about -- they were about 14 metres.
18 Q. And the arrow shows the direction from which
19 it is being suggested those two shells came.
20 A. That is correct. West.
21 Q. Then the next two up, which are a little
22 further short, they didn't travel quite so far, it
23 would appear. Same general bearing, 4.800. Is that
25 A. That is quite correct, 4.800 mils.
1 Q. Their distance apart?
2 A. Their distance apart was, if I remember,
3 about 70 metres. However, that is not the significant
4 aspect. What is significant is their deviation from a
5 centre line between them. Both them lay astride the
6 centre line, which is the line drawn on as 4.800 mils;
7 one slightly north by a few metres, and one slightly
8 south by a few metres. They were consistent as regards
9 bearing, but not as regards range.
10 Q. The last pair at the top, how close together?
11 A. Thirty metres.
12 Q. We haven't yet dealt with, but you must know
13 your source of information as to the order in which
14 these shells fell; was that from ECMM monitors or from
15 some other source?
16 A. Yes. I spoke to witnesses on the ground.
17 Q. One or two or how many?
18 A. Numerous. We spent several days in Zenica,
19 and I spoke to considerable numbers of people who had
20 been there during the shelling; those who lived in
21 houses beside where the shells fell, other witnesses
22 who were brought to me by MUP. I must emphasise that I
23 had no direct, personal knowledge of the times myself,
24 and got it from witnesses.
25 Q. Was there consistency or inconsistency in the
1 accounts that you were given as to the order of the
3 A. There was considerable consistency. And the
4 most consistent fact that I came across was that the
5 shells were described as falling in the three groups of
7 Q. Did they all hit the ground directly, or did
8 any of them land up first somewhere else?
9 A. Four of the rounds impacted on the ground.
10 One of them impacted on the wall of a house in Stari
11 Carcija [phoen], and one of them impacted on a tree
12 just outside the radio station.
13 Q. On the basis that they fell in the order that
14 you've heard, in the three groups of two, what was your
15 conclusion as to the number of pieces of artillery that
16 were firing?
17 A. I concluded that there were two pieces of
18 artillery in use. Given the fragments that I had --
19 was given, which purported to be from those shellings,
20 it seemed to me quite clear that it was a D-30 J-gun
21 which fired. This is a hand-loaded weapon, which takes
22 time to fire a second time. Only a certain number of
23 rounds can be fired from it in a minute. So if there
24 were only five seconds between the shells being fired,
25 the logic was that two guns were involved.
1 Q. What, if anything, is the significance or
2 what is to be derived or interpreted from three pairs
3 of shells doing that which you see evidence for on the
4 ground and from the other witnesses, and as shown in
5 this plan, going from south to north, with the changes
6 of distance that you've spoken of?
7 A. I see this as a very professional piece of
8 artillery work. I believe that it was -- the rounds
9 were observed as they were landing and the fire was
10 adjusted, and the fire was adjusted in a way that seems
11 to me to be, "Add 100, add 50," from an observer who
12 would be in a general southerly direction from the
13 target to be engaged.
14 Q. What might have been the intended object of
15 this shelling?
16 A. I think it is most likely that the intended
17 target was the radio station on the banks of the river.
18 Q. The reason for that conclusion?
19 A. Two rounds, 5 and 6, bracketed the area, and
20 then the firing ceased. Normally, artillery fire
21 ceases when the target has been successfully engaged.
22 There was nothing else in that area that I could see
23 that would be a likely target.
24 Q. When you say "bracketed the area", two
25 questions that you might deal with, and we'll come back
1 to the type of artillery piece in a minute. But given
2 the artillery piece you believe this to have been, what
3 degree of accuracy can be achieved? And the second
4 question involved with that is how near to a target
5 does a shell have to land in order for the shelling to
6 count as a success?
7 A. A shell of the nature of that size, of about
8 122 millimetres, would have a lethal radius of
9 something in the region of 40 to 50 metres, and it
10 would have a danger radius of around 300 metres. So if
11 a round fell within 25 or 30 metres of the target, it
12 would neutralise it, and I would say that that is an
13 acceptable level of accuracy for neutralisation
14 purposes. By "neutralise", we mean put out of action,
15 prevent from engaging in the activity which it had been
16 engaged in beforehand. It doesn't necessarily mean
18 Q. The accuracy of this sort of shelling?
19 A. The D-30 J, firing the type of ammunition
20 which I believe it fired, has a beaten zone at a
21 maximum range of around 45 metres by 10 metres. That
22 means that about 50 per cent of the shells will fall in
23 an elliptical pattern; fired from the same gun, at the
24 same bearing, at the same elevation, will fall within
25 an area 45 metres long by 10 metres wide.
1 Q. So on your plan, you've drawn a possible
2 location of an observer, and is the general position
3 that where artillery is being aimed from many
4 kilometres away, you need an observer to see where the
5 first shell lands?
6 A. You need an observer generally to see where
7 every shell lands, unless the target has previously
8 been adjusted and recorded or a similar target within
9 certain very limited parameters has already been
10 engaged by that particular type of weapon within,
11 again, a particular area.
12 Q. Why do you choose this line as the line along
13 which a possible observer might have been positioned?
14 A. I think it's quite likely. It could also
15 have been in the opposite direction to the north. But
16 if you look at the three sets of rounds, the first set,
17 the second set, MPI-corrected, and the third set all
18 give an "add or a drop" pattern. Given that the north
19 side or the east side of the river was in ABiH hands
20 completely, and given that there was high ground to the
21 south, you can just see on the edge of the map the
22 beginning of the contour lines leading to high ground
23 where an observer could be stationed. Similarly, there
24 were very high buildings in this area which could have
25 housed an observer who could have been relaying
1 information to guns by radio or by telephone, if
2 telephones were working.
3 Q. You've also marked the nearest military
4 installation or, rather, an arrow in its direction.
5 Tell us about that.
6 A. This is the nearest military installation.
7 It is 310 metres from the closest round, which was
8 number 3. Yet after number 3 was fired, 5 and 6 were
9 fired in a direction away from that particular military
10 installation. Therefore, I concluded it was not the
12 Q. What was that military installation?
13 A. I'd have to examine my notes. The
14 headquarters of the 301st Mechanised Brigade of the
15 Armija located in the Prostor building.
16 Q. Then if we could mark your summary, which I
17 think you've gone through your summary and checked it
18 for accuracy, have you not?
19 A. I have.
20 Q. We'll mark that, with the Court's leave, as
21 an exhibit. But two other issues.
22 In order to identify the type of artillery
23 piece, were you provided with a bag or container of
24 remnants from the shelling?
25 A. I was.
1 Q. That contained two fuses?
2 A. It did, and various bits of shell case
4 Q. And the fuses showed you what?
5 A. The fuses showed me, given the writing on
6 them, showed me that it was, in fact, an OF 462 Z shell
7 which was fired. The reason I say that is because the
8 fuses themselves were RGM-2 fuses, which are
9 specifically fitted to that type of shell.
10 Q. Now, was that type of shell in use by any of
11 the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia at the
12 time of this shelling?
13 A. That shelling was only used by the D-30 J,
14 which was a Yugoslav-built variant of a Warsaw Pact
16 Q. To your knowledge, did any of the warring
17 parties have access to that weaponry at that time?
18 A. To my belief, they did.
19 Q. Does that weapon have a known and defined
21 A. It does. Firing that particular shell, it
22 has a defined maximum range of 15 thousand and about
23 280 metres.
24 Q. With the knowledge that you had then
25 collected, did you try and find out where it might have
1 been fired from, these shells?
2 A. I did.
3 Q. Using the map that's on the board and the
4 pointer -- there's a loudspeaker that should pick up
5 your voice -- could you explain to the Judges what it
6 was, please, that you -- and for counsel, what it was
7 you were able to conclude?
8 A. Based on the fact that the shell came from --
9 the shells came from the west, due west, from --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the
12 A. The shells came due west into Zenica.
13 Therefore, I went west along the road between Vitez and
14 Travnik and examined the area, and I found a feature in
15 Puticevo which provided ideal gun platforms.
16 MR. NICE:
17 Q. Looking at the map, we see the front line for
18 the Serb troops to the west of that. Could the gun
19 concerned or the artillery piece concerned have been
20 fired from within Serb territory?
21 A. Under no circumstances.
22 Q. Were it to have been fired from the Puticevo
23 feature, would that have been at maximum range, or near
24 maximum range, or what?
25 A. It would have been very close to maximum
2 Q. Why did you prefer that as a possible site to
3 any of the intervening places at a shorter distance
4 between there and Zenica itself?
5 A. The weapon would have been firing on maximum
6 charge, which would have meant a noise level of
7 something in the region of 180 decibels; an extremely
8 loud noise, in other words, which would have been heard
9 over a very wide area. If it had been much closer to
10 Zenica, it would have been within distance -- hearing
11 distance of Armija locations. I heard no reports that
12 anyone had heard rounds being fired on that day.
13 Therefore, I concluded, from logic, that it was a good
14 distance away from where Armija units were located.
15 Q. Just remind the Judges. Roughly, where were
16 the BiH positions?
17 A. The Armija were located in Travnik itself, in
18 Zenica, and somewhat west of Zenica.
19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, if we are to get
20 through this --
21 MR. NICE: Yes. I think I've probably
22 concluded. In any case, everything else contained in
23 your summary, including the comments that are made
24 about launch time and so on, may this summary become
25 Exhibit 2816, please?
1 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Sayers.
2 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I'll do my best to
3 finish today, but I can't guarantee it. But let's get
5 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
6 Q. You served as a United Nations military
7 observer in Sarajevo from May of 1993 to August of
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. So you were in the country when the shelling
11 actually occurred?
12 A. That is not correct. The shelling occurred
13 on the 19th of April.
14 Q. I'm sorry, April the 19th, 1993. But you
15 undertook no contemporaneous investigation of the
16 shelling incident at all, did you?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Right. Throughout your tour of duty as a
19 United Nations military observer, you never witnessed
20 any deliberate attacks on civilian targets, did you?
21 A. I witnessed attacks on targets in which there
22 were civilians, yes.
23 Q. On page 2 of your statement, sir, five years
24 ago, you said: "I never witnessed myself a deliberate
25 attack on civilian areas from the sector in which I was
1 working." Is that right?
2 A. From the sector in which I was working,
3 that's correct.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness please
5 speak into the microphone.
6 A. From the sector in which I was working at the
7 time, that is correct.
8 MR. SAYERS:
9 Q. Yes. Now, you've given two separate
10 statements to the Prosecution's investigators, is that
11 right, one in 1995 and one in 1997?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. In the 1995 statement, there wasn't any
14 question asked of you about the Zenica shelling
15 incident, was there?
16 A. I was not aware of the Zenica shelling
17 incident at that time.
18 Q. So your first involvement, and I think you've
19 said this, was in 1997, four years after the shelling
20 had actually occurred?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. And that was the first time that you actually
23 made a visit to the site, four years later; right?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. All right. Now, when you were asked to take
1 a look at this incident, I take it you studied the file
2 in the Tribunal or in the Prosecution's office in The
3 Hague. Is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Did you see -- have you reviewed the
6 testimony of Major Baggesen in this case?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Have you reviewed the testimony of Colonel
9 Landry in this case?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Have you reviewed the testimony of Professor
12 Jankovic, a ballistics engineer in the Blaskic case?
13 A. Yes, I have.
14 Q. Are you a ballistics engineer?
15 A. No, I'm not. I'm an artillery officer.
16 Q. All right. Have you reviewed the testimony
17 of the investigating judge who investigated this
18 incident in Zenica, Mladen Veseljak?
19 A. I may have done. At this stage, I don't
20 remember. If I did, it was at that time in 1997.
21 Q. Have you actually seen the extensive report
22 that was produced by Mladen Veseljak concerning the
23 Zenica shelling incident, sir?
24 A. I can't answer that.
25 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I wonder if I
1 could ask for the booklet of exhibits that I've put
2 together to be distributed to everybody. For
3 everybody's convenience, they are highlighted.
4 Just for your information, Mr. Hamill, they
5 are separately tabbed. We'll have an exhibit number
6 attached, and then I'll refer to a tab number and you
7 should see what I'm referring to highlighted in your
8 copy, sir.
9 I wonder if I could ask you to turn first in
10 this exhibit, after it's been given a number by the
11 registrar --
12 THE REGISTRAR: The number will be D202/1.
13 MR. SAYERS:
14 Q. Could you turn, sir, to Tab 6. This is a
15 copy of the report that was prepared by the
16 investigating judge, Mladen Veseljak, on the 19th of
17 April, 1993. Have you ever seen this document before?
18 A. I honestly couldn't say.
19 Q. All right. If you could just turn to page 2,
20 sir, the investigating judge recites that:
21 "Many large and smaller shell fragments were
22 found at the scene. Based on a fuse found at the
23 scene, members of the crime squad concluded that the
24 shells were fired from a 150-millimetre calibre, and
25 shell fragments were then taken for further expert
2 Were you aware of that conclusion,
3 155-millimetre calibre?
4 A. I was.
5 Q. Did you ever speak to Judge Veseljak?
6 A. No, but it's not correct.
7 Q. All right. Did you review the testimony of
8 the artillery expert used in the Blaskic case,
9 Mr. Sefjulah Mrkajlevic?
10 A. No, I did not.
11 Q. Now, it's true, sir, is it not, that the
12 European Community Monitoring Mission prepared
13 absolutely no reports that you've seen concerning this
14 shelling incident?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Where did you get the shell fragments from,
17 sir? Who gave them to you?
18 A. I was given them in the police station in
19 Zenica by a representative of the MUP.
20 Q. (redacted)
22 A. No.
23 Q. All right. Were you aware that
24 Mr. Mrkajlevic, in the Blaskic case, testified that all
25 the shell fragments had been turned over to the
1 Canadian Battalion?
2 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
3 Q. All right. Did you see any chain of custody
4 records concerning what you just --
5 A. No.
6 Q. You have to wait for the interpreters, to be
7 fair to them. Have you seen any chain of custody
8 records confirming that this bag, or whatever it was
9 that you were given, containing bits and pieces and two
10 fuses had been kept in the custody of the MUP or the
11 Ministry of the Interior from the time of the shelling
12 until the time that they were turned over to you?
13 A. No, I did not.
14 Q. All right. Now, you say that it's impossible
15 for these shells to have been fired from Serb
16 positions; is that right?
17 A. I say it's impossible for them to have been
18 fired from Serb positions if, in fact, the fuses which
19 were given to me were the fuses which detonated those
20 rounds which exploded in Zenica on that day.
21 Q. We'll get to the fuses in just a second,
22 sir. But could you turn to Tab 10. I'm sorry, Tab
23 11. This is a report that was prepared by the European
24 Community Monitoring Mission concerning a shelling
25 incident on Vitez and on Zenica May the 9th, 1993, and
1 the actual shelling occurred the day before. Have you
2 ever seen this report before?
3 A. No.
4 Q. And this report concludes that 152-millimetre
5 shells were fired from the Vlasic feature from Bosnian
6 Serb artillery on both locations; correct?
7 A. It says that, but that's not relevant.
8 Q. Well, there is no question, sir, is there,
9 that Bosnian Serb artillery had Zenica in range from
10 its positions in Vlasic, as you can see from that
11 exhibit. Isn't that true?
12 A. That is absolutely correct, but the point is,
13 the point is --
14 Q. No need to argue.
15 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.
16 A. The point is that the weapons that were used
17 at the time, on that day on the 19th, bears no
18 relationship to that question. They were
19 122-millimetre D-30 J's based on the fact that the
20 fuses that I was given were in fact fuses that were
22 Q. All right. You say that the RGM-2 fuse is
23 used in the OF 62 shell that is fired from a
24 122-millimetre weapon; correct?
25 A. The fuse is very specific to a particular
1 shell, which is the OF 482Z, yes.
2 Q. Actually, the RGM-2 fuse is used in a
3 152-millimetre shell of a designated OF 540; isn't it,
5 A. If it is, I wasn't made aware of that until
7 Q. And equally true, sir, the RGM-2 fuse is used
8 in a 130-millimetre shell designated OF 482, isn't it?
9 A. I base that finding on books which were given
10 to me of the weaponry of the Yugoslav army, in none of
11 which I could find the RGM fuse used for anything other
12 than this particular shell, which was used for this
13 particular gun.
14 Q. Sir, you presumably have read the testimony
15 of Professor Jankovic in the Blaskic case, where he
16 makes precisely that point, that those fuses, the RGM-2
17 type fuses, are used in three separate calibers,
18 120-millimetre, 152-millimetre, and 130-millimetre.
19 A. That may be the case, but I can say from the
20 firing tables that I was given, I could find no other
21 reference to the RGM-2 fuse.
22 Q. You are not saying, sir, I take it, that a
23 RGM-2 fuse is not used in a 152-millimetre shell, or a
24 130-millimetre shell, as testified by the ballistic
25 engineer, Professor Jankovic?
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could you, please, slow
2 down for the interpreters.
3 A. I am not saying that. What I am saying is
4 that given the information that I had, the only
5 reference that I could find to it in Yugoslav field
6 manuals was in relation to a 122-millimetre shell.
7 MR. SAYERS:
8 Q. All right. Turning to the reports that Judge
9 Veseljak prepared. He makes a reference to one fuse
10 found at the scene. If you take a look at page 2 of
11 Tab 6, sir.
12 "Based on a fuse found at the scene, members
13 of the crime squad concluded that the shells fired were
14 of 155-millimetre calibre."
15 Where did the other fuse come from?
16 A. I have absolutely no idea.
17 Q. Now, you say in your statement on page 2,
18 that April the 19th was the first occasion on which the
19 city of Zenica was shelled?
20 A. I was given to understand that by people at
21 the scene.
22 Q. Were you aware that Zenica had actually been
23 shelled the night before, on the 18th of April, 19 --
24 JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Sayers. The witness has
25 just said that what he was told was that they were
1 shelled the first time on the 19th. He's obviously not
3 MR. SAYERS: I don't like to play games with
4 the witness.
5 Q. Could you just turn to Tab 4, sir, which is
6 an ECMM document. The local situation in Zenica, which
8 "The situation is quiet, as these lines are
9 being typed, throughout the night and the day there was
10 sporadic shelling."
11 And the date is April 18, 1993. Were you
12 aware of that?
13 A. No, I was not.
14 Q. No one told you that. All right. You said
15 that at 800 mils elevation, or 45 degrees, a D-30 J
16 weapon has a 50 per cent probability of landing in what
17 you referred to as a beaten zone, which is an ellipse,
18 45 metres by 10 metres; is that correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Which also means that it has a 50 per cent
21 probability of not landing in that beaten zone, doesn't
23 A. It does, but the probability curve can be
24 worked out statistically. It's not very large.
25 Ninety-nine per cent of rounds will fall within an area
1 90 metres by 20 metres.
2 Q. All right.
3 A. -- 95 per cent.
4 Q. And you would agree that that accuracy of the
5 fall of shot depends upon a wide number of variables,
6 wouldn't you?
7 A. Absolutely.
8 Q. And we'll go into those in just a minute.
9 You also said that the D-30 J weapon has a slow rate of
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Let me put it to you, Mr. Hamill: D-30 J can
13 fire eight rounds per minute, can't it?
14 A. It may well do, but that is at extreme stress
15 on the crews. Generally, I would have said five rounds
16 per minute, max.
17 Q. One every 12 seconds, right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. But at eight rounds a minute, that's one
20 every seven-and-a-half seconds?
21 A. Seven-and-a-half seconds, yes.
22 Q. Now, were you aware that the -- what
23 information did you have that the HVO actually had
24 122-millimetre calibre weapons in their arsenal?
25 A. None.
1 Q. Let's take a look at Tab 1, sir, which is a
2 milinfosum dated November the 15th, 1992, number 16.
3 And I turn you to page 3, where there is a reference to
4 an HVO 203-millimetre gun, nicknamed Nora by local
5 villagers. Were you aware that the HVO had a
6 203-millimetre weapon nicknamed Nora?
7 A. No, I was not. But I was aware that the
8 Yugoslav army had been well equipped with artillery
9 before the war.
10 Q. All right. Similarly, sir, if you would just
11 turn to Tab 16. There is a report on page 3, paragraph
12 11A, of two 155-millimetre Nora howitzers in the Mosunj
13 quarry. It says it remains to be corroborated, but
14 were you aware that the HVO had 155-millimetre weapons
15 in their inventory?
16 A. As I said, I am aware that the -- all the
17 factions had various weapons, because the JNA was
18 extremely well equipped with artillery. And again, if
19 you look at this, this contradicts your last comment
20 where the Nora was described as 203-millimetre --
21 talked about 155-millimetre Noras.
22 Q. Yes, sir. Now, the ABiH also had heavy
23 artillery, did they not?
24 A. They did.
25 Q. For example, if you look at Tab 2, they had
1 152-millimetre weapons available to them, or larger;
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. And if you also take a look at Tab 12, sir,
5 the ABiH, at least, if you look at paragraph 8C, had
6 122-millimetre D30 weapons in their inventory, didn't
8 A. I don't doubt it.
9 Q. And, indeed, that howitzer at 122 millimetres
10 was observed in the Travnik area firing at Vitez, or in
11 the Vitez direction, on the 13th of May 1993, wasn't
13 A. So it appears.
14 Q. Now, you always found the Bosnian Serbs to be
15 very secretive about their artillery assets, didn't
17 A. I did.
18 Q. And it was known that Bosnian Serb artillery
19 had positions high on the Vlasic feature at Mount
20 Palinik; is that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Which is, I think, 1.933 metres above sea
23 level or about 6.000 feet high, right?
24 A. May well be.
25 Q. All right. And there is no question, sir,
1 that the Bosnian Serb army had in its inventory
2 155-millimetre weapons; correct?
3 A. This is irrelevant to this particular
4 shelling, because the shelling did not come from
5 Vlasic. It came from the west. Vlasic is to the
7 Q. If you'd answer my question, sir. The
8 Bosnian Serb army had 155-millimetre ordnance in their
9 arsenal, did they not?
10 A. Yes, they did.
11 Q. And 152-millimetre ordnance, 130-millimetre
12 ordnance, right, and 122-millimetre ordnance?
13 A. Right.
14 Q. Now, sir, would you turn to Tab 21, page 2.
15 A gentleman from whom we've heard in this case, a
16 gentleman with the 3rd Corps, I can't remember his
17 name, so I won't mention it. I can't remember whether
18 he was in closed session, so I won't mention the name,
19 but you can read it there. This gentleman from the 3rd
20 Corps stated that various four to six rounds had fallen
21 in the town centre in Zenica, and that these rounds had
22 been fired from Bosnian Serb artillery held positions
23 on the Vlasic feature. Right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. So once again, sir, there is no question, is
1 there, that Zenica was in range of Bosnian Serb
2 artillery on the Vlasic feature?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. Now, when were you informed that this
5 shelling started?
6 A. I was informed the shelling started at 1210
7 hours on the 19th of April 1993.
8 Q. All right. Would you turn to Tab 5, please.
9 This is an entry from the battlefield diary or war
10 diary prepared by Major Baggesen, Exhibit D75/1. Have
11 you spoken to Major Baggesen?
12 A. No.
13 Q. All right. If you turn to the 19th of April,
14 you can see that he records in his contemporaneous
15 diary the fact that the attack began at 0930 hours. Do
16 you see that?
17 A. I see that.
18 Q. Is that the first time that you are aware of
19 that information?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 Q. All right. And the shelling continued,
22 according to Major Baggesen's war diary, into the
23 afternoon. Do you see that?
24 A. I see that.
25 Q. Now, it's true, as you can see from other
1 entries in Major Baggesen's war diary, that Zenica was
2 shelled fairly regularly after April the 19th, 1993.
3 Let me give you a few examples. If you turn to the
4 entry for April the 21st, where 130 people were wounded
5 in a shelling incident. Were you aware that a shelling
6 had occurred just two days later?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Do you know who fired those shells?
9 A. No.
10 Q. All right. And just anyone can read it.
11 I'll just read out the dates: April the 22nd, April
12 the 26th, fired at 1130 at night. Incidentally,
13 Mr. Hamill, it would be rather difficult for a forward
14 observer to walk shots in at 1130 at night; wouldn't
15 you agree?
16 A. No, I wouldn't agree at all.
17 Q. By the way, you say --
18 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Mr. Sayers, can you please
19 stick to the testimony in chief, because this is
20 expertise. We are not going to go through to the whole
21 shelling from the beginning of Zenica. Can we stick to
22 the expert itself. Because we can ask this witness:
23 Do you know this and this? And he doesn't know. This
24 is not the sense of the -- of his testimony anyway.
25 MR. SAYERS: I understand, Your Honour. I
1 think that the -- it is material, however, that Zenica
2 was regularly shelled, and this individual who has been
3 -- or this gentleman, who is being produced as an
4 expert, didn't even know about that, and I wasn't told
5 about that.
6 JUDGE MAY: I don't think that's going to
7 help. Look, he just deals with one particular
8 shelling, and he gives evidence about it. And we would
9 be helped, really, if you are contradicting his
10 evidence, if you deal with it.
11 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
12 JUDGE MAY: What are you -- I mean, I don't
13 want to interfere with your cross-examination, but it
14 may help if we know the direction you are heading.
15 MR. SAYERS: The direction -- the direction
16 is that there is simply no way for anybody to tell
17 where the shells came from, or what the calibre was on
18 April the 19th, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, ask him some
20 questions about that.
21 MR. SAYERS: I will.
22 Q. With respect to crater analysis, sir, you say
23 in your statement, statement number one, five years
24 ago, that crater analysis can give you just a general
25 sense of direction from which incoming fire was
1 actually fired. But it's not possible to determine the
2 range from forensic examination of a shell crater; is
3 that correct?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. Now, to do a crater analysis, the first thing
6 you need is a very accurate compass, don't you?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Because you need to know what the magnetic
9 deviation of the particular compass is, right?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. It's certainly relevant, when you are doing
12 this compass analysis, or compass reading, to try to
13 determine the direction from which the shell came,
14 whether there is any magnetic metal in the vicinity,
16 A. Right.
17 Q. Would you just take a look at one of these
18 photographs that you were shown. I don't have a number
19 on mine. It's one of the copies of Exhibit Z2281.
20 Well, actually, why don't you just show him this. If
21 you put that on the ELMO, it might be the best way of
22 doing it. And you can see that there's a large amount
23 of metal around that particular crater, can't you?
24 A. There is a certain amount of metal, but if
25 you move far enough away from it, your compass won't
1 get disturbed.
2 Q. Do you know whether the people that measured
3 the angle of incoming fire with their compass moved far
4 enough away from those metallic features when they did
5 their analysis on the 19th of April?
6 A. I don't know what they did, but I know what I
8 Q. Now, do you know what the magnetic deviation
9 of the compass used by Major Baggesen and his
10 colleague, Mr. Lausten, was on the 19th of April?
11 A. No. But I do know what the magnetic
12 deviation of my compass was. I used a tested prismatic
14 Q. And a tested prismatic compass is preferable
15 to use, because it actually lists the magnetic
16 deviation on it, doesn't it?
17 A. No.
18 Q. How do you determine what the magnetic
19 deviation of your compass was?
20 A. My compass was tested to be accurate, so it
21 was accurate. And all I had to do was place the
22 magnetic deviation of Zenica on it, which I got from a
23 local map.
24 Q. All right. Now, when you first visited
25 Zenica in 1997 to look at the scene, it's true that
1 insufficient traces remained to conduct any kind of an
2 accurate crater analysis; isn't that right?
3 A. There are degrees of accuracy involved. I
4 saw nothing in my analysis which differed from the
5 analysis which I had been given as Major Baggesen's
6 analysis. And even allowing for some deviation, we are
7 talking about gross error here. The shells, obviously
8 came, even to an untutored eye, from the west,
9 generally west.
10 Q. All right. Let's take a look at some of the
11 variables that -- that are -- that affect the accuracy
12 of fall of shot, sir. The first variable, or set of
13 variables, the purely mechanical variables, the actual
14 ordnance itself. One would be the so-called tube life,
15 the amount -- the number of rounds that have actually
16 been shot through the gun tube. The more rounds that
17 have been shot through the tube, the less accurate the
18 piece becomes. Would you agree?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. You don't know what the tube life of a
21 particular piece of ordnance at issue was, do you?
22 A. No.
23 Q. The next variable is the quality of the
24 explosive propellant actually used. Because with
25 uneven burning characteristics, the trajectory of the
1 expelled shell can be affected. Wouldn't you agree
2 with that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you don't know what kind of propellant
5 was used on the shell at issue, do you?
6 A. No.
7 Q. All right. The next set of variables are the
8 meteorological variables, if you like. Any proficient
9 artillery officer, before he fires off a round at a
10 specific target, has to know, for example, the air
11 temperature, right?
12 A. That's very useful, yes.
13 Q. Because the hotter the air, the less dense it
14 is, and therefore the greater the range. Right?
15 A. In general terms, yes.
16 Q. And the denser the air, the less the range,
17 or the steeper the fall of shot?
18 A. Right.
19 Q. Do you know what the air temperature was on
20 the 19th of April, when you say the shelling occurred
21 around midday?
22 A. No.
23 Q. The next variable is barometric pressure.
24 You have to know that, because that affects air density
25 and, in fact, air density influences the fall of shot
1 as well; correct?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. All right. And do you know what the
4 barometric pressure was around midday on the 19th?
5 A. I am given to understand it was roughly
6 standard temperature and pressure.
7 Q. Who told you that?
8 A. People on the day.
9 Q. Can you identify anybody particularly?
10 A. Specifically, at this stage, no.
11 Q. Now, I can certainly understand that
12 contemporary observers would be able to tell you what
13 the temperature may have been on that day, but how
14 would they have been able to tell you the barometric
15 pressure on that day, sir?
16 A. Some people are sensitive to pressure.
17 Q. All right. The next variable, sir, is winds
18 aloft. You need to know the strength and direction of
19 the wind through the various levels that the shell
20 passes during its ballistic trajectory, because winds
21 aloft effect the direction of flight. Correct?
22 A. That's quite correct.
23 Q. And it's typical, isn't it, that the higher
24 you go, the harder the winds blow, generally speaking?
25 A. Generally speaking, that would be acceptable,
2 Q. Now, what is the top of the ballistic
3 trajectory above sea level of a D30 J 122-millimetre,
4 do you know?
5 A. As I don't have the ballistic tables at hand,
6 I couldn't tell you.
7 Q. All right. Let me suggest to you that the
8 maximum height that a 122-millimetre shell can reach at
9 a 45-degree angle, which is a maximum firing angle
10 would be 6.000 metres, or approximately 19.000 to
11 20.000 feet. Do you know what the winds aloft were on
12 the 19th of April?
13 A. Personally, no.
14 Q. Wouldn't it be fair to say, sir, that you
15 have no information that the HVO had any kind of
16 meteorological facilities whatsoever?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. Another factor that you have to take into
19 account is the Coriolis force, the rotation of the
20 earth. Is that right?
21 A. That's correct at extreme ranges.
22 Q. And this was fired, in your opinion, at
23 extreme range?
24 A. Very likely.
25 Q. Now, other variables include the actual
1 range -- I mean, the more extreme the range, the less
2 accurate the weapon becomes. Wouldn't you agree?
3 A. Generally, yes.
4 Q. And conversely, the closer you are, the more
5 accurate the fall of shot would be expected to be?
6 A. It doesn't actually work like that. It
7 depends on whether you've got one fixed charge or a
8 number of charges. Generally, if you have a weapon
9 with, say, five charges, then at the maximum extent of
10 each charge the inaccuracy will be greater.
11 Q. Do you know how many charges were used on the
12 19th of April 1993, in any of the weapons?
13 A. All I can say is that if it was fired at
14 15.000 metres, or thereabouts, it was fired at maximum
16 Q. All right. Do you know -- well, another
17 variable is the accuracy of the maps available to the
18 artillery commander. Right?
19 A. Strictly speaking, yes. And that's why we
20 fire adjusting rounds, which was done on this occasion
21 to shoot out barometric temperature, Coriolis, and
22 other variations.
23 Q. Similarly, another variable is the accuracy
24 of the firing data charts that are actually maintained
25 in the command post. Right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And do you know anything about those, whether
3 they were accurate or not for this particular weapon on
4 the date at issue?
5 JUDGE MAY: Are you seriously asking the
6 witness if he knew what was in the command post on the
7 19th of April? Mr. Sayers --
8 MR. SAYERS: It's a more generic question,
9 Mr. President.
10 Q. Do you know whether the HVO had accurate
11 firing charts available, generally speaking, sir, for
12 this particular type of weapon?
13 A. Generally speaking, yes, they did.
14 Q. From whom did you discover that?
15 A. I spent a long time in the area and in the
16 mission, and I know a lot of people. I have spoken to
17 HV, I have spoken to HVO, I have spoken to Armija, I
18 have spoken to VRS people, and it's quite obvious that
19 if they have the weapons, they have the firing tables
20 to go with them.
21 Q. All right. One final variable is the level
22 of training of the particular gun layers in the
23 artillery battery members. Right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you know whether the HVO artillery members
1 were well trained or anything about their training?
2 A. It's clear from their shooting that they were
3 well trained.
4 Q. It's clear from whoever shot the weapon that
5 they were well trained; wouldn't you agree with that?
6 A. I would say it's clear from the HVO shooting,
7 generally, that they are well trained.
8 Q. All right. Now, one sure way to determine
9 the source and range of artillery fire is artillery
10 locating radar. Wouldn't you agree?
11 A. Yes, absolutely.
12 Q. If you just turn to Tab 9, sir. I think it's
13 Tab 9. You can see that the ECMM addresses arguments
14 regarding another shelling incident in Zenica, or Vitez
15 I believe, April the 27th, 1993, arguing about the
16 source of the shelling: "And the ECMM monitor strongly
17 felt that the situation could be resolved, once and for
18 all, if locating battery could be made available to
19 clarify the situation."
20 Do you see that?
21 A. I see that, yes.
22 Q. And the next tab on page 2 makes the
23 contention that the problem of verifying firing units
24 and targets must be solved so that there is no question
25 as who is firing on who. The only way to do that is by
1 artillery-locating radar. Do you concur with that?
2 A. Within limits, I concur with it.
3 Q. All right. That would certainly have
4 eliminated any doubt at all, wouldn't it?
5 A. I would have done it, had it been available.
6 Q. Right. Now, did you expect any of the shell
7 fragments collected by Mr. Lausten which were turned
8 over to the Canadian Battalion?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Do you know whether the shell fragments that
11 you inspected, sir, in 1997, fours year after the
12 incident, were the shell fragments that were collected
13 by either Mr. Lausten or Judge Veseljak?
14 A. As I already made clear, I went on
15 information that was given to me at the time, and I
16 cannot speak for the chain of evidence, and I cannot
17 say exactly where the fuses came from, nor the
18 fragments, merely what they meant to me.
19 Q. And to be perfectly fair to you, Mr. Hamill,
20 you did say on page 4 of your 1997 statement that you
21 looked at two RGM-2 fuses, and that these fuses
22 purported to come from shells fired on Zenica on April
23 the 19th. Right?
24 A. Of course.
25 Q. But you are not sure of that fact, are you?
1 A. Of course not.
2 Q. Would it be fair to say, sir, that you do not
3 yourself know, and you have not performed any
4 calculations yourself of the angle of descent of the
5 shells that landed in Zenica on April the 19th?
6 A. That's not possible.
7 Q. It's not possible --
8 A. It is not possible to do that type of work.
9 Q. All right. Have you ever seen any treatises
10 or technical data on how to do crater analysis,
11 anything that's in writing, any published treatises or
12 anything like that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Could you identify one for us, so we can all
15 see how to go about doing it?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Please do.
18 A. Sorry, I am not with you.
19 Q. Can you identify for the Court, and for us,
20 any authoritative treatise on how to do a proper crater
22 A. I couldn't give you a name, but I have used
23 two; one produced by artillery school, and one produced
24 by, if I remember right, the Royal Artillery in the
25 United Kingdom.
1 Q. All right. Now, you have given us your
2 conclusions regarding the source of the artillery
3 fire. You say that -- I believe that it was at the
4 eastern end of the Puticevo feature; is that right?
5 A. Based on the information that I was given, I
6 would estimate that that was the most likely place to
7 locate artillery of that type to fire into Zenica on
8 that bearing.
9 Q. All right. Do you know whether the HVO
10 actually had any artillery assets there that day?
11 A. I do not.
12 Q. And no one has contended to you that any such
13 artillery assets were located there that day?
14 JUDGE MAY: Come on. Look, he is an expert.
15 He comes here to give his evidence of the analysis
16 which he made. He is not giving hearsay evidence or
17 anything of the sort. The witness has told us how he
18 has come to his conclusions. You may challenge those
19 conclusions, Mr. Sayers, but there is no point asking a
20 series of hypotheses and a series of matters which he
21 might or might not be aware of. Now, let us
22 concentrate on his analysis.
23 MR. SAYERS: All right.
24 Q. Let me address one other question, sir. You
25 eliminated, as a possibility, the site of the quarry at
1 Mali Mosunj as being the potential firing point, right?
2 A. I did.
3 Q. And I think that the reason that you did that
4 would be that that would have required an angle to the
5 -- from the quarry to the point of the centre of
6 Zenica, where the shells fell, at 4.500 mils, or about
7 253 degrees true, right?
8 A. That is correct, yes.
9 Q. And you concluded that a 17-degree difference
10 would be just too much, given the ECMM conclusions of
11 their investigation on the 19th of April, and yours; is
12 that right?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. All right. And so, sir, you would discount
15 the Mali Mosunj quarry as being the firing point, in
16 your opinion?
17 A. In my opinion, I discount it, yes.
18 Q. Now, on page 5 of your statement three years
19 ago, you said that it's possible that the shells were
20 fired closer to Zenica than either the Puticevo feature
21 or the Mosunj quarry, given the confused nature of the
22 front at the time?
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. And you still abide by that opinion today?
25 A. I do.
1 Q. Yes, all right. If you could just turn to
2 the last tab on this document, sir, there are a series
3 of statistics from the U.S. Department of Defence,
4 December of 1995, entitled, "Bosnia Country Handbook."
5 Looking at the D-30 J weapon, the extended
6 range on that weapon is listed at 17.300 metres. Were
7 you aware of that before today?
8 A. Yes, I was.
9 Q. So the conventional range is 15.300 metres,
10 but the extended range is actually 2.000 metres more
11 than that?
12 A. Using a different projectile.
13 Q. What kind of projectile?
14 A. To the best of my knowledge, it was an M-95,
15 but I wouldn't swear to it. Correction, it was not an
16 M-95, it was an -- it was not the OF 482.
17 Q. All right.
18 A. I read about it at the time in the firing
19 manuals issued by the Yugoslav national army or the
20 Yugoslav People's Army, and the fuse that they used was
21 a different fuse to the RGM-2 on that particular shell.
22 Q. All right. If you take a look at the last
23 page here, there's data on 152-millimetre howitzer
24 M-84. The conventional range on that weapon is 17.200,
25 and the extended range is 24.400 metres; right?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. That weapon, as I said before, sir, uses an
3 OF 540 shell, doesn't it?
4 A. I do not know.
5 Q. And you do not know that that OF 540 shell is
6 detonated by an RGM-2 fuse?
7 A. No.
8 Q. And the page before that is a 130-millimetre
9 weapon, an M-46. The conventional range of that weapon
10 is 27.490 metres. Let me just ask you, sir, were you
11 able to determine, from the fragments that were given
12 to you, that the shell fired was actually a
13 122-millimetre calibre?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Were you handed a large fragment of the shell
16 that was quite intact, or were these very small pieces
17 that were in the bag that was given to you?
18 A. They were very small pieces.
19 Q. And were you aware that Judge Veseljak
20 actually collected a very large fragment that he found
21 to be quite intact?
22 A. I was not aware of that.
23 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Sayers,
24 with all due respect, I think, you should stop this
25 kind of exercise. This is not the first time that you
1 go back to what Judge Veseljak did, and the witness has
2 already told you that he was not abreast of the
3 investigation conducted by this judge, that he did not
4 follow all that, and you are turning around an expert
5 opinion. Are you contesting it or not? If you do,
6 then challenge and tell us what you are challenging, or
7 if you are not an expert, you may also, at a given
8 moment, call in an expert who will challenge this
9 expert opinion.
10 We have testimony here which is very strictly
11 confined to an area, which is an expert opinion on the
12 shelling of Zenica at a particular moment in time and
13 with some conclusions which this witness is offering
14 us, and I believe you should adhere to this.
15 We cannot continue like this, going into
16 things, establishing what the witness knows, what he
17 doesn't. Tell us, what you are challenging in this
18 testimony itself? You are going around this expert
19 opinion. You are not addressing this opinion
20 directly. Either tell us what you want, really, what
21 you are challenging in this case, or then call a
22 witness of your own.
23 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Your Honour, but the
24 only point to the question was that I was trying to
25 establish that this gentleman was not given all of the
1 shell fragments that were actually collected by the
2 gentleman that did the investigation on the 19th of
4 JUDGE MAY: I think we've covered the shell
5 fragments. We've got the point.
6 MR. SAYERS: Yes, I think so too, Your
8 Q. Let me just put it to you, Mr. Hamill, that
9 if a 152-millimetre shell uses an RGM-2 fuse, and if a
10 130-millimetre shell uses an RGM-2 fuse, as does a
11 122-millimetre shell, OF 462, and you're given just the
12 fuses and some small fragments, you can't tell what the
13 calibre of the shell was that actually hit Zenica on
14 the 19th of April, 1993, in all fairness, can you?
15 A. If it is the case that other weapons use that
16 fuse, contrary to the information that I was given at
17 the time, then of course I accept that.
18 As I said earlier on consistently, my report
19 is written purely on the facts as I knew them and
20 information that I was able to ferret out from forces
21 in the Armija, for example, who provided me with the
22 range tables for the full range of Yugoslav weapons of
23 the day. And nowhere did I find a reference to that
24 particular fuse, except for the D-30 J.
25 Now, if you're telling me it is used
1 somewhere, then I have to say that in the range tables,
2 which are the official range tables of those weapons, I
3 saw no reference to it, because believe me, I looked.
4 Q. I understand, sir, and I don't mean to
5 challenge you, but I just mean to put to you the
6 position very simply. If those weapons, all three of
7 them, use -- of different calibres use RGM-2 fuses,
8 then you can't tell what calibre of weapon actually hit
9 Zenica or what calibre of shell hit Zenica on the 19th
10 of April, can you?
11 A. [Inaudible] that a long time ago.
12 MR. SAYERS: Right. Thank you. No further
14 MR. KOVACIC: No, sir, no questions. Thank
16 MR. NICE: A few things, if I may, in
18 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
19 Q. By the time of your own personal inspection,
20 the craters had lost definition, to a degree, I think.
21 A. Some of the craters had lost definition to a
22 greater degree than others, but some of them were still
23 very, very clear. The one at the bus stop was quite
24 clear, and what I described as number 1, the first
25 shell to land, based on the testimony of other people,
1 was also still very clear.
2 Q. So from your own inspection at that time, how
3 many compass degrees of error or allowance have to be
4 made, in your judgement?
5 A. I would say that it came in on a true bearing
6 of 4.800 mils in the case of number 1. Number 2 --
7 Q. I'm going to stop you again. I'll come to
8 that in a second. But by the time of the loss of
9 definition of the craters, insofar as there had been a
10 loss, do we have to allow for any greater error or
11 margin of error at the time of your inspection than,
12 for example, at the time of the inspection by the ECMM
14 A. It depends on the type of blurring. In the
15 case of one shell, in particular, there was no
16 blurring, as such, and the marks were very, very clear
17 and related very, very closely to the photographs that
18 I had seen that were taken on the day or, correction,
19 that purportedly were taken on the day.
20 Q. So overall, taking into account the
21 photographs, the ECMM monitors' assessments and your
22 own inspection of these craters, within how many
23 degrees do you say it was due west?
24 A. I am satisfied that it came in due west.
25 Q. So if we look at your plan, because you've
1 been asked about the Mosunj quarry and we can see it
2 marked on the plan, is that, in any sense, a candidate
3 site or not?
4 A. In my view, it is not a candidate site. But
5 further, it was also HVO held at the time.
6 Q. The Vlasic feature, which you've been asked
7 about but we haven't yet just identified it on the map,
8 can you tell us where it is by compass bearing or by
9 pointing it out?
10 A. The Vlasic mountain extends north of
12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
13 MR. NICE:
14 Q. Thank you. Any possibility of that being the
15 source of these artillery shells?
16 A. The Vlasic Mountain extends north of Travnik,
17 and that is generally in a north-westerly direction.
18 This is clearly 45 degrees or 800 mils from 4.800
19 mils. Now, if I excluded rounds coming in from 4.500
20 mils, I'm certainly excluded rounds coming in from
21 roughly 5.200 or thereabouts.
22 Q. Thank you. Just a couple more questions.
23 The fragments, you weren't able to say from
24 what size of shell they came. Were they consistent or
25 inconsistent with the possibility of their coming from
1 the shell you've described?
2 A. They were just shell fragments.
3 Q. Thank you. These fuse manuals and so on that
4 you looked at coming from the JNA, in your experience,
5 are these documents exhaustive and complete?
6 A. They are extremely exhaustive and they are
7 extremely complete, and they relate to every aspect of
8 what your learned colleague mentioned earlier on, such
9 as wind speed and direction, barometric pressure, chart
10 temperature, air temperature, and it gives the
11 variations for each of those at an exhaustive list of
12 ranges, generally in terms of pair hundred metres.
13 Q. And the manuals that told you of the use to
14 which fuses were put for particular shells, again in
15 your experience, how exhaustive are they?
16 A. These were the same manuals. What I examined
17 was the manuals of the particular weapons, which gave
18 the shell types, their fuses, the ranges and the
19 elevations that one would use.
20 Q. And no sign of this fuse to you being used
21 for any other weapon -- for any other shell available
22 to the JNA at that time?
23 A. I looked through them exhaustively in order
24 to find what shells would have used that fuse, and I
25 must say I didn't find it. That is not to say that
1 such shells do not exist. But I, in my exhaustive
2 examination of the JNA manuals, could find no reference
3 to them.
4 Q. But when you were being -- I must be careful
5 I'm not going too fast.
6 When you were being asked about variables,
7 one of them was the absence of meteorological
8 information. But here you're postulating the use of an
9 observer, and you use the term "adjusting rounds",
10 which may need defining. With an observer, does the
11 absence of meteorological information necessarily
12 become significant?
13 A. With an observer, the absence of
14 meteorological information or accurate mapped data is
16 Q. And what are "adjusting rounds"?
17 A. Generally, the information is given to the
18 gun position by the observer as to the location of the
19 target, and the battery, or single gun, or a
20 combination of guns in question fires what is called an
21 adjusting round. The observer sees where this round
22 falls in relation to the target, and he gives a
23 correction down to the guns by way of left or right,
24 add or drop, in relation to his position to the
25 target. Then a second round or group of rounds is
1 fired, and again the observer checks to see where they
2 are in relation to the target, and generally the third
3 set of rounds would be accurate, they would be on
5 We have seen an example of it, according to
6 the testimony given to me during my investigation, in
7 this particular shelling, which was a classic example,
8 to my mind, of, "Add 100, add 50," or alternatively,
9 "Drop 100, drop 50," if the observer were in the
10 north, that is, on the other side of the river.
11 Q. And if the third rounds hadn't been on
12 target, what would you then have seen?
13 A. It would have called for an additional set of
15 Q. Finally, on the question of the timing or the
16 time of the shelling, you've told us about your
17 information and the times given to you, and you've told
18 us about how the order of the shelling was always
19 consistent in its account or consistent in its
20 account. Were you having people describing hearing one
21 shell and then getting out of the way and finding
22 another one; is that the way the story gets told?
23 A. More or less. It depended on the individual
24 in question.
25 Q. Very well.
1 A. But as I say, the consistency was that there
2 was a very short period of time between each of the two
3 in the groups, in the three groups. One witness said,
4 "Maybe two seconds." Another one said, "Oh, maybe
5 four or five seconds." But it was a short period of
6 time, certainly less than seven and a half seconds.
7 Q. And then the time between the rounds, as you
8 got them, were, I think, 12.10 --
9 A. 12.24 --
10 Q. The final two at 12.29?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. You've been asked about whether you've read
13 Professor Jankovic's report, and you have, or his
14 testimony. Is there anything you want to add by way of
15 dealing with it now or have you dealt with it in the
16 course of answering Mr. Sayers' questions?
17 A. I think I dealt with it in the course of
18 answering your learned colleague's questions, but I
19 would say that generally it was irrelevant to this
20 particular case, and how relevant it is to the
21 remainder of the trial, I don't know.
22 Q. Irrelevant because?
23 A. Because it didn't deal with this particular
24 type of shell.
25 Q. You've been challenged as to whether you've
1 been, as it were, available to inspect this at the
2 time, I think. At the time, were you dealing with
3 another shelling or did you deal with another shelling
4 in the course of your time in Bosnia, the market
6 A. I did, but --
7 MR. SAYERS: I do not believe that was
8 challenged, Your Honour, and that was not raised on
9 direct or cross-examination.
10 MR. NICE: Very well.
11 Q. But I believe you did deal with the Merkale
12 shelling in Sarajevo.
13 A. I did, but that was 1994.
14 MR. NICE: Very well. Nothing else, thank
15 you. And I'm grateful to the Chamber for sitting to
16 accommodate the witness.
17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Hamill, that concludes your
18 evidence. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give
19 it. You are free to go.
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
21 [The witness withdrew]
22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, tomorrow.
23 MR. NICE: The position tomorrow is that
24 there are the two witnesses who probably will be quite
25 short. There's the third witness we have been speaking
1 of and I won't name who we've been hoping to get here
2 and eventually discovered we were going to be able to
3 get, as I understand it. So there will be three
4 witnesses tomorrow.
5 There are a number of administrative matters
6 and one or two rulings still to be dealt with.
7 You have, I hope, now received not only the
8 Defence skeleton argument in relation to formal
9 statements and affidavits, but I hope you've received a
10 document from us, including a schedule, by way of
12 JUDGE MAY: No.
13 MR. NICE: It's been filed, and I'm sorry it
14 hasn't found its way through. I'm sure it will come
15 through in one form or another tonight.
16 There have been some issues about transcripts
17 and one or two other issues, but it may be possible,
18 because I know that this would be the desire of the
19 Chamber, to conclude matters tomorrow.
20 JUDGE MAY: Are the video arguments in
21 comprehensible form?
22 MR. NICE: Yes. There is another schedule
23 being produced over the weekend, much more complete, I
24 think, and I hope it addresses the Defence concerns.
25 Indeed, I think now it is much fuller in relation to
1 the identification of transcripts to videos.
2 JUDGE MAY: And is it on its way?
3 MR. NICE: I hope so, yes.
4 JUDGE MAY: Because if we're going to deal
5 with these matters, we must have these schedules
6 tonight. I don't know if the Registry can help.
7 MR. NICE: Well, if we're allowed to approach
8 you in the informal way, other than through the
9 Registry, then I can, as soon as I leave here, ensure
10 that the documents are made available to you.
11 JUDGE MAY: Could you do that, please.
12 MR. NICE: And to the Defence as well, if
13 there are any of them that they are missing at the
15 JUDGE MAY: Well, the Defence should have
16 them too, yes.
17 MR. NICE: Yes, of course.
18 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, if I may address
19 the Court very, very briefly.
20 As our colleague Mr. Nice just said, we have
21 been also informed about the possibility of having a
22 witness -- I guess I cannot use his name. That was a
23 witness under number 10 in previous listings of
24 transcripts. We have been told about that possibility
25 of his appearance an hour ago, indeed while we had the
1 afternoon break, for the first time, and that is not in
2 accordance with the batting order by which we should
3 have been informed in at least 14 days, and then within
4 that frame it might have been changed, whether first
5 day or last day, but it was not listed. Indeed, this
6 witness was listed last time -- forgive me if I'm
7 wrong, but many months ago; sometime, I guess, in
8 October or November. And after that, the case was
9 dropped. He appeared in the list of possible
10 transcripts, and we were not informed about the
11 possibility he's coming here.
12 We simply, under this -- after so many trial
13 hours in the courtroom continuously, I don't see the
14 possibility that we can really prepare this witness for
15 tomorrow morning. He had been testifying in two other
16 cases; in one of them, quite a great deal of
17 testifying. There are a couple of his earlier
18 statements, and I really see the problem here.
19 I'm not raising that objection just as a
21 JUDGE MAY: No, I'm sure. But there has been
22 talk of this witness being called. His transcript was
23 produced, and he's been on the list for a great deal of
24 time. Well, Mr. Kovacic, see how you get on tonight.
25 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, certainly.
1 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] In French
2 they say, and I believe that in other languages the
3 same holds true, that you should sleep on it and you'll
4 be wiser in the morning.
5 JUDGE MAY: Not too much sleep.
6 MR. KOVACIC: No. Since we did study at that
7 time many transcripts, and luckily this one fell in the
8 category to be discussed, I have to admit that I did
9 not read it, really. I mean I went through, and that
10 was three weeks ago, if I'm not wrong. So if I'm
11 preparing a witness, if he was testifying in two cases,
12 I have to go through.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, see what you can do,
15 as I say, by way of preparation. If need be, we shall
16 have to sit on Friday morning to accommodate you, but I
17 hope that can be avoided.
18 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, thank you, sir. I
19 certainly will. And in some earlier occasions, if I'm
20 not wrong, you did admit that such a witness could
21 appear later for cross.
22 JUDGE MAY: In this case not, because this is
23 right at the end of the Prosecution case.
24 MR. KOVACIC: And not to add that he is a
25 very repetitive witness as well. He's maybe not
2 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
3 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, there's also the
4 Witness AO issue that needs to be resolved, the sooner
5 the better.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We shall have that in mind
7 for tomorrow.
8 Very well. Nine tomorrow, please.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
10 5.32 p.m., to be reconvened on
11 Thursday, the 9th day of March, 2000,
12 at 9 a.m.