1 Wednesday, 14 April 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar, would you
6 please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.
10 Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into the
11 courtroom and while doing so, I'd like to first inform the parties that,
12 unfortunately, we cannot sit on Thursday in the morning, so we have to
13 stick to the schedule, although everyone would have preferred to sit in
14 the morning.
15 The second issue is that rumours told me that there would be a
16 letter on its way. It's even -- or said that it was a seven-page letter,
17 dated already last week. We haven't received it. So if there's a letter
18 on its way and if someone sent it to us, then a courtesy copy might speed
19 up the Judges dealing with the letter. So it's just for whomever did
20 write us a letter.
21 MR. STEWART: I think this is -- well, I think I can solve this
22 particular mystery quite quickly, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. STEWART: I wrote such a letter, so I assume that is what it
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. STEWART: I sent it very specifically and directly addressed
3 to Trial Chamber I, and I addressed it to Your Honours. So I naturally
4 expected it would find its way to you. But this is a very large building.
5 I understand that. But of course, Your Honour, we can easily produce a
6 copy of that letter during the next break.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm not saying -- since I do not know, although
8 rumours tell me something about it as well, but we can't even start
9 thinking about it if we haven't read it.
10 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, of course I entirely understand
11 that. It is -- I may just comment. It is a little bit extraordinary that
12 the rumours can pass in the building but a simple piece of paper can't
13 find its way across a corridor. But that's another matter. Your Honour,
14 we will produce a copy of that letter if that's from a practical point of
15 view helpful. Because clearly until Your Honours receive something
16 there's not much you can do with it, is there.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You know rumours always go quicker than
18 anything else.
19 [The witness entered court]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Treanor.
21 THE WITNESS: Good morning.
22 JUDGE ORIE: I remind you as usual that you're still bound by the
23 solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony, and
24 I'll now give an opportunity to Mr. Stewart to proceed with his
1 WITNESS: PATRICK TREANOR [Resumed]
2 Cross-examined by Mr. Stewart:
3 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I say, if Your Honours need any
4 guidance at any point as to the physical matter of which files to bring
5 into court for which sessions, then I'll be happy to help, but I think at
6 the moment Your Honours probably have something up to about 5 or 6.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I've got 4 to 6 with me, and also the transcripts and
8 the intercepts. So --
9 MR. STEWART: There shouldn't be any problem until the first
10 break, Your Honour, in that case.
11 Q. Mr. Treanor, good morning.
12 A. Good morning.
13 Q. I wonder if we could take, then, file or bundle 3. And this
14 relates to the Political Council of the SDS, 15th of October, 1991. And
15 you particularly drew attention to items on the second page. I'm talking
16 always in my case of the English translation.
17 JUDGE ORIE: 47.
18 MR. STEWART: Tab 47. I beg your pardon.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's where we ended yesterday.
20 MR. STEWART:
21 Q. Tab 47, second page. And in the middle of the page you drew
22 attention to Mr. Krajisnik. We should not start from the standpoint that
23 the coalition has adopted a decision, because they have not adopted in a
24 legal manner. And of course when he refers to coalition, he's referring
25 to the SDA and the HDZ, isn't he?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And secondly, since the above-mentioned decision is illegal and
3 unconstitutional, we must find a method of proving this.
4 So it's apparent, isn't it, at this stage, Mr. Treanor, that
5 Mr. Krajisnik is wishing, on the basis of what he says here, to proceed
6 through legal mechanisms to try to resolve this stand-off between the SDS
7 and the other parties?
8 A. Well, I'm not sure if I get that out of this passage. The reason
9 why I thought it was important was because it indicated the view of the
10 SDS leadership in general and Mr. Krajisnik in particular, of the nature
11 of the action that had been taken by the coalition partners what their
12 appraisal of that was.
13 Q. It goes a bit further than that, doesn't it. Of course, we know
14 that the SDS did not accept the legality and constitutionality of the
15 position taken by the other parties. We know that, don't we?
16 A. Well, that's what it says here.
17 Q. Yes. And that was a consistent position, wasn't it? It's not
18 just here, but that was their consistent position.
19 A. Yes, I would say so.
20 Q. But Mr. Krajisnik is talking about finding a method of proving
21 this. And then if we go on, then Mrs. Plavsic talks about asking for a
22 slot on television for the president of the Assembly to address the public
23 and explain what happened. And then at the end of that passage: The
24 entire procedure should be forwarded for verification to the expert legal
25 commission. And then of course lots of other people are coming in saying
1 that it was illegal, unconstitutional. Mr. Neskovic takes a different
2 view. But the -- but can't we get a bit more than your indicating from
3 this, Mr. Treanor, that they're wanting to explain to the public the --
4 what they see as the illegality, they're wanting to get some backing and
5 verification of their views on the illegality and try to deal with the
6 matter by demonstrating that what's been done hasn't been legitimately
8 A. Well, that's what they're discussing, yes.
9 Q. And then, if we go on, please, to tab 49. And then you drew
10 attention to the second paragraph on page 3. Well, in fact, it's the
11 second full paragraph, is what I'm talking about, starting from this
12 organisation of the MUP, it says Ministry of the Interior. And just to
13 remind ourselves, this is a document setting out the possibility of
14 organising a Serbian Ministry of the Interior. So this is 17th of
15 October. This is just a few days after that particular crisis in the
16 Assembly. And this is -- I'm sorry, to give the reference, it's 1431 of
17 the transcript of your evidence. The existing -- starting with this
18 organisation, that is the existing organisation of the Ministry of
19 Internal Affairs, it's possible to establish a Serbian Ministry of
20 Internal Affairs as a parallel organ of authority. And it goes on to
21 enumerate those ways.
22 So item 1, going back to the document itself, paragraph 3. The
23 possible ways of establishing are as follows: That the existing Ministry
24 of the Interior should not be split, that the Serbian Assembly and the
25 Serbian government should appoint a Serbian Ministry of the Interior and
1 then install Serbian personnel in key positions.
2 So the second sentence, or the last sentence in that paragraph:
3 The Serbian MUP set up in this way would continue to function in
4 cooperation with the existing MUP, with which it would be in contact
5 regarding issues of common interest.
6 Then of course item 2 goes on to an alternative possibility, which
7 is to move the Serbian MUP out of the existing MUP. But it's --
8 Mr. Treanor, we do see, don't we here, would you agree, we do see
9 considerable flexibility in the approach of the SDS at this point? And
10 looking for ways of resolving the matter without a head-on split or
12 A. Well, indeed in this document discussing possibilities for
13 establishing a Serbian MUP, various alternatives are considered.
14 Q. And the first alternative, that the existing MUP should not be
15 split, would in the context of what had happened at that time, and
16 particularly the crisis which had occurred in the previous few days, would
17 have been a very constructive way of approaching the matter, wouldn't it?
18 A. Well, I think that would depend on your point of view.
19 Q. Well, you're the witness and the expert, and it's your point of
20 view which is being sought, Mr. Treanor.
21 A. Well, I don't think I'm here to say what's constructive and so
22 forth. I'm here to say what the documents -- indicate what the documents
23 say and try to put them into some sort of context. I notice the date on
24 this document. It's always good thing to look at the date of documents
25 and consider what the situation was at that particular time, is the 17th
1 of October, and reference is made here to a Serbian Assembly and a Serbian
2 government, which didn't even exist yet. So I would say that some of the
3 things they're considering here are -- would not have been considered
4 constructive by other parties in Bosnia certainly.
5 Q. All right. Let's take possibility number 1, then, that the
6 existing MUP organisation should not be split. Are you saying that -- if
7 you say that other parties and that presumably is very simple code, let's
8 say especially for the SDA, other parties might not have considered it to
9 be constructive, what less than this could the SDA have reasonably
10 expected the SDS to do as a reaction to what had happened in relation to
11 the MUP?
12 A. You're asking me to speculate now on what the SDA would have
13 thought the SDS should have done?
14 Q. All right. What less could the SDS have done in the circumstances
15 in relation to the future structure and organisation of the MUP?
16 A. Well, one thing that they could have done is nothing.
17 Q. Yes. Logically, that's right. Nothing would have been -- well,
18 it would have been politically a very difficult position for the SDS to
19 have adopted and it would have been rather an unrealistically lame
20 response, wouldn't it, to the situation that they were faced with?
21 A. Well, whether it was unrealistic or lame or not, I don't know.
22 You asked me what they could have done. That's one thing they could have
23 done. What they are discussing doing in this paper is of course in one
24 way or another splitting the ministry and establishing a Serbian ministry.
25 That is in fact the response that they seem to be advocating here, whether
1 this is one that the SDA would have thought that was reasonable, I could
2 only speculate.
3 Q. Well, speculate. I want to perhaps try and see if we can see what
4 the ground rules are here, if you like. A few minutes ago, when I asked
5 you for a view, I think you said something like you were only here to say
6 what the documents said. If you -- if you are only here, Mr. Treanor, to
7 tell us what the documents say, then - and I don't mean this at all
8 rudely - you could have saved yourself and everybody else a great deal of
9 time, because the documents say what the documents say. I had understood,
10 certainly from a lot of your evidence in chief, that, like many expert
11 witnesses, you are also here to express views on matters connected with
12 this case and arising out of the document within the limits of what you
13 can properly know and say. Am I wrong about that?
14 A. Well, I think what I said was I'm here to indicate what the
15 documents say and help to put them into context for the Court.
16 Q. Well, it may be, Mr. Treanor, that there's a difficult line
17 sometimes between putting them into context and expressing views, but when
18 I ask you to express a view, if you simply can't, if the answer is: Well,
19 I just -- I, Mr. Treanor, just don't know enough about this or I wasn't
20 there or we can't tell from the documents, that's a reasonable response.
21 But if in putting the documents into a context you can offer a view, that
22 would be helpful.
23 Just going back to this document we've got in front of us, the --
24 you have indicated, if you like, a prior possibility. You've got numbers
25 1 and 2. Number 1 is that the existing -- on the document, number 1 is
1 that the existing organisation should not be split. Number 2 is that it
2 should be split. You put before that logically the possibility that they
3 could do absolutely nothing at all, and simply allow the MUP to continue
4 in its present form. And I'm suggesting to you that that prior
5 possibility that they should just do nothing was completely unrealistic
6 for the SDS, given that what they were faced with and the decisions and
7 declarations made by the other parties, that that was the context.
8 A. Well, I think it's apparent that they certainly considered a null
9 option to be unrealistic.
10 Q. Mr. Treanor, you know a lot about the context, and with your
11 clearly more objective view than the view of the members of the SDS who
12 were there at the time, from your objective viewpoint, wouldn't it have
13 been an absolutely politically unrealistic position for the SDS to adopt,
14 to say: Well, let's do nothing. We're faced with this situation. Let's
15 just let the MUP carry on as it is.
16 A. Well, I'm not sure whether I'm going to be speculating or not, but
17 you seem to be interested in this issue, in the Serbian view, the view of
18 the SDS leadership of the situation in MUP and what could be done about
19 it. As some of the documents indicated from an earlier period going back
20 to the summer of 1991, the SDS leadership was unhappy with the situation
21 in MUP, in particular, the personnel situation. They were, among other
22 things, unhappy with the performance of some of their own designees in the
23 ministry, in particular Mr. Zepinic, who they felt had become -- seemed to
24 have felt had become a tool of the minister, Mr. Delimustafic. One
25 possibility that they might have explored would have been replacing
1 Mr. Zepinic with someone more forceful and reliable, in order to force the
2 type of personnel policy which they wished to see in the ministry. That
3 is one possible line of action within the framework of their concerns as I
4 see them, and I think I could sit here and speculate all day as to
5 different things that they could have done.
6 Q. Okay. Let's move on, then, if we may, to same bundle but tab 50.
7 These are minutes of a session of the Deputies' Club of the SDS on the
8 18th of October, 1991. And you dealt with this at page 1441, the
9 transcript of your evidence. And you particularly looked at page 4. You
10 drew the -- there were other items, of course, to which you drew the
11 Court's attention, but Dr. Karadzic's comments, page 4 of the English
12 translation, point 29. You said: A team -- you -- well, Dr. Karadzic
13 said. Do you see that? The team made up of the leading men of the party,
14 the government, and the Political Council has been working day and night.
15 I have decided to impose a state of emergency on the party. Please inform
16 the others -- inform others that the party is working in emergency
17 conditions. We must not take a single wrong step. Listen to our leaders.
18 Maximum discipline is required.
19 Mr. Treanor, do you have, from your inspection of the documents
20 and your knowledge of the context, do you have any knowledge of who was in
21 that team?
22 A. Well, the specific reference to the team is an ad hoc reference.
23 I don't know exactly who he had in mind at that particular point in time
24 when he was speaking.
25 Q. Do you in fact know whether it was correct that there had been any
1 such team working day and night?
2 A. Well, I think that it's apparent from the documentation which
3 exists from this period, including the minutes of various meetings,
4 telephone conversations, et cetera, that there was -- this was an intense
5 period of interaction among the members of the leadership.
6 Q. Yes. Mr. Treanor, I think we can agree about that. There was
7 lots happening. But from what you've seen on the documents, have you
8 actually seen anything to indicate whether there was actually anything
9 that could reasonably be identified as a team in the way that Dr. Karadzic
10 was referring to it?
11 A. Well, and there are some documents that were discussed in the
12 course of my presentation relating to the establishment of -- I forget
13 what the exact term was. I believe it was the -- something like the
14 National Security Council of the SDS and the whole reporting structure
15 that they had laid out. It could be that there was something like that in
16 operation at this time.
17 Q. And in particular, to be very specific --
18 A. Again, I'm just trying to link that with the document. I realise
19 it's slightly speculative, but I'm trying to find a documentary basis to
20 respond to your question.
21 Q. Yes. Well, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Treanor. I appreciate
22 that, and we always have to see, don't we, where the limits of where you
23 can go on what you know. The -- to be specific, do you, for example, have
24 any idea whether Mr. Krajisnik was involved in any such team activity at
25 that time?
1 A. Well, I believe that Mr. Krajisnik was involved in these series of
2 meetings and consultations that took place.
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in fact, inevitably would pretty much always have
4 been involved in discussions from his standpoint and his position as the
5 president or the Speaker of the Assembly, wouldn't he?
6 A. Well, I agree that he would inevitably have been involved in these
7 discussions. But that they would have been solely as a result of his
8 position as Speaker of the Assembly, I don't know, because of course that
9 was not the case. He was not solely the Speaker of the Assembly.
10 Q. I'm not suggesting that he was, because we can see indisputable
11 other positions that he had. There may be some in dispute, but we can see
12 some positions are indisputable. But it is correct, is it, Mr. Treanor,
13 that throughout this whole period, late October -- sorry, late 1991 and
14 right into 1992, Mr. Krajisnik's duties and responsibilities as Speaker of
15 the Assembly, and in a sense it doesn't matter which Assembly you're
16 talking about, the BH Assembly before and then the Serb Assembly
17 afterwards, would have taken a very great deal of his time?
18 A. Well, I don't know how much of his time it might have taken. The
19 Speaker of the SR BiH Assembly had the duty of presiding at joint sessions
20 of that Assembly, which were rather infrequent. The session at which the
21 memorandum and the platform were adopted was the 8th joint session. The
22 9th joint session didn't take place until January. So it wouldn't appear
23 that he was particularly busy being the president of the Assembly of SR BH
24 from that point of view. The setting up of the Bosnian Serb Assembly,
25 which he was elected president, was -- is a matter that I presume would
1 have taken up quite a bit of his time, since it was a new initiative and
2 an important initiative as far as the Bosnian Serb leadership was
4 Q. Yes. Well, Mr. Treanor, I wanted to include the BH -- SR BH
5 Assembly, because he did have that job as well. But primarily, as your
6 last answer suggested, primarily I was thinking of his position as the
7 Speaker of the Serb Assembly, because, again, the position is this, isn't
8 it, that, as you rather implied, a brand new body, with its own brand new
9 Rules of Procedure, at a time of intense activity, was inevitably going to
10 require an enormous amount of time for the Speaker, wasn't it?
11 A. Well, I don't -- I would think it was going to take up -- it was
12 going to be a busy period for him, but inevitably enormous, I don't know.
13 But it was clearly -- it was an important job that had to be done, and he
14 was the one that was doing it.
15 Q. Again, Mr. Treanor, you weren't there. You've seen voluminous
16 documentation and can form some sort of view based simply on the scale of
17 the documentation and the type of issues that were resolved. Perhaps I
18 can put it this way. Being Speaker of the Serb Assembly from late 1991
19 onwards must have been a full-time job, mustn't it?
20 A. Well, again, I don't know what a full-time job is, and --
21 Q. Easy to recognise --
22 A. I'm sure that his days were very busy. I don't really think that
23 a sharp distinction can be drawn among the various tasks and matters that
24 many of these individuals were involved in and make a clear distinction
25 between, well, this is work on the Assembly, this is work in the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 government, this is work in the party, this is work in the Political
2 Council. I don't think that they structured their work days that way.
3 Q. Well, Mr. Treanor, I'm not going to make such an unrealistic
4 suggestion to you as that people ask compartmentalise their work in such
5 an extreme way. I have your answer in relation to whether it was a
6 full-time job. Do you know -- for example, do you know where the Speaker
7 of the Assembly worked, this being Mr. Krajisnik, of course?
8 A. I believe his office was in the Assembly building in Sarajevo.
9 Q. And do you know where Dr. Karadzic's office was?
10 A. Well, his party office was in the Holiday Inn, I believe.
11 Q. So that was a completely -- obviously it's a hotel. It's a
12 completely different building from the Assembly. How far away is that
13 from the Assembly building?
14 A. I think it's only a matter of a couple hundred metres.
15 JUDGE ORIE: We can follow almost literally your conversations.
16 MR. STEWART: Sorry?
17 JUDGE ORIE: Very interesting, but ...
18 MR. STEWART: I'm glad Your Honour found it interesting.
19 Q. Could we take, please, the intercept binder now. [Microphone not
20 activated] This is a -- sorry. Tab 20?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
22 MR. STEWART:
23 Q. Tab 20, conversation between Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Dukic. And
24 we're in November 1991. And then towards the foot of the page, we get
25 about ten lines up: On Thursday, the 21st. Do you see that? That's
1 Mr. Dukic speaking. Do you see that?
2 A. I'm sorry. Which page?
3 Q. It's on the first page.
4 A. On the first page. Toward the bottom.
5 Q. Towards the bottom.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. About ten lines up: On Thursday, the 21st at 2.00, we have our
8 Deputies' Club, isn't that right? Yes, there will be an assembly, an
9 assembly at 2.00. Yes, our assembly, but I mean it's like the Deputies'
10 Club. At 2.00. Yes. Please I suggest we have a meeting at the party
11 Main Board at 12.00 and Radovan agrees with it. And then they go over the
12 page. And then at the top of the next page, Mr. Dukic says: Because, you
13 see, there are some things -- there's the referendum report. I don't see
14 50 per cent of the deputies are also members of the Main Board or the
15 other way around, and I think you commented in your evidence, you dealt
16 with this at page 1480 to 1481. You commented. You thought it was
17 probably about a third.
18 The -- when -- what do you understand what is meant by the
19 reference to: Yes, our assembly, but I mean it's like the Deputies' Club.
20 Can you say what it is Mr. Dukic is meaning by that?
21 A. I think Mr. Krajisnik is speaking at that point.
22 Q. I'm so sorry. Yes, it is Mr. Krajisnik. I beg your pardon.
23 You're quite right.
24 A. Well, he's, I believe, referring to the fact that almost all of
25 the members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly were members of the Deputies'
1 Club of the SDS and SPO.
2 Q. So he's simply really saying -- is it really saying this: You
3 don't really have to worry about technical distinctions about whether it's
4 a meeting of the Deputies' Club or it's a session of the Assembly, because
5 actually they're the same people? Is that what you're saying?
6 A. Well, I think he's saying they're the same people. In fact,
7 interestingly enough, we do continue to see a distinction made between
8 meetings of the Deputies' Club and sessions of the Assembly, of the
9 membership almost completely coincided.
10 Q. Then at page 2, about ten lines on, because look here, you see
11 Mr. Dukic is saying: Because, look here, we completely neglected the Main
12 Board. I don't know whether the next phrase -- we see this all the time,
13 and I'm just going to ask you to clarify. We see people all the time
14 saying fuck this and fuck that and fuck the other. Is that equivalent in
15 strength to the phrase which presumably comes up time and time again in
16 B/C/S? This is not a very easy area for interpreters as it happens, so
17 I'm just asking you whether --
18 A. Well, it's my impression that in certain circles, certainly in
19 that country, the use of that expression is a lot looser than the
20 equivalent expression is in English.
21 Q. Yes. I see. Well, I think that's really answering my question.
22 So that seems to indicate it's rather milder, it's rather more freely
23 used, is what you're saying. Of course, it's less consternation than it
24 might do.
25 A. Yes. It depends on the situation. For instance, I don't see
1 Dr. Plavsic using that a lot in her conversations with Dr. Karadzic. So I
2 think the degree of formality of the conversation and the relationship
3 between the individuals speaking enters into it.
4 Q. Yes, well, it's not a major point, Mr. Treanor, but it does come
5 up about a million times in the papers, so ...
6 So anyway, with that phrase coming up again, we completely
7 neglected the Main Board. And then Mr. Krajisnik [indiscernible]. Then
8 Mr. Dukic says: The people have not got together for a year. You know
9 what it's like. They are calling and asking and what's going on. And
10 then Mr. Krajisnik: No, the Main Board has to function. And then
11 Mr. Dukic: See here, it's the main -- the party's main body. It can't
12 listen. First we'll clear up the political situation a bit.
13 Do you -- you've done a very extensive study of the documentation
14 in this case. Would it be a fair summary to say that Mr. Krajisnik's
15 approach to matters generally was to want them to be done properly,
16 constitutionally, legally, procedurally, correctly?
17 A. Well, I think he was aware of the niceties, indeed.
18 Q. Not just aware of them. After all, I suggest you must have formed
19 a clear impression of this, Mr. Treanor, because this case is, after all,
20 a very major prosecution of Mr. Krajisnik and that's what we're here for
21 and you've been reading these documents for many years. So you must have
22 formed an impression as to whether what I've just put to you is correct,
23 that Mr. Krajisnik, and just to clarify, that Mr. Krajisnik was somebody
24 who was -- I might as well quote what I said before, his approach to
25 matters generally was to want them to be done properly, constitutionally,
1 legally and procedurally [sic], correctly?
2 A. Well, I would say that my impression is that Mr. Krajisnik is
3 somebody that knows how to use the system, that knows how to use it to get
4 done what he wants to get done, someone who knows how to manipulate the
5 system, if you will. I thought you might be going a different place with
6 your question about this passage. I notice that it's Rajko Dukic whose
7 the chairman of the Executive Board who suggests having a meeting of the
8 Main Board. Mr. Dukic is a bit of a stickler. He's a businessman. I
9 think that's why they made him head of the Executive Committee, to make
10 sure that things got done. And here he's talking to Mr. Krajisnik who is
11 a member of the Main Board suggesting that they have a meeting of the Main
12 Board which hasn't met in over a year and which is apparently a matter
13 that really hasn't bothered Mr. Krajisnik at all.
14 Q. Well, you can't quite go that far, can you, Mr. Treanor?
15 A. Well, it hasn't apparently bothered them in the last year and he's
16 only gotten around to it since Mr. Dukic pointed out to him, and they
17 said, yes, of course, we have to have a Main Board meeting. But he seems
18 to have been very happy to operate over the previous year, or at least
19 since July 1991, when he -- it may only have been at that date that he
20 became a member of the Main Board, without having meetings of the Main
22 Q. On a more general point, Mr. Treanor, the -- I take it that in the
23 course of preparing for this case, you have, for example -- well, you've
24 read the indictment against Mr. Krajisnik, have you?
25 A. Quite honestly, I don't think I have ever read any of the versions
1 of the indictment against Mr. Krajisnik from beginning to end, and
2 probably what I ever read of it was the first version of the indictment,
3 which I understand has been replaced many times since then.
4 Q. So if you haven't read the indictment, what, if any, other
5 documents specifically relating to this case against Mr. Krajisnik have
6 you read?
7 A. You mean legal documents?
8 Q. I'm sorry?
9 A. You mean legal documents?
10 Q. Yes. Perhaps I should -- thank you. Perhaps we should refine it
11 first in that sense. Yes, legal documents, such as pre-trial briefs.
12 A. Well, I had a look - I certainly didn't read from cover to cover -
13 at the Prosecution's pre-trial brief, in particular, sections which were
14 related to the subject matter of our report. And I similarly had a look -
15 but again did not read from cover to cover - at the Defence's pre-trial
17 Q. So anything else in the -- so far as filed legal documentation is
19 A. I don't believe so. I'm not sure what else there would be, quite
21 Q. I can promise you, there's other stuff, Mr. Treanor. What about
22 any evidential material, statements of witnesses or potential witnesses,
23 prospective witnesses in this case?
24 A. What is the framework of your question? Temporally and case-wise?
25 Well, I've been working here for ten years, so I have seen witness
1 statements. I quite frankly do not make it a practice to read witness
2 statements. In fact, I sort of make it a practice not to read witness
3 statements, because, among other things, I don't have time to do that.
4 I'm more interested in the documents, and I'm interested in finding out
5 what I can from the documents and not being influenced by things that the
6 witnesses may say. It's a practical matter as well. I do not have time
7 to read both. That being said, I have seen witness statements over the
9 Q. You have from time to time been involved in --
10 A. Yes. I have very occasionally taken part in interviews,
11 particularly during a mission to Pale in -- well, I guess there were two
12 missions; one in very late 1997 and one in early 1998. That was the
13 mission during which Mr. Krajisnik was interviewed. There have been a
14 couple of other occasions in which I have sat in on witness interviews,
15 not in relation to this particular case, I don't believe.
16 Q. Just a point arising out of a question and answer a few minutes
17 ago. The SDS headquarters in the Holiday Inn were in fact about three
18 kilometres away from the Assembly. Those are my instructions,
19 Mr. Treanor. Could that be correct?
20 A. Could be. Could be. I haven't -- I haven't measured it.
21 MR. STEWART: Excuse me one moment.
22 [Defence counsel confer]
23 MR. STEWART:
24 Q. There's something I'll have to clear up and come back to there,
25 because there's some discrepancy about dates. But I'm not going to take
1 the Tribunal's and Mr. Treanor's time by trying to sort that out this very
2 second. I'll come back to that if necessary, and if there's any
3 correction required, I shall make that.
4 Mr. Treanor, you gave some evidence in relation to the -- by now
5 fairly well-known documents or document described as Variants A and B?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. I'm not going to dwell on that in great detail right now, but what
8 you did say in your evidence, and this is at page 1507 of the transcript,
9 you said -- there were two things you'd like to point out on the basis of
10 previous documents that we've seen in the course of your evidence. One is
11 that you believed that the document had been distributed at a meeting of
12 the Main Board of the SDS on the 20th of December, and then you based that
13 on the fact that -- you said: We see various parts of the document being
14 implemented very soon after that date.
15 The -- is the position that you -- well, clearly personally you
16 weren't there, but that based on your reading of the documents, despite
17 that inference, you actually don't have any reliable knowledge of when and
18 how that document came to be distributed?
19 A. Documentarily, no. Certainly, the documents are -- I think we
20 introduced all the documents. That is an inference based on the
21 documents. I think it's a reasonable inference. The variant A and B
22 documents dated the 19th of December, we know from the Grkovic diary that
23 there was a large party meeting, I believe at the Holiday Inn, on
24 the 20th. There was a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 21st,
25 which involved a lot of the same people that came to the meeting on the
2 Q. And then you --
3 A. The first Crisis Staff, of which we have definite knowledge of
4 when it was formed, was formed on the 23rd of December, which I believe
5 was a Monday. So in fact, that would have been -- appears that it would
6 have been the first opportunity to have called a local meeting to form a
7 Crisis Staff after the 19th of December and after those other meetings
8 took place, hence the conclusion that it was distributed during that
9 period and most likely at the meeting on the 20th, which was a party
10 meeting at the session of the Assembly. It doesn't make any reference to
11 distributing such a document.
12 Q. And that Crisis Staff of which you say you have definite knowledge
13 of when -- was that Bratunac?
14 A. I think there's more than one, and I would only be speaking from
15 memory. It may have been Bratunac. I think there may have been another
16 one, but certainly there was at least one.
17 Q. Well, it's just you refer to the first Crisis Staff, singular. If
18 you want to correct that, then of course --
19 A. Again I'm speaking from memory. There may have been more than
20 one, and there were others formed in days shortly thereafter, before the
21 end of the year, as well.
22 Q. And so when you -- when you said in your evidence, and I don't
23 know whether I gave the page reference, 1507 of the transcript, when you
24 said that you based your inference of distribution of the document on the
25 fact that you saw various parts of the document being implemented very
1 soon after that date, that's what you're talking about there, this --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Your references a moment ago?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And then you say: It's clear -- well, you say numerous numbered
6 copies of this document. How numerous are the, roughly speaking, how
7 numerous are the numbered copies that you have of this variant A and B
9 A. I think they're all listed in a footnote in the report. I don't
10 know the exact number. I think we're getting up to 10 or 12. Again,
11 there's a footnote. I could locate the footnote and count them. But I
12 think it's in, you know, the 10, 12, 15 area.
13 Q. Well, we both have to try and work from memory of your footnote,
14 Mr. Treanor. So but we've -- but it's in that ballpark, anyway?
15 A. Yes. I mean, it's not 50.
16 Q. Okay. No. That's helpful.
17 A. And it's more than -- it's certainly more than one.
18 Q. Where are they at this particular moment?
19 A. Those documents?
20 Q. Yes.
21 A. They're in the evidence unit.
22 Q. I'm just -- physically where?
23 A. In the Evidence Unit.
24 Q. But the originals are physically where? It's just a simple
25 practical question, Mr. Treanor, because I don't know the answer to it.
1 MR. TIEGER: I think it's a simple practical question that was
2 just answered twice. Mr. Treanor indicated it was in the Evidence Unit.
3 If you're asking physically where that's located --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I think the confusion is whether we are talking about
5 the originals or certified copies or just copies. Is that --
6 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. Actually, partly the simple
7 confusion was I didn't pick up the word "unit", and so when the witness
8 said, "They're in the evidence," that was why I then asked a couple of
9 times, because in the evidence can mean ...
10 JUDGE ORIE: He should clarify. Please proceed.
11 MR. STEWART: My apologies. I didn't pick up the word "unit". So
12 no doubt we don't need to take time here sorting out where the Evidence
13 Unit is. That could be worked out.
14 Q. Anyway, that material is presumably readily obtainable if we want
15 to see it?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. That's the point. Thank you.
18 A. Indeed, if I can add, I'm under the impression that copies have
19 been made of all the documents that are referred to in the report and
20 provided to Defence and the Trial Chamber. So ...
21 Q. Mr. Treanor, I very much expect they have. But there's no thrust
22 of complaint or criticism. But sometimes original documents are something
23 worth looking at and I just wanted from a practical point of view to see
24 where they were. Thank you. That's a very helpful answer. Thank you.
25 And then you pointed out in your evidence there's no direct
1 reference in the records of the Assembly session of any distribution of
2 that document. And in fact, it's correct, isn't it, that there's no --
3 there's no direct record, minutes or notes of any meeting of any organ or
4 body of distribution of that document?
5 A. That's correct. The only reference we have, the only knowledge of
6 the meeting on the 20th, comes from the diary entry.
7 Q. And there's also -- there's no -- it's connected, really, but
8 there's no record of any such document having been -- or its contents
9 having been formally adopted or approved by any organ of the SDS or --
10 A. No.
11 Q. Or the Serb Assembly?
12 A. No. If I could just add to the question about the whereabouts of
13 the Variant A and B document, just to be perfectly clear we're talking
14 about the same thing. Such copies of those documents as we have are in
15 the Evidence Unit. What the status of those particular copies is
16 vis-a-vis are they original, the original documents that were recovered
17 somewhere in the field or are they copies of those documents or certified
18 copies of those documents, I couldn't say at this time. But that can
19 easily be determined from the records of the Evidence Unit.
20 Q. Yes. Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, if I may at this point seek some
23 clarification within the terms of 90(H), and I was trying to divine from
24 the questions precisely what the Defence case was with respect to this
25 particular document. I think 90(H) obviates the need to make that effort
1 and that should be made clear.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see on the transcript it says "98(H)", where
3 you referred to 90(H).
4 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, 90(H), requires you, if you are not
6 sticking strictly to the subject matter of examination-in-chief, to put to
7 the witness what your case is in respect of the matter you are raising
8 with him.
9 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honour, yes. Even without the number, I
10 certainly am proposing to do that. However, I'm going to come back to
11 Variants A and B in the course of my cross-examination rather than pursue
12 it to the end now. But Your Honour can rest assured that our case will be
13 put so far as it properly needs to be put to Mr. Treanor.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The question is to what extent it properly
15 needs to be put, isn't it?
16 MR. STEWART: Yes. Well, that is the question, Your Honour,
17 because there are distinct limits to how far strictly anything needs to be
18 put to a witness who was not there, who has no firsthand knowledge, and is
19 just here to tell us and explain what's in the documentation and put it
20 into context. However, I'm not necessarily going to adopt a minimalist
21 approach to the application of the Rules in relation to the putting of my
23 JUDGE ORIE: Although I do not see any limitation in Rule 90(H),
24 where it reads: "In the cross-examination of a witness who is able to
25 give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-examining party, counsel
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 shall put to that witness the nature of the case of the party for whom
2 that counsel appears, which is in contradiction of the evidence given by
3 that witness."
4 I just repeat what exactly is in Rule 90(H). I wouldn't say that
5 in every respect it's easy to apply and easy to interpret, but in my view,
6 it's -- but perhaps we could discuss it over the break with the Judges
7 that to put the case of the Defence in a situation should not be done at
8 the end but rather when starting asking questions on that subject matter.
9 MR. STEWART: Well, I would certainly want --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
11 MR. STEWART: With respect, Your Honour, I'd certainly like to
12 think about that, but if I say I'd like to think about it, that's exactly
13 what I mean. I'd like to think about it. I'm not saying --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you're not pursuing the matter at this very
15 moment, then I'd like to give you some time to think about it, and
16 whenever you revisit the issue, that you have a clear opinion on how to
17 apply this Rule and whether we then agree with you or not is --
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I do. I could suggest, I have some
19 fairly, well, views, forensically views as an advocate I do have some
20 submissions and views about it. First of all, so far as the precise
21 timing is concerned of when the case is put, I would follow the perfectly
22 general principle that matters must be put to a witness in a way that's
23 favour to the witness. So to ask questions in a way that the witness
24 can't really fairly understand by saving up putting the case until the end
25 of the questions wouldn't be a fair way of dealing with it. Apart from
1 that, subject to that principle of fairness, the precise timing as to when
2 the case is put I'd suggest is pretty much in the hands of the advocate as
3 long as it's done in the course of the cross-examination.
4 As a matter of fact, the citation, I don't have the Rule in front
5 of me, but it turns out actually that my recollection of it in my own head
6 was pretty reasonably accurate as Your Honour cited it. The limitation or
7 the limitations really are pretty much inherent in the first few words of
8 that Rule, that it's, so far as the -- now I'm not remembering in detail,
9 but the -- so far as the witness is able to give evidence relevant to the
10 Defence case. Because in this particular case, actually, that would be
11 likely to be far more restrictive in Mr. Treanor's case of what I would be
12 required to put to him than I would in practice actually put. So I doubt
13 there's going to be a problem, because my inclination following naturally
14 with a certain amount of cultural baggage that I bring with me as to how
15 these things are done, my inclination will be to put to Mr. Treanor
16 probably slightly more than would absolutely strictly be required under
17 that Rule. So if we do run into problems, we do, but I think perhaps we
18 could cross that bridge, Your Honour, when we come to it.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And you are now pursuing another subject.
20 MR. STEWART: Yes, I am. I'm going to come back to Variants A
21 and B.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I don't think it would have any use now
23 to ask from the Defence to put to the witness what would be dealt with
24 only at a later stage. Yes, I see you're nodding.
25 Please proceed.
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I just say that I don't believe
2 that there's been any unfairness so far in the way that I've put any
3 questions to the witness or any difficulty for him in relation to --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I took it that Mr. Tieger wanted to prevent this to
5 happen. Yes.
6 MR. STEWART: Nothing like getting your retaliation in first, as
7 we say, sometimes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
9 MR. STEWART: Yes. I'm sorry. There was something I just wanted
10 to mention. Yes. And, Your Honour, it may very well of course clearly my
11 questions about where these documents are physically located that we might
12 take the trouble to get hold of those documents before proceeding with
13 this topic.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. STEWART:
16 Q. We moved on in your evidence in chief, then, Mr. Treanor, and you
17 were referring to a document at -- in bundle 6, and we're back to the main
18 files rather than the transcript or speeches file.
19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I hope Your Honours -- do you say you
20 have number 6 in court?
21 JUDGE ORIE: At least we have one copy here, and we could share
23 MR. STEWART:
24 Q. And at tab 68, minutes from the 4th Session of the Assembly of the
25 Serbian People. That's the 21st of December, so that's among the meetings
1 that we were just talking about. And at page 24, we've got Mr. Brdjanin
2 talking. You had cited the passage at page 24 about three paragraphs
3 down: We know very well that the Serbian people want a state ruled by
4 law, a state that has its laws, but at the same time, we can see for
5 ourselves that Europe does not recognise that, since Europe apparently
6 understands only force, I think that force must be responded to with
7 force, thus I urge us to stop pledging ourselves to -- and that presumably
8 serfdom rather than Serbdom, is it?
9 A. I'm checking. There is a concept of Serbdom, which I don't know
10 if that word exists in English.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Treanor.
12 A. But it's the totality of Serbs.
13 Q. Yes. So it is pledging ourselves to Serbdom. Yes, I see.
14 Serbdom. And instead, I call upon Serbs in Sarajevo, [indiscernible] and
15 Northern Bosnia to heed the call for mobilisation so we can defend our
16 western border. Once we have secured our borders, Europe will accept the
18 And you said that that in particular, that portion, reflected what
19 you described as this ongoing tension. This is at page 1516 of the
20 transcript. If not outright military hostilities in Croatia. And you
21 said in your evidence: I'm not sure exactly what the military situation
22 in Croatia was at this point.
23 Well, probably without being flippant, nobody knew exactly what it
24 was because nobody ever does really with a military situation. But what
25 what was in its essentials at that time, Mr. Treanor, the military
2 A. I'm not really sure. I mean, what I was referring to is the fact
3 that there were discussions going underway under international auspices
4 which did result at the beginning of January in the adoption of the
5 so-called Vance Plan for Croatia. So how active the fighting was per se
6 at this particular point in time, I don't know. And I think I'm trying to
7 indicate that maybe it was -- it was winding down a bit in view of the
8 fact that the negotiations were coming to a conclusion. There had, of
9 course, been numerous ceasefires and they had been broken and repeatedly,
10 that sort of thing. But how active the fighting was at this particular
11 time, I just don't know.
12 Q. Well, they were on the -- we needn't go into enormous detail of
13 this, but they were on the verge of agreement in relation to Croatia,
14 weren't they, and there was an agreement in January and UNPROFOR was then
15 established, wasn't it?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And agreed to by the parties in relation to Croatia?
18 A. Yes. At this particular point in time, there may have been an
19 expectation -- not an unreasonable expectation on the part of certain
20 people, including Mr. Brdjanin, that hostilities might in fact continue or
21 flare up again or whatever.
22 Q. Could I ask you this, Mr. Treanor: We could no doubt go through
23 dozens, hundreds, perhaps, of passages in the various minutes, which are
24 pretty extensive, but your impression from all the documents that you've
25 read, including the quite voluminous minutes of various sessions and Serb
1 Assembly and so on, does it support the conclusion that the members of the
2 Serb Assembly - let's take the most numerous body - were at all points a
3 very difficult group of people to control and keep in check?
4 A. Well, I would certainly say that they spoke their mind and the
5 discussions are very interesting. And differences of opinion certainly
6 arise. I would say, however, that, in my impression, and I believe that's
7 what you're asking me for, is my impression --
8 Q. It is.
9 A. -- over reading these things, that especially in the early period,
10 and by the early period, I would say I mean through the middle, say, of
11 1992, almost everything gets passed. It's put on the agenda. There might
12 be a lot of discussion and some amendments, that sort of thing, but at the
13 end of the day, the agenda items do in fact get passed and they seem to be
14 passed virtually unanimously. There are certain points where
15 Mr. Krajisnik does say: Okay. We'll save this for later and that sort of
16 thing. But if by difficult to control you mean they would not accept, at
17 this period in time, the proposals that were put before them by the --
18 whoever it was, the Council of Ministers or a report by Dr. Karadzic,
19 et cetera, they almost invariably did accept them.
20 Q. Throughout this whole period -- we're focusing largely, but not
21 entirely, but focusing largely on what was happening within the organs of
22 the SDS and then the Serb Assembly and so on. Throughout this whole
23 period, international negotiations were continuing, weren't they?
24 A. Of one sort of another, yes.
25 Q. Of one sort or another?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And again, rather generally at the moment, but on the
3 documentation that you've seen, the Bosnian Serb leadership were not, in
4 late 1991 and through the first three or four months of 1992, they were
5 not seeking to sabotage those negotiations, were they?
6 A. I'm not sure what you mean by "sabotage". I think that they --
7 and by "they" I mean the negotiating team as presented in their reports to
8 the Assembly, negotiating team consisting of Dr. Karadzic, Dr. Koljevic,
9 and Mr. Krajisnik primarily, seemed hopeful that they would be able to get
10 what they wanted through negotiation.
11 Q. Yes. Well, in a sense, Mr. Treanor, you have -- you have
12 correctly defined for the purpose of your answer my use of the word
13 "sabotage". So but then to make it clear: The --
14 A. Well, there are some tactical issues, perhaps, which I don't find
15 much light on in these documents. But, you know, for instance, you see in
16 the press and elsewhere perhaps, they have accepted this particular
17 proposal because they know the other side won't accept it and so then the
18 onus will be on the other side for having rejected it, you know, that sort
19 of game. But not being able to speak to that, I would say that one
20 certainly does get the impression, especially during the course of the --
21 of February and early March, that the Bosnian Serb negotiating team seem
22 very hopeful indeed that they would be able to reach their goals through
24 Q. Well, it's certainly, Mr. Treanor, we can probably agree what you
25 describe as, well, we ask for something that we know they will refuse so
1 they will be in a bad light and so on. There's nothing to distinguish
2 this part of the world, former Yugoslavia, from any other part of the
3 world, where that's all part and parcel of normal negotiating tactics,
4 isn't it?
5 A. Well, I think that's -- that's in the -- that's in the basket of
6 negotiating tactics. That's certainly true, I think.
7 Q. But you, of course, have the considerable advantage of not just
8 having read all the public stuff and no doubt the media stuff about the
9 negotiations, but of course we have all this documentation showing what
10 was going on back at home in the Assembly and in the various meetings. So
11 that's the advantage that you've got. So in a nutshell, is it fair to say
12 that there's no indication of -- at all of any sabotage in a sense of it
13 being a conflict between the position adopted in the negotiations
14 internationally and what was happening back in former Yugoslavia, with it
15 being just a transparent ruse to get negotiations to break down?
16 A. No. No. In fact, what -- and getting back a little bit to your
17 earlier question, what we see is the negotiating team trying to assure the
18 deputies that the negotiations were going well, they were progressing,
19 they were making progress toward their goals, in spite of some
20 reservations that certain people may have had, in particular, an important
21 point that they were not getting in -- that emerged in the second half of
22 February and certainly continued, was the idea of remaining within
23 Yugoslavia. This was the Suma, if I can put it that way, in many
24 respects, of Bosnian Serb policy and politics. Hence the sharp reaction
25 to the platform of the memorandum, the establishment of the Bosnian Serb
1 Assembly, the holding of the plebiscite, all of which I laid out in my
2 presentation in the relevant documents. The plebiscite thereafter came to
3 be a very important catchword in discussions in the Assembly. Constant
4 references back to the plebiscite. The Serbian people have spoken in the
5 plebiscite what they want and that is what we are bound to seek to
7 As I say, toward the end of February, it became clear that that
8 was not going to be achievable immediately and the negotiating team had
9 to, if you will, sell that to the delegates, which they managed to do.
10 Q. You've exactly anticipated my next question with your use of the
11 word "sell," Mr. Treanor. Is it your impression from the documents that
12 the leadership who had been involved in the negotiations were constantly
13 involved in a very difficult exercise of leading the rank and file, if I
14 can call them that, of the Assembly to feel that progress was being made
15 in the negotiations, that that line should continue to be pursued,
16 although in fact things were being lost along the way?
17 A. I'm sorry. Could you repeat the question?
18 Q. All right.
19 A. Just the beginning of it.
20 Q. Yes. Is it your impression from the documents that the
21 leadership, SDS Serb leadership who had been involved in these
22 international negotiations, were constantly involved in a very difficult
23 exercise of leading the rank and file of the Assembly to feel that
24 progress was being made, so that that line of negotiations should be
25 pursued, even though, of course, from time to time the leadership knew
1 that they were losing things in the negotiation?
2 A. Yes, indeed. They were involved in what appears to have been a
3 rather difficult process all around, the negotiations on the one hand and
4 going back to the Assembly, on the other. They were able to bring the
5 Assembly along, it is my impression, because of the confidence that the
6 members of the Assembly had in the negotiating team, in particular, the
7 confidence that they had in Mr. Krajisnik, who, it is my impression, was
8 one of the most outspoken advocates of the Yugoslav line, if I can put it
9 that way. That is, that the ultimate goal is to be part of Yugoslavia, or
10 whatever the state of the -- of all the Serbs will be called, and we are
11 not giving up on that goal. We cannot achieve it now, for tactical
12 reasons. But trust me, we're still headed in that direction. We're not
13 selling out.
14 Q. Can we move on? We're in file 6. Could we go to section 74,
15 tab 74, please. I beg your pardon. No, I think I actually might want to
16 move on to the next file.
17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's number 7. I don't know whether
18 that would mean that perhaps that's a convenient point for the Tribunal to
19 have the break. I'm entirely in Your Honour's hands, of course, as
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. You finally are. We'll have a break
22 until five minutes to 11.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, the mail has arrived.
1 MR. STEWART: So I understand.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I remember when first-class mail was introduced in a
3 certain country that it always went slower than second-class mail.
4 MR. STEWART: Well, it's in some book or other cleft sticks are
5 sometimes used for carrying documents backwards and forwards.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I might as well hand them up. I did
8 bring three copies of the letter with me, so you can't have too much of a
9 good thing, Your Honour, so I will hand them up.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, quality rather than quantity.
11 MR. STEWART: Both, Your Honour. [Previous translation
12 continues]... microphone when I say we aim for both. It does contain at
13 the back, just for the record, Your Honour, the fax transmission sheet,
14 which confirms when it was sent.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. STEWART: Mr. Treanor -- should I say, Your Honour, I have
17 received what I accept as entirely justified complaints about going too
19 JUDGE ORIE: I'm aware of it and I am also aware of your answer,
20 which is cooperative and not being offended if you're reminded to the
21 speed of your speech. Yes.
22 MR. STEWART: And I think also it's helpful if I go really slowly
23 now, it's helpful if I leave a little bit more of a gap. Or perhaps,
24 Mr. Treanor, there was no criticism of you, but I think between us if we
25 leave a little bit more of a gap between questions and answers for them.
1 But I think I'm the culprit here really, so ... Or was.
2 Q. Mr. Treanor, could we take -- we'll need 6 and 7 here, but if we
3 could just take volume 6, please, 74. And again, my apologies. I'm
4 afraid I'm not in a position to give at every point the cross-reference to
5 the page in the B/C/S version. I've acknowledged the point and we'll do
6 our best in future. But I apologise. I'm not able to do that this
7 morning. I don't have those cross-references. So my apologies to the
8 interpreters there.
9 But page 12, you drew attention, Mr. Treanor, to comments of
10 Mr. Leovac and then Professor Nadanovic [phoen], who said: We can split
11 up on the basis of the recent census what happens to Serbs in Croatia.
12 The army must conquer Osijek and Sisak to compensate for the deficiency
13 within national borders. A confederation is the minimum we must demand,
14 and we did not define the maximum, what are our maximum borders. We need
15 a single Serbian state which cannot be inhabited by Muslims because they
16 would overwhelm us with their birth rate.
17 Now, the first point here is this is, would you agree,
18 Mr. Treanor, this is a pretty good example of a rather hawkish member,
19 isn't it?
20 A. Well, I would say that these -- this represents a rather
21 maximalist view how -- if you want to equate that with hawkish, you may.
22 Whether -- and I think there was another part to your question.
23 Q. Well, you're giving evidence, Mr. Treanor, so if you present it,
24 don't adopt my --
25 A. How common -- how common this view may have been relative to other
1 people is a little bit harder to gauge.
2 Q. Yes. All right. The -- then the second point is this: That he
3 refers in the last sentence to needing a single Serbian state which cannot
4 be inhabited by Muslims. So that's a strongish view, isn't it, on that
5 point? Does that come within your definition of maximalist?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And then he talks about, wherever it leads, he talks about:
8 Because they would overwhelm us with their birth rate.
9 Now, as a simple fact, Mr. Treanor, it is correct, isn't it, that
10 the Muslim birth rate was substantially higher than the Serb birth rate at
11 this time?
12 A. Well, I'm not a demographer. This is a complex issue. I think
13 what I can say on that issue, and I believe what I present to the Court,
14 is the fact that that was certainly a widespread perception among the
15 leadership of the SDS.
16 Q. Well, in your -- the material that you put before the Court in
17 bundle 7 -- we can go to tab 83. In the first place, I'm going to have to
18 ask you, Mr. Treanor, to remind us, by which I mean me, among other
19 things, exactly what this particular document is.
20 A. Well, I believe this document is an update of a previous report
21 that was done with the same title. The previous report is dated, I
22 believe, September 1991. And this document appears to be an update on
23 that report, prepared at the request of the Bosnian Serb Council of
24 Ministers in January 1992.
25 Q. And at page 9 of the same document, we see a graph, don't we,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 headed, "Demographic trends of the BH population"? Do you have that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, I don't want to put to you any question which you can't
4 fairly be expected to answer. So I'll put it this way: Have you seen any
5 material in the course of your examination of all the documentation in
6 connection with this case which is significantly inconsistent with what
7 we -- the pattern that we see in that graph or that chart at page 9?
8 A. Well, what we see here is a, I may say, a rather crude analysis of
9 population trends. I say crude because I have seen in other cases
10 certainly reports prepared by our demographers. They are a lot more
11 complex than this. As far as comparing this to any other document that
12 I've seen, the only documents that I've looked at in this connection are
13 the documents produced by the Bosnian Serbs, and I don't recollect
14 anything among their papers that's at great variance to this. I think
15 that is the point I was trying to make presenting the document, that this
16 was their view of population trends.
17 Q. Well, you've referred to more sophisticated -- that wasn't your
18 exact word, but I'm sure that's the gist of it, to more sophisticated
19 demographic reports which you have seen in connection with other cases,
21 A. Yes. I probably have seen the one for this case as well, since it
22 was produced in my unit.
23 Q. Well, so based on that, then, my question would be: Have you any
24 reason, based on everything you've seen in relation to the demography of
25 Bosnia in the late '80s and the early '90s, 1990s, have you seen anything
1 which is inconsistent with the basic proposition that the Muslim birth
2 rate was and birth rate projections were significantly above those for the
3 other nationalities?
4 A. You're asking me to recollect what I've seen in a very complex
5 report, one which I certainly did not read from cover to cover, and if I
6 did, I'm quite confident that I would not have understood a lot of it
7 because of its technical nature. My recollection is that the differences
8 in the rate of population growth were not that great. But that is a
9 report that I believe is before this Trial Chamber, so I'm a bit reluctant
10 to say more than that.
11 Q. Well, Mr. Treanor, I don't want to -- that's very fair if you --
12 there's limits of what you feel confident of saying. I'm not going to
13 press you any further on that.
14 The -- then on the same page, in bundle 6. Well, in fact, going
15 over the page to page 13. Sorry. Are you there, Mr. Treanor? Dr. Milos
16 Blazic: How can we secure economic foundations for our republic? What
17 are the consequences of the influx of refugees from Croatia to BH?
18 A. I'm sorry, I've --
19 Q. I beg your pardon. Have I lost you? Tab 74, bundle 6.
20 A. And the page number?
21 Q. 74. And then it's the last page.
22 A. Okay.
23 Q. 13th. It is the very last page in 74.
24 A. Yes. Okay. Professor Leovac: There will have to be a detailed
25 discussion -- well, I'll start again. Mr. Blazic, Dr. Blazic: How can we
1 secure economic foundations for our republic? What are the consequences
2 of the influx of refugees from Croatia to BH? And then Professor Leovac:
3 There will have to be a detailed discussion about this in the future.
4 Proclaim a Serbian republic of BH as soon as possible. Form an analytical
5 group for determining the overall Serbian borders in BH. Set the record
6 clear with the army. What does it want? And then Professor Leovac:
7 Representatives of the council should talk to the SDA president and the
8 president of the Assembly of the Serbian People. We should talk to
9 Krajisnik tomorrow and settle this immediately.
10 And of course the president of the Assembly is Mr. Krajisnik. The
11 council is -- because that's what this whole section is dealing with. The
12 council is the Political Council, isn't it?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And then you, in the evidence that you gave earlier in this case,
15 and this is at page 1528 of the transcript, you cited that passage and
16 then you -- well, in fact, Mr. Tieger quoted that passage. And then you
17 answered: Yes. This is a reflection of who the council perceives to be
18 the two most important leaders among the Bosnian Serb leadership.
19 Mr. Treanor, the -- expressed in that very general, fairly
20 sweeping way that they are the two most important leaders among the
21 Bosnian Serb leadership, it's part of my obligation to put my case, I'm
22 not going to remotely suggest that Mr. Krajisnik was unimportant. That
23 would be ridiculous. But it doesn't necessarily follow from this
24 particular exchange and this particular issue that Mr. Krajisnik overall
25 was one of the two most important leaders among the Bosnian Serb
1 leadership, does it?
2 A. Well, in my view, it indicates that. They're discussing some very
3 important matters here, and they seem to want to pursue the matter
4 further, and they want to go right to the top.
5 Q. Well, isn't it here also importantly a question of what actually
6 needs to be done so that if you are going to, as Professor Leovac
7 suggests, you're going to proclaim a Serbian republic of BH as soon as
8 possible, and then you're going to form a group for determining the
9 overall Serbian borders, there are two particular responsibilities of
10 Mr. Krajisnik which are bound to bring him in for this issue: One is, and
11 obviously, his speakership or Presidency of the Assembly, because it's
12 bound to involve the Assembly and procedures in the Assembly, isn't it?
13 A. Well, at some point it certainly would, and in fact it did.
14 Q. Yes. So what I'm saying is it's just absolutely obvious on this
15 particular issue, formation of the Serbian republic for one thing, on this
16 particular issue. Being the Speaker of the Assembly, in practice, he's
17 got to be involved, hasn't he?
18 A. Well, it gets back to an approach that we've seen before, where
19 you see some inevitability about something. I'm afraid I'll have to admit
20 to the Trial Chamber that in my world view, certainly in history and
21 politics, unlike death and taxes, nothing is inevitable. There are always
22 choices to be made, there are different personalities involved. Some
23 people perform well in the functions they hold, some don't. Some people
24 become important despite the fact that they don't have particular
25 functions. And I think Mr. Krajisnik is somebody who did well at his job.
1 Other people recognise that, people in his political party, including
2 Dr. Karadzic, who he was otherwise close to. And therefore, they looked
3 to him for leadership and guidance. If he had been a different person, or
4 if a different person had been the chairman or the president, I'm sorry,
5 we call him president of the Assembly, that might not have been the case.
6 They might have said: Well, talk to Mr. Krajisnik -- I mean, they could
7 have said the same thing except not the president of the Assembly, but
8 let's talk to the president of the Deputies' Club, Mr. Krajisnik, if
9 Mr. Krajisnik had been the president of the Deputies' Club and
10 Mr. Maksimovic had been the president of the Assembly and they were
11 perceived in different ways by different people, then this could be
12 different. As I say, there's no inevitability about anything.
13 Q. It's this. I want to try to -- let's say narrow, but identify
14 such differences as there might be between us, Mr. Treanor. The -- and
15 more generally, it may be helpful if I make it absolutely clear. I've
16 already said that it's no part of the Defence case that Mr. Krajisnik
17 wasn't important. That would be just ludicrous. It is so you and
18 everybody else understands the Defence case that Mr. Krajisnik was good at
19 his job. Whether he would say it himself, that's the case I'm putting on
20 his behalf, that he was good at his job. In fact, very good at his job.
21 He was -- and I'm talking about the job as Speaker, president of the
22 Assembly, as, if you like, his principal position. It's also the defence
23 case that Mr. Krajisnik was -- he was a popular person. You speak of
24 parliaments all over the world tend to have that characteristic, don't
25 they, which helps them to get into the job and do it. That's broadly
1 correct, Mr. Treanor, isn't it?
2 A. Well, the position of Speaker, as you put it, is a different
3 position in different countries, has a different quality in different
4 political systems, which is why we refer in our report to the president of
5 the Assembly, not to confuse that office with the office of Speaker in the
6 United Kingdom or the nature of the office of Speaker of the House of
7 Representatives in the United States, which are two different things
8 indeed. Whether those particular individuals are popular and who they're
9 popular with, I think is a subject for discussion.
10 Q. Let me ask you specifically, Mr. Treanor: Is it apparent to you,
11 from the documentation, maybe there were people that didn't like him, but
12 is it apparent to you from all the documentation you've read that
13 Mr. Krajisnik was very broadly a popular figure within the Assembly and
14 the SDS membership?
15 A. Well, if by the Assembly you mean the Bosnian Serb Assembly.
16 Q. Yes, I do mean that.
17 A. Well, as I say, I would qualify him as being a very respected
19 Q. Well, respected and, so far as one could tell from the
20 documentation, Mr. Treanor, respected and generally liked?
21 A. Well, he may have been with -- with all candidness, I didn't quite
22 get the being -- the liked and loved bit out of what I read, but I
23 certainly did get the respect part.
24 Q. Yeah. Well, you added the loved bit, Mr. Treanor, there. But I'm
25 not going to press you on that. But if you don't get from the
1 documentation what I put to you, then that's a fair answer. You don't get
3 But it's my case, which is also what I was doing, it's my case on
4 behalf of Mr. Krajisnik that he was generally well-liked among the SDS
5 membership, that he was -- certainly he was respected, that he was very
6 good at his job and that, in particular, and I just invite your comment as
7 to whether this is an impression which you have been able to gain from the
8 documentation, that he was -- he was a pretty effective fixer in the
9 perfectly good political sense.
10 A. I believe, and the impression I have, is he was very effective, he
11 was respected. He may have been liked. Just not one -- in the
12 impressions I gathered, I'm not disputing that, it's just not one of the
13 impressions that was made on me.
14 Q. And that in fact what you referred to earlier of -- you said
15 earlier this morning that -- either everything, perhaps you said, or
16 practically everything which was put on the agenda for the Serb Assembly
17 got passed.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And quite often in parliamentary bodies, things get consistently
20 passed as a result of good judgement as to what to put on the agenda in
21 the first place, coupled with sound and assiduous preparatory work before
22 you actually get to the session itself.
23 A. Well, undoubtedly many factors that go into the adoption of any
24 particular decision.
25 Q. That's normal politics, isn't it, that it's --
1 A. Well, yes, and I'm not trying to dispute that. What's in the back
2 of my mind is that what's going on here is not a normal situation. This
3 is a -- from the Bosnian Serb point of view, a very severe crisis
4 situation, and I think one of the factors that enters into the consensus -
5 that's the wrong word. One of the factors that enters into the adoption
6 of all the measures that I referred to during this period is that there
7 was a consensus on how to confront this crisis and how to surmount it,
8 what the steps taken should be. Later on, after they get the republic
9 established and they start getting into economic issues, privatisation,
10 all that sort of thing, then you see differences starting to emerge. But
11 as far as their primary national interests and how to protect them and
12 advance them, I think there was a large -- very, very large degree of
13 consensus on that, and that is one of the factors that enabled so many of
14 these measures to be passed with very brief discussion at many of the
15 sessions, which is not to say that I believe that Mr. Krajisnik didn't
16 handle the Assembly effectively. I think he did handle it effectively.
17 That's another element in this situation.
18 Q. And throughout -- when I say this period, and really, I'm talking,
19 say, October 1991 through to April 1992. Let's take that six-month
20 period. Throughout that six-month period, there was, as I think you've
21 indicated yourself earlier, there was constant activity for the Serb
22 Assembly, wasn't there?
23 A. Well, I'm not sure what you mean by "constant". By constant you
24 mean continuous. No, it wasn't continuous. We know when the sessions
25 were. They weren't every day. They were certainly more frequent than they
1 were during the months after April, and there was undoubtedly a lot of
2 preparatory work to be done, and this, that, and the other thing. So
3 there was a period of intense activity.
4 Q. See, having indicated to you, I hope clearly, and covered the
5 basic ground what the Defence case is in this area. Accepting that
6 Mr. Krajisnik was certainly important as president, and I'll stick with
7 that terminology, as president of the Assembly, once we start to move into
8 other areas of activity and to face it head on, once we start to move into
9 the situation of extreme conflict in 1992 and once we get into an area
10 which therefore involves military activity and other organs, it's too
11 sweeping to say that Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik were the two most
12 important leaders among the Bosnian Serb leadership. It's too much of an
13 oversimplification, isn't it, Mr. Treanor?
14 A. You're referring to a particular period now?
15 Q. Well, I refer to the -- yes, all right. We move on towards --
16 let's -- I was still referring to the whole of that period, but if we look
17 at the situation in February, March, April, where, we'd agree, it was
18 really reaching crisis point, wasn't it?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Look at that situation, and we look at the -- all the issues,
21 including the -- obviously the escalating military questions which were
22 coming up, it's simply too sweeping to say: Yes, the two most important
23 leaders were Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik? I should say I'm not
24 disputing Mr. Karadzic as one of the two most important. That also would
25 be ludicrous. But as far as Mr. Krajisnik is concerned.
1 A. The only qualifier I would put on that would be that they
2 continued to be the two most important civilian political leaders.
3 Obviously, after the conflict broke out, especially after the
4 establishment of the army, military leaders got to be very important
5 indeed. But as civilian political leaders, my impression is that they
6 continued to be the two most important.
7 Q. I think to some extent we can see this from your report and your
8 evidence, but I wonder, Mr. Treanor, whether you could indicate to the
9 Tribunal the extent to which you have or haven't in your review of the
10 documentation examined the military aspects of the situation, and I'm
11 talking particularly about the military actions of Serbs in February,
12 March, April, May 1992.
13 A. I have examined very few military documents.
14 Q. Is that because they were largely not available or because you
15 broadly didn't regard that as part of your remit for your report?
16 A. The latter.
17 Q. Did you, in order to write this report which plainly has been in a
18 process of gestation since long before Mr. Krajisnik was indicted, was
19 your report written in response to an instruction received at some point
20 from the Office of the Prosecutor?
21 A. Well, I take what you mean by written and report to mean the
22 report that has been submitted in this case.
23 Q. Yes. I do, Mr. Treanor.
24 A. As I indicated earlier, the origins of this report go back to the
25 end of 1994, when I commenced doing research and writing on the subject of
1 the Bosnian Serb leadership and utilising such documents as were available
2 to us at that time and continuing over a period of years to develop that.
3 So that work -- there was a work in progress, let me put it that way.
4 There came to be a point in time when this trial team was interested, so
5 they told me, interested in filing a report that would deal with the
6 Serbian Democratic Party, how it was organised and functioned, and the
7 other structures that were set up by the Bosnian Serb leadership during
8 the period beginning in -- well, 1990 through the end of 1992. At that
9 point, the pre-existing, if there's such a word, the existing draft was
10 taken and added to and modified, and of course I think they gave us some
11 desired parameters as far as length, which I apologise to the Court, I
12 think we exceeded. So I think that pretty much answers the question.
13 Q. Yes. So it was -- and, Mr. Treanor, I don't suggest there's
14 anything surprising about this. So you had, if you like, your overall
15 report, which had been worked on since 1994, in some form or another,
16 anyway, and it was tailored, and I don't imply again anything in the least
17 bit improper here, it was then tailored for the purposes of this case.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. I stress, I'm not suggesting anything improper there.
20 A. I would use the word "completed," perhaps. Yes, that's right.
21 Q. After all, tailoring is not in itself a bad thing. So it was
22 tailored for this particular case. So the point in time when this trial
23 team, and the Prosecution trial team we're talking about, was interested
24 in filing a report that would deal with the matters you've said, that was
25 the subject of -- they expressed their interest to you, that was the
1 subject of a formal communication to you, was it, a written communication:
2 This is what we would like you and your team to do?
3 A. Well, the nature of the communication, I don't think I would
4 describe as formal. Not too many things get done in a formal manner.
5 There were meetings, say, at which the issue was discussed. There wasn't
6 a formal -- I don't believe that there was a formal sort of, you know,
7 memorandum or something.
8 Q. After all, at one end of the spectrum --
9 A. If there was, I've long forgotten and long ignored it. But I
10 would describe it as being -- the request as being put informally, as I
11 say, not embodied in some sort of formal document, but in the normal
12 course of work, in discussion, and what not.
13 Q. So as far as you're aware, there doesn't exist -- I think this
14 follows from what you've said, but as far as you're aware, there doesn't
15 exist a memorandum or letter or whatever in which the Prosecution say:
16 Dear Mr. Treanor, please would you prepare a report covering the following
17 matters and the following areas, 1, 2, 3, 4. No such memorandum?
18 A. I don't recall such a thing, which isn't to say it might not be
19 there, but that would only be because I promptly forgot it, because I knew
20 what was required in any case and went ahead with it and that sort of
21 thing. But I just don't recall there being anything of that nature.
22 Q. That's something that's presumably --
23 A. In other words, it wasn't something that I had next to me or
24 members of my team had next to me as we were writing the report to make
25 sure we were adhering to these -- whatever guidelines or something might
1 have been in some formal paper of that description.
2 Q. Mr. Treanor, I wouldn't suggest to you that that's what a team of
3 experts would normally do, to keep the instructions at their elbow
4 throughout the work. But the question of whether -- you said you don't
5 remember. The question of whether there is somewhere a formal request to
6 you and your team in writing, that's -- presumably that's something that's
7 fairly readily checkable, isn't it?
8 A. Well, I can look where, you know, where -- places where I look for
9 things, certainly.
10 Q. Yes. I'd be grateful if -- I think I put these requests through
11 the Tribunal, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Treanor. If you'd look at those places
13 where you'd expect to find such a thing. If it exists, then it would be
14 highly appreciated if you would come back in the court and tell us whether
15 you found anything and what you found.
16 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 THE WITNESS: If I could just clarify. What is it I'm looking
19 JUDGE ORIE: We are talking, as far as I understand, we're talking
20 about a request in writing, because that's at least an object you could
21 find, a request in writing indicating that you're requested to draft or
22 write a report on certain subjects, whatever details therein.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes, I understand that. Mr. Stewart used the
24 word "formal, "however.
25 JUDGE ORIE: We are talking about memorandum a piece of --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 whatever has been put on paper in respect of a request asking you to write
2 a report on the subjects covered by the report you have delivered.
3 THE WITNESS: Is that to include email?
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If printed out, it's email, and if it's not
5 printed out and if you find something on your inbox, then we'd like you to
6 print that out and consider it to be an object.
7 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. That's most helpful,
8 and that's exactly it.
9 Q. Mr. Treanor, so far as formal is concerned, I think I was simply
10 probably wanting to draw a distinction between that and oral
11 communication, which I'm not going to ask you to look for, surprisingly.
12 I suppose I should say this: If actually what there is is a scrap of
13 paper that says, you know, hey Pat, give us some stuff about Bosnia.
14 Well, actually, in this context, yes, please, we would like to have it,
15 but I don't seriously suppose that we're talking about that. So actually
16 delete formal, please, and just substitute written, including email.
17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, does that seem fair?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Printed out. That makes it easier.
19 MR. STEWART: Could we then go on, please, to -- we're still in --
20 well, I think we've moved back to number 6, so can we go on, then, to
21 volume 7.
22 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
24 MR. TIEGER: I was waiting for this opportunity. I didn't realise
25 that so much time would pass between the small clarification I wanted to
1 bring the Court's attention to and this moment.
2 But at page 41, line 11, there is -- the transcript indicates a
3 reference to the SDA in referring to a quotation by Professor Leovac. The
4 document, however, indicates the SDS. And that's the document found at
5 tab 74, page 13, I believe. I believe the line was: Professor Leovac,
6 representatives of the council should talk to the SDS president. That
7 was -- Mr. Stewart was simply reading from the document, and I think
8 inadvertently substituted the word SDA for SDS at the page and line I
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It looks to me as if it was on line 13 rather
11 than on 11, where I read: "And then Professor Leovac: Representatives of
12 the council should talk to the SDA president. That's line 13, rather
13 than 11, where it should be SDS, I take it.
14 Yes. Please proceed.
15 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you. I'm grateful for the -- thank you.
16 I'm grateful for the correction.
17 Q. Just going on, then, to 7, file 7, bundle 7, page -- I'm sorry,
18 tab 82. And then on page 5 -- I think it goes back to -- beg your pardon.
19 On to page 6, paragraph 4. This was dealt with by you, Mr. Treanor.
20 Page 1550, 1550 of the transcript earlier in evidence. And then you had
21 highlighted paragraph 4, under questions and proposals. And I remind
22 ourselves, this is a minute -- second meeting of the Ministerial Council
23 of the Assembly. Mr. Krajisnik especially stressed the need to distribute
24 the activities of the Assembly of the Serbian People of BH, its
25 Ministerial Council and the Serbian Democratic Party of BH and its organs,
1 in accordance with their competence.
2 And you dealt with this in your evidence by saying this: That
3 interesting remark by Mr. Krajisnik, interesting observation on the
4 division of labour between the Assembly, the Ministerial Council, and the
5 SDS. And then you say that Mr. Krajisnik may have apparently been feeling
6 that the lines of authority were being crossed here and confusing.
7 You describe this. Interesting is a word you use quite a lot,
8 Mr. Treanor, in your evidence. What is the -- you've given evidence about
9 this already, but I'm not quite clear. What is the particular point of
10 interest here in this remark?
11 A. Well, I find it interesting for two reasons, one general and one
12 particular. In general, it indicates the perception of a very important
13 player in the Bosnian Serb leadership of the state of affairs, if you
14 will, within the structures they're setting up, reflecting a bit of
15 confusion that's arising. They're setting up these new bodies and that
16 sort of thing. And so their people are feeling their way as to what they
17 should be doing and what they're doing, and he's saying that, well, you
18 know, maybe we're getting a little confused here and we should be a little
19 more rigid in distributing activities, as a general reflection of the
20 state of business, if you will, within the new organs set up by the SDS.
21 In particular, I found it interesting -- now, I thought I mentioned that,
22 and if I didn't, I'll mention it now, although I can't remember the
23 specific date of the documents. There is a document that emanates from
24 the Executive Board of the SDS around this time, signed by Mr. Dukic,
25 which is addressed to the Serbian ministries. Yes, I think that was the
1 letter addressed to the ministries in the Bosnian Serb Ministerial Council
2 about establishing relations with the corresponding ministries in the
3 Republic of Serbia. And that document had always struck me as being
4 interesting, if you will, as coming from a party organ, going to the new
5 state organ. And I thought I had speculated in my testimony, if I'm
6 allowed to speculate, that that may have been the type of thing that
7 Mr. -- that may have struck Mr. Krajisnik as well. What's going in here?
8 Why is the Executive Committee sending something to the Council of
9 Ministers? That should be handled in a different matter, in a different
11 Q. Yes, in fact, the letter you're talking about -- you did refer to
12 it in your evidence before, Mr. Treanor. That's absolutely right. The
13 letter is convenient. It's in the same bundle. It's back at tab 80.
14 That's -- we can -- that's the letter that you're talking about, isn't it?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I just want to see whether this is in fact fairly limited. As I
17 think you've commented yourself, in the fairly early stages of this rather
18 radical new set-up, with the different, separate Serb organs, leading, of
19 course, to declaration of Republika Srpska eventually. It's first of all
20 not surprising that they were feeling their way, and it would be in a
21 sense again very obviously Mr. -- part of Mr. Krajisnik's responsibility
22 as president of the Assembly to make his contribution to having things
23 efficiently run?
24 A. Well, again, there's no inevitability about anyone saying
25 anything. But the point of presenting this, as indeed many of the other
1 documents that I presented and you've raised is simply to show the Court
2 what Mr. Krajisnik was doing and saying along the way. That's all. If
3 I'd made a presentation, that theoretically would be possible, I suppose,
4 without mentioning Mr. Krajisnik at all, I would imagine the Court would
5 be sitting there thinking: Well ...
6 Q. It would have been --
7 A. Why do we need this?
8 Q. It would have been a strange thing to do, Mr. Treanor. I think we
9 can agree there.
10 On the 11th of January, the Badinter -- I think it's Badinter
11 Commission issued a report in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Can you
12 give the Tribunal just a -- not much, I'm just asking a basic -- just a
13 basic history of the establishment of the Badinter Commission and how that
14 fitted in.
15 A. Well, off the top of my head, I believe it was in November, the
16 end of November 1991, although it could have been December, the European
17 economic -- no, the European Community, I guess, as it was then, the EC,
18 having obviously been seized of the matter of the disintegration of the
19 former Yugoslavia, adopted some guidelines, procedures, as to how they
20 would deal with that issue, and in particular, the fact that they were
21 being presented with requests from individual republics that the EC
22 recognise their independence. And they wanted to satisfy -- when I say
23 they, I mean the leaders of the EC, wanted to satisfy themselves that
24 those republics had met certain minimum standards of democracy and,
25 loosely put, respect for human rights. And they established this
1 commission to review those applications for recognition and any other
2 materials that may be submitted in that connection, and presumably they
3 would have the right to ask for materials on their own, and then to offer
4 an opinion to the members of the EC as to whether the individual republics
5 had satisfied the requirements for recognition.
6 Q. Mr. Badinter -- well, he certainly had been a French minister. I
7 think he had been a foreign minister of France; is that correct?
8 A. I don't know.
9 Q. But he had been -- perhaps it isn't. But he had been a French
10 minister, hadn't he?
11 JUDGE ORIE: I think Mr. Badinter once was, and this is a fact of
12 general knowledge, was the minister of justice of France.
13 MR. STEWART: Minister of justice. I beg your pardon.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. "Garde des sceaux", as it is said in French.
15 MR. STEWART: Merci bien. Yes. Minister of justice. And thank
16 you for the correction.
17 Q. And you had -- you've cited the opinion in relation specifically
18 of that commission in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The will of the
19 peoples -- the commission indicates opinion that -- and this was 1555 of
20 the transcript, the will of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
21 constitute the SRBH, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
22 a sovereign and independent state cannot be held to have been fully
23 established. This assessment could be reviewed if appropriate guarantees
24 were provided by the republic, applying for recognition, possibly by means
25 of a referendum of all the citizens of the -- of BH, SRBH, without
1 distinction, carried out under international supervision.
2 Now, that, in a sense, I'd suggest to you, Mr. Treanor, that
3 represented, if you like, good and bad news for the Bosnian Serbs, in this
4 sense, that the -- if you like, the good was that it really vindicated
5 their position, didn't it, that the steps taken by the SDA and the HDZ
6 were steps beyond what ought properly to have been done because the will
7 of the people, as the Serbs were saying, hadn't been fully determined and
9 A. Well, as I think I said in my testimony, yes, it was good news for
10 the Bosnian Serbs, and I think I indicated something to the effect that
11 obviously the steps that had been taken by the SDS leadership in
12 establishing the Assembly and various resolutions and activities of the
13 Assembly had -- which were among the materials considered by the
14 commission, as indicated in its report, had had an effect on the
15 commission and made it render this ruling, that the recognition cannot be
16 granted immediately because it was apparent that there were very important
17 segments in Bosnia that were opposed to independence.
18 Q. The bad news, and say if this is a wrong understanding of what is
19 here, but the bad news is this, wasn't it, that talk of a referendum of
20 all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina without distinction carried
21 significant danger for the Serbs that actually that referendum would
22 simply go in favour of independence?
23 A. Well, without entering into the interpretation of this sentence,
24 which I think has been hotly contested ever since, I think that is broadly
25 correct. I mean, we see that in fact what happened was that there was a
1 referendum which -- in which anyone was permitted to vote, and it was
2 supposed to be open to all. The Bosnian Serbs under the guidance of the
3 SDS chose to boycott that, their position being that they had already had
4 their referendum. Therefore, that significant portion of the population
5 did not take part in the referendum. The referendum, of course, delivered
6 a favourable vote among those that did vote, and about a month later,
7 recognition was forthcoming. So yes, there was a danger lurking in there
8 for them, for the Bosnian Serbs.
9 Q. Which, from your reading of the documentation, can you say that
10 the danger was very well appreciated by the Bosnian Serb leadership?
11 A. Most of the -- the discussion that I can recall relates to the --
12 the response to the -- holding the referendum and that sort of thing. I
13 would say yes. I mean, they definitely appreciated that this was not
14 necessarily a good thing for them, and they had a lot of discussion about
15 how to handle it. Their attitude toward the referendum, on the one hand,
16 and other steps that they may take to counter that, to continue to make it
17 clear to the outside world that they continued to be opposed to
19 Q. Well, is it correct what they were involved in was a continuation
20 of this very difficult political juggling act which was that there had
21 been this commission set up by the European Community, so they, being
22 involved in international negotiations, they would have wanted to be as
23 receptive and cooperative as they could be with what was coming from this
24 commission appointed by the EC, but, on the other hand, being aware of the
25 lurking danger implicit in that conclusion, there was only so far they
1 could ever go?
2 A. Well, they had choices before them as to what to do, and I think I
3 set out in the documents that I presented the path that they followed,
4 namely, as far as the referendum per se was concerned, once that decision
5 was taken, which is another decision they opposed in the Assembly and that
6 decision they hotly disputed the validity of that decision, taken in the
7 end of January 1991 in the Bosnian Assembly about holding the referendum,
8 then they had to consider their position toward that referendum. At the
9 same time, they were pursuing international negotiations, and on another
10 track they were proceeding with the establishment of their own
11 governmental institutions.
12 Q. Perhaps you could then -- you could put aside, please -- and
13 that's 7 you've got at the moment, isn't it. If you could put that aside
14 and be given 8.
15 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm not currently, so far as I'm aware,
16 receiving any gentle reprimands from the interpreters. I hope that means
17 that no news is good news and that the pace is all right for them. I'm
18 receiving a visual signal that confirms that position.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. STEWART: For the record. I look forward to the visual signal
21 where the position is opposite.
22 JUDGE ORIE: They will know exactly how to stop you, Mr. Stewart,
23 when necessary.
24 MR. STEWART:
25 Q. Perhaps we could take the first tab. That's 84 in bundle 8. And
1 I think you highlighted a number of comments, but I certainly don't want
2 to grind through them all, Mr. Treanor. But you highlight particularly at
3 18, 1-8, the middle of the page. This is the 26th of January. So this
4 was fairly hot after the report of the Badinter Commission, wasn't it?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And he -- Mr. Krajisnik says in the middle of page 18: In fact,
7 the conclusion is that the Council of Ministers be tasked with drafting a
8 decision on calling the referendum to be held 30 days following the
9 completion of the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be
10 agreed by all three national communities, with a view to transforming
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina into a composite, confederate community comprising
12 of three legal identities."
13 So this contained the -- what had really been a consistent
14 element, hasn't it, in one form or another of the Bosnian Serb position,
15 that got to be approval, some way or another, on behalf of all three of
16 the nationalities, as a precondition to moving ahead with a change?
17 A. Yes, broadly speaking. I mean, initially, the issue, back in the
18 fall of 1991, was simply independence versus remaining in Yugoslavia for
19 the whole of Bosnia. By this time, the Bosnian Serb leadership I think
20 has become aware that their preferred option, that is that the whole of
21 Bosnia stay in Yugoslavia, was not going to happen. And so they adopted a
22 new strategy, namely, the transformation, which is the word used here, and
23 that was the word that Dr. Karadzic liked to use, that Bosnia must be
24 transformed internally, and then we can talk about the independence of
25 Bosnia or whatever entities may be within the transformed Bosnia, but only
1 after this transformation has taken place can we consider the issue of
3 Q. By this time, they were in this position, weren't they, that,
4 following the Badinter Commission, as far as the European Community is
5 concerned, there could be no independence of Bosnia without a referendum?
6 A. Right.
7 Q. And then the Bosnian Serb leadership here, as we see,
8 [indiscernible] as part of the jigsaw is no referendum without agreement
9 among the three nationalities?
10 A. On transformation, right.
11 Q. On the transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
12 A. Yes. By the way, just to remark that I think that among the items
13 in dispute about that sentence in the Badinter Commission, one of them is
14 whether the referendum really is a satisfactory condition for recognition
15 or simply an example of one of the types of things that could be done.
16 But certainly within Bosnia, it was taken to mean that, that: Okay, now
17 we have to have a referendum and the referendum will decide the issue.
18 Q. Yes. Presumably, that comment is based on -- the comment you've
19 just made, Mr. Treanor, is based on the sentence in the report: This
20 assessment -- the assessment that they hadn't fully established the will
21 of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina could be reviewed if appropriate
22 guarantees are provided by, in this case, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then it
23 says possibly by means of a referendum of all the citizens. So that
24 implies that, if it's possibly by that means could possibly be by some
25 other means. That's what you're talking about, are you?
1 A. Right.
2 Q. And is -- you said the transformation was a favourite word of --
3 well, you said Dr. Karadzic, and I think you probably meant Dr. Karadzic.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. In fact, it's being used in this case by Mr. Krajisnik. This is
6 what we're looking at at page 18?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Well, Dr. Karadzic wouldn't have had a monopoly on words in
9 Serbian. Is the transformation in English, is it in fact a close
10 reflection of the Serbian word, in other words, implying, as I suggest it
11 does, some neutrality as to what the changes might be?
12 A. Well, it's a very interesting question.
13 Q. About that, anyway.
14 A. The word is a long word in Serbian. It's from the Latin, so it's
15 not a Serbian word. And I believe Dr. Karadzic indicated in discussions
16 of this issue that this was a word they should use because basically what
17 they were talking about was some sort of partition. But the international
18 community would not accept partition. So they couldn't talk about
19 partition. We'll talk about transformation, but that's in fact what it
20 was, was a partition of the country into, as it's put here, three legal
22 Q. Would you say, Mr. Treanor, that, just looking at the remark that
23 Mr. Krajisnik makes in the middle of page 18 of that document at tab 84,
24 that he talks about the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
25 would be agreed by all three national communities, with a view to
1 transforming, using the word again, Bosnia and Herzegovina into a
2 composite, confederate community, comprising three legal identities, that
3 it wouldn't have been very difficult for anybody to read into
4 that, "partition"? Wouldn't have been difficult to --
5 A. Well, I wouldn't have thought so.
6 Q. You wouldn't have thought it was difficult?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Yes. And the position being adopted -- well, at this point,
9 there's no -- there had been no suggestion of any difference between any
10 views expressed by Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Krajisnik at this point on this
12 A. Any differences between them?
13 Q. There were no differences between any views expressed by
14 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik on this issue at this time?
15 A. No, not that I can recollect.
16 Q. And that -- I know you're sometimes reluctant on such questions,
17 Mr. Treanor, but that was a -- that was a politically realistic judgement
18 for the Bosnian Serb leadership to have adopted at this time, wasn't it,
19 in the context of the Badinter report and what had already happened in
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
21 A. Which judgement?
22 Q. The judgement that transformation, in not very heavily coded
23 terms, implying partition within Bosnia-Herzegovina, that was a
24 politically realistic judgement for them to have adopted?
25 A. Well, yes, realistic, and indeed, in the end, successful.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Unhappily, yes. But also realistic in this sense, that it was --
2 it was, if you like, it was on the spectrum, it was somewhere in the area
3 which at least held out some hope of quelling, dampening down the momentum
4 towards some sort of civil war?
5 A. Yes, and I think they perceived it in that fashion and indeed that
6 formed the basis of the negotiations that took place under international
7 auspices after this.
8 MR. STEWART: Excuse me one moment.
9 Q. And then if we go on to page -- same document, tab 84 in this
10 bundle. If we go on to page 19.
11 A. Same document, page 19?
12 Q. Yes. And you had drawn attention -- you had highlighted some
13 further comments by Mr. Krajisnik on that page, that the -- he said: We
14 have adopted -- do you see about 15 lines up I think it is from the
15 bottom: We have adopted two conclusions.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. It's a rather larger passage than the particular point you cited.
18 We have adopted two conclusions after all. One of them was to declare
19 null and void those decisions that were adopted at that illegal session.
20 And that plainly refers back to October 14th, 15th, doesn't it?
21 A. No. I think --
22 Q. Oh, it doesn't.
23 A. No. The reference here, I believe, is to the assembly session of
24 the 25th of January, at which the decision to hold a referendum was
25 adopted in circumstances similar to the adoption of the platform and
1 memorandum in October.
2 Q. Yes. I see. Thank you. And then second, the conclusion is
3 that: We in fact tasked the Council of Ministers to draft a decision for
4 the next session of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina. In it we will also express our readiness to go to the
6 referendum once certain conditions are met.
7 And those would be the same -- broadly the same conditions we were
8 looking at a few moments ago?
9 A. Yes.
10 [Defence counsel confer]
11 MR. STEWART:
12 Q. So it goes on then that the transformation, we see that word
13 again, the transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina be carried out 30 days
14 thereafter. We can go to the referendum. As regards the nature of that
15 decision, it's going to look like, however, let us leave it to the Council
16 of Ministers to draft it and submit it at the next session. We will fix
17 the date, as Mr. Vjestica said, we must sit in some sort of a permanent
18 session. We must also meet the deadlines.
19 And you cited in your evidence, this was at page 1561, you cited
20 that very last bit and commented -- well, in fact, Mr. Tieger cited it and
21 then you commented: Yes, so this is Mr. Krajisnik's agreement with the
22 desire to complete the legislative programme necessary for establishing
23 the state as soon as possible.
24 This is an example, isn't it, very specifically and clearly, of
25 Mr. Krajisnik doing his principal job as president of the Assembly?
1 A. Yes, this is a good example of him guiding the Assembly sessions.
2 Q. And of course -- well, a part of his job. Of course I say his
3 prinicipal job. Of course he had to chair and guide the Assembly
4 sessions, but also plan them and organise the timetables and then --
5 A. I suppose.
6 Q. Well, you say you suppose. That's obvious, isn't it?
7 A. Well, it's obvious, but again, I don't have documents that show
8 that process, the pre-assembly process, what happened, how the agenda was
9 set, this, that, and the other thing. All we have are the records of the
10 assembly itself. I suppose something like that happened, though. But I
11 can only suppose it.
12 Q. Yes. That's a realistic inference from -- in fact, what the
13 published constitutional and procedural responsibilities of the president
14 were --
15 A. In the Rules of Procedure of the assembly.
16 Q. Yes. I had in mind the Rules of Procedure included in that, which
17 I think you referred to those specifically in Article 26. It sets out the
18 president's responsibilities and the fact that, well, they seemed to
19 manage to meet, so from all that, we -- just an inference that
20 Mr. Krajisnik was not recording it formally, but involved in setting all
21 that up.
22 A. That would be my supposition, yes.
23 Q. Then at page 21 of the same document, at the very bottom of the
24 page, Mr. Krajisnik again -- the passage you've cited: Sir, let us be
25 clear. Do you see that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, this is a conclusion of the Council of Ministers to draft for
3 the next session of the Assembly of the Serbian People a decision on how
4 to communicate a demand to the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina for the partition balance sheet.
6 And you initially in your evidence - this is at page 1563 - you
7 referred to this matter as a rather obscure one, but I think in fairness,
8 you came to accept that it wasn't quite that obscure. You had suggested
9 it was due to the annual budget, but in fact it's looking ahead, if you
10 like, but it's looking to one -- I was going to say inevitable, but you
11 don't like that word so much, Mr. Treanor. It was looking to one
12 practical consequence of transformation, i.e., partition, which was that
13 the country's assets would have to be split up, the country's finances
14 would have to be reorganised.
15 A. Yes. It was looking forward to that, as far as I can understand
17 Q. And then not long after this, the -- of course, the international
18 negotiations were going on, as you've confirmed, but not very long after
19 this, in February, there was a session, negotiating session, in Lisbon,
20 wasn't there, on 21st, 22nd of February?
21 JUDGE ORIE: Before we move into the Lisbon session, how much time
22 would it need? Because otherwise I'd like to have a break now for 20
23 minutes and then continue for another hour. Yes.
24 MR. STEWART: No problem at all, Your Honour. Again, I'm entirely
25 in your hands.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll have a break until a quarter to 1.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 12.48 p.m.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
5 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. Mr. Treanor, we were just considering Lisbon and Lisbon agreement,
7 21st, 22nd of February. In a nutshell, the fundamental point of the
8 Lisbon agreement, which was reached between the Bosnian Serbs, but also
9 involved agreement of the Muslims under Mr. Izetbegovic's leadership, were
10 these, weren't they, first of all, to preserve the existing external
11 borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and secondly, to form national territorial
12 units within Bosnia and Herzegovina?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And that represented a -- maybe a positive one in this case, but a
15 turnaround by Mr. Izetbegovic?
16 A. Yes, I think that's fair to say.
17 Q. And then, if we -- if you could take document number 93, please.
18 We're in bundle 8, tab 93. These are notes of the 8th Session of the Serb
19 Assembly. So February 1991. I'm sorry, February 1992. Page 20. It's --
20 in this case, I can say it's page 23 of the B/C/S version. And
21 Mr. Krajisnik is speaking - you referred to this at page 1600 of the
22 transcript - as a participant in the Lisbon talks himself. And then he
23 set out two options which you refer to there in the middle of the page one
24 to fight by political means and then to break off talks and go to force.
25 At the foot of this same page, Mr. Krajisnik says: And the taboo
1 of indivisibility, wholeness, non-division was thus removed. We consider
2 this a 30 to 40 per cent success, but it's still a long way to go from the
3 ultimate success. That's why Mr. Koljevic's suggestion is good to sort
4 all this out today to be aware of what it is that our representatives
6 And he says: I absolutely refuse the discussion on whether you
7 have or do not have confidence in me. Anyone more suitable should take
8 his place in the talks and negotiations immediately without any
9 discussion, irrespective of Messrs. Koljevic and Karadzic only the best
10 players may play this game. Sometimes a game is better played by the
11 players from the bench than by the first team and no apologies should be
12 made here.
13 Now, I suggest to you, Mr. Treanor, that this is interesting
14 because this is Mr. Krajisnik classifying himself as somebody coming off
15 the bench for these purposes rather than being a member of the first team,
16 isn't it?
17 A. Well, let me look at the original. Well, what I get out of this,
18 quite frankly, is something that I think I first studied in Latin class
19 back in --
20 Q. Sometime ago?
21 A. What we call junior high school in the United States, the seventh
22 or eighth grade, Cicero or somebody, the rhetorical device of saying, oh,
23 I'm not so good, so please replace me, and then it was oh, no, no, no, we
24 need you. This is, in my view, a rhetorical device, the whole passage.
25 Q. Mr. Treanor, that may be so up to a point, mightn't it, but I
1 don't want to get too Ciceronian about it, but even as a rhetorical
2 device, would you agree, unless it's got some element of truth in it for
3 the audience, it's not going to work, is it?
4 A. It depends what the element of truth is. The element of truth, in
5 order to make it work, is that the audience, in this case the assemblies,
6 want him to be on the team. You're focusing in on this that the best
7 players and the players from the bench. I mean, I can hardly believe from
8 what I've read that the members of the Assembly would consider
9 Mr. Krajisnik not to be among the best players.
10 Q. I don't want to get into too much of an academic debate, and I'm
11 trying to think of an analogy, but if Pele had said to the population of
12 Brazil, sometimes you don't need your first team players and people have
13 to come off the bench, so here I am, would have been just -- you're
14 talking -- maybe Pele doesn't mean a thing to you, Mr. Treanor. But if he
15 was absolutely blindingly obviously a first team player, it would have
16 been a silly remark to make and it wouldn't have had any effect, as he
17 wished it to have on the audience. There's got to be some truth in the
18 fact that he is not in the same category and league for these purposes as
19 Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Karadzic, for the rhetorical device to have any
20 chance of working; isn't that right?
21 A. That's just not obvious to me. In fact, the reference could be,
22 and again, this is probably a rather off-the-cuff remark, but the
23 reference could be to the idea: Don't be hesitant to put in someone who
24 is not as important as I am into this, because maybe they're better than I
1 Q. All right. Let's move on.
2 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you an additional question? Because I had
3 some difficulties in understanding what -- to whom he was referring when
4 he said sometimes a game is better played by the players from the bench
5 than by the first team. Was he referring to the players on the bench as
6 those who would possibly replace him, or would he refer to the players of
7 the bench as himself, as is suggested in the question by Mr. Stewart? Is
8 there anything in the original language that would favour the one or the
9 other interpretation of this sentence?
10 THE WITNESS: I really don't think so, Your Honour. I'll look at
11 it again.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Because I was puzzled who was on the bench and who
13 was on the first team.
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I can actually offer Mr. Treanor the
15 B/C/S version.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 THE WITNESS: I'm looking at it.
18 MR. STEWART: I beg your pardon. I didn't realise he had got it.
19 THE WITNESS: Not a problem. No, I don't think the original is
20 different here. I don't think it helps. The translation is adequate.
21 But, as I say, I think that the sense may be that he's referring to his
22 potential replacement as being someone from the bench. If you think
23 someone is better than I am --
24 MR. STEWART:
25 Q. Perhaps I can simply invite you to -- it's only say a couple of
1 sentences. Could you -- because you're homing in on it as opposed to
2 doing the whole document. Could you offer us your translation of -- I
3 think that paragraph, three or four sentences: I absolutely refuse.
4 That's the translation we've got at the moment.
5 A. "I will in no way discuss about that." I'm doing it kind of
6 literally here because of the word order. Whether I have or don't have
7 confidence. Right away, without discussion, whoever is more suitable must
8 take a place, accomplish, perform, the discussions and negotiations,
9 independently of Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Karadzic. Here the best players,
10 quote unquote, must play in this quote unquote match. Sometimes those who
11 are in reserve as players know how to play the match better than the first
12 ones and there is no pardon here, no excuse, no need for -- there's no
13 pardon here, literally.
14 Q. It may ultimately have been a matter of reading and argument, but
15 I do suggest to you that on any translation and reading, it's clear what
16 he's saying is: The best players, in other words, the best people must go
17 into these negotiations. Sometimes the best people for a particular
18 purpose or a particular game, particular negotiation, are not the first
19 team players but the reserves or those coming off the bench, and I'm
20 making no apology, because in that case that's me. I'm one of the best
21 people for this particular negotiation.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But the witness has answered the question that
23 he interpreted these lines in a different way, that he -- the persons to
24 enter the team would be the ones on the bench, not Mr. Krajisnik. That's
25 how I understood your interpretation. And now you repeat the same issue.
1 If I'm wrong, Mr. Treanor, please ...
2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, with respect, what I was doing, was as
3 one sometimes needs to do, is, having given the witness the opportunity of
4 doing his own translation and looking at it again, I was giving him the
5 opportunity of reconsidering his answer. Now, it may be --
6 JUDGE ORIE: No.
7 MR. STEWART: The result --
8 JUDGE ORIE: You repeated your own position in interpreting what
9 it meant. In reading the original language and giving your translation,
10 does this change your mind or on your first interpretation?
11 THE WITNESS: No.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
13 MR. STEWART:
14 Q. And then, very shortly afterwards, by -- in fact, before the end
15 of February, Mr. Izetbegovic drew back, didn't he, very clearly, from his
16 agreement of the Lisbon document?
17 A. Apparently, yes.
18 Q. Could we then go on, please, to 9, bundle or file 9. Go to
19 tab 96, please. Now, this is a decision on proclaiming the Serb Republic
20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that was published in the Official Gazette.
21 And then you highlighted a number of matters. In Article 1, which is at
22 page -- well, it's at page 2. It's not difficult to find Article 1. It
23 comes very early in the document. Sorry. I had forgotten a few minutes
24 ago that you are operating consistently with the B/C/S versions of these
25 documents this morning, or this afternoon, Mr. Treanor; is that right?
1 A. Well, I've been looking at the translations since that's what
2 you're giving the references to. I haven't discovered or noticed any
3 particular translation problems.
4 Q. I'm sorry. I just wasn't clear. I got the impression a few
5 minutes ago, and a member of my team informed me you were operating from
6 the B/C/S files or bundles. But it's the English one you've got in front
7 of you?
8 A. Yeah. Well, they're both here.
9 Q. You've got both. No problem. Right. Article 1, the Republic --
10 this was your evidence, 1629 of the transcript: The Republic is defined
11 as the state of the Serbian people and of the citizens living in it.
12 And you commented that the word "all" which we see here wasn't in
13 the original. In fact, it's the obvious sense, anyway, isn't it, even
14 without the word "all," the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the
15 state of the Serb people and the citizens living therein. It's not going
16 to be different, is it?
17 A. Well, that's an interesting question. There are no articles in
18 Serbian as there are in English. So whereas in English the word --
19 coupling the word "all" with "the" in this context may seem redundant. In
20 Serbian, to my knowledge, it is not, since there is no article in
21 Serbian. So it says: Of citizens living in it.
22 Q. Well, we've covered Cicero between us this morning, Mr. Treanor,
23 so I don't want to get into too much refined detail about the Serbian
24 language. But you'd add the "and" anyway, wouldn't you, so it would be
25 the state of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the state of Serb
1 people and citizens living therein?
2 A. Yes, that would be a literal translation.
3 Q. Yes, all right. Anyway, perhaps it's not valuable to pursue this,
4 although it wasn't in the original, that's what we have here. And then
5 you say this in contrast to a similar provision in the BH constitution
6 which mentioned three peoples. So you say -- what you said in your
7 evidence early, so this state, as the article defines it, is a state of
8 only one people. And then you say: Therefore, I think it's safe to say
9 that under this article, only one people is being given rights as a
11 Now, that -- I suggest to you, Mr. Treanor, of course you've got
12 the advantage of the Serbian version -- well, actually, what you really
13 have the advantage of is understanding Serbian. But I suggest to you it's
14 not saying that. It may be giving some primacy, in an obvious sense, to
15 the Serb people, but it is not, even if we just look at Article 1 on its
16 own, it is not defining this as a state of only one people, is it?
17 A. The article says what it says. We've been over that.
18 Q. And it doesn't say what --
19 A. I was calling the Court's attention to the fact that this differs
20 from the wording in, for instance, the Bosnian constitution, in which
21 three peoples were mentioned. The whole basis of practically every
22 document that I've presented in the course of my testimony is that that
23 constitution gave the Serbian people, as a people, certain rights within
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina, rights which the SDS were determined to see
25 defended. So they attached very important -- very high significance to
1 the wording of the corresponding article in the constitution of the
2 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that the wording
3 here is different is therefore not simply inevitable, as you might put it,
4 but is purposeful.
5 Q. Mr. Treanor, it wouldn't be the Defence case that there's anything
6 different. After all, it would be -- it would be naive to the point of
7 ridiculous to suggest that drafters of the constitution of the Serb
8 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the circumstances in which it was
9 created, are not going to reflect some special position of Serbs. That's
10 what it's all about. All I'm trying to do at the moment is to seek your
11 agreement that what you said in your evidence earlier is actually
12 inaccurate and exaggerated, that this article does not define this state
13 as a state of only one people, because, apart from everything else, it
14 defines it as a state of the Serb people and all the citizens living
15 therein, whoever they might be.
16 A. Well, again, the corresponding article in the constitution of the
17 Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina contained similar wording.
18 It mentioned other citizens. Despite that, and I'm not challenging the
19 interpretation, the interpretation of the leadership of the SDS of the
20 mention of the Serbian people along with the other peoples conferred
21 certain rights on the Serbian people - I think I'm repeating - within that
22 entity which had to be exercised by the Serbian people as such. Their
23 rights could not be subsumed into -- and I realise I'm getting into areas
24 of constitutional law that perhaps are beyond me, but I'm merely trying to
25 repeat their arguments, as we've seen them in the documents -- could not
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 be subsumed among the mass of the citizenry, for instance, in a referendum
2 of all the citizens. So for them, having the particular peoples
3 enumerated is very important. Now, as you say, it's rather logical that
4 they're going to enumerate the Serbs, since this is a Serbian entity. But
5 that ipso facto, in their line of reasoning, deprives other national
6 communities of the types of rights within their republic that they sought
7 to exercise within the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 Q. Let's look at Article 5, same page. Not hard to find. The
9 constitutional order of the Republic is based on the following: Guarantee
10 and protection of human freedoms and rights in compliance with
11 international standards. And then assurance of national equality. Then
12 social justice, reign of justice, which may be rule of law, probably, as
13 an alternative translation. And then free elections and so on. And the
14 last one, protection of rights of ethnic groups and other minorities.
15 Do you see that?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And 7, official language, Serbian language. But Mr. Treanor, you
18 gave evidence about the meaning of these articles in your earlier
19 evidence. It's not unusual or sinister to find an official language
20 declared in a written constitution, is it?
21 A. Article 7?
22 Q. The first limb, declaring Serbian as the official language. I'm
23 saying -- suggesting to you that's not -- it's not an unusual provision to
24 find in a modern democratic state's constitution.
25 A. Well, I wouldn't say that it's unusual. And I'm not sure what my
1 original testimony on this point was. However, the name of the language
2 was an issue that was rather vigorously debated. And when I say that, I
3 mean not between, necessarily - I haven't seen that. There may be such
4 discussion - between the SDS and the other coalition partners, but within
5 the Bosnian Serb Assembly they had quite a little debate on the language
6 law in later months. And there were rather sharp differences of opinion
7 as to what the name of the language should be. So that is in issue.
8 Q. It's a slightly different point, but I think perhaps I'll move on.
9 The second limb of Article 7, having stated Serbian as the
10 official language and the -- sorry.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, if I may. It appears to me that
13 Mr. Treanor is being challenged on the attention he drew to Article 7 in
14 his examination-in-chief, at least that's part of the premise of the
15 questioning. As I examine the transcript, I don't believe that
16 Mr. Treanor did draw attention to Article 7, and I'm certainly not
17 objecting to any questions about it, but I think that premise should be
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, could you give us the page where Mr. --
20 unless there's any -- you couldn't clarify or you think it would not be
21 proper to clarify.
22 MR. STEWART: Yes. The -- Your Honour, the position is this: I
23 don't believe I did suggest that Mr. Treanor had referred to Article 7 in
24 his evidence earlier, because I don't believe he did.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Then at least you agree on that.
1 MR. STEWART: Yes. I'm not sure where it leads us, Your Honour,
2 but I think I can agree on that. I stand corrected, as always, by the
3 transcript if I did, but I don't believe I did.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I don't think you said that. You said: First limb
5 declaring Serbian as the official language. I'm suggesting to you that
6 it's not -- it's not an unusual provision to find in a modern democratic
7 state's constitution.
8 And the second limb --
9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I don't wish to draw into attention, but
10 I think the reference I was referring to occurred just prior to that.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Since you do agree, we had better not pursue the
12 matter and proceed. And I'll look at the transcript anyhow.
13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I believe the position is very simple.
14 Mr. Treanor did refer to Article 1, to Article 2, to Article 3, to
15 Article 5 expressly in his evidence. I don't believe he did refer to
16 Article 7, but on the other hand --
17 JUDGE ORIE: You agree on it.
18 MR. STEWART: Yes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
20 MR. STEWART: So ...
21 Q. The -- anyway, where were we? In regions -- we were in regions
22 inhabited by groups speaking other languages. The language and script
23 shall also be used in the manner as provided by the law. Well, it's got
24 as provided by the law. But it's clear the thrust of this is it's the
25 linguistic aspect of general protection of minority rights, isn't it?
1 A. Yes, something like that.
2 Q. And Article 10, which I believe is another one you didn't refer to
3 in your earlier evidence, Article 10 states that citizens of the Republic
4 have equal rights in their freedom, rights and obligations, they're equal
5 before the law and enjoy the same legal protection regardless of race,
6 sex, language, ethnic origin, religion, social background, birth,
7 et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. That, well, I hesitate to say, couldn't
8 be clearer. It is very clear, isn't it, as a specific statement that
9 everybody, every citizen, is equal before the law?
10 A. Yes, it's pretty standard stuff.
11 Q. It may be pretty standard stuff, Mr. Treanor, but it's standard
12 stuff because well-drafted constitutions require it and should have it,
13 and it's a proper reflection of those international standards in
14 recognised democracies?
15 A. Yes, precisely.
16 Q. Yes. And standard stuff in this sense, that if enforced, you're
17 safe as a citizen, aren't you?
18 A. If enforced, yes.
19 Q. With mild hesitation, in the light of the question a few minutes
20 ago, but I'm inviting you to reconsider your simple description of
21 Article 1, when, after all, it's looked at in the context of all those
22 other provisions as providing that this state is a state of only one
23 people. Is that --
24 A. Well, again, without getting too far into legal and theory
25 interpretation, the issue that is posed by Article 1 and the comparable
1 article in the constitution of the Socialist Republic of
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I don't think that issue is not covered here. The
3 issue is whether, as the Serb posed it, in my understanding, the way the
4 SDS leadership posed this issue, was whether a constituent people, in this
5 case -- in their case, the Serbian people, had the right to prevent the
6 secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. That was the first
7 issue. I don't -- then the comparable issue here would be: Does anyone
8 have the right to take part of this Serbian Republic that we're forming
9 out of the Republic? I don't think those issues are addressed in those
10 articles. And I'm speaking off the top of my head, since you posed the
11 question, and I don't want to get -- I can't get too far into legal
12 reasoning and interpretation. But the force of the article and the
13 constitution of the Socialist Republic dealt with matters that, as far as
14 I can understand, are not covered in these other articles.
15 Q. Well, in fact, I think -- well, I don't think. I know, because I
16 can read it. In your earlier evidence, it's at page 1629 of the
17 transcript, you did refer specifically to Article 3 and the statement in
18 Article 3 that the Republic is part of the Federal State of Yugoslavia.
19 And then you pointed out, absolutely correctly, that there is no reference
20 here, for instance, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21 A. Right.
22 Q. Now, first of all, the -- a difficulty, if you like, with the Serb
23 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina being part of the Federal State of
24 Yugoslavia was, if you like, at the Federal State of Yugoslavia end. I
25 think you gave evidence to the effect that the federal -- Belgrade was
1 saying: Well, actually, we can't do that. We can't offer you that.
2 A. At a certain point in time that seems to have been communicated to
3 them, yes.
4 Q. But the fact that there was no reference to Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, was that not in a sense the -- forget that, Mr. Treanor. I
6 won't press the next question.
7 The -- yes. You drew attention, as I said, to the fact that there
8 was no reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The literal words are there,
9 of course, but they're only there as part of the definition of the Serb
10 Republic. That the -- it was a combination, whatever the attitude of
11 Belgrade, the combination of the Serb -- Bosnian Serb leadership's wish
12 and clear stated wish to remain part of the Federal State of Yugoslavia,
13 if -- I use Belgrade to try and make it clear, if Belgrade would have
14 them, put together with the Bosnian Muslim position of declaration of
15 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inevitably - inevitably -
16 logically led to there being no reference in this constitution to Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina?
18 A. Well, I think you made reference to a declaration of independence.
19 There really wasn't a declaration of independence.
20 Q. I'll perhaps rephrase that. Policy of independence. Rather long
21 question. Perhaps I'll --
22 A. No. I'm fine. Again, there's nothing inevitable about any of
23 this. In fact, there was quite a bit of discussion in the Assembly about
24 these articles and whether there should or should not be a reference to
25 being part of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or not. I
1 can't recall precisely, but that may even have been in the initial draft
2 that was presented to the Assembly. But certainly, as you indicated, it's
3 obviously an issue, and in that connection, I would point out again --
4 let's look at the date of this document. It's the 28th of February,
5 before the referendum was taking place and way before the recognition of
6 the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina took place. So, in my layman's
7 understanding of -- I guess it's international law, the people who were
8 doing this were still within the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina. But this is -- that was a fact which they ultimately chose
10 not to include in this document, obviously reflecting their intention not
11 to be part of that state should it become independent.
12 Q. Well, the -- so you said there was debate. The alternative --
13 well, obviously, the alternative to not mentioning Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 is to mention it. If it had been expressly mentioned, then it would
15 presumably, then, Mr. Treanor, have been mentioned, if it was worth
16 mentioning at all, in terms which recognised that the Serb Republic of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina was within the -- within --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- Bosnia and Herzegovina?
20 A. That was apparently the thrust. And of course that was the object
21 or the stated object of the negotiations that were under way, that this
22 new Bosnia-Herzegovina, whatever it was going to be called, would be
23 composed of three entities. This was one of the entities and they would
24 all be within the new Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think one of the reasons -- I
25 can only speculate on that. But they left that out. That's all.
1 Q. If Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent, and I'm talking
2 about Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, if Bosnia and Herzegovina became
3 independent, then clearly Article 3 of this constitution would have to go,
4 wouldn't it?
5 A. Not as it stands now.
6 Q. Sorry?
7 A. Not as it stands now.
8 Q. How do you mean?
9 A. Well, according to this text, this entity is part of Yugoslavia.
10 It doesn't make any reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The only
11 reference is in Article 4, that they can make agreements with other parts
12 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So if Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes
13 independent, and I think that's what I was going to say before, that would
14 not necessitate a change in this constitution, and I think that may be one
15 of the reasons why they decided to leave it out, to leave their options
16 open, so to speak, and not have to amend the constitution contingent on
17 the results of the negotiations.
18 Q. Perhaps I'm not making myself clear, Mr. Treanor. The -- if this
19 constitution had expressly stated that the Serb Republic of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina was part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, right, and if Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina became independent, an independent state, okay, so that's one
22 and two, it would have been inconsistent, then, for the constitution of
23 the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue to say, as is
24 stated in Article 3 here, that the Republic is a part of the Federal State
25 of Yugoslavia?
1 A. Right, yes. And what I'm suggesting is what they would have done
2 is to amend the part that says that they are part of Bosnia and
4 Q. So what it comes down to, then, really, is this, does it, and this
5 is a question, Mr. Treanor, after all: That, in effect, this
6 constitution, as drafted, was already adapted as drafted to, in its
7 effect, to independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
8 A. Yes. It took that contingency into account. Perhaps the
9 confusion arises over the -- something to do with the attitude of the
10 Bosnian Serb leadership at this time. Their attitude at this time was
11 that if the non-Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina want to leave Yugoslavia,
12 that's fine with us, but we're staying in. So, I mean, that was a
13 decision that -- a standpoint that they had adopted some time ago, and I
14 thought I was trying to indicate is reflected in this constitution. This
15 is saying that our entity is staying in Yugoslavia. The rest of you can
16 do what you want.
17 Q. Yes. It's entirely consistent with that. And that clearly, then,
18 would be -- well, if you like, socially and culturally, it clearly would
19 be then the new Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it clearly would
20 be predominantly a Serb society, wouldn't it?
21 A. Under which contingency?
22 Q. The Bosnian Muslims and the Croats, for that matter, they leave
23 federal Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian Serbs stay within it.
24 A. Well, that would depend on the borders of the Serbian entity.
25 Q. Well, any borders which made any sense of the exercise at all
1 would have the effect that the new Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 would be predominantly and clearly a basically Serb society?
3 A. Well, if by Serb you mean having a predominantly Serbian
4 population, I don't think that's the case. Any borders which made any
5 sense of the exercise at all. Well, whose sense? As we've seen in the
6 documents that I presented, the Bosnian Serb leaders consistently and
7 repeatedly claimed 65 per cent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8 Now, again, I'm not a demographer, but - and I hope the Trial Chamber will
9 hear testimony on this issue - I don't think it's possible to make sense,
10 if I may use that term, out of drawing borders which would encompass 65
11 per cent of the territory of the Republic but still be predominantly
13 Q. I actually had in mind, Mr. Treanor, just tell me if this is just
14 totally wrong. After all, you're giving evidence, and that's your
15 prerogative, to express your view. But what I had in mind was this: That
16 if Bosnia is transformed and there is then a separate Serb Republic as
17 part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for the Serb Republic to end
18 up as an entity in which the Serbs were in a minority would surely have
19 simply laid the foundations for the same problems to emerge again another
20 year in the future.
21 A. Well, indeed. And as I thought I indicated, in their terms, that
22 would not have made sense.
23 MR. STEWART: Excuse me one moment, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm coming on now to really rather a
2 large discrete topic to the question of the -- I was planning to go next
3 to the question of the six strategic objectives.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Six minutes, that might not be enough for six
5 strategic objectives.
6 MR. STEWART: The question is -- yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: If you have a smaller subject you could deal with in
8 five minutes, we'd like to hear that. If not, then we'll adjourn for the
10 MR. STEWART: Well, I don't, Your Honour. That is really the next
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. Before we adjourn, it would be
14 helpful, if possible, for some forecasting of our schedule for the
15 remainder of the week.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honour, I believe that we are fairly well
18 on track. We've got tomorrow afternoon and Friday morning, and I had
19 indicated to the Tribunal and earlier to the Prosecution that I expected
20 to be, as far as I could estimate, all or most of this week with
21 Mr. Treanor. I feel as confident as one can reasonably be that I am going
22 to finish with Mr. Treanor this week. I also don't feel it's at all
23 likely that I will finish with him tomorrow.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We might have to find time as well for a few
25 procedural issues, but I'd rather leave them until the cross-examination
1 of Mr. Treanor has been finished. First of all, there's your letter,
2 which might need some attention, then another issue might be adjudicated
3 facts on which the Chamber would like to -- perhaps would like to briefly
4 discuss the way of dealing with that and procedurally with the parties.
5 So it's uncertain whether we would find time before the weekend to
6 deal with these issues, but your estimate is that somewhere on Friday
7 you'd be able to conclude your cross-examination, then of course it also
8 depends on how many questions there are from the Bench and whether this
9 would trigger any new questions from the parties. But, Mr. Tieger, is
10 this sufficient guidance?
11 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour. I think that's -- I understand
12 that -- sorry. I understand that that's the best estimate that counsel
13 can offer, and I appreciate it.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you. Then we adjourn for the day. We
15 will sit tomorrow, Thursday, at a quarter past 2.00 in the afternoon in
16 this same courtroom.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 15th day of April,
19 2004, at 2.15 p.m.