1 Tuesday, 30th November, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
6 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario
7 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, the position is as
9 yesterday, that Judge Robinson is not here, for the
10 same reasons. The position, as we understand it, is
11 that you have a witness, but there are objections to
12 his giving a deposition, which we will hear and see
13 what we can resolve.
14 MR. NICE: I'm not sure about there being
15 objections to his giving a deposition, because I have
16 just spoken to both my learned friends about Brix
17 Andersen, the witness I imagine you have in mind.
18 Before we come to that, can I mention one
19 other matter and one other difficulty. The other
20 matter is that in certain circumstances -- no, in
21 other circumstances I would have sought an ex parte
22 hearing now, and I think that you probably have been
23 told in general terms the nature of the hearing that I
24 would seek. Ex parte hearings and deposition hearings
25 are covered, if at all, only to a limited extent by
1 authority, and I simply don't know if this Chamber
2 would be prepared, as a two-member chamber, in
3 effectively deposition mode, to deal with the
4 particular part of the ex parte matter at this stage.
5 If yes, then I would ask to have a hearing,
6 and I think it would take about 15 minutes, at most, in
7 addition to the time that would be taken to change all
8 the technical things that have to be changed. If the
9 Chamber is not disposed and doesn't feel that it can
10 deal with that part of the ex parte hearing this
11 morning, then I will take appropriate administrative
12 steps, and we'll deal with that when Judge Robinson is
13 with us again. But it would certainly save time, and a
14 considerable amount of administrative difficulty, if
15 the Chamber were able to deal with just that part of
16 the ex parte hearing today.
17 JUDGE MAY: No, we can't deal with ex parte
18 matters, all that sort of thing, unless we are fully
20 MR. NICE: I quite understand, and I'll deal
21 with that appropriately.
22 The second matter, which is a difficulty, is
23 that Mr. Scott is not particularly well; in fact, he is
24 probably getting worse, and the balance has to be made
25 between the interests of the case and the interests of
1 his health and the health of those with whom he is in
2 contact, either directly or by the air-conditioning.
3 It's always a balance. It may be that although I think
4 he is going to start off this morning, at some stage he
5 will simply have to bail out, and if he does, I hope
6 you understand; I will take over, although I won't have
7 taken the time to prepare the witness because I didn't
8 know this was forthcoming.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, that's perfectly
10 understandable, and if Mr. Scott feels he needs to
11 leave, no one is going to complain.
12 Now, what is the position about this
14 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, let me articulate
15 the position from Mr. Kordic's perspective. We have a
16 difficulty in principle with this witness, and that
17 arises from two things. The first is the delivery to
18 us yesterday of the exhibits that this witness is
19 apparently going to authenticate, some 800 pages of
20 these things. Now, we've been able to go through them,
21 but obviously they have not been provided in a language
22 that the accused understands, and that provides a
23 significant difficulty.
24 Secondly -- I've been through this before,
25 and I don't want to be accused of wasting time -- the
1 Court's orders are absolutely clear: All witness
2 statements had to be delivered to us by May the 17th at
3 the latest, after two extensions, and we received a
4 witness statement yesterday, again in a language that
5 the accused does not understand, in English, and
6 apparently the date that that statement was taken was
7 November the 28th, 1999. So we have an objection in
8 principle to this witness testifying as to any of the
9 matters that are contained in the witness statement for
10 those reasons.
11 JUDGE MAY: Let me interrupt to understand
12 the position: Have you received no previous witness
14 MR. SAYERS: Right.
15 Now, as a practical matter, Mr. President, we
16 understand that the witness is here; we understand that
17 the Trial Chamber's time is valuable; and, speaking
18 from the perspective of the Kordic Defence once again,
19 we do not object to this witness testifying by way of
20 deposition if the Court -- if the two judges present
21 consider that to be appropriate, with one exception,
22 and that is that as we understand it from the offer of
23 proof that we were given yesterday, this witness is
24 being proffered for two reasons. The first is to
25 authenticate a substantial number of the documents.
1 Obviously, we don't object to that.
2 The second is to offer a wide range of
3 opinions contained in paragraphs 13 through 18 of the
4 offer of proof, and we do object to that, for these
5 reasons: If you take a look at paragraph 19, it's
6 clear that this witness has never met either of the
7 accused and has never spoken to them; and from
8 paragraph 9, it's clear that he's never been to Central
9 Bosnia. So what he is doing is essentially looking
10 over all the documents and coming up with conclusions
11 and opinions of his own, which are built, in turn, upon
12 conclusions and opinions of others who are reporting up
13 the ECMM chain of command that we went into yesterday.
14 So that's the position of the Kordic
15 Defence. We object to his delivery of opinions and
16 conclusions based upon no personal knowledge. We can't
17 conceive of any way in which they would be of any use
18 to the Trial Chamber, and what we would suggest is
19 this: Let's go ahead, do a deposition, and leave the
20 issue of whether those opinions and conclusions -- if
21 the Court feels that they might be of any utility at
22 all, any marginal utility -- leave a decision on the
23 admissibility of those conclusions and opinions until
24 the Trial Chamber is fully constituted.
25 That's our position, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MAY: Would you have any objection to
2 his producing the documents, as they were? I have just
3 this moment been handed them, but, I mean, the first
4 what I notice is a fax. Is there any problem on this
5 basis, that to some extent these documents are going to
6 speak for themselves?
7 MR. SAYERS: Well, two comments about that,
8 Your Honour. Obviously, the witness wrote some of
9 these documents himself and so to that extent he can
10 talk about those. With respect to the other documents,
11 as you point out, they do speak for themselves. They
12 are records of the ECMM and they are going to be coming
13 into evidence and we fully understand them. So we
14 don't have any objection to that.
15 And let me just say, there is a separate
16 subject that we would want to bring to the Court's
17 attention. We had hoped to --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Sayers, will you slow
19 down, please. Could Mr. Sayers slow down, please.
20 MR. SAYERS: -- in connection with the
21 confidential witness that was discussed last Friday at
22 the status conference. But we can leave that until the
23 end of the day, if you feel that's appropriate.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. So I got your
25 position, you object to the witness's evidence of
1 opinion, or ECMM opinion, as you put it, in paragraphs
2 13 to 18?
3 MR. SAYERS: Yes.
4 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Mr. Sayers, between the
5 opinion of the witness himself and the witness being
6 here for testifying, giving the testimony on the ECMM
7 position, I think, as he was head of mission, deputy
8 head of mission in this organisation, he can be able to
9 testify about the position of the ECMM as such, but not
10 giving his own opinion. I think there is a
12 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I absolutely take
13 your point. I think that creates one difficulty, and
14 let me just say what it is. Obviously, to the extent
15 that the witness has his own opinions or own
16 conclusions, that raises its own set of problems, and
17 we all know what those are. To the extent that he
18 purports to be speaking on behalf of an institution,
19 and giving that institution's opinions and conclusions,
20 I think that raises a whole different category of
22 But more importantly, it puts us in the
23 invidious position of having to cross-examine him on
24 those, and waste time and be criticised for wasting
25 time, when the witness has been proffered, if you like,
1 by the Prosecution as a vehicle for those opinions.
2 Obviously, we would have to evaluate whether those
3 opinions have a valid, factual basis, and I hate to do
4 it, but that's what we have to do.
5 Thank you.
6 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, can I just get your
7 position right. You object to the witness producing
8 the documents, in the sense of saying these are the
9 documents, if this is right, collected by the Danish
10 delegation of the ECMM. Now, can there be any
11 objection to his doing that?
12 MR. SAYERS: No. That's not our position,
13 and I apologise to the Trial Chamber if I communicated
14 that. I mean, these are obviously ECMM documents, Your
15 Honour, and they do speak for themselves and we assume
16 that they are authentic. So we don't object to the
17 production of the documents. But if I might just
18 summarise, the objection is as follows: First, in
19 principle, because of a violation of the Court's order
20 of April the 1st, which established an absolute right
21 line --
22 JUDGE MAY: I am trying to find a compromise
23 here, because we can't make a ruling, obviously,
24 because there are merely the two of us. I am simply
25 trying to find a compromise, to save the time of the
1 Court and also save the time of the witness, to see
2 upon what basis a deposition could be agreed, on the
3 basis that the witness might have to return to be
4 cross-examined or to give further evidence before the
5 Tribunal. If it were possible for him to produce the
6 documents and give his evidence without the opinion
7 part, would you be prepared for him to give a
9 MR. SAYERS: I think that we would be
10 prepared to give a deposition, provided the issue of
11 late disclosure of the witness statement could be
12 reserved for subsequent adjudication by a fully
13 constituted Trial Chamber. That way the Trial
14 Chamber's time would be maximised, the inconvenience to
15 the witness would be minimised, and the rights of all
16 parties would be protected.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. What do you say about his
18 giving detailed evidence or detailed deposition about
19 the documents?
20 MR. SAYERS: About the contents of the
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
23 MR. SAYERS: I would suspect that he should
24 be permitted to do that. We have prepared to examine
25 him somewhat on the documents. Obviously, it's been
1 somewhat hurried and it will be a little disorganised
2 as a result; I hope not too disorganised. But if he
3 wants to give detailed testimony regarding the
4 documents, he should be permitted to do so, so that he
5 doesn't have to be dragged back here yet another time,
6 Your Honour.
7 JUDGE MAY: Just thinking aloud. If a
8 deposition was to be permitted or agreed to, subject to
9 matters of admissibility being reserved to the Trial
10 Chamber, you would not object to his giving a
11 deposition, including the production of the evidence,
12 but not giving opinion evidence, paragraphs 13 to 18?
13 MR. SAYERS: That is absolutely correct.
14 JUDGE MAY: That would be your position?
15 MR. SAYERS: Yes, sir. Thank you.
16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, that, at the moment,
17 is a suggestion which is made. We'll hear your
18 position on it.
19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours,
20 we would agree to an acceptable solution. In
21 principle, I agree with what my colleague Mr. Sayers
22 said, so I don't want to repeat any of it. However,
23 before any definite decision is made, I would like to
24 point out two details.
25 The first is the following: If this witness
1 is primarily supposed to authenticate certain
2 documents, perhaps the witness is not even needed
3 then. At least until now the Defence did not contest
4 the authenticity of any document. If anything was
5 contested, it was the substance, but then we had a live
6 witness who took part in our work, so we could discuss
7 it. That is to say that we are not challenging the
8 authenticity of the documents, we are not saying that
9 various documents were not produced by the signatories
10 concerned, so we don't really need the witness for
12 As for the presentation of these documents
13 that come with this witness, we agree that the
14 documents produced by this witness himself be tendered;
15 also, documents in whose creation he participated; and
16 perhaps even those documents that came into his office
17 from the ground. And then on the basis of these
18 documents, if he and his team produced their own
19 documents on that basis, then these documents should be
20 accepted too. However, we cannot agree to having
21 documents that were produced by other institutions and
22 signed by other persons. For example, there are a few
23 documents here that were signed by witness -- I'm
24 sorry, I don't know whether I can use his name anymore,
25 but the witness will be coming in in a couple of days,
1 whose statement we discussed, the one that we are going
2 to take over from the Blaskic case. So I cannot ask
3 this witness about that document because, of course, he
4 is going to say, "I don't know. I haven't produced
5 that document." So I don't think that such documents
6 should be tendered along with this witness.
7 We agree with all the rest. We agree with
8 the most important points. We agree that the Court
9 hear this witness today and then decide on all these
10 objections when the Chamber is here in its entirety.
11 This is only a deposition, but it seems to be a
12 reasonable and a practical solution to me.
13 That would be all, thank you.
14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, can we make some
16 MR. SCOTT: I believe so, Your Honour. Let
17 me just respond to a couple of points, so the record is
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
20 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, in terms of the
21 underlying documents themselves having not been
22 translated into the B/C/S language, as the Court knows,
23 that's a not a requirement and that has not been a
24 practice. As apart from statements, the documentary
25 materials have never been translated -- the English,
1 French, or what-have-you materials -- into B/C/S. So
2 we don't think there is a firm foundation for any
3 objection on that basis.
4 In terms of the statement not being produced,
5 Your Honour, there simply was no prior statement of
6 this witness. The investigator and I met this witness
7 for the first time on Sunday morning. There was no
8 prior statement whatsoever. Frankly, no prior
9 statement or written statement was required. And I
10 think this -- what this points out is that perhaps
11 leaves us in a position where the Prosecution would
12 like -- would perhaps have been better off not to
13 prepare a statement that could then be characterised as
14 late. We simply could have called the witness without
15 any statement whatsoever. There was no prior statement
16 to produce in March or April of this year.
17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, you may be right, but
18 how does it come about that there wasn't a statement?
19 After all, this is a witness you were going to call.
20 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, to be perfectly
21 candid, it was based on an assessment at the time that
22 the witness, this type of witness, with the likely
23 involvement that he had and with the likely knowledge
24 of a broad range of documents, that given his position,
25 that we would likely call. But we had never taken a
1 detailed statement from him before. There had been
2 very limited contact with him in connection with the
3 production of the documents, but it was based on an
4 assessment, Your Honour, that he would ultimately be a
5 viable witness.
6 The outline, Your Honour, that was prepared
7 and tendered to the Defence, again, Your Honour, was to
8 do our very, very best, as we have always tried to do,
9 to provide them as much advance notice as possible.
10 The paragraphs 13 to 18 that the Defence makes
11 particular objection to were simply, again, the absence
12 of a more detailed statement. If you'll accept my
13 characterisation, Your Honours, it's simply a means of
14 putting some very broad statements, as a means of
15 putting the Defence on notice -- on some notice, as
16 opposed to no notice at all, as to what this witness
17 would talk about, and the basic thrust of his
18 statements. They were not, Your Honour, frankly, meant
19 to be exactly the kind of detail outline that we have
20 for most witnesses, because again there was no prior
21 statement or set of statements to summarise.
22 We tried to reach a halfway house, Your
23 Honour, if we could, to simply -- in fairness to the
24 Defence, provide some advance notice of the basic
25 concepts or themes, whatever the Court would like to
1 use, subjects, that the witness would touch upon. And
2 that's the effort that was made to do this.
3 They are not opinions. Most of these, as we
4 pointed out, and as I think Judge Bennouna hit the nail
5 on the head, we are talking about ECMM -- largely here
6 ECMM institutional positions, institutional
7 assessments. This was the deputy head of missions for
8 political matters. He was the most senior official at
9 ECMM charged with these matters and he is in a position
10 to state ECMM's position on these issues. So it's not
11 a matter of personal opinion.
12 Finally, Your Honour, in terms of the
13 documents, virtually all these documents, if they
14 didn't fit within Mr. Kovacic's first and second
15 category, certainly fall within his third category.
16 And that is documents which this witness may have been
17 involved in processing in some fashion. Reports came
18 to him, he read them; he may in many instances prepare
19 other reports on the basis of these reports. There is
20 only, at the very most, very few documents, probably
21 not more than half a dozen, if that many, which might
22 be something different -- a document, for instance,
23 faxed from a third party -- nonetheless received by
24 ECMM and incorporated into ECMM's records. There are
25 few of those.
1 There is, for instance, a statement by
2 President Tudjman that was faxed to ECMM. Well, that's
3 arguably not -- ECMM didn't produce the document, but,
4 as a matter of fact, it's part of their historical
5 records received by them.
6 So these are essentially ECMM documents
7 either prepared, made, or received by them in their
8 ordinary course of business during their mission in the
9 former Yugoslavia, and we think that they are all --
10 they all should be admitted, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MAY: The difficulty is that matters of
12 admissibility have got to be dealt with by the Trial
13 Chamber as a whole. So how would you invite us to
14 proceed today?
15 Deal with this, first: Are you proposing to
16 go through this binder with the witness document by
18 MR. SCOTT: What I had thought to do, Your
19 Honour, last week, before we knew we would be in
20 deposition mode, is there is a big bundle, a thicker
21 bundle of documents which was produced for the purposes
22 of completely covering the documents to be tendered
23 through Mr. Brix Andersen. We didn't intend to go
24 through all of those in detail because, again, of the
25 volume. Then there is a secondary packet, that's
1 somewhat smaller, which we intended to review with him
2 in a more traditional way, although even many of those
3 might be extremely short, by way of just a reference or
5 JUDGE MAY: Let me see: We have a binder
6 which, I take it, is the larger document.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 MR. NICE: Hole punch coming.
9 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, while we're dealing
10 with these matters, the Court may find it useful to
11 have Exhibit Z2788 in front of you, which is a list of
12 the documents, essentially, and it was tendered to the
13 registry this morning, Z2788.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we've just been handed
16 MR. SCOTT: If I may, Your Honour, let me
17 back up and try again, now that everyone maybe has the
18 materials at hand.
19 This exhibit, Z2788, Your Honour, is a list
20 of what's in this entire thick -- the biggest bundle,
21 with the exception of about two or three documents
22 which were not added until after the list was
23 originally prepared, but it's 98 per cent of what's on
24 this list. And I had a couple of other documents that
25 I intended to supplement with the witness as we
1 proceeded, but essentially, for all practical purposes,
2 these are the same.
3 What the witness is prepared to say is that
4 he has reviewed all these out of court -- it didn't
5 seem a good use of the Court's time to sit here
6 reviewing documents -- and but he would say he's
7 reviewed every one of these documents out of court, as
8 listed on this list and verified by him to be ECMM
9 documents and records.
10 We were going to tender those to the Court,
11 and then there is a smaller packet, represented by this
12 binder, which would be the documents that we would
13 actually, to varying degrees, use in the examination of
14 the witness.
15 JUDGE MAY: And the questions of opinion
16 which are objected to, do they appear at all from the
17 documents? Can you deal with them from the documents,
18 as opposed to the witness giving his opinion, as it
20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. Primarily they
21 come from the documents. What the witness's testimony,
22 in some -- in much respects -- excuse me, Your Honour
23 -- in many respects would be, or is, that he simply --
24 here is a live witness to confirm that yes, this was
25 ECMM's opinion at the time, but very much based on the
1 historical records.
2 When the Court has a chance -- and I realise
3 the Court hasn't had a chance -- when the Court has had
4 a chance to see the nature of some of these documents,
5 which are contemporaneous assessments by the ECMM in
6 1993 of what was happening on the ground, you'll see
7 what they are, and they are quite important and helpful
8 documents. But the witness can simply say that -- you
9 know, as the deputy head of mission, "These are
10 documents that we produced, these are analyses and
11 assessments we produced at the time and represented our
12 institutional position."
13 JUDGE MAY: Well, if the witness gives a
14 deposition, he goes through the documents which you
15 want to refer him to, and he can then be cross-examined
16 on them. All matters of admissibility would be
17 reserved for the Trial Chamber as a whole. It may be
18 that we could make progress on that basis.
19 Mr. Scott, if you are not feeling well and
20 you want to sit down, do so, if it's more comfortable.
21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour, very
22 much. I'm fine for the moment, but I may take you up
23 on that at some point. Thank you.
24 JUDGE MAY: If that's agreeable to the
25 Defence, we will go on that basis.
1 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.
2 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour, but could I
3 just make a proposal to make things even simpler: If
4 it is authenticity of the documents, we agree, they are
5 authentic; there is no need to ask a witness about
7 JUDGE MAY: I think he is going to be asked
8 globally; I don't think we are going to go through one
9 by one.
10 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you.
11 JUDGE MAY: The legal officer, please.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE MAY: I've spoken to the legal officer
14 about the formalities, and we would be grateful if the
15 Defence would file their consent again in writing,
16 reserving matters, of course, of admissibility for the
17 Trial Chamber. If you would send in an appropriate
18 document, please.
19 MR. SAYERS: We will send one over this
20 afternoon, Your Honour. Thank you.
21 [The witness entered court]
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let the witness take the
24 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will
25 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
2 WITNESS: OLE BRIX ANDERSEN
3 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to sit down,
4 Mr. Brix Andersen.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Scott.
6 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Examined by Mr. Scott:
8 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, your full name is Ole,
9 O-l-e, Brix Andersen?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And you have been a career diplomat with the
12 Danish government since 1973?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. You are currently the minister counsellor in
15 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; is that
17 A. I'm a minister counsellor.
18 Q. All right. And how long have you been in
19 that position?
20 A. I've been there in my present job since
22 Q. This is essentially after your return from
23 the former Yugoslavia?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. I understand, by way of background, sir, that
1 you studied law, and you also spent two years in
2 national military service; is that correct?
3 A. It's true.
4 Q. From 1974 to 1976, you worked in the NATO
5 department of the Danish Foreign Ministry, and in fact
6 you attended the NATO defence college in 1982; is that
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. During your career, sir, you have been posted
10 to various foreign countries as part of your foreign
11 service, including Poland, Saudi Arabia, and China; is
12 that correct?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. From approximately the 1st of September,
15 1992, to 1 July 1993, you were the head of the Danish
16 delegation to the ECMM; is that correct?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. And from approximately the 1st of January of
19 that year, 1993, you were the deputy head of mission
20 (political) at ECMM's headquarters in the former
21 Yugoslavia in Zagreb, Croatia; is that correct?
22 A. That's correct, during the Danish presidency
23 of the European Union.
24 Q. And just for the record, and since it does
25 kind of affect the nature and scope of your testimony,
1 during what period of time did Denmark have the
2 presidency of the EU or EC at that time?
3 A. The first half-year of 1993.
4 Q. And in reference to your position, which we
5 will come to again in a few minutes, when it says
6 "deputy head of mission (political)," what were your
7 areas of responsibility? What does "political" mean,
8 in other words?
9 A. There was one head of mission, the Danish
10 ambassador; there was myself, in charge of the
11 political affairs, acting as his deputy, and I would be
12 the acting head of mission in his absence. Then there
13 was a Danish officer, a brigadier general, who was in
14 charge of operations.
15 Q. And was that Brigadier General Villy Durr?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Sir, you were first notified that you would
18 be posted to the former Yugoslavia during July 1992; is
19 that correct?
20 A. Yes, it is.
21 Q. And prior to taking up your duties with the
22 ECMM, you took various steps to familiarise yourself
23 with the situation in the former Yugoslavia; you
24 travelled to Zagreb, before -- I think before taking up
25 your duties, to be briefed on the ECMM mission. Is
1 that correct?
2 A. That is correct.
3 Q. And in fact you also served as a member of
4 the Danish delegation to the London Conference on the
5 former Yugoslavia; is that correct?
6 A. Yes, I did.
7 Q. During your posting as deputy head of
8 mission, you were stationed in Zagreb; you travelled to
9 some of the ECMM's regional centres or other offices,
10 but to make it clear, you were not in Central Bosnia
11 during your tenure with the ECMM. Is that correct?
12 A. That's correct. I was not.
13 Q. Let's likewise jump ahead for a moment, just
14 simply make it clear for the record so there is no
15 possible misunderstanding: In the course of your time
16 at ECMM, you did not meet the defendant Dario Kordic;
17 is that correct?
18 A. No, I did not meet him.
19 Q. And you did not meet, ever, Mr. Mario Cerkez?
20 A. I did not.
21 Q. And in fact, with particular regard to
22 Mr. Cerkez, you really had no knowledge of or dealings
23 with or about him at all; is that fair to say?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. All right. Sir, turning to your duties,
1 then, as political adviser, or deputy head in charge of
2 political affairs, why don't you tell us a little bit
3 more in your own words about what that job involved and
4 what kind of activities you would be involved in on a
5 day-to-day basis.
6 A. I would review all the reports which came
7 from the field, not necessarily every single of them on
8 a day-to-day basis, but certainly the daily reports
9 which were written up by the operations people and sent
10 to Copenhagen. All of them would pass through my hands
11 before being sent off to Copenhagen. We had a system
12 of sending daily reports, weekly reports, and monthly
13 reports, and from time to time that would be
14 supplemented with special reports if there were
15 subjects of particular importance, either at our own
16 initiative or at the request of the presidency in
18 Q. Is it fair to say that to one degree or
19 another, sir, you had your hands, or at least I can say
20 your eyes, on all of the documents, reports, that were
21 coming through up to the level of Zagreb headquarters
22 and then being passed on to your government? Or if not
23 all --
24 A. Not all the reports coming to the
25 headquarters, but all the reports going from Zagreb to
1 Copenhagen when I was in Zagreb.
2 Q. I'm sorry; I misspoke. Certainly not every
3 report, but you would be the principal officer in
4 Zagreb that would then be involved in compiling reports
5 coming from below, if you will, and then sending on to
6 either the ECMM presidency or your government; is that
7 fair to say?
8 A. I would review the draft reports which were
9 presented to me by either the political adviser or the
10 chief of operations.
11 Q. And who were those two individuals, or were
12 they at the time?
13 A. Mr. Christian Warming, who was a Danish
14 diplomat, and he was in the beginning a Canadian
15 colonel, Noseworthy, who was chief of operations, and
16 he was later exchanged for a British colonel, Ford.
17 Q. Now, I'm going to go for a moment to dealing
18 with some document issues. Is it correct, sir, that in
19 the past several days you were presented with a volume
20 of materials, asked to review them for the purpose of
21 verifying if they in fact were ECMM documents or
22 records? Do you remember that?
23 A. Yes, I do.
24 Q. I'm going to ask the usher to please put in
25 front of you both one of the bundles, if we could just
1 have it just for the record purposes, one of the large
2 bundles of documents, and also Exhibit Z2788.
3 Is it correct, sir, that the bundle of documents
4 that's now been put in front of you were reviewed by
5 you and a list was made with reference both to a
6 document identification number and in reference to an
7 exhibit number for the purposes of this trial, and that
8 you were able, in fact, to confirm that all the
9 documents listed in the exhibit marked Z2788 are, to
10 the best of your information and knowledge, authentic
11 ECMM documents and records?
12 A. Yes. To the best of my knowledge, these are
13 original -- sorry, copies of the original documents,
14 and from ECMM, with one exception, which is mentioned
15 in the notes, which is not an original ECMM document.
16 Q. At the end of Exhibit 2788, bottom of the
17 second page, there was one exhibit that was
18 characterised, a document that was a bit different.
19 Did you nonetheless recognise that as a document
20 communicated by the European Union presidency to
21 members of governments of the European Union or
22 community at the time?
23 A. Yes. It has the standard format for such
25 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please pause
1 between question and answer.
2 MR. SCOTT:
3 Q. And beyond that, would it be fair to say that
4 with regard to a number of the documents in that
5 bundle, you would have had more, in fact, more
6 extensive personal involvement in some fashion, either
7 in having actually assisted in preparing or reviewing
8 them, or in some other fashion?
9 A. That's true.
10 Q. I am going to show you three additional
11 documents, Mr. Brix Andersen, that didn't find their
12 way into the bundle. Let's just complete as much as we
13 can this exercise now.
14 Let me direct your attention -- the three
15 that were just distributed. Let me start with Exhibit
16 939,1, which is a one-page document titled "Meeting at
17 Medjugorje, 18th of May, 1993." And we reserve that
18 document. I think it better in terms of the context,
19 but simply note that you have that in front of you.
20 If you'll go, then, to Exhibit 910,1,
21 Z910,1. Can you review that document momentarily and
22 again tell the Court, is this again an authentic ECMM
23 document or record, from various markings or format
24 that you see on the document?
25 A. From the markings of the document, this is an
1 original ECMM document from the files of the Ministry
2 of Foreign Affairs.
3 Q. All right. And if you go, then, in similar
4 fashion, to Exhibit Z937,1. Can you likewise tell us,
5 please, whether that is also an ECMM document and
7 A. It appears, in the same manner, to be a copy
8 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs files, coming from
9 Zagreb ECMM.
10 Q. All right. Your Honour, I would just say at
11 this point, that represents the scope or universe of
12 documents to be presented through this witness.
13 Subject to the Court's earlier determinations, we --
14 whatever the Court deemed most acceptable, we tender or
15 introduce or offer those to the Court at this time.
16 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
17 MR. SCOTT:
18 Q. Now, sir, in the smaller binder that you have
19 in front of you, and likewise in the smaller binders
20 that the Court and Defence counsel have been provided,
21 these documents should be roughly in the -- hopefully
22 will be in the order in which they will be examined,
23 even though they -- some of the exhibit numbers may be
24 out of order. Let me just alert: Some of the
25 numerical numbering may have been changed because of
1 subject or topic, but they should themselves be in the
2 order which they may come up now in your examination,
3 with the exception again of the three that were loose,
4 which, if need be, we'll address separately.
5 The first Exhibit, then, Exhibit Z707,1. Is
6 this the type of a weekly summary that you -- that was
7 the practice of ECMM to make, this particular summary
8 coming from RC Zenica to, on the title of the document
9 -- on the memo itself, to HQ ECMM?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. And --
12 A. All the regional centres were under
13 instructions to file daily and weekly reports, and, as
14 I said, also special reports upon request or their own
16 Q. All right. And sometimes there would be, as
17 I recall, daily reports, weekly summaries, and there
18 might even be monthly reports; is that correct?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. Now, the Court has heard some information
21 about these activities or components, but what was RC
22 Zenica? What was an RC in ECMM's organisation at that
24 A. The basic structure was that we had the
25 headquarters in Zagreb. Subordinate to that, we had
1 the regional centres, which would then coordinate the
2 activities of what we call the coordination centres,
3 the CC's. And under that there would be the teams. So
4 we would have this structured layer of the
5 headquarters, the RCs, the CC's and the teams.
6 We would go from the teams to the CC's to the
7 RC's, and then they would be compiled and reviewed and
8 condensed and whatever and sent up to Zagreb.
9 Q. Is it fair to say that RC Zenica, or the
10 Regional Centre Zenica, was the principal ECMM office
11 in or for Central Bosnia?
12 A. That's true.
13 Q. And as you said earlier, then beneath the RC
14 level there was another -- there were the coordinating
15 centres, or CC, that were even at yet a lower, more
16 local level; is that correct?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And just so the Court just is familiar with
19 the terminology, then, when you see RC Zenica here,
20 meaning the ECMM regional centre in Zenica. Then if we
21 see something like CC Travnik, that would be the
22 coordinating centre located in Travnik; is that
24 A. That's true.
25 Q. All right.
1 A. And which would be under the immediate
2 direction of the RC Zenica.
3 Q. All right. Now, can you tell the Court,
4 during the period of time from approximately the 1st of
5 January, 1993, through the summer of 1993, who was the
6 head of RC Zenica?
7 A. A French diplomat by the name of Jean-Pierre
9 Q. Looking at Exhibit Z707,1, is this a report,
10 a weekly summary from RC Zenica, then, which in
11 particular gives a chronology of various events in
12 Central Bosnia during the previous week?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. Looking to the middle, approximately the
15 middle of the second page, the second one says
16 "comment." A comment is made following the
17 chronology. It says:
18 "All the incidents which took place during
19 the week appear to be originated by one source and been
20 part of a prepared plan. Obviously the provocations
21 were planned to deteriorate the fragile relationships
22 between Croat and Muslims."
23 Et cetera. That would be the type of
24 information, as indeed the information in this document
25 as a whole, which then might be further compiled and
1 reported by you to other senior levels of ECMM, and in
2 fact to the EC; is that correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Let's go on to Exhibit 719, which I believe
5 actually has already been tendered, but for purposes of
6 having it all here, we've included it in your bundle of
7 documents. This is something called a special report,
8 and I think you mentioned earlier that in addition to
9 the regular periodic reports, the various ECMM
10 components at any particular time could make special
11 reports of -- which they felt appropriate to make; is
12 that correct?
13 A. That is correct. Either at their own
14 initiative or at the request from Zagreb.
15 Q. And without reading, certainly, the entire
16 document, this is a document that again seems to give a
17 report on various events in Central Bosnia in mid-April
18 1993; is that correct?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. All right. Let's go on to Exhibit Z766,1.
21 Can you tell us, look at that and just tell us what
22 that document is and whether you prepared it; and if
23 you did prepare it, for what purpose?
24 A. It was prepared in Zagreb for me and for my
25 review, from a meeting which I believe was in Brussels,
1 but I'm not quite sure of that. But it was a meeting
2 of the ad hoc group on former Yugoslavia, and I was
3 asked by the president in Copenhagen to participate in
4 that meeting, and I was asked to introduce the
5 meeting's view on what was going on in Yugoslavia. And
6 it was for that purpose that this briefing paper was
8 Q. All right. Skipping down to the end of the
9 second page where it talks about Central Bosnia, and
10 going over to actually the third page and the first
11 full paragraph starting on page 3. Was it your
12 assessment at the time, and your briefing, as directed
13 by -- that you were directed to carry out, as you told
14 us a moment ago, that:
15 "The situation in Central Bosnia had
16 deteriorated sharply during last week. A possible
17 explanation for the tension in the area could be the
18 suspected aim of the HVO, while the world's attention
19 is focused on Srebrenica in East Bosnia, to take over
20 the territory of the two 'Croat' provinces. The Muslim
21 community is determined to avoid this. There is a deep
22 mistrust from the BiH side concerning Croat intentions
23 in this region. The HVO is suspected by the BiH to try
24 to 'cleanse' the areas around Mostar, Jablanica,
25 Konjic, Travnik, Prozor, Vitez and Busovaca."
1 Was that assessment reached on the reports
2 you were receiving from the field and that became part
3 of the analysis and assessment in the headquarter's
4 office in Zagreb?
5 A. That is correct. This is based on the
6 reports we received from mainly RC Zenica, and it was
7 based on the assessment with that in headquarters.
8 Q. Let's go to Exhibit Z812,1. Is it correct,
9 sir, this is then a weekly summary for the week of the
10 17th, the 24th of April, 1993, from RC Zenica?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. Looking to the second paragraph under the
13 title "Summary." Was it the report that it was the
14 clear position of CRO -- is that an abbreviation for
15 Croat, Croatian?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. "... clear position of CRO authorities to
18 implement the Vance-Owen Plan, pressing the Muslim
19 population to leave the so-called 'Croat provinces,'
20 provoked their reaction, with very strong and cruel
21 fighting and actions against the civilian population."
22 And the rest of the memo goes on to talk
23 about essentially these matters in greater detail; is
24 that correct?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Directing your attention to the last
2 paragraph starting on the next page. The report states
4 "The Croatian community and authorities at
5 all levels consistently quote the Vance-Owen Plan, and
6 HVO will implement the plan without delay, and by
7 force, if necessary. This policy is dangerous and has
8 resulted in a Muslim backlash through Central Bosnia
9 and Mostar, where provocation has been extreme."
10 Was it the assessment of the ECMM during this
11 period, sir, that there had been, in the first part and
12 mid-April of 1993, an organised offensive or campaign
13 carried out by the HVO against various Muslim towns,
14 villages, locations in Central Bosnia?
15 A. That is correct. That was our assessment.
16 Q. And what did you understand this -- if any,
17 the connection between this series of attacks or
18 campaign and the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan,
19 at least the implementation in the views of one group,
20 that is, the Croats?
21 A. I didn't get the question.
22 Q. Sorry. Did you understand there to be any
23 connection between this series of attacks in mid-April
24 1993 and the implementation or carrying out of the
25 Vance-Owen Plan, at least as that plan was interpreted
1 by the Bosnian Croats?
2 A. It was our assessment that the Croat
3 leadership used the Vance-Owen Plan as a vehicle for
4 gaining control of what was assigned as provinces 8 and
6 Q. All right. Let's continue on to Exhibit
7 840. I simply want to point your particular attention
8 to the bottom of the second page. There is a paragraph
9 or a section starting "40 trucks, UNHCR convoy." It
10 was reported to you, or to the Zagreb office, by the
11 head of RC Zenica at the time, which again was
12 Mr. Thebault, that:
13 "A 40-truck convoy of food supplies escorted
14 by two warriors was hijacked on its way to Zenica. The
15 HVO forces responsible for this action claimed that
16 they did not care of the orders of Colonel Blaskic and
17 Brigadier Petkovic concerning the free movement, that
18 they had strict orders from Mr. Kordic, official
19 highest-level representative of HVO for Central Bosnia,
20 to arrest this convoy and to search it. BritBat
21 decided to send immediately a company of warriors to
22 have the convoy back. I --"
23 "I" again referring to Mr. Thebault.
24 "-- took Brigadier Petkovic outside of the
25 meeting and stressed the absolute craziness of this
1 action of the HVO, which was a deliberate provocation
2 against UNPROFOR concerning the core of its mandate."
3 "He," meaning apparently Mr. Petkovic,
4 "decided to reach Mr. Kordic, and, after several
5 telephone calls, succeeded in obtaining from him the
6 release of the convoy."
7 Is that part of the report that you received
8 from Mr. Thebault, sir?
9 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour --
10 A. That is part of the report.
11 MR. SAYERS: Once again, Your Honour, the
12 document speaks for itself. We are going to be wasting
13 a huge amount of time here if we are just going to go
14 through these documents, have pieces read out, and then
15 have the witness [sic] say, "Is that what the document
17 JUDGE MAY: Well, except for this: that the
18 relevance of the documents can be pointed out. It
19 seems to me the Prosecution are entitled to do that;
20 otherwise it's just a pile of documents. And it is
21 useful for them to say what they rely on.
22 Of course, the cross-examination about the
23 documents, or the foundation for the documents, must
24 come from another witness, which can be dealt with in
25 due course, and you won't be expected to cross-examine,
1 of course, on these matters about which this witness
2 knows nothing except what was reported to him.
3 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 MR. SCOTT: And in regard to that, Your
5 Honour, it is certainly our intention to, if you will,
6 pick up some speed as we go; but as the Court has
7 indicated, we would like to point out some of the more
8 relevant passages.
9 Q. I've been reminded also, sir, again, for both
10 of us, if we can pause between question and answer, it
11 makes it easier for the interpreters.
12 Now, I'm going to point you to another part
13 of this memo down the page, but before I do so, can you
14 state in your own words the assessment, if any, that
15 ECMM had of a man named Dario Kordic, and where he fit
16 within the events in Central Bosnia or the Bosnian
17 Croat leadership?
18 A. As I stated a little while ago, I have never
19 met Mr. Kordic, never had any dealings with him in
20 writing, so my knowledge of him is from the documents,
21 from the reports, mainly from RC Zenica.
22 Based on these reports, it was the assessment
23 of ECMM, and my own opinion, that Mr. Kordic had an
24 influential position, in some areas a controlling
25 position, within the HVO.
1 Q. And did you know, or again, was it part of
2 the ECMM's assessment, whether Mr. Kordic had any
3 particular relationship to Mate Boban?
4 A. That is correct. It was reported to us that
5 he was a relative of Mr. Boban, a cousin.
6 Q. Apart from any family relationship, in terms
7 of their working or political or governmental
8 relationship, what, if any, understanding did ECMM have
9 between Mr. Kordic and Mr. Boban?
10 A. The assessment in Zagreb was, again, based on
11 the reports which reached us, that they worked closely
13 Q. Directing your attention, then, to one of the
14 paragraphs under item 4, "Comment," again, it was
15 reported to you that Mr. Kordic is in fact "the cousin
16 of Mr. Boban, his special delegate in Central Bosnia,
17 and located in Busovaca, the main responsible" -- and
18 I'll just leave it at that, I suppose, whether it's
19 "the main responsible" something or "the man
20 responsible" -- "identified by all agencies of the
21 troubles in Busovaca two months before and again
23 And then he essentially repeats the story
24 about the convoy, saying that it could only be released
25 on Mr. Kordic's special orders. "It is absolutely
1 needed to put pressure on him immediately."
2 Is that correct, sir?
3 A. It's correct that this was reported to us.
4 Q. All right. And not only reported to you, but
5 accepted, and, if true -- and that's the question to
6 you -- was that incorporated and became part of the
7 ECMM's assessment of what was happening in Central
9 MR. SAYERS: Object to the leading nature of
10 that question, Mr. President.
11 MR. SCOTT: Well, okay.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Rephrase it, please.
13 MR. SCOTT:
14 Q. Can you tell us, then, sir, what role, if
15 any, this information played in ECMM's reaching its
16 positions or making its overall assessments in Zagreb?
17 A. It entered into our assessment on what was
18 going on in Central Bosnia. It didn't have -- what
19 shall I say -- operative effects, for what happened in
20 headquarters, in the sense that we would initiate
21 dealings with Mr. Kordic from the headquarters in
22 Zagreb. These dealings we would leave to RC Zenica.
23 We would report it further on the chain of command up
24 to the president in Copenhagen, but it is not my
25 recollection that we had any dealings at all with
1 Mr. Kordic from the headquarters in Zagreb.
2 Q. Very well. And that was left primarily to
3 Mr. Thebault and his staff?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Let's go on to Exhibit Z859,1. Directing
6 your attention to the last page of the exhibit
7 momentarily, this in fact again is a report prepared by
8 Mr. Thebault, and if not signed, but at least
9 initialled off by him, "Best regards, Jean-Pierre
10 Thebault"; is that correct?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. And what did you find in your working
13 relationship with Mr. Thebault, in terms of -- did you
14 find the reports coming from RC Zenica to be competent
15 and reliable reports?
16 A. It was our assessment in Zagreb that
17 Jean-Pierre Thebault was probably one of the best heads
18 of a regional centre we had, and had had for a long
20 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'll tell the Court
21 that this is a particularly rich document, but I will
22 only, for present purposes, point Mr. Brix Andersen to
23 two paragraphs, but -- well, the document, as we say,
24 speaks for itself; but there is a tremendous amount of
25 material in this particular document that I would call
1 to the Court's attention.
2 Q. Sir, would you look at the last paragraph on
3 the second page of this document, starting with "All of
5 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour?
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] With regard to
8 what we talked about yesterday, for instance, we shall
9 not be able to cross-examine the witness about the
10 document, because he was not prepared for that.
14 JUDGE MAY: Since the documents are being
15 produced, let it be done now, (redacted)
17 (redacted). All this witness is doing is
18 simply producing the document for what it's worth. He
19 can't take the matter any further. Really, the only
20 significance of pointing out passages is that there may
21 be relevant matters which, clearly, the Prosecution
22 want to rely on, and they're entitled to point them
23 out. (redacted)
25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Just one more
1 thing, Mr. President: (redacted)
2 (redacted) I'm afraid this will
3 affect our interests. What will happen, and it has
4 happened several times, that we were anticipating there
5 were witnesses and refrained from certain questions or
6 from certain submissions, and then those witnesses did
7 not come, or the Prosecution decides not to call them
8 after all, and then we're left high and dry. So this
9 is a practical problem, really, that I'm asking about.
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I appreciate that, but let
11 us cross the bridge when we come to it. If the other
12 witness doesn't appear, then we would have to consider
13 the admissibility of the evidence.
14 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Thank
16 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, at the bottom of the
18 second page -- again, only directing your attention to
19 a couple of particular paragraphs -- this particular
20 paragraph was reported by Mr. Thebault that "All this,"
21 meaning the events reported above, "All this has been
22 closely monitored in Central Bosnia by direct HVO
23 high-level commissioners, M." -- perhaps "Mr.," or what
24 have you -- "M. Dario Kordic, Mate Boban's cousin and
25 'minister for Herceg-Bosna,' located in Busovaca,
1 since the beginning of the troubles there; M. Anto
2 Valenta, HVO vice-president, located in Travnik, where
3 he took a decisive part to the recent troubles just
4 before the conflict; M. Ignjac Kostroman, general
5 secretary of HVO travelling the area."
6 Is that correct, sir?
7 A. That is correct, and I think I can explain
8 the M's. Mr. Thebault is a Frenchman, so that would
9 stand for "Monsieur."
10 Q. I was about to suggest that myself, but thank
12 Going to the next page, the second paragraph
13 under item 2 -- and I will ask you to comment on this
14 beyond the document, if you are able to -- the document
15 itself says, "The political pressure put last week on
16 Croatia was fruitful but not powerful enough. It maybe
17 helped to stop the large-scale military actions, in
18 particular in prohibiting, at least for the while, the
19 large-scale involvement of the military forces of
20 Croatia in order to 'defend the Croat community against
21 the Muslim extremists.'"
22 Based on your role as deputy head of mission,
23 political affairs, can you explain to the Court why
24 putting political pressure on Croatia would be
25 connected to events in Central Bosnia?
1 A. Yes, I can. It was the assessment of the
2 ECMM, chaired by the president in Copenhagen, that
3 there was a close link between the Bosnian Croats and
4 the state of Croatia, and that in order to influence
5 events inside Bosnia, you would have to rely also on
6 pressure being put on the leadership in Zagreb, which
7 actually also did take place.
8 Q. Are you aware, sir, that during your tenure,
9 a number of occasions on which direct high-level
10 international communications, if you will, were made to
11 the Zagreb government, and in particular to President
12 Tudjman himself, in connection with that government or
13 Mr. Tudjman using their position or role to affect
14 affairs in Central Bosnia?
15 A. Without being able to give you the specific
16 dates, pressure was being put to bear by the
17 co-chairmen, Vance and Owen, by the presidency, on
18 Mr. Tudjman and the government in Croatia.
19 Q. All right. Let's continue on, then;
20 Exhibit 910. When you look at -- this is a little bit
21 different than the weekly summaries or reports that
22 we've been seeing before. Can you tell us what this
23 document is?
24 A. The document in Danish is just a cover note
25 sending the report of the three ambassadors to
1 Copenhagen, suggesting that it be sent out as a COREU,
2 as it is called, which is an acronym for the
3 communication between the presidency and the other
4 European union capitals, which is used for political,
5 consular, et cetera, affairs.
6 Q. So apart from the cover communication itself,
7 we have then an enclosed report; is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And can you tell the Court what this report
10 was? And I'm not sure this has been brought to the
11 Court's attention before, but what was this effort
13 A. Apart from the mission leadership as such,
14 which was controlled by the presidency, there was also
15 national contingents, with each having a head of
16 delegation. These heads of delegation would meet with
17 the mission leadership a couple of times a week, during
18 the Danish presidency, to discuss the situation and to
19 recommend whatever action perhaps needed to be taken in
20 capitals, of either a political nature or logistics,
21 getting more monitors, getting more funds, getting more
22 radios or vehicles or whatever. But this was a useful
23 committee discussing these issues.
24 Now, in that committee, the idea was brought
25 up to do something at a fairly high level, and fairly
1 visible on the part of the ECMM, in order to
2 investigate what had been done in Ahmici and to get a
3 broader perspective on what was going on in Central
4 Bosnia. This was not in order to undermine the efforts
5 of Mr. Thebault, but it was in order to be certain that
6 the assessments we were making in Zagreb on the basis
7 of the reports from RC Zenica would also stand up to
9 It was therefore decided to send the three
10 heads of delegation from Britain, France, and Spain, on
11 a joint mission to the area in order to see for
12 themselves and to report back to headquarters. And
13 that is their report here.
14 Q. Leaving, again, most of the document to speak
15 for itself, let me simply direct your particular
16 attention to paragraph 13, on the -- well, what's
17 numbered, in handwriting, page number 4 in the upper
18 right corner.
19 And at the end of paragraph 13, under
20 "Conclusions," did this delegation, made up of the
21 head of -- this essentially fact-finding mission, made
22 up of the heads of the British, French, and Spanish
23 delegations, conclude that these events had not been so
24 much "as a result of the actions of uncontrolled
25 elements, but rather as a result of the application of
1 deliberate HDZ/HVO policy"?
2 A. As it says in the document, that was their
3 assessment, and this was an assessment which was
4 discussed in Zagreb and accepted by the rest of the
5 delegations and by the mission leadership.
6 Q. Let's go on, then, to Exhibit Z926 and touch
7 on it only momentarily. The Court has seen this
8 document before.
9 Was one of the ECMM staff in Zagreb at this
10 time, working with or for you, a man named Charles
12 A. Yes, Charles McLeod was at the headquarters.
13 Q. And in addition to this other mission, was
14 Mr. McLeod sent on a similar investigative mission, if
15 you will, concerning the events in Central Bosnia in
16 mid-April 1993?
17 A. Yes, he was.
18 Q. And as reflected only in part here, not to --
19 for the purpose of not reproducing the entire document,
20 Mr. McLeod did in fact make a written report back to
21 ECMM headquarters; is that correct?
22 A. That is correct. He was a very meticulous
23 person, so he made a fairly long report.
24 Q. What was your general view or assessment of
25 Mr. McLeod's work and competence?
1 A. He was a very competent monitor.
2 JUDGE MAY: We've already had this document
3 produced, and Mr. McLeod has given evidence about it,
4 so I don't think there is any point in going over it
6 MR. SCOTT: That's exactly the end of it,
8 JUDGE MAY: That might be a convenient moment
9 to adjourn.
10 MR. SCOTT: Thank you.
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll adjourn for half an
13 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.35 a.m.
15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, I've been asked by the
16 interpreters to slow you down in reading the
18 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE MAY: They have apparently got them,
20 but it's difficult to interpret.
21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. I
23 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, if we could continue with
24 Exhibit 9.
25 I should correct this, Your Honour. It's now
1 been clarified that 936,1, Your Honour, that number was
2 previously signed, so if the Court will allow us to
3 redesignate this exhibit, and the Registry, please, as
5 In any event, Mr. Brix Andersen, only one
6 highlight on this particular document, which is a
7 report from Mr. Thebault concerning freedom of
8 movement. About the middle of the first paragraph, it
9 was in Mr. Thebault's report and ECMM's assessment
11 "The blocking of the two or three roads
12 leading to Central Bosnia, and therefore to Tuzla,
13 areas where most of the Muslim population is now
14 living, is one of main HVO policy."
15 Is that correct?
16 A. I'm sorry, I didn't get the question.
17 Q. Sorry. I apologise. I said: Was it
18 Mr. Thebault's report and ECMM's assessment, as
19 reported by -- stated by Mr. Thebault in the middle of
20 that first paragraph, that:
21 "The blocking of the two or three roads
22 leading to Central Bosnia, and therefore to Tuzla,
23 areas where most of the Muslim population is now
24 living, is one of the main HVO policy."
25 A. That is correct. It was our assessment that
1 the HVO, they tried to do whatever they could to block
2 the convoys, and they used quite a lot of resources in
3 this end to try to see how to get the convoys through.
4 Q. Let me ask you on some general topics, before
5 we turn to the next document. Can you tell the Court,
6 to the extent that you may or may not have touched on
7 it already, what was the ECMM's assessment of the
8 position or desire of the HVO and Herceg-Bosnia
9 leadership to have the Croatian community of
10 Herceg-Bosna come into any sort of formal relationship
11 with the Republic of Croatia?
12 A. It was our assessment that the Croats in
13 Herceg-Bosnia, they wanted a confederation or
14 federation, or whatever kind of relationship, with
15 Croatia, meaning, in effect, that they would be living
16 in a -- not perhaps a unitary state, but in a state for
17 Croats, so that there would be a stronger link between
18 Herceg-Bosnia and Croatia than there would be between
19 the Bosnian Croats and the government of
21 Q. Was it ECMM's assessment whether there was
22 any sort of overall concept or strategy of how the
23 Herceg-Bosnia and HVO leadership would accomplish
24 this? Let me rephrase that. Was it ECMM's assessment
25 that there was such an overall concept or strategy?
1 A. That is correct. That was our assessment,
2 that it was a concept and a strategy.
3 Q. Can you tell the Court any assessment or
4 conclusions that the ECMM reached in terms of whether,
5 among the Herceg-Bosnia and HVO leadership, there was
6 any policy or strategy, at that level, involving ethnic
7 cleansing directed against Bosnian Muslims?
8 A. It was our assessment, through 1993, and the
9 first half-year when I was there, that there was a
10 policy of ethnic cleansing directed against the Muslims
11 in order to have a -- to have provinces 8 and 10
12 predominantly, or almost exclusively, Croats.
13 Q. You have touched upon, I think, the existence
14 of ties between the government of Republic of Croatia
15 and Herceg-Bosnia. What was ECMM's assessment of the
16 level of support that Zagreb showed toward the
17 Herceg-Bosnia, HVO leadership, in connection with that
18 leadership's aspirations to be confederated with or
19 joined with Croatia?
20 A. It was our assessment, and I believe it was
21 shared by the member governments of the European Union,
22 that there was a strategy of support by the Croatian
23 government to the leadership of Herceg-Bosnia. From
24 our reports, which we will come to, it will appear that
25 we were looking very carefully for evidence of this.
1 It was difficult to establish evidence of direct
2 Croatian HV involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
3 there were many signs that the Croatian government
4 actually supported Herceg-Bosnia and the Bosnian Croats
5 politically, with equipment and with troops.
6 Q. In that regard, then, let's go forward to
7 Exhibit Z1012. This is a report from the deputy head
8 of RC Zenica, which I believe is the reference to DHRC
10 A. That is correct.
11 Q. And in June, 1993, do you recall whether that
12 was Mr. Bees?
13 A. Yes, that was Mr. Bees.
14 Q. This memo is directed, in part, to you as
15 "DHOM (political ops)"?
16 A. When it is addressed to "DHOM (political
17 ops)," that means that it goes to both political:
18 myself; and operations, General Durr.
19 Q. A few highlights under item 2:
20 "The existence and extent of HV involvement
21 has always been difficult to define, and the many
22 reports provided by the BiH armija have seldom been
23 confirmed by ECMM, UNMOs or UNPROFOR."
24 And that is consistent, in fact, with your
25 testimony a moment ago; is that correct, sir?
1 A. That is correct. Of course, the
2 embarrassment value would be high if we could find out
3 evidence of HV involvement inside Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4 We were looking for it. It was not the action of the
5 individual team, or team leader, to try and find at his
6 own will. It was the mission policy to try and see to
7 what extent there would be Croatian involvement. Like
8 on the other side, there would be similar resources
9 deployed, or attempted to be deployed, to try and find
10 involvement by the Yugoslav army on the Bosnian Serb
12 So we were always on the lookout for evidence
13 of outside interference in the affairs of
15 Q. You started out in your answer just now, and
16 you said, "To find such evidence would have had a high
17 embarrassment value." What do you mean by that?
18 A. It was our assessment that Croatia did
19 provide such assistance, to a higher or lesser extent,
20 but we were fairly confident that that was actually
21 what was taking place. Now, the pressure which had
22 been brought to bear on the Croatian government
23 indicates that that was a combined assessment, not only
24 of the ECMM, but also of capitals. In that respect, it
25 should be borne in mind that all the daily reports, the
1 weekly reports, the monthly reports, were not only sent
2 to Copenhagen, but they were sent, distributed by
3 Copenhagen, to all the member countries.
4 And had we been widely off the track, I'm
5 fairly confident that other member governments would
6 have indicated to the presidency that they should bring
7 us under control. That did never happen. We never had
8 any instruction from Copenhagen indicating that we were
9 off the mark in this respect, trying to find evidence
10 of Croatian involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Q. Two other --
12 A. And I can add to that, if I may --
13 Q. Please.
14 A. -- that we were in daily contact. Perhaps
15 not every single day, but I would, several times a
16 week, consult on the telephone with the desk officers
17 in Copenhagen about what was going on in the mission
19 Q. A couple of additional highlights. Under
20 item number 5, and simply the first part of that
21 paragraph: "It is not in the interest of either party
22 for HV troops to be seen in Bosnia, and in practice,
23 with good planning, there is much that can be done to
24 hide their activity." And then it goes on to describe
25 that in more detail.
1 You indicated that this wasn't just something
2 that was left to the individual monitors, but that it
3 was ECMM's institutional position to try to document
4 the HV involvement to the extent possible; is that
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. And finally, on the very end of the document,
8 it concluded that "Evidence for HV involvement exists.
9 It has had a considerable impact on the military
10 balance in favour of the HVO and shows no sign of
12 Let me direct your attention next to
13 Exhibit Z1050.
14 JUDGE MAY: Where am I going to find this
16 MR. SCOTT: It should be --
17 JUDGE MAY: I'm not sure -- I had difficulty
18 with 1012.
19 MR. SCOTT: I apologise, Your Honour. I
20 should -- it should be there. There's two maps -- I'm
21 sorry. There are two maps that are part of
22 Exhibit 1012, and then there should be a divider sheet,
23 and then there should be 1050, I hope, in the yellow --
24 in the manila binder. Sorry.
25 JUDGE MAY: I don't have it, but I've just
1 been handed 1050. Perhaps we could have a copy of
2 1012, please.
3 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
4 Q. On Exhibit Z1050, again, a report concerning
5 HV involvement in BiH -- well, let me direct your
6 attention for now just to the second -- it's hard to
7 say exactly the number, but it's approximately the
8 middle paragraph, saying "Regardless."
9 You touched on earlier, sir, that there were
10 a number of instances in which pressure -- or whatever
11 term might be better -- diplomatic efforts were made
12 toward the government of Croatia to intercede with the
13 Bosnian Croats to stop or control events in Central
14 Bosnia; is that correct?
15 A. That is correct. But if you allow me, on
16 this document --
17 Q. Please.
18 A. -- to make the comment that this is not a
19 report from the field; this is a report prepared at
20 headquarters and sent and copied to RC Zenica. As you
21 will see, it is from headquarters ECMM info section.
22 Q. Yes, okay.
23 A. So this is based on headquarters' assessment
24 of the situation, talks with UNPROFOR, talks with other
25 sources. So it is not a report from the field.
1 Q. And in fact, at the bottom of the page, the
2 name "Hal Pugh" appears. Who was he, or what position
3 did he have? Do you recall?
4 A. He was a monitor serving in what was called
5 the info section, which would in practice gather
6 information on the forces on the ground and other
7 information which would be relevant to the teams to
8 know, so that to the extent that we had knowledge from
9 other sources, in Zagreb, we would take care to
10 distribute that information to the teams for their
11 security and for their interest.
12 Q. Okay. In reference to the paragraph under --
13 it's under "Beginning text," or "Begin text," did you
14 recall or have any knowledge at the time of this
15 conversation with the HV Major-General Praljak about HV
16 involvement in Bosnia?
17 A. Seeing the document now, I have a vague
18 recollection that this conversation took place. I did
19 not take part in it myself, and as I said, it's only a
20 vague recollection.
21 Q. All right.
22 A. This would be consistent with the efforts of
23 the mission to try and limit the outside interference
24 into events in Central Bosnia. But as I said, I have
25 no personal knowledge of the meeting.
1 Q. In the second -- in the -- I'm going to call
2 it the third paragraph, again, the paragraph starting
3 with "Regardless"; at the end of that, it states that
4 "Indeed, there are some indications that Croatia has
5 taken heed of warnings from the international community
6 about involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
7 Can you assist the Court with any instances
8 that you can recall now as to what might have indicated
9 in fact that Croatia was heeding warnings? Do you know
10 of any steps that Croatia or its government took to
11 intercede in the events in Central Bosnia?
12 A. Like I said just before, it was always
13 difficult for us to follow events on the ground because
14 most of the movement of troops, equipment, et cetera,
15 would take place at night or in areas where we had
16 little or no access. From time to time some areas
17 would be declared off limits to ECMM and to UNPROFOR,
18 which in certain cases indicated to us that something
19 was going on which we were not supposed to see.
20 So the assessment here is based on
21 impressions, from the various people involved, of talks
22 with the Croatian government or President Tudjman.
23 This could be the co-chairmen of the conference, Lord
24 Owen and Mr. Vance; it could be EU ministers, European
25 ministers, meeting with the Croatian leadership in
1 Geneva, in New York, other places. It could be the
2 result of communiqués issued by the European Union, but
3 the combined assessment was, as stated here, that there
4 was actually some effect of the pressure which the
5 European Union and others wanted to bring to bear on
6 Croatia. But it's difficult to quantify.
7 Q. Will you go on, please, then, to
8 Exhibit Z1151,1. Following up on the last question,
9 toward the bottom of the second page of that exhibit:
10 "A last strong protest of the international community
11 against HV involvement has probably had an effect and
12 lead HV and the HVO to a very strict and cautious
13 attitude. It is so no more possible to deny a certain
14 level of HV troop involvement after several months of
15 observation, although it still remains difficult to
16 estimate accurately its scale."
17 Did Mr. Thebault report to you around this
18 time, as reflected in the early part of the document
19 and at the last paragraph, that he had had some
20 contacts with this General Praljak in connection with
21 the presence of HV troops or support in Bosnia?
22 A. Now, I have no prior knowledge of this
23 document. It appears to be a genuine ECMM document,
24 but as you will see, it is dated 30 July, which is
25 after I left the mission. It refers to the special
1 report of 3rd of June, and the reporting here is
2 consistent with what had been reported on the 3rd of
3 June, and it is consistent with the ECMM assessment of
4 the situation. But I have had no knowledge of this
5 report until it was shown to me here.
6 Q. All right. Let me ask you a separate
7 question, then. Were you aware, at the Zagreb level of
8 ECMM, whether in fact various senior HV officers --
9 generals, commanding officers -- had moved across and
10 taken very senior positions in the HVO?
11 A. As a general statement, yes, I believe that
12 to be true and correct. But I have no, shall we say,
13 concrete recollection of names and times and dates.
14 Q. All right. Let's move forward, then, to
15 943,2. I apologise for the quality of the copy, but it
16 seems to be the best available.
17 JUDGE MAY: On mine, my bundle, you're going
19 MR. SCOTT: The number -- Your Honour, maybe
20 we could substitute. It may be the bundle,
21 unfortunately, has not been prepared as well as it
22 might have been, and we could substitute additional --
23 a different bundle.
24 Q. It is true that some of the exhibit numbers
25 do drop back down, but, as I indicated at the outset,
1 in that sense some of the documents are out of order.
2 But the order should have been correct in the bundle
4 Looking at 943,2. I just want to direct your
5 attention to about a third of the way down the page.
6 It talks about the foreign minister, Niels Helveg
7 Petersen. Do you see that? Have you found that? With
8 reference to that, did it come to your attention there
9 was a meeting or series of meetings about the conflict
10 in Central Bosnia, in Medjugorje, on about the 18th of
11 May, 1993?
12 A. Yes, we were aware of this meeting. Of
13 course, it was with the participation of the Danish
14 minister for foreign affairs, Helveg Petersen. I did
15 not participate myself, because we thought it was
16 better for Mr. Thebault, who had the detailed knowledge
17 from the ground, to represent the ECMM there;
18 especially since both the co-chairman would be there,
19 Lord Owen, and Mr. Vance. So we would not need to be
20 involved at the, as you say, the policy level. That
21 would be taken care of by the minister and the two
22 co-chairman, but we thought it would be helpful if they
23 could rely also on information provided by the ECMM.
24 Q. All right. Did you understand that among the
25 other participants in these meetings were President
1 Izebegovic from Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Tudjman
2 from Croatia, and Mate Boban?
3 A. Yes, that was known to me.
4 Q. Can you provide any assistance to the Court
5 in terms of why it was that President Tudjman was
6 involved in this meeting concerning a resolution of the
7 conflict in Central Bosnia?
8 A. It was the assessment of the ECMM that
9 Croatia, and of course President Tudjman, had a large
10 degree of influence on what happened on the site of the
11 Bosnian Croats. So in that respect it would be natural
12 to see to it that President Tudjman would be present.
13 Q. Can you relate to the Court a particular
14 event around that time where a senior Danish official,
15 perhaps the foreign minister, had had some direct
16 conversation with Mr. Tudjman, President Tudjman, about
17 these matters?
18 A. As appears from this document, it was
19 Mr. Helveg Petersen, the foreign minister, who himself
20 made the statement, and explained to President Tudjman,
21 as it was said in the document here, that he should use
22 his influence with the Bosnian Croats to bring
23 hostilities to an end.
24 Now, for the information of the Court,
25 perhaps just the information here, that this is not an
1 ECMM document. This is a document coming from Minister
2 of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. So, in effect, this
3 represents the summary of the Ministry of Foreign
4 Affairs of the meeting in Medjugorje. It is not the
5 ECMM's summary of the meeting.
6 Q. Very well. In fact, this was the one
7 document in the list earlier today that you'd
8 identified as different, somewhat distinct from the
9 other documents listed in the Exhibit Z2788?
10 A. That is true. This is a document sent from
11 the presidency to the other capitals of the European
12 Union with information on the meeting.
13 Q. Before moving on in that same general part of
14 the document, it states:
15 "It was clear, from President Tudjman's own
16 statement and his general demeanour, that he felt put
17 under heavy pressure and that he recognised that he
18 himself had to use his influence with the Bosnian
19 Croats to bring hostilities to an end."
20 Again, this was a part that was being
21 reported not to just your government but to all the EC
22 governments at the time?
23 A. It was not reported to my government. This
24 is my government's report to the other governments of
25 the European Union.
1 Q. All right. Let's go on to Exhibit -- Your
2 Honour, these are the three now -- the next three are
3 the ones that were separate from the bundle, that I
4 introduced, were offered, tendered this morning. The
5 first one is 939,1, which they were distributed
7 With reference to about the middle of that
8 page -- not really the middle of the page; about a
9 third of the way down the document it refers to a
10 "General Cuk of the HV also present." This document
11 is about the same series of meetings at Medjugorje on
12 18th of May; is that correct?
13 A. That is correct.
14 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, one point in
15 connection with this document. It appears to be
16 incomplete, since there is a reference to an Annex 1,
17 approximately halfway down the page, and I don't have
18 an Annex 1 on my document.
19 MR. SCOTT: We don't, Your Honour. This is
20 the only part that we have at the moment.
21 JUDGE MAY: No doubt efforts can be found to
22 find the annex.
23 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
24 Q. Only one question about that, sir. Do you
25 have any reason why this HV General was participating
1 in these meetings, either you or -- if not yourself
2 personally, ECMM?
3 A. Well, this meeting took place in Medjugorje
4 on 18 May, when the meeting with the foreign minister
5 and the co-chairman took place, and President Tudjman,
6 so it would be entirely consistent that President
7 Tudjman would come not alone but with a number of his
8 staff present.
9 Q. All right. Going on to Exhibit 910,1, which
10 again is one of the loose exhibits, if you will.
11 910,1. Can you describe for the Court what that
12 document is, or actually series of documents?
13 A. The cover note is in Danish. Would you wish
14 me to give a translation of that?
15 Q. Please.
16 A. "This is sent to the minister of foreign
17 affairs by the political adviser, Christian Warming."
18 And it states that, "ECMM has, for the possible use of
19 the EU presidency, prepared a draft to President
20 Tudjman. And for the information of the ministry,
21 enclosed is also a copy of President Tudjman's
22 statements concerning the situation in Central Bosnia."
23 And point 2:
24 "... the approval of the ministry, the ECMM
25 will hand over the enclosed protest to Mate Boban."
1 Q. For the record, can you say, what is a
3 A. Demarche is a diplomatic term for a meeting
4 in which you voice the concern, the opinion of your
5 government, or the institution you represent, vis-à-vis
6 the interlocutor.
7 Q. All right. Would you then go on --
8 A. It is normally considered a term that you
9 would only use for, shall we say, most solemn
11 Q. Could you go on to the second page of that
12 document and tell the Court what that is.
13 A. This is a PM, which is diplomatic slang for
14 pro memoria. That is a piece of paper that you would
15 hand over to the person you are talking to, which would
16 summarise the message you are conveying on behalf of
17 your government or of your institution. So this will
18 normally not be the full text of what is actually being
19 said to the person you are talking to, but it will be a
20 short and concise summary.
21 Q. This one was in particular being directed by
22 the European Union to the President of Croatia; is that
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Among other things, President Tudjman is
1 being called upon to exercise all his influence with
2 the Croat leadership of Herceg-Bosnia; that it brings
3 an immediate end to the HVO aggression in Central
4 Bosnia, especially in Mostar; that the blatant
5 violations of humanitarian law is stopped.
6 And the last item:
7 "Further, the President of Croatia is called
8 upon to withdraw all HV military personnel and
9 equipment from Bosnia-Herzegovina."
10 A. This statement, of course, is based on our
11 assessment of the situation on the ground. It is not
12 in our hands, the ECMM, to decide the final fate of
13 this PM. To be honest, I have no clear recollection of
14 how this was transmitted to President Tudjman, and by
15 whom. I am confident it was not transmitted by the
16 ECMM. It could have been the co-chairman. It could
17 have been the Danish Ambassador to Croatia.
18 Q. At what level would such a document normally
19 be communicated to a head of state?
20 A. It would always be communicated at the level
21 of head of mission, which in most cases will be
22 ambassador, or in some cases Charge d'Affaires.
23 Q. Can you look to the next page and just tell
24 us what that appears to be?
25 A. That is an excerpt from HINA, which is a
1 Croatian press agency.
2 Q. Is that a government press agency or is that
3 an independent press? Do you know?
4 A. It is an independent agency, but of course
5 operating within the laws of Croatia at the time.
6 Q. All right. And we won't go through the
7 document in detail. This is some response, apparently,
8 made by President Tudjman in connection with these
9 documents that were faxed to you by Christian Warming
10 on the 11th of May.
11 What's finally the third or, excuse me, the
12 last document, "Dear Mr. Boban." Can you tell us what
13 that is?
14 A. That is a draft letter to Mr. Boban to be
15 signed by the head of mission of the ECMM, Mr. Skor,
16 Ambassador Skor, which is referred to in the cover
17 note, that we were seeking the ministry's approval
18 before transmitting it to Mate Boban.
19 Q. Do you recall, sir, whether the document like
20 this was in fact finally transmitted to Mr. Boban?
21 A. I am confident that it was, but I would
22 hesitate to state it with certainty. I believe it was,
23 but I'm not sure.
24 Q. Very well. And the next one is Exhibit
25 937,1, which is the last of the so-called loose
1 exhibits. Mr. Warming was a political adviser that
2 worked with you; is that correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Only one highlight on this document. Next to
5 the final paragraph on page 2, the paragraph that
6 begins with the words "Mate Boban," but a little over
7 halfway through that paragraph, is this statement, and
8 I'll simply ask again if this is consistent or was in
9 fact an ECMM assessment.
10 "To all intents and purposes, much of
11 Herceg-Bosnia was, by late 1992, behaving as an
12 integral part of Croatia, and in practice the Bosnian
13 Croats, Croatian Council of Defence, HVO, continue to
14 resist any joint command with the Bosnian armed forces
15 loyal to the Sarajevo presidency."
16 Was that ECMM's view?
17 A. It was.
18 Q. With reference, then, to Exhibit 963, which
19 should be again back in the bundle, Exhibit Z963.
20 Looking at the number -- item number 3. Only this
21 question, and perhaps you know separate from the
22 document. The meeting that was held in Medjugorje on
23 the 18th of May, 1993, do you know whether it was in
24 fact President Tudjman who had initiated that meeting?
25 A. I have no clear recollection of who called
1 the meeting. I assume that it was President Tudjman,
2 since it is written here, but I have no clear memory as
3 to exactly what took place.
4 Q. Very well.
5 A. There are several possible explanations. It
6 could have been at the suggestion of the co-chairman
7 that he call the meeting; it could have been at the
8 suggestion of the presidents in Copenhagen. So the
9 fact that he hosted the meeting does not in itself mean
10 that he was the one who took the initiative to have it
12 Q. Very well.
13 A. As I said, I have no recollection of it.
14 Q. Let's move on to Exhibit Z993. This is a bit
15 different than the other documents, the ECMM documents
16 we've seen so far. Can you tell the Court what
17 document this is?
18 A. This is a series of documents prepared for
19 the morning briefings. At the morning briefings in
20 Zagreb we would normally expect the chief of
21 operations, or one of his assistants, to give a fairly
22 detailed account on the events in the last 24 hours.
23 But it was always introduced as sometime during our
24 presidency, I don't remember exactly when, that we
25 should have also reports of a more in-depth nature so
1 as to give a better perspective to the mission
2 leadership, but also to the monitors, on what was going
3 on, because these briefings would be communicated to
4 all the teams.
5 Q. And again just a couple of highlights on what
6 would be the fourth page of the document, including the
7 cover page. A couple of paragraphs up from the bottom
8 of the page. It was again reflected that:
9 "It was the clear conviction of the EC, or
10 European Community, that Croatia, which was de facto
11 deeply involved, had to play a prominent role for the
12 clear acceptance of the peace plan by the Bosnian
13 Croats and their respect for democratic principles."
14 A. That was our assessment at the time, yes.
15 Q. If the Court will allow me, this is again one
16 of those documents which has an extreme amount of
17 relevant information, but for the purposes of this
18 witness and time, we won't go through it in any greater
20 If we can continue on, then, to Exhibit 937,
21 which is a -- it starts with a cover page and then a
22 report on the situation in Mostar.
23 MR. SCOTT: I think, Your Honour, we'll let
24 that document, for the time being, speak for itself.
25 Q. The reference to Exhibit Z1008,1, did it come
1 to your attention, sir, that around the 1st of June,
2 1993, two Danish civilian drivers in a convoy had been
3 killed in Bosnia in connection with their being
4 involved in a humanitarian convoy?
5 A. Yes, it did come to our attention. They were
6 not ECMM drivers.
7 Q. Yes, not ECMM, but they were Danish drivers,
8 and around the same time, there had been some Italian,
9 I believe, some Italian drivers that were killed; is
10 that correct?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. From the ECMM's position, was it increasingly
13 difficult during this time to assist in getting
14 humanitarian aid into Central Bosnia?
15 A. It was difficult all through our presidency,
16 but it became increasingly difficult.
17 Q. If I can go on to Exhibit 1013, I will just
18 advise --
19 A. Would you allow me to go back to the document
21 Q. Certainly. Go ahead.
22 A. It being presented in this case here would
23 tend to support a thesis that there was one particular
24 party which was behind the -- the incident at Maglaj.
25 I think I owe it to the Court to say that it is my
1 opinion or assessment, based on information other than
2 this document, that there is no clear evidence that the
3 Bosnian Croats were involved in this.
4 Q. Very well. But in terms of in general, you
5 had indicated earlier that it was the ECMM's assessment
6 there was an HVO policy of restricting movement in
7 Central Bosnia; is that correct?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. And simply the overall state of affairs
10 continued to make it more and more difficult to get aid
11 to various locations in Central Bosnia; is that right?
12 A. That is right.
13 Q. All right. Let's go ahead, then, to
14 Exhibit 1013.
15 MR. SCOTT: And I'll just point out,
16 Mr. President, and to the Defence, that there is an
17 identical document in a different format that follows
18 immediately on, for whatever reason, printed out in
19 different -- again, different format. But it's
20 somewhat easier to read than the other version.
21 Q. This is a special report from the head of RC
22 Zenica dated the 3rd of June, 1993, covering a number
23 of matters, but for the present purposes, let me direct
24 your attention, please, to the last paragraph on
25 page 2, meaning -- well, the last paragraph on page 2,
1 if you are using the clearer version of the document.
2 Was it Mr. Thebault's report at that time,
3 and ECMM's assessment, that the third problem, this
4 third problem, was "more worrying. It concerns the
5 presence of real Bosnian Croats extremists in the
6 provincial authorities, like Messieurs Valenta or
7 Kordic, both HVO vice-presidents at the national level
8 in province Travnik. They will be, de facto, the real
9 powerful people in the provincial authorities, and
10 using the absolute majority the Bosnian Croats have due
11 to the absence of Serb representatives, they will be
12 able to use and abuse the fact that most of the
13 decisions will be taken with simple majority."
14 Was that the assessment, sir?
15 A. It was Mr. Thebault's assessment, and shared
16 by ECMM headquarters.
17 Q. This had to do with the establishment of
18 provisional provincial governments under the Vance-Owen
19 Plan; is that what is being discussed here?
20 A. That is correct.
21 MR. SCOTT: I'm only going to touch on 1053,1
22 to simply indicate that again, this is a report from
23 Mr. Thebault dated the 13th of June, 1993, and we will
24 leave it for the time being to speak for itself, Your
1 Q. Going to Exhibit 1064,1, can you tell us the
2 circumstances surrounding this -- sending this
3 communication to Mr. Boban?
4 A. To my recollection, we had a report from the
5 field that the three interpreters and the driver, they
6 had been taken hostage by HVO soldiers. We discussed
7 in Zagreb what to do. It is my recollection that apart
8 from sending this letter to Mr. Boban, a similar
9 protest was sent by UNPROFOR and UNHCR -- could be
10 UNPROFOR or could be in the name of the U.N. military
11 observers; I'm not quite certain. My recollection is
12 that it was a concerted action to secure the release of
13 the people taken hostage.
14 Q. And can you tell the Court whether the HVO
15 did subsequently release these individuals?
16 A. They were released. I'm not certain about
17 the time frame, but it was sort of close in time to the
18 letter here. Whether it happened immediately or a day
19 or two after, I do not remember.
20 Q. Going on to Exhibit 1061, this is a document,
21 appears to be, that you were a little bit more directly
22 involved in yourself; is that fair to say?
23 A. That's true.
24 Q. Just tell the Court the circumstances
25 surrounding this document.
1 A. I had been invited by Mr. Ganic, the
2 vice-president of the BH government, to come to Geneva
3 in order to take place meetings with the co-chairmen.
4 It so happened that the meeting did not really take
5 place as foreseen, but it gave us the opportunity to
6 hold meetings with Lord Owen and with Mr. Ganic.
7 I was accompanied, as you will see from the
8 report, by Mr. Bees, who was the deputy head of RC
9 Zenica, a very competent man, and he and I had the
10 talks mentioned in the memo and in subsequent
12 We were -- after the meeting with Lord Owen,
13 during the meeting, we were asked by Lord Owen to
14 prepare a briefing paper for him; he was going off to
15 see the German government. And since we brought the
16 newest information from the field, he was grateful that
17 we would prepare this paper for him.
18 The extent to which it was used, I don't
20 Q. Directing your attention, then, to the
21 briefing paper itself, which is, including the cover
22 page of the document, would be the fourth page, titled
23 "Croat/Muslim Relations in Central Bosnia," is that a
24 copy of the paper that you and Mr. Bees prepared?
25 A. Yes, it is.
1 Q. Down that page, was it the assessment at the
2 time of the HVO aims that they appear to be, "(a),
3 militarily establish a front line between provinces
4 8/10 and the 'Moslem' 9; (b), eliminate all Moslem
5 resistance to their plans within provinces 8 and 10;
6 (c), eventually cleanse provinces 8 and 10 of Moslems
7 in pursuit of their dream of 'Herceg-Bosna'; and (d),
8 establish a loose confederation with Croatia in due
10 Was that ECMM's assessment of HVO's aims or
11 objectives in June of 1993?
12 A. That was our assessment, and the more so that
13 we would be very careful with the wording in the
14 document to be given to Lord Owen for the purposes
16 Q. This document, then, you're saying, was not
17 lightly prepared?
18 A. No, it was not.
19 In terms of language in the paper, you will
20 perhaps see that it is not the normal strict, dry
21 language of a foreign-office memo. This was because it
22 was prepared for Lord Owen, for his own eyes, to use
23 for the briefings. So it was not brought into a more
24 terse format, exactly because we wanted also to give
25 the atmosphere or the assessment of the situation, and
1 that was based on -- in this kind of language.
2 Q. Before continuing on, then, on the next page,
3 under heading 5, "Action required to reduce tension,"
4 sub-item (c), did the ECMM continue to push, and was it
5 your recommendation to Lord Owen that Croatia continue
6 to be pressured or influenced in some way to "terminate
7 HV military activity and all other material support for
8 the HVO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as troops, weapons,
9 and money"?
10 A. It was our assessment, at the time, that
11 there was still HV involvement inside
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I think also that with the
13 circumstances of preparing this document for Lord Owen
14 going to see the German chancellor, it would be natural
15 for us to make a special point of highlighting the
16 assessment that there was still HV involvement and
18 Q. All right. And if we can then continue on to
19 Exhibit Z1065. Again --
20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, looking at the
21 clock --
22 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MAY: -- we must try and finish this
24 witness by -- at least in chief -- this morning.
25 MR. SCOTT: I fully intend to, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MAY: Is the witness able to come back
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I am, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE MAY: It's not too inconvenient? Very
5 well; thank you.
6 As far as the other documents are concerned,
7 you may be able to take them a little more briefly --
8 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE MAY: -- if you just refer us to the
10 relevant passages.
11 MR. SCOTT: Z1065 is, again, a particularly
12 substantial document. The rest of the documents from
13 then on, which are only -- I don't know, perhaps four
14 or five -- we can simply basically identify. But I do
15 have every intention to be completed by 1.00, if not
17 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Mr. Scott, just to complete
18 what Judge May just said, it's not necessary for all
19 these documents to be read by the witness. If you
20 attract our attention on the relevance of this and
21 this, and having the document identified, in particular
22 when we have gone before to the same subjects, like to
23 the Vance-Owen Plan, and so on.
24 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Thank you.
1 MR. SCOTT: I will do the rest quite
3 Q. With reference to 1065, sir, again, this
4 appears on its face to be a document in which again you
5 were more extensively personally involved; is that
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. Can you tell the Court again the
9 circumstances for preparing this particular document?
10 A. We were coming towards the end of the Danish
11 presidency. We had not achieved exactly what we came
12 there to achieve, namely peace. So I think this was
13 sort of my valedictory dispatch to the presidency, and
14 to the co-chairmen and whoever cared to read it, our
15 assessment of the situation.
16 It is written under my name, but of course it
17 was based on the combined efforts of the mission.
18 Christian Warming was involved in writing it, and not
19 least Charles McLeod. So based on reports from the
20 field, based on the work of the three of us, this is
21 how it ended. And this, I think, is our best attempt
22 at a fair assessment of the situation towards the end
23 of our presidency, and with recommendations for
24 whatever action could and should be taken by the
25 western governments in order that things may be speeded
1 up. It still took a couple of years before it
3 Q. Just as a matter of historical interest, is
4 it your view that in fact the recommendations made here
5 were largely many of the actions which were ultimately
6 taken to end the war?
7 A. I think that's fair to say. However, I
8 wouldn't think it's based on this document.
9 Q. Very well.
10 A. But as I said, this was not my personal
11 opinion only. It does represent my personal opinion,
12 but it was a combined effort at the mission.
13 Q. Let me direct your attention, then, to only
14 one paragraph of this long document, paragraph 16 on
15 page 4, talking about command and control of the HVO.
16 I don't think it's probably necessary to read out loud
17 the entire paragraph, but if everyone could have the
18 paragraph in mind.
19 You state here, sir, at the end of that
20 paragraph, "In the Novi Travnik/Vitez/Busovaca area,
21 HVO preventing the movement of relief convoys answer
22 only to Dario Kordic, minister for Herceg-Bosna in the
23 HVO government, political leader, effective military
24 commander in Busovaca, and cousin of Mate Boban."
25 I do see, in passing, moving on, that I will
1 make a quick reference to paragraph 22 on page 5, and
2 the document also goes on to talk about such things as
3 the Convoy of Joy and about Croatia's relationship.
4 Paragraph 22, stating about -- a little over halfway
5 through the paragraph, "A loss of political support
6 from Croatia could pressure the HVO into accepting a
8 The ECMM's assessment, sir, throughout your
9 six-month tenure, or the term of the presidency,
10 continued to be --
11 I'm sorry, Your Honour.
12 MR. SAYERS: Just in the interests of
13 completeness, Your Honour, I think that the full
14 sentence on page 22 should be read into the record, and
15 not half of it.
16 MR. SCOTT: Happy to.
17 "A loss of political support from Croatia
18 could pressure the HVO into accepting a ceasefire or
19 serve to incite them to pursue their objectives in
20 isolation, becoming more defiant and desperate."
21 Q. I'm sorry, I was saying before, was it your
22 assessment -- when I say "your," ECMM's assessment --
23 throughout the six months of the presidency of Denmark
24 that in fact there was this strong connection between
25 the government in Zagreb and the Bosnian Croats?
1 JUDGE MAY: That's a leading question.
2 MR. SCOTT: All right. Very well, Your
4 JUDGE MAY: Let's move on.
5 MR. SCOTT:
6 Q. Let me just simply point out that -- if you
7 look at Exhibits 1079 and 1079,2, which are the next
8 two exhibits, reports by Mr. Thebault dated the 19th of
9 June, 1993.
10 Mr. Brix Andersen, if you'll have those in
11 mind, and the Court have those in mind, and you can
12 simply keep a finger there. And if you go on to
13 Exhibit Z1086, which is another ECMM report. Exhibit
14 Z1086, at page -- well, if you use the stamp numbers on
15 the top of the page, the last two digits would be 23.
16 Starting with "RC Zenica."
17 Is it correct, as you explained throughout
18 the course of this morning, sir, that the reports that
19 would come up from the field, if you will, would often
20 then be incorporated into other reports that would then
21 be passed on from the headquarters level; is that
23 A. Yes. The team reports would be coming up
24 through the system, but the team reports would also,
25 according to a system we devised early on in our
1 presidency, the team reports would also become
2 available in full to the headquarters, so we could make
3 excerpts of whatever material we thought was relevant,
4 and to send it off unedited to Copenhagen for their
6 Q. All right. And the only point being there is
7 that it illustrates the point, Your Honours, that the
8 Court can see on the part of 1086 that I've directed
9 your attention to, starting with "RC Zenica," that that
10 report then goes on for the next couple of pages to
11 essentially restate or incorporate, if you will, the
12 two individual reports from Mr. Thebault. The content
13 is basically either the same or very, very close.
14 Referencing only one paragraph in 1079,1,
15 and then finally after that, Your Honour, going to the
16 last document. I simply point out the third paragraph
17 starting on the second page of 1079,1. And
18 Mr. Thebault reports, states:
19 "It seems machiavellic, but it is only
20 Balkan. And everyone who has met regularly the top
21 Bosnian Croat leaders, Messrs. Boban, Stojic, Kordic,
22 Valenta, in various situations and on various subjects,
23 where their paranoia and extremism were not hidden, can
24 easily believe it. "
25 In reference to this memo, sir, did ECMM also
1 come to know that -- were there instances in Central
2 Bosnia where the Bosnian Croats moved, if you will,
3 some of their own population in order to attempt to
4 arrive at certain goals?
5 A. As appears from the reports, on the evidence
6 here, it was our assessment, certainly the assessment
7 of the people on the ground, that some of the movements
8 were not because of direct, imminent threats from the
9 Bosnian government forces, but it was largely at the
10 instigation and under the control of the Bosnian Croats
12 Q. In fact, if the Court will allow me one final
13 reference in this document. The paragraph immediately
14 preceding the one we mentioned before, cites an example
15 or the rationale for just such movements. If you see
16 that, sir. "... need to reinforce Croat populations in
17 certain areas."
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All right. Finally, if you can go to Exhibit
20 1149,1. A further report dated the 22nd of July, 1993,
21 from Mr. Thebault; is that correct?
22 A. Yes. After I had left Zagreb.
23 Q. All right. But in terms of the first two
24 paragraphs on the first page, under the title of the
25 memo, is it correct, sir, that the reports and
1 observations made by Mr. Thebault were consistent with
2 the ECMM's assessment during the previous six months?
3 A. Yes, they are consistent, although, as I
4 said, it's after my departure.
5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, I don't know what the
6 value is of having this witness produce documents which
7 he did not originate but were originated by another
8 witness we may be hearing from.
9 MR. SCOTT: For several reasons. Well, if I
10 may, Your Honour. For several reasons. One is what he
11 has said, what the witness has said throughout the
12 morning, is that these were not just the positions, for
13 instance, of RC Zenica or Mr. Thebault, but represented
14 the institutional assessment of ECMM and, at the very
15 highest levels, many of which were communicated to a
16 number of European and union governments. And I think
17 that additional level that he can add to the documents,
18 albeit as one step removed from the ground, is true.
19 But again, as the deputy head of mission, we thought
20 that it was important for him to put these documents in
21 that particular context.
22 Thank you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Is there anything
24 else in chief?
25 MR. SCOTT: No, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE MAY: That concludes the evidence in
3 MR. SCOTT: That concludes.
4 JUDGE MAY: Cross-examination, I hope, will
5 be completed by tomorrow.
6 MR. SAYERS: Absolutely no question that the
7 cross-examination will be completed by tomorrow, Your
9 JUDGE MAY: You'll leave enough time for
10 Mr. Kovacic?
11 MR. SAYERS: Most certainly, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Brix Andersen,
13 I'm afraid we haven't finished your evidence today and
14 we are not in a position to sit this afternoon. Could
15 you be back, please, tomorrow at half past 9.00, when I
16 trust your evidence will be concluded.
17 Could I remind you, as I have to remind every
18 witness, not to speak to anybody about your evidence
19 until it's over, and that does include members of the
20 Prosecution team.
21 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to go now,
23 please be back tomorrow morning.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE MAY: Let me return the documents,
1 which were the additional documents I was given. Give
2 them back to the Prosecution, please, with thanks.
3 Mr. Sayers, if I was to say that an order to
4 the Registry has been signed to take place immediately,
5 does that deal with the matter you have in mind?
6 MR. SAYERS: If I can intuit the content of
7 the order, I would suspect it does, Mr. President.
8 JUDGE MAY: If there is any difficulty about
9 it, would you report it this afternoon to the legal
11 MR. SAYERS: Immediately, Your Honour. Thank
13 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Tomorrow morning,
14 half past 9.00.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
16 12.58 p.m., to be reconvened on
17 Wednesday, the 1st day of
18 December, 1999, at 9.30