1 Wednesday, 1st December, 1999
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.
7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T.
8 WITNESS: OLE BRIX ANDERSEN [Resumed]
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.
10 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.
11 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:
12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Brix Andersen. Just for
13 the record, my name is Stephen Sayers, and together
14 with my colleague, Mr. Naumovski, we represent Dario
15 Kordic. These gentlemen to the rear of me are
16 Mr. Kovacic and Mr. Mikulicic, who represent Mario
18 I take it, sir, that you were interviewed by
19 the Prosecution two days ago and that you signed a
20 statement on that date, November the 28th, 1999;
22 A. That is correct, sir.
23 Q. You also authenticated a significant quantity
24 of documentation, by my count close to 800 pages.
25 Could you just let us know when those documents were
1 provided to you for your review?
2 A. They were provided on Sunday and Monday.
3 Q. Sir, now, you have stated in your direct
4 testimony that you had never met or spoken to
5 Mr. Kordic and you have never been to Central Bosnia.
6 Is that correct?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. So it would be accurate to say that all of
9 the assessments, conclusions, and opinions that we
10 heard from you yesterday are based upon the
11 conclusions, opinions, and observations of others lower
12 down in the organisation of which you were a member in
13 1993, the European Community Monitoring Mission;
15 A. It is correct that I had no personal
16 knowledge of what happened in Bosnia, as a governor,
17 but as to the sources, yes, my information was based on
18 what was reported to me by the ECMM monitors and the
19 RCs but also from the information received from the
20 presidency and UNPROFOR and other sources.
21 Q. Right. But just so the record is crystal
22 clear, you yourself had no independent personal
23 knowledge of any of the facts relevant to what was
24 happening in Central Bosnia or the facts that are
25 recited in your assessments and records; correct?
1 A. Correct. I have no -- I have no personal
2 access to facts as such in Central Bosnia. I was never
4 Q. We can leave that subject now,
5 Mr. Brix Andersen. Would it be fair to say that as a
6 career diplomat, sir, of many years experience and
7 training, you are taught to be and are careful when you
8 make written conclusions, when you write written
10 A. Correct. Both written conclusion and
11 statements in other forms.
12 Q. And you would agree that it is important to
13 ensure the factual accuracy of the materials upon which
14 you rely to make sweeping conclusions about someone
15 that you have never met or spoken to? Wouldn't you
16 agree with that?
17 A. Yes, I would.
18 Q. And the reason is, of course, that if the
19 facts upon which you base the conclusions are not
20 correct or inaccurate in any way, then obviously that
21 affects perhaps vitally the validity of the
22 assessments, opinions, and conclusions that you write;
24 A. That appears to be correct, yes.
25 Q. Sir, let me just ask you if you have ever met
1 or spoken to any members of the HVO leadership, and
2 I'll mention some names to you. I'll just represent to
3 you that Dr. Jadranka Prlic was appointed president of
4 the HVO, the Croatian Defence Council, on the 14th of
5 August, 1992.
6 A. No, I did not meet him.
7 Q. I'll similarly represent to you, sir, that on
8 the same day, Stipo Ivankovic was appointed
9 vice-president or the first vice-president of the HVO.
10 Have you ever met or spoken to that gentleman?
11 A. No, I have not.
12 Q. On the 17th of October, 1992, some few months
13 later, Kresimir Zubak was appointed the second
14 vice-president of the HVO. Have you ever spoken to or
15 met that gentleman, sir?
16 A. I have not.
17 Q. On the same day as Mr. Zubak was appointed
18 vice-president of the HVO, Anto Valenta was appointed a
19 vice-president of the HVO too. Have you ever met or
20 spoken to him, sir?
21 A. No, I have not.
22 Q. There is a reference in your April the 17th
23 to 18th, 1993 report -- I think it's dated [sic]
24 Z735 -- to the head of the HVO department of defence, a
25 man by the name of Bruno Stojic. I believe he was
1 appointed on June -- in June of 1992 to that position.
2 Have you ever met or spoken to Mr. Stojic, sir?
3 A. No, I have not.
4 Q. All right. Have you ever met or spoken to
5 the president of an entity known as the Croatian
6 Community of Herceg-Bosna, a man by the name of Mate
8 A. No, I have not.
9 Q. Let me just step back a little bit, sir, and
10 ask you some general questions about your understanding
11 of what was going on in Central Bosnia during the time
12 that you were responsible for your duties in the
13 European Community Monitoring Mission headquarters in
14 Zagreb. I believe that we've established that your
15 duties basically spanned the first six months of 1993;
16 is that correct?
17 A. I was there from August, beginning of
18 September, 1992, as a monitor, and with a view to
19 preparing the Danish presidency; that is, setting up
20 the organisation that we would run when we took over
21 from the British. Then I would stay on as Deputy Head
22 of Mission from the 1st of January. So from the 1st of
23 January through June, 1993, I was the Deputy Head of
24 Mission. Before that I was the regular monitor and
25 head of the Danish contingent.
1 Q. Please forgive the pause, Mr. Brix Andersen,
2 but we have to let the interpreters catch with us.
3 There is no doubt, sir, that throughout the
4 time of your involvement in the former Yugoslavia, from
5 August of 1992 up until the termination of your
6 position as Deputy Head of Mission in Zagreb at the end
7 of June of 1993, that there was a vicious ethnic civil
8 war raging throughout the territory; isn't that
10 A. That's correct.
11 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, the Court knows we
12 have a continuing objection to the characterisation in
13 questions as a "civil war." We haven't renewed it
14 often but just to make sure that it's on the record, we
15 object to the characterisation in question. Thank
17 JUDGE MAY: That's ultimately for us to
19 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE MAY: I'm not sure really if it assists
21 us, who have to decide that ultimate question, to hear
22 it described as a civil war or not.
23 Mr. Sayers, I would say this: that it's a
24 question in similar terms which you've put to virtually
25 all the witnesses. I myself now can't see the point of
1 it, because clearly there was a war raging, and if the
2 next question is was it chaotic and confusing, you can
3 take it that it was. We don't need to hear that
5 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I am mindful of
6 those observations and I'm also mindful of the
7 observation that the Court made some days ago regarding
8 repeating territory over which we've already trodden,
9 but the purpose of this question for this particular
10 witness, since this witness has been offered to speak
11 with the voice of the ECMM, was not really to elicit
12 his personal opinions but, rather, to elicit the view
13 of the ECMM. I can confirm that with an ECMM document
14 that I think outlines the view of the ECMM, and I'd
15 just like the witness to confirm that, with the Court's
16 permission, obviously.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you can put the document.
18 MR. SAYERS: This has already been admitted.
19 It's Exhibit Z1040, and I have an additional copy there
20 to be shown to Mr. Brix Andersen for his convenience.
21 Q. I just wonder, Mr. Brix Andersen, if you
22 would turn to page 9. Perhaps it might be useful to
23 have a copy for the ELMO, too.
24 JUDGE MAY: What is the document, please?
25 MR. SAYERS: The document, Mr. President, is
1 dated June the 10th, 1993, and it appears to be
2 entitled, "Excerpts of Political Material in ECMM Team
4 Q. I'd just like to read to you one section,
5 sir, in the third paragraph. It says: "It is beyond
6 doubt in this area," and that's Busovaca and Novi
7 Travnik, "that a war which began as a common fight
8 against a common foe (the Serbs) has degenerated into
9 an outright civil war."
10 And that is the view of the ECMM at the time
11 of this particular document, June the 10th, 1993; isn't
12 that so, Mr. Brix Andersen?
13 A. Perhaps not quite, in the sense that if you
14 look at the first page of this document, it's entitled
15 "Excerpts of the Political Material in the ECMM Team
16 Reports." Now, that means that this is the unedited
17 observations and statements by the individual teams.
18 It was at the time thought to be useful to us
19 in headquarters to have the unedited opinion of the
20 monitors on the ground. So this would not have passed
21 through the CC or the RC chain of command to
22 headquarters. This would be the raw material written
23 by the team leader and his fellow monitor. So this
24 does not necessarily represent the opinion of the ECMM
1 Q. Well, what was the opinion of the ECMM
2 headquarters? Was it a civil war or wasn't it, sir?
3 A. I think that that question bears on the legal
4 qualification of the events in the former Yugoslavia,
5 and I think it is up to the Court to decide what the
6 qualification should be.
7 Q. You would agree, sir, that the situation that
8 confronted you in the former Yugoslavia was a
9 disintegrating country that had emerged from a
10 single-party system?
11 A. Yes. To my recollection, there was one
12 dominant party, but there were other parties as well.
13 That's besides the point perhaps.
14 Q. In the former Yugoslavia, there's no question
15 that there was a tradition of an omnipresent,
16 all-powerful central government; isn't that correct?
17 A. That is certainly correct.
18 Q. And in the early '90s, immediately before the
19 foundation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on
20 March 6, 1993, there's no question that that central
21 government had disintegrated, at least in the territory
22 of the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina;
24 A. That is correct, yes.
25 Q. And really before the central government of
1 the republic was able even to start functioning,
2 Sarajevo had been surrounded and besieged, had it not,
3 sir, in April of 1992?
4 A. As you know, that was before my time with the
5 ECMM. That is certainly common knowledge.
6 Q. Right. And there is no question, sir, that
7 throughout your tenure or throughout the time of your
8 responsibilities for Central Bosnia, the central
9 government in Sarajevo was really not able to
10 communicate effectively with other parts of the
11 country; in effect, it really was not functioning at
12 all, was it?
13 A. The government obviously could not function
14 the way a western government functions today, but to
15 take it to the extent that there was no communication
16 between the government and the territory I think is
17 carrying it a bit too far. There was communication.
18 The members of the leadership and the government were
19 able to travel, with assistance from UNPROFOR and
20 others from time to time, but I don't think it's
21 correct to say that they were limited to Sarajevo
22 without communication to the rest of the country.
23 Q. You would agree, though, that the government
24 of a country effectively could not function, and the
25 result of that was that communities and peoples were
1 basically left to organise and fend for themselves?
2 A. I think I will stick to what I said in answer
3 to your previous question. Yes, there was a
4 government. Yes, they were doing what they could to
5 exercise control. Yes, they were facing difficulties,
6 more difficulties than most other governments would
8 Q. All right. Have you actually ever heard of
9 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?
10 A. Yes, I have.
11 Q. Do you know what it was, sir?
12 A. I had heard of it. I had a general
13 impression of what was the gist of it, yes.
14 Q. Do you know what the powers of a
15 vice-president of the Croatian Community --
16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, I wonder what the
17 point of asking the witness this sort of question is.
18 If you have a case about what the powers were, it may
19 be simpler if you put it to the witness so that he can
20 comment on it as to whether he knew or not.
21 MR. SAYERS: That's a fair observation,
22 Mr. President.
23 Q. Did you know that the president of the
24 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was actually the
25 supreme commander of the armed forces of the HVO, sir?
1 A. As to the exact functioning of the various
2 persons who were in the Herceg-Bosna leadership, I
3 would hesitate now, six years later, to have any
4 precise opinion.
5 Q. Did you have an opinion at the time in 1993
6 or did you not know?
7 A. I knew what was the main area of
8 responsibility of most of the important persons, but to
9 say that I could describe it in legal detail, no, I
10 don't think I could.
11 Q. Were you aware that Brigadier Milivoj
12 Petkovic was the chief of the general staff of the HVO,
13 the senior commanding officer of the military forces
14 headquartered in Mostar, sir?
15 A. I was aware of that, yes.
16 Q. And you were aware that the military
17 organisation of the HVO was split into various
18 operative zones under the command of separate
19 subordinate commanders subordinate to Brigadier
20 Petkovic; correct?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. And I take it, sir, that in the Central
23 Bosnia Operative Zone, you were aware that the military
24 commander was Colonel Tihomir Blaskic.
25 A. Yes, that appears to be correct.
1 Q. Just one final question on personalities and
2 whether you had met them.
3 Did you ever meet Bozidar Rajic, the Minister
4 of Defence of the government of the Republic of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina and a vice-president of the Croatian
6 Community of Herceg-Bosna?
7 A. I have no recollection that I met him.
8 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, was the ECMM ever aware
9 that the HVO was established as a temporary emergency
10 measure until some semblance of civilian order could be
11 restored in the country?
12 A. I think that's a difficult question to
13 answer, because most of what happened in the former
14 Yugoslavia was of a temporary nature at that time.
15 Q. Good point. Let me just ask you to take a
16 look, if you would, at a document that's already been
17 introduced into evidence. I don't think it's in your
18 bundle, but it comes from the ECMM archives, and I
19 think it was one of the documents that you were brought
20 here to authenticate. It's Exhibit Z1132, and it
21 appears to be a document entitled, "Excerpts of
22 Political Material in ECMM Team Reports," dated June
23 the 28th, 1993. Before we actually go into this
24 document, had you left your duties by that date or were
25 you still performing your duties, sir? That's June
1 28th, 1993.
2 A. I was still there at that time. We left, I
3 believe, on the morning of the 1st of July.
4 JUDGE MAY: Can we have it on the ELMO,
6 MR. SAYERS: Yes. I'll put page 4, which is
7 the only page I wish to ask the witness about, on the
9 Q. Basically, sir, this is the second page of a
10 report from the coordination centre in Mostar, and it
11 records a meeting with Mr. Vlado Pogarcic, who was the
12 advisor for foreign affairs for Mr. Mate Boban.
13 Basically, there are a number of points recorded that
14 are made by Mr. Pogarcic. The one I want to draw to
15 your attention is on page 4, which says: "HVO/HDZ
16 always said that Community of Herceg-Bosna is a
17 temporary solution to allow to establish normal life
18 again. It will disappear as far as there is an overall
20 The question that I have for you is, sir: is
21 that basically consistent with the ECMM's understanding
22 of the functions of the Croatian Community of
23 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO, as a temporary solution in an
25 A. As I said before, these reports are unedited,
1 in the sense that they contain the material reported
2 directly from the teams of the CCs. Now, as to the
3 substance of it, as I said before, everything was
4 temporary in the former Yugoslavia. There had been a
5 number of peace plans put forward by Mr. Akmadzic, by
6 Mr. Vance and Owen, so everything in that sense was
7 temporary. Everybody was hoping for a solution to the
8 whole conflict, so in that sense, yes, temporary.
9 Q. Thank you, sir. I have no more questions on
10 that document.
11 As there was a reference to the HDZ, did you
12 have any knowledge of who held what post within that
13 political party, sir, in 1993?
14 A. I had that knowledge in 1993. Obviously, six
15 years later, it will be difficult to say with certainty
16 what was the exact nature of that knowledge.
17 Q. That's fair enough, sir. All right.
18 With respect to Mr. Kordic, let me just ask
19 you some questions about him. I would like to begin
20 with what you described as your valedictory analysis
21 dated June the 16th of 1993, marked Z1065, and I think
22 that's in your bundle.
23 The only particular reference to Mr. Kordic
24 appears on page 4, paragraph 16, which you have already
25 read into the record. Is it true, sir, that the
1 factual information contained in this paragraph is
2 based, would it be fair to say, entirely on the reports
3 of Jean-Pierre Thebault to you, the head of the
4 regional centre in Zenica?
5 A. No, it would not. It would be based on his
6 reports and his assessments but also the assessment of
7 other people, other organisations, like most of what we
8 did in headquarters, we did not rely exclusively on one
9 source. We tried to balance information we received
10 with information from other sources.
11 Q. All right.
12 A. Like I explained with the mission of the
13 three ambassadors who went to Ahmici, yes, we did rely
14 on Mr. Thebault to be a competent and meticulous head
15 of the RC, which never meant that we would not find it
16 useful to have his information and his assessment
17 corroborated by other sources.
18 MR. SAYERS: All right. I wonder if I could
19 just ask the usher to put one page of Exhibit Z840 on
20 the ELMO. Page 3, please.
21 Q. In the comments section of Mr. Thebault's
22 April the 28th, 1993 memorandum, sir, he informs the
23 headquarters of the ECMM that Mr. Kordic is, in fact,
24 the cousin of Mr. Boban. Do you see that?
25 A. Yes, I do.
1 Q. Do you know where the ECMM ever came up with
2 that notion?
3 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that?
4 Q. Yes. Let me put it a different way. Let me
5 suggest to you that Mr. Kordic is, in fact, not
6 Mr. Boban's cousin and is not in any way related to
7 him. Can you tell us or do you know where the ECMM
8 came up with that erroneous factual information?
9 A. No, I cannot. It was reported to us, and it
10 was a fact that we never questioned; not to my
11 knowledge, at least.
12 Q. All right. Let's go on -- thank you. I'm
13 through with that document. I appreciate it.
14 You make the contention in paragraph 16 of
15 your valedictory memorandum that Mr. Kordic is
16 supposedly, "Minister for Herceg-Bosna in the HVO
17 government." What does that mean, sir? Minister of
19 A. I think it's fair to say that for many of the
20 people holding responsible positions in Herceg-Bosna,
21 it was difficult to have a precise description of their
22 titles. They would tend to differ from time to time.
23 Some of it could be changed, changes made in the
24 leadership. Some of it could be changes because of
25 translation errors. Some of it -- I don't know.
1 Basically, this is taken to mean that he held a
2 responsible position. Whether it was "minister" in our
3 sense of the word or whether it was a leading
4 personality was not of any great importance for the
5 thrust of this paper.
6 Q. I take it, sir, that -- and I'll suggest to
7 you that, in fact, Mr. Kordic was never minister for
8 Herceg-Bosna and that he held no position in the HVO
9 government. Could you just tell us where this
10 information came from, if you know?
11 A. The information came to us from the reports
12 from the RC's and from the teams. If you say it's
13 inaccurate, I really have no other comment to that,
14 other than Mr. Kordic's name repeatedly came up in
15 reports from the field, from other sources also, as an
16 influential person. Whether he held this or that title
17 is perhaps, to me, not quite as important as the
18 importance of his position.
19 Q. Thank you, sir. Do you know, in order to
20 clear up this confusion, apparently, as to the status
21 and functions of Mr. Kordic in Central Bosnia, do you
22 know whether anyone actually asked him what his
23 position was and what his powers were?
24 A. I don't know. A number of ECMM monitors must
25 have met him. I suppose that they would have had the
1 opportunity to ask him the question if they felt it was
2 a relevant question to ascertain his formal, precise
3 title. Perhaps they also had the opinion, but I'm
4 speculating, that the fact that he seemed to exercise
5 authority was sufficient for them when they were
6 discussing things with him, rather than to ascertain
7 his exact legal title. I don't think I can comment any
9 Q. Thank you, sir. And I don't mean to quibble,
10 but the long and the short of it is you just don't know
11 whether anybody asked that particular question of
12 Mr. Kordic himself, do you?
13 A. That's correct. I don't know.
14 Q. Similarly, you don't know whether anybody
15 took the trouble to ask the question of the head of the
16 HVO government, Dr. Jadranka Prlic, what functions, if
17 any, Mr. Kordic had in that government? You don't
18 know, do you, sir?
19 A. I don't know for a fact, that's true.
20 Q. On the political front, the same is true with
21 respect to Mr. Boban, the president of the Croatian
22 Community of Herceg-Bosna and also the president of the
23 HDZ. You do not know whether anyone within the ECMM
24 took the trouble to ask him what Mr. Kordic's functions
25 or powers were, do you?
1 A. Well, it's like I said just before. We were
2 less concerned with the formal legal title of the
3 people we were dealing with, the same as we within the
4 ECMM actually had very few titles and very few titles
5 were used. It was a question of mostly the authority
6 that the person seemed to exercise. If you were an
7 influential person, then that would be sufficient for
8 us to talk to him or relay his views and the
9 information he would give to us.
10 Q. I appreciate the repetition of that answer,
11 Mr. Brix Andersen, but the question was --
12 JUDGE MAY: I think the question has been put
13 often enough. Now, let's move on.
14 MR. SAYERS: On the military front then,
15 Mr. President.
16 Q. Do you know whether anybody questioned the
17 military authorities in Central Bosnia,
18 Colonel Blaskic, for example, as to whether Mr. Kordic
19 had any military power whatsoever, and if so, the
20 extent of it or the limitations on it? You don't know
21 that, do you?
22 A. No, I don't.
23 Q. And on the highest level, the same is true
24 with respect to the commander in chief of the HVO armed
25 forces, Brigadier Petkovic. You don't know whether
1 anybody clarified with Brigadier Petkovic whether
2 Mr. Kordic had a military role and, if so, what was it
3 and what limitations were attendant to it; would that
4 be fair to say?
5 A. It would be fair to say, yes.
6 Q. Thank you. Let me turn to a different
7 subject, sir. Mr. Anto Valenta, about whom you gave
8 some testimony and whose name is mentioned in the ECMM
9 reports and who was, in fact, a vice-president of the
10 HVO, his name is actually mentioned in Exhibit Z859,1.
11 It's a May the 1st, 1993 special report, and I believe
12 it is in the package that you have in front of you. If
13 you would just turn to it, sir. I actually have --
14 A. Could I have the reference, again.
15 Q. Yes. It's Z859,1, sir, and May the 1st,
17 MR. SAYERS: There are just two pages that I
18 would like the usher to put on to the ELMO, if I may.
19 Q. The first page is page 2, sir, of this
20 special report, and it's right at the bottom of the
21 page where the reference is made that: "Mr. Valenta,
22 HVO vice-president, located in Travnik where he took a
23 decisive part to the recent troubles, just before the
25 Then there's a reference to Mr. Kostroman,
1 who is supposedly or who is described as: "General
2 Secretary of the HVO travelling the area."
3 Do you know what kind of decisive part in the
4 recent troubles Mr. Valenta took? Was that ever
5 reported to you or do you have no current recollection
6 of that, sir?
7 A. I have no specific recollection of that.
8 Q. All right. If would you turn to the second
9 page. It's under paragraph 3, "Provisional
10 conclusions." It appears on page 6, I believe, of this
11 document. There's a reference, in the first full
12 paragraph of this letter, if you would just -- yes. To
13 a letter that had been sent or: "Very clear letter
14 sent the week before to the ECMM by an HVO
15 vice-president, who is the real number two, after Mate
16 Boban, of the HVO as a political body, Mr. Valenta."
17 Supposedly, the author of this special report
18 was to meet with Valenta that afternoon, as he was just
19 coming back from a town called Citluk, where he had
20 played a major role as the HVO representative in charge
21 of the situation in Central Bosnia.
22 This is what was reported to you by the head
23 of the regional centre in Zenica in May of 1993;
25 A. Yes. Correct.
1 Q. You're not aware of any information to
2 suggest that the assessments and conclusions contained
3 in this document are factually incorrect, are you,
5 A. No, I'm not.
6 Q. You describe two documents in connection with
7 your direct testimony. Thank you, I'm through with
8 that. The first was a fact-finding mission report that
9 was generated, I think, by three Ambassadors. It was
10 Exhibit Z910 and dated May the 12th. I don't think we
11 need to put this one on the ELMO. I'll just touch very
12 lightly on this.
13 Apparently the Ambassadors wanted to meet
14 with the responsible local authorities to the extent
15 that they could. Isn't that correct, sir?
16 A. Yes. They were sent there to see for
17 themselves what had happened --
18 Q. Right.
19 A. -- form their own opinion and talk to the
20 people necessary.
21 Q. Right. They were taken around by UNPROFOR;
23 A. They were taken around by ECMM but with the
24 escort of UNPROFOR.
25 Q. As far as you're aware, they spoke to
1 everybody to whom they wished to speak in order to come
2 up with valid conclusions regarding their fact-finding
3 mission; correct, sir?
4 A. That I don't know. I know that they have
5 reported on the conversation they've had. I have no
6 recollection that they had wished to see other people
7 whom they couldn't see. They may have had other wishes
8 which for practical or other reasons could not be met.
9 Q. Very well.
10 A. I don't know.
11 Q. You are aware, sir, that they did, in fact,
12 have a meeting with Mr. Valenta, the HVO
13 vice-president; correct?
14 A. Right.
15 Q. You are aware that they had no meeting with
16 Mr. Kordic; correct?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. To the extent -- if I can add that -- that it
20 is not reflected in the report, and I have no
21 recollection, six years later, whether or not they had
22 met Mr. Kordic and not reported it.
23 Q. That's a very fair observation, Mr. Brix
24 Andersen. You also made one reference to a report by
25 Charles McLeod, Exhibit Z926. I only have one question
1 in connection with this document.
2 Mr. McLeod records that he -- "I went to the
3 area to talk to leading members of the community on
4 both sides."
5 Are you aware, sir, that not only did Mr.
6 McLeod not meet Mr. Kordic, he never attempted to meet
7 with Mr. Kordic, never asked --
8 JUDGE MAY: How is the witness going to know
9 this sort of thing? It doesn't help us, and, anyway,
10 we heard Mr. McLeod.
11 MR. SAYERS: I think, Your Honour, the point
12 is made and there is no need to beat a dead horse.
13 Let's move on.
14 Q. One of the documents that was contained in
15 the package of materials that you were asked to review
16 and authenticate, Mr. Brix Andersen, was
17 Exhibit Z856,1, and it consists of three -- actually,
18 two separate documents. It looks like there is a press
19 release from HINA, the press agency [Realtime
20 transcript read in error "president"] In Zagreb that
21 you referred to. I don't know whether you have a copy
22 in your package.
23 The press release, and we'll try to locate a
24 copy of this document just in a few seconds, the press
25 release makes reference to a joint statement issued by
1 President Boban of the Croatian Community of
2 Herceg-Bosna, and President Alija Izetbegovic of the
3 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on April the 25th,
4 1993, regarding the political and military situation in
5 Central Bosnia.
6 Do you recall whether you ever saw a copy of
7 that joint communiqué?
8 A. I don't recall that.
9 Q. I wonder if the usher would just show you the
10 document marked as Exhibit D27/1, please.
11 MR. SAYERS: While that's being located,
12 Mr. President, I think there's one transcription error
13 on line 7, page 25. The word "president" with the term
14 "president agency" should read "press agency."
15 Q. You may or may not have seen this joint
16 statement, Mr. Brix Andersen. There are actually two
17 separate documents. There's a joint statement issued
18 by President Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban, witnessed by
19 Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and then at the end there is a
20 separate document regarding the command structure for
21 the BiH army and the HVO, signed by the commanders in
22 chief, President Izetbegovic, and Mr. Boban, and by the
23 military chiefs of the general staffs of both
24 organisations, General Sefer Halilovic and General
25 Milivoj Petkovic. Have you ever seen this document
2 A. I believe I have, but I wouldn't say it with
3 one a hundred per cent certainty.
4 Q. Very well. The --
5 A. When I say I believe I have, then it is
6 because the information there would have been known to
7 me somehow. Whether it is based on these documents
8 it's impossible to remember now.
9 Q. That's all the questions I have for that. If
10 you have no clear recollection of it, then there's no
11 point in going through the document, Mr. Brix
13 One document would I like you to look at and
14 verify for us though is this document that was attached
15 to Exhibit Z856,1. Unfortunately I only have one copy
16 of it so I'll put this on the ELMO, please.
17 Do you recognise this document as a press
18 release issued by the HVO public relations office on
19 May the 1st of 1993, sir?
20 A. I believe I've seen it, yes.
21 Q. And from the faxed information that's
22 contained on the top of the first page, is it accurate
23 to say that this document was being faxed within the
24 ECMM to its various offices, to people that needed to
25 see it? I believe the fax date appears as May the 3rd
1 of 1993.
2 A. No. The information I can see seems to
3 indicate that this document was sent from the ECMM to
4 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. The
5 acronym UM KRYPTO, that is the name of a fax machine in
6 Copenhagen. So it was sent from Zagreb to Copenhagen,
7 it appears to me.
8 Q. The only point that I would like you to
9 confirm or deny, as the case may be, is that this
10 document was in the possession of the ECMM by May the
11 5th of 1993 at the latest?
12 A. Yes, it would have been there on the 3rd of
14 Q. All right. I wonder if the usher could just
15 show you page 2 of this document. Paragraph 4. Were
16 you aware that the HVO public relations office, sir, I
17 believe in Mostar, had announced to the world at large
18 that an investigative commission would be appointed to
19 investigate the facts regarding the crimes that had
20 occurred in the recent past in the interethnic fighting
21 that had broken out in Central Bosnia and else where?
22 A. Yes, I remember that.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 A. Meaning, when I say I remember that, yes, I
25 remember seeing it in this statement.
1 Q. Yes. Thank you very much. I'm through with
3 The next topic I'd like to address is the
4 ceasefire negotiations, Mr. Brix Andersen, that
5 actually brought something of an end, perhaps a lull,
6 in the fighting that occurred in Central Bosnia.
7 Were you aware that the head of the regional
8 centre of the ECMM in Zenica was a participant in those
10 A. Yes, I was.
11 Q. And those negotiations occurred on the
12 highest military level, did they not? Perhaps that's
13 an unclear question. Let me --
14 A. I'm just waiting for the translator. Yes, I
15 was aware of that.
16 Q. Participants in those negotiations included
17 not just the head of the regional centre in Zenica but
18 also the commanding officer of UNPROFOR in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lieutenant-General Philippe
20 Morillon; correct?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. And the most senior military officers on the
23 part of the competent factions, Brigadier Petkovic for
24 the HVO, General Halilovic for the ABiH; correct?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Do you recall that you actually -- did you
2 actually write a memorandum about those negotiations
3 yourself, sir, as far as you can recall?
4 A. Are you referring to the briefing notes I
5 used in Geneva?
6 Q. That's a good place to start. You actually
7 did make a reference to the ceasefire negotiations in
8 your briefing notes and briefed, in the document that
9 you prepared, for Lord Owen's use; is that correct?
10 A. The document Lord Owen used was much later.
11 Q. All right.
12 A. My recollection, that was in the first third
13 or first half of June.
14 Q. Let me move on, sir, but just ask you to
15 agree that Mr. Kordic took no part whatsoever, as far
16 as you're aware, in any of those ceasefire negotiations
17 or any of the original ceasefire negotiations that
18 occurred in Vitez involving representatives of the HVO
19 and ABiH sides.
20 A. I couldn't give you a precise answer to
21 that. No, I don't have any recollection of it today.
22 It doesn't mean it did not happen. It may not have
23 been reported to me or I may have forgotten.
24 Q. You just don't know; correct?
25 A. I don't know today.
1 Q. Moving on in time, you made a reference to a
2 meeting held at Medjugorje on May the 18th of 1993. Do
3 you recall that? Once again, sir, it's true that all
4 of the principal civilian and military leaders on both
5 sides were present at that meeting; correct?
6 A. That is correct, including my own minister.
7 Q. And Mr. Kordic took no role whatsoever in any
8 of those negotiations, did he, sir?
9 A. That I don't know. It was not reported to me
10 that he did. He may have been there without it being
12 Q. Once again, though, you simply don't know
13 whether he was there or not, so you can't help us out
14 on that subject, can you?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. One general question concerning a body known
17 as the Busovaca Joint Commission. Have you ever heard
18 of that body or does that not ring any familiar bells
19 in your recollection?
20 A. It does ring a bell.
21 Q. It's true, isn't it, that as far as you're
22 aware, Mr. Kordic took no role whatsoever in the
23 negotiations that were chaired by one of the ECMM
24 monitors, Mr. Jeremy Fleming, I believe, that led up to
25 the establishment of that body; correct?
1 A. It's correct I have no recollection of it.
2 Q. And would it be fair to say that you -- were
3 you aware that Mr. Kordic -- not only did he not take
4 any role in those negotiations, he never sat on the
5 Busovaca Joint Commission at all and never attended a
6 single of the daily meetings held by that institution?
7 A. I really don't know whether he was there or
8 was not.
9 Q. Fair enough.
10 A. If he were there, it would somehow have been
11 reflected in the reporting, I'm confident, but I'm not
13 Q. Very well, sir. Let me move on to another
15 You were asked some questions in connection
16 with Exhibit Z943,2, which was a two-page document. It
17 looks like it's signed by Torbjorn Junhov. I think
18 that's in your package, and it is dated the 19th of
19 May, 1993, regarding the relations between Bosnian
20 Croats and Muslims and application of the agreements
21 that had been worked out at Medjugorje. Just one point
22 of detail on this, since this document shows
23 essentially how the Vance-Owen Plan was supposed to
25 MR. SAYERS: Just for the Trial Chamber's
1 information, I had previously pointed out Exhibit
2 Z571,1, pages 138 to 39, and that was in the testimony
3 of Brigadier Duncan. There's no need to go over that
5 Q. But would it be fair to say, sir, that as of
6 this date, the governmental arrangements envisaged for
7 Province 10 under the Vance-Owen Plan, the Travnik or
8 Travnicka province, were as follows: The provincial
9 governor was to be a Croat; correct?
10 A. If you ask me detailed questions like that, I
11 think my answer would be I have no recollection over
12 and beyond what is in the document.
13 Q. All right. In that case, I would just like
14 to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to the bottom of
15 this page which deals with Travnik and providing that
16 the governor would be a Croat, the vice-governor would
17 be a Muslim, and that the interim provisional
18 government would consist of five Croats, four Muslims,
19 and one vacancy. If you have no knowledge of this
20 document, sir, we will move on, but just one point of
21 detail. Do you know who the provincial governor was
22 supposed to be, the Croat provincial governor?
23 A. I have no recollection now. I may have had
24 at the time, but I'm not sure.
25 Q. There's a reference in Exhibit Z1013, a
1 special report dated June 3rd, 1993, on page 2 that
2 says: "The mayor of Bugojno, Mr. Seljic, HVO, has now
3 been appointed as governor by the Bosnian Croats, and
4 it seems to everybody, including the Bosnian Muslims,
5 to be a good beginning." Does that refresh your memory
6 at all?
7 A. Vaguely, yes.
8 Q. And it is true that Mr. Soljic was supposed
9 to be the Croat governor of Province 10, as far as
10 you're aware; correct?
11 A. According to the document here, yes.
12 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, do you recall the ECMM
13 ever receiving any reports concerning the structure of
14 the military forces in Busovaca and the chain of
15 command within those forces?
16 A. Not offhand.
17 Q. All right. With respect to the document
18 about which I was just asking you some questions,
19 there's a reference, sir, to high political and
20 military leaders from the Croat and Muslim side being
21 present, namely President Izetbegovic, Mr. Boban,
22 Mr. Ganic, and a gentleman by the name of
23 Mr. Akmadzic. Does the name "Akmadzic" ring a bell?
24 Do you know who he was?
25 A. It does ring a bell, yes.
1 Q. Do you recall that Mr. Akmadzic was one of
2 the five vice-presidents of the HDZ political party?
3 A. Yes, I remember that.
4 Q. And it was envisaged, sir, that a military
5 committee consisting of President Izetbegovic,
6 Mr. Boban, Mr. Ganic and Mr. Akmadzic would be formed;
7 correct? If you take a look at page 2 of the document
8 that we were just discussing, Exhibit 943,2.
9 JUDGE MAY: Whereabouts should the witness
10 look, Mr. Sayers?
11 MR. SAYERS: On page 2, Your Honour. It's
12 rather difficult to read because the copy is a little
13 blurred, but it appears under Roman Numeral V, "Central
14 Government." It's May the 19th, 1993, sir. I have a
15 copy for the ELMO, if that would assist the witness.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
17 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.
18 Q. If you would just look down at Roman
19 Numeral V, sir, it says, "Central Government. It was
20 agreed that in accordance with existing constitution of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following changes should be
22 made: A military committee of four should be
23 established," and it contains the four names that I
24 just recited. It also goes on to say that those
25 members affected would have to resign their positions
1 and that it was further agreed that Mr. Prlic would be
2 appointed the prime minister of the government. You
3 were aware that Mr. Prlic was actually the president of
4 the HVO at this time, were you not, sir?
5 A. Yes, I was.
6 Q. All right, thank you. The next document that
7 I'd like to just ask you a few questions about is
8 Exhibit Z993, Mr. Brix Andersen, May the 29th, 1993.
9 MR. SAYERS: I have a copy for the ELMO,
10 Mr. President, if the usher would be so good as to put
11 it on there.
12 Q. The first page to which I would like to draw
13 your attention is actually page 7. Once again, sir,
14 this is an official ECMM document; correct?
15 A. Yes. This is a document in a series of
16 briefings prepared by the headquarter staff.
17 Q. And so this sets out the position of the ECMM
18 headquarters on the date of this document, anyway, the
19 29th of May, 1993; correct?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. Would you turn to page 7, paragraph 8, sir?
22 One question about this. The observation is made by
23 the ECMM headquarters that: "While the Vance-Owen Plan
24 may be the preferred solution for the West, it may
25 falter in attempts to impose it on a region where the
1 natural political evolution may be toward three
2 constituent states." That was the view of the ECMM at
3 the time this document was prepared; correct?
4 A. No, it was not. As I said, this was a
5 briefing document prepared for the headquarters. Now,
6 this did not reflect, shall we say, the official
7 position of the ECMM as we would report it to
8 headquarters. This would be more a sort of discussion
9 paper for our internal understanding of the situation.
10 This was not supposed to be made public. It was not
11 supposed to be sort of a background paper for policy
12 decisions. This was how we saw it, and this was how we
13 thought it would be useful to stimulate the monitors'
14 thinking about what was going on on the ground. So it
15 does not reflect European policy on this.
16 Q. But nonetheless --
17 A. At that point in time, we were still
18 committed to the implementation of the Vance-Owen
19 Plan. What it says here is that it would be a
20 difficult job, which it has also proved to be.
21 Q. This does represent what the headquarters was
22 disseminating to monitors as briefing materials;
24 A. That is correct. We disseminated this to
25 monitors for their information, not as a policy
1 statement that the Vance-Owen Plan was about to fall.
2 On the contrary, at every given opportunity we declared
3 that we were firmly behind the implementation of the
4 Vance-Owen Plan. But we could also see what was
5 happening in the real world.
6 Q. And it's true that the plan actually evolved
7 in July and August of 1993, as far as you're aware,
8 into the Stoltenberg-Owen Plan which actually did
9 envisage a union of three constituent republics of
10 three constituent peoples; correct?
11 A. Yes. But as you indicate, this is after I
12 had left the mission, so I didn't follow events quite
13 as closely as when I was in Zagreb.
14 Q. But you are aware of the basic details of the
15 Stoltenberg-Owen Plan, and that's about the most basic
16 detail; is that correct?
17 A. That is correct.
18 Q. All right. Next, sir, page 7 again,
19 paragraph 10. The observation is made by the
20 headquarters that the rise of nationalism among the
21 peoples of this region has created what are arguably
22 legitimate aspirations for self-determination and
23 sovereign state status. Then you go on to observe the
24 challenges that are connected with that particular
25 observation. Was that the view of the ECMM at this
1 time at the end of May 1993?
2 A. It was our assessment that there was a rise
3 of nationalism. I think that very few people would
4 doubt that. I think also that it is true that what had
5 been created was what was arguably legitimate
6 aspirations. That goes for all of the peoples in the
7 former Yugoslavia, for the Krajina Serbs, for the
8 Serbs, for the Croats, for the Croatians, for the
9 Muslims. What we tried to grasp was how do we explain
10 to ourselves and to the outside world exactly where is
11 the limit. The view of the mission was that we would
12 try to understand what were the political motives
13 behind the events on the ground, while at the same time
14 being very careful not to accept or condone the methods
15 with which the peoples of the region tried to implement
16 these political principles. So we tried to make a
17 clear distinction between our analysis of the political
18 aspirations and the methods of the leadership and the
19 methods of the troops and the people on the ground. I
20 think that is, in essence, what the mission was about.
21 Q. Thank you, sir.
22 A. But never accepting the methods which were
23 not democratic, legitimate, in every single aspect of
25 Q. You were aware, I take it, at all times, sir,
1 that the Croat segment of the population of Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina was a small minority, about 17,3 to 17,8
3 per cent of the total population; correct?
4 A. Total population of what?
5 Q. I beg your pardon?
6 A. Total population of what?
7 Q. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic.
8 A. I think there are many statistics. It
9 depends a little on when you make the census. Yes, we
10 were aware that the Croat community was fairly small
11 when you compare it to the total population of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yes, we were also aware of the
13 fact that in Herceg-Bosna, there was a majority. But I
14 don't think it's fair to ask if I remember all the
15 figures to the exact point.
16 Q. I agree.
17 A. But we had the basic understanding of the
18 figures for the whole of the country and for the
19 various provinces, yes.
20 Q. Two final questions in connection with this
21 document, sir. If the usher would turn to the next
22 page, page 8, there's a summary prepared by Mr. Pugh
23 from the information section. The conclusion appears
24 here that there is a separate but parallel agenda that
25 exists among all three parties to this conflict. Do
1 you have any knowledge of what that agenda was or what
2 the discussions on the subject of that tripartite
3 agenda were?
4 A. I think that the fair answer to that question
5 is that whenever we were dealing with events in
6 Yugoslavia, you wouldn't expect one agenda only from
7 any given party. There would always be one extra or
8 several extra agendas.
9 Q. And you found that to be the case with
10 respect to all of the various participants in the
11 conflict; correct?
12 A. As a general statement, yes, like I just
13 said, but depending on the level at which you are
14 operating and the territory which was involved. There
15 was never any clear agenda, one agenda, for each of the
16 parties, covering all aspects at all levels and all
18 Q. Thank you, sir. Can I just draw your
19 attention, lastly, on this document to paragraph 14.
20 There's a rather resigned tone about that paragraph,
21 which indicates that the ECMM's view is that: "The
22 Vance-Owen Plan, while still the official international
23 solution, may not be able to be implemented because of
24 the deep-rooted animosity among the warring parties,
25 and the capacity to live together may simply not
2 Was that the official ECMM view at the end of
3 May 1993?
4 A. Yes, it was. And we were right, weren't we.
5 But with the added comment that the official position
6 of the ECMM was to work for the implementation of the
7 Vance-Owen Plan until the day that Lord Owen himself
8 declared it didn't serve any purpose any more and you
9 had to start afresh. So we were loyal to the political
10 directives we received from the presidency and from the
11 Member States, but it didn't mean that we did not think
12 about what we saw on the ground ourselves.
13 Q. Sir, was there a perception on the part of
14 the ECMM that UNPROFOR, the UNPROFOR forces in Central
15 Bosnia, were not able to function at full effectiveness
16 because of the tremendous limitations upon their
17 mandate, being confined, as they were, to providing
18 assistance to the UNHCR in the provision of
19 humanitarian aid?
20 A. I think you're putting it more squarely than
21 I would subscribe to. I think UNPROFOR was doing their
22 very best to implement their mandate as they construed
23 it. They were facing great difficulties, which was
25 Q. In your valedictory address, June the 16th,
1 1993, Exhibit Z1065, on page 7, you make the
2 observation that: "The current conservative
3 interpretation of the mandate limiting UNPROFOR to
4 support of UNHCR convoys has given the impression of an
5 ineffective organisation and has deeply affected the
6 credibility of the International Community."
7 Then you make some suggestions regarding a
8 possibly more expansive interpretation of UNPROFOR's
9 mandate. But the conclusion that I've just read to
10 you, that's a conclusion that you had reached at the
11 end of your tour, essentially in the middle of June of
12 1993, is that correct, sir?
13 A. It is correct that this is a conclusion I
14 signed on to in a report to my government. I think
15 it's fair to say that if I had written the same paper
16 for publication, I would perhaps have termed it
17 slightly different, but in a sense it would be the
19 Q. Thank you. The final topic that I would like
20 to cover with you, sir, and I appreciate your patience,
21 is the testimony that you gave regarding the asserted
22 presence of Croatian army units or forces in southern
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You never saw any reports of the
24 presence of HV or Croatian army troops in Central
25 Bosnia, did you, sir?
1 A. You have the reports before you. I was not a
2 monitor in the field in this period of time. We used
3 not a lot but we used some of the resources of the ECMM
4 in order to ascertain whether or not the HV were
5 operating inside Bosnia or whether they were giving
6 support, in terms of equipment or supplies, to the
8 As is stated in several of the reports, it
9 was, of course, difficult to find such information
10 because, obviously, it would be in the interests of the
11 HVO and especially the HV to try to keep it concealed
12 to us and UNPROFOR. Nevertheless, it was our
13 considered opinion that the HV did give assistance to
14 the HVO.
15 If you go back to the paper regarding the
16 Medjugorje meeting, it would be difficult for us or for
17 the West to tell President Tudjman that he should limit
18 the support and that he should exert influence on the
19 HVO if we thought that Croatia did not assist the HVO.
20 And this was done on behalf of the European presidency,
21 it was done by the president himself, my Foreign
22 Minister, and was done with the knowledge of all the
23 member governments.
24 Now, if our information had been inaccurate,
25 there would have been one or more of the member states
1 whose representatives would have objected to this
2 statement being made. The fact that the presidency was
3 able to make the demands --
4 Q. I going to cut you off, sir. I appreciate
5 your answer but the question is a very narrow one. You
6 never saw any reports of the presence of HV or Croatian
7 army troops in Central Bosnia --
8 JUDGE MAY: The witness cannot be expected to
9 remember everything that's in the reports. As he
10 points out rightly, you have them. Now, if there's any
11 further point you want to make about it, do.
12 MR. SAYERS:
13 Q. We have been provided with three reports.
14 Let's take a look at one or two of them, sir.
15 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Sayers,
16 yesterday you said that you would finish this
17 cross-examination this morning. Moreover, it is a
18 cross-examination based on the examination of certain
19 documents. You have been cross-examining the witness
20 for about an hour and a half, and I really should like
21 to know -- I would appreciate you telling me how long
22 do you intend to go on, bearing in mind that
23 Mr. Kovacic also needs to cross-examine this witness.
24 So how long will you take do you think?
25 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I'm mindful of the
1 commitments I made to the Trial Chamber yesterday. As
2 I informed the Trial Chamber, this is the last subject
3 about which I have questions for Mr. Brix Andersen, and
4 I would anticipate maybe another 20 minutes of
5 questions and I'll be through. So Mr. Mikulicic will
6 have the remainder of the time, which should be a good
7 hour and a quarter, I think.
8 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you can look at the
9 documents -- we'll adjourn, take our break now -- and
10 reduce it to 10 minutes if it's merely one subject.
11 MR. NICE: Can I just raise an administrative
12 query at one stage this morning in order to plan
13 witnesses for this week and next week?
14 JUDGE MAY: It may be convenient when we've
15 completed this witness.
16 Yes. Half an hour.
17 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.
18 --- On resuming at 11.34 a.m.
19 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, we've been given ten
21 minutes, so please give me a hand. We'll try to rush
22 through these three exhibits in short order.
23 The first is Exhibit Z1151,1, and I have a
24 copy here for the ELMO. This is a document dated July
25 30, 1993, and I appreciate that this postdates your
1 involvement in the area, sir. But if you take a look
2 at the first page, the observation is made that it is
3 very difficult for ECMM teams to provide a definite
4 answer to these questions, questions such as HV
5 involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as military
6 intelligence is strictly forbidden to them for their
7 safety in the field. That was true throughout your
8 tour as deputy head of the mission; is that correct?
9 A. That's correct. We were very concerned about
10 the security of our monitors. We were unarmed and we
11 were not able to protect ourselves. Therefore, we made
12 a point of being seen -- not only being but being seen
13 to be impartial, and to engage in intelligence
14 gathering would not be impartial. But there is a
15 difference between intelligence gathering and providing
16 information on what is obvious on the ground.
17 Q. But suffice it to say that it was the
18 position of the ECMM that it was difficult for monitors
19 to gather military intelligence for the reasons stated
20 in this document; correct?
21 A. That is correct. We would try to get the
22 information from the ground that occurred, but we would
23 not go to the extreme that a military unit perhaps
24 would go in order to obtain such information.
25 Q. If I could just draw your attention to the
1 second page, sir.
2 If you could just lower the page, Mr. Usher,
3 by about two inches, actually lower it instead of
4 pushing it up. There you go.
5 Now, would it be fair to say, sir, that the
6 best that the ECMM had accumulated as of July the 30th,
7 1993, on this subject, HV involvement in BiH, were the
8 hints or evidences in three areas of Herzegovina
9 summarised on this page?
10 A. Six or seven years later, I don't think I can
11 provide any more specific information than what is in
12 the document here, over and above to say that it was an
13 issue in which we took great interest. We wanted to be
14 able to verify to our governments whether or not
15 Croatia was involved, so we went to some lengths in
16 order to obtain such information without endangering
17 our personnel. And we were quite confident that the
18 Croatian government, the Croatian army, did operate
19 within Bosnia-Herzegovina with equipment, with
21 Q. You never obtained any definitive information
22 regarding the magnitude of that involvement, though,
23 did you, sir?
24 A. Not over and above what is in the reports in
25 evidence here.
1 Q. Well, moving along -- I'm finished with that
2 document -- the next one that I would like to address
3 to you is Exhibit Z1012 about which you gave
4 testimony. This is a document dated June the 3rd,
5 1993. I have one question on page 1. If you go
6 under --
7 Mr. Usher, if you could show paragraph 2,
8 please, on the ELMO. Thank you. That's good.
9 There's a reference here to a trickle of
10 confirmed proof, and as of June 3rd, 1993, the position
11 that the existence and extent of HV involvement has
12 always been difficult to define, and the many reports
13 provided by the BiH Armija have seldom been confirmed
14 by ECMM, UNMOs, or UNPROFOR, and that's correct, isn't
16 A. That is correct, but you must also understand
17 again that we did not get involved in what is strictly
18 intelligence gathering, and it wasn't necessary for our
19 purposes. Our purpose was only to demonstrate that
20 there was a high degree of probability, bordering on
21 certainty, that the Croatian army was involved. That
22 was enough for us to report to the presidency and to
23 the capitals that there was a problem which we couldn't
24 solve on the ground and which would be an issue that
25 should be dealt with at the level of capitals and for
1 capitals to decide whether or not to approach President
2 Tudjman or others in order to stop such assistance.
3 Now, we didn't have to provide specific information on
4 where and when we decided particular pieces of
5 equipment or troops, but our assessment was, and it
6 still stands, that there was HV involvement in
8 Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that document,
9 and the last document that I have for you is Exhibit
10 Z1050, which is a document dated June the 13th, 1993,
11 and about which you testified, sir.
12 This is right at the end of your tour, and as
13 you've stated in your direct examination, part of the
14 mission of the monitors on the ground was to look for
15 proof of HV involvement specifically. In Item 7, the
16 observation is made that regardless of the outcome of
17 the debate over HV presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
18 international perception is as you've or as this
19 document articulates. There is no question that there
20 was an active and ongoing debate about the nature,
21 existence, or magnitude of the involvement of HV troops
22 in south-western Herzegovina; isn't that correct?
23 A. It's true that we started to debate within
24 the ECMM the extent to which there was HV presence and
25 assistance. We did not discuss and we did not doubt
1 among ourselves that there was such an involvement.
2 Q. The debate, though, was still unanswered as
3 of this date, was it not, June the 13th, 1993?
4 A. No, it was not. The debate would have been
5 over, at the very latest, in preparing for the
6 Medjugorje meeting. At the Medjugorje meeting, the
7 presidency explained to President Tudjman that the time
8 had come to stop HV involvement. These statements were
9 on the basis of several reports, of course, to the
10 presidents in Copenhagen and to capitals, but one of
11 the sources would, of course, be the ECMM, and at that
12 point in time there was no doubt about Croatia's
14 Q. Let me just ask you one question in that
15 regard, sir. With regard to paragraph 5 of this
16 document, apparently there had been a discussion
17 between the headquarters of the ECMM and Major General
18 Slobodan Praljak from the Croatian Ministry of Defence,
19 and it was reported by Major General Praljak that
20 while -- he denied that there was any direct
21 involvement by HV combat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
22 didn't he?
23 A. According to the report, yes.
24 Q. And reported to you that people in HV
25 uniforms may have been spotted but those were the
1 individuals who were chosen to join the HVO for
2 personal reasons; correct?
3 A. It is correct that that is in the report. It
4 was not our assessment that it was a true
5 representation of the facts.
6 Q. My final question, meeting the 10-minute
7 deadline: Do you know whether the ECMM ever prepared
8 any written analysis containing the conclusions that
9 you've just reached, that the reports of involvement of
10 Croatians on behalf of the Croat forces in south-west
11 Herzegovina, for personal reasons, was, in fact, not
13 A. I have no specific recollection of any
14 document over and above the documents that have been
15 brought into the court as evidence here, but still, it
16 was the general assessment of the ECMM headquarters, as
17 well as the monitors on the ground, that there was such
19 Now, sometimes you come to a point where you
20 do not dispute the facts and you do not dispute the
21 assessments. So over and above the documents you've
22 seen here, there was no need perceived to prepare any
23 specific analysis of the subject. We took it for
24 granted. And the behaviour and the reactions of the
25 various individuals was, in a way, to confirm our
1 assessment. The document you pointed out here seems to
2 confirm it, and the reaction of the Croatian government
3 seems to confirm it. There was no dispute of the fact,
4 there was no Member Government which responded to
5 Copenhagen that ECMM was out of line, which would have
6 been the case if we had made an erroneous assessment of
7 such an important issue.
8 Q. So as far as you're aware, the three
9 documents which we've just looked at basically set out
10 and summarise the sum total of information available on
11 that subject, HV involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
12 south-west Herzegovina specifically, available to the
13 ECMM after the conclusion of your six-month tour in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?
15 A. No, it does not. These documents are the
16 documents which have been brought before the Court.
17 There may be other documents in the files of the ECMM.
18 There may be other documents in the files of the Member
19 Governments. These documents are there. There may be
20 other information. You cannot conclude from my
21 statement that this is all the ECMM knew about
22 the HV involvement.
23 Q. If such documents exist, however, you
24 certainly weren't shown them in preparation for your
25 testimony yesterday and today, were you, sir?
1 A. No. I was shown the documents which are in
2 the folder here and which have been referenced to the
4 Q. Thank you very much indeed, sir. I
5 appreciate your testimony.
6 MR. SAYERS: Thank you very much,
7 Mr. President. No further questions.
8 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic:
9 Q. Good morning, Mr. Brix Andersen. I am Goran
10 Mikulicic. I'm a lawyer from Zagreb, and with my
11 colleague Mr. Kovacic, I represent the second accused
12 in this case, Mario Cerkez.
13 Mr. Brix Andersen, the ECMM headquarters in
14 Zagreb where you discharged your functions was, if I
15 may put it that way, a multi-national, multi-ethnic
16 organisation, wasn't it?
17 A. Yes, it was.
18 Q. So there are people who came from different
19 countries, members of the European Union. Would it be
20 then correct to say that members from different
21 countries, members of the European Union, also brought
22 with them different views about the situation in the
23 then Yugoslavia, which would correspond, which would be
24 in agreement with the official positions of the
25 countries they came from?
1 A. That would not be correct to say. If you
2 came there --
3 Q. Yes, sorry.
4 A. The people were assigned by their
5 governments. They came to the ECMM with their own
6 background and experience. We were under the command
7 and control, whichever word you prefer, of the ECMM
8 headquarters. They were briefed on the situation by
9 the ECMM over and above whatever national briefings
10 they may have received. They were not there to
11 represent national political points of view. Some of
12 them, from countries which had had close relations to
13 one or the other of the parties, would have the
14 advantage of perhaps understanding better the
15 situation. Some of them even spoke the language, which
16 of course was an advantage. But, no, they were there
17 as monitors. They were under our control. They did
18 not represent the Member Nations.
19 That level of control was exercised through
20 the presidency which rotated with the European
21 presidency. So whatever political input had to come
22 from capitals would come via the presidency.
23 Q. Yes, I quite understand that,
24 Mr. Brix Andersen, but as you say yourself, there were
25 different people with different backgrounds coming from
1 different cultural environments and different levels of
2 education too. So would it be fair to conclude that
3 when on the ground those people, of course, acquired
4 and developed their own views, of course within the
5 broad context of the monitoring mission?
6 A. I don't want to be splitting hairs with you,
7 but it's very much a question of your definition. No,
8 they did not have their own personal views. They had
9 the views of the mission. They had -- you have to
10 remember also that the teams always operated with at
11 least two people. There were always two monitors on a
12 team, plus a driver, plus an interpreter, but there
13 were always two monitors. They would very seldomly be
14 from the same country. They would prepare their
15 reports together. So for one monitor to influence a
16 report in a direction which was not based on the facts
17 of the points of view expressed to them during
18 conversations would be very, very difficult. So we
19 made a special point of trying to ensure that all the
20 monitors were impartial, and we didn't have any
21 incidents of the kind you were referring to, where
22 reports were obviously influenced by personal belief or
23 national instructions.
24 Q. I understand that. Would this same
25 conclusion could be applied vice versa too; that is, I
1 mean, the briefings of the new monitors who would
2 arrive in Zagreb and take over the functions. So that
3 is, were the briefings on the ground just as well
4 balanced when this comes to the ECMM?
5 A. The ECMM was set up very much like a military
6 organisation, which it was not, but about 75, 80 per
7 cent of the monitors were military men or women. And
8 when things are done the military way, it is done very
9 meticulously and it is down according to format. So
10 there would be very little chance of any briefer to
11 express and to impress on the monitors he was briefing
12 his own personal points of view. It would be done on
13 the basis of standard material with very little
14 diversions from time to time.
15 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation]
16 Mr. Mikulicic, I should like to ask Mr. Andersen if
17 when those monitors were briefed that what has already
18 become international, but were those also asked to
19 distinguish between the facts they reported and the
20 opinions that they may have held or come to on the
21 basis of what they had seen? Was a distinction made
22 between the facts and their personal opinions?
23 A. Yes, Your Honour. We made a point of
24 distinguishing between facts and assessment. Now, when
25 you read the various reports, especially the kind of
1 reports which are termed "political excerpts," you will
2 see that that dividing line is not always easy to
4 One reason is the difference in background.
5 Some of the monitors were fairly young officers or
6 reserve officers; some were fairly senior, be from the
7 level of 1st Lieutenant to Colonel, on the monitor
8 side; and they were military men. The diplomats or
9 civilians who were there would rank from a young first
10 secretary to an Ambassador. So there was a huge
11 difference in background of the people.
12 There was also a difference in command of
13 English, English being the language of the mission. It
14 is fairly obvious from the reports which have been
15 brought into evidence in the court.
16 So, yes, it was the opinion of the mission
17 that there should be made a distinction between facts
18 and assessment. In practice it was sometimes difficult
19 to uphold that distinction for the reasons I mentioned,
20 coupled in some cases also with pure fatigue, because
21 many of these people were working very, very long hours
22 under difficult circumstances.
23 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] And to
24 complete my question -- Mr. Mikulicic, I do apologise
25 to you -- a certain level of this European mission were
1 there to established facts, to find the facts. You
2 received the information, but before you make your
3 report do you try to go through all the information
4 and, therefore, gather it, infiltrate in order to
5 produce a report on facts?
6 A. Your Honour, we have different reports before
7 us. The mundane reporting system was based on the fact
8 that every team reported at the end of every day what
9 they had done for the whole of the day. That would
10 include political talks, whatever military
11 establishments they had visited, monitoring of weapons
12 in storage in some cases, monitoring of ceasefire
13 lines, simple questions as to their logistics, et
15 These reports would be sent to the
16 coordination centre, which would compile a combined
17 report based on the various team reports. That again
18 would be sent to the RC, which would again condense the
19 report before sending it off to Zagreb.
20 Now in Zagreb, the chief of operations and
21 his people in the operations centre would compile a
22 draft daily report which would be sent over to
23 Copenhagen after it had been reviewed by the political
24 advisor, by the chief of staff, by myself, and
25 ultimately shown to the head of the mission before we
1 sent it to Copenhagen.
2 In Copenhagen it would again be looked over
3 by a desk officer and then disseminated to the capitals
4 of the European Union and with copies made to the
5 co-chairmen, Vance and Owen.
6 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 Thank you very much.
8 MR. MIKULICIC:
9 Q. So these reports that you are referring to,
10 what kind of reports were they? Were they internal
11 reports or were they public reports; that is, reports
12 that could perhaps be published and given to the
14 A. The reports that were made were internal in
15 the sense that they would, probably all of them, be
16 marked ECMM restricted. That means that they were not
17 for publication. They were meant for the next higher
18 level in command, and they were ultimately to be
19 distributed to the member states of the European
20 Union. Only if they were marked "press communiqué", or
21 whatever, would they be made available to the public,
22 not the regular reporting.
23 Q. So if I understand it, the reports which were
24 shown to be ECMM restricted, they were meant for
25 restrictive use only. Who would be the individual who
1 would authorise giving such reports to anyone outside
2 the ECMM, who had such an authority?
3 A. It depends on who you would give the report
4 to. If you give it to the co-chairman, the liaison
5 officer, would, of course, be authorised to do so. If
6 it was to the U.N., UNPROFOR, yes, of course, the
7 liaison officers could do it. If we're talking about
8 the public, meaning the media, such decisions would
9 normally have to be taken by a person who was confident
10 that he could take that responsibility. What I'm
11 trying to say is that there were no written-down,
12 formal, legal, strict rules on the dissemination of
13 these reports. But again when they were marked
14 restricted, they were not intended to be made public,
15 but they could be distributed to friendly agencies and
17 Q. Thank you. Let us move on to another topic,
18 Mr. Brix Andersen.
19 We shall be helped, I believe, by a map, and
20 I should like to ask the usher to help me to distribute
21 it and show it to you. It is about the position of the
22 Croat national minority in the territory of
24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Mikulicic, what is the map
25 that you're showing the witness, and where is it from,
2 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] This map is
3 showing the ethnic composition of the municipalities in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the 1991 census, and the
5 map was used as a Prosecution exhibit in the Aleksovski
6 case, produced through the expert witness Professor
8 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Anderson, we spoke about the Croat
11 community or Croats, if you will, in the territory of
12 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this map, the
13 Croats are in red. However, if you look at this map,
14 then you will see that in three -- that Croats in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina are grouped in three areas; in the
16 north in the municipalities of Bosanski Brod and
17 others; then in Central Bosnia there is municipalities
18 of Vitez, Busovaca, and so forth; and in south-west
19 Bosnia, that is the municipalities bordering on
20 south-east Croatia.
21 Now, my question is, and I'm referring to the
22 ECMM mission, in your view was the ECMM aware of the
23 difference between individual -- were you aware of the
24 fact that various Croat communities in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not always share the interests,
1 bearing in mind their geographical location and the
2 surroundings and environment in which they lived?
3 A. Can you rephrase that question for my better
5 Q. Yes. I do apologise for not being clear
7 So Mr. Andersen, my question is the
8 following: Did the ECMM see the Croat community in the
9 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral and
10 uniform community, in view of the geographic location,
11 but did it also perceive that there were differences
12 between individual Croat communities, in view of their
13 geographical location?
14 A. Yes. We were aware of the 1991 census. We
15 knew of these figures. We knew the approximate
16 distribution of the various ethnic groups in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also knew, as is clear from
18 this point of the report in evidence here, that the
19 wishes and aspirations and interests of the Croats in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina were not always the very same,
21 depending on where in Bosnia they were located. That
22 is true. You will see one of the reports referring to
23 some of the Croat communities to the east and to the
24 north of the provinces or the districts you have marked
25 in red here. So, yes, we tried our very best to
1 understand the composition of the population in the
2 various parts of the territory.
3 Does that answer your question?
4 Q. It does, yes. Thank you. Perhaps just
5 another question.
6 Will you please look at the north-west part
7 of this map marked green, which shows the predominance
8 of predominantly Muslim municipalities of Velika
9 Kladusa, and others. Are you familiar with the name of
10 Fikret Abdic and his political standing, his political
12 A. I know the name of Mr. Abdic, yes.
13 Q. Do you know that Mr. Abdic is a Muslim by
15 A. That is my understanding, yes.
16 Q. Do you know that at some point during the war
17 which was raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Abdic, as
18 the political leader of the area that we referred to,
19 which is usually called Cazin's Krajina, that he
20 proclaimed an independent province there, that is,
21 independent of the central government in Sarajevo?
22 A. Yes, we knew that.
23 Q. And do you know that as a result, a conflict
24 broke out between Muslim forces loyal to Fikret Abdic
25 and the Muslim forces loyal to the central government
1 and the BH army?
2 A. In general, yes. I don't think I would be
3 able to give you the precise details of the fighting
4 and the times, but yes.
5 Q. Very well. So I won't insist on this
6 particular topic anymore, but I should like to ask
7 could we get the number for this exhibit, please?
8 THE REGISTRAR: This document will be
9 numbered D49/2.
10 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 Q. Let us move on to another subject,
12 Mr. Andersen, and that is the relations between the
13 Republic of Croatia and the Republic of
15 I assume, and you yourself said, that before
16 you assumed this responsible role, that you, of course,
17 took pains to gather some information about the
18 situation in that part of the world. That is so, isn't
20 A. That's true.
21 Q. In this regard, I should like to ask you to
22 look at a document which has already been tendered here
23 as an exhibit, and I also have copies for you and for
24 the ELMO so we could follow it easier. This is
25 Document D98/1.
1 So this is an agreement on friendship and
2 cooperation between the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina
3 and the Republic of Croatia, and I should like to draw
4 your attention, Mr. Andersen, that evidently there has
5 been an error in this document which was that it was
6 referring to the 21st of July, '91, and it was '92 in
7 fact, because in '91 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 did not exist yet.
9 So Mr. Andersen, you must be aware that on
10 the 6th of April, '92, the Republic of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence, its
12 sovereignty. Do you know that in the wake of that,
13 that is, the very next day, the 7th of April, it was
14 the first one to recognise the sovereignty of
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Are you aware that the Republic of Croatia
18 was the first country member of the world community
19 which sent its ambassador to the Republic of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the war was going on in the
21 occupied Sarajevo?
22 A. I couldn't say that I knew for certain that
23 it was the first, but I knew that it was one of the
25 Q. Will you now please look at Item 3 on page 2
1 of the document? It says here that the Republic of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina expresses its gratitude to the
3 Republic of Croatia for having received and provided
4 for refugees. The ECMM, and you personally, were aware
5 of the fact that the Republic of Croatia, as the war
6 raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as during the war
7 that raged in the Republic of Croatia, offered refuge
8 to some 250.000 Muslim refugees who had escaped to the
9 territory of the Republic of Croatia?
10 A. In general, yes. I'm not quite so certain
11 about the figure, but the order of magnitude seems to
12 be about right.
13 Q. Will you please look at Item 6 on the same
14 document. The ECMM, and you personally, were you aware
15 of the fact that in keeping with this agreement, the
16 HVO became an integral part of the armed forces of the
17 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. That is what the document says, yes.
19 Q. Will you please now look at Item 7. Did you
20 know that under this agreement, the Republic of Bosnia
21 and the Republic of Croatia assumed a mutual or
22 reciprocal obligation to grant dual nationality to
23 their citizens?
24 A. In general, yes, and I seem to remember that
25 the implementation of it was complicated. But in
1 general, yes.
2 Q. And could you please look at page 3 of this
3 document now. I would like to draw your attention to
4 the end of the third section, where it says that the
5 states would continue their cooperation in the
6 military sphere and would coordinate military
7 operations. Were you aware of this agreement?
8 A. I don't have a memory of it which is
9 sufficiently clear to say "yes", but in general, that
10 was the impression that we had, yes.
11 Q. Very well. So we don't need this document
13 You said, during your examination-in-chief,
14 Mr. Andersen, that you got some basic impressions.
15 After all, you stayed in Zagreb, the capital of
16 Croatia, so I have a question in relation to that.
17 You personally and the ECMM mission, were you
18 aware of the fact that the Republic of Croatia had
19 passed certain laws whereby the citizens of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina would be expelled from its territory? I'm
21 referring to persons of Muslim ethnicity and I'm
22 referring to the period when you were there. Were
23 there any laws that would block their bank accounts,
24 freeze their assets, or something to that effect?
25 A. I have no recollection of having seen any
1 such law or decree, no.
2 Q. The International Community, and, of course,
3 through the activity of the ECMM, decided, as you told
4 us, to exert some pressure on the Republic of Croatia
5 through its president, Dr. Tudjman, that he use his
6 influence and try to put a stop to the fighting between
7 the Muslim and Croat communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
8 is that correct?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. My question would be the following: Was
11 there indeed an attempt made by the Republic of
12 Croatia, through its president, to influence both
13 communities, naturally the Croat community more, but
14 both communities in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
15 and there are numerous examples that would point that
16 out, not to go into all of them now?
17 A. Yes. In the pile of documents brought into
18 evidence, there are communiqués and reports on
19 President Tudjman visiting and talking to Bosnian Croat
20 leaders and to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. Mr. Andersen, could you please have a look at
22 a document that you already saw during your
23 examination-in-chief? I'm talking about document Z910,
24 910/1. I have a copy here so you don't have to look
25 through all your documents.
1 MR. MIKULICIC: Could the usher please assist
2 me and have this placed on the ELMO and have it
3 distributed as well, please.
4 Q. Could you please have a look at page 3 of
5 this document. So, Mr. Andersen, you said during your
6 testimony that on the 24th of April, 1993, a meeting
7 was organised in Zagreb under the patronage of
8 Lord Owen, so to speak. The meeting was attended by
9 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic as the representative of the
10 Muslim community and Mr. Boban as the representative of
11 the Croat community from Bosnia-Herzegovina. President
12 Tudjman had, in a way, given the initiative for calling
13 this meeting.
14 Do you have any information about this?
15 A. I have the information in the documents that
16 you have put before me, yes.
17 Q. Could you please have a look at another
18 document which was already tendered in this case. This
19 is D33/2.
20 You see an appeal that was addressed by
21 President Tudjman to the Muslim and Croat leaders in
22 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, calling upon them
23 to stop fighting. He also invited them to Zagreb on
24 the 24th of April, 1993, to attend a meeting with
25 Lord Owen. You can see the last line of this
2 Is that the meeting that we talked about?
3 A. I believe it is, yes.
4 Q. Thank you. So let us go back to that meeting
5 and to its aftermath. There was a press release
6 through HINA, the Croat news agency, and it was said
7 that attempts were made to stop the fighting. Is it
8 true that the Croatian parliament established a
9 multi-party delegation with a view to its going to the
10 critical areas in order to bring about a ceasefire?
11 A. I remember that there was a delegation
12 formed. I have no clear recollection of whom they met
13 and what the results were, but I remember that the
14 delegation was discussed and I believe it was formed.
15 Q. Would it jog your memory if I said that in
16 Bosnia, unfortunately, it was not possible for this
17 delegation to visit these critical areas?
18 A. I believe that is the term in one of the ECMM
19 reports, yes.
20 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Andersen, that President
21 Tudjman, during his visit to Turkey, which is also a
22 predominantly Muslim republic in terms of the ethnic
23 background of the population and religious, that an
24 agreement was reached to set up a governmental
25 commission between Croatia and Turkey that would be
1 sent to Bosnia as a goodwill mission?
2 A. Yes, I remember that.
3 Q. Are you aware of the fact that
4 President Tudjman also talked to the highest
5 representative of the Islamic community in Croatia and
6 Slovenia and asked him to influence his Muslim
7 believers to the effect of having the fighting stopped
8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. The way you're asking the questions, it calls
10 for a more or less yes or no. Yes, I was aware of it,
11 but if you'll allow me the further comment that I've
12 already made before, that in many cases in the former
13 Yugoslavia, people had more than one agenda. I think
14 that is also a remark to cover the activities of
15 President Tudjman. He's on record, as you have stated
16 here, of appealing to the various parties. He's on
17 record of having met with the Turkish representatives
18 and Muslim representatives in Croatia and Slovenia.
19 That, I think, is one of the agendas, to be seen to
20 exert influence. It was our assessment that in order
21 for this agenda to be the prevailing one, there was
22 still a need for some prodding.
23 Q. If I understood your answer correctly,
24 Mr. Andersen, in spite of these efforts the conflicts
25 did not stop in the area, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is
1 that right, at least at that time?
2 A. The conflict did not stop at that time. It
3 went up and down but it didn't stop.
4 Q. I know, Mr. Andersen, that you left your post
5 sometime in July 1993. However, I'm going to ask you
6 something about the following: Do you know something
7 about the agreement from the 30th of July, 1993,
8 between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of
9 Bosnia, so to speak, and this agreement resulted in a
10 joint declaration between Presidents Tudjman and
11 Izetbegovic in Geneva in September 1993? Do you know
12 about this joint declaration?
13 A. I know of it. I have no precise information
14 on what went on there -- I had left the mission and I
15 was preparing for another assignment -- but in general,
17 Q. Mr. Andersen, could you please have a look at
18 the text of this joint declaration and tell me whether
19 that is the document that we've just been discussing?
20 MR. MIKULICIC: I would like to have it
21 admitted into evidence, please.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Document is numbered D50/2.
23 MR. MIKULICIC:
24 Q. Of course, Mr. Andersen, I'm not going to ask
25 you about the document itself because it's
1 self-explanatory; however, I would like to hear your
2 comment. Is that the meeting we discussed which was a
3 consequence of the Geneva agreements between
4 Izetbegovic and Tudjman?
5 A. That is what I believe, but as we have talked
6 about, I wasn't there at the time. I was preparing for
7 another assignment, so I didn't follow events closely
8 enough to have any specific opinion on this document.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Andersen, for having been
10 patient with me.
11 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honours. I
12 have no further questions of this witness.
13 MR. SCOTT: If the usher could leave the last
14 document, perhaps we should start with that.
15 Re-examined by Mr. Scott:
16 Q. The document which is Exhibit D50/2, looking
17 at this document, sir, this appears to be essentially
18 what might be considered a peace agreement or ceasefire
19 involving Bosnia in terms of the conflict between the
20 Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. Does that
21 appear to be the case from looking at the document?
22 A. Yes, it would, but I mean, there are no
23 signatures, there are markings, et cetera. So whether
24 this was the actual final document is difficult to
25 say. It could be a draft. It could have been signed.
1 I think it was signed, but I mean ...
2 Q. Assuming for the moment -- putting aside the
3 ultimate authenticity of the document and whether this
4 was ever signed or not, which we can perhaps suspend
5 for the moment, this, though, was an agreement to
6 resolve a conflict that at least by some accounts was,
7 some would suggest, and certainly Croatia had
8 suggested, was purely internal to Bosnia-Herzegovina;
9 is that correct?
10 A. Yes, signed by President Tudjman.
11 Q. Yes, and that was my question. But to
12 resolve an agreement, by his account wholly internal to
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the two parties signing it was
14 the president of that country and, in fact,
15 Mr. Tudjman, the president of the wholly third country
16 or foreign country; is that correct?
17 A. That's correct. And that is consistent with
18 what the ECMM held for true, that the Republic of
19 Croatia was an important factor in the events of
21 Q. You've said a few moments ago that
22 Mr. Tudjman's visits to various places such as Turkey
23 and other public appearances for the purposes of being
24 seen to support a peace effort concerning Bosnia was
25 considered by ECMM to be one of his agendas. Can you
1 tell the Court what might have been his other agenda?
2 A. I'm perhaps overlooking a few, but the one
3 certain agenda could be for Croatia to be seen as a
4 country with close ties to the West and which would
5 ultimately become members of the Western organisations
6 and interlinked in the Western economic system. I
7 think that was one of the paramount interests of
8 President Tudjman and Croatia, and that was one of the
9 reasons why they seceded from the former Yugoslavia.
10 They didn't want to be part of that economic and
11 political system. They wanted, together with Slovenia,
12 to join the north-western part of Europe.
13 Q. Did you at ECMM sense any conflict between
14 the agenda on the one hand to be seen as, if I can say
15 it this way, a respectable member of the Western
16 European community and on the other hand the desires of
17 the Bosnian Croat leadership to be part of or
18 confederated with Croatia?
19 A. I think it calls more for speculation than
20 for a statement of fact, but there's very little
21 question that Croatia wanted both to the extent
22 possible --
23 Q. Very well.
24 A. -- in case of conflict between the aims. I
25 would tend to believe, but others would perhaps defer,
1 but I would tend to believe that Croatia's linkage with
2 the respectable West would have overriding importance
3 to the government and to Dr. Tudjman.
4 Q. Very well. And staying on President Tudjman
5 for a moment, there was an earlier document, perhaps we
6 can just refer to it without taking the time to pull it
7 out again, Defence Exhibit 27/1, which was the
8 agreement signed between, I think again,
9 Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban in Zagreb around the
10 23rd of April, 1993, in which Tudjman also signed it.
11 Well, I think I'm going to have to correct
12 myself. Forgive me. It's probably going to be
13 necessary to look at the document. Defence 27/1.
14 Perhaps we could just look at the third page,
15 signature page, first on the ELMO, if that's possible.
16 Mr. Brix Andersen, if you could let the usher
17 see that momentarily to put it on the ELMO. Thank
19 On the third page, just confirming that it
20 was, in fact, signed by Mr. Boban, President
21 Izetbegovic, and President Tudjman. If could I then
22 direct your attention to paragraph 5, starting on
23 page 2 --
24 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, just for the
25 accuracy of the record -- obviously the document speaks
1 for itself -- but I think that to be fair, the question
2 should reflect that Dr. Tudjman witnessed that
3 agreement. He did sign but only as a witness, not as
4 one of the contracting parties.
5 MR. SCOTT: No position to the contrary, Your
7 Q. If you look at paragraph 5, the document
8 states: "The signatories of the joint statement
9 condemn most severely all violations of the rules of
10 International Humanitarian Law regardless of their
11 perpetrators, both sides having been responsible,
12 according to data available so far, and undertake to
13 urgently initiate joint and individual inquest
14 concerning each instance of violation of such rights
15 and immediately examine personal responsibility for the
16 conflicts and crimes perpetrated against the civilian
18 Now, sir, would you agree with me that in the
19 wake of the events around Ahmici and the Lasva Valley
20 in April of 1993, there was considerable international
21 pressure, partly reflected back by this document,
22 considerable international tension brought to bear on
23 these atrocities?
24 A. There was a great deal of attention, yes. We
25 wanted that attention also. That was why we sent the
1 three Ambassadors to Ahmici.
2 Q. Can you tell the Court whether or not as part
3 of this international essentially world class interest,
4 was part of that focus brought on President Tudjman and
5 his government, to try again to use the influence to
6 get some answer to the causes and perpetrators of these
8 A. It was the constant aim of the co-chairman
9 and whoever met with President Tudjman and others to
10 see to it that the atrocities were limited in number
11 and scope and that the people who had committed them,
12 they were brought to trial.
13 Q. To your knowledge, sir, by the time you left
14 the ECMM at the beginning of July, 1993, had any public
15 report or criminal charges been brought or military
16 discipline been exercised, to your knowledge, over any
17 party involved or allegedly involved in carrying out
18 the atrocities in the Lasva Valley?
19 A. Not to my knowledge, no.
20 Q. Concerning the questions about the views of
21 individual monitors, can you tell the Court: Did you
22 ever find Ambassador Thebault to be biased or
23 prejudiced for or against any particular of the parties
24 involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
25 A. I most certainly did not. He was a very
1 competent, very professional French diplomat.
2 Q. Concerning -- there was a series of questions
3 concerning Mr. Kordic's role or position. Do you
4 recall receiving any reports from the field, either
5 from ECMM or UNPROFOR or otherwise, indicating that in
6 any meetings or communications with Mr. Kordic that he
7 expressed a disagreement or rejection of the view that
8 he was, in fact, a powerful and central figure among
9 the Bosnian Croat leadership?
10 MR. SAYERS: Objection, to the extent that
11 that calls for speculation, Your Honour. That would
12 assume that Mr. Kordic would be aware of the reports
13 that were being made about him by the ECMM, and this
14 witness has stated that those were entirely internal
16 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, if I could --
17 JUDGE MAY: The question is allowable. It's
18 an open-ended question and the witness can give a
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. Did you get my question or would you prefer I
22 repeat it, sir?
23 A. I think I would prefer to know exactly what
24 I'm responding to.
25 Q. Yes, absolutely. Let me just simply read it
1 back to you. I'm not sure I can improve on it. Do you
2 recall receiving any reports from the field, either
3 from ECMM or UNPROFOR, otherwise indicating that at any
4 meetings or communications with Mr. Kordic, that he
5 expressed a disagreement or rejection of the view that
6 he was, in fact, a powerful and central figure amongst
7 the Bosnian and Herzegovinian -- actually, if I could
8 correct that to say the Bosnian Croat [realtime
9 transcript read in error "Bosnian and Croatian"]
11 A. I never saw such reports.
12 Q. Did you have any information that both
13 Mr. Kordic's colleagues, if I can use that term, his
14 fellow members of such things as the HDZ, the HVO, and
15 members of the international organisations in Central
16 Bosnia frequently referred to him as "Colonel Kordic"?
17 JUDGE MAY: That's a leading question.
18 MR. SCOTT: Well, all right, Your Honour.
19 I'm sorry to belabour this, but I think it's
20 important for the transcript. My last question, line
21 14 of the screen, should be "the Bosnian Croat
23 Your Honour, if you could give me just one
24 moment, please. Your Honour, I think in the interests
25 of time, and I know the Court does not want us
1 presumably to stand here and read lengthy passages from
2 the documents in evidence, perhaps I can indicate to
3 the Court this: There was a considerable line of
4 questions about the question whether, in fact,
5 Herceg-Bosna was not intended by the Bosnian Croat
6 leadership as a temporary authority ultimately loyal to
7 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are a
8 series of documents that are already in evidence, and
9 if time allowed and if the Court was so inclined, I
10 could take the witness through them. But I would point
11 the Court to Exhibits Z859,1, Z1013, and Z993, in
12 particular, which I can simply represent to the Court,
13 and I'm happy to go there if the Court wishes me to,
14 deals with this issue at length in which the ECMM's
15 position is that that characterisation of Herceg-Bosna
16 is not accurate.
17 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
18 MR. SCOTT: If I could just maybe close on
19 this point, Your Honour, and then I have only one other
20 point to make.
21 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, if I can direct your
22 attention to Exhibit 1065, your, as you've called it
23 several times, your valedictory report, do you have
24 that still? Perhaps if you could keep your finger on
25 that for one moment, 1065, and then could you also find
1 and have in front of you Exhibit 1061. It's actually
2 just the document immediately before it, I believe.
3 Sorry if that's unwieldy, but if you would look first
4 at Exhibit 1061, to the fourth page where you testified
5 yesterday about the four aims of the HVO. Do you have
6 that in front of you?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. By the time that your tenure ended in early
9 July of 1993, did you and ECMM see that the HVO views
10 or aims had changed in any significant respect from
11 those four aims or did they continue to be the same?
12 A. It's my belief and my understanding of it
13 that they were still the aims.
14 Q. And, in fact, if you will look then at 1065
15 very briefly, Your Honours, to page 2, carrying over to
16 the top of page 3, do you not at those locations in
17 many respects reaffirm and restate those same aims?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. In terms of the friendship or cooperation
20 agreement that Mr. Cerkez's counsel showed you, in
21 terms of military cooperation, let me -- if we can
22 hopefully do it shortly this way: Was it ECMM's
23 assessment, again at least continuing up until the time
24 that you left that organisation, that the State of
25 Croatia and its armed forces were not involved in
1 Bosnia, only in connection with fighting against what
2 might be called the Serb forces, but that the State of
3 Croatia and its armed forces were also involved in
4 supporting and involved in the armed conflict between
5 the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims?
6 MR. SAYERS: Objection to the leading nature
7 of that question, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE MAY: No, this is an International
9 Tribunal. We are not in some national jurisdiction
10 where we have to have these constant interruptions.
11 But it doesn't help, equally, if leading questions are
12 asked. Counsel should be experienced enough not to do
14 Now, is that concluding the witness's
16 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, and I can ask
17 that several different ways but I'm trying to be
18 sensitive to the time factor. I would be happy to take
19 the Court's guidance either way.
20 JUDGE MAY: I think we've had this question
21 answered several times. We don't need to hear it
23 Mr. Brix Andersen, thank you for your
24 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International
25 Tribunal to give it. Your evidence is now concluded,
1 and you're free to go.
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 [The witness withdrew]
4 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, I've just got this
5 manila bundle. I wondered whether it's going to be of
6 use when the witness gives evidence next week or
7 whether it's intended to produce yet another bundle.
8 MR. NICE: I think we're undecided on that
9 yet, and we probably won't be able to decide until the
10 end of Monday. But can we keep it in mind, and if we
11 keep that manila bundle to hand, we'll try and remember
12 either to say, "That's the bundle to use," or, "There's
13 a substitute bundle."
14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. And if we can use the
15 same one, so much the better.
16 MR. NICE: I absolutely agree. I think it
17 would be sensible to use the same bundle.
18 Your Honour, it's 10 to 1.00. The next
19 witness is the subject of an application in respect of
20 protection, so at some stage we perhaps should go into
21 private session. I have doubts -- I'm going too fast.
22 I have doubts about the wisdom of starting this
23 witness. Perhaps we can go into private session and
24 I'll explain why.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We won't start the witness,
1 in any event.
2 MR. NICE: Very well. If we can go into
3 private session, I can deal with the application and a
4 couple of administrative matters as well.
5 [Private session]
13 pages 10877-10881 redacted – private session
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
17 1.00 p.m., to be reconvened on
18 Thursday, the 2nd day of December, 1999,
19 at 9.30 a.m.