1 Monday, 27 September 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar, would
6 you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus
8 Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
10 Before we start, I used the word "almost insurmountable" last
11 week. If one doesn't move to the mountain, sometimes the mountains move
12 toward us. There is a fair chance but it will be confirmed either today
13 or tomorrow that we might be not sitting in the week preferred by both
14 parties, and that would be the week of the 11th of October. I would say
15 there is a 90 per cent chance that we'll manage to achieve that.
16 Mr. Harmon, is the Prosecution ready to call its next witness?
17 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we are. Our next witness is Mr.
18 Stjepan Kljuic.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you --
20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, before Mr. Kljuic comes into court, I
21 wonder if I could just say something and be clear about the way in which
22 we are proceeding -- well, with specifically this witness but it may be a
23 point of more general application. A draft or an 89(F) statement has
24 been prepared in relation to Mr. Kljuic, but the Defence expresses its
25 concern that the original purpose of the -- if you like the special 89(F)
1 procedure which was thrashed out for the purposes of this case is in
2 danger of being misused. The starting point for that was that in
3 relation to any witness where there was a longish statement, there would
4 inevitably be parts of the statement which were not likely seriously to
5 be in contention, not likely to be seriously capable of challenge by the
6 Defence and really rather pointless and time-consuming to draw out with
7 elaborate oral examination-in-chief.
8 It followed from that, though, that because there might be fairly
9 substantial passages which were dealt with then by, really, reference to
10 a statement, that those outside the Court would have no idea what was
11 going on in relation to those passages. So the remedy was to produce a
12 piece of concise information for the general public to enable them to see
13 what had happened, and that was the purpose.
14 We seem to be creeping and more than creeping, we seem to be
15 moving quite fast to the procedure being used for a quite different
16 purpose, which is, of course, to save time but to save time in a way
17 which is driving everything then too far, because the idea was not that
18 we should go beyond and trespass beyond those relatively non-contentious
19 areas and start using the 89(F) procedure as some equivalent, and this
20 was mentioned in relation last week I think to a different witness as
21 some equivalent to 92 bis and some way of going into and presenting more
22 contentious and -- I say more significant; all the evidence we hope is
23 significant -- but more contentious evidence going into the more
24 significant areas without exploring them pouring in examination-in-chief.
25 And we do submit, Your Honour, that over the last few weeks alone, it's
1 been consistently demonstrated that there is potentially an enormous gap
2 between what a witness says and signs up to in a written statement and
3 what the witness actually says if that matter is explored in direct
4 examination in chief. Of course some of our cross-examination has been
5 directed to that. But we believe, Your Honour, that that has been, and
6 we submit that that has been consistently and clearly showed. In other
7 words, that we have demonstrated the severe dangers of assuming that what
8 a witness says in a written statement in relation to important matters is
9 in fact and would in fact represent the evidence that he would give.
10 So with that general comment, but specifically in relation to
11 this witness, we do particularly invite the Tribunal to ensure, please,
12 that this 89(F) procedure which we have worked out is only used for its
13 original purpose and that great care is taken that it does not creep into
14 that other area altogether.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stewart. Let one thing be clear,
16 that you perfectly set out what the purpose of the whole 89(F) summaries
17 is. The summaries are not in evidence. It's just to inform the public.
18 And therefore, if there is any contentious issue, or at least if there is
19 any issue on which the witness would testify different from what his
20 written statement says, then the Prosecution could either choose to leave
21 out certain parts, especially contentious issues, from the 89(F)
22 statements. It could indicate that, for example, that the witness gave
23 his statement and will testify and then just mention the subject rather
24 than to what exactly the contest is so that the public is able to follow.
25 And this brings me to another observation, and that is that in
1 the view of the Chamber and, I think, having seen some of the 89(F)
2 summaries, the Chamber has indicated that it thinks that the summary for
3 the public could be far shorter and less in detail. Let's leave the
4 details to the examination-in-chief where it needs further attention. If
5 the 89(F) statement as such is not contentious, then of course it's the
6 statement which is then in evidence or any relevant parts in evidence.
7 So I think we still have to -- we have to be very precise to that extent.
8 The Chamber agrees with you. We have to be -- we have to keep clearly in
9 mind what the summary is -- what the statement is. If the statement
10 differs from what the Prosecution expects, that would be the testimony
11 that should then not be confused in one way or the other, and finally
12 that the summary serves this specific purpose of enabling the public not
13 to lose track of what happens in this courtroom.
14 Mr. Harmon, I don't know whether you'd like to add anything to
15 that, but --
16 MR. HARMON: No, Your Honour. I'd like to proceed with the
17 witness as soon as possible.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand. But on the other hand, it is
19 a concern which is expressed and which needs proper attention.
20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I just very briefly clarify what
21 is the distinction from the Defence point of view. We endorse, with
22 respect, everything that Your Honour has just said. So far as the 89(F)
23 summary is concerned, in a sense the Defence's concerns are no greater or
24 no less than anybody else's in court. That's simply to keep the public
25 informed. So it's not really -- it's not an issue between the
1 Prosecution and the Defence.
2 What's more important from the Defence's point of view is that it
3 is clear to us which bits of the statements the Prosecution are intending
4 not to explore in oral examination-in-chief and which they are intending
5 to explore. And the 89(F) summary -- the shorter it is the more this is
6 true -- only in the barest terms gives us that indication. So the 89(F)
7 summary is almost irrelevant from the Defence's actual working purposes.
8 The important thing is that this clear distinction is drawn and we have
9 some firm indication as to which areas of the statement the Prosecution
10 is not proposing to explore in examination-in-chief so that we have the
11 chance to make submissions in relation to that at the appropriate time.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll see what is the case in relation to this
13 witness. You've specifically drawn our attention to that. We will pay
14 that attention to the issue.
15 Madam Usher, would you please escort the witness into the
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Kljuic.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning to everyone.
20 JUDGE ORIE: By your answer, I do establish that you hear me in a
21 language you understand.
22 Before giving testimony in this court, the Rules of Procedure and
23 Evidence require you to make a solemn declaration that you will speak the
24 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Madam Usher now hands
25 out text of this declaration. May I invite you to make that solemn
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
3 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated. Mr. Kljuic, you'll
5 first be examined by Mr. Harmon, counsel for the Prosecution.
6 WITNESS: STJEPAN KLJUIC
7 [Witness answered through interpreter]
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, please proceed.
9 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Good morning, Your Honours, counsel.
11 Examined by Mr. Harmon:
12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kljuic.
13 A. Good morning.
14 MR. HARMON: Now, if the witness could be provided with a copy of
15 Prosecution Exhibits 291 and 292, a copy of his statement and a binder
16 with intercepts and his comments.
17 Q. Mr. Kljuic, while these documents are being distributed, let me
18 begin by asking you about your background in part. Once these documents
19 have been distributed I will interrupt and then I will continue with a
20 further description of your background.
21 Mr. Kljuic, you were born in Sarajevo on the 19th of December,
22 1939. What I'm going to do is ask you to affirm what I say at the
23 appropriate moment.
24 You were born in Sarajevo on the 19th of December, 1939. You are
25 a Bosnian Croat. You studied literature at the University of Sarajevo.
1 By profession, you were a journalist from 1964 until 1971. You were a
2 journalist for the newspaper Oslobodjenje in Sarajevo, and from 1971
3 until 1990, you were a correspondent for the Croatian newspaper Vjesnik,
4 but you were reporting from Sarajevo. Is that correct?
5 A. That's all correct.
6 Q. Now, Mr. Kljuic, I'm going to come back to further details about
7 your background and your political career in particular, but you have
8 before you a Prosecution Exhibit which is a statement that was given by
9 you on the 18th of April, 2001; the 23rd of May, 2001; and the 5th of
10 December, 2002. You have had a chance to review this statement, have you
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Okay. Now, other than one correction which you pointed out to me
14 which is found in paragraph 53, which is the last line in 53, in the
15 English translation of that statement the last word should not be the
16 word "state," it should be the word "town." So the sentence should
17 read, "He had one foot in the country and one foot in the town."
18 Is that the correction that you wanted to make?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. So do you, therefore, affirm your statement before this Court?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 Q. Now, in respect of Prosecution Exhibit 292, which is a binder
23 with intercepts, let me review that with you briefly. Mr. Kljuic, while
24 you were here in The Hague before testifying, did you have an opportunity
25 to listen to a number of intercepts, and were you asked to either make
1 comments on them as well as identify the voices of the speakers to the
2 extent that you were able to do so?
3 A. I listened to the intercepts. I identified the people I was able
4 to. I identified, and I also made several comments.
5 Q. Now if you turn to the binder which is Prosecution Exhibit 292,
6 if you open it up you will see first there is a declaration signed by
7 you. If you turn to the next page, you will see a spreadsheet that has
9 A. [In English] Stop, please. I have French language.
10 Q. Can you hear me now in the Bosnian language, Mr. Kljuic?
11 A. [Interpretation] Yes, I do.
12 Q. Now this -- I'd like to take you through this Prosecution Exhibit
13 292. There has been prepared a spreadsheet on which it identifies the
14 specific intercept by number. On the left-hand side there is a KID ID,
15 and you will see that each of the intercepts thereafter has a tab
16 associated with a particular intercept.
17 The speaker that you were able to identify is identified in a
18 column. Then that is text that contains your comments. And your
19 signature appears on the first page of this spreadsheet, 17 pages long,
20 and your initials appear thereafter on each of the pages.
21 Do you adopt, then, the comments that are contained in this
22 particular spreadsheet? And there are two other similar spreadsheets
23 that were prepared. Do you adopt your comments contained in those
24 particular spreadsheets?
25 A. Yes. Those are the comments that I made.
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, this is a very thinly disguised way of
2 giving a very large body of evidence by written statement without going
3 through the proper procedures. A considerable proportion of this
4 witness's evidence, apparently, relates to these intercepts. We were
5 supplied with a very large -- or a list of a very large number of
6 intercepts, as it happens, for the witness. We raise the other question
7 which is why on earth we've been supplied with this list so recently.
8 These comments, I believe I'm right, that we even had them over the
9 weekend, this particular schedule, which makes it completely impossible
10 to get it to Mr. Krajisnik anyway. So we turn up on the first morning of
11 court with this witness's detailed comments on a large number of
12 intercepts not having -- it's helpfully -- there is a column in B/C/S,
13 but without our client having had a chance to look. So we do raise the
14 question why on earth couldn't have been done while Mr. Kljuic was back
15 in his own country. I presume he didn't require a last-minute input
17 But it is, to go back to the essential point, this is
18 effectively, in this area, the witness preparing or somebody preparing a
19 substantial and detailed written statement and just getting into the
20 witness box and saying, "Yes, I confirm my statement." So it's
21 equivalent to 92 bis or it's equivalent to 89(F) and it's simply not the
22 way these matters should be dealt with, leaving aside the practical
23 difficulty that I have indicated.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
25 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I have identified for the Defence a
1 potential list of intercepts about two and a half weeks ago, if I'm not
2 mistaken. I provided that list to the Defence. Mr. Stewart had ample
3 opportunity to review those potential intercepts as well -- I'm sorry.
4 And then subsequently I provided to the witness, after Mr. Kljuic
5 arrived, the comments that Mr. Kljuic made on those intercepts. Once Mr.
6 Kljuic had narrowed down from the potential list of intercepts that I had
7 selected, I provided to the Defence -- I wish I had brought my notes as
8 to when I provided these. I provided before the weekend, the 17-page
9 list of intercepts and comments to the Defence. I informed the Defence
10 that there were additional intercepts that I needed to have Mr. Kljuic
11 review, which he did. Then there needed to be translations of those
12 comments so the Defence could have them in a language, and yesterday
13 afternoon, I believe, I provided the next and final list which was ten
14 intercepts to the Defence. I provide that had to them sometime around
15 noon yesterday.
16 The situation is this, Your Honour: The witness is here for a
17 limited period of time. The intercepts can be played one at a time. His
18 testimony can be protracted. That's not the most efficient way to
19 proceed, in our view. Our position is that Mr. Kljuic has had an
20 opportunity to listen to these intercepts. He has made his comments.
21 These intercepts have been provided to the Defence weeks ago. There was
22 ample opportunity for the Defence to consult with their client about the
23 intercepts, and we believe that this is an efficient and fair way to
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We've got two issues as far as I see. The
1 first one is time; the second one is whether this is the way to proceed
2 with 89(F) statements.
3 Mr. Harmon, I don't think I'm mistaking when I say that the
4 requirement under Rule 92 bis, as far as the act and the conduct of the
5 accused is concerned, also applies in respect of 89(F). And I noted that
6 it seems that the intercepts deal to a large extent with -- well, what
7 one could say is act and conduct of the accused. That's what he did at
8 that time.
9 So to that extent, I think it would be fair to stick to the case
10 law of this Tribunal, that is, not to introduce just by his and other
11 comments especially not if they are related to the words spoken at that
12 time, at least as it appears from the transcript by Mr. Krajisnik.
13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I --
14 MR. HARMON: It's my intention to introduce a number of these
15 intercepts, to play them in Court, to have Mr. Krajisnik hear them, to
16 have Mr. Stewart hear them and have Mr. Kljuic comment on them.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, my first comment -- I don't want to
19 have an unseemly squabble about it. Mr. Harmon wishes he brought his
20 notes with him, et cetera. We wish he brought his notes with him because
21 a little more care needs to be take been the timetable. Mr. Harmon says
22 weeks ago. The 10th of September, which was sixteen days ago, was the
23 first notification that we were given that this witness was going to be
24 giving evidence during this phase of the trial at all. On the 17th of
25 September, we were given a list of 137 or 138 intercepts. The detailed
1 summary which we're talking about now and which we're looking at with
2 this witness's comments were supplied on Saturday. Mr. Harmon asked me
3 -- he very kindly telephoned me. We had a couple of short telephone
4 calls. He courteously telephoned me he asked if I had any objection
5 about that being passed on I think in accordance with the Court's
6 requests to the Court. I indicated to him that I didn't have any
7 objection but that I hadn't read them. I just take the view that if of
8 course for any reason the material should be withdrawn from the Trial
9 Chamber a professional Bench doesn't have a problem with that. So I
10 didn't want to slow things down by saying oh, no, give me time to read it
11 before you even pass on the material to the Trial Chamber, but I made it
12 clear I hadn't.
13 This timetable is really quite different from -- well, from Mr.
14 Harmon's apparent recollection of it. The weekend when we're coming up
15 with this witness is not the ideal time, and it does not give Mr.
16 Krajisnik the opportunity. We don't wish, Your Honour, as far as it can
17 possibly be --
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 MR. STEWART: Sorry. I'm just pausing because I can see Your
20 Honour is conferring with his colleagues.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, proceed.
22 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. We say we don't wish to have
23 unnecessary playing of tapes or disks of the actual telephone
24 conversation. It will be necessary from time to time, but we don't want
25 that to be done just for the sake of doing it. But there is an
1 intermediate stage. After all, we have transcripts as well, so some
2 combination -- but, Your Honour, we've made our point as to how we submit
3 this matter should be dealt with but we don't want to say that the actual
4 timetable is a little different, if it ever became necessary to explore
5 that in more detail.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, may I add one suggestion.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 MR. HARMON: And that is this. I'll make one observation first.
10 Mr. Kljuic, if possible, needs to conclude his testimony and be in
11 Sarajevo on Thursday. This is a discussion that we should have and
12 perhaps we could have after Court and after his testimony in any
13 particular day.
14 My suggestion is this, Your Honour: If there is a particular
15 intercept that the Defence identifies that goes to the acts and conduct
16 of the accused that it specifically wants to have Mr. Kljuic comment on
17 or have it played in front of him, I'm more than happy to have any
18 intercept that they find objectionable on that basis played before this
19 Court while Mr. Kljuic is here. He can provide his comments viva voce.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's -- may I say, Your Honour, that
22 isn't quite the point. We assume out of those 138 intercepts the
23 Prosecution have made a selection. I'm not sure exactly what the total
24 is, but it's more like -- I don't know whether it's 17. Maybe that's
25 just one list but it's in the nature of 20 or 30 or something like that.
1 I may stand to be corrected on the detail but, you know, it's of that
3 We rather assume that the Prosecution have selected those
4 intercepts because they regard those as more significant to their case.
5 All the intercepts are within the category of acts and conduct of the
6 accused because these are conversations to which the accused was a party,
7 whatever the precise topic of the conversation. So when we have
8 intercepts which the Prosecution have identified as sufficiently
9 significant to make that selection, in principle, in relation to each of
10 those intercepts the evidence should be given what we would call in
11 summary properly. That doesn't necessarily require them to be played at
12 length, because we do have transcripts. So a witness's explanation of
13 what he understands and legitimate comments that he can make can in many
14 cases be made by reference to the transcript but that is -- the
15 transcript of the conversation, but that is a wholly different exercise
16 from simply preparing a batch of comments and saying, "Yes, those are my
17 comments," and handing them over on what we have already made our
19 JUDGE ORIE: I think I already gave some guidance to Mr. Harmon
20 in that respect. The Chamber, of course, is concerned about this way of
21 preparation, not primarily blaming the Prosecution because the Chamber,
22 is aware that as the Defence, the Prosecution has also its time
24 We'll now proceed, and on the basis of what we hear, we'll then
25 decide whether additional time or facilities should be given or whether a
1 recall would be appropriate at a later stage. But let's first see with
2 the guidance the Chamber just gave to Mr. Harmon where we -- in what
3 direction we go and whether there's any remedy needed at a later stage.
4 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.
6 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
7 Q. Mr. Kljuic, we're now going to proceed, continue with your
8 evidence. What I would like to do is in summary form outline the
9 highlights of your political career and ask you to affirm whether what I
10 say is correct.
11 Mr. Kljuic, you joined the Croatian Democratic Party of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina in March of 1990, and you served as the political
13 secretary and acting president of that organisation until September of
14 1990. Between the 7th of September, 1990, and the 2nd of February, 1992,
15 you served as the president of the HDZ BiH.
16 Following the multi-party elections in 1990, you became a member
17 of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
18 the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and served in
19 that capacity until 6 November 1992. You were again appointed to the
20 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and assumed that role from the 10th
21 of October, 1993, until October of 1996.
22 On the 6th of June, 1994, you founded the Republican Party of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, a party which advocated multi-ethnic Bosnia,
24 secular Bosnia, a democratic Bosnia, advocated the return of refugees.
25 Between April of 1992 and October of 1993, you were the president of the
1 state commission for gathering information on war crimes, and you
2 remained a member of that body until the end of 1993.
3 Currently, you are an advisor for foreign affairs to the
4 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 Is that an accurate summary of positions that you have held and
6 currently hold?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 Q. Now, I would like to focus, first of all, Mr. Kljuic, on your
9 knowledge of and acquaintanceship with the individuals who were in the
10 Bosnian Serb leadership, and specifically I'd like you to tell the Court,
11 and I'll identify the person first and then I would like you to identify
12 for the Court how well you knew that person, what the -- what contacts
13 you had with that person.
14 If we could start, first of all, with Radovan Karadzic. Can you
15 describe to the Court if you knew Mr. Karadzic, how you knew him, how
16 long you knew him, what your contacts with him were.
17 A. I knew Dr. Radovan Karadzic for about 25 to 30 years. He wrote a
18 lot about cultural events. He was a doctor as well. For a long time we
19 were members of the same football team in Sarajevo, on which he also
20 served as a psychologist. At the time when political parties, national
21 political parties came into being, our contacts took place almost on a
22 daily basis until April 1992.
23 Q. And while we turn our attention to Ms. Biljana Plavsic. Can you
24 tell the Court your contacts with her, how well you knew her.
25 A. I knew her family very well because for over 30 years I was a
1 very good friend of her brother. Her I met a long time before the war,
2 in Dubrovnik where they spent their holidays. Before the elections in
3 1990, my contacts with Biljana Plavsic were frequent because her brother
4 insisted that we should be close, allegedly because we needed to assume
5 joint stands, joint between the SDS and HDZ. Apart from that, we sat
6 next to each other at Presidency sessions and saw each other practically
7 every day.
8 Q. Now, in respect of Nikola Koljevic, could you address your
9 knowledge of him?
10 A. I had known him for many, many years too. He specialised in
11 Shakespeare, and his brother Sveto was also a lecturer at the Sarajevo
12 University. All of them were people with whom I took part in many
13 cultural events. And of course the intensity of our contacts increased
14 in the preparations for the first multi-party elections in 1990.
15 Q. Mr. Koljevic was also a member of the Presidency of Socialist
16 Republic of --
17 A. Certainly, certainly. I spent many a day with him because we
18 were members together in certain Presidency bodies such as the foreign
19 policy committee.
20 Q. Finally, let me turn my attention to Momcilo Krajisnik. Can you
21 address how well you knew Mr. Krajisnik, please.
22 A. I met Mr. Krajisnik in 1990, during the election campaign.
23 Later, when he was president of the parliament, we had a series of
24 contacts, all the more so because as a member of the Presidency, I
25 attended every parliament session. And in addition to that, in all major
1 negotiations between the party, the SDS was mostly represented by
2 Karadzic and Krajisnik, whereas I, at the time, was a leading
3 representative of the HDZ.
4 Apart from that, I spoke to Mr. Krajisnik several times in the
5 course of official talks between the HDZ and the SDS. I wish to point
6 out, however, that this political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
7 starting from early 1990 to early 1992, was very condensed, very fraught.
8 I cannot enumerate exactly how meetings we had [as interpreted], but that
9 we knew each other very well, at least as politicians, is unquestionable.
10 Q. Now let me turn to the leadership in Serbia and have you address
11 your remarks in respect of Slobodan Milosevic.
12 A. It is evident that Slobodan Milosevic was the vehicle
13 implementing a project that had been developed by the intellectual
14 circles in the Serbian Academy of Sciences, and he was the first and only
15 real leader that everybody had to obey one way or another.
16 Concerning my political contacts with Slobodan Milosevic, I gave
17 a statement when I testified in his trial. The subject of our
18 conversations concentrated on efforts to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 However, to his great regret, I was not a good partner for that kind of
20 agreement. We did talk, but there was no agreement.
21 Q. So is it fair to say that you had numerous contacts with Mr.
22 Milosevic and were able to ascertain from those contacts his views and
23 attitude toward Bosnia and Herzegovina?
24 A. You couldn't really say that they were numerous, but we did have
25 official talks, and in their framework we also had informal
2 As for the policy of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic relative to Bosnia
3 and Herzegovina, he did not hide his plans. On the contrary. He tried
4 to find in me a partner for that sort of thing, as did Karadzic.
5 However, I was an integrationist by conviction, as far as Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina were concerned, and this is precisely the reason for my
7 disagreement with the official circles in Zagreb. I was the first man to
8 publish the national programme of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the
9 most important thing in that programme was for Bosnia and Herzegovina to
10 remain a sovereign republic, that is, to have the same status of the
11 other former republics of Yugoslavia, a stand that was to be confirmed by
12 the Badinter Commission. [In English] [previous translation
13 continues]... finish.
14 [Interpretation] And I sought equality for Croats in the
15 then-Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I'd like to remain focused, if I could, on the
17 leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. And can you identify the paramount
18 leaders in the Bosnian Serb constellation of power.
19 A. Although officially speaking that circle was a bit broader, the
20 greatest power and authority were wielded by Karadzic and Krajisnik, at
21 the same time were the people relevant in our eyes. Biljana Plavsic and
22 Koljevic occupied important state positions, but in the strategy of
23 implementing the programme developed earlier, they did not have much say.
24 Also, there were a number of other people such as Maksimovic, Buha,
25 Ostojic, and others who were treated as members of the inner circle of
1 the SDS leadership, but they exerted maybe some influence in the regions,
2 certainly not in important issues of policy and strategy.
3 Q. Now --
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I wonder if we could have a little
5 less journalism in Mr. Harmon's questions. "Can you identify the
6 paramount leaders in the Bosnian Serb constellation of power." This
7 becomes almost lurid as a way of questioning a witness. There is a far
8 more neutral way of expressing questions so that we actually get the
9 witness's answers, and we do hope that if the phrase "paramount leaders"
10 and "constellation of power" ever appear later in this case in any
11 document it will be specifically noted that they first appeared in Mr.
12 Harmon's question rather than in the witness's answer.
13 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I think that's a perfectly appropriate
14 way to ask the question. I can ask it a different way: Who are the most
15 important leaders in the Republika Srpska. It's the same way of asking
16 the same question. So the form of asking the question, Your Honour, I
17 think is appropriate and I would like to proceed with the testimony of
18 Mr. Kljuic.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber does not find the form such that this
21 would be inappropriate to put it to the witness. You may proceed, Mr.
23 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Kljuic, you had an opportunity -- did you have an opportunity
25 to observe Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic working together?
1 A. Well, that was no secret. Not only were they leading
2 politicians, they were best friends. I believe in the entire Serbian
3 leadership in Bosnia, the only sincere friendship was between Karadzic
4 and Krajisnik.
5 Q. I was going to ask you if you could kindly describe the personal
6 relationship as you knew it between Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic.
7 A. I said they were the only real friends, and that was confirmed by
8 the leading positions they occupied. I can speak about that from my own
9 experience and practice.
10 When we spoke to SDS representatives, including Koljevic and
11 Plavsic, and we agreed on something, that agreement could not be
12 considered final. But when I spoke to Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik and
13 we reached an understanding, we knew that that meant something.
14 Q. Now, in respect of the actual position held by Mr. Krajisnik
15 before the commencement of the war, he was the president of the Assembly.
16 I would like to ask you your views. Was he -- did he have the powers
17 merely of a legislator or did his powers extend beyond that? And when I
18 ask you about those powers, I'm talking about powers within the Bosnian
19 Serb party, the SDS, and the governmental structures.
20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, before the witness answers that
21 question, could we be very clear, as we often need to be in relation to
22 witnesses, if the witness is being -- well, there is expert evidence
23 which this witness is not here to give. There is public record evidence.
24 There are constitutional and legal matters and so on. Those are
25 absolutely not what this witness is here to testify about. Of course, in
1 the other area, the witness is then going on to give evidence of what he
2 actually knows, what he saw and heard himself, then I can't object to
3 that in principle. But I do wish before the witness even gets into these
4 areas, with respect, to draw that clear, important distinction which runs
5 throughout a lot of the evidence in this case.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, you're inviting to keep it as much to
7 the facts as possible, and of course the type of knowledge this witness
8 has might make him not always entirely clear what would be expert
9 testimony and what would be just testimony of a witness of fact that is
10 related to his special position.
11 Please proceed.
12 MR. HARMON:
13 Q. Kljuic, you have described earlier to the Court your extensive
14 contacts and almost daily contacts with Bosnian Serb leaders and other
15 important figures in the SDS party. You worked closely with Mr.
16 Krajisnik. You had an opportunity to observe him relate to Mr. Karadzic.
17 You had him -- you had an opportunity to observe his conduct in respect
18 of other Bosnian Serb political figures on not only the national level
19 but on the municipal level.
20 My question is this: Based on your -- those facts, based on your
21 knowledge of Mr. Krajisnik, having spoken to other Bosnian Serb leaders
22 including members of the Presidency itself, are you able to inform this
23 Court as to whether Mr. Krajisnik's authority within the SDS party
24 exceeded those normal authorities vested in a Speaker of the Assembly?
25 A. I must tell you that that was a period when for the first time in
1 50 years there was political pluralism in Bosnia. Political parties were
2 coming into existence. We had no particular experience in politics. And
3 most frequently, there would be interference between the official
4 position one occupied and positions in political parties.
5 I can tell you that Mr. Krajisnik was very skilful, that he was
6 good at manipulating the agenda, that he could obstruct things that had
7 been voted for. But every citizen of Bosnia can tell you that Mr.
8 Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik were the top and everybody else was just the
10 Q. So did his authorities, did his powers exceed those of a mere
12 A. Well, in political negotiations at the top of the party, he was
13 at a significantly higher level than the one that he had within the state
15 Q. And are you aware of how his power within the Bosnian Serb
16 political circles was viewed by Bosnian Serbs who were leaders of the SDS
17 in the municipalities?
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's -- that question, how his power
19 within the Bosnian Serb political circles was viewed by Bosnian Serbs who
20 were leaders of the SDS in the municipalities, is not an appropriate
21 question. If this witness has some knowledge which he can impart by
22 evidence to the Tribunal of such matters of what Mr. Krajisnik's powers
23 were in relation to the municipalities, what his links were with the
24 municipalities, then he is legitimately able to give that evidence and
25 then it can be evaluated. But for the question to be put simply in terms
1 of how the people in the municipalities viewed Mr. Krajisnik's power,
2 which is already a fairly vague concept, is really not the appropriate
3 way of proceeding.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, that was not the question. The
5 question was whether he was aware of how this was viewed. I take it that
6 the answer will be yes or no, and if he was aware, then I take it that
7 Mr. Harmon will come with further questions.
8 And of course if the witness is asked about how others viewed a
9 certain situation, then the course the Chamber expects Mr. Harmon also to
10 explore on what basis he think he -- the witness thinks he -- knew what
11 other people -- and how other people were viewed in certain positions.
12 MR. STEWART: But the distinction Your Honour draws with a
13 non-distinction, with respect, because the introduction "Are you aware,"
14 that is implicit in any question. Without the introductory words of the
15 question "are you aware," the question is exactly the same. So the point
16 is the same so my point --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon knows what the Chamber expects him to do.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. STEWART: I simply want to make the point that the
20 distinction that Your Honour draws is not a distinction which deals with
21 my objection at all.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, I said a few more things as well, and
23 that was certainly related the basis of the knowledge of this witness.
24 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
25 MR. HARMON:
1 Q. Can you answer the question I asked you, Mr. Kljuic.
2 A. I know what the attitude was of the municipal officials, of
3 lower-ranking officials with regard to Mr. Krajisnik.
4 Q. And what was it?
5 A. Well, he was very respected, because Mr. Krajisnik wielded a lot
6 of authority. Apart from the high-level official positions that he had
7 in Ergoinvest, the largest Yugoslav company, he was also respected as a
8 good host. He liked to work on his property, and the image people had of
9 him was a positive one. He was taken to be a good example in Yugoslavia.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please tell us what is the basis of this
11 view that other people respected him. How did you know that?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if there was an incident in
13 the field, I, as president of many Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina at
14 the time, if I wanted to solve the incident in a given area, an incident
15 involving Croats and Serbs, I would speak to Karadzic. He'd wave his
16 hand and say that everything would be all right, but he never made a
17 record of anything.
18 But if I spoke to Mr. Krajisnik and said, "Let's solve this
19 problem." If he agreed to do so, then rest assured that the problem
20 would be solved.
21 JUDGE ORIE: But that still couldn't answer my question how you
22 knew that the lower people could have been -- for other reasons that the
23 matter was resolved. But how did you know how well he was respected by
24 those on the lower levels?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was a journalist for many
1 years, and there is such a thing as public opinion, and there's an
2 attitude toward public opinion. Karadzic was the sort of spokesperson
3 for those policies. He liked to speak to journalists. He liked to brag.
4 He liked to issue threats. Whereas Mr. Krajisnik was a completely
5 different type of character. He was very serious. He was very measured.
6 He never gave statements that would irritate anyone. But he also
7 implemented the general programme, and this could be seen in the
8 Assembly. This is where it could be best seen.
9 If we adopted an agenda that was of great importance for the
10 state, you should know at the time the work of the Assembly was very
11 intense because the society was in a transitory process. It was
12 necessary to have reforms, new laws, et cetera. It was being transformed
13 from a socialist system to a capitalist system. If the SDS didn't find
14 this was appropriate, the president of the Assembly would give all 72
15 representatives the right to speak. The Assembly would then no longer
16 have any purpose. The session would go on for a number of days, and we
17 would end up without a quorum.
18 So with regard to what the SDS advocated and with regard to the
19 citizens who were in favour of the SDS at the time, with regard to these
20 people, in their eyes, Mr. Krajisnik had a lot of authority.
21 JUDGE ORIE: It's still not a full answer to my question, but
22 please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
23 MR. HARMON:
24 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me explore also the authority -- your assessment
25 of Mr. Krajisnik's authority during the war and after the war. Can you
1 give us your assessment of his authority in those two periods of time.
2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, once again, are we going to get facts?
3 Because the way the question is put invites a repetition of the
4 continuation of exactly the sort of answers we keep getting. It is
5 terribly important that witnesses in the position of Mr. Kljuic are not
6 steered by the questions towards some general statement of view which is
7 very different from what they can actually tell the Trial Chamber they
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic -- yes.
10 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I intend to explore that, but I kept
11 getting interrupted. I asked Mr. Kljuic what his assessment was, and
12 then I was going to ask him the basis of the assessment.
13 MR. STEWART: Well, he should do it the other way round, Your
14 Honour, because Mr. Harmon will continue to be interrupted, with respect,
15 by me until he continues asking the questions in the correct form. And
16 if he intended to do he should have avoided the question and gone to the
17 correct, specific question first .
18 MR. HARMON: I believe that is the correct form, Your Honour, and
19 I would ask to continue with the examination of this witness.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, whenever an assessment or an opinion on
21 a certain situation is the subject of the question, would you include in
22 your answer to the extent possible always on what factual basis your
23 opinion or your assessment is based.
24 So you now may answer the question, but please keep in mind this
25 instruction. The question was your assessment of Mr. Krajisnik's
1 authority during the war and after the war. So don't just tell us that
2 he had a high authority but also on the basis of what you came to that
3 assessment. Please proceed.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, everyone in Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina is aware of the authority he had. As far as the wartime
6 period is concerned, I could not say because we were on opposing sides.
7 But as for the post-war period is concerned, Mr. Krajisnik was the first
8 Serb who was a member of the Presidency. He was also at the Dayton
9 negotiations after Karadzic withdrew. One could say he had the support
10 of the Serbian political elite. He was the most prominent
12 If you're asking me about the power he wielded, with the
13 Prosecutor's leave, I with like to refer to a meeting that we had. I was
14 an independent politician. I was pro-Bosnian, and the Serbian side kept
15 accusing me of collaborating with the Muslims. And this was related to
17 One day President Tudjman asked me why I wasn't cooperate with
18 the Serbs. Probably because of the time that he had already established
19 contact with Milosevic. I think that they had a telephone line in
20 constant use.
21 I arranged for a meeting of the Serbian and Croatian leadership
22 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the Serbian side, there was the late
23 Koljevic. There was Krajisnik and Karadzic. The meeting was held in
24 Krajisnik's office in the Assembly. On our side, in addition to myself,
25 there was the Minister Jerko Doko, and Ivko Stanic, my vice-president.
1 That was a key moment at which it was possible to see the balance of
2 forces. We, who were in favour of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina,
3 wanted to recognise the borders of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro,
4 because if we did so then Bosnia wouldn't be an issue because no one
5 would have any territorial desires. On the other hand, the SDA and Mr.
6 Izetbegovic recognised Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia. As president I
7 recognised Serbia Montenegro and Croatia.
8 We had an important meeting between the leadership of the Serbs
9 and the Croats, and I suggested to them, since they all said that I was a
10 friend of theirs because I was very close to everyone, they said that it
11 was very important to have me as someone born in Sarajevo, because in the
12 HDZ leadership I had rural representatives, and they said it would be
13 easy to reach an agreement with me.
14 When I asked them, when I said that the only good thing for them
15 to do would be to recognise the borders of Croatia, Serbia and
16 Montenegro, they all stood up, all three of them, and said that this was
17 not acceptable for them. That gave me the best argument, that gave me
18 the best sort of proof that they didn't want to recognise
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina ago a state. They didn't want a peaceful solution. I
20 could talk about the details of those policies later, but neither Plavsic
21 nor Buha more Maksimovic weren't in front of me. It was the top
22 leadership of the SDS, the first rank, and that showed how powerful these
23 people were.
24 There were certain images of certain people because that after a
25 communist period that had lasted for 45 years. So this was the first
1 time that people could see new faces at the political top. The
2 newspapers would write about people's hobbies, about how they would spend
3 their free time. So the media gave the impression, portrayed these
4 individuals in a certain manner. And Mr. Krajisnik was portrayed as
5 someone who had authority, perhaps because he didn't often appear in
6 public. He was very cautious. He was very withdrawn, which wasn't the
7 case for Mr. Karadzic, who was too extravagant. He always wanted to be
8 the centre of attention. He made a lot of promises, he made a lot of
9 threats, et cetera, et cetera.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Just for my information, the meeting took place when
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That meeting took place in autumn
14 MR. HARMON:
15 Q. Let me focus -- I'm trying to focus your attention on the period
16 of time during the war and after the war. And if I could have the next
17 exhibit, which would be an intercept, and if it could be played. It is
18 an exhibit that is found in the binder, 292. It will be found at the tab
19 KID number 31423. Perhaps the usher could assist Mr. Kljuic in
20 getting --
21 A. I haven't got anything on my monitor.
22 Q. If that could be turned to the appropriate page. It was again, I
23 will repeat, KID number 31423. And if the Bosnian transcript could be
24 placed in front of into Kljuic.
25 MR. HARMON: Did your honour find that particular intercept?
1 Okay. I'm told it's -- do Your Honours' binders have KID number tabs on
2 the side?
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and they --
4 MR. HARMON: It should be --
5 JUDGE ORIE: -- are numbering from low to high, and my last
6 number is 31272, if I'm --
7 MR. HARMON: There should be a 31423. It is about halfway
8 through the binder, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Halfway.
10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it's a bit old fashioned --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see the numbering is not consistently -- yes,
12 I've found it.
13 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. I was going to say it's a little
14 get old fashioned, but what would be helpful for identification of
15 intercepts is just to be given the date as well. These numbers are all
16 very valuable, but the simple date is extremely helpful since that's how
17 some of us work.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I expect Mr. Harmon to give us the best possible
19 clue for finding -- yes.
20 MR. HARMON: This is an intercept, as it says on the top, dated
21 the 27th of May, 1992. It has been identified in the spreadsheet. It's
22 a conversation between Ratko Mladic and Mr. Krajisnik. And if we could
23 have that intercept played.
24 Could I just have a moment, please.
25 [Prosecution and case manager confer]
1 MR. HARMON: We apparently have a technical difficulty, Your
2 Honour. It disappeared from Sanction. So I think I will --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please try to get it back at a later stage.
4 MR. HARMON: I think it's important to get it back. I see we're
5 ten minutes before the normal break time. If we could have a break now
6 and I can see if I can solve this problem.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We can have an early break now and begin again
8 at quarter to eleven.
9 --- Recess taken at 10.20 a.m.
10 --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, I'd like to give some guidance
12 from the Trial Chamber to the parties. The Prosecution is invited to
13 explore, and I add to that, to the extent reasonable, the factual basis
14 for any assessment of a situation the witness is asked to give. And the
15 Defence is invited to at least give an opportunity to lay that
17 The Chamber does not expect - I'm now talking about this witness
18 - is that conclusions come into his mind today for the first time in his
19 life. For that reason, the sequence, facts first, then the assessment,
20 or assessment and then the facts, seems not to be of utmost importance.
21 More importantly is that the factual foundation for the opinion or the
22 assessment of the witness is finally presented.
23 Mr. Harmon, technical problems having been resolved as I
24 understand --
25 MR. HARMON: Yes. Miraculously, things were resolved in the time
1 allotted, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Kljuic into
3 the courtroom.
4 MR. HARMON: We will again, Your Honour, be paying attention to
5 KID intercept, KID 31423.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE ORIE: We have it in front of us.
8 MR. HARMON:
9 Q. Mr. Kljuic, you should have a copy of a transcript of an
10 intercept that you have listened to in front of you. It's the intercept
11 that is dated the 27th of May, a conversation between Ratko Mladic and
12 Momcilo Krajisnik. So if we could now hear that intercept.
13 [Audiotape played]
14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover].
15 Mladic Ratko: Hello?
16 Unidentified female: Hello.
17 Mladic Ratko: Good morning! This is Mladic the General here.
18 Unidentified female: Good morning!
19 Mladic Ratko: Is Momir there?
20 Unidentified female: Yes. Hold on a minute, please.
21 Mladic Ratko: Please put him on. I need to speak with him
23 Unidentified female: All right, immediately. Hello?
24 Mladic Ratko: Yes.
25 Unidentified Female: Here. The speaker is on his way. Hold on,
2 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes.
3 Mladic Ratko: Good morning, speaker.
4 Krajisnik Momcilo: Good morning.
5 Mladic Ratko: How are you?
6 Krajisnik Momcilo: Well, okay. Did you sleep well?
7 Mladic Ratko: I slept well. Look, I need to tell you that we
8 have done our part at the airport deal totally, so it should be
10 Krajisnik Momcilo: All right.
11 Mladic Ratko: There are some individual shots there. They
12 opened fire but we don't fire back.
13 Krajisnik Momcilo: I'm doing that immediately this morning.
14 Mladic Ratko: Yes. Momir is on his way down there.
15 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes.
16 Mladic Ratko: With these ... Boskovic and the others and they
17 will be doing their job down there. Yeah, hello?
18 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes, yes. I can hear you.
19 Mladic Ratko: I'm going further on as planned and tomorrow I
20 will stop by to get new instructions.
21 Krajisnik Momcilo: Excellent.
22 Mladic Ratko: So we'll arrange for what we should do next.
23 Krajisnik Momcilo: All right.
24 Mladic Ratko: I have given Tolimir some instructions at the
25 fronts and elsewhere everything is all right. Here I still don't have
1 exact information on the area toward Ivan Sedlo but I hope we'll manage
2 how to --
3 Krajisnik Momcilo: We have consolidated that Trovrh a bit. So
4 it too is excellent.
5 Mladic Ratko: That's excellent. I told Manljlo to strengthen it
6 a little.
7 Krajisnik Momcilo: You know, we have a kind of situation here.
8 Mladic Ratko: Yes.
9 Krajisnik Momcilo: It doesn't matter, it's just that this
10 doesn't befit the Serb people. It can say much.
11 Mladic Ratko: Yes?
12 Krajisnik Momcilo: We are having a grand robbery of cars down in
14 Mladic Ratko: Let's not talk about that. Oh, yes, yes. You
15 should prevent that from happening.
16 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes, yes, but let me just tell you --
17 Mladic Ratko: Yes?
18 Krajisnik Momcilo: We have to send our military police this
19 arrest these people.
20 Mladic Ratko: No, no. Military police is not to be used like
22 Krajisnik Momcilo: It's not to be used like that.
23 Mladic Ratko: Don't do that, no. You have civilian police and
24 let the civilian police do their job.
25 Krajisnik Momcilo: All right.
1 Mladic Ratko: There's also this --
2 Krajisnik Momcilo: These people doing.
3 Mladic Ratko: ... in Zunovnica, Momo.
4 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes.
5 Mladic Ratko: In Zunovnica they steal military equipment and
6 sell it to the Muslims.
7 Krajisnik Momcilo: No, if we do things like this we will fail.
8 Mladic Ratko: That's right.
9 Krajisnik Momcilo: No way. Nor can these misdeeds be done by
10 honest people.
11 Mladic Ratko: There. Civilian police should take care of this.
12 I told that same thing to that guy in Vogosca. They told me people from
13 the Ministry of Interior should take control of this.
14 Krajisnik Momcilo: All right. It's a deal.
15 Mladic Ratko: This ministry and judiciary should do their jobs.
16 Krajisnik Momcilo: General, every -- all people that have
17 generals like you are lucky.
18 Mladic Ratko: Let me ask you --
19 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes.
20 Mladic Ratko: What do you think if I gave a brief interview up
21 there and call on younger pensioners?
22 Krajisnik Momcilo: That would be excellent for the homeland, for
23 the defensive war.
24 Mladic Ratko: Excellent.
25 Krajisnik Momcilo: There's no problem.
1 Mladic Ratko: It's a deal.
2 Krajisnik Momcilo: There will be a man up there who will join
3 you as planned. Up there, at Sokolac.
4 Mladic Ratko: Excellent. But let him come to that centre.
5 Krajisnik Momcilo: He knows, he knows where too. You will be at
6 the same place and he will be at Sokolac, you know.
7 Mladic Ratko: All right.
8 Krajisnik Momcilo: It's a deal.
9 Mladic Ratko: All right.
10 Krajisnik Momcilo: Bye.
11 Mladic Ratko: Bye.
12 MR. HARMON:
13 Q. Mr. Kljuic, first of all, can you tell me on May the 27th what in
14 your view the context of this intercept relates to?
15 A. Well, it relates to the subordination of the political and the
16 military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. Secondly, it is obvious that
17 General Mladic was acting on political instructions. The problems that
18 they had, for example the theft of cars in Vogosca and the looting that
19 was carried out, is very characteristic for the first phase of the
21 And finally, it's a fact that there was a sort of overall plan
22 consisting of a number of stages. And on the following morning, Mladic
23 was to find out what his next task would be.
24 Q. And in respect of the power and authority of Mr. Krajisnik, how
25 do you interpret this particular intercept?
1 A. Although Mr. Krajisnik was officially the president of the
2 Assembly of Bosnian Serbs at the time, it's quite clear that he had a lot
3 of influence in day-to-day tasks.
4 Q. Can you tell me in the intercept where it says, "I will stop by
5 to get new instructions," what is your views as to what that illustrates
6 as to Mr. Krajisnik's authority?
7 A. Well, the authority wasn't just official. It wasn't just based
8 on the position that he held, because one would assume that the president
9 of the Assembly would be involved in legal matters. But it's clear that
10 events in the field developed in such a way that it was necessary for the
11 very top or for the Serbian leadership to supervise all actions, to lead
12 all actions including military ones.
13 Q. In the intercept it indicates and I quote: "Mr. Krajisnik, we
14 have consolidated that Trovrh a bit. So it, too, is excellent." What is
16 A. First of all, Ivan Sedlo is a significant point on the road from
17 Mostar to Sarajevo. And from Ivan Sedlo, its it's possible to control
18 the traffic on the road. And Trovrh is also one of the elevations in the
19 vicinity of Sarajevo, and it obviously had a lot of military importance.
20 Q. Could you tell me your views as to what Mr. Krajisnik's knowledge
21 of the situation on the ground reflects.
22 A. Well, obviously he was well-informed, if the chief commander of
23 the Serb army was reporting to him and seeking instructions, or at least
24 very often if not every day.
25 Q. Thank you. I've conclude with that intercept.
1 Let me ask you now: We were focussing on his power, Mr.
2 Krajisnik's power and authority, and you had contacts with him after the
3 war ended. Can you very quickly and succinctly give us your views as to
4 what power and authority Mr. Krajisnik had, and can you give us the
5 factual basis on which you base your views.
6 MR. STEWART: What time period is the question directed to?
7 Because -- that might be helpful, because Mr. Harmon has referred to Mr.
8 Kljuic having had contacts with Mr. Krajisnik after the war and then it's
9 not clear what period as far as Mr. Krajisnik's power and authority are
11 MR. HARMON: I was talking about after the war ended.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, that is now clear.
13 MR. HARMON: I'm glad.
14 Q. Mr. Kljuic, could you kindly answer the question. After the war,
15 what authority and power did Mr. Krajisnik have, and can you tell us on
16 what you base your conclusions.
17 A. I did not have contacts with Mr. Krajisnik during the war,
18 because I was never in the BH delegation during the war at negotiations
19 in Geneva or Dayton. However, I know that Mr. Krajisnik was part of the
20 leadership of the Serbian delegation.
21 After the war, in 1996, I left the Presidency, and I was a
22 parliamentarian for four years whereas Mr. Krajisnik was elected in the
23 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina but he never wanted to enter the
24 building of the Presidency. Instead, the first meeting of the Presidency
25 was held in a restaurant. Later on, every following session took place
1 in the land museum. It is interesting that Mr. Krajisnik was the
2 only one of four members of the Presidency who didn't want to enter the
3 building of the Presidency, although everybody who was elected knew that
4 there were supposed to work in that building.
5 Since after Dayton Accords were signed, Karadzic could not occupy
6 a political position. Having been eliminated by Americans from political
7 life, and that was one of the conditions of the Dayton Accords, Mr.
8 Krajisnik became officially the leader of Bosnian Serbs.
9 His stance after the war and after the aggression were no
10 different than the stance that he had advanced before the aggression, at
11 least when the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned,
12 together with equality among peoples, the return of refugees,
13 indemnification of victims, et cetera.
14 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I'd like to turn to an entirely different topic, and
15 that is your observations and conclusions about the SDS party itself.
16 Based on your contacts with the political leaders, based on your contacts
17 with members of the SDS party, can you tell the Court how the party
18 itself functioned?
19 A. Well, it was more a military organisation than a political one.
20 It was not democratic. It did not recognise the principles of political
21 dialogue. Instead, it set an objective that was unacceptable to others.
22 Namely, in political life the freedom of one political organisation is
23 restricted by the freedoms of other similar political organisations.
24 When we came into power, it was primarily needed to change the political
25 regime from socialism to some sort of democracy. All controversial
1 issues needed to be agreed upon in the parliament. However, that did not
2 happen because of the ultimatum imposed by the Bosnian Serbs not only on
3 other peoples, other nations, but on all the citizens who did not support
4 their policy.
5 Later, we would get a major confirmation that not all Serbs were
6 in favour of Karadzic. And when a referendum for the independence of
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina was declared on the 22nd of March, 1991, a great
8 number of Serbs -- possibly a third, and there would have been even more
9 if the referendum had not been declared on the entire territory did
10 support the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- the most important
11 institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina worked directly against that
12 state's interests. Namely, we wanted to reach a political understanding
13 with the other former republics, and that was completely normal. The
14 understanding was to be that Bosnia and Herzegovina should have the same
15 status --
16 Q. We're going to get into that. I would like you to stay focussed
17 on the question I asked you, and that question is, essentially: Can you
18 describe to the Court, based on your experiences, based on your
19 observations, how the SDS party functioned, if you're able to give us
20 that answer.
21 A. I said very clearly it required military discipline and within
22 the party there was no dialogue, to wit, they had their own programme
23 which was part of Milosevic's general programme. In order to break up
24 Yugoslavia, Serbs in Croatia, in Eastern Slavonia, in Knin, were
25 activated first. Bosnia and Herzegovina's turn would come later.
1 Q. Mr. Kljuic, you're going beyond the question that I asked you,
2 and I'd like to try to stay focused on the question.
3 Let me ask you, in terms of the SDS policies that had been
4 created, what role did Mr. Krajisnik have in ensuring that those policies
5 were implemented? Can you give us your views on that, and then can you
6 tell us on what you base those views.
7 A. Very well. I said that the SDS policies were not pluralistic.
8 They had a programme that was part of Milosevic's general programme, and
9 those Serbs who would not accept those policies were proclaimed to be
10 traitors. I have to say that the number of such Serbs in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina were significant, as we would later see in the
12 parliament. For instance, when we decided to seek independence, the
13 Serbs from the SDS walked out, but Serbs from other parties such as
14 communists and reformists stayed at the session, and a number of Serb
15 deputies voted in favour of independence.
16 The policy of the SDS was two-phased. They had, on the one hand,
17 Milosevic's global programme, and for a while, before they had prepared
18 for the aggression, they conducted talks and allegedly sought
19 consultations and negotiations about the future of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina, trying to create an impression with the public opinion that
21 they wanted to solve the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While within
22 the framework of all institutions such as the government Assembly, et
23 cetera, we discussed general issues, they secretly prepared arming
24 themselves and preparing documents such as stage A, stage B, et cetera,
25 that --
1 Q. Mr. Kljuic --
2 A. -- that testified to their insincerity.
3 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it's not clear how that answer is
4 getting anywhere near the answer to the question.
5 JUDGE ORIE: That's the reason why Mr. Harmon --
6 MR. HARMON: That's why I --
7 MR. STEWART: I think we probably were both just choosing the
8 same moment to run out of patience on that.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Otherwise, I would have done it.
10 MR. HARMON:
11 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I'd like you to very carefully listen to the question
12 I asked and then if you could focus on the question I ask and give the
13 Court the answer to the question, it would be helpful because we will get
14 through the examination very efficiently. I have a limited amount of
15 time in which to present your evidence, and I'd like to do so as
16 efficiently as I can.
17 My question to you is: What role -- if you can give us an answer
18 on this. What role did Mr. Krajisnik have in ensuring that SDS policies
19 were implemented?
20 A. His role was crucial.
21 Q. Can you explain that, please?
22 A. You see, he was at the head of the Assembly for the parliament of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he held 72 per cent of SDS deputies under
24 control. On all issues, including some very trivial issues that did not
25 involve political or national interests, those deputies always voted the
1 same way.
2 Q. And what role did Mr. Krajisnik have in that process? If you
4 A. In the process of destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, you
6 Q. Starting with the implementation of SDS policies?
7 A. I have already said that he played the main part, in view of the
8 fact that Karadzic kept higher profile and took a greater part in
9 negotiations with all sorts of negotiators that passed through Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina at the time. In the structure of the SDS itself, Mr.
11 Krajisnik had no match, and that was a fact well known to every citizen
12 of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.
13 Q. Now, in your evidence -- in one of your answers you mentioned
14 that the -- the word "traitors." And let me just draw your attention, if
15 I can, to the use of that term within the context of what we're talking
16 about, and that is SDS policies. And I draw your attention and the
17 Court's attention to comments of Mr. Karadzic from the 8th session of the
18 Bosnian Serb Assembly. These are found in -- this is Exhibit 65, binder
19 8, tab 93, and let me quote Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Kljuic, to you, and let me
20 get your observations about this quotation.
21 And that is Mr. Karadzic: "However, once the party has adopted a
22 policy, anything else is treason. Anything outside the adopted policy is
23 treason. Assisting the enemy cannot be tolerated, giving him a way out
24 and confusing the people while being a member of that party of the
25 Assembly and the party organs. This cannot be. I will not allow it. I
1 will signal to the people, people, this man is a traitors. That is what
2 I will do in the future."
3 First of all, Mr. Kljuic, do you have any observations or
4 comments about what Mr. Karadzic said on the 2nd of February, 1992, or at
5 the 8th session of the Assembly?
6 A. Of course. Since a significant number of the Serbs, the majority
7 of the citizens, did not agree with Karadzic's aggressive policy, nor
8 could they accept a forced division of ethnic communities in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina because it is impossible except through violence and
10 crime, Karadzic, in order to ensure the untouchability of his own party
11 and its status, required that this programme be universally accepted.
12 One member of the Serbs never accepted it and remained with us in
13 Sarajevo with us during the aggression. Because that programme
14 consciously accepts military objectives without any alternative at the
15 time negotiations were under way primarily concerning the future of
16 Yugoslavia. The leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its entirety
17 accepted that Bosnia-Herzegovina could stay if Croatia and Slovenia were
18 staying as well. If those two republics were not willing to stay and
19 that turned out to be the case later --
20 Q. Mr. Kljuic, again, I was only asking you about your comments and
21 observations as to the quotation that I read from the 8th session of the
22 Bosnian Serb assembly. I think we're going beyond that. Let me,
23 therefore, continue with the examination.
24 You mentioned that some Serbs did indeed stay with the government
25 after the Bosnian Serbs left the parliament. What was the attitude of
1 the Bosnian Serb leaders, including Mr. Krajisnik, if you know, to people
2 who were Serbs who did not adhere to the SDS policies?
3 A. They were treated as traitors. And to tell people that somebody
4 is a traitor means condemning that person to isolation and to certain
5 consequences that "irresponsible" citizens could inflict on that person
6 and his family.
7 Q. Did Mr. Krajisnik share the view that the persons who did not
8 subscribe to the SDS party views was a traitor?
9 A. Certainly.
10 Q. If I could play the next intercept --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please, Mr. Harmon, I would like you to lay a
12 factual foundation for the last answer.
13 MR. HARMON: All right.
14 Q. Mr. Kljuic, did you have an opportunity to observe Mr.
15 Krajisnik in his relations with people who were not -- who were Serbs but
16 were not SDS members? Can you describe his views and attitude toward
17 those people.
18 A. He, just as Karadzic, condemned those people as traitors of
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Witness, could you give us, just like we saw a
21 quote of a speech given by Mr. Karadzic, would you have similar factual
22 observations and then specifically relating to Mr. Krajisnik?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the Presidency and in the
24 parliament and in the government alike, certain Serbian representatives
25 remained, and they always complained that Karadzic and Krajisnik were
1 threatening them for allegedly committing treason against Serb interests.
2 It is not an insignificant number of people who were concerned, and those
3 people held important positions. For instance, after the walkout of the
4 SDS in the beginning of the aggression, there were three Serbs in the
5 government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Miodrag Simovic, as deputy prime
6 minister, who stayed on for a while longer before leaving; and the
7 Minister of Justice, Ranko Nikolic, who stayed throughout the war in
8 Sarajevo. And he stayed even later on after the war. And there was Mr.
9 Kovac, Minister of culture, who also stayed throughout the war. And he
10 became later ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Paris. There are some
11 Serbs who also stayed in the parliament.
12 There are specifically two Serbs who replaced Mrs. Plavsic, Mr.
13 Koljevic and later Mr. Kecmanovic. These people remained in the
14 Presidency, and they were with me every day, namely Mirko Pejanovic and
15 Tatjana Lujic, both university professors. And there was a Serb, Miro
16 Lazovic, acting as speaker. All of them constantly complained about
17 threats issued against them from Pale, these threats saying that they
18 should leave their positions because they do not represent the Serbs.
19 Some of these people took part in negotiations in Geneva, and Lazovic was
20 involved in Dayton Accords negotiations as well, were told by Milosevic,
21 whenever he came, that, "I don't want to see these people. They're not
22 Serbs. They're Izetbegovic's Serbs."
23 So that sentence "that anybody against this programme was a
24 traitor" pursued two objectives: One, for the programme to be
25 implemented unquestioningly; and second, to label anyone who did not
1 support the programme as a traitor.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Now, we have heard in the question a quote by Mr.
3 Karadzic. In your answer, you've told us that threats came from Pale.
4 Then you gave another example how Milosevic treated them. The question,
5 however, was about Mr. Krajisnik. So did they tell you that they were
6 threatened by Pale? Did they tell you that they were threatened by the
7 SDS leadership or by Milosevic or by Karadzic? Where did they -- did
8 they ever, and then please explain to us, did they ever specifically
9 mention in this respect Mr. Krajisnik? Because that's what this question
10 is about.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see. I cannot say they
12 specifically named him, but the word "Pale" was a synonym for the Serbian
13 leadership of Bosnian Serbs. And I know for a fact that there were some
14 people who kept in touch with both Pale and specifically Mr. Krajisnik on
15 the one hand, and Sarajevo on the other hand.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
17 MR. HARMON: Yes. If we could go to the next exhibit. It's an
18 intercepted conversation dated June the 26th. Your Honours, it is found
19 in the binder at KID 31472. That's about two-thirds of the way through
20 the binder.
21 When Your Honours have found it, I will proceed with the actual
22 playing of the intercept.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
24 MR. HARMON: Could we then have the intercept played, please.
25 Your Honour, there appears yet again to be a technical problem. We will
1 come back to this intercept in a few minutes when the technical problem
2 is solved, and I'll continue with the examination.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
4 MR. HARMON:
5 Q. All right. Mr. Kljuic, we're going to return to an intercept
6 that's before you. You can -- I would like to direct your attention to
7 another portion, another subject.
8 The Court has heard a lot of evidence, and there's no reason for
9 you to recount that evidence, about the contacts and the cooperation that
10 existed before the multi-party elections. Likewise, the Court has heard
11 considerable evidence about the manner in which the structures of
12 government were formed after the multi-party elections, when Mr.
13 Krajisnik became the president of the Assembly. What I would like to
14 focus your attention on, and focus it specifically at this point in time,
15 is on the respective platforms of the SDS, HDZ, and the SDA in respect of
16 the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a disintegrating Yugoslavia.
18 So first of all, Mr. Kljuic, can you tell us what those positions
20 A. Well, after 45 years of a single-party system, for the first time
21 political parties came into existence, some of which were of a
22 nationalist kind. But there were also other parties, reformist parties,
23 liberal ones, and parties of post-communist orientation. All the
24 platforms were acceptable.
25 A problem arose with regard to the implementation of these
1 platforms. The SDS platform, at the beginning of the 1990s, was a very
2 democratic one. However, this is one of the consequences of the
3 communist regime. People in the former Yugoslavia are used to saying one
4 thing but acting differently.
5 A problem arose with regard to discussions of the future of our
6 common state. Most of the western part of the former Yugoslavia wanted a
7 reformed Yugoslavia. They wanted it to be transformed into a sort of
8 confederation in which central power would be constituted of five
9 elements, the army, the police, the customs office, the diplomatic office
10 and financial department. This is something that Milosevic did not like,
11 and discussions commenced. And because of Milosevic's attempt to take
12 over power in Yugoslavia, there were increasing conflicts. The Slovenes
13 and the Croats, although they initially didn't have a plan for
14 independence, after the unsuccessful talks demanded independence.
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina could not remain in a rump Yugoslavia, because that
16 would have been tantamount to a Greater Serbia. So the SDS then issued
17 an ultimatum: Either remain in Yugoslavia, or we'll split up
19 Since according to the constitution Bosnia-Herzegovina was equal
20 to all the other republics, we discussed the matter. We said we can't
21 remain within Yugoslavia, but we can form a democratic Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina in which no single ethnic group will be threatened.
23 At the time, I was president of the HDZ, the Croats' political party, and
24 they were in the minority in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But instead of finding
25 a compromise in the Assembly, and instead of finding a manner of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 protecting national interests, and in order to do this we suggested a
2 Belgian model in which each three people would be represented by a --
3 some -- a body called the Council of People, and they would have the
4 right to veto any law or decision that would pose a threat to the people
5 concerned. However, the SDS did not accept this proposal and on the one
6 occasion Karadzic stated that either the will of the Serbian people would
7 be accepted or they would deal with the matter in a military manner. The
8 will of the Serbian people is not an element contained in the
9 constitution, and I'm not going to address the matter as to whether the
10 entire Serbian people had such a will.
11 And this is what led to the break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But
12 the entire situation was unfolding on two levels. There was the public
13 and political level, and the other level was the one represented by
14 Milosevic and the JNA and a group of nationalists from Serbia, because
15 before Bosnia-Herzegovina had been internationally recognised on the 4th
16 of April, the JNA units inundated its territory. They had been withdrawn
17 from Slovenia. And then there were the reservists who came from the JNA
18 from Serbia and Montenegro. There were paramilitary Chetnik formations
19 led by Arkans and Seseljs. And finally there was the well-armed Serbian
20 people who had been armed by the JNA.
21 MR. HARMON:
22 Q. Let me ask you again to come back to the question. Can you
23 distil for the Court what the SDS position was in respect of Bosnia --
24 the status -- future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The Court's heard
25 a lot of evidence about the history in this case of the -- and they've
1 heard about a number of elements you've described, but I'm interested in
2 your describing to the Court what the SDS position was in respect of the
3 status of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 A. It was very clear. Bosnia-Herzegovina had to remain in
5 Yugoslavia at all costs, or it would no longer exist.
6 Q. What was the position of the HDZ and the SDA?
7 A. Naturally, we were in favour of an independent
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. My question is: Which citizen of any country in the
9 world would not want the independence of his own state after a period of
11 MR. STEWART: The whole necessity for this sort of evidence is
12 that if there is one fact among others in the case which has been very
13 clear for a very long, long time, it's that the SDS wished Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina to remain within Yugoslavia. With everything we have to deal
15 with in this case, it does seem that this witness is being invited to
16 cover a great deal of ground which is now simply not in issue at all and
17 is perfectly well known. We wouldn't have any objection if it's really
18 thought for some reason important to have this as a feature of this
19 witness's evidence, then I would positively invite Mr. Harmon to lead
20 quickly through some of this absolutely well-known material.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, the Chamber has heard a lot of evidence
22 indicating that the position of the SDS was that they wanted to remain
23 within Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, that the SDA and HDZ
24 preferred to have an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. If there's
25 anything new you would expect this witness would tell us, please ask him,
1 but otherwise, I think not only this position but also some explanation
2 of these positions, that is fear to become a minority and an independent
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina which could be -- are explained as well extensively,
4 so --
5 MR. HARMON: I am aware, Your Honour, that this has been covered
6 considerably. This was a foundational question to get to other matters.
7 I was interrupted by Mr. Stewart to get to other matters.
8 JUDGE ORIE: You could have led the witness in this respect:
9 "Would it be fair to say the position of the SDS was," and you repeat
10 what is in evidence, because it took us two pages of transcript.
11 Please proceed.
12 MR. HARMON: All right.
13 Q. Based on your conversations, Mr. Kljuic, with Mr. Karadzic, Mr.
14 Krajisnik, and other Bosnian Serb leaders, did they describe to you what
15 would happen if there was not a resolution to the situation in Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina? What was it they said to you would happen?
17 A. Well, everyone knows this, and they didn't conceal it. Karadzic
18 even publicly stated this in the Assembly. He said that if the will of
19 Serbian people wasn't accepted, and he wasn't referring to international
20 constitutional law, he said that if in such a case one people would
22 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, I'm again going to stop you. The question
23 was what they told you in the conversations you had with these gentlemen.
24 If Mr. Harmon would be interested to say what kind of public statements
25 were made, he'll certainly ask you.
1 But please listen carefully to the question. Your conversations
2 with Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and other Bosnian Serb leaders. Did
3 they describe to you what would happen? So the focus on the question is
4 on your conversations with them and what they told you, and not what was
5 commonly known. Please proceed with your answer.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In conversations that I had, they
7 would say the same thing. They said if this isn't done, our will will be
8 done. It wasn't a secret. It was something that was made quite public.
9 MR. HARMON:
10 Q. Now, did -- you are fully aware, Mr. Kljuic, of the positions
11 that were taken by Mr. Krajisnik about Bosnia. You're very aware of what
12 the consequences were if those -- that position was not adopted. What
13 did Mr. Krajisnik tell you would happen to Bosnia and Herzegovina if the
14 Serb position was not accepted?
15 A. His opinion didn't differ from that of Karadzic's, but that
16 evening when we were in the Assembly in Mr. Krajisnik's office, he said
17 that this was something that the Serbian people would never accept. That
18 meant that they would never accept an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Only an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina could have been a solution for
20 all the three peoples, naturally providing that the constitution
21 guaranteed their equality.
22 MR. HARMON: Was --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Still, Mr. Harmon, this does not answer the
24 question. The question is not whether Mr. Krajisnik accepted it but what
25 he said would happen if the Serb position was not accepted. So did he
1 say, "Well, we'll live then happily together for the rest of our lives,"
2 or did he say, "We'll go to the joint European Union," or did he say,
3 "I'll pray for a better future"? That is the question: What if not
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All of them only said one thing.
6 They said the Serbs have a solution if you don't accept our positions,
7 and this position was an ultimatum.
8 MR. HARMON:
9 Q. What was the ultimatum that was given to you?
10 A. Either there will be Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia or part
11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Western Herzegovina will be part of Croatia,
12 and all of us will join Yugoslavia. And these were problems that
13 recurred on a daily basis in relation to these positions.
14 Q. Was war ever considered to be an option to solving the problem in
15 the Yugoslav context?
16 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I object on the basis of leading to
17 that particular question.
18 JUDGE ORIE: The question may be put to the witness. The
19 objection is denied.
20 So the question was whether war was ever, you said, Mr. Harmon,
21 ever considered or was mentioned as a consequence of non-accepting the
22 Serb position.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] War was also part of the ultimatum.
24 According to their plan, it was necessary to separate the Serbian people
25 from the other two peoples. Anyone who has any knowledge about Bosnia
1 and Herzegovina knows that this is impossible. This idea wasn't even
2 accepted by all the Serbs.
3 However, by making all the preparations for an aggression, even
4 when negotiations were very intense, they would stir up incidents to see
5 to what extent we were prepared for resistance. In February and in March
6 1992, there were a number of large-scale incidents in Sarajevo at key
7 points --
8 JUDGE ORIE: I'll stop you again. The question is whether in
9 your conversation, as I said, whether war was ever mentioned as one of
10 the options. And then you explained to us that this was more or less
11 implicit in their plans. The question was clear. Did they say, "We'll
12 go for war," or did they say this: "This and this is what had happen,
13 that this part will join this entity, that part will join --" and it was
14 your opinion that this could not be achieved without war? So, did they
15 mention the war or was it your conclusion that war was inevitable in
16 order to achieve those plans?
17 A. Your Honours, these plans can only be implemented by having
18 recourse to the military. They can't be implemented through political
19 means. They didn't conceal this. They had two rehearsals before the
20 aggression, and this was done at the locations where the upper part of
21 town was supposed to be cut off from the lower part of town. And in the
22 upper part of town, that's where all the state institutions were located.
23 If they had cut this off, the lower part of town couldn't have existed.
24 So they did not conceal the war option in any way.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just try to understand your testimony
1 properly, that is, it was your conclusion that it could not be done
2 without war, and you found this confirmed in, well, a -- in an exercise
3 you observed take place. Is that a correct understanding of your
5 I see you are nodding yes --
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That's correct.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Please continue, Mr. Harmon.
8 MR. HARMON:
9 Q. Let me read to you a quotation from the Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 10th Assembly Session that took place on the 11th of March 1992, and let
11 me just get the exhibit number. It is Exhibit 65, binder 9, tab 107.
12 So this is March, before the war, and let me read to you Mr. Karadzic in
13 quotation. And he's reporting back to the Bosnian Serb Assembly about
14 the conference in Brussels, and he says as follows:
15 "Fortunately, Europe realised that a conference on Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina was what was needed and that nothing done against the will of
17 one ethnic community could succeed in Bosnia and Herzegovina; i.e., that
18 such action could lead only to uncontrolled processes and chaos, the
19 result of which would be a bloody civil war with hundreds of thousands
20 dead and hundreds of destroyed cities, after which would -- we have the
21 same situation as we have now with three Bosnias and Herzegovinas. But
22 only after a war and with much less population in cities which would be
23 completely, ethnically homogenous, for it must be assumed that the
24 forcible and bloody removal of minority peoples from one region to
25 another would be carried out on a large scale in a civil war."
1 Now, this is Mr. Karadzic speaking on the 11th of March. Can you
2 comment on this quotation that I have read and put it into context with
3 what had been said to you by Mr. Karadzic and by Mr. Krajisnik prior to
4 the commencement of the war.
5 A. This is a very clear position expressed by the SDS leadership.
6 However, it's not based on the constitutional law. However, it's not
7 based on the constitutional law. On the other hand, they would never
8 have spoken in such a way if they hadn't prepared a military force. You
9 must be aware of the context within which this took place.
10 After the JNA withdrew from Slovenia and Croatia, it came to
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at the time was an area with the highest
12 concentration of military force in Europe. It was necessary to negotiate
13 under such conditions. On the other hand, the question of the survival
14 of Bosnia and Herzegovina wasn't an issue. It had existed for centuries,
15 even when it wasn't an independent state in the Austrian Empire and in
16 Turkey. It was a separate administrative entity.
17 The terms used by Karadzic, "if there is no Yugoslavia there
18 won't be a Bosnia-Herzegovina either," is not a true statement because
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina is an old state. Through the last hundred years it
20 has a standard established border, whereas Yugoslavia existed as a
21 democratic monarchy and one year after it was unified it became a
22 absolute monarchy. It was a state that existed on the basis of an
24 So this statement illustrates the message that Karadzic gave to
25 us before the war. But in order to understand the message and its force,
1 you must be familiar with the action that they took prior to that event,
2 prior to that message.
3 Q. Okay. But in your negotiations where you were trying to resolve
4 the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the SDS party, the Bosnian Serb
5 leadership, you mentioned, for example, Mr. Karadzic giving a speech in
6 October in the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Let's listen to that speech. We
7 will listen to that speech, and then I will ask you some additional
8 questions about it.
9 This is -- I'll just organise this here from this end.
10 MR. HARMON: Perhaps, Your Honour, it would be time to take a
11 break. We apparently have another difficulty.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
14 JUDGE ORIE: The technician suggests, Mr. Harmon, to come and
15 assist, because they think there should not be a real problem. They, of
16 course, can follow on the screen what actually is done at this
17 windows ...
18 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I think we still need a break.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Still need a break. I'm just figuring out if we
20 have the usual break now of 20 minutes whether we would --
21 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, actually I can make one suggestion.
22 While we try to resolve the issue of the film, I'm told that the
23 intercept that was unavailable earlier can be played now if that would
24 give us additional time. It breaks up the examination and the manner in
25 which we're proceeding, but we have so many technical difficulties and
1 problems today that --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see. Well, let's have the 20-minute break
3 now. That means we will adjourn until 20 minutes past twelve, and then
4 we'll continue without further interruptions until a quarter to two, and
5 could you please make sure that there is an alternative programme for
6 next phase of the technical facilities.
7 We adjourn until 20 minutes past twelve.
8 --- Recess taken at 11.58 a.m.
9 --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, would you escort the witness into the
12 [The witness entered court]
13 JUDGE ORIE: I take it, Mr. Harmon, the final technical solution
14 has been found.
15 MR. HARMON: We hope so, Your Honour.
16 Q. Mr. Kljuic, before the recess, we were focusing attention on the
17 Bosnian Serb position in respect of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18 I was asking you questions about the position of Bosnia -- about the
19 position of the Bosnian Serb party if their position was not accepted,
20 and I read to you a quotation from Dr. Radovan Karadzic on the 11th of
21 March, 1992. I would now like to play for you a video of a speech given
22 by Dr. Karadzic in October in the Assembly.
23 If we could played that. If it could be audible.
24 [Videotape played]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, usually for the transcript it is -- the
1 text is translated. It wasn't now because we only could read the English
2 text on our screens. On the other hand, I think that this video has been
3 played before.
4 MR. HARMON: Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore, at this moment the -- we'll find the
6 translation of the part just played in the transcript of the previous
7 playing of this same part.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. HARMON:
10 Q. Mr. Kljuic, was Mr. Krajisnik present when that speech was given?
11 A. Yes. He chaired the session of the Assembly of Bosnia and
13 Q. Were you present when that speech was given?
14 A. Yes, I was.
15 Q. What was the reaction to that speech?
16 A. Whose?
17 Q. What was the -- your reaction? What was the reaction of the
18 non-Serb parties in the legislature?
19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's a slightly ambiguous question.
20 Perhaps Mr. Harmon could -- does he mean the immediate reaction, there
21 and then on the occasion, or does he mean the wider reaction or does he
22 mean both? We'd suggest it is too general at the moment.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Part of the reaction was audible, visible but
24 audible. But, Mr. Stewart, I think that this position we could first how
25 the witness understood it and then see what additional questions to be
1 put to him.
2 MR. HARMON:
3 Q. Mr. Kljuic, what was the reaction to that speech in the non-Serb
4 communities, both in the parliament and outside of the parliament?
5 A. This statement not only revealed Karadzic's true intentions, it
6 also caused consternation not only among Serbs but among all the citizens
7 who couldn't possibly expect such an announcement of evil, because this
8 reaction, in view of what had been done by Slovenia and Croatia, was
9 completely normal. The European Union asked us whether we wanted
10 independence. And I ask again: Is there any citizen who wouldn't wish
11 his country to be independent?
12 Yugoslavia had been compromised by the hegemony of Serbs, but
13 most prominently by Milosevic. That was visible in all the institutions
14 of the system, especially diplomacy, the media, the police, and the army.
15 The people who had any sense of equality and any sensibility for equality
16 did not wish to remain in a Yugoslavia of that kind.
17 Q. Now, what did -- what were you informed -- having negotiated with
18 the Bosnian Serb leadership and having had daily contact with them, what
19 were you informed specifically of what areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina
20 were sought by the Serbs?
21 A. Serbs had claims that went beyond any imaginable principles.
22 They invoked all sorts of historical periods and eras, claiming that
23 certain territories belonged to them, even when those territories had
24 never, ever been populated by a majority of Serbs. That concept, that
25 design, was known under the name of Greater Serbia, which involved a
1 territory in Croatia from Zadar and Karlovac, which was 50 kilometres
2 away from Zagreb, and Virovitica, which is in Slovenia.
3 In all the negotiations with Croats in Zagreb and with Croat
4 representatives in Sarajevo, they gave freedom to Western Herzegovina,
5 which had a clear majority Croat population, because in the structure of
6 the new Croat state, the Herzegovina lobby was very influential.
7 So their territorial claim was absolutely unnatural and impossible.
8 However, in view of the power they had in the army, the police, the
9 media, and in view of the preparations they had put in place, they
10 considered it normal to put such ultimatums.
11 Q. And the territorial claims, let me show you next exhibit. It is
12 a map. If we could have the map shown to the witness.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecution Exhibit number P293.
14 MR. HARMON:
15 Q. Mr. Kljuic, before you have a copy of a map based on the ethnic
16 distribution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Now, you said the territorial claims
17 made in respect of Bosnia-Herzegovina were impossible. First of all, how
18 did those territorial claims in the negotiations affect the distribution
19 of people within Bosnia and Herzegovina?
20 A. There are two important points here. The map shows territories,
21 but this is not a realistic picture because a great number of these
22 territories are almost unpopulated, or are half-populated. Serbs had the
23 majority in 31 municipalities out of the total of 110 in
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In certain municipalities they had a relative
25 majority. But all of this was significantly below their claims. In
1 other words, they claimed even the territories where they were not even
2 the second largest group. This would become evidence in -- evident in
3 Brcko, which was populated by 44 per cent Muslims, 25 per cent Croats,
4 and 20 per cent Serbs. However, in all their proposals, they wanted
5 Brcko for themselves.
6 In some other areas as well, such as Foca and Prijedor, where
7 Muslims were in the clear, overwhelming majority, the Serbs made similar
8 claims. And some of these territories did end up in Republika Srpska.
9 All this goes to show that the ethnicities were so intertwined in Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina that division was impossible, even if you grant a
11 one-year period for families to move to other places. All this could
12 only be effected with huge sacrifices involved.
13 Q. And if the Bosnian Serb position in respect of the future of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina was not accepted, we have seen what has been forecast
15 by Mr. Karadzic in the 10th Assembly Session. I read a quotation to you
16 from that. Mr. Karadzic has expressed himself in October in the Bosnian
17 Serb Assembly session.
18 I'd like you, Mr. Kljuic, to tell this Court what Mr. Krajisnik
19 said to you and what Mr. Karadzic said to you if the Bosnian Serb
20 Assembly session -- Bosnian Serb position was not accepted. You've
21 described ultimatums. I'd like you to touch upon those ultimatums that
22 were made to you, and I would like you to be very specific and focussed.
23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour -- Your Honour, that's inappropriately
24 leading. Mr. Harmon asked the witness to tell the Court what Mr.
25 Krajisnik said to him and what Mr. Karadzic said to him. That would have
1 been better divided up, actually, as it happens, but the point is that
2 then to say to the witness, "You've described ultimatums," and then
3 introduce the word "ultimatum" into the question in that way, even if he
4 has referred to ultimatums at some time in his evidence, that is really
5 significantly leading, to introduce a word like "ultimatum" in that
6 question and quite unnecessary in the sense that if the witness is able
7 to give evidence on this, he doesn't need and shouldn't be given a such
8 word in the question.
9 MR. HARMON: I'm asking him about the ultimatums he received very
11 JUDGE ORIE: The question -- the question focusses on what the
12 witness earlier said about ultimatums and otherwise there's a serious
13 risk that the witness will tell us whatever was said by Mr. Karadzic or
14 Mr. Krajisnik. So since the witness used that word before, it's not
15 improper to focus the question on that issue.
16 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
17 MR. HARMON:
18 Q. Mr. Kljuic, you can answer the question. If you'd like, I'll
19 repeat the question.
20 A. It is no secret that they made ultimatums to us. Similarly, it
21 is no secret that the Serb leadership never said, "If you don't accept
22 the will of the Serb people as formulated by SDS leaders, there will be
23 war, there will be devastation," and so on. It was their answer in any
24 discussion about a peaceful solution to the Bosnian crisis, a crisis that
25 should never have existed in the first place. Namely, we used to live in
1 a relatively well-organised state.
2 JUDGE ORIE: You are commenting on the situation, but you're
3 required to answer the question. The question was: When you say that
4 they expressed themselves in terms of ultimatums, what was then said to
5 you, not whether it was -- whether crisis should have existed or not.
6 The question is simply what did they say to you at those meetings.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just what I said before. If we
8 don't abide by the will of the Serbian people, there will be war. And I
9 must tell you the hardest night we had was after Karadzic's speech at the
10 Assembly. A very heavy atmosphere descended upon us. And in the hall of
11 the Assembly we tried to talk and to explain certain things.
12 The situation was so fraught, so sensitive, that the Assembly
13 continued discussing only at 5.00 a.m. the next morning, after we had
14 spent that entire night in the Assembly trying to find a compromise.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Now, the beginning of your answer says just what I
16 said before. "If we don't abide by the will of the Serbian people, there
17 will be war."
18 You earlier explained that these were not the words used in your
19 conversations but that you concluded from what they said that war would
20 be inevitable. Now, the question, was if you're talking about
21 ultimatums, what did they exactly tell you? Because it seems to be a bit
22 inconsistent with your earlier answer.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, these contacts were
24 frequent. They were daily contacts. And I just told you that after
25 Karadzic's speech, we spent the following seven hours in the Assembly
1 talking, trying to save the situation. Always, at all times, and they
2 never hid that, they had one and only ultimatum. It's either going to be
3 as they say or Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be. It was not a
4 diplomatic discussion, it was an open talk just like in a green market.
5 MR. HARMON:
6 Q. When you were talking about the topics with Mr. Karadzic, for
7 example, or Mr. Krajisnik, for example, topics of the future of Bosnia
8 and Herzegovina, did you understand that when Mr. Karadzic was talking to
9 you he was asserting the position of the SDS party? Likewise, when Mr.
10 Krajisnik was talking to you on that same subject, did you understand him
11 to be talking and asserting the SDS position to you?
12 A. Of course. They propounded the stance of the SDS with the
13 proviso that Mr. Karadzic was more aggressive, more egocentric, more
14 open, whereas Mr. Krajisnik was more tactful, calmer in discussing
15 certain details.
16 Q. Now, in the speech that was given by Mr. Karadzic on the 11th of
17 March -- I've quoted from it earlier, I'll requote a portion of it. The
18 last sentence that I quoted: "For it must be assumed that the forcible
19 and bloody removal of minority peoples from one region to another would
20 be carried out on a large scale in a civil war."
21 Did Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, touch upon in their
22 conversations what would happen to the non-Serb people who were living in
23 Bosnia in territories that the Serbs wanted?
24 A. It is clear that they envisaged their own fate, that they would
25 come to a bad end.
1 Q. Let me repeat my question. In the discussions that you had with
2 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik, did they discuss with you what would
3 happen to the non-Serb peoples who were living in Bosnia and Herzegovina
4 in the territories that the Serbs coveted? Did they tell you what would
5 happen to those people?
6 A. Of course. They forecast the fate of those people, namely that
7 they would have to leave those territories in one way or another.
8 Q. Okay. And what you -- and when you say "in one way or another,"
9 can you explain that to the Court, please.
10 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, the question -- Mr. Harmon quite
11 correctly, if we may say so, started off by focussing in this series of
12 questions on what was actually said, but at this point we shift in Mr.
13 Harmon's question and ask the witness to explain, and that's an
14 unfortunate shift because if we were to stick with what the witness can
15 say was said, the questioning would proceed in a proper way.
16 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask you --
17 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, may I -- sorry.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I'd rather clarify this issue. You said that they
19 forecast the fate of those people, namely that they would have to leave
20 those territories, and then your last words were "in one way or another."
21 Is that -- are these the words they used? Did they say "in one way or
22 another?" Or is this just a summary of what they said? I'd like to know
23 that first.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. That was their message. And
25 it was very strongly confirmed.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But my question was whether these were the
2 words used. Did they say "in one way or another," or did they explain?
3 What was it?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. They only said they would
5 leave. I said "in one way or another." And an argument in corroboration
6 of that was the way the Serbs cleansed those areas where they had seized
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's what -- what may have happened
9 afterwards, but not, I take it, at that moment what was told to you in
10 your conversation.
11 So they said they would have to leave. How did you understand
12 this, what you said was a message?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there was no dilemma
14 whatsoever as to their wishes. We had experience from Croatia, and they
15 end of the day one part of the people, Croats and Muslims who lived in
16 villages and towns with a majority Serb population already in the second
17 half of 1992 started fleeing from those areas. The threats were made on
18 a daily basis, at work, at school, in shops, because tensions were
19 heightened intentionally in order to create incidents.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but that's of course a different matter from
21 what was said in your conversations, I mean, what happened in the shops
22 and the schools, et cetera.
23 So I'd like to know from you where you said a message was went to
24 you and that the words that they had to leave not in one way or another,
25 on the basis of what did you understand this to be a message that
1 whatever would happen, there would be -- they would have to be out of
2 those territories? I just want to know what made you draw that
3 conclusion. Was it the wording? Was it the other experiences? What
4 is -- because you linked this to what was said elsewhere. Well,
5 whatever, but I'd like you to explain to us why you understood this to be
6 a message that whatever would happen, whatever means, whatever, they
7 would have to leave.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By heightening the tensions in
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina, an aggressive structure of people appeared in the
10 ground -- on the ground, especially in areas where Serbs were the
11 strongest, and they started preparing others for an exodus. For
12 instance, in infirmaries, in hospitals, in schools, people -- non-Serbs
13 in senior positions were replaced by Serbs. That was when power was
14 being seized unofficially. And people did not need additional
15 explanations as to what would happen when power was seized officially.
16 Everybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina knew that. You didn't need to say it
17 in so many words.
18 MR. HARMON:
19 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me put into context, if I can, your remarks when
20 you had these conversations with Mr. Krajisnik, with Mr. Karadzic, that
21 the non-Serbs would have to leave one way or another.
22 What had happened in Croatia in respect of non-Serb populations
23 prior to the war breaking out in Bosnia? And did those events have any
24 relevance on your understanding of what Mr. Krajisnik and what Mr.
25 Karadzic were telling you about the non-Serbs having to leave one way or
1 the other?
2 A. That was our principle argument and, unfortunately, our tragic
3 experience. And most importantly, they publicly supported what was going
4 on in Knin, Dubrovnik and Vukovar.
5 Q. When you say "they publicly supported," who are "they"?
6 A. The leadership of the SDS, the entire leadership.
7 Q. Now, what had happened in Croatia in respect of the non-Serb
8 populations who had been living in territories that were claimed by the
9 Croatian Serbs?
10 A. I think you have very good evidence in the Tribunal. And as
11 everybody knows, there were crimes, rapes, killings, deportations,
12 expulsions, always accompanied by actions pursuing material gain such as
13 seizure of property.
14 Q. Had there been ethnic cleansing in Croatia, in your opinion?
15 A. Not only did it exist, it was the only aim of that policy.
16 Q. In conversations with the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Mr.
17 Krajisnik, including Mr. Karadzic, did they point out -- did they discuss
18 what happened in Croatia with you?
19 A. Of course.
20 Q. What did they say to you in respect of what would happen -- what
21 had happened in Croatia?
22 A. I held a speech in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina at a
23 session chaired by Mr. Krajisnik. In that speech, I said that all of us
24 had to distance ourselves from the crimes and the ethnic cleansing taking
25 place in Croatia.
1 Some MPs from the SDS were laughing. I said they shouldn't be
2 gloating. They shouldn't feel triumphant about this evil, because I
3 personally was horrified that this suffering was taking place in Serbian
4 towns, and I referred to Cacak, Valjevo, and others.
5 I also said I couldn't understand them. How could they have no
6 empathy at all for the victims? And this lack of empathy for the victims
7 would continue to be typical of them, to this very day.
8 You know, in Bosnia, people suffered a great deal. This
9 suffering will never be known to the public at large, because in many
10 instances all the witnesses were killed. But I have to say, Your
11 Honours, there were people in Bosnia-Herzegovina who cried out loud,
12 "Don't do this. This will be a crime forever." However, this feeling of
13 power manifest in the media, in the police, and in the army imbued them
14 with a false sense of superiority, and they could not be stopped in those
16 JUDGE ORIE: You were asked what they said to you. You're now
17 describing a lot of things that have got nothing to do with the question
18 any more. In the beginning I was waiting, because you said what speech
19 you made, how they responded. That's still not a direct answer. But
20 then you just start -- and I'm not saying it's not true and it's not
21 relevant, but it's not the question. And then you start telling us about
22 the suffering of the people, and of course this Tribunal pays a lot of
23 attention to those aspects of the case, but it's not the question put to
25 So I again instruct you to listen carefully to the question and
1 not give a kind of general commentary on the situation but just to answer
2 the question.
3 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
4 MR. HARMON:
5 Q. Let me be very narrow and precise in my question, Mr. Kljuic. We
6 have been discussing the issue of ultimatums. You have told us that in
7 your discussions that you had on a daily basis with the Bosnian Serb
8 representatives, in the discussions you had with Mr. Karadzic and Mr.
9 Krajisnik, they said that the non-Serb people would have to leave in one
10 way or another if their solution was not accepted.
11 I asked you about the context, what had happened in Croatia
12 before, and you stated there had been ethnic cleansing in Croatia --
13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour --
14 MR. HARMON: I'm trying to summarise so I can get to the point,
15 Mr. Stewart. So if I can finish before --
16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, an accurate summary is essential in
17 the exercise and I thought that the whole point of exploring this matter
18 was to see what these men did say --
19 MR. HARMON: That's what I was getting to.
20 MR. STEWART: And Mr. Harmon has already said in his summary they
21 said that the non-Serb people would have to leave in one way or another.
22 That is precisely what this whole line of questioning -- in a frustrating
23 way for everybody, I quite agree -- is designed to establish. So to
24 incorporate that in a summary is to lead the very conclusion that
25 everybody is wondering that we will reach.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Things can change. You insisted in one way or
2 another on being part in what was said before been now it's a different
3 situation. Let me ask you --
4 MR. STEWART: It's totally different, Your Honour, and it's
5 unfair for Your Honour to suggest I introduced that phrase because it's a
6 wholly different point.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Let's -- Witness, you told us that in the
8 conversations, the frequent conversations, you were told that the
9 non-Serbian population had to leave those territories claimed by the
10 Serbs. Was what had happened in Croatia one of the reasons why you
11 understood this to be an ultimatum?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there were no
13 secrets, if Karadzic said in six months prior to the aggression, if he
14 said this in the Assembly.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understood that after the events
17 in Croatia, and on the basis of the behaviour of the leadership of the
18 Serbs in the course of the war.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But you could not at that moment understand
20 those observations on the basis of what happened later, isn't it?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. But given the daily conduct of
22 the Serbian leadership, I thought that this is what would happen in
23 Bosnia too.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So you say what happened in Croatia, and as
25 you just explained on the words used by Mr. Karadzic during his speech
1 where he said they would have to leave, you gave it -- at least in your
2 opinion this had a specific meaning. Is that a correct understanding?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Earlier in one of your answers you referred to
5 people fleeing Croatia. You mentioned the second half of 1992. Is that
6 what you intended to say? What did you --
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Croatia, this all took place in
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's the reason why I'm asking you. So you
10 say what happened in Croatia, and you referred yourself to Croatia. You
11 wanted to refer to the latter half of 1991 and not as it appears in the
12 transcript in the latter half of 1992.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. That's correct.
14 JUDGE ORIE: It therefore is in this context that you understood
15 the words all non-Serbs had to leave in your conversations with not yet
16 very much specified but with the Bosnian Serb leadership.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In addition, I was a member of the
18 state Presidency, and I was the president of the party, and I would
19 receive information at the state and party level from the field. I
20 received information on the status of Croats in areas where the Serbs
21 were in the majority.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
23 MR. HARMON:
24 Q. Mr. Kljuic, in your conversations with Mr. Krajisnik, when he was
25 discussing with you the consequences that would ensue if the Bosnian Serb
1 position about the future of Bosnia was not accepted, did you explain to
2 him that such consequences would be unacceptable?
3 A. Naturally. Not just myself. Many people said the manner in
4 which the SDS acted was an impossible matter in which to act in normal
5 and peaceful circumstances.
6 Q. Was he aware, Mr. Krajisnik aware, of the consequences that war
7 would bring if the Bosnian Serb people tried to assert their position
8 forcefully in Bosnia?
9 A. Absolutely.
10 Q. What do you say -- on what do you base that conclusion?
11 A. I should first of all tell you what the relationship between
12 Karadzic and Krajisnik was. Karadzic was more aggressive, more
13 bombastic, and he articulated their objectives at greater length, whereas
14 Krajisnik didn't speak much.
15 However, on one occasion, Karadzic told all of us -- he was
16 addressing the core circles, the core members of the SDA and the HDZ and
17 the SDS, he said, "Be aware of the fact that the Serbs will do what they
18 intend to do, and the international community will, in the end, support
19 the side that is the strongest one."
20 Q. Was that statement made in the presence of Mr. Krajisnik, either
21 on that occasion or any other occasion?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, you said in the course of the debate that was occurring on
24 the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina that both the Serbs had one
25 position, the Croats and the Bosniaks had a different position. The
1 Bosniak position was in favour of sovereignty. At the same time those
2 discussion were is going on with the SDS party in which you participated,
3 in what Mr. Krajisnik participated, what steps were being taken by the
4 Bosnian Serbs to ensure that their position would prevail?
5 A. On the one hand there were the political negotiations, either
6 within institutions, the Presidency, the parliament, the government, or
7 there were bilateral or trilateral party leaderships. And on the other
8 hand, on the other side, there were preparations for an aggression, which
9 were supervised from Belgrade with the assistance of the JNA, the police,
10 the media, financial institutions. And later, paramilitary formations
11 joined them too.
12 The purpose of the negotiations was to portray them as people who
13 were interested in finding a peaceful solution to the problem, whereas
14 the technical preparations made for the aggression had as their -- the
15 motto was that they should be as arrogant as possible in those
16 negotiations, that this is a picture reflected from the top echelons of
17 Yugoslavia. And after reactions such as the one in Croatia, the chances
18 that Yugoslavia would survive diminished.
19 So given our starting point, our desire for a reformed or a
20 transformed Yugoslavia -- that was our starting point, but because of
21 their threats, we ended up with a desire for an independent Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina. If this hadn't been the political will just of the
23 leaderships of certain citizens' parties, the HDZ, et cetera, this will
24 be demonstrated by the referendum at a subsequent date.
25 Q. Let me interrupt you for a second. At the same time that there
1 were negotiations on the fate of Bosnia that were taking place between
2 the HDZ, the SDA, and the SDS, were the Serbs being armed?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Who was arming the Serbs during that period -- during the period
5 of time prior to the destruction and the break-up of Bosnia?
6 A. Primarily it was the army, but there were other sources too.
7 Q. Okay. You're referring to the JNA. Can you give us a concrete
8 example that you know of the JNA actually arming Serbs? The Court's
9 heard a lot of evidence about this subject, but I'm asking you for any
10 examples that you can tell the Court, very specifically.
11 A. I knew the gentleman whose name was Vlado Stopjic. Vlado is an
12 interesting name because both those of the Orthodox faith and of the
13 Catholic faith use this name. He was a very capable man. He was a
14 businessman, and he had a fruit juice factory and a big house in
15 Lukavica, which is a suburb of Sarajevo and which is inhabited mostly by
17 One morning in front of his house, he saw a Zolja, a hand-held
18 rocket launcher, three or four cases of weapons, and it was packed in
19 green cases and had "JNA" inscribed on it, which shows that it was from
20 the JNA. It also had various codes inscribed on it. This took place a
21 few months before the aggression. And he found a Serb in Croatia, and
22 they exchanged their properties, and he moved to Croatia. He was one of
23 the more intelligent men.
24 But the fact that there were weapons provided by the army is not
25 in dispute. There's an interview given by General Kukanjac. It appeared
1 on the Serbian television in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he expressed his
2 dissatisfaction for having been forgotten after he had retired. He said,
3 "None of this would have happened if I hadn't armed them."
4 Q. Okay. General Kukanjac, just identify him, his position, please.
5 A. He was the commander of the army region which covered most of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he had his headquarters in Sarajevo. And he
7 was the commander of the 91st in 1991, up until the beginning of 1992,
8 when he was replaced by Mladic.
9 Q. Now, let me turn your attention to a document that you're
10 familiar with, the variant A and variant B document. And I won't take
11 the time to show it to you. I know you have seen it before. But let me
12 ask you -- I would like to quote from Mr. Karadzic. This is a quotation
13 from Mr. Karadzic at the 50th Bosnian Serb Assembly Session held on the
14 15th and 16th of April, 1995, in which he refers to variant A and variant
15 B. I'm going to read it to you, and then I'm going to ask you for your
17 "At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were
18 in the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
19 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
20 up secret government, municipal boards, municipal assemblies, presidents
21 of executive boards. You will remember the A and B variants. In the
22 B variant where we were in the minority, 20 per cent, 15 per cent, we had
23 set up a government and a brigade, a unit no matter what size, but there
24 was a detachment with a commander."
25 This is a quotation, for the record, from Exhibit 65, binder 12,
1 tab 128.
2 Mr. Kljuic, can you comment on the variant A and the variant B
3 documents and what that suggested to you was happening at the same time
4 negotiations were occurring to resolve the problems in Bosnia.
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we suggest a bit more foundation needs
6 to be laid here to establish, for example, when Mr. Harmon asserted the
7 witness has seen variant A and variant B. No doubt he has in the course
8 of some preparation, but when he saw it. Some link between this witness
9 and that document needs to be laid as a foundation.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, it should be clear whether the witness
11 at that time had any knowledge it and how he understood it at that time
12 or how he interprets it with the experience he gained since that period
13 of time.
14 MR. HARMON:
15 Q. Mr. Kljuic, are you aware -- have you seen the variant A and
16 variant B document?
17 A. Yes, before the aggression.
18 Q. Now, how did you interpret that particular document?
19 MR. STEWART: No, that's not good enough, Your Honour. We don't
20 know whether he saw the variant A been B document yesterday because he
21 was shown it by the Prosecution or in 1990 something or other.
22 MR. HARMON: He answered he saw it before the aggression.
23 MR. STEWART: I beg your pardon. My apologise for overlooking
24 that. But nevertheless, with that recognition, nevertheless something
25 more specific is required. Because we've had evidence about variants A
1 and B when certain people say it was produced. It is important to be
2 specific about this.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Witness, at this moment you may proceed on
4 your line of questioning, Mr. Harmon.
5 MR. HARMON: Perhaps, Your Honour, we could show the witness
6 variant A and variant B, and I could have -- and it's found in Exhibit
7 65. It's in 65, binder 6, tab 66.
8 Q. In the meantime, Mr. Kljuic, you've seen this document. How
9 did -- how do you interpret this document any time when there were
10 negotiations ongoing to resolve the situation in Bosnia?
11 A. Well, that was the game being played by the SDS at two levels.
12 First of all, they were negotiating, asking for equality, et cetera, but
13 in secret they were preparing for an aggression and they were arming
14 Serbian civilians.
15 It's not a secret. The document with version A and version B was
16 familiar even before the war. I think it comes from the end of 1991, but
17 towards the end of January or February 1992, we had this document at the
18 Presidency. You must know there were parallel institutions, and many
19 intelligence officers and policemen remained loyal to Bosnia-Herzegovina,
20 and this was a document, the application of which was very broad. It's
21 not something that could be concealed. So we were aware of their plan
22 for variant A and variant B. And to how well it was prepared, you can
23 see this very well in the case of Brcko because that was plan B, and they
24 took over a certain percentage of the town and expelled a certain amount
25 of Bosniaks and Croats.
1 Q. Now, these instructions are dated the 19th of December, 1991.
2 What is this -- what else occurred on the 19th of December, 1991, that
3 was significant?
4 A. That evening we had a meeting of the Presidency, and it was a
5 very important one, and it was necessary to extend the term of office for
6 the president since according it our constitution one representative of
7 the seven equal members of the Presidencies would be selected, but it was
8 only possible to preside for one year plus one year.
9 On the 19th of December, 1991, Mr. Izetbegovic's mandate expired.
10 He could extend it for a year. He had the opportunity to do so, although
11 that morning Karadzic tried to distract me, but I didn't accept that. He
12 attempted a form of sabotage.
13 Q. Will you explain that, please.
14 A. Well, please don't interrupt me, then. It was very important to
15 replace Izetbegovic in order to stabilise Bosnia-Herzegovina. Karadzic
16 suggested I should be the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I said,
17 "Well, how?" He said, "It's no problem. There will be two Serbs and two
18 Croats. That amounts to four votes. And perhaps Fikret Abdic will vote
19 for us too."
20 Formally, it was possible to do that. And if I were someone
21 else, I could have agreed to being president. But at the time, I had
22 already split with Zagreb because of the policies conducted with regard
23 to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
24 And secondly, if I were elected as president, it would have been
25 necessary to rotate the president of the government and the president of
1 the parliament, because if you know -- as you are aware, there were three
2 representatives from three peoples, the three key positions, and such a
3 change would have caused a certain crisis in power, because who knows
4 whether they would have agreed to have someone else appointed in the
5 place of Krajisnik as president of the Assembly. Who knows whether they
6 have agreed to have Jure Pelivan, the prime minister, replaced. And
7 perhaps the idea was to bring me in, as I had no influence over the
8 population apart from the fact that they respected me as a citizen. But
9 I didn't have any real influence over the masses and I wouldn't have been
10 able to command the army and police. Also Bosnia-Herzegovina didn't
11 really have any weapons. Later there was a form of arming, assistance
12 from the side, et cetera, but these things I couldn't get involved in.
13 And finally that evening we were supposed to make a request for a
14 referendum to be held on independence. And while we were working on this
15 at the level of the state leadership, in the morning they distributed the
16 document containing variant A and B. They distributed it in the field.
17 Q. Okay. Now, I'd like you to direct your attention also to any
18 other events that were happening, Mr. Kljuic, that were -- that you
19 interpreted as preparations for war by the Serbs at the same time they
20 were discussions with and between the various political parties to
21 resolve the crisis in Bosnia.
22 Did the Bosnian Serbs create parallel governmental structures?
23 Did they create their own Assembly?
24 A. Yes, they did.
25 Q. What about the events -- what about the common means that were
1 available to support the Bosnian people, the SDK, for example? Were
2 there any actions taken in respect of them at the same time there were
3 discussions to resolve the matter of Bosnia? And can you explain what
4 those actions were.
5 A. Well, Your Honours, perhaps you're not aware of the fact that in
6 the socialist system, all financial transactions were conducted via a
7 service called the SDK. They thus maintained financial control over all
8 transactions. And one of the instructions contained in variant A and B
9 was to take those funds and to keep funds in areas where the Serbs were
10 in the majority. And what is most important is that all the reserve food
11 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all the reserve weapons - and this was not
12 an accident - all these reserves were in areas where only Serbs lived.
13 So in making these preparations, they took everything they could take
14 from what was jointly owned, not only because this was in their own
15 interest but because they wanted to prevent others from acting. And
16 while this was being done, this greed and this looting, was something
17 that their power structure did.
18 Later, all those people who left had to hand over all their
19 property to the Serbian parastate.
20 Q. Let me turn to another topic and that is the issue that we
21 touched upon a little bit earlier, and that is whether or not Bosnia
22 could be divided ethnically, whether you could separate the Serbs from
23 the Croats and the Muslims. And you've told us that that was not
24 possible. Did you have such a discussion with Mr. Krajisnik? Did you
25 tell Mr. Krajisnik that fact?
1 A. There were a number of discussions. There was a tete-a-tete
2 that we had in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in his office, and
3 we suggested a peaceful solution.
4 If this peaceful solution was refused, there was only one
5 alternative, and that was war. And I must say that the tragedy of the
6 Bosnian Serbs is that they had partners for peace, because no one wanted
7 to go to war apart from themselves in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the
8 other hand, the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina can't be regarded as
9 consisting of only Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. There were a lot of
10 people who didn't have a national identity, who didn't characterise
11 themselves in nationalist terms. There were some people who didn't think
12 that the nation was an important factor. But the most difficult thing
13 was that there were very mixed marriages, mixed in terms of religion and
14 ethnic affiliation. And the children issued from such marriages could
15 not opt for just one identity. This was clearly evident when you have a
16 look at their names. Children from mixed marriages would take neutral
17 names which didn't reveal the ethnic community to which they belonged.
18 On the other hand, the fact that the population was mixed -- the
19 population was mixed to such an extent that in one skyscraper you'd have
20 80 Muslim families, 50 Serbian families, 20 Catholic families, two Jews.
21 And no one would agree, and no one would -- no one would agree to leaving
22 Sarajevo and going to a village where his ethnic community lived.
23 Apart from that, the citizens' parties that had 18 per cent in the
24 election -- 18 per cent of the votes in the elections --
25 Q. My question was: Did you tell Mr. Krajisnik that Bosnia could
1 not be divided along ethnic lines?
2 A. I did. Not only Mr. Krajisnik. I said that to many people lots
3 of times. It was unimaginable.
4 Q. And what was Mr. Krajisnik's reaction to that?
5 A. I've already described the rhetoric of Krajisnik and the rhetoric
6 of Karadzic. Krajisnik did not have much need to speak when Karadzic was
7 voicing everything that both of them thought. Karadzic made a lot of
8 threats. Krajisnik never did.
9 However, when Karadzic made that speech in the Assembly,
10 Krajisnik, as the chairman, did not stop him. He didn't say, "What the
11 speaker is saying is inappropriate."
12 Q. My question, again, is: When you told Mr. Krajisnik that Bosnia
13 could not be divided along ethnic lines, what was his reaction to what
14 you told him?
15 A. He was silent while Karadzic was saying, "We will do what we will
16 do, and the international community will recognise the force of the
17 stronger party."
18 Q. How often did you tell Krajisnik and Karadzic? Did you warn them
19 that Bosnia couldn't be divided along ethnic lines?
20 A. Please, this is no longer an issue of recognition or
21 acknowledgement. If somebody says something like that a hundred times,
22 you can't forget it.
23 On the other hand, I have to tell me we had joint meetings of all
24 the institutions, for instance, Presidency, parliament, and government,
25 where we wished to discuss outstanding issues. However, those
1 outstanding issues could not be resolved in any parliamentary way because
2 of their ultimatums.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, the question was just how often, be it ten
4 times, be it 50 times, be it a hundred times. That was the question. Do
5 I understand you correctly that it was at a high frequency, because you
6 mentioned at least somewhere in your answer that if something said a
7 hundred times. Was that -- is that a correct understanding?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know if this will mean
9 anything to you, but I said that a number of times. I didn't count. But
10 it was imperative in our life at the time to repeat it: Please, don't go
11 ahead with force, please. All of us will end up suffering. Let's not
12 going to war.
13 MR. STEWART: Could I mention at this point, Your Honour there
14 are two or three matters for which I would need about five minutes, but
15 if that helps the Tribunal with a view to timing.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
17 MR. HARMON: I was going to play an intercept that lasted 6
18 minutes and 49 seconds, because I thought I had ten minutes.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And I take it you would like to put some questions
20 to the witness.
21 MR. HARMON: It was going to be the intercept I couldn't play
22 this morning. I was going to --
23 JUDGE ORIE: I'm hesitant, because if it can be played now, at
24 least it shows that we have no technical problems in respect of this. So
25 therefore, with the approval of the interpreters and the technicians,
1 also keeping in mind that we started the last session rather early, that
2 means if we're running out of tapes it's over anyhow...
3 Please do that, Mr. Harmon. Also, let's try to get the answers
4 as concrete as possible.
5 MR. HARMON: Okay. Let me put this intercept in context.
6 Q. We were interrupted, Mr. Kljuic, because of technical problems.
7 We were discussing the view of Bosnian Serb leaders in respect of Serbs
8 who did not adhere to or follow or subscribe to the SDS policy. And if I
9 could play this following intercept.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and the interpreters are requested to say it
11 into English.
12 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, for your sake, it is found in tab
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. HARMON: All right.
16 MR. STEWART: What's the date, please, Your Honour? Or through
17 Your Honour, what's the date, please, Mr. Harmon?
18 MR. HARMON: June the 26, 1992.
19 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
20 [Audiotape played]
21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
22 Mandic Momcilo: Hello.
23 Miljana: Minister, how are you? Just a minute, the president
24 would like to talk to you.
25 Krajisnik Momcilo: Hello?
1 Mandic Momcilo: Yes. Hello?
2 Krajisnik Momcilo: Mandic. All right. Are you a traitor as
3 everybody else?
4 Mandic Momcilo: God forbid. Hello?
5 Miljana: Minister, the connection broke up.
6 Mandic Momcilo: Something at your end.
7 Miljana: You can talk now.
8 Mandic Momcilo: From the village up there, and then you get cut
10 Krajisnik Momcilo: Hello?
11 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
12 Krajisnik Momcilo: Momo?
13 Mandic Momcilo: Yes, President.
14 Krajisnik Momcilo: What was it?
15 Mandic Momcilo: Probably something at your end.
16 Krajisnik Momcilo: The moment I told you and you betrayed that
17 you are a traitor. The line got cut off.
18 Mandic Momcilo: God forbid. I would never do that.
19 Krajisnik Momcilo: Momo, tell me, how is it going?
20 Mandic Momcilo: Well, I'm not up-to-date with what's going on in
21 the lower part. The main one but as for this one it's going well.
22 Krajisnik Momcilo: These haven't come in at all.
23 Mandic Momcilo: Not at all.
24 Krajisnik Momcilo: No.
25 Mandic Momcilo: I wouldn't know anything about that.
1 Krajisnik Momcilo: It's a shame, a shame.
2 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
3 Krajisnik Momcilo: Two things. Actually, I wanted to see if
4 Stanisic was there, to see with him what was going on so it means that we
5 all agreed -- that what we agreed upon was not respected.
6 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
7 Krajisnik Momcilo: There's still half a chance today and
8 tomorrow I will finish.
9 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
10 Krajisnik Momcilo: It's a big problem with Alija, has that one
11 been finished? That is awful. As of today we finish it all, you know.
12 Mandic Momcilo: Here there is something pounding.
13 Krajisnik Momcilo: Uh-huh.
14 Mandic Momcilo: It could be heard that they are pounding.
15 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes, that's it. Has he made it down there or
16 not? It's all over now. Secondly, have you released the one I told you
17 about by any chance?
18 Mandic Momcilo: Yes I have.
19 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes?
20 Mandic Momcilo: He left for Vrbanja one hour ago.
21 Krajisnik Momcilo: Thank God.
22 Mandic Momcilo: Karamehmedovic, that's right?
23 Krajisnik Momcilo: Yes, that's him.
24 Mandic Momcilo: Well, he's gone.
25 Krajisnik Momcilo: Let me also ask you about that Savic Milos.
1 It's his brother that's really...
2 Mandic Momcilo: President, I put it on the list. The first next
3 exchange and it will be finished.
4 Krajisnik Momcilo: Check it down there. Do you have anyone
5 there? Can you contact someone?
6 Mandic Momcilo: There is this Vukovic, a member of the youth
7 organisation, a Serb who is criticising us because we are -- we have 400
8 prisoners here, you know.
9 Krajisnik Momcilo: Who is criticising?
10 Mandic Momcilo: I've got 400.
11 Krajisnik Momcilo: And who is criticising?
12 Mandic Momcilo: This Filip Vukovic, member of the youth
13 organisation. Serb, he says. Clean it, but for them they are --
14 Krajisnik Momcilo: Filip Vukovic, you say.
15 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
16 Krajisnik Momcilo: Communist.
17 Mandic Momcilo: Yes, yes.
18 Krajisnik Momcilo: What does he want?
19 Mandic Momcilo: He is president of that Exchange Commission.
20 Krajisnik Momcilo: Their commission?
21 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
22 Krajisnik Momcilo: And what is it that he wants?
23 Mandic Momcilo: War prisoners. No, they are ex- for them. They
24 are hardly interested in people. They are interested in ammunition and
25 meat and now we let those women and children to go to Vrbanja, to go to
1 their own people. He says that's ethnic cleansing what we're doing.
2 Krajisnik Momcilo: Does he now.
3 Mandic Momcilo: Here when --
4 Krajisnik Momcilo: And where is he now?
5 Mandic Momcilo: There somewhere. I don't know.
6 Krajisnik Momcilo: With them, isn't he?
7 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
8 Krajisnik Momcilo: That means he's one of them.
9 Mandic Momcilo: Yes, yes.
10 Krajisnik Momcilo: God, traitors are all around.
11 Mandic Momcilo: Yes, yes.
12 Krajisnik Momcilo: Good, Momo. Look, please do call him. I
13 would like to help Savic. It's his brother at stake.
14 Mandic Momcilo: First exchange I will take care of that.
15 Krajisnik Momcilo: Good, Momo.
16 Mandic Momcilo: And that man, is he gone?
17 Krajisnik Momcilo: Momo, let me ask you something.
18 Mandic Momcilo: Yes.
19 Krajisnik Momcilo: Who should we appoint the republican
20 prosecutor? Slobodan Avlijas?
21 Mandic Momcilo: Yes. It is -- President, here there is a man
22 who knows everybody who is from here.
23 Krajisnik Momcilo: I know him.
24 Mandic Momcilo: So you know him too. Good.
25 Krajisnik Momcilo: If he was pro-judge --
1 Mandic Momcilo: He was -- he was in my ministry. However, he is
2 skilled, capable. He knows many of those people and the place doesn't
3 hold him. I think he is the right man for it. Slobodan Kovac, that one
4 will not do.
5 Krajisnik Momcilo: Slobodan Kovac, that one will not do.
6 Mandic Momcilo: Slobodan Kovac? What?
7 Krajisnik Momcilo: Good.
8 Mandic Momcilo: Already.
9 Krajisnik Momcilo: You should draw up that proposal and sent it
10 from there.
11 Mandic Momcilo: Deal.
12 Krajisnik Momcilo: All right.
13 Mandic Momcilo: Bye.
14 Krajisnik Momcilo: Come on, go back to work. You are hardly
15 there yourself. Listen, you say I will fax you and you do it
16 straightaway. You say I will give you the phone number, and you do it
17 straight away. We should set you free from this fax because --
18 Mandic Momcilo: Don't. Will come.
19 Krajisnik Momcilo: You don't have to.
20 Mandic Momcilo: Skrbo is here. I don't know what to do with
22 Krajisnik Momcilo: Don't go to the field now.
23 Mandic Momcilo: No, no, no. President, what are we going to do?
24 Send a commissioner to Kasindol, two, three men, some Papazi. They came
25 to me from doctor Avramovic from Kasindol. Nobody ever called. They
1 scattered away over there. They appoint their own people, directors.
2 Krajisnik Momcilo: And who is that one?
3 Mandic Momcilo: Kasindol, the hospital.
4 Krajisnik Momcilo: Who are those people? Where is that coming
6 Mandic Momcilo: Local community of Kasindol, the Crisis Staff.
7 Krajisnik Momcilo: And is that a municipality? Which one?
8 Mandic Momcilo: It's the local community of Ilidza. Ilidza is
9 the municipality. Kasindol is local community.
10 Krajisnik Momcilo: And why do they have the Commissioner? Why
11 don't they go there?
12 Mandic Momcilo: No, it isn't. I don't know which. Those
13 doctors came to me. They appointed some Sonja Divljan instead of this
15 Krajisnik Momcilo: And how could they do that?
16 Mandic Momcilo: This Crisis Staff of the local community,
17 Kasindol, appointed her.
18 Krajisnik Momcilo: Come on.
19 Mandic Momcilo: And then Koviljka Popovic, the cashier, to make
20 an overview to see how the income is being distributed in income again.
21 Krajisnik Momcilo: I will now call Prstojevic to go there and to
22 send somebody because he has the Crisis Staff in Ilidza and that is
24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter hasn't finished.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, we have not received the full
1 interpretation of the intercept. Please proceed.
2 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: When I said please proceed, it's for the
5 MR. HARMON:
6 Q. Mr. Mandic identifies --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, we first have for the transcript to
8 receive the full English interpretation of the transcript. So I think
9 that we finished approximately with Popovic Koviljka. Is that correct?
10 I'm asking the interpreters to finish the interpretation.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Apologies of the interpreters.
12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
13 Mandic Momcilo: It's a shame, President.
14 Krajisnik Momcilo: I will see that they take care of that
16 Mandic Momcilo: But they are in contact with Prstojevic.
17 Krajisnik Momcilo: See, then, if he doesn't do anything we will
18 have to send someone else there.
19 Mandic Momcilo: They are in some kind of business with that
20 Prstojevic, black-marketeering or something.
21 Krajisnik Momcilo: He cannot do anything on his own. He has the
22 committee now some wonderful people are there now, you know? They aren't
23 the old ones any more.
24 Mandic Momcilo: But Doctor, these came and they are whining and
1 Krajisnik Momcilo: Tell them it will be taken care of properly.
2 Mandic Momcilo: Because they're not obeying. They didn't give
3 them a slice of bread.
4 Krajisnik Momcilo: Who?
5 Mandic Momcilo: Those from the local community because --
6 Krajisnik Momcilo: Who is not giving them a slice of bread?
7 Mandic Momcilo: They would not allow assistance to go straight
8 to the hospital in Kasindol but only through them. Then they stopped
9 that assistance, aid, and then they gave them a little. It's a disgrace.
10 Krajisnik Momcilo: I will now --
11 Mandic Momcilo: People should be arrested, President.
12 Krajisnik Momcilo: I will find Dragan Kalinic now to go there
13 and see what needs to be done.
14 Mandic Momcilo: Yes, please, Doctor, do call. Here I have five
15 people sitting here right across from me staring at me and --
16 Krajisnik Momcilo: Momo, what you were promised I will do.
17 Mandic Momcilo: Good, President.
18 Krajisnik Momcilo: There is no such Minister in the entire
20 Mandic Momcilo: Oh, come on, please.
21 Krajisnik Momcilo: I will --
22 Mandic Momcilo: So they don't disperse the staff.
23 Krajisnik Momcilo: I will, Momo.
24 Mandic Momcilo: Thank you very much. Bye.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Harmon.
2 MR. HARMON:
3 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I played this intercept for you in the context of
4 your previous testimony that dealt with the attitudes of Mr. Karadzic,
5 Mr. Krajisnik and other attitudes toward non-Serbs who did not subscribe
6 to the SDS agenda. Can I have your comments on observations in respect
7 of this intercept.
8 A. We see in this conversation the drastic qualifications they
9 give to people who are not towing the line. Although there is an error
10 in the identification of Filip Vukovic. It's true he is a communist, but
11 he's not a Serb. He happened to be a Croat.
12 We see from this that they were sending women and children to us,
13 which is another result of ethnic cleansing. But if you wish, we can
14 also see from this that Mr. Krajisnik was involved in many problems
15 beginning with exchanges with the Muslims, because this person,
16 Karamehmedovic, had been sent to Sarajevo, and in exchange some people
17 were demanded from Sarajevo.
18 Another detail: The hospital in Kasindol -- that's a small
19 place, Kasindol, and there was some local problem there. It was not
20 natural to involve the Speaker of the Assembly in such a small local
22 Anyway, that's the way it happened. That's how it was.
23 MR. HARMON: I have no further questions at this point, Your
25 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Kljuic, this concludes for today this
1 hearing. We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this same courtroom.
2 That will just be checked whether it's in the same courtroom or not. I'd
3 like to instruct you not to speak with anyone about the testimony you
4 have given or you're still about to give.
5 And may I ask you specifically for tomorrow to carefully listen
6 to what is the core of the question, because I'm fully aware that you
7 could tell us far beyond what you're asked to tell us. But we have to
8 stick mainly to the questions. So therefore, may I ask your specific
9 attention for that. You're excused.
10 Madam Usher, please escort the witness out of the courtroom.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
14 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. The first point is this: I ask
15 that Mr. Krajisnik could be supplied with -- and I don't one know whether
16 it's a tape or a disk, a tape or CD -- but if Mr. Krajisnik this
17 afternoon could be supplied with the audio of today's proceedings in
18 B/C/S so that he is able to review Mr. Kljuic's examination today and
19 what he said about intercepts, and so on.
20 JUDGE ORIE: From what I understand, Mr. Stewart, it takes -- if
21 we have been here for five hours, it takes five hours to play it and get
22 it on another medium. I don't know what could be done so that at least
23 he might have it this evening, but it would certainly not be before 7.00,
24 because we are in Court for five hours.
25 MR. STEWART: Well, 7.00 would be better than not at all, Your
1 Honour. It's not ideal, but of course it will be about an hour before
2 Mr. Krajisnik gets back there anyway and if he were to set aside some of
3 his evening for that, well, the --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We will try to do our utmost best. If you
5 could please get in touch -- keep in touch with the registrar to see what
6 is possible and what is not, but I do understand.
7 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
8 The second point is this: On the list we were supplied by the
9 Prosecution this morning there's a CD relating to authenticated
10 transcripts. We haven't been given that, but I wondered if we could be
11 given that or the opportunity to burn a copy of it, that would be most
12 helpful. It obviously exists because it's listed.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, this CD mentioned on the list, is it
14 there for the Defence?
15 MR. HARMON: Which list is counsel referring to? If I could have
16 a copy of that, I could respond.
17 MR. STEWART: It's the list which we were provided with this
18 morning, the list as of October 26 [sic] setting out the various exhibits
19 the Prosecution intended to call. It's the Prosecution's --
20 MR. HARMON: I understand, Mr. Stewart, which list because we
21 provided with you a lot of lists --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Number 2 on this list is "CD containing
23 authenticated transcripts."
24 MR. STEWART: I referred specifically to this list we were
25 supplied with this morning. My apologies if that didn't identify it
1 specifically enough.
2 JUDGE ORIE: It's the list in relation to Mr. Kljuic.
3 MR. HARMON: I'm informed that we are -- will prepare that and we
4 will provide that to the Defence this afternoon.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MR. STEWART: This afternoon. Could we have a -- I don't want to
7 be too demanding but some time target?
8 MR. HARMON: I don't have that information at hand. I'll get it
9 to you as soon as I can.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let's say three times the times it means
11 burning a new CD. Is that a fair --
12 MR. STEWART: 4.00 would be satisfactory, Your Honour. It seems
13 reasonable, gives plenty of latitude.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart.
15 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. The last point is this,
16 Your Honour, Your Honour has made a decision last week about a question
17 of closed session and obviously I'm going to be careful about what I say
18 in open session about that. This is the last day on which we could apply
19 for a certificate under Rule 73(B). We are going to face a practical
20 problem over the next couple of hours as well, Your Honour, that the
21 printers and computers are not going to be available to us -- this is bad
22 day for technology. They're not going to be available to us for
23 technical reasons.
24 Your Honour, it would take me about one minute to make my
25 application to Your Honours now, because really there is essentially one
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 point as the basis for that certificate.
2 JUDGE ORIE: We should then turn it to private session.
3 MR. STEWART: No, Your Honour, not necessarily, because I won't
4 identify the witness. The point is a point of principle.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MR. STEWART: And it's simply this, Your Honour: Your Honour in
7 your judgement, which has been given openly anyway, the decision said
8 that "the Defence seeped to be under the misapprehension that the Chamber
9 itself is obliged too see original evidence of the objective factors
10 before it may form an opinion."
11 Your Honour, that was not our misapprehension and not our
12 submission. Where we say that the Trial Chamber has gone wrong with
13 respect is a matter of fundamental principle is the Trial Chamber
14 required enough evidence to be satisfied that there was the basis for
15 saying there was an objective risk or objective danger. Where we, the
16 Defence -- of course Your Honours will disagree, but then after all,
17 we're talking about an appeal, when, we submit, that the Appeals Chamber
18 might agree with us that the central point is this: That what Your
19 Honours didn't do, we submit, and we still -- did submit at the time, but
20 we do say that the Trial Chamber was wrong on that -- didn't allow us to
21 pursue the matter to see whether on further reasonable inquiry that prima
22 facie position, that the Prosecution had met the threshold of
23 establishing an objective risk, might in fact then be neutralised by
24 further inquiry. And we do say, Your Honour, with respect, that it was
25 unreasonable for us to be stopped from pursuing the matter with the
1 witness to establish whether one looked at the totality of that "readily
2 obtainable evidence," whether the overall balance would have been in
3 favour of interfering with the prima facie right of the accused to have
4 the matter dealt with in public. And we do urge that this is a matter on
5 which -- important point on which guidance should be sought from the
6 Appeals Chamber and that it is a matter of principle here. And although
7 Your Honours' position is Your Honours' position and by definition you
8 won't agree with my submission because you have ruled. But it is exactly
9 the sort of point on which an Appeals Chamber might very well take a
10 different view. It is an important point.
11 And it is would, of course, in principle it does materially
12 advance a trial if something which should have been dealt with in closed
13 session is then, as a result of an appeal ruling, dealt with or opened up
14 then for open session. So it is an important point, Your Honour, and in
15 this case we do urge that a certificate would be appropriate.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand. This is an oral application
17 for certificate --
18 MR. STEWART: For a certificate under Rule 73(B), Your Honour,
20 JUDGE ORIE: But Rule 73(C) says the ask for certification will
21 be filed within 7 days which at least suggests that it should be a
22 written submission. But if it would help you, of course, I do understand
23 that you have previously explained it already and perhaps on the basis of
24 that explanation --
25 MR. STEWART: Well, yes. And I think Your Honour has a general
1 -- the Trial Chamber has a general power to dispense with that specific
3 JUDGE ORIE: On the basis of your explanation, you're granted an
4 additional day for filing the written application for such certificates.
5 MR. STEWART: Yes. I'm obliged, Your Honour. Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Krajisnik, is it true that you would like
7 to address the Chamber? It seems that -- yes.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would only like to say a few
9 words about this witness, more specifically regarding the material I
11 There is a small number of witnesses whom I know and with regard
12 to whom I could assist my own defence. I have received no material
13 whatsoever except for one written statement. I didn't receive any
14 intercepts or transcripts or anything. And my participation is very
16 I would like to be enabled to participate, because this witness
17 got dates wrong and years wrong and mixed up meetings. I would like to
18 be able to say that to my counsel so that he can put it to the witness.
19 You will understand that I'm very unhappy because the Prosecutor says he
20 gave this to my Defence yesterday. Yesterday was Sunday. And it is
21 technically impossible for my counsel to consult me. He can only do it
22 in the afternoon, after the testimony, whereas it would be logical for
23 him to consult me before the testimony.
24 Your Honours, you will appreciate this is a very complex case.
25 You know this better than I. It would be a good thing to enable me to
1 participate in my own defence. There are certain things I am technically
2 unable to point out to my Defence counsel.
3 I'm sorry that I am taking the floor here, but I do have to
4 object to this situation of complete confusion, and the technical
5 difficulties I have with consulting with my Defence counsel.
6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I say I didn't know Mr.
7 Krajisnik was going to say anything today but in this case I utterly
8 support what he said. I did have in mind to review overnight so that we
9 could inform the Trial Chamber very specifically, particularly in light
10 of the conversation this morning, what the timetable had been with the
11 supply of material. Because it is, without going into -- it's a wholly
12 unsatisfactory situation and way of dealing with these matters.
13 But, Your Honour, I undertake to sort out overnight -- Mr.
14 Krajisnik has in fact -- the only thing I disagree with he has in fact
15 been supplied with some material by us on Friday, but so far as the
16 intercepts are concerned, before the weekend all we knew was there were
17 137 or 138 intercepts from which some selection would be made. So we did
18 not make our own guesswork selection of what it would be.
19 But, Your Honour, we will get the facts straight overnight so
20 that we can assist the Trial Chamber to sort out any residual
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, as was said in the beginning of this
23 hearing, that the Chamber would closely monitor how the examination of
24 this witness would go, it was not the easiest one until now, and
25 certainly we'll keep in mind there as well the concerns expressed by Mr.
1 Krajisnik as far as preparation is concerned. And as I indicated before,
2 we'll finally see how to find a remedy for difficulties incurred.
3 MR. HARMON: Just -- I would like to make the record abundantly
4 clear, Your Honour. The intercepts -- all of the intercepts, I am
5 told -- were handed over to the Defence in June of this year. Then, Your
6 Honour, I identified -- and I'll correct -- and I'll get that date in
7 just a moment. Then I was informed, Your Honour --
8 MR. STEWART: 2.000, of them, Your Honour.
9 MR. HARMON: Right. There were a large body of intercepts that
10 were turned over to the Defence on the 16th of September.
11 MR. STEWART: 17th, Your Honour.
12 MR. HARMON: We have a dispute, but it's either a day difference.
13 But let me just say, Your Honour, 137 intercepts were then provided to
14 the Defence as the possible pool from which the exhibits would be
15 identified. On the 24th of September, I identified 21 of those exhibits
16 to the Defence, and because we had to translate the comments on the
17 remaining ten intercepts that formed part of a spreadsheet, we had those
18 translations completed and on those ten were sent over to the Defence, I
19 believe, yesterday afternoon. So that is the history of the intercepts.
20 I'm just trying to find out whether transcripts as well were
21 turned over to the Defence in June. I will inform you accordingly. But
22 I think it's important to put on the record the facts that relate to the
24 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I'd just like to say that rarely
25 does one party so cogently make the case against himself by that
1 description of the timetable.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand that the appreciation of the
3 time is quite different between the parties. The Chamber is more
4 inclined to concentrate on how to solve the matters, because the Chamber
5 has an open eye for both the difficulties the Prosecution is facing but
6 at the same time also the difficulties the Defence has to resolve, and in
7 order not to add another difficulty, that is that we are running out of
8 the tapes, we will adjourn until tomorrow morning.
9 Madam Registrar will do her utmost best to get the tape or at
10 least the audio material of today's hearing available to Mr. Krajisnik,
11 and we'll finally see how the further preparation, to what conclusions
12 that will lead and whether any specific solutions should be found for
13 that situation.
14 We will adjourn to -- until 9.00 tomorrow morning, same
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.05 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 28th day of
18 September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.