1 Thursday, 22nd July, 1999
2 (Open session)
3 (The accused entered court)
4 (The witness entered court)
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.32 p.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your
7 Honours. Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor
8 versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
9 JUDGE MAY: Before the witness makes the
10 declaration, may I say that we will allow the video to
11 be referred to during the course of the witness's
12 evidence. If, at a later stage, there's an argument
13 for exclusion, we will consider it, but for the moment,
14 it will be admitted.
15 Yes, if the witness would like to take the
17 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
18 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
20 WITNESS: JOHN BARTLETT ALLCOCK
21 Examined by Mr. Nice:
22 Q. Full name, please?
23 A. My name is John Bartlett Allcock.
24 Q. Dr. Allcock, your report contains --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. NICE: I apologise.
2 Q. Dr. Allcock, your report contains at Roman
3 pages I and II notes about yourself and notes about
4 some of your publications. I don't intend to run
5 through that in any detail but to amplify it simply to
6 this extent: You set out your principal publications,
7 but what is your first special interest in Yugoslavia
8 reflected by a publication of papers and one thing and
10 A. I think that would be about 1977, yes. My
11 first area of interest in Yugoslav affairs was in the
12 development of Yugoslav agriculture, and I published a
13 chapter in "A Historical Geography of the Balkans,"
14 edited by Frank Carter, that was published, I think, in
15 1977. That would be the first major publication.
16 Q. Are you a speaker of the language?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Having acquired it when?
19 A. Over the years, my first visit to the former
20 Yugoslavia was the Easter of 1967, and the University
21 of Bradford shortly acquired after that the capacity to
22 teach the language, so I pursued courses at Brantford.
23 But I think my first scholarship in Yugoslavia through
24 the British Council was, I believe, in 1970. So from
25 that point onward, I began to attend courses at various
1 centres in the country itself, so intermittently since
3 Q. Visiting the former Yugoslavia with what
4 approximate frequency?
5 A. Very variable, actually. In the early days,
6 I had fewer family and university obligations so was
7 able to spend quite long periods of time there, with
8 scholarships extending over several months, two or
9 three months at a time. There's rarely been a year
10 since 1967 when I have not visited the country. But
11 for lengths of time varying from a week to three
13 Q. In addition to the publications that you cite
14 as being your principal publications, are you also a
15 contributor to something called the Annual Register of
16 World Events?
17 A. That's correct. Perhaps I should have
18 included this in the list of publications which I
19 mentioned here. The Annual Register is quite a useful
20 reference source which appears each year with entries
21 for every country in the world, and I think for the
22 past ten years, I have been the contributor, first of
23 all, relating to Yugoslavia, but subsequently to the
24 states which have emerged from the former Yugoslav
25 Federation. I think the importance of those
1 publications are that they suggest that I have a
2 familiarity with the region which extends beyond simply
3 my own narrow profession of sociology, because one has
4 to review in those publications also the primary
5 political and economic developments on a fairly broad
7 Q. At Roman II, you set out forthcoming a book
8 on Yugoslavia at the time of typing it up. It was to
9 be called "Historical Sociology". The present
11 A. I'm delighted to say that the script has been
12 very well received to the publisher who immediately
13 sent it on to Columbia University Press, and it looks
14 as if there will be a simultaneous publication of an
15 American edition. We will be using a slightly
16 different title, "Explaining Yugoslavia," but there
17 were some very warm reports, indeed, from the
18 publishers' readers, so that is certainly going to be
19 going ahead very shortly.
20 Q. This is the first overall, you say,
21 sociological characterisation of the long-term
22 historical development of Yugoslav society?
23 A. That's right, yes. Obviously, political
24 scientists, such as Denison Rousinow, have for a long
25 time been producing accounts of the country. My former
1 colleague, Fred Singleton, has made his contributions
2 as a geographer. This is the first attempt by a
3 sociologist to produce a broad, overall
4 characterisation of Yugoslavia and its historical
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could we please ask the
7 witness to speak more slowly because of the
8 interpretation? I'm sorry.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. The previous witness, Dr. Donia, first of
11 all, did you, before becoming involved in this case,
12 know of him; just "Yes" or "No"?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you, before becoming to be involved in
15 this case, know him?
16 A. We met briefly at a conference, yes.
17 Q. Did you know his work?
18 A. Yes, I'd used both of his major books, yes.
19 Q. Are you able to express a view on your own
20 view of him as an academic, or however you would
21 describe him, and are you able to express a view on how
22 he is regarded in the academic community?
23 A. I have high regard for him as a historian,
24 and I think that view would be shared by professional
25 colleagues too.
1 Q. Next, the film that we've all recently seen,
2 it's not a film that's referred to in your report in
3 any way, was it a film that you had in mind to refer to
4 when you came to The Hague?
5 A. I think this is something of an oversight on
6 my part, in that having been asked to write a report,
7 my mind was rather fixed on the production of printed
8 evidence. If I'd used my imagination a little bit
9 earlier, I might have suggested to the Court sooner.
10 It does fit in admirably with the kinds of argument
11 that I've tried to develop in my report.
12 Q. All of us have seen it comparatively
13 recently. In short, what is its significance so far as
14 the conclusions you draw are concerned?
15 A. Its significance with respect to the argument
16 I've tried to develop in my report is simply twofold.
17 First of all, I lay quite a strong emphasis on the idea
18 that hostility between different ethnic groups in the
19 region is not something which is deeply rooted and
20 pervasive in the population of the area but is
21 something which has been fostered more recently as a
22 consequence of the conflict, rather than as its
23 precondition. I think the film shows that very
24 clearly, shows the way in which neighbours do relate to
25 each other, in an easy, friendly manner, in the
1 ordinary course of their lives.
2 But, secondly, it illustrates very clearly
3 the way in which such difficulties as there are in
4 their relationships intrude into the village by forces
5 coming from the outside, rather than hostility
6 developing spontaneously between the population of that
8 Q. Your report contains several charts and maps,
9 and I want your brief explanation on them to ensure
10 that they are properly understood, and so far as the
11 colour ones, that the Court has the advantage of colour
12 as opposed to black and white ones and is able to
13 interpret them. First, in your report at page 25,
14 there's the first of three pages of statistics
15 summarised that we must be sure we understand.
16 A. Okay.
17 Q. On page 24 itself, we have the ethnic
18 structure of the population of Yugoslavia in 1991, and
19 the table below, the ethnic structure of the population
20 of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the same
21 year. Significance or interpretation from that,
23 A. Well, I think making fairly basic points
24 which are alluded to in the text, I would have thought
25 already that the Court would be familiar with the
1 claims implied in the first of those tables, that
2 Yugoslavia has a very diverse, multi-ethnic population
3 and certainly did at the time of that census. That is
4 also true of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, shown
5 in table C(2), which indicates the relative sizes of
6 the population of Croats, Muslims, Serbs, those who
7 describe themselves as Yugoslavs and others.
8 Q. We see, in 1991, the Muslims are 41 per cent,
9 just over double the size of those declaring themselves
10 as Croats?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Over the page, please. The top
13 table is headed "Yugoslav's Ethnic and Confessional
14 Muslims." Just ensure that we all follow those two
15 terms, please, "ethnic and confessional."
16 A. Yes. I'm going to have the opportunity to
17 clarify this, because once again the Court will already
18 be familiar with the reference to a large proportion of
19 the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Muslims,
20 and normally when one talks about ethnic Muslims, this
21 refers to people who, in the censuses, have been
22 prepared to accept or have offered themselves the
23 designation "Muslim" to describe their national
25 Islam is, of course, a faith, and a large
1 number of other people living in former Yugoslavia were
2 Muslims in that confessional sense, although they would
3 not have responded to the census question, "What is
4 your nationality," by putting down, "Muslim."
5 In that table, C(3), the larger part of
6 former Yugoslavia's Albanian population, there are
7 certain proportions of Catholics principally in
8 Kosovo. The greater proportion of them would have
9 described themselves as Muslims if pressed to give some
10 kind of indication of their confessional identity.
11 The Romi, also gypsies, are not entirely
12 Muslim in their religious adherence. A large
13 proportion of them are. Quite a number are also
14 Orthodox in different parts of former Yugoslavia.
15 Of course, the vast majority of those who
16 would accept the ethnic designation Turks also have
17 some kind of association with Islam, even if it's only
18 a fairly sentimental and historical one, so that the
19 purpose of that first table there, C(3), was to suggest
20 the significance of the, I suppose, the cultural
21 importance of Islam within Yugoslavia, going simply
22 beyond those who would have described themselves as
23 Muslim in the census.
24 Q. And being something that, according to what
25 was declared in the census, was growing in relation to
1 ethnic Muslims between 1971 and 1991?
2 A. That's correct, yes.
3 Q. Likewise, so far as Albanians are concerned?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Similarly, so far as Romi or gypsies are
7 A. Yes. It's interesting to note you've drawn
8 attention to the changing numbers here. I think there
9 is considerable controversy among demographers as to
10 what the causes of those changes might be, because in
11 part, of course, these changes can be attributed to
12 different birth rates, but also in different areas of
13 the country there are good reasons of one kind or
14 another for people to wish to assimilate to the
15 majority ethnic group in their area.
16 So people do change their own ethnic
17 identification over time, and I think this is one of
18 the reasons for including these two tables here, to
19 suggest that surrounding the ethnic designation
20 "Muslim" in Yugoslavia in particular, there is a
21 considerable amount of ambiguity and, indeed, fluidity
22 over time.
23 Q. The bottom table to which we now turn picks
24 up the global figures from the top and simply reveals
25 the distribution of national and confessional Muslims
1 between the various parts of former Yugoslavia; is that
3 A. That's correct, and the significance of this,
4 I think, is really quite important as far as this case
5 is concerned because it relates to the question of the
6 structure of the former Yugoslavia in terms of
7 republics, and part of the argument which I develop in
8 my report is that for several of those republics, there
9 is no problem when it comes to identifying the republic
10 with a particular dominant ethnic group who can be
11 considered to be -- whose homeland the republic can be
12 considered to be, so that Slovenes naturally look to
13 Slovenia as their homeland.
14 One of the difficulties facing the Republic
15 of Bosnia-Herzegovina is that although, as that table
16 indicates, more than 1,8 million of the 2,3 million
17 people who identify the ethnic designation "Muslim"
18 lived in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They did
19 not constitute a majority of the population of that
20 republic, so that for the republic to have been
21 regarded as their homeland in the same way as Slovenes
22 might look to Slovenia, Montenegrins to Montenegro,
23 would have been politically extremely contentious, so
24 although practically, because of their numerical
25 predominance within the republic, they had a strong
1 association with the republic. That association had to
2 be qualified for important political reasons which I
3 tried to set out in my report.
4 Q. If we turn then to the last of these
5 tables --
6 A. Excuse me. One of the corrections that I
7 submitted suggested that that table had been superseded
8 by others.
9 Q. Thank you for that.
10 The next exercise I would like your help
11 with, or almost the last, is with, I think, the plans
12 or the maps which the Chamber has only seen so far in
13 black-and-white form.
14 So bundles, as before, for the Chamber
15 itself, for the Judges, for the Defence, and one for
16 the witness.
17 While they are been distributed, Dr. Allcock,
18 I don't know if you've been shown the device on your
19 right-hand side. That's the overhead projector.
20 A. I thought it was an instrument of torture.
21 Q. That's the overhead projector, and you may
22 find that you get used to handling the document
23 yourself rather than go through them swiftly in order.
24 The usher will help you, if appropriate, but if you
25 simply take the first one off, which is Z1668,1, that's
1 the one in your right hand. Lay it on the ELMO. If
2 you look at the screen, you should see the document
3 coming up on the screen.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If you need to point anything to us, you'll
6 be provided with a pointer, but you point not on the
7 screen, you point at the document on the overhead
9 A. Right.
10 Q. You deal in your report extensively with
11 questions of dialect and their significance, and
12 therefore I can go through these maps quite swiftly.
13 This map of 1993 shows what?
14 A. Well, although the majority of South Slav
15 people speak a related group of dialects, which an
16 attempt was made to codify these as Serbo-Croatian,
17 although there has subsequently been some controversy
18 about that, all closely related to each other, but the
19 point that I'm trying to make is that it's very
20 difficult to identify a language which could quite
21 simply and uncontroversially be thought of as being the
22 Croatian language, because the divisions between the
23 major dialect groups don't correspond easily and
24 simply, uncomplicatedly, either to the pattern of state
25 boundaries in the area nor even to the pattern of
1 ethnic distribution in the area.
2 In this first map here, you've got broadly
3 indicated three groups of dialects which are important
4 in the region. The green area toward the top is known
5 as the Kajkavski dialect or Kajkavian dialect. Each of
6 these dialects, incidentally, is identified, for the
7 sake of convenience on the part of linguists, by the
8 word for "what" which is used by speakers of that
9 dialect, so that "kaj" would be the word used for
10 "what", which would be used in that area, although
11 that is by far from being the only distinction. There
12 are differences of vocabulary and others as well that
13 go on there.
14 Q. To take it fairly shortly, there is another
15 dialect which we see predominates in the islands
16 themselves, part of the coastal strip and another area,
17 and that's marked blue?
18 A. That's marked blue, yes. This is the
19 Cakavski dialect, which again has quite strong
20 differences between that and the other two dialect
21 groups. But the majority of people in the area speak
22 the dialect known as Stokavian or Stokavski dialect,
23 which is represented by the brown areas of that map.
24 You'll see that although the area covered by the
25 Republic of Croatia is divided between those three
1 major dialect groups, the Stokavian dialect is shared
2 also with the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 Q. The next map, please --
4 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice, I
5 wanted to ask the witness if the people speaking these
6 different dialects can still understand each other. In
7 other words, is there really a major difference? So,
8 if you could help us as to what you mean when you say
9 "a dialect." A dialect in relation to which language?
10 A. Yes, they would be largely mutually
11 intelligible, although not completely so. It would be
12 impossible to encounter conversations between speakers
13 of these different dialects who, on occasion, certainly
14 would have difficulty in fully understanding each
15 other. But they are not so different from each other
16 as to be completely unintelligible, so that they can --
17 this is the basis upon which an attempt was made to
18 construct a Serbo-Croatian dialect, in that all of the
19 dialects in that area are believed by linguists to have
20 sufficient in common for them to be organised,
21 systematised, as a single language, although that
22 point, of course, has been contested subsequently.
23 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Thank you,
24 Mr. Allcock. As for the dominant dialect, the
25 Stokavski, is it truly the same throughout this region,
1 which is a mountainous region, and we know that often
2 in mountainous regions, there may be certain specifics
3 here and there, so even within that dominant dialect,
4 are there some specific areas?
5 A. This is the point of the second map, the one
6 that I've called map 2, that draws attention to what is
7 called the Stokavian dialect groups.
8 Within that predominant brown area on the
9 first map, if I can just change the maps over, the
10 coloured areas here represent simply a refinement of
11 the detail within the brown area indicated on the first
12 map, and you'll see that within that Stokavian group of
13 dialects, there are a group of subdialects.
14 In fact, of course, the situation, if one
15 were a professional linguist, one could probably
16 identify further complexities here, but I'm not a
17 linguist and I don't think it's of sufficient relevance
18 to the Court for the Court to go into that level of
20 MR. NICE:
21 Q. But as we've seen from these two maps, the
22 dialects are no particular respecters of the boundaries
23 between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and so on?
24 A. That's correct. You'll see, looking at the
25 map which is on the screen in front of you at the
1 moment, that the borders of the dialect groups do not
2 correspond with any precision at all to state borders,
3 and I think the significance of this pattern appears
4 even more clearly if we can move on to the third map.
5 Q. You'll have to probably select a part of the
6 third map to be displayed.
7 A. Right. Well, I think we can do it just with
8 that portion which is on the screen at the moment.
9 This map represents -- it's a rather
10 complicated piece of ethnographic cartography --
11 represents the distribution of ethnic groups according
12 to the 1981 census. It's produced by the Slovene
13 Statistical Institute, and it's not necessary for us to
14 look in too much detail at this. It's the shear
15 mind-numbing complexity of the pattern which is the
16 relevant datum that I want to put before the Court and
17 the fact that you can't map, with any ease, this
18 distribution of people according to their declared
19 ethnicity onto the pattern of dialects which was
20 indicated in the previous two maps.
21 Q. I'm going to ask you just, I think, to slow
22 down a little, because you're giving a lot of
23 information, and if the technical booth could very
24 kindly focus on the key at the bottom left-hand
25 corner. First of all, perhaps you could --
1 A. If I just move the position of it?
2 Q. That, I think, will help, a little bit
3 further up, because we haven't got this fully
5 A. Okay, right. Is that okay there? Fold it.
6 Yes, that's a good idea. Does that help?
7 Q. In case anybody wants interpretation of some
8 of these words, and I'm not going to go through all of
9 them, only the principal ones, if we start at the
10 left-hand side, the first block in red reflects what?
11 A. Montenegrins, followed by Croats,
12 Macedonians, Muslims, Slovenes, Serbs, and then those
13 who declared themselves to be Yugoslavs.
14 Q. The next column?
15 A. These are Albanians, Bulgarians, Czechs,
16 Hungarians, Roma or gypsies, Romanians and Rusins.
17 Then the final column, Slovaks, Italians, Turks,
18 Vlahis, and then those who chose to use some other
19 regional identifier.
20 Q. Inevitably, with such a number of peoples,
21 we've run out of colours, effectively, and there comes
22 a point on the map where distinguishing between the
23 colours is difficult or, in reality, impossible?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. But, nevertheless, the point you make is --
1 well, are there any areas on this map of simple
2 occupation by a simple group, by a single group?
3 A. Yes. If we can restore the original position
4 that I gave it here, there are a few. Certainly, if
5 one looks at the area of Montenegro, that's relatively
6 unproblematic. Large areas of Serbia, Eastern
7 Macedonia there, most of Slovenia is relatively
8 homogeneous in its ethnic population, the Zagolj
9 (phoen) area of Northern Croatia and an area down here
10 of Southern Croatia which lapses over into Western
12 Q. We see that to the west of Mostar?
13 A. That's right, yes.
14 Q. Again this is a map, as you've told us,
15 produced from within the former Yugoslavia?
16 A. Correct, yes, by the Slovene Statistical
18 Q. Again on the basis of what, declared
19 nationality census?
20 A. Declared nationality in the 1981 census.
21 Q. The next map, please. I think this is a map
22 that you want included and that was additional to the
23 ones in your report, and you wanted it for a small
24 point only. But tell us, please, of 164,3.
25 A. Right. Yes, this is an interesting map for
1 the following reason: It contains --
2 Q. First of all, where does it come from?
3 A. Right. This is from the same source as the
4 first two maps of dialect areas. It comes from the
5 official Croatian atlas, but the atlas I've used in my
6 original report is of the 1993 edition. The slide
7 which you have in front of you at the moment is of the
8 previous edition, the 1992 edition, and it shows the
9 same information as would have been contained on those
10 earlier maps of dialect groups in Croatia.
11 Now, the reason for my drawing this to the
12 attention of the Court is that the information here
13 relates specifically and exclusively to the Republic of
15 Now, in my report, I do make the point,
16 referring to a scholar from the University of Zagreb,
17 Dr. Agocic, who has shown the way in which the
18 representation of Croatia in relation to Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina has changed over time, particularly in
20 schoolbooks, so that by implication at least, the
21 claims of the Republic of Croatia on the territory of
22 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina become stronger over
23 time. I thought this was a remarkably vivid indication
24 of that kind of thing.
25 But in 1992, we have the official Croatian
1 atlas confining its attention to the Republic of
2 Croatia. In 1993, we have a subsequent edition of that
3 same atlas at least by implication suggesting that
4 socially and culturally, there is a continuity between
5 what has happened in the Republic of Croatia and what's
6 happening in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so
7 at the very least you could say that it's being claimed
8 that Croatia has a legitimate interest of some kind or
9 another in what goes on in Bosnia.
10 Q. Thank you. The next map, please, 1668,4.
11 This relates to ancient kingdoms and empires. The
12 Chamber has already heard something about this and we
13 may be only marginally concerned, so deal with it very
15 A. I think that you probably are largely
16 familiar with this information. I'm not quite sure
17 what Professor Donia presented you with before, but
18 again it refers to the same kind of problem of the
19 difficulties of separating historical claims for
20 territory, particularly when one is looking, so far as
21 we are concerned at the moment, at the relationship
22 between Croatia and any Bosnian state.
23 In the left-hand of those maps here, it is
24 not transmitting very well at the moment, but the area
25 to which I'm pointing at the moment would be the area
1 occupied by the medieval state of Croatia at its
2 greatest extent. It's interesting to compare this, in
3 particular, with the area indicated on the right-hand
4 map, which is the Empire of King Tvrtko to whom
5 Bosnians traced the history of their state. You will
6 see that there's a very substantial overlap between the
7 two areas indicated there.
8 Q. Thank you very much. Next map, please,
9 1668.5. Again, I think with this we are familiar.
10 There might be little or nothing that you want to add,
11 this being the --
12 A. This indicates the area covered in the late
13 1930s by the Banovina Hrvatska, the attempt to draw
14 together the parts of the first Yugoslavia which were
15 inhabited by a majority of ethnic Croats into a single
16 political unit. Although the aspirations of different
17 Croatian nationalist groups for the extension of a
18 Croatian state into the area which has been the
19 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina varied quite a lot, the
20 Banovina Hrvatska provides one of those historical
22 Q. I think those who are taking down your every
23 word --
24 A. I'm speaking too quickly. I'm sorry.
25 Q. -- ask that you breath a little more
2 A. I will slow down. I'm sorry.
3 Q. It's not the speed but the volume.
4 A. Is that a better distance for you? Okay.
5 What was the last point? I don't need to repeat that.
6 Okay. That's the significance of that map.
7 Q. Thank you very much. The next map does need
8 a little explanation and is not necessarily vividly
9 clear, even when the map becomes clear.
10 A. One of the points which I make very strongly
11 in my report is that it's a mistake to look at the
12 problems of the region and, in particular, the causes
13 of armed conflict in the region exclusively in terms of
14 national sentiment and as a result of that. There are
15 very substantial economic issues at stake here, and I
16 quoted at one point in my report or in --
17 Q. I'm sorry. I'm going to stop you. I was
18 looking at another map, 0081 -- I beg your pardon,
19 Z7597, as I think this is the one -- this is the
20 Croatian military frontier --
21 A. Oh, right, there isn't a copy of that in the
22 sheaf that I've been given, I think.
23 Q. Z1668.6.
24 A. I do beg your pardon. The two pages were
25 stuck together when I moved them. I'm sorry about
2 Q. That's all right. A small point on this one,
4 A. Yes. I think it is a relatively small point
5 and it's one which the Court has probably encountered
6 before. There's a tendency to look at ethnic
7 minorities in all of the states of the region as if
8 they are relatively recent interlopers, and I would
9 simply like to emphasise the antiquity of some of these
10 settlements. A great deal can be made of that point.
11 I simply wanted to draw attention here to the fact that
12 from the seventeenth century onwards, large numbers of
13 Orthodox, who subsequently came to identify themselves
14 as Serbs, were settled by the Austro-Hungary Empire in
15 the military frontier region running along the north
16 and northwest areas of what is now Bosnia. This is the
17 basis of subsequent Serbian settlement, and the point
18 of the right-hand map is to show that this is still, to
19 some extent, visible in those areas which subsequently
20 attempted to secede from the Republic of Croatia as
21 autonomous Serbian krajina.
22 Q. It is not immediately apparent where the
23 match of shaded areas is from --
24 A. Unfortunately, the maps are not to an
25 identical scale here, and I haven't had the opportunity
1 to ask a cartographer to superimpose them. I wouldn't
2 claim that there is a complete correspondence between
3 those areas, just that there is a measure of
5 Q. To what degree are those areas now wholly
7 A. Well, that remains to be seen. Since the
8 famous Operation Storm in which the Republic of Croatia
9 reasserted its authority over Serbian secessionist
10 forces in that area, I don't know of any systematic
11 attempt to survey the population, but the majority of
12 the Serb population certainly has left.
13 Q. Thank you. Next map, Z1668.7.
14 A. Right. We're back on target again now. A
15 point which I've tried to make very strongly in my
16 report is that you can't understand the development of
17 the conflict in this area exclusively in terms of the
18 expression of national sentiment or nationalism, that
19 very substantial economic interests underlie the
20 conflict, and, indeed, I refer at one point to a
21 quotation by Franjo Tudjman that Croatia is something
22 of an economic nonsense without placing it alongside
23 with Bosnia.
24 What I've tried to do is to indicate on this
25 map that if you want to communicate between significant
1 areas of Croatia, the cheapest, shortest way of doing
2 so over land is to travel through Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina. So that if you want to go from Osijek to
4 Dubrovnik without an extremely long and dubious detour,
5 you need to go through Bosnia. The principal railway
6 lines between Croatia, between the eastern and western
7 parts of Croatia, run through important railway
8 junctions, such as Bihac.
9 Q. So that the red lines are not --
10 A. Are a rather sterilised version of those two
11 indication routes. They are not traced from a map.
12 They are simply drawn to indicate the broad lines of
13 the major routes of communication.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Dr. Allcock, apart from the
15 communication factor, are there any other economic
17 A. There certainly are, and these are
18 illustrated on the next map, if I may move on to that.
19 MR. NICE:
20 Q. 1668.8.
21 A. This may not be immediately very clear, but I
22 think the idea is a very straightforward one, and the
23 area contained within the triangle in the middle is the
24 area of Central Bosnia, and you'll see that Sarajevo is
25 at that point of the triangle, Jajce is up here, and,
1 well, Mostar is down there. So this is the Neretva
2 Valley running here.
3 The point that I'm trying to indicate is that
4 a very significant proportion of Bosnia's economic
5 resources are located within that triangle, in terms of
6 manufacturing capacity, of mining resources, and of
7 power generation resources, as well as important
8 communication routes. So that whoever controls that
9 triangle of territory, in effect, has control over the
10 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that if we're
11 trying to understand what was the point of a struggle
12 for the control of Central Bosnia, it hasn't just to do
13 with the fact that some groups of people might be
14 assumed to have prejudices about other groups of
15 people; it has to do with states, proto states or
16 putative states attempting to control resources which
17 are going to be of major importance to their survival.
18 Q. And the black arrows are again the --
19 A. Just a sketchy indication of the main
20 communication routes.
21 Q. The next map, 1668.9, and I'm dealing with it
22 simply because this is the order in which they turn up
23 in the original report before turning to maps that are
24 additional to those in the report, is a map from
25 Valenta's book --
1 A. That's correct, yes.
2 Q. -- proposing movement of peoples in huge
3 numbers. Comment on that, please?
4 A. That's right, yes. I think that it is the
5 figures, as much as the map, which are of relevance
6 here, and what the map, in fact, shows is that Anto
7 Valenta presupposes a three-stage reorganisation of the
8 distribution of the population of the republic. In the
9 first of these stages, represented by the top pair of
10 arrows, he's suggesting that there could be some kind
11 of exchange of 98.000 Croats from the eastern area and
12 98.000 Serbs from the second. The second stage,
13 represented by the pair of arrows here (indicating)
14 suggests an exchange of 170.000 Muslims for 170.000
15 Croats. The third set of arrows there suggests an
16 exchange of 194.000 Serbs for 194.000 Muslims. We've
17 passed over those numbers very quickly, but I'd invite
18 the Court to consider the human consequences of
19 population exchanges on that kind of scale which are
20 treated here rather glibly.
21 Q. The publication of this book being when in
22 relation to the war?
23 A. I haven't got that date in front of me now.
24 I think it's something like 1993, but I'd have to check
1 Q. Okay. Then we come to the last map. The
2 last map, which appears in the appendix of your report,
3 is 1668.1 and is the Vance-Owen Plan.
4 A. Right.
5 Q. The significance for the sociologist being?
6 A. I'm sure this is a map with which the Court
7 is already thoroughly familiar. The point of it in
8 relation to my report is really to draw attention to
9 the timing and the development of conflict. But area
10 10 here was one which the Vance-Owen Plan designated as
11 principally an area of Croat control, although looking
12 back at the map of ethnic distribution that I have
13 presented earlier, it would be clear that this is one
14 of the most thoroughly mixed areas of population from
15 before the war and that the designation of this area as
16 being part of a Croat canton can be looked at as one of
17 the stimuli which led to the intensification of war in
18 that area as Croatian forces attempted to consolidate
19 their hold over the area, assuming that this was going
20 to be awarded to them, strengthening their claim in
21 subsequent negotiations internationally, that this,
22 indeed, would be part of a Croat state.
23 Q. I turn now to the additional maps, please,
24 and start off at 1668.11.
25 A. I would --
1 Q. Just a minute. Give people a chance to take
2 a breath.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. The source of these maps appears in the
5 right-hand side about a third of the way down. What is
6 the source?
7 A. The source of these maps, as I understand it,
8 is the Croatian Statistical Office, the official
9 republic's statistics office.
10 Q. This map, the first one, is the area to the
11 south of Zenica. The circles, coloured circles, are
12 well explained by the key at the top, and although
13 there is difficulty in discriminating between green for
14 the Muslims, purple or whatever the colour is for the
15 Yugoslavs, and what looks like black for the others, is
16 that difficulty in discrimination on the colours that
17 we have likely to be significant or not?
18 A. No. In fact, I think it's probably only
19 necessary at this point first to look at one of these
20 maps as an illustration of the idea in general, which
21 the map in front of us will do at the moment, which is
22 of the Busovaca municipality, and it does make the
23 point that you really do need to look at the local
24 level when coming to understand the problems of the
25 pattern of ethnic settlement. It's all very well to
1 look in the statistical handbook and find that the
2 municipality of Busovaca has an ethnic composition of
3 such and such proportion of different groups. But the
4 local complexity of the relationship between different
5 groups is much more considerable than that simple
6 observation would lead us to understand.
7 Q. These circles here, as you understand it,
8 when they are read, reflects what for the particular
10 A. These are local villages. I believe that
11 each of the circles represents a mjesna zajednica, a
12 local neighbourhood. As you pointed out, the red
13 circles represent those localities which had a majority
14 Muslim settlement. I don't think there are significant
15 numbers of Yugoslavs or even Serbs in the area. So
16 that the darker ones represent localities of majority
17 Croat settlement, the open circles, those in which
18 there was no clearly identifiable majority of one
19 ethnic group or another.
20 Q. We can see in Katici, purple, which would
21 appear to be?
22 A. If I can find it, that seems to be almost the
23 only predominantly Serb settlement in that particular
25 Q. Apart from at the bottom --
1 A. Oh, yes, Podjele.
2 Q. We can simply turn over to see that we have
3 similar maps for Gornji Vakuf, Jajce, Novi Travnik --
4 A. I would make exactly the same points in
5 relation to these other maps.
6 Q. There may have been a misinterpretation or a
7 slip of the tongue. Red is for Croat, isn't it?
8 A. Yes, it is. Did I say something else?
9 Q. You may have done.
10 A. I'm sorry.
11 Q. If you did, I missed it as well. Thank you
12 very much.
13 I want to turn, quite shortly really, to your
14 conclusions and to one or two other matters seeking
15 elaboration only to a limited extent. The Chamber has
16 been provided, in advance of your most recent
17 attendance here, with a summary that you've seen, I
19 A. I have, yes.
20 Q. If the Chamber has that, page 2, paragraph 6,
21 your conclusions --
22 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, please.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Is there a copy for the
25 MR. NICE: There certainly should be a copy
1 for the interpreters, and it's my fault if one hasn't
2 been provided. My apologies to the interpreters for
3 that oversight.
4 Q. You've expressed the view that ethnic
5 cleansing has not occurred spontaneously at the grass
6 roots but has been top down. Just a word or so to
7 amplify that and the materials on which you rely to say
9 A. Yes. I think it's quite an important point
10 to establish in relation to understanding what happened
11 in the former Yugoslavia the way in which, certainly in
12 Britain, events were covered in the press, suggested
13 that antagonisms between ethnic groups in the area was
14 something which emerged spontaneously as a result of,
15 Mr. Major's phrase, "ancient hatreds between ethnic
17 I think that what I am doing in my report
18 here is simply summarising the consensus of social
19 scientific colleagues that this is absolutely not the
20 case, that although different ethnic groups had a clear
21 awareness very often of their own identity, that
22 although they were aware of other people's identities,
23 and although a measure of social distance sometimes
24 existed between them which might be reflected in their
25 different patterns of residence, you could not deduce
1 from these that there was a long history of mutual
2 hatred between the groups in question.
3 This is the point of my having introduced the
4 film produced by the anthropologist Tone Bringa which
5 demonstrates a pattern of very amicable relationships
6 between the population of a mixed Muslim and Croat
8 So if we're trying to explain why Yugoslavia
9 should have broken down in violence, we can't resort to
10 that as the primary factor of explanation. We have to
11 look elsewhere. A good part of my report has been
12 concerned to point towards other factors, including the
13 circumstances of the break-up of the League of
14 Communists, economic problems of one kind another, we
15 can pursue those if you like, but there are those
16 external and systemic factors which are much more
17 important in accounting for the violent break-up of the
18 state than any notion of diffuse ethnic hostility
19 between the members of the population.
20 Q. We will turn very briefly to those other
21 topics --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry, but just a
23 clarification. I think that point was also made by
24 Dr. Donia, but even if the ethnic cleansing was
25 orchestrated from the top and filtered down, doesn't it
1 reveal something as to the strength of a sort of
2 undercurrent, that it was caught on so quickly by the
3 masses because they followed the leadership.
4 A. I think the longer I look at the history of
5 this particular problem, the more I'm persuaded that
6 it's very important to be aware of local differences.
7 We tend to talk about ethnic cleansing as if it's a
8 simple and single phenomenon, as if we know immediately
9 what that means, but, in fact, what we're referring to
10 here is a wide range of very diverse phenomena.
11 Sometimes we're simply dealing with people who are
12 fleeing from the disruption and danger of a war between
13 two armies, so that the displacement of population is
14 incidental to what has been happening.
15 The mechanisms for ethnic cleansing are also
16 quite diverse. I was speaking, not long ago, to a very
17 experienced Slovene journalist friend of mine who is
18 familiar with the area of eastern Bosnia and saying
19 that when she had been visiting that area, talking to
20 people who had been involved, who had been victims of
21 ethnic cleansing, what often happened was that
22 paramilitary forces would come to the village and say
23 to some of the locals, "You will go to your neighbours
24 and you will tell them that if they don't leave, they
25 will be killed, and if you do not tell them that, you
1 will be killed." So that the locals were very often
2 brought into the process of ethnic cleansing under
3 compulsion rather than reflecting their own
5 I'm not denying that on some occasions and in
6 some localities opportunities of this kind may not have
7 been seized on fairly positively by locals to settle
8 old scores, but we're dealing with a very complicated
9 process here, the causes of which are not always
10 identical in different areas.
11 MR. NICE:
12 Q. I'm not sure if that -- sorry.
13 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Dr. Allcock,
14 your thesis, which was also presented by Dr. Donia,
15 though not in the same way, is to say that the conflict
16 did not have, as its source, hatred or confrontation
17 among ethnic groups, this ethnic hatred and
18 confrontation being more the result of the conflict
19 rather than being at the origin of the conflict. It
20 was rather the consequence which promoted this hatred
21 and confrontation among ethnic groups and also so that
22 these should not be considered the root causes of the
23 conflict. That is your thesis.
24 But you tell us that there was a considerable
25 differentiation, distinction, between various ethnic
1 groups and identities among those populations. Then
2 came the communist system, and this system, established
3 after the Second World War, did it not freeze, if we
4 could use that term, these ethnic and national
5 differences which broke out again after the system
6 collapsed in the 1990s or at the end of the decade of
7 the 1980s? Couldn't it be said that this did exist,
8 after all, like lava in a volcano which, at a given
9 moment, erupts?
10 A. I would quarrel with your metaphor, and there
11 are two main points that I would want to make in
12 response to your question here. First of all, I don't
13 deny in my report, indeed I make a feature of the fact,
14 that the sources for mutual suspicion between different
15 ethnic groups are historically available, but they are
16 not permanently present in people's minds and permanent
17 influences upon their behaviour. They need to be
18 triggered by a particular stimuli. If I can just use
19 an illustration, which I don't use in the report, from
20 my own experience when we were children in East
21 Leicester, we used to play the usual chasing games that
22 children play in the school yard, only the contending
23 parties were Highlanders and Redcoats, referring back
24 to the Scottish rebellion of 1745. this does not mean
25 that the children in East Leicester in the 1950s went
1 around hating --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down
3 for the interpretation?
4 A. Yes. I will slow down. This doesn't mean
5 that you can assume that English children were living
6 in a permanent state of hatred against the Scots. It
7 simply means that every ethnic group has, what I have
8 called in the report, an encyclopaedia of symbols or
9 images about relevant others which may be drawn upon
10 under the appropriate historical circumstances as
11 justifications for particular sorts of action towards
13 The other point that I would want to make in
14 response to your question is to challenge what you're
15 saying about the importance of the communist regime.
16 You used the notion of containing historical hatreds
17 which then, in your metaphor, burst out
18 like volcanic lava.
19 The point which I tried to develop in my
20 report is that the way the communist state operated in
21 post-1945 Yugoslavia, it shouldn't be looked at as
22 something which acted to minimise or conceal or contain
23 a sense of ethnic difference, but, indeed, that
24 particular political system, in many respects, created
25 and was responsible for the shape of people's
1 perception of ethnic differences and ethnic
2 relationships in post-1945 Yugoslavia. It was the
3 communist regime which set up the very structure of
4 republics. It was their attempt to deal ideological
5 with the question of nationality which promoted a
6 sense of Muslim identity in the sense of there being a
8 A very important part of the consequence of
9 both communist economic policy and its failure was the
10 intensification of economic conflict between republics,
11 providing the raw materials, in many cases, for the
12 representation of political differences in terms of
13 ethnic differences. So far from being a factor which
14 contained, concealed, or reduced the potential for
15 ethnic conflict in post-war Yugoslavia, I would argue
16 that the communist regime was very important in giving
17 form to and, in some cases, even stimulating the
18 development of ethnic conflict.
19 Q. One question --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just one more point.
21 MR. NICE: I'm sorry.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: One more question. Have you
23 presented in your report any evidence to support your
24 claim as to what I might call an imposed ethnic
25 cleansing, that is, the leadership saying to the
1 masses, "Go to your neighbour's house and do so and so
2 or you will be killed." Do you have evidence of that?
3 Because it seems to me to be very important if the
4 conflict did not arise out of the history of mutual
6 A. I wasn't requested to deal with that level of
7 detail in my report, so I didn't deal with it in my
8 report. I covered two main areas: One was the
9 question of the development of ethnic identity, the
10 character of ethnic identity in the region, and then
11 the second part of the report to deal more generally
12 with the characteristics of both the Croatian and the
13 Bosnian states. I wasn't asked by the trial team to
14 provide evidence of the sort to which you've referred,
15 so I didn't do so in my report. I assumed that other
16 witnesses would be contributing to those kinds of
18 MR. NICE:
19 Q. Judge Robinson's question is do you, in fact,
20 have evidence of that, beyond the particular item
21 you've already given us?
22 A. Well, incidentally, yes, I've mentioned the
23 conversation that I've had. But also while preparing
24 and discussing my report with the trial team, I have
25 been given access to a certain amount of documentary
1 material in the archive of the Tribunal, and it does
2 seem to me, from that material, that there is a fair
3 degree of evidence that would support that. But I
4 haven't introduced that in any systematic sense into my
6 Q. If I can return to both Judge Robinson, on
7 your right, and Judge Bennouna's first questions and
8 ask you a question that may be susceptible to quite a
9 short answer, was there or is there underlying the
10 peoples of this region a propensity to inter-ethnic
11 violence different from, greater than or lesser than,
12 that which you would find in other multi-ethnic
13 communities around the world?
14 A. It's a very broad question, indeed. I
15 wouldn't have said -- if I can answer, since you asked
16 for a brief answer, I would not say that the area of
17 Central Bosnia was distinguished as being particularly
18 prone to ethnic conflict in relation to other areas of
19 which I'm aware, if that's what your question meant.
20 Q. I think that probably is what I meant,
21 although I expressed it differently to try and reflect
22 what I believed was underlying the two Judges'
24 Perhaps we can move on, coming back to that,
25 if it's going to be appropriate, later. I'm going to
1 stick with the document I have, you don't have it in
2 front of you at the moment, and I'm asked by the
3 interpreters to ensure that both of us, when we're
4 having exchanges, leave a gap between the question and
5 the answer. So don't --
6 A. I do apologise to the interpreters.
7 Q. It may be the first time you've given
8 evidence in this way or, indeed, given evidence orally
9 at all.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. So let's move on. You've already dealt,
12 6(B), this is, for those following the document, with
13 the fact that Bosnia was unique in the former
14 Yugoslavia because it was not the homeland of any
15 single ethnic group. You've also, I think, dealt
16 already with the International Community's efforts
17 serving to reinforce ethnic divisions. That's the
18 Vance-Owen Plan, in particular?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So that is part of the material conclusions
21 that lead to your wider conclusion that the
22 inter-ethnic conflict was caused by a breakdown in
23 political and economic foundations of the former
25 A. A part of it, yes.
1 Q. Is there anything additional that you wish
2 particularly to highlight, and you can do it in summary
3 form, that leads to that conclusion at the moment? If
4 not, we'll move on to the next topic.
5 A. Nothing immediately comes to mind.
6 Q. All right. You say --
7 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice, to
8 round off this area, as you are going on to another
9 question, I remember the answer of the expert,
10 Dr. Allcock, that the communist regime stimulated the
11 development of ethnic conflict, because it did not
12 contain these things. How come then that during that
13 regime, the regime under President Tito in Yugoslavia,
14 the conflict did not explode? As far as we know, there
15 were no explosions of violence. How was it possible
16 that those relations were contained and remained
17 peaceful? Your conclusion may appear to be rather
18 paradoxical in relation to this period between 1945 and
19 1985 or 1990.
20 A. I think you've slightly placed a stronger
21 interpretation on what I said than I would have
22 intended when you talked about the communist regime
23 containing the propensity to violence or the communist
24 regime stimulating ethnic conflict. What I said was
25 that the communist regime operated to stimulate
1 people's sense of ethnic identity and their awareness
2 of this, and the social and political significance of
3 that perhaps of ethnic identity.
4 But I wouldn't like to suggest that
5 throughout the post-1945 period, Yugoslavia was
6 necessarily a seething hotbed of ethnic violence or
7 potential ethnic violence. Sometimes, in some
8 occasions, problems of ethnic conflict did become quite
9 serious, in Croatia itself, for example, between 1971,
10 1972, in Kosovo on several occasions, but you shouldn't
11 form the impression that the communist authorities were
12 faced with a constant struggle to repress ethnic
13 conflict. That's not my impression at all, if I've
14 understood your question correctly.
15 MR. NICE:
16 Q. The stimulation of ethnic identity was inter
17 alia by either creation or recreation of the
18 constituent states along ethnic lines, as opposed to,
19 for example, creating fresh banovinas which transected
20 ethnic, an experiment that had been tried and failed
21 decades before.
22 A. That is correct, yes. The structure of
23 Yugoslav politics was cast in terms of a pattern of
24 relationships and subsequently conflicts between
25 republics. So that if the major political conflicts
1 which are driving the political process along are
2 conflicts between republics which are largely
3 identified with ethnic groups of one kind or another,
4 the sense of ethnic identity and its relevance to
5 political conflict is enhanced in that process.
6 The motor of political development and
7 political conflict is the conflict between republics
8 which then draws with it, as a consequence, a
9 heightened sense of people's ethnic awareness and its
10 relevance for politics. So that when the Yugoslav
11 state breaks up, you have then the formation of ethnic
12 parties, and the stories carried on in those terms.
13 Q. The next conclusion was that the new Croat
14 leadership adopted policies and practices uniting the
15 Croatian people, and you build that, in part, on the
16 HDZ's partial rehabilitation of the independent state
17 of Croatia, but you're very careful, I think, in your
18 comments at page 61 to 62 to qualify that. Just in a
19 sentence, how partial was partial or how near to
20 complete was this rehabilitation?
21 A. It was very partial. The HDZ is an
22 interesting phenomenon in that it was, in effect, a
23 coalition of people who had sometimes quite different
24 views about the nature of Croatia and the future of a
25 Croatian state, so that it may be possible to find
1 within that party people who had quite strongly
2 different views. The relevance of the independent
3 state of Croatia was that the HDZ tried to build its
4 claim for there being an independent Croatia, built on
5 the debris of Yugoslavia, on the notion of the
6 historical continuity of a Croatian state going back to
7 the Middle Ages. They, therefore, were compelled to
8 rely, to some extent, on the NDH in saying that this
9 was also a legitimate bearer of that tradition of
10 independent Croatian statehood.
11 I certainly wouldn't want it to be thought
12 that the HDZ took over all of the ideological baggage
13 of its predecessors in that respect.
14 Q. Under B, we have summarised, or it has been
15 summarised from your report, that the HDZ programme
16 created the impression that Serbs in Croatia were alien
17 and hostile, that they feared being reduced to second
18 class citizens, and the HDZ's actions set a precedent
19 for ethnic exclusivism that was to follow?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. And that simple conclusion is one you still
23 A. It is.
24 Q. Fearing the creation of an independent Bosnia
25 would make the Croats living there politically
1 insignificant. Your view is that the HDZ had that fear
2 and claimed that the BiH government aimed to create an
3 Islamic state, raising Croats' fears.
4 A. Yes. There is a parallelism between the
5 fears of Serbs in Croatia that they would be reduced to
6 second class citizenship by the creation of a Croatian
7 state and the fears of Croats living in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they would similarly be
9 marginised, since only about 18 per cent of the
10 population of the republic were Croats.
11 Q. Can we divert from the printed text for one
12 question that I wanted to deal with?
13 At the time of the creation of Herceg-Bosna,
14 and Herceg-Bosna so long as it existed, to what extent
15 did that body have the qualities of either a nation or
16 a state?
17 A. I don't think that you could talk about
18 Herceg-Bosna in terms of a nation, because one of the
19 things which is very clear about the material that I've
20 seen published in relation to Herceg-Bosna is that they
21 insisted on their Croatian identity, that they were
22 part of the Croatian nation and not a different
24 But certainly speaking sociologically,
25 there's no doubt in my mind that the project of
1 Herceg-Bosna was to set up a state. The way a
2 sociologist would approach the nature of a state would
3 be to talk about the monopoly of the legitimate use of
4 force over a given territory, and when you have
5 established an institution such as the HVO, effectively
6 an army, you have got the creation of a civil service
7 which is intending to administer political affairs in
8 that state, the Croatian judiciary and educational
9 system, it seems to me to be pretty unambiguous that
10 the project of Herceg-Bosna was to set up a state.
11 Q. Then we turn to the part of the HDZ BiH
12 programme, which was to challenge the sovereignty of
13 the recognised government. You summarise the position
14 of Franjo Tudjman. We've heard that elsewhere and
15 needn't dwell on it.
16 You say that the disintegration of the former
17 Yugoslavia provided an incentive for both the Croats
18 and the Serbs to seek partition, joining with, in each
19 case, their larger neighbouring nation states, and that
20 to this end Tudjman and the HDZ aided the local HDZ BiH
21 that opposed the multi-ethnic and united Bosnia?
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. Anything you need to add to that, or can we
24 move on?
25 A. Well, only that the evidence in support of
1 that seems to have been growing steadily, and if we
2 need to, I can talk about that further. But you have
3 suggested that we need to move on.
4 Q. Yes. Finally, the organisation and
5 implementation of this programme, you say, remained in
6 the hands of leading figures. Just one thing. Before
7 you became involved in this particular case, did you
8 know the name "Kordic" at all or not?
9 A. No, I hadn't encountered him before.
10 Q. "Kostroman"?
11 A. Yes, I had encountered that name. If you
12 look at the list of publications which I've put in my
13 little author note there, you'll see that there are two
14 reports which I wrote on the creation of new political
15 parties in, first of all, former Yugoslavia and then
16 its successive states, and the name "Kostroman," I
17 recall, had cropped up in one of those volumes.
18 Q. But perhaps just a word or so more about the
19 last conclusion that we've cited in the very short
20 summary, to the effect that the model of management
21 which mixed military and civilian spheres of
22 responsibility was used in the Second World War by the
23 Communist Party of Yugoslavia and was adopted by the
24 HDZ. Can you give us just one or two of the
25 characteristics of that sort of management, including,
1 in particular, dealing with rotation?
2 A. Yes. One of the interesting features of the
3 political order which the parties attempted to set up
4 even before the end of the Second World War was the use
5 of members of the party, party cadres, to infuse both
6 the supposedly civilian administration and to
7 effectively ensure political control of the military,
8 so that you had a very blurred set of boundaries
9 between what was the party, what was administration,
10 and what was the military.
11 One of the curious things about not only the
12 situation in the HVO but it was a tendency that had
13 been remarked on in Yugoslavia throughout the late '70s
14 was a tendency to revert rather more to that kind of
15 pattern of fluidity. The 1974 constitution insisted
16 upon there being rotation between various leadership
17 positions in all aspects of economic and political life
18 and tended to promote throughout the whole Yugoslavia,
19 not simply Croatia, a sense of fluidity and ambiguity
20 about where the borders of one set of institutions
21 ended and the others began, and I was just struck by
22 the similarities between those systems and the way in
23 which the structures of Herceg-Bosna seemed to operate.
24 Q. Just developing that by one further question,
25 centralisation and the presidency within these
1 structures, is there anything you would like to add on
3 A. Well, I think I've made these points fairly
4 fully in my report. But, yes, in relation to the
5 Republic of Croatia, one of the things which has been
6 remarkable about the post-Communist pattern of politics
7 in Croatia is a very pronounced tendency towards
8 centralisation around the power of a presidency.
9 Q. Do you have knowledge enough to comment on
10 the similarities or dissimilarities between that and
12 A. The detailed knowledge I have of the
13 operation of Herceg-Bosna wouldn't run to a detailed
14 analysis of that kind of thing, no.
15 Q. Thank you very much. I think you deal
16 with -- well, whether you deal in your report or not
17 with religious symbols and so on, can you just look at
18 this exhibit, please, which is in the core documents
19 and is Prosecution Exhibit 321? I have copies
20 available, in any event.
21 Now, this is, I think, Dr. Allcock, a
22 document you've only seen very recently.
23 A. Waved under my nose.
24 Q. All right. I hope you've had a chance to
25 read it.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. If you have had a chance to read it, do you
3 have any comment that you wish to make about it?
4 A. Yes. I think that there's a dimension of
5 developments here which interests me greatly as a
6 sociologist, and that refers to the extent to which
7 populations might be considered to be under pressure in
8 relation to other groups of people. We tend to rather
9 concentrate on the presence or absence of a physical
10 threat, and the whole discussion of ethnic cleansing
11 has tended to concentrate very much on the threat of
12 armed reprisals, that kind of thing.
13 As a sociologist, I'm impressed by the
14 importance of symbols and the bearing of symbols on the
15 development of political action, and the way in which
16 you can persuade people pretty emphatically to do what
17 you want to do or to change their perception of
18 themselves in relation to you without resorting to
19 force. I referred to this in a limited way in my
20 report by talking about, for example, the referendum on
21 independence in Croatia, when voters were led in
22 processions in Zade (phoen) by the town Ban. It makes
23 participation in voting in a certain way part of a kind
24 of a public festival.
25 The negative side of that is you can surround
1 other people with symbols of your own dominance as a
2 group within the community and, conversely, you can
3 make sure the symbols of your own identity and its
4 significance and its value for the culture as a whole
5 are minimised.
6 Q. I'm going to interrupt you just for this
7 purpose: Can you lay that document on the overhead
8 projector, so that although we haven't gone through it
9 in detail, what you're talking about can be understood
10 by anyone following the trial?
11 In summary, it's an order dealing with
12 religious symbols of the Catholic faith made in
13 December 1992?
14 A. Right. So that I would expect that the
15 consequence of this kind of order, if it was in fact
16 implemented, would be really quite considerable on a
17 population who would not consider themselves to be
18 Catholics, that in every public place there are now
19 present images of the importance, the power, the
20 significance of a Catholic community. And the
21 converse, of course, of this would be the minimisation
22 and exclusion, the reduction of the presence of symbols
23 of any other community who are not Catholic.
24 The French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, has
25 been responsible for the creation in recent years of a
1 theory of what he calls symbolic violence, and I think
2 this is a very clear illustration of symbolic
3 violence. In order to perpetrate violence on other
4 people, you don't necessarily have to go and hit them
5 or shoot them. The effect can be just as dramatic,
6 just as impelling, if you apply to them symbolic means
7 of coercion, and this seems to me to be a dramatic
8 illustration of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of symbolic
10 Q. Flags, may they also have an effect?
11 A. They can do, yes, and either the omnipresence
12 of certain flags or corresponding, and this is very
13 common elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the prohibition upon
14 the use of your own flag, which is usually the other
15 side of the same coin.
16 Q. The remaining conclusions set out in your
17 report, are they conclusions you still adopt?
18 A. I've not changed my position with respect to
19 any of the items in my report.
20 MR. NICE: May that report be given exhibit
21 number 1668.
22 Thank you very much. You'll be asked further
24 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) I have a
25 question to Dr. Allcock.
1 Still regarding the question that I put a
2 moment ago regarding the role of the Communist system,
3 regarding the strengthening of ethnic identity, you did
4 nevertheless say somewhere in your report that the
5 Muslims were frustrated, in a sense, during that regime
6 because they were the only ones, while their ethnicity
7 was being strengthened, they didn't have the right to a
8 state. What did you mean when you said that they never
9 considered Bosnia as a state? I'm quoting you from
10 page 23.
11 (In English) " In the specific case of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina, however, the system actively promoted
13 the ethnogenesis of 'Muslims,' while denying the
14 legitimacy of any aspirations which they may have
15 developed for the political embodiment of that identity
16 in a state."
17 A. Yes, the Bosnian Muslims were not the only
18 group to feel frustrated in that sense, and I think
19 looking at the contemporary situation, you would say
20 that Albanians in Kosovo had the same sort of
22 The reason why I commented in particular on
23 the sense of frustration of Bosnians was that they were
24 in an ambiguous situation. They were referred to as a
25 narod, as a nation, as one of the charter groups of a
1 South Slav state, and yet it was unclear, given the
2 structure of politics within the Republic of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that they did have the same dignity
4 as others who were supposedly given that status of
5 narod. They were in an ambiguous situation there, and
6 I think that is the focus of my point.
7 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Why was this
8 reserved for the Muslims within ex-Yugoslavia and not
9 to other ethnic groups? Why was this fate reserved for
10 the Muslims?
11 A. I think in large measure because of the
12 structural population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It
13 certainly shouldn't be looked at, if this is the tenor
14 of your questions, as some kind of hostile position on
15 the part of the regime towards Muslims. In many
16 respects, the Yugoslav Communist regime could be seen
17 as having a very positive attitude towards Islam. Many
18 of the leading states within the non-align movement
19 were also Muslim states, and some critics of the
20 Yugoslav nationalities policy have suggested that this
21 attribution of a state of a nation to Muslims in
22 Yugoslavia in some sense could have been seen as
23 favouring them, you know, and attempting to curry
24 favour with other leading states within the non-align
1 It certainly shouldn't be looked at as any
2 attempt to deliberately disprivilege them, but they
3 were faced with this embarrassing problem, that you
4 can't really make Bosnia-Herzegovina the homeland of
5 Muslims, because to make that suggestion does carry the
6 implication that somehow or another they have some kind
7 of particular relationship to the state which Serbs and
8 Croats. And there is certainly a very large proportion
9 of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina which have not
10 only a large representation in the population but very
11 strong historical connections with the region as well.
12 It's a very delicate balancing game here as
13 to what symbolic importance you give to nationality and
14 how you represent the role of nationality within the
15 political life of the community. It's an attempt of
16 the Communist authorities to square the circle,
18 JUDGE MAY: Now, cross-examination. Who is
19 representing the Defence? Mr. Stein.
20 MR. STEIN: Yes, Sir.
21 JUDGE MAY: Do you want to begin your
22 cross-examination today or do you want to deal with it
23 altogether? We have got another hour or so remaining.
24 Can you usefully use it or not?
25 MR. STEIN: Well, I'm in the Court's hands,
1 to quote from my colleague. I can use some of it, I
2 can use half an hour, 45 minutes of it, certainly, and
3 perhaps not.
4 JUDGE MAY: Well, it might be sensible, since
5 time is short, if we adjourn now for a quarter of an
6 hour and then you have half an hour or so to
8 MR. STEIN: Very good, sir.
9 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn for a quarter of an
11 --- Recess taken at 4.00 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.
13 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Judge.
14 Dr. Allcock, my name is Bob Stein. I
15 represent Dario Kordic.
16 Cross-examined by Mr. Stein:
17 Q. May I first ask, sir, in what year you got
18 your Ph.D.?
19 A. I got the Ph.D. I think it was in 1992.
20 Q. And its title?
21 A. I forget the exact title, but it was actually
22 the study of tourism in Yugoslavia.
23 Q. Let me try to help you. "Studies in the
24 sociology of tourism, with special reference to the
25 role of tourism in the development of Yugoslav
2 A. That sounds familiar.
3 Q. That's the title.
4 A. Okay.
5 Q. It's described as an essay on constructing
6 tourist identities.
7 A. Okay.
8 Q. What does that mean?
9 A. Well, actually the dissertation was a
10 collection of materials covering a variety of aspects
11 of the nature of tourism in Yugoslav society, its
12 economic and social and political significance, and the
13 notion of tourist identities there refers -- has two
14 references; one, of the consequences for the
15 development of tourism for the way in which Yugoslavs
16 look to themselves and experience their own identities,
17 but also the identity of tourists.
18 Q. Do I take it that your research was done
19 during your summers travelling in Yugoslavia?
20 A. You're quite wrong about that, no. I'm
21 accustomed to receiving this kind of response to work
22 on tourism, which somehow suggests that to study
23 tourism, one must be a tourist. Actually, tourism has
24 now become one of the largest industries in the world
25 and has an enormous significance both for the economies
1 of the countries concerned, especially the Republic of
2 Croatia, and also for the social lives of people caught
3 up in it.
4 The greater part of my research was done, I
5 suppose, over a period of about eight years, but the
6 nature of the case is that that would be spread over a
7 variety of visits, most of which were in fact made
8 during the winter and not exclusively to tourist
9 resorts. I shouldn't like you to think that I spent my
10 time enjoying myself while pretending to be an
12 Q. Well, there would be nothing wrong with
13 enjoying and studying at the same time, Doctor.
14 Your master's degree, sir, when was that?
15 A. I finished that, I think, in 1968.
16 Q. Was that a degree that you studied for and
17 then took a test?
18 A. That was a research degree. Well, a mixture
19 of examination of my course work and by thesis.
20 Q. The title of that thesis?
21 A. It was the study of the nuclear disarmament
22 movement in Canada.
23 Q. Now, your current position is where?
24 A. The University of Bradford.
25 Q. And you were hired when?
1 A. I began to work in Bradford in early October
2 of 1966.
3 Q. And you are a lecturer there, as I understand
5 A. I am at the moment, although my situation is
6 rather ambiguous. I am actually paid as a senior
7 lecturer, and as we sit here at the moment, a committee
8 is meeting to discuss my promotion. I hope to get good
9 news when I return.
10 Q. So right now?
11 A. Formally, my position at the moment is
12 lecturer and head of the research unit in southeast
13 European studies.
14 Q. That's not a tenured position, I take it?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. That is a tenured position?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you teach students?
19 A. I have a mixture of things. I have a sort of
20 Jeckyl-and-Hyde existence. By day, the university pays
21 me to teach general sociology to students in the
22 humanities department, and otherwise I come out in a
23 completely different persona as a sociologist studying
24 southeastern Europe.
25 Q. Bradford actually doesn't have a department
1 of sociology, does it?
2 A. It doesn't have a dedicated department of
3 sociology, but there are quite a lot of sociologists
4 distributed among the number of different departments.
5 I'm in the humanity department, but we have a
6 management centre in which there are sociologists, a
7 development study centre, plus there is applied social
8 studies. I think there are six or seven departments in
9 which sociologists are represented.
10 Q. Is it also fair to say, Doctor, that your
11 research between 1967 and 1988 dealt with issues
12 involving migration?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Agriculture?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. Tourism, which we've talked about?
17 A. Right.
18 Q. And the perceptions of the Balkans by the
19 foreign traveller?
20 A. Correct.
21 Q. Do I take it you are currently developing
22 your former work in tourism to a study of the problems
23 of dissonant heritage in the Balkans?
24 A. Well, that was a project which I entertained
25 before I became -- was drawn quite so heavily into the
1 study of political affairs, as I have at the moment.
2 I've, unfortunately, definitively had to move away from
3 the study of tourism, unless one considers the specific
4 branch of military tourism.
5 Q. So the short answer is, "Yes," but you're not
6 working on it actively?
7 A. I'm not working on it actively.
8 Q. What is "dissonant heritage"?
9 A. The idea of heritage I don't suppose needs
10 explanation to the Court, but our heritage is generally
11 looked at as something of which any particular group of
12 people can be proud.
13 Unfortunately, for a variety of groups of
14 people, including, I'm sure, the English, parts of our
15 heritage are not ambiguous in that respect. They
16 require some sort of special explanation as to how we
17 cope with them, what their symbolic significance is for
18 us, and also how we present those rather embarrassing
19 parts of our heritage, in particular, to visitors.
20 This, I think, is of particular interest in relation to
21 Yugoslavia and has a very direct bearing on the sort of
22 thing we're talking about at the moment, in that there
23 have been some rather unsavoury aspects of Yugoslav
24 history and yet the tourist industry manages to make
25 something of those in presenting the history of the
1 various South Slav peoples to tourists. It's exactly
2 the same problem in another form to which we have
3 already alluded in talking about the problems of the
4 HDZ in dealing with the heritage of the independent
5 State of Croatia during the war; how do you deal with
6 your heritage in a way which can be presented to other
7 people in an acceptable way.
8 Q. Now, I gather from your web site, frankly,
9 that your area of expertise includes the media role in
10 democratisation of the Balkans.
11 A. This is an area I teach to undergraduates.
12 I'm not engaged in research on that.
13 Q. You teach that to undergraduates, do you?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Democracy relative to the mass media's role
16 in the former Yugoslavia?
17 A. Well, this again -- I'm not quite sure where
18 you're getting this information from, but the work that
19 I do on mass communications, the course which I teach
20 with a colleague to students in the humanities in which
21 we look at a variety of aspects of the sociology of
22 popular culture and mass communication, I do use some
23 materials from southeast Europe in that course.
24 Q. You teach a course on tourism as well?
25 A. No.
1 Q. That is one of your areas of expertise,
3 A. Yes, but there's some crossover here
4 obviously between these, the reporters, my teaching,
5 and other such interests.
6 Q. Again, you list as areas of expertise
7 political development in the former Yugoslavia; is that
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And social change in the former Yugoslavia?
11 A. Right.
12 MR. STEIN: What I'm doing is listening to
13 the French at the same time, Judge.
14 Q. The research unit in southeast European
15 studies at the University of Bradford, that's not a
16 department of the university; correct?
17 A. It's not a department, no. It's a research
18 unit. It's a grouping of people from different
19 departments who share research interests in the region
20 in one way or another.
21 Q. Membership in that unit is open to all staff
22 and graduate students.
23 A. Who have relevant areas of interest in the
24 region, correct, and we have some honorary participants
25 as well who are not full-time members of either the
1 staff or the student body.
2 Q. In other words, it's wide-open membership?
3 A. Well, it's not wide open, in the sense that
4 we would want to know the people do have a serious
5 research interest in the area and they have a degree of
6 competence in pursuing it. It's not like a bus.
7 Q. Do I take it, as part of your duties as well,
8 you advise two international organisations who recruit
9 personnel for businesses in the Balkans?
10 A. Well, I have done that and I've advised a
11 number of organisations in the past, but this is not a
12 regular contractual business at all. I was approached
13 at one point by the European Bank for Reconstruction
14 and Development to advise about the recruitment of
15 their staff. I was approached by the United Nations,
16 when they were establishing the UNPROFOR mission in
17 Zagreb, to advise them about the recruitment of staff
18 also. I was approached by this Tribunal in the early
19 days to advise them. But there's no regular retainer
20 or contractual obligation here. These are just
21 approaches that are made from time to time because the
22 research unit has a reputation of contacts and
23 knowledge in the area.
24 Q. Do I take the gist of your meaning to be you
25 got a phone call?
1 A. Yes, or a letter sometimes. Sometimes the
2 relationship can be rather longer standing than that.
3 Q. But in these instances, they were relatively
4 short calls and short-standing relations?
5 A. Of varying lengths of correspondence, yes.
6 Q. Do I take it, sir, that as a sociologist, you
7 feel free to study and to opine on some, if not all, of
8 the following I'm going to mention: Ethnic origins;
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Man and society?
12 A. That covers just about everything, doesn't
14 Q. Yes, it does.
15 A. You could hardly make any sociological
16 comment or whatever without covering that one.
17 Q. History?
18 A. Well, it depends how you interpret that. I
19 certainly would not see myself as being a professional
20 historian, but you can only view society in a
21 historical sense in terms of its development over time.
22 Q. Political process?
23 A. Yes, okay. Yes.
24 Q. Cultural process?
25 A. Well, once again, that's like the man and
1 society thing, isn't it? This is a very general topic,
2 but one would want to know from what particular respect
3 one was pursuing that thing.
4 Q. Religion?
5 A. From time to time, I've worked on religion,
7 Q. Linguistics?
8 A. No, not linguistics. That's a very technical
9 area. Obviously, language is socially significant, is
10 an element of culture, and becomes extremely important,
11 both in political processes and in others, but I
12 certainly wouldn't regard myself as an expert in
13 linguistics, and never have I pretended to either.
14 Q. Race and religious issues -- I'm sorry. Race
15 and racial issues?
16 A. Discuss about race doesn't figure very much
17 in relation to southeastern Europe, so I certainly
18 would not say that any of the work that I've done
19 touches on discussions of race relations in the sense
20 that that's come to be used as a phrase.
21 Q. It is, however, something that sociologists
22 are familiar with and comment on?
23 A. Oh, yes.
24 Q. Nationalistic issues?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Migration?
2 A. I've worked on migration.
3 Q. Demography?
4 A. To a very limited extent. It's one of the
5 points I've been trying to make to colleagues,
6 that sociology as a profession has tended to be rather
7 ignorant of demography. So my work on demography has
8 been largely to remind colleagues that we should read
9 the work of others, rather than do any original work in
10 it myself.
11 Q. Geography?
12 A. No. Again, geography is a separate
13 discipline. I certainly wouldn't describe myself as a
14 geographer, nor as having done work in that area.
15 Q. Psychology?
16 A. Again, as a cognate discipline, I think as a
17 social scientist, the borders between different
18 disciplines are rather permeable, and you need to know
19 some things that are going on in other areas. But I
20 would never describe myself as a psychologist.
21 Q. But as you say, you say in your work as
22 a sociologist, there are elements of looking at the
23 discipline of psychology?
24 A. Occasionally, I have to read works which are
25 by people who would describe themselves as
2 Q. You studied, as we indicated earlier, mass
4 A. I do some teaching in that area, yes.
5 Q. Social structure?
6 A. Well, that's almost the redefinition
7 of sociology.
8 Q. Social mores --
9 JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Stein, I don't think we
10 are being helped by this very much.
11 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) I think,
12 Mr. Stein, if I may make a suggestion, that in order to
13 gain time, it would be better to ask Dr. Allcock
14 whether he is a generalist or whether he specialises in
15 sociology. Because in all spheres of science, there
16 are generalists and specialists. So perhaps you could
17 ask him that, and if the answer is the latter, then you
18 can ask what is his speciality. In that way, we could
19 gain time.
20 MR. STEIN:
21 Q. Did you hear the Judge?
22 A. I followed the question, yes. Thank you.
23 Q. Will you answer the Judge's question or shall
24 I recast it for you?
25 A. No, I can answer the question. In the nature
1 of the case as a teacher of undergraduates within the
2 department of humanities, I have to, in many respects,
3 be a generalist, because this is the nature of the
4 curriculum which we teach to undergraduate students.
5 As a specialist, there are very few social
6 scientists working on the affairs of Yugoslavia and its
7 successor states, and, in fact, even
8 fewer sociologists. I think I am the only tenured
9 sociologist in the British higher education system
10 whose primary research interest is in the affairs of
11 Yugoslavia and its successor states.
12 In the nature of the case, I am under
13 considerable pressure to take an interest in a variety
14 of different aspects in the transformation of the
15 Yugoslav society in order to meet the changing nature
16 of interest in the region. But I would remind you also
17 that what you've been doing in your comments is
18 summarising a research career which has extended well
19 over 30 years, so that although you've touched on a
20 wide range of issues relating to Yugoslav society, my
21 interests in those has been particular periods, and
22 I've never attempted the feat of trying to do all of
23 them at once.
24 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) So,
25 Mr. Allcock, you are a generalist.
1 A. Yes.
2 MR. STEIN:
3 Q. Just to follow up on my own question, if I
4 may, there's no aspect of the human experience that
5 falls outside of the realm of sociology?
6 JUDGE MAY: I don't think that's a helpful
8 A. We will talk about that in the bar
10 MR. STEIN:
11 Q. Have you yourself published yourself any
13 A. At the time of writing, I am not the single
14 author of an entire book. I've edited a large number,
15 and there's a very substantial book with the publisher
16 at the moment. But at the moment, I am not the sole
17 author of a book-length study.
18 Q. Can we agree that the majority of your
19 editing was with regard to issues surrounding tourism?
20 A. No, that is certainly not true. In fact, the
21 work that I've done on tourism, I believe, doesn't
22 figure very much in the report that I've given here.
23 The work which I was involved in editing, for example,
24 on Yugoslavia's defence and security issues was a major
25 study there, the work which I did on Yugoslavia in
1 transition did nothing -- well, it involved one chapter
2 on tourism. So, no, most of my work, I would say, has
3 not been on tourism.
4 Q. Your opinion in this case has not been put
5 out for peer review or the general public?
6 A. I'm sorry?
7 Q. Your opinion in this case has not been put
8 out for peer review or in the general public?
9 A. Are you talking about the report which I've
10 presented to the Court here?
11 Q. That's right.
12 A. Well, in the nature of the case, that is so,
13 because I understood I was writing a report of a
14 confidential character for the Court. I thought it
15 would be inappropriate to seek review from other
17 Q. Do I take it also from your resume, sir, that
18 you edit encyclopaedias on Yugoslavia?
19 A. You should steer clear of the plural. There
20 is a volume of which I am the chief editor, which
21 appeared at the end of last year, co-edited by Marko
22 Milivojovic and John Horton, which is "The Conflict in
23 the Former Yugoslavia: An Encyclopaedia". That is the
24 only one which I have edited. I have contributed to
25 other encyclopaedias, including the Encyclopaedia
1 Britannica, but that is the only one which I've
3 Q. In all your work as an editor, an author, or
4 even as a tourist, you've never heard of Dario Kordic?
5 A. Until I came to work with this Court, I had
6 not encountered the name Dario Kordic. That's
8 Q. Did you ask, before you did your research, to
9 speak with Mr. Kordic or any member of his counsel?
10 A. No, because the kind of questions which I was
11 asked to -- on which to prepare my report by the
12 Prosecution team dealt principally with aspects of the
13 nature of ethnic identity, the nature of nationality
14 and nationalism within Yugoslavia, and some general
15 considerations about Croatian and Bosnian politics. So
16 the initial point of orientation that I was given was
17 to provide that background material and not an
18 assessment of the career of Dario Kordic. That was not
19 my brief.
20 Q. As part of your work in this case, did you
21 read of the Defence submissions to determine whether we
22 covered those issues at all?
23 A. I was shown some material which the Defence
24 had -- your initial brief, yes, I was shown that.
25 Q. When were you shown that?
1 A. I made a visit some time ago to The Hague to
2 meet with the Prosecution team, and on that occasion,
3 they allowed me to see that material.
4 Q. All right. Now, your report, if I read it
5 correctly, has no end notes or annotations or
6 footnotes; correct?
7 A. I didn't consider this was appropriate
8 because of two reasons: First of all, I understand
9 that the people likely to read it are under pressure to
10 read a very considerable amount of documentation and,
11 therefore, that in as far as it was possible, I should
12 be relatively brief about this. But, secondly, I
13 didn't think that the report that I was presenting was
14 that kind of document. It was a report and not an
15 academic book. I'm very happy to provide a reading
16 list, if you should wish to pursue these matters
17 further, but I didn't think it was appropriate to
18 provide those kinds of notes on this occasion. It was
19 a deliberate choice on my part not to do this.
20 Q. On your part, you were not instructed to do
22 A. I was not instructed to do so. I was simply
23 asked to write a report, and I decided that the form in
24 which I presented the report would meet what I
25 understood to be the needs of the Court.
1 Q. Certainly, your masters thesis, your Ph.D.
2 thesis, your professional writings contained footnotes,
3 annotations, and end notes?
4 A. Some of them do. Some of them are in a
5 variety of different forms. My contribution, for
6 example, to the Encyclopaedia Britannica does not
7 contain footnotes because it's not that kind of
8 publication. Every author has to make a judgement
9 about what are the rules of the game in writing a
10 particular sort of publication and what are the needs
11 of the audience in question. So on this occasion, I
12 decided that it was not appropriate to treat this as an
13 academic publication in that standard sense.
14 Q. Doctor, let me ask you this: Do you belong
15 either to the British Sociological Association or to
16 the American Sociological Association?
17 A. To the British Sociological Association and
18 the International Sociological Association.
19 Q. All right. Before I go on to something else,
20 I want to deal right up front with this exhibit, which
21 is Z321, the one that was thrust in front of you. May
22 we put it on the ELMO, please?
23 A. Oh, sorry.
24 Q. Who thrust this in front of you?
25 A. It was given to me by members of the
1 Prosecution team. I think the person whose hands
2 actually bore it were -- I've suddenly had a blank
3 here -- the lady sitting in the middle there. I've
4 forgotten her name.
5 Q. Ms. Somers.
6 A. Ms. Somers. Thank you very much, indeed.
7 Q. She handed it to you; she didn't thrust it to
9 A. She offered it to me.
10 Q. Very good. You note that that document is
11 dated 16 December, 1992?
12 A. It is, indeed.
13 Q. You don't have to have a degree in sociology
14 to know that's the Christmas season?
15 A. Right.
16 Q. Did you note with care paragraph
17 3: "Religious symbols are to be returned to places
18 where they formally stood, and we must be wise in
19 implementing global Croatian policy and must not
20 irritate anyone with our actions. This order is to be
21 carried out in a subtle and systematic way."
22 A. Okay.
23 Q. If I understand your direct testimony, you're
24 unaware as to how this order was carried out on the
1 A. That's true. All I've had in front of me is
2 this piece of paper.
3 Q. As to whether or not it was carried out in a
4 subtle way or not, you have no knowledge?
5 A. No, but what I was commenting on in my direct
6 testimony is the -- I think you have to place this sort
7 of action within the political and social context in
8 which it stood, in which people had already been rather
9 anxious about these kinds of things, and the potential
10 for causing offence was really rather considerable.
11 I'm not aware that the -- I'm certainly not
12 aware, as you've suggested, as to what the actual
13 implementation of the policy might have been, but it
14 does seem to me to be an extraordinarily risky thing,
15 to go around placing, publicly, symbols of one's
16 national and religious identity in an area of mixed
18 Q. Even around Christmastime?
19 A. I think one has to be cautious about these
20 kinds of things.
21 MR. STEIN: Your Honours, with respect, I
22 promised you roughly half an hour, and that's where I
23 am, and with your permission, I would defer the rest of
24 our examination until a later date.
25 JUDGE MAY: How long do you anticipate you're
1 going to be?
2 MR. STEIN: Be in my deferral or be in --
3 JUDGE MAY: In your cross-examination.
4 MR. STEIN: When we have him back, I expect
5 to be two hours or less.
6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.
7 Mr. Kovacic, will you be cross-examining?
8 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, we would
9 appreciate if we can continue after them, which is our
10 original plan. Only if you insist, we may, but then we
11 will be probably wasting some time. We wouldn't be
13 JUDGE MAY: You'll be less time?
14 MR. KOVACIC: Less, certainly. An hour or so
16 JUDGE MAY: All right. We'll adjourn the
18 Dr. Allcock, I hope you've been told that
19 you're going to have to come back. I'm sorry about
20 that, but it looks as though it's the only way in which
21 the cross-examination can be concluded.
22 THE WITNESS: Okay.
23 JUDGE MAY: I hope that a convenient date can
24 be found for you.
25 It is the practice here to tell witnesses not
1 to talk to anybody about their evidence, and I, of
2 course, repeat that to you during this adjournment, and
3 that does include members of the Prosecution. But, of
4 course, you can talk to them about your arrangements
5 for coming back. It's mainly about your evidence.
6 If you would like to go now and be back,
7 please, when it's convenient and when it's arranged.
8 (The witness withdrew)
9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, if a convenient date
10 can be arranged, the sooner the better, obviously.
11 MR. NICE: Yes. I understand from what's
12 been said, that half a day is required, effectively,
13 possibly a little more.
14 As the Defence know from a letter they
15 received and that I hope has now found its way to your
16 corridor, the confidential witness who was to have been
17 taken in a week or so's time is not a witness who can
18 be taken at that time, and so I'm finding other
19 witnesses, and I've listed some, to cover the rest of
20 the available hearing dates between now and the summer
21 break. It's possible that Dr. Allcock may be available
22 in that very last week when I think we have two and a
23 half days. There it is, I'm told I've got that wrong
24 as well. It may therefore be September, I'm afraid,
25 before he can be dealt with finally.
1 JUDGE MAY: Well, are there any other matters
2 you want to raise now?
3 MR. NICE: I don't think so.
4 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
5 Just for the hearings next week, we are going
6 to amend our hearing times slightly, which we trust
7 will cause no inconvenience. We are going to sit each
8 day from half past 9.00 in the morning until 11.00,
9 then take a slightly longer break than we have been
10 doing, and sit again from 11.30 to 1.00, the normal
11 statutory break at lunchtime until half past 2.00, and
12 then in the afternoon we'll sit from half past 2.00
13 until 4.15.
14 So we adjourn now until Monday at half past
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
17 4.48 p.m., to be reconvened on
18 Monday, the 26th day of July, 1999,
19 at 9.30 a.m.