1 Tuesday, 13 April 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone after a relatively long
6 break. Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Perhaps for the new start, we go through the routine and ask the
11 appearances for Prosecution first.
12 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. Alan
13 Tieger and Tim Resch appear on behalf of the Prosecution, assisted by case
14 manager, Carmela Javier,
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
16 MR. STEWART: May it please Your Honour. I appear with my learned
17 friend Ms. Loukas, as before, and Ms. Tatjana Cmeric.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then, for the record, you --
19 MR. STEWART: Oh, I personally am Nicholas Stewart.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, just for the record, Mr. Stewart.
21 Before the longer break, we finished the examination-in-chief of
22 Mr. Treanor. Is the Defence ready to cross-examine Mr. Treanor?
23 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. May I just make two comments.
24 First of all, my apologies, Your Honour, that we have kept the Court
25 waiting a few minutes. We had some unexpected security problems this
2 JUDGE ORIE: I accept that.
3 MR. STEWART: The second point is this, Your Honour: I have
4 mentioned to Mr. Harmon, who is not here personally at the moment, a
5 point. I don't want to go into what the point is, but I have mentioned an
6 issue which I do wish to raise at some stage in front of the Tribunal, not
7 this morning. Mr. Harmon knows about it. I'm sure Mr. Tieger knows about
8 it as well, actually. I simply wanted to say this: That because it
9 does -- I have had correspondence with the Chief Prosecutor, Mrs. Del
10 Ponte, and it's not impossible that I may make some criticism of Mrs. Del
11 Ponte, I do wish to say that I'm not going to raise it today. If it is
12 felt that Ms. Del Ponte wishes to be in Court when I raise this point then
13 I invite the Prosecution to let me know. I shall assume not, in which
14 case it's likely that I shall raise the matter at the beginning of some
15 session during the course this week, probably when we finish with Mr.
16 Treanor. It's not immediately urgent; on the other hand, it's something
17 that shouldn't be left for too long. But I didn't want to be discourteous
18 and I didn't want it to be said then that if I do make any criticism that
19 Mrs. Del Ponte should have had the opportunity of being here. She has
20 that opportunity. If the Prosecution would like to let me know and then
21 if she does, then we could arrange a suitable day. Because I know she is
22 a very busy lady.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, if you give notice well in advance and I
24 think it belongs to the good manners in court to indicate that you might
25 have some criticism of someone, although I can imagine that someone being
1 criticised could not always be present in this courtroom, certainly she
2 should have the possibility to attend.
3 Then if there are no other issues, Mr. Usher, would you please
4 escort Mr. Treanor into the courtroom.
5 Yes, Mr. Krajisnik.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour. If I may
7 have five minutes, by your leave.
8 JUDGE ORIE: If it would be five minutes, then we'd rather not
9 have Mr. Treanor in yet, unless it's directly related to Mr. Treanor. But
10 I don't think so. Please proceed.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, I would like to thank
12 you for the attention you have dedicated to this trial, Your Honours. I
13 find it encouraging that you have dedicated a lot of attention to this
14 trial, more, if I may say, then we see in other trials, and I hope we can
15 reach the truth, which is the main objective of this trial. However, I do
16 have a proposal to make to expedite proceedings in this trial. It may be
17 a little criticism too.
18 I believe the interpreters are not interpreting this trial
19 sufficiently well. I do not know English myself; however, when
20 Mr. Treanor read from a Serbian document and translated the Serbian
21 document directly into English, then I was receiving interpretation and I
22 realised that the meaning of the document was entirely different from what
23 I was receiving. I assume this may also happen when proceedings are being
24 interpreted into English. I did manage to find a reason for the
25 interpreters going wrong on that particular document. Many of the
1 participants in this trial speak very fast, and Mr. Treanor too was
2 speaking fast at that time. That may have been why the interpreters got
3 it wrong, and I think the meaning of their interpretation was entirely
5 This provided a motive for me -- I do not mean hereby to complain
6 about the interpreters. A recording of that trial was published in
7 Republika Srpska through an agency that follows these trials, and what was
8 said was that Mr. Krajisnik wanted and proposed to go to war, whereas the
9 meaning of the original document was entirely different. It is in
10 relation to this that I would like to see more attention devoted to the
11 issues of interpretation in this trial.
12 And secondly, I would like to ask the following: There is an
13 agency here that has an exclusive right to all interpretations being made
14 in these trials. May they please come to us and see our team so that it
15 would be made possible for us to communicate with the public and to help
16 to establish the truth.
17 I believe it would be very helpful for everyone in Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina and Republika Srpska to know these are the people who are made
19 to answer, and this is what they're being charged with. The comments made
20 by this agency, the name of the agency is Sense, are quite mistaken and
22 Another thing that I wish to raise is the following: The Registry
23 has curtailed the funds for our defence, which makes it increasingly
24 difficult for us to prepare our defence. They said that I was actually
25 not in debt in relation to come credits that they spoke about. I asked to
1 have a certificate from the Registry to certify either that I'm able to
2 finance my own defence or, on the contrary, that the funds be raised,
3 because there is a lot that remains to be done. The OTP sent out into the
4 field an entire army of their investigators, and they're going to each and
5 every one of our witnesses directly, asking them to give statements. As a
6 result, they are under pressure because they tell each and every one of
7 the witnesses that they themselves are under suspicion, therefore people
8 refuse to testify in this case, and we ourselves have not sufficient funds
9 to organise for this to go and see each and every one of the witnesses
11 Last but not least I personally do not believe that my defence
12 team is prepared to cross-examine Mr. Treanor. I went it through the
13 materials myself, through the documents. I know what the situation is
14 because I lived in the area, after all. There is a massive amount of
15 documents and I know what we're dealing with. I know it is in my best
16 interest to expedite proceedings, but if we do it thoroughly, I believe
17 things might be better understood in Bosnia and Herzegovina once this
18 trial is completed. I believe it would be necessary to postpone the
19 cross-examination of Mr. Treanor for at least another month. In this way,
20 Your Honours, it will be easier for you to expedite this trial.
21 I don't think it will truly contribute to a speed-up proceedings
22 if we just deal with this witness quickly. As I asked at the beginning,
23 and thank you for helping me to give my own contribution to establish
24 the -- to establishing the truth, if I may be allowed, once the testimony
25 of Mr. Treanor is over, to help and elucidate on a number of points. I'm
1 sure this will only go to help you establish your verdict and reach the
2 final truth.
3 Thank you very much for granting me this opportunity to just
4 address you with a couple of words. Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.
6 Yes, Mr. Stewart.
7 MR. STEWART: Well, this is not --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
9 MR. STEWART: It isn't the usual situation where counsel has
10 informed the Court that he's ready to cross-examine and then his client
11 says very directly to the Tribunal and therefore in effect to me that he's
12 not. I should say, I don't believe any of this creates any enormous
13 personal tensions between Mr. Krajisnik and me, but it's clearly not an
14 entirely happy situation.
15 Just thinking on my feet for the moment, which is also part of my
16 job, how to reconcile the position. It wouldn't be any surprise to the
17 Tribunal that what Mr. Krajisnik has just said reflects, of course,
18 private discussions which have taken place. The Tribunal would be
19 astonished if this were the first time that Mr. Krajisnik had ever
20 expressed any such a view and had taken me totally by surprise. I don't
21 suggest that that has happened. I don't need to go into any of those
22 discussions, but it will be plain that they have taken place.
23 The -- we suggest, with respect, that the appropriate way to deal
24 with this would be as follows: That I should proceed, notwithstanding
25 Mr. Krajisnik's remarks, that I should proceed with cross-examination of
1 Mr. Treanor, because I'm confident that there is a considerable amount of
2 ground that can be adequately covered, notwithstanding Mr. Krajisnik's
3 concerns about lack of preparation.
4 However, I do acknowledge, recognise, that -- and I say on
5 Mr. Krajisnik's behalf that Mr. Krajisnik has done a very great deal of
6 work on Mr. Treanor's evidence, and he's done a very great deal of
7 detailed work, because Mr. Krajisnik is, if he wouldn't be embarrassed by
8 my saying so, we would suggest that Mr. Krajisnik is probably far better
9 than averagely equipped to do such work than many defendants who appear in
10 front of this Tribunal. And he does do that work. This gives us -- there
11 is, of course, a general point in relation to this as well, of which the
12 Tribunal is aware. This does give us a considerable amount of extra work,
13 about which in a sense we don't complain because most lawyers welcome
14 having a client who takes an active interest and does provide them with
15 active instructions. But he does produce a great deal of work, and
16 Mr. Krajisnik writes all his material, of course, in Serbian, which means
17 that there's only one immediate member of our team with such assistance as
18 we can muster who is able to deal with that, so that we can then digest
19 it. So it is an enormous burden.
20 Getting to the point, Your Honour: We do feel that it's likely
21 that we would get to the position some point, therefore, in the next two
22 or three days of saying: Well, there is potentially further
23 cross-examination of Mr. Treanor arising out of particularly work which
24 Mr. Krajisnik has done and relating to his concerns. Now, at least with
25 Mr. Treanor, we are in the position where he doesn't go back to Republika
1 Srpska or he doesn't go back to another part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
2 has to be brought back and forwards all the time. At least Mr. Treanor
3 from a purely practical view is, as we understand it, generally reasonably
4 available as long as practical arrangements have been made. Therefore it
5 seems, and it will be a matter of application at an appropriate point and
6 judgement for the Tribunal, but looking ahead, it seems that we would get
7 to that point at some stage where Mr. Krajisnik would clearly feel far
8 more comfortable and with reason, Your Honour, because even over the last
9 few days Mr. Krajisnik has done more work on the matter and we have
10 received more detailed material from him and there are actually limits to
11 how quickly that can be absorbed.
12 So what I propose -- I'm not -- I should make it clear to the
13 Tribunal, and perhaps indirectly to Mr. Krajisnik, that I'm not happy with
14 a proposal under which I conduct part of the cross-examination, then
15 effectively Mr. Krajisnik conducts part of the cross-examination himself.
16 That wouldn't seem to be as a method of proceeding in this Tribunal
17 ultimately helpful to the Tribunal, to Mr. Krajisnik, or in fact to me on
18 behalf of Mr. Krajisnik. It would be much more satisfactory to have time
19 so that Mr. Krajisnik then himself felt sufficiently confident that his
20 Defence team had been briefed and instructed by him, so that they could
21 then do -- complete the cross-examination.
22 Your Honour, that's given where we are and given the comments that
23 our own client has made this morning, I suggest that that is the
24 appropriate course. I've indicated -- I know the Tribunal of course as a
25 Tribunal always does, wants to know about timetable and scheduling and so
1 on. The best I could indicate to the Prosecution team before Easter was
2 that I expected to take, for practical purposes, all or most of this week
3 with Mr. Treanor, and I was aware that if they needed -- if they brought a
4 witness before the end of this week, that witness might be hanging around
5 until next week before actually coming into court. Naturally, I undertook
6 to the Prosecution in the normal way to update them continually on where I
7 had got to, and I wouldn't be absolutely sure that we would need the whole
8 of the week anyway and I would keep the Tribunal and the Prosecution
9 informed as we went along. But in the light of what I've just said and in
10 the light of Mr. Krajisnik's comments, I should say straight away that it
11 looks far more likely therefore that we would get some time a little while
12 before the end of the week, we would get to that point then when I would
13 say, well, in the light of the further work done and in the light of
14 Mr. Krajisnik's concerns, this is as far as we can realistically go with
15 Mr. Treanor.
16 So if that would help as far as scheduling and as far as other
17 witnesses are concerned. I just don't know, of course, because the
18 details of the practical arrangements of the Prosecution are not in my
19 hands. But, Your Honour, I hope that that's -- well, I certainly hope
20 that's as helpful as we can be this morning in relation to this slightly
21 unusual situation.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
23 I'd like to -- unless there's any need for the Prosecution to
24 respond to what was just said both by Mr. Krajisnik and by Mr. Stewart.
25 MR. TIEGER: Only with respect to one matter, Your Honour, and
1 that is the prospect of concluding before the end of the week. Mr. Harmon
2 and I addressed that issue specifically with Mr. Stewart earlier, because
3 of the scheduling concerns. As a result of those discussions, we were --
4 and we advised the Defence accordingly, we did not schedule witnesses for
5 this week because of the logistical difficulties involved, it would be
6 impossible to alter that schedule at this point.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. I'd like to make a few
8 comments, unless there's anything to be raised at this moment,
9 Mr. Stewart.
10 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, about the interpreters. Let me tell
11 you that interpreters are human beings, although, in general, excellent
12 human beings, doing their job very properly. Nevertheless, it can happen
13 that a certain phrase is interpreted not fully exact. That's -- if you
14 imagine what it takes to sit here for many hours a day and interpret every
15 word spoken, especially if people are speaking very quickly, you'll
16 certainly have understanding for that.
17 If such a thing happens, especially in respect of, for example,
18 the testimony of Mr. Treanor, we're usually dealing with texts that are
19 already available in both languages, so it's more easy to identify any
20 mistake in interpretation. If it's really about a critical element, if
21 it's something of importance, as you indicated it was, then please inform
22 Mr. Stewart, and Mr. Stewart will certainly take care that not only on
23 paper but also if necessary in the courtroom any misunderstanding will be
25 This same -- it was not quite clear to me what agency you are
1 talking about, but since, in my view, it's the Registry who is finally
2 responsible for preparing, together, of course, with the Bench, for the
3 transcripts to be made of this hearing and about further distribution, I'm
4 not fully aware what agency is involved. But if there's any problem in
5 respect of that, please inform Mr. Stewart, Mr. Stewart will know how to
6 address the Chamber, as long as it is within the responsibility of the
7 Tribunal. Whatever happens outside, you know that all the transcripts,
8 apart from closed and private sessions, is made available to all media
9 agencies, whoever want to have it. What happens then with it later on, we
10 do not know. What I do know is that sooner or later on the Internet site
11 of the Tribunal you'll find the transcripts of open sessions, and that's
12 the direct source for the outside world to get acquainted with what
13 happened in this courtroom.
14 Then finally about the funds, I'd rather not speak about it at
15 this moment, since it's still subject for decision, although not entirely,
16 but there are issues still to be determined.
17 Let me just turn back to the agency. You asked the agency to see
18 your team. I think it would be proper to do it the other way around, that
19 if there's any complaint about whatever agency, the team will certainly
20 find the agency you had in mind and speak with them.
21 Then when I said that the financial issue is still to be
22 considered, where you suggested that the Registry could provide you with a
23 certificate about their findings, it might be that the Registry in this
24 way would interfere in an external dispute about whether debts are still
25 existing or not. I do not think that that's the task of the Registry, but
1 if it is part of a decision, you can use that decision to whatever person
2 to say that at least the Registrar or, after review, even the Chamber
3 could not determine or could determine that a certain situation exists,
4 and therefore in this way I think you can take advantage of decisions to
5 be taken in this respect.
6 Then finally, you said something about witnesses that were very
7 much under pressure once they had been approached by the Prosecution, and
8 you also mentioned that the Prosecution informed them that they were
9 suspects as well. I think from the point of view of fairness to those who
10 are giving statements to the Prosecution, it sometimes is necessary to
11 make the potential witnesses aware that they are not beyond suspicion in
12 certain respects. If this would keep them off from appearing as a
13 witness, then the solution would not be not to say anything about it, but
14 there are other ways of -- if a witness appears, there are specific rules
15 on whether they have to fear anything at all. I couldn't guarantee to you
16 now that a witness who appears here would never be a potential even
17 accused in this courtroom. That's the situation. I can't change that.
18 So therefore, it's perhaps a matter that could be discussed between
19 Prosecution and Defence to what extent persons giving statements are
20 unnecessarily put in a position that they are under suspicion and that
21 would be -- would put some pressure upon them not to appear. But it's not
22 under all circumstances unfair, and it's even under some circumstances,
23 it's necessary to inform potential witnesses about the risks that do exist
24 in respect of those persons themselves.
25 So I'd rather not -- you didn't give any examples. I don't think
1 it would be proper for the Chamber to enter into any details, but this is
2 just a general explanation of a situation that might exist and might have
3 caused some concern to you.
4 Then finally, about the cross-examination. I think I do quite
5 well understand what you intended to say, that is, that you had concerns
6 on whether the Defence was sufficiently prepared to finish the
7 cross-examination of Mr. Treanor. Perhaps I should better ask whether the
8 Defence was ready to start cross-examining Mr. Treanor. The Chamber is
9 aware of the concerns, not only expressed by you, but also by Mr. Stewart,
10 that time for preparation might not be sufficient at this moment. I also
11 do understand if you have worked all over the weekend on some details,
12 that you are concerned about whether these details will properly be taken
13 into consideration when cross-examining Mr. Treanor. I will follow the
14 suggestion of Mr. Stewart that we start the cross-examination of Mr.
15 Treanor now and that we'll see where we come and where the preparation
16 seems to cause so many problems that Mr. Stewart will ask us to take a
17 different course.
18 I would like to leave it to that for this very moment, unless
19 there's any urgent and necessary issue further to be raised.
20 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, just if I could briefly address the
21 inference that I think was to -- that could conceivably be drawn from
22 Mr. Krajisnik's comments, and that is that the Prosecution intentionally
23 marshalled a team of investigators to go to the field to locate his
24 prospective witnesses and issue warnings that would intimidate them. Of
25 course, that is erroneous in virtually all respects, and I just want to be
1 on the record as saying that's the case. I might add one note, and that
2 is, of course, the Prosecution is not in possession of the Defence's
3 witness list in the first place. Beyond that, any inferences along the
4 lines that were suggested are flatly wrong and categorically denied.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I understood the comment of Mr. Krajisnik
6 mainly to mean that when you interview potential witnesses, that they
7 might feel some pressure if they are informed about their potential status
8 before this Tribunal. I did not understand it to be as an intentional
9 attempt to intimidate witnesses. So, therefore, that's how I understood
10 it. If I misunderstood the words of Mr. Krajisnik, I'll certainly hear
11 either from him or from Mr. Stewart.
12 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I think -- of course, I accept
13 and realise entirely that the Prosecution isn't in possession of some
14 checklist of potential Defence witnesses that they can immediately go and
15 contact. As reported to me, and these reports come from Republika Srpska,
16 of course, there seems to be two concerns in particular. There may be
17 others. One is that when witnesses are contacted - and this may just be a
18 matter of practice - my information is they're told something like: We
19 are from the United Nations and we want to talk to you about the war. If
20 that's correct, then it would seem to us that it was rather better
21 practice -- simply that's the report I get. If that is correct, it would
22 be better practice, we would suggest, for it to be very clearly indicated
23 that the investigators are from the International Criminal Tribunal for
24 former Yugoslavia. But, Your Honour, I simply don't know in the
25 transmission of these reports what happens.
1 JUDGE ORIE: It's all too vague at this moment to comment more
2 specifically. If there are examples, if there's a real problematic
3 situation, the Chamber would like to hear about it, because the most
4 important thing is that whoever is needed to appear as a witness here
5 should appear, if possible. And if you have any suggestions as far as
6 phrasing of introducing yourself is concerned, then I'm sure that
7 Mr. Tieger will listen to it and we'll see what he -- how he could
8 instruct investigators to act in such a way that the purposes of this
9 Tribunal are best served by their phrasing and while addressing potential
10 witnesses. I think it's not an issue we should discuss at this moment in
11 further detail. And therefore, I'd like to --
12 MR. STEWART: I respectfully agree, Your Honour. May I just
13 mention one other point. It's only this. It is a general point again
14 without going to specific examples, but there's just an underlying concern
15 from the information I'm getting. It is a fine line but it's one that we
16 suggest these investigators should be alert to that, and of course
17 following Your Honour's observations it is only correct that anybody who
18 might even conceivably be a potential indictee at some point should be
19 given a warning. That's only fair. On the other hand, it's equally
20 important that there is no exaggeration of that. So somebody who is not
21 actually seriously ever going to be brought before this Tribunal, which is
22 not -- I think it's fair to say is not looking to add hundreds of
23 indictees to its work between now and certain dates in the future and is
24 prioritising that somebody who is simply not seriously likely to -- ever
25 to be before this Tribunal shouldn't be given the impression that they are
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 a serious prospect.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I tend to agree with that. It's a matter of
3 phrasing. It's a matter of detail. It's a matter of -- but I do agree
4 with you that whatever is not necessary to tell a witness as far as his
5 position is concerned at this Tribunal and that could disencourage him to
6 give a statement or to appear as a witness in a later stage, that should
7 be refrained. I also am aware that this is valued for both parties, as I
8 have experienced in the past.
9 Then, Mr. Usher, would you please escort Mr. Treanor into the
11 [The witness entered court]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Treanor. Please be seated. You'll
13 certainly remember that at the beginning of your testimony you gave a
14 solemn declaration. You're still bound by that solemn declaration. And
15 although perhaps unnecessary to remind you to that I nevertheless after
16 the long break do it.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. I do remember.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
19 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR [Resumed]
20 Cross-examined by Mr. Stewart:
21 Q. Mr. Treanor, good morning again. I'd just like to clarify one or
22 two basic points about the work that you'd done on the report. You
23 described to the Tribunal how I think broadly speaking it's been about ten
24 years work for you, hasn't it?
25 A. Broadly speaking, yes.
1 Q. Yes. And of course you've got a team assisting you.
2 A. In later years, yes.
3 Q. Yes. You joined the particular section of this organisation that
4 you now work for in 1994. And up until 1994, as I understand it, you were
5 working in the United States?
6 A. Yes, that's correct.
7 Q. Did you have occasion any time before 1994 to go to former
9 A. Yes, indeed.
10 Q. And when was -- well, when was your first ever visit to former
12 A. I believe my first visit to the former Yugoslavia was in February
14 Q. And during the period that we are particularly focusing on now,
15 let me take it as, say, 1990 through to 1992, did you go to the former
16 Yugoslavia during that three-year period?
17 A. 1990 to 1992. No, I don't believe so.
18 Q. Sorry, you said no, did you?
19 A. I don't believe so.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just check, Mr. Stewart, whether there is
21 any -- whether the translation is coming through to Mr. Krajisnik. I
22 think there's no ... No, the translation is not ...
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 JUDGE ORIE: I'm informed that there's a technical problem with
25 the B/C/S translation and that we're working on it. At least, they are
1 working on it now.
2 Yes, Mr. Krajisnik. I do understand from your hand signal that
3 you now receive translation again. Yes. Okay.
4 MR. STEWART: He's not, apparently.
5 JUDGE ORIE: He's not.
6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, especially in the light of the comments
7 this morning, I really wouldn't wish to proceed without Mr. Krajisnik
8 having translation. I'm sure Your Honour is not expecting that.
9 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not even inviting you. As soon as the
10 technicians have solved the problem, I'd like to be informed. And if it
11 is anticipated that it will take more than five minutes, then I'd like to
12 be informed.
13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
14 JUDGE ORIE: The technicians have asked for a ten-minutes break,
15 and sitting in this courtroom for ten minutes, which is the most difficult
16 thing for a lawyer to do, is not to speak, would be overasking the
17 parties. We'll have a break of ten minutes.
18 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 --- Break taken at 9.45 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 10.01 a.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, may I first check whether you can now
22 hear me in a language you understand.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, Your Honours. Thank you
24 very much. Sorry for creating that particular problem.
25 JUDGE ORIE: You didn't create any problem. The problem was
2 Well, Mr. Treanor will certainly have had some time to reconsider
3 the years 1990 to 1992 and it was your last question, Mr. Stewart. Please
5 MR. STEWART:
6 Q. So that devastating question I asked you, Mr. Treanor, you're now
7 able to answer?
8 A. Yes. I think I have the same answer I had before.
9 Q. All right. Before --
10 A. I'm fairly confident I was not there. I have no recollection of
12 Q. Yes. Do you have any recollection -- so before that period, can
13 you remember when is the last time you were in the former Yugoslavia?
14 A. I think the last time I was in the former Yugoslavia before I came
15 to work at this institution was in January 1988.
16 Q. Now, you will have been back since you started to work here?
17 A. Here, yes.
18 Q. I think just to clear this out of the way: You have in fact met
19 Mr. Krajisnik, haven't you, on at least one occasion, because you
20 participated --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- in an interview of Mr. Krajisnik, haven't you?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. But that of course was well after the events with which this case
25 is concerned?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Have you ever met - and first of all I'll ask this apart from any
3 question of any interviews conducted in connection with proceedings - have
4 you ever met any of the others, and it's rather a long list, of course,
5 but have you met any of the other what I'll call significant players that
6 have been dealt with in your evidence?
7 A. I'm not sure what you mean by "significant".
8 Q. Well, that's to some extent a judgement, but if we start at the
9 top, have you ever met or had you ever met, apart from interviews
10 conducted subsequently, had you ever met, for example, Mr. Karadzic --
11 A. No.
12 Q. -- Mrs. Plavsic, Mr. Koljevic? Had you ever met any of those
14 A. Well, I met Ms. Plavsic within the context of an interview.
15 Q. Yes, of course.
16 A. When she arrived here.
17 Q. But leaving aside interviews conducted in connection with this
18 Tribunal, you've never met any of those people?
19 A. None of those people.
20 Q. Mr. Djukic; you've never met him
21 A. No. I met Mr. Buha.
22 Q. In what context?
23 A. During a visit to Pale. I met --
24 Q. That's after the --
25 A. The events.
1 Q. The events.
2 A. Yes, indeed.
3 Q. Yes. All right. But up to, let's say, and before and up to 1992,
4 and of course, as you've indicated to the Tribunal, you hadn't been in the
5 former Yugoslavia for several years, you hadn't met any of the significant
6 people or those that in your view would be significant people --
7 A. No. No.
8 Q. -- being considered in your evidence?
9 A. No.
10 Q. The -- can we take it also that your -- you say that your report
11 is not a history by any means of the conflict. Those were your words in
12 your evidence. Is it also your approach to this report that you are not
13 purporting to enter into the rights and wrongs in any way?
14 A. Well, in the sense that I understand that, yes. I'm not -- I do
15 not attempt in the report to enter into any rights or wrongs.
16 Q. In your evidence before the Tribunal before the break, you
17 referred to the multi-party elections that took place in Slovenia, and
18 those were on the 8th of April, 1990, and then Croatia followed soon,
19 didn't it, on the 22nd of April. Then you said that both sets of
20 elections resulted in severe defeats for the Communists, the League of
21 Communists in those republics, and brought to power nationalistic
22 parties. And then you said in both of those republics who were by no
23 means committed to the continued existence of Yugoslavia. Now, that
24 sounds like a bit of English understatement, Mr. Treanor. Is it not
25 correct to say that certainly in Croatia, to say that the nationalistic
1 parties were not committed to the continued existence of Yugoslavia as an
2 understatement. They plainly were looking for something else, weren't
4 MR. TIEGER: Excuse me, Your Honour. I'd be grateful for a
5 transcript reference numbers when counsel is making reference to
6 particular pages.
7 MR. STEWART: Yes. I beg your pardon. Page 1264 of the
8 transcript. And this is in the middle of the page, so it's around line 10
9 this passage begins.
10 Q. Isn't is true that it's not just they weren't committed to the
11 continued existence of Yugoslavia but their policies were very clearly to
12 gain independence?
13 A. Well, I don't know what their policies very clearly were. They
14 continued to participate in the process of negotiations with the other
15 leading political factors in Yugoslavia regarding the restructuring of the
16 state. So from that fact, I take it that they were not simply
17 unreservably, unequivocally, committed to declaring independence or
18 something of that sort the day they took power.
19 Q. So you just -- well, apart from -- after all, there's politics,
20 isn't there, and you may not be able to come straight out and say
21 something in absolutely trenchant terms. But in Croatia, for example,
22 didn't it become quickly clear that the government there and Mr. Tudjman,
23 that they were looking for an independent Croatia?
24 A. Well, without mastering or having in mind all the details of the
25 developments of that period of time and the various statements and
1 negotiations and so forth that took place, in my opinion, I think that's a
2 fairly safe thing to say.
3 Q. For example, by -- after all, the HDZ, which you said, and this is
4 at page 1266 of the transcript, you informed the Tribunal that was founded
5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 18th of August, 1990, is the Croatian
6 national party. Now, HDZ, that was exactly the same name, wasn't it, as
7 the nationalist party in Croatia?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And would it be fair to say that there were always pretty close
10 links --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- between those two --
13 A. I think that's fair to say.
14 Q. -- organisations? And as you told the Tribunal on the primary
15 issue of the day, that's to say, the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
16 position of the HDZ in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that Bosnia-Herzegovina
17 should be enabled to exercise the right of self-determination up to and
18 including secession from Yugoslavia? That's correct, wasn't it?
19 A. Yeah. I'm not sure whether the exact wording was the secession of
20 Bosnia or the secession of the Croats in Bosnia, but certainly something
21 like that.
22 Q. Well, I'm actually quoting from your evidence, your description of
23 what their policy was. And the -- you indicated yourself -- again, that
24 was at 1266 of your transcript, and then you said, and this is at page
25 1270, you said that the HDZ, and talking about the BH HDZ, in August 1990,
1 merely spoke of the right of the Croatian people to self-determination up
2 to and including the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So you
3 expressed it just slightly differently. After all, the secession from
4 Yugoslavia, in one case the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They're
5 entirely consistent, because we're talking of secession of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina from the Federation, aren't we?
7 A. Right. But the point that I was getting back to was that they
8 spoke of the right of the Croatian people.
9 Q. Well, let's clarify that. So when you talked about the HDZ
10 speaking of the right of Croatian people up to and including secession,
11 yes, secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But that's -- so piece that
12 together for us, then. So what they -- what they -- when talking about
13 the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so they would be talking of
14 secession of a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
15 A. Well, I think the way that's phrased, they're talking about the
16 whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 Q. Well, that's how it came across in your evidence. So that would
18 be the effect. Clearly they only wanted it -- this is right: They only
19 wanted it for their own purposes, for their own interests. They -- these
20 are the Croats who wanted to associate themselves with Croatia?
21 A. Well, are we discussing this particular sentence or their policy
22 in general?
23 Q. Well, both in a sense, but let's go from the particular sentence
24 which is after all only a lead-in, in effect, so their policy in general,
1 A. Getting back to the sentence. I'll finish that. I find the
2 wording rather peculiar. Obviously the Croatian people in Bosnia would
3 not be able to take the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina out of Yugoslavia.
4 The implication there seems to be that they would agree to such a thing.
5 On the other hand, they may have also, some of them, at least, at that
6 time and later, advocated a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina with part
7 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if we can resume calling it BH, with part of BH
8 being a Croatian entity and perhaps joining Croatia.
9 Q. Well, I'm just trying to get clear what it was you were and are
10 saying, because it was your evidence, and we're back to 1266, it was your
11 evidence, and I'm quoting precisely, that on the primary issue of the day,
12 that is, the future of BH, it's the HDZ in BH, its position was that BH
13 should be enabled to exercise the right of self-determination up to and
14 including secession from Yugoslavia. That was your evidence.
15 A. That point in their programme would -- seems to relate to the
16 whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. Indeed.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And is the reason for that that, after all, as the most -- in a
20 sense the most obvious mechanism and the most obvious step to achieving
21 what they wanted, which was effectively joinder with Croatia, the
22 secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Federation would be in a sense
23 the most obvious way of achieving that?
24 A. Well, the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia
25 could have been seen as a step toward some other arrangement than simply
1 an independent, integral, if I can use that expression,
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, including, as I mentioned just a few minutes ago,
3 including the partition of BH with part of that republic joining Croatia.
4 That's certainly one of the options that was on the table. But when
5 precisely and to what extent that in fact became the policy of the HDZ is
6 another issue. There were differences of opinion within the HDZ, both
7 in -- as far as I'm aware of, both in Croatia and in Bosnia, as to the
8 best policy to follow in that connection. There were people that were in
9 favour of partitioning BH and joining part of it to Croatia, and there
10 were those that were against doing that.
11 Q. Well, is the position this, that for those within the HDZ who were
12 looking to join a part of BH with Croatia, that the more promising way of
13 doing that, if you like, was to create a more general breakup, a more
14 generally fluid situation with BH seceding from the Federation. It was
15 more likely then that in the fallout from that exercise they would be able
16 to achieve what they wanted. Is that a fair --
17 A. Yes. As I think I said a few minutes ago, that could be seen by
18 certain people as a step in that direction, undoubtedly.
19 Q. In your evidence earlier, and this was page 1265 of the
20 transcript, you talked about the various amendments to the BH
21 constitution, and in particular, Amendment 62, saying that -- specifying
22 the territory of BH was indivisible and the boundaries of the republic
23 could only be changed at a referendum of the citizens with a two thirds
24 majority. Now, there's an issue as to whether that was -- in effect, that
25 was the internal boundaries, I think you indicated, that that amendment
1 had in mind.
2 A. I think by boundaries they're referring to the external boundaries
3 of the republic. I mean, it doesn't have any other boundaries as a
4 republic. If by internal boundaries you mean the boundaries of the
5 municipalities or something, I don't think that's what's in question.
6 Q. All right. Well, thank you for that clarification, then. Now,
7 one of the things that you --- I think you were at pains to indicate in
8 your evidence is that, Mr. Treanor, you're not a lawyer and you haven't
9 had legal training?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. And I think you indicated you don't really wish and are not
12 equipped to enter into discussion or debate about the legal aspects of
13 these matters.
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. If we look at binder 1, I hope you have your various binders there
16 available to you over there, I think, aren't they? Are those
17 Mr. Treanor's copies there?
18 MR. TIEGER: Well, those are the, to the best of my knowledge, the
19 Registry's binders and not Mr. Treanor's, and he had with him during
20 direct examination a different set consisting, as I recall, primarily of
21 B/C/S documents.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Let's work on the basis of the documents that have
23 been admitted into evidence, which are at this moment in the hands of the
24 registrar. I've got my own copy with me.
25 MR. STEWART: Fine. As long as of course the Tribunal has its own
2 JUDGE ORIE: It would be -- Mr. Stewart, this morning, I guessed
3 that you would start at 1 and not at 18, so I took the first four. If you
4 could give us an indication what binders to bring for the next session,
5 then it would certainly help us.
6 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honour, I can certainly say that as far
7 as the whole day is concerned, we won't get beyond, say, number 8. But I
8 think for the first couple of sessions, Your Honours would be fairly safe
9 with, I think, 1 to 4.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We've got one copy now and at the next break I
11 think we could bring some more copies.
12 Please proceed.
13 MR. STEWART:
14 Q. Mr. Treanor, the -- we looked at tab 2, which is -- I hope you
15 don't feel handicapped by having to look at it in English.
16 A. I would feel a bit handicapped looking at it in English, but the
17 B/C/S seems to be in here as well.
18 Q. Oh, well, that's good, then. It's the programme, then, of the
19 Serbian Democratic Party. I just want to clarify with you: Would you
20 agree there's absolutely nothing surprising at all in this programme?
21 A. Well, without trying to put too fine a point on the meaning of
22 "surprising", I find the programme rather unexceptionable.
23 Q. Yes. In fact, frankly, it's pretty anodyne, isn't it?
24 A. It could be qualified that way.
25 Q. Well, would you qualify it as that way?
1 A. Probably not. I mean, "anodyne" is not a word I use very
3 JUDGE ORIE: It's not only that Mr. Treanor might not use it very
4 frequently, but for us for understanding, the word is not -- it looks as
5 if it comes from chemistry, more or less, anodyne.
6 MR. STEWART: I think -- I beg your pardon. I think harmless
7 would do as a word. Harmless, bland.
8 A. Well, I think I described it as being rather unremarkable, and
9 I'll stick with that.
10 Q. That's not a bad word. It's your word and you're the witness,
11 Mr. Treanor. So it's unremarkable. After all, it's, well, random in a
12 way, but equality is the basis of joint life and democratic Yugoslavia
13 structured as a modern federal state. It's all status quo stuff as far as
14 that's concerned, isn't it?
15 A. Yes, indeed.
16 Q. It does contain, doesn't it, a bit of, if you like, historical
17 reference to what the Serbs, with justification, regard as terrible times,
18 in connection with the Second World War?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And Ustasha, doesn't it?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. But apart from those significant historical references,
23 unremarkable is your word?
24 A. Yes. It's clearly a -- the programme of a Serbian party.
25 Q. And you -- then you went on to tab 4, same bundle, and we looked
1 at the statute of the SDS, and you drew attention to Article 9. And I'm
2 going on the point, this is at page 1271 of the transcript, particular
3 point to which you drew attention, that the rights and obligations of SDS
4 BH members are, and then you listed them all, and then you said: So party
5 discipline -- well, you drew attention to obligation to obey party
6 regulations and support the achievement of its goals and programme
7 orientation and then you --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please slow down for the
9 benefit of the interpreters.
10 MR. STEWART: [Previous translation continues]... something that
11 was required and -- I'm sorry.
12 JUDGE ORIE: The interpreters ask you to slow down.
13 MR. STEWART: More than one person has asked me to slow down, so I
14 will try to do that immediately, Your Honour.
15 Q. Article 9, yes, you drew attention to that article and then
16 specifically to the provision about obeying party regulations. And I'm
17 really just wondering. You say party discipline was something that was
18 required and expected. And I don't mean this rudely at all, Mr. Treanor,
19 but is that any more than a statement of the blindingly obvious for a
20 political party?
21 A. Well, I don't know how the statutes in this respect of political
22 parties across the world or Europe read in this respect. The thing that I
23 found interesting in that is that that is the type of party discipline
24 that was required in Communist parties and in -- I believe in the League
25 of Communists, a rather top-down approach to things. Once decisions had
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 been made, then people were obliged to adhere to them.
2 Q. All right. And then you addressed briefly, page 1271 of the
3 transcript, the central organs of the party, the party assembly. Now,
4 that was originally limited to a thousand, wasn't it, and then the maximum
5 number was reduced by Amendment 300, wasn't it? Do you recall that?
6 A. I thought it was 200. I don't recall the exact provisions.
7 Q. I think it was 300, actually, but we probably don't need to
8 quibble. Article 13 at tab 4, the Assembly comprises all members of the
9 party until its membership exceeds 1.000. And then you refer to the party
10 president and the Main Board and the Executive Committee. We'll come back
11 to some of these organs in more detail in due course. But you said
12 yourself in your evidence at that point that the Main Board and the
13 Executive Committee were less important. That's correct, isn't it?
14 A. Less important than what?
15 Q. Well, less important than the other two, the party assembly and
16 the party president.
17 A. Well, according to the statute, the Assembly was the -- certainly
18 the supreme organ, and certainly the Executive Board was less important
19 than that, and the Main Board was less important than that.
20 Q. We'll look at these in more detail. But perhaps we can get it
21 straight, because they're perhaps two entirely different things. As far
22 as the formal structure is concerned, the Assembly was the supreme body;
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. As a practical matter, do you say that the Assembly was an
1 unwieldy body that didn't in fact truly take the decisions, or that it did
2 truly take the decisions?
3 A. Well, it only met once a year, and the types of things that it
4 considered were rather broad. For instance, the statute and the programme
5 carrying out elections to the various party organs seemed to be the main
6 activity of the Assembly.
7 Q. Okay. So the -- in your evidence, what seems to emerge is that
8 then that the Assembly, for the reasons you've indicated, it may be
9 technically the supreme body but it doesn't meet very often, it's quite a
10 large body, the effective decisions have really got to be taken somewhere
11 else, haven't they?
12 A. Yes. And I think that was the reason for the creation of the Main
14 Q. But you yourself, when you say the Main Board and the Executive
15 Committee are less important, your evidence appeared to be, is this right,
16 that the Main Board wasn't all that important in practice either?
17 A. Yes. You -- I think you've hit the nail right on the head there.
18 If you read the statute, the Main Board comes out to be -- seems to be
19 very important indeed, but as we look at the documentation that's
20 available to us, we can see that the Main Board really didn't meet all
21 that frequently and did not have very many formal sessions where it was
22 strictly a meeting of the Main Board and made the type of decisions that
23 seem to be foreseen in the statute. So in practice, it did not operate in
24 the manner and at the level of importance that one would gather simply by
25 reading the statute.
1 Q. Yes. And the Executive Board, that applies even more so, doesn't
2 it, the Executive Board fed in to the Main Board, but it also wasn't
3 really a central decision-making organ?
4 A. Well, the Executive Board, according to the statute, had a
5 different function than the Main Board. However, we do see that the
6 Executive Board, at least after the 1991 party assembly, when the party
7 organs were reconstituted, we see the Executive Board meeting on a fairly
8 regular basis and dealing with the types of issues that it's supposed to
9 deal with, and it became a -- apparently became a fairly efficient organ
10 of the party, along the lines that one would expect by reading the
11 statute. But it was not supposed to be a policy-making body.
12 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interfere. When you're talking about the
13 Executive Board, you're referring to the Executive Committee, I take it,
14 as it appears in this document?
15 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, I think the -- as often happens
16 with the translation, I think the terminology changes quite frequently
17 within the documentation and indeed within the evidence. It is -- it's
18 often referred to as Executive Board, often referred to as Executive
19 Committee. It's exactly the same organ, Your Honour.
20 Q. That's right, Mr. Treanor, isn't it?
21 A. Yes, that's correct. I believe in our report and in my testimony
22 hopefully we used the terms Executive Board and Main Board.
23 Q. And you do in fact at paragraph 42 of your report, you do say the
24 Executive Board was an important forum for decision making in its own
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And that's what you've just described. And I suppose that, is
3 this right, that part of the reason for that is a very simple one, that it
4 was smaller than the Main Board, which was in turn smaller than the
6 A. Yes. Well, it certainly was smaller.
7 Q. And Mr. Krajisnik was never a member of that, was he?
8 A. The Executive Committee -- the Executive Board, no.
9 Q. There are a number of different organs. I'd like to go quickly
10 through a list at this point, really perhaps just to put some of them on
11 one side so we don't have to be troubled with them, and then can focus
12 perhaps in due course on those that are important. The -- there's a body
13 called the Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. Are
14 you familiar with that, as an organ?
15 A. In the Presidency of...
16 Q. Well, does that mean anything to you? I appreciate these are all
17 translations, but it's translated as Council for the Protection of the
18 Constitutional Order. Do you know anything about that? Mrs. Plavsic was
19 the chairman.
20 A. Yes. That's a council operating within the framework of the
21 Presidency of the Socialist Republic of BH.
22 Q. Isn't the position this: It was previously that before the
23 elections and before the formation of the new parties, that had previously
24 been a BH body, there had been a BH body as opposed to an SDS body, the
25 SDS didn't exist, Council for the Protection of the Constitutional Order,
1 that's correct, is it?
2 A. Yes. I believe it existed prior to 1990.
3 Q. And then --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could both speakers kindly remember to pause
5 between question and answer. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, there's a very important message on
7 page 32, line 22.
8 MR. STEWART: Yes. My apologies.
9 JUDGE ORIE: For all of us. You're even violating when I said it
10 was an important message. I do not mind from a personal point of view,
11 but you spoke at the same time when I said this, and it's impossible for
12 the transcribers to put everything on the record if two persons are
13 speaking at the same time or are interrupting each other. So could we not
14 only not interrupt each other, but at the same time take a little pause
15 between question and answer, and answer and question.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. STEWART: Yes. Certainly. I apologise. I'm sure Your Honour
18 understands no discourtesy was intended. I was intending to acknowledge
19 that I had just seen that message, and I apologise if it appeared
21 Q. Mr. Treanor, so the -- that previous BH body, what happened was
22 this, wasn't it, that after the elections, then, each party set up its
23 own, the SDS, the SDA, and the HDZ, set up its own equivalent Council for
24 the Protection of the Constitutional Order?
25 A. No. I'm not aware that that's the case. The council that I
1 referred to, that I believe existed prior to the 1990 elections continued
2 to exist within the BH Presidency after those elections. That's the only
3 body of that name that I'm aware of.
4 Q. Well, since there appears to be a difference between the
5 information that I'm putting to you and what you're saying, perhaps we can
6 short-circuit it by asking whether in your view it's important anyway in
7 the context of your report and the issues with which we're concerned in
8 this case.
9 A. Well, the importance of that body is similar to the importance of
10 other offices that SDS appointees, if I can use that expression, meaning
11 people that were put forward for a particular position, whether it be in
12 the election or in a more pointed process after the election, gave the
13 SDS, as it would have given the other political parties and the positions
14 they held, access to official information and the ability to influence
15 official action. The particular council we're referring to was chaired by
16 Dr. Plavsic, who was an SDS candidate for that -- to the Presidency and
17 was successful, and within the framework of the work of the Presidency,
18 they had different councils and committees, that sort of thing. And the
19 different members of the Presidency were allotted chairmanships or
20 memberships on various of those bodies, which also included other
21 officials, such as ministers. That particular body dealt with matters
22 related to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. So that gave Dr. Plavsic an
23 important insight into what was going on in the Ministry of Internal
24 Affairs and the ability to influence developments there.
25 Q. So it was -- concerned internal security issues?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And it's right, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik was not involved at all
3 with that body?
4 A. He was not a member of that body, no. No.
5 Q. I'll rephrase it as two separate questions, then. First of all,
6 as you've just confirmed, he wasn't ever a member of that body?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. That's correct?
9 A. I believe that's correct.
10 Q. And are you aware of his ever having had any involvement with that
12 A. Well, I'm not sure what you mean by "involvement". I do not have
13 the minutes of all the meetings of that body that took place, on the one
14 hand; on the other, there are many telephone conversations in which issues
15 surrounding -- issues that would have been within the purview of that body
16 that were discussed, and I believe he participated in some of those
17 discussions. I can't think of a particular one offhand, but I'm trying to
18 be cautious in my answer. So as far as involvement is concerned, that's
19 about all I can say.
20 Q. Yes. Mr. Treanor --
21 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at the clock. If you could find a
22 suitable moment within the next three to four minutes to have a break.
23 MR. STEWART: Certainly. I can do exactly that. But Your Honour
24 would like me to use up another three or four minutes preferably?
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then we'll have a break of 20 minutes.
1 MR. STEWART: Yes.
2 Q. Mr. Treanor, I certainly wouldn't be fair to you, I'm certainly
3 not trying to push you into, if you like, proving a negative or some
4 assertion that he never had any involvement, because you can't know that.
5 I think that's what you're implying. So what I'm inviting you to do is to
6 point specifically positively to anything in your report and anything that
7 you can identify now which shows specific contacts or work by
8 Mr. Krajisnik with that particular organ, the Council for the Protection
9 of the Constitutional Order.
10 A. I'm not aware of anything of the nature you seem to be describing.
11 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that would, I think, be as convenient a
12 point as any, I hope, for the Tribunal.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then have a break until five minutes past
15 --- Recess taken at 10.42 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 11.09 a.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
18 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Mr. Treanor, we had been looking at the Council for the Protection
20 of the Constitutional Order, but we can leave that. And there are a
21 number of bodies we'll come back to which plainly, in your view, as you've
22 expressed it, are important, the Deputies' Club. So I'll put it on one
23 side, not because it's unimportant, but because it is important. The
24 Economic Council. That was a body of which Mr. Krajisnik, who is an
25 economist by training, was a member, but you wouldn't suggest that the
1 Economic Council is material for the purposes of this case, would you?
2 A. Well, as far as I'm aware, we don't have any significant
3 documentation relating to that council. There are references to it in
4 some of the documents that I presented in my testimony, where that council
5 was assigned certain tasks.
6 Q. All I'm getting at --
7 A. And I'm thinking of the question of the meeting about
8 landownership or land use. But absent documentation from that body, I
9 can't say how important it in fact was.
10 Q. I'll, as I did earlier, I'll put it in a slightly different way,
11 then. Mr. Treanor, on what you know and everything you've read, you're
12 not able, are you, to suggest that the work of the Economic Council has
13 any real significance for this case?
14 A. I'm certainly unable to say on the basis of the documentation that
15 I've seen that it was a very important body.
16 Q. Well, it's clearly important for the economy, but apart from
17 that. You say you can't say it's very important. Indicate whether it
18 really has any importance at all for this case, in your view.
19 A. On the basis of the documentation that I've seen, I certainly
20 would not say that it's a very important body, or even perhaps an
21 important body.
22 Q. The expanded Presidency again I'll put on one side, because
23 clearly on your evidence that's more central. The -- similarly with the
24 National Security Council. An organisation, the personnel and
25 organisation committee, or an organ, personnel and organisation committee
1 which you had mentioned, you described it in your report, and I'm now
2 talking about the initial printed report, as a potentially -- another
3 potentially important body. But it's -- and Mr. Krajisnik was a member of
4 that body. But it's again, I'd suggest to you, say if you disagree, that
5 for the purposes of this case and the issues in this case, with which you
6 are, after all, pretty familiar, Mr. Treanor, personnel and organisation
7 committee is again not particularly important, is it?
8 A. Well, I'm not sure what the issues are in this case and all the
9 legal ramifications. But let me just say in relation to that particular
10 body, the situation there is similar to that with the Economic Council in
11 that I'm not aware that we have much documentation relating to its
12 activities. We do have a few documents, which I think is probably a few
13 more than we have relating to the Economic Council. However, those
14 documents indicate that is seems to have had the function typical for such
15 bodies, again going back to the Communist period, of identifying the, in
16 this case the SDS candidates for various posts that the party wishes to
17 endorse for various government positions. So if I'm being asked how
18 important do I think that body is, I think it, in and of itself within the
19 framework of the party's operations, was an important body. We just don't
20 have much documentation relating to its operations.
21 Q. Yes. What I'm suggesting really, Mr. Treanor, is we don't operate
22 in some sort of a vacuum. You're an expert witness, but you do, after
23 all, know very well, don't you, what the charges are against Mr. Krajisnik
24 and what the essential thrust of the Prosecution's case against him is?
25 A. Well, I have -- I certainly have an idea, yes. I mean, I --
1 again, not being a lawyer, I don't know whether I could put it in the
2 proper terms, but certainly I have an idea of what the charges are, and if
3 I understand your question correctly, the -- I would say that the -- this
4 particular body does not play the role that other bodies do, for instance,
5 the expanded Presidency, certainly.
6 Q. Yes. But in fact the gap is really rather bigger, that there are
7 two separate things, aren't they. There's a body that was important in
8 the overall functioning of the SDS and the government generally at that
9 time, but which is nevertheless clearly not at all important in relation
10 to the issues which this Prosecution of Mr. Krajisnik is concerned and
11 that this particular body, the personnel and organisation committee, is
12 exactly in that category.
13 A. Well, it may be or it may not be. I'm -- have not written the
14 report to make a case but simply to set out the documents as we know them
15 relating to the SDS and its various party organs and the other bodies that
16 it created and how they operated. Whether something is important within
17 the framework of this case or not is not really for me to say. I wouldn't
18 have thought it was, if you want an opinion.
19 Q. Well, your report, after all, this report that's been produced and
20 refined over many years, again it hasn't been produced in a vacuum. It's
21 been produced by you working for the OTP, for this Tribunal, hasn't it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. It's not an academic study of the -- it may include that, but it's
24 not primarily an academic study of the situation in Bosnia for professors
25 around the world to read. It's for this Tribunal, for prosecutions of
1 alleged, to use a broad term, war criminals.
2 A. Well, if you ask me to characterise the report, I would feel quite
3 comfortable in characterising it as an academic study for this
5 Q. Yes, but what this institution does is prosecute and judge and
6 either convict or acquit people accused of broadly war crimes, doesn't it?
7 That's what it does?
8 A. Well, that's what certain people in this institution do, namely,
9 the Trial Chamber. It's not my function.
10 Q. It's just that you do, in the course of your evidence and in your
11 report, you have very clearly identified certain organs as important or
12 very important, haven't you, such as the Presidency?
13 A. Yes, I think that's fair to say, yes.
14 Q. My apologies for --
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. -- talking at the same moment as you. But you seem to be
17 strangely reluctant, although you classify or characterise certain organs
18 as very important or important, you seem strangely reluctant to downgrade
19 any of them by saying they're not important.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I didn't want to intercede, but this
22 line of questioning seems to ignore the testimony of the witness that this
23 particular body was important within the framework of the party's
24 operations. It would seem to me that Mr. Stewart received an answer to
25 the question he posed and is now engaged in a debate about a preparatory
1 matter that preceded that response.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I understood the testimony of the
3 witness until now, and I add this before giving you an opportunity to
4 respond to what Mr. Tieger said, is that on the basis of the documentation
5 he studied that he could identify certain bodies as -- of importance for
6 this case with his knowledge but it seems that the witness is reluctant
7 and I think correctly so, to say that something is not important because
8 he has no overall overview of the case as a whole. Not working in the
9 vacuum does not mean that you have a hundred per cent knowledge of
10 whatever could come up in a case. So therefore, I'd like you to move on.
11 If you'd like to put a final question on this subject, it's fine, but it's
12 of no use to continue for another 20 minutes to see how you'd like to hear
13 from the witness that a certain part is not important and where the
14 witness seems to be hesitant to express himself clearly on the
15 non-importance of a certain body where he has no full knowledge. That's
16 how I understand his repeated reference to the documents he studied from
17 the basis of what he saw. So please, would you keep this in mind and then
19 MR. STEWART: With the same vein -- thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. In the same vein, Mr. Treanor, can I ask you, then, about the
21 Political Council. And in your report, and I'm talking about the actual
22 report rather than your evidence, at paragraph 39, and I'm citing, you
23 say: The Political Council in which Plavsic and Krajisnik sometimes
24 participated played an important advisory role in practice. And then in
25 paragraph 40, the following paragraph, you say: The Political Council
1 played a subsidiary advisory role while other statutory bodies did not
2 make significant contributions.
3 So you see, Mr. Treanor, what I'm just trying to get us to focus
4 on what's really important. So as far as the Political Council is
5 concerned, in the light of those two comments which do appear to be
6 marginally different, at least in tone, where do you place the Political
7 Council in importance for what you know about this case?
8 A. Well, again, I can only place the Political Council within the
9 framework of the activities of the SDS, and on the basis of the
10 documentation which we dispose of, I would say that the Political Council
11 was a -- was an important forum of discussion. It included many prominent
12 Serbs, and it seems to have been called upon quite frequently, when I say
13 it seems to have, because we have frequent references to its meetings, but
14 perhaps not all the references. And it -- the people in the council
15 offered opinions on important subjects of the day and the council as a
16 whole discussed important subjects of the day. So it was one of the
17 important bodies on which the leadership of the SDS drew for advice and
19 Q. And then the Statutes Council, which is mentioned at page 38 of
20 your report, the Statutes Council, Mr. Treanor, could we put that one
21 safely in the category of clearly unimportant for the purposes of this
23 A. Well, again, I can only speak to what its role appears to have
24 been within the SDS, which -- about which we don't have terribly much
25 documentation. So it does not appear to have played a very important role
1 within the SDS.
2 Q. The supervisory board, you say that in practice its activities
3 were related to auditing the party's financial activities and informing
4 the competent organs of its findings. Now, I'm not suggesting money is
5 not important but can we also safely put the supervisory board in the box
6 labelled not important for this case?
7 A. Well, again, I don't know what may or may not be important for
8 this case. You said money is important. Maybe money is important for
9 this case. But in relation to this body, we seem to have more references
10 to it and that sort of thing. But perhaps as a rule of thumb I could say
11 that the amount of space devoted in the report to a given body is a fair
12 indication of how important I think it was within the operations of the
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, if I may give you some guidance.
15 Whenever this issue of important or not of a body comes up again, could
16 you please ask the witness whether this body belongs to the category he
17 did not identify on the basis of his studies.
18 MR. STEWART: I beg your pardon, Your Honour. Sorry. I didn't
19 catch that.
20 JUDGE ORIE: He did not identify on the basis of his studies of
21 importance. That's another way of saying almost the same. But that
22 prevents -- that Mr. Treanor has to explain again and again within what
23 limits he gives his opinion and could save you some time.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. STEWART:
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. The -- in fact, Mr. Treanor, really, I've pretty much gotten to
2 the end of that checklist. It's the way it sometimes happens. The --
3 page 1283 of the transcript of your evidence, you talked about the
4 amendments to the constitution, the BH constitution, and that within the
5 Assembly, there would be a commission for the question of the equality of
6 peoples. Perhaps you could expand a little on what you understand the
7 functions of that particular commission to have been.
8 A. Well, in my understanding, the functions of that commission would
9 have been akin to the -- that of the chambers of nationalities, I think
10 they were called, chambers of peoples that the SDS had suggested creating
11 in the autumn of 1990, and I'm referring to Dr. Karadzic's letter to the
12 then existing Assembly of BH. That is, it would have had the function of
13 considering matters that were important to the national rights of the
14 various peoples within BH, especially the constituent peoples, and would
15 have had to approve any measures that affected those rights.
16 Q. Now, the letter that you just referred to, to get clear, that's
17 the letter, isn't it, at tab 9 of the first bundle? I think you still
18 have that file, don't you, number 1, in front of you?
19 A. Yes, that's the letter.
20 Q. That's the one you're talking about. And you said in your
21 evidence, and this is at page 1287 of the transcript, that -- well, just
22 before that, actually, you commented. You said that one of the -- you
23 said the force of the act of the amendment which Dr. Karadzic sought would
24 basically have given any one of the three constituent nations of BH a veto
25 over any measure before the Assembly which it felt adversely affected its
1 interests as a nation. And then you said: In other words, it would have
2 been impossible for -- under this proposed arrangement for the Serbian
3 deputies in that council to block the secession of BH from Yugoslavia.
4 Of course it follows it also naturally would have been possible
5 for the Muslim deputies to block in the same way. That follows, doesn't
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And perhaps in theory the Croat?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- deputies. And then you say that not surprisingly, and this is
11 at page 1287, you say: Not surprisingly this letter did not draw
12 favourable action given that the Assembly was on its way out. I wonder if
13 you could clarify. What's the connection between the fact that the
14 Assembly was on its way out and the lack of any favourable action or
15 reaction to his letter?
16 A. Well, there's -- I've made a presumption, perhaps unwarranted, but
17 I thought obvious that given that this letter was dated the 8th of
18 October, 1990 and that elections had been scheduled two months before, the
19 elections due to take place the following month, that the Assembly whose
20 term in office was obviously very limited in time at this particular date,
21 was hardly likely to take action to amend the constitution.
22 Q. But it's a bit more than that, isn't it? Isn't it not just that
23 the Assembly was on its way out. The timing might not have been perfect
24 from the, if you like, the practical point of view, for everybody to make
25 those amendments. The lack of any favourable reaction was that the
1 recipients within the Muslim deputies and Croat deputies just didn't want
2 such an amendment; isn't that correct?
3 A. When you say the Muslim deputies and the Croatian deputies, we're
4 talking about an assembly now that was elected during the Communist
5 period. So --
6 Q. Well, yes, but, Mr. Treanor, within that assembly, is it not
7 correct that for practical purposes, any individual deputy would have been
8 likely to have identified himself or herself with Serb, Muslim, or Croat
9 nation or community?
10 A. Well, I don't know the ethnic composition of that assembly, but
11 there were undoubtedly many Muslims and Croats, as well as Serbs, in that
12 assembly, and there were also undoubtedly many people who identified
13 themselves as being Yugoslavs and members of other nations. As far as the
14 political aspects of the question is concerned, I would presume, and I
15 don't think that's what I was thinking of when I gave that answer, that
16 the position of the Assembly would have been -- well, we've already made
17 our provisions in that respect in the amendment that I referred to, and
18 that's as far as we're going to go.
19 Q. Yes. It's just that the two reasons -- in fact, you gave two
20 reasons in your evidence, this is at 1287 of the transcript. You said not
21 surprisingly, this letter did not draw favourable action, given that the
22 Assembly was on its way out, the point we just mentioned, and perhaps
23 given the fact that the letter confused Amendment 60 with Amendment 70.
24 But giving those two reasons, I'm suggesting that rather glosses
25 over the much more simple, fundamental reason which was that a very
1 significant number of the recipients of this letter simply were opposed to
2 any such change.
3 A. Well, they may have been, but I don't know that.
4 Q. You don't know the reason was that the letter confused
5 Amendment 60 with Amendment 70, but you are content to offer it as a
6 suggested reason, aren't you?
7 A. Well, that's something -- that is something which, like the date
8 of the letter, proceeds from the letter itself. I would say that the
9 letter has drafting problems and the date of the letter is important in
10 connection with the fact that that Assembly was no longer going to be in
11 office very long. If they had been of a mind to make such changes, that
12 presumably would have taken some length of time anyways. How long, I
13 don't know, but I just think -- my -- the thrust of my answer was that
14 from the technical point of view, it was rather late in the day to suggest
15 that this Assembly make such changes. Now, they had, in the
16 constitutional amendment the you referred to initially, made some
17 provisions in that regard, and as I say, they quite likely would have
18 felt, since they're the ones that instituted it, that that's how they
19 dealt with that problem and that was -- the way they wanted to deal with
20 it and not consider something else offered by someone who kind of confused
21 the various amendments of the constitution, doesn't seem to know what he's
22 talking about.
23 Q. And then you -- in your evidence, and this was at page 1287 still
24 at the transcript, you referred to an open-air meeting in Banja Luka on
25 the 13th of October, 1990. Do you remember that? And a speech by
1 Mr. Karadzic. And then we saw a video of that speech, actually. And you
2 said, and this is at page 1289 of the transcript, that: We hear Dr.
3 Karadzic specifically addressing the situation in Croatia. He said that
4 if the Croats in Croatia wanted to leave Yugoslavia, that's fine, but they
5 can't take the Serbs in Croatia with them. And that's in the area of
6 Krajina; right?
7 A. Primarily.
8 Q. Primarily. And then he moved on to address the situation in BH.
9 This is you talking now: Then he, Dr. Karadzic, moved on to address the
10 situation in BH and raising the fear that the next step would be to try to
11 take BH in its entirety, including the Serbs, in it outside of Yugoslavia.
12 Well, first of all, he was right, wasn't he?
13 A. That that materialised, indeed, yes.
14 Q. And there was, from what you know of the situation at the time, it
15 isn't just that he was proved right, as it happens, but it was the very
16 next day, if he was proved right, that did materialise, but there was
17 every justification at that time for that fear, wasn't there?
18 A. Well, I'm not sure what you mean by every justification.
19 Q. I'll rephrase it. It was an entirely reasonable view for a
20 political leader to take at that time and to express.
21 A. Yes. From his point of view, definitely, to be on guard for such
22 a contingency.
23 Q. Yes. In fact, in his position, it would have been rather
24 irresponsible or remiss of him not to recognise that risk, wouldn't it?
25 A. Yes. As I think I indicated, that this was the burning issue of
1 the day, I think is the expression I used. The future of the relationship
2 between BH and the rest of Yugoslavia.
3 Q. And you referred yourself - this is at the foot of 1289 of your
4 evidence. You say reference is also made to Assembly decisions which
5 could appear legitimate, the majority of the Assembly could vote for the
6 secession of BH, and all of the Serbian delegates would be against that.
7 But since they wouldn't have a majority, this would look perfectly
8 legitimate to the outside world and this is what they were determined to
9 prevent. So what in effect, without getting into any legal technicalities
10 about it, Mr. Treanor, this was a fear of what can sometimes be referred
11 to as the tyranny of the majority, if you like, wasn't it?
12 A. Yes. I think it's fair to say that's very much what they were
13 afraid of.
14 Q. In your evidence at page 1292, we looked at, or you looked at and
15 drew the court's attention to tab 11 in this same bundle. When I say
16 "bundle", I'm afraid I'm just slipping into English terminology all the
17 time. I'm referring to a file. When I say bundle 1, I really always mean
18 just file 1.
19 What you say, you drew the Court's attention to it. You say, in
20 the second paragraph, according to this decision -- according to the
21 decision of the Serbian National Council of BH, the Serbian people in
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina shall not recognise any decision to change the
23 state character of BH taken by the deputies rather than the people, but
24 only a decision reached through a referendum of the Serbian people.
25 And then the way you describe that, you say: So here the Serbian
1 National Council is basically announcing, it is in effect setting itself
2 up as a Serbian Chamber of Peoples, which Dr. Karadzic had earlier sought,
3 and giving themselves a veto, so to speak, over any decisions made by the
4 Assembly that would affect the interests of the Serbian people.
5 Now, I just want to clarify with you: That's the way you
6 expressed it in your evidence, giving themselves a veto over any decisions
7 made by the Assembly that would affect the interests of the Serbian
8 people, that's -- if you reconsider that, that's too broadly expressed,
9 isn't it, Mr. Treanor?
10 A. Well, this decision makes reference to the change in the state
11 character of BH. I was trying to link this -- the setting up of this
12 council with the previous demands for a chamber made in the October
13 letter, which would have had a broader mandate.
14 Q. All right. But what you were specifically talking about in your
15 evidence is what the Serbian National Council was announcing and what it
16 was announcing and also what they were giving themselves by -- that was
17 your phrase, giving themselves by this declaration. It was very
18 specifically confined to changes of the state character of BH, wasn't it?
19 A. That's what it says here, yes.
20 Q. And then when we go on to what you said, and this is at page 1295,
21 the reference of your -- the transcript of your evidence. You were
22 referring to the interview which is at tab 13 in the same bundle. And
23 working from the translation, the relevant paragraph is the one at the top
24 of the last page of the English translation. It's probably the last page
25 of the B/C/S as well. The paragraph that begins in English: Serbian
1 priorities. Do you see that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Serbian --
4 A. In translation.
5 Q. Yes, in translation, of course. Serbian priorities are the
6 preservation of the spiritual, cultural, political and state unity of the
7 Serbian people. A Serbian priority is the return of the Serbian people
8 among the happy peoples and the Serbian state among the happy states. A
9 Serbian priority is preventing a single Serbian village from being left
10 out of Yugoslavia and remaining in some new Independent State of Croatia
11 which existed during the Second World War.
12 It says "NDH" in the English translation. Is that a historical
14 A. Yes. That's an acronym for the B/C/S word for Independent State
15 of Croatia.
16 Q. Yes. Yes. And then you -- what you said in your evidence, this
17 is at page 1295 of the transcript, you said -- having read that passage,
18 you said: So here he seems, and this is Dr. Karadzic, he seems to be
19 claiming for Yugoslavia every Serbian village in Bosnia. But he's not
20 saying that, is he? This is relating specifically and only to those
21 villages which could fall into Croatia.
22 A. Well, that statement is -- relates to the situation in Croatia,
24 Q. Yes. So what I mean is, what I'm putting to you is, where you
25 said he seems to be claiming for Yugoslavia every Serbian village in
1 Bosnia, he's not making any such claim here, because this doesn't relate
2 to the whole of Bosnia, does it?
3 A. Well, it seems to me that mutatis mutandis he would have made the
4 same claim for Bosnia.
5 Q. Mutatis mutandis?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. But he's not making it here.
8 A. No. This statement directly relates to -- or mentions
9 specifically Croatia, but he's talking about Serbian priorities and being
10 opposed to a single Serbian village being left out of Yugoslavia.
11 Q. And remaining in some new Independent State of Croatia. So it
12 doesn't -- he's not possibly talking about those which are so far away
13 from Croatia that nobody would seriously suggest, at least of all the
14 Croats, fall into that independent state; that's right, isn't it?
15 A. Sorry. Could you repeat that?
16 Q. Because he's specifically talking -- after all, let's start at the
17 beginning. Croatia was a real crisis at this time, wasn't it?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. In fact -- although there were, of course, these concerns by
20 Dr. Karadzic and others about where the future of BH was going, there was
21 an immediate problem and conflict, wasn't there, involving Croatia?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. So that's what he's talking about. And he's talking about here
24 only about those villages which are, my phrase here, for the purpose of
25 the question, vulnerable to being absorbed into Croatia at some point?
1 A. He makes reference to preventing a single Serbian village. Now,
2 it seems to me that that remark betrays -- or indicates an attitude that
3 was easily transferrable to Bosnia.
4 Q. I won't pursue this point any further now, Mr. Treanor.
5 Can we move on, then, in the same bundle, the same file, to
6 letters -- well, letter 14. It's a letter from Dr. Karadzic to
7 Mr. Milosevic. And you read this letter, or the two paragraphs of it,
8 anyway, the paragraphs beginning: Your election means. And also:
9 Through your electoral victory. You read those out to the Trial Chamber
10 when you gave your evidence. What I'm wondering and asking you,
11 Mr. Treanor, is: What the letter -- you drew attention to it and you read
12 it out -- what it actually adds to anything. What do you suggest is its
14 A. Perhaps you can give me a tab number.
15 Q. I'm so sorry. Did I not give it? Tab 14. I beg your pardon.
16 A. 14. Okay. Well, I find this letter interesting in that, on the
17 one hand, not surprisingly, it indicates on the part of Dr. Karadzic a not
18 surprising favourable attitude and support toward the authorities in
19 Serbia. I think, as we've been discussing, one of the primary goals of
20 Dr. Karadzic's party was that the Serbs in Bosnia remain in the same state
21 with Serbia. On the other hand, it's a letter of support to someone who,
22 at least until very recently, when they changed the name, at least, if not
23 the structure, of the ruling party in Serbia, support for someone who had
24 been a lifelong Communist, which is something that Dr. Karadzic and his
25 party were opposed to.
1 Q. So what is the -- is that the point of interest in the letter?
2 A. Yes. Those two things.
3 Q. So what do you say? There's an irony in that or it's some
4 contradictory element, or what?
5 A. Well, his expression of support extends to, as I put it, the
6 Communist rulers of Serbia, from whom, since they had won the election, he
7 may have hoped to get some support for his position.
8 Q. It's just this, isn't it, that you work with the people you have
9 to work with, and if they -- somebody gets elected to power somewhere
10 else, then -- well, I'll put it more broadly, Mr. Treanor. All over the
11 world, politicians write congratulatory letters to each other upon their
12 election, sometimes through gritted teeth, sometimes with enthusiasm?
13 A. Well, that may be the case. That may be his motivation.
14 Q. That's what it looks like, doesn't it? It's a -- if you like,
15 it's a bread-and-butter letter written by one political leader to another,
16 knowing that he's won a very comfortable election victory and he's the
17 person he's going to have to deal with?
18 A. Well, he wrote the letter, so there's obviously an explanation for
19 it, and I would agree with you that that's it. But there are other
20 courses of action he could have taken.
21 Q. What, such as -- a disparaging letter and then spoiling relations
22 for ever more? Something like that?
23 A. He could have refrained from writing any letter at all.
24 Q. And tab 15, if you'd turn over, is not an election in the same
25 way, but same sort of spirit really, isn't it? It's a congratulatory
1 letter. And of course it involves perfectly natural support for the Serb
2 people in the Krajina?
3 A. Yes. Well, this letter is certainly less surprising, but it does
4 embody the solidarity which Dr. Karadzic felt for the Serbs in Krajina
5 who, by the way, had a ruling party with the same name as his and a party
6 which he, I believe it's correct to say, tended to view as sort of their
7 older sister in certain respects.
8 Q. That reminds me, actually. There was an entirely different
9 question I just wanted to ask you at some point. Now, as it happens,
10 Mr. Krajisnik's own name as an origin of the name indicates, doesn't it,
11 it signifies somebody from the Krajina, doesn't it?
12 A. Yes, it does.
13 Q. Krajisnik. I just wanted to ask you this specifically, because
14 occasionally, and it may help the Tribunal, occasionally, the word
15 "Krajisnik" appears in a document, and it's not referring to
16 Mr. Krajisnik at all, is it; it's making a reference to somebody from
17 Krajina in more general terms?
18 A. Yes, that's correct. And there are two Krajinas. A Croatian
19 Krajina and a Bosnian Krajina. And the word does appear in documents in
20 the sense of someone from Krajina, one of the Krajinas.
21 Q. It's only this, Mr. Treanor, one has to be a tiny bit careful when
22 "Krajisnik" leaps off the page, to be sure that it is in fact
23 Mr. Krajisnik who is being referred to as opposed to this other use of the
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you. The -- so anyway, you -- this was at 1297 of the
2 transcript. After all, you, Mr. Treanor, in your chronological survey for
3 the Tribunal, you picked out this letter at tab 15 to Mr. Babic, to
4 Mr. Milan Babic as worth specific mention and worth citing to the Tribunal
5 particular paragraphs. So I just wanted to be clear. You say: In
6 summary we have an expression in that letter of solidarity with the
7 Croatian Serbs, who had the same desire as expressed by the leaders of the
8 SDS that the Serbs in Croatia should remain within Yugoslavia. I just
9 invite you to confirm that there's absolutely nothing surprising about
10 that. It's exactly what you would expect and it was in the context of the
11 time an entirely reasonable and legitimate political position to adopt?
12 A. Well, it's what you'd expect from Dr. Karadzic, certainly.
13 Q. But it's not only what you'd expect from Dr. Karadzic, is it?
14 Mr. Treanor, you've been working in relation to this region and have
15 written this very extensive academic report. It was an entirely
16 reasonable political stance for Dr. Karadzic to adopt, wasn't it?
17 A. For Dr. Karadzic, yes.
18 Q. Well, I --
19 A. I don't think the head of the HDZ in Bosnia would send such a
20 letter. I mean, so from Dr. Karadzic's political perspective, and we've
21 seen that in the documents I've presented, beginning with the party
22 programme, this is indeed perfectly natural.
23 Q. It's perhaps my fault. I'm not putting the question well enough,
24 Mr. Treanor. The -- you say it's reasonable from Dr. Karadzic's own
25 perspective. Well, no doubt among other things he saw it that way. Given
1 that this was a pluralist society, especially after those elections, you
2 had Muslims, you had Croats, you had Serbs, that any reasonably objective
3 political observer would have said: Well, all right. I understand what
4 the Muslims are saying, I understand what the Croats are saying, I
5 understand what Dr. Karadzic is saying as a Serb. And that looks like
6 perfectly reasonable politics to me.
7 A. For the SDS, indeed.
8 Q. The -- you referred to the composition of the chamber, then, after
9 the elections in November 1990, and you gave the figures, and you
10 illustrated how it was the numbers, as it often is in politics, which
11 created the difficulty. The -- you gave some figures - this is at
12 page 1299 of the transcript - that the SDS won a total of 72 seats, 38
13 seats in the Chamber of Municipalities, and 34 seats in the Chamber of
14 Citizens. So that was how the 72 was made up. But the SDA had won a
15 total of 86 seats, and the HDZ, you thought, 44. And then you said those
16 two chambers are composed of on the one hand the 130 deputies in the
17 Chamber of Citizens and 110 in the Chamber of Municipalities. And then
18 you said the total of 230 is important. Mr. Treanor, this is a rather
19 nit-pickingly small point in a sense, but you refer to 130 deputies in the
20 Chamber of Citizens, 110 in the Chamber of Municipalities, and then a
21 total of 230. In fact, they total 240. I just wonder whether you're in a
22 position today to confirm which of those figures is the one that needs
24 A. I confess. I have a hard time keeping that straight. I believe
25 it's 110 and 120.
1 Q. Okay. So it's probably -- well, we'll check that, then, is the
2 easiest thing to do.
3 A. I'm sorry.
4 Q. It's all right. It's probably the 120 that needs correcting.
5 A. I know it's 110 for the one chamber.
6 Q. The arithmetic obviously needs adjusting somewhere, or the
7 figures. But the 230 to 240, I wanted to try and get it straight, is not
8 critical, is it, because the same problem about the Serb deputies being
9 below the necessary threshold to block a change arises whether it's 230 or
10 240 anyway, doesn't it so...
11 A. Yes. The point that I was alluding to is the fact that they did
12 get together as a single group on many occasions and decide as a unified
13 body and not as separate chambers. So the total strength in the two
14 chambers becomes important per se.
15 Q. Yes. Now, if we look at tab 16, please. This is the diary or
16 translation of the diary of Mr. Maksimovic. I'm never quite sure. Where
17 does the emphasis come in the syllables, Mr. Treanor?
18 A. I'm never quite sure either.
19 Q. All right. Well, that makes two of us.
20 A. Maksimovic is fine with me.
21 Q. Sorry. Would Your Honour give me a moment. Sometimes the
22 transcript has -- you have to go back quite a long way in the transcript
23 to pick up the page number of the document that you're referring to.
24 In the -- my apologies, Your Honour.
25 It's page 3. I beg your pardon. It's page 3 of the translation.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Towards the top it says -- the second -- what's described in your
2 evidence, this is at page 1304 of the transcript, the second bullet point:
3 What have our first parliamentary experiences shown regarding our national
4 protection? You see that point. Then you say -- well, you cite the next
5 bit of the document. We will have heavy fighting and so on. And then you
6 say -- this is in your evidence at 1305: There are two points which I
7 would remind the Court came up in our discussion of the programme of the
8 SDS and Dr. Karadzic's speech. The feeling that the municipal boundaries
9 should perhaps be redrawn and the desire, as we saw later expressed, to
10 form a Chamber of nationalities to prevent outvoting.
11 Then you say: Move down a little bit, in the middle of the page,
12 the present state of our unity - and we see that in the middle of page 3
13 of the translation. The present state of our unity is unsufficient [sic].
14 We've heard many promises at meetings but what have we done? The unity
15 of Serbian deputies has not been shaped. Some believe that the
16 intellectual level of our deputies is satisfactory. However, our position
17 in parliament will never be favourable. I am certain of that. There will
18 be all sorts of things in the Assembly, outvoting, treachery, rows,
19 walkouts and protests. Is that democracy? We'll see. So again we have
20 the fear of outvoting in the Assembly.
21 It's really -- it's a rather long preamble, Mr. Treanor, to the
22 question, but again, you felt it valuable to draw attention specifically
23 to what appeared in this diary at this point, but is the fundamental point
24 about forming a Chamber of Nationalities to prevent outvoting, do you see
25 that as, in substance, the same as the proposals which have been put
1 forward by Dr. Karadzic in his earlier speeches and letter?
2 A. Well, I'd say it's the same idea. There are no specifics here,
3 but it's obviously designed to meet the same situation.
4 Q. The mechanics changed, but the underlying point is the same.
5 There's just a --
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. -- if you like, a repeated attempt to deal with this obvious
8 problem of potential outvoting in the Assembly?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. The otherwise, is there -- you cited this -- these fairly
11 extensive passages from that diary. What particular significance, if any,
12 do you attach to those cited passages?
13 A. I'm sorry. Where are we now?
14 Q. It's the present state of our -- well, the particular passage
15 which you've cited, or passages, were page 3 of the English translation:
16 What have our first parliament experiences shown regarding national
17 protection? We will have heavy fighting and so on. Then in the middle of
18 the page: The present state of our unity is insufficient. And then going
19 down to -- and then you also referred to the paragraph: Who says we can't
20 create a Serbian state of sorts, which would be more appropriate and bring
21 us closer to the achievement of our memorial ideals.
22 So just to make clear my question, Mr. Treanor: It's really this,
23 that you cited these passages at some length. I'm just asking what
24 particular significance you -- if any, you attach to them which led you to
25 draw specific attention to them.
1 A. Well, in general terms, and without having read the -- and
2 analysed the entire passage again, what I found interesting here is an
3 indication at this early date that the -- at least one of the leaders of
4 the SDS felt that they were running into problems already with this new
5 coalition government they've established. They had a rather decisive
6 victory over the previous ruling party, the League of Communists, whom the
7 national parties feared might try to win the election by fraud, if by no
8 other manner. They had -- the national parties had won the election and
9 formed a coalition, and the outside observer might have thought they will
10 live happily ever after. But this, as I say, is an early indication that
11 the leaders of the SDS discovered quite quickly that this was not the
13 Q. Well, the concern about the outvoting, that had been there for
14 some time, hadn't it?
15 A. Yes. But they had come -- they had an agreement on forming a
16 coalition, on distributing offices, and they may have felt, as indeed
17 later on in the year Dr. Karadzic felt, and I think it came through in
18 some of the documents we saw, that Mr. Izetbegovic, at least, had agreed
19 that they would not do that. They would not force a decision on one of
20 the other nationalities by outvoting. So there may have been at this date
21 a perception that, as I put it earlier, that everything was going to be
22 fine now and that the political agreement would prevent the outvoting, but
23 Mr. Maksimovic seems to be forming the opinion that that particular danger
24 is by no means over.
25 Q. Well, the way he puts it is outvoting, treachery, rows, walkouts
1 and protests, is that democracy? Mr. Treanor, you might say, well, yes,
2 it is, mightn't you?
3 A. You might.
4 Q. Part and parcel, the normal feature of -- features of democracy?
5 A. He seems to find that a bit disturbing.
6 Q. Again, he was actually right, wasn't he?
7 A. I think -- well, without analysing the particular strategies and
8 tactics he had in mind, in some substance that's exactly what happened.
9 Q. Yes. The agreement never protected anybody, because eventually
10 that is what Mr. Izetbegovic --
11 A. That was certainly their perception, yes.
12 Q. And then you make another -- in your evidence -- this was at
13 page 1307 of the transcript, just a very short reference, you say that --
14 well, you cite a passage in which Mr. Maksimovic is fearing treachery.
15 And then you refer to -- he makes a reference to Herzegovina, which as you
16 say is a reference to the fact that he perceives that the Croats in
17 western Herzegovina would like to split off from BH and join Croatia
18 perhaps. And he expresses his fear for what may happen in the Serbian
19 part of Herzegovina.
20 What you refer to as his perception that the Croats in western
21 Herzegovina would like to split off from BH, that wasn't really just his
22 perception that was at the time, wasn't it, that was clearly the
23 position. Wasn't it?
24 A. Well, there are a lot of Croats in western Herzegovina. Whether
25 every single one of them wanted that, I don't know. That certainly was
1 one of the main positions represented within the HDZ.
2 Q. You -- yes. Could we go to -- it will be the next volume,
3 actually, number 2, at section 29. Just to remind ourselves what this is,
4 this is the session, the second session of the SDS. Its second assembly
5 is another way of referring to it in translation. On the 12th of July,
6 1991. I think it was exactly a year after the first one, wasn't it,
7 Mr. Treanor?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Yes, to the very day. And it's a fairly long record, because of
10 course it was quite a large meeting. And then we go certainly not going
11 to grind all through it, but if we go right on to page 55, and you dealt
12 with this. It's at page 1337 of the transcript of your evidence. And
13 then you say "he," which is Dr. Karadzic at this point: He gives some
14 interesting remarks on the leadership of the party and its most prominent
15 figures. And you say in this particular paragraph: We nevertheless have
16 to name two of the delegates who have emerged as eminent political
17 figures. And that's toward the bottom of page 55. It's about ten lines
18 up. Do you see that: We nevertheless have to name two of the delegates?
19 Do you see that passage?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, again, you -- interesting is a word that you perhaps not
22 unnaturally use quite often throughout your evidence. What is the
23 particular interest of his remarks?
24 A. Well, it's interesting that, within the context of a party
25 meeting, he has singled out two leadership figures and identifies them
1 by -- not by a role they play within the party but by roles they play
2 within the official governing structure of BH.
3 Q. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, because he identifies them as the speaker of
4 the BH Assembly. That's what you have in mind first; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And then Mr. Maksimovic as the president of the delegates club.
7 And just remind us. The delegates club, what's the status of that, then?
8 A. I think we referred to it as the Deputies' Club.
9 Q. Deputies' Club.
10 A. -- in the report. That is the organisation of the deputies from
11 each particular political party represented within the Assembly. And they
12 carry out certain business within the framework of the club. And the
13 individual clubs are recognised within the Assembly.
14 Q. Sorry. I think I hadn't appreciated that's delegates club, that's
15 not some new animal, then. That's simply a translation of --
16 A. Of the Deputies' Club.
17 Q. Deputies' Club. So this is one of the three official or
18 semi-official? What's the apt description of those really within --
19 A. Well, the Deputies' Clubs are mentioned within the Rules of
20 Procedure of the Assembly.
21 Q. Yes. So official is fair?
22 A. To that extent.
23 Q. Context.
24 A. They're not constitutional or legislative -- legislatively
25 created. Statutorily created bodies but within the --
1 Q. I'm just trying to get at what the particular point of interest
2 is. Is it the fact that they're identified by reference to their
3 positions, as you said a moment ago, in Bosnia-Herzegovina as opposed to
4 their positions in the party, or some other point of interest?
5 A. Well, he has identified to the party assembly two people who he --
6 whom he regards as being -- as having emerged as important leaders.
7 Q. Well, can we look at what -- this is quite a long -- other people
8 get to speak as well, but Dr. Karadzic says a lot on this occasion,
9 doesn't he?
10 A. Indeed.
11 Q. And at page 2, right at the very beginning, he greets all the
12 delegates, that's all perfectly normal. They've sung the anthem, he
13 greets all the delegates. He says at the foot of page 2: I would also
14 like to greet the members of the SDS Political and Economic Council whose
15 advice and suggestions have been crucial for the success of our policy.
16 Do you see that? I'm sorry. Have I gone too fast? It's back --
17 A. Back at --
18 Q. Back at page 2 of tab 29.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So there's a plaudit for the -- was the Political and Economic
21 Council a single organ then at that stage, so far as you're aware, or can
22 you not say?
23 A. I can't say definitely. As we've seen in the statutes, it refers
24 to two different bodies, but later on, late in 1991, for instance, we just
25 see references to the party council, as if there's only one now. So they
1 may have been in fact melded into one at some point.
2 Q. Anyway, there's a plaudit for them, isn't there? Their advice and
3 suggestions have been crucial for the success of our policy.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So it's well done Political and Economic Council. And then over
6 the page, page 3, I would like -- top of the page: I would like to
7 welcome the esteemed representatives of the press, and I want to thank
8 them for the successful and fair coverage of our activities so far. So
9 there's a plaudit for them as well, isn't there?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Then if we go on to page 6, foot of page 6: From the date of its
12 appointment until today, the Executive Committee has truly worked in
13 adverse circumstances and in inadequate premises without a party of
14 administrative apparatus and without the technical and other resources for
15 its work.
16 And then down towards to the middle of page 7: In the first
17 phrase the Executive Committee tried to mobilise all the communities in BH
18 as quickly as possible. And I'm going as slowly as possible. As quickly
19 as possible in order to set up the municipal and local party branches.
20 The efforts were made in highly adverse circumstances. The information
21 and propaganda blockade had to be brought down and a number of other
22 syndromes aimed against the Serbian people. That is why we can say that
23 this part of the work was completed very successfully.
24 So plaudits for the Executive Committee there?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And then we go to page --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, if you wouldn't mind if I interfere. I
3 don't know whether your point would be, which I have in my mind already
4 for quite some minutes, that everyone was applauded for doing a wonderful
5 job and everyone was a rising star. Why don't ask the witness if that's
6 your point. Of course if it's not your point, I'll listen to your next
8 MR. STEWART: It is, Your Honour. I did in the same way that we
9 went through quite a lot of material here, I did want to make it and
10 obtain Mr. Treanor's agreement. There's actually -- Your Honour, if I
11 may, I'm practically there. If I may, one more.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But then perhaps on your next subject, I don't
13 know how many minutes it took to get us through this rather simple
14 question. Just as the question or whether Mr. Treanor did not generalise
15 too much where Mr. Karadzic said something about villages in Croatia and
16 whether he generalised it for all villages. That very often takes us five
17 to seven or eight minutes. The question is quite simple. After the first
18 minute, it's entirely clear to everyone who listens carefully what the
19 point is, and then I'm just wondering whether we could not hear the answer
20 of the witness in a more speedy way. You just said I'm going as slowly as
21 possible. I didn't took that as -- I took it as just referring to your
22 speech at that moment. But I think a bit more tempo could --
23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, of course I was only referring to the
24 way I was speaking. I'm certainly not going to enter into a squabble with
25 the Tribunal about the speed. However, Your Honour, in the same way that
1 considerable chunks of documents were placed on the record in the course
2 of examination-in-chief, I am, with respect, Your Honour, while proceeding
3 as quickly as I can, also going to do my job of placing certain items on
4 the record.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, as I told -- yes. Placing items on the
6 record. But we could perhaps discuss that at a later stage. Could
7 perhaps be done in a more speedy way. But it's just my feeling that we
8 could proceed a little bit more quickly if the point is already clear, on
9 from the, I would say, from the first 30 seconds.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.
12 Q. Well, just for the record, then, at page 25, without dwelling on
13 it, he complicated the Main Board for its work, and if one were to read
14 through this document, which no doubt can be done but not right now, it's
15 apparent. It's a political speech. It's a political leader's speech,
16 isn't it, where he's -- prizes for everybody and encouragement and
17 plaudits for everybody and every bit of the organisation. That's what it
18 comes down to, isn't it?
19 A. Well, two things. Yes, I think Dr. Karadzic is trying to give
20 credit where credit is due.
21 Q. Or even sometimes, Mr. Treanor, I'm suggesting maybe even where
22 it's not due, because that's what you do, encouragement. It's not -- he's
23 actually telling everybody they've done a good job, which is what
24 political leaders often do in public anyway, don't they?
25 A. Well, let me give the second part of my answer to the previous
1 question. One portion that you read there I believe comes from the report
2 by Velibor Ostojic, where he speaks about the boards doing a good job
3 under difficult circumstances.
4 Q. Well, if that's right, then I stand corrected, Mr. Treanor, on
5 that. That's particularly -- which page is that?
6 A. On page 7, pages 6 and 7.
7 Q. On page 7.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You're quite right. You're absolutely right, and I stand
10 corrected on that.
11 A. If I could just comment on that.
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. Velibor Ostojic, in his report, is I think trying to put a good
14 face on things. He was the chairman, president of the Executive Board,
15 elected the previous year. And I think it's apparent from this report and
16 other things said at this meeting that there had been certain deficiencies
17 in the work of the party organs and he in fact was not re-elected to that
18 position. So his remarks are a little defensive.
19 Q. But it's -- all it comes down to in the end is this, with that,
20 that it's that the remarks that you particularly highlighted as
21 interesting remarks and you picked out Mr. Krajisnik, and after all, we
22 know why Mr. Krajisnik is here in court, it's actually of no interest, I
23 suggest, beyond the fact that Mr. Krajisnik, as a whole list of other
24 people and organs of the SDS, Mr. Krajisnik is included in the people who
25 are given a pat on the back and told well done. There's no more to it
1 than that, is there?
2 A. Well, he's certainly included. I mean, I would -- if he had done
3 a terrible job then maybe he might not have been included.
4 Q. Well, Mr. Treanor, you agree with what I said. There's no more to
5 it than that?
6 A. Than what?
7 Q. Than that Mr. Krajisnik is included in the list of people who are
8 given a pat on the back.
9 A. Well, as I say, I think that the indication that he and other
10 people are given a pat on the back is an indication that Dr. Karadzic
11 thinks that they've done a good job, as opposed to -- I mean, there are
12 other people, as I indicated, that perhaps didn't do such a good job.
13 Q. And the significance of the fact that he's referred to as the
14 president of the Assembly of BH is just that when courtesies that are
15 adopted in this particular society we're dealing with, as in many
16 societies, you give somebody, if you're going to give them a title, you
17 give them their official highest title, don't you, as the normal courtesy?
18 A. I suppose.
19 Q. I'll illustrate what I mean. We refer to Her Majesty the Queen.
20 We don't normally mention that she is the Duke of Normandy. That's all it
21 is, isn't it?
22 A. I take your point there, yes.
23 MR. STEWART: Or Queen of Australia, I suppose.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Queens in different countries have different
1 Mr. Stewart, would this be a suitable moment to have our next
3 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: We'll then have a break until five minutes to 1.00.
5 And again, where you said that you would certainly not -- you expected not
6 to go beyond the first eight binders, so therefore, we could feel
7 confident with just the four with us at that very moment, was at that
8 moment still very encouraging.
9 MR. STEWART: Certainly you're comfortably --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll adjourn until five minutes to 1.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.
13 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Mr. Stewart.
14 MR. STEWART:
15 Q. Mr. Treanor, you took the Tribunal to the -- on occasions to the
16 intercepts. There were various intercepts. And they are in a separate
17 file, P66, I think is what it was numbered as. If we go to tab 2, please,
18 Mr. Treanor. And this is apparently or purportedly a transcript of a
19 conversation the 20th of June, between Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic.
20 And -- or Dr. Karadzic. And you dealt with this in your evidence. The
21 transcript reference is 1340 and 1341. And what I'm asking you,
22 Mr. Treanor, is just this: That you drew the Tribunal's attention to this
23 quite short transcript and you mentioned some of the people or you
24 identified some of the people mentioned. But what is it that you extract
25 of any interest or significance from this transcript?
1 A. Well, without reading the transcript over again --
2 Q. Why don't you do that, because actually it is very short.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, in light of the
5 passage of time since Mr. Treanor's examination-in-chief, I wonder if it
6 might not also be of some assistance to the witness and might not
7 facilitate this process if some reference is also made to the points he
8 identified during the course of that examination.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, Mr. Tieger seems to ask you to point to
10 what the witness already testified upon as far as the relevance or
11 importance of this conversation is concerned, which might assist him in
12 making up his mind on what might be missing or what needed further
14 MR. STEWART: By reference to the transcript?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. STEWART: Yes. I'm very happy to do that, Your Honour. It
17 doesn't always work out that way, as we sometimes find. I was hoping to
18 speed it by not doing that, but I can certainly do that.
19 Q. What you said in your evidence in chief was you observed that
20 Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Karadzic spoke to each other in the familiar form. You
21 said the exact nature of what Mr. Krajisnik wanted to discuss with
22 Dr. Karadzic wasn't clear but he wanted to meet him on what he regarded as
23 an important matter. You identified Mr. Simovic as the highest-ranking
24 SDS designated member of the government, deputy prime minister,
25 Mr. Zepinic, who was the deputy minister of internal affairs, and
1 Mr. Mandic, an SDS designated functionary in the BH Ministry of Internal
2 Affairs. You said you believed he was an assistant minister. And then
3 you said there was a series of conversations on that day which all revolve
4 around setting up the same meeting among the various individuals involved.
5 And that was it. So on that, I'm asking what -- how did I phrase my
6 question originally? Just what of particular interest or significance you
7 extract from that intercept or that transcript?
8 A. Well, this intercept is an early example, I'm not sure if it's the
9 earliest example, but an early example of consultations over the telephone
10 between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. It illustrates, as I indicated,
11 something about their relationship. They speak to each other in the
12 familiar form, which Dr. Karadzic certainly doesn't do with everybody.
13 There are -- there's at least one expletive in there, which indicates that
14 they are indeed on very familiar terms and are quite comfortable speaking
15 with each other. It mentions several other SDS officials, again if I can
16 put it that way, within the government, indicating that consultations
17 among the SDS officials in the government do take place, that they include
18 Dr. Karadzic, who is not a government official, and include Mr. Krajisnik,
19 who is not an official of the government per se, that is, in the former
20 Yugoslav context, a member of the executive. It means an official, a
21 deputy, and an official in the Assembly. So those are simply the points
22 of interest there.
23 Q. Yes. And then can we go, then, to tab 6. I'm sorry. Tab 6 of
24 that bundle, page 16. This is a conversation between Mr. Karadzic, or
25 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Miroslav, as he announces himself, from Banja Luka.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Just at page -- in fact, where we see -- we see an example of what I was
2 referring to earlier just very briefly at page 11, don't we. About four
3 lines down, we see a reference to "Krajisnik", which is not this
4 Mr. Krajisnik. We won't go to it specially but it's in this document,
5 page 11, fourth line. That's an example of what we're talking earlier?
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: Just one point of clarification, if I may. Counsel
8 is quite correct that the conversation begins with an exchange between
9 Dr. Karadzic and Miroslav, but by the time it reaches page 16 of the
10 translation, Dr. Karadzic is speaking with Mr. Brdjanin.
11 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 MR. STEWART:
14 Q. Yes. The page 11 point, that's just an example of what we were
15 talking about, isn't it, the fourth line?
16 A. Yes. I see that in the English. I haven't found it in the B/C/S,
17 but it undoubtedly is the point that you raised before.
18 Q. Yes. And then at -- so at page 16, whereas -- where Mr. Tieger
19 helpfully observes, it's now a conversation between Dr. Karadzic and
20 Mr. Brdjanin. It says therefore -- and Dr. Karadzic is saying in the
21 middle: Therefore I said to the Main Board Slobo would get a gift of 20
22 billion dollars if only he gave up on us and then the answer is: I know
23 that. Can you explain that?
24 A. Well, I don't know anything about the 20 billion dollars. I can
25 only infer that he's trying to get across the idea that a lot of people
1 inside and perhaps outside of Yugoslavia would be happy if Mr. Milosevic
2 did not support the SDS in its position in relation to remaining within
4 Q. Is dollars just because it's a major currency or does it imply
5 money coming from the United States? Can you say?
6 A. I certainly wouldn't say the United States is being referred to in
7 particular. I think -- yes, everyone knew what dollars were.
8 Q. Yes. And then -- the -- can we go back to the other bundles,
9 please. This is file 2. I don't know whether that was the one you had in
10 front of you. I think not yet.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we had already.
12 MR. STEWART:
13 Q. We'll go to 41, tab 41. And this is a decision of the 16th of
14 December. It's a proclamation -- or it says it is, actually, a
15 proclamation of the Autonomous Region of Krajina as an inseparable part of
16 the federal state of federative Yugoslavia and an integral part of the
17 federal unit of BH. And then you were asked -- this is at page 1399 of
18 the transcript to explain the significance of various highlights, and in
19 particular, you'd highlighted Articles 1, 2, and 3. And then -- I won't
20 take time on Articles 1 and 2, but 3 states, and then -- well, we can see
21 it. I don't have to read the whole thing, but it begins: Federal law
22 regulations and other general legislation laws and regional legislation
23 should be applied on the territory of the Autonomous Region of Krajina as
24 well as legislation of BH not incompatible with this legislation.
25 And then you say -- you drew attention to this at page 1401 of the
1 transcript. The position is this, isn't it, that that is actually, when
2 you cut through all the wording and what it's doing, it actually declares
3 the existing legal position, doesn't it? I should say, Mr. Treanor, I'm
4 not going into something highly technically here but it's quite clear it
5 declares the existing legal position?
6 A. Well, I'm not sure what you mean by the existing legal position.
7 What it does --
8 Q. Should I clarify?
9 A. No. That's all right. What it does, in my view, is it -- this
10 autonomous region, which has -- the existence of which has no
11 constitutional or statutory basis is giving -- appears to be giving itself
12 in this Article the right to decide precisely that, what is the legal --
13 the existing legal position. That is, they seem to be giving themselves
14 the right to decide when the laws of BH are in conflict with federal law.
15 Q. Well, as -- let's take it in stages. First of all, in terms,
16 Article 3 says, doesn't it, that federal law shall be applied on the
17 territory of the Autonomous Region of Krajina; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And it does anyway at this time, doesn't it?
20 A. Well, this is September 1991. I'm not sure that in Slovenia and
21 Croatia they were making such statements.
22 Q. Well, aren't we in BH here?
23 A. Yes. Well, you said anywhere.
24 Q. Sorry?
25 A. You said anywhere.
1 Q. I'm sorry. I'm not following you, Mr. Treanor.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Let me -- Mr. Stewart, Mr. Treanor said: You
3 referred to anywhere. He's referring to page 77, line 6, where you said:
4 And it does anywhere at this time, doesn't it?
5 MR. STEWART: Yes. My apologies, Mr. Treanor. I didn't mean
6 anywhere in the world. I did mean -- I did mean, but I didn't make it
7 sufficiently clear. I accept that.
8 Q. Actually, it applied anywhere within the Federation of Yugoslavia,
9 didn't it, by definition?
10 A. Well, again, I'm not sure what the authorities in the republics of
11 Slovenia and Croatia would have -- what position they would have taken on
12 that issue at this particular point of time, in September of 1991.
13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think some of my confusion there, my
14 co-counsel has just -- actually, what I said was it does anyway at this
15 time, doesn't it. So that's why I was a bit puzzled. Because I didn't
16 think I had said "anywhere". Perhaps that's a historical detail, but she
17 thinks that I actually said "anyway", which is -- which would make sense
18 of all the confusion in a sense.
19 Q. But, Mr. Treanor, let's get back to where we are. This document
20 relates to a territory, and I'm using that as an entirely neutral
21 scriptive geographical word a territory part of Bosnia and Herzegovina at
22 this time, doesn't it?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Bosnia and Herzegovina at this time is part of the Federation of
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. So federal law applies.
3 A. Well, it should.
4 Q. In the whole of -- I'm sorry. I'll make it clear to avoid the
5 previous confusion. In the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including this
6 particular territory where this document is concerned, federal law applies
7 anyway, doesn't it?
8 A. It should. It should.
9 Q. It does.
10 A. Well --
11 Q. Why do you draw the distinction, Mr. Treanor, between --
12 JUDGE ORIE: May I try to -- I feel that it's a legal issue,
13 whether a law applies or is applied is not the same, and it seems that
14 there's some confusion, and you, Mr. Stewart, as a lawyer, and Mr. Treanor
15 as a non-lawyer, I'd like to make clearly the distinction that where the
16 law applies it is on the theoretical level and whether it applies, which
17 is on the practical level.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. STEWART:
20 Q. In the light of His Honour's observation, Mr. Treanor, it
21 technically applies -- it should, therefore, be applied as the law should.
22 We're agreed so far?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. The legislation of -- well, the laws, for that matter, of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina also apply or should apply --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- in that territory, but not, of course, when they're -- and I
3 don't think this is a difficult legal point -- where they're inconsistent
4 with the federal law, and I think you would know this, Mr. Treanor, that
5 the federal law will override and that will apply, won't it? Or perhaps
6 you don't know.
7 A. Well, this is precisely what is a contentious issue within
8 Yugoslavia at this point in time. The republics, some of them, at least,
9 were adopting various provisions, amendments to their constitution or
10 statutes, saying things along this line, but in some cases the reverse.
11 That is, federal law will not apply here if it's in conflict with our law.
12 Q. Had any such statute at any such provision been passed or
13 implemented in Bosnia-Herzegovina at this time?
14 A. Not in Bosnia. As I say, within the framework of larger
15 Yugoslavia, this type of thing was happening. So that this is an issue,
16 and they are taking here a particular position on that issue.
17 Q. Well, again --
18 A. Which, I admit, seems to be the obvious one, but there were other
19 stances on that issue that were being taken by people.
20 Q. And then you -- what you said -- this is at page 1402 of the
21 transcript, when you were following on from this point, by specific
22 reference to this article in this document, you said: So here we see a
23 very strong link between these -- this autonomous region, certainly, and
24 the Federal State of Yugoslavia.
25 That was your evidence?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. That was the way you described it. The link was very strong in
3 this sense, wasn't it, that this autonomous region, as it had been
4 declared, was in the Federal State of Yugoslavia, wasn't it?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. About as clear a link as it's possible to get?
7 A. Yes. And it's clear from this that they wanted to remain within
9 Q. And then at 43, same file, we've got a letter, and it's a letter
10 of support to the federal secretary of National Defence, general of the
11 army, that's Mr. Kadijevic. I'm not sure whether we met him before in the
12 course of your evidence except in the reference to this document. And you
13 said, again, to remind you, you drew the Tribunal's attention to this
14 document and you said: This document is reflective of two things in
15 particular that I'd like to point out. One is the continued support for
16 the Yugoslav People's Army, the JNA. As the Court will remember, that
17 figured very early on in the programme of the SDS and continues during
18 this period of hostilities in Croatia.
19 And just without going at all into the details of it, Mr. Treanor,
20 hostilities in connection with Croatia at that time were severe, weren't
22 A. In September? Yes, I think they can be safely characterised that
24 Q. And you say: I think we've alluded earlier to assistance in
25 mobilisation and that sort of thing and by the SDS and, on the other hand,
1 the opposition or reluctance of the other two parties in the governing
2 coalition, the SDA and the HDZ, to support those military operations.
3 Well, again, the underlying politics is perhaps very clear, but
4 absolutely at its simplest, those military operations involved the JNA,
5 the army of Yugoslavia, federal Yugoslavia, in military operations, and
6 support coming from the SDS as a major party in the constituent part of
7 the federal Yugoslavia, or the army of the country that it was in. That's
8 it in a nutshell, isn't it?
9 A. They support the JNA, yes.
10 Q. In a nutshell, they're supporting the army of the state to which
11 they belong and which they're in?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Whereas the SDA and the HDZ are in fact not supporting the
14 military operations of the army of the state that they are in?
15 A. Right.
16 Q. Can we then turn to tab 44. No, I'm sorry. We have to go back to
17 the intercepts bundle again at 14. And you drew attention -- this is a
18 transcript of a conversation between Dr. Karadzic and -- I think it's
19 doctor, actually Dr. Plavsic, and you drew attention particularly to the
20 passage in the middle of the second page, where Dr. Karadzic is -- refers
21 to right in the middle of the page, until in the SUP it appoints -- I
22 mean, until they stop deciding where shall each individual Serb work.
23 And Mrs. Plavsic -- Dr. Plavsic says: Yes, exactly as long as
24 they don't stop determining. And you said -- in your evidence you said:
25 So he's not happy with the way even Serbs are being appointed. And you
1 say: And we do have a lot of information on this subject but here is
2 reflected the concern that I mentioned.
3 And the concern -- you said that the SDS was not getting to
4 determine which Serbs would work where. And then Judge Orie said: Yes.
5 And you read that in until in the SUP it appoints that passage I just
6 mentioned. I mean, until they stop deciding where shall each individual
7 Serb work. And you said: Yes, I would render that as where which Serb
8 will work. So it's a selection of or a question of selecting people and
9 the place that they will work.
10 I'm actually just really asking where you get that from,
11 Mr. Treanor. On the face of this document, it doesn't support what you're
12 saying there. Perhaps you can explain where you get that from.
13 A. Sorry. Where do I get what from?
14 Q. Your conclusion there. You would render that as them deciding
15 where -- the way you put it is where which Serb will work.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Which page of the transcript we are exactly?
17 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. It's 1407.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
19 MR. STEWART:
20 Q. And you had also expressed it as them being concerned about not
21 being able to determine which Serbs would work where. Now --
22 A. I think the one issue is strictly a translation issue, how to
23 translate that particular phrase.
24 Q. So you would need to go back to the B/C/S for that, would you?
25 A. Yes, I've found it.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could you then please read it in B/C/S, Mr. Treanor,
2 so that we receive translation in English and can compare it with what's
3 on paper.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Until an appointment is made to the
5 SUP, until they stop appointing, or rather, determining where which Serb
6 will work.
7 MR. STEWART: I don't think I'm going to get any further with
8 this, Mr. Treanor. I think I know when I'm beaten by the general fog
9 surrounding a particular point. Let's move on.
10 Q. In file 2, at tab 44, which was the last one - we were just coming
11 to that - this is instruction to municipal communities of the SDS, and it
12 comes from Dr. Karadzic. The wartime forces of the police are currently
13 being mobilised. There are rumours that up to a hundred per cent of the
14 force are being mobilised, although the bodies at the republic level can
15 mobilise only 50 per cent. There are also rumours that only Muslims are
16 being called up or that Serbs do not heed the call-up, which would result
17 in a Muslim police force.
18 Are you able to say - if you're not, Mr. Treanor, you're not - are
19 you able to say whether at that time those rumours were in fact
21 A. I believe so. Well, I'm not sure what the rumours are. No. I've
22 seen other -- there are other documents about this. Maybe we had another
23 one. There was a document that I -- we may have used, indicating that
24 perhaps a slightly later date, that it was -- Dr. Karadzic might have
25 thought it was a good idea that Serbs do heed the call-up. The nature of
1 the rumours being referred to here are rather imprecise and slightly
2 contradictory, that only Muslims are being called up or that Serbs did not
3 heed the call. I think all I can say is that I do believe there was a
5 Q. All right. Thank you, Mr. Treanor. If we turn now -- we can
6 put -- well, we've finished 2. We can put that bundle 2 aside and go
7 to 3. And this -- well, this is I think something you described -- you
8 dealt with this at page 1421. It is in the transcript, it's something you
9 described as the October 16th memorandum. Actually, it seems to be dated
10 the 14th, but we occasionally get these discrepancies in date. But you
11 drew attention to item 2, that BH will continue -- well, I should say at
12 the top of the first page pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Rules
13 of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, the Assembly of
14 SRBH, at a joint session of the Chambers of the Assembly of SRBH on 14th
15 October 1991 adopted the following and so on. And then 2, BH --
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. STEWART: Excuse me a moment.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, if you put your microphone off. Then
19 you can't blame us for overhearing. Yes, please.
20 MR. STEWART:
21 Q. You drew attention to item 2 on the second page:
22 "BH will continue to advocate the survival of the Yugoslav
23 community on new foundations acceptable to all. In the meantime, she will
24 also advocate the proper functioning of existing joint institutions. Our
25 representatives will not attend sessions of the Assembly and Presidency of
1 the Federation of Yugoslavia if they aren't attended by representatives of
2 all republics."
3 And the position at that time was this, wasn't it, that it was in
4 fact quite clear that Croatia were not attending, so that, in effect,
5 given that context, that Croatia were not attending, it was absolutely
6 clear that the -- that Bosnia-Herzegovina would also not be represented?
7 A. Yes, I would say that's correct.
8 Q. And you said in your evidence - this is at page 1422 - you said:
9 "Now, as I've indicated, Croatia was in fact, and I think in law,
10 independent at this time, so whatever relationship BH was going to have
11 with Serbia under that provision, it would certainly not include being
12 part of ..." And then your evidence said: "... not include being part of
13 a federal state with Serbia."
14 Now, I apologise. You haven't actually got this piece of paper in
15 front of you. But that doesn't make sense, does it, Mr. Treanor? I
16 suggest you must have intended to say: Would certainly not include being
17 part of a federal state with Croatia. Do you follow me?
18 A. No.
19 Q. It's a little bit hard, because you've --
20 A. No. The meaning, if I'm recollecting correctly, is the following:
21 As you indicated -- as you indicated that I indicated, Croatia was
22 independent by this time. And I think that -- and this is just something
23 I, you know, I've understood, that the -- October the 9th is the date
24 that -- from which Croatia is considered, perhaps in retrospect, to have
25 gained its independence. There was a three-month moratorium on
1 independence imposed, or agreed to, in early July, so that had run out.
2 So Croatia is out of Yugoslavia now. And so the implication of this is
3 that since we're going to maintain the same relationship with Croatia --
4 with Serbia as we do with Croatia, and Croatia is out of Yugoslavia, then,
5 therefore, we will not be in Yugoslavia either, because Serbia is in that
6 state. So we will not be in the same state with Serbia, because we're
7 obviously not going to be in the same state with Croatia.
8 Q. Yes. I think I should correct myself on the transcript, actually,
9 because I -- I think I -- I think I referred to Republika Srpska. What I
10 meant to say Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's a few lines
12 Then paragraph 4. BH was going to do everything -- this is the
13 fifth line: "BH will do everything in its power to remain neutral in the
14 conflict, which means that her citizens would not be engaged on either
15 side and her territory would not be used for war." Of course, that
16 conflict was the conflict between Croatia and Yugoslavia?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And then you said that that was -- you thought it fair to say the
19 SDS leadership took violent exception to that, and that, in effect, the
20 memorandum -- and then you said you didn't - still 1422 of the
21 transcript - you didn't want to overstate this, but in effect, it
22 announced the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 My question is this: that that -- in your view, that would have
24 been clearly understood, would it, by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
25 and particularly the SDS at the time?
1 A. Yes, indeed.
2 Q. This was an absolute crystal-clear message?
3 A. I believe so.
4 Q. And you pointed out in your evidence earlier on this same page,
5 you said that this -- well, Mr. Treanor, to say that this is not at all to
6 the liking of the SDS leadership, that would be an admirable
7 understatement, wouldn't it, to say --
8 A. Whether it's admirable or not, I'm not sure. But yes, I could
9 call that an understatement.
10 Q. And they -- in fact, you said they were, of course, extremely
11 angry, and they were angry at the manner, wasn't it, weren't they, because
12 they thought they had the agreement of Mr. Izetbegovic, as you said, but
13 this was a complete U-turn by Mr. Izetbegovic, wasn't it?
14 A. Well, It certainly seemed so to them.
15 Q. Well, It was, wasn't it?
16 A. Well, I don't know if Mr. Izetbegovic was telling his people what
17 he had or had not agreed with Dr. Karadzic. I know, and presented here,
18 what Dr. Karadzic thought their understanding was.
19 Q. Let me clarify, then, Mr. Treanor. You're quite right. It may be
20 that as far as his private communications with his own party were
21 concerned, it was a naught-degree turn by Mr. Izetbegovic. But as far as
22 what he had said to the SDS was concerned and what he had agreed with the
23 SDS, this was 180-degree turn, wasn't it?
24 A. Yes. It certainly seems, from what we've seen in these documents
25 on the Serbian attitude, that they definitely regarded it in that light.
1 Q. In fact, the agreement that they had had with Mr. Izetbegovic
2 had -- it had been broken by Mr. Izetbegovic, hadn't it?
3 A. Well, if that was the agreement, I would say, without having seen
4 any other possibly relevant documentation, that's the case.
5 Q. And then if we go to 47 --
6 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I may.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MR. TIEGER: Just a minor point of clarification. I don't think
9 the record today indicates that the memorandum to which counsel was
10 referring was located at tab 46, and I just wanted to make that explicit.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Now it is on record.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I do not know how much time you would
14 need for 47. If it would be more than two or three minutes, then I'd
15 rather adjourn until tomorrow.
16 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, with respect, I would -- I'd
17 rather the Tribunal adjourn until tomorrow on that point, then.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Usually I try to get organised after we adjourn, but
21 this time I changed the order. Madam Registrar, tomorrow we'll sit where
22 and at what time?
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking it because we were scheduled for tomorrow
25 to sit in this same courtroom at 9.00 in the morning. On Thursday,
1 however, we were scheduled to sit in the afternoon, but there is a
2 possibility to sit in the morning, if everyone can adapt his agenda to
3 that. I can imagine that, for example, visits to Mr. Krajisnik could
4 oppose to a change of schedule at such short notice. So, therefore, I'd
5 like to know as soon as possible from the parties whether they'd prefer
6 and whether they are able to sit in the morning next Thursday. If you can
7 give me the answer right away, then --
8 MR. STEWART: I hope -- I can give you this answer right away,
9 Your Honour. We have no objection to sitting on Thursday morning.
10 However, Your Honour, please, on my side, may I know as soon as possible,
11 because I have to rearrange various things as a result of that change.
12 JUDGE ORIE: So I see there's, as such, no opposition, but you'd
13 like to know as soon as possible. But --
14 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, because then I simply -- I have to
15 rearrange something that I will rearrange, but I do need to know, please,
16 soon, in order to do that.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, is the position of the Defence already
19 MR. TIEGER: No, it's no problem.
20 JUDGE ORIE: The Prosecution, I'm sorry. No problem for you?
21 MR. TIEGER: Yes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: There are good chances. The only one that has to
23 check his agenda is myself. So I'll let you know immediately after the
24 adjournment. You can ask Mr. Acquaviva or Ms. Philpott whether we'll sit
25 in the morning or in the afternoon. . But I first have to check it.
1 We'll then adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00, same courtroom.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of
4 April, 2004.