1 Thursday, 21st October, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario
8 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
10 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 WITNESS: PHILIP JENNINGS [Resumed]
12 Q. And good morning, Major Jennings.
13 A. Good morning.
14 Q. I've been through my notes. I think that we
15 can finish up your cross-examination in 10 or
16 15 minutes. Let's start by just cleaning up a few
17 loose ends that were left over from yesterday.
18 MR. SAYERS: We have previously distributed,
19 Your Honour, to counsel for the Prosecution and our
20 co-defendants, a few short exhibits that we intend to
21 use today. The first one is the -- I'm sorry, actually
22 the registrar has the packets.
23 Q. The first document I would like you to
24 review, Major, is milinfosum number 98. That is dated
25 the 6th of February, 1993, previously marked as
1 Exhibit D49/1.
2 A. Thank you.
3 Q. Two points regarding this milinfosum, sir.
4 The first is, it's true that actually both the ABiH and
5 the HVO forces were digging entrenchments, fortified
6 positions, defensive positions; isn't that true?
7 A. Yes, that is the case. It wasn't just the
9 Q. And second, there is no mention in this
10 milinfosum of the meeting that you had with Mr. Kordic
11 on that day, I believe.
12 A. No, as you've established in other cases,
13 there isn't a record, although I do have my own notes
14 recording the record.
15 Q. Right.
16 A. And there are other documents which record
17 such meetings or events which took place, specifically
18 the 1 Cheshire war diary.
19 Q. I'm sure that's the case. We have not had
20 the opportunity to review that.
21 The next document I would like you to review,
22 sir, is milinfosum 99, from the next day, February the
23 7th, 1993.
24 MR. SAYERS: This does need an exhibit
1 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
3 MR. SAYERS:
4 Q. Two very brief points with respect to this
5 document. The first page and a half, essentially,
6 chronicles a list of complaints related to the BritBat
7 representatives by the commander of the 3rd Corps in
8 Zenica, and the comment on page 2 essentially concludes
9 with the observation that these sorts of accusations
10 are being made by both sides. That was consistent with
11 your experience; correct?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. And there is no reference in this milinfosum
14 to your meeting on February the 7th, 1993, with
15 Mr. Kordic?
16 A. There isn't. I have this from yesterday. We
17 actually established this point yesterday.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. So I have now two copies of this --
20 Q. Very well. The next document I would like to
21 review with you is milinfosum number 103, which has
22 previously been marked as D109/1, 11th of February,
24 A. Thank you.
25 Q. Just take a look on the first page of this
1 document. There is a reference to your meeting. The
2 OC of C Company visited the HVO HQ in Busovaca and
3 spoke to the HDZ representative, Dario Kordic. It
4 relates the details of your conversation. It relates
5 accurately the details of the conversation that you had
6 with Mr. Kordic, I take it, sir?
7 A. This is an instance where, because I was able
8 to get back in time and actually speak, I can recall,
9 to Sergeant Connelly, he had time to actually get it in
10 the milinfosum. As I explained yesterday, this wasn't
11 always the case. It depended on when the information
12 came in.
13 And I see that it does actually, within the
14 milinfo, refer to the HDZ representative, Dario Kordic,
15 when we had the discussion yesterday about the
16 HZ-HD [sic].
17 Q. I think we can move on. I would just like to
18 show you the milinfosum for February 12th of 1993,
19 milinfosum number 104.
20 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
22 MR. SAYERS:
23 Q. Just one point with this, Major, and that is
24 that there is no reference in this milinfosum to the
25 mine-clearing or mine incident that you related in your
1 testimony in chief; would you agree with that?
2 A. There is no reference to it.
3 Q. Yes. The next document is the next
4 milinfosum, for the following day, February the 13th,
5 1993, milinfosum number 105.
6 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
8 JUDGE MAY: Is it suggested, because there is
9 no mention in the milinfosum, that these incidents
10 didn't occur?
11 MR. SAYERS: I don't believe that that's
12 suggested at all, Your Honour. The only point that I'm
13 making is that these conversations were not deemed
14 sufficiently important to be included in the
15 milinfosums. That's all. I'm not in any way, and I
16 hope the Court doesn't suggest in any way -- or doesn't
17 perceive in any way that I am suggesting that we are
18 attacking the major's veracity. We are not.
19 JUDGE MAY: I thought that wasn't the case,
20 but I just wanted to be sure. Yes.
21 MR. SAYERS:
22 Q. Now, milinfosum number 105, major, once
23 again, doesn't contain any reference to the
24 mine-clearing incident, does it?
25 A. Which mine-clearing incident are you
1 referring to?
2 Q. The incident that you referred to where you
3 saw a substantial quantity of explosives --
4 A. Indeed. So -- so it doesn't contain
5 reference to the fact that I discovered a quantity of
6 mines under a bridge. There was no clearance.
7 Q. Very -- I stand duly corrected.
8 There is a reference to shelling in the
9 Busovaca area. You can see that on the bottom of the
10 first page, where it is suggested that Bosnian
11 artillery or Bosnian army fire was falling onto HVO
12 positions. Did you ever see any of that when you were
13 present in the area?
14 A. In terms of this specific reported instance,
15 I cannot recall that I would have seen shelling on that
16 day. However, during the period, really, from the
17 start of the conflict up to the day -- that is the 25th
18 of January, when we established a U.N. control point on
19 the bridge at Kacuni, thereafter there was shelling all
20 the time. You would be driving along roads in the
21 course of your duties, and you would hear an explosion,
22 you would record it, and you would report it as such.
23 So this may have taken place whilst I was
24 driving around. It may not have. The fact that it's
25 in the milinfo, as I stated yesterday, I don't discount
1 the validity of it. I would just say that the comment
2 does underline, possibly, Bosnian army fire. I'm sure
3 that they did.
4 Q. Major, I'm not suggesting one thing or
5 another. You were performing your duties under
6 difficult circumstances, and isn't it true that
7 shelling from both sides was actually a regular
9 A. I can't rule out the fact that the army BiH
10 may have had artillery fire which they used. What I've
11 always stated is I didn't see any myself in my personal
13 Q. The next document brings us to where we
14 finished up yesterday, your conversation on the 23rd of
15 February, 1993, and I would just like the usher to show
16 you milinfosum 116, dated the 23rd of February, 1993.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Document D114/1.
18 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
19 Q. Three points with respect to this milinfosum,
20 Major. The first is, as you can see under the Busovaca
21 section, there is no reference to the conversation that
22 you had with Mr. Kordic on that day?
23 A. There is no reference to the conversation I
24 had with Mr. Kordic on that day.
25 Q. With respect to the Vitez section, there's a
1 description of the incident that you described
2 yesterday, during which a Dutch Bat captain, Captain
3 Linsen's Mercedes was apparently hijacked by two
4 individuals while travelling in the Vitez area?
5 The third point that I would like -- you have
6 to say "Yes".
7 A. I beg your pardon. Yes, an incident which I
8 recall clearly. We were all briefed on it.
9 Q. The third point I would like to make is on
10 page 2, right before the Gornji Vakuf entry, where it
11 says the CO of the 1st Cheshires and the Vitez-Travnik
12 LO visited the HVO Vitez to request the return of the
13 vehicle and its contents. Were you aware that Colonel
14 Stewart and, I take it, Captain Forgrave had --
15 A. Captain Martyn Forgrave.
16 Q. Yes. They had visited the headquarters of
17 the HVO military forces in Vitez to bring this incident
18 to the attention --
19 A. I believe I would have been aware of that,
20 and as I said yesterday, the commanding officer had
21 made it clear to us all it was a very high priority. I
22 wouldn't be surprised that a dozen or so officers in
23 various capacities were doing what they could to try
24 and retrieve it, myself included.
25 Q. Very well. And finally with respect to the
1 meeting that you had on the 27th of February, this is
2 actually recorded, I think, in milinfosum number 120,
3 dated February 28th, 1993, and I would just like the
4 usher to show you that.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Document D115/1.
6 MR. SAYERS:
7 Q. The particular provision appears, Your Honour
8 and Major, on page 2 under the Busovaca entry.
9 A. Can I just read it?
10 Q. Absolutely.
11 A. That is a factual statement.
12 Q. Thank you. You previously described that the
13 chief of police in Vitez actually was the gentleman who
14 arranged for the retrieval of this Mercedes?
15 A. I was told that it was Mr. Pasko by Dario
17 Q. And Mr. Pasko told you that he had, in fact,
18 arranged that, I take it, when you saw him.
19 A. The meeting with Mr. Pasko was very brief.
20 As I think I've already outlined yesterday, I basically
21 bumped into a stand-off position between two opposing
22 factions, shall we say loosely, HVO, and, well, that's
23 really all that concerned me at the time, that they
24 were opposing factions. Mr. Pasko, shall we say, was
25 rather busy at the time.
1 Q. Yes, Major. I think that's a very
2 understated way of putting it.
3 The last question I have for you is this one,
4 Major: Do I understand that the first time that you
5 met Major Kordic was February 3rd was after the
6 fighting generally had ended and after the negotiated
7 ceasefire agreement was already in place?
8 A. I don't believe that the fighting had ended.
9 I don't believe, actually, during the period in
10 question right up to the last meeting I had with
11 Mr. Kordic, that the fighting ever ended. In fact,
12 there was several ceasefire agreements that were made
13 over the period. I couldn't date them, specify them,
14 other than on recollection there were many, and they
15 were broken by both sides. So, no, it wasn't when the
16 fighting had ended.
17 MR. SAYERS: Very well. Thank you very much
18 indeed, Major. I appreciate your testimony. That
19 concludes my questioning, unless the Court has any
20 questions for me.
21 JUDGE MAY: Do I take it from your
22 examination, Mr. Sayers, that there's no dispute about
23 the conversations which this witness had with
24 Mr. Kordic? Mr. Kordic said on one occasion he would
25 hold up the prisoner exchange until various points were
1 sorted out?
2 MR. SAYERS: That point, Your Honour, is
3 actually disputed.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. On another occasion, he
5 said that, on the question of aid, that they were
6 discussing blocking the road with civilians. Is that
8 MR. SAYERS: I believe that point is
9 disputed. But we do not dispute the fact that the
10 Major had the conversations which he has described with
11 Mr. Kordic, or at least that various conversations
12 occurred at the time that he describes.
13 JUDGE MAY: Or that the car had been returned
14 thanks to Mr. Pasko?
15 MR. SAYERS: That point is not disputed, Your
17 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
18 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
19 Q. It may be that you'll need to refer to your
20 notes for the questions I have to ask, and these were,
21 of course, extracted from a pocketbook which contains
22 other notes as well, I think.
23 A. That is correct.
24 Q. I have a number of topics to deal with, but
25 all quite shortly.
1 First, I think, can I deal with Donja Polje.
2 In respect to that, some statistics from a census were
3 put to you. I would be grateful for sight, if it's
4 possible, of the census statistics that the Defence
5 were speaking from.
6 While that's being considered, can you check
7 or tell us whether you had any entries in any of your
8 pocketbook, other than the ones you've already shown
9 us, that relate to Donja Polje, that is, that relate to
10 what you saw at Donja Polje, not the occasion when
11 there was a reference by Kordic, Mr. Kordic, to Donja
13 A. No. I can say this: I did check my
14 notebooks, I had two, and I believe there are no other
15 references which are relevant to what's happened in the
16 last couple of days, and certainly there's no specific
17 reference to the incident which I did witness, the
18 incident being the observation of one or two HVO
19 soldiers entering a building, which identified to be
20 Muslim in architecture, and then leaving. I believe,
21 from my memory, that it was Donjavic Polje or the area
22 of Donjavic Polje. There were, actually, buildings all
23 the way down from Donjavic Polje to the bridge itself.
24 There was no specific demarcation line. There must
25 have been, obviously, on a map which showed a village
1 boundary, for example.
2 Q. Precisely. Could you take this map and lay
3 it on the ELMO? And we'll look at the bit that shows
4 Donja Polje. The area that you're speaking of, I think
5 you may have to reposition it a bit, that would
6 probably be sufficient, if it can be sharpened on the
7 bottom right-hand corner, so much the better, but that
8 may not be possible. Thank you. That's perfect.
9 That shows the point that you've made,
10 because we can actually see what appear to be house
11 markings along the side of the road, can we not?
12 A. That is correct.
13 Q. There are, therefore, marked housing all the
14 way between Donja Polje and Kacuni; is that correct?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. You say that you saw this incident, first of
17 all, with the emerging HVO soldiers and the house that
18 then went up in flames. Can you be at all precise
19 about whereabouts that was on that road?
20 A. I cannot be exactly precise, relating to this
21 map, where I actually saw this incident taking place.
22 When I gave evidence and a witness statement was taken,
23 I focused in on this place, Donjavic Polje as a centre
24 of mass, but the destruction of buildings that I saw
25 occurred all the way along this road, as certainly
1 from, if you look at the map now here, the centre of
2 mass of Donjavic Polje going southeastwards all the way
3 to the U.N. checkpoint shown at Kacuni. It would have
4 been in one of these houses along that road.
5 Q. Indeed, the houses that were then seen by you
6 to have been damaged, were they also lying between
7 Donja Polje and Kacuni?
8 A. They were, but I must say that in relation to
9 my previous statement, I did say Donjavic Polje as
10 well, because I believed that such houses as I've
11 described being destroyed were in there as well, so it
12 is actually both.
13 MR. NICE: I don't know if the quoted census
14 is available for my consideration. Thank you very
15 much. If the usher could produce it so I can see it.
16 MR. SAYERS: It is, Your Honour, and I have a
17 copy here.
18 JUDGE MAY: If the usher would just hand it
19 to the Prosecution, please.
20 MR. SAYERS: The entry for Donja Polje is
21 actually referred to as "Polje" in this census on
22 page 2, for the Prosecution's assistance.
23 MR. NICE: Thank you. We'll just have a look
24 at that, please. Perhaps that can be demonstrated.
25 Q. First of all, look at the first sheet to
1 understand how the columns are to be construed, and it
2 totals, then, Muslims, Serbs, Croats, Yugoslavs and
3 then others. If we turn to the second sheet, which is
4 the bear statistic that was read out from you, it comes
5 not from Donja Polje but from Polje, and that statistic
6 would suggest no Muslims for Polje, 5 Serbs, 709
7 Croats, 8 Yugoslavs, and 7 others. Are you aware, one
8 way or another, of how the registration of "others" was
9 typically -- what that typically represented at the
10 time of the censuses?
11 A. I'm not aware of that, no.
12 Q. In any case, seven were others.
13 If we then turn back to the first page to
14 Kacuni, which you can see just halfway down, there the
15 Muslims are 963, 9 Serbs, 207 Croats, 3 Yugoslavs, 11
16 others. Do you see that?
17 A. I do, yes.
18 Q. It would appear from that that Kacuni is a
19 majority Muslim area, a place called Polje showing no
20 Muslims but some others, and you're not able to
21 identify for which part of this road and area Polje
23 A. No, I'm not.
24 JUDGE MAY: Has this document got an exhibit
1 MR. NICE: No. It had better have one, I
2 think, now. I don't know how it -- what happens.
3 JUDGE MAY: I think it had better be a
4 Defence exhibit, since it's --
5 MR. SAYERS: I think it had better be, Your
6 Honour. Thank you.
7 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
9 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice,
10 could you tell us with greater precision what it is
11 exactly you wish to tell the Chamber through your
12 intervention? Apparently there were no Muslims in
13 Polje, according to the census. In Kacuni, you tell us
14 that there was an important majority of Muslims. We
15 are agreed on that. And then what else? Are you
16 making any inferences from these figures? Is that what
17 you are trying to tell us?
18 MR. NICE: No, the point was this: The
19 cross-examination on this part of the witness's
20 testimony seemed to be aimed at throwing some doubt on
21 whether what was happening was as described by the
22 witness; namely, first, an attack by the HVO on a
23 Muslim house, and second, the destruction of Muslim
24 houses. Because it was suggested, effectively, that
25 what was being described didn't fit with the census
1 statistics, which would have revealed no Muslim
2 occupation, and therefore no Muslims and no Muslim
3 houses, in the area concerned.
4 As we now see, the cross-examination
5 proceeded on an incomplete and, unfortunately, a
6 misleading picture, first because we don't quite know
7 what Polje is. Second, because Polje, in any event,
8 does contain some unattributed others, but most
9 significantly, because the witness's evidence -- as has
10 always been clear from his witness statement, and as is
11 clear in the summary -- relates to an event that
12 happened between Polje, or Donja Polje, and Kacuni.
13 And the statistical material makes it quite clear that
14 it is probable in the extreme that that road contains
15 Muslim property and that his account therefore --
16 which, as I understand it, was in some way being
17 challenged -- is likely to be right.
18 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) I should
19 like to ask the major, the witness: These houses that
20 he saw burning, under precisely what circumstances was
21 it in Donja Polje, and on what road?
22 A. Your Honour, it was on the side of the main
23 road, the only main road between Kacuni and, as is
24 shown on the map, Donjavic Polje, as I'm pointing to
25 now, this particular road. If I understand your
1 question correctly, Your Honour, as I said, I can't say
2 exactly which of the houses it was. I do believe that
3 it was in the area in between.
4 And the circumstances were, in the course of
5 patrolling up and down that road, I did not take my
6 Warrior off it, as a standard procedure, because of the
7 threat of land mines, and we all stayed to the main
8 roads. I therefore observed this from the turret of my
9 Warrior, this specific incident to which I relate. And
10 the rules of engagement at the time did not allow us to
11 intervene in such instances; nor, given the state of
12 ongoing fighting, sporadic as it was, would I have left
13 my Warrior to do so.
14 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) That
15 clarifies things a little bit regarding this incident.
16 Thank you.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could I ask, Mr. Nice, might
18 there be a village between Polje and Kacuni which is
19 not reflected here and which could be the area in which
20 the major saw the houses burning?
21 MR. NICE:
22 Q. Major, I don't know if you are able to help
23 with the completeness of the map?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please,
25 Mr. Nice.
1 MR. NICE:
2 Q. Major, I don't know if you are able to help
3 with the completeness of the map -- [Wrong channel of
4 translation] -- village, His Honour said, between
5 Polje and Kacuni. It may be that His Honour had in
6 mind between Donja Polje --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. -- and Kacuni, shown on this map, reflected
10 in the census figures.
11 A. I don't think I can help you there. And going
12 by memory, there was clearly a signpost which showed
13 you were entering the village of Kacuni. I can recall
14 this. It was on the side of the road. It was actually
15 just north of the bridge where we had the U.N.
17 I think I can recall a sign for, as I
18 describe it from the map, Donjavic Polje. I cannot
19 recall a sign on the road of a village or hamlet, or
20 anything with an identifiable name, in between the
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
23 MR. NICE: Just to complete the answer to His
24 Honour Judge Bennouna's question, the Chamber will
25 recall, I think from Professor Donia's evidence, that
1 Muslims regularly enough registered themselves either
2 as Yugoslavs or as others -- as, indeed, may have done
3 other ethnic groupings.
4 Q. The second topic, the holding-up of the
5 exchange of prisoners. Just remind us, is this
6 recorded in terms in your pocketbook?
7 A. Yes, it is. It is detailed in the list of
8 notes which I took at the meeting that I had with Dario
9 Kordic on the 3rd of February, 1993, and it comes after
10 the list of complaints which I took down.
11 Q. Can you just lay it on the ELMO again, so
12 that the Chamber can see it.
13 What you wrote, in terms, was, Major?
14 A. I wrote after the list of complaints, "No
15 exchange of prisoners" -- I put the word "until 48
16 hours," for 48 hours, and I then put the date, the 5th
17 of the 2nd, '93, next to it. That was 48 hours hence
18 from the meeting that I was attending at the time.
19 These are the actual notes that I took as
20 Dario Kordic was speaking, and a page or two later, as
21 I've submitted, I then wrote them up, as it were, in
23 Q. Would you just take us to that passage again
24 as well.
25 A. As you can see, at the top, it says, "Summary
1 of points for meeting with Dario Kordic on Wednesday,
2 the 3rd of February." A summary of the complaints, the
3 sticking points, and then, in fact, in paragraph 4
4 relates to the roadblock, and then paragraph 5,
5 specifically, "Exchange of prisoners is delayed for
6 48 hours, until sometime on the 5th of February."
7 Q. Your attention has been drawn in
8 cross-examination to the specific terms of the
9 ceasefire agreement, but in your discussions with
10 Mr. Kordic, who raised the question of linking an
11 exchange of prisoners to resolution of these
13 A. It was Mr. Kordic who said, in
14 effect, "Therefore, as a result of this, the exchange
15 of prisoners will be delayed for 48 hours." I did not
16 bring the subject up.
17 Q. Did you have an understanding at that time
18 that prisoners were being exchanged or were about to be
20 A. Yes, I do recall from memory that efforts
21 were ongoing to organise an exchange of prisoners, an
22 exchange of civilians, an exchange of hostages. There
23 were various levels of exchange of people who, shall we
24 say, were generally being detained, for whatever
25 reason. I was not actively involved in this because it
1 was being dealt with by those who had signed a
2 ceasefire document on the 30th of January. But in the
3 course of daily briefings and in terms of my
4 discussions with other people at the school in milinfo
5 in the operations room, I was aware that there were
6 efforts to try and exchange some people as soon as
8 I also believe, because this was a very big
9 task, that the efforts were concentrating on trying to
10 get just some exchanged as a demonstration of goodwill,
11 so that this would have been a gradual process.
12 However, I can't say that I knew that prisoners or
13 hostages were going to be exchanged at a specific time
14 at that period.
15 Q. In fact, as you told us in chief, was there a
16 delay in the exchange of prisoners following on this
18 A. There was certainly a delay. Whether it
19 actually lasted the full 48 hours or not, I don't
20 know. As I put in my notebook, there was no specific
21 time given; that's why I put "until sometime on the 5th
22 of February." But I do know that there was a delay.
23 This from talking to people when I got back to the
24 school and over the next day.
25 Q. A number -- next topic, briefly, a number of
1 milinfosums have been put to you. Some of them you'd
2 read previously, some of them you had never read?
3 A. Some of them I had never read. Two
4 examples: I'd never read the milinfosum of the 9th of
5 January that was put to me. I'd left my previous job
6 some 12 hours previously -- I had no leave. I went
7 straight to Bosnia -- I was on a plane to Zagreb when
8 this milinfosum was written. In others, as I've
9 explained, I was often out on the ground for two to
10 three days, actually out on the ground doing nothing
11 other than operations and then sleeping and didn't, in
12 fact, return to the school sometimes. And there are
13 gaps in my notebook where I did not attend the 5.00
14 conferences because of this.
15 Q. Various statistics have been spoken of and
16 events have been spoken of that are covered in those
17 milinfosums. I'm not going to take you to any of them
18 in detail, save to draw to your attention that the
19 statistic of the 19th of February drew also attention
20 to the fact that of the Muslim soldiers identified,
21 less than 10 per cent were thought to be armed. Do you
22 remember that?
23 A. I don't believe I have a copy of the --
24 Q. D62/1.
25 A. I've got quite a lot of milinfosums here,
1 but --
2 Q. The Chamber can see it.
3 A. I'm sorry, which date was it again?
4 Q. Yes, it's coming. The 19th of February.
5 A. The 19th?
6 Q. Yes, the 19th.
7 A. I have one the 20th of February.
8 Q. The 19th of February.
9 A. I'm sorry, the one I've been given is the
10 20th of February.
11 Q. I think it's D62/1.
12 MR. NICE: I have mine and for convenience
13 can put mine on the ELMO if necessary. It's been
14 highlighted but perhaps we'll have a look at it.
15 Q. This deals with Jajce, the liaison officers
16 commented that the majority of the soldiers were
17 unarmed. There is no evidence of any heavier
18 equipment. The fact that the majority of these
19 soldiers were unarmed agrees with B Company's reports
20 that less than 10 per cent of the soldiers in Jajce
21 Brigade were armed.
22 Does that accord with your recollection, or
23 did you not know anything of this?
24 A. I have to say it would accord equally with
25 any recollection that I may have had at the time in all
1 the milinfosums that were handed to me by the Defence
3 Q. Thank you, that's all I ask on that or any
4 other document in detail. The statistics that have
5 been drawn to your attention, all, of course, focusing
6 on the Muslims as opposed to the Croats, does that
7 affect at all the overall picture you gave of the
8 comparative state of arms of the parties yesterday?
9 A. No, it does not because the statements which
10 I made yesterday are taken from witness statements I've
11 made, are based on my own recollection as a field
12 commander, and I stress, that is where the majority of
13 my time was spent. It was not spent in analysing
14 documents, giving comparative strengths. It was spent
15 on the road, trying to unblock checkpoints, to get
16 sides to talk to each other.
17 Q. Thank you. Second-to-last topic, I think.
18 The engineers who asked you not to tell Kordic, how
19 many times did you see them? Once, or more than once?
20 A. The engineers in question, over a period from
21 early February, possibly the 5th or 6th of February, I
22 would say I saw them maybe a dozen times over a
23 two-week period. Usually in the vicinity of the
24 checkpoint. It was a U.N. controlled point, similar to
25 the one at Kacuni that was established where the
1 roadblock had been removed. It was a similar principle
2 to establish U.N. control of passage as an arbiter
3 between the two sides.
4 Q. The reference to Kordic and not to tell him,
5 once or on any more than one occasion?
6 A. It was only on the occasion which I related
7 in my testimony. And it was unsolicited.
8 Q. And their demeanour -- last question on this
9 topic -- at the time they said that?
10 A. They were clearly, in my opinion, they were
11 clearly very concerned that he might know of what they
12 were going to say.
13 Q. Last topic -- no, last topic apart from two
14 tiny details. The two HOS individuals you met in Dario
15 Kordic's bunker, you've had one document shown to you
16 from April '93?
17 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, I'm not going to
18 go through the exercise of showing a number of
19 documents which show totally different conclusions;
20 that wouldn't be helpful because the witness won't have
21 seen them.
22 Q. Just tell us, please, they were introduced to
23 you on what basis, as what sort of person?
24 A. My recollection, as I stated at the time, was
25 that they were introduced to me as the commander and
1 deputy commander of the HOS in Zenica, and I'm
2 obviously going by my memory here.
3 Q. Was there any suggestion that, far from being
4 HVO, that they were BiH representatives?
5 A. There was no other reference to the
6 individuals. In fact, it was, I believe, a courtesy to
7 explain who was in the room, because we immediately got
8 down to specific business that we were relating
9 probably of minor detail. They didn't speak whilst I
10 was in the room, and I was only in there for a few
11 minutes, relating to points with regard to the equal
12 distribution or perceived equal distribution of aid.
13 This was the topic at the time.
14 Q. Did you see those same men on a subsequent
16 A. Yes. I believe I saw both individuals at the
17 meeting which was called by Mr. de la Mota at the UNHCR
18 depot in Zenica, which was set for 4.00 p.m. the
19 following day or, sorry, 4.00 p.m. that afternoon.
20 Q. Therefore, on either occasion were these
21 people introduced as BiH representatives?
22 A. I do not recall that.
23 Q. If there had been BiH representatives in
24 Dario Kordic's bunker, would that have been a matter to
25 note and recall?
1 A. I would have certainly taken note if that had
2 become clear to me. [Technical difficulties with
3 realtime transcription]
4 MR. NICE: The transcript has got a technical
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice. It's up and
8 MR. NICE: Thank you.
9 Q. At the second meeting, if people there had
10 been introduced as representing in any sense the BiH,
11 would that have been noted?
12 A. I would have noted that. However, I was very
13 much an observer at this meeting. At the initiative of
14 Mr. de la Mota, the issue was very much out of my
15 hands. All I had done was to bring it actually to
16 Mr. de la Mota's attention. After Dario Kordic had
17 made the complaint about the unequal distribution of
18 aid, I spoke to nobody.
19 Q. You've described the bunker as effectively an
20 operations room, with maps and so on?
21 A. When I first went in and on subsequent
22 occasions, except for the 27th of February, when it did
23 look like, I would say, an office --
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. -- from my experience and also from visiting
1 other headquarters, it looked to me like an operations
2 room from where operations were planned and conducted
3 and orders given out to the ground. That's the
4 impression which I gained.
5 Q. Did you have any other experience -- any
6 experience, to your knowledge, of seeing Mr. Kordic
7 allow BiH people into this room?
8 A. No.
9 Q. I think it was suggested -- two tiny
10 details. It was suggested to you that the Vance-Owen
11 Plan was signed on all three sides at one stage in your
12 questioning. Do you know, one way or another, whether
13 it ever was? Just "Yes" or "No" will do.
14 A. No.
15 Q. It was put to you that the receipt document
16 for the Mercedes, Exhibit 502, was signed by Mr. Kordic
17 in his role as vice-president of HZ-HB. Would you look
18 at the document? Are you aware that he also signed as
19 "Pukovnik", which is translated as "Colonel"?
20 A. I'm now aware of that.
21 Q. You were asked then, and my last question
22 just this, about your career, and the point was made --
23 I'm not sure why -- you've been a major since 1990.
24 There's very few people in the public gallery. Is it
25 right that there may be further gazettings in your
1 career in the near future, just "Yes" or "No"? If you
2 think it's tempting providence, I will not even press
3 the question for an answer.
4 A. [No audible response]
5 MR. NICE: Right. That's concludes all I
6 wish to ask the witness, in order not to tempt
8 JUDGE MAY: Very well. I think we have the
10 Major, thank you very much for coming to the
11 Tribunal to give your evidence. That concludes it.
12 You are free to go.
13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 [The witness withdrew]
15 MR. NICE: The next witness can come in.
16 He's Mr. Weckesser. He's a German national. He, I
17 think, speaks perfectly good English, at a sufficient
18 level to make the need for an interpreter from German
19 into English probably unnecessary. But I think we have
20 an interpreter here, should one be required.
21 The Chamber may recall that as a result of
22 timetable changes of the Chamber and personal
23 difficulties of one of the witnesses we originally
24 intended for this week, there had to be a reordering of
25 witnesses, and Mr. Weckesser was brought up as a person
1 who was available and cooperative enough to come. To
2 some degree, his evidence is out of order, but I don't
3 think it's going to take very long to give, in any
5 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, unfortunately I'm
6 not in a position to be able to relate to the Court
7 which items can be led and which can't, because we've
8 just received the proposed outline. But one thing I
9 can tell the Court is that apparently this witness's
10 testimony does not concern our co-defendant, and
11 therefore our co-defendant has informed us that there
12 will be no questions from Mr. Cerkez, and I will be
13 conducting the cross-examination. Thank you.
14 MR. NICE: As, I think, time is likely to be
15 taken by reorganising the room to accommodate the
16 interpreter, if I'm right, it may be sufficient simply
17 for the interpreter to be kept in reserve, and it may
18 not be necessary to go through --
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, let's see how we get
20 on without the interpreter.
21 MR. NICE: The Chamber may find it helpful,
22 if it still finds the coloured map useful -- I'm going
23 to refer to it -- to turn to the Vares sector north and
24 east of the general area of interest.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness take the
3 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
4 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
6 WITNESS: ROLF WECKESSER
7 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat,
8 Mr. Weckesser.
9 MR. NICE: My copy of the map that I've
10 referred to is highlighted in two colours as to certain
11 locations but is otherwise unmarked. I imagine it
12 would probably be quite helpful to simply lay that on
13 the ELMO.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
15 MR. NICE: If the usher could assist.
16 Examined by Mr. Nice:
17 Q. Your full name, please, sir?
18 A. My name is Rolf Weckesser.
19 Q. Did you spend some 36 years in the German Air
20 Force, leaving with the rank of colonel, and then being
21 deployed, in May 1993, as part of the ECMM mission?
22 A. That is correct, sir.
23 Q. Between October and December, were you a team
24 leader based in Travnik, with an area that included
25 Vares in the east and Maglaj in the northwest, and thus
1 also included Zepce, Kakanj, Breza, and Zavidovici?
2 A. That is correct, sir.
3 Q. On arrival to this mission, were you briefed
4 by Sir Martin Garrod as to who was or were the leading
5 figures in the territory?
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Namely, for both politics and military
8 purposes, who were the leaders?
9 A. That is correct, sir.
10 Q. What names were given to you?
11 A. The names were, beside the other vital
12 persons, were Mr. Kordic and Mr. Blaskic as the
13 responsible personnel on the HVO side.
14 Q. I think you have before you some records to
15 which you are able to refer for dates and so on. When
16 were those records made in relation to the dated
17 entries that you may find yourself referring to?
18 MR. SAYERS: If I may, Your Honour, could we
19 be informed of what the witness is referring to? We
20 don't know.
21 JUDGE MAY: What were the nature of the
22 notes? Perhaps we can find that out.
23 MR. NICE: Yes.
24 A. Is that a question to me?
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. It's a question to you, yes.
2 A. I'm sorry, I misunderstood that. I have
3 some -- taken during my stay in Central Bosnia, done
4 personal notes, I have done daily records which went
5 into a record of the RC Zenica as a daily record and
6 was published up to the staff in Zagreb. These are
7 basically the -- because I do have.
8 MR. SAYERS: Just as a matter of principle,
9 Mr. President, I must vigorously object to witnesses
10 called by the Prosecution testifying using notes that
11 have not been previously provided to the Defence. I
12 think we've raised this issue several times before, and
13 I think the time has come where we just have to
14 register the objection.
15 JUDGE MAY: You registered the objection.
16 Your right is to have the notes when the witness refers
17 to them. If they can be provided before, that's a
18 matter of convenience and obviously it's more
19 satisfactory, but the witness is entitled to refer to
20 the notes while giving evidence and then you are
21 entitled to have a look at them. That's when your
22 entitlement occurs, not before. Yes.
23 MR. NICE:
24 Q. Mr. Weckesser, I think you also have -- maybe
25 there will be objection to this, but you also have on
1 the desk, I don't know whether you're looking at it,
2 the summary that's been made of your evidence; is that
4 A. That is correct, sir.
5 JUDGE MAY: Any objection to that?
6 MR. SAYERS: No, Your Honour.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. Vares is where we're going to focus our
10 Looking at the map and using the pointer that
11 you can see to your right-hand side and which you can
12 use to point to things on the map, can you just paint
13 the historical position, in a couple of sentences, of
14 Vares; who occupied it and so on?
15 A. Maybe "occupation" is the wrong word. Out of
16 my memory, Vares was a pocket, an HVO pocket, isolated,
17 boundering [sic] in the north to the 2nd BiH Corps and
18 to the south to the 3rd BiH Corps and to the east to
19 the BSA. The area was militarily governed by the
20 Bobovac Brigade. The headquarters was located, I
21 think, about three kilometres due north of Vares on the
22 way -- on the road to Tuzla.
23 Q. At the time with which we are concerned,
24 which is October 1993, was there something described as
25 an exile government of Vares?
1 A. Yes, that is true that there was an exile
2 government which was located in the south, close to --
3 in the south of Vares, close to the town of Breza.
4 Q. These people, or if it was more than one
5 person, had they formerly lived in Vares itself?
6 A. That's what I don't know. I can't remember.
7 I only know that the lady, Mrs. Mervana -- and she has
8 a complicated name I can't really pronounce -- she
9 indicated that she has been the elected president of
10 Vares, and she was indicating, in all talks we had,
11 that she will go back to Vares as the president of the
13 Q. At this same time, was pressure on the HVO in
14 Vares constant or was it getting stronger?
15 A. I arrived in the area I'd say the 5th of
16 October, I remember, and from the early beginning of my
17 working period there the pressure on the HVO was
18 rising. We had records, we had movements, we had
19 reports that the 2nd Corps from the north was moving
20 south, the 3rd Corps was moving northeast from Kakanj
21 area, and in all meetings I had with HVO authorities in
22 the town and in the Bobovac Brigade up to the date of
23 about the 23rd, there was a rising tense atmosphere.
24 At that time, it was really culminating in the transfer
25 or in the cooperation and coordination of a convoy
1 called Joy 2 from Split up to Tuzla. This convoy was
2 hampered several times by the conflicting parties on
3 its way to Tuzla, and the latest it was hampered by the
4 denial of -- initial denial of Vares authorities and to
5 get the Convoy Joy 2 through, mainly because the valley
6 north of Vares -- this must have been the 18th/19th of
7 October -- was blocked by hundreds of Croatian refugees
8 who were coming -- who were supposed to come out of the
9 northwest of Central Bosnia and were intended to be
10 brought to the south, to the Herzegovina area. I had
11 serious, very difficult discussions with the security
12 officer in Vares, Mr. Zvonko Duznejevic, and finally he
13 gave up persistence and he let the Convoy Joy 2 pass.
14 After in the night action, the HVO had taken away the
15 Croats out of the road.
16 Q. Before we turn to the detail of what happened
17 at Stupni Do, can you tell us how the rising pressure
18 on the HVO in Vares was finally resolved? Did they
19 eventually give up Vares?
20 A. It's an assumption on my side. I mean that I
21 think the HVO in Vares was, from the beginning, let's
22 say the date 20th of October, preparing their retreat.
23 I think it has become obvious to them that they would
24 not be strong enough, by men and by armament, to stand
25 a possible offensive from the Bosnian from the north
1 and from the south, and obviously the BSA had not given
2 the assistance which had been possibly wanted by the
3 HVO. I think this was part of the nervousity [sic] at
4 that time in that area, that the retreat was imminent,
5 and I think all the responsible people in that area
6 knew about that.
7 JUDGE MAY: The BSA, I take it, is a
8 reference to the Bosnian Serbs. Is that right?
9 A. That is correct, yes, the Bosnian Serb army
10 located due east of this area.
11 If I may add this, there were rumours at that
12 time, when talking to HVO officials -- I cannot refer
13 exactly who really stated, but it was stated several
14 times -- that when we questioned the situation of the
15 HVO, that they tried to convince us that they would
16 have tanks available. And when asked where, they
17 pointed to the Serb side.
18 MR. NICE:
19 Q. When did the retreat eventually happen?
20 A. The retreat, I think it started about the
21 30th of October, when there was some shooting around
22 the Bobovac Brigade, and the 31st, when I met the new
23 commander, Kresimir Bozic, at his headquarters, when he
24 was begging me to remember is the date of his
25 command -- taking his command. And at that time --
1 Q. I'm going to cut you off there, because
2 having painted the overall picture of the tension and
3 the retreat, we'll now go through the matters on which
4 you can help us in chronological order.
5 Did the woman with the unpronounceable name
6 who was the president of the exile government provide
7 intelligence about an alleged attack on the village of
8 Stupni Do, and if so, when did she do that?
9 A. Yes. This was in the night from the 23rd to
10 the 24th of October, at about 23.00, at the
11 headquarters of the ECMM at Zenica. We got a telephone
12 call from this location close to Breza, I think between
13 Breza and Dabravine, asking for help -- for immediate
14 help for a possible fight or massacre in Stupni Do.
15 At that night, because we were not allowed
16 and supposed to go out and drive at night, I could not
17 do anything, so I had to wait for the next day, for the
19 Q. On the 24th, did you attempt to get to Stupni
20 Do, what could you see, and tell us why, if it was the
21 case, you couldn't enter the village?
22 A. Early in the morning of the 24th, we intended
23 to go to Stupni Do following these cries for help from
24 the exile government. The situation in Vares was
25 tense. The control posts were tense. We ended up in
1 the access road towards Stupni Do, which is in the
2 south of Vares.
3 Q. If the video booth could focus in on the map
4 exactly where the pointer is. Thank you very much.
5 This map is a map, Colonel, with which you're
6 only recently familiar. You've only seen it, I think,
7 this morning.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Does it, nevertheless, appear to show the
10 roads or the road into Stupni Do accurately?
11 A. I think it shows correctly the road at least
12 I know, which is where the pointer is put on now
13 [indicates], which is due south of Vares. I think that
14 was the road which was blocked and which was supposed
15 to be our access road towards Stupni Do, which is at
16 the dam. I think the railway is crossing there, and
17 there's a tunnel over the road, and at that tunnel HVO
18 forces were blocking the road with some trenches, with
19 some mines, and with dozens of soldiers, not allowing
20 us to get in.
21 Then, standing there discussing about
22 entrance, we saw three pickup-type cars and, I think,
23 one Jeep coming out of that tunnel carrying soldiers,
24 shouting, yelling, showing their arms. They stopped
25 for a while. I really don't know why. And so my
1 interpreter had a chance to talk to them, and he
2 relayed later on to me, he said, "Yes --"
3 MR. SAYERS: Objection to this, Your Honour,
4 unless the witness actually heard the soldiers speaking
5 to the interpreter.
6 A. May I answer?
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. First of all, I think before the witness may
9 contribute, if he may, it's clear that this is simply
10 communication via an interpreter, who would be required
11 in any event. The evidence is as good as it can ever
12 be, in terms of proximity, unless you call the
13 interpreter himself.
14 JUDGE MAY: Well, perhaps the witness could
15 indicate whether he heard the soldiers talking to the
16 interpreter, or saw it, and how soon afterwards he
17 himself received the information.
18 A. Yes, I'm willing to do. I was standing about
19 four metres apart from that grouping. I saw the
20 interpreter talking to these soldiers, and he
21 immediately relayed this wording to me. And the
22 wording were --
23 JUDGE MAY: Just before you do this, there
24 has been an objection, Mr. Nice.
25 [Trial Chamber deliberates]
1 JUDGE MAY: We will admit this evidence. It
2 could scarcely be more contemporaneous, in our view,
3 and therefore has that degree of reliability about it.
4 What weight is to be given to it, of course, finally,
5 will be a matter for us.
6 Yes, Mr. Weckesser, if you would like to tell
7 us what was said.
8 A. Thank you, Your Honours. The soldiers said,
9 "We did not like to do this job, but we had to do it,
10 and we do not like our leaders," which gave us at that
11 time an assumption or a hint that something has
12 happened which was extraordinary.
13 MR. NICE:
14 Q. Before I move on in the chronology of events,
15 what sort of village was Stupni Do and for what was it
16 noted? And in giving that answer, can you, by
17 reference to the map, maybe, point out how near it was
18 to front lines of the various opposing parties?
19 A. As I said, I came in only at the 5th of
20 October in this area. The area was first, before,
21 handled by another monitor, called Hap Stutt, and he
22 told me, when taking over this area, he said Stupni Do
23 is a very nice valley, with charming people. He also
24 told me at that time, giving me a hint that this is
25 possibly a village where some smuggling is done; that
1 at least is a rumour, or was a rumour at that time,
2 reasoning basically on the fact that Stupni Do was
3 really in a kind of central point between the three
4 warring parties. To the east, immediately -- close to
5 the east to Stupni Do was a bordering to the BSA, to
6 the Serb territory. To the north, it was included,
7 actually -- almost included into the HVO pocket, and to
8 the southwest they had good access to the BiH forces.
9 So it was an ideal point, as it looks to me,
10 for transferring weapons, goods, whatever is possible,
11 among the warring parties. And exchanging goods and
12 arms and whatever among the warring parties was not an
13 extraordinary happening in this kind of war. I
14 experienced this at other locations during my two-year
15 stay in ex-Yugoslavia.
16 Q. Mr. Weckesser, I must explain that I wait
17 sometimes for the interpreters to catch up.
18 A. I understand, sir.
19 Q. Did you then decide to seek access by getting
20 permission from the local relevant brigade?
21 A. Yes, sir. Since --
22 Q. Tell us about that.
23 A. Since the access was denied by the soldiers
24 at this blockade in the south of Vares, I proceeded
25 that day to the Bobovac Brigade, and there I met the
1 commander, Emil Harah, who refused to grant access to
2 Stupni Do, pretending to me that there was heavy
3 fighting going on and it would be much too dangerous
4 for me and my team to go there, and there would be a
5 lot of mining around that village. So he promised me
6 that it might be possible, on the next day, to get
7 access to Stupni Do.
8 Q. While you were at the brigade headquarters,
9 did you see some other soldiers?
10 A. Yes. There were dozens of soldiers. Some
11 were inside, in the restaurant close to the area where
12 we had the meeting or the get-together with the
14 Q. Again I'm going to interrupt you, because
15 there's a small collection of exhibits. I think
16 they've been provided already. They can be
17 distributed, in readiness for production, in bundles.
18 The first one is a photograph. It may be the
19 photograph should just go on the ELMO.
20 A. May I use the photograph as reference?
21 Q. Yes. If you put it on the ELMO, then the
22 public can see it. That's the advantage.
23 Tell us about what we're looking at, and then
24 tell us about the soldiers that you saw.
25 A. That is the burned-out Bobovac -- former
1 Bobovac headquarter brigade building [indicates].
2 Between this pole and this wall over there [indicates]
3 was the gate, a primitive gate, control gate, to get
4 access to the Bobovac Brigade. There you were normally
5 standing for a long time until somebody really tried to
6 pick up, and I think they discussed whether they would
7 receive you or not. It happened also that we had been
8 sent away by saying nobody is in and nobody could talk
9 to us.
10 In this area [indicates] left of the
11 headquarters, at that time I saw, I think in this area,
12 there have been two different type of soldiers. One
13 type of soldier looking from experience to be normal
14 HVO soldiers, and there had been another grouping which
15 looked to me different. When we were standing here
16 [indicates] and waiting for access to get to the
17 commander, they were looking from behind the
18 headquarter towards us, going a few steps forwards and
19 then backward, it appeared to me and it appeared to us
20 that they were somewhat kind of hiding. One person
21 here [indicates] in front of us, actually leading us
22 then to the commander, he looked a little bit like that
23 other type of soldiers we saw wearing a bandanna. He
24 also had gloves on his hands, exposing the fingers,
25 leaving the fingers in the open, carrying the
1 trigger -- with the hand constantly on the trigger as
2 if we would consist of a danger to them, which was no
3 danger, out of question. That was about the situation
4 we found when we tried to meet the commander.
5 Q. On that same day, having failed to get
6 permission from the HVO commander, did you go and speak
7 to the BiH commander, Nehru Ganic?
8 A. Yes. On our way back, I think it was in the
9 afternoon, 15.00, around, together with Colonel
10 Hendriksen from the NordBat Battalion, we met the OG
11 commander, BiH commander, Ganic.
12 Q. It may just add some colour to your evidence
13 if we put the map back on the ELMO and just point out
14 where the Bobovac Brigade headquarters were and where
15 it was that you went to see the BiH commander.
16 A. [indicates]. So the command post, a
17 relatively primitive command post, in a house, was on
18 the road towards Vares at Dabravine, that was the
19 command post for the OG, and there we met the -- took
20 us with Colonel Hendriksen, the commander. He bitterly
21 accused us at that time of doing nothing. He pretended
22 that a massacre had taken place in Stupni Do. He
23 complained bitterly that NordBat had not and was not
24 intervening in the HVO attack, and he stated at that
25 meeting that out of 220 Muslim inhabitants, former
1 inhabitants of Stupni Do, only 21 had escaped.
2 Q. Were you given intelligence about vehicles
3 seen to have been leaving Stupni Do, and if so, where
4 did the intelligence come from?
5 A. The intelligence -- we got some information
6 came from NordBat. We always kept very, very close
7 contact to NordBat, because they were on scene, and we
8 could only come, actually, for hours out of Zenica, if
9 we had been visiting other areas. So NordBat told us
10 that they had observed several HVO trucks coming out in
11 the night, out of this Stupni Do area and out of the
12 Stupni Do road, in the night from the 23rd to the 24th
13 of October. And I assumed that they had been taking
14 away the looted material, I could not assume anything
15 else, which was taken out of this village.
16 Q. Did you, that same day, learn that Sir Martin
17 Garrod was intending to hold a meeting with Dario
18 Kordic in his capacity as vice-president of HZ-HB?
19 A. That's correct, sir.
20 Q. The reason for the meeting being what?
21 A. Primarily on the coordination of the giving
22 back of the two helicopters which had been kept back on
23 a medevac -- on a coordinated medevac mission at
24 Medjugorje. This was the prime aim of this meeting, in
25 order to help out in this kind of conflict.
1 In this conflict, I used the chance to ask
2 Mr. Garrod for a favour, and I had asked him in that
3 night, since I was seriously now concerned about the
4 fate of Stupni Do, to ask Mr. Kordic what was going on
5 in Stupni Do.
6 Q. So at this stage, at the time you made the
7 request for the interview to take place, you were still
8 working on rumour and complaint, no one from the ECMM
9 having gone into Stupni Do?
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. To your knowledge at that time, had NordBat
12 gone into Stupni Do, or not?
13 A. No, they had not at that time.
14 Q. Apart from the HVO soldiers blocking entry of
15 the road, were you aware of anyone else having access
16 to Stupni Do?
17 A. No, I was not aware.
18 JUDGE MAY: Is this a convenient movement?
19 MR. NICE: Yes, it is.
20 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now.
21 I'm getting the French coming through my
22 channel, but we'll adjourn for half an hour. No doubt
23 that can be put right.
24 --- Recess taken at 11.00
25 --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
2 MR. NICE:
3 Q. We're at paragraph 14. Did you hear back --
4 just yes or no to this -- from either Sir Martin Garrod
5 or someone else as to the results of the interview that
6 he had with Dario Kordic?
7 A. Would you repeat, please, the last portion of
8 your question?
9 Q. Yes. Did you hear the results of the
10 interview that were had with Dario Kordic? Just yes or
12 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.
13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, the position is that
14 Martin Garrod will be being called quite soon. The
15 matter is recorded, in any event, in an ECMM report
16 which I might as conveniently produce through this
17 witness, and then the Chamber will know at least what
18 the narrative is going to be.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
20 MR. NICE: So can I produce the next exhibit,
21 please, 1263,1, which you will find the first document
22 underneath the photograph.
23 Q. This is the daily report for the 25th of
24 October, but it deals with the matters you've been
25 telling us about. And on the political situation, it
1 deals with HRC visiting Dario Kordic in Busovaca in
2 connection with the helicopters that you've already
3 spoken of. There are other entries, which I'm not
4 going to go into, and then at the bottom of the page,
5 it says that he was questioned about Stupni Do, and it
6 sets out on the following pages what it was said that
7 he had given by way of comment or explanation.
8 Were you aware of that explanation being
9 given at the time?
10 A. I was aware, yes.
11 Q. And included, as we can see -- well, let me
12 come back to that.
13 Were you satisfied with the explanation, or
14 did you decide to continue your efforts to get into
15 Stupni Do?
16 A. Actually we were not satisfied, because the
17 circumstances, the rumours, the information so far
18 gotten by the BiH, the demands, we were not satisfied.
19 We were still trying to get a clear -- a clear picture
20 on the situation. But we trusted in that promise of
21 Mr. Kordic that he will -- that he look into it, and we
22 hoped, but we were not certain, that it would not look
23 that bad as it finally looked.
24 Q. On the 25th, did you try again, through the
25 Bobovac Brigade commander, Emil Harah, in company with
1 William Stutt?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Then did you find out that there had been a
4 change of personnel?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. Tell us about that.
7 A. It was surprising, especially to Mr. Stutt,
8 who knew Mr. Rajic personally. For me, it was the
9 first get-together with Mr. Rajic, and when Mr. Stutt
10 with his team joined my team in the afternoon and we
11 went to the Bobovac Brigade, we were surprised to find
12 two commanders, not only Kresimir Bosic but also
13 Mr. Rajic, who introduced himself, was his name, and
14 took place on the meeting table, and -- should I refer
15 to the meeting itself?
16 Q. Yes, go on and tell us -- but tell us first,
17 where was Rajic known to be a commander from?
18 A. I was -- this was part of my initial
19 briefing. I still have some personal notes of that,
20 given at the 5th of October by Mr. Beaumont, that
21 Mr. Rajic was an HVO commander in Kiseljak.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 A. So it was surprising that he was now in
25 Q. Tell us about the meeting.
1 A. The meeting focused from the beginning on the
2 access possibility to Stupni Do, and it was surprising
3 from the beginning that the expected commander in
4 charge, Mr. Bosic, did not control the meeting. He
5 almost did not take part in the conversation. The
6 talking was almost purely done by Mr. Rajic, in a
7 friendly, almost charming way, but denying any --
8 denial of any access to Stupni Do at that time.
9 Q. On what grounds was access denied?
10 A. I can't remember.
11 Q. The following day, I think you had to go to
13 A. That is correct, sir.
14 Q. Some distance away. And in a sense not the
15 topic you're here to help us with, but in a few
16 sentences, because it may be relevant for our
17 considerations, in Zepce, what evidence did you find of
18 co-operation between Croats and Serbs at that time?
19 A. Zepce was -- the Zepce authorities pretended
20 and they played towards us that they were besieged not
21 only by the -- or surrounded not only by BiH in the
22 east and in the south, but also in the north,
23 northwest, from the Serbs. I normally -- despite the
24 fact that based on the Brioni agreement, we were
25 promised to have freedom of movement, the freedom of
1 movement for these teams, especially in the particular
2 areas, was quite often limited and not given.
3 So whenever I went to Zepce for the meetings,
4 in order to prepare or to open a humanitarian corridor
5 aiming towards the starving city, Zavidovici, which was
6 isolated at that time and really surrounded, I was very
7 well escorted from the beginning and had, actually,
8 this exception of the meetings with Mr. Lozancic and
9 Ivo Jozinovic, no possibility to move.
10 But on that occasion I used a break to escape
11 from the escort, and I said to my team immediately,
12 "Get to the car. We'll do a little tour around the
13 town." And it was surprising, after a few house
14 blocks, to get into a warehouse of the HVO, where we
15 pretended to try to buy some chocolate, where we saw
16 ECTF food in the original packages, the original
17 pallets, stored, even under the normal plastic cover
18 they were sealed with.
19 Q. "ECTF" meaning ... ?
20 A. I can't remember, actually, what the
21 abbreviation means. It still is just in my mind, ECTF.
22 I think it was the abbreviation for the -- for the aid
23 which was provided to Bosnia at that time from the EC.
24 This was one, and then we continued our
25 drive, in that break period. And after one turn in the
1 north of Zepce, we ran into a Serbian platoon, tank
2 platoon, fully active, with the flags up, racing out,
3 yelling, charming, smiling to us, racing up to the
4 north, towards the area of Maglaj or Zepce or basically
5 BSA-held territory. This was a clear indication that
6 they had excellent relations at that time, and the HVO
7 with the BSA, this was also admitted personally by
8 Mr. Niko Jozinovic to me by indicating that all the
9 wounded people, the wounded HVO soldiers, are being
10 brought to Banja Luka to be cared for, and that he has
11 to pay a lot of money for that.
12 Another indication how they tried to fake
13 their kind of non co-operation with BSA at that time
14 was that I pretended, with a meeting with Mr. Lozancic,
15 who was the president at that time of Zepce, to need a
16 break, and I asked him twice. I think every time --
17 no, not twice. Every time I asked him, when I was in
18 Zepce and meeting him, to have a walk through his town
19 to look to the damages done by the Bosnian and Serbs.
20 And we had a walk, and during the walk, he
21 always showed me -- the windows were missing. He was
22 asking for alternatives for the windows, the window was
23 coming soon. And whenever we approached a certain
24 corner, he always stopped me by saying, "This is now
25 getting very dangerous. Here the Serbs are shooting
1 into our town. We should not progress." We always
2 returned at the same spot. This was in contrary,
3 actually, to the observations I had made in regard to
4 the tank platoon.
5 And an additional one: On almost every
6 occasion we went into the Zepce pocket, we saw Serbian
7 staff cars standing in front of the staff building.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 Paragraph 20. On the 27th of October, did
10 you succeed eventually then in gaining access to Stupni
11 Do, with the assistance of NordBat and despite
13 A. That's correct, sir.
14 Q. As a matter of interest, how was the
15 resistance overborne, overcome?
16 A. The location of the resistance was the same
17 as described before, on the south of Vares at this
18 entrance gate to the road up to Stupni Do. The tunnel
19 itself -- or right after the tunnel, the road was
20 blocked with concertina and with three tank mines, the
21 middle tank mine with an antenna on it, and on the
22 right side, on the left side, a normal -- without
23 antenna, a normal tank mine.
24 We had a discussion -- it was one carrier
25 with us from the NordBat Battalion, we were one Jeep --
1 and they refused in a very clear way, saying, "No way,
2 you cannot get up there." And very bravely, one
3 NordBat soldier, he pushed one HVO soldier to the
4 chest. He was almost falling back. He took himself
5 the mine in the middle, put it aside, shifted the other
6 two mines to the side of the road, gave a sign to the
7 carrier. The carrier went through the concertina, and
8 we right away, after this carrier, followed up to the
9 road to Stupni Do.
10 I do not observe it -- later on I realised --
11 that I think a TV team, or at least a team of unknown
12 media, was also chasing behind us into Stupni Do.
13 Q. So was this, so far as you could judge, the
14 first entry into Stupni Do after the massacre that
15 you're now going -- or the massacre, the remnants of
16 which you were able to see?
17 A. It was not the first one. It was the first
18 one for ECMM, for an ECMM team. We had learned that in
19 the evening before, the NordBat had gained already
20 access to the Stupni Do area.
21 Q. I think in the village you found complete
22 destruction, some houses still smouldering. You found
23 some 20 bodies, most of them burned beyond recognition,
24 the size of the skull of some of them showing that they
25 were children?
1 A. That is correct, sir. I might add that also
2 in the meanwhile an UKLO team, a United Kingdom liaison
3 team, was coming up; a special force, obviously a small
4 grouping -- they just had one car and three persons --
5 and there was killed people. And together with them,
6 we were investigating the remains, especially from the
7 bodies of the children, having some kind of children's
8 skulls in our hand. It seemed to me at that time, not
9 being an expert of forensic experience, that these
10 human bodies had been burned together with animals,
11 because at the same location we also found sheep heads,
12 burned sheep heads.
13 Q. Did you search for signs of fighting, that is
14 to say, warfare-type fighting?
15 A. Yes. This was of prime interest also for my
16 colleague and me, to look for indications of the
17 suspected heavy fighting. I could not detect, in these
18 hours we spent up in Stupni Do, any sign of heavy
19 fighting. I could not see bullet signs in the walls,
20 in the remaining walls. I could not find any
21 fortification, military-oriented fortification. And we
22 were looking on the ground for small-arm shells, and we
23 only found about five small-arm shells right at the
24 vicinity of a house in the middle of the former Stupni
25 Do, where we in the cellar found, I think, three women,
1 three women which had been killed or had been dead.
2 Q. Thank you. Then we move to the 31st of
3 October when, I think, you met the man Bozic again --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. -- who you had last seen playing a
6 subordinate role in the discussion with Rajic?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. His behaviour, and what did he say?
9 A. Maybe I have to jump back just a little bit,
10 sir. I might add on that on that day when ECMM,
11 together with a NordBat carrier, went up to Stupni Do
12 on the 24th, also later on the chief of staff, I think,
13 of the Vitez BritBat unit was coming in, a gentleman,
14 Ramsey, and in an improvised TV or media conference,
15 which was aiming to, I think, one media team and
16 actually almost transmitting into the blind, he was
17 publicly blaming Mr. Kresimir Bozic for this massacre
18 and telling that this will be pursued.
19 When I met Mr. Bozic on the 31st, he was
20 considerably nervous and referring especially to this
21 presentation of the General Ramsey, and he was
22 indicating to me -- "indicating" is not the proper
23 word -- he was begging to remember and to put down in
24 records that he took command of the Bobovac Brigade on
25 the 24th and not before.
1 Q. Can you turn, please, now to the next paper
2 exhibit which follows in the stack, which should
3 probably just be placed on the ELMO. You can lay it
4 over the map. That's not a problem, I think. It's
6 A. What are we looking for now?
7 Q. Yes, the next paper exhibit. It's the ECMM
8 daily report for the 31st of October.
9 A. 31st of --
10 Q. 31st of October. You can see a couple of
11 entries that relate to Stupni Do. In the middle of the
12 first page, there's a reference to a meeting with Prlic
13 and Slobodan Bozic, respectively president and deputy
14 minister, and in that meeting it's recorded, so far as
15 Stupni Do is concerned, that General Petkovic had
16 removed all local commanders and an investigation was
17 under way. Did you learn of that at the time,
18 Mr. Weckesser?
19 A. No. I can't remember, actually.
20 Q. Then at the foot of the page, it deals with
21 the meeting of Bozic, and in these terms says he was
22 visibly nervous and explained that he was promoted and
23 took over his new post on the 24th of October. The
24 following comment is made:
25 "This is believed to be a piece of serious
1 scene setting, since the Stupni Do massacre took place
2 on the 23rd of October. Bozic explained the military
3 situation to the north. He said that 2 Corps BiH
4 captured the village of Dubrastica yesterday and, in
5 the process, killed seven children.
6 "Comment: NordBat",
7 and then to the next page:
8 "informed that the village was captured
9 without apparent civilian casualties. It was a poor
10 military action."
11 And then I think I needn't read any more.
12 Did you provide this or some of this
14 A. Yes, exactly. That's my wording.
15 Q. Thank you. Is there anything further that
16 you want to comment on that entry and the meeting of
17 Bozic or not?
18 A. I think it's well said and well stated in
19 that record, so ...
20 Q. As explanation for Stupni Do, did you in any
21 event examine a village called Kopljari, and if so,
22 could you explain why, quite briefly?
23 A. Yes. Since Kopljari was mentioned,
24 especially when Stupni Do has happened, in Vares,
25 because I had met the priest on one occasion, the
1 senior priest, I asked him, I said, "These have been
2 inhabitants almost of your town. Could you not help to
3 prevent such a happening?" He just told me that, "We
4 did what they did to Kopljari." Immediately, after
5 rumours have been spread about a suspected massacre of
6 Kopljari, NordBat had investigated the scene, and they
7 had at any time, I remember, not found any sign of
8 massacre. They found the body of one man who maybe, I
9 just remember, had been dying from normal reasons.
10 A few days after this event in Stupni Do, I
11 visited with my team also Kopljari, which is a -- or
12 has been a little village surrounded by mountains on
13 three sides and on one side open to the valley. The
14 village itself was completely destroyed, burned. Some
15 houses were flattened. We could not find any sign of a
16 massacre. We did not realise any special smell which
17 we experienced in Stupni Do, so at that time I
18 concluded that it was most unlikely that a massacre --
19 a scene of massacre of the type in Stupni Do had taken
20 place in Kopljari. But it's true the Kopljari event
21 was, in the discussion with officials, quite often used
22 as the reasoning for the Stupni Do revenge.
23 JUDGE MAY: Where is that on the plan,
24 Mr. Nice?
25 MR. NICE: Sorry, yes.
1 Q. Can you find Kopljari on the map for us,
2 Mr. Weckesser? I'm sorry not to have done that. My
4 A. It's just due west of Vares. I hope it's
5 visible here. Where the pointer is directed now
6 [indicates], Kopljari.
7 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. Mr. Weckesser, did you form a view as to
10 whether what had happened at Stupni Do was planned or
12 A. It's a very difficult question, sir. Based
13 on my experience, two years' experience in the former
14 Yugoslavia from '93 to '95, serving in different areas
15 and serving actually in the territories of all warring
16 parties, I always had the experience that all parties,
17 all conflicting parties, followed the same doctrine.
18 The doctrine was, in all decisions, to go up the chain
19 of command first and to check if they should say "Yes"
20 or "No", do it or not do it, and this despite the fact
21 that sometimes you offered an advantageous position or
22 possibility and it was always initially put back,
23 referring to further coordination.
24 So I assume that the Stupni Do event cannot
25 have been a spontaneous event. I think it had been
1 directed, especially if you look to the reaction
3 Q. The next exhibit, which is the ECMM report
4 for the 7th to the 13th of November, please.
5 You're blocking the light at the front of the
7 In the weekly report for the 7th to the 13th
8 of November, is there the report of ECMM attending a
9 meeting in Kiseljak? Were you present at that meeting
10 yourself or is it a question of relying on the report
11 from others?
12 A. I was not present at this meeting. This
13 meeting was --
14 MR. SAYERS: Two objections, Mr. President.
15 First, this appears to be an extract of a document and
16 not a complete document. I'm sure the complete
17 document can be made available. But, secondly,
18 apparently this is a report from someone. May we know
19 who it is that supposedly witnessed this conference?
20 Thank you.
21 A. If I may comment?
22 MR. NICE: It may be the witness may be able
23 to help us.
24 A. Yes. I think, if I remember correctly, the
25 head of the ECMM, Mr. Stutt, attended that meeting on
1 that day. It was a big issue, and we discussed it
2 several times in the evening meeting, because it might
3 have also put our safety into question, this kind of
4 action. Therefore, it was a matter of urgency for us.
5 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment, Mr. Weckesser.
6 Would it be better to deal with this when Mr. Stutt
7 comes to give evidence?
8 MR. NICE: We can deal with it with
9 Mr. Stutt. It's just a matter of whether the Chamber
10 would find it more helpful to have the whole scene set
11 now. Certainly he can do it when he comes.
12 JUDGE MAY: Well, it may be better if he
13 deals with it.
14 MR. NICE: Very well.
15 Q. Did you later hear, and this is the next
16 exhibit from this witness, Z1293,1, which is the daily
17 report for the 9th of November -- if you would like to
18 look at that, please -- did you later hear of Rajic
19 being dismissed, apparently?
20 A. That is correct, sir, yes. It was a major
21 issue for us, and therefore we -- all team leaders had
22 got this information.
23 Q. Despite being dismissed, were there reports
24 of sightings of him later elsewhere?
25 A. My colleagues were interested, sir, to --
1 were interested in the fate of Mr. Rajic afterwards,
2 and they were instructed to look for Mr. Rajic in
3 Kiseljak. At one time it was reported that he was seen
4 in the G-3 area of the headquarter in Kiseljak, but he
5 was trying to avoid contact with the ECMM team member,
6 which was unusual because normally he was open for any
7 discussion and any contact.
8 Q. The last exhibit is 1296,1, a newspaper
9 article which at the moment is attached to or has
10 attached to it not a translation by this Tribunal's
11 translators but an ECMM translation.
12 A. Sir, I don't have it at hand here.
13 Q. It should be the last document.
14 A. It's not in this package.
15 Q. I'm not going to go through it in detail, but
16 if we just look at the --
17 A. Oh, it is. I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
18 Q. If we look at the newspaper article itself
19 with the photograph --
20 A. That is -- that's being myself on the right
21 corner of that picture.
22 Q. Yes. If we turn to the English translation
23 provided by the ECMM, we can see that the date is the
24 10th of November. There is an eyewitness account given
25 by a survivor. Your Honour, I don't again propose to
1 read this at this stage. The material is available
2 there, showing what was being broadcast or revealed at
3 that time. But for your purposes in this trial, we
4 will, of course, call a live witness to deal with the
5 massacre itself.
6 JUDGE MAY: What is the newspaper?
7 MR. NICE: What is it?
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Which newspaper is it?
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. Can you help us?
11 A. I think it's News Week. I don't know what
12 kind it is, whether it's News Week from the United
13 States, I doubt.
14 Q. But you have -- I think you have the
15 original. The earlier one or --
16 A. No, I only have this one. Maybe it's only an
17 extract of the News Week, but I was so much isolated
18 from press material at that time, I was grateful to
19 have some kind of statement from the press on that, so
20 I kept it.
21 JUDGE MAY: There is a photograph of you,
22 Mr. Weckesser. What is happening in that photograph?
23 Can you remember the incident?
24 A. Oh, yes, yes. In detail, yes.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
1 A. That's one of the victims in Stupni Do, in
2 the northern part of the village, which is uphill to
3 the north, one body we found behind that gate in the
4 background, about 50, 60 metres uphill, and this one
5 was lower here. It was interesting for me that he
6 seemed -- he seemed -- I have to be very careful -- he
7 seemed to have been tortured, because his fingers were
8 showing blisters, heavy blisters, and it was
9 interesting -- I might be forgiven for using the word
10 "interesting" -- that he was killed not by cutting the
11 throat but seeming just to stab through the throat.
12 An additional thing was our observation as
13 amateurs in this area, that it seemed to be a fake
14 position because he was covered by coal-burned wood,
15 but the clothing beneath was not burned. So this was
16 actually, in our opinion at that time, not the position
17 where he was stabbed or murdered.
18 The soldiers you see, these are the
19 accompanying soldiers of NordBat.
20 MR. NICE: That's all I propose to ask this
21 witness. Thank you very much.
22 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice,
23 could the witness tell us if that person was
24 identified, the person that he just mentioned? Was he
1 A. Not to my knowledge, but since we had a
2 funeral of some victims in Breza and the victims which
3 were, at least from the body to a reasonable extent
4 intact, were brought to Breza, I think the remaining
5 inhabitants of Breza, part of them then being at Breza,
6 must have identified this man. I'm pretty sure.
7 We had visited or we had seen the bodies once
8 more, or the bodies available, at Breza, but I can't
9 remember to have seen these men in the primitive morgue
10 we went to.
11 MR. NICE: I don't know that we'll be able to
12 help further with identification in other evidence. I
13 suspect not.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Sayers.
15 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.
16 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
17 Q. Good afternoon, Colonel Weckesser. My name
18 is Steve Sayers. Together with my colleague,
19 Mr. Naumovski, we represent Dario Kordic.
20 I would suspect that I have maybe an hour and
21 a half of questions for you, at the maximum.
22 Please forgive me if the delivery is somewhat
23 halting, but we have to, as Mr. Nice says, we have to
24 keep in mind the interpreters, because everything that
25 we say is being interpreted for our clients.
1 A brief matter of general background. I
2 believe, sir, that you spent 37 years in the Luftwaffe.
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. And you left the Luftwaffe in March of 1993;
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Two months later, sir, you joined the ECMM;
9 A. I think almost one month earlier. One month
10 earlier. I must correct this, yes. I was coming in, I
11 think, in mid-April already.
12 Q. At the beginning of September of 1993, you
13 became a team leader for Team V-4 in Central Bosnia; is
14 that correct?
15 A. I think it was at the beginning of October.
16 Q. All right.
17 A. I had -- that was a mistake in my initial
19 Q. You said in your statement that it was at the
20 beginning of September, but actually what you mean is
21 that it's the beginning of October. I think you said
22 October 4th of 1993.
23 A. Yes. I was coming in on the 5th, the 5th of
25 Q. Just so we're both clear, Colonel, the
1 statement to which I referred and to which you referred
2 is a statement that was given to the investigators for
3 the Prosecution on May the 7th and 8th of 1996;
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. I believe, sir, that your tour lasted from
7 September to December 1993 as a member of Team V-4; is
8 that correct?
9 A. Yes, with some breaks for leave, but this was
10 the overall period.
11 Q. Would you just answer a general question?
12 What was the military purpose, if any, of the ECMM?
13 What was it monitoring?
14 A. Yes. ECMM had no military purpose at all.
15 The monitoring of military actions and ongoings had the
16 only purpose in order to avoid further conflicts, in
17 order to get the parties to a position to stop warring,
18 in order to get the possibility to get in with
19 humanitarian aid or with humanitarian help. There was,
20 at least from my side, not any aspect for military
21 intelligence or something, which was always suspected
22 from the conflicting party, especially when they knew
23 and we introduced ourselves in the open, and when they
24 knew that we had been formerly officers of the air
25 force or army. Actually, the military were driving the
1 conflict, so it was natural and I think it's
2 understandable that we concentrated especially in the
3 areas where military conflicts were active, on the
4 movements and on the coordination with military
5 people. In other areas where we had a calm period, not
6 warring period, we concentrated on the political
7 representatives and on economic and political matters.
8 Q. Would it be fair to say that all of the
9 monitors employed by the European Community Monitoring
10 Mission were, in fact, ex-officers?
11 A. I cannot speak for other nations. For the
12 German side, when I was there, we started with 23
13 monitors. I think they were all -- they all had a
14 former military background, that is correct, but I
15 cannot speak for the other nations. I think most of
16 them had a military background, yes.
17 Q. Now, you gave some testimony regarding a
18 briefing that you had received from Sir Martin Garrod
19 at the beginning of your tour in early October of
20 1993. You were actually briefed that the political
21 leader of the Croats in Central Bosnia was a man named
22 Dario Kordic; correct?
23 A. That is correct, yes.
24 Q. And you were briefed that the military
25 leader, the HVO military leader in Central Bosnia, was
1 Colonel Tihomir Blaskic?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. You also have stated during your testimony,
4 sir, that the position of Mr. Kordic, as you understood
5 it, was the vice-president of the HZ-HB? Paragraph 13
6 of your proofing statement that you have before you.
7 A. That's correct, sir. I knew him as the
8 deputy of Mr. Boban, yes.
9 Q. You never actually met Dario Kordic at all,
10 did you?
11 A. No, we have not met. At least I cannot
13 Q. And the same is true of Colonel Blaskic?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Now, let me just ask you, sir, were you aware
16 that by October of 1993, the HZ-HB had actually ceased
17 to exist?
18 A. What do you mean this HZ -- could you repeat
19 that? What did --
20 Q. Yes. You said, in paragraph 13, that you
21 were informed that Mr. Kordic was the vice-president of
22 the HZ-HB?
23 A. Oh, you mean the Republic of Herceg-Bosna or
25 Q. What did you mean by the term "HZ-HB"?
1 A. What are you referring now, if I may ask?
2 Q. Paragraph 13 of the statement that you have
3 before you, you have -- represented by the Prosecution
4 to testify about.
5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, what is it that
6 you're putting to the witness? Let's get to the
8 A. We'll get it straightened --
9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Weckesser, yes. Let's hear
10 again the question, please.
11 MR. SAYERS:
12 Q. Were you aware that by October of 1993, the
13 HZ-HB, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, had
14 actually ceased to exist?
15 A. I must think about it. Give me a second.
16 To answer your question, sir, straight, I
17 would say I was not aware, but I knew at that time that
18 it was a constant discussion about the credibility that
19 that organisation would exist or not exist. I remember
20 we had a discussion -- always discussions, "Is it still
21 existing, is it still a matter or not," and it was not
22 clear at that time to us.
23 Q. Colonel, we have been regularly reminded, and
24 appropriately so, by the Trial Chamber that witness
25 testimony is not a memory contest, but let me just see
1 if I can jog your memory on two matters.
2 Were you aware that towards the end of August
3 of 1993, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan had actually been
4 approved and signed by the three combatting parties,
5 the Serbs, the Muslim side, and the Croat side?
6 A. I cannot say today if I was aware at that
8 Q. Were you aware that following the
9 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan proposals, the Croatian Republic
10 of Herceg-Bosna had actually been established as one of
11 three constituent republics making up
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that it was established on
13 August the 28th, 1993?
14 A. Yes, sir, I was aware.
15 Q. Would it be fair to say that you yourself
16 have absolutely no idea what Mr. Kordic's official
17 position in this new republic, if any, was?
18 A. Just to come back once more to your first
19 question, in the same time period, I was working in an
20 area in the middle, between the two scenes we have
21 described, Bukanovici, which is a Croatian town, an
22 isolated Croatian town north of Kakanj, which was in
23 complete distress. And it was exactly the same time
24 period. And there, from the priest, I learned that
25 they had been ordered by -- they told me by
1 Mr. Boban -- to go to the south, to the southern part
2 of Herzegovina. They went, and after that, they could
3 not find any housing and any food, and they went back.
4 In the meanwhile, their village was robbed, and they
5 were almost starving to death.
6 Q. Colonel, I don't mean any disrespect, but let
7 me stop you, because the question was: Would it be
8 fair to say that you, yourself, have absolutely no idea
9 what Mr. Kordic's official position in this new
10 republic, if any, was? That would be fair to say,
11 wouldn't it?
12 A. No, it would not be fair. I only knew that
13 he was the vice-president.
14 Q. The vice-president of what, though?
15 A. Of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
16 Q. That was your understanding, was it?
17 A. That was my understanding.
18 Q. Who told you that?
19 A. I can't remember.
20 Q. Can you tell us who the chief of the general
21 staff of the Croat armed forces in Mostar was, sir?
22 A. No, I can't.
23 Q. Do you know to whom the commander of the
24 Bobovac Brigade, Emil Harah, that you've previously
25 testified, to whom that commander reported?
1 A. To my understanding, he was responsive to the
2 second group, in Kiseljak.
3 Q. But who was his commanding officer, sir?
4 A. For his operational zone, it was Colonel
5 Blaskic. I don't know who was the commanding officer
6 of the group. I can't remember.
7 Q. Would it be fair to say, Colonel Weckesser,
8 that the ECMM knew Stupni Do as a notorious centre of
9 black-market activities before October the 23rd, 1993?
10 A. This would be too strong. It was laid down
11 in the reports that there was a suspicion that it would
12 be a smuggling centre, yes.
13 Q. That suspicion had been the number of several
14 written reports from the European Community Monitoring
15 Mission, had it not?
16 A. I know only from one.
17 Q. I wonder if I could show you a document that
18 I'd like to have marked as the next exhibit, please.
19 It is a copy of a daily summary of the coordination
20 centre in Travnik of the ECMM, dated November the 2nd,
22 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
24 MR. SAYERS:
25 Q. First things first, Colonel Weckesser: Have
1 you seen a copy of this report before?
2 A. I can't remember, sir, if I have seen this
4 Q. I just have a few questions in connection
5 with it. First, in the "Comment" section, it states
6 that the ECMM has previously reported on black-market
7 activities around Stupni Do. Do you recall whether you
8 had access to those prior written reports, or that
9 prior written report, sir?
10 A. I don't think so. Maybe I was coming in too
11 late into this mission for that kind of history.
12 Q. Did you ever speak to the gentleman
13 identified as Okreh Mahmutovic -- I believe his actual
14 name is Ekrem Mahmutovic -- who was a member of the
15 BiH OG in Dabravine?
16 A. I might have talked to him, but I can't
17 remember. I cannot identify and cannot match the name
18 with the kind of meeting. We have met so many people
19 and so many officials, so -- no, impossible.
20 Q. The term "BiH OG" in Dabravine means "BiH
21 Operational Group," does it not?
22 A. I think so. I have not put down this
23 report. This had been done by Mr. Stutt.
24 Q. One final question in connection with this
25 exhibit, Colonel, and that appears on the second page,
1 under paragraph 7, "Assessment." The assessment is
2 made by, it looks like, Mr. Stutt, that the BiH appear
3 very much in control, and this is as of November the
4 2nd, 1993. That was how you found the situation on the
5 ground as well, was it not?
6 A. You are referring to para 7, "Assessment"?
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. I can barely read it. It's a military and
9 humanitarian --
10 Q. The final sentence in the first paragraph
11 says, "At the moment, the BiH appear very much in
13 A. Yes, I understand that, but it is not my
15 Q. You found that as of November the 2nd, 1993,
16 which is the date of this report --
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. -- you disagree with that?
19 A. For that day, I have to disagree, because I
20 have not been in Vares or in this area at that day. I
21 was at that day in Zepce.
22 Q. Very well, sir.
23 A. So you must ask the head of the CC who was at
24 that day in this area, Mr. Stutt.
25 Q. I wonder, sir, if I could just draw your
1 attention to one of the exhibits that the Prosecution
2 introduced, Exhibit Z1281, regional centre of Zenica
3 daily report for the 2nd of November, 1993.
4 A. Just give me a chance here.
5 Q. Yes, sir.
6 A. Can I ask for the provision of this copy?
7 Because I don't have it here on the paper.
8 JUDGE MAY: Which is it? 1281?
9 MR. SAYERS: This is Z1281, Your Honour.
10 Apparently it needs to be shown to you. It's been
11 previously exhibited.
12 A. Not among these papers.
13 Thank you.
14 Q. The portion that I would like to draw to your
15 attention appears on the fourth page of this document,
16 where the observation is made that "Hadzihasanovic told
17 HOM that Vares was known as an area for smugglers,
18 and 'gangs and groups of smugglers had been sent there
19 to keep up tension. If the situation is tense, they
20 can do what they want to do.'"
21 The reference to "Hadzihasanovic" is to the
22 commander of the ABiH 3rd Corps, General Enver
23 Hadzihasanovic; correct?
24 A. Mm-hmm.
25 Q. And "HOM" is the head of mission; correct?
1 A. Yes. Yeah. Yeah.
2 Q. At that time, I believe -- correct me if I'm
3 wrong -- that was Sir Martin Garrod?
4 A. I'm not sure.
5 Q. Well --
6 A. I'm not sure.
7 Q. Very well.
8 A. I'm not sure if that is meant, the head of
9 the mission. That would lead normally to the higher
10 level, to the -- to the diplomatic representative of
11 the mission, who was normally stationed at that time in
12 Zagreb. So the -- Mr. Garrod was the head of the CC,
13 the head of the RC, head RC, so "HOM" must be the
14 ambassador himself.
15 Q. I think we can agree, Colonel, that whoever
16 the head of the mission was, nonetheless, that person
17 was told what General Hadzihasanovic said, as reflected
18 in this official ECMM report; correct?
19 A. It looks like, but as I said, this is not my
20 report, it's not my day, and I cannot speak for ECMM.
21 So ...
22 Q. Let's cover one more -- one separate subject,
23 Colonel Weckesser: fighting in the Vares area before
24 October the 23rd, 1993.
25 A. Mm-hmm.
1 Q. Did you have any conversations with the field
2 commander of NordBat, Major Hakan Birger?
3 A. Yes, several conversations, yes.
4 Q. Did Major Birger tell you that the village of
5 Kopljari had actually been attacked, at 5.30 a.m. on
6 October the 21st, 1993, by Muslim forces?
7 A. I cannot confirm the date; I can only confirm
8 the information. Yes, I had been informed that they
9 were informed that Kopljari had been attacked by the
11 Q. Major Birger actually told you that this
12 village had been attacked by Muslims of the 3rd Corps
13 from the areas of Dragovici and Bijakovici; correct?
14 A. Maybe. I cannot remember the detail.
15 Q. He also related to you that every day for the
16 preceding week, shooting had -- exchanges of gunfire
17 had occurred between troops from the 3rd Corps and also
18 troops from the HVO; correct?
19 A. I cannot remember to this statement, sir.
20 Q. Did Major Birger tell you that he had gone to
21 Kopljari on October the 22nd, 1993, because there were
22 a lot of civilians who had been forced to leave their
23 houses, and their houses were being looted by troops
24 from the 3rd Corps?
25 A. I cannot remember the date when this was,
1 that this information was given to me, but I am aware
2 of this information, yes.
3 Q. Major Birger reported to you that he had
4 actually spoken to the commander of the Muslim forces
5 engaging in that assault and had instructed them to
6 cease and desist; correct?
7 A. I cannot remember, sir.
8 Q. All right.
9 JUDGE MAY: Are you going to move from
10 Kopljari, Mr. Sayers? Because there's something I want
11 to ask about it.
12 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
13 JUDGE MAY: Just from the point of view of
14 this case, this isn't the first time that we've had
15 these sort of allegations being put about. Is it
16 suggested that what happened in Stupni Do was in some
17 way justified because of what happened previously in
18 Kopljari? If not, what is the relevance?
19 MR. SAYERS: The answer to that,
20 Mr. President, is absolutely not. We are not
21 contending, and I don't think we ever have contended
22 that because a massacre occurred at Stupni Do -- and
23 there is no question that a massacre did occur at
24 Stupni Do -- that somehow that is justified because of
25 prior massacres. It is not justified, but I think this
1 is important contextually for the Court to realise that
2 these events were going on on both sides. They can't
3 be viewed in isolation.
4 But I do want to emphasise that there is no
5 way that the Defence is ever going to take the
6 position -- at least Mr. Kordic's Defence is never
7 going to take the position in this case that because
8 the same kinds of things were being perpetrated upon
9 Croats, any massacre is justified.
10 JUDGE MAY: So the position is that it's
11 accepted that there was a massacre at Stupni Do, or
12 that perhaps, put more neutrally, that a large number
13 of people were killed, but it's said that there had
14 previously been an incident at another village; is that
15 the way that you put it?
16 MR. SAYERS: I would put it, if I may,
17 Mr. President, even more neutrally than that: There is
18 no question that a large number of civilians were
19 killed. I believe it may have been in the region of
20 20, and I don't have the precise numbers to hand. But
21 I think as we will see, from my questions and from the
22 documents that I hope to go over with Colonel
23 Weckesser, this occurred in the context of a military
24 assault, and I think the evidence is absolutely clear
25 that the civilian casualties were not necessary in that
1 assault, but they nonetheless occurred. There is no
2 question, however, that Stupni Do was defended, and I
3 believe that that fact is even reflected in the report
4 of the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated
5 February the 10th of 1994, as we will see.
6 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's move on, then.
7 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. As we lead up, Colonel Weckesser, to the
9 events at Stupni Do, wouldn't you agree that as a man
10 with over 37 years of military experience, that if
11 military authorities in a village or a town receive an
12 explicit advance warning that there is about to be a
13 military attack, then it is incumbent upon those
14 military authorities to ensure that all civilians are
16 A. In normal military conditions, circumstances,
17 I would agree, sir. But my question would be, in that
18 case, where should the inhabitants of Stupni Do have
19 gone to? Where should they have gone? They had been
20 isolated. They were being controlled -- actually the
21 entrances were controlled by HVO. The Muslims could
22 not go to the Serb side, definitely not. What was
23 left? They could also not go -- evade to the south, it
24 was also blocked, because the HVO control line was in
25 the valley somewhere between Dabravine and Vares. So
1 that valley was -- I cannot say well defended, but it
2 was at least blocked by several checkpoints on the BiH
3 side and by several checkpoints on the HVO side.
4 So the question for me, if I were to have
5 been the president of that little village, I would not
6 have had a possibility to recommend to my citizens
7 where to go to.
8 Q. Thank you for those views, Colonel, but did
9 you know that in fact the president of the Muslim war
10 presidency in exile in the village of Dabravine, as you
11 have testified -- Mervana Hadzimurtezic I believe is
12 her name -- had actually issued an order to the
13 civilians in Stupni Do the night before or two days
14 before the attack occurred to evacuate the village, and
15 that that order was ignored?
16 JUDGE MAY: Well, if you're going to put that
17 to the witness as a fact, you'll have to call some
18 evidence. You are suggesting that that did happen?
19 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
20 JUDGE MAY: If you've got some evidence to
21 support it, put it to the witness; otherwise we'll have
22 to wait and see.
23 MR. SAYERS: We'll do precisely that,
24 Mr. President. I wonder if we could have Exhibit D31/1
25 shown to the witness, please.
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. Colonel, this is a statement that is already
3 in evidence from Ekrem Mahmutovic. I would like to
4 turn you to page 10, please --
5 JUDGE MAY: That's not evidence. That's
6 simply something which some other witness has put in a
7 statement. Now, you can use that if you want to use it
8 in some sort of a comment, something which you've put
9 in evidence, and you're now trying to use it to
10 cross-examine this witness. It's not evidence, and I'm
11 not going to allow you to put it to him. It's simply
12 something that somebody else has said in a statement.
13 Colonel, there is no need to comment on
14 that. If you would like to put it down, do.
15 Yes, let's go on to another point.
16 MR. SAYERS: I take it, Your Honour, you are
17 precluding me from asking the witness whether or not he
18 is aware that these instructions were given?
19 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, did you know anything
20 about any such instructions? Did you hear anything
21 about it?
22 A. I was not made aware about that evacuation
23 order, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
25 MR. SAYERS:
1 Q. One other point, Colonel: Were you aware
2 that on Friday, the 22nd of October, 1993, residents of
3 Stupni Do were actually warned by a Croat from Vares to
4 leave the village, as something terrible was about to
6 A. I know about that warning. You refer to that
7 single Croatian family living in Stupni Do and then
8 leaving one day before? Is that the --
9 Q. Just so that we are on the same topic, let me
10 show you a document that I would like to have marked as
11 an exhibit, which is a letter from the President of the
12 Security Council to Secretary-General -- I'm sorry,
13 it's a report of the Secretary-General, S1994/154,
14 dated February the 10th, 1994.
15 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
17 MR. SAYERS:
18 Q. I'd like to draw your attention specifically
19 to paragraph 5, sir, the first sentence.
20 A. Five?
21 Q. And the remainder of the paragraph.
22 This paragraph states that the day before the
23 hostilities in Stupni Do, a warning had been issued by
24 a Croat to the residents of Stupni Do that they should
25 leave, and most residents of Stupni Do did not take the
1 warning seriously. Were you aware of that?
2 A. Not at that time, not at 22nd. Afterwards,
3 yes, I heard about this Croatian family leaving town
4 and warning -- giving this warning. Yes, that's true,
6 Q. Were you aware that there were 36 local
7 soldiers mobilised to guard the village during the --
8 A. No, I was not aware, no.
9 Q. All right. Let me just ask you a few other
10 questions in this regard. Were you aware that the war
11 presidency in exile in Dabravine had actually created
12 an evacuation plan for all civilians in the villages of
13 the municipality of Vares?
14 A. No, I was not aware of, and I was not told by
16 Q. By Mrs. --
17 A. By the president. Never.
18 Q. You were not aware that, in fact, a radio
19 signal had been sent to the local forces in Stupni Do
20 instructing them to evacuate the village, that that
21 coded message was received, that a meeting was held in
22 the village, and the decision was made not to evacuate
23 the village?
24 A. I'm not aware about this, and it was also not
25 part of any discussion with any authority in the
1 following days.
2 Q. All right. Thank you.
3 Now, turning to the conversation that you
4 apparently witnessed between the NordBat interpreter
5 and the soldiers that you testified about on October
6 the 24th, 1993, two points. First, those soldiers
7 appeared to be drunk, to you, did they not?
8 A. Their behaviour was not normal soldier-like.
9 They were shouting, threatening, threatening with their
10 arms, very unusual behaviour, you know, and I had the
11 feeling they were drunk, yeah.
12 Q. And, in fact, three years ago, you told the
13 investigators for the Prosecution that "It seemed to me
14 that they were also drunk." And you don't disagree
15 with that today, do you?
16 A. I don't disagree, no.
17 Q. All right, sir. Second, you mentioned that
18 these HVO soldiers claimed that they did not like their
19 leaders because of what they had been ordered to do.
20 Did they mention which leaders they did not like?
21 A. They did not mention it, no, sir. It was
22 spoken, I remember, in the plural: their leaders.
23 Q. Turning to a separate subject, your visit to
24 Zepce, I believe it was on October the 26th --
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. -- you say that you spoke to a gentleman by
2 the name of Lozancic, who you identified as the head of
3 the municipal government in Zepce?
4 A. Mm-hmm.
5 Q. Did you ever speak to the president of the
6 House of Representatives of the HR-HB, Perica Jukic?
7 A. I can't remember, sir.
8 Q. All right. Now, on the subject of the level
9 of advance planning that you testified about, at the
10 HVO level, prior to the hostilities in Stupni Do,
11 wouldn't you agree that the decision to mount the
12 Stupni Do operation was actually taken at a fairly low
13 level, not at a high level?
14 A. I would disagree on your assessment, because
15 on a low level, I think, to bring in a commander from
16 another enclave at that time, from Kiseljak to that
17 scene, is very unusual and not understandable for me.
18 Because there was a commander, there was a brigade,
19 they were pretending to be strong; so it seemed to be
20 unusual if a -- not another unit but at least another
21 commander shows up and is at least being the speaker in
22 some decisive moments.
23 Q. Let me just show you one more document, which
24 is the end-of-tour report prepared by the head of the
25 regional centre of Zenica at the European Community
1 Monitoring Mission.
2 A. Mm-hmm.
3 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
5 MR. SAYERS:
6 Q. Just one observation, and it concerns
7 paragraph 5 on the first page, sir.
8 A. Umm-hmm.
9 Q. Here it is stated by the head of the regional
10 centre of the European Community Monitoring Mission in
11 Zenica that: "It is likely that the decision to mount
12 the operation was taken at fairly low level, and it is
13 possible that the massacre was triggered by the refusal
14 of the Muslims in Stupni Do, so the story goes, to pay
15 more to the local HVO from their profits from smuggling
16 operations in the area."
17 A. Sir, as I said, I disagree. That is another
18 assessment of many assessments or assumptions which
19 were taken at that time for that kind of an operation.
20 As I said, since -- what I experienced, the conflicting
21 parties were normally very careful to do such a thing,
22 you know, and therefore I don't think that it was just
23 a spontaneous event.
24 If you look to the prewarnings you just
25 mentioned, to the ever [sic] Croatian efforts, I think
1 it was aiming to that event, actually. Things were
2 driving like that and it was not just a thing which
3 happened out of the -- out of the sky. This is almost
4 impossible, if you refer just -- if I may refer just to
5 the statements you have made in preparation, exile,
6 warnings, family, HVO moving out, so it was obvious.
7 And even a commander change at that very moment is very
8 strange. It speaks for unusual circumstances.
9 So I cannot agree on that assessment which is
10 taken here, and I cannot agree or share your opinion on
11 that assessment, so ...
12 Q. Well, you will appreciate that that's not my
13 opinion, sir. That's the opinion of the head of the
14 regional centre in Zenica.
15 A. Sorry, yes.
16 Q. But let me turn to another subject.
17 In your efforts to obtain access to the site
18 of this reported massacre, you first attempted to
19 contact and you did contact Emil Harah, who was at that
20 time the head of the Bobovac Brigade, and that was on
21 October the 26th, was it not?
22 A. No, it cannot have been, because on the 26th
23 I was in Zepce.
24 Q. Was it on the 27th?
25 A. It was on the -- I'm thinking. It was on the
2 Q. On the 24th, very well. But the point is
3 that this gentleman, Emil Harah, was still in command
4 of the Bobovac Brigade on that day, was he not?
5 A. I don't know. This was a very strange
6 situation, especially if you look to the happenings on
7 the next days. Maybe he was in command.
8 Yes, you might be right, because I met him as
9 a very cool, very direct officer, running a tight ship
10 on his brigade. I think he was a commander, yes.
11 Q. And he instructed you that access to the
12 village would be barred because it was too dangerous,
13 in that fighting was still actively going on there;
15 A. Actually, not barred, but it would be too
16 dangerous for us to go in. He was caring for our
17 safety, so -- pretending, excuse me, pretending to care
18 for our safety.
19 Q. All right. Following the events at Stupni
20 Do, were you aware that General Petkovic, General
21 Milivoj Petkovic, had actually issued an order to the
22 commander of the HVO in Vares to remove three
23 politicians or three governmental individuals from
24 their office?
25 A. We realised -- the first portion of your
1 question, I was not aware at that time that
2 General Petkovic had issued this order, but I was
3 aware, because it was obvious that they had exchanged
4 the authorities in Vares.
5 MR. SAYERS: I wonder if the registrar could
6 show you Exhibit Z1258, please. Two questions.
7 Q. First, were you aware that General Petkovic
8 had actually authorised the removal of Anto Pejcinovic,
9 Zvonko Duznovic, and Ivica Gavran from their present
10 functions on October the 23rd, 1993, the day that the
11 Stupni Do massacre occurred?
12 A. I was not aware at that time.
13 Q. And were you aware that General Petkovic had
14 ordered an investigation into the responsibility of the
15 situation in the Croatian and Muslim villages?
16 A. That I was aware afterwards, so --
17 Q. And there is no doubt that an investigation
18 occurred on the part of the HVO after this massacre, is
20 A. I cannot assess that. I don't know.
21 Q. Now, before you went to Zepce, I believe that
22 you went to see the commander of the Bobovac Brigade
23 again, this date being October the 25th, and you found
24 out that on this day or by this day, Commander Emil
25 Harah had now been replaced by the new commander,
1 Kresimir Bozic?
2 A. That is correct, sir.
3 Q. Indeed, at a press conference that was held
4 two days later, the allegation was made by the BritBat
5 commander that Kresimir Bozic was actually responsible
6 for the massacre; correct?
7 A. That is correct, sir.
8 Q. Let me turn now to the conversation that you
9 had with Sir Martin Garrod, where you asked Sir Martin
10 to speak to Mr. Kordic about the events at Stupni Do.
11 You knew that Sir Martin was going to be
12 speaking to Mr. Kordic on another subject, didn't you?
13 A. Yes, that's correct, because a medevac issue
14 was a big issue at that time.
15 Q. And you knew that Sir Martin had a meeting
16 scheduled with Mr. Kordic for October the 25th;
18 A. That is correct, yes.
19 Q. Then Sir Martin reported to you that he had
20 done exactly as you suggested, that he had spoken to
21 Mr. Kordic about suspicions of an HVO massacre at
22 Stupni Do; isn't that true?
23 A. That is correct, sir.
24 Q. Then he told you that after he had made his
25 enquiry of Mr. Kordic, Mr. Kordic had immediately
1 telephoned General Petkovic, who was at the time in
2 Kiseljak, and asked him what was going on in Stupni Do;
3 isn't that correct?
4 A. That is correct, and gave us some
5 satisfaction, yes, sir.
6 Q. Then it was related by Sir Martin to you what
7 Mr. Kordic had been told by General Petkovic; correct?
8 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.
9 Q. Was it related to you also that Mr. Kordic
10 condemned any atrocities that might have taken place or
11 been committed by either side?
12 A. I remember that statement in some reports.
13 Yes, it was mentioned in the reports -- but at that
14 very moment, I can't remember -- in conjunction with
15 the happenings of Stupni Do.
16 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, if that might be
17 a good time. I'm about to move on to another subject,
18 and I would anticipate at the most maybe 15 more
19 minutes of questions for Colonel Weckesser.
20 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now until half past
22 Colonel, would you be back, please, at half
23 past 2.00 to conclude your evidence?
24 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE MAY: Could you please remember, during
1 the adjournment, not to speak to anybody about your
2 evidence? And that does include members of the
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
5 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.59 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 2.33 p.m.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
3 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.
4 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Weckesser.
5 A. Good afternoon, sir.
6 Q. Turning your attention to the events of
7 November 2nd and 3rd, 1993, you would agree, would you
8 not, that the 7th Muslim Brigade led the ABiH forces
9 into the city of Vares and captured the city?
10 A. That is correct, sir.
11 Q. And that immediately preceding that, there
12 were approximately 7.000 or so refugees who had fled
13 from the city, all Croat; they fled over one of the
14 surrounding hills to the neighbouring village of
15 Dastansko, to the east?
16 A. That's what I heard. I have not seen it.
17 Yes, sir.
18 Q. Would you not agree that there was a huge
19 amount of looting and vandalism and damage perpetrated
20 by the 7th Muslim Brigade in the city of Vares?
21 A. I agree on this. I have observed this, yes.
22 Q. One point on this, sir, I think the final
23 point that I want to make on this particular subject:
24 Would you not agree that the capture of Vares was of
25 extremely important strategic significance to the ABiH
1 because it allowed them to link up the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
2 and 6th Corps, and also because it meant that forces
3 could travel from Tuzla to Gornji Vakuf without having
4 to move, for the first time, through any Croat
6 A. Your analysis is fully correct. Yes, I
7 agree, sir.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 Turning to the subject of Ivica Rajic, did
10 you know that he has actually been indicted in this
11 Tribunal for the events at Stupni Do?
12 A. I think I read it in the newspapers a few
13 years ago.
14 Q. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Weckesser, that
15 you have really no personal knowledge of any of the
16 circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Ivica Rajic
17 from his command?
18 A. With the exception of the -- with the
19 exceptions of the informations which were relayed by
20 other team members to me in RC Zenica, yes, sir.
21 Q. You are of the opinion, I believe, that
22 Mr. Rajic's dismissal could only have been initiated by
23 Colonel Blaskic; is that correct?
24 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
25 Q. I wonder if I could ask you to look at a
1 document that we've previously provided to the
2 registrar, 11th of November, 1993, a monitor team daily
3 report prepared by team V-3?
4 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
6 MR. SAYERS: If I might point this out,
7 there's one document that's already been marked as
8 119/1; this should probably be 120/1.
9 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
11 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
12 Q. Turning your attention, Mr. Weckesser, to
13 paragraph 1(b), the military situation, and there's a
14 reference to a rumour relating to the replacement of
15 Rajic at the instance of General Petkovic upon orders
16 from the president of the Croatian Republic of
17 Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban. Were you made privy to any
18 of the information about which this monitor team daily
19 report concerns, or addresses?
20 A. I cannot guess on statements which have been
21 done by another team, especially when they refer to
22 rumour in the streets, just addressing normal people.
23 I can only say, because this was the initial of your
24 question, that I could not imagine, you know, that this
25 has not been done without influence of the commander,
1 Blaskic, because he was running a tight ship. This was
2 known to me and was felt from me when I had contact in
3 Zepce; everything was really tough, coordinated, in
4 preparing of the tripartite meetings.
5 So as I have stated, I think, before, I think
6 the initialisation, or at least with the participation
7 of Colonel Blaskic, I could not imagine that this has
9 Q. Thank you indeed.
10 Going to one of the last subjects, the
11 investigation concerning the events at Stupni Do
12 performed by the United Nations and by the HVO, do you
13 know anything about that?
14 A. Yes. Later still, when we had a funeral at
15 Breza, which took place on the 30th of October, I heard
16 that United Nations experts were doing a search and
17 investigations. But at that time, and even afterwards,
18 I had no information about the outcome of that, sir.
19 Q. Did you have any personal knowledge about
20 meetings between the G1 legal department of the
21 headquarters of UNPROFOR, Bosnia-Herzegovina command,
22 Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Koet, K-o-e-t, and between
23 Colonel Vinko Lucic, from the HVO headquarters in
24 Mostar, accompanied by Mr. Bandic, a military lawyer?
25 Did you ever --
1 A. Not at all. Not at all, sir.
2 Q. Very well.
3 I'd just like, as my final set of questions,
4 to come back to what your understanding of the position
5 of Mr. Kordic was, and I would like you to see, if I
6 may, three exhibits: Z1276, 1293,1, and 1263,1.
7 Mr. Weckesser, if I could first address your
8 attention to Z1276, was it your understanding that Mate
9 Boban was, in fact, the president of the Croatian
10 Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
11 A. That's correct, sir.
12 Q. Did you understand that Vladislav Pogarcic
13 was the head of human rights and humanitarian issues
14 for that entity?
15 A. No, not at all, sir.
16 Q. Did you know that Dr. Jadranko Prlic was the
17 president of the government of the Croatian Republic of
19 A. No, sir.
20 Q. And did you know that Slobodan Bozic was the
21 Deputy Minister of Defence for the republic?
22 A. No, sir.
23 Q. Do you know who the Minister of Defence was?
24 A. No, sir.
25 Q. All right. Turning to the next document,
1 Mr. Weckesser, Mr. Kordic is identified in this
2 document, Z1293,1, as the vice-president of the HVO
3 government. No one ever informed you that he was the
4 vice-president of the HVO government, did they?
5 A. No, that is correct.
6 Q. Finally, document number Z1263,1: The HRC
7 visited Mr. Dario Kordic, who is now the vice-president
8 of the CRHB, the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Do
9 you know whether or not he was the vice-president of
10 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
11 A. It was my opinion at that time that he was
12 the vice-president of that republic.
13 Q. My last question concerns the photograph that
14 you showed the Trial Chamber, the Swiss-chalet-type
15 building with some smoke coming --
16 A. I believe the Bobovac Brigade, yeah.
17 Q. I think it's Z1283,1.
18 A. Correct, yes.
19 Q. Is this a picture of what was formerly the
20 Bobovac Brigade headquarters?
21 A. As far as I have the knowledge, yes.
22 Q. And this is in the city or to the north of
23 the city of Vares, I believe?
24 A. Exactly, sir.
25 Q. It was known as the Eagle's Nest, wasn't it?
1 A. I can't remember that, sir.
2 MR. SAYERS: I have no further questions,
3 Your Honour.
4 Q. Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Weckesser,
5 unless the Trial Chamber has any for me.
6 A. Thank you.
7 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
8 Q. Just two things, really. You have been asked
9 questions about warnings that were given to the
10 occupants of Stupni Do before the massacre. Apart from
11 what may be contained in other reports, what, if any,
12 knowledge did you gather of warnings given to the
13 occupants of Stupni Do?
14 A. Sir, the warnings -- if I would have had
15 warnings more specifically directed to the situation of
16 Stupni Do, I would definitely have differently cared
17 for that village. Therefore, these warnings did not
18 reach us in that way.
19 We had rumours that there was uncertainty,
20 that it was tense, what we considered it, and it was
21 very difficult to coordinate anything in these days
22 with the local security officer, Zvonko. Actually, the
23 tension we had in that town, we referred it more to the
24 moving of the BiH in the north and more to the travel
25 of the Joy 2 which had to pass this area.
1 Q. I'm going to cut you off there, because I'm
2 only interested to know about what, if any, material
3 you were able to gather yourself after the event about
4 warnings that may have been given to the occupants of
5 Stupni Do. You will recall that in the newspaper
6 article that you produced, there's a reference there,
7 at the beginning of it, to a warning being given to the
8 Croat occupant of the village so that the Croat
9 occupant could move out. But apart from that, did you
10 gather any other form of material about warnings?
11 A. Not that I could remember.
12 Q. The second point, the dismissal of Rajic.
13 You said that would require the initiation or
14 participation of Blaskic. Is that on the grounds that
15 Blaskic is his superior in the military chain of
17 A. That is correct, sir, and what I learned so
18 far, they stick to the chain of command in a
19 disciplined way.
20 MR. NICE: Thank you. I have nothing else.
21 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, thank you for coming to
22 the Tribunal to give your evidence. It's now
23 concluded, and you are released.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, Your
1 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to go.
2 [The witness withdrew]
3 MR. NICE: That concludes the evidence that's
4 available this week, but I can -- when the witness has
5 withdrawn, I may be able to satisfy the Chamber's
6 desire for marked maps of front lines. But because the
7 material may, at this stage, be acting as an
8 aide-memoire or some other kind of guide until put in
9 evidence, it may be this is something that can be dealt
10 with in a Status Conference or at least in private
11 session in case the documents don't ever become
12 evidence. But I'm in the Chamber's hands on that.
13 JUDGE MAY: Well, do you want to deal with
14 the matter in private session or do you think --
15 MR. NICE: No, I don't. I'm quite happy to
16 deal with it in public session.
17 JUDGE MAY: I think it's better dealt with in
18 public, if possible.
19 MR. NICE: I've asked for Mr. Lopez-Terres to
20 come down, because he's been dealing with the
21 preparation of these plans more than I have, and if
22 you've got any questions, he'll be able to explain them
23 to you more.
24 While we're waiting for him, can I at least
25 distribute the material that's been provided? I'm
1 sorry I haven't been able to show it to the Defence,
2 but I've literally only just had it made available to
4 MR. SAYERS: On a completely unrelated point,
5 Your Honour, I actually used the address "Mr." to Mr.
6 Weckesser at his request. I actually didn't address
7 him as "Colonel" at his request, so I didn't want there
8 to be any suggestion that there was any disrespect
9 intended to him.
10 MR. NICE: I don't know how they should be
11 marked. Perhaps they can be given exhibit numbers. We
12 probably should give them numbers of some kind.
13 The first map, perhaps I could simply hold it
14 up and you'll see what's coming, because they are
15 slightly unwieldy things to deal with in court. But,
16 of course, the Chamber may be working on its papers
17 elsewhere or its staff maybe. The first map is headed
18 "Pre-April '93, Main Brigade Dispositions" and is, in
19 a sense, self-evident. It has black for HVO units,
20 ABiH units in green, and red for the VRS front line,
21 which you can see pretty well running round the
22 northwest, northeast, and southeast of the plan, even
23 at this distance. The various brigades are marked in
24 their various locations with a key at the bottom. So
25 it's, I hope, a self-explanatory map which may provide
1 a useful aide-memoire, assuming it's shown to be
2 accurate, for where brigades were before April 1993.
3 The second map is more immediately and
4 pictorially perhaps helpful. July '93, front lines and
5 main brigade dispositions. But you'll see also that it
6 shows the lines marking out the areas held by the
7 Croats both in and around Vitez and Busovaca, and then
8 in Kiseljak and also over in Vares. So as well as
9 having the units marked again, this shows the way the
10 territory was being defended or having to be defended.
11 Now, the next three documents that you have,
12 which have yet to be distributed, I think, recognise
13 the focus of part of the case on Vitez, and it's for
14 these that I might require some assistance from
15 Mr. Lopez-Terres, he having been dealing with them.
16 They focus entirely on Vitez, and they show the front
17 lines -- does the Court have them yet, because they are
18 manageable. If Ms. Ver Haag can perhaps approach your
20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, certainly.
21 MR. NICE: That can be distributed. There
22 are three documents.
23 The first one, as the key shows, in time is
24 17th of April, 1993. The source of the information are
25 Blaskic orders at different times on the 17th of April,
1 '93, and the key is perhaps pretty well self-evident;
2 green for the ABiH front line, and the other lines, as
3 I -- well, I'll have to check and just make sure that
4 I've not misinformed when Mr. Lopez-Terres comes down.
5 So that's the position in April.
6 The next document, dated May or in relation
7 to the HVO front line in May, shows the ABiH front line
8 in green -- Mr. Lopez-Terres is not available
9 apparently -- and the HVO defence sectors in blue, and
10 you can see that they are numbered. This is based on a
11 document called the Vitez Defence Office Report.
12 The third document is from July onwards and
13 again, local to Vitez, speaks of the HVO or talks of or
14 shows the HVO front line, and again self-explanatory, I
16 Now, that is some of the material we've been
17 able to put together.
18 It occurred to me as at least possible that
19 the Chamber would, at some stage, want to be able to
20 consider the detail shown on the small maps in relation
21 to the material on the large maps, so that you have
22 both the micro and the macro picture. Superimposing
23 one on the other permanently looks difficult and is
24 unappealing, so what I'm having done -- I thought they
25 were ready immediately but they are not or perhaps they
1 are not -- I'm having acetate sheets prepared showing
2 the detail on the small maps, but just simply on the
3 acetate sheets, and some simple point of reference so
4 that one can correctly position it over Vitez, and then
5 it will be possible, if this is helpful, to have the
6 micro picture superimposed temporarily on the macro
7 picture. Alternatively, the Chamber may be happy to
8 use it in the form of these documents.
9 So those other acetate sheets will be
10 available later. It may be that they are best left to
11 be called for if and when thought to be helpful by the
12 Chamber, depending on how the Chamber uses the material
13 at all.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, that seems sensible, to
15 leave them for the moment. We have these various
16 documents. We're going to get the July larger map.
17 When the Registry are ready, we ought perhaps to give
18 these some numbers.
19 MR. NICE: Yes, recognising that at the
20 moment, they don't stand as produced exhibits. They
21 are subject, as the Chamber will remember, to the
22 Defence putting in, if they want to, a similar map
23 differently marked or whatever the position may be.
24 Maybe we can achieve a level of agreement and they can
25 go in as agreed documents. I don't know. We'll see.
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I see a difficulty about
2 bringing these backwards and forwards into the court.
3 MR. NICE: Yes. Well, it may be, because the
4 large maps are -- I don't know whether they are easy
5 enough to see from that distance, but they are -- they
6 are not. They are the sort of size, I suppose, which
7 would probably be visible if placed halfway between the
8 Bench and the witness.
9 JUDGE MAY: If we could get hold of the easel
10 and the blackboard and put them up somewhere, but in
11 such a way that we don't cut off half the court.
12 MR. NICE: That's the problem with, of
13 course, the easels placed at the back of the court in
14 the conventional way, it obscures the view of the
16 JUDGE MAY: Not only that, I can tell you
17 it's difficult to see if not impossible to see from
18 here, unless you can get the camera on it, and then it
19 doesn't always work.
20 MR. NICE: It might be possible, I suppose,
21 if the easel -- then there's the problem with
22 microphones, isn't there? I was going to say it might
23 be possible for the witness to move to another place.
24 It might be possible, for example, for a witness
25 dealing with a map to occupy one of these front desks
1 that are otherwise redundant in the way we use the
2 courtroom. But still, time will show.
3 I'm afraid, though, that apart from dealing
4 with the maps to that extent, I've run out of evidence
6 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps it would be sensible to
7 give these some numbers. Maybe Prosecution numbers,
8 whatever the next ones are.
9 MR. NICE: The problem with that, Your
10 Honour, is that the computer system is temporarily not
11 responding, and Ms. Ver Haag can't gain access to the
12 document that identifies what number we've reached.
13 JUDGE MAY: Let's not worry about it now. We
14 can deal with it in due course.
15 There are one or two housekeeping matters,
16 unless anybody wants to raise anything on the maps, to
17 do with dates.
18 There was a question you may remember of
19 whether the Court would sit on the afternoon of Monday,
20 the 8th of November, if a court were available. The
21 answer is that no court is available, and so we shall
22 not sit that afternoon.
23 We have discussed matters arising from the
24 Prosecution's telling us about their current state of
25 thinking, and we've come to this conclusion, that there
1 ought to be a Status Conference in the not-too-distant
2 future. We have in mind Friday, the 26th of November,
3 which will give the Prosecution a month. We shall then
4 have sat, by my calculation, something like 70 days in
5 all, so we ought to be well into the Prosecution case,
6 nearing the end of it.
7 The purpose of the Status Conference will be,
8 first of all, to take stock of where we've reached.
9 Secondly, for the Prosecution to produce a document
10 dealing with the number of witnesses who are to be
11 called, who they are. By that time we will expect
12 decisions to have been made, of course.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Nice.
14 Microphone for the counsel.
15 MR. NICE: I'm sure that won't be a problem,
16 Your Honour. The exercise I spoke of is already well
18 JUDGE MAY: And, of course, we would want to
19 know what the witnesses are going to deal with, the
20 topics. It may be that that's already been covered in
21 other summaries, but we would like at least a reference
22 to that so we may know what they're dealing with, and,
23 of course, an estimate of length. We would also want
24 an estimate of the length of time for the Prosecution
25 case, bearing in mind, as I say, that by then, if
1 everything goes to plan, there will have been some 70
2 days or so spent, in all, on the Prosecution case, and
3 in the Trial Chamber's view, it should be drawing
4 towards a close.
5 MR. NICE: Very helpful. Yes, very helpful.
6 As a matter of information, I can simply tell
7 the Court, I think it may be interested to know this,
8 that we are, of course, and have been for a
9 considerable time, keeping our eye firmly on the
10 affidavit possibility, notwithstanding the difficulties
11 that arise from there being no recognisable and formal
12 affidavit procedure in the former Yugoslavia. So
13 that's a matter that's under active investigation.
14 We're also keeping in mind the transcript
15 issue, which arises independently of, but particularly
16 when we come to deal with the crime base in the
17 villages. I was wondering whether by now we could have
18 identified, either by order or by agreement,
19 transcripts that we could read in, or deal with in
20 whatever way the Chamber decided, whenever we otherwise
21 have a gap.
22 I have to say in our own -- not defence, I
23 think to our own credit, in fact -- there have been
24 very few gaps when we have run out of evidence. This
25 is about the second, I think. It's very difficult, as
1 you can imagine, to keep witnesses here, particularly
2 at the end of sitting periods. So we haven't had many
3 gaps, but it might be useful to have identified
4 transcripts, and then, if we do ever have short gaps,
5 to use the gaps for dealing with those matters.
6 But I think there is outstanding some
7 uncertainty as to how the Chamber wants transcripts
8 formally put into evidence. We never resolved it on an
9 earlier occasion, and I think that different
10 expressions of understanding are given from the Bench.
11 They could be read in, in an entirely public and formal
12 way, by my standing here or one of my colleagues
13 standing here and reading them -- and one would hope
14 that it wouldn't be all of the transcript, but part of
15 it -- or it might be that the Chamber would be minded
16 to take them away and read them.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE MAY: Well, we have in mind simple
19 production being sufficient.
20 MR. NICE: That's extremely helpful and will
21 save a great deal of time.
22 JUDGE MAY: But obviously, again, that's a
23 matter -- we should as soon as possible identify which
24 of the transcripts you have in mind to deal with in
25 that way.
1 MR. NICE: Yes.
2 JUDGE MAY: Because there may be argument
3 about them which we ought to deal with.
4 MR. NICE: Indeed so, yes. I think, by the
5 start of the sittings of the week after next, we will
6 be able to identify several witnesses who've given
7 evidence whose evidence we would like to be read in by
8 way of transcript. We will serve notice of those on
9 our learned friends. If there is any objection, we
10 must find a time convenient to discuss them and argue
12 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Nice, I
13 wanted to intervene regarding testimony. The point was
14 just made by the president. I should simply like to
15 make it quite clear that we expect from you a document
16 so that we can make the best of the Status Conference
17 envisaged for the end of November. That is why we
18 would like to have from you a document prior to the
19 Status Conference, so that it can be prepared under the
20 best possible conditions.
21 MR. NICE: I don't see any problem with that,
22 although I would forecast that we will refer you, in
23 whatever document we produce, to the overview of
24 witnesses which remains a summary, or an analysis by
25 summary, of the available material that is, I hope, as
1 useful to the Chamber as it is to us. And by reference
2 to it, or by use of it, it's easy to refer to matters
3 by topic as well as by individual witnesses.
4 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) No, I don't
5 think you understood quite well what we have in mind.
6 You will have had 70 days of testimony. You certainly
7 intend to call other witnesses. In this document, you
8 should tell us, in relation to what we have already
9 heard, what is the purpose pursued, why it is you need
10 such-and-such a witness to talk about such and such a
11 topic, to complement a certain section of the testimony
12 or to fill in the gaps, as you said, in the testimony
13 heard so far. That is what we would like to have,
14 because we have our own ideas, of course, about this,
15 because we are studying the testimony as we hear it.
16 We would like to have a document from you justifying
17 future testimony.
18 You have the statements and the form in which
19 they will be produced. If one of the witnesses that
20 you envisage will not come, for any reason whatsoever,
21 you can always ask the Court to -- or the Chamber to
22 have him replaced by someone else, justifying the
23 reasons for that substitution. That is what we expect
24 from you, because we will be at the end of November,
25 and we wish a document that will take stock of the
1 situation. And we, too, are engaging in a similar
2 exercise so that the Status Conference should be as
3 fruitful as possible regarding the rest of these
5 MR. NICE: It seems as though what you would
6 like to have from me is exactly what I have been
7 planning to provide you for some time. I don't think
8 you will be disappointed.
9 JUDGE MAY: It may be sensible, if there are
10 outstanding matters of law which we should determine --
11 and I've got in mind that there is an issue as to the
12 statement of witnesses who are dead --
13 MR. NICE: Yes.
14 JUDGE MAY: -- and the status of those
15 statements, it may be that there are other matters
16 which we ought to deal with fairly soon. Again, when
17 you're planning your calling of witnesses, you might
18 like to identify some time for legal argument.
19 MR. NICE: Indeed, sir, I think I said on the
20 earlier occasion this week, the argument about
21 witnesses who are dead or who are unwilling is really a
22 composite argument which breaks into two parts, but it
23 is nevertheless a composite argument, because the
24 underlying principles applicable to one resolution are
25 probably applicable to the other, and therefore it is
1 better for me to know what, if any, unwilling witnesses
2 there are and what categories they fall into, and at
3 that stage to address the argument about both topics
5 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Provided the matter
6 is in mind.
7 MR. NICE: It certainly is.
8 JUDGE MAY: The other dates which I can
9 mention are these: that the last day listed is the
10 10th of December, which is a Friday. We shall not be
11 sitting that morning, so that means that the last day
12 for sitting will, in fact, be the 9th of December.
13 As I think I may have said before, we shall
14 start sittings in the New Year on Monday, the 10th of
15 January. I think that's the date. I haven't got the
16 calendar with me. But my recollection is --
17 MR. NICE: That's our --
18 JUDGE MAY: It's Monday the 10th.
19 MR. NICE: Yes.
20 JUDGE MAY: We have produced a calendar,
21 which should be with the senior legal officer, for the
22 first four months of this year, indicating what days
23 are available for this trial. And the answer is that
24 apart from two weeks or so, we will have the period
25 between the New Year and Easter available for this
2 That, of course, is subject to change. First
3 of all, change necessary because of this case, and then
4 change necessary due to other cases. We shall want,
5 certainly by the 26th of November, to have a good idea
6 as to when the Prosecution are going to close so we can
7 start planning accordingly.
8 MR. NICE: Yes, I don't think you're going to
9 be disappointed in the forecast that we'll be able to
11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. As I say, I will ask
12 the senior legal officer to have copies of the calendar
13 available, and perhaps he can make sure they are handed
14 out to the parties.
15 MR. NICE: Can I make two points about the
16 timetable: First, whenever there's a day that's about
17 to be cancelled, it may be that we do get it at the
18 very earliest moment, but the complexities of getting
19 any single witness here, let alone a week's worth of
20 witnesses, are enormous. Ms. Bauer, who happens to be
21 in court, has to deal with this as one of her many
22 tasks, and she informs me that no witness involves
23 less, in simply arrangements, less than a couple of
24 hours, and frequently it's much more than that. So the
25 earliest possible notification of any day that may be
1 cancelled is helpful to us, even if it's a contingent
2 possibility that doesn't come off.
3 The second thing is, where there is a period
4 marked out as a week clear, we obviously make our --
5 and I'm sure that the Defence does as well -- we make
6 our own domestic arrangements and private arrangements,
7 including vacations, with those weeks in mind, and any
8 sudden introduction of court sittings can be difficult,
9 and to some degree disagreeable, if it means people
10 cancelling their holidays.
11 JUDGE MAY: It applies, too, to the Bench.
12 MR. NICE: I understand.
13 JUDGE MAY: No, I think that on the whole,
14 those weeks will not be interfered with. You can take
15 that as being so. We have in mind, of course, the
16 necessity of trying to fix dates and making
17 arrangements for alterations known just as soon as
18 possible. It's inconvenient to everybody if they're
19 made at the last minute. The problem here is the
20 knock-on effect from other cases.
21 Anything anybody else would like to raise?
22 MR. KOVACIC: (Interpretation) Your Honours,
23 may I take just two minutes? There is one thing, and
24 in all honesty, I really do not know how we should go
25 on in this matter, but I thought it would be wise for
1 me to inform the Court about some facts.
2 We had a Witness C here; I believe we
3 cross-examined him on the 20th of April, and we asked
4 him if he had a wartime diary to which he was
5 referring. He testified here that he had turned over
6 this war diary to the archives of the BH army as the
7 property of the army, to which we responded -- that is,
8 Mr. Cerkez's defence sent a letter to the government of
9 the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina asking them to
10 make that diary available to us.
11 There was no answer. Then we urged an
12 answer, and then eventually they did reply. I have the
13 copies of all this correspondence, in Croatian and in
14 English, for all the parties. We were replied that
15 such a document was nonextant. What confuses me is, of
16 course, we realise that we could use subpoena, but we
17 understand that a practical problem might arise. It
18 might take a very long time, and we hardly believe that
19 the outcome would be favourable.
20 However, I should nevertheless like to have
21 it recorded somewhere that what the witness said was
22 one thing and what the government said was another
23 matter. At least we know now that that diary is gone,
24 does not exist.
25 So all these documents, all this
1 correspondence has been translated, and we should
2 simply like it put on record.
3 JUDGE MAY: It's now on record formally. If
4 you wish the Trial Chamber to have the correspondence,
5 then perhaps you should file it in the normal way, as a
6 notification of the correspondence, and then it will be
7 on the record.
8 MR. KOVACIC: (Interpretation) Thank you very
9 much. Thank you very much for this advice. Thank you,
10 Mr. President.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now until the 1st
13 of November.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
15 3.20 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday,
16 the 1st day of November, 1999,
17 at 9.30 a.m.