1 Wednesday, 21st July, 1999
2 (Open session)
3 (The accused entered court)
4 (The witness entered court)
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.34 p.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your
7 Honours. Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor
8 versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Stein.
10 WITNESS: ROBERT J. DONIA (Resumed)
11 Cross-examined by Mr. Stein:
12 MR. STEIN: Your Honour, first --
13 MR. NICE: Before Mr. Stein starts, I
14 understand from something that the Victims and
15 Witnesses Unit has told us that the witness may have
16 something that he wants to raise with the Tribunal. We
17 had the message indirectly from the people who
18 accompanied the witness here.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Doctor, is there something
20 you want to raise?
21 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I wonder if I
22 might be permitted about five minutes to clarify
23 responses that I gave to a line of questioning
24 yesterday in regard to the one man, one vote matter.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, by all means.
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. If you will recall,
2 yesterday, I was asked a series of questions by
3 Mr. Stein dealing with a quotation from the book
4 Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation by Laura Silber and
5 Allan Little, specifically a quote which referred to
6 one man, one vote in the relationships between
7 President Izetbegovic and the HDZ.
8 Mr. Stein also then, in response to an
9 inquiry from you, stated that this was the big debate
10 about the status of the Croatian community. I believe
11 it was not the big debate or, in fact, any debate at
12 all, and I did not have in front of me yesterday the
13 context from the work of Silber and Little, which
14 shows, I think quite clearly, the nature of this issue
15 and the fact that it was very short-lived and
17 I can use the ELMO, sir, if you wish, or I
18 can just read, but it's about ten sentences from the
19 book and a bit of explanation.
20 JUDGE MAY: It may help if you put it on the
21 ELMO, please.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could Dr. Donia read
23 slowly, please?
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Ma'am. Beginning here on
25 page 209 was the question that was stated to me
1 yesterday. "Like the Serbs, the Croats were infuriated
2 when Izetbegovic announced in September that the SDA
3 opposed the principle of national parity, and that the
4 next government would be formed on the basis of
5 one-man one-vote."
6 I believe this statement to be completely
7 accurate, but there's an important qualification that
8 must be added, namely, the meaning of the word
9 "government." In the structure at the time, the
10 government was a specific institution. It was
11 independent of the assembly and independent of the
12 presidency. It was, in fact, a body called the
13 government or vlada which was a group of -- there was a
14 president of it and vice-presidents and the various
15 ministers. So Izetbegovic's proposal did not pertain
16 to voting in the assembly, did not pertain to
17 membership on the presidency, which was already decided
18 in the constitution, but only to the composition of the
19 government. So this statement is, I believe, factually
21 However, the speculation that follows on the
22 part of the authors assumes that it pertains to all
23 governmental institutions, and it sets off this
24 following speculative conclusion: "Izetbegovic was
25 attempting to play the same game in Bosnia that
1 Milosevic had in mind for Yugoslavia." Now, that's
2 only true to a very limited degree because what
3 Milosevic had in mind for Yugoslavia was, in fact, a
4 national voting for an assembly, which was one man, one
5 vote. "Unless civil and individual rights were secured
6 through institutions, majority vote would guarantee
7 Serb domination throughout the country."
8 Now, the institutions that the author is
9 assuming here are all institutions, and I would point
10 out at the time that civil and individual rights were
11 already secured by a variety of institutions. In
12 force, perhaps not, but secured.
13 The authors then go on: "In Bosnia, the same
14 principle would give the Muslims, the Republic's
15 largest ethnic group with 44 per cent of the 4,35
16 million population, the greatest authority." This was
17 true already. There was no change in the situation
18 from the last days of socialism to the time that this
19 statement pertains to. Then a very speculative
20 conclusion: "A key difference was that Milosevic was
21 striving for changes which subverted the very
22 principles on which Yugoslavia was founded, whereas
23 Izetbegovic's proposals applied only to Bosnia."
24 The final statement of this paragraph: "The
25 Republic's constitution, however, made each of its
1 three groups constituent nations which meant that no
2 major decision could be carried out without
3 consensus." As a matter of fact, the first part of
4 that sentence is absolutely correct. Each of the
5 Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were recognised as
6 constituent nations. The latter part of that sentence
7 is not the case. It is not true that no major decision
8 could be carried out without consensus.
9 This is a very important issue because the
10 constitution in effect at the time defined national
11 communities but gave them no veto power over
12 decision-making, either in the assembly nor in the
13 presidency. In fact, there are numerous examples, both
14 before the election of November 18th, 1990 and after
15 the election, in which decisions were made by those two
16 bodies with the complete opposition of one of the
17 constituent nations. In other words, the status quo
18 was that constituent nations could not obstruct a
19 decision. There was no requirement for consensus.
20 Now, the key part of this, however, is it's
21 still true that the Croats and Serbs were infuriated
22 with Izetbegovic in September. Unfortunately,
23 yesterday, Mr. Stein didn't go on to point out the
24 subsequent sentence at the top of page 210: "Despite
25 the growing tensions, the three national parties,
1 meeting behind closed doors in Sarajevo, agreed to form
2 a united front against their main opponents, the
4 This agreement, which I will represent to you
5 took place in October 1990, prior to the elections,
6 resolved the issue of one man, one vote for all three
7 major parties. It was replaced with a notion that to
8 include the government itself, that council of
9 ministers and various ministry positions, would be
10 generally guided by the census of 1990. I must
11 represent this to you. I don't have with me the
12 documentation to establish this, but I am confident you
13 will have other opportunities to affirm this point.
14 From the time of this agreement onward to
15 today, this issue of one man, one vote, ceased to be a
16 point of contention between the parties. I've just
17 finished six weeks of going through the daily press in
18 Sarajevo from November 1990 until April of 1992, this
19 was in research for another matter, and I never saw a
20 single reference to a debate about one man, one vote
21 versus recognition of communities.
22 There was, however, a very important
23 overriding debate that seized the HDZ, and it was not
24 the one man, one vote issue; it was the question of
25 whether the HDZ would be a party representing all
1 Croats in Bosnia, that is, the national community, or
2 whether it would become a territorial entity defined by
3 the boundaries of Herceg-Bosna as spelled out in
4 November 1991, ruled under what was essentially a
5 constitutionally conditioned martial law as proclaimed
6 on July 3, 1992, and under the fused leadership of the
7 HVO, the HDZ, and the Community of Herceg-Bosna, all
8 responsive to the instructions of President
10 Now, that polarity between those people who
11 wanted the HDZ to represent all Croats and those who
12 favoured a territorial unit which excluded about
13 250.000 Croats from representation, that controversy
14 was ultimately decided because of the Zagreb regime's
15 involvement in favour of the territorial option and
16 leads us to the background of the events discussed in
17 the indictment. I find no evidence of further
18 discussion of one man, one vote, after this September
19 reference that's in the book.
20 I would also just like to point out that the
21 quotations that were given to me yesterday from the
22 book were highly selective, were taken out of context,
23 and omitted some key things which this author, on the
24 very same page, has said about topics that were part of
25 my direct testimony.
1 At the bottom of page 208, you see the point
2 made by the two authors, "National Dreams: The
3 Emergence of Ethnic Parties and Leaders," did not
4 reflect ancient hatreds, as was later claimed by some
5 sectors of the frustrated international community while
6 it struggled to comprehend the war." That was not
7 something that was shown to you yesterday. Nor were
8 the comments that the authors have to make about Dario
9 Kordic shown to you yesterday.
10 JUDGE MAY: Well, I think we're now going
11 beyond what's necessary for the moment. No doubt, if
12 we refer to the book, we can look at it in due course.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Stein.
15 MR. STEIN: Thank you. Your Honour, just one
16 or two brief administrative things. We have
17 substituted for the illegible copies of D42 some new
18 copies. I hope they work; if not, we'll try again.
19 With an opportunity, Judge, I would like to
20 address the issue of the tape that we addressed at the
21 end of --
22 JUDGE MAY: After the witness's evidence.
23 MR. STEIN: Very good.
24 Q. Sir, let me start by asking you this, and
25 that is, did you have the Silber book with you when you
1 came to The Hague today?
2 A. I never leave home without it.
3 Q. Never leave home without it?
4 A. I had it with me when I arrived.
5 MR. STEIN: I'm listening by the way, Judge,
6 to French, so when the French ends, I will begin, and I
7 hope to avoid any speed warnings.
8 Q. So it's kind of like an American Express
9 card: You never leave home without it because it's
11 A. It's important.
12 Q. You don't consider yourself an advocate for
13 one side of this case versus another, do you?
14 A. I don't consider myself an advocate, no.
15 Q. Let's take one brief look at what you said
16 yesterday relative to some quotes from Mr. Izetbegovic
17 that I gave you. I don't want to repeat them. It's
18 the only thing of your testimony yesterday I want to go
19 over. It was relative to the quotes in which he
20 essentially said, "In our state, we will live how it
21 suits us. No one can prescribe how we should live,"
22 et cetera. You were asked when he said that and were
23 you familiar with it, and your response was, quote, "I
24 think it comes from the Islamic declaration written by
25 Mr. Izetbegovic."
1 In fact, sir, I represent to you that that is
2 from a 1994 speech given in May in Mecca, and this of
3 course would be just after the Washington Accords.
4 A. Could I request, sir, to see that document?
5 You've given me many quotes in the last -- yesterday
6 that you've represented as coming from various places,
7 and I would really like to see the exact quote that
8 you're operating from.
9 Q. I have no problem with that. We'll show you
10 the English.
11 JUDGE MAY: Does it matter? What does it
12 matter which was the date of the quotation?
13 MR. STEIN:
14 Q. The question then, sir, as per the Presiding
15 Judge's query, is, this was in 1994; doesn't that give
16 us a different insight, as of 1994, as to what the
17 leader of the Bosnian Muslims was advocating as of that
18 time period?
19 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Stein,
20 in order to clarify what has been said by the witness,
21 I think that we should have precise indications as to
22 the context of this speech that you said was given in
23 May in Mecca.
24 (In English) Given in what context, on what
25 occasion? This is very important. Was it an official
1 speech or a personal interview? What was it, exactly?
2 This is important, to know what we are talking about.
3 Thank you.
4 MR. STEIN: Judge, according to the text we
5 have, this was a speech given by Mr. Izetbegovic,
6 addressing pilgrims and Bosniak heroes, delivered in
7 Mecca publicly in 1994, May.
8 JUDGE MAY: And the witness would like to see
9 where you get that information from.
10 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Where was it published?
11 MR. STEIN: This is our only copy, but
12 certainly you may see it.
13 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Where was it published?
14 MR. STEIN: In 1975. I'm sorry; 1995, and it
15 says --
16 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Where? Where?
17 MR. STEIN: In Zagreb.
18 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Which paper was it?
19 MR. STEIN: According to the title page, it
20 was published by the Muslim Community in Zagreb.
21 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see it.
22 MR. STEIN:
23 Q. And the quote has a Post-It on the beginning
24 and is highlighted for you in yellow next.
25 A. What you've showed me, sir, is not a speech;
1 it's an interview with a publication, Ljiljan, a
2 Sarajevo newspaper, dated December 10th, 1994.
3 Q. You're looking at the wrong Post-It, sir.
4 MR. STEIN: While the witness is reviewing
5 the document, we have for the Court four copies, if you
6 would like, and we can put it into evidence. This is a
7 copy not of the entire book but of the specific speech.
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Stein, I hope we're not going
9 to go over all the evidence of yesterday again.
10 MR. STEIN: I wasn't planning to, Judge.
11 JUDGE MAY: No. Very well. You can put that
12 in, then.
13 MR. STEIN: I'm sorry, sir. Did you wish --
14 JUDGE MAY: Put it in.
15 MR. STEIN: All right. I think we're shy one
16 copy for my adversaries, but we'll make sure that's
18 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked D44/1.
19 MR. STEIN:
20 Q. Dr. Donja, are you ready to resume your
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, can we turn our attentions from the
24 document in front of you to an issue involving the 1990
25 elections? You and I can agree that the 1990 elections
1 transformed the political landscape in Bosnia?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And indeed, you've noted that the elections
4 demonstrated the remarkable historical consistency with
5 previous Bosnian multi-party elections from 1910 and
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And each of the ethnic groups essentially
9 voted for their ethnic party?
10 A. In substantial percentages.
11 Q. And your observation at that time was: "The
12 politicians restored patterns of coalition politics in
13 the Bosnian assembly in a futile effort to achieve a
14 formula for Bosnia's political future that would
15 satisfy all parties."
16 A. I made no comment in writing on the elections
17 in 1990 at the time, so I'm wondering where you're
18 reading from.
19 Q. Well, I'm reading from your book, at
20 page 211, and specifically quoting from it, sir, the
21 last --
22 A. I'll agree that that's from my book, but it
23 was not written in 1990, as you suggest in your
25 Q. Sorry, your book was written in 1994 --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- observing the 1990 elections.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, I wonder if you can explain this for
5 us. The winner of the election on the SDA was
6 Mr. Abdic; correct?
7 A. The leading vote-getter for the presidency
8 was Fikret Abdic.
9 Q. Much more accurate than I posited; you're
10 correct. Yet, as it turned out, Mr. Izetbegovic became
11 the president of the presidency. How did that happen?
12 A. I don't know.
13 Q. I'm sorry?
14 A. I don't know.
15 Q. My last question on this area, sir, is you
16 observe in your book, and I quote: "Many new leaders
17 aroused fear and suspicion among the members of
18 national minorities within their republics'
19 boundaries." That's an observation you made in 1994
20 relative to those 1990 elections?
21 A. That's an observation relative to the
22 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its
23 various republics, yes.
24 Q. All right. Now, very briefly, can we
25 capsulise the different positions of the parties after
1 the November 1990 elections relative to the future of
2 Bosnia? The Serbian position was either a
3 confederation or succession (sic)? Can we agree to
5 A. No.
6 Q. Well, Mr. Malcolm, in his book, on page 223,
7 is quoted as observing, quote, "By early 1991,
8 Milosevic was saying publicly that if there were any
9 attempt to replace the federal structure of Yugoslavia
10 with some looser confederal arrangement, he would seek
11 to annex whole areas of Bosnia and Croatia." Would you
12 disagree with that?
13 A. No, I agree with that. I would disagree with
14 your statement, which was not the same as what you just
16 Q. And what part of my statement did you
17 disagree with, sir?
18 A. Would you like to repeat it, please?
19 Q. Well, no, I don't, actually. Let's go on to
20 the -- if we can see what the Croatian position was and
21 if we have an agreement on that.
22 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Stein,
23 you said -- I think that is where the witness disagrees
24 with you -- you said that there were several
1 (In English) You capsulised the different
2 positions of the parties after the November 1990
3 elections relative to the future of Bosnia, the Serbian
4 position was either confederation or succession.
5 (Interpretation) This is what you asked.
6 What do you mean by "succession"?
7 (In English) I don't understand. What is --
8 succession to what?
9 MR. STEIN:
10 Q. Let's try to break that question down. It
11 was a poorly phrased question on my part. Do you agree
12 that the Serbian position was -- let's just take one --
14 A. No.
15 Q. And what did you take that question to mean?
16 A. I took it to mean that you didn't understand
17 what Noel Malcolm wrote.
18 Q. All right. What was the Serbian position in
19 1991 relative to Bosnia?
20 A. As he said in the passage that you read, the
21 Serb position, meaning that of Milosevic and the SDS,
22 was either a centralised Yugoslavia, not a
23 confederational Yugoslavia, but a centralised
24 Yugoslavia or a secession of Serbian communities and
25 the establishment of a greater Serbia.
1 Q. Let's take the second part of that question.
2 The Croatian position, sir, was for a federation, fair
4 A. The HDZ position really changed over the
5 course of 1991.
6 Q. November 1991?
7 A. November 1991 is a good time to pick
8 because --
9 Q. I want the Croatian position.
10 A. No, there is no single Croatian position, as
11 I've told you previously.
12 Q. Then your answer is not important to me,
13 sir. Now, let's move ahead --
14 MR. NICE: I'm concerned about the witness
15 not being allowed to answer questions --
16 JUDGE MAY: You can ask him in
18 MR. NICE: I'm also concerned about
19 quotations being put without the witness having
20 documents to look at.
21 JUDGE MAY: Let's see how we get on. I'm
22 anxious to finish this examination.
23 Yes, Mr. Stein?
24 MR. STEIN:
25 Q. I want to turn our attention, sir, to the
1 response of the central government of BiH to the Serb
2 aggression. You recognise, sir, do you not, that
3 Mr. Izetbegovic declared in early October that Bosnia
4 was neutral between Serbia and Croatia?
5 A. Can you specify the year, please?
6 Q. 1991.
7 A. Yes, and I would say that was the position of
8 the presidency, in the majority of the presidency of
10 Q. Now, we're making great progress, sir, so I
11 want to turn your attention to one other thing, and
12 that is, in the war itself, you make an observation in
13 your book relative to the actual fighting and fighters
14 on the ground. You noted that there were exclusively
15 Muslim brigades, and this is a paraphrase, formed in
16 the early days of the war to fight within the Bosnian
17 army; is that correct, sir?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Your research shows that there were, in fact,
20 people from outside the region who came into Bosnia to
21 fight this war.
22 A. That is different from the statement that you
23 just read from my book.
24 Q. Let me get directly to the statement from
25 your book, and this is at page 267: "Fighting against
1 Croatian units in Central Bosnia was done principally
2 by Muslim brigades and Bosnian government forces and
3 that region became almost exclusively Muslim." My
4 question, sir, is where did these Muslim brigades come
6 A. A couple of different sources. First, when
7 the mobilisation began at the time of the initial
8 prospect of hostilities, the mobilisation was done on a
9 territorial basis. There were a great many
10 multi-ethnic units of the Territorial Defence force.
11 Many of the Territorial Defence forces in Herzegovina
12 were Muslim and Croat, many in Sarajevo were Muslim,
13 Croat, and Serb, and as time went on, there tended to
14 be a greater ethnic singularity to these units on all
15 sides, first, because members who were not of the
16 ethnic group often departed and sometimes they were
18 So the first source is that there was this, I
19 think, general process of the creation of ethnically
20 more pure units that in some cases resulted in purely
21 Muslim or purely Croat units. The second was specific
22 brigades or units that were raised from early 1992 by
23 leaders typically of the Territorial Defence or MUP,
24 the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
25 Q. I want to specifically ask you whether these
1 individuals you're referring to included individuals
2 who called themselves Mujahedin.
3 A. Well, "Mujahedin" was a term that was
4 frequently used by Croatian commentators as a
5 pejorative term applying to the army of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So at least through Croatian eyes,
7 they were all Mujahedin.
8 Q. I want to be very specific. Were there
9 individuals fighting in the army of BiH who were from
10 outside the region, that is to say, from Islamic
12 A. To my knowledge, there were a very few.
13 Q. So that means there were some?
14 A. There were some.
15 Q. All right. Where did those people come from,
16 from your research and study?
17 A. I don't know.
18 Q. You mentioned in your book and in your
19 testimony in Blaskic that the Muslim irregulars and
20 gangs terrorised civilians in government-controlled
21 areas during the spring of 1992. First, do you still
22 agree with that?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. Second, would you describe that?
25 A. I think the statement speaks for itself.
1 Q. Again, the book that you have on your desk,
2 page 331, describes some of these forces. I'd like you
3 to take a look at it. Now, we might have different
4 editions, so let's make sure we have the right one
5 before I point you to it.
6 A. I hope you bought this too.
7 Q. We bought several copies. We'll come back to
8 it. I just wanted to ask you this about the -- we're
9 looking at this edition. I don't know that it's the
10 same as yours. It's on page 331.
11 A. I'm afraid it's not.
12 Q. Let me quote from it precisely. The 7th
13 Muslim Brigade is the topic of the discussion. "This
14 was explicitly Muslim rather than Bosnian in its
15 origin. Its officers were hostile to Westerners, wore
16 Islamic insignia, long beards, and greeted each other
17 with the Arabic 'Selam Aleikum,' peace be with you.
18 Their families attended Islamic education classes, and
19 their wives and daughters increasingly wore veils in
21 My first question to you, sir, is were you
22 aware that there was a 7th Brigade operating in the
24 A. I am aware, yes.
25 Q. Does the Silber book accurately describe
1 them, based on your research and writings?
2 A. I would say generally, yes.
3 Q. She goes on to note, next sentence, and then
4 we'll put this book down: "For the first time, a
5 strident xenophobic Muslim nationalism was being
6 articulated in Bosnia. The politics of multi-ethnic
7 tolerance, the officers of the 17th Muslim Brigade
8 argued, had led to the destruction of the Muslim
9 people. It was time for Muslims to take matters into
10 their own hands, not as Bosnians but explicitly as
12 Agree or disagree with that observation of
13 the Silber book?
14 A. I can't agree in its totality, no.
15 Q. Sorry, sir?
16 A. I don't agree.
17 Q. You do not?
18 A. No.
19 Q. I want to set the stage here to where we're
20 going on this ultimatum discussion. In order to do so,
21 though, I think it's fair to discuss the refugees that
22 were certainly disturbing the demographic structure in
23 Bosnia. So let's start with this: We can agree, can't
24 we, that in April of 1992 forward into 1993, major
25 Bosnian cities were flooded with refugees.
1 A. Yes. I would actually date -- the date is
2 much earlier than that.
3 Q. All right. What do you give us as the first
5 A. We started seeing refugees coming into Bosnia
6 in significant numbers in the summer of 1991, during
7 the war in Croatia.
8 Q. According to your book and your observations,
9 and feel free to comment, less than three weeks after
10 the EC recognised Bosnia's independence, the UNHCR
11 estimated that 370.000 Bosnians had become refugees, by
12 June 2nd, that number had reached 750.000, and by the
13 fall of 1992, the Bosnian war had produced 2 million
14 refugees, almost half of Bosnia's population, according
15 to the 1991 census. Are those the numbers that you
16 still, based on your current research, agree to?
17 A. The numbers you are citing here are the total
18 number of refugees created. They were not, by that
19 time, anywhere near -- the majority of them were not in
21 Q. But about 1 million of them remain in Bosnia
22 still; correct, sir?
23 A. That's right, yes.
24 Q. And you opined in your book, and I'm sure
25 you'd still agree, that the refugees in Bosnia
1 compounded the urgent needs of the civilians for food
2 and basic supplies?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Let's go up to the spring of 1993. You've
5 opined that there were, again, roughly a million
6 refugees in Bosnia at that point in time?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. We may be saying the same thing, but I want
9 to make sure we put this in context, the U.N.
10 Commission on Human Rights reported, as of November 17,
11 1993, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, there
12 were over 2,1 million people displaced from their
13 homes, nearly 50 per cent of the population recorded in
14 the census of 1991. Now, that's for the totality of
15 Yugoslavia; yes or no?
16 A. You cited that it's the United Nations High
17 Commissioner for Refugees, not Human Rights, but I
18 otherwise concur with your statement.
19 Q. That work goes on to say that about 800.000
20 of the 2,1 million were estimated to have sought refuge
21 outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the rest were
22 seeking refuge inside the country.
23 A. It's, I think, fair to say that this was a
24 process whereby typically when one became a refugee due
25 to hostile action, one sought first refuge in a nearby
1 town or city and, in many cases, ultimately moved
2 outside of either Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia.
3 Q. And the million or 1,3 million, depending on
4 the time and place, individuals in Bosnia who were
5 refugees would sometimes move more than one time?
6 A. Yes. They're still moving.
7 Q. Of course. Now, with that in mind, with
8 those numbers in mind, I'd ask you if your research can
9 help us with this, relative to life from the ground up,
10 if you will: During the war, the entire infrastructure
11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina basically closed down; would you
13 A. No, not exactly. Actually, the
14 infrastructure was seriously weakened before the war
15 began and functioned at some minimal level, and its
16 functioning during the war was highly dependent on the
17 local circumstance. So there were places where I would
18 say your statement is absolutely true --
19 Q. All right.
20 A. -- and other places where things functioned
21 at the same inadequate level they had functioned at
22 before the war began.
23 Q. And certainly services such as water,
24 electrical, natural gas, oil, and the supplies of those
25 necessities were diminished during the war?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Municipal services, such as police, fire,
3 ambulance, rescue, were all impacted by the lack of
4 manpower and men being sent to the front?
5 A. As a general rule, those emergency services
6 frequently worked better than some of the other more
7 routine municipal services.
8 Q. All right.
9 A. Nevertheless, your observation is an accurate
10 one, I think.
11 Q. Fair enough. The currency was devalued and
12 the monetary system collapsed?
13 A. That pretty much happened before the war
15 Q. And remained the same during the war?
16 A. Well, yes, the German mark became the
17 currency well before the war began and remained the
18 currency, at least in the areas controlled by the army
19 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In some cases, in the
20 Croatian-controlled areas, the Croatian kuna became the
22 Q. And state and federal services, such as
23 health care, pensions, state programmes, disabilities,
24 were delayed or impacted or diminished by the war as
1 A. The delay in pension payments preceded the
2 war and continued to be in arrears throughout the war
3 and continue, to this day, in almost all places to be
4 substantially in arrears. So I don't know that the
5 cause of that lateness or retardation can be judged to
6 be the war.
7 Q. The observation is correct, but the cause we
8 separate on. All right. Schools were also affected by
9 the war?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Shut down?
12 A. Most schools continued to function during the
13 war to a surprising degree.
14 Q. All right. Their staffs were affected by
15 people going to the front, obviously?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Radio, TV, and newspapers were sporadic, at
19 A. That's one area where the functioning
20 continued, maybe even increased during wartime.
21 Q. On all those medias?
22 A. In various places, depending on
23 accessibility, as the well-known story of Oslobodenje
24 in Sarajevo never missing a day of publication, and
25 radio broadcasts were continued in many areas, and
1 even, as I say, the stations in some instances
3 Q. How about in the rural areas, sir?
4 A. Well, the media -- generally, the radio
5 capabilities reached into the rural areas, in most
6 cases, just fine. Newspapers were started in some
7 small communities where none had existed before.
8 Q. All right. As I understand it as well, the
9 gaols were opened up, that is to say, the gaols were
10 closed down and the prisoners let out because they
11 couldn't maintain the facilities?
12 A. That's a very broad generalisation, and I
13 wouldn't accept it for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, no.
14 Q. You certainly can accept that part of that
15 statement is true. Gaols were opened in instances?
16 A. I don't know what you're reading from, so
17 I ...
18 Q. Do you know of any instance, sir, in which a
19 prison or gaol was basically shut down and the
20 prisoners released?
21 A. No.
22 Q. You've heard of that?
23 A. Yes. That was another consistent feature of,
24 actually, life. There were periodic pardons that were
25 executed by the presidency going back to the 1970s.
1 Q. All right. Sir, does your review also
2 indicate that the courts within Bosnia-Herzegovina were
3 closed or short-staffed?
4 A. Yes, many, many, I would say, not all, but
5 that was an area that functioning was extremely
7 Q. Factories were shut down?
8 A. "Shut down" is perhaps not the word. Many
9 were already rendered idle by 1991 due to lack of
10 supplies, the high cost of electricity, the
11 difficulties getting adequate means for production, and
12 many factories were bombed and destroyed during the
13 war. So in general, the productive capability, from an
14 industrial standpoint, with very few exceptions, shut
16 Q. And food supplies were limited; civilians had
17 little to eat?
18 A. Again, with some exceptions, that was true
19 for much of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 Q. We can agree, can we not, that by the spring
21 of 1993, inter-ethnic tensions were at an extremely
22 high level?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. These tensions and fears at times and in
25 certain places were characterised by feelings such as
1 terror, fear, and paranoia?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. We can agree, can we not, that in your
4 opinion, the armed forces of all three sides had
5 committed atrocities by the spring of 1993?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. This fact, in and of itself, furthered and
8 increased tensions and volatility within Central
10 A. Throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Q. Now, you claim that there was an ultimatum
12 issued in April of 1993; correct?
13 A. April 3rd, 1993.
14 Q. As I understand it, the basis of your claim
15 is newspaper accounts.
16 A. The basis of my contention that this is an
17 ultimatum is, first of all, the language of the alleged
18 draft agreement between Mr. Boban and President
19 Izetbegovic, the deadlines that are imposed within that
20 agreement, the nature of the resolution that was passed
21 by the HVO at its session on the 3rd of April, 1993,
22 the response that the ultimatum evoked in various
23 media, both within Croatia, the international media,
24 and even Tanjug, the Serbian agency, and finally, the
25 fact that the ultimatum was reiterated by the spokesman
1 for the HVO at a press conference on the 16th of April,
3 Q. And that spokesman would be who, in your
4 opinion, sir?
5 A. I'm sorry, Vaso Vegar, I believe, is the
6 name. Vaso Vegar.
7 Q. First name?
8 A. I think it's V-O-S-O, if I have his name
10 Q. We're going to go through some of those in
11 great detail, but let me start off by saying I would
12 like you to have a look at another little exhibit we've
13 made up, which we'd like to put on the ELMO and which
14 we'd like to give to the Court.
15 JUDGE MAY: Which part of the evidence are
16 you dealing with now?
17 MR. STEIN: This is the ultimatum issue, sir.
18 JUDGE MAY: The evidence in chief?
19 MR. STEIN: The evidence in chief includes
20 his expert report.
21 JUDGE MAY: Whereabouts in the report is it?
22 MR. STEIN: I believe it's towards the back,
24 JUDGE MAY: Well, if you're going to
25 cross-examine on it, you must refer us to it.
1 MR. STEIN: I'm sorry.
2 Q. That would be roughly at pages 41, 42, 43,
3 and 44. Now, sir, I started to --
4 JUDGE MAY: No, wait a moment. I'm going to
5 find it first.
6 MR. STEIN: All right.
7 JUDGE MAY: Now, which part of the report do
8 you want to cross-examine on, Mr. Stein?
9 MR. STEIN: Well, I want to be very limited,
10 sir, and that's going to be relative to page 43 in his
11 conclusion that there was an ultimatum.
12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Would you deal with
13 it as expeditiously as possible.
14 MR. STEIN: All right.
15 Q. Sir, are you done?
16 A. Yes, mm-hmm.
17 Q. Before April 15th, are you aware that there
18 were a series of crimes against Croats in Central
20 A. There were numerous conflicts, including
21 civilian casualties, by both sides in Central Bosnia
22 prior to April 3rd and prior to April 15th.
23 Q. Let me show you a chart prepared by us and
24 see if we can agree that this represents some of the
25 crimes against Croats in Central Bosnia in April of
2 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
4 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Before it's
5 exhibited, we'll see whether the witness agrees with it
6 or not. It may be, Mr. Stein, that you'll have to
7 produce this by another route.
8 MR. STEIN: That's fine, sir.
9 JUDGE MAY: Just let the witness see it.
10 Doctor, if you can agree with it, say so; but
11 if you don't know or you feel you can't, also say so.
12 THE WITNESS: I would feel I'm not qualified
13 to judge the validity of this report.
14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Hand it back to
15 Mr. Stein.
16 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Judge. We'll do it by
17 other means.
18 Q. One of the witnesses in this case, sir,
19 Mr. McLeod, testified on May 14th, at page 199 -- I'm
20 sorry, at page 4 -- that the events in the middle of
21 April leading up to the 16th, quote, "suggested there
22 had been a long period of tension between the two
23 ethnic groups in Central Bosnia. This appeared to have
24 exploded on the morning of the 16th."
25 That's consistent with your opinion of the
1 tension level in Central Bosnia as of April 1993;
2 correct, sir?
3 A. The first sentence, I think, that you read,
4 would be consistent with my understanding of it.
5 Q. All right.
6 A. I would take -- I wouldn't care to express it
7 that way for the second sentence.
8 Q. All right. Were you aware, sir, that on
9 April 15, 1993, an HVO brigadier commander named Totic
10 was kidnapped in Zenica and some of his bodyguards were
12 A. No.
13 Q. You were not aware of that at all?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Do you know who Lieutenant-Colonel Robert
16 Stewart is?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. He was the BritBat commander for Central
19 Bosnia during this period of time?
20 A. That's my understanding, yes.
21 Q. Colonel Stewart has opined in this
22 courthouse, quote: "It is clear to me that the
23 kidnapping of Totic --"
24 JUDGE MAY: Well, what's the point of this?
25 The witness said that he is not aware of it, so there
1 is no point putting something else about the
2 kidnapping. You can put it to another witness or you
3 can call evidence about it, but if a witness says that
4 he is not aware of it, there's no point belabouring
6 MR. STEIN: It's not that I want to belabour
7 that point, sir; it's a different point. I'll try it
8 in another way.
9 Q. Your opinion is that the events of mid-April
10 were as a result of threats issued in the media;
12 A. My --
13 Q. In essence.
14 A. My statement, sir, is designed to address the
15 political situation, and I have not opined on the
16 tactical military unit operations either on the 16th of
17 April or at any other time. I have simply noted that
18 the HVO, which was in charge of the area at the time in
19 kind of a martial-law capacity and was the head of the
20 fused civil and military administration of the area,
21 issued, in what appeared to be ambiguous terms, a
22 specific ultimatum. It was interpreted as such at the
23 time by a wide variety of observers in the region, both
24 the local actors and outside observers. That's the
25 essence of what I have put forward to you here.
1 Q. It's the local actors of which I would like
2 to speak. You haven't spoken with any of the local
3 actors on the ground, have you?
4 A. No, sir. That is not something that I have
5 addressed in this paper, nor would I claim to have
6 spoken with them. It's beyond the scope of my direct
8 Q. And your answer, sir, to my question a few
9 seconds ago was that your report was designed to
10 address the political situation, and you have not
11 opined on the tactical military unit operations either
12 on the 16th of April or any other time. So if I take
13 your answer, you're talking about a theory, but you
14 have never spoken with the individuals on the ground --
15 JUDGE MAY: Well, he's answered that.
16 MR. STEIN: All right.
17 Q. By the way, sir, in your book, no mention is
18 made of this ultimatum?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Were you aware, also, sir, that the April
21 1993 agreement did in fact result in a joint command?
22 A. I cannot accept your characterisation of it
23 as an agreement. It was never endorsed, signed by, or
24 involved in any way the side of the ABH or the
25 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The issue of a
1 joint command was in fact a very old one, going back to
2 early 1992 --
3 Q. Sir, let me just cut you off. You agree with
4 part of my sentence but not all of it; is that right?
5 A. I don't agree with any of it. As I heard you
6 state, the agreement resulted in a joint command; I
7 take exception to the use of the term "agreement."
8 Q. And the term "joint command"?
9 A. And the fact that it led to or established a
10 joint command.
11 MR. STEIN: If it please the Court, I would
12 like to introduce, if I can, or maybe perhaps just read
13 from -- would make it a lot faster -- a statement of
14 Dzemo Merdan, who was the general of the HQ BiH army
15 Sarajevo. He is quoted in his statement given to the
16 Office of the Prosecution, quote: "On April 2nd, 1993,
17 an agreement was signed between Mate Boban and Alija
18 Izetbegovic that had a number of terms and conditions.
19 The basis of this agreement was the work done by the
20 joint commission, which I will refer to later. I was
21 present at the negotiations that led to and followed
22 that agreement. In the formal agreement, one of the
23 terms was to the effect that units that had their
24 origin from outside of the area in which they were
25 present must leave within three days. This was
1 particularly because HV soldiers were in the area, as
2 evidenced by the one killed on a road between Vitez and
3 Busovaca. Regarding the fourth term of that agreement,
4 wherein it was decided that a joint command be formed
5 between the HVO and the BiH, the joint command was
6 formed at the end of April or the beginning of May 1993
7 with the HVO in Travnik, and it functioned for
8 approximately 15 days, until the conflict in Travnik in
9 May. The purpose of that term was to attempt to unite
10 us against a common enemy, the Bosnian Serb army."
11 Having read --
12 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.
13 Are you able to take this in, Dr. Donia?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, I've followed, yes.
15 JUDGE MAY: You've got the gist of it? Very
17 MR. STEIN:
18 Q. At least according to the general, there was
19 an agreement and there was a joint command?
20 A. I believe the general's story is correct. I
21 think he has the date wrong. I think he has it about
22 three weeks too early, and the date was the 3rd of
23 August, not 2nd, and the track that President
24 Izetbegovic followed was from Zagreb, on the 27th of
25 March, back to Sarajevo, where on the 3rd of April, he
1 presided over a meeting of the government of Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina and met with the French ambassador. He was
3 not in Mostar, which is the place at which the
4 agreement was alleged to have been signed. He had no
5 knowledge of this particular draft agreement. There
6 were, however, subsequent talks, after the ceasefire
7 that was arranged about -- in about the middle -- about
8 the 22nd or 23rd of April, I believe, there was an
9 effort by BritBat to bring about a ceasefire, and at
10 that point, further discussions were held.
11 So my best interpretation would be that he
12 simply has the date wrong, and that makes his comments,
13 if I'm correct about that, irrelevant to the ultimatum
14 that we're discussing.
15 Q. If you're correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Is this conclusion that you have, relative to
18 this alleged ultimatum, something on which reasonable
19 historians can reasonably disagree?
20 A. My sense of it is that the evidence is very
21 convincing and that there will always be people who
22 will disagree with me on it, but I wouldn't accept your
23 formulation that reasonable historians can reasonably
24 disagree. I think reasonable historians would agree
25 with me.
1 Q. And some would not?
2 A. Some historians would not.
3 Q. All right.
4 A. Some attorneys might not either.
5 Q. I want to ask you, in conclusion, this:
6 Colonel Stewart opines in his book that -- and I'll
7 read it. Quote: "Bosnia is certainly complex beyond
8 anyone's dreams. There are far more than three sides
9 -- Serb, Croat and Muslim -- we hear about in the
10 media. There are factions within groups and groups
11 within factions, and without an established order,
12 these different elements have created a situation as
13 close to anarchy as I have witnessed." That's from
14 Stewart's book. Have you read his book, sir?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Is that a conclusion with which you agree?
17 A. I think it is applicable for various times
18 and many places in Bosnia. I would say that his
19 general characterisation makes even more unusual the
20 ultimatum of April 3rd, because it was one of the few
21 times in the war when the clear prevailing civil and
22 military administration preannounced an intent to
23 launch a military operation.
24 Q. By the way, were you aware that Colonel
25 Stewart also has told us that the HVO was totally
1 unprepared for the events in the Lasva Valley on
2 April 15th?
3 A. No.
4 MR. STEIN: Nothing further.
5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, or Mr. Mikulicic?
6 Mr. Mikulicic, how long are you going to be?
7 It's five minutes to the break. Would you prefer to
8 take the break now?
9 MR. MIKULICIC: Yes, Your Honour, it seems
10 reasonable to take a break now, and then after that, I
11 will need another half an hour.
12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. A quarter of an
14 --- Recess taken at 3.55 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Mikulicic?
17 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) Thank you,
18 Your Honours.
19 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic:
20 Q. Good day, Dr. Donia. My name is Goran
21 Mikulicic. I am an attorney from Zagreb, and in this
22 case with my colleague, Kovacic, I represent Mario
23 Cerkez, the second accused. I would like to ask you a
24 few questions, so I would ask you to respond to them
25 according to your best knowledge.
1 Dr. Donia, before coming to the group of
2 questions that I noted down, I would like to clarify
3 two topics which, it seems to me, were not sufficiently
4 explained in your testimony to date. The first topic
5 that you mentioned recently, this afternoon, is when
6 you said that the HVO, in the regions where it achieved
7 its jurisdiction, introduced so-called martial law.
8 Could you please explain what you meant when you said
10 A. Yes. I believe I noted that it was a
11 constitutionally provisioned martial law, and I'm
12 referring to both the proclamation of July 3rd, 1992,
13 which made the HVO the temporary supreme authority in
14 the territory of Herceg-Bosna, and also the fusion of
15 authority which took place, I believe, in November of
16 1992 in which the head of the HDZ of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Community of
18 Herceg-Bosna, and the HVO were fused in a single
20 I use the term "martial law" as qualified by
21 the rather unusual provisions that were included in the
22 Act of July 3rd. My use of the term may, in fact, be
23 unacceptable from the point of view of a constitutional
24 perspective, I don't know, but it seems to me to aptly
25 describe the situation as it prevailed in
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Dr. Donia, what were the
3 features of that rule that have inspired you to
4 describe it as martial law?
5 A. Basically, judicial functioning, including
6 courts, and various administrative functions were
7 consolidated under the leadership of a military
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation)
11 Q. Dr. Donia, Judge Robinson, in a way,
12 anticipated my next question, but I would be quite
13 direct. Does that mean that, in your opinion, in those
14 regions, all civil authority was suspended and
15 substituted by military authority?
16 A. In my interpretation, no, it was rather fused
17 with military authority. I would note that in the
18 objections of the members of the HDZ who opposed the
19 formation of a stronger Herceg-Bosna, to them, and this
20 was a proclamation issued on, I think, the 4th or 5th
21 of July, 1993, the part that they objected to was not
22 the existence of the HVO but that the HVO had now
23 assumed administrative functions.
24 Q. Do you know, Dr. Donia, that the term "HVO"
25 also included both the civilian and the military
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Are you familiar, Dr. Donia, with the fact
4 that the military component of the HVO, in July 1992,
5 was recognised as a legitimate component of the armed
6 forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Let's move to the second topic which I felt
9 was not sufficiently clarified. This is the agreement
10 that you cited between Alija Izetbegovic and Mate
11 Boban, which was articulated by the spokesman Vaso
12 Vegar. I would like to concentrate on point 2 of that
13 agreement, so if you would permit me to read it as it's
14 described here. That paragraph states: "All armed
15 forces of the HVO and the police of the Croatian
16 Community of Herceg-Bosna and the army of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the police, the Ministry of
18 Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which come from
19 outside of the borders of the province, must be
20 identified and leave those provinces within three
22 Dr. Donia, could you please concentrate on
23 the part that talks about the forces which come from
24 outside of the province? What is your interpretation
25 of this decree? Is this talking about all the forces
1 of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the police or
2 only those which happened to be in that region of the
3 8th, 9th, and 10th cantons but are not originally
4 linked to those regions?
5 A. Thank you. I, first of all, cannot share
6 your characterisation of this as an agreement because
7 it was never discussed or entered into by President
8 Izetbegovic. In fact, even the press coverage, which
9 was written by the HVO spokesman, I believe, refers to
10 it as a draft agreement and notes that it was yet to be
11 signed by President Izetbegovic.
12 I'm not in a position to interpret what the
13 specific language of that article means. It, I think
14 in some sense, was clear that there was to be a
15 division of forces, but what was meant by the drafters
16 in expressing the term "porijeklom" from origins
17 outside the province, I don't know what that refers
18 to. I'm not qualified to interpret it.
19 Q. Mr. Donja, your report which we received
20 regarding this topic concluded that the text that we
21 have just read would mean, and I quote, "that all
22 Bosnian forces must leave Provinces 3, 8, and 10 where
23 they were present in a significant number." I could
24 only interpret this statement of yours the way it was
25 stated, "all forces," but this does not come out from
1 this text, only those forces which are not originally
2 from that region, and that is something different.
3 Would you agree with me?
4 A. I would, I guess, defer to what happened on
5 the 16th of April, when actually at a press conference,
6 Mr. Vegar clarified the terms of this ultimatum. At
7 that press conference, he was asked whether the army of
8 BiH and its units that were in Provinces 3, 8, and 10
9 had to lay down their arms. That was a question posed
10 to him at the conference. His response was, "No. The
11 requirement is either that the units of the army of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina withdraw or submit themselves to HVO
14 Q. Dr. Donia, perhaps I'm insisting on this too
15 much, but this is a very important fact, so I would
16 like to ask for your understanding and also ask for the
17 understanding of the Court. This is not in the form of
18 an ultimatum, as you say, and that relates exclusively
19 to the forces of the Bosnian army and the police, but
20 also the Croatian army and the police in Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina, which are not originally from the region
22 of Provinces 3, 8, and 10 under the Vance-Owen Plan.
23 A. I think that the language refers to the
24 withdrawal of the respective forces, not from Provinces
25 3, 8, and 10 but from the provinces in which they don't
1 belong, that is, the notion would be that the forces of
2 the HVO would, if there were any in those provinces,
3 withdraw from provinces that were awarded to
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina under Vance-Owen. Likewise, any
5 troops that were army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or police
6 units of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Provinces 3,
7 8, and 10 would be compelled to withdraw from those
9 Q. Dr. Donia, if we accept your characterisation
10 of this topic as an ultimatum, then is it true that the
11 ultimatum was stated equally in relation to the HVO and
12 the BH army? Because both units from these entities
13 were supposed to withdraw from the provinces that they
14 did not originally come from.
15 A. The specific impact of the ultimatum depends
16 on what units were where. If there were a host of ABiH
17 units in Provinces 3, 8, and 10 and no HVO units in
18 provinces awarded to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would,
19 indeed, be a unilateral ultimatum. If, on the other
20 hand, there were forces of the HVO throughout the
21 provinces of those awarded to the central government,
22 it would not be a unilateral ultimatum and it would
23 apply to all those forces. I don't know what specific
24 units were deployed where at that time.
25 Q. Thank you, Dr. Donia. We will move on to
1 other topics.
2 Yesterday, at the beginning of your
3 testimony, my colleague Stein asked you if you had
4 ever, while working on your report, spoken with Dario
5 Kordic, did you ever ask to speak to him, and was it
6 true that his name, the name of Dario Kordic, was not
7 mentioned in your book from 1994. My question is, does
8 this also apply to Mr. Mario Cerkez?
9 A. There are two questions you're asking, and
10 one is have I ever interviewed or met with your client,
11 and the answer is no, I have not. The second question
12 is does his name appear in the book, and the answer
13 also is no, it does not.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) I would like
16 the usher to put document Z1660 on the ELMO, 1660.
17 This is a map of the region of the former Yugoslavia
18 that we are discussing, so in order to make the
19 testimony more plastic, I would like to put a few
20 questions to Dr. Donia.
21 Q. Dr. Donia, we see a map of the region of the
22 former Yugoslavia which is interesting to us only in
23 order to establish or determine the borders of the
24 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to the
25 neighbouring republics, later states. Would you please
1 point on the ELMO with which republics, that later
2 became states, does -- which states border on
4 A. Two states border Bosnia-Herzegovina. One is
5 the Republic of Croatia and the other is the
6 reconstituted Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in its
7 embodiment representing both the Montenegrin republic,
8 the Serbian republic, and the Vojvodina, which was
9 annexed to it in 1990.
10 Q. Dr. Donia, could you please just tell us
11 briefly, which region did the main aggression against
12 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina come from, and
13 by that, I mean the aggression of the former Yugoslav
14 People's Army and the paramilitary Serbian and
15 Montenegrin units.
16 A. Aggression came from both the Republic of
17 Croatia and the units of the Yugoslav National Army and
18 Serbian paramilitary units. I respect your question
19 and will identify it. The aggression came from the
20 Montenegrin irregulars and paramilitaries who entered
21 Herzegovina, it came from forces crossing the border
22 with Serbia, and it came from within
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, including units of the JNA,
24 numerous Serbian paramilitary units, and, in some
25 cases, reconstituted Territorial Defence forces.
1 Have I answered your question?
2 Q. Of course. One explanation, when you
3 mentioned that the aggression came partially from the
4 territory of the Republic of Croatia, would you agree
5 that by that, you mean parts of the Republic of Croatia
6 which at that time were under the rule of Serbian
7 paramilitary units and parts of the Yugoslav People's
9 A. That was indeed part of it, yes.
10 Q. Would you agree with me, Dr. Donia, that the
11 border towards the southeast, towards Serbia and
12 Montenegro, and then on the other side, in relation to
13 the Republic of Croatia, in parts which were occupied
14 by the JNA, were practically closed to citizens of the
15 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina? There was no
16 border traffic across those borders; is that true?
17 A. Could you identify the time period that
18 you're thinking of?
19 Q. I mean the period from 1992 up until the
20 Dayton Accord.
21 A. I would say, from the early summer of 1992,
22 that that was a general statement one could make, yes.
23 Probably also valid for some time after Dayton.
24 Q. Nevertheless, Dr. Donia, the population of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina received humanitarian aid, received
1 medicines, clothes; refugees were crossing the
2 borders. Would you agree with me that this was border
3 traffic that was exclusively conducted through the
4 borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of
6 A. Largely. There was substantial air
7 assistance. I would note that my own entry into Bosnia
8 and Herzegovina during wartime was always through
9 Zagreb, and that in fact a great deal of humanitarian
10 aid passed through the Republic of Croatia on the way
11 to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Very frequently a
12 substantial percentage of it was removed by forces of
13 the Croatian army or HVO on the way in, but indeed,
14 your basic point, I would concur that the border
15 crossings into Bosnia and Herzegovina were largely
16 through the Republic of Croatia.
17 A. Mr. Donia, would you agree with me that the
18 Republic of Croatia, the next day after the declaration
19 of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
20 recognised that state, and that it was the first state
21 out of all the world's states which sent an ambassador
22 to occupied Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina? Is this true?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. After a certain period of time, in Zagreb,
1 the capital of the Republic of Croatia, an embassy of
2 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established;
3 is that true?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Is it true, Dr. Donia, that throughout this
6 whole period that we are talking about, from the moment
7 when the embassies were established, the Croatian
8 embassy in Sarajevo and the Bosnia and Herzegovinian
9 one in Zagreb, that these embassies were continually
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Are you familiar, Dr. Donia, with the fact
13 that at the Bosnian and Herzegovinian embassy in Zagreb
14 in 1993, there was a military-economic representative
15 office, as well as a logistical section of the
16 headquarters of the armed forces of Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina, as well as a sector of that headquarters
18 in Split?
19 A. I was not aware of the Split office, but I
20 was aware of the offices in Zagreb.
21 Q. Permit me, Dr. Donia, to show you a document
22 which I would like to introduce into evidence. I would
23 like you to comment on it if you feel that this is
25 MR. MIKULICIC: Would the usher please ...
1 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
3 MR. MIKULICIC:
4 Q. Would you please be kind enough, Dr. Donia,
5 to look at this document.
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. Would you agree if I say that this body
8 operated on the 15th of July, 1993, in the embassy of
9 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb?
10 A. I'm really not qualified to, I guess,
11 validate this document. I have no reason to doubt it
12 and would find it in agreement with the general
13 approach of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at
14 the time, but I really can't validate the document as
16 Q. Of course. Dr. Donia, a moment ago, in
17 answering questions by my colleague Mr. Stein, you
18 touched on the question of refugees and their fate and
19 their numbers as a consequence of the war in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I should just like briefly to
21 touch upon this topic.
22 Would you agree with me, Dr. Donia -- and I
23 have some figures here of the office for refugees and
24 displaced persons of the government of the Republic of
25 Croatia -- if I say that at the end of 1992, there were
1 about 285.000 refugees from the Republic of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina that had found refuge in the
3 Republic of Croatia?
4 A. I believe that number is right. It accords
5 with my understanding of the refugee reception by
7 Q. Dr. Donia, do you know or did you come across
8 in your research any data which would indicate that the
9 government of the Republic of Croatia expelled refugees
10 coming from Bosnia-Herzegovina?
11 A. I know of no such incident, no.
12 Q. In the course of your research, Mr. Donia,
13 did you find any evidence of the Republic of Croatia
14 during that time -- that is, end of 1992, 1993, and
15 1994 -- in any way confiscating the property of legal
16 persons from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
17 territory of the Republic of Croatia?
18 A. I really can't answer that question. I have
19 not made any point of investigating that question and
20 couldn't really give you an answer.
21 Q. Very well. Do you know, Dr. Donia, that the
22 Republic of Croatia, in its hospitals, provided medical
23 treatment to a large number of people coming from the
24 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina? And I particularly
25 have in mind the Bosnian Muslims.
1 A. Again, I'm not really familiar -- I would
2 assume that there was medical care provided in refugee
3 camps and in various facilities where refugees were
4 housed and cared for by the UNHCR and other agencies,
5 and that some of that came from the Republic of
6 Croatia. But I must -- I'm reaching beyond my
7 knowledge here to make that assumption.
8 Q. I understand that, Dr. Donia, but I hope you
9 didn't misunderstand my question. I was not thinking
10 of the refugee camps; I rather had in mind hospitals
11 and regular medical facilities. In specific terms, do
12 you know that the clinical hospital in Split, in the
13 course of 1992 and 1993, hospitalised almost 4.000
14 persons of Muslim ethnicity from the territory of
16 A. I did not know that number, no.
17 Q. Very well. Dr. Donia, could you agree with
18 me if I say that in 1992, 1993, and 1994, there were
19 frequent meetings between statesmen or representatives
20 of the state authorities of the Republics of Croatia
21 and Bosnia-Herzegovina?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. How would you describe those meetings,
24 roughly? Were they frequent, or were they rare,
1 A. Well, I really don't -- I think it varied
2 from time to time, and in -- certainly in 1992, there
3 were very regular, frequent contacts. I think they
4 became somewhat less regular in the course of the
5 spring and summer of 1993, but I think the contacts and
6 meetings took place at many different levels, and it's
7 difficult to characterise the frequency without looking
8 at specific ministries or heads of state.
9 Q. I see. Dr. Donia, are you aware that the
10 Croatian parliament adopted a declaration with regard
11 to the conflicts that occurred in Central Bosnia
12 between the Croatian and Muslim sides, asking
13 explicitly that those conflicts be halted?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Do you know, Dr. Donia, that the president of
16 Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, in April 1993 issued an appeal
17 requesting that the conflicts in Central Bosnia be
18 stopped between the Muslims and the Croats?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Dr. Donia, I should like to ask you to
21 examine a document relating to this appeal of President
22 Tudjman's and which I should like to tender into
24 MR. MIKULICIC: Could I ask the usher for his
25 assistance to show this document to the witness.
1 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
3 MR. MIKULICIC:
4 Q. Would you please focus on the last paragraph,
5 which I should like you to examine more closely.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Could you very briefly comment on those
8 events and the meeting held in Zagreb on the 24th of
9 April, 1993, under the auspices of Lord Owen?
10 A. I actually referred to it a few minutes ago
11 in response to some of Mr. Stein's questions. In the
12 wake of the violence on April 16th and that subsequent
13 week, the international community actively promoted a
14 ceasefire on the ground in Central Bosnia and rushed to
15 move forward the arrangements of the Vance-Owen Plan.
16 It will be remembered that Boban had signed this
17 agreement already in January, and Izetbegovic had
18 signed it already in March, with certain
19 qualifications. So this document reflects the efforts
20 to push the process forward by the international
22 Q. Thank you. That document, among other
23 things, refers to meetings between the two states,
24 doesn't it? Between the presidents of the two states;
25 I'm sorry.
1 A. Well, it specifies -- the English language
2 version I have says, "I welcome readiness expressed by
3 the Croat and Muslim leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
4 Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic." It doesn't state
5 between states, unless I'm directing my attention to a
6 different section of it.
7 Q. I think there must be a misunderstanding. My
8 question was whether there was a meeting in Zagreb,
9 attended by President Alija Izetbegovic, President
10 Tudjman, and Lord Owen, which is referred to in this
12 A. I'm sorry, I don't see a reference to a
13 meeting with the three of them.
14 Q. Dr. Donia, this appeal was made by
15 Mr. Tudjman on the 22nd of April, 1993, and in the last
16 sentence it says that it welcomes the readiness of the
17 Croatian leaders and the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
18 Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic, to meet with Lord
19 Owen, and that meeting was attended by Lord Owen; is
20 that correct?
21 A. Well, I don't know if the meeting -- I assume
22 the meeting took place, but I see no indication in this
23 document that President Tudjman had attended a prior
25 Q. Very well. Dr. Donia, let us leave this
1 matter aside, and let us turn to another area now which
2 will also be the last area of my cross-examination.
3 You have studied the history of the Balkans,
4 and especially that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you
5 tell us, on the basis of those studies into distant
6 history, how many wars were waged in that area, I do
7 not mean the exact number, but how would you describe
8 those wars?
9 A. I would certainly begin by noting that the
10 two greatest wars of the 20th century on the territory
11 of Bosnia-Herzegovina were major, bloody, large-scale
12 confrontations, it took many, many casualties, those
13 being World War II and the war of the 1990s -- wars of
14 the 1990s. World War I, there was relatively little
15 fighting on the territory of Bosnia.
16 Prior to that, I would -- it's a very valid
17 question, and I'm not sure how I would characterise it
18 without thinking about it some more, but there were
19 sporadic armed conflicts and occasional wars over some
20 centuries, and they were of different types. There
21 were territorial wars around the borders, some of which
22 were no more than skirmishes, some of which were major
24 I would probably, just thinking back on the
25 19th century, consider the Austro-Hungarian invasion of
1 1878 to be perhaps the most substantial military action
2 perhaps of that century.
3 Q. Dr. Donia, bearing in mind the wars between
4 two states that occurred through history in this area,
5 in your studies, did you ever come across an example
6 of, during such war operations between two states,
7 diplomatic relations between those two same states
8 continuing uninterrupted? Have you ever come across a
9 situation of that kind in your research?
10 A. I think it was typical of the earlier period
11 anyway, for diplomatic relations to be maintained even
12 as warfare went on.
13 Q. While states were at war, did ever one state
14 service the other state with weapons, medicines, food,
15 and other forms of aid, allowing it to pass through its
16 territory? Have you ever come across such an example?
17 A. I think that probably it was a very typical
18 situation in earlier times for exactly that situation
19 to prevail.
20 Q. Dr. Donia, in your opinion, as a historian
21 and a researcher of this issue, what is the reason, the
22 cause of the conflict, of the war in Central Bosnia?
23 A. I think that it was --
24 Q. I'm sorry for interrupting. What I have in
25 mind is the conflict between the Croats and the
1 Muslims, to make it quite clear.
2 A. I would say, in a word, Karadjordjevo. It
3 was the determination of the Croatian community, as it
4 became transformed under the leadership of the Zagreb
5 regime, to carve out a territory which would be
6 dominated by the HVO and exclusively Croatian in
8 Q. That is your position, isn't it, Dr. Donia?
9 A. That would be my answer to your question,
10 which was what was the primary cause of the conflict.
11 Q. Dr. Donia, do you know somebody called
12 Muhamed Sacirbey?
13 A. I do not know him personally but I know who
14 he is.
15 Q. Could you tell Their Honours the position
16 this person had in 1993?
17 A. In October 1993, I believe he became foreign
18 minister and was foreign minister until sometime around
19 Dayton, and prior to that, I'm not certain what his
20 function was, prior to October 1993. He was, for some
21 time, the ambassador to the United Nations prior to
22 becoming foreign minister.
23 Q. So Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey was the standing
24 representative of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
25 the United Nations; is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Dr. Donia, is my conclusion correct, that the
3 main function of an ambassador to the United Nations is
4 to articulate the positions and policies of the state
5 he represents in the International Community, that is,
6 in the United Nations, to formulate the official
7 positions of the state he represents? Would you agree
8 with me in that?
9 A. That would be one of his functions, yes.
10 Q. I should now like to ask you to look at a
11 document, with the help of the usher, written by
12 Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, standing representative to the
13 United Nations, dated the 21st of April, 1993.
14 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) Your Honours,
15 the original version of this document is a bad one, so
16 the Defence has copied it to facilitate reading, and
17 I'm tendering both.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Document D34/2.
19 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation)
20 Q. Dr. Donia, will you please look at the second
21 page? It is far more legible than the first. Would
22 you please read this document, upon which I have a
23 question for you or, rather, I will be asking you to
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. To fix this document in time, it is five days
2 following the tragedy in Ahmici.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Dr. Donia, is it true that Mr. Muhamed
5 Sacirbey, and you agreed with me that his function is
6 to articulate the official positions of the Republic of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he describes the conflict in
8 Bosnia, and I'm drawing your attention to the fourth
9 paragraph, as a conflict between local leaders which
10 would never have occurred had it not been for the
11 inadequate humanitarian aid given to the population of
12 Central Bosnia?
13 A. I noted that one of his functions is to
14 represent the official position of his government, and
15 I note your reading of the paragraph.
16 MR. MIKULICIC: (Interpretation) Dr. Donia,
17 thank you for answering my questions. The Defence has
18 no further questions.
19 MR. NICE: I have several matters in
21 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
22 Q. Just dealing with that last document first,
23 do you have any other comment to make on that passage
24 in the statement of the United Nations, its validity or
1 A. I would simply note its correspondence with
2 the broad and longstanding objective of the government
3 of Bosnia-Herzegovina to lift the arms embargo, which
4 is the principal purpose of this document. It is not
5 designed to characterise the conflict but rather to
6 seek assistance in the relief from the arms embargo of
7 September 1991.
8 Q. Going back to the earlier questions you were
9 asked yesterday, first, dealing with questions
10 directed, I think, to the integrity and so on of your
11 report and other writings, when you started work on
12 this region, did you have any personal historical
13 sympathy to one side or the other?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Any connection to any part of the region?
16 A. As I've indicated in the personal statement,
17 my entire family is American of Dutch extraction, and
18 so I have no relationship, familial or origin, in any
19 way connected to any part of Southeast Europe.
20 Q. You were asked about your involvement under
21 the National Peace Foundation. Is that a body that is
22 partial in any way?
23 A. I don't know anything about the National
24 Peace Foundation, except that it facilitated my visit
25 in the summer of 1994.
1 Q. You've been asked a number of questions about
2 critics of your works. For convenience, there are
3 collections of documents.
4 MR. NICE: If they are distributed in this
5 way, as bundles, by the usher, first to the Court and
6 to the witness, as they come, and then -- yes, exactly
7 like that, to the Judges, to the witness, the Court,
8 and the defendants. The documents have separate
9 exhibit numbers. If you can give a bundle to the
10 witness, please. Thank you. One bundle remains for
11 the Court and one for each of the defendants.
12 I've highlighted passages here for speed of
13 finding and because they are the passages to which I'm
14 taking the witness.
15 Q. First, the criticism by Kisslinger, not
16 Kissinger, of September 12, 1994, does it deal with
17 your book, A Tradition Betrayed, and highlighted in
18 yellow in the first paragraph, you're described as "an
19 expert on Islam under Hapsburg rule"?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. In the bottom paragraph, "The unique Bosnian
22 mix is, of course, well-known as a modern urban
23 phenomenon ... but it is this book's particular
24 accomplishment to trace it to the very advent of
25 Bosnian Christianity and extend it to outlying towns
1 and villages."
2 Over the page, please, highlighted in red is
3 the passage read to you by Mr. Stein. Its context was
4 this. The first phrase or sentence even not read was:
5 "Donia and Fine's view of Bosnian culture is
6 on the whole compelling, but its presentation is
7 troubling ..."
8 The last paragraph reads as follows: "Still,
9 like Vulliamy, Donia and Fine deepen our understanding
10 of what has been lost in Bosnia, and underscore the
11 distance between knowledge and political wisdom. Their
12 efforts are valuable because the war in Bosnia has been
13 fought to expunge its past while determining its fate.
14 As a work that documents a legacy, Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed is an answer,
16 however disproportionate, to the burning of the
17 national archives in Sarajevo, the razing of hundreds
18 of mosques and churches, the destruction of the Mostar,
19 Bridge. What conquerors can blast from stone, they can
20 never bottle the genie of historical memory."
21 That was part, in any event, of the comments
22 of Kisslinger on your work.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. There is a French translation for that. But
25 if we can turn swiftly to the next document, they've
1 all been numbered, which should be 1677.3, this is a
2 criticism by Legvold, and there was the one phrase put
3 to you, "written with something of a skilled
4 high-school text"?
5 A. I thought that actually was pretty much the
6 objective that we had in mind in writing it.
7 Q. Shall we now look at the rest of the
8 criticism? Because I'll tell you how that was
9 characterised to you in a question. He suggested that
10 this was not a very favourable criticism when that
11 single line was put to you. Other passages read:
12 "With the calm authority of their craft, they firmly
13 crush the silliness of popular conception. Not only,
14 they make plain, has Bosnia existed as a separate,
15 identifiable entity over all these years with borders
16 more intact than either Croatia or Serbia, but in terms
17 of present century, it's never known ethnic conflict.
18 This history, they insist, has through the centuries
19 been one of tolerated diversity and practical
21 The next paragraph before the single quoted
23 "This book is only 270 pages of small-paged
24 text, simply written, with something of the character
25 of a skilled high-school text. That is appropriate.
1 Given what the warring parties in the region are doing
2 to their history, for others to be saving and
3 preserving it for future generations is a modestly
4 noble act."
5 If we then turn to the next criticism by
6 Fouad Ajami, three pages, dated August 7, 1995, is
7 another comment on your book. The third sheet is a
8 summary criticism of your work by -- do you know Ajami?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Who is he?
11 A. He's at the Johns Hopkins Advanced School for
12 International Studies, frequently a commentator as well
13 for various television networks and, in my view, an
14 outstanding scholar and analyst of, particularly, Islam
15 and Middle Eastern countries.
16 Q. In the third sheet, the highlighted sentence
17 reads: "In one of the best scholarly accounts and
18 histories of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, historians Robert
20 Donia and John Fine ..." and then goes off to summarise
21 the book.
22 Next sheet, please, 1677.5, a criticism by
23 Abbas Milani. Known to you?
24 A. No.
25 Q. And the publication?
1 A. It was the San Francisco Chronicle.
2 Q. And Highlighted: "Bosnia and Hercegovina: A
3 Tradition Betrayed brings a sober voice of academic
4 scholarship into the discussion. Seeking to identify
5 the traditions that have characterised Bosnian society
6 through its history, Balkan historians John Fine and
7 Robert Donia explore the historical roots of Bosnian
8 society from the arrival of Slavic tribes in the sixth
9 and seventh centuries to the breakup of socialist
11 Over the page, highlighted: "The authors try
12 to steer a fair and dispassionate course." They praise
13 your prose and they conclude at the end: "Erudite and
14 impartial, 'Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition
15 Betrayed' greatly illuminates the rich contours of
16 Bosnian history and the genealogy of its current tragic
18 I think the next and perhaps last is a
19 document numbered 1677.6, again by Fouad Ajami dealing
20 with a number of books. I think on the third sheet,
21 there's one sentence highlighted in red but the balance
22 in yellow, where he's dealing with: "This history is
23 an invention, spun out of vanity and a need for
24 consolation." He goes on: "For fate meandered in the
25 Balkans. And its meanderings can now be more clearly
1 understood, and measured against some of the region's
2 deadly myths, thanks to the appearance of outstanding
3 works of research by the impassioned British journalist
4 Noel Malcolm, the exacting American historians Robert
5 Donja and John Fine ..." and he then goes on to deal
6 with others, and he's praise-worthy of your work, three
7 sheets or two sheets further on, in a passage
8 highlighted, again, in yellow. The last document I'll
9 deal with in a minute.
10 Are those the criticisms that were being made
11 of your work?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And the people who made them, apart from one
14 of whom you were unaware, peers, superiors, how would
15 you categorise them?
16 A. In many cases, peers; in some cases, people
17 who have been longer than I have in the business of
18 studying the region.
19 Q. While we have the exhibits with us, and it's
20 a small point that can be dealt with very swiftly, you
21 were asked about the representation in countries other
22 than the region of the party of the Bosnian Muslims.
23 Are you aware of the representation in other countries
24 around the world at that same time of the HDZ?
25 A. Yes. This was actually something that all
1 three parties engaged in at that time.
2 Q. So that if you just look at the last exhibit
3 that was at the bottom of the pile of documents, tell
4 us what the document is, if you can?
5 A. Glaska Hrvatska Demokratska (phoen). It's
6 "Merry Christmas and Happy 1990."
7 Q. What is the document itself?
8 A. It's the journal of the HDZ.
9 Q. If we turn over and just look at the
10 highlighted pages, we see references to, first, North
11 America, I think. Following some pages with pictures,
12 we see Australia, Sweden, and reports from associated
13 groups elsewhere in the world?
14 A. Yes, Australia, yes.
15 Q. You were asked about President Tudjman, his
16 revision of a text because of its having caused ethnic
17 offence. Are you aware of any other examples of
18 President Tudjman causing ethnic offence? Are you
19 aware of a television programme where he spoke of his
21 A. No.
22 Q. Very well. And any other examples of his
23 causing offence?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Thank you. The term "Bosniak," you've
1 defined its present use. Did it, in fact, have an
2 earlier use, however slight?
3 A. It had many earlier uses, and there are many
4 instances of earlier usage. The Bosniak historians
5 have made a point of identifying these instances. As I
6 look at them, the same problem occurred historically
7 that occurs today, which is that at times, the term
8 "Bosniak" applies to clearly the Bosnian Muslims, and
9 at times, it's ambiguous whether it applies to the
10 Muslims or to the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 But there are historical precedents in which people
12 call them Bosniaks and others call them Bosniaks as
13 well, and those are situations in which the people
14 concerned are Bosnian Muslims.
15 Q. You were asked about a number of meetings of
16 leaders, including, of course, Karadjordjevo. Is there
17 a meeting at Grac and is there a meeting at Tikvis that
18 you can help us with?
19 A. The follow-up to the meeting in
20 Karadjordjevo, in which the two heads of state
21 conferred regarding the division of Bosnia, was
22 followed on May 6th, 1992 by a meeting between Mate
23 Boban and Radovan Karadzic in Grac which produced an
24 agreement. It was a publicly released agreement that
25 referenced the 1939 banovina line and agreed to work
1 together further regarding a dual party cooperation.
2 This was subsequently followed by, really,
3 several other meetings in which, in June, President
4 Tudjman met with first the Herzegovinian Croats on June
5 13th and then June 20th with the Bosnian Croats, and
6 further, the implementation, albeit a delayed
7 implementation, of this politics of division.
8 Q. Tikvis? No? Very well.
9 You were asked many questions about efforts
10 to create a Muslim state. Are you aware, yourself, of
11 any efforts, in particular of any documents reflecting
12 efforts to Catholicise areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina with
13 which we are concerned?
14 A. To Catholicise areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
16 Q. By which I mean moves to encourage the
17 erection of religious symbols of the Catholic faith,
18 and so on?
19 A. Well, I interpreted your question to mean
20 Catholic proselytisation or -- establish a more
21 Catholic state, and I would say that there were some
22 efforts to support the formation and strengthen
23 Herceg-Bosna by certain clergy, and there was a great
24 deal of support for the establishment of Catholic
25 churches, support for the clergy, and so on, as a part
1 of the broad effort, to, say, strengthen Croatian
2 culture and religion.
3 Actually, the majority of the leaders of the
4 Franciscan order of Srebrna Bosna and the Catholic
5 hierarchy, which to this day is in Sarajevo, was quite
6 bitter about the formation of a purely territorial
7 unit, and on at least some occasions strongly denounced
8 such a solution, which left, in their view, these
9 hundreds of thousands of Croat Catholics out of the
10 community which had been proclaimed.
11 Q. When asked about the involvement of outsiders
12 on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, were there
13 outsiders involved in the HV or the HVO?
14 A. Yes, at many different times. I think it's
15 worth recalling that on May 15th, 1992, the Security
16 Council passed a resolution which called for the
17 withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, including those of the Republic of
19 Serbia and the Republic of Croatia, and so clearly at
20 that time, in the view of the United Nations Security
21 Council, there were outsiders -- namely Croatian forces
22 and Serbian forces -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
23 There were also various -- the same
24 resolution called for all paramilitaries to be brought
25 under the command, the central command, of the army of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or I think it's -- the language is
2 it's under the command of the armed forces of
4 Q. When you were asked about Mujahedin, was it
5 the case that there were individuals, whether
6 mercenaries or otherwise, involved in the HVO?
7 A. Yes, there were mercenaries -- there were
8 volunteers from Croatian communities around the world.
9 There were mercenaries from a number of different
10 countries, European countries and countries of the
11 former Soviet bloc, that were involved.
12 Q. You were stopped from giving your position on
13 the Croatian position in November 1991 because you
14 didn't agree with either of the two alternatives put to
15 you. What do you say that position was?
16 A. Well, the Croatian position at that time was
17 in transition, and there was no single Croatian
18 position but rather the first emergence of two
19 different ones. The position of the elected leader of
20 the HDZ in the elections of 1990, Stjepan Kljujic, was
21 that the Croatian nation should support a unified
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina and realise its national
23 aspirations within the framework of that republic.
24 The situation at the time was at the very end
25 of the war in Croatia, and consequently that support
1 was frequently conditional on the understanding that
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina would eventually break away
3 from, rather than remain part of, Yugoslavia. Thus, at
4 this time, the second viewpoint emerged, which was that
5 there should be a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
6 either outright or in the form of the canton formula
7 that the international community promoted. I've noted
8 in my paper the two very different responses to the
9 formation of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna by
10 Mate Boban, who saw it as a realisation of a
11 territorial aspiration from the 1939 banovina boundary,
12 and that of Mr. Kljujic, who saw this as a
13 reluctantly-taken step that would not be implemented at
14 this time.
15 So subsequently, of course, with the
16 expulsion and purging of the party at the direction of
17 the Zagreb regime, Mr. Kljujic resigned as president
18 and was subsequently replaced, and the party then
19 adopted at that time the position that the Croatian
20 Community of Herceg-Bosna, with its territorial
21 designation, was the realisation of Croatian
22 aspirations in Bosnia.
23 Q. Thank you. Colonel Stewart's book, which
24 you've read, do you have any observations to make on
25 his commentary generally or on his observations of
1 historical matters, he being an officer who was there
2 for six months, I believe?
3 A. Yes, I think he has a -- his reportage on
4 contemporary events is certainly worthy of note and
5 important. His understanding of history or his
6 relation -- his imparting of history I think is
7 somewhat superficial, if you will, and I don't think he
8 was intending to be a purveyor of serious history in
9 that book.
10 Q. The creation of mutual embassies by Croatia
11 and by Bosnia-Herzegovina; any significance?
12 A. Well, yes, I think that's a very important
13 part of this two-track policy that the Zagreb regime
14 maintained toward Bosnia at this time, and numerous
15 observers have commented on this prolific production of
16 statements, guarantees, appeals, by President Tudjman
17 and various members of the Zagreb regime, recognising
18 borders, recognising the legitimacy of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the same time the support,
20 which was also really overt, of the separatist
21 territorial aspirations of Croats in Bosnia. This
22 really came to a head, I think, in the July 3rd, 1992,
23 proclamation which was read in the world press as a
24 stab in the back to Bosnia. The government -- or the
25 official Russian agency, Itar Tass, simply stated that
1 the Zagreb government is now pursuing the same policy
2 as the Belgrade government.
3 So this policy of supporting the separatist
4 territorial ambitions of the Bosnian Croats coincided
5 in time and at all times ran parallel to this other
6 track, which was a plethora of pronouncements,
7 recognition, exchange of ambassadors, and at all times
8 things that were viewed as required by the
9 international community in terms of the posture towards
11 Q. In your judgement, were those other actions on
12 the second track truly sincere or not?
13 A. Well, I think they were both real tracks, but
14 it seems to me it's hard to view the expressions of
15 support for the territorial integrity of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina as sincere when Croatian forces were
17 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a separatist agenda was
18 being promoted. So I would not view them as sincere,
20 Q. You've referred to two meetings of June the
21 13th and June 20th; do you recall?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Which year? Just for clarification; there
24 may be a problem on the record.
25 A. Yes, those meetings occurred in 1991.
1 Q. Very well. You started this afternoon by
2 correcting certain matters that had been put to you in
3 a selective way from the Silber & Little book. You
4 also drew to the Court's attention that Kordic was
5 referred to in that book, at least in the later edition
6 of it. Is there anything you want to add to about
7 that, and to what does it go?
8 JUDGE MAY: Well, the examination was stopped
9 at that point. If we're to have quotations of that
10 sort from the book, then we need the authors.
11 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.
12 JUDGE MAY: Have you got very much more?
13 We're past our time.
14 MR. NICE: No, if you can give me just a
15 couple of minutes, I can certainly conclude.
16 Q. As a matter of a quick point of history,
17 kuna, the currency you referred to, where was that
18 derived as a name, and was it controversial or
20 A. The kuna is a small animal, the skins of
21 which were used, supposedly, at the time of the
22 medieval Croatian kingdom.
23 Q. Had the name been used earlier as a currency?
24 A. It was also a reference to currency used in
25 World War II by the Ustasha independent state of
1 Croatia. Its adoption, I think in 1993, was very
2 controversial and was viewed as a nationalist symbolic
3 assertion by the Croatian government.
4 Q. You were asked questions about the media, and
5 the newspapers in particular. The newspapers, did they
6 survive the war?
7 A. Which ones?
8 Q. Well, local newspapers.
9 A. Most of them did not.
10 Q. Those that did, what was their content, in
11 your judgement, as to its genuine political commentary
12 or otherwise?
13 A. Oh, well, there were all sorts of
14 publications, and the classic example, perhaps, is
15 Oslobodjenje, the Sarajevo paper, which indeed came out
16 I think every day except one when the printing ink
17 froze. But there were many local publications, some of
18 which had very tendentious agendas and others of which
19 were pretty good.
20 Q. Yes, I think probably I'm going to leave that
21 there, and the only other thing I have is a correction
22 which I think I want to -- yes, one last question: The
23 17th (sic) Muslim Brigade, there was something that --
24 you were, I think, unhappy with the way the question
25 was put to you about that. Is there anything you want
1 to add? If you can't remember, it doesn't --
2 A. 7th Muslim brigade?
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. No, I have nothing further.
5 Q. It's too complicated to ask you all to go
6 back to the relevant passage, but can I here note that
7 at page 18 of today's transcript, line 5, Mr. Stein, in
8 reading an extract from your book, Dr. Donia, on
9 page 267, read it incorrectly, and it probably should
10 be corrected for fear of otherwise being accidentally
11 misleading. It was suggested, I think, that --
12 it was read in this way, or something to this
13 effect: "Fighting against Croatian units in Central
14 Bosnia was done principally by Muslim brigades," and
15 then I think it says, "became exclusively Muslim."
16 What your book said was, "And the Bosnian government
17 forces in that region became almost exclusively
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. It wasn't referring to the area becoming
21 exclusively Muslim or anything like that?
22 A. Right.
23 MR. NICE: There is a small correction to
24 Merdan's statement, but I don't think it's
25 significant. That's all I have to ask.
1 JUDGE MAY: Doctor, that concludes your
2 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International
3 Tribunal to give it. You are now released.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.
5 (The witness withdrew)
6 JUDGE MAY: You've got the next witness to
7 call tomorrow?
8 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes.
9 JUDGE MAY: That will take an hour or so; is
10 that right?
11 MR. NICE: In chief, I would have thought I
12 will be between three-quarters of an hour and an hour,
13 but I hope not more. It could be less.
14 JUDGE MAY: The film has been seen now by one
15 member of the bench and will be seen by the other
16 tomorrow before the sitting, although I gather
17 Mr. Stein has a point.
18 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Judge. We would
19 object -- Your Honour's seen the film, so you know
20 thoroughly, we find, frankly, its relevance
21 attenuated. It is not part of the expert's report, nor
22 does he say that he has relied on it. I'm not sure why
23 it's being incorporated through his testimony at all.
24 It is of an unnamed Muslim family and an unstated
25 date. We have no access to the author of the film,
1 although I gather her name is Tone Bringa. She is not
2 on the witness list; she is the narrator. We have no
3 access, either, to Debbie Christie, the producer or
4 director, and I'm not sure how I would even begin to
5 approach it.
6 Now, I will concede, frankly, that it is, in
7 my view, not particularly relevant except to prejudice
8 the Court, and of course you are professional judges,
9 and I'm not going to think for one minute that it will
10 prejudice your judgement. But when you see the whole
11 thing, as Your Honour has, it's a sad tale.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kovacic.
13 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I would just like
14 to add only one sentence. We think that having that
15 reader as part of Dr. Allcock's testimony is not
16 appropriate. It is not because the discovery was not
17 done appropriately, since we all voted yesterday, and
18 indeed, only twelve hours before. I don't oppose, as a
19 principle matter, a possibility for the Prosecution to
20 enter that film in any other way or any other method
21 throughout his case, but not connected to Dr. Allcock's
22 testimony, since he never mentioned that movie.
23 MR. NICE: Can I just deal with the
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
1 MR. NICE: When Dr. Allcock arrived some days
2 ago, he volunteered that film as a piece of effective
3 field research that he would like to refer to in
4 support of his conclusions. It was not known to him
5 that the film happened to have been seen in another
6 case by the author of the film a week before, and it
7 was just a coincidence. He regards it as a piece of
8 research upon which he would rely, much like any other
9 piece of research.
10 The position is now clear that his
11 cross-examination will not be concluded, I think,
12 tomorrow, and he will have to come back. And it can't
13 be next week; it will have to be at some later date,
14 probably I think now in September, but it may be an
15 earlier date. It's possible. It certainly can't be
16 next week; I think he is examining some doctoral
17 candidates or something to that effect. Therefore the
18 film will not prejudice the defendants because they
19 will always be in a position to deal with it by
20 cross-examination at a later day.
21 As to calling the author of that film, she is
22 not on the witness list, and indeed, I wasn't aware of
23 her potential to assist us until, by the independent
24 route, I had heard of her appearing in the other case a
25 week ago. I gather there had been problems, in any
1 event, with her attendance as a witness, and she was
2 called by the Court, not by one of the parties, in the
3 other case.
4 Of course, if it's appropriate for her to be
5 called and to ask questions, we can do that. Equally,
6 it may be cross-examination in the other court would be
7 relied upon, if that would assist. But the document
8 itself is a piece of original research and is something
9 that the witness may very well refer to in any event.
10 (Trial Chamber deliberates)
11 JUDGE MAY: We'll decide about this
12 tomorrow. Meanwhile, we will have all looked at the
13 film by tomorrow, and we'll let you know.
14 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.
15 JUDGE MAY: Half past 2.00.
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
17 5.50 p.m., to be reconvened on
18 Thursday, the 22nd day of July,
19 1999, at 2.30 p.m.