1 Thursday, 3 June 2004.
2 [Closed session] [Parts of Closed Session made public by order of Trial Chamber].
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
12 Pages 3357 to 3374 redacted. Closed Session
24 WITNESS: MILAN BABIC [Resumed]
25 [Witness answered through interpreter]
1 Examined by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]
2 Q. Mr. Babic, when we adjourned yesterday you were discussing the
3 provision of weapons to Serbs in Croatia from authorities in Serbia. Let
4 me ask you now if any JNA officials, JNA officers, were involved in the
5 provision of weapons to Serbs in Croatia.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And can you tell us of any particular JNA officers or officials
8 who were involved in the provision of weapons and when that was.
9 A. I know about Colonel Dusan Smiljanic, who introduced himself to
10 me as the chief of security of the Zagreb Corps. This was in late
11 July/early August 1991.
12 Q. And did Colonel Smiljanic indicate during his introduction his
13 willingness and ability to provide weapons to Serbs in Croatia?
14 A. Yes, that was his offer. He was the first one to propose that.
15 Q. And did Colonel Smiljanic indeed provide such weapons to Serbs
16 after the offer was made?
17 A. Yes. I know about at least two or three occasions.
18 Q. And to whom or to what forces were those weapons provided?
19 A. I know that they were provided to Serbs around Knin and to the
20 Krajina police.
21 Q. Did you also visit with the minister of defence in Serbia in
22 connection with the provision of weapons and materiel?
23 A. Yes, I did.
24 Q. When did that happen?
25 A. In September 1991.
1 Q. Did you do so on one occasion or more than one occasion?
2 A. At least once or twice in September, and later I had other
3 meetings, but they were for a different reason.
4 Q. And in response to your visits, were weapons and military
5 equipment provided to Serbs in Croatia?
6 A. Yes, although I don't know the details.
7 Q. Mr. Babic, let me turn now to the issue of training camps where
8 armed units were trained. First of all, let me ask you whether or not in
9 1991 camps were established where armed formations or armed units of
10 Serbs in Croatia were trained.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Where was such a camp or such camps established?
13 A. I know about the camp near the village of Golubic, near Knin, and
14 also another training camp in a village near Benkovac. And I also heard
15 about something at Sumarica, in Banija, but I'm not sure exactly what
16 that was.
17 Q. And during which time period were those camps established?
18 A. The Golubic camp was established first, in April 1991. The one
19 in Benkovac I know was established in July, in the summer. I don't know
20 the exact time period.
21 Q. Who established the camps?
22 A. The Serbian state security, along with Martic.
23 Q. And was there any particular state -- Serbian state security
24 official actively involved or more actively involved in the establishment
25 or direction of the camps?
1 A. Yes. It was Franko Simatovic.
2 Q. And I think you indicated earlier that Franko Simatovic was
3 Jovica Stanisic's subordinate.
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. And did you actually have occasion or an opportunity to visit the
6 camp at Golubic?
7 A. Yes, on two occasions, in April and in May 1991.
8 Q. And did a particular official escort you to the camps or around
9 the camp at that time?
10 A. The first time I was there, the camp was just being established
11 and I was introduced to Captain Dragan as the future chief trainer in the
12 camp. And in May when I was there, I met Franko Simatovic there, who was
13 the host and the person in charge of the camp, the boss. He showed me
14 around the camp and told me what was going on.
15 Q. Do you know Captain Dragan's full name?
16 A. He never introduced himself to me as such, but later I was told
17 that his name was Dragan Vasiljkovic. I was told later by others that
18 that was his name. He always used to introduce himself only as "Captain
20 Q. I'd like to ask you some of the details of what you learned about
21 who attended the camps and what kind of training went on and the degree
22 of organisation. First of all, can you tell us from where the trainees
23 who attended the camp came.
24 A. As far as I could see there, or from what I was told, smaller
25 groups of younger people arrived there from the Krajina municipality,
1 from northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, and Banija.
2 Q. And did they come from various municipalities in those areas?
3 A. Yes, from several municipalities.
4 Q. Did you actually have an opportunity to see some of the files
5 kept at the training camp in Golubic to determine whether trainees had
6 come from various municipalities around the area?
7 A. Yes. I was shown the files, because I was interested to see if
8 there were any people from Knin there, so then they showed me the files
9 that they were compiling for each municipality separately. And then they
10 showed me the files for the municipality of Knin. But I didn't know
11 anybody from the people who were registered there. I was shown the files
12 by Nikola Manovic. He was Martic's assistant and he was the one who was
13 maintaining the files.
14 Q. Were the trainees equipped with weapons and uniforms?
15 A. Yes, they were in uniforms and they had long-barrelled weapons,
16 rifles. I was also shown some kind of weapons that had wheels on them.
17 I don't know. It was maybe some kind of anti-aircraft weapon that had
18 two or three barrels. And I was also shown an armoured train which was
19 being constructed by Frenki at the time.
20 Q. And did he indicate to you for what purpose those weapons were
21 intended or had been used?
22 A. Yes. For the units, for the arming of the units. And as far as
23 the anti-aircraft gun, he said that his people had already used it in
24 Borovo Selo on May 2nd against the Croat police.
25 Q. Did you learn how -- approximately how long the individual
1 training periods took and how many trainees attended at any given time?
2 A. I think that they were discussing a short period of training;
3 maybe 10 to 15 days, not longer than that. The place was able to
4 accommodate a few dozen people. I don't know. Maybe a hundred, two
5 hundred people. But this is my estimate. I was never told exactly the
7 Q. And do you know how long the camp at Golubic remained in
9 A. It was in operation I think in August 1991, but I don't know how
10 long it was in operation for. I can't say that. Captain Dragan kept a
11 permanent unit there that was under his personal command. Occasionally,
12 he would move it from the Golubic camp to the Knin fortress, or in some
13 other areas in Krajina.
14 Q. Who paid for the camps or bore the cost of the camps?
15 A. The MUP of Serbia.
16 Q. I believe you mentioned that Captain Dragan was the chief trainer
17 of the camp. Did he have other trainers who were subordinates to him
18 involved in the training process?
19 A. Yes. There were several instructors. I don't remember their
20 names. They had nicknames.
21 Q. And do you know whether or not Captain Dragan was involved in
22 training in camps other than Golubic?
23 A. I know later, from 1993, about the camp in Bruska, which he
24 managed, and he also commanded one permanent unit there.
25 Q. Now, the trainees who trained there, did they later become
1 members of other units such as the police or the TO, or any other
3 A. They were part of the special police, or the so-called volunteer
5 Q. And if I heard you correctly in the Serbian, when you refer to
6 the special police, did you use the term "milicija"?
7 A. Yes, it was the milicija of Krajina. It was the special police,
8 or Martic's police, as it was also known.
9 Q. In addition to the training in weaponry and other physical
10 aspects of military training, was there any indoctrination element to the
11 training at Golubic?
12 A. Yes. This was well known and it was something that was talked
13 about. It was something that was described as brainwashing, which meant
14 that the ideology was promoted there in the sense that they should not
15 belong to any kind of party ideology, they should not follow any
16 particular party, but only the Serbian national interest. I felt that
17 this was an attempt to gain a distance from the SDS, which was the main
18 party at the time, and an attempt to place the people directly under the
19 control of the Serbian SDS, the Serbian state security. So the people
20 were very disciplined and they acted as if they had been brainwashed.
21 Their conduct had changed somewhat.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction. Not the SDS, but the
23 Serbian state security.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. So these trainees would be within the direction of the parallel
1 structure, as you described it earlier.
2 A. Yes. These were their formations, the formations of the parallel
4 Q. What was the aim or purpose of training and indoctrinating and
5 organising these groups under the parallel structure?
6 A. In public, they were presented as the armed forces of the
7 Krajina, and they were quite strongly promoted in the media in that way.
8 Captain Dragan himself became a very powerful media figure who promoted
9 those formations. The media created this picture of them as an armed
10 force or as an army of the Krajina, in a way, but actually, they were
11 armed formations which were carrying out a certain objective which was
12 set by the state security, and that aim was to carry out provocations --
13 to constantly carry out provocations and to draw in the Yugoslav People's
14 Army first as a force of separation in the conflicts and then later as a
15 force which actually moved over to offensive operations in relation to
16 the Croatian side.
17 Q. Mr. Babic, in the statement that was marked as an exhibit
18 yesterday, in paragraphs 10 and 11 you provide information about the
19 media campaign that was waged and its effects, referring back to your
20 testimony initially in the Milosevic case about the media campaign in
21 Croatia. And if I can summarise that quickly, you indicate that the same
22 thing happened in Bosnia, first with an emphasis on the threatened
23 genocide in Croatia against Serbs and then by Muslims and Croats in
24 Bosnia against Serbs, but with even stronger effects. And you refer to
25 the role of the propaganda and the effort to persuade people that an old
1 criminal coalition including Croats and Muslims was being brought back to
2 life; to media stories about Jasenovac and the crimes of World War II and
3 essentially a campaign that triggered fear, hatred, and a desire for
4 revenge; and its role as a tool to win support for the options that were
5 being presented to the Serbian people, and as a precursor to implementing
6 the approach that Mr. Karadzic described in a meeting with Mr. Milosevic
7 and you in 1991. And then in a subsequent paragraph you went on to
8 describe further misuses of history including the use of the term "Turks"
9 and its significance.
10 Let me ask you now: Who was in control of the Serbian media?
11 A. Slobodan Milosevic, first of all. It was the media in Serbia and
12 later the media that was created in Republika Srpska, in Pale and in
13 Banja Luka.
14 Q. And was that control effected, at least in part, by the
15 appointment and removal of directors of media by Mr. Milosevic?
16 A. Yes. I knew that. They were responsible to him. He appointed
17 them. Although the formal procedure was different.
18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I note that on page 13005 through
19 13011, there's further detailed -- in the transcript of the Milosevic
20 case, there's further detailed information about that aspect of control
21 over the media.
22 JUDGE ORIE: I take it, then, that you tender those pages under
23 Rule 92 bis (D); is that correct?
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, it was actually my intention, with the
25 Court's permission, to wait until the conclusion of the examination and
1 identify various portions that may be useful for the Court.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MR. TIEGER:
4 Q. Mr. Babic, when did the JNA become involved in combat operations
5 on a large scale in Croatia?
6 A. From August 26, 1991. The JNA moved to offensive operations.
7 They had the initiative in combat operations. Up until that time -- from
8 March 1991 up until that time, it was a kind of buffer zone between the
9 warring sides. That's how they explained it. But in fact, they were a
10 kind of protection for the Krajina area.
11 Q. Mr. Babic, in the factual basis that was also marked as an
12 exhibit yesterday, it indicates that following the -- that from August
13 1991, "following the attack on Kijevo, you became aware that the JNA and
14 the parallel structure were not protecting the Serbs in Croatia but were
15 along with local Serb TO forces in the Krajina and Martic's police
16 engaged in a war for territory to create the western borders of a new
17 Serbian state." It further indicates that you saw that "the creation of
18 a Serbian state would include the forcible, permanent removal of the
19 non-Serb populations from Serb-dominated areas of Croatia through a
20 discriminatory campaign of persecution."
21 Can you tell us how that was accomplished from August 1991. Was
22 there a particular pattern or particular kind of approach to the actions
23 of these forces in the forcible, permanent removal of the non-Serb
25 A. Yes. What you have read just now is what started in August 1991
1 and lasted until November 1991. It summarises everything that I saw and
2 found out. Excuse me. The last part of your question?
3 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we can either -- it may be more
4 appropriate at this point to adjourn and pick it up after the recess.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps the answer would take some time.
6 We'll adjourn until 5 minutes to 11.00.
7 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
8 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, the Chamber has considered during the
10 break in what form to further deal with the matter of protective
11 measures, and the Defence is invited, if it would like to make any
12 further submissions, to do that briefly in writing and we'll, whenever
13 during the break, we'll try to pay attention to it immediately.
14 MR. STEWART: So may I ask which break Your Honour is referring
16 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the next break, for example, or whatever
17 interrupts the hearings.
18 MR. STEWART: And may I ask Your Honour when it is suggested that
19 I prepare those submissions in writing in time for the Chamber to
20 consider them during the next break?
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you can't do it before the next break,
22 we'll hear from you after the break after that. We spent a lot of time
23 on the issue. It's an important issue. But at the same time, we have to
24 proceed. The decision stands as it is. And if there's any further
25 matter to be submitted, we'd rather receive it in writing.
1 MR. STEWART: May I make one request, Your Honour, which we
2 believe is something which in a sense is logically prior. Leave aside
3 the question of the announcement. It is not clear, because I think
4 that -- I believe that it wasn't actually expressed. We do not at the
5 moment know what the basis was of the renewal of the decision. We do not
6 know now whether the closed session is continuing on the basis of the
7 fact that Mr. Babic is giving evidence and the content, and we also do
8 not know anything -- which we suggest we should at least know -- we do
9 not know anything about what the Trial Chamber's view is as to the
10 content. Having regard to the fact, for example, that the whole lot of
11 stuff was given in open session in the Milosevic case. So if we are to
12 be able to deal with this point at all, may I put it, we have to have
13 something to bite on. We have to know what, in summary form, no doubt,
14 but we have to know clearly, please, what is the basis of the Trial
15 Chamber's decision because otherwise we can't intelligently and
16 intelligibly deal with the matter. And we do need to know that, and with
17 respect, Your Honour, we have to know that - may I put it politely this
18 way, that we have to know that urgently so it may be that it's in the
19 course of the next break that then we have to be put in a position to
20 know that before we can then proceed to deal with the matter on our side.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm aware of that and the Chamber will inform
22 you at shortest notice, perhaps within the next 15 minutes.
23 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. TIEGER:
2 Q. Mr. Babic, just before we adjourned, you had asked for a reminder
3 of the last part of the question I had posed to you earlier. That last
4 part asked whether you could tell us about how -- or if there was any
5 particular manner in which or pattern to the actions of the forces
6 involved in the forcible removal of the non-Serb populations.
7 A. Yes. What I saw was repeated. So based on that, I concluded
8 that there was a pattern and that things were done in accordance with
9 that same pattern. Initially there would be requests to give an
10 ultimatum to Croatian population to move out. That was done on one
11 occasion. And most often, it was done without any ultimatum, whereby the
12 forces of Krajina milicija and the TO would provoke the population. They
13 would be doing that in the territory populated by Croatian population.
14 Following that, the JNA would get involved in the conflict and start
15 using artillery and heavy weapons and then the Croatian population would
16 be forced to flee.
17 This is how they were expelled, mostly in this way. The reasons
18 for the involvement of the JNA were often of a different nature as well.
19 Sometimes they would be doing it on their own initiative, and this was
20 the case in the blockade of the barracks, which was also used in order to
21 wage a local war and to move the front line towards the Croatian side.
22 During that operation, Croatian population fled or was expelled.
23 Q. You made reference earlier to Kijevo, as it was mentioned in the
24 factual basis. Do you recall where you were on the day that Kijevo was
1 A. I didn't know that it was attacked. I learned of it later, but
2 on that day, on that same day.
3 Q. Where were you on that day?
4 A. With Milosevic.
5 Q. And was that in Belgrade?
6 A. Yes, in Belgrade. He invited me.
7 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic indicate to you whether he knew that an attack
8 on Kijevo had taken place or was about to take place?
9 A. He let me know that he knew of that. He said something like:
10 Hasn't that already been finished there? First he told me that he would
11 send Frenki back to Krajina because prior to that, I protested and
12 complained, so he pulled Frenki back. And I think that that was the
13 reason why he called me to the meeting. And that -- and then he also
14 asked me what was going on around Knin, and then I said that the Croatian
15 police was harassing Serbs. And I asked him whether the JNA could
16 protect that village in Otisce phoen] as it had done before, whether it
17 could play the role of the buffer. And he asked me: Well, hasn't that
18 already been solved? Based on which I concluded that he was aware of all
20 During the meeting, Kijevo was attacked and the JNA was in fact
21 active in that area and moved the front line by some 15 to 20 kilometres.
22 But it was done in a different way than prior to that, and I learned of
23 it the following day.
24 Q. When you returned to the area of Knin, did you have an
25 opportunity to observe what had happened in Kijevo?
1 A. Yes, I did pass through, because the house where I was born is on
2 the opposite side. Therefore, I passed through Kijevo on the following
3 day. The village was destroyed. One could see that there was artillery
4 fire on the houses, and that area was controlled by the forces of the
5 9th Corps of the JNA.
6 Q. Did you also have an opportunity to see fighting in the
7 Kostajnica region in September of 1991?
8 A. Yes. I passed through on the opposite side, on the Bosnian side,
9 and on that occasion I saw across the river explosions around a village
10 near Kostajnica. I think the name of the village was Kozibrod and I
11 asked the man what it was all about and he said it was the mortars. 110
12 millimetres; that's what he said. The shells were landing in front of
13 the village, around the village. I saw that in September of 1991. They
14 were landing randomly.
15 Q. And later in November 1991 did you have an opportunity to travel
16 through the area and observe what had happened to Croat villages in the
18 A. Yes. I passed through and I saw that almost all Croatian
19 villages were destroyed and abandoned. There were no inhabitants there.
20 Q. Now, let me ask you at this point about a particular JNA officer.
21 At some point did you become aware that Ratko Mladic had become the
22 commander of the VRS in Bosnia?
23 A. Yes, in 1992. I don't know exactly whether it was the spring or
24 the summer. Perhaps in May.
25 Q. Were you already familiar with him from Croatia?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. What was his position in Croatia when you first became familiar
3 with him?
4 A. He was the Chief of Staff of the 9th Corps of the JNA.
5 Q. Now, you've spoken about the military actions to forcibly remove
6 non-Serb populations. Do you know whether Ratko Mladic was involved in
7 those military efforts during the course of his service in Croatia?
8 A. Yes, I know about military operations that he was in charge of,
9 whereby Croatian population was expelled.
10 Q. First can you identify some of the places where that occurred?
11 A. I can say in general terms that it was the entire area in which
12 the Knin Corp was active, but specifically it was in Kijevo area and then
13 further on towards Sinj; then around Drnis, Sibenik, and Zadar.
14 Q. You've already indicated that the events in Kijevo took place in
15 August. Is it correct that the military actions in Sinj took place in
16 September, in Drnis in September, and in Zadar in October?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you have an opportunity --
19 A. I apologise. On the outskirts of Zadar, it started somewhat
20 earlier, perhaps in September, and then it was around Benkovac and ...
21 THE INTERPRETER: The witnesses [sic] didn't hear the name of the
22 last place. Interpreter's correction.
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. Mr. Babic, you mentioned that on the outskirts of Zadar it
25 started somewhat earlier, perhaps in September and then it was around
1 Benkovac and another place and the interpreters did not hear the other
3 A. In October it was closer to Zadar, and in late September it was
4 around Obrovac, and also towards Zadar on the other side. This is the
5 direction leading to Maslenica.
6 Q. With respect to Kijevo, I believe you indicated earlier that an
7 ultimatum had been given to the villagers to leave, before the artillery
8 barrage actually forced them to leave. Is that right?
9 A. Yes. Initially, the ultimatum was issued by Martic, several days
10 before the attack of the JNA artillery. I personally protested against
11 this, but I was president of the municipality and the prime minister of
12 the government. However, regardless of my protests, some ten days later,
13 the JNA attack ensued. Following that, I received the information that
14 milicija, Martic's men, and the local TO also participated in the attack.
15 Q. And did you actually see Mladic himself in the area during the
16 course of military operations there?
17 A. Yes. Two days later. I think it was on the second day. On the
18 third day, perhaps. The second day that I was there. So that could have
19 been the 28th or the 29th.
20 Q. With respect to the events in the area of Sinj, did Mladic tell
21 you personally anything about his involvement there?
22 A. Yes. These events took place several weeks later, perhaps two
23 weeks. I'm not sure. But this was after the events in Kijevo. Mladic
24 said -- he boasted, in a way -- that he had ordered Mr. Jerko Vukas, who
25 used to be president of Knin municipality a long time ago, and at the
1 time he was an officer of a Croatian ministry. Mladic boasted that he
2 had personally ordered him to remove himself the barricades. And then
3 later on Mladic sent the forces of the corps there. That's what I heard
4 from him.
5 Q. And what did you understand to be the point of ordering the
6 president of the municipality to personally remove the barricades rather
7 than simply having soldiers remove the barricades?
8 A. Well, he boasted, he bragged about it because I think he wanted
9 to show just how powerful he was and that he could humiliate a man by
10 forcing him to remove the barricades. He was quite arrogant. He
11 displayed a lot of arrogance while telling me about this.
12 Q. Based on your contact with Mr. Milosevic and your contact with
13 Dr. Karadzic, which we will touch upon in more detail later, do you know
14 whether they were aware of Mladic's role in Croatia?
15 A. Yes, certainly.
16 Q. Did you have an opportunity to meet Vojislav Seselj in Croatia?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Are you familiar with the concept or notion of Greater Serbia?
19 A. Yes. This was Seselj's political platform.
20 Q. And is it the same notion or a different notion from the concept
21 advocated by Mr. Milosevic of all Serbs in one state?
22 A. It's a similar notion. I couldn't say that it's quite the same.
23 Seselj was more specific, more precise.
24 Q. And did he identify the borders of Greater Serbia, the state in
25 which all Serbs should reside?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did Mr. Seselj take a position in relation to non-Serbs in the
3 territory of what he regarded as Greater Serbia?
4 A. He considered them to be foreigners, aliens. Based on what he
5 was doing, it was clear that he wanted to remove them, at least based on
6 what he was doing in Vojvodina. Also based on what I saw as to his
7 position towards Bosnia. At the time, he didn't dare travel through
8 Bosnia, because of what he had said about Muslims. I can't recall the
9 specific formulation. I can't quote his words.
10 Q. Was he generally known to be someone who favoured steps to remove
11 non-Serbs from the territories of what -- of -- the territories of what
12 was regarded as greater Serbia or of what were considered to be Serbian
14 A. Could you please repeat the question.
15 Q. Sure. I'm sorry. It did get confusing.
16 Was he generally known as someone who advocated steps to remove
17 non-Serbs from areas considered to be Serbian?
18 A. He advocated the idea of Greater Serbia, homogenous Serbia.
19 Based on his words and his deeds, his conduct, it was clear that he had a
20 hostile attitude towards non-Serb population. At least, that's how I saw
22 Q. Did Mr. Milosevic support Seselj?
23 A. Yes. He commended him. Seselj also supported him.
24 Q. Did Seselj have volunteers in Croatia, Serbian volunteers in
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And did he come to the Krajina to visit his volunteers?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you know how he got there or who facilitated his visit?
5 A. He used to come in a helicopter. Marko Milanovic, the
6 then-Minister of Defence of Republic of Serbia, facilitated those trips.
7 Q. Was that a JNA helicopter?
8 I'm sorry. We couldn't hear your answer.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And did you know from Seselj personally that he came to visit his
12 A. Yes. He told me that personally.
13 Q. Mr. Babic, in the course of your role as a leader of Krajina
14 Serbs, did you have an opportunity to meet members of the Bosnian Serb
15 leadership, either on a regional, local, or republic level?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. First, can you tell us some of the regional leaders with whom you
18 became acquainted.
19 A. Andjelko Grahovac, Vojo Kupresanin, Radoslav Brdjanin, Dr. Vukic,
20 Miro Mladjenovic. Perhaps some others, but I can't recall now.
21 Q. And which republic-level leaders did you meet and work with?
22 A. Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Biljana Plavsic, Nikola
23 Koljevic, Velibor Ostojic, and some others.
24 Q. Now, did you have an opportunity to see how the republic-level
25 leaders interacted with each other?
1 A. Yes, I did.
2 Q. Did you have an opportunity to see how regional leaders
3 interacted with republic leaders?
4 A. I did.
5 Q. And did you also have an opportunity to hear from both regional
6 and republic leaders who they regarded as the most significant figures in
7 the SDS and the governmental structures of Republika Srpska?
8 A. There were four people. They considered four people as the
9 leaders: Krajisnik, Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic, and Biljana Plavsic.
10 They were the main leaders.
11 Q. And within that group of four main leaders, were there any
12 individuals in particular who were regarded as the one or two most
13 powerful figures?
14 A. Momcilo Krajisnik and Radovan Karadzic were considered to be as
15 the most powerful figures.
16 Q. May I ask you this. On approximately how many occasions did you
17 have an opportunity to meet with or be with Mr. Krajisnik in the period
18 1991 and 1992?
19 A. Four times, I think. Yes. Four times.
20 Q. And did you have an opportunity on those occasions - which are
21 identified in more detail in your written statement - to see Mr. Karadzic
22 and Mr. Krajisnik or Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik interacting with each
24 A. Yes. They were together.
25 Q. And were those observations consistent with the information you
1 had gleaned from republic and regional leaders about who the two most
2 important figures were?
3 A. Yes. And later I also had some insight which confirmed that.
4 Q. And by that, are you referring to subsequent contact that is
5 contact with Mr. Krajisnik or observations of Mr. Krajisnik after 1992,
6 or are you referring to something else?
7 A. Yes. When I saw him after 1992.
8 Q. Now, was Dr. Karadzic the Bosnian Serb leader -- let me as you
9 this about him. Approximately how much occasions did you meet with
10 Dr. Karadzic?
11 A. On several occasions. More than ten times, but I don't recall
12 quite how many.
13 Q. And did you also speak to him on the telephone on occasions?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What was the general nature and purpose of those meetings or
16 phone calls?
17 A. Mostly I received instructions, advice, information in relation
18 to political objectives and current political developments.
19 Q. Were Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic close collaborators?
20 A. Yes, very close, according to what I saw.
21 Q. Did the Bosnian Serb leadership share the position of
22 Mr. Milosevic regarding all Serbs in one state?
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, at this time I would ask to have not
25 marked but have displayed to the witness an exhibit previously marked
1 during the course of Mr. Treanor's testimony, although I don't know the
2 precise number.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Mr. Treanor --
4 MR. TIEGER: We have copies of the --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Treanor had quite a number of documents, so
6 would it be --
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: -- another witness, it would be -- but let's try to
9 find it. And may I use the time to give Mr. Stewart the information he
10 urgently needed.
11 Mr. Stewart, you'd like to know more about the position of the
12 Chamber, in view of the earlier --
13 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. I would.
14 JUDGE ORIE: At this stage, it's still unclear whether the event
15 in Belgrade, and I'm referring to the event described as having happened
16 on the 5th of May, whether this event was staged to create an atmosphere
17 of intimidation - although it's unclear, it's certainly a possibility -
18 an atmosphere of intimidation which might influence the giving of
19 evidence and also the content of that evidence to be given by Mr. Babic.
20 The fact that in earlier stages, some of the information now
21 protected for at least the near future, may have become known in circles
22 closely following the proceedings does not prevent the Chamber from
23 deeming it appropriate, in view of the interest of the persons concerned
24 and the integrity of the proceedings, to keep it at this moment away from
25 the public, at least until the Chamber has a better insight in the origin
1 of the 5th of May incident. The Chamber has taken steps, meanwhile, to
2 communicate directly with the Victims and Witness Unit in order to keep
3 informed, to be kept updated on whatever development in the investigation
4 and the outcome of it. That's what I would like to tell you at this
6 And since we have now found the relevant document, Mr. Tieger,
7 you may proceed. And it was binder 6, tab 67 of the Treanor exhibits.
8 MR. TIEGER:
9 Q. Mr. Babic, I'd like you to look at the document in front of you
10 which is an exhibit that the Court has indicated is found at binder 6,
11 tab 67, and is a letter dated December 19, 1991, from the president of
12 the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Momcilo
13 Krajisnik. Are you familiar with that document?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. I had asked you earlier about the objective of all Serbs in one
16 state. Is this document a reflection of a commonly shared goal of all
17 Serbs in one state?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. In the fourth paragraph, at least in the English translation, the
20 letter reads: "All Serbs are engaged in a struggle for the same goal
21 under the same banner and we are all convinced of our ultimate victory."
22 What is the goal that is referred to and what is the ultimate
23 victory referred to?
24 A. The achievement of a state in which all Serbs will live, Serb
25 from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia.
1 Q. And in the second paragraph, the letter also refers to the
2 verification of the historical right of the Serbian people to live in one
3 state. In the event of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the
4 independence of various republics including Bosnia, did that mean that
5 the Serbian people from Bosnia and Herzegovina or from Croatia would
6 repatriate to Serbia, or did it refer to territories within the republics
7 of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?
8 A. It referred to the territories inhabited by Serbs in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.
10 Q. What territory did the Bosnian Serb leadership consider was the
11 historical right of the Serbian people to possess or control?
12 A. The territory in which the Serbs constituted the majority
13 population at the time, and also the territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina
14 in which Serbs constituted a majority prior to World War II; i.e.,
15 territories where there was a genocide of the Serbian population and in
16 which -- the territories in which the Serb population constituted a
17 minority at the time.
18 Q. And was this also the view of Mr. Milosevic, as you understood
20 A. Milosevic's position was in two parts: That the republics -- the
21 people constituted a principle, so they had the ability to decide who
22 they wanted to be with. And the other part was the actual state of
23 affairs. So it meant the control over territories until the definite
24 solution of the Yugoslav crisis.
25 But I did not hear a specific position from Milosevic about what
1 these territories are, where the actual state of affairs or the state on
2 the ground should be maintained. The principle was to maintain the
3 actual state as it was in territories which were supposed to remain part
4 of the state. Or to put it better: He agreed with Radovan Karadzic on
5 his position on the approach to the territories in Bosnia and
7 Q. Now, you've indicated the view of the Bosnian Serb leadership
8 that Serbs in Bosnia were entitled historically to territory, both where
9 they were a majority and where they were presently a minority. Did you
10 ever hear from a member of the Bosnian Serb leadership how control over
11 those territories, including those on which Serbs were a minority, was to
12 be obtained?
13 A. Yes, from Radovan Karadzic.
14 Q. When did you hear that from Mr. Karadzic, from Dr. Karadzic?
15 A. In July 1991.
16 Q. Where were you when you heard that?
17 A. In the office of Slobodan Milosevic, for the first time. And the
18 second time in Celinac, in Bosnia.
19 Q. Who was present in the office of Mr. Milosevic in July of 1991,
20 when you heard Dr. Karadzic explain how control was to be obtained?
21 A. Slobodan Milosevic, Dr. Karadzic and myself.
22 Q. Who had called that meeting?
23 A. I was invited by Milosevic.
24 Q. What did you understand to be the purpose of the meeting?
25 A. I was told what the purpose of the meeting was. The purpose was
1 to prevent the political initiative of myself and the people from Knin
2 with the people of Banja Luka regarding the unification of the Serbian
3 region of Krajina and the area of Knin. So the Banja Luka Krajina and
4 the Knin area.
5 Q. And did both Mr. Milosevic and Dr. Karadzic object to that
6 political initiative?
7 A. Yes, very strongly.
8 Q. What was their concern or objection to that?
9 A. The initiative was disrupting the plan that they had for Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina.
11 Q. In what way did the initiative obstruct the plan they had for
13 A. The initiative implied that the population of the Bosnian
14 Krajina, which was a majority Serb population, decides, based on
15 self-determination, to unite with the Serbs in the Autonomous Region of
16 Krajina. In that way, their plans were being ruled out and that was for
17 Serbs to take over control of territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
18 which Serbs were not a majority. So the self-determination of the
19 majority, that principle obstructed the implementation of their plan to
20 control territory where Serbs constituted a minority.
21 Q. What did Dr. Karadzic say about the way that Serbs should proceed
22 to gain control of the territory they considered should be Serbian?
23 A. He said what he would do.
24 Q. And can you describe that to the Court, please. What did he say?
25 A. First of all, he said that Serbs should not make any moves which
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 would present them before the international community as a factor which
2 caused the crisis and a conflict, but they had to wait for Alija
3 Izetbegovic to make a wrong political move, and then he said they would
4 settle accounts with Alija Izetbegovic by expelling the Muslims and
5 forcing them into the river valleys, and then they would link up the Serb
6 territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina into one whole. And he was very
7 theatrically indicating that he had control over Alija Izetbegovic.
8 Q. And how do you mean? In what way was he theatrically indicating
10 A. He said he had Alija Izetbegovic in his little pocket and in
11 Celinac, he took the cigar which he took from Slobodan Milosevic and then
12 he put that cigar into his small pocket. In Celinac, the cigar
13 represented Alija Izetbegovic, which he was putting into his small
14 pocket. So that was the general idea of that gesture.
15 Q. Let me return -- before I move on to the meeting in Celinac, let
16 me conclude your discussion of the meeting in Belgrade. Did Dr. Karadzic
17 indicate whether or not there were any territories he was still uncertain
18 whether or not he would take from -- he or the Bosnian Serbs would take
19 from Muslims?
20 A. He mentioned Zenica. He said: I don't know whether I should
21 take Zenica from them.
22 Q. Id Mr. Milosevic say anything to you after Dr. Karadzic had
23 described the process that should take place?
24 A. He said that I shouldn't bother or shouldn't be in Radovan's way.
25 Q. When did the Celinac meeting take place?
1 A. I think it was on the same day, in the evening.
2 Q. And what was the purpose of the meeting in Celinac?
3 A. The purpose was for Karadzic to discredit me in front of the
4 people who shared his views in Banja Luka and to present to them his plan
5 for Bosnia.
6 Q. Do you know who organised the meeting?
7 A. Yes. Radoslav Brdjanin. He was from Celinac, and I think that
8 was why the meeting was held in Celinac.
9 Q. And was Mr. Brdjanin also a top SDS regional leader in the ARK
11 A. Yes. He was the president of the SDS regional board and he was
12 thought of as Karadzic's man.
13 Q. Who attended, in general, the meeting in Celinac, and about how
14 large was that meeting?
15 A. I think there were about 10 or 15 people from Banja Luka and its
16 environs. They were people from the regional leadership. I cannot
17 remember exactly who was there.
18 Q. Can you tell us, please, what happened at that meeting.
19 A. Basically, Karadzic repeated what he told me at Milosevic's, but
20 he did this in a more theatrical manner. He was waving his arms about.
21 He was taking Alija out of his pocket. He lit a cigar. So he was
22 putting on a performance. There wasn't a lot of discussion, really,
23 after he finished with his presentation.
24 Q. So Dr. Karadzic repeated the elements of the plan he had
25 described at the meeting in Belgrade with Mr. Milosevic.
1 A. That's correct. And then he also said that once that was
2 completed, the Krajina would then be joined to the Serbian territory in
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 Q. Mr. Babic, what was the earliest time or earliest date that you
5 became aware that members of the Bosnian Serb leadership were discussing
6 taking control of territories or municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 A. Following the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a few months
8 after that, I went to Sarajevo in May 1991, to Dr. Karadzic's apartment,
9 and that is where I noticed that he was considering the establishment of
10 control or authority. I cannot really say exactly in what way, whether
11 it was where he had a majority as far as political power was concerned or
12 was he considering perhaps embarking on a coalition with some partners in
13 Bosnia. But I did notice that he was planning something in relation to
14 the police.
15 Also, I knew about the process that was being conducted by the
16 SDS in the political aspect, the creation of associations of
17 municipalities in the area and also the plan that I heard about from
18 Karadzic about joining up all of these different areas.
19 Q. How did it happen that you travelled to Dr. Karadzic's apartment?
20 What prompted that?
21 A. I received information from Martic that Jovica Stanisic had sent
22 a message that I should go and see Karadzic in Sarajevo. He didn't
23 explain why I should do that.
24 Q. Did you go alone or did you travel with Mr. Martic?
25 A. Two or three vehicles went. I took my car. He took his car.
1 Q. And who was present at Dr. Karadzic's apartment when you and
2 Mr. Martic arrived?
3 A. Jovica Stanisic and Velibor Ostojic were there.
4 Q. You made a brief reference earlier to Velibor Ostojic. Can you
5 tell us, please, who he was.
6 A. He was one of the SDS activists, an associate of Karadzic's, and
7 I think at the time he was Minister of Information in the government of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9 Q. And what was happening when you arrived, or what happened after
10 you arrived?
11 A. Well, we came into the apartment. We were invited to sit down in
12 a corner of the room. We were given coffee. And then in the other part
13 of the room, Karadzic and Stanisic were sitting down, looking at the
14 maps. Ostojic brought in some other maps. They were analysing the
15 territories of municipalities and the conversation was not intelligible
16 to me, but I understood that it had to do with the police. Jovica
17 Stanisic was saying that the radio was being amplified so that things
18 would be louder, and I think there was some talk of wire-tapping and so
19 on. It didn't last very long.
20 And then we were taken to the Deputies Club, the deputies of the
21 SDS. It was in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was a public
22 restaurant. And that was it. That was all there was to it.
23 I don't know whether somebody mentioned it or this was a
24 conclusion that I drew. I can't remember. Perhaps it was just my
25 impression, but we were there to give a political performance, because
1 Karadzic needed to appear in public with us.
2 Q. And in what way was it helpful for Dr. Karadzic to be seen
3 publicly with you and Martic?
4 A. Well, at the time we had the image of Serbian nationalists. I
5 don't know whether he wanted to portray himself as a like-minded person.
6 I don't know. That's my assumption.
7 Q. Let me see if we can clarify one reference that you made earlier,
8 and that was to the fact that a radio was being amplified and there was
9 talk of wire-tapping and so on. Does that mean that there was concern
10 about some kind of eavesdropping and someone turned up the radio or
11 suggested turning up the radio to inhibit that, or does it refer to
12 something else?
13 A. That's precisely what it is. Stanisic said that the radio should
14 be turned up so that nobody could eavesdrop to what we were saying there.
15 And I think that Ostojic then got up and turned up the radio.
16 Q. And although you've indicated the difficulty you had in hearing
17 the precise nature of the conversation that was taking place regarding
18 the maps, were you able to see whether the maps -- or hear whether the
19 maps referred to the municipalities within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and if
20 so, approximately how many different ones and in which areas?
21 A. That was the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina with municipalities
22 marked in different colours. I couldn't see what it depicted exactly
23 because I was some three to four metres away from it. I couldn't see
24 precisely what was there.
25 Q. Mr. Babic, you referred to subsequent -- or to contacts you had
1 with Mr. Krajisnik after 1992. Let me ask you if you had an opportunity
2 to have a conversation with Mr. Krajisnik in January of 1995.
3 A. I did.
4 Q. What was the occasion for that conversation?
5 A. The occasion was the event in Livanjkso Polje and in Dinara,
6 meaning in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the vicinity of Knin.
7 This involved operations carried out by the HVO and Croatia in the
8 territory of Republika Srpska. The HVO and the Croatian army were
9 engaged in an offensive and they were taking up the new territory from
10 which they were bombarding the outskirts of Knin and that area.
11 Therefore, we asked for a meeting in Pale. Martic, in fact, did. And
12 then there was also Rajko Lezajic and myself. That was the delegation
13 that went to Pale to inquire with the leadership of Republika Srpska as
14 to what their steps would be.
15 Prior to that, I also went to see Slobodan Milosevic to ask him
16 about this, to ask him what was going on. Milosevic simply told me that
17 he had already ordered Mladic and Martic to stop this. However, this did
18 not materialise, and following that, we went to Pale.
19 Q. And how did you happen to have a conversation with Mr. Krajisnik?
20 What was the occasion for that or event for that?
21 A. Well, after the official meeting. A dinner was organised for us
22 and I was placed next to Momcilo Krajisnik. Therefore, we talked during
24 Q. And did Mr. Krajisnik speak to you about Sarajevo and, more
25 specifically, about ethnic separation in Sarajevo?
1 A. Yes. He spoke about Serbian Sarajevo.
2 Q. Can you tell us what the -- how the conversation began and what
3 was discussed.
4 A. After the conversation ended, I was able to understand the gist
5 of what he was trying to say. He was telling me about Sarajevo as a city
6 where various ethnic communities lived apart from each other, Muslims,
7 Serbs, and Croats, and so on, and that they managed to separate Serbian
8 Sarajevo from the other areas and to maintain it under their control.
9 That was the gist of the conversation. And this was just an introduction
10 to what he in fact intended to tell me, which was that he, as someone who
11 was born in Sarajevo and who was attached to Serbian Sarajevo, was ready
12 to give up Serbian Sarajevo, and that I should give up Krajina as well.
13 And then he said: We have Belgrade for our capital. And then when I
14 asked him: Why should I relinquish Krajina? He said: So that Americans
15 would give them 6 per cent of the territory of BH more than what the
16 contact group was offering them at the time.
17 So there was a trade-off, a trade-off with territories, and that
18 was the essence of the conversation. I was astonished upon hearing this
19 and I put an end to the conversation.
20 Q. And what did you understand him to be suggesting that the Serbs
21 in Croatia should do in exchange for the opportunity of 6 per cent
22 greater territory than the contact group was offering?
23 A. He didn't say that specifically, but the implication was that the
24 Serbs had to leave the territory. And in that context, I heard a similar
25 story from Aleksa Buha, minister of foreign affairs of Republika Srpska,
1 in November of 1994. I also heard this from various sources. So this
2 was an approach which was simply supplemented by Momcilo Krajisnik in his
3 conversation with me. This story on division of territories in Bosnia
4 has been going on since March of 1991, according to what I know, which is
5 when Milosevic and Tudjman met in Karadjordjevo. And the story ended in
6 1995, at least as far as the Serb in SAO Krajina are concerned, with
7 their plan to relocate Serbs to Kosovo. So that was in that general
8 context, and certain steps were taken in order to achieve this.
9 Q. Well, Mr. Babic, you've described some of the steps that were
10 taken in Croatia and the pattern of military operations that you had the
11 opportunity to see and learn about. Was this type of military operation,
12 this type of pattern, restricted to Croatia territories or did you see it
13 repeated in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
14 A. I saw that and I heard that about that taking place in Bosnia and
16 Q. When and where did you see it in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
17 A. I saw in August, as I was passing through the so-called corridor
18 from Doboj to Bijeljina, as I was travelling to Belgrade to attend the
19 funeral of Dr. Raskovic. I also saw it later on in Prijedor, in Bosanski
20 Novi. The consequences of these events. I also heard from some people
21 about what had happened.
22 Q. And in general, what were you able to see in those areas,
23 including Prijedor and Bosanski Novi?
24 A. I saw destroyed Muslim villages without inhabitants. I saw
25 sights similar to those I saw in Krajina in November of 1991.
1 Q. Let me ask you it, since you mentioned the area of the corridor:
2 Did the areas you passed and observed this devastation include Sanski
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Did you also have an opportunity to see what had happened in
6 areas toward Brcko and Bijeljina or the area around Zvornik, toward
7 Han Pijesak and Pale?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And was that similar to what you've just described?
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'd like to show a small portion of a
12 video at this time. I'd also like to advise the Court that we will be
13 finishing the examination-in-chief in this session.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You'll take considerably less than the six
15 hours you indicated. The session, you mean this morning's session.
16 MR. TIEGER: I mean this very session. Yes, Your Honour. And I
17 never thought I could be potentially embarrassed for being more efficient
18 than --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm not blaming you, but -- not at all,
20 Mr. Tieger. Let's first look at the video. You know that we would have
21 a break from now not later than the next ten minutes, but are you telling
22 me that we don't even need that break? It's not entirely clear what you
23 mean by "this session." Until the next break or this morning's session
24 or --
25 MR. TIEGER: I believe we're going to break next at 12.25 or
1 12.30; is that correct?
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MR. TIEGER: 12.30 is what I anticipated. And I anticipate I
4 will conclude the examination-in-chief by that time.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now it's clear to me. Let's first, then, look
6 at the video.
7 [Videotape played]
8 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, there are two sequences to this video.
9 The first is for a bit of orientation.
10 [Videotape played]
11 MR. TIEGER: Your Honours, this is a video taken along the
12 Prijedor-Banja Luka road in January of 1996 by the Office of the
13 Prosecutor. And I did not previously ask to have it marked, but I would
14 ask to do so at this point.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number P156.
17 MR. TIEGER:
18 Q. Mr. Babic, the footage depicted in that video, is the footage
19 depicted in that video similar to the scenes of destruction that you were
20 describing earlier or is it different in some way you want to indicate?
21 A. What I saw was very similar.
22 Q. And did you also travel along the Prijedor-Banja Luka road in
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Mr. Babic, did forces of the RSK participate in the fighting in
1 the military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1992?
2 A. Yes, they did.
3 Q. And where was that?
4 A. Along the so-called corridor.
5 Q. Posavina corridor?
6 A. Yes. Yes.
7 Q. And what was the importance or significance of the corridor for
8 Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbs in the Krajina region?
9 A. The importance was in linking up the Serbian territories in
10 Bosnian Krajina, SAO Krajina, with Serbia, as well as with the Serbian
11 territories in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 Q. And which RSK forces participated, or under whose direction?
13 A. The forces under the command of Milan Martic were the ones that
14 participated, the ones from RSK. That was a mixture of police and the
15 military. So those were the armed forces of Krajina. That's how we
16 could define them.
17 Q. How did you come to learn that the armed forces of Krajina,
18 including the police and military and those under the command of Milan
19 Martic, were involved in the military operations in the corridor?
20 A. I heard that they had gone there. I saw them upon their return.
21 I heard and I saw that Goran Hadzic, the then-president of the Republic
22 of Serbian Krajina, promoted Martic into the rank of general for his
23 achievements in combat in the corridor. I also heard from the people
24 about the fighting taking place in the corridor.
25 Q. And when you say you heard from the people, does that mean from
1 the people who participated in the fighting?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. In other words, from those who were under Martic's command.
4 A. Yes.
11 Pages 3416-3427 redacted. Closed session.
14 [Open session]
15 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has to deliver two decisions. The first
16 one is in relation to the admission of the Hidic transcript, which has
17 been applied for under Rule 92 bis. It was an oral application made by
18 the Prosecution pursuant to Rule 92 bis, under (D) which was made in the
19 course of the examination of the witness Ahmet Hidic on the 22nd of
20 April. The transcript pages are 2544. We were asked by the Prosecution
21 to admit Hidic's full transcript of testimony in the Brdjanin trial, a
22 testimony that lasted for two days and consumed 260 pages of transcript.
23 Tentatively, these exhibits already received exhibit numbers P91 and P92.
24 We at that time reserved our decision on the application because we first
25 had to determine whether the conditions for admission pursuant to Rule 92
1 bis (D) had been met.
2 We now have had an opportunity to peruse the two transcripts and
3 the Chamber is satisfied that the evidence therein goes to proof of
4 matters other than the acts and conduct of the accused. It does not
5 follow, however, that the transcript must be admitted. And the parties
6 are well aware of the Chamber's concern to limit the amount of evidence
7 in this case to that what is necessary for the just and fair resolution
8 of the issues in this case.
9 Where a witness comes before the Chamber to give live testimony,
10 the Chamber will be reluctant to admit transcript of testimony by that
11 same witness in prior cases unless the moving party can demonstrate the
12 benefits to all concerned. Saving courtroom time is the principal such
13 benefit, although it must be clear to both parties and to the Chamber
14 which segments of the proffered transcripts are relevant to this case,
15 and why. Otherwise, a great deal of the out-of-court time is consumed
16 poring through the material and in an effort to determine what is
17 relevant and what is not and what is merely repetitious of the live
19 Then in relation to the application in respect of the testimony
20 of Mr. Hidic, the Prosecution has asked for the admission of the whole
21 260 transcript pages and we have found reference to a wide variety of
22 topics and a large number of documents admitted in relation to the
23 testimony of Mr. Hidic. Therefore, the Prosecution is invited to
24 indicate in the transcripts the precise text for which admission is
25 sought. This may be done either by highlighting or by the use of shading
1 or by lining it. It doesn't mean a lot of writing, but just to indicate
2 what specific parts are sought to be admitted. We'd then also like to
3 receive an indication on the precise paragraph numbers of the indictment
4 to which each highlighted segment purportedly relates. And we give the
5 Prosecution the guidance that repetition should be avoided, perhaps
6 unnecessary reminding you, but until such time that we have received and
7 finally have decided on the matter, the documents will retain the
8 tentative exhibit numbers P91 and P92.
9 What I just said might serve as guidance for applications of a
10 similar nature in the future for both parties.
11 That's as far as the testimony of Hidic is concerned. Then we
12 still have to give a decision, and it will be an oral decision, on a
13 written motion by the Prosecution dated the 21st of May, 2004, seeking
14 protective measures for three witnesses. I do understand that the
15 Defence has not responded, and that is also to say not opposed against
16 granting the motion. Is that a correct understanding? There's no
17 opposition from the Defence.
18 MR. STEWART: I'm informed we have responded.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then briefly -- then I -- yes, then you have
20 responded in writing?
21 MR. STEWART: Apparently, yes. I say I'm informed because I have
22 absolutely no personal knowledge of this.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Was that a response in just three short paragraphs,
24 which is in my mind. No opposition. Okay. That's clear, then. Then,
25 well, whether it was in writing or for other reasons that there's no
1 objection. I'll give you the decision.
2 Pursuant to Article 22 of the Statute and Rule 75(A) of the Rules
3 of Procedure and Evidence, this Chamber may order appropriate measures
4 for the protection of witnesses provided that the measures are consistent
5 with the rights of the accused; and to order such protective measures,
6 the Chamber must be satisfied that, based on information provided by the
7 Prosecution, the circumstances justify withholding information from the
9 In respect of witness 188, (redacted)
11 (redacted). The reasons given by the Prosecution are sufficient
12 to grant the request, the request being that his identity and whereabouts
13 not be revealed to the public and that he be permitted to testify using
14 image and voice distortion. (redacted)
18 In respect of Witness 144, the Chamber is also satisfied that the
19 protective measures should be granted on the basis of the information
20 given by the Prosecution, the protective measures being that his identity
21 and whereabouts will not be revealed to the public and that the witness
22 may be permitted to testify using image and voice distortion. And the
23 way to conceal his identity is by using a pseudonym. I didn't say that
24 in respect of Witness 188, but of course the same technique would be
1 Then finally we have Witness 565. There also the Chamber is
2 satisfied with the reasons given by the Prosecution justify the granting
3 of protective measures. Therefore, also the Prosecution has requested
4 that this witness be referred to in public hearings and filings by a
5 pseudonym being Witness 565, and that his identity and whereabouts not be
6 revealed to the public, and that the witness be permitted to testify
7 using image and voice distortion. These requests are granted, and the
8 Registrar is invited to convey the content of this decision to the
9 Victims and Witness Unit.
10 If there's nothing else to be discussed at this moment, I would
11 adjourn. But I'm not sure that there's nothing left.
12 MR. STEWART: Just to say, Your Honour, that we have filed a
13 motion. I will only say that, because it does relate to the closed
14 session matters in some way. We have filed a motion. It's a short one.
15 Your Honours no doubt will receive that through the appropriate channels
16 very shortly. Just to say that everything I said this morning has to be
17 subject to that motion that we have just filed.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it it will be a confidential motion.
19 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. I think it's [Microphone not
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. STEWART: Sorry. We have -- I didn't turn my microphone on.
24 Yes, it is, Your Honour. It is marked confidential.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I understand not using the microphone is underlining
1 that it was confidential.
2 We will adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00. Madam Registrar,
3 in the same courtroom? In the same courtroom.
9 JUDGE ORIE: You get all information that would result from this
10 morning's session.
11 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: As soon as we receive information, and I expect to
13 receive information, I'll instruct our staff to inform the parties.
14 Then finally - and to that extent I'm grateful that you said
15 something, Mr. Stewart - the Chamber will also consider the present
16 situation of negotiations and what would be needed to pursue those, I
17 would rather say, communications between the parties; and if the parties
18 would remain available tomorrow in the afternoon, if needed - I'm saying
19 if needed, we have not made up our mind in that respect - to meet with
20 the Presiding Judge again tomorrow morning, in the afternoon, then please
21 make no travel arrangements for 4.00 sharp. Keep yourself available.
22 We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, but not after I've done
23 what I have to do.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.32 p.m.
25 to be reconvened on Friday, the 4th day of June,
1 2004, at 9.00 a.m.