Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 9704

1 Tuesday, 9th November, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.43 p.m.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your

6 Honours. Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor

7 versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

8 JUDGE MAY: Ms. Somers, we're late starting.

9 There seems to be a breakdown in communication with the

10 video booth, but we're now ready. So if you could make

11 your re-examination even quicker, please, so we can get

12 on to the next witness.

13 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour. I would

14 ask the registrar, please, to distribute to the bench

15 and to counsel and the witness a quick summary that

16 will make this very quick.

17 Also, while that's being distributed, if I

18 just may bring to the attention of the court and the

19 court reporters, Ms. Verhaag indicated that on page

20 9671 of yesterday's transcript, there is an error in

21 the date. The line should read: "... recollection of

22 conversations that occurred in February '94," but it

23 says "February '93," which is not the time frame during

24 which Lieutenant-Colonel Carter was in Bosnia. If it's

25 possible just to make that correction, we would

Page 9705

1 appreciate it.


3 Re-examined by Ms. Somers:

4 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a number of

5 questions concerning the role of Dario Kordic in the

6 various governmental structures of Herceg-Bosna were

7 posed to you yesterday, and in review, there were many

8 inaccuracies in the questioning.

9 In order to clear this up, I would ask that

10 everybody take a look at the binder in front of him and

11 pay only attention to those pages that have yellow

12 tabs. I preface this by saying that because of the

13 short time frame, an official translation in the

14 Serbo-Croat of the Narodni List has not been obtained;

15 it has been requested both in French and English. What

16 we have been able to do, if the Court will grant us

17 this, is just to have not a totally accurate, but

18 reasonable summary, and we will put in as quickly as

19 possible the official one. It's just the time frame

20 that's made it impossible.

21 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

22 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.

23 Q. Mr. Carter, if you can look at the first tab,

24 please. The Narodni List, of course, is one of the

25 documents with which International Community people are

Page 9706

1 familiar, as it is the Official Gazette of

2 Herceg-Bosna, both the Community and the Republic; is

3 that correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. On the first tabbed English page, it says

6 page 18, number 1, "October 1993, Official Gazette of

7 the Community of Herceg-Bosna." Can you indicate,

8 please, under "Decision", what that decision concerns

9 and what Dario Kordic has to do with that decision?

10 A. Reading there, it indicates that he has been

11 nominated chamber of deputies, CRHB, that is, for the

12 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, from Busovaca, as president;

13 and Bozo Rajic from Kupres as member.

14 Q. If you turn to the next page, which has some

15 highlighting on it as well, it says "Article 2" and it

16 talks about when it goes into effect, and that

17 indicates it should go in on the date of adoption; is

18 that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. The next decision on that same page, although

21 it does not have a tab -- the tab is on the next page

22 in English -- indicates that it is a decision on the

23 election of members for the Committee for Internal and

24 Foreign Policy and National Security of the HR-HB,

25 Chamber of Deputies, which is another name for the

Page 9707

1 House of Representatives. Do you see Dario Kordic's

2 name on the next page?

3 A. Affirmative.

4 Q. Thank you. Looking at the next tab in

5 English -- may I point out to the Chamber and to

6 counsel that the English is always first and the

7 Serbo-Croat is later. There are other documents which

8 are not tabbed but are relevant, but for the purposes

9 of this examination, I think it's sufficient to go to

10 the highlighted ones.

11 On the next English tab, dated March 1994 --

12 it is page 342, number 8 of the Narodni List, or the

13 Official Gazette -- what does the decision indicate

14 about Mr. Kordic?

15 A. The decision on election, vice-president

16 chamber of deputies, CRHB, as vice-president, Dario

17 Kordic, from Busovaca, and Vlado Santic from Bihac.

18 Q. Thank you. The next English language

19 tab shows June 1995, the Official Gazette of HR-HB,

20 page 403, number 17. What does the decision concern?

21 It's in the centre.

22 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I must object to

23 this. This is, A, beyond the scope of our

24 cross-examination and, B, concerns matters that

25 occurred, apparently, in 1995, which is years after the

Page 9708

1 end of the period covered by the amended indictment.

2 JUDGE MAY: It's all part of the picture.

3 Whether it is of any weight or significance will be a

4 matter for us to decide in due course.


6 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, would you

7 continue, please.

8 A. Announcement of the members of the

9 Presidential Council of HR-HB to include Dario Kordic

10 and Tihomir Blaskic as members.

11 Q. The next English page, please, it says page

12 434, number 18 of the Official Gazette, June 1995.

13 What does the decision concern?

14 A. Relief of duty of members of commissional

15 elections, chamber of deputies. Relieved of duty,

16 Dario Kordic as president --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down for the

18 interpreters.

19 A. Following persons relieved of duty: Dario

20 Kordic as president, Hudic as vice-president, and Rajic

21 as member.

22 Q. And Dario Kordic and Bozo Rajic were the

23 vice-presidents during the HZ-HB period; that is

24 correct?

25 A. Correct.

Page 9709

1 Q. The next page, please, in English would be

2 page 436, number 18 --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Would you please slow

4 down?

5 JUDGE MAY: The interpreters are having

6 difficulty.

7 MS. SOMERS: I'm so sorry. I'll slow down.

8 Q. The next decision, page 436, number 18, June

9 1995. Could you tell us what it concerns, please?

10 A. Appointment of members for internal and

11 foreign policy and national security of the HRHB

12 Chamber of Deputies.

13 Q. And is Kordic named there?

14 A. Yes. He is named as President.

15 Q. The next page, please, page 538, number 23 of

16 the Official Gazette of the Croatian Republic of

17 Herceg-Bosnia, July 1995. The decision concerns?

18 A. It concerns Dario Kordic's relief of duty as

19 vice-president of the Herceg Republic Chamber of

20 Deputies.

21 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, you indicated yesterday

22 that you viewed the type of authority of Mr. Kordic as

23 evolutionary. And in furtherance of that evolution, if

24 you will turn to the next tabbed English page, which is

25 labelled November 1992, Official Gazette of the

Page 9710

1 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna. That would be

2 HZHB, number 7, page 17. Would you please read the

3 decision?

4 A. That decision appoints members of the HVO and

5 includes Dario Kordic as a member of the personnel

6 commission.

7 Q. Of the HVO HZHB personnel commission; is that

8 correct?

9 A. Right.

10 Q. And then finally -- actually, that is it.

11 Therefore, yesterday the assertion that was

12 made that Dario Kordic only held one position in the

13 government structure of HRHB prior to February of '94

14 was inaccurate; is that correct?

15 A. That's correct.

16 MR. SAYERS: Objection, Your Honour. That's

17 argumentative and a comment.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes. I agree. It's for us

19 to make a decision about it.

20 MS. SOMERS: Sorry. If I may just rephrase.

21 Q. There were positions that were held?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down,

23 Ms. Somers, please. Could you slow down, Ms. Somers.

24 Please.


Page 9711

1 Q. I'm sorry. Mr. Carter, I didn't hear your

2 answer.

3 A. Yes, he held various positions.

4 MS. SOMERS: I'm very sorry. My apologies.

5 Thank you. I have no further questions.

6 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, that concludes your

7 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International

8 Tribunal to give it. You are now released.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

10 JUDGE MAY: While we are waiting for the next

11 witness to be brought in, let me deal with two

12 matters.

13 First of all, a memorandum which has been

14 sent to me on behalf of the interpreters. They request

15 that, whenever possible, counsel, when handing out

16 documents, make sure that three additional copies go to

17 the interpretation booths. This was apparently

18 mentioned to you when you were speaking to them at the

19 beginning. And if that is not possible, that at least

20 there is a copy put on the electronic monitor.

21 Bear in mind the difficulty which the

22 interpreters have in a case of this sort and also their

23 crucial role in the case. And so would counsel kindly

24 do all they can to make their job as easy as possible.

25 The other matter concerns the week of the

Page 9712

1 29th of November, when there will be sittings in the

2 afternoon in the case of Simic, which means that this

3 case will not be able to sit. What has been agreed is

4 that on Monday, the 29th of November, and Tuesday, the

5 30th of November, and possibly, and I am told probably

6 by some, on Wednesday, the 1st of December, this case

7 won't sit. So those two first days that I mentioned,

8 definitely, and a possibility of a third day.

9 We'll sit this afternoon till a quarter past

10 five and take a break at a suitable moment.

11 If we could have the witness, please.

12 [The witness entered court]

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would take

14 the declaration.

15 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

16 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the

17 truth.

18 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a

19 seat.

20 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.


22 Examined by Mr. Lopez-Terres:

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Lopez-Terres.

24 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Are you, in fact, Alastair Duncan, now a

Page 9713

1 General in the British army, born in 1952 in Norfolk,

2 England; is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Mr. Duncan, before you begin to testify,

5 could you tell me, please, whether you were able to

6 read the summary of your statements that was made,

7 starting with your statement in April of 1997 and your

8 testimony in the Blaskic case on the 3rd of June 1998?

9 Were you able to read that document?

10 A. Yes, I was, sir.

11 Q. Do you agree with what's stated in the

12 summary?

13 A. Yes, sir, I do.

14 Q. Mr. Duncan, did you join the British army in

15 1970?

16 A. Yes, I did.

17 Q. And since that time you were a Commander of

18 military operations at various levels, in fact all

19 levels, from the platoon to the company, battalion and

20 brigade, and even division; is that correct?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Is it also true that you were responsible for

23 tactics and command duties of commanders in the British

24 army?

25 A. Yes, sir.

Page 9714

1 Q. Were you trained at the Shrivenham College,

2 training college, as well as the Camberley College?

3 A. Yes, I was. I was taught at both

4 establishments.

5 Q. During your career, did you become a

6 specialist and command the responsibilities and duties

7 of unit commanders and, more specifically, in infantry

8 units; is that correct?

9 A. That is correct, sir. Yes.

10 Q. Mr. Duncan, from May 1993 to November 1993,

11 as a Lieutenant-Colonel, were you the commanding

12 officer of the Prince of Wales' Own Regiment of

13 Yorkshire, at that time stationed in Central Bosnia?

14 A. Yes, sir, I was.

15 Q. And you replaced Colonel Bob Stewart, who was

16 responsible for the Cheshire brigade, and who left

17 Central Bosnia at the same time; is that correct?

18 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

19 Q. It was on the 11th of May, 1993 that you took

20 over your command; is that correct?

21 A. The 11th of May.

22 Q. In the days preceding that date, that is,

23 from the 5th to the 11th of May, did you already have

24 the possibility of becoming familiar with the zone that

25 you were going to command by making various on-site

Page 9715

1 visits to unit commanders who were available?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. During the visit, did you have the chance to

4 go to Ahmici?

5 A. Yes, I did. I went to Ahmici briefly with

6 Colonel Stewart.

7 Q. You had already come to Central Bosnia in

8 January and February of 1993 on a reconnaissance

9 mission in order to prepare your future mission; is

10 that correct?

11 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

12 Q. Your area of responsibility for your regiment

13 covered the Prozor region, Gornji Vakuf, Zenica, Vitez,

14 and the way up to Tuzla?

15 A. Yes, sir, that's correct too.

16 Q. Was your regiment composed of several

17 companies, two mixed companies in Vitez, one in Gornji

18 Vakuf and one in Tuzla, with your headquarters being in

19 Vitez?

20 A. Yes, sir, that's correct too.

21 Q. During the period when you held that command,

22 General Duncan, did you note various phases on the

23 ground, particularly that in May and June 1993 the army

24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina had made substantial gains in

25 territory in the Vitez and Busovaca areas?

Page 9716

1 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.

2 Q. Did you also note that in July 1993 that the

3 conflict extended into the Gornji Vakuf zone, where

4 there was very heavy fighting, and from that period

5 onwards the situation became static around Vitez,

6 Busovaca and Kiseljak?

7 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.

8 Q. I would like us to focus now on the Vitez

9 area, the Vitez pocket. That Vitez area was of

10 materiel, political and strategic interest; is that

11 correct? That is, for the Bosnian Croats.

12 A. Yes, it was. Yes.

13 Q. Could you tell us why specifically that zone

14 was important for the Bosnian Croats?

15 A. I believe this zone represented an area of

16 Croat -- Bosnian Croat territory, which was claimed by

17 the Bosnian Croats as for theirs, and they wished to

18 keep that territory. The area was of military

19 significance in that it dominated the Lasva Valley in

20 that part of Central Bosnia and created a pocket, along

21 with the other pockets, which was preventing the

22 Bosnian Muslim army from making further advances to the

23 south and taking more territory.

24 The area had a spinal road through it and the

25 defence was conducted with some territorial forces

Page 9717

1 which held the ground throughout the pockets and then

2 using the spinal road to reinforce the area, in a

3 similar fashion to the way that troops were able to

4 move very quickly by train in the First World War to

5 plug the holes before breakthroughs. And that defence

6 was conducted with extreme success by the Bosnian Croat

7 army in that pocket, the HVO.

8 Q. In Vitez was there also any types of

9 industries that were of particular interest to both the

10 parties?

11 A. There was an ammunition, an armament factory

12 in Vitez, which I believe held large quantities of

13 explosives, which was of strategic significance both to

14 the Croat and Muslim forces. Furthermore, in Novi

15 Travnik area there was an arms factory which was also

16 of strategic significance.

17 Q. The units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army were

18 interested in those factories, and of course the HVO

19 was opposed to their capturing those industries; is

20 that correct?

21 A. That's correct. Yes.

22 Q. As regards the HVO forces that we are

23 speaking about, what is your opinion as to the quality

24 of the equipment that the HVO had as regards

25 communications?

Page 9718

1 A. The HVO had quite sophisticated

2 communications, consisting of telephone and fax

3 facilities, as well as, I believe, satellite phone

4 facilities, and also some what one might term

5 walkie-talkies, for tactical command on the ground,

6 although I believe these were linked by repeaters and

7 thus they were able to communicate throughout their

8 operational zone with this equipment.

9 Q. Did the HVO also have equipment in case there

10 were electricity cuts?

11 A. Yes, I believe they had generators to sustain

12 their communications.

13 Q. As regards the operations of that HVO army,

14 you concluded that that army operated like any other

15 army in the world, even if it had an operating system

16 which is somewhat particular to it, because it was

17 based on a territorial organisation?

18 A. Yes, sir. The HVO army in the Vitez pocket

19 was organised very much on territorial lines, in that

20 some troops were allocated various sectors to which

21 they would be permanently attached. There were then

22 manoeuvre elements behind that could reinforce. And

23 although the soldiers lived at home with their weapons

24 and equipment, they were very quick to mobilise and

25 plug gaps and followed a very good chain of command.

Page 9719

1 This is similar to modern armies in Norway,

2 Sweden and Switzerland, who have a territorial-based

3 army which is every bit as efficient, in fact in many

4 cases more efficient, because troops are already in

5 their battle positions rather than have troops deployed

6 in barracks, where they have to be moved out to engage

7 enemy forces.

8 Q. As regards the military equipment that that

9 HVO army had, were you able to see that the army also

10 had effective operational equipment, modern equipment?

11 A. Yes, sir, they had modern equipment, which

12 had formerly belonged to the Yugoslav army and was now

13 theirs, of up to 152-millimetre-calibre field guns,

14 mortars of up to 120 millimetre, machine-guns and

15 anti-aircraft guns. And it would appear they had

16 sufficient ammunition for that weapon system as well.

17 Q. Still speaking about the HVO army's

18 organisation, did you know that there was a

19 disciplinary regulation or code which had been set up

20 or drafted for the organisation of those units?

21 A. Yes. I understood that there was a military

22 code for the HVO, and I have seen throughout the time

23 an English translation of that code. The code covers

24 all the normal functions and requirements of a military

25 code to enable an army to operate both administratively

Page 9720

1 and on the field in operations.

2 Q. I would like to show you a document,

3 General. This was a document published in the Narodni

4 List in September 1992 and it's dated 3 July 1992 and

5 signed by the President Mate Boban. This is Exhibit

6 Z200-1.

7 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I want to

8 say for the transcript that the document is 3 July, 3

9 July 1992.

10 Q. General, would you have a look at that

11 document, the English version of the document, and tell

12 us whether that corresponds to the Code of Military

13 Discipline that you have just spoken to us about.

14 A. Yes, sir. That is the Code of Military

15 Discipline for the HVO.

16 Q. Thank you. In your testimony before the

17 Office of the Prosecutor in April of 1997, you put

18 forth a document, which was called the battle order, in

19 military language, which was prepared by the

20 intelligence officer of your regiment, Mr. Simon

21 Harrison. I would like to show you the document and

22 would then ask you to make some comments about it.

23 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] The

24 document is referenced Exhibit Z2653, 2653.

25 Q. The document is almost at the end of the pile

Page 9721

1 of documents that was given to you.

2 A. Thank you. I have it here.

3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Could we

4 put that on the ELMO, please. Could we put the

5 document on the ELMO, please. Thank you, Mr. Usher.

6 Q. Is this document the one that you gave to our

7 investigators in April of 1997, General?

8 A. Yes, sir, it is, and I've signed the top

9 right-hand corner to that effect.

10 Q. The document was drafted by the intelligence

11 officer of your regiment, Mr. Harrison, at that time.

12 Could you tell us what information this document was

13 based on?

14 A. Yes, sir. This document was based on

15 information that was, firstly, handed over to us from

16 the previous battalion, that is, Colonel Bob Stewart

17 and the Cheshire Regiment; secondly, from visits by my

18 officers around the area to brigades, formations, and

19 troops, and also visits to headquarters by myself and

20 my liaison officers. Thus we were able to compile this

21 document and maintain it as accurately as we could,

22 keeping it up to date throughout our time in Bosnia.

23 Q. On the first page of the document, we see the

24 operational group commands of the HVO, as well as the

25 various brigades, which were distributed through your

Page 9722

1 area of responsibility and even beyond; is that

2 correct?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. As regards the second, third, and fourth

5 pages, they deal with the Bosnia-Herzegovina army units

6 and the 3rd Corps, in particular, which was in Zenica;

7 is that correct?

8 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

9 Q. Could you tell us approximately when that

10 document was prepared, stating that in the lower right

11 corner, we see the date of 14 June 1993 as being the

12 date when the Kakanj Brigade surrendered to the Bosnian

13 army forces.

14 A. Yes, sir. This document would have been

15 prepared and finalised shortly after that time, after

16 we had received that information, and then my officer,

17 Captain Simon Harrison, would have done an update;

18 therefore, the date of the 14th of June is quite

19 significant and places it around and about that time,

20 perhaps slightly later than the 14th, to allow for the

21 events to filter through to us.

22 Q. In respect of the two accused, their names

23 appear on the document; that is, the accused Mario

24 Cerkez, which is somewhat cut off because the copy

25 isn't very good, and we apologise for that, in the left

Page 9723

1 part, for the Vitez Brigade --

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. -- and we see the name of the accused Dario

4 Kordic on the document as well; is that correct?

5 A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

6 JUDGE MAY: Where, Mr. Lopez-Terres, are we

7 finding this?

8 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] For the

9 accused Mario Cerkez, that is to be found in the lower

10 left part. There is the mention of Viteska. The "Vit"

11 is hard to read. And you've got the name of Cerkez,

12 which you see there, and then furthest to the left,

13 under the Operational Group 1, and right next to the

14 Frankopan Brigade where there was a cross put.

15 As regards the accused Dario Kordic, that

16 also was in the left part of this document, in the

17 first rectangle of that left part.

18 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.

19 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General Duncan, as we said, this is a battle

21 order which is to be used purely by the military; is

22 that correct?

23 A. Yes, sir, that's correct. It's a battle

24 order going down as far as the brigade level, and I

25 carried a copy of this in my pocket during my time in

Page 9724

1 Bosnia.

2 Q. As regards a military document, could you

3 explain to us why, on this upper-left part that we've

4 just spoken about, we see a rectangle in which is the

5 name of Mr. Kostroman, Valenta, Dario Kordic, and the

6 name of the Bosnian Croat party, the HDZ? These are

7 political structures; isn't that correct?

8 A. Yes, sir. I should explain that the box in

9 the centre, the "OPs Zone of Central Bosnia," the top

10 centre, this document describes the hierarchy of

11 military units down to brigade size, and therefore you

12 have three basic levels. The op zone at the top, which

13 was the higher command; below that, the three

14 operational groups, 1, 2, and 3; and below that, a

15 number of named brigades formed up.

16 This gives the skeleton of the key units

17 which formed the op zone of Central Bosnia, commanded

18 at that stage by Tihomir Blaskic, and you will see his

19 name under the central box.

20 On the left and right of that central box are

21 dotted lines which connect the two dotted boxes, the

22 one on the left entitled "HDZ" and the one on the

23 right, the "BiH HVO Joint Command." These two boxes

24 are included because of the political nature of the HVO

25 command in that area, in that there was a clear link,

Page 9725

1 in our minds, between the political and the military,

2 and that's why those lines are dotted. Therefore, the

3 influence from both the HDZ and the joint command would

4 come into that central zone in the middle. That box on

5 the left-hand side is not for specific command over

6 those units there, more for influence into the centre.

7 I could, perhaps, explain the relationship

8 between that box on the left with "HDZ," and underneath

9 it "Dario Kordic," and the "OPs Zone" box in the middle

10 with Tihomir Blaskic.

11 The box in the middle is for the operations;

12 that is Blaskic's task. The box on the left was for

13 the planning of those operations; that was Dario

14 Kordic's task. The box in the middle is for the

15 external fighting of the battle with all those forces

16 underneath it. The box on the left is for internal

17 business within the Vitez pockets and the other pockets

18 that existed at that time. The box in the middle is

19 for action, if you like, and the box on the left is for

20 doctrine. The box in the middle is for the purely

21 military aspects of business and the one on the left

22 for the politics.

23 So I hope that explains more clearly the

24 relationship between those boxes.

25 Q. On the similar document relating to the 3rd

Page 9726

1 Corps, we see the descriptions only of the military

2 units. There is no equivalence in the Bosnian army of

3 that kind of political presence; is that correct?

4 A. Sir, that is correct. We do not have a box

5 to the right or left of that for the reason that the

6 BiH, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mainly Muslim

7 army, did not have those same political connections,

8 and I believe that is partly due to the fact that there

9 was a clear link between the activities of the HVO and

10 Croatia itself and the HV; whereas the Bosnian Muslim

11 army, the BiH, did not obviously have links with anyone

12 external to Bosnia of a political nature, in the same

13 fashion.

14 Q. On the same descriptive document, we do not

15 see units like the military police units or the special

16 units, such as the Vitezovi. Does that mean for you

17 that those units were outside that command structure?

18 A. No, sir. This document is specifically to

19 cover the main military units and not supporting units;

20 therefore, you can say it's a rather coarse, not a

21 finely detailed, document. But this is how we would

22 show, in the British army, an orbit of friendly or

23 enemy forces, or even neutral forces.

24 We would, therefore, not show supporting

25 engineers, supporting artillery units, supporting

Page 9727

1 manoeuvre units, or any other special units, such as

2 military police or other supporting units. They would

3 simply be accepted and attached and moved as required.

4 We might have shown them on a separate sheet as what we

5 would call corps troops available for deployment

6 throughout the area, but I didn't in this case, and we

7 didn't have the detail on the sheets, just, as I called

8 it, course groupings.

9 Q. The influence of politics over the military

10 matters, you yourself, such as your liaison officers in

11 the field, were you able to see that at all levels,

12 including the level of municipalities and brigades?

13 I would like to show you a document in that

14 respect. This is document Z969. It is a report, a

15 milinfosum of 24 May 1993. That is document 969.

16 Would you please read the second paragraph of

17 the document, General Duncan?

18 A. Yes, sir: "The ECMM LO confirms the growing

19 problems of Vitez by reporting that the meeting of the

20 local commission was the most unproductive yet. At the

21 meeting, Mario Cerkez stated that Mario Skopljak, the

22 mayor, had recommended that he stop attending the joint

23 commission as it was clearly not working. Comment:

24 That the HDZ controls the actions of the HVO is

25 becoming increasingly apparent. Comment ends."

Page 9728

1 Q. Thank you. In the report that came from your

2 regiment, do you find the confirmation of the idea that

3 there was an influence of the political side on the

4 military side, including on the brigade level, such as

5 here in Vitez?

6 A. Yes, I did, sir, and this was just one

7 example of that particular influence.

8 Q. Thank you. I want to go back to a point that

9 we've already referred to, that is, the military police

10 units in particular.

11 These military police units do not appear on

12 the battle order that we've just spoken about.

13 According to the information that you were able to get

14 at that time, could you tell us what authority or

15 authorities these units were subordinate to?

16 A. The military police, within the op zone,

17 would be subordinate to the commanders within that op

18 zone, either working directly for the commanders at the

19 highest level -- that is, both externally for Tihomir

20 Blaskic, or internally, I believe, for Dario Kordic --

21 and then down through this hierarchy, they would be

22 assigned as required to meet tasks. When such a unit

23 is assigned, it comes under the operational task of

24 that particular organisation, so that there is one

25 commander for that organisation.

Page 9729

1 It clearly would not be acceptable, in a

2 wartime situation, to have a unit come into one's area

3 of responsibility which had to be fed, clothed,

4 supplied with ammunition, and looked after, if you were

5 not also responsible for its actions; otherwise, you

6 could find it acting as against your plans as opposed

7 to with your plans.

8 Q. You have just said that the military police

9 units could be subordinate both or successively to

10 Dario Kordic, Tihomir Blaskic, or possibly, if I

11 understood you correctly, Mario Cerkez, who was the

12 brigade commander, if those units were acting within

13 his zone of responsibility; is that correct?

14 A. That's correct, sir, yes. Exactly correct.

15 Q. I would like to show you another report that

16 your regiment drafted, that is, Exhibit Z881,1, and I

17 would say that this report is dated 3 May 1993. It is

18 a mistake. It shouldn't say "3 May". That was a

19 typographical error made by the regiment at the time.

20 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, with respect to

21 this document, we've not seen it before; that's not a

22 real problem, but we object to the document coming into

23 evidence for the truth of the matters asserted on page

24 2. The subjunctive phraseology of those questions

25 obviously consists of speculation, and we don't know

Page 9730

1 whose speculation is reflected on page 2.

2 In the absence of a foundation, we would

3 object to this document being admitted for the truth of

4 those propositions which are contested.

5 JUDGE MAY: The witness can give evidence

6 about the document. What weight it has will depend

7 upon our understanding of the evidence and our decision

8 as to its value. Yes, it is admissible.

9 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, could you take a look at the second

11 page of the document, the document which was just

12 mentioned by Mr. Sayers, that is, the paragraph dealing

13 with Vitez. Does this document, in fact, come from

14 your regiment, that is, report number 35 of your

15 regiment?

16 A. Yes, sir, it does. It was prepared on an

17 almost daily basis by Captain Simon Harrison, assisted

18 by warrant officer McLeod, who were responsible for

19 this. The Vitez LO mentioned in paragraph 4 was a

20 Captain Whitworth, and he had confirmed by visiting

21 those details listed under there. And where it says

22 "Comment," that is the comment by a Captain Simon

23 Harrison to do with that information. He has made a

24 comment on the information, and that is clearly

25 separate from the statement.

Page 9731

1 This document represented every day to me, which

2 recorded the day's events, and it would then be

3 distributed around all units on all parts of my command

4 in order that everybody should be kept up to date with

5 events and changes of details as they occurred.

6 Q. In that Kordic's authority over the military

7 police and the estimate that you made, does it

8 correspond to the information that you and the regiment

9 had available at that time in Central Bosnia?

10 A. Yes, it does --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, the document says

12 they apparently come under the direct control of Dario

13 Kordic. What information would you have had that would

14 substantiate that?

15 A. It would be substantiated by visits of my

16 officers to those units. One of their tasks was to

17 work out and complete the sheets of who worked for who

18 in the area. And they wouldn't gather that over one

19 visit; it would be gathered over a number of visits,

20 talking to both local people, officers in the units

21 involved, and as many other sources as we could put

22 together.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you give us a

24 practical example of an event that would indicate the

25 control or some fact that would indicate the control?

Page 9732

1 A. Much of -- it would be difficult to give a

2 concrete fact that would originate control. And I

3 would have to cast my mind back over events that took

4 place to find one. And regrettably, nothing springs to

5 mind immediately. But the officers and the LO's would

6 obviously not put that information in if they didn't

7 think it was of value. And at this stage in June that

8 year, it was of value.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

10 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, perhaps you anticipated the question

12 that I was going to ask you. The incident of June '93,

13 that is the Convoy of Joy, couldn't that be, for

14 instance, an illustration, example of what we are

15 talking about? We shall come back to that incident, so

16 if you would only briefly touch upon it now.

17 A. During the incident involved on which we

18 called the Convoy of Joy, there was an occasion where

19 the road was blocked by both civilians, local HVO

20 soldiers and local police. I quoted the name of

21 Commander Blaskic in saying I had his authority to come

22 through. This was refused and I was only allowed to go

23 through, they said, if I had the express authority of

24 Dario Kordic. Thus, those units therefore were under

25 the express command of Dario Kordic and would not take

Page 9733

1 orders from Tihomir Blaskic.

2 So I hope that briefly gives an example,

3 which I'm afraid I couldn't call to mind before.

4 Q. We shall come back to that incident and

5 discuss about 10th of June, 1993, and we shall talk

6 about it in greater detail during your testimony.

7 However, during your period of command there,

8 you met various personalities in Central Bosnia -- the

9 accused Dario Kordic, Anto Valenta, Colonel Blaskic --

10 and I believe that you are also familiar with the name

11 of Mario Cerkez, but you do not remember meeting him as

12 a brigade commander?

13 A. That's quite correct. Whilst I am familiar

14 with the name Mario Cerkez, I do not remember or recall

15 ever meeting him when I was in Bosnia.

16 Q. But there were, of course, according to the

17 organisational chart, there were responsibilities, and

18 they -- your subordinates were directly in contact and

19 communicated with the brigade commander; is that

20 correct?

21 A. Yes, it is correct. What I wanted to do in

22 my relations with people is not to duplicate activity,

23 because my area of responsibility, as you've heard,

24 stretched a huge distance. And therefore it was

25 important that we didn't duplicate our effort. I

Page 9734

1 elected that it would be correct for me to speak at the

2 level of the Ops Zone Commander, that is, to Tihomir

3 Blaskic and Dario Kordic, and below that my company

4 commanders would take the next level down. Below that,

5 my liaison officers would take a level below that. So

6 that we had a structure to go and find information and

7 come back and monitor what was going on. Because what

8 I didn't want to do was have a stream of people

9 visiting various organisations during the day, which,

10 frankly, would have been upsetting for them and a

11 nuisance.

12 And that also that system I adopted enabled a

13 good flow of information between my officers and the

14 single units in some cases that they were assigned to,

15 or a town, and it may be in some cases I said: Your

16 responsibility is Vitez, your responsibility is

17 Busovaca or your responsibility is Novi Travnik.

18 It was an attempt to separate out and make

19 sure we had some efficient links established.

20 Q. Those liaison officers in the regiment, one

21 of them was Mark Bower; is that correct?

22 A. Yes, that is correct. Bower was one of my

23 key liaison officers.

24 Q. And on the 9th of May, 1993, if I am correct,

25 you met for the first time the accused Dario Kordic,

Page 9735

1 accompanied by Tihomir Blaskic, and you met in the

2 Vitez Hotel, did you?

3 A. Yes, sir. That's correct.

4 Q. Could you tell us very briefly on whose

5 initiative was the meeting called?

6 A. The meeting was called on the initiative of

7 Colonel Bob Stewart, because on the 9th of May I had

8 not yet taken over command of the troops, the British

9 troops in the Vitez area. The purpose of the meeting

10 was to introduce me to Tihomir Blaskic and see his

11 headquarters, and it was also an opportunity for

12 Colonel Stewart to question Blaskic about the events of

13 Ahmici, which had taken place a couple of weeks or so

14 before. That was the purpose of the meeting.

15 Q. As far as you could understand, Colonel

16 Stewart and Tihomir Blaskic had already met before and

17 discussed the massacre at Ahmici, didn't they?

18 A. Yes, they had indeed. Yes.

19 Q. A correction. Excuse me. It seems that on

20 the transcript the name of the liaison officer who was

21 mentioned, by whom I mentioned, is Lee Whitworth, and

22 it seems that it is missing. So I would just like --

23 Lee Whitworth and Angus Hay.

24 JUDGE MAY: You mentioned Mark Bower.

25 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mark

Page 9736

1 Bower. [No interpretation].

2 JUDGE MAY: Well, we've got evidence about

3 these things anyway.

4 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes,

5 right. Thank you.

6 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Excuse me,

7 Mr. Lopez-Terres. It seems that the witness answered

8 only with regard to Mr. Bower, saying that he was one

9 of his most important liaison officers, but he did not

10 comment on other names. Is that so?

11 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes,

12 indeed, Your Honour.

13 Q. Lee Whitworth and Angus Hay were also

14 officers, weren't they?

15 A. Perhaps if I could clarify, because these

16 officers were obviously under my command. Mark Bower

17 was a captain whose primary responsibility was for the

18 Red Cross and also to see whether aid was distributed

19 around the area.

20 Captain Hay, Angus Hay, his primary

21 responsibility was for the Vitez area itself. Later on

22 he was to hand over to Captain Whitworth.

23 And those three captains were part of my team

24 of liaison officers at that time.

25 I trust that makes that clear, sir.

Page 9737

1 Q. Thank you, General. And during this meeting

2 on the 9th of May 1993, was Dario Kordic in a military

3 uniform?

4 A. I don't believe that Dario Kordic was at the

5 beginning of the meeting, but during the meeting he

6 came in. He was dressed in a camouflage pattern

7 material, without a hat, and with no badges of rank.

8 When he came in, the proceedings were stopped and he

9 was briefly introduced as Dario Kordic. I was given to

10 understand that he was, how shall I say, of Colonel

11 status and therefore he had a status, although not an

12 official rank.

13 Q. In the course of this meeting, the item of

14 the village of Ahmici was referred to. Could you

15 please tell us briefly what explanations were made by

16 Colonel Blaskic as regards the perpetrators of the

17 massacre at Ahmici?

18 A. Yes, sir. Colonel Stewart accused Colonel

19 Blaskic of being directly responsible for the Ahmici

20 massacre. This he denied and he gave the reasons -- or

21 the responsibility for the attack on Ahmici to three

22 sources: The first was Serb extremists, who would have

23 had to have come an awful long way to get there; the

24 second was Muslims attacking their own Muslims; and the

25 third was Muslims dressed up in HVO uniform.

Page 9738

1 Both Colonel Stewart and myself found these

2 explanations as to who had done the attacking and those

3 responsibilities completely unacceptable.

4 Q. In the course of this meeting Colonel Blaskic

5 admitted that the village of Ahmici was within his

6 responsibility, didn't he?

7 A. Yes, he did.

8 Q. As far as you know, General, was the village

9 of Ahmici also in the area of responsibility of the

10 Vitez Brigade?

11 A. Yes, it was. It was very close to Vitez, six

12 to eight hundred yards, from memory of that map of that

13 area. It was certainly not far away.

14 Q. During those explanations made by Colonel

15 Blaskic, do you remember if the accused Dario Kordic

16 intervened, perhaps intervened perhaps to add something

17 to these explanations or comment on them?

18 A. I don't recollect that he made any comment at

19 that stage. I think one would describe him as being

20 very much in the back seat of that meeting, which was

21 really a meeting between myself, Colonel Stewart and

22 Tihomir Blaskic.

23 Q. Would you know if Colonel Stewart had invited

24 Dario Kordic to that meeting?

25 A. No, sir, I wasn't aware of that. We were

Page 9739

1 merely -- the plan had been to visit Commander Blaskic

2 in his headquarters, and he was not directly invited,

3 certainly not by Colonel Stewart.

4 Q. And in the course of that meeting, you and

5 Colonel Stewart, did you indicate to Colonel Blaskic

6 that the Muslims in Ahmici were seen escorted by HVO

7 soldiers and then taken to Vitez, where they were

8 detained, and what did Colonel Blaskic answer after he

9 received that information from you?

10 A. He answered that -- well, first of all, he

11 was somewhat reluctant to answer and denied that there

12 were HVO escorting those prisoners, but Colonel Stewart

13 was quite emphatic, because he had personally seen

14 these people been escorted. And one of the reasons put

15 forward by Colonel Blaskic was that this was for the

16 safety of those Muslims. This surprised both Colonel

17 Stewart and myself, because we weren't particularly

18 sure why Muslims should be kept safe from other

19 Muslims. And surely it would be better if the HVO

20 forces were involved in guaranteeing protection for the

21 Croats in the area of Ahmici, rather than the Muslims,

22 since it was the Muslims who had been attacked, and not

23 the Croats.

24 Q. Did Colonel Blaskic mention during that

25 meeting at some time the presence of some extremists in

Page 9740

1 this sector of Ahmici?

2 A. He did mention extremists, yes. At this

3 meeting, and many after, meetings afterwards, the word

4 "extremists" was used a lot.

5 Q. Did you know at that time who was Colonel

6 Blaskic referring to at that moment?

7 A. Perhaps I should state that Colonel Blaskic

8 was clearly referring in his mind to those people who

9 had done the massacre at Ahmici and labelling them as

10 extremists. I came to realise over the succeeding

11 months that this excuse was always used by commanders

12 to deny that they had anything to do with operations.

13 But I found it very strange in such a small place as

14 the Vitez pocket, where there was a military, a firm

15 and an efficient military control, both externally in

16 the defence of the pocket and internally from the HVO

17 military police, civilian police and others, that such

18 a situation of extremists could occur.

19 My conclusion, therefore, was that there

20 weren't extremists at all. There were Croat forces who

21 were being directed from central command to carry out

22 various actions, as and when required by either the

23 military or the political.

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lopez-Terres, if you are

25 going to move on to another topic, this might be a

Page 9741

1 convenient moment to take a break for a quarter of an

2 hour.

3 One matter to consider is this: that I

4 understand this witness can only be here for today and

5 tomorrow. The position tomorrow is that we shall only

6 be sitting in the afternoon. The hearing will be

7 restricted by the fact that the case I am sitting on in

8 the morning is liable to go on till 2.00. So at the

9 earliest, we will not be able to begin until 2.45.

10 That being so, at the present rate of going,

11 it seems very unlikely that we are going to get through

12 this witness's evidence.

13 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] We have

14 already envisaged that possibility, which I know

15 Duncan, Mr. President, General Duncan has confirmed to

16 me that he would not be available after tomorrow

17 afternoon, and, if need be, we have already envisaged

18 another date when he could again appear before the

19 Chamber to finish his testimony.

20 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Five past 4.00,

21 please.

22 --- Recess taken at 3.53 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

Page 9742

1 Mr. President, before we continue with the examination,

2 the testimony, I spoke with Mr. Sayers about the length

3 of cross-examination, and the Defence counsel have told

4 me that they are envisaging a whole day for the

5 cross-examination of this witness.

6 The witness, before he made his solemn

7 declaration, told me that he would be ready to come

8 back on the 25th of November or the 1st of December,

9 and on the basis of what you have told us now, the 1st

10 of December -- evidently, on the 1st of December, we

11 would not be sitting, but we shall have to discuss with

12 this witness a day when he will be able to come again.

13 So if you would allow me, I should like to consult the

14 witness on this matter.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you can do that, you've

16 certainly got leave to do that, but how long do you

17 anticipate being in chief? Can you finish that by

18 tomorrow?

19 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes, of

20 course. Yes.

21 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation]

22 Mr. Lopez-Terres, how much longer is the direct

23 examination going to last?

24 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I believe

25 we shall need perhaps about a quarter of an hour

Page 9743

1 tomorrow to complete the examination-in-chief.

2 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] And that

3 means that the cross-examination can't start tomorrow.

4 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes.

5 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] If you say

6 one day, if you have the whole afternoon tomorrow for

7 the cross-examination, then you will not need another

8 afternoon.

9 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] But that

10 is a question that you should ask the Defence counsel.

11 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] No, I am

12 asking both. Does that mean that tomorrow afternoon,

13 Mr. Sayers, you will use for cross-examination?

14 Because the examination-in-chief will take only ten

15 minutes, a quarter of an hour tomorrow, so you will

16 begin to cross-examine the General tomorrow, and

17 therefore you will need only another afternoon to

18 complete your cross-examination. I believe that would

19 be more useful to us.

20 So would you agree with me, Mr. Sayers, that

21 you will need, after tomorrow, only another afternoon

22 to complete your cross-examination?

23 MR. SAYERS: I would like to agree. I can't

24 be absolutely certain, without hearing precisely what

25 the General has to say, Your Honour. But clearly we

Page 9744

1 respect the General's tight schedule, clearly we have

2 to work around the General's schedule, but by the same

3 token, I would stress -- and I'm sure this point is not

4 lost on the Trial Chamber -- that the evidence of this

5 witness is very significant. He's an extremely

6 important witness; in fact, as far as I can tell, the

7 first witness who has come forward with concrete

8 evidence on the matters charged in the amended

9 indictment, rather than speculation.

10 So it's important for us not to rush through

11 the cross-examination of this witness, as perhaps we

12 have done with other more peripheral witnesses. I want

13 to be certain that we go through the General's

14 testimony very carefully. Many of the issues upon

15 which he has testified consist of matters of opinion,

16 maybe legitimate, and we have to examine the basis for

17 those opinions, and there are a number of documents

18 that we have to examine with this witness.

19 But I would certainly think that the

20 cross-examination would not last more than one entire

21 trial day, and I have consulted with my colleagues

22 representing Mr. Cerkez and they have told me that they

23 anticipate that the questions they have for the General

24 would last perhaps a half an hour, perhaps 45 minutes,

25 depending on how long I am.

Page 9745

1 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Thank you,

2 Mr. Sayers.

3 JUDGE MAY: Certainly we will finish the

4 examination-in-chief, Mr. Lopez-Terres, and you can put

5 your mind to that, please.

6 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General Duncan, before we took our break, we

8 were speaking about the meeting between Colonel Blaskic

9 and Dario Kordic. During that meeting, Colonel Blaskic

10 committed himself to making an investigative report

11 about the events in Ahmici and that everything would be

12 done before the 25th of May, 1993.

13 As far as you know, was an investigative

14 report ever prepared, or did you ever learn about such

15 a report during the seven months that you were there?

16 A. Sir, it's my understanding at that meeting

17 that the date, the 25th of May, was produced for -- was

18 suggested to be the date when that report should be

19 produced, with the evidence fresh in people's minds.

20 At that time, and since then, I have not seen any

21 report produced by the Bosnian Croat forces, the HVO,

22 of events in Ahmici at all. There's been no report, to

23 my knowledge.

24 Q. Four days after that meeting, that is, on the

25 13th of May, 1993, you had quite a long meeting with

Page 9746

1 Anto Valenta in his office at Colonel Blaskic's

2 headquarters in the Hotel Vitez. We're going to speak

3 about that meeting.

4 Mr. Valenta gave you a book on that day and

5 also explained some of his ideas to you about how

6 certain movements of populations would be possible in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could we speak about that?

8 A. Yes, sir. I went to visit Mr. Valenta in his

9 office in the Hotel Vitez, in the centre of Vitez

10 town. He then wished to present to me the contents, a

11 brief resume, of the book he wrote in 1991. This book

12 concerned the movement of -- or the problems, as he saw

13 it, rather, in Bosnia as a whole, and he presented to

14 me what he saw as a number of solutions to this

15 problem.

16 I have to say I found his solutions quite

17 shocking, and some of his comments, I believed, were

18 racist in nature. He was accusing Muslims of

19 dominating towns with their minarets and their prayers,

20 of breeding faster than it was acceptable to breed. He

21 then described how the populations should be moved

22 around to create some order in the state of Bosnia, as

23 he saw it, and this would involve forcible removal of

24 individuals, regardless of their own wishes, a total

25 interference in their lives by the state, and also

Page 9747

1 included the possibility of the use of the army to

2 enact this process. I was frankly horrified by these

3 thoughts.

4 Q. The book that Mr. Valenta gave to you at that

5 time, was that called "The Partition of Bosnia and the

6 Struggle for Integrity"; is that correct?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. During the meeting did Mr. Valenta also show

9 you charts with demographic data that were in his

10 office?

11 A. Yes, sir, he did. He had a number of charts

12 on the wall, which he displayed as he was going through

13 his briefing on the situation and the solution, as he

14 saw it.

15 Q. During the discussion, did Mr. Valenta

16 explain to you as well that he had no more friendship,

17 feelings of friendship with the Muslims in the region,

18 that he even felt hatred toward them?

19 A. Yes, he did. We talked about his past and

20 his life to date. And it transpired, and I knew this

21 from the cover of his book, apart from anything else,

22 that he had been born in Dolac and had been to school

23 in the local area, alongside both Muslims, Croats and

24 some Serbs. He had then gone off to university and

25 come back and been a teacher. And I think the fact

Page 9748

1 that he had returned to teach young people and held

2 these very strong racist views, I found, to be honest,

3 unacceptable; that somebody with such a good education,

4 a university education, could propose a solution to the

5 problems in his country which involved forcible

6 movement of populations based on their ethnic origin.

7 He further went on, when I questioned him,

8 and I said, "Well, how do you feel about Muslims now?"

9 And he said, "I hate them." Those were his exact

10 words.

11 Q. Did he also tell you that it was out of the

12 question for him to continue living with the Muslims?

13 A. Yes, sir, he did. He found them intolerable

14 to live with.

15 Q. During the discussion, or after the

16 discussion with Mr. Valenta, did you make a connection

17 between the theories and doctrine that he was

18 expressing with the events taking place in the area

19 around Vitez in April?

20 A. Yes, sir, I did. It wasn't difficult when

21 one looked at the situation in this pocket, in this HVO

22 pocket in the centre of Bosnia, that Valenta had

23 produced, if you like, the doctrine for what was going

24 to happen. Then the policy from that doctrine had been

25 distilled, I believe, by Dario Kordic, who was

Page 9749

1 responsible for the internal affairs. And that policy

2 was then put into effect by the HVO.

3 So you had a doctrine, a plan, and an

4 instrument to carry out exactly what Valenta had

5 proposed, and I was well aware that Valenta was a

6 serious and senior official of the HDZ party. And here

7 was this party proposing to put in effect and had put

8 into effect this policy. And I believed that Ahmici

9 represented a first step along that line.

10 Q. A few days after the meeting with Valenta,

11 that is, the 19th of May, 1993, did you have the

12 opportunity to go to a country house outside of

13 Busovaca where Dario Kordic lived? What was the name

14 that was given or that you gave to that residence at

15 the time?

16 A. At the time we gave the name of the Eagle's

17 Nest to that residence.

18 Q. Could you tell us why that name was given to

19 that location?

20 A. There were a number of factors that led to

21 that name being given, and it was I that gave it that

22 name. It was the first time I had been there. It was

23 set as a hunting lodge in beautiful countryside, and it

24 was a place where political people clearly met. And I

25 made a parallel with events in the past, and therefore

Page 9750

1 it then became known as the Eagle's Nest.

2 Q. The events in the past that you are talking

3 about are Berchtesgaden? Did you think about

4 Berchtesgaden?

5 A. That is correct. I saw there was a similar

6 parallel to those two situations, of Berchtesgaden and

7 what became known as the Eagle's Nest.

8 Q. During that meeting on the 19th of May,

9 were Mr. Blaskic and Mr. Valenta both present?

10 A. They were indeed, yes, sir.

11 Q. Do you remember some of the subjects that

12 were discussed during those meetings, what was the very

13 specific purpose of the meeting?

14 A. The purpose of the meeting was to get to know

15 -- or for me to be invited, and I think for people to

16 meet me in the area. I believe the main purpose of

17 that meeting was as a political meeting for the HDZ,

18 because, as far as I could see, most of the senior

19 people were assembled at that meeting. But at the same

20 time, it was also a social meeting where they had

21 obviously gathered for lunch, to which I, and I believe

22 the Dutch battalion commander at the time, Colonel

23 Schipper, had been invited.

24 Q. During that meeting did you happen to talk

25 about a safe zone that you were requiring to be around

Page 9751

1 your camp, so as to avoid -- that you would not come

2 under the fire of snipers?

3 A. Yes. I mean, I was -- did not raise many

4 subjects for discussion, since it was clearly a social

5 invitation for lunch, but what I did raise was the

6 problem of both BiH and HVO soldiers firing into the

7 United Nations camp that my troops occupied. And it

8 was my understanding it was an agreement, which had

9 been made with both of these parties in the conflict,

10 that they would observe a 500-metre exclusion zone

11 around my camp, where there would be no military

12 activity and certainly no firing into the camp.

13 The reason I had specifically raised this

14 point, as we had been having HVO sniper fire from the

15 HVO lines to the south of our camp directly into and

16 across our camp, and this was clearly dangerous for

17 us.

18 Q. General Duncan, do you remember any other

19 subjects that may have been discussed during that

20 meeting?

21 A. Not specifically, I'm afraid.

22 Q. Ten days later, that is, the 29th of May,

23 1993, you and some of your men transported in your

24 vehicles the unit commanders to Kiseljak for a meeting

25 which was being held at the United Nations

Page 9752

1 headquarters; is that correct?

2 A. [No audible response]

3 Q. General Petkovic was also there at that

4 meeting. Could you tell us in a few words what

5 happened during that meeting?

6 A. Yes. I was requested by the United Nations

7 to ferry under armour, for their safety, senior

8 officers from the HVO to a meeting in the United

9 Nations headquarters in Kiseljak. The plan was so that

10 the United Nations could speak to the HVO about

11 events.

12 In the event, what actually happened was that

13 the meeting with the HVO and United Nations lasted some

14 20 minutes. After that, the HVO officers drove off in

15 their cars and I believe went for a meeting

16 themselves. They returned some three hours later to

17 the U.N. headquarters and I ferried them back to where

18 they had come from, from the Busovaca and Vitez

19 pockets.

20 Q. After that meeting of the HVO unit commanders

21 in Kiseljak, or the Kiseljak region, did you see any

22 developments in the relationship between the HVO and

23 the Serbian forces in the region?

24 A. We began to notice, after that meeting, that

25 there was very little military activity on the front

Page 9753

1 lines between Serb and Croat. And indeed, in the

2 Kiseljak area we became aware that considerable black

3 market activity was taking place across front lines,

4 cigarettes in particular, and also fuel was coming in.

5 In addition to that, as events went across,

6 we noticed that where the HVO had suffered some defeats

7 at the hand of the BiH Army, civilians and, I believe,

8 some soldiers, had actually moved across those front

9 lines with the Serbs and later reappeared, as it were,

10 having moved around.

11 This took place both in the Travnik area,

12 after the expulsion of HVO from Travnik, and the Croats

13 from Travnik, and also in the Vares area later on in

14 the year.

15 Q. Do I understand you correctly by taking it

16 that the borders between the HVO and the Serb forces

17 became more permeable at that time?

18 A. Sir, that would be exactly correct. That

19 would be a very succinct way of summing up that

20 situation.

21 Q. You just told us that you were responsible

22 for transporting some of the unit commanders to

23 Kiseljak, that is, military authorities. Did it

24 sometimes happen as part of your responsibilities you

25 would transport civilian or political authorities, and

Page 9754

1 specifically Dario Kordic and other representatives of

2 the HDZ political party?

3 A. This I in general refused to do, and indeed

4 on a number of occasions Valenta had asked me

5 specifically to move him round, and I refused so to

6 do. There was one occasion later on in the Vance-Owen

7 planning where I was asked to move a number of

8 civilians out of the area to a major meeting that I

9 believe was taking place in the Mostar area. In

10 general, these directives came down from my

11 headquarters of the United Nations.

12 Q. I would like to show you a document, one

13 dated 24 August 1993, which is reference Z1179. .

14 1179. Would you look at the page, which, at the

15 bottom, says 5-6, the paragraph that says

16 "Orbats/Personalities."

17 Could you make a comment to us about the

18 request that your regiment received at that time and

19 tell us what is the list that we see in this document.

20 A. Yes, thank you. This request was to

21 transport, as it says on the bottom of page 5-6, the

22 full Croat political hierarchy in Central Bosnia, and

23 there follows on page 6-6 a complete, as we believe it,

24 or nearly complete, list of the major political figures

25 that existed in Central Bosnia at that moment.

Page 9755

1 Q. According to the list that was given to you

2 at the time by Mate Boban, or people acting in his

3 name, Dario Kordic appears as the first person on the

4 list in that hierarchy of political authorities in

5 Central Bosnia.

6 A. Yes, he does. He's very much the first on

7 the list.

8 Q. Thank you, General.

9 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Mr. Usher,

10 that's all right now.

11 Q. We have already mentioned the incidents of

12 the 10th and 11th of June, 1993, these incidents

13 relating to the Convoy of Joy or the Convoy of Mercy,

14 since both of the expressions were used interchangeably

15 for that convoy. You yourself were involved, were the

16 direct witness of the fact that we're going to speak

17 about.

18 The convoy was authorised, that is, its

19 movement was authorised, by an agreement between the

20 Croatian authorities and the Bosnian authorities so

21 that the convoy could reach Tuzla. You were able to

22 see yourself documents that indicated that that

23 agreement had been reached; is that correct?

24 A. That's correct, yes. I was shown the

25 documents by Tihomir Blaskic.

Page 9756

1 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I would

2 appreciate it if the Prosecution would not lead on this

3 particular subject.

4 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

5 Q. You learned about these documents. Could you

6 tell us how you learned it or where the documents came

7 from, who issued them?

8 A. I was concerned about the safety of a convoy,

9 which I knew was coming from the south, consisting of a

10 number of Muslim-driven vehicles which contained

11 supplies and equipment for the Muslims in Tuzla. The

12 convoy was about 300 vehicles, that was the proposed

13 strength, and it contained, I believe, a complete mix

14 of medicines, food, clothing, and aid, in general, for

15 Muslims in the north.

16 We learned about the arrival of this convoy

17 from United Nations sources, and I immediately, having

18 learnt about this, went to see Tihomir Blaskic in his

19 headquarters to confirm that he had received

20 instructions to the effect that the convoy was to get

21 through, and I did that because the United Nations

22 command had told me there was a formal agreement.

23 Commander Blaskic then told me about this

24 formal agreement and showed me the pieces of paper, and

25 I sought his assurances that the convoy would not be

Page 9757

1 harmed and that he would facilitate its passage. This,

2 he stated, he would do to the best of his ability, but

3 he did comment that there were a lot of people in the

4 Vitez pocket, some 30.000 additional displaced people,

5 and that it would be difficult to control them.

6 I said, "As a military commander, it is your

7 responsibility, along with the civilian government, to

8 make sure that the people are controlled. You have

9 that responsibility," which he accepted but

10 reluctantly. That is the background to the convoy.

11 Q. Could you tell us briefly under what

12 circumstances that convoy was stopped in the Novi

13 Travnik region and then in Vitez?

14 A. The convoy arrived at the southern edge of

15 the interface between Muslim and Croat forces, which

16 was Gornji Vakuf, and it proceeded up through the

17 Muslim area below Novi Travnik. It then came to an

18 area known, I believe, as Radovica [sic], I think it's

19 called -- I would have to check on that -- it is an

20 area just down below Novi Travnik, where the road from

21 the south at Gornji Vakuf comes out into a village.

22 Q. Excuse me, General. The name that you're

23 mentioning, might it be Rankovici?

24 A. Yes, Rankovici. Thank you. I'm sorry. Yes,

25 it's Rankovici. It was there that the road was blocked

Page 9758

1 and the convoy was forced to halt; it was there that

2 Muslim drivers were extracted from their vehicles and

3 shot, we believe a total of eight. My soldiers were

4 unable to take action at that stage because they were

5 blocked from both seeing this happening directly,

6 although we heard the shots and found the bodies later

7 on, and it was there that that convoy was then looted

8 by soldiers and civilians.

9 I myself was blocked by a crowd of women and

10 children who had moved across the road further to the

11 north of that, as it was my intention to go down and

12 see what was going on and try and resolve the

13 situation.

14 Whilst I was stuck at that roadblock of women

15 and children, trying to get down south, vehicles

16 containing Petkovic, the commander, came down, who

17 spoke to the crowd. I asked for Petkovic for his

18 assistance to get me down south, and he laughed and

19 drove through, leaving me still there.

20 A little later on, two cars of HVO police

21 also came down the road from the north. They stopped

22 again by me at this block of women and children, talked

23 briefly to the women and children. I then asked them

24 to assist me in getting down to the south. They were

25 extremely abusive and they then drove through as well.

Page 9759

1 Q. General, you've just spoken about the HVO

2 police. Is this the civilian or military police?

3 A. This is the military police, and I have seen

4 a video taken by a newsreel team which shows the HVO

5 insignia, belts, batons, and white pistol holders,

6 which indicates the HVO police involved in that

7 activity.

8 Q. Excuse me. I interrupted you.

9 A. The convoy then was obviously stuck, and we

10 were negotiating to get it through. Eventually, it was

11 released from that area and then came up into the area

12 of Vitez, where it was blocked again at the junction at

13 the east end of town, on the Vitez bypass where one can

14 turn south or carry on along the road that eventually

15 leads down the Lasva Valley.

16 You will appreciate that a convoy of 300

17 vehicles is quite a long convoy, and having discovered

18 it had been blocked, I went out with the ECMM

19 ambassador and with Tihomir Blaskic to try and unblock

20 the convoy. It was blocked by local HVO soldiers and

21 women and children.

22 I got to the front of that convoy in my

23 vehicles and demanded that we come through, and I was

24 told that the soldiers and the women and children would

25 not move, except on the express orders of Dario Kordic;

Page 9760

1 I confirmed that a number of times. They were

2 absolutely clear. They were shouting the name "Kordic,

3 Kordic, Kordic," and that was it. They would not in

4 any way speak to Blaskic. Indeed, when I mentioned

5 Blaskic's name, I remember one of them spitting on the

6 ground.

7 We moved off backwards, away from the convoy,

8 back to the ECMM hut, to try and resolve the problem,

9 at which stage I discovered that elements of the convoy

10 had been split off and were being moved by Croats,

11 civilian and military, off the road into the town of

12 Vitez, into the quarry, which is at the beginning of

13 Vitez. Indeed, the whole convoy was being broken up

14 and dispersed round the town and looted by the locals,

15 both civilians and military.

16 I should add that in the course of the

17 movement of the convoy through the Vitez area, two HVO

18 soldiers fired at the convoy, thereby endangering the

19 lives of the drivers, and in order to further protect

20 those lives, my soldiers, in a Warrior, fired their

21 machine gun, which killed those two soldiers.

22 We were now in a stalemate situation where

23 there was no convoy left to look after. I informed and

24 had kept informed the United Nations at all times. The

25 United Nations Chief of Staff, Brigadier Hayes, came

Page 9761

1 down to join me, and the next morning we began work

2 again to undo this problem.

3 I think we then met again at the wood

4 factory, and also in Hotel Vitez, at which time it

5 became apparent that this situation could go on no

6 longer, and I made that point both to Tihomir Blaskic

7 and Dario Kordic. It was Dario Kordic who then said he

8 would sort out the situation, and within an hour, those

9 vehicles had all been released and put back on the road

10 and assembled again; the convoy was then able to move

11 off. I was quite surprised at the speed at which it

12 happened and also quite surprised at the way it was

13 quite clear that it was Dario Kordic who was, as it

14 were, calling the shots for this event and that General

15 Blaskic or Colonel Blaskic was taking the back seat.

16 The convoy eventually moved off, having lost

17 a significant part of its equipment, and people had

18 been killed, and that then closed, if you like, this

19 incident, with the convoy moving out of my area.

20 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] At the

21 beginning of your testimony, General, when you spoke

22 about that event, you spoke about eight people whom you

23 didn't see, but you heard the shots, and eight people

24 were allegedly killed at the beginning of that

25 roadblock. Later on, did you have any information

Page 9762

1 about the execution of those eight individuals?

2 A. We understood, sir, that they had been killed

3 by the HVO or civilians in that area. There were both

4 HVO police in that area and HVO soldiers. It's my

5 understanding that they were killed by weapons held by

6 those people.

7 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] And you

8 don't know why those eight people were executed.

9 A. I can only assume, sir, that they refused or

10 were very reluctant to give up the contents of their

11 load to anyone else. Having been blocked and then

12 clearly assaulted, pulled out of the cabs, they may

13 well have resisted and that resulted in their being

14 shot.

15 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Thank you.

16 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

17 Q. General Duncan, other drivers, or rather

18 several of the other drivers, those who were not

19 killed, they were also subjected to very grave

20 violence, weren't they?

21 A. They were, yes. A number of them were beaten

22 up and they sheltered by their vehicles overnight, and

23 we did as best as we could to provide sentries to stop

24 further harassment. Regrettably, another two or three

25 drivers, I believe, were killed up in the area of

Page 9763

1 Vitez.

2 Q. You spoke about the quarry, the quarry which

3 is near Vitez. Is it the Mosunj quarry that you had in

4 mind?

5 A. Yes, it is. It's a very large quarry. It's

6 a very obvious feature on the map. That quarry was

7 where a number of the vehicles which had been looted or

8 were being looted were taken by local police military

9 and civilians, and that's where they were left. And it

10 was there that I went to examine the situation. In

11 fact, there are HVO forces stationed in that quarry.

12 It is in the area where there were a number of, or one

13 or two, large howitzers which fired from the relative

14 safety of the quarry.

15 Q. And that quarry is therefore in the area of

16 responsibility of Mario Cerkez, isn't it?

17 A. It is his area of responsibility as the

18 brigade commander.

19 Q. And the two HVO soldiers who were killed by

20 your men, why were they killed?

21 A. They were killed because they were firing on

22 the convoy with their rifles, and having fired warning

23 shots, they refused to stop firing and carried on

24 firing. And under my mandate and the rules of

25 engagement, it was clear to us that the only way we

Page 9764

1 could stop them was that they would be shot, or

2 certainly shot at. And unfortunately, both were

3 killed.

4 Q. And it all happened in the Vitez area, did

5 it?

6 A. In the Vitez area, yes.

7 Q. And after your meeting, you talked with the

8 ECMM ambassadors and with Dario Kordic and Colonel

9 Blaskic. What was the interpretation you gave to those

10 events?

11 A. Looking at the events as a whole of that

12 two-day period, I concluded that there had been a plan

13 made, despite the orders from, I assume, Mate Boban, to

14 let the convoy through, that a certain slice could be

15 taken off this convoy for the inhabitants of the Vitez

16 pocket to have. And so a certain amount of looting was

17 to be tolerated.

18 I suspect that this explained the reason for

19 the HVO Commander Pektovic to be in the area that day

20 and the day before. I assumed he was consulting with

21 the HVO in that area.

22 I also suspect that perhaps events got out of

23 hand and people took more than, perhaps, had been

24 bargained for. And the plan, as it were, which I

25 believe -- and it is my opinion -- it was a plan to cut

Page 9765

1 out these things. The plan went slightly wrong and

2 more was taken and people were killed when perhaps they

3 shouldn't have been killed.

4 And then finally, when we realised and when

5 the HVO realised things had gone too far, Dario Kordic

6 was very quick to say, "That's it." They had taken

7 their slice and then they would let the convoy

8 through.

9 It was my opinion the whole thing was very

10 neatly and carefully orchestrated. To achieve the

11 results they did in the way they blocked the road at

12 critical places, to cut out those vehicles neatly and

13 accurately in small packets, would have taken a deal of

14 planning. It was a very precise, clever, fast and

15 slick operation, which required a very clear set of

16 orders and a very clear command chain to make sure it

17 went well. And as far as I could see for the Croats in

18 that pocket, that plan did go well. They succeeded in

19 getting what they wanted.

20 It would, of course, have enhanced the

21 reputation of the local commanders in that area with

22 their population, in that they had given them the food

23 and supplies they believed they needed.

24 Q. And you exclude the possibility that it was

25 organised by civilians who were furious, they wouldn't

Page 9766

1 let the convoy just get away?

2 A. That's an excellent excuse, but, as I said, I

3 have seldom seen such a well-orchestrated plan; where

4 we were cut off, there were clear routes to take

5 vehicles away, people could be moved on and off roads,

6 and, as I say, at the end, when Kordic issued the

7 orders to unblock, things were unblocked very quickly.

8 Q. During your meeting with Kordic on the 11th

9 of June, did he say that he would conduct an

10 investigation of the murders of the drivers who had

11 been killed?

12 MR. SAYERS: I object, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE MAY: This is in dispute, is it?

14 MR. SAYERS: Yes, it is, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, Mr. Lopez-Terres,

16 don't lead on this particular matter.

17 Brigadier, would you tell us what, if

18 anything, Dario Kordic may have said about an

19 investigation or anything like that?

20 A. Because people had been shot, it is a

21 requirement from my side to produce an investigation as

22 to those details of why they were shot. And this

23 affected all shootings that my soldiers were involved

24 in. And I also asked that the HVO in a similar fashion

25 would produce a report as to why people had been

Page 9767

1 murdered, because, clearly, people had been murdered,

2 and I wished to establish exactly why and how.

3 To my knowledge, this report was never

4 produced.

5 JUDGE MAY: And who did you ask to produce

6 the report?

7 A. I asked the report to be produced by Dario

8 Kordic. I would accept that it is not necessarily his

9 responsibility to produce that report, but I would

10 expect the HVO command, as it were, to have produced a

11 report to me. They had in the past proven they could

12 produce reports remarkably quickly. We had an event

13 where a rocket launcher was fired into my camp. Within

14 two days, the HVO soldier who had done this was found.

15 He was put on trial. He was found guilty, sentenced,

16 and locked up in Busovaca prison. So I knew they were

17 capable of producing investigations and reports when

18 they felt like it. And I suspect in this instance they

19 didn't feel like it.

20 You could ask that perhaps I should have

21 reminded the HVO government about this, but, to be

22 honest, with the span of command that I had, this

23 became just another problem which clearly wasn't going

24 to have a resolution, and I had to move onto other

25 concerns and business.

Page 9768

1 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General Duncan, before we round off the

3 testimony regarding the Convoy of Joy, I should like to

4 show you three documents. One is Z1,044. That is

5 1044. The second is a report which has already been

6 produced. The second one is 1049,1. The third is

7 Z1,091.

8 These are three reports. The first one is of

9 June 11th; the second is the 12th June; and the third

10 of the 21st of June.

11 A. I'm sorry, I'm missing the report from the

12 11th of June. Could I ask for the number again? Thank

13 you. I have it.

14 Q. Could we please have report Z1,044 placed on

15 the ELMO. Will you please quickly read through the

16 report.

17 A. Yes, I will. I'll read it off the ELMO.

18 It's the military info --

19 Q. No. No. No. Just for yourself. Just for

20 yourself. Just read it through. This was the report

21 of your regiment and it recounts the circumstances of

22 the incident. And I believe there is also an annex

23 with the precise chronology of the incident. Could you

24 please have a look at this annex, which is on the last

25 page.

Page 9769

1 Does this tell you what you saw happen and

2 what you were reporting about?

3 A. Yes, it does. It is a report, obviously,

4 compiled in my headquarters at the same time as I was

5 out dealing with these events. So the accuracy of

6 times is clearly much more accurate than I have been

7 able to describe from my memory. But it does

8 constitute a fairly succinct and full report of the

9 events that took place in those two days, the 10th,

10 11th of June. The timing, obviously, at the start of

11 each paragraph, the first two figures being the date

12 and then the second four figures the time in a 24-hour

13 clock.

14 Q. Eleven means the day?

15 A. Exactly.

16 Q. The second document is dated the 12th of

17 June, paragraph 2. 1049,1. This is passage 2 on the

18 Convoy of Mercy. It again says that the instructions

19 given by Kordic were followed up and obeyed.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And the third report dated the 21st of June,

22 page 6 of the report. There is a passage entitled

23 "Freedom of Movement." Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. After the 11th of June, did you once again

Page 9770

1 discuss with General Blaskic -- and to discuss the

2 authority which Dario Kordic evidently had in that

3 area, as evidenced a few days before that?

4 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?

5 Q. The report of the 21st of June, and this is

6 in relation to a meeting which you had with Colonel

7 Blaskic. And during that meeting, if I understand

8 properly this report, you reminded Blaskic about the

9 incidents of the 11th of June and that it was possible

10 to put an end to it, owing to the intervention of Dario

11 Kordic, who, evidently, could control the movement of

12 the population in the area.

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. Thank you, usher. We are now passing onto

15 the 19th of June, 1993. That day you organised,

16 General Duncan, a meeting with the authorities of two

17 parties, Colonel Blaskic, Colonel Hadzihasanovic,

18 Colonel Merdan, and the purpose of the meeting was to

19 try to arrive at an agreement on ceasefire and

20 understanding about various issues. And at the time I

21 believe you were the one who drew up a report of that

22 meeting of the 19th of June '93, and which is Z1,078?

23 A. Yes, that's correct. I have the document in

24 front of me. It is -- I typed it myself. I typed

25 these documents immediately after meetings of what we

Page 9771

1 called the joint command. And the joint command is

2 really the -- on the last page those individuals who

3 are named as the action addressees. That includes

4 Colonel Blaskic and Colonel Hadzihasanovic, the two

5 senior military commanders in that area on the BiH and

6 Croat sides.

7 The aim of the meeting was very much as in

8 the agenda, those six items there, as these items were

9 disrupting the stability of the area, to say the

10 least. We were moving from a disturbed situation

11 towards open hostility between the BiH and the Bosnian

12 Croat army, the HVO.

13 The important thing about this piece of paper

14 is paragraph 5, where both commanders agreed to those

15 following subparagraphs there, that they would take

16 action and issue orders to make sure they took effect.

17 And you can see from the list there, these are fairly

18 substantial activities I was asking them to do in order

19 to calm down the situation and prevent these events

20 taking place.

21 Q. At that time of the meeting there were

22 prisoners too who had been detained equally by the HVO

23 and by the Bosnian army. Could you tell us something

24 as regards the HVO? Where were Muslim prisoners

25 detained?

Page 9772

1 A. Muslim prisoners were detained in a number of

2 sites within the HVO area of control. I did not know

3 exactly where these sites were, but the numbers of

4 prisoners were held by the ICRC where they could, and

5 were monitored by the ECMM where they could, and that

6 applies to both HVO and BiH prisoners. Prison exchange

7 was a major feature of this joint command meetings.

8 Q. Are you aware of Muslim prisoners in the

9 areas of Vitez, Busovaca and Kiseljak at the time?

10 A. Yes, I was. And the numbers were given to me

11 by the BiH and for the HVO prisoners, and for the

12 reverse.

13 As a result of getting those numbers, we

14 decided together, with the commanders present, the ECMM

15 and the ICRC, to get together senior officers from both

16 sides to work out a programme for repatriation of the

17 prisoners from both sides.

18 Q. At that time too, are you aware of some

19 complaints of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities

20 regarding the status of prisoners, that is, prisoners

21 made to dig trenches for the HVO?

22 A. This was a complaint from both the BiH and

23 the HVO, that prisoners on both sides were being made

24 to dig trenches. I did state at the time that just

25 because one side is doing it doesn't give carte blanche

Page 9773

1 to the other side to do it, and I said that it was

2 actually illegal to use prisoners in such a fashion and

3 asked that prisoners should not be doing this.

4 Q. After that meeting of the 19th of June, did

5 you also organise other meetings of the same kind with

6 the same participants, or was it because this meeting

7 evidently did not meet with a successful end that you

8 stopped such meetings?

9 A. We continued to organise a series of

10 meetings, but it rapidly became apparent that action

11 was not taking place on either side and, therefore, it

12 was pointless carrying on. To be honest, at that

13 stage, there became a situation of open warfare between

14 the BiH and the HVO in Central Bosnia. So my attempts

15 at mediation had broken down. The inevitable, if you

16 like, had almost been pushed to the right, and open

17 warfare broke out. This represented a period of the

18 maximum activity in that Vitez pocket area.

19 Q. Perhaps just one last item before we conclude

20 for today. We already talked about June 1993, fire

21 was -- rather, a shot was fired at your camp. You

22 complained with Colonel Blaskic about that and Colonel

23 Blaskic assured you very quickly that the person who

24 had fired that shot had been found and detained. Could

25 you briefly recount that incident, please.

Page 9774

1 A. Sorry. I could recount it, but I believe I

2 have already recounted it in some detail.

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Sufficiently for our

4 purposes.

5 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

6 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have a

7 document which bears on this incident. I wanted to

8 show it to the witness. The document is Z1130.

9 Q. It is a letter addressed to Colonel Blaskic

10 on the 30th of June, 1993. Have you found the

11 document?

12 A. Yes, I have. This was another document that

13 I drafted myself. Thank you for reminding me.

14 Commander Blaskic's response to the incident

15 had been so quick and efficient, I thought it polite,

16 since I demanded the inquest, that I write back and

17 thank him for it, and you can see I have complimented

18 him on the speed and efficiency in which he'd taken

19 that action, offering my thanks for his assistance in

20 unlocking that problem.

21 Q. That fire that was opened on your camp came

22 from the area of Vitez.

23 A. Yes, it did. It was initiated by one of the

24 local HVO soldiers, who was subsequently taken off to

25 Busovaca, which is the prison for the local soldiers,

Page 9775

1 and incarcerated there.

2 Q. But you could never ascertain whether that

3 soldier had, indeed, been taken into custody and

4 sentenced. I mean, that was only what Colonel Blaskic

5 told you.

6 A. That is entirely correct. I actually thought

7 it somewhat rude to question Commander Blaskic. He'd

8 obviously taken firm action, and as one commander to

9 another, I thanked him, and that was the end of the

10 matter.

11 Q. You believed his word. You never saw a

12 document.

13 A. No, I never saw a document.

14 Q. I thank you.

15 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

16 Mr. President, I believe that we could adjourn now.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We will adjourn until

18 tomorrow. I said 2.45. It may be more sensible to sit

19 at 3.00 because the previous hearing which I'm involved

20 in will go on until 2.00. So 3.00 tomorrow. We will

21 then sit, provided the interpreters are agreeable, a

22 little more than an hour and a half, sit without a

23 break, I suggest.

24 Brigadier, would you please be back then

25 tomorrow to continue with your evidence. I warn you,

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1 as all witnesses are warned, not to speak to anybody

2 about your evidence until it's over; that does include

3 members of the Prosecution. But, as I said earlier, if

4 you need to speak to them about travel arrangements or

5 a day to come back, of course you can do so.

6 THE WITNESS: Sir, thank you very much, and I

7 apologise for not being able to be more flexible in my

8 dates to return. I do apologise for that.

9 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, we're well used to

10 it.

11 Tomorrow at 3.00 please.

12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

13 5.17 p.m., to be reconvened on

14 Wednesday, the 10th day of November,

15 1999, at 3 p.m.