1 Monday, 23 February 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus

7 Momcilo Krajisnik.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

9 Good afternoon to everyone. I see that in the Defence team

10 Mr. Stewart is not present at this moment.

11 MS. LOUKAS: That's correct, Your Honour. Mr. Stewart will not be

12 here today.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 And on the Prosecution's team, I see you, Mr. Tieger, Mr. Resch,

15 and --

16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we will be assisted today by Mr. Charles

17 Curilan.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much.

19 May I take it that the Prosecution is ready to continue

20 examination-in-chief of Mr. Treanor?

21 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, we are. I'd like to raise one

22 preliminary matter before we do.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please do so.

24 MR. TIEGER: And that is with respect to Mr. Hasanovic.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

1 MR. TIEGER: It turns out that Mr. Hasanovic will not be able to

2 secure his travel documents in sufficient time to be here this week. We

3 have advised the Defence this morning of that development and wanted to

4 alert the Court.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As I indicated before, it seems that it's not

6 Mr. Hasanovic who doesn't want to appear, but it's rather documents he

7 would need. Whenever the Prosecution, and I repeat that, would need the

8 assistance of the Chamber to see whether this problem could be solved, the

9 Chamber is ready to hear whatever you would ask us.

10 MR. TIEGER: We're grateful, Your Honour. Just to clarify: I

11 believe that -- it seems apparent that he will be able to obtain the

12 documents. It's just not in sufficient time. We expect him to have them

13 by the end of the week.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Any further issues? If not, Mr. Usher, may I

15 ask you to escort Mr. Treanor into the courtroom.

16 [The witness entered court]

17 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Treanor.

18 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Your examination will be continued, but before I give

20 an opportunity to Mr. Tieger to proceed, I'd like to remind you that

21 you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've made at the beginning

22 of your testimony.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, of course.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

25 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR [Resumed]

1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Examined by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]

3 Q. Mr. Treanor, at the conclusion of Friday's session, we played for

4 the Court clip 2 of an intercept dated 28 July 1991, and we deferred your

5 comments on that clip until today, because you indicated it required some

6 contextualisation.

7 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, I might add for the Court's benefit

8 that that particular intercept is to be found, or at least the English

9 translation of that intercept is to be found at tab 6 in the intercept

10 binder.

11 Q. Mr. Treanor, if I could ask you now for your comments on that

12 portion of the intercept.

13 A. I wonder if it would be a good idea to play it again to refresh

14 everyone's memory.

15 MR. TIEGER: With the Court's permission, we can do so.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps that's not a bad idea.

17 MR. TIEGER: We're ready to start whenever the booth is ready and

18 we have sound.

19 [Intercept played](no translation)

20 MR. TIEGER: And if we could move to the second clip, please.

21 [Intercept played] (no translation)

22 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Treanor.

23 A. There's certainly a lot in that second clip. One thing that

24 emerges in there which came out in the first clip as well is the idea that

25 the SDS would like to keep the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina within

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1 Yugoslavia, and on the one hand, Dr. Karadzic tries to restrain some of

2 Mr. Brdjanin's enthusiasm for regionalisation in order to make sure that

3 Mr. Brdjanin keeps his eye on the ball, so to speak, that is, on the whole

4 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, in discussions with the

5 Muslim leadership, he's indicating that if they won't agree to that, to

6 keeping the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia, then they, the

7 SDS leadership, has a response to that planned and seems to be assuring

8 Mr. Brdjanin that that's -- they know what they're doing and they have

9 things planned out.

10 Now, I'd like to add to that, which is why I didn't want to get

11 into this Friday afternoon, that the occasion for Mr. Brdjanin's phone

12 call, as indicated at the beginning of that conversation, and as indicated

13 at the beginning of that second clip, which might have been a bit obscure

14 to listeners coming in at that point, is that Mr. Brdjanin is disturbed by

15 something that Mr. Simovic said. Mr. Simovic, as I mentioned earlier, was

16 the highest-ranking SDS designated member of the government of BH, to the

17 effect that there would be no regionalisation, which of course is not

18 Mr. Brdjanin's understanding of the situation. Mr. Karadzic indicates to

19 him that, you know, the negotiation is going on and you probably said it

20 for that reason, and anyways don't worry too much about him because he is

21 not in the party. He is not a party leader; he's a government leader.

22 Now, what was happening at that time, about this time - and the

23 date of this conversation again is the 28th of July - is that negotiations

24 or discussions were under way or about to get under way between the SDS

25 leadership and Muslim leaders on the future of BH within Yugoslavia.

1 These negotiations are a bit obscure to me. We don't have much

2 documentation directly relating to them, although I think there are one or

3 two documents that we'll see very shortly which refer to them.

4 On the one hand, there seem to have been more or less continuous

5 contacts with the leadership of the SDA, in particular, Mr. Izetbegovic.

6 On the other hand, at precisely this time, the SDS leadership was engaged

7 with contacts with the leadership of the Muslim Bosniak organisation,

8 which was another Bosnian Muslim political party. They only had two seats

9 in the Assembly of BH, were not a very powerful party, therefore; however,

10 they were a Muslim party. And in fact, on the 30th of July, there was a

11 meeting or a press conference in Belgrade, featuring Dr. Karadzic and

12 Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic, who was the leader of the MBO, the Muslim Bosniak

13 Organisation, with a view to an agreement between those two organisations.

14 Those discussions apparently continued and, as I say, I think

15 we're going to see some more documents relating to that.

16 One of the things that apparently the MBO was against, as was the

17 SDA, was regionalisation. So that was kind of -- was going to be a topic

18 of conversation during those discussions, and I can only suppose that

19 Dr. Karadzic didn't want at that time to come out too firmly, publicly, in

20 favour of regionalisation, which is something that they were going to be

21 negotiating with Muslim leaders.

22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, the next document is found at tab 31 of

23 binder 2. And it refers to a meeting of 12 August 1991.

24 Q. Mr. Treanor, that document is now on the screen as well, with the

25 first paragraph highlighted. Can you tell us about that meeting and who

1 was in attendance, please.

2 A. Yes. This meeting took place in Belgrade on the 12th of August,

3 1991, pursuant to an invitation issued by Slobodan Milosevic, as president

4 of Serbia, to representatives of, of course his own republic, but also

5 representatives of Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to attend talks

6 in Belgrade about the future of Yugoslavia, in particular, a future

7 Yugoslavia which might only include those three republics. This is an

8 idea which became known as the Belgrade Initiative. In the first

9 paragraph here, we can see a list of the attendees.

10 As the Court will notice, Montenegro and Serbia are represented by

11 the presidents of their respective assemblies as well as members of the

12 Presidencies. Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, is only represented

13 by Mr. Krajisnik as President of the Assembly. Now, the invitation had

14 gone out to Mr. Izetbegovic as well. He refused to attend, and the whole

15 issue of this meeting and who attended and who didn't attend got to be the

16 subject of recriminations within Bosnia and Herzegovina, why didn't

17 Mr. Izetbegovic go, why did Mr. Krajisnik go, that sort of thing. I don't

18 think that need detain us too much here. I think we can perhaps move on

19 in the document.

20 I would call attention, if we could, to the fourth paragraph,

21 which is not highlighted, which says: "The participants of the Belgrade

22 meeting unanimously held the historic agreement between the Muslims and

23 Serbs in BH, emphasising that the agreement was a big step towards a

24 peaceful solution to the crisis, an affirmation of the equality of the

25 Yugoslav peoples."

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1 Now, this so-called agreement between the Muslims and Serbs in BH

2 was one of the main conditions for the success of this whole initiative.

3 The most important thing I think for the Court to know about that

4 agreement is it in fact never took place, that is, the negotiations with

5 the MBO did not result in such an agreement, nor did any talks with the

6 SDA.

7 Q.

8 MR. TIEGER: The next selection, Your Honours, can be found in the

9 intercept binder at tab 7. That is an intercept dated 13 August 1991.

10 And if we could have that played, please.

11 [Intercept played] (no translation)

12 MR. TIEGER:

13 Q. Mr. Treanor, your comments, please.

14 A. Well, in this intercept we move a little bit from high politics to

15 more day-to-day affairs. This conversation is an example of the types of

16 consultations that took place between Mr. Karadzic and the SDS-designated

17 members of the Presidency and the government on day-to-day problems. In

18 this particular case, Mrs. Plavsic is concerned about the situation where

19 apparently Albanian volunteers to fight on behalf of the Republic of

20 Croatia and Croatia are passing through Banja Luka and causing concern

21 among the Serbs there, and he -- Dr. Karadzic advises her on how to handle

22 the situation. He mentions the local SDS people in Banja Luka, not only

23 Mr. Radic, who is identified as the president of the Assembly in Banja

24 Luka, but also Stojan Zupljanin, who is the head of the Ministry of

25 Internal Affairs Security Services Centre in Banja Luka and was an SDS

1 designee. Mrs. Plavsic seems to think it needs a little more attention

2 from Sarajevo end of things, and so Dr. Karadzic encourages her to call

3 the SDS people in the Ministry of Internal Affairs itself, that is,

4 Mr. Zepinic, who is the deputy minister, and Mr. Mandic, who is an

5 assistant minister.

6 Q. And Mr. Zepinic is the gentleman who is referred to in the

7 intercept as Vito or Vita?

8 A. As Vito, yes. Vito Zepinic.

9 Q. If we could turn, then, to the next selected document,

10 Mr. Treanor, which is found at tab 32 of binder 2. And this is a document

11 dated 15 August 1991. Appears on your screen at the moment, Mr. Treanor,

12 with only the date at the top, highlighted. Can you explain the

13 significance of that document to the Chamber, please.

14 A. Well, again, this is getting down to some of the more day-to-day

15 concerns of the SDS leadership. This document is a directive, if you

16 will, from Dr. Karadzic, as the president of the SDS, to all the municipal

17 and regional boards of the SDS, instructing them to introduce a system of

18 coded communication as of the 1st of September. Maybe we could highlight

19 what I have as paragraph 7. It doesn't appear -- I'm sorry. This is a

20 different document. I thought we were skipping this document. This is an

21 instruction on the operation of the local party organs and joining them to

22 have meetings once a week and that type of thing. This again was issued

23 by Dr. Karadzic, as president of the SDS, to all municipal boards of

24 the SDS. And in paragraph 4, if we could magnify that, we can see the

25 idea repeated, which we've seen before, that every member of a local board

1 should be entrusted with maintaining contact with 10 to 20 Serbian homes.

2 Q. This is the same networking system that Dr. Karadzic referred to

3 in the November 1990 Knin interview?

4 A. Right, going back that far, yes.

5 Q. Mr. Treanor, the next documents that you've selected are a series

6 of intercepts in August of 1991, the first involving Mrs. Plavsic and

7 Mr. Mladenovic, the second involving Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic, and

8 the third involving Mrs. Plavsic and Mr. Karadzic. If we could turn to

9 them in order. The first will be found at tab 8 in the intercepts binder,

10 Your Honours, and is dated 22 August 1991. The clip you will hear begins

11 at page 2 of the English translation.

12 [Intercept played] (no translation)

13 MR. TIEGER:

14 Q. Mr. Treanor.

15 A. This is a conversation with a gentleman apparently from Belgrade,

16 who is visiting Sarajevo and Mrs. Plavsic is discussing his schedule

17 there. The gentleman wants to see various people, including

18 Mr. Zulfikarpasic, who I mentioned, and Mr. Krajisnik. There's a

19 reference to the Belgrade Initiative, and Mrs. Plavsic is telling

20 Mr. Mladenovic that, the way I understand it, if things don't go well from

21 the point of view of that initiative and the whole of Bosnia remaining

22 within Yugoslavia, then the Bosnian Serbs were determined to split off and

23 settle that issue once and for all.

24 Q. If we can turn, then, to the next intercept.

25 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, if I could just make a comment at this

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1 point.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MS. LOUKAS: Just in relation to the way the Prosecution is using

4 this witness to explain certain conversations. That in and of itself is

5 actually quite an unusual course. But the point I would make -- for

6 example, this last conversation, I don't think really required any

7 explanation from the witness, and I do feel it's a sort of conversation

8 that Your Honours could look at without the benefit of someone basically

9 reiterating the conversation. If there's something to be added, then

10 perhaps there's a need for that, but I just wonder if there's any point to

11 basically reiterating the conversation.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.

13 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I believe there's nothing unusual or

14 noteworthy about an expert explaining or identifying the materials upon

15 which he has relied for his conclusions, placing them in context or

16 identifying portions of those materials, however self-evident they may

17 appear to anyone, that bear emphasis. In fact, I would think the contrary

18 would be true. If Mr. Treanor was inclined to over-explain materials, I

19 think that would raise an objection by the Defence.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Sometimes some of the explanation becomes so

21 apparent from the text, and of course it's not now for the first time that

22 we hear certain aspects. So in general terms, I would say Mr. Treanor is

23 already limiting himself, but certainly to that extent I would agree with

24 Ms. Loukas, there's no need to repeat something that has been said. But

25 at the same time, I notice that this is done now and then, but not to an

1 extent that it really bothers us a lot. But perhaps, Mr. Treanor, keep in

2 mind, and whenever you explain something, that what was said, we read it

3 and we -- well, heard it, of course, in a language we do not understand,

4 but we could follow it. We always can read it again in the transcript,

5 and whatever additions you have to make, we'd like to hear them.

6 Mr. Tieger, please proceed.

7 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn, then, to the next intercept,

8 intercept of 27 August 1991 [sic], involving Mr. Krajisnik and Mr.

9 Karadzic.

10 Q. Does that conversation, Mr. Treanor, also reflect tensions and

11 concerns about the Muslim-Serb negotiations and circumstances?

12 A. I have two conversations of the 26th of August.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, it appears on the -- on our screen as the

14 next intercept of the 20th of August, but I -- it's in my mind that you

15 said the 26th. Is that --

16 MR. TIEGER: For better clarification, Your Honour, the English

17 translation of this particular intercept can be found at tab 9.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that's the 26th of August, as far as I can

19 see. Yes.

20 MR. TIEGER: And for Mr. Treanor's benefit, if it is of

21 assistance, the ERN on that intercept is 0305-5109.

22 THE WITNESS: It's not assisting much.

23 MR. TIEGER: And the B/C/S ERN is 02079135.

24 THE WITNESS: Yes.

25 MR. TIEGER:

1 Q. The question was whether or not that conversation also reflected

2 tensions between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims, but perhaps it's best

3 to play the intercept and have your comments after it's been heard.

4 [Intercept played] (no translation)

5 MR. TIEGER:

6 Q. Mr. Treanor.

7 A. I will only add there as a bit of context that of course the SDS

8 leadership in BH was supporting the JNA in its military operations against

9 Croatia, and I think reference is being made to that situation. The other

10 authorities in BH, the SDA and the HDZ, of course, were not particularly

11 supportive in that respect.

12 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, just in relation --

13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Loukas. Perhaps we have --

15 MS. LOUKAS: It's just in relation to that the last question and

16 answer. "I think." I mean, there is a lot of speculation in that, and I

17 mean it's one thing to have an expert witness commenting on tapes. But it

18 just seems to me that we are opening the door somewhat to speculation

19 here, and I think the witness should be careful in that regard.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas, I do agree that we always should care not

21 to speculate, but if there's any part on which you think it's rather

22 speculation than any knowledge, I think it would be proper to ask the

23 witness then, perhaps in cross-examination, what made him interpret the

24 intercepts as he did, and then to find out to what extent it is

25 speculation, to what extent he has good reasons for these interpretations.

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1 But the Chamber is certainly aware that the risk of -- you know, famous

2 authors sometimes are surprised to see what other people read in their

3 texts. But I'd rather leave it to cross-examination. But awareness is

4 there, and if you say at a certain moment this cannot be anything else

5 than asking for speculation, then of course you can object against the

6 question.

7 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. May I ask first a different thing. That is,

9 could the text be scrolled back to the beginning? Is that possible? I do

10 not need necessarily to hear the sound, but ...

11 [Intercept played] (no translation)

12 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just -- my eyes are getting better and better, I

13 think, because on that screen, as we see it now, there seems to be 27 of

14 August. Krajisnik and Karadzic. So that's one day of difference. But

15 it's not easy to see, I must say. Is there any explanation for that, or

16 is that ...

17 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I can check to see if it's anything

18 other than a coding error, and of course get back to the Court if it is a

19 matter of substance, rather than a simple discrepancy which should be

20 modified in accordance with the text.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do not know what that date stands for.

22 Perhaps it's the date on which they started working out or when they --

23 well, whatever it is. But I see that we are dealing with a transcript of

24 a telephone conversation which is dated 26th, whereas 27th of August also

25 appears on our screen. Please proceed.

1 MR. TIEGER:

2 Q. And Mr. Treanor, before we leave that intercept, that portion of

3 the intercept, can you tell us what the reference to parliament being

4 finished refers to.

5 A. Well, the reference there is to the -- what I've been called the

6 Assembly of BH, in which we have seen there was quite a bit of tension

7 among the ruling parties.

8 Q. If we could move, then, to the second clip, which is found at

9 page 2 of the English translation.

10 [Intercept played] (no translation)

11 MR. TIEGER:

12 Q. Mr. Treanor, your comments, please.

13 A. Well, it's a continued reflection of Mr. Krajisnik's concern about

14 the situation within the Assembly, and there's also a reference to SUP,

15 that is, the Secretariat of Internal Affairs, which at this time was in

16 fact -- had recently been renamed as the Ministry of Internal Affairs,

17 which was a matter of concern, I think we've mention it had before, to the

18 SDS leaders, that is, the internal affairs within that ministry. So there

19 are some problems there that he would like to discuss as well.

20 Q. There's further reference to letting others expose against the

21 army and thereby marginalise themselves. What is that a reference to?

22 A. Well, apparently the state of relations between the -- among the

23 three parties is such that Dr. Karadzic believes that the other two

24 parties are trying to push the SDS out of the picture, so to speak, in

25 their effort, among other things, to oppose -- the other two parties

1 oppose the JNA and the military operations going on in Croatia. But he

2 believes that they may succeed in only marginalising themselves.

3 Q. And if we could turn, then, to the next intercept, which is found

4 at tab 10, the conversation involving Mrs. Plavsic and Dr. Karadzic.

5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, this first clip begins at page 2 of the

6 English translation.

7 [Intercept played] (no translation)

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. Mr. Treanor, what is the concern being expressed here?

10 A. Well, here again we see a reflection of the negotiations that are

11 going on and Dr. Karadzic's concerns with how they're going or may not be

12 going, and what he plans to do if -- may be planning to do if they in fact

13 break down.

14 Q. If we could then turn to tab 33 of binder 2. And this is a

15 handwritten letter addressed to President Karadzic personally.

16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, we see on screen two section that is

17 are highlighted. For the record, the first is the sentence that appears

18 at number 1, and the second is the sentence that appears at number 3.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, just for our own orientation: Should I

20 conclude from the signature, which says "a signature," that it's unknown

21 who wrote this letter or is there -- you said this is a letter to

22 Dr. Karadzic, but from whom, or is that still to be established?

23 MR. TIEGER: It is, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we'll wait and see.

25 MR. TIEGER:

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1 Q. And let's address that question first, Mr. Treanor. Who is the

2 author of this letter?

3 A. I believe this report was written by Velibor Ostojic, who was a

4 prominent member of the SDS and was the minister of information in the BH

5 government. It relates to some meetings he had in Belgrade on the 3rd,

6 and I believe the 4th, of September, with officials of the government of

7 the Republic of Serbia, including the prime minister of Serbia, the

8 minister of information of Serbia, and the minister for relations with

9 Serbs, outside of Serbia, and he also had contacts with officials in the

10 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, including a

11 meeting with one of the under-secretaries and spoke by telephone with the

12 minister himself.

13 Q. Mr. Treanor, you've highlighted certain sections of this report.

14 If we could turn first to the highlighted sections in the first page.

15 I've already indicated their placement within that document for the

16 record, so you need not read them out verbatim, but if you would comment

17 on them, please.

18 A. Well, these two highlighted portions express the desire of the SDS

19 leadership to have more military equipment at their disposal, as well as

20 communications equipment, particularly with a view to apparently setting

21 up their own television station.

22 Q. And in the next highlighted clip, which is found at page 3 of the

23 English translation, does Mr. Ostojic express a more general suggestion

24 about the approach to be taken by the SDS?

25 A. Yes. At the end he makes some recommendations to Dr. Karadzic.

1 In paragraph 11, he states that: "In addition to public political activity

2 the following should be formed and given assignments: A group responsible

3 for defence, a group responsible for internal affairs, a group responsible

4 for the economy, a group responsible for information, and that activity

5 should be conducted on two levels: Public political activity and

6 undercover work performed by assigned persons."

7 Q. Now, as tensions mounted between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian

8 Muslims, did Bosnian Serb leaders consider warning Muslim leaders of the

9 consequences if an agreement wasn't reached? And if that respect, can I

10 ask you to turn to the intercept located at tab 11 between Mr. Krajisnik

11 and Mr. Karadzic of September 4, 1991.

12 [Intercept played] (no translation)

13 MR. TIEGER:

14 Q. Mr. Treanor, what aspects of the ongoing situation or relations

15 between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims or between the leaders of the

16 Bosnian Serbs was reflected in that intercept?

17 A. Well, I think we see reflected here Dr. Karadzic's increasing

18 frustration with the situation. I think probably within the context of

19 the negotiations, the talks, at least, that were going on, and then a

20 particular incident in which some Muslims were killed by Serbs, and he

21 suggests that Mr. Izetbegovic be made aware of the fact that this is where

22 Mr. Izetbegovic's policy was leading to this type of tension and to those

23 types of consequences for the Muslim people. There are references to

24 various individuals in here that we met before. Again, Vito is Vito

25 Zepinic, and further on we see more discussion of the situation within the

1 Ministry of Internal Affairs that Mr. Krajisnik is attempting to deal

2 with, with -- in consultation with Mr. Mandic.

3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, the second segment of this intercept to

4 be played can be found on page 3 of the English translation.

5 [Intercept played] (no translation)

6 MR. TIEGER:

7 Q. Mr. Treanor, where is Mr. Krajisnik making selections and who is

8 being sent down to Drvar?

9 A. Well, here Mr. Krajisnik has been made aware of some political

10 problems in Drvar on the -- within the Executive Committee of that

11 municipality, and he's suggesting sending Rajko, who I presume is -- would

12 be Rajko Dukic, who is chairman -- the president of the SDS Executive

13 Committee down there to see what's going on.

14 Q. Any other comments before we move on to the third segment of that

15 intercept?

16 A. I could comment that Mr. Cancar, who is referred to, is presumably

17 Petko Cancar, who is an SDS Deputy in the Assembly and in fact the

18 president of the Chamber of Municipalities of the Assembly. I'm not sure

19 who Milos is.

20 Q. And the final segment from that intercept, Your Honours, is also

21 found on page 3 of the English translation.

22 [Intercept played] (no translation)

23 MR. TIEGER:

24 Q. Mr. Treanor, this aspect of the intercept appears to move on to a

25 focus on Prijedor municipality and then back to a concern about what will

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1 happen in two hours, a return to the original segment of the intercept.

2 Can you tell us what aspect of the organisational structure or

3 interrelations of SDS members are reflected in that intercept.

4 A. Yes. This discussion seems to relate to local problems in the

5 party in Prijedor, the Srdjo being referred to is Srdjo Srdic who is an

6 SDS deputy in the Assembly of BH from Prijedor. And then at the end they

7 refer to having a meeting or something of that nature in two hours.

8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, at tab 12 of the intercept binder we

9 can find the next intercept to be played, and the participants in that

10 telephone conversation are Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic.

11 Q. Before we begin the intercept, Mr. Treanor, I note that the date

12 that appears on the English translation is 20 December. Can you tell us

13 whether that appears to be an accurate date or not.

14 A. I presume we're referring to the conversation, the transcript of

15 which bears the ERN 02066246.

16 Q. That is correct.

17 A. Yes. This conversation, judging on the internal evidence, that

18 is, things that are mentioned within the conversation, took place on the

19 6th of September. For instance, there's a reference to The Hague

20 Conference beginning the next day, which occurred on the 7th of September.

21 Q. And with that clarification, if we could begin the first segment

22 of the intercept, which is found at page 2 of the English translation.

23 [Intercept played] (no translation)

24 MR. TIEGER:

25 Q. Mr. Treanor, you've already mentioned the commencement of The

1 Hague Conference on September 7th. Can you amplify other aspects of that

2 intercept.

3 A. Well, we see a reflection here of what the Serbian position there

4 is, and reference again to the situation in Krajina where Dr. Karadzic is

5 trying to keep the leaders in Bosnian Krajina in line. Apparently the

6 idea of uniting Bosnian Krajina with Croatian Krajina has crept up again

7 at what he believes at - and Mr. Milosevic seems to agree - a very

8 inopportune moment, in view of the ongoing negotiations. That's all the

9 talk about the need for discipline and so forth.

10 Q. If we could move to the second segment of that conversation, which

11 appears on page 3 of the English translation.

12 [Intercept played] (no translation)

13 MR. TIEGER:

14 Q. Mr. Treanor.

15 A. Well, here we see a reference again to the Belgrade Initiative,

16 which I discussed earlier. This is -- Mr. Milosevic is saying that this

17 is still alive and he will be using this in the negotiations. There's

18 also -- I would call attention to the portion where Dr. Karadzic refers to

19 as the -- his discussions with Mr. Izetbegovic, and his belief that they

20 have come to an agreement that one side will not impose its views on the

21 other. As we've been discussing here over the last couple of days, one of

22 the great fears of the SDS leadership was of -- was of just that, of the

23 fear of outvoting, as they frequently put it, where the two other parties

24 would line up against them in the Assembly and simply outvote them on

25 the -- in particular, the main issue of the day, which was the status of

1 BH within Yugoslavia. At this point, Dr. Karadzic believes that he has an

2 agreement with Mr. Izetbegovic that that will not happen.

3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the next intercept is found at tab 13,

4 and the portion of the intercept that will be played is found at page 3 of

5 the English translation.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I'm just first trying to verify a matter.

7 I remember, but perhaps we could read it. Part of this English text,

8 there was a part which was not written out, and I tried to compare what

9 I've received now on paper, and it was about the top --

10 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I think that was the fact that -- I

11 noticed that as we were going through too. They missed out the word "opt

12 for," that phrase, "opt for."

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Or I --

14 MS. LOUKAS: That's what it sounded like to me.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Certain moment where it was something that was not

16 written down. I thought what I understood was "conceived by" or

17 something. But I wonder whether we -- what we have got in front of us as

18 the transcript is exactly the same as what we read on the screen,

19 Mr. Tieger. And the only place where we can check it is the English text,

20 as a matter of fact, and of course it --

21 MR. TIEGER: Well, first of all, Your Honour, of course it was our

22 intention to ensure that the text in front of you was the same as the text

23 that was synchronised with the intercept and shown on the screen.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is it possible to have on the screen again,

25 especially the -- I would say the English part of the text spoken by the

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1 person with the initial "S"?

2 [Intercept played] (no translation)

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There, for example, we see already a

4 difference, where in the text it appears that they say "opt for" and it

5 doesn't appear in the -- that's not the only difference, I'm afraid. What

6 is in the next dot: "Although --" and then: "Top representatives." I

7 thought I understood: "Although conceived by." But could we hear that

8 specific part again.

9 [Intercept played] (no translation)

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There again, Mr. -- the text on the tape says:

11 "Although conceived by top representatives." This is expressed by three

12 dots and what we see on the screen, and it disappears on the written text.

13 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, there may be two separate concerns, if

14 I'm hearing the Court correctly. The portion of the transcript which the

15 Court just referred appears to be the same in the translation I have

16 before me as on the screen, although I can hear the same words the Court

17 can hear in English as well.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And I do not see any dots appearing, so there's

19 no indication of missing words in the English text as we received it on

20 paper.

21 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I would indicate, we are having -- we

22 have the similar issue that you've identified. The text of what appears

23 on the monitor and the text of what appears on the hard copy, there are

24 differences.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, I can imagine that we can't solve it

1 right away, and of course what is of some concern to me is that these are

2 a few words spoken in English where we have an opportunity to verify,

3 whereas all the other words, I can't read the B/C/S version and see

4 whether it's complete, I cannot check any translation. But I notice that

5 this at least is not fully congruent, and you're invited, although it's an

6 annex to the expert's report, but the expert can be invited or the

7 Prosecution can take care that we receive congruent versions of what we

8 see on the screen and what we have on paper.

9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we'll certainly do our best to ensure

10 that that happens.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's for this moment, because we could -- we

12 can't solve the whole of the problem right now, but please proceed, Mr. --

13 I think you wanted to -- you wanted to ask the witness something about the

14 next intercept.

15 MR. TIEGER:

16 Q. Mr. Treanor, we were about to move on to an intercept which is

17 found at tab 13, as I indicated to the Chamber earlier, the segment that

18 will be played is found at page 3 of the English translation. And this is

19 another conversation between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic. And first of

20 all, before we begin: I understand that there were a number of intercepts

21 that were inexplicably -- bore the date of 20 December [sic] as the

22 previous one and that have been identified by date on the basis of

23 context. You explained the previous intercept as being dated on September

24 6th, through the reasons you described, and I understand that this

25 intercept is dated 9 September. Is that correct? And if so, can you

1 explain that to the Court.

2 A. Yes. The context -- I'm sorry. Not the context. The content of

3 this intercept would indicate that it took place in September, on or about

4 the 9th of September. It refers to two meetings, one to take place on

5 Thursday, and the other on Friday. The Thursday meeting was to take place

6 in Strasbourg, and the Friday meeting in Belgrade, again, a meeting to do

7 with the Belgrade Initiative. So it seems to have taken place a few days

8 before those meetings. The Thursday was the 12th of September, and then

9 Friday was the 13th of September. I believe there is some other evidence

10 which -- in the form of the original operator's notes in relation to this

11 intercept, which give it a date of the 9th, but the exact date is not

12 certain. But, as I say, very close to these two meetings which are

13 referred to in the conversation as planning for these meetings, which

14 Mr. Milosevic is very interested in. In fact, the meeting in -- or the

15 event in Strasbourg that he wanted Mr. Krajisnik to go to took place on

16 the 13th, on the Friday, rather than on the Thursday, and the meeting in

17 Belgrade, for the Belgrade Initiative, which was a big meeting of

18 representatives from the three republics that I mentioned earlier, that

19 is, Serbia, Montenegro, and BH, took place in Belgrade on Monday, the

20 16th.

21 JUDGE ORIE: You make reference to a meeting in Strasbourg. Do

22 you do that on the basis of the original text? Because both in the B/C/S

23 version of the transcript and in the English, it's not Strasbourg, but

24 it's perhaps a bit surprising. It's Salzburg.

25 THE WITNESS: Well, reference is made to the European Parliament.

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1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

2 THE WITNESS: At one place is says Salzburg, as the seat of the

3 European Parliament. So I read that as Strasbourg.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm aware of that. You are talking about

5 Strasbourg, but I read Salzburg.

6 THE WITNESS: Right, yes.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Both versions, of course in the translation it's --

8 did you check in the original whether -- or is this part of the portion to

9 be played?

10 THE WITNESS: I don't believe the beginning of this is going to be

11 played. However, toward the end -- yes. In the end, the clip, the second

12 clip we will be hearing, it says Strasbourg.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. We'll then hear. Please proceed.

14 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me. In view of the time, perhaps it's best if

15 we forego playing the intercept until after the break.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do agree with you. We will take a break of

17 20 minutes. We'll reconvene at five minutes past 4.00.

18 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 4.09 p.m.

20 JUDGE ORIE: I think we were about to hear a new text. Is that --

21 MR. TIEGER: That is correct, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

23 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if the Court would like me to quickly

24 address the translation issues you raised earlier, I can defer it for

25 another time, if it's more appropriate.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps we could hear already your explanation and

2 see whether it is in need of any further debate or discussion. Please

3 tell us, yes.

4 MR. TIEGER: Well, first of all, I have verified that the document

5 that was synchronised is indeed the same document that appears in the

6 text -- or in the copies the Court has. Secondly, the reference to

7 Salzburg that appears in the early part of the translation, both English

8 and B/C/S, I had wondered whether one of the participants misspoke or

9 whether it was a typo or misheard by the person who transcribed it. It

10 appears to be the latter. On the intercept itself, I'm told you can

11 clearly hear "Strasbourg."

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You said that the document we received on paper

13 is the same as the transcribed. But as far as the dots are concerned,

14 "conceived by," or "opt for," it certain is not.

15 MR. TIEGER: No. That's correct. I think the explanation for

16 that, Your Honour, is in the -- and I'll verify that. I believe it's the

17 effort to ensure that the synchronisation is accurate, and where a word is

18 not heard or does not appear, I think they use the ellipses to extend the

19 portion to do that.

20 Now in that connection, I would mention one further thing. As the

21 Court is aware, during the course of this predominantly B/C/S

22 conversation, some English is used. That English was translated into

23 B/C/S in the transcription of the document, so that the entire B/C/S

24 document is in that language, both, obviously, the portions that were

25 spoken in B/C/S and the English portions. And that -- then there's an

1 English translation of that B/C/S portion. So there is -- that accounts

2 for the discrepancy between the words the Court heard when listening to

3 the speaker in English, and the English translation itself. In other

4 words, the English translation is an attempt to accurately translate the

5 B/C/S transcript, the B/C/S written transcript, rather than go back and

6 forth between the transcript that was provided to the translator and the

7 original intercept itself.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 MR. TIEGER: That, it seems to me, is a relatively unique

10 circumstance in the context of these intercepts, which I don't suspect

11 will -- it is likely to surface frequently.

12 JUDGE ORIE: You say the risk of further mistakes is small because

13 this is very specific situation where English is spoken by the

14 participants in the conversation, who usually speak B/C/S. Yes. Yes, I

15 do understand that. Nevertheless, you're still invited to provide the

16 Chamber with a copy with -- well, how to do it? If it's a translation of

17 the original, then I take it that the dots will reappear. At the same

18 time, I think we have now heard at least two of the dots explained by the

19 original English text, that is, "opted for" and "conceived by."

20 We'll wait and see, but thank you for your explanation up to this

21 moment, Mr. Tieger. I wonder whether the Defence would make any further

22 submissions in respect of this explanation and what happened.

23 MS. LOUKAS: Not in relation to that. I have no further

24 observations to make, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then please proceed.

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1 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. And I think we can now play

2 the intercept itself.

3 [Intercept played] (no translation)

4 MR. TIEGER:

5 Q. Mr. Treanor, that was a short clip after a long preface, but

6 perhaps you can assist us with that.

7 A. Well, I think the only commentary necessary here is that at the

8 beginning of the clip, the "they" who's being referred to are, of course,

9 the coalition partners of the SDS. I think in this case in particular,

10 the SDA. I don't know who Vlado is. And we didn't get to the part which

11 I thought we were going to hear, the next sentence or so, where Strasbourg

12 was in fact mentioned.

13 MR. TIEGER: If the Chamber could then turn to tab 34 of binder 2,

14 we can move on to the next document, which is a 12 September meeting of

15 SDS government members. And if we could display the first highlighted

16 portion on screen. Your Honour, that first portion can be found on page 3

17 of your copies. And for the record, the portion highlighted is that which

18 reads: "Record of a meeting of the officials," down to SDS BiH members,

19 and then the first sentence that appears thereafter.

20 Q. Mr. Treanor, can you tell us the nature of this meeting.

21 A. This is a meeting of one of the groups of officials that I have

22 mentioned before, that is, the SDS-designated members of the government of

23 BH and other high-level officials in the various ministries and

24 institutions within that government's -- below the ministerial level, and

25 they are meeting on this occasion to discuss their common concerns as

1 representatives of their party in those institutions and some of their

2 dissatisfaction with the way things are going emerge in this document.

3 Q. If we could turn to the next highlight, which appears at page 7 of

4 the English translation. And for the record, that highlight appears at

5 number 11 of the enumerated paragraphs and begins: "To propose the

6 setting up of a duty system."

7 A. Yes. Just to expand a little more. The dissatisfaction expressed

8 at this meeting has as much to do with the type of cooperation between the

9 parties on internal government personnel and other matters as anything

10 else, and they perceive the need to keep in better touch with each other

11 and with the SDS leadership. So therefore, we see in this paragraph their

12 recommendation to set up a duty system in order to monitor activities for

13 the implementation of tasks in state organs, day-to-day problem management

14 in different fields and to serve as a liaison with the SDS. With this in

15 mind, Ljubisav Terzic, in the original, and Dragan Kapetina were tasked

16 with developing a method of communication of the SDS and cadres or

17 personnel of the SDS in republic state organs, in the republican state

18 organs with the municipalities. Terzic and Kapetina are two of the SDS

19 officials I mentioned.

20 Q. Does the document also reflect who the record of this meeting of

21 top-level SDS government functionaries was sent?

22 A. Yes. As we can see, it was sent to Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik,

23 and Mrs. Plavsic and Dr. Koljevic, who were members of the Presidency, of

24 course. Mr. Cancar, who I mentioned earlier today, who was the president

25 of the Chamber of Municipalities in Assembly and an SDS member, and Rajko

1 Dukic, who was the president of the Executive Committee of the SDS.

2 Q. Now, in addition to the duty system that was suggested by these

3 high-level SDS government functionaries, was there a growing interest in

4 the summer of 1991 in the SDS in the development of some form of covert

5 intelligence or information-gathering and exchange system?

6 A. Well, on the basis of documents we have, that would certainly seem

7 to be the case, and especially when taken in conjunction with the document

8 we just examined, which recommends certain steps in that area.

9 Q. And if we could turn to a series of documents, the first of which

10 begins at tab 35 of binder 2. That document now appears on screen, and

11 the cover page, a portion of which is highlighted, indicates: "Strictly

12 confidential, the intelligence and security system of the Serbian

13 Democratic Party instructions."

14 A. Yes. And it bears, at the top of the page, under the

15 heading, "Serbian Democratic Party of BH," the title of the National

16 Security Council, which is a body within the SDS, about which we otherwise

17 know very little.

18 Q. And if we could move quickly to these documents. First I'd like

19 to go to the highlighted portion which appears on page 3 of the English

20 translation and now appears on screen. This is a diagram of the proposed

21 system that accompanied the document?

22 A. Yes, that's correct. As you can see, it's a little bit complex,

23 but the main idea here is the inclusion of the various circles of

24 officials on various levels that are available to the SDS leadership to

25 draw on as far as gaining information on the other hand, and carrying out

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1 instructions, on the other, is concerned. The headed at the top by the

2 Main Board with the National Security Council -- the Security Council

3 reporting to it and drawing information from the different republican and

4 municipal-level institutions.

5 Q. Next document is found at tab 36. It currently appears on screen,

6 and the highlighted portion says: "Instructions," and then immediately

7 below it: "Regarding the organisation of officials and high-ranking

8 government officers, duty roster and coordination with SDS duty officers."

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Does that document appear to have anything to do with the

11 recommendation for the establishment of a watch system?

12 A. Yes. This seems to be a reflection of the recommendations which

13 we saw in the document about the meeting of the SDS government

14 functionaries.

15 Q. If we could move to tab 37, please. This document which now

16 appears on screen bears no highlights but is headed: "Communication

17 system - code."

18 A. Yes. This is an elementary code system which comes from the

19 records of the SDS, with simple code designations for the various leaders,

20 and then for other individuals, probably the --

21 Q. And as shown on that document the first two names --

22 A. Probably the bodyguards or other escorts.

23 Q. And if we could turn to the second clip --

24 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honours, before we move on to that, I'm just

25 wondering if there's any indication of dates in relation to that last

1 document, under tab 37 that we were looking at. And also, I think, in

2 relation to 36 there doesn't appear to be a date as well.

3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'm not sure if that's an objection or

4 the beginning of a premature cross-examination.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I think Ms. Loukas would like to know whether

6 there's any date attached to it so that could prevent her perhaps from

7 asking any questions about it. We get a lot of explanation on documents,

8 and where I also asked a few times, is the sender known, is the date

9 known? I thought this is trying to assist the Chamber to better

10 understand the document. Could you please indicate whether dates are

11 known for these documents.

12 THE WITNESS: Well, obviously, the documents themselves bear no

13 dates, and I am only able to place them in conjunction, as I mentioned, in

14 conjunction with at least one other document which we've seen, that is,

15 the meeting of the high-level functionaries, which mentions a system

16 similar to one that is portrayed in the instructions. Other than that, at

17 this point in time, I can't give any date to them.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. No date. Yes, please proceed.

19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. If we could move to tab 38, please, in

20 binder 2, and turn to a document now on screen, the upper portion of which

21 is highlighted and says: "Serbian Democratic Party of BH, strictly

22 confidential." Below that: "President, number, Sarajevo, August 1991."

23 And finally: "To all municipal and regional boards of SDS of BH."

24 Q. The nature of that document, Mr. Treanor.

25 A. Yes. This is the document I thought we were referring to at the

1 beginning of today's session. This is an instruction from Dr. Karadzic,

2 as president of the SDS to the boards mentioned, instructing them to

3 introduce a code system as of the 1st of September, 1991. And I would

4 draw attention in particular to paragraph 7. If we don't have that, I

5 could just read it.

6 Q. No. It's on screen now.

7 A. There we are. "For communication between the municipality and the

8 Main Board, and for mutual communication, use the telephone code that we

9 gave you as frequently as possible."

10 So here again we see another reference, or a reference to codes

11 now. Now is the particular code that's being referred to, I don't know.

12 Q. Mr. Treanor, on Friday, we discussed the commencement of

13 regionalisation as reflected in the establishment of the Community of

14 Municipalities, as well as the reaction to the establishment of that -- of

15 those institutions. As we move now into September of 1991, was there a

16 further push or effort toward regionalisation by the SDS?

17 A. Yes, indeed. As I mentioned earlier, there was, on the one hand,

18 a certain desire among circles in the SDS to forge ahead with

19 regionalisation; on the other hand, there was the need to -- for some

20 caution, in view of discussions that were going on with the Bosnian Muslim

21 political parties who were not too keen on this project, with Dr. Karadzic

22 urging patience in the matter to his SDS subordinates. For whatever

23 reason, in September, in early September, the SDS leadership decided to

24 proceed with the development of regionalisation, as we will see in -- from

25 coming documents.

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1 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, at tab 39, the 25 September decision on

2 appointing staff for regionalisation, that document appears in the English

3 translation, and it is shown on the screen now.

4 Q. Mr. Treanor, you've highlighted both the date of that decision, as

5 well as the paragraph headed "number 2," toward the bottom of the page.

6 A. Yes. The document we're looking at bears the date of 25

7 September, but the important event here is mentioned in the paragraph 2,

8 which is highlighted. There was a meeting on the 7th of September, one of

9 the high-level SDS meetings with various officials present. Dr. Karadzic

10 referred to this meeting as upcoming the next day in the conversation of

11 the 6th of September with Mr. Milosevic, and we read now in paragraph 2 in

12 this document of the city board of the -- City Board of Sarajevo of the

13 SDS that -- which relates to the creation of a regionalisation staff

14 within that particular organisation, that: "The staff shall coordinate

15 the implementation of the decision and of the conclusions adopted at the

16 Pale symposium of municipal, regional, and republic SDS organs of 7

17 September 1991 for the region: City of Sarajevo, together with the staff

18 of the BH, SDS Main Board for regional organisation in all SDS municipal

19 boards."

20 So the meeting of 7 September 1991 seems to have been key for the

21 further development of the regionalisation process by the SDS.

22 Q. Can we turn, then, to a September 16th meeting of the Executive

23 Board, which may be found at tab 40 of the binder 2. The first

24 highlighted portion of that document indicates: "Minutes of the third

25 meeting of the Executive Board of the Serbian Democratic Party of BH, held

1 on the 16th of September, 1991." And if we could turn to the next

2 highlighted portion, please. That appears at the top of page 2 of the

3 English translation, under item 1.

4 A. Yes. Here we see reference made to the regionalisation staff

5 formed at the centre of the SDS: "Decision on the appointment of the

6 regionalisation staff was considered and adopted in accordance with the

7 conclusion adopted at the consultations in Pale. The decision and the

8 statement of reasons were forwarded to the municipal boards and the town

9 board or the city board of the SDS. During the discussion it was asserted

10 that the criterion for the choice of people composing the staff was good."

11 So here we have another concrete result of that meeting, that is,

12 the formation of the regionalisation staff of the SDS.

13 Q. I referred earlier to the foundation or establishment of the

14 Community of Municipalities in April of 1991. Was there a transformation

15 of the Community of Municipalities in September of 1991, consistent with

16 the movement toward further regionalisation?

17 A. Well, what we see at this time, and I would emphasise that we do

18 not know the content of the discussions or the decisions that were reached

19 at the 7 September meeting, but what we see at this time is the, meeting

20 in September, the creation of a number of so-called Serbian Autonomous

21 Districts. At least three of these districts were formed from previously

22 existing communities of municipalities. Earlier we discussed, in

23 particular, the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina, which was

24 established on the 25th of April, at a meeting in Celinac. In May,

25 communities of municipalities were also formed in Eastern Herzegovina and

1 in the Romanian region, which is in the mountains east of Sarajevo. In

2 the middle of September, we see those three communities of municipalities

3 proclaimed as being now Serbian Autonomous Regions. At that time, a

4 fourth Serbian Autonomous -- I'm sorry, Serbian Autonomous Districts. A

5 fourth Serbian Autonomous District was also formed, that is, in the middle

6 of September, and by the beginning of November, two additional Serbian

7 Autonomous Districts were formed. There is some confusion in the

8 terminology here, since the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina

9 transformed itself, if you will, into the Autonomous Region of Krajina,

10 using the word "region" rather district. They did this presumably to

11 avoid confusion with the already existing Serbian Autonomous District of

12 Krajina, which was in fact in Croatia and centred in Knin. We had an

13 earlier document in which Dr. Karadzic congratulated the leaders in Knin

14 on the establishment of that particular entity. That entity had a

15 background similar to at least three of the Serbian Autonomous Districts

16 in Bosnian that I'm referring to, that is, a Community of Municipalities

17 of Northern Dalmatia and Lika was formed in June 1990, and that

18 transformed itself into the Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina in

19 December 1990. Now we're seeing the same development in Bosnia, where the

20 communities of municipalities are transforming themselves into what we

21 call generically Serbian Autonomous Districts.

22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we have one binder that has not been

23 marked for identification, that is, the maps and charts binder. I'd like

24 to have that marked at this time. And then put before the Court one of

25 the maps from that binder.

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1 THE REGISTRAR: The binder will be Prosecution Exhibit number P68.

2 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the map currently on screen can be found

3 at tab 13 of the binder.

4 Q. Mr. Treanor, if you look at your screen, can you tell us what that

5 depicts, please.

6 A. Yes, indeed. We may be jumping ahead of ourselves a little bit

7 here. This map is based on information as of the 21st of November, 1991,

8 as you'll see in the lower left, in the legend. At that time, the Serbian

9 Autonomous Districts were composed of certain territories which -- or

10 claimed to be composed of certain territories which were basically of

11 three types, and I think we'll see a document on this later on. The

12 territories in dark blue are municipalities -- what we have depicted here

13 are municipalities with the names on the map are the names of

14 municipalities. The ones in dark blue are municipalities which, as a

15 whole, belonged to Serbian Autonomous Districts. The ones in light blue

16 are municipalities in which certain Serbian areas within those

17 municipalities declared their adhesion to the Serbian autonomous

18 districts. That is, in a manner of speaking, the municipalities were

19 divided. These are municipalities which the SDS did not control, as

20 opposed to the ones in blue, which, in principle, are ones that were under

21 SDS political control.

22 The document on which this is -- this map is based on also refers

23 to other territories that could belong to the autonomous -- Serbian

24 autonomous districts, which it defined in rather vague terms, for

25 instance, areas which had been -- in which the Serbs had been in a

1 majority until the genocide during World War II, that sort of thing. So

2 it's impossible for us to depict that on these maps. But this is the

3 closest depiction we can come to on a map of the territories of the

4 Serbian autonomous districts. As I say, the process began of establishing

5 districts as opposed to the communities of municipalities in the middle of

6 September and continued through early November, and this depicts the

7 situation as of 21 November 1991.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger. The legend is not very clear to me,

9 Mr. Treanor. The first is a box, wide, with a dark black line, black

10 square.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, I understand, Your Honour. The reference there

12 I think is being made to the dark black line around the box.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

14 THE WITNESS: So the dark black line that you'll see on the map

15 shows the boundaries of the various Serbian autonomous districts.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Isn't it true that the white areas, for example, in

17 the centre of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is also surrounded by a black line?

18 THE WITNESS: Yes. The white areas are those municipalities which

19 are not in either all or in part in the fashion I described, included

20 within the districts. If you see one surrounded by a black line, that's

21 simply because it abuts on two different SAOs and is therefore surrounded

22 by SAOs.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Or the coast.

24 THE WITNESS: Or the coast, yes.

25 JUDGE ORIE: If I look at the centre, the centre, the white

1 centre --

2 A. The map section, yes.

3 JUDGE ORIE: -- is completely surrounded by thick black lines.

4 THE WITNESS: Right. That would be the external boundary of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the south, if you will.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

7 THE WITNESS: And in the interior, that would show the furthest

8 extent of the Serbian autonomous districts.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it's not a very clear way of defining your

10 legends, but thank you for your explanation.

11 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

12 MR. TIEGER: If we could return, then, to mid-September and the

13 transformation of the Community of Municipalities in the Krajina, and turn

14 specifically to the September 16th decision on proclamation of the

15 Autonomous Region of the Krajina, found at tab 41 of binder 2. The

16 document currently on screen has a number of sections highlighted,

17 including the decision on the proclamation, Articles 1, 2, and 3.

18 Q. And if you could explain the significance of those highlights,

19 Mr. Treanor, please.

20 A. Yes. First of all, let me say that again we're showing documents

21 relating to the Bosnian Krajina because that is the area which we do have

22 most documentation from. We know of the existence of the other Serbian

23 Autonomous Districts through other means, which are mentioned in our

24 report in the appropriate section. So here, if we could magnify

25 Article 1. This refers to the alliance, that is, what we've been calling

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1 the community of municipalities of Bosnian Krajina, "Declared the

2 Autonomous Region of Krajina an autonomous democratic unit of sovereign

3 citizens and peoples and an inseparable part of the federative Yugoslavia

4 as a federal state, which consists of the republics of Serbia and

5 Montenegro and the other federal units, which have expressed their free

6 will to remain in this state."

7 This document being dated, as I think was mentioned, the 16th of

8 September, on which at this session of the Assembly of the autonomous --

9 of the municipal -- I'm sorry, the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian

10 Krajina, the Assembly voted to transform it into this new autonomous

11 region or Autonomous District of Krajina. And I think we can take a look

12 at Article 2. "The territory of the region consists of Municipal

13 Assemblies which joined the Alliance, that is, the Community of

14 Municipalities, as well as villages, districts, and areas which will join

15 later, in accordance with this decision."

16 Q. This Article -- I'm sorry.

17 A. And I think we can take a look at Article 3 as well, which states

18 that: "Federal law, regulations, and other general legislation, laws, and

19 regional legislation shall be applied on the territory of the Autonomous

20 Region of Krajina, as well as the legislation of BH, which is not

21 incompatible with this legislation. Until the regional laws, regulations,

22 and other legislation are passed, the laws, regulations, and legislation

23 of the region, as well as the legislation of BH, shall be valid unless

24 they are contrary to the constitution of the SFRY." In other words, the

25 laws, regulations, and other legislation of the Federal State of

1 Yugoslavia.

2 So here we see a very strong link between these -- this autonomous

3 region, certainly, and the Federal State of Yugoslavia.

4 Q. And you've also highlighted a portion that's found on page 2, that

5 is, Article 7?

6 A. Yes. This states that: "The Assembly of the Autonomous Region of

7 Krajina will, in accordance with Article 265, paragraph 4 of the

8 constitution of the Socialist Republic of BH, enable populated settlements

9 from one municipality to be joined to another municipality, in accordance

10 with the citizens' wish to do so."

11 This is a reflection of one of the grievances of the SDS that I

12 mentioned very early on, that is, the manner in which the boundaries of

13 municipalities had been drawn in BH, as they felt to the detriment of the

14 Serbs in BH. This Article providing that some changes be made in that

15 area.

16 Q. Now, you've used the term "transformation" in connection with the

17 change from a community of municipalities to an autonomous region. If we

18 could look quickly at the statute of the Autonomous Region of the Krajina.

19 Does that indicate the nature of the transformation which took place?

20 MR. TIEGER: And Your Honours, that document is found at tab 42.

21 A. Well, interestingly, the change that was made on the surface is

22 mostly in regard to the name, the statute that was adopted and that here

23 bears the date of the 16th of September is virtually identical to the

24 statute of the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina. One change

25 that does take place is of course changing the name of the entity from the

1 old name to the new name, that is, Autonomous Region of Krajina. There

2 are a couple of other minor differences. But the -- other than that, the

3 statute is virtually the same.

4 Q. Mr. Treanor, if we could next turn to a letter dated

5 September 16th, 1991. It is found at tab 43. The document on screen

6 bears two highlights. One is the first paragraph, which appears under the

7 heading: "Letter of support to the federal secretary of National Defence,

8 general of the army, Veljko Kadijevic." And the other is the last

9 paragraph of the letter, which appears immediately above the names of the

10 signatories.

11 JUDGE ORIE: I think we have no signal on our screens at this

12 moment, so we have difficulties in following you. Yes. Yes, we are all

13 on line again.

14 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. Mr. Treanor, if you can tell us why you selected this document and

16 its significance.

17 A. This document is reflective of two things in particular that I'd

18 like to point out. One is the continued support for the Yugoslav People's

19 Army, the JNA. As the Court will remember, that figured very early on in

20 the programme of the SDS and continues during this period of hostilities

21 in Croatia. I think we've alluded earlier to assistance in mobilisation

22 and that sort of thing. And the -- by the SDS and, on the other hand, the

23 opposition or reluctance of the other two parties in the governing

24 coalition, the SDA and the HDZ, to support those military operations. And

25 we also see reflected here the fear of outvoting, which is another

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1 long-standing point in the SDS concerns. We see the first paragraph

2 reading: "The decisions being passed by the organs of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina, especially by the government and the Presidency, relating to

4 a unified system of defence of the country, are being passed by outvoting

5 the legitimate representatives of the Serbian people in these bodies."

6 These are decisions affecting -- referring to decisions which

7 related to the call-up of reserves within Bosnia and which the other two

8 parties did not want to participate in, on the one hand, and as I said,

9 the SDS supporting that. So they're letting the army know that they are

10 against decisions which are preventing complete mobilisation in BH.

11 And then the last paragraph: "Therefore, in the name of the

12 Serbian people and all the peaceful citizens of BH, we hereby fully

13 support the unified armed forces of Yugoslavia in the execution of their

14 constitutionally defined role and tasks."

15 Q. Can we turn now to an intercept, a conversation between

16 Mr. Karadzic and Mrs. Plavsic on 19 September, which can be found at

17 tab 14 of the intercept binder.

18 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I have a conversation on the 17th of

19 September, ERN 02078969.

20 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry. I may have misspoken. That is the

21 document to which I was referring.

22 THE WITNESS: The screen does say 19 September.

23 [Intercept played] (no translation)

24 MR. TIEGER: And we'll turn to the second clip, which can be found

25 at page 2 of the translation, unless you have some quick comments first.

1 A. Yes, I'd just like to point out that Nedjo Vlaski was a member of

2 the State Security Service and a Serb. The State Security Service is one

3 of the two halves, if you will, of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the

4 other the public, that is, basically the uniformed police. The concern is

5 about his situation, and this is again a reflection as we've seen other

6 things, of the tension between the SDS and its coalition partners over

7 internal affairs within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially

8 questions of personnel.

9 [Intercept played] (no translation)

10 THE WITNESS: Part of the discontent of the SDS is reflected here,

11 that is, that even though certain officials within MUP, the Ministry of

12 Internal Affairs, were Serbs, they were not SDS Serbs, if you will, and

13 what they want, of course, is their own people in the places they feel

14 they are entitled to under the inter-party agreement. You also see

15 reflected Dr. Karadzic's belief that the way they're being treated in this

16 regard is the type of thing that will happen to them in general if BH

17 should become independent and the Bosnian Serbs are left in that state as

18 a minority. And then we see reference now to a strategy to deal with that

19 situation, that is, if we're not getting what we believe we should get

20 according to the inter-party agreement, then perhaps what we should do is

21 split the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

22 MR. TIEGER:

23 Q. Can we turn now to a document of September 21, 1991. That

24 document can be found at tab 44, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE ORIE: May I perhaps first ask a clarification on the last

1 intercept. You told us, Mr. Treanor, that: "Part of the discontent of

2 the SDS is reflected here, that is, that even though certain officials

3 within MUP were Serbs, they were not SDS Serbs, if you will, and what they

4 want, of course, is their own people in the place they feel they are

5 entitled to, under the inter-party agreement."

6 Could you indicate a bit more in detail where you read this in the

7 intercept, especially the distinction between non-SDS Serbs and the wish

8 to --

9 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm providing a bit of background here, but

10 right at the beginning of that clip, Dr. Karadzic says: "As long as they

11 don't appoint in SUP, that is, exactly until they stop determining where,

12 what Serb will work." Then Mrs. Plavsic says: "Yes, exactly. As long as

13 they don't stop determining.

14 So he's not happy with the way even Serbs are being appointed.

15 And we do have a lot of other information on this subject, but here is

16 reflected the concern that I mentioned.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 THE WITNESS: That the SDS was not getting to determine which

19 Serbs would work where.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you read that in: "Until in SUP it

21 appoints, I mean, until they stop deciding where shall each individual

22 Serb work?" Is that ...

23 THE WITNESS: Yes. I would render that as where which Serb will

24 work. So it's a selection of -- selecting people and the place that they

25 will work.

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1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I can't say that it's yet crystal clear, but we

2 are in the beginning of this trial.

3 Please proceed.

4 MR. TIEGER:

5 Q. And we were about to look at the document that is presently on

6 screen entitled: "Instructions to all municipal committees, BiH Serbian

7 Democratic Party," and dated 21 September 1991. Is that document also

8 related to the tensions concerning the police?

9 A. Well, this document bears some relation to that, and there was

10 some discussion -- I think we're going to see a conversation between

11 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik on this. The -- apparently there had been

12 an order to mobilise reserve police by the Bosnian authorities, without

13 the knowledge of the SDS and that aroused some suspicion as to what their

14 intentions were. But if we read this, I can comment further. In the

15 first paragraph, it refers to: "Rumours that only Muslims are being

16 called up and that Serbs do not heed the call-up, which would result in a

17 Muslim police force and would create conditions for a civil war." So

18 Dr. Karadzic asks the municipal boards of the SDS to please follow the

19 developments in this respect and to instruct that Serbs should report to

20 the reserve police force, keep us informed of events.

21 Now, if I'm not mistaken, we'll be hearing a conversation which

22 might shed some more light on what's going on here.

23 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, before we turn to the next document,

24 which is an intercept and can, of course, be found -- the English

25 translation of which can be found in your intercept binder, I should ask

1 whether or not the Court has with it binder 3, to which we'll be turning

2 shortly thereafter.

3 JUDGE ORIE: As you see, Mr. Tieger, it's just distributed at this

4 very moment. Please proceed.

5 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. I'd like to turn, then, to the next document, which is indeed

7 found in the intercept binder at tab 15, and I believe that's the

8 conversation to which you referred a moment ago, Mr. Treanor.

9 [Intercept played] (no translation)

10 MR. TIEGER:

11 Q. Mr. Treanor, as you indicated earlier, a conversation that refers

12 to the police and mobilisation. Can you explain that further, please.

13 A. The situation being referred to here is obviously the same one as

14 the previous document. Dr. Karadzic seems to be concerned that Serbs

15 won't get mobilised. I would have -- I might have thought that this

16 conversation took place before the issuing of the previous document, but

17 it's dated the 23rd. Apparently on the -- already on the 21st, unless the

18 conversation is misdated, he had decided that the best course of action

19 would be to have the Serbs respond to this call-up, in order to prevent

20 the reserve police becoming exclusively Muslim and therefore forming some

21 sort of Muslim army.

22 Q. And can we turn, then, to the first document found in binder 3,

23 which is at tab 45, which is the record of a September 30th meeting of the

24 Deputies' Club. And does this document, Mr. Treanor, and specifically the

25 portions you've highlighted, reflect the movement toward regionalisation

1 and the growing tensions to which you've referred?

2 A. Yes. This gets -- we now get back to the more general state of

3 the discussions between the SDS and, in this case, the SDA, about the

4 status of BH within Yugoslavia and shed some light on the state of those

5 discussions at this particular time. In particular, the first highlighted

6 portion is of interest in this regard, where Mr. Karadzic is indicated as

7 saying: "We are negotiating with Izetbegovic, and the only thing we've

8 agreed on is that no one will impose their will on another nation by

9 force." This is something I think we've seen this before in

10 Dr. Karadzic's earlier conversation with Mr. Milosevic. "Their aim is the

11 creation of an alliance of sovereign states."

12 I believe there's more in the next page. An alliance of sovereign

13 states is not something that the SDS was particularly interested in.

14 However, he goes on to say: "They have agreed to discuss

15 regionalisation," which would seem to represent some progress from their

16 point of view. And he continues: "We shall continue down the path we

17 have taken. Judging by their attitude toward the JNA, they are preparing

18 something that is not good. There has been treason in the JNA, but at

19 lower levels, not at the top. The army has been attacked by Croatia and

20 has realised that it is dealing with fascists."

21 That is the regime of the HDZ in Croatia. That's the way they

22 tended to characterise it. "In the JNA, there is no one left who was in

23 favour of the idea that Slovenia and Croatia should remain in Yugoslavia."

24 Now he tells his members of the assembled delegates, and perhaps others

25 who were there, to "introduce order and discipline in your municipalities.

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1 The Serbs must be disciplined now. We are going to fight a battle here.

2 We are preparing regionalisation. We are fighting a battle to preserve

3 the legitimacy of Yugoslavia. On the 7th or 8th, it is possible that

4 Croatia and Slovenia will leave the federal institutions and we must fight

5 to preserve the legitimacy of Yugoslavia."

6 If I could just add there: According to some agreement that was

7 reached after the outbreak of -- shortly after the outbreak of hostilities

8 in Croatia and Slovenia at the end of June, pursuant to intervention by

9 the European Community, it was agreed that the -- their -- the

10 declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia would be put on hold,

11 so to speak, for three months, and that is a period which began in early

12 January and was due to -- early July and was due to expire on the 9th of

13 October. "What is most important is our political existence. Yugoslavia

14 and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nothing can be done in Bosnia and Herzegovina

15 without the Serbs and against their will. The war aim of the Serbian

16 people in Yugoslavia is Yugoslavia, for the simple reason that it is much

17 harder to secede than to keep the old legal order." Is a reflection of a

18 thought that we've seen before, that they thought they had the advantage,

19 since they were trying to preserve the status quo.

20 Q. Now, approximately -- or actually, less than two weeks later, in a

21 conversation with a man named Djogo, Dr. Karadzic expressed scepticism,

22 pessimism, about the prospects of an agreement and made clear the

23 consequences to the Muslims if they filed reach an agreement.

24 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, just in relation to that: Just as -- in

25 relation to the formulation of the question, it's -- we do have apparently

1 an expert in the box, and I don't think it's appropriate to formulate

2 questions in a way that is suggestive of the answer when the documents can

3 speak for themselves.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.

5 MR. TIEGER: Well, Your Honour, having been invited by Mr. Stewart

6 to ask questions that might be arguably leading, until such time as we got

7 to disputed issues, I accept that.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Are we at a disputed issue, or since you said that

9 the documents speak for themselves. So I take it that there's no dispute

10 or what you say that this is not a proper characterisation of that

11 document?

12 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, I'm actually making an objection

13 as to form at this point.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. On the other hand, we have to try to find

15 a practicable solution for these kind of matters. As soon as you say it's

16 in dispute that this is the content of the document, then of course we

17 have to go through that document in detail, and it should be done in a not

18 leading way. If, on the other hand, you say: Well, there's no need to

19 characterise the document, because by reading it, you'd know what it says

20 anyhow. Then of course for following the testimony of this witness, it

21 certainly assists to have it just in brief the information on what the

22 document tells us. Because otherwise we would have to read the whole of

23 the document, there might be a lot of irrelevant parts in it as well. So

24 if it's not -- if it's just a form at this moment, Mr. Tieger, perhaps you

25 could try to put the questions in such a way that where you characterise

1 the document, you could perhaps invite the expert to do so, and if he's

2 just as concise and brief as you are, then it -- Ms. Loukas will be happy,

3 I take it, and we'll get information which is the same or at least I

4 expect it then to be the same as when you introduce the character of the

5 document. Please proceed.

6 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. And if this intercept --

8 this intercept has four clips. I will invite Mr. Treanor to comment on

9 each one successively, if he chooses, or to move on to the next one. The

10 first clip, Your Honour, begins at page 2 of the English translation.

11 THE WITNESS: Let me say first of all that the interlocutor here,

12 Mr. Gojko Djogo, was the president of the association of Serbs from

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina living in Serbia.

14 [Intercept played] (no translation)

15 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour. That's found at page 7 of the

16 English translation.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

18 [Intercept played] (no translation)

19 THE WITNESS: I'd just like to comment at this point that this

20 conversation is reflective of Dr. Karadzic's view of the current state of

21 the discussions among the coalition parties. On the 10th of October, a

22 joint session of the BH Assembly had started. Among other things, it was

23 considering a draft, so-called platform, and a draft memorandum, submitted

24 by the SDA, which went -- was similar in content to the draft decision

25 which we discussed -- that was submitted back in February, although it was

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1 much stronger in its language, as I think we'll see, and it was now being

2 put forward in a situation in which not only had hostilities erupted in

3 Croatia, but as of October the 9th, Croatia and Slovenia were basically

4 independent of Yugoslavia. And I won't comment on what he thought was

5 going to happen as a result of that debate. We'll be seeing that. But

6 this reflects what is happening on that level within the Assembly in

7 particular, at this point in time, which is the 12th -- on the 12th of

8 November -- of October, there was a break in that session, and it resumed

9 again on the 14th of October. I believe it began on the 10th and carried

10 over into the 11th and then resumed again on the 14th.

11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, the next clip can be found on page 9 of

12 the English translation.

13 [Intercept played] (no translation)

14 THE WITNESS: Here we see another reflection of the thought that

15 was in the first couple of clips and also appeared in the earlier

16 conversation with Mr. Milosevic, that is, that the Serbs are stronger and

17 he's having a hard time believing that the Bosnian Muslim leaders don't

18 realise that and don't realise that there's no way that they can win in

19 the type of contest which they seem to be forcing the issue towards.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I'm looking at the clock. It's 5.30.

21 Would this be a suitable time for a break?

22 MR. TIEGER: Of course, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll adjourn until 10 minutes to 6.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 5.29 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 5.53 p.m.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

2 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, the final segment of the video to be

3 played can be found on page 14.

4 [Intercept played] (no translation)

5 MR. TIEGER:

6 Q. That's quite a short clip, Mr. Treanor. If you have any comments

7 about that.

8 A. The reference there is of course to the fighting going on in

9 Croatia, where Montenegrins are participating among other places,

10 certainly in the operations around Dubrovnik.

11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we'll next play a video, which needs to

12 be marked for identification first.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

14 THE REGISTRAR: The video will be Prosecution Exhibit number P69,

15 and the transcript, P69A.

16 MR. TIEGER:

17 Q. Mr. Treanor, this is a video of a speech by Radovan Karadzic at

18 the assembly session of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia

19 and Herzegovina, to which you referred earlier. Is there any additional

20 backdrop information that you'd like to provide the Court before we play

21 that video?

22 A. Yes. I could just point out that, as I indicated earlier, this

23 was a very long session, having begun on the 10th, extending past

24 midnight, I think, into the 11th and then resuming again on the 14th.

25 This speech is given on the 14th. The discussion, of course, turns on the

1 draft documents that the SDA has submitted. At this point, there has been

2 no vote. Those documents had not been accepted. But that is the focus of

3 the debate and Dr. Karadzic's remarks.

4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, the portion that will be played can be

5 found on page 3. I'm sorry. And that would be at I -- intercept

6 binder 17.

7 [Videotape played]

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. Mr. Treanor.

10 A. Well, I think a little commentary is necessary for most of that.

11 We've seen some of the themes we've seen before. I'd just like to point

12 out that when Dr. Karadzic referred to, "We have a constitutional way to

13 prevent you from doing this," he was apparently referring to the power of

14 the president of the Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik, to adjourn the session

15 before it came to a vote, which is something he in fact did. Also you see

16 reference to the negotiations going on in The Hague, which were taking

17 place at that time.

18 Now, what happened is that in fact Mr. Krajisnik did adjourn the

19 session. The SDS deputies left, but the vice-president of the Assembly

20 reconvened the session and a vote was taken. And the so-called platform

21 and memorandum were passed and published in the Official Gazette.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Treanor, may I ask you: You say this speech was

23 given on the 14th, and that's the speech we just saw; is that true?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe that's the correct date. It's

25 possible that --

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1 JUDGE ORIE: It gives -- on the transcript it says the 15th of

2 October.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes. As I was going to say, it's possible it was

4 after the midnight on the 14th. It was a long session.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. Then I better understand. Thank you.

6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, if we could turn to tab 46 of binder 3.

7 You'll find the October 16th memorandum. That document is currently

8 displayed on screen.

9 Q. Mr. Treanor, this is one of the documents that you were referring

10 to?

11 A. Yes. This is the so-called memorandum. I would just call

12 attention to the next page, perhaps, numbered paragraph 2. If we could

13 magnify that. Just to point out some of the things that the SDS

14 leadership found so objectionable here, on a substantive level.

15 Paragraph 2 states that: "Although BH will continue to advocate the

16 survival of Yugoslavia, in the meantime, the proper functioning of

17 existing joint institutions, her representatives will not attend sessions

18 of the Assembly and Presidency of the SFRY if they are not attended by

19 representatives of all republics and provinces. Any decisions made by

20 these bodies in less than their full composition shall not be binding for

21 BH."

22 Now, of course, living in Croatia, we're not attending the

23 sessions of the joint bodies, so in fact this is a statement that BH was

24 not going to -- would not attend, would not participate in the -- in

25 federal institutions either.

1 Paragraph 3 states that: "BH will not accept any constitutional

2 solutions for the future Yugoslav community that do not at the same time

3 include Serbia and Croatia. In any future integration, BH should be

4 connected to Serbia and Croatia in the same manner."

5 Now, as I've indicated, Croatia was in fact, and I think in law,

6 independent at this time. So the -- whatever relationship BH was going to

7 have with Serbia under those -- under that provision, it would certainly

8 not include being part of a federal state with Serbia.

9 And then we can take a quick look at paragraph 4. First,

10 demilitarisation. It states that: "BH will do everything in its power to

11 remain neutral in the conflict," that is, the conflict between Croatia and

12 the -- what is left of Yugoslavia. This again is a provision that was I

13 think fair to say the SDS leadership took violent exception to. In

14 effect, the memorandum -- I don't want to overstate this, but in effect it

15 announces the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As I indicated,

16 substantively, this was not at all to the liking, as I'm sure the Court

17 can appreciate, in view of the documentation that's presented over the

18 last few days, not at all to the liking of the SDS leadership and they

19 were of course extremely angry at the manner in which this decision was

20 taken, that is, it was done precisely by the outvoting that they had so

21 feared for so long, and that very soon after a time, during which, as

22 we've seen in a couple of the recent documents, they thought they had the

23 agreement of Mr. Izetbegovic to a procedure under which none of the

24 parties would impose its will on the others. This is precisely what has

25 happened to them now.

1 Q. Mr. Treanor, you mentioned that this particular session of the

2 Bosnian Assembly extended into the early morning hours of October 15th.

3 Later on that day, October 15th, did the Bosnian leadership gather at a

4 meeting of the political council and discuss those events?

5 A. Yes. Well, this was a day that ushered in a period of very

6 intense and dramatic developments, and that is reflected in the -- a

7 number of high-level meetings, which were -- and consultations which took

8 place over the next couple of days.

9 Q. Can we turn first to a meeting of the Political Council on October

10 15th, which may be found at tab 47 of binder 3. As we can see on the

11 screen, there are large portions of this document highlighted. And

12 perhaps you can take us through them, Mr. Treanor.

13 A. Yes. If we could magnify the first highlighted portion. I was

14 referring to the one up above. Just to make sure we have correct

15 information in the record. These are minutes of a session of the party

16 council held on the premises of the Deputies' Club on the evening of the

17 15th of October, 1991. So later in the day, after that late-night session

18 concluded. Now we'll see the remarks of various of the participants at

19 this meeting to -- which will enable the Court to gauge the strength and

20 tenor of the reaction of the Bosnian Serb leaders to the events at that

21 Assembly session.

22 Milorad Ekmecic, who was a historian and member of the

23 council, "We should thank the incumbent party leadership for their work on

24 the negotiations. Because the plebiscite," reference is made to a

25 plebiscite, which we'll discuss later: "Will confirm not only that the

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1 Serbs do not want to leave Yugoslavia but also that the Croats and the

2 Muslims do. Therefore, we should continue our contacts with the

3 leadership of the Croatian Democratic Union and the Party of Democratic

4 Action in our search for a political solution. The Serbs have created

5 regions which are not interconnected, and these regions must not be

6 allowed to establish governments which would not be interconnected. In

7 public, we must let it be known that we can set up a Serbian government

8 with its seat in Sarajevo which would connect all our regions."

9 Now, the reference to the plebiscite is interesting right at the

10 very beginning of this document. Apparently the decision has already been

11 taken in principle that there should be a plebiscite among the Serbian

12 people in Bosnia as to whether they wish to remain in Yugoslavia. And we

13 see Todor Dutina, a journalist and member of the council: "This evening

14 we must shed the illusion that a form of coexistence with the Muslims and

15 the Croats can be found." The underlining is in the original copy I have.

16 It's been underlined in hand: "Therefore, I suggest the following: Issue

17 a proclamation addressed to the Party of Democratic Action and the

18 Croatian Democratic Union, asking them to withdraw within seven days the

19 decision they have adopted, otherwise the Serbian Democratic Party will

20 instruct its members to leave the existing government institutions and

21 begin creating parallel ones. Within seven days, organise a rally to

22 demand equality, thus exerting pressure through the media. Also emphasise

23 that unless this decision of the Assembly is withdrawn, the regions will

24 stop paying their obligations to the Republic."

25 Then Nikola Koljevic, member of the Presidency of BH: "Nothing

1 can be done legally with the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian

2 Democratic Union. We must not lose," next page, "We must not lose the

3 momentum we have in order to announce our plebiscite for Yugoslavia as a

4 federal state with Serbia and Montenegro as urgently as possible. The

5 plebiscite must be announced tomorrow."

6 Mitar Miljanovic: "Today what is most important is unity in our

7 ranks. Therefore, any one of us who is unable to withstand various kinds

8 of pressure should leave us. The strategic goal of those confronting us

9 is the creation of autonomy, followed by a Republic, and ultimately a

10 Dzamahirija, which is, I believe, an Arabic, Turkish word for "state" or

11 "republic."

12 And Velibor Ostojic, who we've met before, the minister of

13 information, an SDS member: "The party policy up to now was suited to

14 peacetime conditions. Therefore I suggest the following: That all

15 representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party who are in the government

16 and cannot bear the burden placed on them should withdraw. A shift to the

17 opposition at the republican level. Demanding that the coalition parties

18 should, within a certain period of time, suspend the decision of the

19 Assembly, or all finances will be cut off. Organising working and

20 instruction groups in the field. And finally, a media war: An urgent

21 proclamation, daily announcements, letters to all the media."

22 The minutes are incomplete here, but there's reference to the

23 setting up of a parallel government to be reflected, first of all, in the

24 creation of a Serbian parliament is in fact the word used in the minutes

25 rather than assembly. Dr. Karadzic is indicated as saying: "Yesterday,

1 the constitutional and legal order in Yugoslavia and Bosnia was toppled,

2 the Serbian people were deprived of their status. We must not shift to

3 the opposition until the constitutional and legal order is re-established,

4 because we should ensure the sovereignty of the Serbian people. Our

5 people must follow us in all the bodies."

6 And then Mr. Krajisnik stating: "1. We should not start from the

7 standpoint that the coalition has adopted a decision, because they have

8 not adopted it in a legal manner. 2. Since the above-mentioned decision

9 is illegal and unconstitutional, we must find a method of proving this."

10 And Mr. Neskovic, who I believe is a member of the Main Board as

11 well, Radovan Neskovic: "Since they will not revoke their decisions, I

12 suggest that a parliamentary crisis be provoked. Demand new elections,

13 because in this way, we would gain time, which suits us. Third, as

14 regards the ethnic-party outvoting, we were the first to use it at the

15 local level, and they at the republican level." Number 4: "Go for a

16 change of policy with the aim of creating a Greater Serbia. Harmonise the

17 change of policy with Belgrade, but not in the Assembly, because returning

18 to the Assembly would mean recognising their decision."

19 Then Mr. Jovo Miskin, who was the head of the SDS regionalisation

20 staff, addresses that issue, stating: "1. Continue regionalisation more

21 intensively. 2. Assemble a group of experts on constitutional law to

22 analyse the current situation as regards the constitution and give their

23 proposals. 3. Inspire to defend legitimacy. 4. Establish parallel

24 government bodies immediately, so that they will be ready. 5. Organise

25 militarily, especially in the towns, and give instructions to this effect

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1 in the municipal boards and local boards. 6. We are not well organised in

2 the media war. 7. I would stress a plebiscite, but we should not rush

3 it, because regionalisation is the priority."

4 I think we're coming to the end here, with Aleksa Buha, who is a

5 deputy: "No one can declare us to be a minority when we are a constituent

6 nation." I'm sorry, that's the previous speaker.

7 Mr. Buha: "We should draw a distinction between what is legal and

8 what is realistic, and we shall work in both directions. We should remain

9 in the legal institutions. We must demand that the coalition withdraw its

10 decision, otherwise we will establish a Serbian Assembly. Reality

11 consists in further work on regionalisation. A certain success has been

12 achieved in this and now people do not know what to do next. The

13 reactions of the Yugoslav People's Army are too," next page, I

14 believe: "Are too slow. Communications have not been secured yet. We

15 should draw the attention of the Yugoslav People's Army to this."

16 Now, as the Court can see, there was uniformly strong and negative

17 reaction to the adoption of the memorandum and the platform, but some

18 disagreement as to the precise strategy to be followed. Mr. Buha

19 indicated in the first portion of what he said what turned out to be the

20 line of action. There was a feeling that if the demand of some of those

21 present was followed to withdraw from the BH institutions, that the Serbs

22 would lose whatever advantage they might continue to derive from

23 participating in them, so they decided not to do that, but to participate

24 on a basis that suited them wherever they could -- where they felt it

25 would be to their advantage. The plebiscite idea went forward.

1 Regionalisation went forward. And the idea of establishing parallel

2 institutions, while maintaining participation in the old institutions, if

3 I may put it that way, also went forward, including establishing a

4 separate Serbian Assembly.

5 Q. On October 16th, was an announcement issued to the Serbian people?

6 That's a document which can be found on tab 48.

7 A. Yes. Here we have an announcement that was issued the next day to

8 explain the position of the SDS on the -- in regard to the dramatic events

9 of the 14th and 15th of October. It refers to -- perhaps if we just blow

10 up paragraph 1 to give some of the tenor of this. It refers to political

11 terror, an attempted coup d'etat, and emphasises that by this act, the

12 constitutional establishment has been endangered, which was based on the

13 sovereignty and equality of the constituent nations, while the gate has

14 been opened to anarchy and chaos, equality, of course, being the very

15 thing that the Serbs had been insisting on all along.

16 Q. Can we turn, then, to a document of October 17th. That document

17 can be found at tab 39 [sic]. It is on screen and it is

18 entitled: "Possibilities of organising a Serbian Ministry of the

19 Interior," and is dated 17 October 1991, Sarajevo.

20 A. Yes. This is an interesting document. We have had occasion to

21 mention the earlier conflicts within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of

22 BH and indeed the -- a broaching of the idea of setting up a separate

23 ministry, a separate Serbian ministry. Now, after the events of the 14th

24 and 15th of October, we just saw the political council discussing

25 establishing parallel organs of power in general, including an assembly.

1 Here on the 17th already, we see a document which discusses the

2 establishing of a separate Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is

3 the first document of this type that we have, probably because, as I say,

4 the idea of establishing a separate Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs

5 had already been broached in view of the particular situation that existed

6 within that ministry over the course of the entire summer. So we just --

7 draw attention to the highlighted portion here, which is the second full

8 paragraph on page 3, which states: "Starting from this organisation, that

9 is, the existing organisation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is

10 possible to establish a Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs as a parallel

11 organ of authority in several ways," and it goes on to enumerate these

12 ways. So again this document is illustrative of putting into --

13 attempting to put into practice some of the conclusions reached by the

14 political council the day before.

15 Q. Before moving on to the next document, Your Honour, we'd like to

16 clarify just for the record that that document is actually found at

17 tab 49, not 39, as the transcript indicates.

18 If we could move on to the October 18th, 1991 meeting of the SDS

19 Deputies' Club, which is found at tab 50.

20 A. Yes. Now, this is a meeting technically of the Deputies' Club,

21 and if I may draw the Court's attention to the fact that the SDS deputies

22 in the Assembly are of course the ones who are most immediately involved

23 and affected by what happened there. At this meeting are also present,

24 however, aside from the -- 49 of the deputies, ministers, deputy assistant

25 ministers, as well as a large number of presidents of municipal boards of

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1 the SDS, presidents of municipal assemblies, and municipal executive

2 committees. So a large gathering of SDS party and state functionaries on

3 various levels.

4 Q. And do these officials continue to discuss responses to the events

5 of October 14th and 15th?

6 A. Yes. That is the centre of their concern here. I also point out

7 as a matter of interest, or perhaps curiosity, that this meeting in fact

8 took place on the premises of the Assembly of BH. Dr. Karadzic, for

9 instance, is indicated as welcoming those present and saying: "The day

10 had come and that the process of the dissolution of the state had been

11 going on for a long time. We believed that we had a state and that we had

12 to give up a lot for it, lest we offend those with whom we lived. These

13 days we are witnessing the last stage of the destruction of that state,

14 the destruction of all things Yugoslav, except Broz's internal borders."

15 The internal borders being a reference to the borders of the republics

16 which the Bosnian Serb leadership, as we've seen, considered to be merely

17 administrative borders and should not become international borders.

18 "The latest developments in the BH Assembly indicate all the

19 intentions of our partners in the government and our neighbours in the

20 state. They will not stop from violating the constitution in order to

21 come by a slip of paper."

22 Q. You've also highlighted an entry by -- or a comment by Jovan

23 Tintor, which is found at number 9 of the enumerated sections.

24 A. Yes. He's an SDS official from the Sarajevo area. "We've been

25 listening to the same stories for a year. The Serbs must take the

1 initiative or it will turn out that we have betrayed the Serbian people.

2 I suggest to the deputies that we fight for a Greater Serbia. We must

3 decide right now what we will fight for."

4 And further, interesting comments by Velibor Ostojic, who we've

5 met several times before, the minister of information in the BH

6 government: "The situation is such that the SDS in BH must go on an

7 offensive in the government. This is the final stage of the political

8 crisis in BH. The SDS has people to conduct this manoeuvre. The move

9 they made illegally gives us the right to make material moves. As the

10 first move, the Club of SDS Deputies should start functioning as the

11 Serbian National Assembly and then it should start creating a parallel

12 Serbian government. The SDS representatives must remain in the present

13 government. The Serbian authorities in the municipalities should finish

14 the regionalisation process and these regions should be recognised only by

15 the federal state. The will of the Serbian people should be expressed as

16 soon as possible. The SDS has been forced to make radical moves."

17 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honours, just on that point.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Loukas.

19 MS. LOUKAS: If we have going to go to the process of where the

20 witness actually just reads out slabs from the relevant documents, which

21 in itself is an interesting process, because I think we all here have the

22 facility to read, unless there's something beyond analysis --

23 JUDGE ORIE: May I already respond to that immediately,

24 Ms. Loukas, because I've given it some thought as well and of course the

25 Chamber has also given it some thought. Just reading from a piece of

1 paper would not serve the public character of this trial very much. That

2 is an aspect which is not very exciting, perhaps, for those who are in

3 this courtroom and who could read portions of it. But, for example, if

4 this would be broadcasted in the former Yugoslavia --

5 MS. LOUKAS: Sure.

6 JUDGE ORIE: -- then if you wouldn't know English, you could just

7 look at your screen, not knowing what it is all about.

8 MS. LOUKAS: No, I appreciate that concern, and there's a second

9 part to what I have to say, Your Honour. If we're going to have this

10 process of the reading out of these documents, and I understand that the

11 process is as a result of ensuring that the Court in this aspect is as

12 public as possible, at least can we have the portions that involve what

13 Mr. Krajisnik says read out as well?

14 Now, we've gone through this document. We've -- perhaps

15 Mr. Tieger was coming to it later, but we actually bypassed what

16 Mr. Krajisnik had to say and went straight to Tintor and Ostojic. And I

17 think in those circumstances, that's rather inappropriate, because I think

18 it's important that what Mr. Krajisnik had to say about it being an

19 illegal adjournment of the 8th session and about -- and his interests

20 there by being in the constitutionality and in fact the

21 unconstitutionality of what occurred, that should be read out in this

22 process if we're going to have this reading-out process and ensuring

23 the -- that all the available information is publicly available.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The question is whether this should and could

25 be done during cross-examination or whether it would be a balanced

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1 presentation of points that need the specific attention of this Chamber.

2 Also to point already at those portions where Mr. Krajisnik speaks. I

3 don't know what's -- what will be in the next binders, Ms. Loukas, so I am

4 a bit hesitant to say that it's appropriate to point at what

5 Mr. Krajisnik's said, because it might be detrimental for him, it might be

6 very favourable for him. I'm not aware of what will be there in the

7 future. But I do understand that especially in this respect, that is, the

8 constitutionality of the decision, taken on the 15th of October, that

9 especially there you'd like to have Mr. Krajisnik's view be expressed as

10 well.

11 Mr. Tieger, would it be a good idea that on such a specific

12 request, to invite the witness to also pay attention to what Mr. Krajisnik

13 said? Otherwise, the information comes to us in small portions and I

14 think what the witness does is to give us an impression of what happened

15 in these days, what the positions were of the different parties, and I

16 think it might be relevant to hear what Mr. Krajisnik said at the time as

17 well.

18 MR. TIEGER: Believe me, Your Honour, the Prosecution has no

19 objection to the Court hearing everything that Mr. Krajisnik ever said.

20 Let me point out: There will be many portions of his comments quoted

21 during the course of the presentation of Mr. Treanor's testimony. There

22 is one caveat, however, and that is that as we move on to the sessions of

23 the Serbian Assembly, it would be overly time-consuming and I think

24 unconstructive to quote Mr. Krajisnik every time he speaks, and I don't

25 think the Court would find that a useful expenditure of time. I think

1 that is better served for cross-examination. If there are portions that

2 the Defence thinks were omitted and that should have been commented on.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's start with where we are here. Could you

4 please indicate, Ms. Loukas, which portion especially you had in mind that

5 would need attention.

6 MS. LOUKAS: Yes. Just before going to that, Your Honour, just in

7 relation to what Mr. Tieger just indicated, of course, my objection was

8 not framed in such a generalised and overly obfuscating manner

9 that Mr. Tieger sought to characterise it as. I was referring to a

10 specific document and specific elements of that document that were being

11 read out, and we just completely ignored what Mr. Krajisnik had to say,

12 and in fact it's just two sentences. It's on page 1 and it refers to this

13 question of the unconstitutionality. It's just at the bottom of the page.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It sounds a bit silly to ask the witness to

15 read that, because we also can read that. I take it that we are -- you

16 are referring to tab 50, page 1, where it says: "Krajisnik: He presented

17 information on what followed the illegal adjournment of the 8th session.

18 We should adopt a conclusion about the constitutionality or

19 unconstitutionality of the decisions adopted during the illegal resumption

20 of the 8th session."

21 That's the part you would draw our attention to.

22 MS. LOUKAS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. And Mr. Treanor, if I could follow up on the Court's comments. If

1 you would identify the highlighted portions that you think are relevant

2 for comment, as the Court has pointed out, there is no need to read them

3 in their entirety, provided that they are adequately identified for the

4 record. On the other hand, if -- I'm sure the Court has no objection to

5 your reading portions of those that you believe bear emphasis and that

6 assist your explanation.

7 A. I think we finished with Mr. Ostojic's comments. We can move to

8 the next page.

9 Q. I believe we're on page 3 of the English portion. Any aspect of

10 that you wish to comment on or have brought to the Court's attention?

11 A. Yes, indeed. This meeting and the preceding meeting are very

12 important because we see a shift now in the terms in which the SDS leaders

13 are thinking about this whole problem, as has been indicated in the course

14 of many hours of testimony. The idea hitherto has been to keep the Serbs

15 of BH within Yugoslavia by keeping Bosnia as a whole within Yugoslavia. It

16 has now become I think more than apparent to them that that is not going

17 to be possible. They are upset at what has happened and are trying --

18 attempting to devise new strategies to meet that situation, one of which

19 was the idea of the plebiscite, and the other, regionalisation, and the

20 remarks that are made here shed some light on exactly -- or more precisely

21 what the place of these moves will be in their future actions, which we'll

22 be dealing with over the course of the next few hours, if not days.

23 Q. And before --

24 A. So -- sorry.

25 Q. Please go ahead.

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1 A. Here we see Mr. Ostojic saying that: "One of the conclusions of

2 the Serbian Assembly is the declaration of Serbian territory in BH."

3 Again, now moving to the fore is the issue openly of defining what the

4 Serbian territory in BH should be, with a view to the partition of Bosnia.

5 He makes some comment about the plebiscite should be conducted by the

6 Serbian Assemblies. And if we could move down near the bottom of the

7 page. Mr. Miljanovic indicates again the new preoccupation with

8 borders: "We must define the borders of the Serbian regions, resolve the

9 issue of Bogic Bogicevic and request that the JNA use all possible means."

10 Bogic Bogicevic was the Bosnian member of the Federal Presidency.

11 He was a Serb, but he had been elected prior to the elections of 1990 by

12 the communist leadership of BH and was not particularly in sympathy with

13 the SDS in its goals. They hoped, especially at this point in time, to

14 replace him on the -- in the Presidency of the SFRY with one of their own

15 number.

16 I think we can perhaps look at Dr. Karadzic's comments now on the

17 top, under number 29 on this page of the translation, in which he

18 addresses the issue of the manner of the working in the leadership. He's

19 indicated as saying: "A team made up of the leading men of the party, the

20 government and the political council has been working day and night. I

21 have decided to impose a state of emergency in the party. Please inform

22 others that the party is working in emergency conditions. We must not

23 make a single wrong step, and we must listen to our leaders. Maximum

24 discipline is required."

25 Now, at the very end of the document, Mr. Maksimovic, who is the

1 president of the Deputies' Club, is cited here, and we can see that -- he

2 says: "It has been proposed that a period be set between today's meeting

3 and a final session, during which the partners would rescind their

4 decision." They're giving their opponents a chance to go back on their

5 decision. And indicates the other moves that the Serbian deputies could

6 take, namely, to declare the Club of Deputies itself as a Serbian

7 Assembly, to call a plebiscite. And then a technical decision on

8 conducting the plebiscite. So this more or less summarises the results of

9 this meeting and consultation, that is, the idea that a Serbian Assembly

10 should be formed and that a plebiscite be called.

11 Q. And Dr. Karadzic referred to the imposition of a state of

12 emergency during the course of that session. Can we turn to the next two

13 documents, the first of which is found at tab 51, and which is an

14 October 18th telegram.

15 A. Yes. This is dated the 18th of October, the same day as the

16 meeting we just examined, and Dr. Karadzic's comment there about

17 instituting a state of emergency. He indicates that: "A state of

18 emergency in the SDS binding for all SDS organs and members and personnel

19 should be introduced. You will be receiving instructions about the

20 measures daily. The first measure is to organise daily meetings of

21 municipal boards and round-the-clock shifts on the party premises. The

22 introduction of some sort of watch system," as we have -- as we saw, I

23 think, at the very beginning of my testimony, the presidents of the party

24 had authority under the party statute to institute such a state of

25 emergency in the party.

1 Q. And if we could turn next to an October 19th fax from Novi

2 Travnik, found at tab 52. Does that also reflect the state of emergency?

3 A. Yes. This is a document that we have that reflects the fact that

4 the party boards out in the field did in fact respond to his instructions.

5 The municipal board of the SDS in Novi Travnik informs that it:

6 "Completely acted in accordance with your telegram and introduced a state

7 of emergency. And we've organised 24-hour duty around the clock.

8 Q. Now, as the conclusions noted by Mr. Maksimovic at the

9 October 18th Deputies' Club meeting indicated, there was consideration of

10 the declaration of a Serbian Assembly. Can I ask you to turn next to a

11 intercept dated 24 October 1991 between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic,

12 which may be found at -- in the intercept binder at tab 18.

13 The first clip, Your Honours, begins at page 1.

14 [Intercept played] (no translation)

15 MR. TIEGER:

16 Q. Before we move to the second of three clips from that intercept,

17 is there anything you wanted to comment on?

18 A. Yes. Just two things. The -- this conversation sheds some

19 interesting light on the -- what's been going on over the six days since

20 the previous document. Apparently a deadline has been set of 1700 on the

21 24th of October. Now, in fact, what has -- invitations for the founding

22 meeting of the Bosnian Serb Assembly have already gone out and the meeting

23 has been set for that hour. So that is the expiration of the deadline and

24 the calling of that session coincide. Mr. Milosevic is obviously very

25 anxious to -- the possibilities for an agreement with Mr. Izetbegovic be

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1 explored. Interesting is the comment of Dr. Karadzic at the end, saying

2 that we wasted three months on that regionalisation. Apparently, as I

3 indicated earlier, the regionalisation was figuring in the discussions

4 with the Bosnian Muslims and -- the Bosnian Muslim leadership, and he

5 seems to have had reason to believe that they might go along with

6 something like that, as indicated in one of the previous conversations,

7 perhaps along the lines of Bosnia remaining within Yugoslavia and the

8 Bosnian Muslims being given autonomous regions within Bosnia. But then

9 Izetbegovic changes his mind.

10 Q. The next portion can be found at page 4.

11 [Intercept played] (no translation)

12 MR. TIEGER: And the final clip can be found at page 6.

13 [Intercept played] (no translation)

14 MR. TIEGER:

15 Q. Mr. Treanor, any comments on those last two segments of the

16 October 24th intercepted telephone conversation?

17 A. I certainly can't comment on the legal aspects of this dispute,

18 and much of the rest of it I think requires little commentary. But I

19 think what is evident is -- in this especially is Dr. Karadzic's

20 determination to, in view of the situation, to pursue the course they have

21 elected to take and, as he put it, to establish Serbian power on 65

22 per cent of the territory of BH. The number -- the figure 65 per cent is

23 one that I think we'll see recurs frequently.

24 Q. Let's turn, then, to the event that was highlighted in that

25 intercept, and that is the establishment of the Serbian Assembly on

1 October 24th.

2 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, that document may be found at tab 53 of

3 binder 3.

4 Q. Mr. Treanor, I wonder if you might provide us with a brief

5 overview of the session before we run through those portions you've

6 highlighted.

7 A. Yes. Well, this session of the -- the founding session of the

8 Assembly of the Serbian People in BH was a very formal and ceremonious

9 occasion, I suppose. I'm using the word ceremonious correctly here, but a

10 very formal and public occasion. Invitations were sent out to a large

11 number of people, other than Serbian deputies. The session formally began

12 as a meeting of the Deputies' Club, although the invitation had described

13 it as being the founding session of the Assembly of the Serbian People,

14 again a decision which had apparently already been taken. So a large

15 number of prominent guests were present at that session. The main

16 business of the session was precisely to adopt a decision to constitute an

17 Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also adopted a

18 decision on holding a Serbian plebiscite in BH, and the session also

19 adopted a number of technical decisions dealing with the organisation of

20 the Assembly per se, including the election of a president of that

21 Assembly.

22 Q. Now, on page 4 of the English translation, and in the highlighted

23 portion we see here, does the transcript identify a number of those

24 persons present at the Assembly?

25 A. Yes. As we can see, Mrs. Plavsic and Mr. Koljevic were present as

1 members of the Presidency. There is present Mr. Stanko Cvijan, who is the

2 minister for relations with Serbs outside of Serbia in the government of

3 the Republic of Serbia. Serbian ministers in the BH government,

4 presidents of the Serbian and other representatives from Serbian

5 autonomous regions, and of course Dr. Karadzic and other functionaries of

6 the SDS itself, including Mr. Dukic and Mr. Leovac.

7 Q. Did the speakers discuss the reasons for the establishment of the

8 Assembly, including references to not only the events which you've

9 discussed of the previous months, but World War II and genocide?

10 A. Indeed, the discussions at this assembly are -- contained a lot of

11 similarity to the discussions at the previous meetings that we examined,

12 that is, the Political Council and the Deputies' Club meeting a few days

13 before. Our record of this meeting, that is, the record that we have

14 available to us, is a lot more extensive than the records that are

15 available to us from those other meetings, so we can get a much better

16 idea of what individuals were saying and the types of argumentation that

17 was being used.

18 Q. We only have a few minutes remaining. Perhaps we can look at the

19 early portion of the session. Again, Mr. Treanor, if you could provide

20 whatever comments are of assistance while we attempt to identify

21 specifically where the selected portion you're viewing can be found in the

22 transcripts, and, if necessary, cite any particular portion of what the

23 speaker has said.

24 Turning first to page 4 of the English transcript and the bottom

25 of the page highlighted on screen. I'm sorry. Page 7.

1 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honours.

2 A. Here we have Mr. Krajisnik starting out to explain the background

3 to the meeting. Perhaps if the highlighted portion at the top of page 7

4 could be blown up.

5 Q. Since you mentioned the top of the page, I assume you're referring

6 to page 8.

7 A. Yes. Here we see him referring in the second paragraph to a

8 serious attempt to transgress against the national sovereignty of the

9 Serbian people and its constitutional and legal position within

10 Yugoslavia, which, consequently endangers its existence in the territory

11 of BH, where it has been living since time immemorial.

12 Q. And if we could highlight that portion at the bottom of the page,

13 please.

14 A. At this point in the last paragraph on this page he speaks of

15 saying no to transgressions against the national sovereignty of the

16 Serbian people, objecting attempts at deciding the state-related destiny

17 of our people without its approval and against its political will as

18 expressed by its democratically elected deputies. And he speaks of the

19 will of the Serbian people to remain in its historical and ethnic

20 territories and a part of the joint state of Yugoslavia.

21 I'll go on if people are finished with that.

22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm looking at the clock, and I'm wondering

24 whether this is the most efficient way of dealing with these kind of

25 matters. It's my impression that, especially for the larger portions

1 highlighted, that it should be possible, for example, if I just look at

2 the bottom of this page number 8, I think it would be possible to -- in

3 one or two short sentences, to come to the core of what is discussed

4 there. I do not know whether Mr. Treanor has a copy of the documents with

5 all the highlights on it, or is he surprised by the highlighting you've

6 done? Because it's not -- we are not at this moment in a position where

7 we could ask Mr. Treanor to sit together with the Prosecution and further

8 prepare for his examination. But if he would have a copy with all the

9 highlights, we could invite him - and I know that it's overwork,

10 especially since we'll start tomorrow in the morning - to see whether it

11 would be possible just to give a short core description of what is in such

12 a paragraph. Because, as it is now, it takes a lot of time, and sometimes

13 I have read it quicker than the explanation has come, and the explanation

14 sometimes is nothing more than just a repetition of what is in that part.

15 Mr. Treanor, I am aware that perhaps I'm asking a lot of you, but

16 would you be willing to prepare in the way I suggested the comments, to

17 say: Well, bottom page 8 is that and that. Just very briefly. I do

18 understand that of course there might get something lost from your

19 testimony. On the other hand, we have your full report available, and of

20 course we have the full text of these documents available as well. And

21 since it comes down, I would say in 80 per cent of the cases, to just

22 reading what it says, would you be willing to prepare in such a way the

23 subsequent part of what I expect to be your testimony?

24 THE WITNESS: Well, I can certainly try. My only hesitation would

25 be about putting words in people's mouths. I mean, a summary is a

1 summary. I had adopted the procedure which I thought was being accepted

2 of reading what was in the document in order that it be put into the

3 transcript of the proceeding and available to people in that way. I can

4 attempt to summarise what is there in an attempt to move on from quote to

5 quote, so to speak, if the Court finds that satisfactory, my attempt at

6 that, then we can continue in that fashion, I suppose.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This would be my suggestion. We've heard the

8 response of Mr. Treanor, who finally testifies in this Court. It's not up

9 to this Court to say what he has to say or not. Would this be -- would

10 such an attempt be agreeable to the parties?

11 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, on the part of the Defence, I

12 don't have a problem with that, unless we get to contentious areas, of

13 course.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Of course.

15 Mr. Tieger.

16 MR. TIEGER: No, of course not, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then a final question to you: Are you on

18 schedule with Mr. Treanor? He has been scheduled for 25 hours. We now

19 spent some eight hours. Are you on one third of your journey with

20 Mr. Treanor?

21 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, with some hesitation, I think we are

22 roughly on schedule, yes.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So we might even come a little bit before

24 schedule.

25 We'll adjourn now and we'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00

1 o'clock, in this same courtroom.

2 Mr. Treanor, it will not be a surprise for you, but you get the

3 same instruction I gave you before, not to speak to anyone about your

4 testimony.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,

7 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 24th day of

8 February 2004, at 9.00 a.m.

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