1 Tuesday, 9th November, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.43 p.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your
6 Honours. Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor
7 versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
8 JUDGE MAY: Ms. Somers, we're late starting.
9 There seems to be a breakdown in communication with the
10 video booth, but we're now ready. So if you could make
11 your re-examination even quicker, please, so we can get
12 on to the next witness.
13 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour. I would
14 ask the registrar, please, to distribute to the bench
15 and to counsel and the witness a quick summary that
16 will make this very quick.
17 Also, while that's being distributed, if I
18 just may bring to the attention of the court and the
19 court reporters, Ms. Verhaag indicated that on page
20 9671 of yesterday's transcript, there is an error in
21 the date. The line should read: "... recollection of
22 conversations that occurred in February '94," but it
23 says "February '93," which is not the time frame during
24 which Lieutenant-Colonel Carter was in Bosnia. If it's
25 possible just to make that correction, we would
1 appreciate it.
2 WITNESS: FLOYD CARTER [Resumed]
3 Re-examined by Ms. Somers:
4 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a number of
5 questions concerning the role of Dario Kordic in the
6 various governmental structures of Herceg-Bosna were
7 posed to you yesterday, and in review, there were many
8 inaccuracies in the questioning.
9 In order to clear this up, I would ask that
10 everybody take a look at the binder in front of him and
11 pay only attention to those pages that have yellow
12 tabs. I preface this by saying that because of the
13 short time frame, an official translation in the
14 Serbo-Croat of the Narodni List has not been obtained;
15 it has been requested both in French and English. What
16 we have been able to do, if the Court will grant us
17 this, is just to have not a totally accurate, but
18 reasonable summary, and we will put in as quickly as
19 possible the official one. It's just the time frame
20 that's made it impossible.
21 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
22 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.
23 Q. Mr. Carter, if you can look at the first tab,
24 please. The Narodni List, of course, is one of the
25 documents with which International Community people are
1 familiar, as it is the Official Gazette of
2 Herceg-Bosna, both the Community and the Republic; is
3 that correct?
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. On the first tabbed English page, it says
6 page 18, number 1, "October 1993, Official Gazette of
7 the Community of Herceg-Bosna." Can you indicate,
8 please, under "Decision", what that decision concerns
9 and what Dario Kordic has to do with that decision?
10 A. Reading there, it indicates that he has been
11 nominated chamber of deputies, CRHB, that is, for the
12 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, from Busovaca, as president;
13 and Bozo Rajic from Kupres as member.
14 Q. If you turn to the next page, which has some
15 highlighting on it as well, it says "Article 2" and it
16 talks about when it goes into effect, and that
17 indicates it should go in on the date of adoption; is
18 that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. The next decision on that same page, although
21 it does not have a tab -- the tab is on the next page
22 in English -- indicates that it is a decision on the
23 election of members for the Committee for Internal and
24 Foreign Policy and National Security of the HR-HB,
25 Chamber of Deputies, which is another name for the
1 House of Representatives. Do you see Dario Kordic's
2 name on the next page?
3 A. Affirmative.
4 Q. Thank you. Looking at the next tab in
5 English -- may I point out to the Chamber and to
6 counsel that the English is always first and the
7 Serbo-Croat is later. There are other documents which
8 are not tabbed but are relevant, but for the purposes
9 of this examination, I think it's sufficient to go to
10 the highlighted ones.
11 On the next English tab, dated March 1994 --
12 it is page 342, number 8 of the Narodni List, or the
13 Official Gazette -- what does the decision indicate
14 about Mr. Kordic?
15 A. The decision on election, vice-president
16 chamber of deputies, CRHB, as vice-president, Dario
17 Kordic, from Busovaca, and Vlado Santic from Bihac.
18 Q. Thank you. The next English language
19 tab shows June 1995, the Official Gazette of HR-HB,
20 page 403, number 17. What does the decision concern?
21 It's in the centre.
22 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I must object to
23 this. This is, A, beyond the scope of our
24 cross-examination and, B, concerns matters that
25 occurred, apparently, in 1995, which is years after the
1 end of the period covered by the amended indictment.
2 JUDGE MAY: It's all part of the picture.
3 Whether it is of any weight or significance will be a
4 matter for us to decide in due course.
5 MS. SOMERS:
6 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, would you
7 continue, please.
8 A. Announcement of the members of the
9 Presidential Council of HR-HB to include Dario Kordic
10 and Tihomir Blaskic as members.
11 Q. The next English page, please, it says page
12 434, number 18 of the Official Gazette, June 1995.
13 What does the decision concern?
14 A. Relief of duty of members of commissional
15 elections, chamber of deputies. Relieved of duty,
16 Dario Kordic as president --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down for the
19 A. Following persons relieved of duty: Dario
20 Kordic as president, Hudic as vice-president, and Rajic
21 as member.
22 Q. And Dario Kordic and Bozo Rajic were the
23 vice-presidents during the HZ-HB period; that is
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. The next page, please, in English would be
2 page 436, number 18 --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Would you please slow
5 JUDGE MAY: The interpreters are having
7 MS. SOMERS: I'm so sorry. I'll slow down.
8 Q. The next decision, page 436, number 18, June
9 1995. Could you tell us what it concerns, please?
10 A. Appointment of members for internal and
11 foreign policy and national security of the HRHB
12 Chamber of Deputies.
13 Q. And is Kordic named there?
14 A. Yes. He is named as President.
15 Q. The next page, please, page 538, number 23 of
16 the Official Gazette of the Croatian Republic of
17 Herceg-Bosnia, July 1995. The decision concerns?
18 A. It concerns Dario Kordic's relief of duty as
19 vice-president of the Herceg Republic Chamber of
21 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, you indicated yesterday
22 that you viewed the type of authority of Mr. Kordic as
23 evolutionary. And in furtherance of that evolution, if
24 you will turn to the next tabbed English page, which is
25 labelled November 1992, Official Gazette of the
1 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna. That would be
2 HZHB, number 7, page 17. Would you please read the
4 A. That decision appoints members of the HVO and
5 includes Dario Kordic as a member of the personnel
7 Q. Of the HVO HZHB personnel commission; is that
9 A. Right.
10 Q. And then finally -- actually, that is it.
11 Therefore, yesterday the assertion that was
12 made that Dario Kordic only held one position in the
13 government structure of HRHB prior to February of '94
14 was inaccurate; is that correct?
15 A. That's correct.
16 MR. SAYERS: Objection, Your Honour. That's
17 argumentative and a comment.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes. I agree. It's for us
19 to make a decision about it.
20 MS. SOMERS: Sorry. If I may just rephrase.
21 Q. There were positions that were held?
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down,
23 Ms. Somers, please. Could you slow down, Ms. Somers.
25 MS. SOMERS:
1 Q. I'm sorry. Mr. Carter, I didn't hear your
3 A. Yes, he held various positions.
4 MS. SOMERS: I'm very sorry. My apologies.
5 Thank you. I have no further questions.
6 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, that concludes your
7 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International
8 Tribunal to give it. You are now released.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
10 JUDGE MAY: While we are waiting for the next
11 witness to be brought in, let me deal with two
13 First of all, a memorandum which has been
14 sent to me on behalf of the interpreters. They request
15 that, whenever possible, counsel, when handing out
16 documents, make sure that three additional copies go to
17 the interpretation booths. This was apparently
18 mentioned to you when you were speaking to them at the
19 beginning. And if that is not possible, that at least
20 there is a copy put on the electronic monitor.
21 Bear in mind the difficulty which the
22 interpreters have in a case of this sort and also their
23 crucial role in the case. And so would counsel kindly
24 do all they can to make their job as easy as possible.
25 The other matter concerns the week of the
1 29th of November, when there will be sittings in the
2 afternoon in the case of Simic, which means that this
3 case will not be able to sit. What has been agreed is
4 that on Monday, the 29th of November, and Tuesday, the
5 30th of November, and possibly, and I am told probably
6 by some, on Wednesday, the 1st of December, this case
7 won't sit. So those two first days that I mentioned,
8 definitely, and a possibility of a third day.
9 We'll sit this afternoon till a quarter past
10 five and take a break at a suitable moment.
11 If we could have the witness, please.
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would take
14 the declaration.
15 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
16 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
18 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a
20 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
21 WITNESS: ALASTAIR DUNCAN
22 Examined by Mr. Lopez-Terres:
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Lopez-Terres.
24 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Are you, in fact, Alastair Duncan, now a
1 General in the British army, born in 1952 in Norfolk,
2 England; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Mr. Duncan, before you begin to testify,
5 could you tell me, please, whether you were able to
6 read the summary of your statements that was made,
7 starting with your statement in April of 1997 and your
8 testimony in the Blaskic case on the 3rd of June 1998?
9 Were you able to read that document?
10 A. Yes, I was, sir.
11 Q. Do you agree with what's stated in the
13 A. Yes, sir, I do.
14 Q. Mr. Duncan, did you join the British army in
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. And since that time you were a Commander of
18 military operations at various levels, in fact all
19 levels, from the platoon to the company, battalion and
20 brigade, and even division; is that correct?
21 A. Yes, sir.
22 Q. Is it also true that you were responsible for
23 tactics and command duties of commanders in the British
25 A. Yes, sir.
1 Q. Were you trained at the Shrivenham College,
2 training college, as well as the Camberley College?
3 A. Yes, I was. I was taught at both
5 Q. During your career, did you become a
6 specialist and command the responsibilities and duties
7 of unit commanders and, more specifically, in infantry
8 units; is that correct?
9 A. That is correct, sir. Yes.
10 Q. Mr. Duncan, from May 1993 to November 1993,
11 as a Lieutenant-Colonel, were you the commanding
12 officer of the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of
13 Yorkshire, at that time stationed in Central Bosnia?
14 A. Yes, sir, I was.
15 Q. And you replaced Colonel Bob Stewart, who was
16 responsible for the Cheshire brigade, and who left
17 Central Bosnia at the same time; is that correct?
18 A. That is correct, sir, yes.
19 Q. It was on the 11th of May, 1993 that you took
20 over your command; is that correct?
21 A. The 11th of May.
22 Q. In the days preceding that date, that is,
23 from the 5th to the 11th of May, did you already have
24 the possibility of becoming familiar with the zone that
25 you were going to command by making various on-site
1 visits to unit commanders who were available?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 Q. During the visit, did you have the chance to
4 go to Ahmici?
5 A. Yes, I did. I went to Ahmici briefly with
6 Colonel Stewart.
7 Q. You had already come to Central Bosnia in
8 January and February of 1993 on a reconnaissance
9 mission in order to prepare your future mission; is
10 that correct?
11 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
12 Q. Your area of responsibility for your regiment
13 covered the Prozor region, Gornji Vakuf, Zenica, Vitez,
14 and the way up to Tuzla?
15 A. Yes, sir, that's correct too.
16 Q. Was your regiment composed of several
17 companies, two mixed companies in Vitez, one in Gornji
18 Vakuf and one in Tuzla, with your headquarters being in
20 A. Yes, sir, that's correct too.
21 Q. During the period when you held that command,
22 General Duncan, did you note various phases on the
23 ground, particularly that in May and June 1993 the army
24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina had made substantial gains in
25 territory in the Vitez and Busovaca areas?
1 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.
2 Q. Did you also note that in July 1993 that the
3 conflict extended into the Gornji Vakuf zone, where
4 there was very heavy fighting, and from that period
5 onwards the situation became static around Vitez,
6 Busovaca and Kiseljak?
7 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.
8 Q. I would like us to focus now on the Vitez
9 area, the Vitez pocket. That Vitez area was of
10 materiel, political and strategic interest; is that
11 correct? That is, for the Bosnian Croats.
12 A. Yes, it was. Yes.
13 Q. Could you tell us why specifically that zone
14 was important for the Bosnian Croats?
15 A. I believe this zone represented an area of
16 Croat -- Bosnian Croat territory, which was claimed by
17 the Bosnian Croats as for theirs, and they wished to
18 keep that territory. The area was of military
19 significance in that it dominated the Lasva Valley in
20 that part of Central Bosnia and created a pocket, along
21 with the other pockets, which was preventing the
22 Bosnian Muslim army from making further advances to the
23 south and taking more territory.
24 The area had a spinal road through it and the
25 defence was conducted with some territorial forces
1 which held the ground throughout the pockets and then
2 using the spinal road to reinforce the area, in a
3 similar fashion to the way that troops were able to
4 move very quickly by train in the First World War to
5 plug the holes before breakthroughs. And that defence
6 was conducted with extreme success by the Bosnian Croat
7 army in that pocket, the HVO.
8 Q. In Vitez was there also any types of
9 industries that were of particular interest to both the
11 A. There was an ammunition, an armament factory
12 in Vitez, which I believe held large quantities of
13 explosives, which was of strategic significance both to
14 the Croat and Muslim forces. Furthermore, in Novi
15 Travnik area there was an arms factory which was also
16 of strategic significance.
17 Q. The units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army were
18 interested in those factories, and of course the HVO
19 was opposed to their capturing those industries; is
20 that correct?
21 A. That's correct. Yes.
22 Q. As regards the HVO forces that we are
23 speaking about, what is your opinion as to the quality
24 of the equipment that the HVO had as regards
1 A. The HVO had quite sophisticated
2 communications, consisting of telephone and fax
3 facilities, as well as, I believe, satellite phone
4 facilities, and also some what one might term
5 walkie-talkies, for tactical command on the ground,
6 although I believe these were linked by repeaters and
7 thus they were able to communicate throughout their
8 operational zone with this equipment.
9 Q. Did the HVO also have equipment in case there
10 were electricity cuts?
11 A. Yes, I believe they had generators to sustain
12 their communications.
13 Q. As regards the operations of that HVO army,
14 you concluded that that army operated like any other
15 army in the world, even if it had an operating system
16 which is somewhat particular to it, because it was
17 based on a territorial organisation?
18 A. Yes, sir. The HVO army in the Vitez pocket
19 was organised very much on territorial lines, in that
20 some troops were allocated various sectors to which
21 they would be permanently attached. There were then
22 manoeuvre elements behind that could reinforce. And
23 although the soldiers lived at home with their weapons
24 and equipment, they were very quick to mobilise and
25 plug gaps and followed a very good chain of command.
1 This is similar to modern armies in Norway,
2 Sweden and Switzerland, who have a territorial-based
3 army which is every bit as efficient, in fact in many
4 cases more efficient, because troops are already in
5 their battle positions rather than have troops deployed
6 in barracks, where they have to be moved out to engage
7 enemy forces.
8 Q. As regards the military equipment that that
9 HVO army had, were you able to see that the army also
10 had effective operational equipment, modern equipment?
11 A. Yes, sir, they had modern equipment, which
12 had formerly belonged to the Yugoslav army and was now
13 theirs, of up to 152-millimetre-calibre field guns,
14 mortars of up to 120 millimetre, machine-guns and
15 anti-aircraft guns. And it would appear they had
16 sufficient ammunition for that weapon system as well.
17 Q. Still speaking about the HVO army's
18 organisation, did you know that there was a
19 disciplinary regulation or code which had been set up
20 or drafted for the organisation of those units?
21 A. Yes. I understood that there was a military
22 code for the HVO, and I have seen throughout the time
23 an English translation of that code. The code covers
24 all the normal functions and requirements of a military
25 code to enable an army to operate both administratively
1 and on the field in operations.
2 Q. I would like to show you a document,
3 General. This was a document published in the Narodni
4 List in September 1992 and it's dated 3 July 1992 and
5 signed by the President Mate Boban. This is Exhibit
7 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I want to
8 say for the transcript that the document is 3 July, 3
9 July 1992.
10 Q. General, would you have a look at that
11 document, the English version of the document, and tell
12 us whether that corresponds to the Code of Military
13 Discipline that you have just spoken to us about.
14 A. Yes, sir. That is the Code of Military
15 Discipline for the HVO.
16 Q. Thank you. In your testimony before the
17 Office of the Prosecutor in April of 1997, you put
18 forth a document, which was called the battle order, in
19 military language, which was prepared by the
20 intelligence officer of your regiment, Mr. Simon
21 Harrison. I would like to show you the document and
22 would then ask you to make some comments about it.
23 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] The
24 document is referenced Exhibit Z2653, 2653.
25 Q. The document is almost at the end of the pile
1 of documents that was given to you.
2 A. Thank you. I have it here.
3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Could we
4 put that on the ELMO, please. Could we put the
5 document on the ELMO, please. Thank you, Mr. Usher.
6 Q. Is this document the one that you gave to our
7 investigators in April of 1997, General?
8 A. Yes, sir, it is, and I've signed the top
9 right-hand corner to that effect.
10 Q. The document was drafted by the intelligence
11 officer of your regiment, Mr. Harrison, at that time.
12 Could you tell us what information this document was
13 based on?
14 A. Yes, sir. This document was based on
15 information that was, firstly, handed over to us from
16 the previous battalion, that is, Colonel Bob Stewart
17 and the Cheshire Regiment; secondly, from visits by my
18 officers around the area to brigades, formations, and
19 troops, and also visits to headquarters by myself and
20 my liaison officers. Thus we were able to compile this
21 document and maintain it as accurately as we could,
22 keeping it up to date throughout our time in Bosnia.
23 Q. On the first page of the document, we see the
24 operational group commands of the HVO, as well as the
25 various brigades, which were distributed through your
1 area of responsibility and even beyond; is that
3 A. Yes, that's correct.
4 Q. As regards the second, third, and fourth
5 pages, they deal with the Bosnia-Herzegovina army units
6 and the 3rd Corps, in particular, which was in Zenica;
7 is that correct?
8 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.
9 Q. Could you tell us approximately when that
10 document was prepared, stating that in the lower right
11 corner, we see the date of 14 June 1993 as being the
12 date when the Kakanj Brigade surrendered to the Bosnian
13 army forces.
14 A. Yes, sir. This document would have been
15 prepared and finalised shortly after that time, after
16 we had received that information, and then my officer,
17 Captain Simon Harrison, would have done an update;
18 therefore, the date of the 14th of June is quite
19 significant and places it around and about that time,
20 perhaps slightly later than the 14th, to allow for the
21 events to filter through to us.
22 Q. In respect of the two accused, their names
23 appear on the document; that is, the accused Mario
24 Cerkez, which is somewhat cut off because the copy
25 isn't very good, and we apologise for that, in the left
1 part, for the Vitez Brigade --
2 A. Yes, sir.
3 Q. -- and we see the name of the accused Dario
4 Kordic on the document as well; is that correct?
5 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
6 JUDGE MAY: Where, Mr. Lopez-Terres, are we
7 finding this?
8 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] For the
9 accused Mario Cerkez, that is to be found in the lower
10 left part. There is the mention of Viteska. The "Vit"
11 is hard to read. And you've got the name of Cerkez,
12 which you see there, and then furthest to the left,
13 under the Operational Group 1, and right next to the
14 Frankopan Brigade where there was a cross put.
15 As regards the accused Dario Kordic, that
16 also was in the left part of this document, in the
17 first rectangle of that left part.
18 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.
19 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General Duncan, as we said, this is a battle
21 order which is to be used purely by the military; is
22 that correct?
23 A. Yes, sir, that's correct. It's a battle
24 order going down as far as the brigade level, and I
25 carried a copy of this in my pocket during my time in
2 Q. As regards a military document, could you
3 explain to us why, on this upper-left part that we've
4 just spoken about, we see a rectangle in which is the
5 name of Mr. Kostroman, Valenta, Dario Kordic, and the
6 name of the Bosnian Croat party, the HDZ? These are
7 political structures; isn't that correct?
8 A. Yes, sir. I should explain that the box in
9 the centre, the "OPs Zone of Central Bosnia," the top
10 centre, this document describes the hierarchy of
11 military units down to brigade size, and therefore you
12 have three basic levels. The op zone at the top, which
13 was the higher command; below that, the three
14 operational groups, 1, 2, and 3; and below that, a
15 number of named brigades formed up.
16 This gives the skeleton of the key units
17 which formed the op zone of Central Bosnia, commanded
18 at that stage by Tihomir Blaskic, and you will see his
19 name under the central box.
20 On the left and right of that central box are
21 dotted lines which connect the two dotted boxes, the
22 one on the left entitled "HDZ" and the one on the
23 right, the "BiH HVO Joint Command." These two boxes
24 are included because of the political nature of the HVO
25 command in that area, in that there was a clear link,
1 in our minds, between the political and the military,
2 and that's why those lines are dotted. Therefore, the
3 influence from both the HDZ and the joint command would
4 come into that central zone in the middle. That box on
5 the left-hand side is not for specific command over
6 those units there, more for influence into the centre.
7 I could, perhaps, explain the relationship
8 between that box on the left with "HDZ," and underneath
9 it "Dario Kordic," and the "OPs Zone" box in the middle
10 with Tihomir Blaskic.
11 The box in the middle is for the operations;
12 that is Blaskic's task. The box on the left was for
13 the planning of those operations; that was Dario
14 Kordic's task. The box in the middle is for the
15 external fighting of the battle with all those forces
16 underneath it. The box on the left is for internal
17 business within the Vitez pockets and the other pockets
18 that existed at that time. The box in the middle is
19 for action, if you like, and the box on the left is for
20 doctrine. The box in the middle is for the purely
21 military aspects of business and the one on the left
22 for the politics.
23 So I hope that explains more clearly the
24 relationship between those boxes.
25 Q. On the similar document relating to the 3rd
1 Corps, we see the descriptions only of the military
2 units. There is no equivalence in the Bosnian army of
3 that kind of political presence; is that correct?
4 A. Sir, that is correct. We do not have a box
5 to the right or left of that for the reason that the
6 BiH, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mainly Muslim
7 army, did not have those same political connections,
8 and I believe that is partly due to the fact that there
9 was a clear link between the activities of the HVO and
10 Croatia itself and the HV; whereas the Bosnian Muslim
11 army, the BiH, did not obviously have links with anyone
12 external to Bosnia of a political nature, in the same
14 Q. On the same descriptive document, we do not
15 see units like the military police units or the special
16 units, such as the Vitezovi. Does that mean for you
17 that those units were outside that command structure?
18 A. No, sir. This document is specifically to
19 cover the main military units and not supporting units;
20 therefore, you can say it's a rather coarse, not a
21 finely detailed, document. But this is how we would
22 show, in the British army, an orbit of friendly or
23 enemy forces, or even neutral forces.
24 We would, therefore, not show supporting
25 engineers, supporting artillery units, supporting
1 manoeuvre units, or any other special units, such as
2 military police or other supporting units. They would
3 simply be accepted and attached and moved as required.
4 We might have shown them on a separate sheet as what we
5 would call corps troops available for deployment
6 throughout the area, but I didn't in this case, and we
7 didn't have the detail on the sheets, just, as I called
8 it, course groupings.
9 Q. The influence of politics over the military
10 matters, you yourself, such as your liaison officers in
11 the field, were you able to see that at all levels,
12 including the level of municipalities and brigades?
13 I would like to show you a document in that
14 respect. This is document Z969. It is a report, a
15 milinfosum of 24 May 1993. That is document 969.
16 Would you please read the second paragraph of
17 the document, General Duncan?
18 A. Yes, sir: "The ECMM LO confirms the growing
19 problems of Vitez by reporting that the meeting of the
20 local commission was the most unproductive yet. At the
21 meeting, Mario Cerkez stated that Mario Skopljak, the
22 mayor, had recommended that he stop attending the joint
23 commission as it was clearly not working. Comment:
24 That the HDZ controls the actions of the HVO is
25 becoming increasingly apparent. Comment ends."
1 Q. Thank you. In the report that came from your
2 regiment, do you find the confirmation of the idea that
3 there was an influence of the political side on the
4 military side, including on the brigade level, such as
5 here in Vitez?
6 A. Yes, I did, sir, and this was just one
7 example of that particular influence.
8 Q. Thank you. I want to go back to a point that
9 we've already referred to, that is, the military police
10 units in particular.
11 These military police units do not appear on
12 the battle order that we've just spoken about.
13 According to the information that you were able to get
14 at that time, could you tell us what authority or
15 authorities these units were subordinate to?
16 A. The military police, within the op zone,
17 would be subordinate to the commanders within that op
18 zone, either working directly for the commanders at the
19 highest level -- that is, both externally for Tihomir
20 Blaskic, or internally, I believe, for Dario Kordic --
21 and then down through this hierarchy, they would be
22 assigned as required to meet tasks. When such a unit
23 is assigned, it comes under the operational task of
24 that particular organisation, so that there is one
25 commander for that organisation.
1 It clearly would not be acceptable, in a
2 wartime situation, to have a unit come into one's area
3 of responsibility which had to be fed, clothed,
4 supplied with ammunition, and looked after, if you were
5 not also responsible for its actions; otherwise, you
6 could find it acting as against your plans as opposed
7 to with your plans.
8 Q. You have just said that the military police
9 units could be subordinate both or successively to
10 Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, or possibly, if I
11 understood you correctly, Mario Cerkez, who was the
12 brigade commander, if those units were acting within
13 his zone of responsibility; is that correct?
14 A. That's correct, sir, yes. Exactly correct.
15 Q. I would like to show you another report that
16 your regiment drafted, that is, Exhibit Z881,1, and I
17 would say that this report is dated 3 May 1993. It is
18 a mistake. It shouldn't say "3 May". That was a
19 typographical error made by the regiment at the time.
20 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, with respect to
21 this document, we've not seen it before; that's not a
22 real problem, but we object to the document coming into
23 evidence for the truth of the matters asserted on page
24 2. The subjunctive phraseology of those questions
25 obviously consists of speculation, and we don't know
1 whose speculation is reflected on page 2.
2 In the absence of a foundation, we would
3 object to this document being admitted for the truth of
4 those propositions which are contested.
5 JUDGE MAY: The witness can give evidence
6 about the document. What weight it has will depend
7 upon our understanding of the evidence and our decision
8 as to its value. Yes, it is admissible.
9 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
10 Q. General, could you take a look at the second
11 page of the document, the document which was just
12 mentioned by Mr. Sayers, that is, the paragraph dealing
13 with Vitez. Does this document, in fact, come from
14 your regiment, that is, report number 35 of your
16 A. Yes, sir, it does. It was prepared on an
17 almost daily basis by Captain Simon Harrison, assisted
18 by warrant officer McLeod, who were responsible for
19 this. The Vitez LO mentioned in paragraph 4 was a
20 Captain Whitworth, and he had confirmed by visiting
21 those details listed under there. And where it says
22 "Comment," that is the comment by a Captain Simon
23 Harrison to do with that information. He has made a
24 comment on the information, and that is clearly
25 separate from the statement.
1 This document represented every day to me, which
2 recorded the day's events, and it would then be
3 distributed around all units on all parts of my command
4 in order that everybody should be kept up to date with
5 events and changes of details as they occurred.
6 Q. In that Kordic's authority over the military
7 police and the estimate that you made, does it
8 correspond to the information that you and the regiment
9 had available at that time in Central Bosnia?
10 A. Yes, it does --
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, the document says
12 they apparently come under the direct control of Dario
13 Kordic. What information would you have had that would
14 substantiate that?
15 A. It would be substantiated by visits of my
16 officers to those units. One of their tasks was to
17 work out and complete the sheets of who worked for who
18 in the area. And they wouldn't gather that over one
19 visit; it would be gathered over a number of visits,
20 talking to both local people, officers in the units
21 involved, and as many other sources as we could put
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you give us a
24 practical example of an event that would indicate the
25 control or some fact that would indicate the control?
1 A. Much of -- it would be difficult to give a
2 concrete fact that would originate control. And I
3 would have to cast my mind back over events that took
4 place to find one. And regrettably, nothing springs to
5 mind immediately. But the officers and the LO's would
6 obviously not put that information in if they didn't
7 think it was of value. And at this stage in June that
8 year, it was of value.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
10 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General, perhaps you anticipated the question
12 that I was going to ask you. The incident of June '93,
13 that is the Convoy of Joy, couldn't that be, for
14 instance, an illustration, example of what we are
15 talking about? We shall come back to that incident, so
16 if you would only briefly touch upon it now.
17 A. During the incident involved on which we
18 called the Convoy of Joy, there was an occasion where
19 the road was blocked by both civilians, local HVO
20 soldiers and local police. I quoted the name of
21 Commander Blaskic in saying I had his authority to come
22 through. This was refused and I was only allowed to go
23 through, they said, if I had the express authority of
24 Dario Kordic. Thus, those units therefore were under
25 the express command of Dario Kordic and would not take
1 orders from Tihomir Blaskic.
2 So I hope that briefly gives an example,
3 which I'm afraid I couldn't call to mind before.
4 Q. We shall come back to that incident and
5 discuss about 10th of June, 1993, and we shall talk
6 about it in greater detail during your testimony.
7 However, during your period of command there,
8 you met various personalities in Central Bosnia -- the
9 accused Dario Kordic, Anto Valenta, Colonel Blaskic --
10 and I believe that you are also familiar with the name
11 of Mario Cerkez, but you do not remember meeting him as
12 a brigade commander?
13 A. That's quite correct. Whilst I am familiar
14 with the name Mario Cerkez, I do not remember or recall
15 ever meeting him when I was in Bosnia.
16 Q. But there were, of course, according to the
17 organisational chart, there were responsibilities, and
18 they -- your subordinates were directly in contact and
19 communicated with the brigade commander; is that
21 A. Yes, it is correct. What I wanted to do in
22 my relations with people is not to duplicate activity,
23 because my area of responsibility, as you've heard,
24 stretched a huge distance. And therefore it was
25 important that we didn't duplicate our effort. I
1 elected that it would be correct for me to speak at the
2 level of the Ops Zone Commander, that is, to Tihomir
3 Blaskic and Dario Kordic, and below that my company
4 commanders would take the next level down. Below that,
5 my liaison officers would take a level below that. So
6 that we had a structure to go and find information and
7 come back and monitor what was going on. Because what
8 I didn't want to do was have a stream of people
9 visiting various organisations during the day, which,
10 frankly, would have been upsetting for them and a
12 And that also that system I adopted enabled a
13 good flow of information between my officers and the
14 single units in some cases that they were assigned to,
15 or a town, and it may be in some cases I said: Your
16 responsibility is Vitez, your responsibility is
17 Busovaca or your responsibility is Novi Travnik.
18 It was an attempt to separate out and make
19 sure we had some efficient links established.
20 Q. Those liaison officers in the regiment, one
21 of them was Mark Bower; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, that is correct. Bower was one of my
23 key liaison officers.
24 Q. And on the 9th of May, 1993, if I am correct,
25 you met for the first time the accused Dario Kordic,
1 accompanied by Tihomir Blaskic, and you met in the
2 Vitez Hotel, did you?
3 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.
4 Q. Could you tell us very briefly on whose
5 initiative was the meeting called?
6 A. The meeting was called on the initiative of
7 Colonel Bob Stewart, because on the 9th of May I had
8 not yet taken over command of the troops, the British
9 troops in the Vitez area. The purpose of the meeting
10 was to introduce me to Tihomir Blaskic and see his
11 headquarters, and it was also an opportunity for
12 Colonel Stewart to question Blaskic about the events of
13 Ahmici, which had taken place a couple of weeks or so
14 before. That was the purpose of the meeting.
15 Q. As far as you could understand, Colonel
16 Stewart and Tihomir Blaskic had already met before and
17 discussed the massacre at Ahmici, didn't they?
18 A. Yes, they had indeed. Yes.
19 Q. A correction. Excuse me. It seems that on
20 the transcript the name of the liaison officer who was
21 mentioned, by whom I mentioned, is Lee Whitworth, and
22 it seems that it is missing. So I would just like --
23 Lee Whitworth and Angus Hay.
24 JUDGE MAY: You mentioned Mark Bower.
25 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mark
1 Bower. [No interpretation].
2 JUDGE MAY: Well, we've got evidence about
3 these things anyway.
4 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes,
5 right. Thank you.
6 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Excuse me,
7 Mr. Lopez-Terres. It seems that the witness answered
8 only with regard to Mr. Bower, saying that he was one
9 of his most important liaison officers, but he did not
10 comment on other names. Is that so?
11 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes,
12 indeed, Your Honour.
13 Q. Lee Whitworth and Angus Hay were also
14 officers, weren't they?
15 A. Perhaps if I could clarify, because these
16 officers were obviously under my command. Mark Bower
17 was a captain whose primary responsibility was for the
18 Red Cross and also to see whether aid was distributed
19 around the area.
20 Captain Hay, Angus Hay, his primary
21 responsibility was for the Vitez area itself. Later on
22 he was to hand over to Captain Whitworth.
23 And those three captains were part of my team
24 of liaison officers at that time.
25 I trust that makes that clear, sir.
1 Q. Thank you, General. And during this meeting
2 on the 9th of May 1993, was Dario Kordic in a military
4 A. I don't believe that Dario Kordic was at the
5 beginning of the meeting, but during the meeting he
6 came in. He was dressed in a camouflage pattern
7 material, without a hat, and with no badges of rank.
8 When he came in, the proceedings were stopped and he
9 was briefly introduced as Dario Kordic. I was given to
10 understand that he was, how shall I say, of Colonel
11 status and therefore he had a status, although not an
12 official rank.
13 Q. In the course of this meeting, the item of
14 the village of Ahmici was referred to. Could you
15 please tell us briefly what explanations were made by
16 Colonel Blaskic as regards the perpetrators of the
17 massacre at Ahmici?
18 A. Yes, sir. Colonel Stewart accused Colonel
19 Blaskic of being directly responsible for the Ahmici
20 massacre. This he denied and he gave the reasons -- or
21 the responsibility for the attack on Ahmici to three
22 sources: The first was Serb extremists, who would have
23 had to have come an awful long way to get there; the
24 second was Muslims attacking their own Muslims; and the
25 third was Muslims dressed up in HVO uniform.
1 Both Colonel Stewart and myself found these
2 explanations as to who had done the attacking and those
3 responsibilities completely unacceptable.
4 Q. In the course of this meeting Colonel Blaskic
5 admitted that the village of Ahmici was within his
6 responsibility, didn't he?
7 A. Yes, he did.
8 Q. As far as you know, General, was the village
9 of Ahmici also in the area of responsibility of the
10 Vitez Brigade?
11 A. Yes, it was. It was very close to Vitez, six
12 to eight hundred yards, from memory of that map of that
13 area. It was certainly not far away.
14 Q. During those explanations made by Colonel
15 Blaskic, do you remember if the accused Dario Kordic
16 intervened, perhaps intervened perhaps to add something
17 to these explanations or comment on them?
18 A. I don't recollect that he made any comment at
19 that stage. I think one would describe him as being
20 very much in the back seat of that meeting, which was
21 really a meeting between myself, Colonel Stewart and
22 Tihomir Blaskic.
23 Q. Would you know if Colonel Stewart had invited
24 Dario Kordic to that meeting?
25 A. No, sir, I wasn't aware of that. We were
1 merely -- the plan had been to visit Commander Blaskic
2 in his headquarters, and he was not directly invited,
3 certainly not by Colonel Stewart.
4 Q. And in the course of that meeting, you and
5 Colonel Stewart, did you indicate to Colonel Blaskic
6 that the Muslims in Ahmici were seen escorted by HVO
7 soldiers and then taken to Vitez, where they were
8 detained, and what did Colonel Blaskic answer after he
9 received that information from you?
10 A. He answered that -- well, first of all, he
11 was somewhat reluctant to answer and denied that there
12 were HVO escorting those prisoners, but Colonel Stewart
13 was quite emphatic, because he had personally seen
14 these people been escorted. And one of the reasons put
15 forward by Colonel Blaskic was that this was for the
16 safety of those Muslims. This surprised both Colonel
17 Stewart and myself, because we weren't particularly
18 sure why Muslims should be kept safe from other
19 Muslims. And surely it would be better if the HVO
20 forces were involved in guaranteeing protection for the
21 Croats in the area of Ahmici, rather than the Muslims,
22 since it was the Muslims who had been attacked, and not
23 the Croats.
24 Q. Did Colonel Blaskic mention during that
25 meeting at some time the presence of some extremists in
1 this sector of Ahmici?
2 A. He did mention extremists, yes. At this
3 meeting, and many after, meetings afterwards, the word
4 "extremists" was used a lot.
5 Q. Did you know at that time who was Colonel
6 Blaskic referring to at that moment?
7 A. Perhaps I should state that Colonel Blaskic
8 was clearly referring in his mind to those people who
9 had done the massacre at Ahmici and labelling them as
10 extremists. I came to realise over the succeeding
11 months that this excuse was always used by commanders
12 to deny that they had anything to do with operations.
13 But I found it very strange in such a small place as
14 the Vitez pocket, where there was a military, a firm
15 and an efficient military control, both externally in
16 the defence of the pocket and internally from the HVO
17 military police, civilian police and others, that such
18 a situation of extremists could occur.
19 My conclusion, therefore, was that there
20 weren't extremists at all. There were Croat forces who
21 were being directed from central command to carry out
22 various actions, as and when required by either the
23 military or the political.
24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lopez-Terres, if you are
25 going to move on to another topic, this might be a
1 convenient moment to take a break for a quarter of an
3 One matter to consider is this: that I
4 understand this witness can only be here for today and
5 tomorrow. The position tomorrow is that we shall only
6 be sitting in the afternoon. The hearing will be
7 restricted by the fact that the case I am sitting on in
8 the morning is liable to go on till 2.00. So at the
9 earliest, we will not be able to begin until 2.45.
10 That being so, at the present rate of going,
11 it seems very unlikely that we are going to get through
12 this witness's evidence.
13 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] We have
14 already envisaged that possibility, which I know
15 Duncan, Mr. President, General Duncan has confirmed to
16 me that he would not be available after tomorrow
17 afternoon, and, if need be, we have already envisaged
18 another date when he could again appear before the
19 Chamber to finish his testimony.
20 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Five past 4.00,
22 --- Recess taken at 3.53 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
25 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
1 Mr. President, before we continue with the examination,
2 the testimony, I spoke with Mr. Sayers about the length
3 of cross-examination, and the Defence counsel have told
4 me that they are envisaging a whole day for the
5 cross-examination of this witness.
6 The witness, before he made his solemn
7 declaration, told me that he would be ready to come
8 back on the 25th of November or the 1st of December,
9 and on the basis of what you have told us now, the 1st
10 of December -- evidently, on the 1st of December, we
11 would not be sitting, but we shall have to discuss with
12 this witness a day when he will be able to come again.
13 So if you would allow me, I should like to consult the
14 witness on this matter.
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you can do that, you've
16 certainly got leave to do that, but how long do you
17 anticipate being in chief? Can you finish that by
19 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes, of
20 course. Yes.
21 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation]
22 Mr. Lopez-Terres, how much longer is the direct
23 examination going to last?
24 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I believe
25 we shall need perhaps about a quarter of an hour
1 tomorrow to complete the examination-in-chief.
2 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] And that
3 means that the cross-examination can't start tomorrow.
4 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes.
5 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] If you say
6 one day, if you have the whole afternoon tomorrow for
7 the cross-examination, then you will not need another
9 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] But that
10 is a question that you should ask the Defence counsel.
11 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] No, I am
12 asking both. Does that mean that tomorrow afternoon,
13 Mr. Sayers, you will use for cross-examination?
14 Because the examination-in-chief will take only ten
15 minutes, a quarter of an hour tomorrow, so you will
16 begin to cross-examine the General tomorrow, and
17 therefore you will need only another afternoon to
18 complete your cross-examination. I believe that would
19 be more useful to us.
20 So would you agree with me, Mr. Sayers, that
21 you will need, after tomorrow, only another afternoon
22 to complete your cross-examination?
23 MR. SAYERS: I would like to agree. I can't
24 be absolutely certain, without hearing precisely what
25 the General has to say, Your Honour. But clearly we
1 respect the General's tight schedule, clearly we have
2 to work around the General's schedule, but by the same
3 token, I would stress -- and I'm sure this point is not
4 lost on the Trial Chamber -- that the evidence of this
5 witness is very significant. He's an extremely
6 important witness; in fact, as far as I can tell, the
7 first witness who has come forward with concrete
8 evidence on the matters charged in the amended
9 indictment, rather than speculation.
10 So it's important for us not to rush through
11 the cross-examination of this witness, as perhaps we
12 have done with other more peripheral witnesses. I want
13 to be certain that we go through the General's
14 testimony very carefully. Many of the issues upon
15 which he has testified consist of matters of opinion,
16 maybe legitimate, and we have to examine the basis for
17 those opinions, and there are a number of documents
18 that we have to examine with this witness.
19 But I would certainly think that the
20 cross-examination would not last more than one entire
21 trial day, and I have consulted with my colleagues
22 representing Mr. Cerkez and they have told me that they
23 anticipate that the questions they have for the General
24 would last perhaps a half an hour, perhaps 45 minutes,
25 depending on how long I am.
1 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Thank you,
2 Mr. Sayers.
3 JUDGE MAY: Certainly we will finish the
4 examination-in-chief, Mr. Lopez-Terres, and you can put
5 your mind to that, please.
6 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General Duncan, before we took our break, we
8 were speaking about the meeting between Colonel Blaskic
9 and Dario Kordic. During that meeting, Colonel Blaskic
10 committed himself to making an investigative report
11 about the events in Ahmici and that everything would be
12 done before the 25th of May, 1993.
13 As far as you know, was an investigative
14 report ever prepared, or did you ever learn about such
15 a report during the seven months that you were there?
16 A. Sir, it's my understanding at that meeting
17 that the date, the 25th of May, was produced for -- was
18 suggested to be the date when that report should be
19 produced, with the evidence fresh in people's minds.
20 At that time, and since then, I have not seen any
21 report produced by the Bosnian Croat forces, the HVO,
22 of events in Ahmici at all. There's been no report, to
23 my knowledge.
24 Q. Four days after that meeting, that is, on the
25 13th of May, 1993, you had quite a long meeting with
1 Anto Valenta in his office at Colonel Blaskic's
2 headquarters in the Hotel Vitez. We're going to speak
3 about that meeting.
4 Mr. Valenta gave you a book on that day and
5 also explained some of his ideas to you about how
6 certain movements of populations would be possible in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could we speak about that?
8 A. Yes, sir. I went to visit Mr. Valenta in his
9 office in the Hotel Vitez, in the centre of Vitez
10 town. He then wished to present to me the contents, a
11 brief resume, of the book he wrote in 1991. This book
12 concerned the movement of -- or the problems, as he saw
13 it, rather, in Bosnia as a whole, and he presented to
14 me what he saw as a number of solutions to this
16 I have to say I found his solutions quite
17 shocking, and some of his comments, I believed, were
18 racist in nature. He was accusing Muslims of
19 dominating towns with their minarets and their prayers,
20 of breeding faster than it was acceptable to breed. He
21 then described how the populations should be moved
22 around to create some order in the state of Bosnia, as
23 he saw it, and this would involve forcible removal of
24 individuals, regardless of their own wishes, a total
25 interference in their lives by the state, and also
1 included the possibility of the use of the army to
2 enact this process. I was frankly horrified by these
4 Q. The book that Mr. Valenta gave to you at that
5 time, was that called "The Partition of Bosnia and the
6 Struggle for Integrity"; is that correct?
7 A. That's correct, yes.
8 Q. During the meeting did Mr. Valenta also show
9 you charts with demographic data that were in his
11 A. Yes, sir, he did. He had a number of charts
12 on the wall, which he displayed as he was going through
13 his briefing on the situation and the solution, as he
14 saw it.
15 Q. During the discussion, did Mr. Valenta
16 explain to you as well that he had no more friendship,
17 feelings of friendship with the Muslims in the region,
18 that he even felt hatred toward them?
19 A. Yes, he did. We talked about his past and
20 his life to date. And it transpired, and I knew this
21 from the cover of his book, apart from anything else,
22 that he had been born in Dolac and had been to school
23 in the local area, alongside both Muslims, Croats and
24 some Serbs. He had then gone off to university and
25 come back and been a teacher. And I think the fact
1 that he had returned to teach young people and held
2 these very strong racist views, I found, to be honest,
3 unacceptable; that somebody with such a good education,
4 a university education, could propose a solution to the
5 problems in his country which involved forcible
6 movement of populations based on their ethnic origin.
7 He further went on, when I questioned him,
8 and I said, "Well, how do you feel about Muslims now?"
9 And he said, "I hate them." Those were his exact
11 Q. Did he also tell you that it was out of the
12 question for him to continue living with the Muslims?
13 A. Yes, sir, he did. He found them intolerable
14 to live with.
15 Q. During the discussion, or after the
16 discussion with Mr. Valenta, did you make a connection
17 between the theories and doctrine that he was
18 expressing with the events taking place in the area
19 around Vitez in April?
20 A. Yes, sir, I did. It wasn't difficult when
21 one looked at the situation in this pocket, in this HVO
22 pocket in the centre of Bosnia, that Valenta had
23 produced, if you like, the doctrine for what was going
24 to happen. Then the policy from that doctrine had been
25 distilled, I believe, by Dario Kordic, who was
1 responsible for the internal affairs. And that policy
2 was then put into effect by the HVO.
3 So you had a doctrine, a plan, and an
4 instrument to carry out exactly what Valenta had
5 proposed, and I was well aware that Valenta was a
6 serious and senior official of the HDZ party. And here
7 was this party proposing to put in effect and had put
8 into effect this policy. And I believed that Ahmici
9 represented a first step along that line.
10 Q. A few days after the meeting with Valenta,
11 that is, the 19th of May, 1993, did you have the
12 opportunity to go to a country house outside of
13 Busovaca where Dario Kordic lived? What was the name
14 that was given or that you gave to that residence at
15 the time?
16 A. At the time we gave the name of the Eagle's
17 Nest to that residence.
18 Q. Could you tell us why that name was given to
19 that location?
20 A. There were a number of factors that led to
21 that name being given, and it was I that gave it that
22 name. It was the first time I had been there. It was
23 set as a hunting lodge in beautiful countryside, and it
24 was a place where political people clearly met. And I
25 made a parallel with events in the past, and therefore
1 it then became known as the Eagle's Nest.
2 Q. The events in the past that you are talking
3 about are Berchtesgaden? Did you think about
5 A. That is correct. I saw there was a similar
6 parallel to those two situations, of Berchtesgaden and
7 what became known as the Eagle's Nest.
8 Q. During that meeting on the 19th of May,
9 were Mr. Blaskic and Mr. Valenta both present?
10 A. They were indeed, yes, sir.
11 Q. Do you remember some of the subjects that
12 were discussed during those meetings, what was the very
13 specific purpose of the meeting?
14 A. The purpose of the meeting was to get to know
15 -- or for me to be invited, and I think for people to
16 meet me in the area. I believe the main purpose of
17 that meeting was as a political meeting for the HDZ,
18 because, as far as I could see, most of the senior
19 people were assembled at that meeting. But at the same
20 time, it was also a social meeting where they had
21 obviously gathered for lunch, to which I, and I believe
22 the Dutch battalion commander at the time, Colonel
23 Schipper, had been invited.
24 Q. During that meeting did you happen to talk
25 about a safe zone that you were requiring to be around
1 your camp, so as to avoid -- that you would not come
2 under the fire of snipers?
3 A. Yes. I mean, I was -- did not raise many
4 subjects for discussion, since it was clearly a social
5 invitation for lunch, but what I did raise was the
6 problem of both BiH and HVO soldiers firing into the
7 United Nations camp that my troops occupied. And it
8 was my understanding it was an agreement, which had
9 been made with both of these parties in the conflict,
10 that they would observe a 500-metre exclusion zone
11 around my camp, where there would be no military
12 activity and certainly no firing into the camp.
13 The reason I had specifically raised this
14 point, as we had been having HVO sniper fire from the
15 HVO lines to the south of our camp directly into and
16 across our camp, and this was clearly dangerous for
18 Q. General Duncan, do you remember any other
19 subjects that may have been discussed during that
21 A. Not specifically, I'm afraid.
22 Q. Ten days later, that is, the 29th of May,
23 1993, you and some of your men transported in your
24 vehicles the unit commanders to Kiseljak for a meeting
25 which was being held at the United Nations
1 headquarters; is that correct?
2 A. [No audible response]
3 Q. General Petkovic was also there at that
4 meeting. Could you tell us in a few words what
5 happened during that meeting?
6 A. Yes. I was requested by the United Nations
7 to ferry under armour, for their safety, senior
8 officers from the HVO to a meeting in the United
9 Nations headquarters in Kiseljak. The plan was so that
10 the United Nations could speak to the HVO about
12 In the event, what actually happened was that
13 the meeting with the HVO and United Nations lasted some
14 20 minutes. After that, the HVO officers drove off in
15 their cars and I believe went for a meeting
16 themselves. They returned some three hours later to
17 the U.N. headquarters and I ferried them back to where
18 they had come from, from the Busovaca and Vitez
20 Q. After that meeting of the HVO unit commanders
21 in Kiseljak, or the Kiseljak region, did you see any
22 developments in the relationship between the HVO and
23 the Serbian forces in the region?
24 A. We began to notice, after that meeting, that
25 there was very little military activity on the front
1 lines between Serb and Croat. And indeed, in the
2 Kiseljak area we became aware that considerable black
3 market activity was taking place across front lines,
4 cigarettes in particular, and also fuel was coming in.
5 In addition to that, as events went across,
6 we noticed that where the HVO had suffered some defeats
7 at the hand of the BiH Army, civilians and, I believe,
8 some soldiers, had actually moved across those front
9 lines with the Serbs and later reappeared, as it were,
10 having moved around.
11 This took place both in the Travnik area,
12 after the expulsion of HVO from Travnik, and the Croats
13 from Travnik, and also in the Vares area later on in
14 the year.
15 Q. Do I understand you correctly by taking it
16 that the borders between the HVO and the Serb forces
17 became more permeable at that time?
18 A. Sir, that would be exactly correct. That
19 would be a very succinct way of summing up that
21 Q. You just told us that you were responsible
22 for transporting some of the unit commanders to
23 Kiseljak, that is, military authorities. Did it
24 sometimes happen as part of your responsibilities you
25 would transport civilian or political authorities, and
1 specifically Dario Kordic and other representatives of
2 the HDZ political party?
3 A. This I in general refused to do, and indeed
4 on a number of occasions Valenta had asked me
5 specifically to move him round, and I refused so to
6 do. There was one occasion later on in the Vance-Owen
7 planning where I was asked to move a number of
8 civilians out of the area to a major meeting that I
9 believe was taking place in the Mostar area. In
10 general, these directives came down from my
11 headquarters of the United Nations.
12 Q. I would like to show you a document, one
13 dated 24 August 1993, which is reference Z1179. .
14 1179. Would you look at the page, which, at the
15 bottom, says 5-6, the paragraph that says
17 Could you make a comment to us about the
18 request that your regiment received at that time and
19 tell us what is the list that we see in this document.
20 A. Yes, thank you. This request was to
21 transport, as it says on the bottom of page 5-6, the
22 full Croat political hierarchy in Central Bosnia, and
23 there follows on page 6-6 a complete, as we believe it,
24 or nearly complete, list of the major political figures
25 that existed in Central Bosnia at that moment.
1 Q. According to the list that was given to you
2 at the time by Mate Boban, or people acting in his
3 name, Dario Kordic appears as the first person on the
4 list in that hierarchy of political authorities in
5 Central Bosnia.
6 A. Yes, he does. He's very much the first on
7 the list.
8 Q. Thank you, General.
9 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Mr. Usher,
10 that's all right now.
11 Q. We have already mentioned the incidents of
12 the 10th and 11th of June, 1993, these incidents
13 relating to the Convoy of Joy or the Convoy of Mercy,
14 since both of the expressions were used interchangeably
15 for that convoy. You yourself were involved, were the
16 direct witness of the fact that we're going to speak
18 The convoy was authorised, that is, its
19 movement was authorised, by an agreement between the
20 Croatian authorities and the Bosnian authorities so
21 that the convoy could reach Tuzla. You were able to
22 see yourself documents that indicated that that
23 agreement had been reached; is that correct?
24 A. That's correct, yes. I was shown the
25 documents by Tihomir Blaskic.
1 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I would
2 appreciate it if the Prosecution would not lead on this
3 particular subject.
4 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
5 Q. You learned about these documents. Could you
6 tell us how you learned it or where the documents came
7 from, who issued them?
8 A. I was concerned about the safety of a convoy,
9 which I knew was coming from the south, consisting of a
10 number of Muslim-driven vehicles which contained
11 supplies and equipment for the Muslims in Tuzla. The
12 convoy was about 300 vehicles, that was the proposed
13 strength, and it contained, I believe, a complete mix
14 of medicines, food, clothing, and aid, in general, for
15 Muslims in the north.
16 We learned about the arrival of this convoy
17 from United Nations sources, and I immediately, having
18 learnt about this, went to see Tihomir Blaskic in his
19 headquarters to confirm that he had received
20 instructions to the effect that the convoy was to get
21 through, and I did that because the United Nations
22 command had told me there was a formal agreement.
23 Commander Blaskic then told me about this
24 formal agreement and showed me the pieces of paper, and
25 I sought his assurances that the convoy would not be
1 harmed and that he would facilitate its passage. This,
2 he stated, he would do to the best of his ability, but
3 he did comment that there were a lot of people in the
4 Vitez pocket, some 30.000 additional displaced people,
5 and that it would be difficult to control them.
6 I said, "As a military commander, it is your
7 responsibility, along with the civilian government, to
8 make sure that the people are controlled. You have
9 that responsibility," which he accepted but
10 reluctantly. That is the background to the convoy.
11 Q. Could you tell us briefly under what
12 circumstances that convoy was stopped in the Novi
13 Travnik region and then in Vitez?
14 A. The convoy arrived at the southern edge of
15 the interface between Muslim and Croat forces, which
16 was Gornji Vakuf, and it proceeded up through the
17 Muslim area below Novi Travnik. It then came to an
18 area known, I believe, as Radovica [sic], I think it's
19 called -- I would have to check on that -- it is an
20 area just down below Novi Travnik, where the road from
21 the south at Gornji Vakuf comes out into a village.
22 Q. Excuse me, General. The name that you're
23 mentioning, might it be Rankovici?
24 A. Yes, Rankovici. Thank you. I'm sorry. Yes,
25 it's Rankovici. It was there that the road was blocked
1 and the convoy was forced to halt; it was there that
2 Muslim drivers were extracted from their vehicles and
3 shot, we believe a total of eight. My soldiers were
4 unable to take action at that stage because they were
5 blocked from both seeing this happening directly,
6 although we heard the shots and found the bodies later
7 on, and it was there that that convoy was then looted
8 by soldiers and civilians.
9 I myself was blocked by a crowd of women and
10 children who had moved across the road further to the
11 north of that, as it was my intention to go down and
12 see what was going on and try and resolve the
14 Whilst I was stuck at that roadblock of women
15 and children, trying to get down south, vehicles
16 containing Petkovic, the commander, came down, who
17 spoke to the crowd. I asked for Petkovic for his
18 assistance to get me down south, and he laughed and
19 drove through, leaving me still there.
20 A little later on, two cars of HVO police
21 also came down the road from the north. They stopped
22 again by me at this block of women and children, talked
23 briefly to the women and children. I then asked them
24 to assist me in getting down to the south. They were
25 extremely abusive and they then drove through as well.
1 Q. General, you've just spoken about the HVO
2 police. Is this the civilian or military police?
3 A. This is the military police, and I have seen
4 a video taken by a newsreel team which shows the HVO
5 insignia, belts, batons, and white pistol holders,
6 which indicates the HVO police involved in that
8 Q. Excuse me. I interrupted you.
9 A. The convoy then was obviously stuck, and we
10 were negotiating to get it through. Eventually, it was
11 released from that area and then came up into the area
12 of Vitez, where it was blocked again at the junction at
13 the east end of town, on the Vitez bypass where one can
14 turn south or carry on along the road that eventually
15 leads down the Lasva Valley.
16 You will appreciate that a convoy of 300
17 vehicles is quite a long convoy, and having discovered
18 it had been blocked, I went out with the ECMM
19 ambassador and with Tihomir Blaskic to try and unblock
20 the convoy. It was blocked by local HVO soldiers and
21 women and children.
22 I got to the front of that convoy in my
23 vehicles and demanded that we come through, and I was
24 told that the soldiers and the women and children would
25 not move, except on the express orders of Dario Kordic;
1 I confirmed that a number of times. They were
2 absolutely clear. They were shouting the name "Kordic,
3 Kordic, Kordic," and that was it. They would not in
4 any way speak to Blaskic. Indeed, when I mentioned
5 Blaskic's name, I remember one of them spitting on the
7 We moved off backwards, away from the convoy,
8 back to the ECMM hut, to try and resolve the problem,
9 at which stage I discovered that elements of the convoy
10 had been split off and were being moved by Croats,
11 civilian and military, off the road into the town of
12 Vitez, into the quarry, which is at the beginning of
13 Vitez. Indeed, the whole convoy was being broken up
14 and dispersed round the town and looted by the locals,
15 both civilians and military.
16 I should add that in the course of the
17 movement of the convoy through the Vitez area, two HVO
18 soldiers fired at the convoy, thereby endangering the
19 lives of the drivers, and in order to further protect
20 those lives, my soldiers, in a Warrior, fired their
21 machine gun, which killed those two soldiers.
22 We were now in a stalemate situation where
23 there was no convoy left to look after. I informed and
24 had kept informed the United Nations at all times. The
25 United Nations Chief of Staff, Brigadier Hayes, came
1 down to join me, and the next morning we began work
2 again to undo this problem.
3 I think we then met again at the wood
4 factory, and also in Hotel Vitez, at which time it
5 became apparent that this situation could go on no
6 longer, and I made that point both to Tihomir Blaskic
7 and Dario Kordic. It was Dario Kordic who then said he
8 would sort out the situation, and within an hour, those
9 vehicles had all been released and put back on the road
10 and assembled again; the convoy was then able to move
11 off. I was quite surprised at the speed at which it
12 happened and also quite surprised at the way it was
13 quite clear that it was Dario Kordic who was, as it
14 were, calling the shots for this event and that General
15 Blaskic or Colonel Blaskic was taking the back seat.
16 The convoy eventually moved off, having lost
17 a significant part of its equipment, and people had
18 been killed, and that then closed, if you like, this
19 incident, with the convoy moving out of my area.
20 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] At the
21 beginning of your testimony, General, when you spoke
22 about that event, you spoke about eight people whom you
23 didn't see, but you heard the shots, and eight people
24 were allegedly killed at the beginning of that
25 roadblock. Later on, did you have any information
1 about the execution of those eight individuals?
2 A. We understood, sir, that they had been killed
3 by the HVO or civilians in that area. There were both
4 HVO police in that area and HVO soldiers. It's my
5 understanding that they were killed by weapons held by
6 those people.
7 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] And you
8 don't know why those eight people were executed.
9 A. I can only assume, sir, that they refused or
10 were very reluctant to give up the contents of their
11 load to anyone else. Having been blocked and then
12 clearly assaulted, pulled out of the cabs, they may
13 well have resisted and that resulted in their being
15 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Thank you.
16 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
17 Q. General Duncan, other drivers, or rather
18 several of the other drivers, those who were not
19 killed, they were also subjected to very grave
20 violence, weren't they?
21 A. They were, yes. A number of them were beaten
22 up and they sheltered by their vehicles overnight, and
23 we did as best as we could to provide sentries to stop
24 further harassment. Regrettably, another two or three
25 drivers, I believe, were killed up in the area of
2 Q. You spoke about the quarry, the quarry which
3 is near Vitez. Is it the Mosunj quarry that you had in
5 A. Yes, it is. It's a very large quarry. It's
6 a very obvious feature on the map. That quarry was
7 where a number of the vehicles which had been looted or
8 were being looted were taken by local police military
9 and civilians, and that's where they were left. And it
10 was there that I went to examine the situation. In
11 fact, there are HVO forces stationed in that quarry.
12 It is in the area where there were a number of, or one
13 or two, large howitzers which fired from the relative
14 safety of the quarry.
15 Q. And that quarry is therefore in the area of
16 responsibility of Mario Cerkez, isn't it?
17 A. It is his area of responsibility as the
18 brigade commander.
19 Q. And the two HVO soldiers who were killed by
20 your men, why were they killed?
21 A. They were killed because they were firing on
22 the convoy with their rifles, and having fired warning
23 shots, they refused to stop firing and carried on
24 firing. And under my mandate and the rules of
25 engagement, it was clear to us that the only way we
1 could stop them was that they would be shot, or
2 certainly shot at. And unfortunately, both were
4 Q. And it all happened in the Vitez area, did
6 A. In the Vitez area, yes.
7 Q. And after your meeting, you talked with the
8 ECMM ambassadors and with Dario Kordic and Colonel
9 Blaskic. What was the interpretation you gave to those
11 A. Looking at the events as a whole of that
12 two-day period, I concluded that there had been a plan
13 made, despite the orders from, I assume, Mate Boban, to
14 let the convoy through, that a certain slice could be
15 taken off this convoy for the inhabitants of the Vitez
16 pocket to have. And so a certain amount of looting was
17 to be tolerated.
18 I suspect that this explained the reason for
19 the HVO Commander Pektovic to be in the area that day
20 and the day before. I assumed he was consulting with
21 the HVO in that area.
22 I also suspect that perhaps events got out of
23 hand and people took more than, perhaps, had been
24 bargained for. And the plan, as it were, which I
25 believe -- and it is my opinion -- it was a plan to cut
1 out these things. The plan went slightly wrong and
2 more was taken and people were killed when perhaps they
3 shouldn't have been killed.
4 And then finally, when we realised and when
5 the HVO realised things had gone too far, Dario Kordic
6 was very quick to say, "That's it." They had taken
7 their slice and then they would let the convoy
9 It was my opinion the whole thing was very
10 neatly and carefully orchestrated. To achieve the
11 results they did in the way they blocked the road at
12 critical places, to cut out those vehicles neatly and
13 accurately in small packets, would have taken a deal of
14 planning. It was a very precise, clever, fast and
15 slick operation, which required a very clear set of
16 orders and a very clear command chain to make sure it
17 went well. And as far as I could see for the Croats in
18 that pocket, that plan did go well. They succeeded in
19 getting what they wanted.
20 It would, of course, have enhanced the
21 reputation of the local commanders in that area with
22 their population, in that they had given them the food
23 and supplies they believed they needed.
24 Q. And you exclude the possibility that it was
25 organised by civilians who were furious, they wouldn't
1 let the convoy just get away?
2 A. That's an excellent excuse, but, as I said, I
3 have seldom seen such a well-orchestrated plan; where
4 we were cut off, there were clear routes to take
5 vehicles away, people could be moved on and off roads,
6 and, as I say, at the end, when Kordic issued the
7 orders to unblock, things were unblocked very quickly.
8 Q. During your meeting with Kordic on the 11th
9 of June, did he say that he would conduct an
10 investigation of the murders of the drivers who had
11 been killed?
12 MR. SAYERS: I object, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MAY: This is in dispute, is it?
14 MR. SAYERS: Yes, it is, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, Mr. Lopez-Terres,
16 don't lead on this particular matter.
17 Brigadier, would you tell us what, if
18 anything, Dario Kordic may have said about an
19 investigation or anything like that?
20 A. Because people had been shot, it is a
21 requirement from my side to produce an investigation as
22 to those details of why they were shot. And this
23 affected all shootings that my soldiers were involved
24 in. And I also asked that the HVO in a similar fashion
25 would produce a report as to why people had been
1 murdered, because, clearly, people had been murdered,
2 and I wished to establish exactly why and how.
3 To my knowledge, this report was never
5 JUDGE MAY: And who did you ask to produce
6 the report?
7 A. I asked the report to be produced by Dario
8 Kordic. I would accept that it is not necessarily his
9 responsibility to produce that report, but I would
10 expect the HVO command, as it were, to have produced a
11 report to me. They had in the past proven they could
12 produce reports remarkably quickly. We had an event
13 where a rocket launcher was fired into my camp. Within
14 two days, the HVO soldier who had done this was found.
15 He was put on trial. He was found guilty, sentenced,
16 and locked up in Busovaca prison. So I knew they were
17 capable of producing investigations and reports when
18 they felt like it. And I suspect in this instance they
19 didn't feel like it.
20 You could ask that perhaps I should have
21 reminded the HVO government about this, but, to be
22 honest, with the span of command that I had, this
23 became just another problem which clearly wasn't going
24 to have a resolution, and I had to move onto other
25 concerns and business.
1 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
2 Q. General Duncan, before we round off the
3 testimony regarding the Convoy of Joy, I should like to
4 show you three documents. One is Z1,044. That is
5 1044. The second is a report which has already been
6 produced. The second one is 1049,1. The third is
8 These are three reports. The first one is of
9 June 11th; the second is the 12th June; and the third
10 of the 21st of June.
11 A. I'm sorry, I'm missing the report from the
12 11th of June. Could I ask for the number again? Thank
13 you. I have it.
14 Q. Could we please have report Z1,044 placed on
15 the ELMO. Will you please quickly read through the
17 A. Yes, I will. I'll read it off the ELMO.
18 It's the military info --
19 Q. No. No. No. Just for yourself. Just for
20 yourself. Just read it through. This was the report
21 of your regiment and it recounts the circumstances of
22 the incident. And I believe there is also an annex
23 with the precise chronology of the incident. Could you
24 please have a look at this annex, which is on the last
1 Does this tell you what you saw happen and
2 what you were reporting about?
3 A. Yes, it does. It is a report, obviously,
4 compiled in my headquarters at the same time as I was
5 out dealing with these events. So the accuracy of
6 times is clearly much more accurate than I have been
7 able to describe from my memory. But it does
8 constitute a fairly succinct and full report of the
9 events that took place in those two days, the 10th,
10 11th of June. The timing, obviously, at the start of
11 each paragraph, the first two figures being the date
12 and then the second four figures the time in a 24-hour
14 Q. Eleven means the day?
15 A. Exactly.
16 Q. The second document is dated the 12th of
17 June, paragraph 2. 1049,1. This is passage 2 on the
18 Convoy of Mercy. It again says that the instructions
19 given by Kordic were followed up and obeyed.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And the third report dated the 21st of June,
22 page 6 of the report. There is a passage entitled
23 "Freedom of Movement." Do you see that?
24 A. Yes, I do.
25 Q. After the 11th of June, did you once again
1 discuss with General Blaskic -- and to discuss the
2 authority which Dario Kordic evidently had in that
3 area, as evidenced a few days before that?
4 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?
5 Q. The report of the 21st of June, and this is
6 in relation to a meeting which you had with Colonel
7 Blaskic. And during that meeting, if I understand
8 properly this report, you reminded Blaskic about the
9 incidents of the 11th of June and that it was possible
10 to put an end to it, owing to the intervention of Dario
11 Kordic, who, evidently, could control the movement of
12 the population in the area.
13 A. That's correct, yes.
14 Q. Thank you, usher. We are now passing onto
15 the 19th of June, 1993. That day you organised,
16 General Duncan, a meeting with the authorities of two
17 parties, Colonel Blaskic, Colonel Hadzihasanovic,
18 Colonel Merdan, and the purpose of the meeting was to
19 try to arrive at an agreement on ceasefire and
20 understanding about various issues. And at the time I
21 believe you were the one who drew up a report of that
22 meeting of the 19th of June '93, and which is Z1,078?
23 A. Yes, that's correct. I have the document in
24 front of me. It is -- I typed it myself. I typed
25 these documents immediately after meetings of what we
1 called the joint command. And the joint command is
2 really the -- on the last page those individuals who
3 are named as the action addressees. That includes
4 Colonel Blaskic and Colonel Hadzihasanovic, the two
5 senior military commanders in that area on the BiH and
6 Croat sides.
7 The aim of the meeting was very much as in
8 the agenda, those six items there, as these items were
9 disrupting the stability of the area, to say the
10 least. We were moving from a disturbed situation
11 towards open hostility between the BiH and the Bosnian
12 Croat army, the HVO.
13 The important thing about this piece of paper
14 is paragraph 5, where both commanders agreed to those
15 following subparagraphs there, that they would take
16 action and issue orders to make sure they took effect.
17 And you can see from the list there, these are fairly
18 substantial activities I was asking them to do in order
19 to calm down the situation and prevent these events
20 taking place.
21 Q. At that time of the meeting there were
22 prisoners too who had been detained equally by the HVO
23 and by the Bosnian army. Could you tell us something
24 as regards the HVO? Where were Muslim prisoners
1 A. Muslim prisoners were detained in a number of
2 sites within the HVO area of control. I did not know
3 exactly where these sites were, but the numbers of
4 prisoners were held by the ICRC where they could, and
5 were monitored by the ECMM where they could, and that
6 applies to both HVO and BiH prisoners. Prison exchange
7 was a major feature of this joint command meetings.
8 Q. Are you aware of Muslim prisoners in the
9 areas of Vitez, Busovaca and Kiseljak at the time?
10 A. Yes, I was. And the numbers were given to me
11 by the BiH and for the HVO prisoners, and for the
13 As a result of getting those numbers, we
14 decided together, with the commanders present, the ECMM
15 and the ICRC, to get together senior officers from both
16 sides to work out a programme for repatriation of the
17 prisoners from both sides.
18 Q. At that time too, are you aware of some
19 complaints of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities
20 regarding the status of prisoners, that is, prisoners
21 made to dig trenches for the HVO?
22 A. This was a complaint from both the BiH and
23 the HVO, that prisoners on both sides were being made
24 to dig trenches. I did state at the time that just
25 because one side is doing it doesn't give carte blanche
1 to the other side to do it, and I said that it was
2 actually illegal to use prisoners in such a fashion and
3 asked that prisoners should not be doing this.
4 Q. After that meeting of the 19th of June, did
5 you also organise other meetings of the same kind with
6 the same participants, or was it because this meeting
7 evidently did not meet with a successful end that you
8 stopped such meetings?
9 A. We continued to organise a series of
10 meetings, but it rapidly became apparent that action
11 was not taking place on either side and, therefore, it
12 was pointless carrying on. To be honest, at that
13 stage, there became a situation of open warfare between
14 the BiH and the HVO in Central Bosnia. So my attempts
15 at mediation had broken down. The inevitable, if you
16 like, had almost been pushed to the right, and open
17 warfare broke out. This represented a period of the
18 maximum activity in that Vitez pocket area.
19 Q. Perhaps just one last item before we conclude
20 for today. We already talked about June 1993, fire
21 was -- rather, a shot was fired at your camp. You
22 complained with Colonel Blaskic about that and Colonel
23 Blaskic assured you very quickly that the person who
24 had fired that shot had been found and detained. Could
25 you briefly recount that incident, please.
1 A. Sorry. I could recount it, but I believe I
2 have already recounted it in some detail.
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Sufficiently for our
5 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
6 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have a
7 document which bears on this incident. I wanted to
8 show it to the witness. The document is Z1130.
9 Q. It is a letter addressed to Colonel Blaskic
10 on the 30th of June, 1993. Have you found the
12 A. Yes, I have. This was another document that
13 I drafted myself. Thank you for reminding me.
14 Commander Blaskic's response to the incident
15 had been so quick and efficient, I thought it polite,
16 since I demanded the inquest, that I write back and
17 thank him for it, and you can see I have complimented
18 him on the speed and efficiency in which he'd taken
19 that action, offering my thanks for his assistance in
20 unlocking that problem.
21 Q. That fire that was opened on your camp came
22 from the area of Vitez.
23 A. Yes, it did. It was initiated by one of the
24 local HVO soldiers, who was subsequently taken off to
25 Busovaca, which is the prison for the local soldiers,
1 and incarcerated there.
2 Q. But you could never ascertain whether that
3 soldier had, indeed, been taken into custody and
4 sentenced. I mean, that was only what Colonel Blaskic
5 told you.
6 A. That is entirely correct. I actually thought
7 it somewhat rude to question Commander Blaskic. He'd
8 obviously taken firm action, and as one commander to
9 another, I thanked him, and that was the end of the
11 Q. You believed his word. You never saw a
13 A. No, I never saw a document.
14 Q. I thank you.
15 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]
16 Mr. President, I believe that we could adjourn now.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will adjourn until
18 tomorrow. I said 2.45. It may be more sensible to sit
19 at 3.00 because the previous hearing which I'm involved
20 in will go on until 2.00. So 3.00 tomorrow. We will
21 then sit, provided the interpreters are agreeable, a
22 little more than an hour and a half, sit without a
23 break, I suggest.
24 Brigadier, would you please be back then
25 tomorrow to continue with your evidence. I warn you,
1 as all witnesses are warned, not to speak to anybody
2 about your evidence until it's over; that does include
3 members of the Prosecution. But, as I said earlier, if
4 you need to speak to them about travel arrangements or
5 a day to come back, of course you can do so.
6 THE WITNESS: Sir, thank you very much, and I
7 apologise for not being able to be more flexible in my
8 dates to return. I do apologise for that.
9 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, we're well used to
11 Tomorrow at 3.00 please.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
13 5.17 p.m., to be reconvened on
14 Wednesday, the 10th day of November,
15 1999, at 3 p.m.