1 Friday, 20 February 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.19 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus
7 Momcilo Krajisnik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 Good afternoon to everyone this last day of the week. Mr. Tieger,
10 is the Prosecution ready to continue its examination of Mr. Treanor?
11 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then may Mr. Treanor be escorted into the courtroom.
13 [The witness entered court]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Treanor.
15 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Although it goes almost without saying that you're
17 still bound by the solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your
18 testimony, I nevertheless remind you to that.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I understand that.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR [Resumed]
24 Examined by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
25 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Treanor.
1 A. Good afternoon.
2 Q. I believe we concluded yesterday with your explanation of the
3 backdrop to the founding of the SDS in 1990. May we turn then to the
4 speech by Radovan Karadzic at the founding assembly, which will be shown
5 on the screen in Sanction and can also be found in binder 1 at tab 1.
6 Mr. Treanor, I note that portions of the speech have been
7 highlighted. I presume those are the portions to which you wish to draw
8 our attention. May I ask you then to discuss the aspects of that speech
9 that you want to identify for the Court.
10 A. Yes. This is a copy of Radovan Karadzic's opening statement at
11 the founding assembly of the Serbian Democratic Party. In the speech he
12 goes over the reasons for the founding of the party and its aims. We can
13 pick out a few highlights here to give the Court an idea of his approach
14 on this occasion.
15 In the first paragraph, you can see that he says, among other
16 things, he refers to the illusions which had been created, one of which
17 was that the Serbian nation is small, weak, and insignificant. This
18 deferred our friends and encouraged our enemies to begin finishing off the
19 fragmented and dismembered Serbian nation. And further he says the
20 dismembered -- that dismembered and divided during the war we continued
21 divided in peacetime. We continue the genocide our enemies had carried
22 out against us by destroying our own national and cultural identity.
23 This is the sense of grievance that inspired the founding of the
25 Further on in that page, I'd like to draw attention to another
1 passage, in which he says: "Several hundred thousands of Serbs left
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina in this period and Bosnia and Herzegovina was left
3 without posterity. Territorial organisation broke down the natural
4 Serbian entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian nation was
5 reduced to an inferior economic, demographic, and political position."
6 Here he brings up two concerns which we'll be seeing coming to the
7 fore time and again, that is, the demographic situation of the Serbian
8 people in BH and the issue of the territorial division of BH.
9 Dr. Karadzic and other people in the SDS felt that the territorial
10 organisation of the republic, which was based on dividing the territory of
11 the republic into administrative units known as municipalities, had been
12 deliberately gerrymandered against the Serbs in order to prevent them from
13 being a majority in many municipalities that -- in areas that they
14 otherwise would have dominated.
15 I think maybe we have one more passage here in the third page of
16 the original --
17 MR. TIEGER: [Microphone not activated]...page 2 in the English
19 A. He, in this portion of the speech, is turning to the aims of the
20 party. "The basic objective of the party is full and unconditional civil,
21 national, cultural, religious and economic equality for the Serbs in
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina."
23 Two paragraphs below that you see another passage not highlighted
24 here, just the first sentence I'd like to read as one of the objectives of
25 the party: "Is a federative Yugoslavia and in it an equal federal Bosnia
1 and Herzegovina." This emerged as one of the most important points in the
2 party programme and proved to be the crux of many of their activities over
3 the coming months. I would remind the Court at this point that the SDA,
4 the Bosnian Muslim party, the Party of Democratic Action, in its
5 programme, recently adopted had favoured the continuance of Yugoslavia as
6 a free community of republics within the boundaries that had been
7 established within Yugoslavia and against any partition of Bosnia and
9 The HDZ, on the other hand, the Croatian Democratic Community, in
10 its programmatic statement in August 1990 merely spoke of the right of the
11 Croatian people to self-determination up to and including the secession of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina. They didn't even mention Yugoslavia in their
13 document. So the HDZ was clearly not providing a ringing endorsement to
14 the continuation of Yugoslavia, whereas the SDA was willing to contemplate
15 the continuance of BH within Yugoslavia, something which the SDS is very
16 much coming out for here.
17 I think we're finished with that document and we can now turn to
18 the party programme as such, which embodies many of the points that were
19 made in the speech as points in the official programme of the party.
20 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, that document may be found in binder 1
21 at tab 2.
22 A. If we could below up the first highlighted -- first two
23 highlighted portions, maybe. Number 5: Equality as the basis of joint
24 life. Equality was a very important term for the leaders of the Serbian
25 Democratic Party. That means the equality of the Serbian people within BH
1 with the other peoples in BH. And 6, again we see the reference to
2 Yugoslavia, a democratic Yugoslavia, structured as a modern federal state.
3 Again, the word "federal" is a very important word for the Bosnian Serb
4 leadership. There were arrangements under discussion which would have
5 made Yugoslavia a confederal state rather than a federal. They were very
6 much in favour of the maintenance of a federal state.
7 The next highlighted portion, if we could blow that up. Again,
8 repeating Bosnia-Herzegovina as an equal republic in a modern federal
10 I think that's all we have on the programme. I think the main
11 points have been brought out.
12 Now I'd like to turn to the statute of the party.
13 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, the statute can be found at tab 4.
14 A. This is the statute adopted in July 1990. We'll just go over a
15 few general -- one or two general points here. I believe on page 3 of the
16 original, Article 9 is something I'd like to call attention to. This
17 refers to the -- as you can see, the rights and obligations of members of
18 the party, including: "To obey party regulations and support the
19 achievement of its goals and programme orientation and to implement and
20 respect decisions of party organs." So party discipline was something
21 that was required and expected.
22 Now we'll briefly address the central organs of the party that
23 were established by this statute. These are the party assembly, the party
24 president, the Main Board, and the executive committee. Those are the
25 ones we'll consider. The last two are less important. And at this point,
1 I'd like to call the Court's attention to the fact that this statute was
2 modified the following year, in July 1991, at the party's second assembly.
3 Therefore, we will now consider the duties and responsibilities of the
4 various party organs on the basis of that statute, since it was the
5 statute in effect for the most important part of the period that we're
6 concerned with in this presentation.
7 The document you see before you is labelled a proposal. We do not
8 possess a final copy of this document. However, it is apparent from the
9 stenographic records of the second assembly of the SDS, which we have
10 available, that this proposed statute was in fact adopted, with some very
11 minor modifications. So this is the document that we base our discussion
12 on. I would also observe that for the year intervening between the first
13 party assembly and the second party assembly, we do not have very many
14 documents from the SDS to indicate its internal operations. It is only
15 after the second assembly where the volume of party documentation becomes
16 significant. In fact, the second assembly in a certain sense marked an
17 organisational rebirth of the party. They elected a new Main Board and
18 Executive Board and started to get their own internal housekeeping, so to
19 speak, in order.
20 Many of the provisions in the two statutes are the same. I don't
21 think we have anything else -- yes, I think we do. On page 5 of the
22 original, Article 19. This addresses the issue of the hierarchical
23 structure of the party. It states that the organisational forms of the
24 SDS shall be an assembly and boards in local, municipal, city, and
25 republican organisations.
1 Now, those are the various levels of governance in the -- in BH,
2 local meaning the local communities, the municipalities that I referred
3 to, the cities, the city of Sarajevo, the only city in Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina in terms of administrative status, and of course the republic.
5 The difference here between this statute and the original statute was that
6 in 1990 there was reference to a regional -- regional boards of the party,
7 which were party regions. This statute eliminates those party -- regional
8 party boards. In fact, some of them continued to exist as -- Dr. Karadzic
9 referred to them as coordinating bodies. So much for the territorial
10 structure of the party.
11 I think we can turn to the Article 30.
12 Q. Mr. Treanor, does Article 30 address the rules and
13 responsibilities of the SDS?
14 A. Yes. We turn to the individual organs now. Article 30 deals with
15 the Assembly and defines the Assembly as the highest organ of the SDS, and
16 goes on to enumerate its responsibilities and the composition.
17 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, that can be found at page -- excuse me,
18 Mr. Treanor. That can be found at page 11, under tab 5.
19 A. Next we can go to Article 31. Article 31 contains a long list of
20 the particular duties and responsibilities of the Assembly, including
21 adopting and amending the programme, adopting Rules of Procedure, electing
22 the presidents of the SDS, electing the Main Board, et cetera.
23 Article 32 might be of some interest. Here we turn to the
24 president of the party. This article defines the president of the SDS as
25 the president of the Main Board as well, and stating the length of his
1 mandate for four years.
2 Then we have Article 32 and 33. Article 33 again contains another
3 long list of the particular duties of the president of the party,
4 including to represent the party, ensure the implementation of its
5 programme, to convene the Assembly, convene sessions of the Main Board,
6 coordinate the activities of organs and bodies of the party, take
7 political and other decisions on behalf of the SDS, unless they are within
8 the competence of the other organs, ensure the implementations of
9 decisions of the party, et cetera.
10 Now we turn to the Main Board. Article 35 defines the Main Board
11 as the highest organ of the party between sessions of the Assembly of the
12 party. Now, the Assembly of the party met once a year, so for the
13 intervening year, the Main Board, according to the statute, is the highest
14 organ of the party.
15 If we can blow up Article 36. Article 36 specifies that the Main
16 Board will have 45 members. This was a change from the 1990 statute,
17 which had specified 52 members. And indicates that the Main Board will be
18 elected by the Assembly from among its members, taking into account a
19 territorial representation. And then we have 30, Article 37, which again
20 is the long list of the particular duties of the Main Board, which include
21 electing the president and two thirds of the members of the Executive
22 Board of the party, preparing decisions to be adopted by the Assembly,
23 deciding on the territorial organisation of the party, implementing
24 decisions of the Assembly, considering and adopting reports of the
25 Executive Board, et cetera.
1 Now then we turn to the Executive Board, which is the last of the
2 central party organs that we will consider here. In Article 39 - it's on
3 page 11 of the statute - the Executive Board is described as having 15
4 members, some elected from the Main Board and some appointed on the basis
5 of a nomination by the president of the party, and the Main Board is to
6 have its own president.
7 Then we have Article 41. We skipped Article 41, which I think we
8 can conclude with this discussion, which again is the list of the
9 particular duties of the Executive Board. The Executive Board is more of
10 a managerial body rather than a policy making body which the Main Board
11 is, and its duties include preparing materials for the needs of the Main
12 Board, adopting its own Rules of Procedure, ensuring the implementation of
13 the decisions of the Main Board, adopting commissions and appointing
14 commissions and other working bodies, et cetera, including control of the
15 SDS, of SDS property.
16 Q. Mr. Treanor, before we leave those articles, can I ask you briefly
17 to turn to Article 49 and describe its relevance to the Chamber, please.
18 A. Yes. Article 49, as the Court can see, refers to the
19 establishment of councils as advisory bodies of the SDS. These are not
20 party organs per se. They are groups of individuals which are available
21 for consultation by the party leadership. At various periods of time, we
22 will see reference to a political council, an economic council, and indeed
23 sometimes just the council. These are bodies which are composed of
24 distinguished Serbs from Bosnia, not necessarily members of the SDS, but
25 whose expertise was made available to the SDS, and on which the leadership
1 wished to draw.
2 Q. Before we move on in the chronology, Mr. Treanor, I'd like to ask
3 you to identify any of the organs or bodies of which Mr. Krajisnik was a
5 A. Well, in 1991, at the July assembly, at the latest, he was elected
6 to be a member of the Main Board. In fact, at that assembly, he received
7 a higher number of votes than any other candidate to the Main Board. He
8 also later became a member of the Personnel Commission of the SDS, which
9 was a body established by the Executive Committee, I believe, to consider
10 the issue of the appointment of SDS candidates to government positions in
12 Q. Mr. Treanor, you discussed the platform programme of the SDS. May
13 I ask you now to turn to an interview with Radovan Karadzic in July of
14 1990, in which he elaborated some of the purposes and concerns of the SDS.
15 A. Yes. This is an interview which was published in the Belgrade
16 news magazine Knin on the 20th of July, 1990. It's an interview that was
17 conducted with him by one of the members of the editorial staff, Milorad
18 Vucelic, who later went on to become the head of Serbian radio and
19 television, and I understand today is still very active in the socialist
20 party of Serbia
21 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Mr. Treanor. Your Honours, for the
22 benefit of the Chamber and counsel, that may be found at tab 3.
23 Q. Can we turn to the first highlighted portion, Mr. Treanor, which
24 is found at page 6 of the interview.
25 A. Yes. In this interview, Dr. Karadzic goes over many of the same
1 points that he made in his speech to the opening session of the SDS, and
2 makes some other interesting remarks along the way. For instance, we see
3 here him quoted as saying: "Our party has adopted the view of the Serbian
4 nation in BH towards these questions. That is, remaining within
5 Yugoslavia. Thus, the party is committed to a federal Yugoslavia, and
6 within it a federal Bosnia-Herzegovina on an equal footing, with an
7 unconditionally equal status for citizens and nations," again repeating
8 one of the main points in their programme.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I make a small practical
11 suggestion, which I hope would be helpful, and I don't think it will
12 create any difficulty for the witness. That, for example, just at that
13 point when the highlighted passage was identified as being at page 6, it
14 would be exceptionally helpful, and I think would only take a moment and
15 create no difficulty if -- well, either counsel or the witness were just
16 to mention very briefly what the highlighted passage is. There is no
17 problem obviously about his identifying it here. It's just that later
18 reading the transcript, if there is simply a reference to page 6, it
19 doesn't give an immediate clue as to the passage. Whereas with that
20 little addition -- for example, in this case it's a numbered paragraph so
21 that's easy, but a simple identification of the passage would make
22 everybody's work subsequently on the transcript that much easier.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger and Mr. Treanor, could you follow that
24 suggestion, because it saves us not time at this moment, but later. Please
1 MR. TIEGER: Certainly.
2 A. So we can turn to the next paragraph, which is numbered 38 in this
3 translation, which states that in the event that demands for confederate,
4 as translated, transformation of the country prevail, the Serbian nation
5 in BH will, through its SDS, prepare its democratic response to that new
6 situation as well. In any event, Serbs will not go along with living in
7 some new independent state of Croatia, nor in any state in which their
8 mother country, Serbia, is not included. That must be clear, so that
9 there is no misunderstanding. And this is not because the party wants it,
10 but rather because the Serbian nation demands it of its party."
11 I made reference before to the proposals that Yugoslavia be
12 transformed from a federation into a confederation. This was something
13 that Serbian leaders in BH and in Serbia itself were against. So he is
14 taking a position against that here. His reference to the independent
15 state of Croatia refers to the state in Croatia which was set up under the
16 auspices of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy during World War II, a state
17 which engaged in a genocidal campaign against the Serbs in that state and
18 that state did include Bosnia and Herzegovina. So here Dr. Karadzic is
19 expressing the fears of Serbs about living outside of any state in which
20 the rest of the Serbs are not also living.
21 Q. Mr. Treanor, you indicated earlier the distinction between the
22 platforms of the SDA party and the HDZ party with respect to the prospects
23 of remaining within Yugoslavia. Does Dr. Karadzic, in this interview,
24 address the -- any aspect of life, continued life in Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 with the Muslims or Croats?
1 A. Yes. This interview is interesting from that regard. The
2 interviewer seems to be a bit surprised, for instance, that Alija
3 Izetbegovic, who was the head of the SDA was present and indeed I believe
4 spoke at the founding congress of the SDS in July 1990, and in this
5 interview, Dr. Karadzic is at pains to emphasise the degree of harmony
6 between the SDS and the SDA, between the Serbs and the Muslims of Bosnia
7 and Herzegovina. As the previous passage indicated, much of his reserve,
8 if I can put it that way, at this time is addressed toward the Croats.
9 And if we could blow up the passage that's highlighted here, numbered 58,
10 we can see him saying, in order to correct the views which the interviewer
11 has identified in Serbia in regard to the Muslims, Dr. Karadzic says: "In
12 Serbia, on the other hand, the press often wrongly refers to a
13 fundamentalist threat in both Bosnia and Kosovo. It seems that this is
14 done under the influence of certain Western European circles, who have
15 their eyes fixed on Bosnia-Herzegovina as the European bastion of Islamic
17 So Dr. Karadzic is denying that type of threat in Bosnia and again
18 in the interview emphasises the harmony existing between the Muslims and
19 the Serbs in Bosnia.
20 Q. Is that thought also continued on page 9 of the interview?
21 A. Yes. I think if we look at paragraph 63 here, he states
22 that: "Islamic fundamentalism is coming to Europe in the form of people
23 of other races and other languages, and Europe is seized with panic. In
24 our country, we have Muslims of the Slavic nation. People of our blood
25 and language. The vast majority of whom are committed to the European
1 quality of life, while preserving the Islamic faith. There is no place
2 for panic here, neither among Serbs nor among Muslims."
3 Q. Now, in the --
4 MR. STEWART: Excuse me. Your Honour, before we leave those
5 pages, I wonder if either from counsel, and of course we'd accept any
6 assurances there, or through the witness, we might seek some clarification
7 of the status of the manuscript notes which have been made on this
8 document and that the markings and particularly there is some writing.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I was about to ask you because I noticed that
10 next to paragraph 58 we find even some text. I couldn't read everything.
11 It seems to start with "conspiracy."
12 MR. STEWART: It says: "Conspiracy --"
13 JUDGE ORIE: The question is whether this is a conspiracy, isn't
14 it. Could we get some explanation why we have an annotated version of
15 this document.
16 THE WITNESS: I can only state that the notes are not mine, and I
17 really have no familiarity with this in principle, as I think I indicated
18 yesterday; if I did not, I perhaps should have. I and my team work only
19 with the original B/C/S of documents. It is only occasionally that we
20 happen to see translations. Sometimes they are brought to our attention
21 because people think there might be something that needs to be clarified.
22 So I really cannot -- I think the only thing that I can say about this is
23 I think this is -- the translation itself is a translation done by the
24 FBIS, the Federal Broadcast Information Service, which is an American
25 media monitoring agency. Where the -- and when the marginal notes were
1 made, I have no idea.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And I take it that the original - I haven't got
3 it in front of me - does not contain similar annotations?
4 THE WITNESS: No. The original -- and I have an ERN copy here -
5 is simply a Xeroxed copy from the pages of the magazine, and it contains
6 no such notation.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I can clarify further.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. TIEGER: The annotations are in no way intended to communicate
11 the views certainly of the witness or anyone within the OTP. To my
12 understanding, this is the way the document was received and ERNed, but
13 they can either be removed, or with that clarification the Court can
14 understand that it is not intended to be part of the document.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is this accepted by the Defence, or would you
16 rather have a clean translation? Mr. Stewart, usually it's a disadvantage
17 if you can't read something. Here it might be an advantage. I have
18 difficulties in reading it anyhow, but ...
19 MR. STEWART: Yes. We --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we do see what it says, but I'm not
22 going to make an issue about this. We've seen it. If it becomes a major
23 problem, if we see lots more of this sort of stuff, we might have to
24 reconsider but at the moment we're not asking for any special steps to be
25 taken, and I'm grateful for the clarification so far as it's been possible
1 to give it.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Let's then proceed, Mr. Tieger.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Mr. Treanor, in the July -- in that July 1990 interview,
5 Dr. Karadzic indicated that the determination of Bosnian Serbs not to live
6 in a state in which their mother country was not included must be clear.
7 Were concrete steps toward making that position clear to others in Bosnia
8 and Herzegovina taken later in the year?
9 A. Yes, indeed. The next document illustrates that. And in moving
10 to this document, I would also point out that at the very end of the
11 interview, we just considered in its last sentence, Dr. Karadzic refers to
12 the matter of outvoting. It says that something to the effect that on
13 certain issues there can be no outvoting. I'm not sure how they translate
14 that. This is an expression of the fear that he and the other SDS leaders
15 had that even though the Serbs were a sizeable, indeed the second largest
16 nation within BH, they did not form a majority, so that, therefore, it
17 would be possible for, for instance, the representatives of the two other
18 of the three largest nations to join forces and outvote them in a simple,
19 straight-up vote in, say, the assembly or some other forum. This was
20 something that they were determined to resist, and on the basis of the
21 fact that they saw themselves, indeed defined in the constitution, as one
22 of the constituent nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore have a
23 right to have all -- to have all decisions that affect them as a nation
24 subject to their veto.
25 Now, in the next document -- we just saw that paragraph. Thank
1 you very much. The next document represents one effort to address that
2 issue, which is a procedural issue perhaps, but one that gets to their
3 fundamental political stand, that is, having the Serbs in BH remain within
4 one state with all the other Serbs.
5 MR. TIEGER: This document may be found at tab 9.
6 A. This is a letter signed by Dr. Karadzic under the letterhead of
7 the Main Board of the SDS, and addressed to the Assembly of the Socialist
8 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And to remind the Court, this is
9 before the election, so this is the communist-dominated assembly, which
10 is, in fact, about to be disbanded. And the letter refers to Articles -
11 I'm sorry - Amendments 60 and 70 to the constitution. I referred to
12 Article 60 yesterday. Indeed, it quotes Article 60, although it
13 misidentifies it as Article 70, saying that the Socialist Republic of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic, sovereign state of equal citizens.
15 The peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, and
16 the members of other peoples and nationalities which live within it.
17 Now, the premise of this letter is that the guarantees, the
18 provisions of that Article have not been adequately addressed by that
19 amendment, have not been adequately addressed by Amendment 70 to the
20 constitution. Amendment 70 had changed the make-up of the Republic
21 Assembly and had specified in its paragraph 10 that within the Assembly
22 there would be formed a commission for the question of the equality of
23 peoples. The letter see this as inadequate and suggests that another
24 amendment be made to the constitution, which I think we have a blow-up of.
25 Q. And for the record --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart.
2 MR. STEWART: Again, it's a practical matter. The -- looking at
3 this particular document in English, it's a hard one to handle, because,
4 as Your Honours will see, it starts: "Amendment seven, second character
5 illegible, is not in concordance with amendment illegible. Amendment 7,
6 second character illegible," and so on, which is quite hampering. The
7 thing that's puzzling us is that when one looks at the B/C/S version,
8 which I don't pretend to understand as language, but those characters are
9 plainly not illegible. They are very easy to see. The numbering on the
10 B/C/S version -- because in fact it should be: "Amendment 70 is not in
11 concordance with Amendment 60. Amendment 70 reads," and so on. So there
12 isn't in fact any difficulty, except that plainly we don't want to be
13 faced with the task of constantly having to cross-refer to the B/C/S to
14 get little clues as to the -- what the apparently illegible bit of the
15 English version is -- is supposed to be saying. We're wondering if
16 something can be done about this sort of document because it's absolutely
17 unnecessary for the Tribunal and for us to be faced with something which
18 makes continual references to illegibility, when there isn't apparently
19 such a problem.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I can tell you that the previous trial I
21 presided, the Defence usually took a different position that whatever
22 could be doubted was doubted as far as illegibility is concerned. So I
23 can imagine that since the Translation Services sometimes are very much
24 criticised for reading what some people think to be illegible, at other
25 moments, they perhaps become overcautious. Because if you see these
1 numbers, I would also say that it would be 70, but some people with some
2 imagination might say that it's not for certain that it was not 78 and 60
3 not for certain could never be 80. So therefore, if we find ourselves in a
4 position where we think that it's sufficiently legible by consulting the
5 original text, I think this is the way we should try to solve it and I
6 consider this, if the translation was made exactly from this copy, and if
7 the copy is not darkened or made any lighter, then I would say that it is
8 legible. If this often happens, we'll certainly ask the Prosecution to
9 review whatever translations do exist in respect of illegible documents.
10 So therefore, I do to some extent agree with you. On the other hand, I
11 also do understand why our Translation Services have become perhaps
12 sometimes overcautious and are not daring to read anything that someone
13 could say is not for the full hundred per cent legible.
14 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I understand that, and I'm very
15 sorry that the translation team have been so intimidated by that previous
16 fierce defence team. We, of course, are far gentler. But perhaps, Your
17 Honour, we can approach it I think that's the --
18 JUDGE ORIE: I didn't understand the word "intimidation."
19 MR. STEWART: I was not being that serious about it but Your
20 Honour referred to their extreme nervousness about it. But, Your Honour,
21 it seems the position is we can -- may we, with respect, keep this under
22 review, then, to see if it emerges as a larger problem.
23 JUDGE ORIE: We hope that it's an exception rather than what will
24 become a rule. And at least in explaining to us the document, Mr. Treanor
25 has the original in front of him and easily read all the numbers. Please
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. I think we're about to blow up paragraph 4 in
3 the document. Now again, to remind the Court, Dr. Karadzic in this letter
4 is proposing a further amendment to the constitution, to the effect that
5 the Assembly of the Republic establish three national councils or chambers
6 within itself, a Serbian National Council, a Muslim National Council, and
7 a Croatian National Council, composed of deputies from both assembly
8 councils and chambers. Issue of interest for the realisation of the
9 national equality in the Assembly of the SRBiH shall be decided in
10 accordance with a separate procedure. The suggested amendment then goes
11 on to specify the issues which the council would deal with.
12 And then we can turn to the last paragraph in the document.
13 Considering the constitutional arrangements and the Election Act, the
14 Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are faced with two options for
15 ensuring their equality as citizens and a people. First, the first option
16 is contained in the proposal which we are now forwarding to you, and the
17 second one is the declaration of the Serbian National Council," or a
18 Serbian National Council.
19 Now, the force of the act -- of the amendment which Dr. Karadzic
20 sought would basically have given any one of the three constituent nations
21 of Bosnia and Herzegovina a veto over any measure before the Assembly
22 which it felt adversely affected its interests as a nation. And among
23 those issues, and indeed the first issue in the list, just under
24 paragraph 4, item number 1, is the issue of the borders and the legal
25 constitutional status of BH. In other words, it would have been possible
1 for, under this proposed arrangement, for the Serbian deputies in that
2 council to block the secession of BH from Yugoslavia. And Dr. Karadzic is
3 saying that if this doesn't happen, the Serbian people in BH will take
4 other steps.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. What was the date of the -- of this letter to the BiH Assembly?
7 A. The 8th of October, 1990. And the elections are coming up on the
8 18th of November, to remind the Court.
9 Q. Did the SDS take steps toward the establishment of a national
10 council shortly thereafter?
11 A. Yes. Well, not surprisingly, this letter did not draw favourable
12 action, given that the Assembly was on its way out, and perhaps given the
13 fact that the letter confused Amendment 60 with Amendment 70. So in fact,
14 on the 13th of October, which is barely five days later, there was a large
15 open-air meeting in Banja Luka to establish a Serbian National Council.
16 Many Serbian politicians were present there from Bosnia and also from
17 Croatia, giving very interesting speeches, and the assembly -- the
18 assemblage voted to establish a Serbian National Council, and that council
19 in fact made -- issued a decision on that day on certain issues. I think
20 before we get to the decisions of the council, we can look at a portion, I
21 think, of Dr. Karadzic's speech to that assembly.
22 MR. TIEGER: The transcript of the speech can be found in the
23 intercepts binder at tab 1. Before we play a portion of that video, I
24 would remind the interpreters that it is synchronised with the transcript
25 and we therefore ask that no simultaneous translation take place.
1 And Your Honour, I am reminded that the videos also require a
2 separate number, were not previously numbered as an exhibit.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: The video will be Prosecution Exhibit number P66,
5 and the transcript of the video, P66A.
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours and counsel, the first clip of the video
7 can be found at page 4 of the transcript, at tab 1.
8 [Videotape played]
9 MR. TIEGER: Next clip, please, which can also be found at page 4
10 of the transcript.
11 [Videotape played]
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. And Mr. Treanor, we'll move on to the next clip.
14 A. Maybe I can comment on these two before we move on.
15 Q. I was just going to ask that. In the first clip, the reference to
16 former generals being elected presidents, something of that nature, is a
17 reference to Franjo Tudjman, and in the second clip we see -- and the
18 first clip also raises the spectre of civil war if the moves toward
19 independence on the part of Croatia and Slovenia continue.
20 In the second clip, we see the position of the SDS leadership on
21 the republic boundaries. Just to remind the Court, the SDA was very much
22 in favour of maintaining those boundaries. Here is the SDS position,
23 stating that those boundaries are merely administrative boundaries and
24 they cannot become state boundaries, which would divide the Serbian people
25 among more than one state.
1 [Videotape played]
2 MR. TIEGER: That's the end.
3 Q. Before moving on to the next clip, Mr. Treanor, any comments you
4 wanted to make?
5 A. Yes. In that clip, we heard Dr. Karadzic specifically addressing
6 the situation in Croatia in the terms that I referred to earlier, that is,
7 he said that if the Croats in Croatia wanted to leave Yugoslavia, that's
8 fine, but they can't take the Serbs in Croatia with them. And then he
9 moved on to address the situation in BH and raising the fear that the next
10 step would be to try to take BH in its entirety, including the Serbs in
11 it, outside of Yugoslavia.
12 MR. TIEGER: And the next clip, which may be found at page 5 of
13 the transcript.
14 [Videotape played]
15 MR. TIEGER:
16 Q. Mr. Treanor, any comments you wanted to make with respect to that
17 clip from the speech?
18 A. Well, here again we see -- or not -- first let me say that here we
19 see now some fears expressed as to the positions -- the position of the
20 Serbs in an independent BH, reference being made to the Turks,
21 unfavourable reference, that is, to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who
22 are now perceived as a threat. And reference is also made to Assembly
23 decisions which could appear legitimate, that is, the fear -- expression
24 of the fear of outvoting, which I mentioned earlier. The majority of the
25 Assembly could vote for the secession of BH and all of the Serbian
1 delegates would be against that, but since they would not have a majority
2 this would look perfectly legitimate to the outside world and this is what
3 they were determined to prevent.
4 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask you one question in between. Is my
5 recollection right, that the reference to the Turks came from the republic
6 and were not the words of Mr. Karadzic? Because you dealt with them in
7 one line without making any distinction. You said reference is made and
8 then you --
9 THE WITNESS: That could be the case. If we could play that
10 again, we could clarify that.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Where the transcript says it came from the
12 republic, I meant to say that it came from the public.
13 [Videotape played]
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Does that clarify the Court's question?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It clarifies the issue. I think it would have
17 been better if you would have made a distinction between the words of
18 Mr. Karadzic and the words of those -- of individuals in the audience
19 unknown to us.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry about that, Your Honour. I'd just like
21 to point out that, well, when he was referring to -- we saw what the --
22 what happened to the Serbian people before, even when they were a
23 majority. That would have included a reference to the period of Ottoman
24 or Turkish rule over Bosnia.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart.
3 MR. STEWART: This is not completely clarified on the transcript.
4 It might be a good idea if the witness --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, yes. Yes, please.
6 MR. STEWART: -- for the record, for the transcripts, confirmed
7 the position as we now see it.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now I must say, I don't remember the exact
9 words, but where Turks were mentioned, the transcript of the rally of this
10 meeting said that it was voices from the audience.
11 THE WITNESS: Right. And Dr. Karadzic made no explicit reference
12 to or use of the word "Turks."
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If that's clear enough, then we can proceed.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Now, if we turn to the next document, which may be found at
16 tab 12. Did Dr. Karadzic, in his capacity as president of the National
17 Council, issue a declaration on the position of the Serb people in BH?
18 A. Yes. Here we have a declaration which -- I think we have skipped
19 a couple of documents perhaps.
20 Q. I'm sorry. You referred earlier, I recall, to at least one
21 decision by the Serbian National Council that you wanted to draw our
22 attention to after we had viewed the rally.
23 A. Well, yes. There was a decision on the formation of the Serbian
24 National Council and a -- and then the so-called first decision of the
25 Serbian National Council --
1 Q. And I would turn the Court's --
2 A. -- that document.
3 Q. I would draw the Court's attention to tab 11 of binder 1.
4 A. We can consider the second paragraph under the main heading in the
5 document. This document is also dated the 13th of October and states
6 that: "According to the decision of the Serbian National Council, the
7 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall not recognise any decision
8 to change the state character of BH taken by the deputies rather than the
9 people, only a decision reached through a referendum of the Serbian
11 So here the Serbian National Council is basically announcing at --
12 it is, in effect, setting itself up as the Serbian Chamber of Peoples,
13 which Dr. Karadzic had earlier sought, and giving themselves a veto, so to
14 speak, over any decisions made by the Assembly that would affect the
15 interests of the Serbian people.
16 Q. Now, the document you just referred to, the October 13th decision
17 by the Serbian National Council, referred to a refusal to recognise
18 decisions of that nature.
19 Turning now to tab 12, declaration of the position of the Serb
20 people. Does that suggest the possibility of actions beyond
21 non-recognition in response to a declaration to which they were opposed?
22 A. Yes. I think if we turn to paragraph IV of that decision, a
23 decision which bears the date of the 6th of November, 1990, we can see
24 what the Serbian National Council is suggesting.
25 "If a confederal solution or an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina
1 should be imposed on the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
2 Serbian people reserve the right to undertake actions as governed by the
3 circumstances, in order to preserve their unity with the Serbian nation as
4 a whole."
5 And it goes on to say: "To this end, the Serbian National Council
6 shall not acknowledge a single law or decision of the BH Assembly and
7 state organs that is harmful for the interests of the Serbian people in
8 BH, and the Serbian National Council shall arrange a plebiscite on
9 essential issues of the national entity of the Serbian people in BH."
10 Q. Now, several days later, Dr. Karadzic gave another interview to
11 Knin. During the course of that interview, which may be found at tab 13,
12 does he again touch upon or amplify upon the theme of actions to be taken
13 in the event of decisions which threaten the unity of Serbs within
15 A. Yes. This interview was published in Knin, the same journal that
16 the previous interview was published in. It was published on the 9th of
17 November. The interview was conducted with the same journalist. And this
18 is, in fact, the first interview in Knin after the previous one we saw.
19 So it's sort of a continuation of that interview and it represents sort of
20 a catching up on the situation in -- of the Serbs in BH for the readers of
22 If we look at paragraph 4, there is a highlighted portion,
23 beginning with the second-to-last sentence in that paragraph. In this
24 section of the interview, Dr. Karadzic is referring to the success of the
25 SDS in reviving political life among the Serbs in BH and the
1 organisational work of the party. Again, I would remind the Court that
2 this is only a few days, a week or so, before the elections are due to
3 take place. And he states that: "Each member of a local board of the
4 Serbian Democratic Party is in contact with 10 to 20 Serbian households,
5 so that information from the most remote villages reaches the Main Board
6 in two hours at most."
7 Q. Now if we could turn to page 3 of the English portion of that
8 interview. Does Dr. Karadzic during the course of the interview address
9 the question of outvoting and possible responses to it?
10 A. Yes. He returns to this issue again in the third paragraph from
11 the bottom of the page. The second half of the paragraph is highlighted
12 and reads: "The BH Assembly could become a place of dramatic events
13 because the Serbs could be outvoted by a two-thirds majority regarding,
14 for instance, the issues of the change of the state character of BH.
15 Should that happen, all conditions for a civil war would be in place,
16 because the Serbs in BH are no longer helpless, but very powerful and
17 united. Everybody understands now that no political act can be completed
18 here without the Serbs."
19 Now we can move on in the article, on page 4 of the original.
20 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, I believe that would be found at page 6
21 of the English translation.
22 A. Here we see, in the second paragraph from the bottom of the page,
23 highlighted in English translation, a further statement: "The Serbs in
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina will not give in so easily, and their
25 freedom-loving political will, will be mobilised in the Serbian areas.
1 The Serbian National Council will proclaim the rule of the Serbian people
2 and undertake other activities and will ensure freedom for the people.
3 Those who are preparing to rig the elections are playing with fire, which
4 could scorch certain statehoods and certain sovereignties."
5 Now, this statement, as the last part indicates, is made within
6 the context of his discussion of fears that the communist power-holders in
7 Bosnia who are in charge of running the elections will rig the elections
8 and falsify the results and deprive the SDS and the other national parties
9 of their rightful share and power.
10 Q. Later in the interview, does Dr. Karadzic return to the theme of
11 Serbs remaining within Yugoslavia and indicate what areas or territories
12 among -- within Bosnia and Herzegovina are meant to be included?
13 A. I think if we turn to the next portion which we've highlighted on
14 the last page of the translation, the first full paragraph at the top of
15 the page: "Serbian priorities are the preservation of the spiritual,
16 cultural, political, and state unity of the Serbian people. A Serbian
17 priority is the return of the Serbian people among the happy peoples and
18 the Serbian state among the happy states. A Serbian priority is
19 preventing a single Serbian village from being left out of Yugoslavia and
20 remaining in some new, independent state of Croatia."
21 So here he seems to be claiming for Yugoslavia every Serbian
22 village in Bosnia.
23 Finally, at the very end of the interview, he states: "We are now
24 openly saying what could not even be whispered before. The Serbs in
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina pin all their hopes on their mother country,
1 Serbia, and will never allow a state border to separate them from Serbia.
2 Let all the peoples in Yugoslavia make their own arrangements regarding
3 their states any way they wish. The Serbian people will do so too and
4 will find a way to remain in the same state as Serbia, be it a simple or a
5 complex one."
6 Q. Can we turn quickly, then, to the next document, which is found at
7 tab 14. Actually, the next two documents found at tab 14 and 15.
8 Does this also reflect the theme of unity among the Serbs within
10 A. Yes. As Dr. Karadzic has now repeatedly said in the documents
11 that we've considered, the SDS leadership is very determined that the --
12 all the Serbs in Yugoslavia remain in the same state and therefore he was
13 interested in cooperating with Serbian political leaders outside of
14 Bosnia. Here we see a letter addressed by him to Slobodan Milosevic on
15 the occasion of his election as president of Serbia in the first direct
16 elections to that office that took place in Serbia on the 9th of December
17 in 1990. The two Articles that have been highlighted are the second and
18 third from the end of the document, which Dr. Karadzic states that, in
19 addressing Mr. Milosevic, "Your election means that expectations of the
20 majority of the Serbian people in BH have been met, that one capable
21 statesman with a great responsibility toward the state of Serbia towards
22 all its citizens and toward all the Serbs outside Serbia becomes the
23 leader of Serbia. Also through your electoral victory in the first free
24 elections all to the last conditions have been met, which will ensure that
25 Serbia and Serbs get full respect in the coming talks on Yugoslavia, also
1 including the conditions for further strengthening of the relationship of
2 Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina with their parent country Serbia."
3 I could remark in connection with the responsibility of -- toward
4 Serbs outside of Serbia, that that was in fact a provision in the new
5 constitution of Serbia which was enacted in I believe September 1990, and
6 in fact there was a ministry within the government of the Republic of
7 Serbia which had special charge of the question of relations with Serbs
8 outside of Serbia.
9 Q. And the next document found at tab 15, Mr. Treanor.
10 A. Now, this is a letter addressed by Dr. Karadzic to Milan Babic,
11 who was the president of the Serbian National Council in Knin, which is in
12 Croatia. So he is one of the main leaders of the Croatian Serbs. This
13 letter is addressed to him on the occasion of the proclamation of a
14 Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, that is, the Croatian Krajina. This
15 event had taken place on the 19th of December, 1990. And we have the last
16 paragraph there highlighted as of interest. "Along with the
17 congratulations, accept our assurances that the Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 Serb National Council will always be -- always by the spiritual, cultural,
19 political, and state unity, also mean state unity of the Serb Autonomous
20 Region of Krajina and all the other Serb regions with the Serbian mother
21 country within a free, democratic, and federative Yugoslavia, regardless
22 of its size."
23 So here we have an expression of solidarity with the Croatian
24 Serbs, who had the same desire as expressed by the leaders of the SDS,
25 that the Serbs in Croatia should remain within Yugoslavia.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger --
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 JUDGE ORIE: You wanted to move to your next subject or I saw you
4 also looking at the clock. If these were your questions on these
5 documents, there's one intermediary question by the Judges. Both letters,
6 in translation, at least, bear no date. Is that true for the original as
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is true. Neither has a date, but they do
9 have signatures.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's then clear. If this would be a suitable
11 moment, Mr. Tieger, I'd like to adjourn for 20 minutes. We'll recommence
12 at five minutes past 4.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 4.07 p.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Mr. Treanor, you mentioned that the November 9th Knin interview
18 with Dr. Karadzic took place shortly before the elections. Can you tell
19 the Court about the results of those elections in BH.
20 A. Yes, indeed. We have to consider the elections that took place in
21 the republic and the consequences of those elections before we can move
22 into the next documents. I will address the results of the elections
23 per se, and what those elections -- the results of those elections meant
24 for the SDS as a party.
25 First of all, the elections -- the elections took place on both
1 the republic and the municipal level. There were primarily elections of
2 deputies, I referred to them on the republic level or assemblymen on the
3 municipal level, to the assemblies at those levels. At the same time,
4 there were also elections to the Presidency of BH, which for the first
5 time was being elected directly by the voters.
6 Now, on the municipal level, to begin with those elections, we do
7 not have available documentation which would give the summary results of
8 those elections. However, Dr. Karadzic later stated before the SDS
9 Assembly that the SDS had taken power in 37 municipalities, that is, had
10 won a majority of the assemblymen in the assemblies of 37 municipalities.
11 On the republic level, the elections to the two chambers of the
12 Republic Assembly gave the SDS a considerable share of the seats. The SDS
13 won the total of 72 seats, 38 seats -- if memory serves me correctly, 38
14 seats in the Chamber of Municipalities, and 34 seats in the Chamber of
16 The SDA, by contrast, won a total of 86 seats in those two
17 chambers, and the HDZ, I believe, 44. Now, those two chambers were
18 composed of, on the one hand, the 130 deputies in the Chamber of Citizens
19 and 110 in the Chamber of Municipalities. One deputy for each
20 municipality plus one for the city of Sarajevo.
21 The total of 230 is important and, and considering the numbers in
22 relation to that number is important, since, in accordance with
23 Amendment 70 to the constitution, the Assembly could in many instances
24 meet and make decisions in joint sessions, in which the deputies from the
25 two chambers would sit together and combine their votes on particular
1 measures, which are specified in that amendment, including, for instance,
2 voting for the installation of the prime minister and the government. To
3 get into a minor detail, in order for such a session to have a quorum, a
4 majority of the deputies in each chamber would have to be present;
5 however, the voting was done in a combined fashion.
6 Then the elections to the Presidency also gave the SDS a share in
7 that institution. According to the recent constitutional amendments in
8 other legislation, the Presidency was to be composed of seven members.
9 Two members were to come from each of the three constituent nations, that
10 is, the Muslims, the Serbs, and the Croats; and one was to be a -- of the
11 Yugoslav nation, which was one of the ways that people could identify
12 themselves for census purposes, for instance. All national identification
13 in Yugoslavia is on the basis of self-declaration, I might add.
14 So the Serbs were to get two seats in that Presidency, and in fact
15 it was the two candidates of the SDS who were elected. They were Biljana
16 Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic. Just to round out the results of the
17 election, I would mention the fact that the three national parties, even
18 before the election, had got together and agreed to cooperate. I
19 mentioned that -- we mentioned Dr. Karadzic's fear of electoral fraud on
20 the part of the communists, the other national parties had a similar fear.
21 So they agreed to form a coalition after the elections and agree among
22 themselves on the -- on forming a government and distributing the posts
23 within that government and the other posts that were available to them as
24 victors of the election on both the municipal and the republic level.
25 Pursuant to that decision, Alija Izetbegovic was elected as
1 president of the Presidency for a term of one year, and Momcilo Krajisnik
2 was elected president of the Assembly that took place on the 20th of
3 December. And Jure Pelivan of the SDS [sic] was designated as prime
4 minister, and his government, which contained representatives from all of
5 the three parties, on the basis of an agreement which had been reached,
6 took office on the 30th of January.
7 Q. Mr. Treanor, excuse me. The transcript reads Jure Pelivan of the
8 SDS has designated --
9 A. I'm sorry. The HDZ. The agreement reached down through the
10 municipal level and posts were apportioned there -- proportionately to the
11 strength of the three parties in the particular Municipal Assembly, that
12 is, the posts that were available would have been the president of the
13 Assembly and then the members of the Executive Council of the Assembly, in
14 effect, the municipal government.
15 Now, as far as the SDS was concerned as a party is of course --
16 brought them to power. It gave them a lot of office-holders. And aside
17 from the obvious fact that participation in government, it created a whole
18 new group of individuals that were available to Dr. Karadzic and the other
19 leaders of the party to consult with and to implement their policy
20 through. Hitherto, the apparatus of the party, as we went over briefly
21 earlier, consisted of the local boards, the SDS, headed by the municipal
22 presidents of the SDS, and then there were the central boards, in
23 particular, the Main Board and the Executive Board. Now we have Municipal
24 Assemblymen who were SDS members, presidents of municipal assemblies; in
25 effect, the mayors of the municipalities who were SDS members. Heads of
1 Executive Councils who were SDS members or sympathisers, heads of the
2 executive organs of municipal -- of the municipal executive boards.
3 On the republic level, we now have ministers who are appointees of
4 the SDS, if I can put it that way, not necessary members, but people
5 designated by them to fill the posts allotted to them, as well as deputy
6 ministers and other high-level functionaries within the government per se
7 of BH.
8 Then we also have, as I mentioned, 72 deputies in the Assembly of
9 BH, who, as the other parties formed a Deputies' Club, which was an
10 official body within the Assembly, the Deputies' Clubs of the various
11 parties, and which became a forum for discussion of policy issues. So
12 Dr. Karadzic now had available to him a much wider group of people than
13 before, and people who were actually -- including people who are actually
14 now in positions of power. And he in fact consulted with these types of
15 people on a regular basis, sometimes on a one-to-one basis, but frequently
16 in large meetings, where people from the various categories I described
17 would all be present. We rarely find a meeting, if ever, a meeting of the
18 Main Board itself, or just the Main Board members are present and do
19 something. It's usually a much broader meeting at which municipal party
20 presidents are attending, deputies, certainly members of the Main Board,
21 ministers in the government.
22 Now, one more observation in that connection is the fact that
23 there is some overlap among these various groups of people. That is, I
24 don't know, about 15 members of the Main Board were also deputies,
25 including Mr. Krajisnik. Many of the municipal presidents of the SDS were
1 also deputies. Many of them also occupied -- or may have occupied the
2 position of president of the Municipal Assembly or president of the
3 municipal Executive Board, depending on what job they thought might be
4 more interesting.
5 So this gave a new caste to the party structure. We don't see
6 them operating strictly at the central level within, as I mentioned, the
7 Main Board, but rather, having meetings attended by the various types of
8 functionaries, two or 300 people sometimes, to discuss various issues and
9 let Dr. Karadzic know what they're thinking and receive instruction from
11 Q. Mr. Treanor, can we turn, then, to tab 16, for the Court, and to
12 the document which you'll see in front of you. And let me ask you if that
13 document reflects some of the early experiences -- whether or not that
14 document reflects some of the early experiences and responses of members
15 of the SDS to the circumstances within the Assembly.
16 A. Yes. This is a very interesting document, both in itself and for
17 the time period that it deals with. It is the diary of Mr. Maksimovic,
18 who was the president of the Deputies' Club of the SDS, and he was also a
19 member of the political council of the SDS, which was another one of those
20 bodies that Dr. Karadzic could draw on and which various people belonged
22 Now, in this excerpt and a couple of other excerpts we're going to
23 see we'll see reflect the experience of being in this new coalition of the
24 three national parties as seen by one of the top leaders of the SDS. And
25 I think we have highlighted especially the first excerpt in the diary is
1 the 3rd of January, 1991. Just to remind the Court: At this point in
2 time, the new Assembly had been constituted and Mr. Krajisnik elected
3 president of the Assembly, but the new government had not yet taken power.
4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours and counsel, the excerpt from January 3,
5 1991 may be found at page 2 of the diary in the English translation.
6 Q. First of all, Mr. Treanor, does that refer to a meeting of one of
7 the SDS bodies?
8 A. Yes. This -- the entries in this diary are basically notes that
9 were taken at sessions of the SDS political council. So this would be the
10 meeting of the political council on the 3rd of January, 1991, a meeting
11 about which otherwise we have no other available record, to my knowledge.
12 Q. And the entry from January 3rd is highlighted, a particular
13 portion at the bottom of the English translation of page 2, and at the
14 bottom of the page which is shown on the screen. Can you tell us the
15 relevance of that entry.
16 A. Here we see some of his reflections. "Do the new circumstances
17 essentially change the basic political concept of the SDS? It is based on
18 our wish that all Serbs live in the same state. We will never let them
19 divide us up into states. Are we backing away from this important wish of
20 our people?" He seems to be referring to the fact that now they've
21 entered into a coalition government in BH, which to him appears a bit
22 problematic, as we'll see in further entries.
23 On the next page of the translation, at the -- starting with the
24 second bullet-pointed entry, we see these thoughts: "What have our first
25 parliamentary experiences shown regarding our national protection? We
1 will have heavy fighting as deputies in the BH Assembly, with the Muslims
2 and particularly the Croats and some communists and socialists as well.
3 Forming new municipalities is difficult, because it will be difficult to
4 have it approved by the BH Assembly. It will be the same with the forming
5 of the Chamber of Peoples."
6 These are two points which I would remind the Court came up in our
7 discussion of the programme of the SDS and Dr. Karadzic's speech, the
8 feeling that the municipal boundaries should perhaps be redrawn and the
9 desire to, as we saw later expressed, to form a Chamber of Nationalities,
10 to prevent outvoting.
11 We move down a little bit in the middle of the page: "The present
12 state of our unity is insufficient. We have heard many promises at
13 meetings but what have we done? The unity of Serbian deputies has not
14 been shaped. Some believe that the intellectual level of our deputies is
15 satisfactory. However, our position in parliament will never be
16 favourable. I am certain of that. There will be all sorts of things in
17 the Assembly. Outvoting, treachery, rows walkouts, and protests. Is that
18 democracy? We'll see."
19 So again we have the fear of outvoting in the Assembly.
20 And then we move down two bullet points to the entry: "Who says
21 we can't create a Serbian state of sorts which will be more appropriate
22 and bring us closer to the achievement of our immemorial ideals?"
23 Q. I believe that's the last entry from that particular session of
24 the political council?
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me. I turned it off instead of turning it on.
2 Q. Mr. Treanor, I believe that was the last entry from the January --
3 A. Yes, it is. It is indeed.
4 Q. Turn now to the session of 17 January.
5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that can be found at page 6.
6 A. On page 6, at the third complete paragraph, we have highlighted an
7 entry which reads, "my opinion." "Alija Izetbegovic is compromising
8 himself too much as the president of BH. Muslim statements about Kosovo
9 are very indicative and unacceptable to us. Efforts towards the
10 establishment of the National Council should be stepped up and the Serbian
11 National Council should be fully activated. I feel it is necessary that
12 the SDS and the club of Serbian deputies in the BH Assembly be on the
13 alert. People believe that Muslims and Croats are better organised in all
14 respects. Weapons and illegal organisation. Complete conformity with the
15 SPO, the Serbian renewal movement, should be established immediately. If
16 Western Herzegovina is lost and belongs to Croatia, then we will not be
17 naive and let go of Eastern Herzegovina. Can we rely on the JNA? How do
18 we keep the Muslims with us? The Croats' stands are clear to me, but I
19 fear treachery by the Muslims. Croats are our open enemies, but Muslims
20 are sly, perfidious, and fickle enemies, always have been and will be. It
21 will be too late if they catch us unprepared and history will be an
22 unmerciful judge."
23 I would just add that the reference to the SPO there in
24 establishing cooperation with that party was in fact achieved. The SPO
25 had elected one deputy to the Assembly and that deputy in fact joined the
1 Deputies' Club of the SDS. The reference to Herzegovina is a reference to
2 the fact that he perceives that the Croats in Western Herzegovina would
3 like to split off from BH and join Croatia perhaps, and he expresses his
4 fear for what may happen in the Serbian part of Herzegovina.
5 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask one question? Because I'm a bit
6 confused. In the question, Mr. Tieger guided you to page 6, but previous
7 to that he said: May I take you to the 17th of January. In the English
8 text, I find this 17th of January indicated on page 3, no new date on
9 page 4, and on page 5, I find the 24th of January. So I'm a bit surprised
10 at what you've just read from page 6, would be part of the 17th of
11 January, where I would expect it to be part of the 24th of January.
12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, my apologies for what was obviously a
13 misleading question. I thank the Court for clarifying that. I leave it
14 to the witness, however, to view the document and make the appropriate
15 clarification himself.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. It does seem to be the 24th indeed.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
19 THE WITNESS: I think we have one more entry to consider at this
20 point. On the 4th of February.
21 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, that's found at page 8, although it
22 appears the Chamber has found it.
23 THE WITNESS: Now, this is also a political council session, as
24 was the meeting on the 24th of January. And we read this entry: "My
25 comments basically come down to the following: I am convinced that the
1 Serbian deputies will not remain in the BH Assembly for long and that they
2 will have to walk out, because we will not accept the adoption of any
3 enactments against our will and approval which decide our fate. Attempts
4 to dupe us into adopting the so-called declaration on sovereignty and
5 indivisibility of BH was a very enlightening example for us."
6 Now, the reference there is to an attempt to have discussed at a
7 joint session of the Assembly at the end of January a declaration
8 submitted by the -- a draft of which was submitted by the SDA on the
9 sovereignty and indivisibility of BH which the SDS found unacceptable. On
10 that occasion, at that Assembly session, it was decided to postpone
11 consideration of that decision until the next session of the joint session
12 of the Assembly, which in fact took place at the end of February. In the
13 intervening period, a new draft, a new SDA draft, was produced, which was
14 still unacceptable to the SDS, and the SDS Deputies' Club produced a
15 document of its own, presenting its views on the future status of BH,
16 which I think may be our next document.
17 Q. Before moving on to that next document, Mr. Treanor, can I ask you
18 one question about one of the highlighted portions of the January 3rd
19 session. And that was the portion found at the bottom of page 3, I
20 believe, of the English translation, in which Mr. Maksimovic discusses the
21 possibility of forming a state which would be closer to the achievement of
22 our immemorial ideals, and I wonder if you can shed light on the meaning
23 of that.
24 A. Well, I have to speculate a bit here. He is certainly referring
25 to the creation of a Serbian state of sorts. When he speaks of "our
1 immemorial ideals," I'm not quite sure whose ideals he's referring to. He
2 may be referring to the idea which is frequently referred to as a Greater
3 Serbia, which in itself is sort of a indeterminate term. But basically, a
4 state smaller than Yugoslavia, without the Slovenes, without the Croats,
5 without perhaps - I say perhaps - Macedonia, but perhaps including
6 Macedonia. Again, I'm not sure whose ideals he's referring to. But a
7 state which would be territorially smaller than Yugoslavia, and therefore
8 more heavily Serbian in population, but certainly encompassing the vast
9 majority of all the Serbs who were living in Yugoslavia.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, if we can turn to the next document found at
11 tab 17. And I believe we'll find there the document produced by the SDS
12 Deputies' Club, which presented its views and to which you referred
14 A. Yes. This is a document dated the 14th of February, 1991. The
15 month of February saw a lot of public discussion in connection with the
16 draft decision and its forthcoming debate in the Assembly, and this
17 document presents the views of the -- what we can see on the first page of
18 the document is now referred to as the Club of Deputies, SDS and SPO, that
19 is, Serbian Renewal Movement. It's again a fairly lengthy document, so
20 let's move to a highlighted portion.
21 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, that may be found at page 3 of the
22 English translation.
23 A. Page 6 in the original, I believe. Maybe not.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Third paragraph from the bottom.
25 A. Yes. And here we see the statement that: "It is only within the
1 borders of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina, inseparable from
2 Yugoslavia, that basic harmony of all the peoples can be achieved along
3 with the conviction that none of the peoples in it will be subordinate or
4 suppressed when it comes to determining our general fate. Our points of
5 view are firm, even if some republics, for instance, Slovenia, Croatia,
6 and Macedonia, completely secede from Yugoslavia and declare themselves
7 independent. We repeat that the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
8 want to live even in a transfigured and even smaller Yugoslavia, which
9 might not include some of its current republics."
10 Now, here they are taking the position that they would like to see
11 the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina remain within even a reduced Yugoslavia.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. And if we turn to tab 18 of the -- of binder 1, and the next
14 document you selected, Mr. Treanor, do we find further iterations of the
15 proposed boundaries or boundary issues related to Bosnia-Herzegovina?
16 A. Yes. And before we consider this document, I'd just like to
17 observe that in the debate in the Assembly on the 27th of February, it was
18 decided, after much discussion, to end discussion about the draft
19 decision. The draft essentially would have given the Assembly the right
20 to consider its own enactments superior to those of the Federation and
21 that type of thing the SDS found to be unacceptable as being basically a
22 negation of the existence of Yugoslavia and its constitution. So a debate
23 on that was ended. There was no vote. And -- however, this whole
24 controversy had stirred up opinion. It was rather a polarising
25 experience. And at the beginning of March, we see the SDS holding a mass
1 rally in Banja Luka, at which its leaders publicly address the issues
2 which have now been formally raised in the Assembly.
3 Q. Can we turn, then, to the first portion of that document, which
4 you've highlighted, which may be found on page 3 of the English
5 translation -- I'm sorry. On page 2.
6 A. In the last paragraph on the page in the translation, we see
7 highlighted a portion beginning with the second sentence in the paragraph.
8 This is a statement as quoted in the local Banja Luka newspaper, Glas, a
9 statement by Milovan Milanovic, who was an SDS member of the Republic
10 Assembly. He's quoted as saying: "On behalf of the humane people of
11 Bosnian Krajina, we are sending word that any nation which is in favour of
12 federal Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, could live together
13 with the Serbs in this area. We already have a homeland, with Bosnia in
14 it. We do not want boundaries along our alleys or streams, dividing
15 brothers or neighbours. Those who want to leave Yugoslavia can have a
16 pleasant journey but they should know that they will be allowed to take
17 out of this country only what they have brought into it, and nobody can
18 take Krajina from Yugoslavia without breaking their spine."
19 Krajina is a rather large area in Western Bosnia which adjoins the
20 Krajina area in Croatia.
21 Q. And this particular rally took place in the Krajina area?
22 A. Yes, in Banja Luka, which is the main town, if you will. It's not
23 a city in the technical sense in BH. The main centre in Bosnian Krajina.
24 Q. Can we turn, then, to the remarks of Mr. Cizmovic, which are found
25 on page 3 of the English translation.
1 A. Yes. We're at the very bottom of the page here. Mr. Cizmovic,
2 speaking on behalf of the Serbian renewal movement, with whom, as I
3 mentioned, the SDS having a combined Deputies' Club in the Assembly.
4 Mr. Cizmovic is quoted as saying: "Today we address all Serbs, as we
5 speak in the names of those who will never speak again. All Serb graves
6 of this century, in Yugoslavia, bear the --" next page, "bear the signs of
7 Yugoslavia. The Serb tree has cracked for the sake of unitary
8 Yugoslavia's survival. We have never faced a greater risk. Out of the
9 Serb people, other people have been formed. Out of the Serb faith,
10 non-belief. Brotherly reconciliation is therefore the prerequisite of our
11 times. The grandsons of the Chetniks and partisans must not repeat their
12 grandfather's mistakes. The current borders exist only in the federal
13 option. Hence, our placing the demand for the unification of all Serb
15 This is a statement very pregnant with meaning. The reference to
16 peoples being formed out of the Serb people is a reference to the
17 viewpoint of many Serbs that the Bosnian Muslims had in fact originally
18 been Serbs and had -- were merely converts to the Muslim faith. Many
19 Croats held a similar opinion, that they were in fact really Croats. The
20 reference to the grandsons of the Chetniks and the Partisans is a
21 reference to World War II, in which Serbs fought on -- within different
22 armed formations in that war, the Partisans being the communist-controlled
23 resistance movement and the Chetniks being a nationalist movement. And he
24 again makes reference to the borders, that the current borders, that is,
25 the existing republic borders, could only be considered valid if Bosnia
1 remained within Yugoslavia.
2 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask a very general question, Mr. Tieger.
3 I wonder to what extent what we heard over the last, well, let's say,
4 approximately the last hour, is in dispute between the parties. If I
5 understand the testimony well, it explains to us that the Serbs living in
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina very much feared to lose their links with Serbia
7 because they feared that a new confederative structure, or even
8 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would separate these Bosnian and
9 Herzegovinian Serbs from the Serbs in Serbia and that they would be in a
10 minority position in such a confederative or even independent Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina and that this caused a lot of concern and that the SDS was
12 very much opposed against such a development to take place.
13 Mr. Treanor, I hope that I well understood your testimony in this
15 THE WITNESS: I think that's a fair summary.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. To what extent is this in dispute, I would like
17 to ask the Defence. If not, Mr. Tieger, we could have gone through it --
18 of course, I couldn't have invented the summary before hearing the
19 testimony, but perhaps Mr. Treanor could have summarised it in this way
20 and then we would be informed. And therefore, I'd like to ask
21 Mr. Stewart: To what extent what we heard over the last hour is disputed,
22 as summarised by me.
23 MR. STEWART: Well, there's certainly the summary that --
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
25 MR. STEWART: Sorry. The summary that Your Honour has just given
1 appears to me to be entirely accurate and not in dispute. I think I would
2 be slightly hesitant to say that everything over the last hour is not in
3 dispute. That's a rather --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but of course if there would be specific points
5 that were in dispute, perhaps then they could have called some additional
6 attention in the presentation of this evidence.
7 MR. STEWART: Yes. What I would say, Your Honour, is this: That
8 despite our objections earlier status in the trial as to the forming,
9 which questions are put in leading questions, when it comes to this sort
10 of area, Mr. Tieger, I think having probably a pretty clear idea of the
11 sort of areas where there isn't likely to be any serious dispute could,
12 certainly as far as the Defence is concerned, lead the witness quite
13 quickly through that sort of area, which is not seriously in dispute. So
14 if that speeds things up -- Your Honour won't have objections from us in
15 relation to matters which are simply either common knowledge or very clear
16 and not in dispute. I think that's probably the most I can say as a
17 practical help, Your Honour, because clearly I can't give blanket
18 agreement to a huge chunk of evidence.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not asking anyone to give a blanket agreement.
20 But after this approximately one hour, I wondered whether we could not
21 have gone through it a bit more quickly without having any difficulties
22 between the parties. And there's always a risk that discussions on
23 whether you could speed up do not take more time than the time you could
24 gain. So I now leave it to the parties, but could you please keep this in
25 the back of your mind.
1 MR. TIEGER: Certainly, Your Honour. If I may make one brief
2 point. And certainly understand the Court's point. I would note,
3 however, that embedded within statements concerning the apprehensions of
4 Serbs in the area, as the Court described, are foreshadowing of responses
5 that are threatened or that may be taken. That is an area that is
6 somewhat distinct from perhaps the less controversial point about the
7 concerns generated by the possibility of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
8 But I will be -- when it comes to the prospect of leading us through those
9 portions, I will bear that distinction in mind and take advantage of
10 counsel's point with respect to leading questions in the specific area he
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
13 MR. TIEGER:
14 Q. Finally, Mr. Treanor, if I could ask you to just focus on the last
15 comment in the -- at the rally by Mr. Karadzic, which is found at page 6
16 of the English translation.
17 A. Yes. This is at the top of the page, before the -- the heading
18 further down the page. Dr. Karadzic is quoted as saying: "The more
19 Yugoslavia's chances drop, the higher the chances of a Greater Serbia will
20 be. All Serbs and a majority of the Muslims would vote for Serbia. We
21 are the only people in Europe at this moment fighting against fascism, and
22 our weapons are truth and justice."
23 The reference to fascism I take to be a reference to the
24 government of the HDZ in Croatia, which Serbian nationalist leaders tended
25 to brand as being a continuation of the independent state of Croatia from
1 the World War II era, that sort of thing.
2 Q. Mr. Treanor -- I'm sorry. Is there a further point you wanted to
3 make about --
4 A. Yes. I think we only have perhaps one more document on this
5 particular issue and then we're moving to a different topic, I think.
6 Q. Perhaps we could move on in this way, Mr. Treanor, if we may. You
7 spoke of references to -- or you identified references to single villages
8 being -- not being left out of Yugoslavia, to the concern that we spoke of
9 just recently of the Serbs and the SDS, about all Serbs remaining within
10 Yugoslavia. Did the SDS begin to undertake steps, concrete steps, or
11 proposals, to identify areas within Bosnia that were deemed to be Serb and
12 that would not be removed from Yugoslavia under any circumstances?
13 A. Yes. Well, I guess I was mistaken. There are two more documents.
14 This one has come out of chronological order. This document is dated the
15 23rd of February, 1991, which is before the debate in the Assembly on the
16 draft decision took place. So it was produced at the height of that
17 controversy, if I can put it that way.
18 Q. Excuse me, Mr. Treanor. For the benefit of Court and for the
19 Chamber, that document from February 23rd may be found at tab 19.
20 Mr. Treanor, does this document consider the possibility of
21 Serbian municipalities undertaking steps to remain within Yugoslavia in
22 the event of decisions by the Bosnian government which threatened the
23 independence of Bosnia?
24 A. Yes. This is the most extensive, certainly, and most concrete
25 approach to what the leaders of the SDS contemplated as a possible line of
1 action should something like the decision on sovereignty be passed and
2 that lead, in fact, to the separation of BH from Yugoslavia. They had
3 said before that they won't -- wouldn't recognise a decision, that sort of
4 thing. They had spoken of the possibility of civil war as well. But here
5 we see concrete administrative actions being contemplated should the
6 republic government, as is put in this document, cease to function, and
7 that is, no longer function in what the SDS would regard as a legal
8 manner, that is, no longer within the framework of Yugoslavia. So we have
9 a passage here highlighted at the bottom of page 2 or 3 of the
11 Q. Yes. That would be -- yes. That would be page 2 of the English
13 A. Which states that: "In order to provide for the unobstructed
14 functioning of the municipality in such a situation, that is, when the
15 republic government stops acting legally, in their view, as well as for
16 the exercise of the aforementioned rights and obligations, the
17 municipality must pass an appropriate legal document decision by which it
18 would proclaim that from the moment when such a document is passed, the
19 municipality's territory is an integral and indivisible part of
20 Yugoslavia, that in its area, only federal laws adapted to this situation
21 have legal effect. That it recognises the exclusive authority of the
22 federal organs, the SFRY Assembly, the SFRY Presidency, the federal
23 Executive Council, the JNA, security services, judicial organs, and so on,
24 in the area it covers. This action would suspend the implementation of
25 republican regulations in the areas of municipalities where such a
1 document was passed, and at the same time, it would give legitimacy to the
2 activities and measures undertaken by the federal organs."
3 I think we're on a new page now, or new paragraph: "This would
4 create a legal foundation for direct communication, such as assistance,
5 cooperation, and the like, between these municipalities and the
6 Federation, and its organs, the SFRY Assembly, Presidency, the federal
7 Executive Council, et cetera, and through them, this would provide
8 particularly for the need to engage the Yugoslav People's Army, the
9 federal secretary for National Defence, the federal secretariat of the
10 interior, the federal judicial organs," et cetera.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, may I again ask you a question, just to
12 better understand the Prosecution's case. Your question was whether this
13 document considered the possibility of Serbian municipalities undertaking
14 steps in the event of decisions by the Bosnian government which threatened
15 the independence of Bosnia.
16 From what I understood now is that steps had to be taken if
17 decisions would promote the independence of Bosnia, or is this a
19 MR. TIEGER: It was a poorly worded question, Your Honour, and I
20 should have framed it as "threatened the prospect of an independent
21 Bosnia." It might have been clearer.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
23 MR. TIEGER: Perhaps I should ask whether the witness understood
24 it in that manner.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, perhaps from his answer he was mainly
1 referring to the document rather than answering your question, I would
2 say. But he explained what the document said.
3 But it's -- I do understand that you understood the question of
4 Mr. Tieger to be what steps to be taken if decisions would be taken
5 unfavourable to the -- what the Serbs thought the right solution for
7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
9 MR. TIEGER:
10 Q. Mr. Treanor, if we could turn back a moment to the Maksimovic
11 diary and to an entry of March 18th, 1991, which may be found at tab 20 on
12 pages 10 and 11.
13 A. Yes. This is again a meeting of the SDS council on the 18th of
14 March, and this entry, at the bottom of the page, the last three bullet
15 points on that page read: "We have been talking for a long time about
16 activating the National Council, but it is still not working. Shouldn't
17 we forestall the declaration of an independent BH? Is it time to announce
18 the joining of Serbian municipalities in BH with Serbia? We will continue
19 with our parliamentary debates on BH -- will we continue with our
20 parliamentary debates on BH and Yugoslavia? How long will we remain in
21 the BH Assembly as deputies?"
22 This passage -- I don't know if there's any more on the next
23 page. "An appeal for Serbian unity is necessary now."
24 This passage reflects Maksimovic's fears of, again, the way things
25 are going and speculates on possible courses of action that the Bosnian
1 Serb leadership could take to meet those unfavourable developments.
2 Q. Mr. Treanor, beyond the contemplation of the separation of Serbian
3 municipalities from Bosnia-Herzegovina as reflected in the February 23rd
4 document and in the Maksimovic diary, did the SDS begin to undertake
5 concrete steps to mark and separate territories deemed Serbian from the
6 rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina? And in that respect, may I ask you to
7 turn to -- or may I direct the Court's attention to tab 21 of binder 1. A
8 Glas article referencing an SDS press conference in April of 1991.
9 A. Yes. Well, before we consider this document, let me answer your
10 question and provide a little bit more context for this document. We have
11 hitherto been discussing the -- what is the leitmotif in SDS policy, that
12 is, the desire to keep all the Serbs in Bosnia within Yugoslavia, or at
13 least within the same state with all the other Serbs. There was also a
14 current of opinion, not only within the SDS but including members of the
15 SDS, that the structure of governance within BH below the republic level
16 should be changed. I have referred earlier and we have seen mention made
17 in a couple of documents to the desire to re-draw municipal boundaries in
18 a sense more favourable to the Serbs.
19 There was also a desire, particularly, it seems, in Bosnian
20 Krajina and in Eastern Herzegovina, to form regional governments, that is,
21 a level of government intermediate between the municipalities and the
22 republic. Regional governments which would unite municipalities in
23 specific regions, distinguishable in some manner or another, to promote
24 the interests of those regions. This was very controversial within BH, as
25 I mentioned earlier, the SDA was opposed to any division of BH, any
1 partition of BH, and this included any such -- or it included opposition
2 to regional -- any type of regionalisation that would not take place on an
3 economic basis.
4 There had been a debate on this issue in the joint session in the
5 BH Assembly on the 12th of April, at which ultimately a resolution was
6 passed requesting that municipalities not join this movement toward
7 regionalisation that was being promoted without the approval of the
8 government, basically. The effort to form a region in Bosnian Krajina was
9 already under way, and that is what the resolution was directed at.
10 This session of the Assembly was apparently rather dramatic. The
11 SDS deputies walked out, fearing being outvoted, as indeed they ultimately
12 were. After they walked out, according to the minutes of the session, the
13 president of the Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik, basically asked for a vote of
14 confidence by the remaining deputies in himself, that is, he basically
15 offered his resignation. There was some discussion, apparently. This is
16 again according to the minutes. He eventually withdrew his offer of
17 resignation, and the resolution was passed as a -- without the votes of
18 the SDS, as a recommendation to municipalities. That is, it didn't really
19 have any particularly binding effect.
20 So that was on the 12th of April. Now, with a prologue, I think
21 we can turn to this document, which is an article from the Banja Luka
22 newspaper Glas, published on the 13th of April.
23 And here we can see some of the background to the movement toward
24 regionalisation. The article in question is a report on a press
25 conference of the local Serbian Democratic Party, at which it was stated
1 that the: "Initiative for regionalisation started on 21st January at a
2 meeting of presidents of 22 municipalities of Bosnian Krajina," of whom
3 nine were already within the -- what is called here the Banja Luka
4 municipal community, that is, the Community of Municipalities of Banja
5 Luka. "The final decision was made five days ago at a meeting of regional
6 SDS councils," as translated here.
7 The reference to the Banja Luka municipal community is a reference
8 to a Community of Municipalities of Banja Luka, which is a form of
9 cooperation among municipalities recognised with -- by the BH constitution
10 of 1974. The purpose of this cooperation would be to promote common
11 interests, economic interests primarily, tourism, that sort of thing.
12 However, these communities of municipalities were not levels of government
13 per say. They were not, in the Yugoslav terminology, socio-political
14 communities. They did -- they could not make laws, and that type of
15 thing. They were merely voluntary associations of the municipalities that
16 belonged to them. And what was happening at this point is that there was
17 a move to transform the Community of Municipalities of Banja Luka into a
18 Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina, with somewhat different
20 Q. And is it correct, just to put this -- the beginnings of this form
21 of regionalisation into context, that shortly thereafter a large rally was
22 held, also in Banja Luka, during which members of the SDA charged that
23 this was simply an effort at homogenisation of regions of
25 A. Yes. As we will see in another newspaper article, the SDS took
1 such -- the SDA took such a position and held its own mass meeting in
2 Banja Luka --
3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour --
4 A. I'm not sure of the exact date. Shortly before the 22nd of April,
6 MR. TIEGER: The article concerning that rally can be found at
7 tab 22.
8 Q. Looking at the first page, Mr. Treanor, I believe that indicates
9 that the rally was estimated at 30.000 to 50.000 people, and then a much
10 higher estimate, apparently, from the organisers of the rally. And if we
11 could look at page 3 of the English translation, as it appears on your
12 screen at the moment, perhaps we could see some of the perceptions of the
13 members of the SDA about these burgeoning efforts toward regionalisation.
14 A. Yes. Many prominent members of the SDA were present, including
15 Alija Izetbegovic. Here we have Midhat Ajanovic, stating that: "The
16 immediate reason for our gathering here is the rash decisions on
17 regionalisation, which are nothing other than attempts at national
18 homogenisation of ethnic groups."
19 And after him, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic spoke and is quoted as saying:
20 "Today, outside BH, they want to tear up Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's
21 why it needs to be said that this people in the heart of Banja Luka is
22 telling everyone: That's never going to happen."
23 Q. During that same rally, did Alija Izetbegovic address the effect
24 of efforts toward ethnic homogenisation in an ethnically diverse republic?
25 A. Yes, indeed. I think we have a quote which will illustrate that.
1 Mr. Izetbegovic is quoted as saying: "He who says that there are 51 per
2 cent Serbs here and that therefore it is a Serbian municipality is not
3 thinking well. Such a person does not mean well, for what about the 49
4 per cent of Muslims and Croats? To whom do they belong? Bosnia is
5 ethnically mixed, and there can be no division here, unless someone wants
6 disorder and bloodshed, and we don't want that."
7 So here we see the position of the SDA expressed against any
8 partition of Bosnia and their perception that the move toward
9 regionalisation as being undertaken in Banja Luka at this time is a -- was
10 step in that direction.
11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, that --
12 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you not to forget the suggestion of
13 Mr. Stewart to make a clear reference to where we find it, because we now,
14 without saying, we moved back from page 3 to page 2 in the middle of that.
15 So if you would please indicate always where we are at that very moment,
16 not specifically for us, but perhaps for those who have to read the
17 transcript later. Yes, Mr. Tieger.
18 MR. TIEGER:
19 Q. Within a short time after those rallies were held, Mr. Treanor,
20 was a Community of Municipalities formed, and did the documents at tabs 23
21 and 24 reflect that?
22 A. Yes, indeed. The key date here seems to be the 29th of April,
23 1991, at which a meeting was held in Banja Luka which inaugurated the new
24 Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina. I think the first
25 document we have is the agreement on the formation of that Community of
1 Municipalities. This is basically an agreement entered into by the
2 municipalities that wished to join it.
3 Q. And if we turn to page 3 -- excuse me. If we turn to page 3 of
4 the English translation of the agreement, Article 9 of the agreement, can
5 you tell us the significance of the provisions with respect to All
6 People's Defence.
7 A. Yes. Looking at Article 9 of the agreement, we can see that
8 the -- this new Community of Municipalities is assigning itself important
9 functions in the area of national defence, including, for instance, in
10 time of war, or under imminent threat of war, to organise All People's
11 Defence in the territory of the Community of Municipalities.
12 These types of powers were not foreseen by the constitution of BH
13 for communities of municipalities, so this article in the agreement sets
14 this Community of Municipalities out as being of a different -- in a
15 different order from the ones that had existed before.
16 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you also a clarification. Article 9 is the
17 only one who appears as a quote. Is that a mistake or is that - at least
18 in the English translation - or has it any specific meaning?
19 THE WITNESS: It is in quotation marks in the original as well.
20 For what reason, I don't know.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
22 MR. TIEGER:
23 Q. Mr. Treanor, looking at tab 24, is a similar provision with
24 respect to defence, found in the statute of the Association of
1 A. I'm sorry. If I could interrupt, Mr. Tieger.
2 Your Honour, I do have a copy of another version of this
3 agreement, and the version -- the second version that I have in fact bears
4 the signatures and seals of many of the, if not all, of the 17
5 municipalities that are adhering to this agreement. And in that version,
6 there are no quotation marks in Article 9.
7 JUDGE ORIE: So it might still be a mistake.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. Just looking quickly at the statute of the Association of
10 Municipalities, found at tab 24, in particular at Article 16, which is
11 found at page 5 of the English translation, does that reflect a similar
12 focus on the defence issue and the assertion of the power to monitor and
13 coordinate activities for defence?
14 A. Yes. And I would just add that the statute is the document which
15 sets out the purpose and the structure in the organs that are formed for
16 the Community of Municipalities. And Article 16 states that:
17 "The Association of Municipalities shall monitor the situation and
18 coordinate activities for the organisation and implementation of
19 preparations for All People's Defence, in accordance with the law,
20 municipal defence plans, and the republican defence plan."
21 Q. The next two documents, Mr. Treanor, reflect the elections of the
22 president and vice-president of the Community of Municipalities. Can you
23 just tell us quickly who they were.
24 A. Yes. On the 29th of April, at the founding meeting, Mr. Vojo
25 Kupresanin - if we can blow that up - in Article 1 of this decision was
1 elected president of the Assembly of that community. Mr. Kupresanin was
2 an SDS deputy in the Chamber of Citizens of the BH Assembly.
3 And then the next document indicates that on the same day,
4 Mr. Radoslav Brdjanin, who was also an SDS deputy in the Assembly of BH,
5 in the Chamber of Municipalities, was elected as the first vice-president
6 of the Assembly of the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina.
7 JUDGE ORIE: In the transcript the date appears as the 29th. I do
8 not remember exactly what you said, because I see 26th as --
9 THE WITNESS: I may have misspoken. I'm sorry, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: It seems that voting took place on the 25th and the
11 decision is dated the 26th.
12 THE WITNESS: The 26th, yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Mr. Treanor, the next document you've selected is a document
16 produced by the Deputies' Club of the SDS, entitled stances on the
17 resolution of the Yugoslav state crisis and the position of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia. That document may be found at tab 27.
19 I note you've highlighted a number of portions. Can you tell us
20 about the context in which that document was created and the significance
21 of the highlights you've indicated.
22 A. Yes. Getting back to the controversy about the status of BH
23 within Yugoslavia, the issue was coming back to the Assembly which was
24 scheduled to have a meeting later in June - and I can't remember the
25 precise date - to discuss the issue of the status of BH within Yugoslavia.
1 So once again, in connection with that occasion, the Club of Deputies has
2 produced its own paper stating its position on that matter.
3 Q. And if we could turn to page 2 of the English translation. I
4 believe you find the top of that page highlighted, the first paragraph.
5 A. Yes. Here we find the SDS deputies beginning their statement on
6 their position: "Faced with a dire crisis of the state of Yugoslavia,
7 which is threatening to change violently the fate of the Serbian and other
8 Yugoslav nations, Serbian deputies to the SRBH Assembly as legally elected
9 representatives of the Serbian people hereby communicate to the Yugoslav
10 and international public their stances, positions, on the resolution of
11 the Yugoslav state crisis and the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
13 Q. At the very bottom of that same page, another highlight appears.
14 A. Here we see a statement of their position, to the
15 effect that: "No nation can be forcibly kept within the common Yugoslav
16 state, nor can it be led out of it, in full or in part."
17 Q. Just for clarification: The use of the term or the
18 word "violently" in the first paragraph, and the word "forcibly" in the
19 highlighted section at the bottom of the page refers to what?
20 A. Well, I would take that as -- let me say, I'd have to speculate a
21 bit, but I would take that within the context of all documents that we've
22 seen to be a reference to the great fear of the SDS leaders and the --
23 their deputies, that is, the fear of being outvoted, that they would have
24 a decision imposed upon them by the other deputies, a decision which they
25 would have believed very directly closely affected the fate of Serbian
1 nation and therefore one that they could not accept, a decision which, as
2 Dr. Karadzic, I believe, earlier had expressed it, could lead to civil
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger --
5 THE WITNESS: As a minimum, I would take that to mean having a
6 decision imposed upon them by majority vote, by being outvoted.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, if it would be possible to finish this in
8 two or three minutes, fine; otherwise, we'd have the break now rather
9 than -- but I can't see how many highlighted portions will still come.
10 MR. TIEGER: I believe it is, Your Honour, and I'll hazard an
11 effort to do that.
12 Q. Mr. Treanor, on the next -- there are three clips remaining, three
13 highlighted portions remaining to be found at the bottom of page 6 and on
14 page 7. And do those -- can you run us through those highlights quickly,
15 the first of which refers to the solution of regionalisation, the second
16 of which refers to the insistence on remaining in Yugoslavia, and the
17 third of which suggests that consequences will flow from any effort to the
19 A. Yes. In the first highlighted portion, we can see reference to
20 the regionalisation issue in a very interesting manner. It states
21 that: "In republics which have more than one state-founding nation,
22 citizens and nations may proceed to organise themselves into regions based
23 on economic, cultural, information-related, ethnic, and/or other
24 interests. Regions, cantons, provinces, et cetera, may have certain
25 powers in terms of legislation, justice, and administration and powers to
1 regulate public utility services, as in some modern European countries."
2 Now, here the issue of regionalisation is being very closely tied,
3 and indeed directly tied, to the issue of the ethnic composition of the
4 given republic. It only contemplates the forming of such regions within
5 multi-ethnic republics, and indeed it takes as one of the criteria for the
6 formation of such regions to be ethnicity.
7 In the second highlighted portion, we see their view that: "In
8 this respect, the Serbian people in BH are in a satisfactory position
9 because they now share one state with other parts of the Serbian nation
10 and can continue to exercise this historical and natural right. There is
11 no way apart from brutal force in which the Serbian people in BH could be
12 separated from Yugoslavia and deprived of the protection of their
13 interests in the federal state."
14 This is a reflection of one of the -- what the Serbs had
15 originally regarded, the Bosnian Serb leadership, the SDS leadership, as
16 one of their trumps, if you will, the fact that they were defending the
17 status quo, that is, Bosnia was within Yugoslavia and they simply wanted
18 to remain within Yugoslavia, and so it should be easy for them -- easier
19 for them to keep it in Yugoslavia than for the others to take it out.
20 That is one reason why they were so afraid of outvoting, because that, of
21 course, was the way that that could be done.
22 And then finally we read: "Any departure from the democratic way
23 of resolving Yugoslavia's and Bosnia-Herzegovina's state crisis and
24 diversion to a course of violence and imposition of one's will upon
25 others," that's again a reference to the outvoting, "would entail a
1 historical responsibility and other consequences that no one will be able
2 to avoid."
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we now silently move to page 7, the last --
4 previous paragraph, if I -- no. I'm sorry, I'm making a mistake. Where
5 are we?
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I may. This portion of the document
7 to which Mr. Treanor just referred is found on page 7.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 MR. TIEGER: The previous two portions were found on page 6.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Have we gone through them, Mr. Tieger, at this
11 moment? Because I think that both the technicians and interpreters, we
12 really have to stop.
13 MR. TIEGER: This would be an appropriate time, Your Honour, yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would we return to this binder? Because we've
15 gone through one binder now. I have the second one on my desk downstairs.
16 Would it be wise to take this one and bring the next one?
17 MR. TIEGER: Exactly right, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for your guidance. We'll adjourn
19 until 6.00 o'clock.
20 --- Recess taken at 5.37 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 6.01 p.m.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 Q. Mr. Treanor, if we could turn quickly to the next document,
25 entitled, "What the Serbs propose," which is the first document found in
1 binder 2 at tab 28. Is that document effectively a formalisation of the
2 document you discussed just before the break, that is, the stances on
4 A. Well, I wouldn't say a formalisation. It's a dissemination of the
5 contents of the previous document. This is a pamphlet which was published
6 in both Serbian and English, the greater portion of the pamphlet contains
7 the document we previously considered. And I'd just like to conclude our
8 consideration of that document by saying that on the 12th of June, that
9 is, two days after that document was dated, according to the minutes of
10 the BH Assembly, that document and similar documents from the other
11 Deputies' Clubs were submitted to the Assembly, but it was decided among
12 the leaders of the clubs that there would be no debate on the issue. So
13 that concluded that particular chapter in the consideration of the status
14 of BH within the BH Assembly.
15 Q. Can we then turn to the next document you selected. That's found
16 at tab 29. And that would be a transcript of the session of the first
17 anniversary of the founding assembly of the SDS.
18 A. Yes, that's correct. This is the stenographic record of the
19 second assembly of the SDS, held one year to the day after the first
20 assembly. At this assembly, reports were given on the development of
21 party activities over the previous year. Dr. Karadzic gave an address,
22 addressing, among other things, the general political situation. There
23 was a lot of discussion of regionalisation within the party context
24 especially, and finally, the Assembly elected officers in the various
25 boards and committees of the party for the coming year.
1 Q. Can we turn quickly, then, to some of the highlighted portions of
2 that document. The first of which may be found at page 15 of the English
3 translation and will simultaneously appear on the screen.
4 First, Mr. Treanor, can you indicate who is speaking.
5 A. At this point, Dr. Karadzic is speaking.
6 Q. And in that selected portion, which is the fourth paragraph of the
7 English translation, Dr. Karadzic speaks of slowing down and stopping the
8 secessionist aspirations. I believe that's also found at page 16 in the
9 B/C/S version.
10 A. Yes. I can't see which paragraph it is on that page, but it
11 appears to be in the middle of the page, basically the fourth paragraph.
12 "In reviewing the achievements of the party over the previous year, we
13 have achieved this: We have slowed down and stopped the secessionist
14 aspirations that are still alive to this day and which will not be given
15 up lightly. But they will not find it so easy to win and to separate
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia."
17 Q. In the next highlighted portion found at page 25 of the English
18 transcript, Dr. Karadzic speaks about the idea of regionalisation and its
19 role within the aspirations of the SDS from the outset. Can you comment
20 on that, please. And that would be found in the first full paragraph of
21 the English translation, at page 25.
22 A. Dr. Karadzic, according to the stenographic notes, states that:
23 "Those who attend our afternoon session will be able to hear a part of
24 last year's report, in which we presented a general objection to the
25 regionalisation and territorialisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the
1 war, which was carried out consistently to the detriment of the Serbian
2 people. Thus, the idea of the re-regionalisation of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina had been present among the creators of SDS ideas from the very
4 start and the Main Board has always taken that into account. All the
5 ideas on regionalisation have originated from the Main Board, on
6 regionalisation of the party, and others are also from the Main Board
8 I have to say one thing. We have to preserve the strength of the
9 party, not to give in to power-grabbing impulses and little Napoleons who
10 are trying to do things to will harm the Serbian people."
11 In this paragraph the reference is to regionalisation of the
12 party, which I indicated earlier was abolished by the new party statutes,
13 and there was opposition to that among many of the delegates to the
14 Assembly who wanted to indeed see more powerful SDS regional boards,
15 comparable to the communities of municipalities which were now being
16 formed, presumably to cover the same areas. But Dr. Karadzic was opposed
17 to that.
18 Q. The next highlighted section can be found at page 26 of the
19 English transcript. And on page 29 of the B/C/S transcript, number 4, I
21 A. Yes. Beginning with the fourth full paragraph on that page of the
22 translation: "If someone violates the constitutions of BH and Yugoslavia,
23 then we no longer have any obligations toward the constitution and then we
24 will do what Messrs. Vukic and Kupresanin have announced. Not until then.
25 Another party has to violate the BH Constitution, to try to effect the
1 secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if they do so, then we will
2 prepare the democratic response of the Serbian people on all lines and in
3 every respect."
4 Q. And the reference to Vukic and Kupresanin --
5 A. Yes. I think the reference here is to the dispute about
6 regionalisation. One of the arguments that Mr. -- or Dr. Karadzic uses
7 against the establishment of powerful regional boards within the party is
8 that the other regional -- the other party boards are structured the way
9 the government -- the levels of government are structured. You have a
10 municipal board and a municipal government, a republic board and a
11 republican government. There is no regional government in Bosnia yet.
12 The communities of municipalities were not, as I indicated before,
13 regional governments. They might have had aspirations in that direction.
14 Mr. Vukic and Mr. Kupresanin among such people, but they were not -- did
15 not yet have that status, and Mr. Karadzic is not willing to see them
16 elevated to that status until the time was right. And until then, he
17 believes that the regional party boards have no place.
18 Q. And in the next highlighted portion, found -- before going to
19 that, actually, let me turn to the next one in sequence, which is found at
20 page 27 in the English translation, in which Dr. Karadzic again emphasises
21 the importance of the local boards and the need to maintain contact
22 through the local boards to the community. That reference can be found at
23 the top paragraph of page 27.
24 A. Dr. Karadzic is indicated as saying that: "And we keep saying
25 that the main place of work for the SDS is the local board, the local
1 board being the level below the municipality, in fact. That is where we
2 are in touch with the people. We are not in touch with the people in the
3 Main Board, but in the local boards, where every member of the local board
4 has to be in touch with 10 to 20 Serbian households, to be their liaison
5 officer in good times and in bad, through thick and thin."
6 This is similar to the statement we saw earlier in the interview
7 at the end of 1990, about the number of households that they were in touch
8 with through their liaison officers.
9 Q. And if we could turn to the next highlight. This is found on
10 pages 29 and 30 of the English translation, last paragraph of page 29 and
11 then continuing on to page 30. Is that a further iteration of the policy
12 of not moving forward until steps have been taken by other parties?
13 A. Yes. Here we see Dr. Karadzic again stating his view that it's
14 necessary to go slow, so to speak, with the regionalisation process. He
15 says: "I have to say here that the policy of the Serbian Democratic Party
16 is not to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina until others bring it to that
17 point. The SDS furthermore does not approve of the creation of new
18 federal units before the constitutional and legal system has broken down.
19 This cannot be done under our aegis. Those who want to do things that are
20 not in the platform and the Statute of the SDS and the SDS views must form
21 their own party. We had such examples in Banja Luka. A part of our Main
22 Board broke away and created something they called the homeland front, not
23 Kupresanin's front but some other homeland front."
24 And to the next page, perhaps. "Which is doing stupid things,
25 beating its head against a brick, pushing forward without any political
1 logic and causing great political damage to the Serbian people."
2 The reference here is to -- I believe to the desire of certain
3 people in Bosnian Krajina and in Croatian Krajina to unite the two
4 Krajinas and to form a new republic, if you will, of Yugoslavia. I might
5 add at this point that this meeting took place, as was stated, on the 12th
6 of July, 1991. Hostilities had broken out in Slovenia and Croatia after
7 the declarations of independence, technically, I think. I'm not sure what
8 the name is, but they basically declared independence, on the 25th of
9 June, 1991. So the whole situation has now changed and we're entering
10 into a much more intense period of political activity for that reason.
11 Q. And as we move on in the transcript of the anniversary session to
12 the next highlight, are certain leaders of the SDS lauded by the party for
13 their efforts over the last year?
14 A. Yes. Dr. Karadzic --
15 Q. Sorry, Mr. Treanor. I should indicate the page number in the
16 English translation, which is 55 in that version.
17 A. He gives some interesting remarks on the leadership of the party,
18 and its most prominent figures. In this particular paragraph it indicates
19 that he said: "We nevertheless have to name two of the delegates who have
20 emerged as eminent political figures of their people, who are the flowers
21 of the new emerging political leadership. These are Momcilo Krajisnik,
22 Speaker of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Professor Vojislav
23 Maksimovic, President of the Delegates' Club."
24 Q. Mr. Treanor, you indicated earlier the elections to the Main Board
25 that took place in July of 1991. If we turn to the next two highlighted
1 portions found on page 92 and 93 of the English transcript, do we see
2 reflections of that election?
3 A. Yes. On the first page, if we could blow up the middle of the
4 page a little bit, we can see that Momcilo Krajisnik received 212 votes,
5 which was almost equal to the total number of people attending the
6 Assembly and, if I'm not mistaken, is the highest number received of any
7 of the candidates. The candidates to the Main Board were nominated by
8 regions, geographical regions, which operated for this purpose, to ensure
9 territorial distribution within the Main Board, and the Main Board itself
10 nominated a slate of, so to speak, at-large candidates. And Mr. Krajisnik
11 was elected on that slate.
12 Q. Finally, the document shown on the screen now, located at page 93
13 of the English translation, is a list of all those elected to the Main
14 Board on that date.
15 A. Yes. This is the list of the 45, now 45 members of the Main Board
16 that were elected on that day. This is the official report within the
17 stenographic notes of the results of the election to the Main Board.
18 Q. Mr. Treanor, can I ask you to turn now to an intercepted telephone
19 conversation between Dr. Karadzic and a reporter, in which he discusses
21 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honours, the transcript is going to be found
22 at -- excuse me. The transcript will be found at tab 3 of the intercept
23 binder. However, this needs to be given an exhibit, as do the rest of the
25 THE REGISTRAR: The CD containing the intercepts will be
1 Prosecution Exhibit number P67, and the transcripts P67A.
2 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honours, I indicated when we began the
3 examination, we've made some effort to improve the visibility of the -- of
4 particularly the transcript portion of the intercepts. Of course, we'd
5 welcome any feedback from the Court, but we hope this will represent an
6 improvement and make it easier for the Court to watch it on screen.
7 [Intercept played]
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. Mr. Treanor, any comments before we move on to the second --
10 A. Yes. I'd like to certainly comment on that. First of all, we've
11 gone back a little bit in time, as the Court may have noticed. This is a
12 telephone interview which took place on the 24th of June. That is the day
13 before the events in Slovenia and Croatia that I referred to earlier, that
14 is, on the very eve of the outbreak of hostilities in the former
15 Yugoslavia. We see Dr. Karadzic reiterating the point that certainly as
16 regards the Serbs in Croatia, it is not a question of any type of
17 secession, but rather -- from Croatia, but rather, they are in Yugoslavia
18 and they will remain in Yugoslavia, as their own entity, however. The
19 project of Mr. Babic to join the two Krajinas is mentioned, and he says
20 that he's against that for the moment, since there are no conditions for
21 that, since BH is still also in Yugoslavia, and he would like to see the
22 whole of BH remain in Yugoslavia.
23 So this is a succinct statement of his vision of the situation at
24 that point in time. The Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina in Croatia
25 remaining in Yugoslavia as a federal entity linked to the rest of the
1 country via the territory of Bosnian Krajina, but Bosnian Krajina
2 remaining certainly within Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole of that
3 republic remaining in Yugoslavia.
4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, a second portion of the intercept to be
5 played can be found at page 3 of the translation.
6 [Intercept played]
7 THE WITNESS: Here we see reiterated the same position, that as
8 far as Croatia is concerned, it's not a question -- it's a question of
9 Croatia leaving Yugoslavia, but not a question of the Serbs in Croatia,
10 the SAO Krajina, leaving Croatia, because they're going to stay in
11 Yugoslavia, because they're in Yugoslavia now.
12 MR. TIEGER:
13 Q. Mr. Treanor, I'd like to turn, then, to an intercept of June 20th,
14 1991, which can be found at tab 2 of the intercept binder. And can you
15 tell us who the participants in this conversation are.
16 A. Yes, certainly. The participants are Momcilo Krajisnik and
17 Radovan Karadzic.
18 [Intercept played]
19 MR. TIEGER:
20 Q. Mr. Treanor in the course of your comments about this intercept,
21 can you identify some of the other persons who are mentioned during that
23 A. Yes, certainly. This is obviously the first type -- the first
24 such conversation we've heard, and I'd just like to observe that
25 Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic speak to each other in a very familiar
1 manner. They use the familiar form of "you" to each other. There are
2 several expletives in here. The exact nature of what it is Mr. Krajisnik
3 wants to discuss with Dr. Karadzic is not clear, but it's clear that he
4 wants to meet with him on what he regards as an important matter. And he
5 indicates, in fact, that he has already arranged a meeting with certain
6 other individuals on a different matter. And those individuals are
7 Mr. Simovic, who is the -- or was the highest-ranking SDS designated
8 member of the government of BH. He was a deputy prime minister. Also
9 mentioned are Vito Zepinic, who was the deputy minister of internal
10 affairs of BH, also a SDS-designated functionary, and Momcilo Mandic, who
11 was also an SDS-designated functionary in the BH Ministry of Internal
12 Affairs. He was an assistant minister, I believe.
13 Q. And is it correct that your report identifies two other
14 intercepts, during which Dr. Koljevic and Mr. Mandic are contacted by
15 Mr. Karadzic in connection with this same meeting?
16 A. Yes. There are a series of conversations on that day which all
17 revolve around setting up the same meeting among the various individuals
19 Q. Can we turn, then, to the next intercepted conversation, found at
20 tab 4 of the intercept binder. The portion of the conversation which will
21 be shown and heard on the screen appears at page 2, or begins at page 2 of
22 the English transcript.
23 A. I'm sorry. Could you identify this conversation by date and ...
24 Q. I'm sorry, Mr. Treanor. This is the intercepted conversation of
25 July 8th, involving Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic.
1 A. Yes.
2 MR. TIEGER: I would ask the booth for some assistance. We're not
3 getting any sound. We'll need to start the intercept over again.
4 [Intercept played]
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Mr. Treanor, your comments about that intercept, please.
7 A. Well, this is the first conversation we've heard that directly
8 reflects the new wartime situation that I referred to earlier.
9 Mr. Milosevic is obviously very anxious about the military situation and
10 is enlisting Dr. Karadzic's assistance, obviously willing assistance, in
11 getting manpower for the JNA and various operations which are in planning.
12 And Dr. Karadzic, in turn, asks him for assistance in getting weapons for
13 certain of his municipalities, and Mr. Milosevic seems to -- or does
14 indicate that it's not a problem. General Uzelac is being referred to is
15 the commander -- or was the commander of the JNA corps headquartered in
16 Banja Luka, the JNA 5th Corps, which took a very prominent role in the
17 military operations against Croatia in the northern part of Croatia.
18 Q. Mr. Treanor, does your report refer to other intercepted telephone
19 conversations reflecting contact between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic,
20 General Uzelac and others in connection with mobilisation and arming?
21 A. Yes, it does. There are any number of conversations during this
22 period which revolve around the issue of mobilisation, that is, getting
23 manpower for the JNA to prosecute its operations in Croatia.
24 Q. Mr. Treanor, can I ask you to turn next --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Before you move to the next subject, Mr. Tieger,
1 could I just ask you, Mr. Treanor: In the transcript, the words appear
2 that something is of strategic importance for the future RAM. And then
3 the question is: You know what RAM is. And the other participant seems
4 to know. I do not know. Do you know?
5 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I do not know. I could only speculate
6 from the context as well as you could.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. Mr. Treanor, could we turn to the next document, which is found at
10 tab 30 of binder 2, the minutes of a July conference on preservation of
11 lands. Before we move on to the highlighted portion of those minutes, can
12 you provide us with a quick overview of that -- the nature of that
14 A. Yes, indeed. And I'd like to preface my remarks by saying that
15 these minutes are reflective of the new period in the organisational life
16 of the party that I referred to before. We now start to get more minutes
17 of meetings, in particular, meetings of large groups of officials meeting
18 with Dr. Karadzic. This is, if I'm not mistaken, other than the Assembly
19 stenographic notes themselves, of the first meeting -- the first such
20 meeting of which we have a record. The title of the conference sounds a
21 little humdrum, to say the least, but what is going on here is discussion
22 of the issue of the ownership of property and the desire of the SDS
23 leadership to prevent non-Serbs from buying property and moving into what
24 they regard as Serbian areas of BH.
25 Q. And if we turn to the highlighted portion, which is found on
1 page 3 of the English translation, does Mr. Krajisnik express his views on
2 that issue?
3 A. Yes, indeed. Mr. Krajisnik has indicated from these notes as
4 saying that: "The main goal of this meeting is to be acquainted with the
5 SDS action on land protection. Land around big cities is the most serious
6 problem. These parts are overcrowded with men from Sandzak and other
7 nations." Sandzak being a heavily Muslim populated area of the Republic
8 of Serbia. "That is the reason why no one has a right to sell land and
9 the other villagers should point the finger at one doing it. This is the
10 most important task now."
11 Q. Can we move, then, to the next intercepted telephone conversation,
12 which is found at tab 5 of the intercept binder. And that would be a
13 conversation of 18 July 1991. First, please, Mr. Treanor, if you could
14 identify the participants.
15 A. Yes. This is another conversation between Dr. Karadzic and
16 Mr. Krajisnik.
17 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, the portion of the intercepted
18 conversation that you will hear is found on page 2 of the English
20 [Intercept played]
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. Any comments on that conversation, Mr. Treanor?
23 A. Yes, indeed. In this conversation, Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik
24 discuss a number of things, such as newspaper interviews, and so forth,
25 and then they finally discuss, as you saw, the setting up of a couple of
1 meetings. Now, the one meeting which Mr. Krajisnik is anxious to set up
2 and have Dr. Karadzic come to is with people from MUP, that is, the
3 Ministry of Internal Affairs. He says, "Our personnel." This is, I
4 think, a reference to the problems which the SDS perceive as arising
5 within MUP in the area of relations with their coalition partners. Under
6 the inter-party agreement that I referred to earlier, the SDS would have
7 been entitled to certain positions within the Ministry of Internal
8 Affairs, including its regional offices. They were dissatisfied with the
9 way this was being carried out, and in the -- beginning in the summer of
10 1991, this got to be an increasing -- increasingly frequent topic of
11 conversation among the SDS leaders on the telephone. We saw the previous
12 conversation at which Mr. Zepinic and Mr. Mandic were present, and they're
13 the two leading Serbian members of -- or two of the leading Serbian
14 members of MUP, Zepinic being the deputy minister and the highest-placed
15 one. So this -- the one meeting, apparently, relates to that topic of the
16 personnel issues within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
17 The other meeting with Mr. Lejovac - I'm not certain what the
18 topic of that would be - but I could just inform the Court that Professor
19 Lejovac was the head of the SDS political council, that is, its body of
20 outside advisors.
21 Q. Just to assist the Court in understanding the tenor and nature of
22 these conversations: Is there evidence in the body of intercepts that
23 Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Karadzic, and others were aware that their
24 conversations were being overheard and recorded?
25 A. Oh, yes, indeed. Not only within the conversations, but there are
1 other documents where they -- reference is made to that fact. And as we
2 saw in the previous conversation with Mr. Milosevic, he had the same
3 feeling, and there was another occasion, I'm not sure if we're going to be
4 hearing that one, in which Mr. Milosevic asked Dr. Karadzic whether he had
5 a secure phone, and they got into a discussion of the difference between
6 secure phones in Bosnia and Belgrade, this sort of thing. But yes,
7 certainly, they were all acutely aware of that.
8 MR. TIEGER: The next intercept is found at tab 6 of the intercept
9 binder. That is a conversation of 28 July 1991, involving Mr. Karadzic
10 and Mr. Brdjanin. Your Honour, the first portion of that intercept that
11 will be played begins at page 14 of the English translation.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 [Intercept played]
14 MR. TIEGER:
15 Q. Before we move on to the second clip from that intercept,
16 Mr. Treanor, if we could have your comments, if any, on that portion of
17 the conversation.
18 A. Yes. Well, here again we see -- well, here we see, now I think
19 for the first time in the conversations we're reviewing, Dr. Karadzic
20 speaking with a local leader, that is, with Mr. Brdjanin, who is one of
21 the deputies in the Assembly and, as we saw, is the -- at that time was
22 the first vice-president of the Assembly of the new Community of
23 Municipalities in Banja Luka. And he is trying to restrain Mr. Brdjanin's
24 enthusiasm for, in this case, having a referendum, presumably to show that
25 the Serbs want to stay within Yugoslavia and -- or -- I'm not sure exactly
1 what the point is. Have Bosnian Krajina at least stay within Yugoslavia.
2 And Mr. Karadzic is indicating that -- you don't need a referendum for
3 that. They're already in Yugoslavia. And we have a strategy mapped out
4 already for any moves that may be taken by people to take Bosnia out of
5 Yugoslavia and we're ready, we have plans to meet that, so just please be
7 Q. Just to clarify our use of terms: I know you've used the
8 term "local" in connection with local boards, being a unit below the
9 municipalities, and we've referred to republic, regional, municipal, and
10 local. Can you clarify, then, your use of the term "local leader" in
11 referring to Mr. Brdjanin.
12 A. Yes. Very good. I was hesitating what to say. I think it would
13 be fair, however, to call Mr. Brdjanin is regional leader. Without
14 getting into the technicalities of what a region is, he was a deputy in
15 the Assembly from one of the municipalities in Bosnian Krajina, but as I
16 mentioned was also an officer in the Assembly of the Community of
17 Municipalities. And I certainly didn't use the word "local" to mean at
18 the level the governance below the municipality. He's one of the regional
19 leaders in Bosnian Krajina.
20 MR. TIEGER: And I believe we just have time for the -- just
21 enough time for the last clip of that particular conversation, which can
22 be found beginning at page 16 of the English transcript, I believe.
23 [Intercept played]
24 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Treanor, I'm reluctant to ask you to compress
25 your comments. We're actually out of time, unless the -- so I leave it to
1 the Court as to whether or not we reserve your comments for when we resume
2 or take them now.
3 JUDGE ORIE: If you could do it in one or two minutes, we'd like
4 to hear it now. If not, then we'd rather wait.
5 THE WITNESS: I think we'd better leave it for Monday, since
6 there's a bit of context to this.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Treanor, I'd like to instruct you, as
8 I did before, that you not speak with anyone about your testimony given
9 and still to be given in this Court.
10 We'll adjourn until next Monday, in the afternoon, a quarter
11 past 2.00, in Courtroom I, this same courtroom.
12 If there's nothing else to be raised by the parties at this
13 moment, we'll adjourn until then.
14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,
15 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of
16 February, 2004, at 2.15 p.m.