1 Friday, 26th November, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning Your Honours.
7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario
8 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kovacic.
10 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 WITNESS: ALASTAIR DUNCAN [Resumed]
12 Cross-examined by Mr. Kovacic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Brigadier
15 A. Good morning.
16 Q. You are a qualified military officer, so
17 could you please, very briefly, tell us what you
18 consider to be a model brigade by NATO standards in
19 terms of structure and strength; how large it is and
20 which unit it comprises? What is the standard?
21 A. There is no standard for a NATO brigade,
22 because NATO brigades are formed from the alliance, the
23 19 alliance countries that form NATO. The structure
24 and organisation of those brigades are a national
25 responsibility, but the selection of tasks for those
1 brigades will be the responsibility of the senior
2 commander, from whatever force is formed in NATO, be it
3 for standing defensive forces or an expeditionary
4 force, such as Kosovo.
5 Q. Thank you. [No further translation]
6 JUDGE MAY: We are not getting a
8 MR. KOVACIC:
9 Q. If you were to prepare it on the basis of any
10 criteria, what kind of numbers would it have? Did you
11 receive the transcript?
12 A. Yes, I got that. I mean, every military
13 command will always ask for more soldiers, and the
14 politicians will tell them they can't have that many.
15 We don't have a standard number of soldiers at all.
16 Q. Thank you. Tell me, please, when you arrived
17 in the Lasva Valley, you already encountered
18 established HVO brigades, so that the situation was
19 more or less clear even to your predecessors, but did
20 you also learn how large the HVO brigades were and how
21 they were structured, those that were deployed in the
22 Lasva Valley?
23 A. I have no idea of the size of the brigades.
24 I was aware there was a number of brigades which
25 defended the Lasva Valley. Those brigades were a mix
1 of territorial forces who were based in their own homes
2 and would do, I think, some 10 days on the front line
3 in their local area; that is the individuals would
4 serve for 10 days on the front line. The brigades had
5 a structure and a command structure and seemed to be
6 equipped with sufficient radios and telephones to
7 communicate. There were also manoeuvre forces which
8 were able to shuttle fairly swiftly from one part of
9 the Vitez pocket to the other. And then there was the
10 infrastructure of supporting mortar and artillery
11 units, as well as police and other essential elements
12 which put together a fighting force.
13 Q. Thank you. Those manoeuvre forces that you
14 mention, you had no reliable data, any kind of document
15 or any reliable information that they came under the
16 command of the brigades?
17 A. I had no reliable information to that extent,
18 and I understood they were formed on an ad hoc basis as
19 required. I would assume that they would have to come
20 under command of the brigade to which they were
21 deployed, otherwise the command and control
22 relationships would not have worked. In fact, you
23 cannot send reinforcements into an area and leave them
24 on a separate command structure. They would have to be
25 incorporated. And I think this must have happened
1 because of the successful defence of that Vitez
3 Q. So that is an assumption. But Brigadier,
4 within the town of Vitez itself we had the headquarters
5 of the operative zone, the command of Colonel Blaskic
6 in the hotel, who was the commander of the entire
7 zone. In that same town we had the Vitez Brigade, for
8 instance. You heard, and we saw, looking through some
9 documents yesterday, that there were Jokers and others,
10 so the command of the operative zone would
11 hierarchically be the highest command level in Vitez.
12 Therefore, in this hypothetical model, can you be sure
13 that those special units were responsible to the
14 brigade or to the operative zone, or maybe in another
15 town it may have been organised differently? So we are
16 just going -- discussing a hypothesis.
17 A. It would be normal for special units to be
18 attached according to the task of the brigade. There
19 are a number of supporting units, I was aware, that
20 were in Vitez, of special and other natures. As far as
21 I was aware, they were commanded and attached as
23 Q. I see. You will agree that soldiers, members
24 of brigades, had no barracks; they didn't even have a
25 proper base, except that they did have a command post?
1 A. Yes. That's true.
2 Q. So we can agree, I assume, that the brigade
3 soldiers, when they are not on duty, they sleep at
4 home, they go home?
5 A. Yes, that's what I was aware of.
6 Q. So, therefore, this is certainly not the
7 traditional military standard for a soldier to be on
8 the front for eight hours or 12 hours, and then go
9 home. This could hardly be called a generally
10 acceptable or standard solution?
11 A. It's a standard solution for, I believe,
12 Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, and seems to work
13 remarkably well there.
14 Q. So Bosnia had a highly modern solution, did
16 A. I think to jump straight to that conclusion
17 is going a little far. All I am saying is there is no
18 great disadvantage in having territorially based forces
19 that spend some of their time at home and some on the
20 front line. To my certain knowledge, that is the way
21 the Norwegian army are equipped and would intend to
22 fight for a war of national defence, with a good
23 communication system and a good command and control
24 structure. It's a different way of doing business. I
25 am not saying it's either good or bad. It's just one
1 of the range of options for utilising military forces.
2 Q. And to wind up this section on brigades.
3 Just one more question. The kind of brigade you
4 encountered, for instance in Vitez, or perhaps if you
5 are more familiar with the brigade in Novi Travnik or
6 Busovaca, it doesn't matter, the kind of HVO brigade
7 that you encountered, and about which you knew most,
8 how much time would it need, according to your expert
9 opinion, for such a brigade to be fully organised, from
10 the moment commander receives the order to establish it
11 to the moment it has to be combat ready? According to
12 what you knew at the time and on the basis of your
13 peacetime experience.
14 A. My experience is that that -- it would not
15 take long at all for that brigade to be combat ready,
16 since it has all its weapons with it and can move
17 rapidly into its combat positions, which would be
18 fairly close to the homes. Because they know each
19 other and because they will have worked together, as
20 they had for some time, it could deploy extremely
22 Q. I apologise. Perhaps my question wasn't
23 worded properly. If we still don't have a brigade, it
24 still doesn't exist, but somebody is given an order to
25 form a brigade, to establish it, not to activate it,
1 not to deploy it. You were talking about its
2 deployment. I am talking about the situation when it
3 still does not exist. It has to be organised, to find
4 the personnel, to equip it and all the other things
5 that need to be done. I don't know what it is, judging
6 by the situation you found there, but let us assume
7 that these were peacetime conditions. But roughly,
8 would you need three weeks, two months, five months?
9 A. I'm unqualified to speculate on the length of
10 time, I'm afraid, it would take that to do.
11 Q. Thank you. There is no doubt at all that at
12 the time you were aware, on the basis of your contacts
13 with the HVO, that the immediate superior of my client
14 Cerkez was Tihomir Blaskic, who was the commander of
15 the operative zone of Central Bosnia; isn't that so?
16 A. That is correct. Yes.
17 Q. Without producing any documents to speed
18 things up, you did submit table Z2563. Just one
19 question in connection with that diagram. In that
20 diagram, operative groups have been marked. There's
21 the Operative Zone, operative groups, and then
22 lower-level units, including brigades. You know what
23 I'm referring to, I hope, or shall I get the document?
24 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the
25 document, 2653.
1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. So at the medium level of command, we have
3 the operative groups. Do you have any knowledge as to
4 up to which point in time the HVO was organised in this
6 A. As far as I am aware, the date on the bottom
7 right-hand corner of that document, under, as it were,
8 subpara (6) of the notes, refers to a change in -- that
9 a surrender took place on the 14th of June. So I
10 assume that that document would have been compiled on
11 or after the 14th of June, 1993.
12 Q. With the exception of the operative group
13 numbered as 3, on these two others, the name of the
14 commander is not indicated; obviously you had no
15 contact with these institutions or with this level of
17 A. That is correct. That's either because we
18 did not know the names, or the fact that that level of
19 command may well not have existed.
20 Q. We have mentioned the hierarchy between
21 Blaskic and Cerkez; there's no one between them. You
22 would have probably known if there had been someone in
24 A. I think so, yes.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] We don't need
2 the document any more.
3 Q. Brigadier, you had no more precise knowledge
4 as to the way in which the individual units were
5 assigned areas of responsibility; the HVO or Blaskic,
6 for instance, never informed you which unit was
7 responsible for which area of responsibility? Is that
9 A. That is correct, but I would not expect -- I
10 did not know -- I was not particularly interested in
11 that level of command. I had my liaison officers who
12 were attached to each brigade, and they, I believe, had
13 a detailed knowledge of where those brigades were.
14 Q. In a part of your testimony, you told us that
15 you had even personally seen some troops of the
16 Croatian army in Tomislavgrad, Gornji Vakuf, mostly in
17 the area of Prozor. We can agree that that area is
18 much farther to the south from the Lasva Valley, and
19 that between the two, there is a considerable mountain
20 range, so that this is quite a separate area,
22 A. Yes. Could I just confirm whether you said
23 "HVO troops" or "HV troops"?
24 Q. "HV." You mentioned this.
25 A. I can confirm I saw HV soldiers in the area
1 of Prozor: a truck, I think two soldiers, and a
2 150-odd-millimetre D-30 towed howitzer, I think. That
3 was the only time I personally saw HV soldiers in that
5 Q. And that is south of the Lasva Valley, and
6 geographically separate, isn't it?
7 A. Yes, and I think it's certainly in range of
8 BiH troops deployed in the Gornji Vakuf area,
9 certainly, and probably further than that.
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the
11 usher for his assistance to distribute this document.
12 Q. Brigadier, in your examination-in-chief
13 yesterday, there was mention made again of certain
14 criminal groups that were operating in the area of the
15 Lasva Valley, but you specifically mentioned that those
16 criminal groups were really a very good excuse for the
17 commanders to claim that there were elements outside
18 their control. Let me show you just three documents as
19 an example from which it is evident.
20 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could each
21 document, one document out of each set, be provided to
22 the witness, please.
23 JUDGE MAY: Have they been provided to the
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I did not give
1 a copy to the interpreters, but I hope there are enough
3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, before you go on, in
4 the morning, before you begin a cross-examination --
5 and this applies to all counsel -- when you know you're
6 going to refer to documents, then what you should do is
7 make sure that the interpreters have a copy beforehand,
8 because now the Registrar has got to go around
9 distributing them, and it's much more efficient if it's
10 done at the beginning.
11 MR. KOVACIC: I will, Your Honour,
12 certainly. But we will be very short, and --
13 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter. They must
14 have them, because they don't know what reference is
15 going to be made to them.
16 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, sir. I will,
17 certainly, next time.
18 Q. Brigadier, will you please take the document
19 dated the 24th of May. These are UNPROFOR reports from
20 the region towards the centre, are they?
21 A. Yes, that's from headquarters, UNPROFOR in
22 Kiseljak, to UNPROFOR Zagreb, and various other
23 battalions within the organisation.
24 Q. Very well. Will you please turn to page 4.
25 The page number is indicated in the left-hand corner.
1 In the middle of the page, under the heading
2 "Vitez/Busovaca," small 1, the second sentence, that
3 begins with the words, "The main problems"; will you
4 please read it yourself.
5 It is clear, isn't it, that those criminal
6 elements do exist, even in your own reports, so that
7 they are not a negligible problem? I assume that such
8 a statement would not figure in your report if these
9 were quite insignificant issues; is that correct?
10 A. That is correct. My concern with these
11 criminal elements, or so-called criminal elements,
12 should I say -- is that if they are living in the Vitez
13 pocket, in the Vitez area, they are clearly consuming
14 food, ammunition, petrol, water, manpower, and
15 communications that would be best put to effect under
16 the military command. If the military command wish to
17 use them effectively, I would have brought them under
18 control or used them for its own ends; but in a pocket
19 such as the Vitez pocket, I find it very unlikely that
20 people, as I say, consuming food, ammunition, petrol,
21 and the rest of it, would be left on their own just
22 doing criminal activity. It would be a complete waste
23 of military assets.
24 Q. Brigadier, both sides claim that there were
25 criminal elements, and your units also recognised the
1 existence of such criminal elements on both sides.
2 Isn't that correct?
3 A. Yes, but I'm saying that it's quite likely
4 that those criminal elements are being sponsored by
6 Q. Thank you. Let us look at page 7 of this
7 document, please. The second paragraph from the top,
8 under number 4, speaks about disputes between Croat and
9 Muslim communities that are continuing and mentions
10 groups led by Mafia personalities. So this is
11 consistent with the statement we have just looked at at
12 the beginning. Would you agree that such references
13 would not be included in your reports if these were
14 peripheral problems?
15 A. No, they were -- I entirely agree, they are
16 not peripheral problems; they are mainstream problems
17 for both sides. What I am concerned about -- remain
18 concerned about, is that if both sides are trying to
19 win a war, then it is unlikely they would let large
20 amounts of soldiers or criminals operate with
21 activities such as these Mafia activities, which would
22 be degrading their war-fighting capabilities.
23 Q. Very well. Can we have a look at the second
24 document, please, dated the 31st of May.
25 JUDGE MAY: Let us give a number to the first
2 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked
4 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. On this document, let us look at page 3,
6 please. Here, in the second half of the page, the
7 paragraph under the heading "Turbe/Travnik" -- so,
8 according to your terminology, on the edge of the Vitez
9 area -- again, reference is made to a criminal gang who
10 ambushed a BH army vehicle, which appeared to have
11 raised tensions.
12 A. I'm sorry, could you just confirm, on the
13 front page of the document, who is purported to have
14 drafted it and to whom? I've only seen -- I can only
15 see the third page.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Brigadier, if you want to
17 look at the first page, do.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
19 JUDGE MAY: Or, indeed, at anything else.
20 A. This is an opinion written by the person who
21 drafted the report, based on an incident. Again, I say
22 it is quite likely that somebody ambushed a BiH
23 vehicle, but to what end. If it's a criminal killing
24 somebody from the Muslim side or a Muslim criminal
25 killing one of his own side, as it were, it is a little
1 vague as to what happened.
2 Q. Yes. Yes. We agree. But obviously there is
3 a criminal act. If somebody seizes a vehicle, that is
4 a criminal act, regardless of the consequences. I am
5 not saying that this is true; it may be, it may not,
6 but a criminal act has been perpetrated. We agree on
7 that, don't we?
8 A. Yes, I can agree that in this case it would
9 appear that a criminal act has been perpetrated.
10 Q. Finally, the third and last document.
11 Brigadier, it is your report on a meeting, on your
12 meeting with Blaskic dated the 17th of August 1993.
13 Have you seen it, reviewed it recently? Do you recall
14 this document?
15 A. I certainly recall the document. I haven't
16 reviewed it recently.
17 Q. If I may draw your attention to a paragraph
18 that fits within this topic. You agree that this is
19 your note about a meeting with Colonel Blaskic, so
20 please look at the second page and how it ends.
21 Looking at the second page, may I draw your attention
22 to point 6. You said here that Blaskic was irritated
23 by the theft of his liaison officer's car from outside
24 your base. Do you remember that conversation? Is it
25 possible to infer from this that Blaskic's liaison
1 officer had his car stolen in front of your base,
2 probably while he was visiting your base?
3 A. Yes, I can confirm the car belonged to Darko
4 Gelic. He was the liaison officer from Blaskic's
5 headquarters. The car was stolen from outside my
6 base. I think car theft is fairly rife in any
8 Q. Yes, there is crime everywhere, and that is
9 precisely what I wish to establish. And under point 3
10 of the same document, on the first page therefore,
11 Blaskic complains to you because you had organised a
12 meeting between the chief of police in Zenica, Asim
13 Fazlic; Zarko Andric, known as Zuti; of whom Blaskic
14 said, and you repeated, that he was a Mafia Godfather?
15 A. This paragraph 3 records what Blaskic told
16 me. It starts by saying "in his perception," therefore
17 he did not know that this meeting had happened. I
18 finished that paragraph with the words, "This will be
19 investigated further, as at the moment it does not seem
20 to have much credence." This was an accusation that I
21 personally organised this meeting, which I denied.
22 Whether or not the meeting took place, I do not know.
23 But it was certainly not orchestrated or organised by
24 the British Battalion or any member of the British
1 Q. Brigadier, I apologise, but perhaps my
2 question wasn't clear. The description used for Zuti
3 as a Mafia Godfather, this term, was it used by Blaskic
4 or by you?
5 A. It was used by me.
6 Q. Well, you know that there was some kind of a
7 Mafia, someone called Zuti, some criminals in the area?
8 A. Yes, there were. There was an organisation
9 which was, I believe, led by the person we called
10 Zuti. And he's been referred to before, both in the
11 fact that he was running a criminal organisation, and
12 again I would refer to the fact whether that criminal
13 organisation was deliberately tolerated and used by the
14 command structures in that pocket.
15 And you'll also be aware that Zuti and his
16 organisation were pre-positioned where they could
17 potentially ambush the second Muslim convoy late on in
18 my tour. And that is where the road comes north from
19 Gornji Vakuf north to Novi Travnik.
20 Q. And since you are mentioning those places and
21 Zuti and in such detail, even though I had no intent in
22 going so far, Zuti was from Novi Bila, and you knew
23 that; and Nova Bila is in the Travnik municipality? Is
24 that correct?
25 A. Yes --
1 JUDGE MAY: Two questions there. Just ask
2 one at a time.
3 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I am just trying
4 to cut the time.
5 Q. [Interpretation] Are you aware that he was
6 from Nova Bila?
7 A. Yes, I understand that he was previously in a
8 police role, civil police role, in the Nova Bila area.
9 Q. Are you aware that, administratively, Nova
10 Bila belongs in the Travnik municipality?
11 A. No, I am not directly aware of that.
12 Q. And just one more question in relation to
13 this. In late September 1993 there were a number of
14 significant artillery attacks on the Lasva Valley by
15 the army of BiH, and that includes Vitez. Do you
16 remember if towards the very end of September the Vitez
17 health station, the one in the centre of the town was
18 hit by several shells, and that there were quite a
19 number of casualties and that two persons were killed.
20 Do you recall that event? Because it resounded quite
21 forcefully. It was the very end of September, the
22 health station in Vitez.
23 A. Whereabouts in Vitez?
24 Q. In the centre, the very heart of the town.
25 A. I cannot recall that exact shelling
1 incident. All I can say is that both sides in the
2 conflict shelled each other at irregular intervals. I
3 am sure that shells would have landed in that late
4 September and they will have also have caused
5 casualties. That wouldn't surprise me at all.
6 Q. Yes. We agree on that, but I was not asking
7 you if that shelling occurred, because of course there
8 are very many instances of that. But do you remember
9 that it was a health institution which was hit several
10 times, and that people who were killed or wounded came
11 from that health station, and that is why the reaction
12 was rather forceful to that?
13 A. That is entirely possible, that one of the
14 health stations was hit, yes.
15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, do you want the
16 documents which you have produced exhibited?
17 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour, I would. I'm
18 sorry, I forgot to ask for the number.
19 JUDGE MAY: We'll get the numbers.
20 THE REGISTRAR: The previous document dated
21 31st of May will be numbered D47/2 and the last
22 document D48/2.
23 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
24 MR. KOVACIC: And I have just one question
1 Q. [Interpretation] Brigadier, if I understood
2 well your testimony, but will you tell us, you never
3 met with Mr. Mario Cerkez, my client?
4 A. When I consulted my diary last night, I
5 discovered that we met very briefly in company with
6 Colonel Stewart on the 7th of May. It was a brief
7 meeting, and I don't believe we ever met again
8 face-to-face in my time in Bosnia. I don't believe we
9 spoke at that meeting, apart from, perhaps, saying good
10 morning or good afternoon, whatever time of day it
11 was. But apart from that, I never had direct
12 conversations with Mario Cerkez
13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you
14 very much, Brigadier Duncan. Thank you. I have no
15 further questions.
16 Re-examined by Mr. Lopez-Terres:
17 Q. [Interpretation] I should like to ask the
18 witness to give us some further explanations after this
20 Brigadier Duncan, I should like to show you a
21 document which you were already shown. It is a
22 document of the 24th of August 1993, milinfosum. It is
24 Will you please look at the pages 5 to 6, 5
25 and then 6. That is the penultimate page, one before
1 last. Can you see the end of that paragraph 16, which
2 talks about the order of battle and people? Do you
3 remember that document?
4 A. Yes, I do. I remember the request referred
5 to in the paragraph 16.
6 Q. We've already referred to that request which
7 came from Mate Boban, but this milinfosum says, because
8 after that there is a list of individuals, that is of
9 Bosnian Croats, follows this request. Then it says
10 that this request was indicative of the hierarchy of
11 politicians, of political personalities in Central
13 A. Can we -- is this list attached?
14 Q. Yes, the list is attached. It is on the next
15 page. Could you just tell us who are the persons who
16 appear -- the persons who appear first on the list and
17 the person who appears under "c".
18 A. The person at the top of the list is Dario
19 Kordic. Under him is a man called Kostroman, who I
20 know accompanied and I saw accompanying Dario Kordic on
21 many occasions. And then beneath that at paragraph "c"
22 is Anto Valenta. But this continues listing other
23 politicians, two of whose name I recognise.
24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. At that time, this
25 list reflected the hierarchical order that you yourself
1 observed, and those were the prominent political
2 individuals amongst the Bosnian Croats; is that so?
3 A. Yes. And if my memory serves me right, I
4 believe this list was copied from the original Croat
6 Q. I shall now like to show you another document
7 which was used by the Defence yesterday. It is
8 document D135/1.
9 Will you please look at paragraph 18 of the
10 document, and again the passage referring to orbat.
11 This document was shown to you so as to make a
12 distinction between the Joker units and Vitezovi
13 units. Do you remember that?
14 A. Yes, I do remember. I mean, it refers
15 specifically to the Jokers, the Vitezovi and the
16 Viteska Brigade.
17 Q. There is no reason to doubt the reliability
18 of information in that document, is there?
19 A. No. This is some part of the normal
20 compiling of orbats, which was an ongoing requirement
21 for the officers responsible for the milinfosums. And
22 the orbat we've already seen.
23 Q. Could you please read out to us the last
24 sentence in paragraph 18. It refers to the head of
1 A. Does the -- the leader of Vitezovi in Vitez,
2 Darko Kraljevic, is a personal friend of Mario Cerkez,
3 commander of the Viteska HVO Brigade.
4 Q. Thank you. And now something that concerns
5 the incidents related to the Convoy of Joy. Yesterday,
6 you were asked several times about that crowd of
7 hostile civilians -- that is, Croat women, enraged --
8 and we were told that there were not only civilians
9 there, but that the military was also actively involved
10 both in intercepting and in pillaging that convoy?
11 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.
12 Q. And there were two military, two soldiers,
13 from the area of Vitez, who were killed by your troops
14 in that case; they were not civilians?
15 A. Yes, that's correct. Yes.
16 Q. Did Dario Kordic tell you after that event
17 that he, himself, would ask for an investigation to be
18 conducted about the death of eight drivers of the
20 A. Yes, he did. Yes, he did. He made a
21 personal assurance that, firstly, all vehicles would be
22 released; that those vehicles would have freedom of
23 passage; that UNPROFOR would have freedom of passage;
24 and that we had the assurance of the Croat people for
25 this. And then, finally, he said he would investigate
1 the eight drivers -- the murder of the eight drivers.
2 I believe that's also in my notebook, sir, which I
3 submitted, those facts.
4 Q. My question is, Dario Kordic said to you that
5 he himself would investigate it or order it, but he
6 didn't say that he asked or that he would ask the
7 military authorities to conduct that investigation?
8 A. No, he merely stated that he would
9 investigate the murders. There was no rider put on
10 that as to who would do the investigation.
11 Q. And the last point: Following your testimony
12 yesterday, Mario Cerkez's Defence counsel asked you
13 about the availability of the military to prepare for
14 the combat. Do you remember that question asked by the
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. As a professional military, as a brigadier,
18 as a general, does it seem plausible to you that a
19 brigade commander stays at home at the time when he is
20 told that an imminent attack of the enemy is about to
21 take place, is about to happen?
22 A. I would find it very strange that a brigade
23 commander would, firstly, be at home; I would expect
24 him to be out deployed with his soldiers. And
25 certainly, if an imminent attack was threatened, he
1 would be, as it were, round and about, making sure that
2 all was ready to repel such an attack.
3 Q. Would it be either possible that the brigade
4 commander stays at home when he receives orders that
5 they have to be ready for combat within the next
6 24 hours?
7 A. I mean, in my opinion, it would be very
8 unlikely that he would stay at home.
9 Q. And the last thing, which concerns that Mafia
10 and the Mafia's godfather, Mr. Zarko Andric: Did you
11 know that that person was promoted by Colonel Blaskic
12 on the 4th of July, 1993; that is, a few weeks before
13 that conversation that you had with him?
14 A. No, sir, I wasn't aware of that at all.
15 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have no
16 further questions, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, that concludes your
18 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International
19 Tribunal to give it. I'm sorry that you've had to
20 return, but it's now finished, and you are released.
21 THE WITNESS: Sir, thank you very much.
22 [The witness withdrew]
23 JUDGE MAY: We'll go into private session.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
25 9.50 a.m., to be reconvened on Monday,
1 the 29th day of November, 1999, at
2 9.30 a.m.