1 Thursday, 22 June 2000

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- On resuming at 9.50 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness take the

7 declaration.

8 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

9 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

10 truth.

11 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

12 There is difficulty with the translation. Let me see.

13 Yes, everything is all right in the English. Let us

14 try the French. Right, we'll see how things go. Yes,

15 Mr. Sayers.

16 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 Just one brief point. The chart that I

18 prepared regarding the rebuttal time taken in the Lasva

19 Valley cases I have distributed for the Court today.

20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, we see that. Thank

21 you for your industry but it's a little premature.

22 Yes.

23 WITNESS: SLOBODAN JANKOVIC

24 [Witness answered through interpreter]

25 Examined by Mr. Sayers:

1 Q. Sir, would you please state your full name

2 for the Court?

3 A. Slobodan Jankovic.

4 Q. And you are -- you have a doctorate in

5 aerospace from the University of Belgrade in 1967?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Dr. Jankovic, your report dated May 29th of

8 this year has already been filed with the Court and

9 it -- unless the Court wishes, you've already set forth

10 your academic credentials and academic background.

11 There appears to be no point to go through it unless

12 the Court wishes.

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes, there's no need.

14 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

15 Q. During the course of your extensive academic

16 career and military career, Dr. Jankovic, have you had

17 occasion to familiarise yourself with the full range of

18 artillery weapons used in the armed forces of the

19 former Yugoslavia?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Among the calibres of weapons with which you

22 are familiar, are you familiar with the

23 characteristics, flight characteristics and fusing

24 characteristics of projectiles used in 122-millimetre,

25 130-millimetre, and 152-millimetre calibre weapons?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I believe, sir, that your first languages, if

3 I may say, are French and Croatian; you are fluent in

4 both?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you are fluent in written English and can

7 speak the language but would prefer to testify in one

8 of your two native languages?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Who prepared the report to which I have just

11 referred, the one dated May 29th of this year?

12 A. I wrote the first draft part in Croatian and

13 part in English. Then I was given the translation and

14 the amended text was then delivered to me, and then I

15 went through it once again amending it because, of

16 course, there are technical terms and they need to be

17 translated correctly.

18 Q. Did you receive any input or suggestions

19 regarding the factual basis of this report or the

20 expert opinions which you have rendered from us, the

21 people who represent Mr. Kordic in this case?

22 A. No, the other way around. The technical part

23 is all mine. The only instructions I received

24 concerned the format in which they should be presented.

25 Q. Very well. Now, sir, you have, I believe,

1 read the testimony of Mr. Hamill who is in court today,

2 I notice, the expert witness used by the Prosecution.

3 A. Yes, I read several things by him.

4 Q. One of the opinions that Mr. Hamill rendered

5 was based upon the fragments of two RGM-2 shell fuses

6 handed to him by representatives of the intelligence

7 services in the armed forces based in Zenica. Based

8 upon the identification of those two fuse fragments as

9 fragments from RGM-2 type fragments, Mr. Hamill opines

10 that the calibre of weapon used during the shelling of

11 Zenica on the 19th of April 1993 was 122-millimetre.

12 Would you provide the Trial Chamber with your

13 assessment of the validity of that conclusion,

14 Dr. Jankovic.

15 A. That fuse, RGM-2 is used for three calibres,

16 122, 130, and 152. I have here the firing tables for

17 these weapons and I can show them to you. Therefore,

18 if that fuse was found, any of these three calibres

19 could be involved.

20 Q. The RGM-2 fuse is also manufactured under

21 licence, I believe, in the former Yugoslavia and bears

22 the designation UTIU M-72; is that fair to say?

23 A. No, that is not a licence. UTIU was designed

24 in Yugoslavia but it was modelled on RGM-2. On the

25 outside, yes, they are quite identical and they are

1 interchangeable. I can show you the picture.

2 MR. SAYERS: Actually I have a picture here

3 and I'd like to have it marked as a Defence exhibit, if

4 I may.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Document D280/1.

6 MR. SAYERS:

7 Q. Dr. Jankovic, we've had put on the electronic

8 monitor a photograph of these two fuses that I have

9 just mentioned: the RGM-2 fuse, the UTIU M-72 fuse.

10 Are these two fuses practically interchangeable in the

11 calibres of weapon that you have mentioned or not?

12 A. Indeed, they are quite interchangeable.

13 Their functions are exactly alike, and also as far as

14 their dimensions are concerned, they are exactly alike,

15 so that they are quite interchangeable.

16 Q. Based upon the presence of fragments of

17 either one of these two fuses at a shelling site, sir,

18 would it be possible to ascertain with any degree of

19 scientific reliability the precise calibre of weapon

20 used to fire the shell on which this fuse was located,

21 or on which either of these two fuses were located?

22 A. I repeat: It could be any one of the three

23 calibres: 122, 130, or 152. It is impossible to say

24 a priori which calibre was involved.

25 MR. SAYERS: All right. Turning to paragraph

1 10 of Dr. Jankovic's report, Your Honours, on page 5.

2 Mr. Hamill also stated that some "very small pieces" of

3 the shell were given to him, or the shells were given

4 to him, for the purposes of trying to ascertain the

5 calibre. And for the Court's reference, I'm referring

6 to page 16.233 of the transcript.

7 Q. Is it possible to ascertain the calibre of a

8 particular shell, Dr. Jankovic, based solely upon

9 visual inspection of very small pieces, such as those

10 which were given to Mr. Hamill in 1997, I believe?

11 A. As a rule, we establish if a piece belongs to

12 a particular shell only if it is big enough, so that we

13 can recognise it, recognise its geometrical shape.

14 Small pieces are practically impossible to deal, all

15 the more so since shells are made of special material

16 which is special shell steel, so that -- and all are

17 made of it so that not even the chemical analysis can

18 be of any help.

19 Q. All right. Turning to paragraph 12 of your

20 report, Dr. Jankovic, you give some range data derived

21 from the firing tables that are attached as four

22 appendices to your expert report. There's only one

23 question I would like to ask to you. You say that the

24 maximum range or the normal range of a D-30J howitzer,

25 the model which is of 122-millimetre calibre, is 15.3

1 kilometres. There's been some suggestion, and even

2 some documents, I think, produced in this case that

3 suggest that the range of that weapon is as high as

4 17.3 kilometres. Could you give the Court your views

5 on the maximum range of that D-30J weapon and the basis

6 for your views on that subject, sir.

7 A. I can say that the range of that weapon is 20

8 kilometres, because I personally designed a projectile

9 in 1997 with a 20-kilometre range. It was presented in

10 Abu Dhabi and it's well-known. So it simply depends.

11 At the time that we are concerned with, that is under

12 consideration by this august Court, such projectiles

13 did not exist. We know that in Serbia, on the eve of

14 the war, a projectile was designed and built with this

15 range of 17.8 kilometres; however, I did not see that

16 projectile. Croats, however, had two such specimens.

17 One of them was taken a picture of so that it could be

18 shown at the exhibition in Abu Dhabi.

19 Q. Other than these enhanced weapons --

20 actually, let me just ask you a background question.

21 Is that an enhancement in the actual firing mechanism

22 of the howitzer itself or is that extended range the

23 result of an enhancement either in propellant or

24 configuration of the projectile itself?

25 A. It is no kind of improvement of weapon,

1 because the weapon is the same. The gun, the howitzer,

2 is the same. There's nothing there. So the changes

3 concern the projectile. There are different types of

4 modifications: the base bleed, aerodynamic ones. We

5 made the base bleed. The Serb side made aerodynamical

6 constructions, and we did base bleed and the

7 reconstruction of the projectile base in order to

8 increase the -- to enlarge the chamber powder so as to

9 increase the space available for powder. So if there

10 is more powder and a better aerodynamical shape, that

11 enables the Serb projectile to reach longer ranges.

12 And we also redesigned the base, but that is not

13 interesting because that was all in 1997, and I do not

14 really want to tax your patience with it.

15 Q. Let me turn your attention to 1993,

16 Dr. Jankovic. Did these enhanced range projectiles

17 exist for D-30J 122-millimetre-calibre weapons in April

18 1993?

19 A. The Croatian side didn't have it. I know

20 that.

21 MR. SAYERS: All right. One minor detail.

22 If I could ask the usher to put a previously marked

23 Exhibit on the ELMO, D90/1, Your Honours, an ECMM daily

24 report dated May 9th, 1993.

25 Q. Dr. Jankovic, I believe that you have seen

1 this European Community Monitor Mission report before.

2 This is dated two or three weeks after the incident at

3 issue and it concerns an investigation performed by the

4 ECMM, specifically by Stavros Kinigopoulos and Major

5 Lars Baggesen, into the firing point of artillery fire

6 that fell on Zenica and Vitez on the 8th of May, 1993.

7 Insofar as the Zenica shelling was concerned, the

8 conclusion is that the artillery fire probably

9 originated from a hilly area north of Travnik, an area

10 controlled by the Bosnian Serb army.

11 What conclusions can you reach from this

12 report, sir, regarding whether or not Zenica was in

13 range of artillery controlled by the Bosnian Serb

14 artillery as of May 9th, 1993?

15 A. Yes. I did the measurements when I studied

16 the material, and I believe that two weapons could have

17 been used to shell Zenica: the one with 130

18 millimetres and one with 152. The 152 at the maximum

19 range, and 130 has even a longer range. I believe the

20 distance is something 24, because 130 has a

21 27-kilometre range.

22 Q. Do you conclude from that, then, that the

23 Bosnian Serb artillery actually had the range to hit

24 Zenica, or not?

25 A. I think that is self-evident.

1 Q. All right. If I might turn to the last

2 subject covered in your report, the crater analysis or

3 so-called crater analysis performed by the European

4 Community Monitor Mission. You have an extensive

5 career Dr. Jankovic, both academically and

6 practically. Have you ever seen any technical

7 literature that deals with this so-called crater

8 analysis, any academic treatises, any technical manuals

9 on how to go about doing it?

10 A. In the sense that to envisage the crater of a

11 particular calibre, yes, but not the other way around,

12 that the crater can tell you what calibre was used.

13 These are two completely different things.

14 Q. Similarly, there have been a number of

15 photographs that were used taken on April 19, 1993 and

16 conclusions were drawn in various ways by various

17 witnesses. Could you tell the Trial Chamber whether,

18 in your view, any useful or reliable scientific

19 conclusions concerning the calibre of weapon, the range

20 from which the projectile was fired, or the direction

21 of fire can be drawn from photographs?

22 A. Well, I tend to agree with what was said that

23 it is evident that we are dealing with the contact

24 action fuse, because it is evident that the explosion

25 was not delayed so that is the first conclusion.

1 Secondly, it is also evident that these

2 medium calibres as we call them, so 122, 130, 152, and

3 that can also be concluded it is also possible to

4 approximately, but I repeat the word "approximately",

5 one can approximately determine the direction from

6 which the projectile came but nothing else.

7 Q. All right. Now, could you tell the Court

8 what are the major factors that affect ballistic

9 trajectory of projectiles, unguided projectiles in

10 flight?

11 A. The range, the range is initial velocity,

12 muzzle velocity. So there is also one question when it

13 comes to weaponry whether this initial velocity drops

14 because of the fatigue or the age of the weapons and we

15 had that problem in -- because if you have large guns

16 which are very old, then there may be a significant

17 decline in velocity.

18 Then, of course, barrel elevation and so on

19 and so forth. All that has to be calculated in case

20 we're dealing with one weapon and in that case, the

21 wind is very important because it can significantly

22 affect the direction and the range, it plays the

23 crucial role.

24 It is then followed by air density, that is,

25 the temperature and the pressure, the air pressure.

1 Then the spin will also play a certain role and

2 Mr. Hamill, I suppose, will understand this.

3 In this war there was no normal logistics so

4 the projectiles were all mixed up in terms of their

5 weight. There were not classified gunmen --

6 practically should have their projectiles classified as

7 to weight. However, in this war it was not the case.

8 So that sometimes a projectile would fall several

9 hundred metres short because in the same firing group

10 -- because during the same turn of fire, people would

11 use larger projectiles and smaller, the lighter and

12 heavier projectiles. So these are all the things that

13 have to be taken into account.

14 Q. Let me see if we can break these variables

15 down into three categories. I think that there is one

16 that affects range, one that affects direction of

17 incoming fire or -- and one that affects both.

18 In terms of the effect upon range, ambient

19 air temperature and ambient air pressure affect the

20 actual distance over which a projectile can fly; is

21 that fair to say? In terms of the drift or the

22 direction of incoming fire, if you like, winds aloft

23 are a critical consideration, are they not?

24 A. Yes, it affects both the range and the

25 direction because we have crosswind and a drift. But

1 if we talk about a drift, one has to bear in mind that

2 it is always the same. There is always declination

3 towards the right whereas the other factors are

4 scattered so to speak, unless they were being

5 measured. And in the -- in this war, the Croatian army

6 did not have the necessary equipment, instruments for

7 that kind of measurement.

8 Q. The drift measurements that you identified

9 were crosswind and gyroscopic precession causes a drift

10 to the right as a result of the rotation of the shell?

11 A. Yes, this is a well-established fact.

12 Q. Did you see any evidence that any of the

13 people who have testified regarding the Zenica shelling

14 in this case considered any of these factors, sir? Let

15 me just enumerate them: Winds aloft, ambient air

16 temperature, barometric pressure, Coriolis force that

17 results from the force of the earth, the gyroscopic

18 precision effect as a result of the rotation of the

19 shell in flight, tube life of guns used, the quality

20 and consistency of the propellant, level of training of

21 the actual people firing these weapons, and then the

22 accuracy of the firing tables and maps available to the

23 artillerymen.

24 Were any of those factors considered in the

25 conclusions reached and offered to this Court, as far

1 as you are aware?

2 A. In the documents which I reviewed, these data

3 are mentioned and there were even some figures provided

4 but some of them were quite mistaken. It was said, for

5 instance, that if the artillerymen were well-trained,

6 it would be about 50 metres off the mark. But if you

7 do not take into account the wind, it can account for a

8 couple of hundred metres. So it is very important to

9 know what the logistics were. It was fairly primitive

10 at the time, fairly poor, and not as it was supposed to

11 be.

12 Q. Did you see any others that Mr. Hamill or any

13 of the other people who have reached conclusions

14 regarding the direction of fire and the range and

15 calibre considered the meteorological data,

16 Dr. Jankovic, or any meteorological data to which you

17 have referred?

18 A. I did not see. I would only like to add that

19 Colonel Lausten, I don't know exactly the name, he

20 offered an opinion which would be close to reality as

21 far as these ranges are concerned.

22 Q. Based upon the materials that you have

23 reviewed, do you -- can you state in your opinion, sir,

24 whether it is possible or not to ascertain the calibre,

25 the precise calibre of the shells used in the Zenica

1 shelling on April 19th, 1993?

2 A. Absolutely and categorically I concert that

3 it is not possible to conclude which of the three

4 calibres was used based on the fuse and based on the

5 fragments found on site.

6 Q. Based upon the fuse and based upon the

7 fragment and based upon photographs of the crater, is

8 it possible to determine the distance over which the

9 projectiles were fired, in your opinion?

10 A. No, it is not possible, because if it was one

11 type of projectile, then it would have been one

12 distance, and even if we knew which projectile was

13 used, I think it is absolutely impossible to ascertain,

14 on the basis of the crater, the distance from which

15 this projectile was fired.

16 Q. Based upon those same factors, sir,

17 fragments, fragments of fuses, and pictures of the

18 crater, is it possible, in your opinion, to determine

19 the precise direction of incoming fire, the firing

20 location or the putative target?

21 A. The set direction is not possible to -- you

22 can again determine a range. I tried to simulate the

23 situation on the computer and tried to find out this

24 range. If there was a strong crosswind, it would have

25 highly affected the trajectory, and then that would not

1 be the right direction. It would have been sort of the

2 end direction.

3 My calculation showed that I first took the

4 122-millimetre calibre because that is what was mostly

5 considered. That first deviation is 1.5 degrees

6 between -- for the drift, and the crosswind was -- is a

7 very large factor. You can find that in the

8 meteorological data so you can find those data for our

9 own country for that time.

10 So that would increase the angle to about 3.5

11 degrees, but it is very dangerous to calculate that

12 simply while 1.5 degrees is a fixed component. The

13 other one is more variable. So it is very hard to make

14 a clear simple calculation of the two.

15 Q. Without having accurate meteorological data,

16 can you make any conclusions about those three things

17 that I enumerated; the direction of fire, firing

18 location or the supposed target?

19 A. Without such data, it is impossible to give

20 an accurate answer because for any simulated test, you

21 need the accurate data.

22 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Dr. Jankovic. No

23 further questions.

24 Questioned by the Court:

25 JUDGE MAY: Dr. Jankovic, I want to be sure

1 that I have your evidence. The first matter is this:

2 That you gave evidence about the range of the D-30J

3 howitzer and you said that it was 20 kilometres. But

4 that, as I understand it, was in 1997. You said that

5 in Serbia, on the eve of the conflict, a projectile

6 with a range of 17.8 kilometres was designed, but as I

7 understood you to say the Croats didn't have one.

8 So the question is this: What was the

9 maximum range available to the Croats of this howitzer

10 in 1993?

11 A. 15.3 kilometres. I can add that the Croats

12 used the Soviet projectile UF -- I think it's 486,

13 right, and they had their own copy of that projectile.

14 In other words, the same type of projectile was being

15 manufactured in Croatia.

16 JUDGE MAY: Now, the next matter is this,

17 that you were referred to the ECMM report of the 9th of

18 May which concluded that the projectile could have come

19 from the area controlled by the Bosnian Serb army north

20 of Travnik. And as I understood your evidence, you say

21 that you, yourself, did the measurements, and you

22 concluded that two weapons could have been used to

23 shell Zenica, that is, the 130 and the 152. The 152 at

24 maximum range and the 130, you said, had an even longer

25 range. And then you said you believed the distance was

1 24 kilometres, and I didn't follow your evidence from

2 then on.

3 When you said you did the measurements, what

4 measurements were you referring to in this connection?

5 A. This was in the previous case. I was also

6 called here to give my opinion in the case of

7 Mr. Blaskic, and I studied the documents, and among the

8 documents there were dispositions of the Serbian troops

9 on Mount Vlasic which is due north of Travnik. I

10 measured the distance on the map and concluded that it

11 was possible to fire for Zenica from that location

12 using these two weapons. That was on the basis of a

13 statement by a witness whose name I cannot recall right

14 now, but I can provide it at a later time.

15 JUDGE MAY: So the distance to Mount Vlasic

16 was 24 kilometres, is that right?

17 A. I am not sure whether it was Mount Vlasic.

18 Mount Vlasic is also due north of Travnik. But the

19 location was pinpointed for me. I am not exactly sure

20 whether it was on Mount Vlasic or not. I cannot

21 confirm that now.

22 JUDGE MAY: But so we have the point, it

23 was -- the area controlled by the Bosnian Serb army was

24 24 kilometres?

25 A. Yes.

1 JUDGE MAY: And the range of the 152 was 25,

2 or is 25 kilometres; is that right?

3 A. If you will allow me to look. Twenty-four.

4 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

5 Mr. Kovacic, have you any questions?

6 MR. KOVACIC: No, Your Honours, I don't.

7 Thank you.

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

9 Q. Dr. Jankovic, the scientific method, I think

10 you can help us, the scientific method sometimes

11 involves seeking a conclusion by one route and then

12 seeing whether it's confirmed in a wholly independent

13 way; correct?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. And of course wherever that happens, where

16 conclusion 1 is confirmed by entirely independent

17 conclusion 2, it's proper scientifically to add those

18 two conclusions together and to strengthen your first

19 conclusion; correct?

20 A. Yes. Can we move on? I don't know what to

21 say to that.

22 JUDGE MAY: You don't argue with counsel.

23 MR. NICE: I wonder if we could put the front

24 line map on the board, please. Make sure we've got the

25 right one.

1 Q. While that's going on the board and just

2 being straightened out, one other detail, Dr. Jankovic,

3 please. I think in the Blaskic trial you gave a great

4 deal of evidence about angle of elevation of firing and

5 landing. Is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. It, of course, has absolutely nothing to do

8 with the issue in hand, does it, and never did, for the

9 various weapons and the various locations that may

10 explain the Zenica shelling, where all possible,

11 notwithstanding the intervening hills, because the

12 intervening hills were so low; correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Was it, as a matter of fact, your decision to

15 give that evidence on angles of elevation and angles of

16 landing of shells, or was it the decision of the

17 lawyers in that case?

18 A. The lawyer gave me documents. I read them.

19 The documents of the Prosecution. And there were

20 witnesses who spoke about those angles, and I then

21 explained that the witness in that respect was not

22 right.

23 Q. Now, you may not have seen this map, and it's

24 always difficult to work with maps, even for people

25 with your experience, so by all means, with the Court's

1 leave, take as much time as you need to familiarise

2 yourself with it. And I shall simply be asking you

3 about the location of Zenica, the area known as

4 Puticevo, and the Vlasic feature. So if you can just

5 take your time, find those areas, and indeed, when

6 you've found them, point them out to us, please. And

7 there's a pointer on the desk if you want to use it.

8 There it is.

9 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, not to interrupt,

10 but I wonder if we could have an identification of the

11 exhibit number, because I can't see the map.

12 MR. NICE: I'm sorry. It's 2612.2A.

13 JUDGE MAY: If the witness has trouble

14 finding the places, he should say so and then somebody

15 can help.

16 THE INTERPRETER: The witness should also be

17 given a microphone, please.

18 A. I do not know exactly where Puticevo is. I

19 can't find it here. I know it should be somewhere

20 here, but --

21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice --

22 MR. NICE: Due west of Zenica, and just

23 before you come to the front line, red line marking, is

24 the area of Puticevo. It's just off the road between

25 Vitez and Travnik. Even if it's not marked there,

1 that's where it is. I should have checked.

2 JUDGE MAY: Well, why don't you go and check

3 now, Mr. Nice, and point it out to the witness, because

4 otherwise we could spend some time.

5 MR. NICE: It is marked on this map. It's

6 actually very difficult to read because of the

7 enlargement of the map, but we've pointed it out to

8 Dr. Jankovic.

9 Q. And if you've seen those three places,

10 Dr. Jankovic --

11 JUDGE MAY: Dr. Jankovic, are you happy with

12 that, as happy as you can be with that plan? You can

13 find your way around?

14 A. I saw a similar map. Now I know where

15 Puticevo is. That is one locality. I do not know what

16 the other two localities are.

17 MR. NICE:

18 Q. Vlasic you know. You've referred to Vlasic

19 for us. Vlasic is, of course, in Serb-held territory.

20 JUDGE MAY: Well, again, I think, Mr. Nice,

21 go and point it out. It would be much easier.

22 MR. NICE:

23 Q. Thank you very much, Doctor. That's all I

24 want you to do standing up. If you'd be good enough

25 perhaps to take your seat again, then we can press on.

1 The position is actually quite

2 straightforward, if not simple. Puticevo is pretty

3 well due west of Zenica and is within Croat-held

4 territory; Vlasic is pretty well north-west of Zenica

5 and within Serb-held territory. Correct?

6 A. I cannot really say whether all that you are

7 saying is correct or not. If I may, I'm a technical

8 man and I'm a scientist. If these are facts, then they

9 are facts. That is not the question that should be

10 addressed to me, please.

11 Q. I'm sorry to have to address them to you, but

12 you've told us that you did calculations about the

13 possibility of shells coming from Vlasic, and I assume

14 that that included your being familiar with the maps of

15 Vlasic. When you did your calculations about Vlasic,

16 did you not look at a map?

17 A. I had a map like this. It was clearer than

18 this one.

19 Q. Well, then, please confirm: Vlasic is

20 approximately --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. And shall we now just deal with

23 the last little bit of evidence that you were giving in

24 answer to His Honour, the Presiding Judge, His Honour

25 Judge May.

1 The incident in the May shelling where you

2 were saying, as the report suggests, that there could

3 have been shelling coming from Mount Vlasic and from

4 Serb-held territory related, of course, to a shelling

5 in the month of May and did not relate to a shelling in

6 the month of April; that's correct, isn't it?

7 A. The report which I wrote concerns April, and

8 I did not say anything about Vlasic. In this report I

9 only spoke about these things. And this report -- I

10 did not comment on this in my report, on this report.

11 Q. No, but you've been asked a question about it

12 this morning, and I don't want there to be any

13 confusion. So perhaps you'd take D90/1 at tab 11,

14 which is what you were asked to look at, which is the

15 daily report for the 9th of May.

16 Now, you've got it in English, and we're

17 fortunate that you read English. This document, the

18 9th of May, relates to yesterday, the 8th of May,

19 Zenica being shelled. And then the conclusion is that

20 the direction of shelling against Vitez and Zenica

21 shows -- I hope I'm not going too fast, because it's

22 not on the ELMO -- that the firing position was

23 probably on the hilly area six kilometres north of

24 Travnik -- [Microphone not activated] the Vlasic

25 feature, couldn't it?

1 A. Quite.

2 Q. So whatever it may have to do with this case,

3 it doesn't relate to the shelling on the 19th of April,

4 does it?

5 Can we now, please -- I don't know if you're

6 going to answer that question, but can we now please go

7 to your expert's statement, and it would help me if

8 you'd have it before you. I have a few questions to

9 ask on most pages, but only a few, because we're not in

10 much disagreement, Dr. Jankovic, you'll be pleased to

11 know.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Page 1 -- sorry, page 2, as it is, but

14 paragraphs 1 and 2 set out the history of your

15 qualification, and very impressive they are, if I

16 respectfully say so, but they're basically to do with

17 aerodynamics of projectiles; correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Which is distinct from working with shells

20 and with artillery. Projectiles of this kind are

21 different from artillery projectiles; correct?

22 A. I worked as a ballistics expert; that is,

23 aerodynamics is my basic field of research. But I was

24 the ballistic expert in the military institute and I

25 studied the projectiles, and I also told you that I

1 designed artillery projectiles myself. I told you so.

2 Q. Let's go to page 3, because we then move from

3 what's set out on page 2 to what's set out on page 3.

4 And then on line 2 you do say:

5 "I worked from 1991 to 1995 at the Zagreb

6 Maritime and Defence Institute on the problem of

7 developing fire control and firing tables."

8 Now, I don't want to take any time on this,

9 but just explain to me --

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. -- was it a practical problem or a

12 theoretical problem? Was it about new weapons? I

13 don't know. Just tell us.

14 A. Fire control means developing software for

15 gunmen which helps them to calculate various elements

16 needed for targeting and firing, and firing tables, and

17 I can show you the ones that I calculated.

18 Q. It may not be necessary. By all means do, if

19 you think it's important, but it may not be necessary.

20 Then we come to the --

21 A. These are firing tables for Nora 152 with the

22 Russian projectile, or OF 540.

23 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreter is

24 sorry. Didn't get the second mark.

25 A. But that was done after these events.

1 MR. NICE:

2 Q. You see at the end of this paragraph, in the

3 middle of the page, that your published articles and

4 books include exterior ballistics, missile

5 aerodynamics, and the mechanics of projectile flight.

6 This would appear to be -- I don't say just

7 theoretical, but it would appear to be perhaps theory,

8 and high theory at that, and would appear to be

9 concerned mostly with missiles. Would that be

10 correct?

11 A. I also dealt with guided missiles and at

12 present I teach the flight mechanics of aircraft.

13 Q. Now, thus far, unless I have missed it, you

14 haven't identified any experience as an artillery

15 officer, as a person regularly firing or supervising

16 the firing of guns; correct?

17 A. I did really fire at the firing range, but

18 not with units and I did not work with the army, with

19 troops.

20 Q. And you haven't identified any experience

21 then or since of the types spoken of by Mr. Hamill

22 where post facto analysis of shelling is done by

23 artillery officers. You haven't spoken of that type of

24 experience.

25 A. No.

1 Q. You don't have that sort of experience at

2 all.

3 A. Except at a firing range when we engineers go

4 to see the craters made by projectiles because that is

5 rather important.

6 Q. Before I move on, just a couple of things,

7 really. Are you aware that Mr. Hamill's work on that

8 dreadful Markale market shelling was incorporated in an

9 United Nations report?

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. Because I must suggest to you that it was,

12 and that it included his analysis of direction built on

13 crater analysis. Would you accept that that may have,

14 indeed, happened?

15 A. I accept it.

16 Q. So far as one of the witnesses who we've had

17 reference to, a man, Baggesen, would you accept that

18 when Vitez was shelled, along with Zenica, on the 8th

19 of May, his conclusions were accepted by all sides

20 based though they were, in part, on crater analysis.

21 Would you accept that? It's in his war diary.

22 A. Well, I have -- I do not object to any of

23 these things, but I did not read these things and I

24 cannot comment on them. I cannot say yes or no.

25 Q. Let's move back to your report. I have no

1 challenge to your paragraph three. And when you come

2 to paragraph four, you say this, you have been asked by

3 the Kordic Defence to provide an expert opinion

4 regarding the shelling of Zenica on April 19th. It

5 must have been a slip of the pen, but you can't provide

6 any opinion on the shelling of Zenica itself, can you?

7 A. We can always theoretically simulate events,

8 that is how we analyse events, and that is what I

9 understood was asked of me to do.

10 Q. I may have not been clear but let me make

11 myself clearer. You haven't examined the craters left

12 by the shells yourself, have you?

13 A. No.

14 JUDGE MAY: [Microphone not activated]

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. And you do not offer an opinion one way or

17 another as to where the shells that fell on Zenica may

18 have come from.

19 A. I said that within a certain interval, one

20 can accept that they may have come from, and I tried to

21 measure that interval, and I said here that it was

22 difficult and it was only with a certain -- that with a

23 certain degree of probability, one could say what the

24 interval was.

25 For instance, for 122, I concluded that if

1 these measurements were accurate, absolutely accurate,

2 and then again probably an error is included there

3 because there are errors in any kind of measurements,

4 that that interval could be at least plus or minus five

5 degrees. That was said roughly by Colonel Lausten

6 or --

7 Q. I'll come back to five degrees, and I'm only

8 going to press you once more. What you've provided to

9 the Court is some expert opinion on various topics

10 including fuses, and your opinion on accuracies of

11 certain types of measurements, but you do not provide

12 on opinion on where Zenica was shelled from on the 19th

13 of April because you don't have an opinion on that

14 topic, do you?

15 A. I did not give my opinion.

16 Q. And you don't have an opinion.

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. I'm sorry, I don't understand that. Either

19 you do or you don't have an opinion on where it was

20 shelled from.

21 A. I repeat once again, if all those

22 measurements were correct, according to the document

23 that I write, I concluded that the most probable, the

24 most likely but only the most likely was that it had

25 come from the direction plus minus five degrees from

1 the direction that was measured. So it could be plus

2 five or minus five to the other side, so that was

3 within that interval. That is my opinion. But it only

4 applies to 122 millimetres and that is the most

5 probable so it can be more, it can be less, but in all

6 likelihood, that is five.

7 I did not compute it for calibres because one

8 would have to perform simulation.

9 Q. We don't have to deal with it later, we can

10 deal with it straight away. Now, that we understand

11 the map and, of course, look at it if you need to, but

12 the Judges have seen it. If the calculation made by

13 Mr. Hamill is honourably and properly made, to the

14 effect came from due west and if you are allowing for a

15 five degree maximum error or allowance, what is quite

16 clear is that the shelling cannot have come from the

17 Vlasic feature which is 45 degrees away; correct?

18 A. No, not maximum error, but the most probable

19 error at the maximum, that is the maximum can be

20 infinite. But in practice, we take it for Gauss

21 distribution that the maximum error is four times the

22 most probable one.

23 Q. But just so that I can understand that, and I

24 was troubled by your narrative of the number of factors

25 to be taken into account. If you multiply 5 by 4,

1 that's 20. You are you really saying that firing of a

2 major artillery piece involves a scatter of plus or

3 minus 20, a total of 40 degrees of error? You can't

4 seriously be saying that, can you, Doctor?

5 A. No, no, no, that is not what I said. I

6 repeat, I know it is very difficult technical matters,

7 so may I have some more time to explain it.

8 We do not know what the wind was. In those

9 areas of our country winds can be very strong at high

10 altitudes even though there are none perhaps close to

11 the ground. As these reports say that there was no

12 wind, that the weather was nice, it does not mean that

13 there was no wind up there, quite the reverse. It

14 could have been very strong wind up there.

15 And at these altitudes at which these

16 projectiles fly, these are 5, 6, 7 kilometres or more,

17 the wind there is 50, 60, 70 metres as a rule, 50

18 metres, but it can be faster or slower. And with these

19 weather tables, I also have them with me, I can show

20 you. Now if we have a wind of that order of magnitude,

21 lateral wind, that angle can curve the path by 3.5

22 degrees. And then if you add that 1.5, that is five.

23 But this wind can be even stronger and that

24 was a very -- that is very likely. It could have been

25 very strong, of course it needn't have been but it

1 could have been very strong.

2 So if it was twice as strong, then it will be

3 a deviation of 7 degrees. If it was even stronger then

4 the deviation would be even higher. So the 2.5 degrees

5 are always the same, but the deviation caused by wind

6 can be much more than that because of this high

7 altitude wind, and that is what I said.

8 Q. You said something about maximum error being

9 4 times the most probable error. I hadn't understood

10 how you could get 5 degrees from 3.5 and 1.5 and I must

11 have made the -- an error somewhere in multiplying 5 by

12 4.

13 What are saying, please, Doctor --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- is the maximum error?

16 A. No, I am talking about the most probable

17 error, and the most probable error is about 3.5

18 degrees, and you said "maximum." If you want to talk

19 about the maximum one, then we must multiply the most

20 probable one by four times, that is, the Gauss

21 distribution, that is the probability. And to this

22 one, one has to add 1.5 because that is a constant

23 value. It's always the time it doesn't scatter.

24 Q. Well, so that we are now up to a possible

25 maximum error, 15.5 degrees, is that really what you're

1 suggesting is the accuracy of these heavy artillery

2 pieces?

3 A. No, no, no, no, don't. The accuracy of

4 artillery weapons is a completely different matter.

5 The accuracy of artillery weapons is not what you are

6 saying. All I said, because we do not know what the

7 wind was. We need to assume -- we need to hypothesise

8 a certain value of the wind and hence the error,

9 because we are hypothesising the strength of the wind.

10 And the maximum error which you calculated correct, but

11 it is very unlikely. The most likely is the one that I

12 spoke about, 3.5 plus 1.5 equals 5.

13 Q. I come back to my first proposition. If

14 Mr. Hamill is right, if he was honorable and honest and

15 careful and calculating from the craters, the shells

16 originated apparently due west, making all allowances

17 for wind and everything else even on your own analysis,

18 there's no way those shells could have come from the

19 Vlasic feature which is 45 degrees away.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you. Would you accept, in general, for

22 rounds being fired, since you raised the question of

23 statistics -- Your Honour, just give me a minute.

24 Would you accept and I'm sorry not to be able

25 to use the proper terminology of statisticians, I'll

1 have to use layman's talk, would you accept that

2 artillery rounds will fall as to 68 per cent of them

3 within 2.5 per cent either way of their target and that

4 95 per cent of them will fall within 5 per cent either

5 way of their target? Do you accept those statistics?

6 A. Excuse me, could you repeat it slowly? I

7 didn't get all the figures. I suppose these are common

8 artillery facts, but I should like, before I say yes or

9 no, I'd like to know what it's about.

10 Q. Of course I'll repeat them in a tabular form

11 and I'd note one last figure as well. 68 per cent

12 within 2.5 degrees either way, 95 per cent within 5

13 degrees either way, and 99.5 per cent within 7.5

14 degrees either way.

15 A. I think these are the normal scattering

16 characteristics of these weapons, that is what it is.

17 We know those well-known artillery scattering

18 intervals, that is well-known, that is correct. I

19 don't know exactly these scattering figures.

20 Mr. Hamill will know these figures by heart but, yes,

21 that is correct.

22 However, if you wish, I do have firing tables

23 and I can look at them and then I can give you an

24 accurate answer to your question.

25 Q. Finally, can I suggest -- well, we will be

1 having a break at some stage and it may be, although we

2 shouldn't impose on you over a break, but that would be

3 a useful use of your time.

4 But finally, may I suggest to you that

5 however strong the wind may be, the maximum deviation

6 that the wind is going to cause for this type of shell

7 would be about 3 degrees and no more.

8 A. That is not true.

9 Q. Well, what do you say is the maximum

10 deviation a wind could achieve for a shell of this

11 general magnitude?

12 A. For 122 millimetres, I have tables here, and

13 one knows what the deviation is for a particular wind.

14 If the wind is twice stronger, then it's twice as big;

15 three times, three times. It is -- mostly the linear

16 correlation depends on the strength of the wind. I can

17 give you the figures if you wish.

18 JUDGE MAY: It may be convenient to deal it

19 during the break. We are going to have a break about

20 this time.

21 Is that a convenient moment, Mr. Nice?

22 MR. NICE: Probably as convenient as any,

23 Your Honour, yes.

24 JUDGE MAY: Have you got much more for the

25 witness?

1 MR. NICE: I have got quite a lot. I'm

2 confident that I will be able to deal with both

3 witnesses in the course of today, but this is evidence

4 clearly to be taken carefully.

5 JUDGE MAY: Dr. Jankovic, if you'd like to

6 look at your tables for those points about which you

7 were asked, and then you can refer to them afterwards.

8 Don't speak to anybody, please, about your evidence

9 until it's over. We'll break for half an hour.

10 --- Recess taken at 11.04 a.m.

11 --- On resuming at 11.37 a.m.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. Dr. Jankovic, can you help us with any

15 researches made over the short adjournment?

16 A. Yes, I can. This is a sketch and it is not

17 done to scale. The angles are smaller. I enlarged

18 them only to facilitate their understanding.

19 Look here. This is the effect of the wind.

20 This is the crosswind. The projectile will deviate

21 like this. And let's say it had fallen here. In the

22 firing tables, what the artillery people are using is

23 this angle here. For instance, for the crosswind of 10

24 metres per second, the tables show that this is 20

25 millimetre. When you translate that into the Russian

1 tables, it's 1.2 degree. But the level of the crater

2 is this. This is the plane.

3 And as you see, this angle does not appear in

4 any firing tables. The artillerymen have no use for

5 it. But I created a computer simulation, and in this

6 case the angle most probably was 3.5 degrees. I

7 assumed that the crosswind at the ground level was near

8 zero and that at 6.000 metres was most probably 16

9 metre per second, and the computer gave me the result

10 of 3.5 degrees. So one should not confuse that angle

11 with this angle.

12 Q. We haven't, of course, seen these workings,

13 but are you still saying that the maximum deviation for

14 reasons of wind at the end of the projectile's path is

15 3.5 degrees from whatever was intended?

16 A. Not the maximum. Most probable. And I serve

17 that with full responsibility. I can also give you a

18 demonstration. I have a computer. I have a NATO

19 model, MPMM, modified point materiel model.

20 Q. This assumes a 10-metre-per-second wind, does

21 it?

22 A. No. No. The 3.5 degrees was a result for

23 the wind at zero -- at the ground level, because the

24 witnesses testified that there was no wind at the

25 time. But I don't know what the wind was in the higher

1 altitude. So I took just a value from the tables,

2 which means that even though there was no wind at the

3 ground level, that does not mean that it was not there

4 at the higher altitudes, and I just assumed that it

5 increased as you went higher up.

6 Q. Of course you're -- and the last point I'm

7 going to ask on this, because we haven't been served

8 with advanced detail of all this. But the last point

9 I'm going to ask on this is as follows. Perhaps you'll

10 look at my spectacles. They'll do. I'm holding

11 something up, Dr. Jankovic. It's the easiest way of

12 dealing with something. Dr. Jankovic, could you look

13 at me, please. If this is a projectile going through

14 the air and there's a wind coming from your direction,

15 it's not necessarily going to be turned around as if by

16 the front wheel of a car; the wind is going to move the

17 thing across laterally, isn't it?

18 A. There are two factors to be considered. It's

19 pretty difficult. First, we assume here the so-called

20 Didion principle; that is, the area with this -- with

21 the wind, there is -- and as the space moves, the

22 projectile moves with it. But the projectile changes

23 its speed, its velocity. It slows down going up and

24 then again increases going down.

25 The wind will have the most effect where the

1 velocity is at its lowest, and the effect of the wind

2 is going to be the highest there. And whether it

3 spins, gyrates, it's more of a scientific point. I can

4 discuss it with you here, but I don't think that we

5 should go into that.

6 Q. A very quick point on the short diagram. I'm

7 going to ask you to look at -- I've only got one point

8 at the moment -- on the ELMO. This is a diagram

9 dealing with statistics built entirely on the

10 observations you have made this morning, and therefore

11 taking them, which we don't accept, but taking them on

12 the figures you assert.

13 And if we could have the bottom right-hand

14 corner of the picture in as well. Thank you very

15 much.

16 This is a -- you'd accept, would you not,

17 that if your 5 per cent is accurate, what this shows --

18 I'm sorry it's not very clear.

19 MR. NICE: See if we can get it clearer.

20 It's very light at the moment. Well, if it's not going

21 to work, I'll have to have it back and I'll put it to

22 you in verbal form. It's too light. Can I have it

23 back? We can't afford the time, I'm afraid. No, I'll

24 have it back and I'll deal with it. My mistake. I'll

25 take it back. Perhaps we can get it copied, if we

1 can. I'll come back to it.

2 Q. I return, please, to your report, and I want

3 to deal with some things quickly. Have you got your

4 report open at page 4, paragraph 6? Mr. Hamill's

5 conclusion, as you know, that the calibre was 122

6 millimetres, was built on the firing tables available

7 to him at the time, and there's nothing wrong with him

8 making that conclusion if those were the only tables

9 available to him; correct?

10 A. That may be correct, but that is not all.

11 Q. Since I'm not going to challenge, probably,

12 the firing tables you produce, what it amounts to is:

13 From the firing tables provided to him, he found one

14 calibre shell; you show that there were two others that

15 had the same fuse, and we don't challenge that, all

16 right?

17 Paragraph 7, just as a matter of detail, line

18 2, Mr. Hamill never said anything about the thing being

19 of Russian origin. The word "Russian" doesn't appear

20 in his evidence, I don't think. Do you accept that?

21 A. I may have read it in another witness'

22 finding that there were Russian Cyrillic letters there.

23 Q. Paragraph 8 we don't challenge. Just

24 summarise it because it's helpful and important. It's

25 a little hard to find. You've got three possible

1 projectiles, three possible weapons. In fact, I don't

2 think there's anything else I do need to say on that,

3 but I do need to look at your footnote. "The

4 Prosecution's witnesses are not unanimous on this

5 conclusion." The conclusion that you're referring to

6 here as to the calibre of the shell. "The Zenica

7 investigating judge, who conducted a contemporaneous

8 investigation of the shelling, wrote in his report, and

9 testified, that the calibre of shells used in the

10 shelling was 155 millimetres," and you refer to the

11 Blaskic testimony of the witness Veseljak.

12 I think it's correct, as you will recall,

13 that Veseljak actually first led -- reached the

14 conclusion 155 on a day when he said it was very

15 difficult to do tests, because everything was in the

16 state of crisis, accepted that he was subsequently

17 given reports to suggest that it was 122 but,

18 nevertheless, stuck to his original report because he'd

19 already drafted it as instructed or as commissioned on

20 the first day and stuck to 155.

21 Do you remember that?

22 A. Yes, I remember, and 155 was not mentioned by

23 Veseljak but rather by the expert who was part of the

24 commission together with Veseljak.

25 Q. Exhibit 1019.2 is indeed the other report

1 that was available to Veseljak which was prepared with

2 just a little more time and a little less crisis and,

3 of course, you are in the happy position of being able

4 to read the original or the English version, but in

5 English, it reads, from Husein Hadzimejlic on the 5th

6 of June, and this was an expert opinion on the shelling

7 of Zenica that, "On the 19th of April between 12.00 and

8 1.00, the centre of the town was shelled." Next

9 sentence, "Carried out by HV Croatian units from a

10 122-millimetre howitzer from their position in the

11 Puticevo section on the right-hand side of Nova

12 Bila-Travnik road. Information gleaned from pieces of

13 shrapnel and artillery hits that were noticed spread

14 out on the ground. Contact fuse, high explosives,

15 OX-462Z, six shells in total."

16 No doubt, if you're going to refer to

17 Veseljak's opinion, you'd accept that it's fair to take

18 into account, if we are to take into account at all,

19 the contrary opinion prepared a few days later.

20 A. We discussed that during the previous trial

21 of Mr. Blaskic. If it was 122 millimetre calibre, it

22 does not have the range, it cannot reach from Puticevo

23 to the centre of Zenica. It cannot reach Zenica from

24 Puticevo.

25 Q. I'll come over that as we turn over the page

1 to page five, paragraphs 9 and onwards. I have nothing

2 to say about paragraphs 9 or 10 now that the Russian

3 word has become irrelevant. Paragraph 12, your

4 conclusions, the RGM fuse can be used on each of the

5 projectiles, 122-millimetre howitzer with a range of

6 15.3 kilometres would, in fact, cover the distance from

7 Puticevo to Zenica. There's a map there if you want to

8 check it.

9 A. I checked it if -- on the map where -- which

10 I consulted, I did not see Puticevo, so I cannot say

11 what the distance is between Puticevo and Zenica. My

12 understanding is that it was out of range, but somebody

13 has to determine exactly where this Puticevo is so that

14 we can measure the exact distance from the centre of

15 Zenica, and from the map which I used, it was 16

16 kilometres from this Puticevo to the centre of town.

17 Q. Dr. Jankovic, you've just told us that in

18 Blaskic, you told the Court that it was out of range

19 and now you tell us you've never measured the

20 distance. How can that be?

21 A. I did not measure the distance on the ground,

22 I measured it on the map. And on the map, I showed 16

23 kilometres. And -- but someone has to know the exact

24 distance. I don't know the exact distance. I only

25 showed it on the map. From what I was able to

1 determine by reading the map, it was 16 kilometres.

2 Q. You know, of course, Mr. Hamill, unlike you,

3 visited the area, and I'm going to come to this right

4 at the end and, indeed, found an area in Puticevo

5 suitable for firing in the direction of Zenica. Now,

6 if he measured it and found it could be within range,

7 you've got no reason to challenge him on that, have

8 you?

9 A. I have no reason, no.

10 Q. Because Puticevo is an area probably itself 2

11 kilometres in extent.

12 If we stay with paragraph 12, the position, I

13 think, is this, that the Croats at that time had

14 122-millimetre howitzers. What weapons of either of

15 these two gauges did they have, to your knowledge?

16 A. So far as I know, the Croats in Central

17 Bosnia had the 152-millimetre calibres. I'm not aware

18 of them having the other calibres.

19 Q. So of course the 152-millimetre howitzer

20 would have no trouble reaching Zenica from Puticevo.

21 It would be well within range.

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. If we look at the three weapons, that's

24 looking at it from the Croat's point of view, they had

25 two weapons, assuming Mr. Hamill is right, the 122 and

1 the 152, which could easily have reached Zenica from

2 Puticevo.

3 If we now look at the Serb side, and you may

4 want to have another look at the map which, I'm so

5 sorry, is inconveniencing the interpreters, and perhaps

6 I'll take it down after this exercise and have it

7 moved, if you look due west from Zenica, and think of

8 the three weapons that could have carried this fuse and

9 asked yourself the question: Could the Serbs have

10 fired from due west? The answer comes as follows: 122

11 millimetre would have had insufficient range, couldn't

12 have done it.

13 Likewise, the 130 millimetre one which we've

14 just been referring to at 27.5 kilometres would have

15 had range from the left of that red line, that red

16 front line would have had range to reach Zenica. The

17 third one, the 152 millimetre one which has a range of

18 only 24.4 kilometres would not reach; do you accept

19 that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And even so, the one with the longest range

22 of 27.5 kilometres would only just be able to reach

23 from Serb-held territory, and the problem there is that

24 out west of Zenica at that point of the map, and we can

25 all see straight left, there's no suitable territory

1 there for firing this type of artillery piece; would

2 you accept that?

3 A. I don't know. I was not there.

4 Q. Thank you. Can we turn over then please

5 to --

6 JUDGE MAY: Can we take that down now?

7 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.

8 JUDGE MAY: And Mr. Nice, if you'd have

9 regard to the clock.

10 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, if I may, I will

11 actually have one question about that map so if --

12 JUDGE MAY: Why don't you ask it now?

13 MR. SAYERS: Very well. To do that now, may

14 I have leave just to approach?

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course.

16 Re-examined by Mr. Sayers:

17 Q. Dr. Jankovic, it's been put to you --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Sayers,

19 please.

20 MR. SAYERS:

21 Q. Dr. Jankovic, it's been put to you that it's

22 a 45 degree angle from Mount Vlasic to the centre of

23 Zenica, but Mount Vlasic, if you take a look at the

24 map, is actually an extremely large area, it's a

25 tabletop mountain that lies to the north of Travnik and

1 covers a very large area in here; isn't that right?

2 A. I was not on that mountain, but that is my

3 impression just by observing the map. [In English] I

4 think so. I wasn't there but I think so looking at the

5 map.

6 Q. Topographically, you can see that the map has

7 a tabletop fairly even surface that stretches over a

8 wide area which is why it's such a commanding,

9 strategically important feature?

10 A. [Interpretation] It may -- it could be.

11 Q. Puticevo is this little feature here that was

12 outlined by Mr. Nice, and I believe Vlasic comes down

13 to this point and comes up to this point at the

14 north --

15 MR. NICE: I believe we're now getting --

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice.

17 MR. NICE: We're now getting to the stage of

18 Mr. Sayers giving evidence. There's no evidence to

19 this effect at all, the evidence about where Vlasic is

20 has all been to the contrary effect.

21 JUDGE MAY: It may be that we are going to

22 need some further evidence on this particular topic.

23 In any event, the witness really can't give evidence

24 about it but your point is that -- go on about

25 Puticevo, Mr. Sayers.

1 MR. SAYERS: The point is, Your Honour, that

2 Puticevo is here where I'm indicating. The southerly

3 point of Vlasic, the Vlasic plateau is here. Puticevo

4 here, southerly point of the Vlasic plateau here. And

5 if you measure the angle from the southern point of the

6 Vlasic plateau to Zenica, you get a completely

7 different angle at the southern point than you do from

8 the northern point which was using the 45 degree point

9 that Mr. Nice referred to.

10 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

11 MR. SAYERS: And that's just a matter of

12 cartography, but we're more than happy to produce the

13 one who's familiar with the --

14 JUDGE MAY: Whether we need that or not, it

15 doesn't matter. That sounds like a matter for

16 argument. Is that all?

17 MR. SAYERS: And the second question is

18 simply a matter of measurement.

19 Q. We viewed a map, the Zenica 4 series,

20 yesterday and measured the distance from the Puticevo

21 feature to the centre of Zenica, where the shells fell,

22 and I think you've said that that distance was 16

23 kilometres. Was that within or outside the range of a

24 D-30J 122-millimetre artillery weapon?

25 A. Yes. I said so. I measured 16 kilometres,

1 and that is out of the 122-millimetre howitzer's range.

2 JUDGE MAY: And what is the range of the 122,

3 then, Dr. Jankovic?

4 A. It is really dangerous to answer that

5 question, because there are two standards whereby the

6 range is determined: There is the NATO standard and

7 the Russian standard. Usually one uses the Russian

8 standard because it being a Russian weapon, and its

9 range is about 15 kilometres, 300 metres, perhaps a few

10 metres less. That is according to the Russian

11 standard.

12 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Can we take the map

13 down now, please?

14 MR. NICE: Yes.

15 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

16 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice [Cont'd]:

17 Q. Dr. Jankovic, just help me, please. I asked

18 you before this adjournment whether we could eliminate

19 Vlasic as of relevance because it was too far away.

20 You're now being reminded of what you looked at

21 yesterday at the map and you give a different answer.

22 How? How can that come, please?

23 A. If I may, it all depends on where those

24 weapons are and what is Vlasic. It is known exactly

25 what is the range of weapons. If any of their

1 positions were within that range, then they could have

2 fired; if not, then, naturally, not.

3 Q. Equally, when you return to what the position

4 was in May and the conclusions were of shellings coming

5 from an area six kilometres north of Travnik, that was

6 a part of Vlasic well outside any parameters of error

7 on the part of shells for these purposes; it was far

8 too far away, wasn't it?

9 A. I don't know. I have to look exactly at

10 where the position is, where are these 24 kilometres --

11 for 152, that's 24 kilometres -- and if so, if it's

12 possible, then it's possible; if it's not possible,

13 then it's not possible. That's all I can say.

14 Q. And finally, when I explain to you that

15 Mr. Hamill, who had about there, found the area and

16 measured it and said it was within range, you accepted

17 it. Can you help me, please, with how you then change

18 your answer?

19 A. I do not know where the weapon was. If

20 Mr. Hamill says that it was within the range, then it

21 is so. If it was outside that range, then it is not

22 so. I cannot say whether it was within or not, because

23 I do not know where the weapon was.

24 Q. Thank you. May we now, then, look, please,

25 at the same exhibit, that is, the general Exhibit

1 D202.1. But may we look at tab 15, which is actually

2 Exhibit D164.1. Sorry, D164/1.

3 First of all, then, if we look at -- sorry.

4 If we look at D164/1, a milinfosum, that's a military

5 information summary, for the 6th of June, a little

6 later, it says this of the location of weapons, so far

7 as the BSA is concerned. Under D -- do you see that?

8 -- it gives there 122- and 155-millimetre howitzers

9 and it gives the reference points, which we can all

10 see, all in the Vlasic feature and all quite close

11 together. And they're all far to the north. Do you

12 accept that?

13 MR. SAYERS: I just object to the form of

14 that question, Your Honour, because it's quite clear

15 that this milinfosum refers to artillery dispositions

16 of the BSA in the Tuzla area.

17 JUDGE MAY: I don't think the witness can

18 help us with this.

19 MR. NICE: It may have to turn up in

20 argument. But can we then turn to the next exhibit in

21 the bundle, which is Z1044, one of the Defence

22 exhibits. I can always make mine available if it would

23 help. It's part of, and I'll just -- I'll hand it all

24 to the usher, but open at the one line I want. It's a

25 milinfosum for the 11th of June, and it's that sheet.

1 Lay it on the ELMO, please.

2 Q. This is again a military information

3 document, and what it says, in relation now to the

4 Croat disposition of forces, we can see, in the Vitez

5 area, under paragraph 11, is that there were 255 Nora

6 howitzers in the Mosunj quarry. Well, do you know

7 this: The Mosunj quarry is not only not on Puticevo;

8 it's a little bit south of Puticevo, but well within

9 range of Zenica. Would you accept that?

10 A. I do not know anything about it. I do not

11 know. But Nora is 152-millimetre calibre, so this has

12 to be corrected.

13 Q. Well, for the want of time, I'm going to pass

14 over that particular point, although I could deal with

15 it. And can we return, please, now to your report.

16 And we are on to the last page -- no, not the last

17 page -- page 6, where you deal first with crater

18 analysis to ascertain calibre of shells. And I'm not

19 going to deal with that, because what you're saying is

20 it's an inaccurate method, isn't that correct,

21 imprecise method?

22 A. It's not, no.

23 Q. I'm not going to debate that issue with you.

24 The Court has heard some witnesses who rely on it, but

25 I'm not challenging in substance what you say about its

1 limitations.

2 If we go to paragraph 15, you make some

3 references there to the sort of ground that these

4 craters fell on. Asphalt is a very good surface, would

5 you accept, for what we find on the following page,

6 page 7, at paragraph 17, which is the only analysis of

7 craters done by Mr. Hamill?

8 A. I do not know what term I'm supposed to

9 accept.

10 Q. Well, let's deal with this in stages. First

11 of all, your report, it happens, doesn't deal with

12 Mr. Hamill's evidence really at all on the use he made

13 of crater analysis. You don't comment on it at all, do

14 you?

15 A. I did not.

16 Q. Was that your choice or the lawyer's?

17 A. It was my choice, because my approach is as

18 I've written it down here.

19 Q. Mr. Hamill made no attempt to gauge the type

20 of shell from the crater; he used the crater only to

21 deal with the direction of incoming fire. You accept

22 that, don't you?

23 A. I do for an approximate determination of the

24 direction. That is what we talked about.

25 Q. He did not do it by photographs, as seems to

1 be being implied at some stage in the evidence. As you

2 must know from his evidence, he visited the area,

3 looked at the existing craters, and was able to confirm

4 what they were by reference to photographs taken at the

5 time. Do you accept that?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR. NICE: May we now, please, look at the

8 document that was earlier not visible on the ELMO, and

9 which can be distributed as Exhibit 2822.

10 Q. I repeat, Doctor, that I'm not a

11 statistician, and my understanding of terms you were

12 referring to is therefore untutored. But I think what

13 you talked about when you spoke of the Gaussian

14 distribution is something we can reduce to

15 understandable terminology with which I hope you will

16 agree.

17 This little diagram is built on your own

18 calculations of a standard 5 per cent deviation, and

19 what it shows is that on the basis of your figures of 5

20 per cent -- which we don't necessarily accept, but 5

21 per cent -- 68 per cent of firings would land within 5

22 per cent either side; 95 per cent would land within 10

23 degrees of either side; 99.5 per cent would land within

24 15 degrees of either side; and the remaining half per

25 cent would lie outside that range. Converted into

1 something that the layman can easily understand, would

2 you accept that there is a 1 in 200 chance of an error

3 more than 15 degrees, a 1 in 20 chance of an error more

4 than 10 degrees, a 2 to 1 chance of an error more than

5 5 degrees, and a 1 to 2 chance of an error less than 5

6 degrees?

7 A. Artillerymen, gunmen, they call this one

8 probable deviation, and this area, plus/minus so much,

9 is 50 per cent, which means that 50 per cent is within

10 and 50 per cent without, and that is the most probable

11 value that I used. So when I said that the angle was

12 most probably 5 degrees, it means that the chances --

13 that the odds are 50 per cent that it will be within

14 these 5 per cent and 50 per cent that it will be

15 without. And then the probability goes more or less as

16 you described it. There is a very low probability that

17 it could be as large as that. That is correct.

18 Q. Now these probabilities, thank you for that.

19 If we can put that on --

20 A. Just one thing more. May I add something?

21 Q. Of course.

22 A. So the most probable value here, if we're

23 talking about the maximum, the word that you used then

24 we mean this one here, four times.

25 Q. Now, that distribution of variation is, as it

1 were theoretical, built on your factual assumption

2 about five per cent. Of course, theoretical

3 determinations have to be modulated by real experience

4 of a particular event.

5 MR. NICE: May I hand in Exhibit 2260 which I

6 have lightly highlighted, 2260.3, which I have lightly

7 highlighted, to assist the witness and if it can go on

8 the ELMO. I hope the highlighted colours will show

9 up. I don't think they do very satisfactorily but to

10 some degree they do.

11 Q. I've tried to highlight the shell position

12 landing in yellow and green, but the green shows up,

13 the yellow doesn't very well.

14 The evidence has been, Dr. Jankovic, if you

15 look at the bottom of the two pairs of colours, that

16 there was a yellow and green shell landing in that

17 southern position. Further up the page, there was a

18 yellow one more significantly to the left, and then the

19 green one near the apex of the little triangle that's

20 formed there, and then at the top, and again the yellow

21 one isn't very easy to see, there was two more shells,

22 one yellow one green close together. That's what was

23 found on the ground.

24 Do you accept that?

25 A. Yes, yes, yes.

1 Q. All right. Dealing with the one that's a

2 little further to the left or west, that is the one in

3 the middle, the shortfall of that shell could easily be

4 explained, could it not, by what you were saying about

5 some shells being of different weight in times of war?

6 A. Different weight markings, as we call that.

7 Q. That can easily explain that. But the

8 general extreme close proximity of these shells one to

9 another shows, does it not, that they fall within -- on

10 our statistical diagram, well within the central area

11 of the five per cent error and, frankly, they show a

12 pretty high level of accuracy. You would accept that,

13 wouldn't you?

14 A. I calculated that and that is a difficult

15 question to answer. The statistical scattering of

16 these shells can mean that they belong to the same --

17 to one and the same group but it does not have to mean

18 that. That is both answers are possible.

19 Q. If we accept the evidence for the time being,

20 that the order in which the shells landed was as

21 follows: The bottom two first, the middle two next,

22 the top two last. With your knowledge of the army,

23 that is entirely consistent with there being somebody

24 providing information of where shells are landing and

25 that information being reported back to the

1 artillerymen, and then making appropriate adjustments

2 to their firing in order to better reach their

3 targets.

4 A. No. Other explanations are also feasible.

5 Q. Well, all right. Let's deal with that in two

6 stages. First of all, what I propose to do which is

7 what Mr. Hamill gave in evidence is one explanation and

8 I'd like it correct and then please tell us what the

9 other explanations are.

10 A. What Mr. Hamill said is correct, either

11 explanations are. I know from the rules of firing of

12 the Yugo army when you fire at a target with a certain

13 area, then the firing direction changes over time, and

14 this could have been the case of firing at a surface

15 target, that is, as Mr. Hamill said. I could agree

16 that there were two weapons which were firing, that one

17 projectile and then they changed the direction, again,

18 they fired one projectile each, then they slightly

19 shifted direction and then again takes turns. So that

20 is another possible explanation.

21 Q. If these shots were fired in the way

22 suggested, moving first once and then the second time

23 in a northerly direction, and if the firing then

24 stopped, that would again, as Mr. Hamill has suggested,

25 fit with there being an intended object and with that

1 object having been effectively hit; correct?

2 A. Perhaps, but again, there may be other

3 explanations.

4 Q. And it's always possible that everything is

5 entirely at random, but there's no reason to believe

6 that these firings were entirely at random, is there?

7 A. I wouldn't know.

8 Q. Mr. Hamill told us, although you haven't

9 dealt with this in your report, that his experience of

10 crater analysis for the purpose of finding direction of

11 incoming fire is that it is accurate within a degree or

12 so, a couple of degrees. You don't challenge that, do

13 you?

14 A. We just talked about it, and I said that in

15 my view, with the probability of 50 per cent that

16 measurement error would be about five degrees.

17 Q. But you have no experience to base that on

18 because you've never done it yourself.

19 A. When I said that it was five degrees, the

20 probable error -- I hypothesised that the

21 measurement -- excuse me for a moment -- so my

22 hypothesis is this angle was measured accurately. I

23 did not calculate any error into my measurement. So it

24 is measured accurately. But between that direction and

25 this direction, there is this big one and it -- I'm

1 talking about this value that it is most probably about

2 3.5 degrees so -- and people say, and I also consulted

3 other people how accurate could the measurement be of

4 the crater symmetry and everybody said it's about two

5 degrees and I believe Mr. Hamill has said the same

6 thing, and I accept it. But then this error has to be

7 added to these 3.5 degrees, and I didn't even take that

8 into account.

9 The thing is, this direction could have been

10 determined accurately, but it is not the direction

11 where the weapons was. The weapon is here, and this

12 measurement direction is here. This is exaggerated,

13 isn't it?

14 Q. Let me just see if I understand this, having

15 none of your special expertise. I have to use my arm.

16 If you look at my arm, please. My arm indicates the

17 incoming fire, and if my elbow is Mr. Hamill standing

18 to check on what angle it's coming from, and your

19 method of identifying the incoming line of fire may be

20 inaccurate by a couple of degrees on either side;

21 that's the point, isn't it?

22 A. The measurement of that angle, the

23 measurement of that angle, the angle of your arm is one

24 to two degrees probably, I wouldn't know. But I

25 accepted that it was measured accurately.

1 However, your arm shows points at the plane

2 of the crater symmetry whereas the gun could have been

3 here and then because of the wind, its path was curved

4 and it landed there. That is what I'm repeating and

5 that tolerance is 3.5 degrees, or rather one has to add

6 to it 1.5 degrees and so on.

7 Q. And I don't know where the figure of 3.5

8 comes from, we don't have time to explore it, but can I

9 just make this point if we go back to the plan that --

10 A. From computer simulations, from computer

11 simulations, exactly for 122-millimetre for the maximum

12 range.

13 Q. Doctor, the material --

14 JUDGE MAY: Let's not go --

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. But if we go back please to the diagram, if

17 you move your book off the ELMO and just look at the

18 diagram again. Where we see the cluster where the

19 shells landed, whatever may have been the accuracy or

20 inaccuracy of the calculation of the incoming shell,

21 the cluster of these shell craters shows that there was

22 no significant or affecting variation at the point of

23 discharge of the guns. They were slowly and

24 methodically moving comparative short distances to

25 their target. That's correct, isn't it?

1 A. I don't know.

2 Q. They certainly -- this is my last point on

3 this. The clustering of those shells and the direction

4 in which they moved as a series points towards accuracy

5 and points towards any unforecast deviation by wind at

6 the point of firing.

7 A. I don't know.

8 Q. One point on your tables, just a matter of

9 detail, if you'd look, please, over a couple of pages

10 in your report to the very first of the firing tables,

11 just a little oddity in this document that I wonder if

12 you could clear up for me.

13 The document is dated 1984 at the bottom.

14 We've only got a photocopy and yet at the top it's got

15 the symbol of the Croatian chequerboard which I think

16 would have been unacceptable in 1984 on a national

17 document of this kind. The table you looked at, was it

18 in this form or is this some form of composite heading

19 that's been put on this table?

20 A. In original, there was a five-point star in

21 that location, and as the HVO used these tables, they

22 put on top of the five-point star the chequerboard

23 which is the Croatian symbol.

24 Q. A small point, but that symbol is the

25 Republic of Croatia at the top, isn't it?

1 JUDGE MAY: No, but you can see it's at an

2 angle. Do let's move on.

3 A. Correct.

4 JUDGE MAY: Look, it's a very -- Mr. Nice,

5 it's a very small point. The time of this Trial

6 Chamber is being taken up by unnecessary

7 cross-examination. Now let us bring this

8 cross-examination to a conclusion.

9 MR. NICE: With respect, not on this topic,

10 it is very important.

11 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, we will be the judges

12 of what is important and what isn't, and as far as this

13 cross-examination is concerned, it's gone on long

14 enough in my view.

15 MR. NICE: Well, I'm sorry that Your Honour

16 takes that view.

17 JUDGE MAY: Don't interrupt. Now please

18 let's get on.

19 MR. NICE: I'm afraid that I have to make our

20 position clear on these important topics and this is an

21 important topic. This evidence will be the subject of

22 considerable argument at the end of the day.

23 The witness is providing important and

24 helpful answers and I've come actually to the end, I

25 think, subject to checking my notes but the last point

1 I want to make is an important one.

2 Q. Now, Dr. Jankovic, you agreed with me at the

3 beginning that scientific method involves reaching a

4 conclusion by one area and confirming it in another; do

5 you remember?

6 A. Yes, that happens.

7 Q. You accept that Mr. Hamill worked back from

8 his crater analysis, toured the area, and located a

9 suitable firing position in flatlands in the Puticevo

10 area.

11 A. Those are facts. I have nothing to add.

12 Q. We now know from a Defence witness of

13 considerable seniority in the HVO, transcript 17225,

14 that in April 1993, there were howitzers of both 122

15 and 152 calibre west of Zenica at Puticevo in the broad

16 area of Puticevo. That independent evidence, would you

17 accept, that there were such weapons there, is bound to

18 confirm the scientific findings of Mr. Hamill. Would

19 you accept that?

20 A. I don't know. I would need to know which

21 things were there, have to analyse it, and then give

22 you an answer. Otherwise it's too dangerous to just

23 say yes or no, tell you yes or no because I could be

24 mistaken.

25 Q. My last question on that answer and my last

1 question of you is that subject only to the possible

2 issue of range of 122-millimetre weapons, subject only

3 to that, each of these weapons, the 122 and the 152

4 calibre weapons held by the HVO in Puticevo, could have

5 sent these shells to Zenica, and there is nothing in

6 what you have seen to make that an improbable

7 conclusion.

8 A. If there was a Nora 152-millimetre artillery

9 weapon, it certainly could have sent the shell to

10 Zenica. I was not in Central Bosnia. I cannot speak

11 to -- as to who had what at the time there, but as an

12 engineer, as a person who worked in the logistics, my

13 knowledge is that the Croatian army did not have

14 ammunition for 152-millimetre at that time. I made

15 tables for 152 but how the projectiles were OF 540 and

16 530 which are used for the Nora weapons were only

17 acquired a year later.

18 We regretted that we did not have projectiles

19 for these weapons which by myself and other experts

20 were considered very good weapons.

21 MR. NICE: Thank you.

22 MR. SAYERS: No redirect examination, Your

23 Honour.

24 JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Dr. Jankovic, for

25 coming to give your evidence. It's now concluded. You

1 are free to go.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, it

3 was an honour for me.

4 [The witness withdrew]

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Next witness, please.

6 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, based upon the

7 estimate of cross-examination, we've asked the witness

8 to be available after lunch. Would it be possible to

9 take a somewhat early lunch break and maybe come back

10 20 minutes earlier than normal?

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

13 MR. NICE: Could we have private session for

14 just a couple of minutes, please?

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

16 [Private session]

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5 [Open session]

6 JUDGE MAY: But continuing with the matter,

7 you yourself raised the issue of when this trial was to

8 finish and have suggested that you might have an

9 extensive rebuttal case.

10 It is far too early to determine the scope of

11 that case, but it's going to be very much within your

12 hands as to whether this case does finish in November

13 or not. And speaking for myself, I regard the amount

14 of detail which the Prosecution has thought necessary

15 to bring forward as a serious matter, and one we shall

16 have to review in due course as to whether it was

17 necessary. But for the moment, of course, I have in

18 mind your duty to present your case as you think right,

19 but I do ask you to have in mind our duty to try the

20 case expeditiously and the fact that we determine what

21 is relevant and what isn't and what significance we

22 wish to be placed on evidence.

23 Having regard to the length of the evidence

24 in chief, it is my view that more than enough time has

25 been devoted to cross-examination. I would not

1 consider putting counsel under any sort of pressure,

2 and would indeed make no comment unless I thought it

3 was really necessary. For the moment, I think we can

4 leave it at that.

5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes, but I would

6 desire just to say, I think, one thing, or perhaps two

7 of importance, and I think they are important. I'm

8 only mentioning them in private session -- I'm quite

9 happy to be in public session -- because --

10 JUDGE MAY: I think we are in public session.

11 MR. NICE: I'm quite happy to mention them

12 all. The thing that is concerning me, and has

13 concerned me for some time, arises in this way really:

14 First of all, we are being blamed from time to time for

15 the length of the case, but I have to remind the

16 Chamber that there was nothing agreed, despite every

17 effort, nothing at all, and the Chamber is now faced

18 with the reality that the Defence cases are simply

19 neither continuing to challenge nor calling evidence on

20 very large areas of evidence that we said from the

21 beginning should not have been the subject of live

22 evidence. So I'm afraid I simply, on behalf of the

23 Prosecution, cannot accept that we were over long,

24 because we did what we were compelled to do by

25 circumstances that arose.

1 And on the second point, so far as

2 cross-examination is concerned --

3 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Please, can you wait a

4 second, please. I have to consult with the President.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] I would like

7 to tell you, Mr. Nice, my personal opinion with regard

8 to what goes on in this Chamber. In this Chamber the

9 two parties to the case that we are hearing now have

10 both right to express their concerns. The Presiding

11 Judge, at a given moment, gives the view of the

12 Chamber. But we are not conducting a permanent

13 dialogue. Once the opinion of the Chamber has been

14 given, one needs to stop the dialogue at a given

15 moment. We are not here in a permanent discussion.

16 We're not involved in an ongoing dialogue. This is not

17 the place for a dialogue; this is a place for a

18 judgement. So that I'm saying I express my opinion,

19 but I should like to ask you to observe that

20 procedure. The President has given you the opinion of

21 the Chamber on the manner in which this case is

22 conducted, and I think that that is where one must put

23 an end to it.

24 MR. NICE: I quite accept that, save that

25 where criticism is mounted, I'm entitled to answer,

1 basically.

2 And my only other point, and I was going to

3 make this directly in answer to one of the points

4 raised by His Honour Judge May is this: In the Defence

5 case, let it be remembered, we have been provided with

6 material, typically, at the last moment within the

7 timetable, a timetable has been set, and we have met

8 that timetable without stretching into a second day on

9 all, save, I think, one witness. We have always cut

10 our cross-examination down, and we will today. There

11 are two witnesses for today. They will both be

12 finished today. And we have, I have to say, with

13 respect, honoured our duty, indeed gone beyond it, in

14 ensuring that the timetable set by the Defence, not by

15 us, is not broken. And it's been hard work to do

16 that. And I have to say that, for example, with this

17 last witness, it may be there was a lot of potential

18 for obfuscation in what was adduced, and what I have

19 asked him has, I hope, made it quite possible for

20 matters to be clear and succinct in closing arguments.

21 And I'm grateful for the opportunity of being able to

22 make that point in answer to Judge May's observations.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: A general comment I'd like

24 to make on cross-examination by both parties is that

25 some of the cross-examination could be avoided and

1 could be appropriately left to submissions. And I say

2 this even taking into account that when you make your

3 submissions, you obviously must have a background in

4 the evidence, but I would still conclude that some of

5 it could properly be left to submissions at the end of

6 the case, and that would shorten the cross-examination

7 appreciably. And this relates to cross-examination by

8 both parties.

9 MR. NICE: We'll do our best further to

10 abbreviate.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. It's now 10 to 1.00.

12 We'll take a slightly longer than usual -- no. On

13 reflection, perhaps we could come back at 20 past 2.00

14 and start the witness then. Twenty past 2.00.

15 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.51 p.m.

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1 --- On resuming at 2.25 p.m.

2 [The witness entered court]

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness take the

4 declaration.

5 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

6 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

7 truth.

8 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 WITNESS: JURE CAVARA

11 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

12 Examined by Mr. Sayers:

13 Q. Mr. Cavara, just for purposes of the record

14 will you please state your full name for the record?

15 A. My name is Jure Cavara. I was born on 14

16 March 1948 in the village of Solakovici in the

17 municipality of Busovaca. I am married and I have

18 three children. I live in the village of Donji

19 Solakovici in the municipality of Busovaca.

20 Q. Now, Mr. Cavara, you have signed an affidavit

21 that was dated May 19th, 2000; correct?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And everything in that affidavit, is it true

24 or is it not?

25 A. It is correct and true, and I stand by it.

1 Q. All right. Mr. Cavara, there's only one

2 other subject that I would like to raise since you are

3 here that's beyond, specifically, what's contained in

4 your affidavit. We can all read your affidavit so

5 there's no point in going over that. Let me just ask

6 you this: Do you know a man named Anto Juric?

7 A. I know him. This was in 1993. He was the

8 commander of the 1st Battalion.

9 Q. The 1st Battalion of the Nikola

10 Subic-Zrinjski Brigade?

11 A. 1st Battalion of the Nikola Subic-Zrinjski

12 Brigade of Busovaca.

13 Q. All right. Mr. Cavara, let me draw your

14 attention to an event that occurred in August of 1992,

15 a line up of HVO soldiers. Were you present at that

16 lineup?

17 A. Yes, I was.

18 Q. And was Mr. Juric present at that lineup as

19 far as you're aware?

20 A. Yes, Mr. Juric was also there as commander of

21 the 1st Battalion of the HVO Busovaca municipal staff.

22 Q. All right. And this was actually, I believe,

23 sir, a little bit before the Nikola Subic-Zrinjski

24 Brigade was formally established.

25 A. No, that was the first lineup of the HVO in

1 Busovaca which was held in August 1992.

2 Q. And what did Mr. Juric do at this lineup, if

3 you can recall?

4 A. Mr. Juric reported to the chief of municipal

5 HVO Busovaca staff, Mr. Niko Cosic.

6 Q. Are you sure that this lineup was in August

7 of 1992 as opposed to June or July of 1992?

8 A. I'm 100 per cent sure because this lineup was

9 on the 20th of August, 1992.

10 Q. All right. Now, you've just said that

11 Mr. Juric presented a report to Mr. Cosic.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Are you sure that it was Mr. Cosic and not

14 Mr. Kordic that the report was presented to?

15 A. I'm 100 per cent certain.

16 Q. The final question sir is when exactly was

17 the Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade actually formed?

18 A. The Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade was formed

19 on 19 December 1992 when it was formally brought into

20 existence at the football field in Busovaca.

21 MR. SAYERS: Thank you very much. No further

22 questions, sir.

23 MR. KOVACIC: No, thank you, Your Honour, we

24 don't have any questions.

25 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

1 Q. Mr. Cavara, you are here to give evidence

2 about various topics. Do you know what topics you are

3 expected to cover today?

4 A. I came in respect of the defence of Mr. Dario

5 Kordic and the topics are that Dario Kordic never had

6 any military power or any commanding position.

7 MR. NICE: Thank you. May the witness

8 therefore please see Exhibit 243.

9 Q. While that's being brought to you,

10 Mr. Cavara, you would accept, would you not, that the

11 people most likely to know whether Kordic had power

12 over and authority over or with Blaskic is Kordic and

13 Blaskic themselves; would you accept that?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Why not?

16 A. Because Mr. Kordic had no power over the

17 Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade nor did he have any

18 commanding authority either over myself or my

19 predecessor, Mr. Dusko Grubesic.

20 Q. Or over any military matters, would that be

21 right?

22 A. Over no military matters because Mr. Kordic

23 was only a political figure.

24 Q. Thank you. I come back to my question. The

25 people most likely to know, would be able to help us

1 with who -- whether Kordic had military power, and

2 particularly whether he had military power with or over

3 Blaskic would be Kordic and Blaskic themselves.

4 A. Yes. I was the commander of the brigade

5 before, and before that I was the assistant for

6 training of the brigade, so I was able to see all the

7 orders coming to the brigade.

8 Q. Can you just have a look at this document,

9 please, in the original version. You may not have seen

10 it before. And it's the last page of it. It's a

11 document that's dated 21st of October, 1992. It deals

12 with things in Novi Travnik. And if you turn over the

13 pages, it deals with the HVO. And if you come to

14 paragraph 10, you'll find that the following is

15 written. I read it in the English version. Perhaps

16 you would be good enough to follow it in the version

17 you have.

18 "While defence operations are being

19 conducted, the vice-president of the HZ HB, Dario

20 Kordic, and I are in Novi Travnik, continuously leading

21 the military operations, through deep knowledge of the

22 situation and by keeping all forces under our

23 control."

24 You'll then see at the end of that is the

25 place for signatures of Blaskic and Kordic, and a

1 handwritten receipt. You were first involved in

2 matters in the middle of 1992, were you?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can you explain how this man who you say has

5 no military authority should be described in that way

6 by Blaskic, the passage I've just read to you?

7 A. Will you please let me read the document

8 which I just received.

9 Q. Paragraph 10 is what I want you to read.

10 A. I read that document, that is, paragraph 10,

11 and according to this, I see nothing from which one

12 could glean that Dario Kordic had any commanding duty.

13 He was there only as a political figure.

14 Q. Very well. Let's turn from that to 1993.

15 You were involved in the Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade

16 from January; correct?

17 A. I was involved in it before, with the HVO

18 Busovaca Municipal Staff, and after January I was in a

19 different position.

20 Q. You were in the brigade, and the person in

21 charge of the brigade for most of 1993 was Dusko

22 Grubesic?

23 A. Yes. From the beginning of January 1993 I

24 was in a duty of the chief of training, until August

25 1993.

1 Q. So that Dusko Grubesic is --

2 A. And from August 1993 until 11 October 1993, I

3 was in -- I had the duty of the chief of brigade. On

4 the 11th October, 1993, I was appointed the commander

5 of the brigade, and I was in that duty until 1st

6 October, 1997. That is --

7 Q. Thank you.

8 A. -- from the beginning until then, the

9 commander of the brigade was Dusko Grubesic.

10 Q. So for that period, the period of 1993, the

11 person who best knows by whom he was ordered, from whom

12 he received orders, is Dusko Grubesic; correct?

13 A. Yes. Dusko Grubesic received orders from the

14 commander of Central Bosnia Operative Zone, Colonel --

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

16 otherwise we take too much time. The person who best

17 knows from whom he receives orders is Dusko Grubesic;

18 just yes or no?

19 A. Yes. But I can add that all orders had to

20 first come to the training centre of the brigade, where

21 I was on duty, and this is where they were processed

22 and then forwarded to the subordinate units.

23 Q. Where is Dusko Grubesic at the moment?

24 A. Dusko Grubesic, I think, is still with the

25 Federation army.

1 Q. So far as you know, alive and well?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You cannot speak, even on the basis of your

4 evidence, of what instructions Grubesic received

5 informally, and other than by written orders, passing

6 through the system you described, can you?

7 A. Duties which I carried out all together and

8 all orders had to go through the training department,

9 because Dusko Grubesic could not command outside of the

10 command and control duties.

11 Q. I don't understand that, I'm afraid. I don't

12 understand that: "Dusko Grubesic could not command

13 outside of the command and control duties." My

14 question was --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. My question was: If somebody in authority

17 gave him an order or instruction verbally, for example,

18 he would be in no position to know one way or another

19 whether that instruction had been given and who gave

20 it?

21 A. Such orders could not have been issued,

22 because oral orders were not being taken; only the

23 written ones.

24 Q. Very well. The written orders to which you

25 refer, where are they now?

1 A. The written orders were delivered to the

2 district command.

3 Q. They still exist in some archive, do they?

4 A. Yes, they must exist in some archive, because

5 all the orders of the commander of the Vitez

6 headquarters had to be turned over.

7 Q. You haven't looked at or tried to look at any

8 written orders before coming to give evidence here?

9 A. No, because I had no need to.

10 Q. You can remember everything, can you?

11 A. Yes, every event and every date.

12 Q. I want a picture, please, of Busovaca -- just

13 let me go back on that. Every event and every date.

14 Have you gone through these events recently or written

15 them down or made notes?

16 A. No, I didn't have access to any notes or any

17 documents. It is true that at home I have some notes

18 which I kept.

19 Q. I want a picture of Busovaca, please. It's a

20 very small town, isn't it?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Just a few hundred metres across.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So that the Judges can have a picture of it,

25 does it have a cinema? How small is it? Does it have

1 a cinema? Does it have one petrol station or two

2 petrol stations? Give us a picture.

3 A. In 1992, 1993, there was only one petrol

4 station and now there are two, and there is no cinema.

5 Q. Your brigade was based there. Was there any

6 other brigade based there?

7 A. No, it wasn't. Only the Nikola

8 Subic-Zrinjski Brigade of Busovaca. No other unit was

9 deployed in the territory of Busovaca.

10 Q. What about police units?

11 A. The police units only existed insofar as the

12 civilian police is concerned and small military police

13 presence, the strength of a platoon.

14 Q. So that just in 1993, give a figure, if you

15 can, an approximation will do, for the total number of

16 civilian police and the total number of military

17 police.

18 A. The civilian police at first were about 40

19 and the military only 15.

20 Q. When people in Busovaca in 1993 or since

21 spoke of the HVO, who would they be speaking of, the

22 brigade?

23 A. They were referring to the brigade. At

24 first, the brigades were established on a territorial

25 principle in 1992 and they were part of the Busovaca

1 municipal staff, and in December 1992, the brigade was

2 established and then it was referred to as the brigade

3 units.

4 Q. Thank you. In referring to the HVO, people

5 would not be referring to the civilian police or even

6 to the military police, would they?

7 A. No, because both the civilian and the

8 military police only had authority to maintain peace

9 and control over the territory.

10 Q. So when, in the beginning of January of 1993,

11 just in the start of the beginning, although I'm not

12 going through everything in detail for want of time,

13 but in the beginning of 1993 when the HVO restricted

14 the movement of people, it was your unit that did it.

15 Why?

16 A. I didn't understand the question.

17 Q. Peoples' freedom of movement in Busovaca,

18 according to witnesses we've heard, was restricted

19 right in January of 1993. It was restricted by the

20 HVO, that means it was restricted by your unit. Why?

21 A. That is not correct.

22 Q. There's no truth in that at all? People were

23 free to move around, were they?

24 A. They could go wherever they wanted to.

25 Q. Very well. The Judges have heard the

1 evidence. If we move on to the 20th of January of

2 1993, what orders, if you've seen all the orders, what

3 orders was it that --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- the HVO gave to destroy the Muslim

6 businesses, please?

7 A. Such an order never existed. That means that

8 it could happen in a situation when there was certain

9 disorganisation that certain incidents could occur

10 which were outside of the chain of command.

11 Q. Please explain that. We've heard that it was

12 the HVO who destroyed these buildings. How did that

13 come about?

14 A. HVO could not have destroyed that and no

15 members of the HVO units could have done so.

16 Q. What about the murder of the person Mirsad

17 Delija. You, as an important person in the brigade,

18 must know how that came about.

19 A. I don't know anything about that incident.

20 Q. We've heard that prominent Muslims on the

21 20th of January and thereabouts were arrested and

22 taken -- rounded up by the HVO. Can you tell us,

23 please, about the written order that led to that

24 happening?

25 A. Such an order was never issued and never

1 existed.

2 Q. Can you explain how the rounding up of people

3 then by the HVO happened? We have evidence about it

4 being heard by the Judges, you see.

5 A. Yes, but it is certain that I don't know

6 anything certain about this event, nor about under what

7 circumstances it took place.

8 Q. Well, you knew and know about all the written

9 orders. If these things happened, then they happened

10 without orders, didn't they?

11 A. Without orders issued, that means no order

12 was issued to any individual or group to commit such an

13 act.

14 Q. But the HVO was under the control and no

15 doubt the firm control of Dusko Grubesic?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Therefore, if members of the HVO were doing

18 the things I've suggested to you, it was Dusko Grubesic

19 who was running them, who was having them done;

20 correct?

21 A. I think he couldn't have done that without

22 having issued a written order.

23 Q. He could have done it, couldn't he, if he'd

24 been instructed to do so by some other superior and

25 been instructed verbally?

1 A. I personally think that Dusko Grubesic would

2 never have ordered such a thing, nor any other person.

3 Q. Dario Kordic was based in the village or the

4 town, wasn't he?

5 A. No. He had his office in a location in a

6 facility called Tisovac.

7 Q. In the beginning he did. Did you go there?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Subsequently, he based himself in the PTT

10 building. Did you see him there?

11 A. Yes, I saw him only once. He came by briefly

12 to inquire about the situation on the ground.

13 Q. We'll come to that later, not long later

14 because I don't have that much to ask you. I'm not

15 going to take this witness through all the evidence

16 that's been given about what happened in Busovaca in

17 light of his answers on the first topics, so I hope I

18 won't be criticised for not doing so.

19 As early as the 3rd of February of 1993 and

20 also on the 5th of February of 1993, officers of the

21 British battalion met Kordic in the PTT building in the

22 basement there in a bunker. Your headquarters, I

23 think, were in a similar place; is that right?

24 A. The forward command post of the brigade

25 command was -- that is on the 25th of January, 1993,

1 when the ABiH attacked the HVO units. And as far as

2 the meeting with the British battalion, I don't know

3 much about that. That is with the British battalion

4 officers.

5 Q. But can you help us, please, with why

6 Mr. Kordic had moved his base, if he had done, from

7 Tisovac down to the centre of the town? Was it because

8 he was assuming more military responsibility?

9 A. As I said, the forward command post, command

10 post of the brigade command was in the PTT building.

11 His offices, his proper offices continued to be in --

12 at Tisovac.

13 JUDGE MAY: My recollection was that he was

14 in PTT at the beginning and Tisovac afterwards, but

15 that may be the wrong way around.

16 MR. NICE: Or it may be one sandwiched the

17 other. Perhaps the witness can help us.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

19 Can you help us with that, Mr. Cavara?

20 Mr. Kordic's headquarters, we've heard, was in Tisovac

21 and we've had evidence about that and now also of

22 course we know about the PTT building. Can you help us

23 as to when his headquarters was in each? Did one

24 follow the other or did he, in fact, have both

25 headquarters at the same time?

1 A. Mr. Kordic had a permanent office at Tisovac,

2 and the forward command post of the brigade command

3 only from the 25th January, 1993 until the end of March

4 1993 was there. And the permanent office of Mr. Kordic

5 continued to be at Tisovac.

6 JUDGE MAY: So he was in the PTT, or he had a

7 headquarters in the PTT between January and March 1993;

8 is that right?

9 A. Correct as only that that was the forward

10 command post of the brigade command, and Mr. Dario

11 Kordic was not part of the command staff.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. Can you give any reason why he should present

15 himself to British battalion officers as having

16 authority over military matters at that time?

17 A. I can only comment that he could have

18 represented himself as a political figure because of

19 certain negotiations and requests for assistance, given

20 the situation that Busovaca municipality was in.

21 Q. Your brigade obviously covered Busovaca, and

22 what part of the surrounding territory did it cover,

23 typically? Merdani?

24 A. No, it didn't cover Merdani.

25 Q. Which unit would have covered Merdani?

1 A. That's where ABiH army units were.

2 Q. Well, if the HVO was represented at Merdani

3 -- for the Court's benefit, this is the 5th or 6th of

4 February, and it's document Z862 -- the HVO were

5 appearing at Merdani. Would they have come from your

6 area?

7 A. Our units never entered the village of

8 Merdani.

9 Q. Very well. Can you explain, on the basis of

10 your evidence so far, how, on the 11th of February of

11 1993, Kordic would be making ceasefire agreements if he

12 was just a politician? The document is Z459. I'm not

13 going to turn to it.

14 A. As far as I know, the ceasefire was signed

15 earlier, 31st January, 1993, and this is the ceasefire

16 signed by Petkovic and Sefer Halilovic.

17 Q. Because to negotiate over the ceasefire, on

18 your own evidence, would be outside Kordic's

19 responsibility, wouldn't it?

20 A. I don't think there was any need to negotiate

21 about the ceasefire, because the ceasefire had been

22 signed.

23 Q. The road to Merdani, I think, has a little

24 bridge on it somewhere, doesn't it, going over the

25 river?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. On the 12th of February, do you know what HVO

3 soldiers were doing laying mines there, evidence of

4 Philip Jennings, 89065 transcript page reference?

5 A. That bridge is not in the village of Merdani;

6 it is in Katici.

7 Q. What were HVO soldiers doing putting mines

8 there? Or explosives, probably, not mines; something

9 to blow the bridge up. What were they doing?

10 A. I am not aware of that incident.

11 Q. You see, if it be the case -- it's for the

12 Court in due course to decide -- that they were doing

13 something with explosives on the instructions of

14 Kordic, that would be further evidence that the written

15 orders of which you speak were an incomplete record of

16 the orders being given to the brigade, wouldn't it?

17 A. Well, I can answer this question concretely.

18 Since the territory of the municipality of Busovaca was

19 attacked as early as the 25th of January, 1993, at that

20 time, no doubt for security's sake, orders were issued

21 for the defence, engineering services, and the front

22 line. I can explain the front line which was held by

23 the brigade Nikola Subic-Zrinjski in Busovaca.

24 Q. Mr. Cavara, are you now saying that orders

25 may have been given to blow up that bridge?

1 A. There was no order on the destruction of the

2 bridge. That is, it is possible that mines were placed

3 to ensure the security of crossing the bridge.

4 MR. NICE: Can the witness please have

5 Exhibit 2801. May the usher please place on the ELMO

6 the appropriate pages of 2801.3. I've marked 2801 with

7 the pages I want the witness to look at, it being in

8 the original script, to save time.

9 Q. Mr. Cavara, there are tape recordings of

10 conversations. It is for the Judges to decide what to

11 make of them in due course. But included on them are

12 conversations between you and other people. I want

13 your comment on them, please.

14 MR. NICE: If the witness could have the

15 original, at the first tabbed marking, which is I think

16 pages 3 and 4. If the witness could have those and if

17 we could put an English version on the ELMO, because

18 the Judges don't have a copy each. Sorry. 2801A, I

19 think, for the exhibit. And the English page number is

20 3.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone.

22 MR. NICE: The English page number is 3 for

23 the English. It may be that it's 2801A that we need.

24 That's correct. Thank you very much.

25 Q. Mr. Cavara, it's right, isn't it --

1 Mr. Cavara, it's right, isn't it, that there was for a

2 time a telephone communication between a telephone in

3 the PTT building in Busovaca and Kiseljak?

4 A. Yes, there was a telephone communication.

5 Q. This was the time when Blaskic was isolated

6 in Kiseljak because he couldn't get back?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, if you look at, in your hands, pages 3

9 and 4, and if the usher very kindly places on the ELMO

10 page 3, we see this conversation. It exists on a

11 tape. For time reasons, I'll deal with it this way.

12 You say, "Hello." Blaskic says, "Yes." You say, "Hi,

13 Colonel. This is Grubesic." And he says, "This is

14 TO." The conversation goes on. And if we can turn

15 over --

16 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry, Mr. Nice. This is

17 Grubesic?

18 MR. NICE: Yes. I'm so sorry. This is

19 Grubesic talking. I'm so sorry. It's not this

20 witness. Yes, of course. Yes, my mistake.

21 Q. But if we turn over the page to page 4, we

22 see Grubesic talking and speaking at line 25 about

23 Colonel Dario having gone to a conference and saying

24 something about put Caritas stickers on something.

25 Now, I'm sorry that I suggested it was your

1 conversation. Of course it wasn't and never -- I

2 couldn't have suggested it was. But this is a Grubesic

3 conversation. Do you remember Grubesic having

4 conversations with Blaskic from that phone in the

5 basement?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. And this is just a small example where

8 there's reference to Colonel Dario giving instructions

9 about putting Caritas stickers on something. Do you

10 accept that that's the sort of thing that Dario Kordic

11 would have been saying?

12 A. I don't, because I don't see any conversation

13 with Dario Kordic here.

14 Q. No, this is a conversation between Blaskic

15 and Grubesic but the point is --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- the topic of the conversation includes

18 Kordic saying that certain stickers should be put on,

19 no doubt, certain transports. Do you accept that

20 Kordic would have been saying things like that to

21 Grubesic?

22 A. I don't think he said it.

23 Q. Very well. The English page five and in your

24 version page five, we see at line 15, somebody called

25 Arapovic on the phone and asks of the other person:

1 "Who would you like to speak to? Would you like to

2 speak to Mr. Dario?" And the colonel, may well be

3 Blaskic at the other end, says, "Either to Dusko or to

4 Dario. It's all the same to me."

5 Now, the suggestion is that this conversation

6 occurred on the 24th of February. By the 24th of

7 February 1993, was Kordic effectively sharing authority

8 with Dusko Grubesic in Busovaca?

9 A. No, he had no authority. And as for this

10 conversation here, Arapovic was simply Mr. Kordic's

11 driver.

12 Q. Yes. Very well. The next passage I'd like

13 you to look at and I think probably the last is at page

14 11 on the English and indeed page 11 in your version.

15 If you would be good enough to go to that.

16 This, it is suggested, is the 25th of

17 February, and if we look at page 11, this is a

18 conversation or part of a conversation between Grubesic

19 and Blaskic, and we can see at line 18 Blaskic giving

20 the topic saying he "... sent a request last night for

21 me and the chief to come down there to you, you know.

22 Well, UNPROFOR rejected it all again, and the 22 tonnes

23 of potatoes are going to freeze and rot."

24 Now, further down at line 29, Grubesic says,

25 "Now, Colonel Kordic is here. He would like to talk

1 to you." Then we turn over the page to page 12 at

2 10.

3 The record shows Kordic saying, line ten,

4 "Very well then, the people will go out again today.

5 Blaskic replies: "Well, the people should be informed

6 about that, and they should go out and block

7 everything, altogether, because those potatoes, if

8 they're not used today, we can throw them away.

9 Twenty-two tonnes of potatoes." And Kordic says:

10 "Listen, call those people in Kiseljak now and tell

11 them that the traffic will be blocked in Central Bosnia

12 unless the potatoes arrive by 1200 hours."

13 Do you remember that sort of instruction

14 being given by Kordic?

15 A. I do not remember those instructions.

16 Q. Do you accept that such instructions for

17 interference with convoys was given?

18 A. I don't accept that.

19 Q. Two things: You tell us you know all the

20 orders. Was there any written order covering such

21 interference with convoys?

22 A. There was no order bearing on the

23 interference with convoys.

24 Q. So if the HVO interfered with convoys in the

25 way described or anticipate or forecast in that

1 conversation, it was an order given but not in

2 writing. Do you accept that?

3 A. An order which was not issued in writing.

4 Q. Yes. Do you accept that there must have been

5 orders, other than in writing, given for things like

6 the blocking of convoys?

7 A. All orders had to go through the operative

8 training centre which means that there was never such

9 an order.

10 Q. In which case I'm going to move on very

11 swiftly. Where were you on the night of the 15th, 16th

12 of April, please?

13 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness hand back the

14 exhibit.

15 A. The 15th -- between the 15th and 16th of

16 April, I was in my command, the command of the

17 brigades.

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. In Busovaca?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. When were you first deployed anywhere after

22 the 15th, 16th of April?

23 A. Our units were not deployed anywhere outside

24 the area of responsibility of the brigade.

25 Q. When were you first deployed, what did you

1 first do after the rising of the sun on the 16th of

2 April of 1993?

3 A. On the 16th of March [sic], I am not aware of

4 that date.

5 Q. I'm sorry if it's been translated as March,

6 I've asked you about April and it's, of course, the

7 date when the Ahmici massacre occurred.

8 Can you help us, please, with what you were

9 doing on that day?

10 A. On the 16th of March [sic] I was in my

11 brigade's command and --

12 JUDGE MAY: I don't know what the reason for

13 this is. The question is clearly related to April and

14 the transcript should reflect that.

15 Mr. Cavara, you're being asked about the 15th

16 and 16th of April. That is the day at which the -- or

17 the evening of the previous day and the day of the

18 conflict in Ahmici. You tell us that you were in your

19 command that day. Where was your brigade deployed at

20 that time?

21 A. The command of the brigade was in the

22 Sumarija building, and the brigade units were deployed

23 along the front line in the area of the responsibility

24 of the brigade Nikola Subic-Zrinjski in Busovaca. And

25 Ahmici, the village of Ahmici itself, is not within the

1 area of responsibility of the Busovaca Nikola

2 Subic-Zrinjski Brigade.

3 JUDGE MAY: And where was the front line on

4 which the units were deployed?

5 A. They were, I can show it on the map if need

6 be, from Kuber to Gornja Rovna.

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

8 MR. NICE:

9 Q. How many kilometres from Ahmici is that?

10 A. It's about four kilometres.

11 Q. So what did you hear of what was going on in

12 Ahmici?

13 A. I only heard some gunfire but there was

14 gunfire all over the place that day. I didn't hear

15 anything special. We did not know anything about the

16 event which took place there on that same day.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. Were you engaged in active duty at all on the

20 15th or 16th?

21 A. No.

22 Q. When were you next engaged in active duty,

23 firing things at people?

24 A. On the 17th of April, 1993 when the BH forces

25 attacked the units of the Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade

1 of Busovaca across the facility of Kuber in the

2 direction of Kaonik.

3 Q. Did you find yourself in Loncari at one

4 stage?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Do you know which HVO soldiers were in

7 Loncari?

8 A. I wouldn't know that. Our front line was at

9 the Kuber facility, not at Loncari.

10 Q. When did you first learn of the massacre at

11 Ahmici?

12 A. I heard it a day or two later, but I didn't

13 know how it happened.

14 Q. What was the explanation given to you at that

15 time, and by whom was the explanation given?

16 A. Those were rumours, rather, that one could

17 hear.

18 Q. What were the rumours? What did they say had

19 happened?

20 A. Only that there was an attack from Zenica via

21 Ahmici because the BH army wanted to come together with

22 Vranjsko but there are also army units.

23 Q. Nothing to do with the HVO attacking Ahmici

24 at all; is that right?

25 A. There were no rumours.

1 Q. Did you ever hear a rumour or a suggestion

2 that the HVO forces had committed a massacre in Ahmici

3 or anywhere else?

4 A. I did not hear it with my own ears.

5 Q. When did you first hear it at all?

6 A. Well, I heard it from the media, but that was

7 after the war or, rather, after the conclusion of the

8 Washington Accords.

9 Q. Well, I'm going to turn to one detailed

10 matter that you deal with in paragraph seven of your

11 affidavit. On the 28th of April, according to evidence

12 we have heard from half a dozen or more witnesses, a

13 convoy of food supplies was hijacked at Busovaca. The

14 hijacking of a convoy of food supplies at Busovaca

15 could not have gone unnoticed by the inhabitants of

16 Busovaca, could it?

17 A. It did not exist at all. You know that's

18 April 1993 which you mention. Nobody ever knew

19 anything about that convoy at the time.

20 Q. Let's just deal with your position. Were you

21 in Busovaca at the time?

22 A. I was in the brigade command doing my duty.

23 Q. So we've had evidence from international

24 observers called Wesley, Witness AA, other

25 international observers called Anderson, McLeod,

1 Watters, and Landry and also a man called Beese. As I

2 say, six international observers have described this

3 event; are you saying they are all wrong?

4 A. To begin with, I'm not familiar with the

5 incident. I simply know nothing about this event. I

6 do not know that any convoy was abducted on that day or

7 any other day. Had it been abducted, I mean all this

8 quantity of food, we would know about it.

9 Q. What your statement, your affidavit says, at

10 paragraph 7, is that you understand -- that's you,

11 Mr. Cavara -- understand that a witness called Landry

12 has testified that on that day Dusko Grubesic

13 supposedly received orders from Kordic in relation to a

14 humanitarian convoy. You then go on to assert that Mr.

15 Grubesic never received any orders or instructions from

16 Kordic relating to any convoy on that date or any

17 date.

18 A. That is in the statement and that is

19 accurate.

20 Q. Before I move on from this topic, I have two

21 more questions. First, I want you to just take your

22 time and think carefully. We've had six witnesses,

23 soldiers and observers from the International

24 Community, who say this happened. Is it possible it

25 happened and you didn't know about it, or are you

1 really saying to this Court that it simply didn't

2 happen? Which is it?

3 A. I'm not aware of that event. I told you, I

4 knew nothing about that event. And even if all these

5 people may claim that this event happened, but

6 Mr. Kordic couldn't have issued such an order to

7 Mr. Dusko Grubesic; and likewise, Dusko Grubesic

8 couldn't have issued a written order before having such

9 an order analysed at the operative training department

10 where I worked.

11 Q. My only other question on this topic, from

12 which I will now pass, is this: Some of the evidence

13 about this incident suggests that the soldiers

14 concerned, the HVO people concerned, were wearing black

15 uniforms. Can you help us, please, with who would be

16 wearing black uniforms in Busovaca on the 28th of April

17 of 1993?

18 A. I never set my eyes on soldiers like that.

19 Q. Just to eliminate them, in case the

20 suggestion is made that it was the police or anything

21 like that who were interfering with this convoy, it

22 couldn't be the police wearing black uniforms, could

23 it?

24 A. No, it couldn't, because they had their

25 uniforms and they had to wear them.

1 Q. Was there any paramilitary group near to

2 Busovaca that wore black uniforms?

3 A. There were no such paramilitary groups.

4 Q. Paragraph 4 of your affidavit says that in

5 this period of time you held the position as chief of

6 the operations and training department. May we take it

7 that operations includes military operations?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So that if your brigade was engaged in

10 military or quasi-military, near military activities,

11 you would have been involved and may even have been in

12 charge?

13 A. I only analysed orders and sent them on to

14 subordinate units which were assigned by the brigade

15 commander. And the Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade of

16 Busovaca was only providing the defence, the decisive

17 defence, at that.

18 MR. NICE: I've only got a few more

19 questions, I think, on a couple of documents. But

20 let's -- I'm sorry not to have given notice to the

21 registrar of this one: 861, please, and it may be

22 861.1.

23 Q. Would you say that by May of 1993 there was

24 any harassment of citizens of Busovaca by members of

25 the HVO?

1 A. There were no such cases. And we can talk

2 about that in a different way. Those who wanted to

3 leave the territory did it of their own free will.

4 Q. Are you really saying, so that I can

5 understand this, in the middle of 1993, in Busovaca,

6 the HVO behaved in a blameless way? Is that really

7 what you're saying?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR. NICE: This is a document, if we can put

10 the English on the ELMO --

11 THE REGISTRAR: This document was marked as

12 confidential.

13 MR. NICE: I'm sorry. In which case, don't

14 put it on the ELMO, but can the witness just see the

15 original? We will not read out the name of the person

16 referred to. And I'm very grateful to the registrar

17 for her advice.

18 Q. This is a document that, in English, dated

19 the 1st of May, signed by Grubesic, Maric, and Kordic,

20 says:

21 "Pursuant to demonstrated need, after finding

22 that certain members of Busovaca HVO units whose

23 residential buildings had been destroyed in combat

24 operations in the area of Busovaca municipality were

25 trying to solve their existential problems by force,

1 and with the aim of preventing such occurrences and

2 protecting the safety of persons and property for all

3 citizens, regardless of their political, religious, and

4 national affiliation, I hereby issue to ..." We won't

5 read the name, "... a certificate whereby it is

6 forbidden to Busovaca HVO members to harass ..." that

7 person.

8 The HVO, as you have explained to us, was

9 your brigade. Why was Blaskic, with Grubesic and one

10 other, having to sign this document?

11 A. This document must have been signed for the

12 sake of cooperation with civilian authorities so that

13 all the authorities in the municipality could take part

14 in activities like this.

15 Q. Yes. Page 103, line 11, has omitted the name

16 "Kordic" as one of the signatories. The question is,

17 Mr. Cavara, what was the HVO doing? What were your men

18 doing harassing civilians in the summer of 1993?

19 A. 1993? There could not have been any

20 harassment of civilians. There is such a possibility

21 when many refugees arrived in 1993 from the area of

22 Zenica and then Travnik. So it is possible that there

23 was harassment by displaced persons who were looking

24 for their accommodation, and that is why it was

25 necessary to issue such a document.

1 Q. That apart, are you still maintaining -- and

2 this is my last question on this topic -- are you still

3 maintaining that the HVO was blameless in its

4 activities in the summer of 1993?

5 A. It behaved in an organised and disciplined

6 manner.

7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, just give me a

8 minute. I'm afraid I've overlooked something that I

9 wanted to put to the witness.

10 Q. You took over from Grubesic. Why?

11 A. Because Mr. Grubesic had to take over another

12 duty in the Vitez command headquarters.

13 MR. NICE: I'm just seeing if the exhibit

14 that I want the witness to look at has been exhibited

15 already, because, by my oversight, I haven't had it

16 copied, if it needs to be copied. But there's a very

17 small part of it to look at.

18 May I place the first page of this document,

19 which is all I want for a few lines, on the ELMO, and

20 we'll sort out the evidential position in a second.

21 It's a milinfosum dated the 30th of November, and it's

22 consistent with my practice of giving witnesses an

23 opportunity to consider what observers say about them.

24 Q. If we look at the first page, Mr. Cavara,

25 this is a document from a military information summary

1 of the Coldstream Guards from Great Britain of the 30th

2 of November. And it says in relation to Vitez that the

3 liaison officer had spoken to Ivan Sarac. And when the

4 liaison officer asked about Dusko Grubesic and asked if

5 he was about to be replaced, he received no answer.

6 And then can we turn -- and there's a comment there

7 about the sensitivity of his replacement.

8 Can we turn to the next page, please. And it

9 then reports on Busovaca as follows: The liaison

10 officer reported that the new commander of your brigade

11 was indeed you, Mr. Cavara. The liaison officer had

12 seen you on previous visits. It was stated that Dusko

13 was replaced due to health reasons. It then goes on to

14 say the replacement of Dusko had been rumoured from

15 both the BiH and the HVO over the last couple of

16 weeks. Health reasons appears to be the easy

17 explanation for this appointment change, but it could

18 possibly be that Dusko was not as extreme as the HVO

19 would have liked.

20 I'd like your comment on that, please.

21 MR. NICE: And I can tell the Chamber that

22 this has in fact been tendered as 1320.2.

23 Q. Your comment, please, on the rumours that

24 were circulating, or may have been circulating, that

25 Dusko was not as extreme as was wanted by HVO.

1 A. Dusko Grubesic was replaced not because he

2 was extreme or he was not extreme but because he had

3 health problems and he could not carry on his duties as

4 the brigade commander, and this is why commander

5 Tihomir Blaskic assigned him to another duty in the

6 Vitez command. Later on in 1993, he went to Croatia

7 for further medical treatment.

8 Q. You took over and you stayed in charge until

9 1997, didn't you?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. But only a short time between your taking

12 over and the Washington Agreement. Please tell me

13 this, from your period both under Grubesic and in

14 charge, who was the politician in Central Bosnia who

15 had the most authority and to whom military men would

16 refer? Who was that politician?

17 A. In Central Bosnia, one can say that the

18 person with most authority was Mr. Dario Kordic.

19 Q. Do you accept that wars may be run on a

20 practical and local basis by military men but they were

21 usually, if not always, commanded by politicians; do

22 you accept that?

23 A. I don't.

24 Q. I'm suggesting to you that you know full well

25 from your proximity to Kordic in Busovaca that he had a

1 great deal more authority than you, in this affidavit,

2 have sought to say. Isn't that the reality?

3 A. No. Because Mr. Dario Kordic never wanted to

4 meddle in the military power and command.

5 Q. Finally, on a different topic, so far as the

6 affidavit of Anto Juric is concerned, what you've been

7 telling the Court about the ceremony in Busovaca in

8 1992, what's your recollection of that? When was it?

9 A. That was held in August of 1992.

10 Q. What was your role in it?

11 A. At that time, I was the commander of the 2nd

12 Battalion and the operations officer in the Busovaca

13 command.

14 Q. What was Kordic's role there then?

15 A. Kordic only came to the parade as a political

16 figure to give a speech.

17 Q. He gave a speech?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did he give a salute? Did he take a salute?

20 A. No.

21 Q. And who do you say it was that Dusko Grubesic

22 gave his report to?

23 A. Dusko Grubesic was not there at all. He was

24 in the Travnik hospital because he had health problems.

25 Q. I'm not in a position to accept what you say

1 and I'm not going to take it any further.

2 MR. NICE: Thank you.

3 Re-examined by Mr. Sayers:

4 Q. Mr. Cavara, just a few questions. You were

5 interrupted from identifying the Central Bosnia

6 Operative Zone commander, the military person that was

7 in charge of the HVO in Central Bosnia. Who was that

8 sir?

9 A. It was Colonel Blaskic.

10 Q. You were asked some questions about the

11 military police, Mr. Cavara, and as I understand it,

12 you testified that there was one platoon of military

13 police stationed in the Busovaca municipality?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. The military policemen reported up their

16 chain of command to whom, as far as you know?

17 A. Reporting to the commander of the 4th

18 military police battalion which was in Vitez.

19 Q. And you were also asked some questions about

20 orders ordered to certain people in Busovaca in

21 January. Do you, yourself, have any knowledge of

22 orders, the nature of the orders written or otherwise

23 issued to the military police in Busovaca in that

24 month, sir, in January of 1993?

25 A. There were no such orders.

1 Q. You were asked some questions by the

2 Prosecution about a period of time in January of 1993

3 and February of 1993 when Mr. Kordic was seen in the

4 PTT building. Did Mr. Kordic ever move his office from

5 Tisovac to the PTT building at any time?

6 A. He never moved it there. He remained there

7 until the end of the war even following the Washington

8 Accords.

9 Q. Just so the point is clear, do I understand

10 it that what you're saying is that the brigade had its

11 headquarters in the PTT building for a period of time

12 up to March of 1993, I think you said, and then it

13 moved subsequently?

14 A. The brigade had a forward command post at the

15 time, the period of around 25 January 1993 when the

16 ABiH carried out an attack on the Busovaca

17 municipality.

18 Q. And the forward command post remained there

19 for how long?

20 A. It remained there until the end of March

21 1993.

22 Q. You've identified, I think, the Sumarija

23 building as the location of the headquarters of the

24 brigade. At what time was the Sumarija building the

25 brigade headquarters, Mr. Cavara?

1 A. The Sumarija building was the permanent

2 headquarters of the brigade command.

3 Q. Thank you. Now, you were asked some

4 questions in relation to a transcript of an audiotaped

5 conversation that supposedly occurred in January or

6 February of 1993, and specifically you were asked some

7 questions about comments assertedly made by Mr. Kordic

8 about blocking convoys in February.

9 Were there any convoys blocked in February as

10 far as you are aware?

11 A. No there were not.

12 Q. And just my final question, sir. It was put

13 to you anyway that six people have testified from the

14 International Community, six international observers in

15 connection with a convoy incident that occurred on the

16 28th of April 1993.

17 Now, none of these people were in Busovaca;

18 you were. Did you ever hear of such a convoy, a large

19 convoy, 40 trucks and escorted by military armed

20 personnel carrier, armoured personnel carriers? Did

21 you ever hear of any convoy being abducted or detained

22 in Busovaca in April, towards the end of April of 1993

23 at any time, sir?

24 A. Never. No convoy was held or abducted in the

25 month of April.

1 MR. SAYERS: Thank you very much. No further

2 questions, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Cavara, that concludes your

4 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International

5 Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.

6 [The witness withdrew]

7 JUDGE MAY: Now, unless there's anything that

8 anybody wants to raise, we'll adjourn.

9 MR. NICE: The only thing I have raised in

10 correspondence is the question of the outstanding

11 witnesses in the Defence of Kordic. I think a copy of

12 the letter has been circulated. The position is as I

13 have stated it on a couple of previous occasions. We

14 provided extensive lists of witnesses, of course they

15 had to change from time to time, we all understand

16 that. But it makes our preparation very difficult to

17 just have two weeks at a time. We have a lot to do

18 with each witness.

19 There would seem to be no reason why we

20 shouldn't have a longer list, probably a complete list

21 of the remaining Kordic witnesses. And under the

22 policy of equality of means, sometimes called equality

23 of arms, there is no reason why we shouldn't have that

24 list provided to us in our respectful submission.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, what's the up-to-date

1 position.

2 MR. SAYERS: Well, I'm sure the Court doesn't

3 want to be burdened with any forensic discussion of the

4 nature of, dare I say, gamesmanship that was played

5 with respect to witness lists in the Prosecution case.

6 It is not tit for tat.

7 Let me point this out, Your Honour. At the

8 very beginning of our case, we gave the Court a

9 good-faith estimate and an assurance that we will be

10 finished before the August recess, and we will. We

11 have been ordered by the Court, I believe, to provide

12 two weeks' notice and we have done so scrupulously.

13 Every two weeks, we believe we've scrupulously complied

14 with that obligation.

15 In the week of July 10th, I think the

16 Prosecution has already been provided essentially with

17 our witness list. That's videolink week. There are

18 two days, I think there will be three days of testimony

19 that week. We are trying to line up a witness to fill

20 the Monday, but the Prosecution already knows the

21 position with respect to the last two days of that

22 week. We've identified the witnesses. I believe they

23 are all testifying in open session; Ivica Kristo,

24 Srecko Kristo, and Ilija Zuljevic, and if we can get

25 him and he's healthy enough, Anto Stipac. And then

1 with respect to the very last week of evidence,

2 obviously we're still contemplating that, and we do not

3 have a final decision with respect to the last week.

4 I will, as soon as we've got the position

5 made certain for us, as soon as we know exactly who our

6 witnesses are going to be for the final week, I see no

7 reason why we should not let the Prosecution know. And

8 anticipating the rebuttal case, I assume that we will

9 be entitled to the same concrete courtesy of knowing

10 exactly who the witnesses are going to be for the

11 Prosecution's rebuttal case, not a guessing game, not a

12 shell game, and not having people switched at the last

13 minute as was repeatedly the case before the --

14 JUDGE MAY: Let us not go into that.

15 So apart from one day in which your answer

16 and the final week, the witnesses have been disclosed.

17 MR. SAYERS: They have. There is one matter

18 that I would like to raise, Your Honour. I don't want

19 to let it slip through the cracks. I don't think it's

20 necessary to belabour the point.

21 We have submitted papers on this. We have

22 made a written request for access to the closed session

23 transcripts of the Lasva Valley cases, and I appreciate

24 that that provides some logistical problems for the

25 Court, but it also provides some considerable

1 logistical problems for us when it comes to considering

2 the transcripts of witness' testimony in other cases

3 which we should designate. We simply do not know and

4 cannot make an informed decision of all of the

5 transcripts that we would like to designate because we

6 have not been made privy to those transcripts. Of

7 course the position is completely different from the

8 Prosecution, the Prosecution's perspective. They've

9 always known who these witnesses were and they made

10 their selection knowing full well who all of these

11 witnesses were and the full knowledge of their

12 testimony.

13 I don't want to belabour the point. We've

14 made the point in our papers, but we have been trying

15 hard for two years to try to get access to all of these

16 transcripts and we still don't have them.

17 JUDGE MAY: We'll see what the position is

18 about those transcripts. It's right that you have been

19 making application and also right that there are

20 logistical problems. I think the position may be that

21 we have done what we can, and you will remember the

22 upshot of our previous endeavors, and it may be the

23 position will remain the same but we'll make further

24 inquiries.

25 MR. SAYERS: Very well, thank you, Your

1 Honour.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We're starting then on

3 Monday with Dr. Almond; is that right?

4 MR. SAYERS: I believe so. I think that

5 Dr. Pavlovic might be coming in over the weekend. He

6 has expressed a desire to go first, if that won't

7 create undue difficulties for the Prosecution. If it

8 does cause undue difficulties, then we'll stay with the

9 order has been given.

10 MR. NICE: I think it may create

11 difficulties. I'll try and get around them but I think

12 it may create difficulties. I'll do the best.

13 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now to

14 Monday morning at half past nine.

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

16 at 3.52 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday

17 the 26^th day of June, 2000, at

18 9.30 a.m.

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