1 Monday, 8th November, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.43 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
6 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario
7 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
9 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Three short matters. First, we have just
11 received a revised copy of this witness summary. The
12 original came in to us at about 8.00 last night. We
13 would like to move in limine to preclude this witness
14 from testifying about matters or events outside the
15 period covered by the amended indictment, and I can, I
16 think, alert the Court's attention to the particular
17 paragraphs that we had in mind.
18 The first is paragraph 37, the second is 38,
19 the third is 39, and finally paragraphs 40 to 42, which
20 were apparently added today.
21 The second application that we would like to
22 make is to limit this witness to testifying about facts
23 rather than the expansive opinions that are contained
24 in this offer of proof, the most significant and
25 particular of which is paragraph 31, which analogises
1 Mr. Kordic's position to that of Adolf Hitler, but also
2 to the opinions contained in paragraphs 24, 27, 29, 30,
3 and 35.
4 And finally, Your Honour --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: 27?
6 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour. 27, 29, 30,
7 and 33, in addition to paragraph 31.
8 And the third and final point is that we do
9 not --
10 JUDGE MAY: It may be easier to deal with
11 these points separately --
12 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MAY: -- rather than trying to run them
14 together. The first point you take is that there is
15 reference to matters at the end of the statement,
16 paragraphs 37 onward --
17 MR. SAYERS: Correct.
18 JUDGE MAY: -- which deals with times outside
19 the indictment?
20 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour. And with the
21 Court's permission, when matters of opinion come up as
22 to which we object specifically, perhaps I could draw
23 the Court's attention to that at that time.
24 JUDGE MAY: Looking first of all at
25 paragraphs 37 onward, whether or not it's outside the
1 date of the indictment, it doesn't seem to be terribly
2 important and I wouldn't have thought very contentious
3 evidence. What's really the objection to it?
4 MR. SAYERS: Well, one example would be, Your
5 Honour, paragraph 38 appears to be a hearsay statement
6 made by someone other than the accused at a time
7 outside of the amended indictment. And we have been
8 provided with a copy of this witness's contemporaneous
9 diary, or at least pieces of it; I did not see any such
10 entry in the contemporaneous diary. Accordingly, we're
11 not in a position to concede that matter at all, even
12 if it were relevant, which I do not believe it to be.
13 But the last point, Your Honour, is with
14 respect to leading questions --
15 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with this point.
16 Let's finish this point.
17 Ms. Somers, yes, what do you say about this?
18 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour. First
19 of all, the fact that certain things that the witness
20 knows came to him at a point outside the indictment is
21 irrelevant. What is relevant is that this Court has an
22 obligation under Rule 85(A), sub (vi), to have before
23 it "any relevant information that may assist the Trial
24 Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence if the
25 accused is found guilty on" --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down,
3 MS. SOMERS: -- "one or more of the charges in
4 the indictment," all of which must come in during the
5 course of the trial.
6 Further, the actual text refers to times
7 within the time of the indictment. The fact that there
8 are things that happened in '94 is a continuum of the
9 political activities, or they concern personae who were
10 very much at the heart of this indictment. So the
11 relevance is direct, but clearly Rule 85 would require
12 that the Court know what Dario Kordic was doing from
13 the time of the indictment all the way through the time
14 of apprehension, or surrender, as he calls it.
15 On Point 38, if the Court reads the question,
16 it talks about a comment made by Valenta, and it refers
17 directly to the things that happened during the
18 Muslim/Croat conflict, which is absolutely the heart of
19 this indictment. Further, if the Defence wishes to
20 cross-examine or to have Mr. Valenta testify, the
21 Defence is free to so bring him.
22 Virtually every point that has been raised by
23 the Defence has no merit, and in fact, the information
24 is critical to this Court's hearing a full picture of
25 this defendant's activities and authority.
1 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Yes,
2 Mr. Sayers, could we not agree about the period covered
3 by the indictment? It is of course quite clear that if
4 a testimony goes beyond the period of the indictment,
5 and in order to cause prejudice, and has nothing to do
6 with other counts, that objection would perhaps stand.
7 But here we are only dealing with some information
8 which is relevant and which is relevant to various
9 counts of the indictment and the period of the
10 indictment, even if it refers to a period after the
11 period covered by the indictment. But I believe that
12 we are fully entitled to hear this information, that
13 is, to establish the truth regarding the indictment
15 Therefore your objection really should tell
16 us, is it that it deals with some facts which have
17 nothing to do with the indictment, or rather that they
18 would represent some additional charges? But the fact
19 that it goes beyond the period covered by the
20 indictment I do not think provides sufficient grounds
21 to object to this testimony, unless it is --
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. For the reasons
23 Judge Bennouna has set out, we will admit the
25 Your next point had to do with the various
1 opinions which were --
2 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
3 JUDGE MAY: -- mentioned; yes. Perhaps you
4 could deal with that briefly.
5 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour, I would be
6 happy to. This witness is no different from any other
7 witness who comes before the Court, and of course the
8 witness should be permitted to talk about the facts of
9 which he knows. But if he proceeds to give
10 wide-ranging, tall political opinions of the type that
11 are contained in the paragraphs that I've just recited
12 to the Court, then unfortunately we have to consume
13 time --
14 JUDGE MAY: Which paragraph again? Remind
16 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE MAY: The one about Hitler?
18 MR. SAYERS: Number 31.
19 JUDGE MAY: 31?
20 MR. SAYERS: And then there were a variety of
21 others, but paragraph 31 is the most representative.
22 Obviously, the Court is concerned with
23 expediency, for reasons we went into last week. If the
24 witness is permitted to express all manner of opinions
25 like this, we have to consume valuable time going into
1 these matters. And the Court has pointed out on
2 occasion, and perhaps appropriately, that obviously
3 these matters are not really a memory contest, but
4 really it is, in a sense, if the witness volunteers all
5 manner of opinions on the subject and then is shown
6 subsequently to lack a valid or sufficient factual
7 foundation for the utterance of those opinions. So
8 that's the basis for our objection.
9 JUDGE MAY: Just dealing with it for a
10 moment, and we can discuss it: The witness has had an
11 extensive military career -- we can see this between
12 paragraphs 1 to 15 -- he's had various jobs involving
13 the analysis of political matters, so we can see that.
14 Whatever the appropriateness of the parallel which is
15 drawn, and clearly again bear in mind that this is not
16 the case of a jury and we would not be influenced by
17 the type of the parallel, but why can the witness not
18 say, although it is not a parallel, nonetheless, there
19 was a mixture, as he appears to be saying, in his view
20 of military and political roles, and then he refers to
21 his experience in Kosovo, where he is now; why can he
22 not say that, with his background? Again, it's a
23 matter of opinion, but he's got a basis for saying it.
24 MR. SAYERS: If that's the view of the Court,
25 Mr. President, that's the view of the Court. But
1 obviously we would be entitled to explore, in some
2 detail, the basis for that opinion, since he professes
3 to be a political expert. And I think that if the
4 Court is inclined to permit him to express his
5 opinions, I'm certainly prepared to go into these
6 matters on cross-examination, with the Court's
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE MAY: We think that, first of all, it
10 will be for the Prosecution to establish that the
11 witness can give these opinions. We'll hear the
12 evidence about that.
13 In any event, we think that references to
14 Hitler will be extremely unhelpful and should be
15 excised because of the inflammatory nature of that sort
16 of reference.
17 Now, there was a third point.
18 MR. SAYERS: The third point was that the
19 Defence for Mr. Kordic, and I believe I can speak for
20 my colleagues representing Mr. Cerkez, we have no
21 objection to the Prosecution leading this witness
22 through paragraphs 1 to 17 and also, to the extent that
23 the Court deems relevant, paragraphs 40 and 41, which
24 I've just reviewed. That appears to be not
1 I would also like to inform the Court, with
2 again the permission of my colleagues representing
3 Mr. Cerkez, that they do not propose to cross-examine
4 this witness. Accordingly, I will be conducting all
5 the cross-examination, just so that the Court is aware
6 of that. Thank you.
7 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
8 Ms. Somers, apart from the matter which is in
9 dispute, which is the background of the witness in
10 order that he should be able to give political
11 opinions, apart from that, you can take it that we've
12 read about his career.
13 MS. SOMERS: It is considered read --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 JUDGE MAY: You can take it that we've read
16 about his career, and there's no need to go into it in
17 any detail. Paragraphs 1 to 60.
18 MS. SOMERS: Then start with 17, as I
19 understand. Fine.
20 JUDGE MAY: Well, apart from the matter which
21 is in issue, which is his political expertise, if any.
22 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.
23 JUDGE MAY: That you'll have to cover.
24 Yes. Can we have the witness, please? Can
25 we have the witness?
1 While we're waiting for the witness, there is
2 a matter which I note from last week which I want to
3 raise with you. It concerns the afternoons of the week
4 of the 29th of November. Because of Simic
5 over-running, in which two members of the Court are
6 involved, the afternoons of that week look as though
7 they are going to be required. But before making any
8 such order, I would like to hear from the Prosecution
9 as to what effect that will have.
10 MR. NICE: Can I deal with that after the
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
13 MR. NICE: The people dealing with witness
14 arrangements are not present in court at the moment.
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course, but we would like
16 to hear from you about it.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would like
19 to take the declaration.
20 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
21 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
23 WITNESS: J. FLOYD CARTER
24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Carter, if you would like to
25 take a seat.
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
2 Examined by Ms. Somers:
3 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, if I may call you
4 Lieutenant Colonel Carter -- I realise you're retired
5 -- the Chamber has indicated that we may take as read
6 certain points about your background and your training
7 and your education. However, I would like to ask you
8 if you can discuss, from your background, education and
9 training, the times wherein you have had to use the
10 instrument of political analysis and/or military
11 analysis in such a manner that would enable you to
12 analogise contemporary situations and/or leaders, be
13 they political or military, to situations of precedent.
14 A. Certainly. My background is such that for at
15 least 15 years or more, I have had the occasion to rely
16 upon training within the military and subsequently
17 within the United Nations to review documents, records,
18 using various types of information and intelligence in
19 order to analyse and report on that information,
20 whether to -- whether to the Defence Department, the
21 Pentagon, or to the United Nations at various levels,
22 to include the special representatives of the
23 Secretary-General, Mr. Akashi and Mr. Annan, and
24 directly to the Secretary-General's office as well.
25 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, is one of the
1 tenants of analysis that history is often an indicator
2 of the present or future and thus requires careful
3 analysis and analogy?
4 A. Not invariably, but certainly there are
5 patterns that are established over a period of time.
6 And knowing the background of a particular region or
7 area and constantly working in that area, as I've done
8 in Asia for 16 years and the Balkans for six years
9 continuously, certainly one develops a sense, an
10 instinct, as well as the logic for certain
12 Q. Do you have experience, both practical and
13 theoretical and academic, with analysis of structures
14 and figures in both totalitarian and Communist-style
16 A. Yes. By event of my educational background,
17 both in international relations and then in Asian
18 studies, with a speciality in politico-military
19 structures and systems, I learned about
20 Marxist/Leninist doctrine, and then practical
21 applications in Southeast Asia, and certainly in the
22 Balkans in the post-break-up of Yugoslavia.
23 Q. In your military training, did you have to
24 become familiar with the campaigns and figures of the
25 Second World War, both the Pacific theatre and the
1 European theatre?
2 A. Certainly, with particular emphasis in Asia.
3 But subsequently, when I was in the military, of
4 course, we were dealing with what was termed at that
5 time the Soviet threat in the Eastern Bloc, its
6 organisation and structure, with emphasis, of course,
7 upon military but also the political over-arching
8 structures that controlled, dominated, the military.
9 Q. Has your experience allowed you to compare
10 and analogise the actions, designs, objectives of
11 certain military and political figures from regime to
13 A. I would say that it enables one to, let's
14 say, look at certain patterns or parallels that exist
15 over time, yes.
16 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, turning to Bosnia,
17 did you have any observation about the comparison
18 between the weaponry of the ABiH and the HVO?
19 A. Certainly. Initially, during my early days
20 in Bosnia, November of 1993, and until the war between
21 the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks concluded as of
22 about 1 March 1994, one could see the relative
23 inferiority of the ABiH weaponry in contrast to the
25 Q. Would you characterise in any way the Bosnian
1 army as one of heavy artillery or in some other
3 A. No, it was mainly light infantry in nature.
4 They would rely upon mass manpower to achieve its goals
5 rather than the use of weaponry, whether it be
6 artillery or armour, although they did possess some
7 limited quantities of armour and artillery.
8 Q. Can you please explain the terms "internal
9 lines of communication" and how this term relates to
10 HVO superior positioning?
11 A. Certainly. The HVO benefited from internal
12 lines of communication in that their areas of control
13 within Central Bosnia were small pockets in Kiseljak,
14 Vares, also the Lasva Valley and the Vrbas Valley, and
15 they controlled the main roads through those areas, and
16 so they were able to rapidly move forces from one
17 threatened area to another. Of course, many of these
18 pockets were surrounded by the ABiH.
19 Q. On how many fronts were you aware of the ABiH
20 having to fight, and did this affect its status of
21 advantage or disadvantage?
22 A. Well, certainly the ABiH suffered from the
23 fact that it had no organised army to begin with, had
24 no external means of support or supply, basically, and
25 it had to fight on two fronts simultaneously during
1 much of the war from basically 1992 until early 1994,
2 both against the Serbs and the Bosnian Croats.
3 Q. You referred both to the Vrbas and Lasva
4 Valleys. Could you indicate which is the principal
5 city of the Vrbas Valley?
6 A. The principal city would have been Vitez.
7 That's where the HVO --
8 Q. Excuse me. Of the Vrbas, not the Lasva
10 A. I'm sorry. The Vrbas Valley, the principal
11 city would have been Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje.
12 Q. Is Prozor also in the Vrbas Valley?
13 A. That's correct. It's on the edge the valley,
14 above the Makljen Ridge.
15 Q. Were you aware of the HVO renting artillery
16 or tanks from the Serbs?
17 A. Yes. In my capacity as a civil affairs
18 officer, we certainly had meetings in Sarajevo of all
19 the civil affairs officers, and part of my area of
20 responsibility bordered on Kiseljak, and we had reports
21 from the UNPROFOR forces, the UNMOs, that is, U.N.
22 military observers, and civil affairs officers, that
23 there was an exchange basically between the Bosnian
24 Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, but regarding equipment
25 usage and rental, after a certain point in time during
1 the war. I believe it would have been the fall of
3 Q. Kiseljak is one of the municipalities in the
4 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; is that correct?
5 A. That's correct. It bordered on the edge of
6 what at that time was controlled by the Bosnian Serbs
7 as well.
8 Q. Who is Ivan Santic? Would you describe his
9 position --
10 JUDGE MAY: There is no need to ask the
11 witness. We know who he is; he is the mayor of Vitez.
12 I don't think there is any dispute about that. Perhaps
13 you could just deal briefly with the witness's
14 impression of him in relation to the accused Dario
16 MS. SOMERS: Of course.
17 Q. In the course of your numerous dealings with
18 Ivan Santic, did you come to any conclusion about the
19 level of authority which he had, and to whom, if
20 anyone, he was subordinate?
21 A. I first made contact with Mayor Santic as of
22 mid to late November, 1993; had frequent contacts, not
23 quite daily, but almost, after that. As the mayor, he
24 looked after certain administrative issues within the
25 municipality, but on political issues he deferred to
1 Mr. Kordic.
2 Q. Although he was a mayor of a municipality or
3 town, did you hear him make comments which could be
4 described as derogatory toward the Muslim population?
5 A. Yes, he frequently referred to them as
6 "balija," which is a pejorative term for Muslims, and
7 suggested that for air drops, that pork should be
8 air-dropped to the Muslims. This is not a particularly
9 unique prejudice on the part of some of the Bosnian
10 Croats, but he certainly expressed it.
11 Q. Did you personally hear Dario Kordic make any
12 comment about the Christian world vis-a-vis the Islamic
13 world or its culture?
14 A. Yes --
15 MR. SAYERS: Objection to that, Your Honour.
16 It lacks a time period. Could we have some indication
17 of when this exchange occurred?
18 A. Certainly. The first time that I would have
19 heard something of that nature would have been in a
20 meeting at the Wolf's Lair; I believe it was February
21 of '94, then and subsequently on a couple of occasions
22 in -- later in '94, in the summer, and even in '95, he
23 believed that Bosnian Croats -- for that matter,
24 Croatians -- had a historic duty to defend Christendom
25 against inferior Muslim culture.
1 MS. SOMERS:
2 Q. Are you able to describe the nature of the
3 authority or responsibility for the HVO throughout
5 A. The HVO had a security role, and of course
6 during times of conflict, its presence and authority
7 reached into almost every aspect of society, to include
8 the delivery of humanitarian aid, the exchange of
9 prisoners and bodies, the distribution of food, water,
10 electricity. And certainly in the political sphere,
11 there was a blurring of roles between that of the HVO
12 and the party itself, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 Q. Was, then, military intervention and
14 involvement in traditionally civilian aspects of life
15 the norm, or was it an aberration?
16 A. No, it was the norm. This is a pattern that
17 manifested itself in Bosnia, and I saw it in Croatia as
18 well, and in Serbia, and presently I'm witnessing it in
20 Q. You had indicated certain areas that were
21 falling under that control. What is your observation
22 as to the use of these areas or resources as
23 instruments of warfare?
24 A. I wouldn't ascribe it to any one particular
25 side. Both sides used water and electricity, the
1 distribution, the delivery of food, humanitarian aid,
2 or the exchange of bodies, prisoners, and wounded, in a
3 political fashion. Although the Bosnian Croats denied
4 that they did such, in fact they did do -- they did
5 manipulate these for political purpose.
6 Q. What particular forces of government within
7 political or military leadership become blurred, as you
8 see it?
9 A. Well, the HVO -- the roles of the HVO and the
10 party, the HDZ, tended to become more blurred and the
11 more operational and tactical down on the level.
12 Certainly at the Bosnia-wide level there was a
13 blending, but less so. But at the operational level,
14 let's say the operational zones, whether they were
15 southeast, northwest, central zone, or the Posavina
16 zone, the identity of the individual, the political
17 party leader, tended to become also the primary HVO
18 leader. In other words, in military parlance,
19 "Clausewitz on War" stated that war is an extension of
20 politics by other means. Mao says that power grows out
21 of the barrel of a gun.
22 JUDGE MAY: I'm sure this is right, but I
23 think, Colonel, we would be most helped if you would
24 restrict your evidence to what you saw in Bosnia. That
25 would be of real assistance to us, as opposed to the
1 more general historical background, if you could --
2 A. I understand.
3 JUDGE MAY: -- distinguish between those two
4 strands, please.
5 A. Your Honour, I was merely pointing out that
6 there is a theoretical blending which becomes practical
7 in nature on the ground in Bosnia, where the political
8 party rules over the military execution of tactical
9 events on the ground.
10 Q. Was it your observation --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 Microphone, please, for Ms. Somers.
13 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's put that in a less
14 leading fashion.
15 MS. SOMERS: I'm sorry.
16 A. I'm so sorry; I didn't hear the question.
17 JUDGE MAY: That's just as well.
18 Tell us about Mr. Kordic and his role, as you
19 observed it.
20 A. Certainly. I wouldn't want to overdraw the
21 analogy and certainly not infer that the personages are
22 of the same ilk.
23 MS. SOMERS:
24 Q. Excuse me; may I just stop you for a moment.
25 You were not in the courtroom earlier, but I would ask
1 that any particular figure may not be named, historical
2 figure, but perhaps a political regime analogy if you
3 wish, but I would be cautious, and the Court has
4 cautioned us not to do that.
5 A. Thank you. If you are looking for a World
6 War II analogy, it would be the identification of the
7 National Socialist Party and the Wehrmacht being
8 directed by that party. A similar sort of thing, but
9 at a much lower level, at the operational zone central
10 in Bosnia. Basically the individual within the old
11 Soviet system, although there is a carryover which
12 still continues to this day in Croatia, Bosnia, and
13 Kosovo, and Belgrade, of course, that the political
14 zampolit or political officer ensures that political
15 direction is executed down through the military chain
16 at the ground level.
17 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Ms. Somers,
18 could you please ask the witness if that is not the
19 case the world over, when the military serve a
20 particular policy; but military are not part of the
21 politics; they are applied, but doesn't it happen in
22 all the systems in the world, democratic or the
23 military ones which follow a certain political line?
24 A. To an extent, yes, sir; but in democracies,
25 there is a distinction between the political party, per
1 se, in this case the HDZ, whereas -- let's take the
2 United States, which I'm probably more equipped to
3 discuss. It's no particular political party; in fact,
4 it's the government that develops the policy, not the
5 party that develops the policy. And there is not the
6 blending in the field at the military level, let's say
7 the corps, division, brigade level, where you have a
8 political officer overseeing execution of military
9 events on the ground.
10 If I could elaborate a little bit also,
11 within the old stream system in Yugoslavia, which still
12 continues to a degree, the Ministry of Defence would
13 look over main-line conventional units; in the case of
14 the HVO, let's say, the 110, the 111 Brigade up in the
15 north, whereas the Ministry of Interior would tend to
16 look after the police, special police, and the
17 paramilitary units.
18 Q. Which leads to your observations on the
19 nature of the police in societies and republics of the
20 former Yugoslavia. Can you comment about the use of
21 the police: Is it as traditionally in the west, or
22 does it have another type of use?
23 A. In former Yugoslavia, whether it be during
24 the initial breakup, in which the Serb special police
25 used their tactics in order to agitate, or in the case
1 of in Bosnia, where the Bosnian Croats tended to use
2 special police in order to agitate, to force out the
3 movement of people through the use of propaganda or
4 outright intimidation in order to bring about certain
5 developments, whether it be the forced raising of a
6 flag, or lowering of a flag, or integration of Muslim
7 conscripts into the HVO rather than having them
8 independent; things of that nature.
9 Q. Do you know from experience whether or not
10 the use of the police is restricted just toward the
11 military, or does it also serve as an instrument of the
12 political leadership?
13 A. In fact it tends to be used more as an
14 instrument of the political leadership, which controls
15 both the military and the police, whereas the military
16 leaders, let's say in the case of General Blaskic,
17 would have been most likely confined to only using
18 conventional main-line units.
19 Q. My colleagues have brought to my attention
20 that in the course of asking one question, I did not
21 get a complete answer, and I wonder if the Court would
22 indulge me: On the issue of comments, derogatory
23 comments by Mr. Kordic toward the Muslim population, do
24 you recall any comment about the cultural level of the
25 Muslim population that was made by Mr. Kordic?
1 A. Actually, I believe I did address that
2 earlier when I mentioned that they had a historic duty
3 to defend Christendom against culturally inferior
4 Muslim culture.
5 Q. The White Road Convoy in 1993, in December,
6 what distinguished it from other convoys? Was it a
7 U.N. Convoy?
8 A. No, the convoy was put together by the
9 efforts of Dr. Slobodan Lang, a Croatian from the
10 republic of Croatia, and also some Muslim imams, and
11 the Bosniak representatives, to provide aid into
12 Central Bosnia. There were some 200 trucks, with
13 distribution to go equally to both nationalities.
14 Q. Meaning Muslim and Croat, I take it?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Can you indicate the routes by which the
17 trucks were to come from Croatia down to their
19 A. They went from Zagreb to Split and then up to
20 Tomislavgrad via Route Triangle and Diamond, which was
21 an old logging route improved by the British Battalion,
22 then up to Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Uskoplje and then Novi
23 Travnik. And then the convoy split at the T-junction,
24 with part of it going to Travnik, that part destined
25 for the Muslims, and then up a back mountain road to
1 Zenica. The part of the convoy destined for the
2 Bosnian Croats went on to Vitez, Busovaca, and
4 Q. Were there discussions -- excuse me.
5 Were there discussions involving yourself,
6 Lieutenant Colonel Williams of BritBat, and the Bosnian
7 Croat and Bosnian representatives about the routes, the
8 actual road routes to be taken, and could you describe
9 the discussions and the ultimate result?
10 A. Certainly. There were previous discussions
11 with General Alagic of the 3rd Corps in Zenica, and
12 subsequently there were discussions, I believe on the
13 15th of December, with Mr. Kordic, General Blaskic, I
14 believe Brigadier Skender, and the chief of police for
15 Vitez, Mr. Rajic. Colonel Williams was there, Larry
16 Hollingworth of the UNHCR, and myself.
17 Q. By which route did Mr. Alagic request that
18 the food be delivered or supplies be delivered to the
19 Muslim areas?
20 A. He preferred that the main route, the
21 hard-surface macadam route, be used through Vitez to
22 the flyover and then back to Zenica be used so that the
23 trucks wouldn't be stuck along the mountain road during
24 this harsh weather. The roads were particularly muddy
25 and slippery.
1 MS. SOMERS: I would ask the usher to
2 distribute to the witness exhibits already in evidence,
3 Z2612,3, I believe, and Z2781,2, as well, if possible,
4 as Z2612,7.
5 Q. Lieutenant Colonel, if you can reference the
6 approximate routes using a combination, if you will, of
7 the maps, to show preferably the roads by which the
8 ABiH representative wanted the delivery, if you are
9 able to do this.
10 A. Certainly. General Alagic wanted the
11 delivery to go along what is referred to --
12 MS. SOMERS: Could you put it on the ELMO,
13 please, on the projector, if you can.
14 Is the Court getting a projection of the
15 map? We aren't.
16 Q. Okay. You're kind of on your own here. I
17 don't have that projection, but if you could show the
18 Court, please.
20 A. General Alagic preferred that the routing be
21 directed along what's marked here as E761661
22 [indicates], from the T-junction here, down through
23 Vitez, around to the flyover which leads back to Zenica
24 this way [indicates]. In lieu of that, Mr. Kordic and
25 General Blaskic insisted that this route over the
1 mountain road from Guca Gora be taken to Zenica.
2 Q. Which in fact -- sorry.
3 And which request prevailed?
4 A. The latter request prevailed.
5 Q. Of Colonel Blaskic and Dario Kordic?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Did BritBat also have a preference for roads?
8 A. The British preferred the Hardball Express,
9 because it would have been much easier for them.
10 Ultimately they had to rescue quite a few of the trucks
11 that went along the back road, the mountain road.
12 Q. The "Hardball Express" meaning the road --
13 A. The hard surface; sorry.
14 Q. Can you describe Dario Kordic's appearance at
15 the time you met him, and also Colonel Blaskic's
16 appearance on that December 15th meeting?
17 A. Both were dressed in uniform.
18 Colonel Blaskic did have rank insignia; Mr. Kordic did
19 not. Mr. Kordic was wearing -- other than a military
20 uniform, he had a large wooden cross on around his
22 Q. Did you have any observation about who was
23 leading the discussion, or was it fairly equally led?
24 A. Fairly equally led. But through body
25 language and otherwise, I would suggest that
1 Colonel Blaskic deferred to Mr. Kordic, and in
2 discussions as well to some degree.
3 Q. Do you recall the reasons that were given by
4 Blaskic and Kordic for not having the convoy travel
5 along the main HVO-controlled road?
6 A. The concern from their point was security, in
7 that they probably did not want to compromise
8 intelligence along the way, although that was an
9 unstated desire, I suspect, their concern being that
10 they were not too sure that they could control perhaps
11 reactions of the local Croatian populous.
12 Q. Did you and Lieutenant Colonel Williams --
13 sorry. Did you find that a plausible position?
14 A. Not entirely. We found that through
15 experience, that generally when an order was given,
16 that it was pretty much obeyed by the units on the
17 ground. The degree of control and discipline was
18 better in the HVO than it was, say, in the ABiH.
19 Q. Are you aware of any incidents of attack by
20 the HVO on the convoy in your area of responsibility?
21 A. No, none.
22 Q. Can you describe, please, or define the term
23 "interlink" in terms of operational strategy when
24 discussing policy and policy formulation and
1 A. One of the things that we were trained, both
2 in the military and then certainly used during my time
3 in the United Nations, was the use of linkage analysis
4 to determine the degree of command and control through
5 the political levels down to the military levels as far
6 as execution is concerned.
7 Q. Concerning Bosnian Croat power and authority
8 and Dario Kordic, did you have any observations that
9 fit into the framework of what you have just discussed?
10 A. I would say that at the operational level for
11 the Central Operations Zone, that the synthesis of both
12 the political and the military existed in the personage
13 of Mr. Dario Kordic.
14 Q. How would that affect the planning of policy
15 and its implementation, if you're able to comment?
16 A. It would have been his responsibility to
17 ensure that policies that he assisted in the
18 formulation of that might have been sent from Zagreb,
19 certainly delivered from Grude, Mostar, the leadership
20 there, would be executed in terms of their military
22 Q. On the 7th of February, 1994, a meeting was
23 held in the Hotel Vitez between yourself, Lieutenant
24 Colonel Williams, Kordic, and Colonel Blaskic. Could
25 you describe the purpose of that meeting and any
1 particular points which stick in your mind about the
3 A. If I recall correctly, the basic purpose was
4 to discuss the delivery of humanitarian aid and also
5 the exchange of wounded from various areas. In
6 particular, I believe there were some wounded that were
7 in Stari Vitez that required -- that is a Muslim pocket
8 inside the Croat pocket. They required evacuation.
9 Q. Do you recall how Kordic and Colonel Blaskic
10 were dressed? And as to Colonel Blaskic, was there any
11 observation about the consistent type of dress he wore
12 throughout your time?
13 A. Colonel Blaskic was dressed in camouflage. I
14 don't believe Mr. Kordic was at that particular time.
15 Colonel Blaskic later, rather than wearing a camouflage
16 uniform, came to dress in a black uniform, black
17 coveralls. And if I recall correctly, basically that
18 was a pattern after the Washington Accords of March of
20 Q. What are political polemics, as you know the
21 term, and did they apply to this meeting?
22 A. Yes. Basically, during any meeting that one
23 might attend, whether it be with the Bosniaks or the
24 Bosnian Croats, they would engage in a little history
25 lesson as to who was guilty for what and attempt to
1 sway the listener to believe their particular line,
2 thus using political polemics to propagandise their
3 particular side. Mr. Kordic, as others, engaged in
4 this practice and at this particular meeting.
5 Q. At this particular meeting, what was the
6 nature of the accusation about the use of humanitarian
7 matters or aid by one side or the other?
8 A. Well, he accused the Bosniaks of manipulating
9 humanitarian aid and the delivery of water. In part,
10 he was correct, in that the Bosniaks would cut off
11 water from the mountains up above Novi Travnik and not
12 let a complete flow of water through. He inferred that
13 and stated that Bosnian Croats would never do such.
14 However, in fact, the delivery of humanitarian aid,
15 electricity, and water was manipulated by the Bosnian
16 Croat side as well.
17 Q. And was such a comment referred to, such
18 delivery of water, referred to by Mr. Kordic, vis-a-vis
19 the Muslims, in any part of the Lasva Valley at that
21 A. Yes, with regard to Novi Travnik. But he
22 also said that unless they allowed water to go through,
23 then he would not release or allow the wounded in Stari
24 Vitez and other humanitarian cases to be addressed.
25 Q. On the 21st of February, 1994, a meeting was
1 held at a place called the Wolf's Lair. Would you take
2 whichever map at your disposal would best assist you in
3 showing the Court -- there's a map also in front of
4 you, if you can see.
5 A. It may take a second here to locate it. The
6 Wolf's Lair was located down after the T-junction from
7 Busovaca, and generally, although I don't have the grid
8 coordinate, it would have been in this area here
10 Q. Are you familiar with a location called
12 A. I think that's approximately in the same
13 location. Colonel Williams was leading the convoy, and
14 so I wasn't following the map
15 Q Who was at that meeting?
16 A. Colonel Williams, myself, Larry Hollingworth,
17 Tihomir Blaskic, Dario Kordic, and I think Rajic was
18 there, Anto Rajic.
19 Q. Was that the chief of police of Vitez?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. Who was Nikica Petrovic?
22 A. He was a liaison officer between the Bosnian
23 Croats and the International Community, as well as with
24 the Bosniaks themselves. He tended to inter-relate
25 with a Bosniak by the name of Beba Salko, who was his
2 Q. What was the area of responsibility of
3 Brigadier Skender?
4 A. It's my understanding that Brigadier Skender
5 controlled the Operational Zone Northwest, which I
6 believe was headquartered out of the Prozor area.
7 Q. Was Skender, Petrovic and Rajic then also --
8 sorry. Was Rajic, Skender and Petrovic also at this
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. What was the discussion?
12 A. If I might refer back.
13 Q. Surely. Or was this also about humanitarian
14 aid and about inspections?
15 A. Yes, thank you. It had to deal with the fact
16 that there had been some invasive inspections of UNHCR
17 convoys. And UNHCR, like the United Nations, having
18 diplomatic immunity, was not supposed to be subject to
19 having vehicles physically examined, and the HVO on
20 occasion had stopped some vehicles, opened doors, and
21 had people get out of their vehicles, checked the
22 property, the equipment, in some of these vehicles.
23 Q. What assurances were given as to the nature
24 of the future inspections, and who gave those
1 A. After a protest was basically collectively
2 levied by Lieutenant Colonel Williams, Larry
3 Hollingworth and myself, and after some discussion,
4 Mr. Kordic and Colonel Blaskic agreed that inspections
5 would be limited to visual checks only and not invasive
6 physical searches of the vehicles or the convoys.
7 Q. Did Kordic make any references to having to
8 seek the approval of the Herceg-Bosna governmental
9 structures or did he make any assurances on his own?
10 A. He suggested that normally he would have to
11 have approval, but in this particular case he put the
12 final stamp of approval on that particular policy with
13 regard to the convoys.
14 Q. Did you have anything -- excuse me. Did you
15 participate in any investigation of a massacre alleged
16 by the Bosnian Croats to have taken place in
17 approximately March of 1994 at Krizancevo Selo in the
18 Vitez municipality, and if so, what was checked out and
19 what were the results?
20 A. Yes. We had a complaint from Mr. Kordic that
21 there had been a massacre to the north of Vitez at the
22 location of this village. The BritBat troops, the
23 Coldstream Guards, sent a detail up to check it out.
24 They had UNHCR there as well as ICRC and forensic
25 experts, and in checking it out, they did find a
1 grave. But the victims were all victims basically of a
2 conflict, a battle, and not executed or massacred.
3 Q. Did you find, then, the complaint to be
5 A. Not accurate.
6 JUDGE MAY: Well, that's a very leading
7 question. If you want to ask it, ask what the finding
8 was. But I think the witness has given the finding.
9 Yes, let's move on.
10 MS. SOMERS:
11 Q. The Washington Agreement or Accords signed at
12 the end of February or the end of March of 1994, were
13 you informed of the presence of -- I'm sorry.
14 Following these agreements, were you informed of the
15 presence of HV or Croatian troops at checkpoints in the
16 area of Divjak in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. Yes. There was an old gas station that used
18 to be located on the left-hand side of the road going
19 to Vitez from Stara Bila, and that was burned down.
20 Just beyond that, there was a small building or
21 restaurant, and it was occupied by HV special police.
22 Both -- the current commander at the time, Lieutenant
23 Colonel Williams, complained about this to Mr. Kordic
24 and Colonel Blaskic, and subsequently there were other
25 incidents in which Colonel Williams' successor, Colonel
1 McCall, also complained of the presence of HV special
2 police in that location.
3 Q. To your knowledge, was the United Nations
4 made aware of the presence of HV troops on the
5 territory of Bosnia?
6 A. Yes, on several instances. When I was
7 personally there, in two different fashions. One,
8 Lieutenant Colonel Williams and the Coldstream Guards
9 actually had to rescue an HV general, I believe
10 brigadier general, and some other officers from the
11 mountainside near Tomislavgrad. They had been stranded
12 in the snow in bad conditions. He had also complained
13 of another incident of the presence of HV troops in
14 Central Bosnia. We, as civil affairs officers, were
15 aware of this in our meetings, when we would hold
16 monthly meetings in Sarajevo. This was reported, of
17 course, in discussions with headquarters in Zagreb.
18 They could come back to us with questions in that
19 regard and ask for information.
20 MS. SOMERS: Would the usher please
21 distribute two exhibits, Z1379,1 and Z1380,1. They are
22 at the back of the diary.
23 The two particular exhibits, Your Honours,
24 are Security Council exhibits attached at the very back
25 of the packet which you have just received.
1 Q. Turning your attention to -- do you have in
2 front of you the document that is from 17 February
3 1994? This document signed by then Secretary-General
4 Boutros Boutros-Ghali makes reference to the presence
5 of HV troops, troops of the Republic of Croatia, on the
6 territory of Bosnia. Are you familiar with the types
7 of allegations set forth in this particular document?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Does this document reflect accurately your
10 understanding of the situation?
11 A. Yes. The presence of HV troops in organised
12 military units, as well as volunteers.
13 Q. Turning your attention -- excuse me -- to
14 Exhibit 1380,1, dated 18 February 1994, it is a
15 response fashioned by Mr. Nobilo, Mario Nobilo, the
16 ambassador, the permanent representative, Croatia, of
17 the Security Council to the United Nations. Do you see
18 the explanation, if any, offered for the presence of
20 A. Mr. Nobilo, in paragraph 2, suggests that
21 these were volunteers and that they had departed the
22 Neretva region in Bosnia and had gone south beyond
23 Metkovic, which is basically on the boundary with the
24 Republic of Croatia.
25 Q. On the map that you have in front of you, the
1 colour, which is Z2612.7, although it's not a very
2 complete map, if it's complete enough to show the area
3 of Neretva River near Mostar.
4 A. Well, basically the Neretva goes in this
5 fashion [indicates] down to Mostar. That's the
6 beginning of the Neretva, and then goes from Mostar
7 down south.
8 Q. Can you show the boundary of Croatia and
9 Bosnia, please?
10 A. Well, no, not -- well, other than here,
11 [indicates], the southern boundary is not reflected on
12 this map.
13 Q. Thank you. Did you meet with Dario Kordic
14 after the Washington Accords were signed? Did you have
15 continued contact?
16 A. Yes, on several occasions. I was requested,
17 through Mr. Kordic's office, to provide security and to
18 be present with him during certain visits in the
19 post-Washington-Accord period so that he could travel
20 freely in Central Bosnia and particularly to Bugojno
21 and Travnik, where minority Croat populations lived.
22 Q. Did Kordic himself --
23 MR. SAYERS: Just for the record, Your
24 Honour, I would like to renew the objection to the
25 testimony beyond the scope of the amended indictment
1 for the reasons previously stated.
2 JUDGE MAY: We have already ruled on that,
3 Mr. Sayers.
4 MS. SOMERS:
5 Q. You said "through Mr. Kordic's office." Are
6 you aware of whether or not the request came personally
7 from Dario Kordic?
8 A. I can't say directly, but I believe it
9 probably did, and also it was relayed to me in addition
10 through Salko Beba from the Bosniak side, because --
11 well, it's my understanding that they had a fair degree
12 of confidence that if I stated that security would be
13 provided, that it would be provided, and certainly with
14 my personal presence there, that it would add an
15 additional measure of security.
16 Q. In this post-Washington era, did you observe
17 Mr. Kordic have any shift of his public persona,
18 vis-a-vis political or military?
19 A. Yes. Rather than being referred to as
20 "Colonel," which he had been on occasion, he took on
21 more of a political public role, and I never saw him
22 again after that dressed in uniform. And then he
23 became, I believe as of April of '94, the
24 vice-president of the HZ-HB or the Croatian Community
25 of Herceg-Bosna, and then later in the year became the
1 president of the BH-HDZ, the HDZ party of Bosnia.
2 Q. The security which you arranged for
3 Mr. Kordic, were you aware of any concerns Mr. Kordic
4 had about travelling through Central Bosnia?
5 A. Well, obviously by requiring a personal
6 presence, not only mine but BritBat, he must have had
7 some measure of concern for his life and security.
8 Q. Were you aware of any particular concerns he
9 had about travelling through territories that were held
10 by Muslims?
11 A. Yes, certainly. Whether he travelled to
12 Gornji Vakuf, Uskoplje, Travnik, or Bugojno, he feared
13 for his life, as did Anto Valenta.
14 Q. In June of 1994, did you also accompany
15 Mr. Kordic, at his request, to a meeting in Gornji
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And that was a political meeting?
19 A. Basically, these meetings were in order to
20 facilitate implementation of the Washington Accords and
21 bring about the federation between Bosnian Croats and
22 Bosnian Muslims.
23 Q. In July of 1994, was a comment made to you by
24 Anto Valenta concerning Zepce, which is part of HZ-HB
25 in the Lasva Valley, and its relationship or connection
1 during the time of the Muslim-Croat conflict which was
2 terminated by the Washington Accord?
3 A. Yes. It was his contention that there was no
4 connectivity or linkages between those areas as far as
5 direction or chain of command from Vitez/Busovaca,
6 either by the HVO or the HDZ. I knew this not to be
7 true. The BritBat Coldstream Guards' intelligence
8 officer -- not only that one but subsequently the
9 information had been provided that, in fact, there was
10 interconnectivity between those operational pockets.
11 Q. You made a reference to Mr. Kordic's
12 continued authority in the Herceg-Bosna government,
13 which experienced several changes both in name and in
14 form. The HR-HB, from '93, did it assume a different
15 name after the Washington Accords, if you can recall?
16 A. Yes. After the Washington Accords, I believe
17 about April time frame, it then became referred to as
18 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna for political
19 purposes, because they couldn't refer to themselves as
20 a republic, per se, and still be within the federation.
21 Q. That polity had originally been referred to
22 as HZ-HB, the Croatian Community, is that correct,
23 before the change to HR-HB?
24 A. Prior to 1993, that's correct. In 1992, I
25 can't exactly remember, but probably the fall of 1992,
1 early '93.
2 Q. The former head of the HDZ-BiH, Mate Boban,
3 what became of him if Kordic became the president of
4 the HDZ-BiH?
5 A. Mr. Boban went to Zagreb, where he assumed
6 the position of director of INA, which is the Republic
7 of Croatia state petroleum and energy company.
8 Q. Did you change your position within UNPROFOR
9 from civil affairs officer to political officer, and
10 during what time period?
11 A. I was civil affairs officer for Central
12 Bosnia Canton basically until January of '95. Then I
13 became the civil affairs coordinator for the entire
14 sector southwest until August of '95, and then went to
15 Zagreb, to the headquarters, to be the political
16 officer for Bosnia-Herzegovina for First Special
17 Representative Akashi, and later for Special
18 Representative Annan, who came in late October
19 through March of '96. He was acting in the dual
20 capacity as the head of the peacekeeping operations and
21 as SRSG.
22 Subsequently to that, I also worked as a
23 political officer with the U.N. liaison office in
24 Zagreb until May of '98, and I continued to follow
25 developments in Bosnia.
1 MS. SOMERS: Would the Court like me to -- I
2 have three more question. Shall I continue?
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you would like to finish
4 this, please, and then we'll adjourn.
5 Q. Finishing a question earlier asked about Mate
6 Boban, are you aware of the date of his death and the
7 circumstances surrounding his death in 1997? The
8 reports of his death, rather.
9 A. Yes. I was in Zagreb at the time, and of
10 course we followed the developments when he was
11 suddenly taken ill and then a ceremony was held. I
12 found it a bit curious, in that it was a closed-casket
13 sort of funeral, and normally for people of, let's say,
14 his distinction, normally it would be an open-casket
15 funeral. But other than that, there's no indications
16 of solid evidence as to his demise.
17 Q. Did you also serve as a political officer in
18 Belgrade, and if so, when did you terminate your
19 service in Belgrade?
20 A. In May of 1998, I left Zagreb and began work
21 as a political officer in Belgrade, where I followed
22 developments in the former republic of Yugoslavia,
23 Serbia, Montenegro, and in particular, Kosovo.
24 Q. Just a point about your position as legal
25 officer. Did it involve -- perhaps, if you've said
1 this, stop me -- the political analysis of developments
2 in and between Bosnia and Croatia and/or Bosnia and
4 A. As a political officer in Zagreb, yes, I
5 followed developments not only in Bosnia but the
6 interrelationship between the two, particularly with
7 regard to the implementation of the Washington
8 Agreement and the Dayton Accords.
9 Q. From 1995 until October of 1997, which was
10 when Kordic was surrendered, did you follow anything
11 about his whereabouts or any of his political career?
12 A. On a couple of occasions, I personally saw
13 him in Zagreb. In fact, one case he was attending an
14 affair in Zagreb, and he was known to travel back and
15 forth fairly frequently visiting his residence in
17 Q. Did he receive any awards that you know of
18 from the Republic of Croatia?
19 A. Yes, he received some fairly high awards from
20 the Republic of Croatia for his efforts in Bosnia.
21 Q. As a last point, you had kept a diary, copies
22 of the relevant pages of which have been provided to
23 the Office of the Prosecutor and given to the Defence.
24 MS. SOMERS: I would simply ask the usher --
25 I believe it has been distributed, and I will bring to
1 the Court's attention that it is Exhibit Z2783, and
2 that some of the responses in this testimony came from
3 entries in that diary.
4 I have no further questions.
5 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now. Twenty-five
7 --- Recess taken at 11.14 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.40 a.m.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
10 MR. NICE: Witnesses for the 29th of
11 November, there are two or three, depending on how we
12 do this week, who will have been booked for some time
13 and who are international. One way or another, we'll
14 be able to cope with them. The balance of the week was
15 to be filled with witnesses from the former
16 Yugoslavia. Arrangements have been made for them to
17 attend, but I'm sure that we will be able to cut the
18 list without unusual difficulty, and therefore we are,
19 for that week, flexible. But thank you very much for
20 giving us the opportunity to be heard and to think
21 about it first.
22 JUDGE MAY: Well, thank you for being
23 flexible. In fact, having discussed the matter
24 further, I think it likely that two days would be
25 sufficient. So we will have two days remaining -- two
1 afternoons, I should say. Sorry, two afternoons would
2 be sufficient, and therefore we would retain two
3 afternoons in Kordic.
4 MR. NICE: So seven sessions as opposed to
5 nine; that's very helpful.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
7 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
9 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.
10 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
11 Q. And good morning, sir.
12 My name is Steve Sayers. Together with my
13 colleague Mitko Naumovski, we represent Dario Kordic,
14 and we have some questions for you.
15 I understand, sir, that you have already been
16 interviewed by the Prosecution and by an attorney named
17 Andrew Cayley on August the 23rd of 1996, just over
18 three years ago?
19 A. That's correct. And at that time you had
20 available the contemporaneous diary that I believe
21 you've brought with you today; correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. And therefore you are able to consult your
24 diary at your leisure to ensure that the information
25 that you conveyed to that attorney was accurate;
2 A. Yes, that's correct. It would have been
4 Q. Just some matters of background, sir. Your
5 speciality for about 16 years was essentially in matters
6 connected with various countries in Asia, was it not?
7 A. That's correct. Sixteen out of twenty-five
8 years with the American military.
9 Q. All right. Now, you arrived in the Balkans,
10 I believe, in November of 1993; correct?
11 A. Right.
12 Q. You first received the --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the other witness's
14 microphone be switched on, please.
15 A. I'm sorry; could you repeat that?
16 MR. SAYERS:
17 Q. Yes. You received your first briefing at the
18 United Nations headquarters in Zagreb; correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. How long did it last, sir?
21 A. Approximately one week.
22 Q. And who gave you that briefing?
23 A. Well, various people. It was an orientation
24 briefing for the overall former Yugoslavia, and more
25 particularly, I think there was a one-day orientation
1 for Bosnia.
2 Q. Just so the record is clear, of the one-week
3 briefing that you received, only one day was devoted to
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Had you undertaken any study prior to your
7 arrival in Zagreb individually, any individual study to
8 help you understand the political structure that was
9 likely to confront you and the military situation that
10 was likely to confront you when you arrived in Bosnia,
12 A. I had started doing some independent reading,
13 one "The Fall of History" -- sorry, "The Fall of
14 Yugoslavia," and the other one a short history of
16 Q. "The Fall of Yugoslavia"; that's the book
17 authored by Misha Glenny, is it?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. A former journalist; correct?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. All right. You also received a briefing from
22 the BritBat component of UNPROFOR -- please forgive the
23 contraction. I believe that the BritBat component of
24 UNPROFOR was the Coldstream Guards regiment when you
25 were present in Central Bosnia; correct?
1 A. It was there -- I believe it had arrived
2 sometime in September. I of course arrived in
3 mid-November. It departed in May and was replaced by
4 the Royal Anglians and then by the Royal Highland
5 Fusiliers, and by the Devon and Dorset, all of whom I
6 worked with, and subsequent to that with two -- well,
7 during that time and subsequent, worked with three
8 regimental commanders, Brigadiers Reith, Ridgeway, and
10 Q. Thank you, sir. But it would be fair to say
11 that the Coldstream Guards was the BritBat component of
12 UNPROFOR from the time of your arrival in Central
13 Bosnia until the end of March of 1994; correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. You were briefed that Mr. Kordic was the
16 political leader of the Croats in Central Bosnia, I
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. You were briefed that Colonel Blaskic was the
20 senior military commander of all of the HVO forces in
21 Central Bosnia; correct?
22 A. Correct. Of that operational zone.
23 Q. When you refer to "that operational zone," is
24 it true that the operational zone formerly known as the
25 Central Bosnia Operative Zone had been renamed, prior
1 to your arrival, the 3rd Operational Zone?
2 A. I believe that's correct, yes.
3 Q. And Colonel Blaskic was the senior military
4 commander in charge of that particular Operative Zone?
5 A. Affirmative, until he was replaced by Colonel
7 Q. All right. Who was the Muslim political
8 leader in the Central Bosnia area when you were there,
9 sir, prior to March of 1994?
10 A. Basically it was a pretty fragmented
11 situation as far as political leadership was concerned
12 within the Bosniaks. It tended to be almost tribal in
13 nature, oriented around municipalities or villages.
14 Very personality-dependent. I'm trying -- the key
15 political person would have been in Zenica, and
16 Salcinovic would have been the last name.
17 Q. What was that name again?
18 A. Salcinovic.
19 Q. And what was his position, sir?
20 A. Basically he assumed the position of
21 governor. During the period of time that he was there,
22 he was one of the political people within Zenica
23 itself. I didn't have -- other than at the
24 municipality level, I didn't have too much contact with
25 the Bosnian leadership at the higher levels -- at that
1 point in time. Later I did.
2 Q. In your journal, sir, and we have been
3 provided with some relevant pages, the journal was kept
4 contemporaneously; correct?
5 A. Correct. Now, there is a portion that's
6 missing, which unfortunately I couldn't recover; it's
7 at home in Washington, D.C. It covers a period
8 initially when I was there. It's one of these
9 flip-over notebooks that basically covers daily events
10 from mid-November through to early February.
11 Q. And you've lost that, have you?
12 A. Well, it may be lost. It's packed, and of
13 course most of my possessions are in Washington, D.C.,
14 in boxes that I haven't opened for -- well, almost six
16 Q. Prior to the end of March of 1994, correct me
17 if I'm wrong, but there's only one entry for Mr. --
18 that mentions Mr. Kordic in your diary, and that's
19 February the 21st of 1994. Would you agree with that?
20 A. February 21st? Yes, and I believe February
21 the 7th as well.
22 Q. All right.
23 A. Although that may have been also separately
24 in another -- in another booklet as well.
25 Q. How do you mean, another booklet?
1 A. Well, because the transition between one book
2 and the other book occurs in early February, and so
3 some notes may have been kept in one and then
4 transferred over to the other, incompletely.
5 Q. Suffice it to say, though, that whatever that
6 other book is, you have not been able to consult it or
7 review it in order to refresh your recollection?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Now, in November of 1993, you've told us that
10 you were assigned to work as a civil affairs officer in
11 Central Bosnia; right?
12 A. Right.
13 Q. Your predecessors in Vitez were, I believe,
14 first Randy Rhodes; right?
15 A. That's correct. Randy Rhodes was there I
16 believe from March or April of that year until about
17 September, and then Luc Duchesne took over in a
18 temporary capacity until I arrived.
19 Q. Now, as civil affairs officer, your principal
20 area of concentration was really the rehabilitation and
21 reconstruction of a country that had been ravaged by
22 civil war; correct?
23 A. Yes. Also we had a political reporting
24 responsibility and interface with political leaders at
25 the lower level, at the municipality level, and of
1 course that inferred some connections with the military
2 as well.
3 Q. Fundamentally, though, your area of
4 responsibility, if I might use that term, was
5 coterminous with the BritBat area of responsibility;
7 A. Affirmative. A huge area at that time.
8 Q. Including areas such as Gornji Vakuf in
9 Herzegovina; correct?
10 A. That's correct, and even went down to
11 Tomislavgrad and almost west to Mostar at that point.
12 Later on it did -- in Sector Southwest, it did include
13 that area. And it went north to Zepce, Zavidovici,
14 just to the south of Doboj.
15 Q. Now, you've given some testimony connected
16 with what you have referred to as Croat pockets,
17 pockets of area controlled by the Croats that you
18 discovered when you arrived in Central Bosnia in
19 November of 1993. Turning to the Vitez/Busovaca pocket
20 to begin with, it's true that that pocket was entirely
21 surrounded by ABiH forces; correct?
22 A. That's correct. At one point they were
23 joined, and then -- well, along with the Kiseljak
24 pocket, and then through various attacks, the pockets
25 became divided, but the Vitez/Busovaca pocket basically
1 remained intact and under HVO control.
2 Q. Right. Actually, there had been an ABiH
3 offensive against the Vitez/Busovaca pocket in
4 September of 1993, which was unsuccessful, and you were
5 aware of that; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Similarly, you were aware that the ABiH
8 launched another offensive in -- just before Christmas
9 of 1993, on December the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th; correct?
10 A. That's correct, and it's recorded in my
12 Q. And finally, the ABiH launched another more
13 successful offensive in January of 1994 which succeeded
14 in -- for a time, anyway -- cutting off the main supply
15 route between Vitez and Busovaca; correct?
16 A. That's correct, and it forced reliance upon
17 the Santici back road in order to establish any sort of
18 road communications through the area.
19 Q. Would it be fair to say that in the
20 Vitez/Busovaca pocket, your perception as a
21 representative of the United Nations was that a siege
22 mentality prevailed?
23 A. On the part of virtually everybody, not only
24 in the Croatian pockets, but the Bosniak areas as well,
25 because the Bosniaks were surrounded by the Serbs.
1 Q. But in the Vitez/Busovaca pocket --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. -- a siege mentality prevailed?
4 A. I would expect that would be the case, and
5 certainly the Bosniak subpocket in Stari Vitez and
6 Kruscica, so ...
7 Q. Exactly, sir. Wouldn't you agree that this
8 was a --
9 A. It depends on where you are exactly.
10 Q. -- an extremely complex geographic,
11 political, military and ethnic situation, wasn't it?
12 A. Pockets and wheels within wheels and pockets;
14 Q. Turning to some of the other pockets, the
15 Kiseljak pocket, you've described; that was also
16 surrounded by ABiH forces throughout the period from
17 your arrival until the end of -- well, up to the
18 signature of the Washington Agreement; isn't that
20 A. That's correct. The ABiH controlled the area
21 just outside, to the east of Busovaca, until an area
22 probably, I'd say, five kilometres to the west of
23 Kiseljak. They controlled the road area there.
24 Q. Would you not agree that throughout the first
25 four months of your tour in the area, the HVO was
1 essentially on the defensive?
2 A. In many ways, that's certainly the case,
3 because they had suffered succeeding defeats, and
4 that's one of the reasons that essentially they agreed
5 to the Washington Accords.
6 Q. I do not want to spend too much time on this,
7 sir, but there's no question that the following towns
8 were actually captured immediately before your arrival
9 in the area or during your arrival in the area; Travnik
10 for one. Correct?
11 A. Before my arrival.
12 Q. Kakanj was before your arrival too?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Bugojno?
15 A. Bugojno, before.
16 Q. Fojnica?
17 A. Fojnica before.
18 Q. And the Croat enclave in Vares, the Vares
19 area, which may have been somewhat outside of your area
20 of responsibility, was actually captured in its
21 entirety in November, early November of 1993; correct?
22 A. Actually, I believe it was earlier than that,
23 probably October that that occurred. But yes, that was
24 outside our area. That was basically within the Tuzla
1 Q. And there's no question that in connection
2 with the military defeats suffered by the HVO in all of
3 these major towns and areas, large quantities of
4 refugees flooded out of those towns following the
5 military actions; correct?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. So by the time that you arrived in the area,
8 it would be fair to summarise that the Croat population
9 in Central Bosnia had been squeezed, if you like, into
10 first four and then three enclaves: the Vitez/Busovaca
11 enclave; the Kiseljak enclave; the Vares enclave, which
12 ceased to exist in late October or early November of
13 1993; and finally the Zepce enclave?
14 A. That's correct. They had suffered succeeding
16 Q. Now, upon your arrival in Kiseljak at the
17 middle -- in the middle or the end of November of 1993,
18 you were confronted by an extremely tense and lawless
19 atmosphere; would you not agree?
20 A. Correct, particularly in Kiseljak. There
21 were a lot of -- there was a lot of random violence
22 and gangs; some military that were engaged in harassing
23 not only citizenry but the U.N. as well.
24 Q. Right. Beatings, shootings and robberies
25 were commonplace; correct?
1 A. It didn't happen every day, but frequently,
3 Q. But you would agree that criminal activity
4 was rampant, and the civil authorities had little, if
5 any, grip on law and order in that enclave, at least as
6 far as you could see; isn't that right?
7 A. I would say, in contrast to the Vitez pocket,
8 that it was more chaotic and under less control.
9 Q. You never found anybody from any one of the
10 warring factions who you could ever identify as being
11 in charge of civil affairs in the area, or military
12 affairs, for that matter; isn't that true?
13 A. I'm sorry; again? I'm not quite sure I've
14 caught the direction of your question.
15 Q. That's all right. If I ask you a question
16 which is unclear, please tell me, because that's my
17 fault, not yours.
18 You never were able to identify anybody from
19 either of the warring factions in that area, on the
20 Muslim side or the Croat side, who was in charge
21 civilly or militarily, were you, sir, in Kiseljak?
22 A. Well, I was only there for about a week, and
23 that was in a transition period before going to Central
24 Bosnia, and even during that period, a week or so, I
25 went to Sarajevo for a brief orientation as well. So
1 it really wasn't my -- I hadn't settled into a job,
2 per se.
3 Q. Just one final point in connection with
4 that. While you were there for this one week, Kiseljak
5 was targeted on a number of occasions by ABiH mortars;
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Let me turn to your arrival in the town of
9 Vitez, sir. I believe that was in early December of
11 A. No, actually, it was mid-to late November
12 when I was there.
13 Q. All right. Now, you say that you set up the
14 office of civil affairs next to the operations room of
15 the headquarters of BritBat?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Where was it before that?
18 A. Well, it had been around a corner, and it was
19 a little bit smaller office, and by moving nearer the
20 operations room it made me more accessible. And in
21 contrast to my predecessor, I was a bit more senior and
22 long in the tooth and with military experience, and so
23 I think Colonel Williams understood that and felt a bit
24 more comfortable in that regard.
25 Q. You would agree that the situation
1 confronting you when you arrived in Vitez in
2 mid-November of 1993 was pretty grim; isn't that
4 A. Absolutely. It was like something out of
5 World War II. Pretty grey and dismal.
6 Q. Most of the buildings that you saw in Vitez
7 were marked -- pockmarked by shell fire or gunfire
8 strikes; correct?
9 A. It was a mix. In certain areas that had been
10 predominantly inhabited by Muslims, those were pretty
11 well destroyed, the roofs gone, and burned down. In
12 areas in which it was obvious that there was a direct
13 confrontation and fights going on, buildings were
14 pockmarked on both sides, indicating that the building
15 itself was a site of confrontation.
16 In central Vitez, not that many buildings had
17 been destroyed directly. Some had been subjected to
18 long-barrelled automatic weapons from 50 calibre and
19 above, markings from them and mortar rounds that would
20 have been fired from Stari Vitez into central Vitez.
21 In particular, Hotel Vitez had been hit many times.
22 Q. All right.
23 A. And Hotel Vitez was the headquarters for the
25 Q. The civil affairs office produced reports on
1 a fairly regular basis; correct?
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. [Indiscernible] reports and weekly situation
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. You gave some testimony concerning the
7 linkage, if you like, to the provision of humanitarian
8 aid to other concessions sought by the various factions
9 to which a request was made. I'd just like to show you
10 two exhibits on that, if I may: the first dated
11 September the 1st, 1993, a report prepared by one of
12 your predecessors, Mr. Rhodes, from the civil affairs
13 office in Vitez.
14 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
16 MR. SAYERS:
17 Q. Just a few brief questions on this document,
18 sir. You can see in paragraph 2, your predecessor
19 makes the observation that all sides have been guilty
20 of using or denying the use of humanitarian aid,
21 medical treatment, and supplies -- water, power,
22 et cetera -- to further their military or political
24 A. Correct, and I made that statement also
1 Q. Right. If you turn over to the next page,
2 there are some comments made or summarised in
3 paragraph 5 made by Colonel Hadzihasanovic. Did you
4 ever meet or speak with -- I think General
6 A. On a couple of occasions, but most of my
7 contacts tended to be, militarily, with General Alagic
8 and his immediate staff.
9 Q. That's general Mehmed Alagic; correct?
10 A. Correct. And one of his staff officers,
11 Colonel Merdan.
12 Q. Was General Alagic the commander of the 3rd
13 Corps, headquartered in Zenica, while you were present
14 in the area, sir?
15 A. Affirmative.
16 Q. All right. Did General Alagic ever mention
17 to you that the ABiH, insofar as Stari Vitez was
18 concerned, had three options: the first to permit the
19 Muslims within the Stari Vitez area to surrender; the
20 second to permit them to be evacuated en masse to the
21 southwest, and the third to keep them besieged and
22 pressured so that ABiH supplies from Croatia would not
23 be completely withheld?
24 A. No, he never directly made any statements of
25 that nature to me. However, within BritBat, in
1 discussions with BritBat, that was certainly mentioned.
2 Q. All right. In your discussions with General
3 Alagic, did he ever, on this subject, tell you that --
4 and I'm citing the book that he published in 1997 --
5 "Faced with this overall situation, we chose the last
6 option. Instead of liberating Vitez, we chose to leave
7 it as a strategic vent for the supplying of other parts
8 of Bosnia"?
9 A. I'll take General Alagic at his word. I
10 would say that both sides had an interest in a way of
11 preserving Stari Vitez, because had the pocket not been
12 there, then it would have probably made the Croatian
13 pocket even more vulnerable to a mass attack from the
15 Q. Thank you. The point I was trying to
16 elucidate was that the situation of the Muslims in
17 Stari Vitez was considered by the 3rd Corps and that
18 the deliberate decision was made essentially to
19 preserve the status quo in order to ensure the
20 continued supplies of materiel to the ABiH through
21 Croatia. That was the view of your office and of your
22 immediate neighbours, the BritBat contingent in Vitez;
24 A. A manipulation of the population in order to
25 serve other interests, yes.
1 Q. And on the subject of -- well, I'll save that
2 for later.
3 You asked -- you were asked some questions
4 about the Croat political party. The HDZ-BiH is the
5 acronym that we use. Was that the acronym by which it
6 was known when you were in the area, sir?
7 A. It became more known or more properly
8 addressed within our circles at BH-HDZ, but the same
10 Q. Whatever the acronym, it's the same party.
11 Have you ever, with your political expertise,
12 scrutinised any of the founding documents of that
13 party, setting forth its basic constitution or
14 elaborating its party political platforms throughout
15 the years?
16 A. Not in depth, but I have seen them. And I
17 attended actually a -- I'm trying to think of the
18 correct term. At the invitation of Mr. Kordic, a
19 conference in Busovaca in 1994, and the precepts that
20 were evidenced at that time and some of the documents
21 that I looked through are, on the surface, very
23 Q. Speaking about the testimony that you gave
24 regarding the comments assertedly made by Mr. Kordic
25 concerning Muslims, would you agree with me that there
1 is no record whatsoever in your contemporaneous journal
2 about those comments, sir?
3 A. That is correct, there is none in my
4 journal. This is from recollection.
5 Q. Recollections of conversations that occurred
6 in February of 1993, you say?
7 A. Over various occasions, and not just with
8 Mr. Kordic but also with Mr. -- or, rather, General
9 Roso, Mr. Valenta, and a few others.
10 Q. What was Mr. Kordic's position within the
11 BH-HDZ prior to March of 1994, sir?
12 A. Within the BH-HDZ?
13 Q. Correct.
14 A. He was a vice-president.
15 Q. How many vice-presidents were there?
16 A. Quite a few.
17 Q. He was just one of these vice-presidents; is
18 that correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Do you know what the powers of -- the
21 prescribed powers of a BH-HDZ vice-president are?
22 A. It would depend upon the position within the
23 party structure itself, and whether the individual
24 would be operational on the ground or not, and what
25 degree -- some of the designations of vice-presidents
1 would be honorific in nature and others would be more
2 functional in nature.
3 Q. Do you derive this from the records and
4 documents about which you've testified you regularly
5 consult, or is this just your opinion?
6 A. No, this was based upon not at the time but
7 records reviewed by myself in my capacity within the
8 U.N. liaison office in Zagreb subsequently, following
9 up developments in Bosnia.
10 Q. Would these be documents that were generated
11 by the BH-HDZ itself, which actually delineated the
12 specific powers of a vice-president, or military
13 intelligence documents of the type that you regularly
14 consulted concerning conclusions arrived at by others?
15 A. A combination of both, taking open-source
16 information and then cross-checking that against
17 statements and interviews, discussions, that were held
18 either personally or by other colleagues with
19 individuals within the HDZ not only in Bosnia but in
20 Croatia as well.
21 Q. Who was the president of the BH-HDZ in
22 Busovaca; do you know?
23 A. In Busovaca?
24 Q. Yes, sir.
25 A. The mayor of the city was Florijan Glavocic
1 [sic], and I can't recall whether he was the president
2 of the HDZ or not. I might have it in my notes. It's
3 not something that I concentrated on.
4 Q. Let me put it to you, sir, that the mayor or
5 the president of the HVO civilian government was
6 actually Zoran Maric. Isn't that correct?
7 A. That's correct initially, that's correct, and
8 then Florijan took over after that.
9 Q. Florijan Glavocevic was actually the head of
10 the HDZ-BiH in Busovaca, wasn't he?
11 A. I'm trying to recall now. Yeah, that's
13 Q. You gave some testimony in connection with
14 your initial meetings with Vitez politicians. Your
15 first meeting, I believe, was within three or four days
16 of your arrival in Vitez sometime in November of 1993,
17 and you met with various local businessmen and
18 politicians; correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. The meeting was chaired by Ivica Santic;
22 A. One of the meetings, yes.
23 Q. And his actual formal title is not the mayor
24 of Vitez, although that's a good vernacular --
25 A. Analogy, yes. The president.
1 Q. The president of the HVO municipal
2 government; correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Now, you were instructed that Mr. Santic had
5 occupied this position for the last six or seven
6 months; correct?
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. Isn't it true that he actually had been in
9 that position for about two years?
10 A. Well, that's possible, but I hadn't been
11 there for that period of time and I was taking
12 information basically as presented by Luc Duchesne, and
13 that would have covered the time that he was
14 knowledgeable and that Randy Rhodes might have been
16 Q. Isn't it true, sir, that you told the
17 prosecutors three years ago that you never, in fact,
18 actually heard Mr. Santic say anything derogatory about
20 A. I don't believe I said that, because I can
21 certainly recall the anecdote that he told me about
22 parachuting pork in to the Muslims, and that was maybe
23 not the first or the second meeting but certainly
24 within the first couple of months that I was there.
25 Q. Have you seen any reference to that comment
1 in any of the daily reports or weekly situation reports
2 that you prepared as the civil affairs officer of the
3 United Nations in Vitez?
4 A. No. I wouldn't have included that
6 Q. Let me just read you a portion of your
7 statement from page 3, which says: "I never heard him,
8 Mr. Santic, say anything derogatory about Muslims,
9 although I do remember he used the pejorative term of
10 'balija' when describing Muslim people."
11 A. Well, that's a pejorative term. It's
13 Q. What does it mean?
14 JUDGE MAY: Are we assisted by this
15 argument? The witness has given his evidence about
16 it. Let's go on.
17 MR. SAYERS: I believe that's correct, Your
18 Honour. I'll move on.
19 Q. Just one question, though. You would agree
20 that it's not unusual to refer in less than
21 complimentary language to opposing forces when you're
22 engaged in a civil war?
23 JUDGE MAY: We don't need evidence on that
25 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
1 Q. Now, speaking of Mr. Santic, he was
2 responsible for running the civil government in the
3 entire municipality of Vitez, was he not?
4 A. That's correct, administratively, in
5 practical terms.
6 Q. And in your dealings with Mr. Santic -- I
7 think you said that you met him 30 times or so -- if
8 issues relating to police, freedom of movement or
9 security arose, he routinely referred you to
10 Mr. Valenta, didn't he, sir?
11 A. Mr. Valenta or to Mr. Kordic if it couldn't
12 be solved basically at that level, although it tended
13 to be a mix.
14 Q. You said, on page 4 of your statement, that
15 when dealing with Santic, "if certain issues were
16 raised during discussion, we were always referred to
17 Ante Valenta. By 'certain issues,' I mean issues such
18 as the police, freedom of movement and security."
19 That's what you told the prosecutors three years ago;
21 A. Well, it's certainly the first call of
22 recourse, but above him would have been Mr. Kordic.
23 Q. You didn't make any contention to the
24 prosecutors along those lines three years ago, did you?
25 A. No, I didn't.
1 Q. All right. And I believe that Mr. Santic
2 later became the Deputy Minister of Energy in the
3 government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 A. That's correct, and I had some meetings with
6 him subsequently after that concerning the Bratstvo
7 munitions factory and then independent of that in
9 Q. One of the other politicians that you met in
10 Vitez was Pero Skopljak; correct?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. And in your view, you had determined that he
13 was the leader of the HDZ party for Bosnia-Herzegovina
14 in Middle Bosnia; correct?
15 A. Right, particularly for the Vitez area if --
16 in that particular area, and if -- my first line of
17 recourse to getting anything done, if I couldn't get it
18 done through Santic or Valenta, I also used or went to
19 Mr. Skopljak to address various issues, to include one
20 I can recall on freedom of movement.
21 Q. Three years ago, you told the prosecutors
22 that this gentleman was the leader of the HDZ party for
23 Middle Bosnia; correct? Page 10.
24 A. I don't have the document, but if that's what
25 it has. But I would focus it down more to the Vitez
1 area. It's like you referred to Florijan being the
2 leader for the Busovaca area. Mr. Skopljak would be
3 more like for the Vitez area.
4 Q. His function was to attach the party seal of
5 approval required for higher-level decisions; correct?
6 A. Right.
7 Q. And indeed in your view, with your experience
8 that you've derived over the years, the local political
9 authorities in Vitez and Busovaca could do nothing
10 without his assent, and that was always clear to you,
11 wasn't it?
12 A. He was one of the key actors, yes.
13 Q. You do agree that you say -- that you said on
14 page 10, "It was always clear to me that the local
15 political authorities would do nothing without his,
16 Mr. Skopljak's, assent"; correct?
17 A. That's part of the formula, and Mr. Kordic
18 would have been higher than Mr. Skopljak.
19 MR. SAYERS: All right.
20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
21 MS. SOMERS: I beg your pardon, but because
22 these pages are not numbered, unfortunately, could you
23 refer to the ERN reference number at the top that would
24 give us the page number? The statement is not a
25 numbered statement, as I have it.
1 MR. SAYERS: I would be delighted to do so,
2 but the document that we've received does not have an
3 identifiable ERN number on it. It actually only has
4 numbers that go from D2490 -- it starts with D2940 and
5 actually descends to 2480, and I was reading from page
7 JUDGE MAY: That sounds like a Registry
8 page. They do the things backwards. Yes.
9 MS. SOMERS: Sorry, Your Honour. I just had
10 trouble locating the particular passage, and perhaps if
11 I could just get it from the number of pages from the
12 last signature page, of the last page, that would help
14 JUDGE MAY: Do you have a different one from
15 the Registry?
16 MS. SOMERS: No, I have a differently
17 numbered one. I'll make arrangements.
18 MR. SAYERS: It's actually on the last page,
19 third paragraph down, three lines from the bottom.
20 MS. SOMERS: Thank you very much.
21 MR. SAYERS:
22 Q. Now, turning for a minute, sir, to Mr. Anto
23 Valenta, what was his position?
24 A. He was designated as one of the
1 Q. Of what?
2 A. Of the -- well, initially when I met him, of
3 the northern portion of the HR-HB, the Croat Republic
4 of Herceg-Bosna.
5 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Carter, that the Croat
6 Republic of Herceg-Bosna did not have an office of
7 vice-president. Did you know that?
8 A. That's the way he represented himself.
9 Q. I also put it to you that Mr. Valenta was one
10 of three vice-presidents of the HVO and had been for
11 some considerable time prior to your arrival; at least
12 a year. Do you agree with that?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In fact, let me just show you a document.
15 Maybe this will jog your memory, and since you say that
16 you've looked at the official records that are in the
17 public record.
18 Just for the record, this is an October the
19 17th, 1992 decision appointing Mr. Valenta as one of
20 the vice-presidents of the HVO.
21 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
23 MR. SAYERS:
24 Q. Have you ever seen this document before, sir?
25 A. No, I have not.
1 Q. All right. Did you know who the other two
2 vice-presidents were?
3 A. No. This is before my time, and I would
4 point out that this is before the republic was created
5 in '93. And, of course, subsequent to the Washington
6 Accords, it reverted back to the Croatian Community of
8 Q. It's not your testimony, sir, that the HVO
9 was somehow abolished by the foundation of the Croatian
10 Republic of Herceg-Bosna on August the 28th of 1993, is
12 A. No, not at all.
13 Q. Are you aware of any information that would
14 suggest to you that Mr. Valenta was not, in fact, or
15 did not continue to be a vice-president of the HVO
16 throughout the first five months of your tenure in the
17 Vitez/Busovaca area?
18 JUDGE MAY: The witness can only deal with
19 what he knows himself. He's given his evidence on the
20 point. Now let's move on to something else.
21 MR. SAYERS: Very well.
22 Q. Who was the president of the HVO, sir?
23 A. In our particular area or outside of our
25 Q. The president of the HVO throughout
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you know?
2 A. I couldn't say to that effect, no.
3 Q. Did you know that Mr. Valenta was the HVO
4 civil affairs representative throughout the Lasva
5 Valley, sir?
6 A. Certainly, he was our primary point of
7 contact and wielded some considerable authority, and
8 deference was made to him partially because of his
9 writings that he had done previously, which basically
10 urged for cantonisation.
11 Q. Were you aware that it was the view of the
12 European Community Monitoring Mission that Mr. Valenta
13 was the real number two in the HVO after Mate Boban?
14 A. No. When was that allegation or --
15 JUDGE MAY: Don't bother.
16 A. Okay.
17 MR. SAYERS:
18 Q. Did you review any of the documents by Randy
19 Rhodes, one of your predecessors, any of the reports
20 prepared by him, insofar as they related to the
21 political structures of the Croat authorities in the
22 Vitez/Busovaca pocket, sir?
23 A. Not initially, no, because there had been a
24 change in the battalions and a change in location, so
25 some of the material -- well, many of the materials
1 during his presence were not available, and so I had to
2 rely to some extent initially, certainly, on Luc
3 Duchesne's brief knowledge of the area.
4 Q. All right. I take it, sir, that you did not
5 have the opportunity to speak with Mr. Randy Rhodes
7 A. No. He had already left, already departed.
8 Q. And the person to whom you did speak, Mr. Luc
9 Duchesne, had only been in the area for a very short
10 period of time; correct?
11 A. That's correct, approximately four or five
13 Q. Just to bring a conclusion to this line of
14 questioning, you have not seen any of Mr. Rhodes'
15 reports, I take it, subsequently.
16 A. No, I have not, other than the one that you
17 showed me.
18 Q. In that case, we can move on. Thank you.
19 Did you know that Mr. Valenta still works for
20 the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
21 A. Yes. In fact, I saw Mr. Valenta. I'm trying
22 to recall, but I believe it was 1996 or 1997 in
24 Q. Now, you gave some testimony concerning the
25 chain of command within the HVO. Sir, it would be fair
1 to say that as a former military man or as a military
2 man with more than 25 years of experience, it was your
3 view that Colonel Blaskic was able to exercise
4 effective command and control over all HVO forces in
5 the Vitez/Busovaca pocket, even down to the infantry
6 company level; correct?
7 A. Correct, conventional units.
8 Q. And how many soldiers are actually in an
9 infantry company?
10 A. Well, it depends upon whose system you're
11 looking at. Within the Yugoslav system, the Croatian
12 HVO, approximately 100 men or less.
13 Q. Whenever you met Colonel Blaskic, he always
14 wore a rank badge of colonel on his breast pocket;
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. And also rank epaulettes on his sleeve too?
18 A. On occasion, it would. Certainly a change
19 when he went into black uniform.
20 Q. Was your first meeting with Colonel Blaskic
21 on December the 15th, 1993, the date that you first met
22 with Mr. Kordic too?
23 A. I believe that's correct, yes.
24 Q. And --
25 A. I don't believe I met him any time prior to
1 that, or if it was, it was an incidental meeting of no
2 particular consequence.
3 Q. It would be true to say that following that
4 meeting, you were in no doubt that Colonel Blaskic was
5 indeed the commander of the HVO military forces in
6 Central Bosnia; correct?
7 A. Right.
8 Q. You gave some testimony about the White Road
9 Convoy. It would be fair to say that in that instance,
10 as in all others, you were unaware of situations in
11 which Colonel Blaskic's military orders were not
12 carried out; correct?
13 A. As far as conventional units were concerned
14 and my knowledge basically during my time there, there
15 may have been incidents, but generally speaking, his
16 orders were carried out.
17 We had a couple of incidents in which British
18 troops were fired upon by Croatian HVO. They were
19 fired back at, and we never had any repeated incidents
20 of it. But I would say that's an anomaly rather than
21 the norm.
22 Q. You never asked Colonel Blaskic whether there
23 were any military units that were outside of his
24 command, did you, sir?
25 A. No, I never deliberately asked him that.
1 Q. And, similarly, you never asked either
2 Mr. Valenta or Mr. Kordic whether any military units
3 were under the political chain of command, did you?
4 A. No, I never did.
5 Q. Turning to the December the 15th, 1993
6 meeting that you gave some testimony about, it was
7 Colonel Blaskic who actually did most of the talking at
8 that meeting, wasn't it?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. Mr. Kordic was actually, sir, not in uniform
11 at all, as you testified in your direct examination.
12 Wouldn't you agree with that?
13 A. I'm getting the dates confused, but at one
14 point, that's correct. On the 21st of February at the
15 Wolf's Lair, he was in uniform.
16 Q. Not at the first meeting; correct?
17 A. No.
18 Q. The mountain road via Guca Gora, about which
19 you've testified the White Road Convoy ultimately
20 travelled, that was territory controlled by the ABiH
21 forces; correct?
22 A. Correct.
23 Q. One of the concerns articulated to you by
24 Colonel Blaskic, and articulated on a fairly consistent
25 basis after this first meeting, was the concern that
1 convoys such as the White Road Convoy were being used
2 to smuggle arms and ammunition; isn't that correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. And his concerns in this instance, at least,
5 turned out to be justified because explosives,
6 detonators, and ammunition were discovered being
7 smuggled in that convoy; correct?
8 A. In one of the vehicles, that's correct.
9 Q. That was despite the reassurances and
10 representations made by ABiH commanders to you, amongst
11 others; correct?
12 A. Correct, but it was never determined who
13 placed the explosives in the vehicles.
14 Q. And you say that the convoy proceeded without
15 incident, without being attacked, to Zenica. On its
16 return to Herzegovina, however, on December the 22nd,
17 the convoy was attacked, wasn't it?
18 A. When it returned back into the Stara Bila and
19 then the Gornji Vakuf areas, it was attacked, and I
20 believe there were one or two Croatian drivers that
21 were killed and injured -- or injured and killed,
22 excuse me.
23 Q. That was actually the day that the ABiH
24 offensive, the Christmas offensive, or just before
25 Christmas of 1993, started; correct?
1 A. That's correct.
2 Q. And that was the offensive which resulted in
3 the fatalities at Krizancevo Selo. I don't think you
4 mentioned the number of people that were killed there,
5 but it was about 75, wasn't it?
6 A. I don't recall the exact figure, but it was
7 certainly a fairly high number. It was quite a
9 Q. Were you actually present when the bodies of
10 the people killed at Krizancevo Selo were dug up or
11 exhumed three months later?
12 A. No.
13 Q. All right. At the time of the White Road
14 Convoy, sir, you were actually aware that the ABiH was
15 actively planning offensive operations aimed at the
16 Vitez/Busovaca pocket; correct?
17 A. UNPROFOR, BritBat, and myself had indications
18 to suggest that they had intended an offensive. We
19 made very strong representations to Dr. Lang and
20 suggested to him that he must move his convoy
21 immediately prior to the 22nd. He declined and did not
22 leave until the 22nd.
23 Q. Did you ever let Colonel Blaskic or anybody
24 else within the Croat military leadership know that
25 such an impending attack was about to be launched so
1 that casualties could be minimised?
2 A. No, it's not our role to provide information
3 to one side or the other. But for humanitarian
4 purposes, we attempted to let Dr. Lang know that it
5 would not be in the interests of he or his convoy to
6 remain there, and we made very strong representations
7 to him.
8 Q. Let me turn to the level of knowledge that
9 you have about the structure of government within the
10 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, sir.
11 This entity had been in existence for two and
12 a half months by the time that you arrived in Central
13 Bosnia; correct?
14 A. I'm not sure of the exact date, but, yeah,
15 for some bit.
16 Q. Did you ever read the constitution of the
17 Republic or the documents that set it up and defined
18 the powers of its various organs?
19 A. No. If I recall correctly, the only
20 constitution or founding documentation that I read had
21 to do with the Croat Community and not with the
22 Republic itself.
23 Q. Were you aware that the supreme commander of
24 the HVO armed forces, according to the constitution,
25 was the president of the Republic, sir?
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. And who was that?
3 A. Sorry?
4 Q. The president of the Republic.
5 A. Mate Boban.
6 Q. Prior to February the 14th of 1994, sir,
7 could you just tell us what position, if you know,
8 Mr. Kordic held within the government of the Croatian
9 Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
10 A. As one of the vice-presidents.
11 Q. I put it to you, sir --
12 A. And self-styled, and in various
13 documentations that I've seen, referred to as colonel
14 in the HVO as well.
15 Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Kordic, "What position
16 do you hold within the Croatian Republic of
17 Herceg-Bosna," sir?
18 A. No, I didn't, because that information was
19 given to me by the British. I didn't ask him directly;
20 that's correct.
21 Q. Would it fair to say, sir, that there was
22 some considerable confusion regarding the precise role
23 of Mr. Kordic within the Croatian Republic of
24 Herceg-Bosna, in your view, and also in the view of the
25 British intelligence services; would that be fair to
2 A. I would say that Mr. Kordic, as others, took
3 on various guises and functions over the period of
4 time, some of them evolutionary in nature, through
5 promotion; some of them, as I was indicating in my
6 testimony, there is a blurring of distinction and
7 responsibility, particularly in times of conflict,
8 where roles that are generally political in nature
9 are -- sorry, military in nature are assumed by the
10 military --
11 Q. It's a very simple question. Isn't it true
12 that there was a degree of doubt or confusion regarding
13 Mr. Kordic's precise position within the Croatian
14 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, in your view and in the view
15 of your colleagues in the military community?
16 A. Perhaps there are -- I would suggest that
17 there are others that perhaps have a clearer view than
18 I might have, but some confusion in my mind, yes. Not
19 necessarily confusion, but duplication of various
21 Q. Well, are you aware of anyone who just asked
22 the question, "Mr. Kordic, what is your position within
23 this new republic?"
24 A. The question -- if Mr. -- or Brigadier
25 Williams testifies, I'm sure he'll give you an answer
1 in that regard.
2 Q. Are you aware that he actually asked that
3 question, sir?
4 A. I'm not aware, but ...
5 Q. Let me put it to you, sir: Isn't it true
6 that Dario Kordic was one of 69 legislators in the
7 House of Representatives --
8 A. In the assembly, yes.
9 Q. Yes. In addition, the only appointments that
10 he ever held were as the president of one of the
11 commissions of the House of Representatives and a
12 member of a ten-member commission on foreign affairs
13 and internal security prior to February the 17th of
14 1992? Did you know that?
15 A. No -- well, not specifically, no.
16 Q. Did you know that --
17 A. But that would have been prior to 1992.
18 Q. Well, in 1994, or right at the end of 1993,
19 the government of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna
20 was appointed by the -- by the House of
21 Representatives; did you know that?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Who was the prime minister, sir?
24 JUDGE MAY: Why are we asking questions?
25 It's not a school test.
1 A. I'm afraid that --
2 JUDGE MAY: The witness can't remember,
3 probably, what happened six or seven years ago. If
4 there is some point about it, Mr. Sayers, put it in
6 MR. SAYERS: That's fair enough,
7 Mr. President.
8 A. I'm afraid my knowledge has waned with time,
9 but --
10 Q. That's all right.
11 A. -- and limited to the personal relationships
12 that I might have had at the time with Mr. Kordic,
13 Mr. Prlic, and some others.
14 Q. All right. Just before we go through these,
15 and it won't take very long, did you make any
16 contemporaneous notations in your diary as to who held
17 what position when?
18 A. Yes, I have a legend that indicates at
19 certain times when various individuals assumed various
20 responsibilities, if I might refer to it.
21 Q. Certainly, but let me just, in the interest
22 of accelerating the pace of proceedings here, just
23 suggest to you: Isn't it true that the prime minister
24 of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was
25 Dr. Jadranko Prlic?
1 A. Yes, and he also assumed the responsibility
2 of foreign minister at one point, too.
3 Q. Isn't it also true that there were ten
4 separate ministries, each headed up by a different
5 person, and Mr. Kordic wasn't one of them?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. Isn't it true, sir, that the Croatian
8 Republic of Herceg-Bosna held a major convention in, I
9 believe, the city of Neum in February of 1994, and it
10 was at that time that a gentleman by the name of Ivan
11 Bender was appointed as the chairman of the House of
12 Representatives, the legislative organ of the
13 government; correct?
14 A. Correct. I do recall that.
15 Q. And simultaneously with that appointment,
16 Mr. Kordic and Mr. Vlado Santic from Bihac were
17 appointed as deputy chairmen of the house of
18 representatives; did you know that?
19 A. Not specifically, no. But I recall the
20 incident about Mr. Bender.
21 Q. And you would agree with me that before that,
22 Mr. Kordic held no position within the government of
23 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna of which you were
24 aware; isn't that true?
25 A. Not in a formal status, except as reported to
1 me by the British and information subsequently
2 collected within the U.N. liaison office. One of the
3 notations I have on page 44 is that Kordic is removed
4 from military chain of command but remains deputy
5 president of Herceg-Bosna, dated the 30th of April.
6 Q. But you have no personal knowledge whatsoever
7 of the facts relating to that entry, do you?
8 A. That information was provided to me by the
9 British military intelligence.
10 Q. I understand, sir, but you would agree that
11 you are just reporting what other people have told you;
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. All right.
15 A. And another entry I have on the 21st of June,
16 page 62, Kordic declared HDZ president.
17 Q. Were you aware, Mr. Carter, that a
18 presidential council of nine persons was established on
19 December the 10th of 1993 by President Boban?
20 A. No. I can't honestly say that I would
21 have --
22 Q. Very well.
23 A. -- been aware of that.
24 Q. Turning to Mr. Kordic for just a few moments,
25 before the end of March of 1994, I believe that you had
1 a grand total of three meetings with him; is that
3 A. Three that I have recorded. There may have
4 been more, but I don't believe so.
5 Q. Mr. Kordic would routinely be present if
6 anything of political significance was being discussed;
7 isn't that correct?
8 A. I would say, in a trans-Vitez or trans-Lasva
9 Valley context, that's correct. I tended to try to
10 relegate my contacts at the level appropriate; in other
11 words, with the mayors or the political representatives
12 of the specific area, whether it be Busovaca or Novi
13 Travnik or Travnik or Vitez.
14 Q. Did you know that before the civil war, that
15 Mr. Kordic was a journalist and that he did not have a
16 military background?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Were you aware that Mr. Kordic was elected as
19 the president of the commission for the implementation
20 of the Washington Agreement by the republic, sir?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And it was in connection with his functions
23 in that capacity that he made the requests to you for
24 safe passage through Muslim-controlled areas to places
25 such as Bugojno; correct?
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. All right. The only time that you ever saw
3 Mr. Kordic in camouflage clothing was the February
4 the 7th, 1994, meeting about which you've testified;
6 A. I believe it was the 21st of February. It
7 was the one at the Wolf's Lair, that I recall.
8 Q. Well, reading from page 7 of your statement
9 -- I don't think there is any dispute about this; it's
10 page 2483 of the document we've been given. Relating
11 to the 7th of February, 1994, meeting, you said, "I met
12 Dario Kordic inside this building," which you've
13 referred to as the Wolf's Lair. "He was in a
14 camouflage uniform, although I do not remember seeing
15 any badges or rank insignia on his uniform. It was the
16 only time that I ever saw him in uniform." Does that
17 refresh your memory?
18 A. There was one incident; it was at the Wolf's
19 Lair. I thought it was the 21st, but it might have
20 been the 7th.
21 Q. At this time, the ABiH was still in control
22 of the portion of the main supply route just outside of
23 Santici; correct?
24 A. That's correct. The HVO resumed -- resumed
25 control of it sometime in late February, early March.
1 I don't remember the exact date.
2 Q. Turning to the February the 21st meeting
3 about which you've testified, the first comment made to
4 you in that meeting was that the Croatian Republic of
5 Herceg-Bosna had its own laws, just as did UNPROFOR;
6 and that comment was made to you by Mr. Kordic, was it
8 A. I believe that's correct, yes.
9 Q. And Mr. Kordic said that notwithstanding his
10 assurance to you that convoys -- U.N.-sponsored convoys
11 should not be subject to physical inspections, that
12 would have to be approved by the central government of
13 the republic in Mostar; correct?
14 A. Correct. But he made the decision on the
15 spot, at the end of the meeting. He assumed the
16 responsibility himself, which is the appropriate
18 Q. And he specifically did so as a gesture of
19 goodwill, did he not?
20 A. Certainly that was the impact, yes.
21 Q. Did you or anyone of whom you know ever ask
22 Mr. Kordic what the limits on his political
23 decision-making powers were?
24 A. No, not specifically.
25 Q. All right. You gave some short testimony,
1 and I won't spend too long on this, about meetings that
2 you held with HVO commanders and HR-HB dignitaries on
3 February the 25th of 1994. That was a meeting with
4 Colonel Filip Filipovic; correct?
5 A. Right.
6 Q. And also present was General Ante Roso;
7 correct? Do you remember that?
8 A. Vaguely, yes.
9 Q. Were you aware that General Roso, unlike
10 Mr. Kordic, was actually a member of the government of
11 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna and that he also
12 sat on the presidency?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. All right. Turning to the Washington
15 Agreement, this was negotiated in Washington, D.C., and
16 signed approximately March the 14th or so of 1994; is
17 that correct?
18 A. I believe it was March the 1st, but --
19 Q. March the 1st? I may be wrong.
20 A. Early March.
21 Q. Mr. Kordic was not a participant in any of
22 the negotiations on the Croat side, was he?
23 A. No.
24 Q. In fact, the Croat representative was an HVO
25 vice-president by the name of Kresimir Zubak, was it
2 A. Correct.
3 Q. And he actually signed the Washington
4 Agreement on behalf of the Croat contingent; correct?
5 A. That's correct, and he subsequently assumed
6 responsibility as the president of the Federation.
7 Q. Yes. I have just one question in connection
8 with the burned-down fuel station at the village of
9 Divjak. That's a village that is to the south of
10 another village called Grbavica; correct?
11 A. I would say to the south and east, yes.
12 Q. Yes. Now, let me just conclude your
13 examination, if I can, just by going over some of the
14 opinions that we heard from you for the first time last
15 night and this morning. With respect to the asserted
16 rental of Bosnian Serb artillery and tanks, have you
17 ever seen any receipts for that, any documentation that
18 would support it?
19 A. No, not either directly or indirectly within
20 the U.N. These are reports that we had from both
21 Zagreb and internally.
22 Q. Suffice it to say, though, that neither you
23 nor anybody else of whom you are aware ever spoke to
24 any Croat commander who confirmed that; correct?
25 A. No one that I know directly, no.
1 Q. And the same is true with respect to Bosnian
2 Serb army commanders, too; no one has ever confirmed
3 that story to you, or anyone else that you know of.
5 A. Not to me directly, no.
6 Q. All right. Were you aware -- just one
7 question about the president of the HR-HB: Were you
8 aware that the president, in addition to being the
9 commander in chief of the armed forces of the HVO, also
10 had the specific power to appoint and dismiss
11 high-ranking military holders of office?
12 A. It makes sense.
13 Q. With respect to the HV military police about
14 which you testified very briefly, you didn't see any of
15 these gentlemen yourself, did you?
16 A. The -- yes, I did, as a matter of fact. In
17 the -- in the store, the restaurant that was next to
18 the burned-out garage.
19 Q. How many of them did you see?
20 A. Five. Five, six.
21 Q. Did you ask them whether they were from
22 Croatia or from Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. I looked at their patches, and they were HV
24 patches with "Policija" under it.
25 Q. All right, but the question was: Did you
1 ever ask them, either yourself or through an
2 interpreter, where they came from?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Do you speak Croatian yourself?
5 A. No. I understand Serbo-Croat.
6 Q. The last question, sir, with respect to
7 Mr. Boban and his fortunes after the signature of the
8 Washington Agreement, let me put it to you that he was
9 actually one of 15 sector directors in the INA, and
10 that the actual director of the INA -- and I think you
11 know this -- was a gentleman by the name of
12 Dr. Gregoric; is that correct?
13 A. I'm sorry, I wasn't aware of that
14 specifically. I thought he was a director. But he was
15 on the board of INA. Okay.
16 Q. Thank you very much, sir. I have no further
18 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
19 JUDGE MAY: Two minutes.
20 MS. SOMERS: Your Honour, may I ask the Court
21 if tomorrow morning I could have ten minutes? Because
22 it'll go beyond two minutes.
23 JUDGE MAY: Really?
24 MS. SOMERS: Just to clean up, it would -- I
25 will keep it very focused, but I would ask just for ten
1 minutes in the morning.
2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Carter, can you come back
3 tomorrow? It'll be tomorrow afternoon, not tomorrow
5 THE WITNESS: That's fine, Judge.
6 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.
7 JUDGE MAY: No more than --
8 MS. SOMERS: Absolutely.
9 JUDGE MAY: -- a few minutes.
10 If you come back then, please, would you
11 remember during this adjournment not to speak to
12 anybody about your evidence, of course, and that
13 includes members of the Prosecution.
14 THE WITNESS: Very well, sir.
15 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much.
16 Half past 2.00 tomorrow.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
18 1.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,
19 the 9th day of November, 1999, at
20 2.30 p.m.