1 Friday, 25 June 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in the courtroom and also to
7 those assisting us just outside the courtroom. Madam Registrar, would you
8 please call the case.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
10 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.
12 Good morning to you as well, Mr. Okun. I hope for the last time,
13 because we hope to finish your testimony today, but -- so therefore I hope
14 for the last time, but I have to remind you that you are still bound by
15 the solemn declaration that you have given at the beginning of your
17 WITNESS: HERBERT OKUN [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, are you ready to continue the
21 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.
23 Cross-examined by Mr. Stewart [Continued]
24 Q. Good morning, Mr. Okun.
25 A. Good morning.
1 Q. At the close of yesterday I asked you about a quotation from
2 Mr. Izetbegovic and I'll just remind you of it where he said "I would
3 sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina but for that peace I
4 would not sacrifice sovereignty."
5 Would you agree that that can be ready paraphrased and accurately
6 paraphrased as we, Mr. Izetbegovic and his associates, we want a sovereign
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, we would prefer to get it by peaceful means, but if we
8 can't get it by peaceful means then we shall get it by other means.
9 That's what he's saying, isn't he?
10 A. I wouldn't think so. I think he is saying that the country is
11 sovereign. This is an understandable statement. Leaders, when countries
12 become independent, are very proud of the fact.
13 He's recognising the fact that in some cases violence has been
14 practised against his government. That's the reality. The violence did
15 not begin from the government. It was being -- the government was under
16 attack. So he was essentially saying that they will defend themselves.
17 That's the way I would interpret it, Mr. Stewart.
18 By the way, could I ask you when did he make this statement?
19 Q. Well, I -- 27th of February, 1992, was the date that I gave you
20 yesterday. That's what I understand to be --
21 A. Thank you. So it was made, then, on the eve of the referendum,
22 which was February 29th and March 1, 1992. I think it's a standard
23 statement that a leader makes of a -- leader of a country, that is, that's
24 about to become independent and sovereign. I read no malevolent motive
25 into it.
1 In any case, as I mentioned yesterday, he had no army, and
2 everybody in Bosnia knew that. So it would have been exceedingly
3 foolhardy for him to put the interpretation on it that you've mentioned.
4 Q. Well, Mr. Okun, I should say that I gave you the date both
5 yesterday and today of 27th of February, 1992, but my client,
6 Mr. Krajisnik, tells me that it was February 1991. So I'm -- I'm going to
7 defer to him on that and --
8 A. Well, we ---
9 Q. And give it to you on the basis of February 1991 and give you an
10 opportunity to adjust the comment you've just made?
11 A. I think the comment is the same.
12 Q. The -- excuse me. Excuse me one moment, Your Honour.
13 [Defence counsel confer]
14 MR. STEWART:
15 Q. You gave evidence of discussions --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
17 MR. STEWART:
18 Q. Mr. Okun, you gave evidence - this was on Tuesday, it's at page --
19 for those that have the transcript, page 80 of the transcript - of
20 discussions on the 16th of April, 1992, and you -- well, in light of what
21 I said a moment ago, I should make sure it was 1992, shouldn't I. Yes, it
22 was. I've got the right year this time.
23 The -- 1992, discussing the parties -- still discussing the
24 Cutileiro plan, the map of March 1992. The map had initially been
25 accepted by the three sides. We should more correctly say a draft map.
1 Then the Bosnian government - and we've been over that at the end of March
2 1992 - withdrawn its initial acceptance. This was on Dr. Karadzic's mind
3 and he's making a claim again for the ethnically based entities to be
4 inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and he says "we won't fight after the map is
5 decided." This is one of your meetings on April the 16th, 1992. And you
6 were asked -- and Ambassador, is Dr. Karadzic saying to you and Secretary
7 Vance that once the Bosnian Serbs acquire the territory they want or agree
8 with they'll stop fighting, and you said, "yes, that was the clear
9 inference to be drawn from that statement, deciding the map means deciding
10 who has what. So when he says we won't fight after the map is decided,
11 that obviously has to mean we won't fight after the division of the land
12 is decided," and that was shorthand for that term.
13 Mr. Okun, I -- the question I have really is that -- in that
14 exchange of question and answer during your evidence-in-chief, and it
15 stopped there then, whether you have in mind or are suggesting that
16 there's anything in the least bit surprising or unusual or objectionable
17 about the position being taken by Dr. Karadzic at that point in that
19 A. Could I have the page citation for that, please?
20 Q. Yes, page 80 and 81 of --
21 A. 80 and 81.
22 Q. Sorry, the page citation. I beg your pardon. You're -- of course
23 you're talking about the diary entry. Yes, I'm sure I can -- well, fairly
24 sure I can find it for you. It's -- I think the reference was given in
25 the -- yes, 70 and 71 in your marking.
1 A. Thank you. That's what I need.
2 Q. Yes, that's it.
3 A. Yes, I've got it. Thank you. Yes. The remarks that he made, and
4 I should say "they made" because the diary journal indicates it was both
5 Karadzic and Koljevic on page 71, that we won't fight after the map is
6 decided. The question I was asked and to which you are referring now
7 meant that once the Bosnian Serbs had achieved their military aims in
8 conquering the territory they wanted, and one knew but that along with
9 that went the ethnic cleansing, that they would have achieved quite a lot.
10 Note also, please, Mr. Stewart, that the very next entry, the next
11 line in the diary, they refer to the veto, the blocking mechanism. They
12 want that also you see. So this was yet another variant, another
13 restatement, another asseveration of their war aims. Not all of them,
14 because they didn't repeat all six war aims at the same time, but this was
15 a fair and understandable statement concerning their territorial
16 ambitions. That was understood by the use of the word "map." "Map" is
17 the shorthand word for the territories.
18 Have I answered the question.
19 Q. Yes, thank you, Mr. Okun. And you were -- you were asked then,
20 it's a -- it's a separate point in your evidence, you were asked on
21 Wednesday and the transcript reference to that is for those who have a
22 transcript is page 8 and 9. You were asked about information that you had
23 received on Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and you -- this was in relation to camps,
24 particularly, camps, detention centres, and so on. You said -- you were
25 asked, "was the information you received from these various sources
1 consistent," and you said, "Yes it was entirely consistent, I may say."
2 And then you were asked, Now did you and Secretary Vance have occasions to
3 let the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Mr. Krajisnik, know that you
4 were aware of widespread ethnic cleansing or ongoing ethnic cleansing?"
5 Answer from you: "Yes, repeatedly." Question from Mr. Tieger: "What was
6 their response, Ambassador? Was there any meaningful attempt to deny that
7 cleansing had taken place or was ongoing?" And you said, "No, they didn't
8 deny the typical. Indeed, the almost invariable response was to point out
9 the genocide that had been practised against the Serbs in World War II and
10 earlier periods or to point to crimes that were" --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you're reading. Your speed is going up.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you for reminding me, Your Honour.
13 Q. The typical, indeed the almost invariable response was to point
14 out the genocide that had been practised against the Serbs in World War II
15 and earlier periods or to point to crimes that were allegedly being
16 committed in -- at the present time, 1992 and 1993, 1991, whatever, mostly
17 in 1992 and 1993 that were crimes against them.
18 The -- the typical response that you describe there sounds like
19 your description of Mr. Karadzic's response, and would you say that that
20 response was generally coming from Dr. Karadzic in the terms that you
21 describe there?
22 A. It normally came from Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic, because they
23 talked more than Mr. Krajisnik. That is the case. When the three were
24 together or when Dr. Karadzic was together with Mr. Krajisnik, the
25 response was the same.
1 In this connection, Mr. Stewart, I should also mention that in the
2 constitution of the Republika Srpska, which was adopted by the Bosnian
3 Assembly under Mr. -- excuse me, under Mr. Krajisnik's chairmanship in
4 February 1992, on the eve of the referendum, the Bosnian Serb constitution
5 itself said that the lands that were to be claimed by the Bosnian Serb
6 republic, soi-disant, which they were creating, and I'm paraphrasing here,
7 that the lands also would include those areas which had been Bosnian Serb
8 areas but in which they had suffered a genocide in World War II and
9 therefore in the minority in 1992.
10 I'm paraphrasing, I repeat again. But you see that they implanted
11 in their constitution that idea that the lands that they should have in
12 1992, lands which they felt were theirs by right, included lands where
13 they were in a distinct minority. And the reason they gave for that was
14 the genocide of World War II. I mention that to show that this was not
15 some figment of their creativity. It was not just a debating point. It
16 was something that the Bosnian Serb leadership deeply believed, that they
17 had a right to this land, that somehow they could restore the status quo
18 ante, except that the status quo ante mention the restoration of the
19 status quo ante involved expelling, killing, murdering, intimidating the
20 people that lived there in 1991, 1992, and 1993. I think that is
21 important to bear in mind.
22 Q. Now, we know that the -- the only occasions, the maximum number of
23 occasions on which you could have included Mr. Krajisnik in any such
24 statement on your part in relation to this matter were March 19 -- were
25 March 1992, and September 18th and 19th, 1992, because those were the only
1 occasions on which he was present at meetings.
2 Throughout that period you had quite a number of meetings in 1992.
3 Do you say that -- that you let the Bosnian Serb leadership present at
4 those meetings know at every meeting that you were aware of ethnic
6 A. At every meeting? They certainly were aware of it whether it was
7 mentioned or not, because it was in the newspapers every day. It was in
8 the -- on the television every day. This was a very intense period. So
9 it formed a background, a -- it was part of the background to the
10 meetings. Whether one said explicitly or not upon shaking hands when you
11 go into the room, you know, you ask that kind of a question, but it was
12 very much in the air because it was happening.
13 Q. When you say this was a very intense period, you're talking, are
14 you, about the period from the second half of 1992 as an intense period?
15 A. Well, I would say all of 1992 after March become quite intense
16 when the conflict began. The fighting began in March on a small scale and
17 it increased throughout the spring and summer and fall, and you will
18 recall, of course, that the shelling of Sarajevo began in April and became
19 very intense, and that increased. So I would characterise 1992, after
20 March, particularly after April, as all an intense period. I wouldn't put
21 a number on the intensity scale. There's no Richter Scale for this sort
22 of thing, but it was all pretty intense. That's why the London conference
23 was called in August, precisely because the -- as you mentioned yesterday
24 correctly, the effort of Lord Carrington was running into the sands and
25 the situation on the ground was worsening. It was becoming more intense,
1 and that's why the British government called the conference in August 1992
2 and why the international conference was established immediately
3 thereafter in September 1992, in order to give an impulse, it was felt, in
4 order to give an impulse to the negotiating to end this conflict which had
5 become more intense in the previous months.
6 Do I make myself clear?
7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Okun. And on Wednesday as well, and this is at
8 page 10 of the transcript, you were asked by Mr. Tieger, who on a number
9 of occasions was careful to include Mr. Krajisnik expressly in his
10 question, you were asked: "Did the members of the Bosnian Serb
11 leadership, including Mr. Krajisnik, indicate to you and Secretary Vance
12 and the other negotiators that the use of force would cease as soon as the
13 Bosnian Serbs got what they wanted?" And your answer was "yes." And of
14 course a few minutes ago we were looking at a particular occasion, the
15 16th of April, 1992, on which Dr. Karadzic was saying exactly that to you,
16 as you reported.
17 You -- you're not in a position to say, are you, that
18 Mr. Krajisnik himself personally gave you that indication on any
19 particular occasion, are you?
20 A. If it's not written down, then -- then I would not say -- I would
21 not put words in his mouth, no. But when you're sitting with three
22 gentlemen in front of you and one of them speaks and nobody objects, had
23 there been an objection, I would have noted it. I would have noted it,
24 there's no question about that. So the assumption was that this was a
25 statement on behalf of -- of the leadership.
1 Q. You described an occasion on which Dr. Karadzic spoke to somebody
2 apparently in Banja Luka on a cell phone in the course of a meeting. Do
3 you remember that?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. It may seem a remember detailed question, Mr. Okun, but do you
6 have any recollection of that cell phone, what it was like?
7 A. No, I don't. I don't use a cell phone myself. I'm not a
8 technical expert. And since I don't own a cell phone, and I've never
9 owned a cell phone, I'm afraid I couldn't tell you one from another.
10 Q. It's -- it's -- it's -- it's just -- I'm -- I'm wondering,
11 Mr. Okun, whether your recollection of using a cell phone is in fact firm,
12 because some -- at that time a network of cell phones was not available in
13 that country.
14 A. Well, you can find the meeting in the diary journal. I recall it
15 as I mentioned to you. It was an evening meeting in Geneva at the Palais,
16 Lord Owen and myself with Mr. Karadzic, I believe it's described in
17 Lord Owen's memoirs, and I'm sure you can ask him about it again. It
18 concerned, as I mentioned earlier, the question --
19 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt just for -- in that country, did
20 you mean to say in Switzerland, Mr. -- Or did you mean to say in the
21 former Yugoslavia?
22 MR. STEWART: Well, I meant to say in the former Yugoslavia,
23 Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Since the witness is answering the question in
25 relation to a meeting in Geneva, and -- I would say it's more or less
1 common knowledge that you can make a connection between a cell phone and a
2 fixed telephone.
3 MR. STEWART: Indeed, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: That's point one. And the second is that unless you
5 say that in Switzerland that at that moment there was no network of mobile
6 phones but that would need further investigation, I would say.
7 MR. STEWART: Well, it would, Your Honour, and I must confess that
8 I don't stand here in a position to put to anybody whether there was or
9 wasn't such a cell phone network available in Switzerland at that time,
10 so I shall have to leave that point, yes. Thank you.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MR. STEWART:
13 Q. The -- you've mentioned -- you've mentioned Lord Owen. Lord Owen
14 has written a number of -- quite prolific writer in various ways. Are you
15 talking about a book called "Balkan Odyssey"?
16 A. That is one book he's written. He's written other things. I've
17 not written everything Lord Owen writes, I confess. What I meant to say
18 to you, Mr. Stewart, was that if you ask Lord Owen I'm quite sure he will
19 recall that conversation, and I think that he may have even described it
20 in print. That's all.
21 Q. It was -- the reason I mentioned that particular book is that I
22 would like to ask you now about just three or four passages from that
23 particular book by Lord Owen, Balkan Odyssey. We've got some photocopies
24 of the relevant pages, Your Honour.
25 Yes, Your Honour. We know that the practice is to expect that the
1 page before and the page after would normally be produced. We haven't
2 done that right now. I hope Your Honour will accept that as a practical
3 course. We will --
4 JUDGE ORIE: For the context, Mr. -- you see, my colleagues are
5 reading what would come up.
6 MR. STEWART: Delighted to see that. One should never leave home
7 without it, Your Honour. We will, of course, produce whatever batch of
8 copies are considered to be appropriate.
9 Q. Mr. Okun, can we look at page 32 is the first reference. Do you
10 have that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I won't start with the very first paragraph which is a bit of
13 history, really, of how it all came about, but at the -- towards the
14 bottom of page 32, there's a paragraph beginning "The Netherlands." Do
15 you see that?
16 A. Yes. "The Netherlands had held the EC Presidency from the
17 outbreak of the war in July until December 1991, and in consequence of my
18 visit to The Hague, I discovered that on 13th of July, 1991, when the
19 Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were just 18 days old,
20 the Dutch government had suggested to the other EC Member States that the
21 option of agreed changes to some of the internal borders between the
22 Yugoslav republics might be explored. The Presidency continues to feel
23 that --" and then that's a -- the next -- this bits of quotation: "The
24 Presidency continues to feel that it is necessary to reconcile the various
25 principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris which may
1 apply to the situation in Yugoslavia. It considers it especially
2 important that selective application of principles be avoided. The
3 principle of self-determination, e.g. cannot exclusively apply to the
4 existing republication are being deemed inapplicable to national
5 minorities within those republics. The following should be seen as a very
6 tentative attempt on the part of the Presidency at structuring our
7 discussion on the future of Yugoslavia with a view to developing a common
8 position which may serve as guidance for possible troika involvement in
9 the Yugoslav negotiating process. One, we seem to agree that it is not
10 possible for Yugoslavia to continue to exist with its present
11 constitutional structure intact. The joint declaration of Brioni clearly
12 states that a new situation has arisen in Yugoslavia. Two, it is
13 equally --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Would counsel please slow down when reading.
15 Thank you.
16 MR. STEWART:
17 Q. Two, it is equally difficult to imagine that Yugoslavia could
18 peacefully dissolve into six independent republics within their present
19 borders. Both Serbia and Serbian elements in federal administration, not
20 least the JNA, have made it plain that they will never tolerate the
21 emergence of an independent Croatia with 11 per cent Serbs within its
22 borders. Three, a loosely structured Yugoslavia consisting of six
23 sovereign republics is not likely to assuage the Serbian concerns either.
24 The higher the degree of sovereignty for Croatia, the greater the need for
25 solid guarantees for the Serbian minority in Croatia. The looser the
1 federal structure, the more difficult it will be to supply such
2 guarantees. The foregoing -- four, the foregoing seems to point in the
3 direction of a voluntary redrawing of internal borders as a possible
4 solution. It is clear that this option would entail daunting problems.
5 In the first place it is impossible to draw Yugoslavia's internal borders
6 in such a way that no national minorities would remain. Many minorities
7 reside in relatively small pockets or even in isolated villages. On the
8 other hand, it cannot be denied that if the aim is to reduce the number of
9 national minorities in every republic, better borders than the present
10 ones could be devised."
11 I think I won't, unless I'm particularly pressed to read the --
12 the next two paragraphs of the -- the cited passage, and then Lord Owen's
13 text resumes in the middle of page 34 with the word "incomprehensibly".
14 "Incomprehensibly, the proposal to redraw the republic's boundaries had
15 been rejected by all 11 other EC countries. The first ground for
16 rejection was that it would open a Pandora's box. But the Organisation of
17 African Unity while against changes to the map of Africa is defending the
18 boundaries of states already recognised by the UN. Secondly, it was
19 considered out-of-date to draw state borders along ethnic lines. Thirdly,
20 it was thought that republic boundaries could not be redrawn in view of
21 the large numbers of separate pockets where there were ethnic minorities
22 not geographically connected. It is --"
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, for the record did you read minority
24 where it says majority.
25 MR. STEWART: Perhaps I did Your Honour, let me see. Yes, I did.
1 I -- thank you very much, Your Honour; I did indeed.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
3 MR. STEWART: Yes, I'll do that sentence: "Thirdly, it was
4 thought that republic boundaries could not be redrawn in view of the large
5 numbers of separate pockets where there were ethnic majorities not
6 geographically connected. It is true that there could not have been a
7 total accommodation of Serb demands. But to rule out any discussion or
8 opportunity for compromise in order to head off war was an extraordinary
9 decision. My view has always been that to have stuck unyieldingly to the
10 internal boundaries of the six republics within the former Yugoslavia,
11 namely Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and
12 Macedonia, before there was any question of recognition of these republics
13 as being the boundaries for independent states was a folly far greater
14 than that of premature recognition itself."
15 Mr. Okun, do you -- do you agree with that -- that last conclusion
16 there of Lord Owen that to have stuck unyieldingly to the internal
17 boundaries in those circumstances was a folly far greater than that of
18 premature recognition?
19 A. Lord Owen is a wise and experienced man. On this point I do not
20 agree with him.
21 Q. Is your difference of view between him -- is it on the relative
22 folly of those matters or do you not regard the ruling out of any
23 redrawing of the internal boundaries as a folly or error at all?
24 A. I think the arguments given after the words "The first ground for
25 objection," the passage you read on page 34, I think those arguments, that
1 it would open a Pandora's box, that ethnicity was no longer the issue, you
2 couldn't withdraw them, the arguments that you've just read, I think those
3 are compelling arguments. I think they made sense. I must say I was not
4 involved in this at all. This was the summer of 1991, and as you know,
5 Mr. -- Secretary Vance and I became involved in October 1991. So what I'm
6 stating now is simply my opinion now based on this. I had no involvement.
7 But I think that the effort to redraw the boundaries would have led to
8 more fighting and that the EC and the CSCE were, on balance, correct in
9 rejecting the thought that is being put forward here.
10 Q. And if we can go on to page 41. You've just got a few clips of
11 photocopies, Mr. Okun. It's in the middle of page 41. Lord Owen writes:
12 "Cosic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjman are nationalists, if nationalism is
13 defined at simply the determination of a people to cultivate its own soul,
14 to follow the customs bequeathed to it by its ancestors, to develop its
15 traditions according to its own instincts." I'm afraid we've sliced off
16 the footnote reference that tells us where that comes from, but that's not
17 the critical point. But is their nationalism a more malignant force than
18 this? Serbian and Croatian nationalism, as it developed in the latter
19 half of the nineteenth century, carries with it an inherent tendency to
20 cross over into racial and religious discrimination and to ignite passions
21 that feed on violence. Bosnian Muslim nationalism has historically been
22 more benign, but the party Izetbegovic leads, the SDA, became evermore
23 intolerant under the pressures of war. Pausing there, do you agree with
24 that, that Mr. Izetbegovic's party, the SDA, became evermore intolerant
25 under the pressures of war?
1 A. I wouldn't use the word intolerant. I think they became more
2 aware -- I would say they became more aware of their Muslim heritage. And
3 the reason for that, Mr. Stewart, was they were being expelled by their
4 neighbours. They were being killed by their neighbours simply on the
5 basis of their ethnicity as Muslims. Mixed marriages were common in the
6 former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that when you take a
7 person who is a, let us say, a secularised Muslim and suddenly harm that
8 person, take an action against that person, when -- naturally he becomes
9 more aware of what he is. If, for example, you looked at the most secular
10 Jew in Germany in 1933, 1934, somebody who may have even become a
11 deracinated Jew, and all of a sudden the Gestapo comes around and kicks
12 him out of his apartment, denies him a job, beats him up because he is a
13 Jew, well, naturally the man is going to become more aware of his
14 Jewish-ness, as happened in Nazi Germany.
15 So I think it's a fair statement to say that people under attack,
16 under an unprecedented attack because of their religion, feel the religion
17 more even if they had not felt it deeply previously. I think that's a
18 normal reaction.
19 Q. The passage continues: "It was a reflection of Izetbegovic's
20 pre-war view that the state was a means to an end, not an end in itself,
21 that he opposed the break-up of Yugoslavia, was reluctant to press for an
22 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and was against recognition being granted
23 to Croatia and Slovenia. Once nationalism had found independent
24 expression in Croatia and Slovenia, he felt he had to establish Bosnia's
25 independence from Serbia, Izetbegovic knew that this would lead to
1 bloodshed. In his 'Islamic Declaration', he warned that the" - "Islamic
2 Declaration" is a title of a work of his - "he warned that the Islamic
3 Renaissance cannot be imagined without people prepared for enormous
4 personal and material sacrifice."
5 And would you agree with the proposition there as propounded by
6 Lord Owen that Izetbegovic knew that this would lead to bloodshed?
7 A. I think the word "know" in that context has to be an
8 overstatement. It is impossible to know things in advance. One may
9 assume, one may believe, one may have a -- an almost certain belief that
10 something will happen, but to know in advance, well, if that were the
11 case, I'd go right out to the racetrack or go to Wall Street and become
12 very rich. Nobody knows anything in advance.
13 Q. Can we then move on to --
14 A. But it is true, Mr. Stewart, what Lord Owen writes here, that
15 President Izetbegovic was reluctant to press for an independent Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina. He told Secretary Vance that to -- and me before the war.
17 That is to say, he realised what the Serbs might do and where things might
18 go. To that degree, as I've indicated earlier, as we all know, the
19 situation in Bosnia became increasingly tense as independence of Croatia
20 and Slovenia moved down the track. So of course he was aware of the
21 delicacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina's position as the independence train
22 for Slovenia and Croatia was moving down the track. Yes, that is true.
23 Q. Did you ever in the -- you've described the various remarks made,
24 observations made from time to time in your meetings with the Bosnian
25 Serbs about ethnic cleansing. In the course of 1992, did you ever -- you
1 and Secretary Vance, say anything to Mr. Izetbegovic or his colleagues
2 about their -- any suggested illegal activities on their part?
3 A. I recall some conversations about some activities, particularly at
4 the beginning of the conflict in Sarajevo itself. Various acts by Muslim
5 militants were carried out against the JNA in and -- in Sarajevo. I think
6 if you checked a meeting with General Kukanjac in that period you'd see
7 his mentioning it to us and our mentioning it to President Izetbegovic and
8 Foreign Minister Silajdzic, Ganic. Those were our principal
10 But the fact is, Mr. Stewart, that the ethnic cleansing was being
11 carried out overwhelmingly by the Serb side. Therefore, it is not
12 surprising that we mentioned it much more frequently, because it was
13 happening much more frequently.
14 Q. Can we turn to page 63, and towards the top of page 63 there is a
15 passage that begins -- do you see it, a paragraph that begins "In
16 Sarajevo"? Do you see that?
17 A. Uh-huh. Yes.
18 Q. Now, "In Sarajevo it became ever clearer that there were in fact
19 two sieges of the city: one by the Bosnian Serb army, with shells, sniper
20 fire and blockades, and the other by the Bosnian government army, with
21 internal blockades and red tape bureaucracy which kept their own people
22 from leaving. In a radio broadcast, the army, not the government, said
23 that able-bodied men aged 18-65 years and women aged 18-60 years were
24 forbidden to leave because they were needed for the city's defence, but
25 their main reason was different. In the propaganda war, the Serbian siege
1 aroused the sympathy of the world and for this they needed the elderly and
2 the children to stay. It was their most emotive propaganda weapon for
3 bringing the Americans in to fight the war, and they never waned it to be
5 Is that passage consistent with what you know about the situation
6 in Sarajevo?
7 A. It's broadly consistent, but Lord Owen here does not mention yet
8 another fact which is relevant, and the additional fact is that, as we've
9 discussed frequently here, the Bosnian Serb goal, openly stated, was to
10 divide the city and to achieve a - if they could - a preponderance of the
11 nationality, so that by asking the Muslim people to remain in the city,
12 the Bosnian government also was opposing that goal because they didn't
13 want to give the Bosnian Serbs the victory of dividing the city via the
14 shell-fire. We've already discussed that point.
15 So that's the additional gloss I would put on that, Mr. Stewart,
16 but it is true that they also realised that there was value from the
17 emotional point of view, to having the people there.
18 Q. Now, it's -- as far as Sarajevo is concerned, it was a proposal in
19 the course of the Cutileiro discussions that Sarajevo might be under UN
20 administration, wasn't it?
21 A. Proposals like that to put the city under some kind of UN or EC or
22 CSCE or American or God knows what superior authority, they grew like
23 mushrooms after the rain. They were very frequent, and they never -- they
24 never went anywhere. There were many, many such proposals.
25 Q. And one possible outcome eventually of a -- it didn't -- that
1 proposal was not followed, of course, at that point, but one possible
2 outcome of that UN administration would have been eventually some division
3 of Sarajevo, wouldn't it?
4 A. I doubt that. In any case, it was never a serious proposal, so I
5 mean we cannot put, I think, pile hypothesis on top of hypothesis. I
6 doubt it would have happened, but we're discussing two hypotheses that
7 never saw the light of day.
8 Q. Mr. Okun, you're familiar with the -- the European Union action
9 plan which was formulated around the end of 1993 and early 1994.
10 A. The European Union Action Plan?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. I'm not particularly familiar with it but I have a general
13 knowledge of it. I was not involved.
14 Q. Well, do you know that that involved a -- Sarajevo being a
15 separate district but there being a division of Sarajevo?
16 A. No, I don't.
17 MR. STEWART: Would Your Honour give me a moment.
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 MR. STEWART:
20 Q. Yes, we looked -- Mr. Okun, in the course of your evidence
21 earlier, and there are two -- two differences, I don't think we need to
22 dwell particularly on the content, but the references are last Wednesday,
23 23rd of June, at page 23, and then again at page 69. We looked at a map
24 which has the Exhibit Number P211. That's the -- that's the large map
25 showing the ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You -- I'm
1 holding it up now just to remind you of which map we're talking about.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And we considered that. I'm going to show you another map.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, this -- this map which I physically
5 collected from Mr. Krajisnik yesterday evening is not an easy one to
6 produce lots of photocopies of in a useful form overnight. I hope
7 Your Honour will be tolerant about that. It's a large coloured map. But
8 of course we will, again, undertake to fill in any unnecessary gaps as far
9 as proper material for the Tribunal and the Prosecution and everybody else
10 is concerned.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart. As always, the Chamber tries to be
12 tolerant, and certainly in this area. It's no problem.
13 MR. STEWART: Well, the Chamber is succeeding this morning,
14 Your Honour. Thank you.
15 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, may I have a quick look at this map.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps, since we don't have any copies that we
17 have a quick look at --
18 MR. STEWART: -- That's entirely fair, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps in the meantime we could use the time to ask
20 Madam Registrar to give an exhibit number to the excerpts of the book
21 Balkan Odyssey.
22 Madam Usher, could you -- we'd like to have a look at it for a
23 second as well.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Number for the excerpts from the book will be D22.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
1 MR. TIEGER: And -- Your Honour, as -- since we are in a brief
2 pause, as a minor housekeeping matter and in the same spirit with which
3 Mr. Stewart has raised earlier housekeeping matters, I would like to note
4 that we did not have an opportunity to see either the map or the excerpts
5 from Balkan Odyssey, all of which I think should have been presented to us
6 before Court. We would ask due to it that that be done.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps a five-minute glance at the map would be
8 better. I do understand from Mr. Stewart that a map was provided to him
9 only yesterday. I do remember that when we looked at the other map there
10 was a comment saying that this was the wrong map. I remember that I then
11 responded that this was the map presented to the witness, but now we see
12 that another map is presented to the witness.
13 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honour, can I say I -- I apologise for
14 not having and/or taking the opportunity to show material to Mr. Tieger
15 this morning. We do normally offer each other that courtesy and then
16 we'll certainly try to continue to do that, yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
18 MR. STEWART:
19 Q. Mr. Okun, I should say I don't want to dwell on -- on any detailed
20 questions about this map, actually, it's just that I put it to you what it
21 shows is that -- it shows the ethnic composition of Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina. I think it's the later stage on that map, somewhere in the
23 small print is 1991, but what it does by comparison, would you agree, with
24 the map that I referred to a moment ago, 211, the P211 that you referred
25 to in your evidence, is it -- it shows a more detailed breakdown of the
1 ethnic composition within the individual municipalities.
2 A. It purports to do that. This map was given to us, I have a copy
3 of it in my personal file here. It was given to us at the conference by
4 the Bosnian Serb delegation. I'm quite familiar with this map. When we
5 asked them, How do you know -- what -- there's a lot of blue on the map.
6 Well, that you see, that's the 65 per cent of Bosnia that belongs to us,
7 and when we would ask, Well, how do you know that? There was never an
8 answer given.
9 Q. Well, you say -- take the word purported, Mr. Okun, but it does --
10 A. I use that word advisedly based on what I just said, Mr. Stewart.
11 We asked them the question. Now, what one can do -- there are many maps.
12 There's one there that you have alluded to earlier, this one that you've
13 just given me. I preferred to use this -- this was the, ICFY map, this
14 map, which I'm happy to provide to the Court as they wish, is a map
15 produced by the -- because I think is the most complete. What it does is
16 show some opstina by opstina, the entire country, including
17 Bosnia-Hercegovina, of course --
18 Q. Sorry, Mr. -- Mr. Okun, may I -- may I just interrupt you because
19 I -- I very slightly swallowed a word that we -- didn't get picked up.
20 You say -- you said it was a map produced by --
21 A. The US government.
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. Based on the 1991 census. What they did here was to take opstina
24 by opstina and, based on the population, show those which had a majority
25 and there they would colour it either deeply or less deeply on the colour
1 based on the majority 50 to 85 per cent, 85 to a hundred. It's all
2 explained. But where the opstina had no majority, they coloured it white.
3 So you would have yellow for the ethnic Serbs, red for the Croats,
4 green -- light green for the Muslims in Bosnia, and white where the
5 opstinas had no majority, which I thought myself was quite a useful thing
6 to do because it explained and was a clear visual indication of the most
7 mixed areas, that is to say where no -- no nationality had majority.
8 And there were various ways to do this. I mean, there are ways to
9 show the ethnicity, the -- that map is a -- is an accurate one based on
10 the census that -- that shows this, as I say, purports to because we see
11 these -- you know, these snake-like lines running through each province,
12 and unless one had gone to the land register, to the cadastre, if you did
13 a Doomsday book of Bosnia in 1991, as William the conqueror did in England
14 in 18 -- 1066 and 1067 and went through each parcel of land and said who
15 owns what, you could come up with something like this. But to the best of
16 my knowledge, nobody has ever done that kind of Doomsday book for the
17 former Yugoslavia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why I used the word
18 "purported" to show.
19 As I said earlier, as we all know, the Bosnian claim, and not just
20 the Bosnian claim from Professor -- from President Milosevic on down, the
21 claim was we Bosnian Serbs or we Serbs, if it was President Milosevic, we
22 are 35 per cent of the population. In fact, there were 31, but, okay. We
23 are 35, but we own 65 per cent of the land. That's repeatedly stated.
24 And this map seeks to justify that claim.
25 Q. But would you agree at least so far as continuity of territory is
1 concerned, that the -- I'll give you a moment?
2 A. I'm sorry I'm wrapping this up. Should I pass this to you if you
3 wish to see it or to the Court if they wish to see it? It is simply to
4 indicate that there are various ways to indicate the ethnic composition.
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it should go in somehow, Your Honour,
6 because the witness has specifically dealt --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's just what I discussed with my colleagues.
8 So what I wanted to say to the parties is if none of the parties ask
9 Mr. Okun to provide a copy in order to have it in evidence, then the
10 Chamber would ask. So it's -- but priority to the parties, but --
11 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it seems appropriate. Mr. Okun is a
12 Prosecution witness who has produced this during the course of my
13 cross-examination. I'm more than happy for, well, either of the Trial
14 Chamber or the Prosecution. I think probably we'll defer to --
15 MR. TIEGER: I think there is a consensus, Your Honour. We agree,
16 of course.
17 JUDGE ORIE: So the Prosecution would -- we would invite Mr. Okun
18 to provide us with a -- the original, and -- but then of course to make a
19 copy and return the original to you after the parties have had an
20 opportunity to inspect the original, and then it -- the Prosecution would
21 tender that into evidence. Is that -- yes.
22 Then, Mr. Okun, I'd like to ask you to leave the original at this
23 moment, and we'll -- I think we do not need the original, Mr. Stewart,
24 would we, or a copy would do?
25 MR. STEWART: I'm -- I'm fairly sure. I think before it finally
1 leaves court we'll get a chance to look at it Your Honour, and --
2 JUDGE ORIE: If it's put in the hands of Madam Registrar so that
3 we could take care of copying it. And if the parties would inspect the
4 original, Madam Registrar, would you give them an opportunity to look at
5 the original, because I see there is some marking on it as well. Yes, but
6 that seems -- from what I see just from a distance just your name on it,
7 sir, Mr. Okun. Yes. Let's proceed this way.
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I say a word?
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 THE WITNESS: I provided it to be of assistance to the Court, to
11 Your Honours and to everyone room. I do not do this for the Prosecution
12 or on a partisan basis. It is the map that Secretary Vance and I
13 routinely referred to and most of the other negotiators. So I hope it's
14 helpful. It's not a partisan issue. I hope that's understood.
15 JUDGE ORIE: We do not know yet, Mr. Okun, whether the Prosecution
16 or the Defence will find on the map includes -- that serve their position.
17 It's -- it's in evidence that's what it is. At least it will be tendered
18 into evidence. Let's proceed.
19 MR. STEWART: Probably wise to put your name on it, Mr. Okun,
20 since we've taken it from you. But that was -- that was foresight there.
21 Q. This -- Mr. Okun, so far as the map P211 was concerned, the one
22 that you were referring to previously, the one that I'd just waved at you
23 a few minutes ago, it's just in a hard form to my left there, you -- you
24 would agree this much, would you, that it does -- that the presentation
25 which is for its own purposes, the presentation of that map does at least
1 have this relatively crude element which was -- which is that by colouring
2 each municipality just as a single block, of course it does obscure,
3 doesn't it, that within a municipality there may very well be divisions of
4 territory where one bit of that municipality is predominantly one
5 nationality and another is another nationality, so there may be -- you
6 described them as snake-like, but there may be routes through by way of
7 contiguity which are obscured by that presentation.
8 A. I'm sure that's the case in any effort to put on paper the living
9 reality. It did have the bars that indicated the actual percentage of the
10 nationalities, the three communities in each -- in each opstina. That is
11 to say there was -- the majority one would be green or blue, and then the
12 minority ones in the map you held up were indicated. So there was no
13 effort on that map to hide the reality. But, of course, as you cover
14 the -- if you colour the entire opstina one colour, it -- it has a certain
15 visual effect.
16 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Okun.
17 MR. STEWART: I have no further questions, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stewart. Is there any need,
19 Mr. Tieger, to ask further questions to Mr. Okun?
20 MR. TIEGER: I'm not sure how many questions the Court might have.
21 I could proceed. I could also proceed a bit more efficiently if we took
22 an early break and I organised my relatively few questions. I'm certainly
23 prepared to proceed, but that might be one expedient.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. Then we'll have an early break. We'll
25 resume at twenty minutes to eleven.
1 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 10.47 a.m.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I take it that you're organised, so you
4 could start your redirect.
5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I am prepared to begin my very brief
6 redirect examination.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 Re-examined by Mr. Tieger:
9 Q. Ambassador, you were asked by Mr. Stewart about meetings in 1992
10 with the Bosnian Serb leadership at which Mr. Krajisnik was not present,
11 and during your examination-in-chief, you stated that Karadzic would
12 frequently mention his name, meaning Mr. Krajisnik's name, when he wasn't
13 in the room. Did Dr. Karadzic indicate whether or not he would consult
14 with Mr. Krajisnik about issues raised during the meetings at which he was
15 not in attendance?
16 A. It wouldn't be fair to say that he said every time on every point,
17 "I will consult with Mr. Krajisnik," if Mr. Krajisnik was not in the room,
18 or, "I will consult with Professor Koljevic," if Nikola Koljevic were not
19 in the room, but it was clear that he would speak with the other leaders,
20 and he would often say words to that effect such as, "I have to talk to
21 the others," or, "I'll discuss this with my colleagues," that sort of
22 phrase. So I think it was our correct inference that he would consult
23 with the other leaders.
24 Q. Ambassador, you also indicated during today's cross-examination
25 that knowledge of ethnic cleansing was all part of the background of these
1 discussions because it was happening and everybody knew it. I wanted to
2 turn quickly to the meetings on September 19th and September 18th.
3 First, on the 19th at R0163971. That's a meeting at 5.00 p.m.
4 attended by Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Koljevic, Mr. Buha, and Misa
5 Milosevic, and the second entry from that meeting is: "CRV: Detainees
6 from camps. Need fix date good for you."
7 And secondly, Ambassador, I would ask you to turn to page
8 R0163962. That's a meeting of September 18th, one of two meetings that
9 day attended by Mr. Krajisnik. This particular meeting was at 4.20 p.m.
10 and included Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Koljevic, Mr. Buha, and Mr.
11 Misa Milosevic. And also present was Madam Ogata on behalf of UNHCR.
12 Ambassador, was the issue of ethnic cleansing not only in the
13 background of those two meetings but in the forefront of those two
15 A. Yes, it was. That's why Mrs. Ogata was there. The meeting
16 concerned the -- what to do about the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
17 who had been ethnically cleansed and who were in camps, being held in
18 detention centres by the Bosnian Serbs or who were just wandering around
19 the countryside. That was the issue.
20 Q. Thank you, Ambassador. I have nothing further.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Okun, Judge Canivell has one or more
22 questions for you.
23 Questioned by the Court:
24 JUDGE CANIVELL: Mr. Okun, please, I would like to know the --
25 about this map you had lately shown to us, who provided you with this map?
1 A. Your Honour, you mean the very last one that I gave to the Court?
2 JUDGE CANIVELL: Yes, the last one we didn't know and you had
3 produced --
4 A. It was produced by the United States government mapping service.
5 JUDGE CANIVELL: Yes. So you don't know what sources or what date
6 it was handed or used by those services for making this map? It's --
7 normally you find that these sources are reliable enough to be taken
8 without any difficulty.
9 A. Yes, in fact we know, Your Honour, precisely the data that were
11 JUDGE CANIVELL: Yes.
12 A. The data that were used were as the map so states, the 1981
13 census, the official Yugoslav census of 1981. And if you turn the map
14 over, you will see the census figures on the map.
15 JUDGE CANIVELL: Yes.
16 A. That's one of the reasons it was very useful to us.
17 JUDGE CANIVELL: Yes.
18 A. It was the map, and it had the census figures for every opstina in
19 the entire country, and it was therefore very, very useful for us.
20 JUDGE CANIVELL: Thank you very much. There's no more questions.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Judge El Mahdi also has one or more questions for
23 JUDGE EL MAHDI: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness.
25 A. Good morning, sir.
1 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] I should like to ask you several
2 questions in order to be able to understand your testimony better. And my
3 first question is this: It has to do with what you said regarding the --
4 the moving the venue of the international conference to New York, and I
5 think you said, and I'm quoting: "[In English] The conference moved to
6 New York to be closer to the UN and to the decision-makers in Washington."
7 [Interpretation] My question concerns the sentence you used, and
8 I'm quoting: "[In English] The decision-makers in Washington."
9 [Interpretation] What did you mean when you said "the
10 decision-makers in Washington"?
11 A. The situation, Your Honour, was the following: The International
12 Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was convened by the EC, the European
13 Community, and the United Nations. Secretary Vance and I worked in our
14 capacity for the UN. Lord Owen was the EC negotiator. So that the EC,
15 for example, was fully informed of events that were happening in the
16 conference because Lord Owen would routinely have his staff draft either
17 every day or on an almost daily basis a report of what had gone on in the
18 conference. You will understand that's important, because many of the
19 sessions were closed, particularly the negotiating sessions.
20 The UN was informed via our team. The absentee at the table was
21 the United States. It only got the very small and inadequate reporting of
22 the UN people, and it was felt that given the importance of the country
23 and the interest in the situation that more American involvement would
24 have been desirable, indeed both of the co-chairmen, Secretary Vance and
25 Lord Owen, would have wished this to be the case, but it did not happen.
1 So that when we returned to be at the United Nations, that was the
2 principal reason for the returning to New York, to be at the United
3 Nations, but in February of 1993. An ancillary reason which I mentioned
4 in the answer which you've cited was to be closer to Washington also so
5 that the Americans could be kept informed of what was happening at the
6 conference, because Secretary Vance and Lord Owen felt, and indeed so did
7 I, that the American government was inadequately informed about the
8 developments at the conference.
9 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So you're in fact confirming my
10 initial understanding of the matter, which is that from 1993, the United
11 States played a role, which can be said to have been active, and if I can
12 put it this way, replaced the role played by the European Community. So
13 it was the United States' involvement which was emphasised after 1993. It
14 was stepped up after 1993.
15 A. No, Your Honour. It would be incorrect to say that the United
16 States replaced the EC. The United States never replaced the EC; rather,
17 it became a more active observer. They appointed, for example, they being
18 the new US administration, appointed an observer to the conference when it
19 came back to New York. Reginald Bartholomew by name, a distinguished
20 American diplomat, and Mr. Bartholomew, you will note from my diary
21 journals, was present in Athens when the Bosnian Serbs, when Dr. Karadzic
22 signed the Vance-Owen Plan. But it was never a question of replacing the
23 EC. Rather, it was a case of a more active role as observer.
24 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for giving me
25 that clarification. I should now like to go on to another area, and that
1 is the following, and I would like to focus, if I may, principally on the
2 period starting from July 1991 to the 30th of December, 1992, that period.
3 You were asked a number of questions concerning your meeting with
4 Mr. Krajisnik, and you asserted that you met him in the month of
5 September, that you had meetings on the 18th and 19th of September, 1992,
6 in fact. Now, did you have occasion to meet him during that period of
7 time? Would that be yes or no?
8 A. The meetings were all indicated in the diary.
9 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So it was just the meetings in
10 the course of those two days, that is to say on the 18th and 19th of
11 September; is that right? That's the only time during that period?
12 A. The physical presence was on those days.
13 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you very much.
14 That's what I meant.
15 And can you also confirm that during those two days you spoke in
16 one way or another of the fact that there were detention centres? Did you
17 touch upon the subject of detention centres? I would like to have the
18 specifics, please. I would like to know whether you discussed genocide at
19 any point, and ethnic cleansing or detention centres. So what, in fact,
20 were the subjects discussed and expressly mentioned during those two-day
22 A. Excuse me, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes, please go ahead. Take your
25 A. On September 18, 1992, in Geneva, we met for more than an hour
1 with Mr. Krajisnik, Dr. Karadzic, Koljevic, Buha, and Misa Milosevic, and
2 the entire discussion of more than one hour concerned the ethnic
3 cleansing. That is on page R0163962 and R0163963 of the diary journal.
4 JUDGE ORIE: May I just interrupt are for one second. I had the
5 pages on my screen. I do not have then any more. Could they be restored.
6 A. If I might just read, Your Honour, while it's coming. I'll read
7 from -- I'm quoting the diary.
8 JUDGE ORIE: We have it on our screen now, again. Thank you.
9 A. This was a meeting that Madame Ogata, who was the chairman of the
10 humanitarian working group of the international conference, and, of
11 course, simultaneously the head of the United Nations high commission on
12 refugees which incidentally had been made as the legal agency for the
13 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the first time a lead agency was
14 secretaried by the Secretary-General to direct all of the work of the
15 United Nations in the area, and it was precisely because of the ethnic
16 cleansing that Secretary-General designated Mrs. Ogata as the lead agency.
17 In any case, I now look and read the notes.
18 Mrs. Ogata began by explaining, and I write "Statement to be
19 signed." That statement was a statement by the parties, particularly the
20 Bosnian Serbs, that was permitting the UNHCR to remove the displaced
21 Muslims and Croats from the detention centres where they had been placed
22 by the Bosnian Serbs as a result of the ethnic cleansing, of the killings.
23 Next I note Koljevic --
24 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] I apologise for interrupting you,
25 but just to clarify one point, to check it out. My question was precisely
1 concerned with this: I understood that they were detention centres, and
2 so with hindsight, these detention centres, did you mean to say ethnic
3 cleansing, at the back of our mind?
4 A. The persons who were held, the civilians, the men, women, and
5 children, were civilians. They were in detention centres because they had
6 been ethnically cleansed from their areas. Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So the subject was broached, was
8 it, explicitly?
9 A. It was broached explicitly, yes, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] So my question is this, then:
11 Did you receive any reaction from Mr. Krajisnik on that score?
12 A. The reaction from the three Bosnian leaders was enunciated by
13 Koljevic and Dr. Karadzic because they spoke English and we wanted to move
14 the conversation along. And as you see on page R0163962, Koljevic's
15 immediate reaction was, and I quote here: "Complains about lack of aid
16 for the Serbs, especially in Sarajevo. Asks for the route." That is to
17 say by what route would the ethnically cleansed Muslims and Croats be
18 taken out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You see, they were being taken out of
19 the country.
20 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you. Now I'd like to
21 move on to another area, but the subject does have to do with what we have
22 just been discussing.
23 You testified to the effect that you said to Dr. Karadzic that --
24 with respect to talking about genocide, his words led -- would lead to
25 pre-emptive genocide as you put it, the term you used, pre-emptive
1 genocide. Now, what was the reaction on Mr. Karadzic's part when you said
3 A. This was a conversation between just the two of us before the war
4 began, and he simply waved it off. I mean, he just shrugged it off.
5 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] But you do assert that you
6 said -- or, rather, that he said to you, and this was mentioned on the 2nd
7 of December, 1991, and I quote: "[In English] War would be disastrous."
8 A. Yes. He routinely made statements like that. At the same time,
9 Your Honour, at the same time and in the same conversation, indeed only
10 minutes later, he said, in that same conversation of December 2, 1991,
11 that "if the Serb opstinas in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not joined to
12 Yugoslavia, there would be war." Well, these anomalous, indeed
13 contradictory statements by Dr. Karadzic were quite frequent. Here you
14 have the man on the one hand saying "war would be disastrous" and two
15 minutes later he says "there will be war." But that is Dr. Karadzic.
16 That is the way he speaks.
17 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. Now based on your own
18 experience, did you feel that he was sincere?
19 A. I felt he was sincere when he said there would be war. I did not
20 judge him to be sincere when he said war would be disastrous, unless he
21 meant it would be disastrous for the Muslims and the Croats. That he also
22 said. I mean, there are frequent references to that throughout the diary
23 about how the Muslims, you know, are -- are going to end up badly, that
24 sort of thing. That was quite common.
25 I must say, Your Honour, excuse me for adding just this one
1 sentence, but as I've said before and I would like to indicate because I
2 think it's useful for the Court when you read Dr. Karadzic's statements,
3 he is given to extravagant overstatement. One does extract from that the
4 meaning, but he is given to these contradictory outbursts. And we knew
5 how to judge them because, after all, we judged the actions. We have the
6 proverb, actions speak louder than words, and we were judging these words
7 against these actions. But when he said there would be war, there would
8 be war if the Serb opstinas would not be joined to Yugoslavia. Well, then
9 three months later there was fighting.
10 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Thank you for your answers. I
11 would like to ask you this. In your opinion, and you spoke about the
12 decision taken by the Assembly of the Serb people in Bosnia, mentioning
13 the six principle -- six principles, priority principles, the six basic
14 principles, if I remember correctly. It was a decision taken on the 12th
15 of May, 1992, in fact, by the Assembly of the Serbian People of
17 Now, we spoke at length about those six priority objectives, and
18 my question to you is this: I would like to focus principally on the
19 division of the city of Sarajevo. Do you consider that a demand of this
20 kind was legitimate, to divide it up?
21 A. I would say no to that, Your Honour, on the basis that the city
22 had never been divided, to the best of my knowledge, ever. It had
23 lived -- the populous of the city had lived peacefully together, the
24 Bosnian Muslim, the Bosnian Serb, and the small Bosnian Croat number, plus
25 the number of people who declared themselves Yugoslavs. If you look at
1 the ethnic census -- at the census for 1981, you will see in addition to
2 the three nationalities those who declared themselves to be Yugoslavs in
3 answer to the question "What's your nationality?" So I personally could
4 not see any reason artificially to divide a city.
5 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Very well. Now you also spoke
6 about your personal experience, and you said that during the month of
7 October 1992, you were in Sarajevo yourself.
8 A. I don't think I gave the exact time, Your Honour, but during that
9 period we visited Sarajevo, yes, I -- it may or may not October or
10 September or, but in that period we made a few visits to Sarajevo, yes.
11 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you. Now, if I
12 understand it correctly, at that point in time the city of Sarajevo was
13 under siege; is that right.
14 A. That is correct.
15 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Now, how were you able to enter
16 Sarajevo and reach it?
17 A. We went either by car or flew. One was able at that period to fly
18 in and out of Sarajevo in UNHCR aircraft. You see, in June of 1992, the
19 Bosnian Serb army turned over the Sarajevo airport to the United Nations
20 peacekeepers so that humanitarian flights of food and personnel could go
21 in and out, but only on UNHCR chartered aircraft. So we flew on those
23 We also drove, I recall, on at least one occasion from Split
24 through the -- through Bosnia to -- to Sarajevo.
25 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes. And you also said that you
1 observed that the city had been bombed by between 3 and 5.000 shells per
3 A. I did not personally observe or count 3 to 5.000, Your Honour.
4 That was the number that we --
5 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Precisely. So where did you get
6 those figures from and that information from?
7 A. As I indicated in my previous testimony, the figures were provided
8 by UNPROFOR, the UN military observers who were present in Sarajevo.
9 They --
10 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] And you yourself, did you
11 yourself -- were you yourself informed about the number? Did anybody tell
12 you personally or was it generally stated in the media, for example, or
13 by -- or by other information means? So was this first-hand knowledge?
14 A. Well, depends how you define first-hand. It was first-hand United
15 Nations knowledge. The figures came from UNPROFOR military observers who
16 reported them officially to the conference on Yugoslavia. They were
17 not -- they were not figures from the journalistic press.
18 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] And you also stated that the city
19 was inhabited by a mixed population, mixed ethnicity. The Serbs lived in
20 buildings alongside other ethnic groups, so the shells were attacking
21 whom? What were the targets? The forces that were holding the siege and
22 launching the attacks on the city, they weren't concerned whether the
23 targets were Serbs or others, whether they would be hitting one or the
25 A. Your Honour, the city of Sarajevo is a city of hundreds of
1 thousands of people. Some of them lived, as in any large city, intimately
2 in the same building. There were, of course, again, as in any other large
3 city, certain sections of the city that were known to be by and large
4 inhabited by one or the other. If, for example, one looked at New York
5 City with its 7 or 8 million people and you asked the question where do
6 African Americans live? The answer is they live all over New York City.
7 If you also ask the question is there one section that is heavily African
8 American, the answer is, yes, Harlem - a good Dutch name, I note in
9 passing - is well known as the section that is 90 per cent African
10 American. I think that's common in large cities that certain sections are
11 occupied while the overall city is mixed.
12 So there was no segregation, but at the same time Alipasino Polje,
13 for example, an example that Dr. Karadzic used to frequently cite, he
14 would say, "Let the Muslims have Alipasino Polje." Well, I'm hardly an
15 expert on the intimate living arrangements of the Serbs and the Croats in
16 every district, every arrondissement, every borough of Sarajevo, but to
17 answer your specific question, the shelling was designed to --
18 fundamentally designed to separate the peoples from these areas that each
19 one occupied, as I've indicated, but there's no question that the
20 shelling, that large number of shells falling on the city was bound to
21 hurt, bound to affect the Serb populous as well.
22 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] And this brings me to my last
23 question. It has to do with what you said when you spoke about the
24 retreat of the SDA, the SDA party, from signing -- what you were saying
25 was that the president of the SDA party, after having signed the accords
1 in March 1992, went back on that and withdrew his signature, in fact.
2 A. Correct.
3 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] And that it was at that point in
4 time -- you said up until then, that's what you said and I'm quoting you:
5 "[In English] The Serbs were open to negotiate a peaceful settlement."
6 A. Excuse me. Could you repeat that, Your Honour?
7 JUDGE EL MAHDI: Yes. "The Serbs were open to negotiate a
8 peaceful settlement."
9 A. I don't recall saying that, but if the record so indicates, fine.
10 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes, but your opinion. That was
11 an observation on your part. I might have misunderstood you, of course.
12 But do you now assert that up until March 1992, the Serbs of Bosnia were
13 open to negotiations and that one the SDA party withdrew its involvement
14 in the process that the events took a different direction.
15 A. The withdrawal of the signature did not lead events to go into a
16 different direction because the negotiations continued, at least until May
17 or June. To use Mr. Stewart's accurate word, they were a continuum, and
18 they ended up unsuccessfully. But the events at the end of March were a
19 stage in the negotiations, no question of that.
20 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes, but if one can put it this
21 way, one can say that it was a turning date, a turning point, a
22 fundamental point, in fact, a determining factor.
23 A. I think that would be an overstatement, with all due respect,
24 Your Honour. I think it's an overstatement to call it a turning point,
25 because it was an ongoing negotiation.
1 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Maybe I wasn't making myself
2 clear enough. What I'm saying is this: I gained the impression that I
3 had understood you to say that the Serbs were ready to negotiate up until
4 the end of March 1992.
5 A. They were negotiating. All of the parties were negotiating.
6 Whether the Serbs were negotiating in good faith or bad faith is not for
7 me to say because I did not participate.
8 My point, Your Honour, in seeking to answer the question is simply
9 to indicate that while this was an important moment, the withdrawal of the
10 signature, it did not end the negotiations because the negotiations
12 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] That's another matter. I'm
13 talking about the attitude, if I can put it that way, of going to war and
14 resorting to arms. So they were continuing to negotiate peace, but they
15 were in fact resorting to weapons.
16 A. The Serbs?
17 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes.
18 A. Yes, because the -- they -- they were resorting to arms. We had
19 seen the barricades go up in Sarajevo. We had accurate and correct
20 information from the EC monitors about the ethnic cleansing. So it was a
21 two-stage, two-track process. Yes, Your Honour, you're correct.
22 JUDGE EL MAHDI: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand. Yes, thank
23 you very much. Thank you.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Okun, I've got a few questions for you as well.
25 But I also need to be organised, just as Mr. Tieger. I'll mainly ask for
1 some clarifications and whether I understood you well.
2 You have talked about the claim of consensus in decision-making,
3 referring to the meeting of the 6th of January, 1993. I -- did I
4 understand you well that it's your position that asking for consensus
5 decision-making where none of the national groups has a majority would
6 finally paralyse the administration of that state? Is that a correct
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And therefore is not a sensible proposal at all.
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. You repeatedly used the expression
12 "ethnic cleansing," and that seems to be a rather broad concept. I would
13 like to hear from you what still falls within that concept and what you
14 would consider not to be ethnic cleansing any more. If I may just suggest
15 to you that on the one hand of the scale is just killing everyone of that
16 ethnicity and on the other side of that scale is to convince them that
17 it's better for them to leave. I'm not talking about the means, I'm just
18 trying to understand the range of the concept.
19 When you said, "We saw this ethnic cleansing," I understood what
20 you saw on the ground was people being deported, people being detained.
21 Where you would say or what -- would there be any non-violent way or a way
22 without any threat of violence which would still be within your concept of
23 ethnic cleansing, or would you require it to be violent, whether it's
24 deportation, killing, mistreating, whatever, or a threat of violence, if
25 you don't leave now, would there be any non-violent of a -- or a
1 non-threatening with violence situation which you would include in your
2 concept of ethnic cleansing?
3 A. Thank you, your Honor. I think I understand the question. I
4 would say that the spectrum covering the phrase "ethnic cleansing" would
5 necessarily involve at the minimum intimidation, deprival of livelihood,
6 verbal threats and violence as you just indicated. The other end of the
7 spectrum would, of course, be death. And during this period one observed,
8 one heard from the hundreds of thousands of displaced Muslims of all of
9 these modalities being employed against them.
10 We, the negotiators, had had previous experience on a more limited
11 scale of this, particularly as regards Serb behaviour in Eastern Slavonia,
12 in Croatia, in 1991 where we were able to see it ourselves and to receive
13 accurate reports of it. As I've indicated, we were in Vukovar the day it
14 fell. We tried to get the Bosnian -- the -- excuse me, the JNA to release
15 prisoners from the hospital. They took them out and killed them, that
16 sort of thing. So we were not unaware of what happened before.
17 But specifically with reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina, there
18 were numerous reports from eyewitness accounts by observers, international
19 observers, the press, others, of the range -- of the range of coercive
20 activities employed by the Bosnian Serbs to do the ethnic cleansing.
21 We also had the example of the request by the Bosnian Serb
22 Assembly, in fact signed by Mr. Krajisnik, to the JNA to help the Bosnian
23 Serbs - I have to put quotation marks around the word "help" - because
24 the standard procedure for the ethnic cleansing was to first create
25 trouble, start an action, "aktie" as they called it in German, to start
1 some action, and then to call in the JNA ostensibly to divide the parties
2 or to protect the local Serbs. That was the pretext. That was the
3 standard pretext. The JNA has entered this opstina. The JNA has gone to
4 Foca to Visegrad, to Zvornik "to protect the local Serbs." That was not
5 the reality. That was not the truth. They were there to cooperate with
6 the Serb irregulars in cleansing the Muslims or the Croats as the case
7 might be. And that was the recurring pattern over and over again, and we
8 were able to observe it.
9 So to sum up, Your Honour, I think that there was always
10 intimidation, force, violence, coercion involved in the matter. And the
11 civilians, men, women, and children, who were in the detention centres,
12 and bear in mind there were thousands upon thousands of them, were the
13 result of this activity. They did not leave their homes voluntarily.
14 JUDGE ORIE: That's at least the way you used the expression, so
15 that's for us a guidance to understand your testimony.
16 A. Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: You've told us what you had seen. You said it was
18 clear to everyone during this these meetings that ethnic cleansing was on
19 its way. It was -- it went on. And then you said we'd seen it. We also
20 saw it in newspapers, on television. You have just drawn our attention to
21 what happened, what you had seen in -- let me just say 1991, let me see
22 what indication you gave about it, place, you said, I think, in Western
23 Slavonia --
24 A. I believe I mentioned Vukovar.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Vukovar. Yes. Did you also see it in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina with your own eyes?
2 A. Yes. Mr. -- Secretary Vance and Lord Owen reported back when they
3 had been in Banja Luka after that visit that we have discussed already.
4 They saw the results of the ethnic cleansing in and around Banja Luka
5 during their visit in the autumn of 1992.
6 JUDGE ORIE: When you said you could also read it in the newspaper
7 and see it on television, did you mean to include local newspapers and
8 local television, or were you mainly referring to what I would say the
9 outside world --
10 A. I was referring to the outside world.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Then I'd like to draw your attention to the maps.
12 You said the map that the Defence provided didn't satisfy you. You knew
13 about it not because it was from the Defence, but it does not give the
14 information that would be suitable as a working basis.
15 Is my understanding correct that this map is based on the 1991
16 census, the --
17 A. Yes, that's what it says.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, I see "1991," and I know that there was a
19 census in 1991, but I do not read B/C/S, so therefore I -- then your map,
20 you said, was based on the 1981 census.
21 A. That is correct.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if I understood you well. To that extent,
23 they're not fully comparable, are they?
24 A. They are 99 per cent identical. The difference between 1981 and
25 1991 was minimal, Your Honour. In addition to which the last official
1 census was 1981. The 1991 census was never officially promulgated. I
2 believe I stated that earlier. But there is no essential difference
3 between the two maps. None of the parties ever claimed there was a
4 difference between the maps, and the map that I believe Mr. Tieger
5 introduced, the large one --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 A. -- that Mr. Stewart was waving around earlier, that he showed the
8 Court, that map was also based on the 1991 census. The three maps are
9 essentially identical in all serious -- in all aspects. They show a
10 reality somewhat differently, as Mr. Stewart pointed out.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The one gives more territorial details. The
12 other one gives more information about the minorities, where the -- well,
13 at least --
14 A. They present the data differently.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that answer.
16 A. The reason that I say that I personally preferred to use the map
17 that I have called the US government map, the one that I made available to
18 the Court, was that in the opstinas where there was no majority, that map
19 indicated it clearly by covering those opstinas white. Or perhaps I
20 should be accurate -- more accurate in saying by not colouring it. So one
21 could immediately see, as one does, as you look at the US map, which were
22 the mixed or minority -- the opstinas where there was no majority.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Could you imagine that on the -- on your map, the
24 United States government map, that an opstina would be white, whereas, for
25 example, under the 1991 census figures that same opstina would be, well,
1 majority Serb or --
2 A. If there were a -- an opstina, and there were such opstinas,
3 which, let us say, was 49/49, with one ethnicity or one religion, however
4 you choose to describe it, having 49 per cent and the other having 49 per
5 cent, a swing of 1 per cent is possible and probably did occur. It may
6 have occurred. I don't know. In any case, it would be very rare. It
7 would be very rare.
8 JUDGE ORIE: It would be exceptional. Then you talked about the
9 number of shells counted by monitors in Sarajevo, and you mentioned a
10 number. Were you informed also about was -- about whether there was an
11 exchange of fire or whether the picture changed? Was this about autumn
12 1992 or would it include the period at the beginning of the fighting in
13 Sarajevo? I think you said it started in April. Would that include the
14 whole of the period or was it just a momentum, the number you gave? And
15 were you also informed about shells flying the other way?
16 A. Yes, sir. The UN observers, after they arrived in Sarajevo and
17 they were in sufficient number to count the shells, they also counted the
18 shells going back, the Muslim response fire, yes. So we had the count of
19 the Muslim shelling as -- it wasn't shelling. The Muslim firing as well.
20 I can give you the numbers if you wish.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Were they, according to the -- first perhaps I draw
22 your attention to a second element in my question. The number you gave,
23 was that -- was that for the whole period up until -- October-on from
24 April, or was it just April?
25 A. It covered the --
1 JUDGE ORIE: I mean October.
2 A. It covered the period after the observers arrived in sufficient
3 number in Sarajevo to do an accurate shell count, and we received these
4 figures at the international conference in Geneva beginning in September
5 1992, because there was no conference before then in which we
6 participated, and we left Geneva at the end of January 1993, as we've
7 discussed, to return to New York. So it covered basically the period from
8 the beginning of September through the end of January 1993. From
9 September 1992 to -- through January 1993. And we did receive -- they did
10 count the opposing fire from the Bosnian army, their firing also. So we
11 got two figures.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Were these figures of the fire of the opposing army,
13 were they considerable figures as well or how would you qualify them?
14 A. Well, I can give you the figures if you wish.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you -- if you have them.
16 A. Yes. There were 3 to 500 approximately. 3.000 to 5.000 on the
17 Serb side, 300 to 500 from the Muslim army.
18 JUDGE ORIE: That's 1 to 10.
19 A. 1 to 10. And one should note that the calibre of the Serb guns
20 was much heavier. This was artillery fire, and basically the Bosnian Serb
21 army was responding with rifle fire and machine-gun fire.
22 There was one period I should mention, Your Honour. There was one
23 period when the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina gunfire equalled for a very
24 brief period, it might even have surpassed for a few days that of the VRS,
25 the Bosnian Serb army. That was in January 1993 when the Bosnian army
1 mounted an offensive to try to recapture Mount Igman from the Bosnian Serb
2 army. Mount Igman, as we know, is the dominant geographical feature, the
3 highest point, and therefore a strategic, very strategic high ground to
4 hold, and in January, the Muslims gathered their forces and made a serious
5 effort to capture Mount Igman from General Mladic's forces. They failed
6 to do so. They failed, and the Bosnian Serbs kept control, military
7 control, of Mount Igman throughout the fighting.
8 JUDGE ORIE: So I do understand that your figures include, as you
9 said, rifle fire and machine-gun fire, not only heavy weaponry?
10 A. No. The -- the figures do include that, yes. The figures we
11 received from the UNPROFOR observers counted small-arms fire as well.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honour, but I was hoping
14 for a clarification before the transcript moved farther. That's at 50:
15 23 through 25. The Ambassador said, "One should know that the calibre of
16 the Serb guns was much heavier. This was artillery fire and basically the
17 Bosnian Serb army was responding with rifle fire and machine-gun fire." I
18 think from the context we should ask the Ambassador about the Bosnian Serb
19 army. It's now at the top of the page, or the Bosnian Muslim army.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 A. No, it should be Bosnian Muslim army was responding. The Serbs
22 had the artillery. The Muslims had the rifles.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that answer. Finally I'm seeking
24 confirmation of my understanding of one -- of what I thought would be one
25 of the main lines of your testimony at this Court. Did I understand you
1 well that you said that even if the goals would be not necessarily
2 politically incorrect, these political aims in the existing situation
3 could not be achieved without the use of force when removing the non-Serbs
4 both from areas where they were majority, if claimed by the Serbs, or
5 where they were in a minority? Is that a proper understanding of your
6 testimony? Because many questions have been put to you on whether goal
7 three or aim five were as such legitimate or -- well, what -- not
8 expressing necessarily a -- a wrong political ambition, but did I
9 understand your testimony well that you said, in the present situation, to
10 achieve these aims or goals would necessarily involve the use of force in
11 removing the population, the non-Serb population from these areas?
12 A. Yes, your understanding is correct.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
14 If the questions of the Bench have raised any issue, the parties would
15 like to put additional questions on -- Mr. Tieger, you are on your feet.
16 MR. TIEGER: One small matter of clarification, Your Honour, about
17 which I don't think there's any dispute, and so I won't put it in the form
18 of a question to the Ambassador. And it arose from questions by
19 Judge El Mahdi about the meetings with Mr. Krajisnik in 1992. I believe
20 the Ambassador said they're reflected in the diary. I think
21 Judge El Mahdi I then indicated that his understanding that they involved
22 only September 18th and September 19th. I think we addressed that issue
23 yesterday and directed everyone's attention to a meeting on March 5th,
24 1992 as well.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. STEWART: That's certainly correct. We did --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MR. STEWART: -- we did resolve that yesterday.
4 JUDGE ORIE: A very short report on the 5th of March meeting.
5 Mr. Stewart, do you have any additional questions?
6 MR. STEWART: Yes, I do, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 Further cross-examined by Mr. Stewart:
9 THE INTERPRETER: Please speak into the microphone.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
11 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry.
12 JUDGE ORIE: If you put on your earphones then you will hear also
13 the kind requests of the interpreters about reading or speaking into the
14 microphone. Very often I could do without as well, but ...
15 MR. STEWART: Yes, no, it's -- I -- I hadn't realised as I leaned
16 over to the screen it would bring me out of contact, out of radio contact
18 The -- Your Honour, it's at 36: 16 was the answer. Well, I
19 better read the question. It's short passage. Judge El Mahdi, its --
20 it's easier if we have the piece of paper as well with us, Your Honour
21 because otherwise it's not easy to understand the question.
22 Q. It's -- it relates, Mr. Okun, to the meeting in Geneva. There's a
23 reference number R0163962, but it's -- it's the meeting of the 18th of
24 September, the one at 4.20 in the afternoon that you record Dr. Karadzic,
25 Mr. Krajisnik, Koljevic, Buha, and Misa Milosevic. Do you have that,
1 Mr. Okun? In fact it's a meeting that lasted about an hour and ten
2 minutes with apparently -- with a break of half an hour in the middle that
3 you record so it was about -- in substance it was about a 40-, 45-minute
4 meeting, something like that. I think that's --
5 JUDGE ORIE: You have it in front of you.
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 MR. STEWART:
8 Q. On the next page you record a break so it's about a 45-minute
9 meeting in substance. That's not my question, Mr. Okun, that's just to
10 set the scene.
11 Then in your evidence in response to Judge El Mahdi's question,
12 did you receive any reaction from Mr. Krajisnik on that score? Answer:
13 "The reaction from the three Bosnian leaders was enunciated by Koljevic
14 and Dr. Karadzic because they spoke English and we wanted to move the
15 conversation along." And as you see on that page, Koljevic's immediate
16 reaction was, and I quote here: "Complains about lack of aid for the
17 Serbs, especially in Sarajevo. Asks for the route." And then you say --
18 that's -- that's unquote from your note. And then you say in your
19 evidence today: "That is to say by what route would the ethnically
20 cleansed Muslims and Croats be taken out of Bosnia-Herzegovina? You see,
21 they were being taken out of the country."
22 Now, looking at your note again, Mr. Okun, and what you record
23 Mr. Koljevic having said, "Complains about lack of aid for Serbs,
24 especially in Sara," that's Sarajevo, "asks for route, Belgrade, Uzice,
25 Gorazde to be extended: Foca, Trebinje." I'm looking at that again and
1 just considering that route?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Belgrade, Uzice is in Serbia, but very near the border of
4 Bosnia-Hercegovina. Gorazde is then, of course, a municipality inside
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina as you're going south-west, I think really from pretty
6 much south-west from Uzice you're going into --
7 A. South-east of Sarajevo.
8 Q. South-east of Sarajevo but if you're copying down from Gorazde
9 you're going near enough south -- south-west. You're -- and then Foca and
10 Trebinje is right down at the --
11 A. Drina.
12 Q. Bottom of the page of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's apparent, isn't
13 it, that that's a route for aid for Serbs, and it follows --
14 A. No. I can explain that simply, Mr. Stewart, if you have the
16 Q. You have the chance, Mr. Okun.
17 A. Thanks. The question arose how to get the Bosnian Muslims out.
18 They were being held all over the west and the east as well. The Serbs
19 offered to take them into Serbia. This was an offer. They said, well,
20 you know, we'll accept them. You can bring them and -- into Serbia. And
21 that was discussed more than once. You'll see this route discussed quite
22 frequently. And the offer was never accepted. They were by and large
23 evacuated to Croatia. Some -- some went to Serbia, yes. There were
24 no -- there were camps or centres. I don't mean that in an invidious
25 way. The refugees were taken out.
1 In addition to that - your point, Mr. Stewart - when he talked
2 about lack of aid for Serbs, that route also could have served for aid,
3 but in fact, in fact, the aid for the Serbs in Sarajevo, bear in mind this
4 is the point he's complaining, as you correctly read, "complains about
5 lack of aid for Serbs," especially in Sarajevo, they were being helped by
6 the humanitarian flights that I've already mentioned from the UNHCR. The
7 airlift into Serbia -- excuse me. Sorry. The airlift into Sarajevo was
8 designed for the populous of Sarajevo. That's the only way they got food.
9 They got enough. There was no starvation. But the airlift into Sarajevo
10 beginning in the summer of 1992 when UNPROFOR took control of the airport,
11 when they were given control of the airport by the Bosnian Serb army was a
12 very effective airlift. Indeed, it was the largest airlift since the
13 Berlin airlift of 1948, according to the numbers. It was a very big
15 So the complaint that Dr. Koljevic, Nikola Koljevic, was making
16 was, without putting too negative a gloss on it, really phoney, because
17 the Serbs of Sarajevo were being aided and assisted by air, and Nikola
18 Koljevic knew that as well as we did. This was again their standard tu
19 quoque argument, you see. It's our people who are being abused. It's our
20 people who are being hurt.
21 With respect to the Bosnian Serb population along the Drina in
22 these -- these areas, well, they were living adjacent to Serbia. So there
23 was no problem in getting food or, I may say, ammunition across the Drina
24 to help them. So this was yet another employ, essentially, on the part of
25 the Bosnian Serb leadership to seek to evoke sympathy where it really was
1 not correct.
2 Q. Yes. Mr. Okun, your evidence was -- after all, you were asked
3 specifically about this point in your note where Mr. Koljevic was asked
4 for the route, and your answer was that what he was talking about. I'm
5 paraphrasing the first few words, but that is to say by what route -- your
6 actual words are by what route would the ethnically cleansed Muslims and
7 Croats I can taken out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, you're
8 saying that note of what Mr. Koljevic was saying is that he was talking
9 about the route by which ethnically cleansed Muslims and Croats should be
10 taken out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Now, whatever the other explanation that you've just given in your
12 answer, I am still putting it to you that it's clear that what
13 Mr. Koljevic was talking about as noted there was indeed an aid route, not
14 necessarily into Sarajevo, of course, because Sarajevo isn't Foca, isn't
15 Trebinje, but the route he's talking of -- first of all, two clues. First
16 of all, he's asking for the route to be extended. He's not offering it.
17 He's asking. And secondly, the route starts from Belgrade as expressed
18 there, goes to Uzice, Gorazde, and he's asking for it to be extended down
19 to Trebinje right in the very south of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's quite
20 clear that there, that's what's talking about, isn't it?
21 A. I would say as I mentioned earlier that that was part of what he
22 meant, part of what we understood him to mean. He might even have had a
23 preponderance of mentality in that direction. That is to say, that might
24 have been his principal aim in stating that. But we all understood, and
25 you can see by Madam Ogata's response, which you haven't read but I will
1 read, Madam Ogata responds, "There are 68 air evacuation cases have been,"
2 in other words have already been evacuated from the Banja Luka area. You
3 see, we were talking in general about the evacuation of people from Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina, and you see how Madam Ogata responded. She didn't even
5 respond directly to the point which you have just reverted. She discusses
6 the question in general. And that's what I tried to do in my response a
7 few moments ago, to point out that the overall situation was being
8 discussed. And you know, we had these discussions quite frequently with
9 the parties so that both they and we understood pretty well what they were
10 driving at.
11 Q. Well, Mr. Okun, yes, what Mrs. Ogata said next I didn't -- I
12 didn't read out, but I suggest to you that -- it's your note, of course,
13 but given the content of the note and given what you've discussed, I put
14 it to you that what's becoming reasonably clear is that Mrs. Ogata
15 explains and produces the statement of what's primarily her concern,
16 what's primarily her item on the agenda and what's -- why she's at that
18 After Mr. Koljevic has made his intervention, which as far as
19 Mrs. Ogata is concerned would have slightly switched the discussion away
20 from her agenda item, she switches it straight back again. But in
21 between, Mr. Koljevic, if you like, the mini topic, I don't mean
22 unimportant topic but in terms of the meeting. The mini-topic that
23 Mr. Koljevic is dealing with, or the chapter heading is perhaps a better
24 way for putting it. The chapter heading is aid for Serbs, and there are
25 two elements about Sarajevo. You have made your comments about that,
1 Mr. Okun. And then a second element of that is asking for the route, and
2 I won't repeat what I've put to you but does --
3 A. Yes, I agree. I agree. Mr. Stewart, they -- there was -- a route
4 goes two ways. London to Southampton, Southampton to London.
5 Q. I think one must admit that, yes?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Yes, we'll agree on that.
8 A. So one can be talking about the route and Nikola Koljevic could
9 have said -- would -- did say and meant, I have been -- there is no
10 argument about that. There's no dispute that in his mind he probably, for
11 debating-point purposes, said get aid to the Serbs, ground assistance to
12 the Serbs on the London to Southampton route. They also offered us, which
13 I did not mention, here but it was a known fact, it was discussed
14 frequently, you will see is it in other cases, they offered to take along
15 the same route, they offered to accept Bosnian Muslims and the a few
16 Croats into Serbia as they did indeed, as they did indeed.
17 Q. So are you saying that --
18 A. I'm simply --
19 Q. I'm sorry --
20 A. -- saying that the route went both ways and my previous answer
21 gave you the London Southampton route. You are now pointing out the
22 Southampton London route. It went both ways. That's the question.
23 JUDGE ORIE: May I point out something. It was one of your -- it
24 was part of your question was that it was under the heading, aid for
25 Serbs. I'm trying to find it. I do see the word aid for Serbs in the --
1 well, I'd say the first Koljevic line. Did I understand your question
2 well that you were referring to that aid for Serbs as the heading of the
3 whole of the observation of Mr. Koljevic?
4 MR. STEWART: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour. Perhaps I should
5 clarify. When I was saying and I think Mr. Okun understood it that way
6 but I mean it's obviously the Trial Chamber must understand what I'm
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 MR. STEWART: I acknowledge that. When I was saying, chapter
10 heading, I was using that in a rather figurative sense. I wasn't saying
11 that Mr. Okun's notes actually show Mr. Okun --
12 A. It was a mini -- it was a subsidiary part of a larger discussion.
13 MR. STEWART:
14 Q. Yes, that's right. I think I used mini topic and then I just felt
15 I should correct myself because the topic was important.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. STEWART: So, I didn't wish to imply by mini that it was some
18 trivial manner, so I switched to chapter heading in the sense that --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Sometimes it's of some use not only to understand the
20 answer, but also to understand what it is in answer to.
21 MR. STEWART: I would a hundred per cent agree with that,
22 Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
24 MR. STEWART: But -- no, Your Honour. Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Okun -- Mr. Okun, since the Judges have no
1 further questions for you, this concludes your testimony in this Court.
2 I'd like to thank you very much for having come to The Hague. You have
3 been in this courtroom and other courtrooms for a considerable period of
4 time. And you have answered questions of both parties and of the Bench.
5 I'd like to thank you very much for that, and I would like to wish you a
6 safe trip, I would say home again but looking at your agenda, it might
7 never be certain that your next station will be home, but I wish you at
8 least a good further trip whether it's home or not.
9 Madam Usher, would you then please escort Mr. Okun out of the
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 JUDGE ORIE: I suggest that we have another early short break and
13 then deal with procedural matters on from 12.30. Yes.
14 --- Recess taken at 12.11 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.
16 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber would like to discuss at least two
17 procedural items and is open for whatever procedural matter will be on our
18 table. Let's start with an easy one. We have -- we face some problems in
19 the processing of the 92 bis statements and the transcripts tendered into
20 evidence. I have sought the advice of the registrar, and I do understand
21 that yesterday the parties have met with the registrar, because what we
22 have at this moment is we have the statements attached to the motions in
23 which their admission is sought, but finally they're not attributed to any
25 That music sounds familiar to me. It's Windows again.
1 Therefore, I did understand that the parties agreed that in order
2 to have all the evidence well together, I know that when -- that is the
3 prevailing programme in the world but is there anyway --
4 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I had to do that in order
5 to mute it. I'll try not do it again but I had to go through that step
6 with it in order to mute it. My apologies.
7 JUDGE ORIE: We've done without the music for approximately my two
8 and a half years at the Tribunal and it's now three times in two days, so
9 if all your activity could be used to avoid further advertisements for --
10 MR. STEWART: Yesterday's music was provided by some other --
11 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not addressing --
12 MR. STEWART: -- other organisation --
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- any party in particular.
14 MR. STEWART: We take the point, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: It's -- so we have difficulties. We have all the
16 evidence together. Therefore, the parties agreed, as far as I understand,
17 that they will then provide the statements and the transcripts in an
18 electronic form and that the electronic versions will then get the exhibit
20 One of the reasons why we changed the system is also that when
21 exhibits are attached to these statements or to these transcripts, then
22 it's a bit odd not to have the numbers for the original document but have
23 numbers for attached exhibits.
24 As far as I understand, exhibits related to such statements and
25 transcripts will get the same number but with an addition, A, B, C, et
2 Is my understanding correct that the parties have no problem
3 solving it this way so that we could soon, especially from the
4 Prosecution, receive these exhibits in order to be admitted?
5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Now you're both.
7 MR. TIEGER: We both feel so strongly about this issue but I'm
8 going to defer to Mr. Harmon.
9 MR. STEWART: We hope their music's in harmony if they're going to
10 stand up together.
11 MR. HARMON: I am not aware of any particular agreement. I am
12 aware of an e-mail I received with a proposition.
13 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact, I thought it would be wise to
14 have everything dealt with at a practical level. So therefore the
15 registrar met with the case manager as far as I understand from both
16 Prosecution and I insisted also the Defence so that those who actually do
17 the work could agree upon it, but of course I understood -- well, I'm not
18 a specialist in chain of commands, but I did understand that the agreement
19 by the case manager on practical matters would be sufficient.
20 MR. HARMON: My case manager has suggested that after getting the
21 information that we get a chance to meet and discuss this and we have not
22 had that opportunity yet.
23 JUDGE ORIE: If you say you're not there yet --
24 MR. STEWART: That is the position, Your Honour, because Ms.
25 Cmeric didn't meet yesterday. That's not a complaint at all, but, yes, we
1 need -- we need to do some more discussing on this, I think.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. If you -- one of the main reasons is to
3 have -- to suggest this to you is to have a full set of everything that's
4 in evidence, whether it's in paper form or whether it's in electronic form
5 but that it's there and that numbers are assigned to it. That's number
6 one. And second is where both the Chamber and the other party is provided
7 already with a paper copy as an attachment to the submission -- the
8 application for admission into evidence under 92 bis, to prevent that we
9 need another rule to produce the paper on which we print that out once
10 again. That is what is the underlying thought that has led to this
11 practical solution.
12 But I will hear from the parties. Could we do it in this way,
13 that if there is any opposition, any objection that I would hear from the
14 party interested within three days, five days? Let's say a week, weekend,
15 et cetera.
16 Then the next issue is the proposal communally suggested by the
17 parties not to sit until the end of July. The proposal is contained in
18 the memorandum of the -- let me just -- the 10th of May, and it's called
19 schedule concerning discussion between Prosecution and Defence in
20 Prosecutor versus Krajisnik, and attached to it is a schedule for
21 discussions on municipalities and experts.
22 The Chamber has already indicated to the parties that we would
23 follow the suggestion, at least to start following your suggestion under
24 the close monitoring by the Chamber, and I would like to explain to the
25 parties, before I give an opportunity to make further observations, why
1 the Chamber is, on the one hand, not opposing again the suggestion but, on
2 other hand, is very cautious to not lose any further time.
3 Madam Usher, could you please put on the ELMO a calendar.
4 What I've done is to put on paper how many days we could have been
5 sitting in court, so I excluded UN holidays, and how many days we actually
6 have been sitting in court, but I see that -- that's what this calendar
7 shows us. You can also see that we actually were 46 days in court and
8 that, as far as I can -- could you please zoom in a tiny little bit so
9 that my eyes can still read it. That we could have been another 55 days
10 in court.
11 We couldn't say that we lost that time. We lost that time in
12 court, but that time was used, I would say mainly to give a further
13 opportunity to the Defence to further get on top of the case, and on the
14 other hand, some of this time has been used for communications between
15 Prosecution and Defence to see whether we could avoid some evidence to be
16 heard in court and be replaced by compromised facts between the parties.
17 That is also these efforts to reach compromises is very much at
18 the basis of the submission, the joint submission by the parties to not --
19 not to sit in the month of July, and they have given a relatively detailed
20 schedule of how they propose to continue these communications. They
21 mainly deal with evidence on what happened in their municipalities rather
22 than how the vertical lines would -- would have been. And also to see
23 whether specific portions could be identified on which we would have to
24 hear further evidence in relation to experts but what parts could be
25 accepted, what issues could be accepted by both parties.
1 I've prepared this calendar just to give an impression in colour
2 on what the balance is now between sitting and not sitting, and I'd like
3 to go back, first of all, to last December when the start of this case was
4 discussed between the parties. It did not remain unnoticed that the
5 Defence said that they would like to have an additional 70 days on from
6 the 2nd of February not sitting in the spring in order to be sufficiently
7 prepared. The Chamber has then made another proposal. I would say the 18
8 days to start with and this schedule has been adapted several times,
9 mainly on the request of the Defence but in recent times also on the basis
10 of joint suggestions made to the Chamber, joint suggestions by the parties
11 made to the Chamber.
12 I'd like to have a look at what until the summer recess this would
13 mean to the trial.
14 Madam Usher, could you please put number 2 on the ELMO.
15 This would be the picture if we follow the suggestion of the
16 parties, and we indicated already that in principle we are willing to
17 follow it. At the same time, we see that the balance between time spent
18 in court hearing evidence and the time spent out of court preparing and
19 communications between the parties is -- is already different.
20 In view of the fact that in December the Defence said that it
21 would need 70 additional days if the schedule is followed, we, up till the
22 recess, will have not been sitting for 80 days. I am aware that the 70
23 days the Defence had asked for in December were preparation days. I am
24 also aware that it was very much stressed that days as such was not the
25 same as certain periods. I think it's for that reason that it was the
1 Defence that preferred to sit for the first 18 days and then have a
2 more -- a more continuous period of a couple of weeks off to further
4 I'm also aware that these 80 days were not exclusively -- are not
5 exclusively -- were not exclusively to further prepare but used for
6 negotiations or communications, however you call it. But the balance is
7 such if we follow this suggestion, the Chamber has to consider whether the
8 time saved from now on, because until now it has hardly resulted in any
9 considerable reduction of court time, although there were some -- there
10 was some expectations that this would be the case if we would allow the
11 parties now to continue their communications, but the balance, as we see
12 it now between green and red could not continue unless we would have
13 results, results in time. The Chamber is not in a position to say that
14 parties should agree on certain facts. It's not up to the Chamber to do
15 that. The only thing the Chamber can do is to say, if the parties can
16 agree on certain facts and if that would take some time and at the same
17 time would save time in court and save witnesses travelling to The Hague,
18 save -- well, a lot of other things are saved as well if we're not sitting
19 in court, then this would be highly appreciated.
20 If I look at the schedule for the discussions and what could be
21 achieved until July, I am aware, and that's of course part of the next
22 part of the schedule not yet on this calendar, that after the recess it
23 would take us another eight to nine weeks to -- if you would work in the
24 same speed as prior to the recess. It would take another eight or nine
25 weeks to communicate, to discuss -- not us but the parties, to discuss the
1 remaining municipalities and the remaining experts.
2 That means that what is now asked for the month of July and what
3 the parties intend to continue after the recess has to be successful,
4 because otherwise a lot of time has been used. We are not using the
5 courtroom. We are not sitting. We are not hearing any evidence, which
6 would certainly cause a delay in concluding this case and concluding the
7 presentation of Prosecution evidence and the start of the Defence case if
8 it ever comes to that. So therefore, the Chamber wants to monitor closely
9 whether the result of the communications between the parties would still
10 justify us to not sit and not hear any evidence, because we can't do both,
11 first spend 12 weeks on negotiations, communications, and then to say
12 since they were not successful, now we have to spend another 14 weeks in
13 court to do it.
14 That is the reason why the Chamber insists so much on monitoring,
15 because if we look what we had in mind in the beginning, that is case
16 presentation 450 hours for the -- for the Prosecution, until now the time
17 spent in hearing witnesses, so apart from the days, altogether was not
18 much more than 175 hours, which means that we are not yet sufficiently on
19 our way. On the other hand, the Chamber also has noted that the -- of
20 course it was until now mainly the Prosecution, that they stayed well
21 within the time limits indicated for the examination-in-chief. Altogether
22 they saved up to 25 per cent of the time indicated, and then, of course,
23 it depends on whether you take the first -- the first estimate or the
24 second estimate, for example, if you would like to talk in percentages.
25 It makes a difference whether you talk in respect of one or two witnesses
1 of 25 hours or six hours. That's of course what you gain and highly
2 depends on your starting point. But Prosecution is staying well within
3 its limits. Defence is -- it's also highly appreciated that the Defence
4 stays within approximately the 60 per cent rule, but the overall, I
5 wouldn't say performance -- but the overall progress that we've made until
6 now does not allow the Chamber to take any risk that further time is taken
7 for preparations and for where we cannot have the expectation that it will
8 then save time in court. I mean, a similar number of red days on the
9 agenda in September, October, November, should also result in the
10 reduction of the time spent in the presentation, especially of viva voce
11 evidence of witnesses.
12 It is only on this basis that the Chamber, with some hesitance but
13 agreed to follow the suggestion of the parties, but after two weeks, that
14 is on Friday the 9th of July, wants to be informed as to whether the
15 expectations in terms of agreement on facts, compromise -- compromise on
16 facts have turned out to be realistic. We then also would like to hear,
17 as it was done recently by the parties, to see exactly what this will save
18 us in time in court. How many witnesses do we not have to hear any more?
19 How many experts -- how much time can be gained in hearing experts only on
20 those points the parties have identified.
21 It's only on this basis that the Chamber is willing to continue.
22 And as always, if on the balance the time spent results in time gained, it
23 will be easier for the Chamber to further follow your suggestions for the
24 month of September and perhaps even October.
25 I was speaking about days. It was assumed that on the basis of
1 the 18 days start, that means a slow start of the case, we would have
2 spent in court until the summer recess some 370 hours. It now turns out
3 that we did spent in court approximately - I have not all the details of
4 the witnesses available - some 135 hours. That's in general terms, and
5 the Chamber wanted to explain not only to the parties but also to the
6 public why we would not be sitting in the month of July to explain how
7 there's a fair expectation that it would not cause any delays -- I'm not
8 talking about further delays, but it would not any delays in concluding
9 this case and delivering the judgement. It even gives some possibilities
10 also for the Chamber to concentrate on other tasks this Chamber also has
11 apart from hearing the Krajisnik case.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, this is a -- a more or less a public
14 explanation of why the Chamber, although hesitantly, followed the
15 suggestion of the parties and why the Chamber wants a close monitoring of
16 the developments.
17 Is there anything the parties would like to submit in respect of
18 what they suggested and what I said?
19 MR. TIEGER: Nothing on behalf of the Prosecution, Your Honour.
20 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, please. The -- at the beginning
21 of what Your Honour has said just now, we were slightly dismayed because
22 Your Honour referred to the proposal coming from the parties only as being
23 in the terms of not sitting in July and made no mention of September.
24 That was causing considerable consternation among the Defence team being
25 fed into me from both sides but I didn't need it to be fed into me from
1 both sides because I had that consternation myself. However, the better
2 news is that it has become clear as Your Honour has proceeded that that
3 was only a shorthand expression because Your Honour has made it very clear
4 that the proposal agreed by the parties for submission to the Trial
5 Chamber does specifically involve a package, if I may put it that way, of
6 not sitting in July and then discounting, as Your Honour has clearly
7 agreed, should happen, discounting the three weeks' recess because that is
8 needed as a recess, the -- that it would continue on into September. So,
9 Your Honour, our consternation at the beginning point has faded
10 considerably as far as that is concerned.
11 So, Your Honour, we remain, as we have been for many weeks in
12 formulating the proposal, we remain committed to constructively
13 approaching this project, if we may call it that. We would therefore
14 confine ourselves to two observations -- well, three, perhaps. One is the
15 general one.
16 Your Honour, we do and we always will reserve our position as to
17 what we would then submit if the Trial Chamber or anybody else claims the
18 view to view that this particular programme was not going to prove to be
19 constructive, because at that point it would, of course, be completely
20 open to the Defence to bring whatever motion, make whatever application it
21 made in the circumstances then prevailing with a view to the trial
22 proceeding in a way that ensured fairness to Mr. Krajisnik, fairness in
23 terms of preparation time and so on, and then whatever views the Trial
24 Chamber had expressed in the past could only ever be provisional because
25 the Trial Chamber would have to naturally approach any such application in
1 a judicial way on the basis of the facts and the submissions at that time.
2 So we -- we do accept the spirit of it, and it is absolutely clear in
3 principle that none of this can be binding and set in stone because at
4 every point, at every application and every consideration will have to be
5 judiciously assessed in the circumstances prevailing at the time. So
6 that's number one. And that's if you like an important reservation but
7 not meant other than constructively, Your Honour. It just is always
9 It ties in with the second observation, of course, which is a
10 message which Your Honour has indicated on a number of occasions has been
11 clearly transmitted by the Defence to the Trial Chamber on some occasions,
12 probably relatively few. But it's been transmitted publicly but it's been
13 submitted in an open way among the Prosecution, Defence, and Trial Chamber
14 with a view to -- to practical progress, which is that the Defence has
15 always consistently rejected and does with respect continue to reject the
16 notion that there must be a trade-off of time spent out of court and
17 sometime saved. The fundamental point, Your Honour knows, is that there
18 must be adequate preparation time for the parties, and in particular in
19 the circumstances of this case, the Defence. So simply as a comment mere,
20 that when Your Honour refers to the slow start of this case, we assure
21 Your Honour that it didn't feel like a slow start to the Defence. It had
22 rather the opposite feel to the Defence. In fact, I have never been
23 involved in a case which was further from what felt like a slow start. So
24 we do have our different perspectives here. Those 18 days were about as
25 quick a start as any team of the size of this Defence team in a case of
1 this size could realistically have faced and was at the absolute limit of
2 what this team could physically, let alone mentally, cope with. But we
3 did cope with it. So what may look like a slow start from some
4 perspectives wasn't objectively a slow start, we suggest, but certainly,
5 subjectively, it didn't feel remotely like it.
6 So, Your Honour, with those reservations, the third observation is
7 simply this, that Your Honour observes that correctly, that the Trial
8 Chamber is not in a position, of course, to impose upon the parties any
9 agreement as to anything. The Trial Chamber can offer strong exhortation
10 and encouragement and support for us attempting to reach agreement, and we
11 believe that we have between us an extensive discussions between the
12 Prosecution and the Defence produced a framework, a way of approaching the
13 matter, some understanding of the sort of areas which are likely to be
14 fruitful for agreement, an indication, as Your Honour has indicated, as to
15 where we would draw the line between -- likely to draw the line between
16 the vertical elements of the case leading up through the chain of command,
17 which are at the nub of the case here, where it's unrealistic to suppose
18 that there's going to be significant agreement there, because that's at
19 the heart of Mr. Krajisnik's defence. So we know that. But the -- but
20 there's a very large number of matters in relation to municipalities which
21 we do believe open the way to agreement which is, in the end, in
22 everybody's interest. Mr. Krajisnik's interest is to have his -- a fair
23 opportunity to present his defence. It's not in his interests to take any
24 longer than is consistent with that but it is vitally important to him
25 that it proceeds at a pace which is entirely consistent with his defence
1 being adequately and properly presented.
2 But it does mean this, Your Honour, that there is a very -- there
3 is a very careful line to be observed here, or careful path to be trodden,
4 which is that just as the Trial Chamber of course has acknowledged cannot
5 bring pressure on the parties -- cannot insist that the parties agree,
6 there is clearly an implicit risk of indirect or implicit pressure here.
7 We have and we continue to say and assure the Tribunal that we will
8 approach this project constructively, but it is very important that we're
9 not approaching it in circumstances where we feel, and I'd use the
10 metaphor, Your Honour, that the Trial Chamber is breathing down our necks
11 on this, and that is simply a harmless metaphor, Your Honour, that if we
12 don't agree enough, then we will be brought straight back into court where
13 our position, frankly, Your Honour, is we do need more time to be on top
14 of this case, and we would therefore make an application almost
15 inevitably. We -- we can't predict completely, of course, what the
16 circumstances will be in two weeks' time, three weeks' time, but we can
17 form a pretty confident projection of where we might be in relation to
18 being on top of this case in three, four, five weeks' time and so on. As
19 we get further into the future then it becomes a bit murkier, as the
20 future always does.
21 But we -- of -- we are -- do remain uncomfortable, Your Honour,
22 about a suggestion that if we -- if we don't achieve the saving which
23 represents the investment, if we don't balance what we're doing, if we
24 don't produce enough with one coloured days as opposed to another coloured
25 days we will be brought back into court and we will have to proceed at
1 the -- to us, relentless pace. Your Honour refers to 175 hours. We look
2 at that. We actually suggest that's not at all bad considering the way in
3 which this trial started and is actually -- reflects credit on both
4 parties here for having achieved that. But, Your Honour, if we -- if we
5 are in two or three weeks' time, if it's just -- you haven't agreed
6 enough, you haven't produced enough saving, we do the calculation, it's 23
7 per cent short of this, it's not going to be balanced and if we are
8 dragged back into court, this is not in the end going to achieve the
9 efficient and effective running of this trial. That is our position.
10 It's in the end, the efficient running of the trial, as everything else
11 ultimately the -- a matter for assessment of the Trial Chamber. Fair and
12 efficient is key to every trial, with fairness being absolutely the
13 dominant -- predominant feature.
14 So, Your Honour, that remains a concern. I hope that we -- we
15 undertake conscientiously and will undertake in full the obligation to
16 keep the Trial Chamber informed, and we do understand that the Trial
17 Chamber will not impose such onerous obligations on us in relation to
18 reporting that we have to take up -- take away too much time from the
19 actual work on which we're reporting so that it simply makes the position
20 worse, but with a fair balance on keeping the Trial Chamber
21 conscientiously informed which the parties will do and a conscientious
22 attempt to agree what we can reasonably agree, we do hope that there will
23 not be too rigid an accounting approach to how much time is saved and so
24 on and that sight will not be lost of the fact that quite independently of
25 all those calculations this Defence needs more time. And if we were doing
1 none of this, Your Honour, if we had not gone down this very fruitful
2 route of exploring the possibilities and the framework for discussions,
3 Your Honour knows and has known for a considerable time that the Defence's
4 position has been that we must have more time built into that. And we
5 have in effect deferred that while we have cooperated in producing this
6 constructive framework, and we have every -- at the moment every week or
7 further week, every couple of weeks of evidence that we deal with remains
8 very difficult for us, and we need that time.
9 So with those caveats, I don't want to resile at all from the
10 essential constructive approach which the Defence is offering to this
11 matter, but I do wish to make all those reservations on Mr. Krajisnik's
12 behalf more than clear. Because at the end of a couple of weeks of
13 evidence that we've heard, it takes us several days on the Defence side
14 just to catch up with all the incidental aspects of this case. Maybe
15 they're incidental, maybe they're more important than incidental. It
16 takes us several days to catch up on that. Even if you leave aside such
17 things as normal life, which occasionally comes into the equation, and I
18 hope that Your Honours will keep all those observations in mind but will
19 also accept our assurance that we wish to continue, and we have already
20 invested plenty of time and energy into this matter, and we will approach
21 this proposal constructively.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stewart. I make a few observations.
23 First of all, that should be clear to the parties. The question is not a
24 matter of bookkeeping but the question is how to come to a decision in
25 this case as efficiently as possible providing the accused had a fair
1 trial. That's -- a fair trial is absolutely at the top of our mind. But
2 at the same time, this institution and this Chamber is responsible for how
3 public funds are spent, so we can't just lose out of sight the efficiency.
4 If I tell you at this moment and if you look at the calendar I
5 gave, that after six months, the Prosecution has approximately spent on
6 the presentation of its case 135, 140 hours, and if we granted 450 hours,
7 that means that in this speed, we'd need another three times six month
8 just for the presentation of the Prosecution case, and that's something
9 that's just not a possibility. That would bring us two years where on the
10 basis of the figures we gave the Chamber had the firm expectation that the
11 presentation of the Prosecution case would be concluded in early 2005,
12 very early. I'm not going into any details at this very moment.
13 The second observation I'd like to make is that where I fully
14 understand that the Defence says we are not fully prepared, we're not
15 ready, so if finally the communications would not have the results the
16 Chamber would like them to have, so therefore we keep all our options
17 open, it should not be forgotten that if you communicate -- if there's
18 communication between the parties in order to see whether they compromise
19 on certain facts, that -- at least that's how the Chamber understands it.
20 That's not eight hours a day negotiating but preparing a specific
21 municipality, getting fully acquainted with the details of an expert
22 report and then see whether you can agree or not.
23 So therefore, the time given to further communicate is time which
24 also is expected to be used for the preparation of the case. And it's in
25 that context that I mentioned the 70 days mentioned at the beginning at a
1 December meeting of last year by the Defence, the 70 days they would need
2 in order to be appropriately prepared for the case, and I compared that
3 with the 80 days we finally have not been sitting if the schedule
4 continues until July.
5 For the Chamber it's just a choice. Do we have sufficient reasons
6 to accept the suggestions of the parties not to sit and to see whether a
7 lot of matters we otherwise would have to decide can be dealt with by the
8 parties themselves, or whether we say we have not sufficient confidence
9 that this will bring such results that it is to be preferred above just
10 sitting here and hearing the evidence.
11 When I drafted the calendars, I hesitated if I would make it read
12 until the 9th of July or the end of July. The fact that you find the full
13 month of July coloured red means that the Chamber has confidence. The
14 fact that you do not find the month of September also in full red could be
15 understood as -- that the Chamber still is aware that its hesitations are
16 not necessarily improper hesitations.
17 I think I have made all the observations I would have to make?
18 And further needs? Then is there any other --
19 MR. STEWART: Yes, sorry, yes, yes. The answer is yes,
20 Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ORIE: The answers. Yes.
22 MR. STEWART: Yes. I will try to be as brief as I can. But,
23 Your Honour, we -- we do not see that any projection leads to the simple
24 arithmetic that we multiply the period taken so far to cover 135, 140
25 hours of the Prosecution case simply gets multiplied pro rata to produce
1 450 hours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I could be -- I could be very short on that,
3 Mr. Stewart. Until now, I've heard the reservations. I haven't heard
4 commitments like, if we do not -- if it seems not to work out, we will
5 make sure that within so and so many days we will -- I mean, I heard
6 reservations, and it was on the basis of these reservations that I made
7 this projection. But if you say that it's not necessarily, as some people
8 say, you never know what will happen in advance, you can't say what will
9 happen in advance, of course that's true always well. I just am giving a
10 picture that if we had gone at the same speed, that it would presumably
11 take altogether two years for the Prosecution, and I don't want to have a
12 great discussion on -- it's a picture. It's a projection, and I could --
13 I could give you five reasons why not to use it, and I could give you
14 another five reasons why it's of some use. But it's -- I'd rather not
15 make it subject of debate at this moment.
16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I don't wish to make it the subject of
17 debate either. I simply wanted to make that record. There is no
18 projection that leads to that conclusion, as far as we're concerned. But
19 if it arises, we could -- then we could debate it, but not today.
20 In relation to the 70 days mentioned by -- in December by the
21 Defence, which Your Honour has mentioned more than once this morning, we'd
22 simply like to observe it's -- really follows from everything we've said
23 about this case. The whole problem is: The Defence didn't even know
24 enough about the case at that time to make any seriously reliable
25 projection. We were only doing our best at that point on the -- on the
1 little -- relatively little we knew about the case. So we do suggest that
2 looking backwards that that 70 days, that's really ancient history as far
3 as our knowledge and grasp and ability to project the case is concerned.
4 It's of no value with respect now as far as our assessment of the position
5 is concerned.
6 And the -- the third observation is just briefly that, yes,
7 Your Honour is completely right. We, with respect, entirely accept
8 that -- and this has been part of our discussion that we would in parallel
9 or in tandem we would proceed with preparation. We would proceed with our
10 schedule for agreement on municipalities and experts and that there would
11 be considerable overlap. Naturally you can't say, well, that doesn't
12 count as part of the preparation, that part of what we would have to
13 prepare. But we would like to emphasise it's only part of what we have to
14 prepare because after all that whole enormous area which is excluded from
15 the ambit of any proposed agreement is itself part of the preparation,
16 and, frankly, I wouldn't have minded cross-examining Ambassador Okun after
17 I had had the chance to really have an idea what all these international
18 negotiations and agreements were all about beyond the very limited grasp
19 that we've been able to obtain so far. And we just don't want too many
20 more witnesses to be examined by the Defence when we don't feel we have
21 sufficient grasp. But Your Honour has that message and those are our
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. That message was clearly received.
24 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, there is one remaining matter.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. TIEGER: And that concerns the exhibits that were marked
2 during the course of Ambassador Okun's testimony, including an exhibit
3 that was not marked and that was the map referred to during the course of
4 the Court's questioning.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar, could you give a P number to
6 the map that was provided to you by Mr. Okun.
7 THE REGISTRAR: The next number will be P214, and that's for the
9 JUDGE ORIE: That's for the map.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Marked by Mr. Okun.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. His name is on it.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Then we have still some other exhibits pending
14 because we're still waiting for a selection of the binders, I think it
15 was. Not the binders in relation to Mr. Okun, but we had some other
16 binders where not all the exhibits were used. So -- and I think we have
17 some other Sanski Most exhibits pending as well but we then decided to
18 deal with them at the same time, altogether. So it's clear that exhibits
19 have not -- we are not fully up-to-date with the exhibits, but I think the
20 exhibits as far as Mr. Okun are concerned we could now decide on them.
21 Madam Registrar, could you -- then we get -- no. It's one --
22 there are only two exhibit numbers, so it will not take too much time.
23 Could you please read the exhibits in relation to Ambassador Okun aloud
24 with the numbers so that we could give a decision on the admission. Or
25 would you prefer Ms. Philpott to do it next time?
1 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar reopens the list she has on her
4 THE REGISTRAR: Okay. The first exhibit, P210, it's a binder
5 containing diary of Vance mission to Yugoslavia. P211, map board entitled
6 Etnicka Karta, Bosne i Hercegovine. P212, two binders containing diary of
7 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. P213, a map, the
8 division of BiH planned according to the agreement Cvetkivic-Macek in
9 1939. And the last exhibit was the map P214 that was tendered by
10 Mr. Okun, which we just previously mentioned.
11 JUDGE ORIE: That was provided by Mr. Okun.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Provided by Mr. Okun.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And tendered by the Prosecution.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I think we also have one map, a Defence exhibit.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That is -- I have two actually.
17 I have D22, which is the excerpt from the book.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. I'd forgotten about the excerpt from the
20 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. And the map, D23.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. D22 excerpt of the book written by Lord Owen,
22 and D23 the map produced by the Defence.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Since there are no objections, they're all
25 admitted into evidence.
1 We adjourn for an unknown period of time, but we will, I take it,
2 see each other again. Perhaps it should be a meeting on the 9th of July.
3 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, there is just one further matter before
4 we adjourn, if I might deal with it if it's an appropriate time.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MS. LOUKAS: There is some outstanding material in relation to the
7 municipality of Sanski Most that the Prosecutor Mr. Tom Hannis and I
8 discussed. That's material in relation to Mr. Adil Draganovic and I --
9 seeing we have two minutes, and I thought this might be an opportunity to
10 tender that material.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I must say not all the details are still in my
12 mind, but would it not be -- if it's with Mr. Hannis, well, one reason to
13 do it now is that we might not sit in the coming weeks.
14 MS. LOUKAS: That's what I was thinking, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Another reason not to do it is that Mr. Hannis is not
16 there. But if you have got it, we could -- we could look at it and see
17 whether we can agree, but would there be any problem as far as the
18 Prosecution is concerned. If you would prefer to delay that, then --
19 MR. HARMON: I'm not sure what exhibits relate to Mr. Draganovic.
20 I am aware that there are exhibits with Mr. Karabeg, exhibits 98 through
21 115 that were still not yet admitted. I am aware of Mr. Hidic's 92 bis
22 materials. Mr. Hannis has advised me of that. I'm not aware of
23 Mr. Draganovic's materials that were referred to by counsel.
24 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, I'll just enlighten Mr. Harmon in
25 relation to that. This is material that relates to the evidence of Mr.
1 Karabeg, and it was an agreement between Mr. Hannis and I -- the-- on the
2 basis that the Trial Chamber preferred it saving some time in relation to
3 this issue.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I make another discussion.
5 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, it's not of enormous importance that I
6 do it at the moment.
7 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will prepare a list of all outstanding
8 issues in relation to exhibits of witnesses who have not yet be admitted
9 into evidence and also the reasons why. Because we are still waiting for
10 a selection or about whatever reason. There were usually good reasons to
11 delay. We will make that list. We will present it to the parties and
12 then we -- the first time we will be sitting we will deal with them all at
13 the same time so that everyone is properly prepared for it. Yes.
14 So then we adjourn for an unknown period of time and most likely
15 at least the Presiding Judge will meet with the parties on the 9th of
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.39 p.m.,
18 sine die.