1 Tuesday, 28 September 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus
7 Momcilo Krajisnik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 Good morning to everyone. I have a few practical matters. First
10 of all, the insurmountable problems turned out not to be insurmountable.
11 That means that the week we're not sitting in October will be the week
12 starting on Monday, the 11th, as I already indicated as the most likely
14 Then the second issue is how to proceed with the intercepts in
15 relation to this witness. I think the Chamber sent a message yesterday
16 that we intend to treat the comments as something that should not be put
17 in front of the witness and just to be read or just to be confirmed,
18 because it would come close to 92 bis or 89(F), and therefore, that's
19 something that should be presented viva voce.
20 One of the problems may be how to draw the attention on the
21 relevant part of the transcript. Let's just see how it works, but perhaps
22 a reference even to his comment, if it's not very much a contentious
23 issue, could perhaps assist the witness, because otherwise he might have
24 great difficulties in finding at all the spot and the context in which the
25 questions are put to him. But as such, the comment whether something is
1 very important or whether something is contradicting other parts is
2 something we'd like to hear from the witness and not as a result of
3 confronting the witness with what he stated earlier in these comments.
4 Having said this, is there any further observation?
5 MR. HARMON: We're ready to proceed, Your Honour. I have asked a
6 member of my staff to join us. He's a technical wizard, if you will, and
7 I have asked him to sit in the rear. He'll come in, and in the event we
8 have a development like we had yesterday, he should be able to assist us.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. STEWART: Well, how nice for the Prosecution they're able to
11 lay their hands on a technical wizard, because we have to double up with
12 that task.
13 Your Honour, we endorse, as Your Honour I think already knows
14 informally, we endorse, with respect, what the Trial Chamber said about
15 the handling of intercepts, which is completely in line with what we
16 submitted yesterday. May we simply comment, certainly as far as directing
17 a witness to the relevant part of the intercepts are concerned, that seems
18 to be part of the normal challenge for an advocate to steer the
19 examination efficiently. Your Honour, it would follow, we suggest, that
20 the schedule containing the witness comments ought, as a matter of good
21 practice, it ought to be retrieved from the Trial Chamber, because since
22 that material is not going to be in evidence, that schedule in that form
23 should be handed back by the Trial Chamber now, or -- well, not now. It
24 doesn't have to be done this second, but at some convenient point.
25 JUDGE ORIE: We might keep it for practical reasons at this
2 MR. STEWART: Right now, of course, Your Honour. I'm sorry, I
3 withdraw "now." That's absolutely not necessary, but at some suitable
4 point because it isn't in evidence.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I simply comment, the report on the
7 video, I delivered three videotapes with my own fair hands to the United
8 Nations Detention Unit yesterday evening just before 8.00. I'm very --
9 JUDGE ORIE: I saw them leaving at 7.40.
10 MR. STEWART: I understood that Your Honour had seen them in one
11 set of even fairer hands before they were handed to me. The -- Ms. Dixon,
12 namely. Your Honour, they were, I'm happy to say, they were transmitted
13 very quickly to Mr. Krajisnik, for which I'm grateful to all concerned at
14 the UNDU. That doesn't, as a matter of fact, give him an enormous amount
15 of time then at already 8.00 in the evening.
16 It leads on to one simple practical matter that I've been meaning
17 to mention for a couple of days, Your Honour, which is this: A long time
18 ago, Your Honour invited the parties' views on preferences for sitting in
19 the morning and the afternoon. I understand the Trial Chamber's
20 preference is for mornings. As it happens, my own personal preference is
21 for mornings, not entirely shared enthusiastically by every member of my
22 team as a preference, but we all have our personal preferences. But there
23 is a practical matter, Your Honour, which we are finding increasingly,
24 which is that it is far more difficult to get useful time with Mr.
25 Krajisnik when we sit in the morning, because the earliest we're really
1 able to get to the Detention Unit then, and Mr. Krajisnik is able to get
2 there, is around 3.00. We end up having about -- if Mr. Harmon could just
3 let me finish on this, I think it would be useful. The -- we end up
4 having a maximum of about an hour and a half after several hours in court.
5 That is nowhere near as productive -- maybe Mr. Harmon is going to
6 agree, Your Honour, but if I could just explain -- so I apologise if Mr.
7 Harmon is about to signify agreement, but all the same, I would just like
8 to indicate --
9 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry to interrupt, but there is a limited amount
10 of time with this witness and this is a matter that seems could be taken
11 up after court or at another time.
12 MR. STEWART: It will take almost less than time than the comment,
13 Your Honour. The morning will give us a clear run through. The practical
14 suggestion I was going to make, Your Honour, was reserving our position on
15 the overall schedule, but if we are sitting continuously, we wonder if it
16 would be possible to alternate weeks of mornings and weeks of afternoons
17 as a compromise.
18 That's all I have to say on that subject, Your Honour. I'm sorry
19 for Mr. Harmon's anxiety that his witness should get back to Sarajevo,
20 which, of course, is understood.
21 JUDGE ORIE: We'll consider that, and I do agree with Mr. Harmon
22 that this is a matter, especially since it seems not to meet a lot of
23 opposition, that could have been dealt with during a break and through the
24 intermediary of one of our legal officers. But we certainly will consider
25 it and it sounds fair what you say.
1 Then could you, Madam Usher, escort the witness into the
3 [The witness entered court]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning. Please sit down, Mr. Kljuic. May I
5 remind you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've given
6 at the beginning of your testimony. Your examination will now continue.
7 Mr. Harmon, please proceed.
8 WITNESS: STJEPAN KLJUIC [Resumed]
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 Examined by Mr. Harmon: [Continued]
11 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kljuic. I would like to focus your attention to
12 events that occurred in Bijeljina at the end of March and the beginning of
13 April 1992. Bijeljina is a municipality in Bosnia that sits along the
14 Drina River and is contiguous with Serbia; is that correct?
15 A. Da.
16 Q. And from an ethnic composition point of view, the Muslims formed a
17 minority in that particular municipality; correct?
18 A. Da.
19 Q. Can you tell the Judges what happened to the Bosniak community in
20 Bijeljina at the end of March 1992 and the beginning of April 1992.
21 A. [No interpretation].
22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, excuse me just a second. I may ask you to start again
23 because we're not getting the English translation.
24 JUDGE ORIE: On channel 4 where I usually --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?
1 JUDGE ORIE: Now we can, yes.
2 MR. HARMON:
3 Q. Let me ask you, then, Mr. Kljuic, will you start again.
4 A. As I was saying, before the incident in Bijeljina, there were a
5 number of similar situations in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina where we
6 had the killing of people. However, the incident in Bijeljina had a very
7 specific message to convey, and it was this: In addition to the Yugoslav
8 army, there were paramilitary units that found themselves there of Serbs
9 from Yugoslavia, and they were led by Zeljko Raznjatovic, better known as
10 Arkan. He had his own units. In the Presidency, we received a report
11 according to which it was said to be a question of conflicts; however,
12 there was no fighting of partners that was taking place. What happened
13 was that the Serb paramilitaries had started killing the Muslims and
14 abusing them. Then we set up a state delegation --
15 Q. Let me interrupt you for just a moment, please, Mr. Kljuic. If I
16 could have some exhibits shown to you.
17 MR. HARMON: They would be two photographs. They're related
18 photographs. If I could have a number on those.
19 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit number P294A for ERN ending
20 098808, and P294B for ERN ending 098812.
21 MR. HARMON:
22 Q. Now, Mr. Kljuic, are you familiar with these photographs?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Can you tell the Court what these photographs depict?
25 A. On one of the photographs, you can see the victims and the
1 brutality of this particular soldier who is hitting them. On the other
2 photograph, probably the bereaved family of this first victim. However, I
3 should like to say that these photographs are not secret photographs.
4 They were in fact published, made public, after all this took place.
5 Q. Mr. Kljuic, could you tell the Court --
6 MR. HARMON: Actually, Your Honours, let me just draw your
7 attention to these two exhibits. You will notice that the woman who is on
8 the ground in Prosecution Exhibit 294A is the same woman who is standing
9 over the man who is laying on the ground. She is depicted in Exhibit
10 294B. So these are related photographs.
11 Q. Please, Mr. Kljuic, if you could then tell us again what happened
12 to the Muslim population and what the reaction was in the Presidency.
13 A. Yes. It is clear that the Muslim population, as a whole, was
14 being intimidated and was afraid, and many of them were killed. A number
15 of victims was never established. But when the Presidency delegation
16 returned, and it comprised of members of the Presidency, Fikret Abdic,
17 Biljana Plavsic, and the defence minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jerko
18 Doko, the reports coming in were contradictory, in fact. Fikret Abdic and
19 Biljana Plavsic said that it was an incident which could be overcome,
20 whereas my minister said that what he saw in Bijeljina was horrendous and
21 that he, as the defence minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had to lie down on
22 the ground and be disarmed when Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, gave the
23 command, the order for him to do so.
24 Now, that reports of this kind were quite normal and usual is
25 borne out by a photograph when Biljana Plavsic, as member of the
1 Presidency, embraced Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan. In that report, the one
2 that came in, we see a polarisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two sides,
3 those fighting against crimes and those supporting crimes.
4 Q. Now, let me show you the next exhibit, Mr. Kljuic. You said that
5 Mrs. Plavsic had formed part of the commission. Let me show you a film
6 and then I'm going to ask you to comment on it.
7 While we're waiting for this film to come up, until it does, what
8 was the role of Mrs. Plavsic supposed to be in respect of her visit to
10 A. Well, first of all, she was supposed to submit a realistic report,
11 all the more so since she was the president of a commission within the
12 Presidency in charge of the constitutional order. So this was the most
13 responsible role in defending the constitutional order and system of
15 Q. Was she supposed to be a neutral and fair observer to the events
16 in Bijeljina?
17 A. She would have had to have been a just observer. But of course
18 you can't be neutral, because the question is: What did Zeljko
19 Raznjatovic's units do as paramilitary formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
20 Q. Now, let me show, and you can see in front of you a monitor, you
21 can see a film. It's very brief. I want to ask you your comments after
22 you see this.
23 JUDGE ORIE: May I instruct the interpreters to read the English
25 [Videotape played]
1 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] Momcilo Krajisnik showed our reporter
2 today --
3 [Technical difficulty]
4 MR. HARMON:
5 Q. While we're trying to find this film, we will continue with the
6 examination and I will be informed when this film is available on this
8 What did Mrs. Plavsic report back to the Presidency as to what
9 happened in Bijeljina?
10 A. Well, roughly speaking, she said there had been an incident, that
11 the number of dead was not known, that it wasn't organised, that it was
12 spontaneous, that it was a group of irresponsible young men who committed
13 the act, and that the Muslims had probably caused the incident and that
14 the killing was the result of that.
15 Q. Let me show you -- now we have the film on. Let me show you the
16 film and then I'm going to ask you for your comments, Mr. Kljuic. It
17 should be on the monitor in front of you.
18 [Videotape played]
19 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] On behalf of the leadership of the
20 SDS, Mrs. Plavsic, former member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
21 publicly, in front of the eyes of the world, paid recognition to the
22 Serbian --
23 MR. HARMON:
24 Q. That's the end of the film. It's a very brief clip, Mr. Kljuic.
25 Can you tell us what that film depicts?
1 A. You can see a very warm relationship between Mrs. Plavsic and the
2 leadership, or rather, the leader and organiser of the perpetrators of the
3 crime. Instead of acting like a Presidency member of the Republic of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, the supreme state body, and protecting
5 the interests of all citizens equally, without exception, regardless of
6 their ethnicity and religion, Mrs. Plavsic kissed Arkan, which was a
7 shocking thing to behold for all the people who were there, especially for
8 the mothers, because even before that happened, Arkan had presented the
9 image of a war criminal for everything that he did -- had done in Croatia.
10 Q. Was that gesture symbolic in the eyes of the non-Serbs in Bosnia?
11 A. Absolutely correct.
12 Q. Can you explain your answer, please.
13 A. Well, this is how it was: Because of Milosevic's policy and the
14 overall plan that was being put into practice, there was less and less
15 trust and confidence in Belgrade as the centre of the country and its
16 institutions, and the least trust or greatest lack of confidence was
17 expressed towards the army, which just had the name in nominal terms the
18 Yugoslav People's Army, whereas judging by its leading cadres and the
19 structure of the army itself, it was first and foremost a Serb army and a
20 Montenegrin army. However, that was not its greatest handicap. The
21 greatest handicap was that the people had lost their confidence in an army
22 of that kind, and because before that time, in Croatia, it had shot at the
23 people. The greatest way in which the army had compromised itself was
24 subordination with the paramilitary formations.
25 So that the ordinary citizen was easily able to conclude and
1 deduce that the Yugoslav People's Army and the paramilitary formations and
2 Biljana Plavsic, as one of the leaders of the Serbian Democratic Party,
3 were all on the same side. Their conduct and behaviour gave rise to fear
4 amongst the non-Serbs.
5 Q. Now, Mr. Kljuic, was Mr. Krajisnik aware of what happened in
6 Bijeljina in March and April of 1992?
7 A. Yes, he was.
8 Q. And would it be fair to say that Bijeljina represented the first
9 municipality where ethnic cleansing of the Bosniaks took place?
10 A. No. Before Bijeljina, this was done in a Croatian village, in the
11 one-time municipality of Ravno, in Eastern Herzegovina, in which the units
12 of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Montenegrin reservists slaughtered
13 the population. The reason given was that the village had armed itself
14 and that there was Croatian terrorists there. However, neither on that
15 occasion, nor previously in the events in Croatia, was there a single
16 functionary of the SDS who did something about those crimes. And that is
17 what happened in Bijeljina with the killings that took place there too.
18 Q. Okay. That is an event that related to the Bosnian Croats. My
19 question was: Is it fair to say that Bijeljina represented the first
20 municipality where ethnic cleansing of the Bosniaks took place?
21 A. Da.
22 Q. So before that incident, there was an event that was directed by
23 the army against a certain village involving Bosnian Croats. That's what
24 your testimony is; is that correct?
25 A. Da.
1 Q. All right. Now, when the commission from the Presidency went to
2 Bijeljina, was that as part of the Commission on Constitutional Order? Did
3 they go in that capacity?
4 A. Da.
5 Q. And can you tell the Court, first of all, were you a member of the
6 Commission on Constitutional Order?
7 A. [No interpretation].
8 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry. I did not get the English translation of
10 Q. Could you repeat your answer, Mr. Kljuic. I'm sorry. I did not
11 get the translation in English.
12 A. I was. Mrs. Plavsic was the chairman and I was a member of that
14 Q. Did the Commission on Constitutional Order receive reports about
15 events, violent events that were occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
16 A. In keeping with the method of work of the commission, it was
17 supposed to receive all police records regarding all incidents happening
18 at the time.
19 Q. Did Mr. Krajisnik receive copies of those reports, to your
21 A. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, as speaker of the parliament, and Mr. Jure
22 Pelivan, as Prime Minister, were receiving these reports.
23 Q. Would it be fair to say that based on the reports that you were
24 receiving in the commission and the reports that Mr. Krajisnik was
25 receiving as well, that Mr. Krajisnik was informed about the situation on
1 the ground in Bosnia?
2 A. Yes. I think he was much better informed than the rest of us.
3 Q. Now, if I could show you the next exhibit. It will be an exhibit
4 that is P47. We have seen these exhibits before perhaps. P47 is a
5 decision of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. It is dated the 12th of May, 1992,
6 and it is signed by Momcilo Krajisnik, as the president of the national
7 Assembly. In this particular exhibit, Mr. Kljuic, in the first paragraph,
8 it says: "The strategic objectives or priorities of the Serbian people in
9 Bosnia and Herzegovina are two: One, establish state borders separating
10 the Serbian people from other two ethnic communities," and it has five
11 additional objectives.
12 In the Assembly, when this objectives were passed, Mr. Krajisnik,
13 said the following. Let me quote this to you. This is found in Exhibit
14 65, binder 12, tabs 127 and 129. Mr. Krajisnik said to the assembled
15 members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly: "As for the strategic goals, I
16 would like to offer an explanation, since I have taken part in adopting
17 these goals. We must make a choice regarding one thing. The first goal
18 is the most important one, and in relation to all other goals, all other
19 goals are sub-items to the first one."
20 Now, I'd like you, Mr. Kljuic, to focus on the strategic
21 objectives, the exhibits before you, and particularly, strategic objective
22 number 1. And I'd like you to relate the events that took place in Bosnia
23 before May the 12th to the SDS policy, and specifically to strategic
24 objective number 1.
25 A. It is abundantly clear that this decision is a component of
1 Belgrade's global policy, because the leadership of Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina's SDS was entrusted with the implementation of one aspect of
3 that project that related to Bosnia and Herzegovina. We can see that this
4 is true from para 4 of this decision, very clearly. In this paragraph,
5 borders are explicitly established on the Una and Neretva River. Those
6 are the maximised claims of Mr. Milosevic, geared at creating Greater
7 Serbia. This 12th May decision, for purely practical reasons, in order to
8 show people involved in armed combat that what they are doing is permitted
9 and approved by this document, should dispel any doubt among the people
10 wielding rifles. Namely, the very idea of separation is unnatural in
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Communities could by no means be separated
12 without brutal force, because the population was so intertwined, so mixed,
13 that even on the level of individual families, people belonged to
14 different ethnic groups.
15 On the other hand, the idea about forcible separation of
16 communities implies the breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the time
17 when this was published, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina had already
18 been internationally recognised. Ten days after this decision, we were to
19 become a member of the United Nations, at the same time as Slovenia and
21 And finally, these decisions very eloquently speak to the fact
22 that they were aware they had to achieve their aims by violence. We only
23 have to see para 2, which reads that the corridor from Western Bosnia to
24 Semberija had to be protected. Because this corridor passes through
25 majority Croat and majority Muslim populated centres, this corridor was
1 not easy to ensure.
2 For some people, this may have come as a surprise, but for those
3 who had been closely following the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
4 this document, with this wording, in this shape, was known as part of
5 Mr. Milosevic's global plan for the creation of Greater Serbia.
6 Q. Now, Mr. Kljuic, were these objectives that you have before you
7 that were promulgated on the 12th of May, were these an epiphany for the
8 Bosnian Serb leadership or were these essentially an expression of policy
9 that the Bosnian Serbs, including Mr. Krajisnik, had expressed to you
10 earlier and had been following?
11 A. This is genuinely the political platform of the SDS, with the
12 proviso that it is systematised in this document and presented in a
13 sequence that reflects priorities. It had never before been presented
14 this way. But the everyday conduct of the SDS and the things that they
15 always insisted on are reflected here in this programme.
16 In their entire political conduct over the several months after
17 the elections, prior to the aggression, their political conduct and their
18 conduct on the ground, that is, violence, was contrary to the content of
19 these decisions.
20 Q. And after the promulgation of these strategic objectives, how did
21 events play out on the ground in respect of the separation and the
22 division of non-Serb ethnic communities?
23 A. After 2nd May, which is considered to be the date of the beginning
24 of the aggression, military operations of Bosnian Serbs, synchronised with
25 the actions of the JNA, paramilitary units, as well as the local armed
1 population, were horrific. First of all, at that time, people were
2 confused. They were not expecting their neighbours to drive them out of
3 their homes. It is the time when the greatest crimes were committed,
4 because in a military onslaught, for which they had been well prepared,
5 Bosnian Serbs captured a large chunk of territory.
6 There is evidence that as far back as June 1992, they held, for
7 all practical purposes, about 70 per cent of BH territory. In order to
8 attain this goal, many crimes were committed. And it was a fortunate
9 non-Serb who was allowed to be deported. I must recall here that many had
10 to pay for this freedom, and all of them had to sign away their assets.
11 Such a blitzkrieg against an unprepared and unarmed population,
12 many among whom had never thought that things would end that way, seemed
13 to have encouraged Karadzic and the SDS leadership to continue with their
14 ultimatums. This policy, sponsored by Slobodan Milosevic, would become
15 dominant first of all in the summer of 1992 with the London peace
16 conference and onwards throughout their negotiations, mediated first by
17 Vance and Owen and later by Owen and Stoltenberg, in Geneva and other
19 What horrified the entire world, including ourselves who could not
20 possibly expect this, is the intensity and the way these crimes were being
21 committed. Hundreds of people were forced to flee. Many were killed at
22 their doorstep. And due to the military superiority they had, with regard
23 to large cities, especially Sarajevo, where I spent four years of the war,
24 they used daily shelling and sniping.
25 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the question was a very general one.
1 It's just disappearing off the screen, but how did events play out on the
2 ground in respect of the division? It is so general that it is
3 tantamount to inviting the witness, "Give us an account of what happened
4 in former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at this time." It's not
5 exactly that. That's a slight exaggeration. But it is that order of
6 question. That, therefore, raises a serious question as to how far this
7 witness ought to be giving evidence of these matters.
8 And by analogy with what we considered yesterday, where the
9 question arose of laying of the proper factual basis and the Trial Chamber
10 indicated that it was permitting Mr. Harmon considerable flexibility as to
11 whether he asked a general question first and then explored the factual
12 foundation or did it the other way around, there nevertheless does have to
13 be that. In relation to this particular witness, Your Honour, we're
14 getting into an area where it is extremely important, first of all, that
15 the witness's evidence is confined -- well, first of all, to what he
16 knows. Secondly, Your Honour, that it's confined so as to exclude
17 material where there are other witnesses who either already have done or
18 will do or far more appropriately might cover some of this ground. But at
19 the very least, these general questions, which then lead to general
20 answers, must be supplemented, we submit, by specific questions which
21 enable everybody, and particularly the Trial Chamber, of course, to see
22 precisely where it is this witness gets this information from and
23 precisely the limits of his knowledge and what the sources are.
24 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'm more than happy to respond. In the
25 description of Mr. Kljuic's qualifications, he testified that he was a --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 between April of 1992 and October of 1993, the president of the State
2 Commission for Gathering Information on War Crimes, and he remained in
3 that commission and a member of that body until the end of 1993. I think
4 Mr. Kljuic is well informed about the crimes that took place on the
6 JUDGE ORIE: Let me ask Mr. Kljuic.
7 Would you please indicate clearly when giving this rather wide
8 answer, broad answers, whether you gained that knowledge in your capacity
9 as a member of that committee or whether your sources were otherwise.
10 What you just told us until now, what was the source?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My sources are primarily my own
12 empirical knowledge; second, the political information that was available
13 to me as member of the state leadership; and third, information available
14 to the commission in charge of gathering evidence of war crimes, which I
15 first led and in which I later continued to work as a member, and which
16 followed the Wiesenthal method. I stayed in that commission until 1994.
17 The commission gathered information from the victims. At the time, this
18 was a commission of great import, in which I was only the chairman. But
19 the real authors who worked on the collection of evidence were lawyers,
20 young international law experts, and every day we had ample opportunity to
21 watch all sorts of TV channels and listen to the radio, and I can tell you
22 that the greatest amount of information was available from the radio and
23 television of Bosnian Serbs who never made any effort to conceal what was
24 happening on the ground. I believe, by the way, that everybody who wanted
25 to get informed anywhere in the world had enough information available
1 from Bosnia and Herzegovina to do so.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, on the basis of the variety of sources
3 the witness uses, and also the -- well, possible difference in quality of
4 these kind of sources, because media sources are quite different from what
5 you learn in your capacity as a member of a committee who receives reports
6 on what happened on the ground, would you please try to get as detailed
7 information every time what the source of the witness's knowledge is.
8 MR. HARMON: Yes. I'd be glad to, Your Honour.
9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could we also say that yes, although it
10 is quite true that Mr. Kljuic's position as the president of this
11 particular commission is mentioned as effectively part of his curriculum
12 vitae, that is a very different matter from him coming here and now
13 apparently seeking to give fairly extensive evidence - because that's one
14 of the categories, it's one of the sources - derived from and based upon
15 that position. That really is a step well beyond what could reasonably be
16 gathered from that being included as one of his bits of experience. It's
17 a large and significant area, and we submit that it's not appropriate for
18 his evidence now to go into that realm.
19 JUDGE ORIE: I gave guidance to Mr. Harmon. Please proceed,
20 Mr. Harmon.
21 MR. HARMON:
22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, would it be fair to say that the events in Bijeljina
23 were a preview of things to come during the war?
24 A. Correct. That was a message that all those who would not obey and
25 accept the political ultimatums of the SDS would end up the same way as
1 the Muslims in Bijeljina.
2 Q. Now, I would like to play for you a film clip.
3 MR. HARMON: This is a film clip, Your Honour, of the 34th session
4 of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The date of this is the 27th of August,
5 1993. We have a transcript. A transcript has been provided to the booth,
6 and as soon as the transcript is disseminated, we will play this
7 particular clip.
8 Q. And then, Mr. Kljuic, after this clip is played, I would like to
9 ask you some questions about a particular part of this clip.
10 All right. I think we can now proceed with the video.
11 [Videotape played]
12 MR. HARMON: I see lips moving on the video, and this is a bad
13 sign, because I don't hear any sound coming.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Neither do I, Mr. Harmon, but since you've got your
15 wizard with you ...
16 MR. HARMON: Yes. Perhaps we can start this again.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, as you know, I'm not a wizard, but if you
18 have copied these video clips on CD-ROMs, rather than start searching
19 through all of the hard disks somewhere, rather play it from the CD-ROM,
20 which is, I think, a very practical solution.
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour -- sorry. We are in the middle of a
22 task. While all this is happening, Your Honour, what -- by supplementing
23 a submission I made a few minutes ago. What I would wish to do would be
24 to draw the Court's attention very specifically to the 65 ter summary
25 provided in relation to this witness, because -- and it may be that Your
1 Honours would wish to see that specifically. Because those 65 ter
2 summaries do have a purpose, and the evidence which we have been hearing
3 over the last 10 or 15 minutes is, in our submission, going far beyond the
4 scope of the 65 ter summary, and after all, we note the purpose is
5 essentially to give an indication, in fairly broad terms, but to give an
6 indication of the areas and the topics that are to be covered. Nobody
7 objects to sensible flexibility at the margins involving a margin of
8 appreciation, and from time to time, of course, it's quite natural that
9 additional areas are indicated between the sometimes long-ago service of
10 the 65 ter and the actual evidence. But that's a different matter.
11 What we have here is information or evidence which goes way beyond
12 that. Your Honour, is it helpful for Your Honour to -- I've only got --
13 there seem to be two versions. They may be very slightly
14 different. I can't explain that immediately. I think what happens is
15 they're often updated and a new one is served. I think there was one in
16 2001 and another one in 2002. Would it be helpful for the Trial Chamber
17 to have an opportunity at some convenient point of seeing these summaries?
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber would like to have them available during
20 the next break so we can --
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, yes. During the next break, Your
23 JUDGE ORIE: During the next break.
24 MR. STEWART: I'm obliged. Yes. We'll organise that as soon as
25 we can.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
2 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I apologise for this. Could we have a
3 break for a few minutes and we will try to resolve this as quickly as
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll -- the Chamber will remain --
6 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry. I'm told it has arrived. Let's see if we
7 have some sound on this.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Let's see whether it now works.
9 MR. HARMON: Let's take a break, Your Honour. I think that ...
10 Your Honour, I think it would be appropriate to take a break. Thank you.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. What we could do is to have our early break
12 now. We would then restart at 10.30. Then continue -- well, I'll think
13 about the schedule to follow, but let's have a break for 25 minutes, and
14 please find all wizards in the building, Mr. Harmon.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.07 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.37 a.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I do understand that the technical
18 problems have not been solved and that you will proceed by other means.
19 That's point one.
20 Second point: The Chamber has considered during the break the 65
21 ter summary, which is a very broad summary, which covers a large area, and
22 taking into account the time when the 65 ter summary was delivered, and
23 also taking into account later statements provided to the Defence, the
24 Chamber does not consider it inappropriate to deal with the matters as you
25 have done until now. So please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, do I have the opportunity of making
2 submissions on that matter? Because I simply have handed up the 65 ter
3 summary with a view to Your Honours reading it, but --
4 JUDGE ORIE: You also added a few words to that.
5 MR. STEWART: In advance, Your Honour, yes, but then I stopped
6 because I realised that there was not much value in my going into it in
7 any detail before Your Honours had seen the piece of paper.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, from what I remember - but let's just
9 check it - you told us that on the basis of the 65 ter summary, it was
10 inappropriate to deal with the matters --
11 MR. STEWART: Yes. I did, Your Honour. That was my basic
12 submission. But what I didn't do then was point Your Honours to specific
13 aspects of the 65 ter summary when Your Honours were at the disadvantage
14 of not having seen it. I've stated what my point is but in order to make
15 it good I would like the opportunity of referring to the summary.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has based its decision on your basic
18 observations in this respect. The Chamber has read the 65 ter summary.
19 If there's anything to be added, you're free to do so, but please, in
21 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, how can I do it in writing, with
22 respect, in time for the point to be taken on board? The witness is
23 giving his evidence. If I give it -- if I now -- even if I were to leave
24 Court, which is not really a fair thing to expect me to do, how can I do
25 that, Your Honour, with respect, in time for the matter to be properly
1 dealt with? This witness is giving evidence on these matters.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I'll just check what you said at that time.
3 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, with respect, checking what I said, my
4 submissions -- as I'd indicated, Your Honour, my submissions were not made
5 at that point and not intended to be made, because in fairness to the
6 Trial Chamber and everybody, I wished to give the Trial Chamber the
7 opportunity of looking at the 65 ter summary before I made specific
8 submissions on the matter. Your Honour is coming dangerously close to
9 shutting the Defence out from making proper submissions on an important
11 JUDGE ORIE: You agree that you mainly have drawn our attention to
12 the 65 ter, although you clearly indicated what the purpose of the 65 ter
13 summary was and that it went far beyond that. You have two minutes to
14 make any submissions if you want to do it orally at this moment,
15 Mr. Stewart. Please proceed.
16 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. The particular point
17 in the 65 ter submission, given that I've only got two minutes, relates to
18 the work of this commission. The witness does not indicate -- the 65 ter
19 summary does not indicate that the scope of the witness's evidence is
20 going to include the details of the work of the commission looking into
21 war crimes and any information obtained by him in relation to that matter.
22 Neither does the statement -- there is not a section of that statement,
23 there is not an area of that statement relating to this matter at all.
24 We, in fairness, could have been given and have been given no indication
25 whatever that the area of what actually happened during the war, as
1 opposed to before, and the areas that the witness went into based, it
2 seems at least partly, on information that he had gathered through his
3 work on that war crimes investigative commission, there's not the
4 slightest indication, in fairness, that we would have faced that
5 particular area, and that was the ambit of -- included within the ambit of
6 this witness's evidence.
7 That, Your Honour, is the essential point here.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
9 MR. HARMON: The witness described in general terms what happened
10 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have been in trial submitting evidence
11 through the various crime-base witnesses precisely addressing that fact.
12 Mr. Kljuic gave some general and summary observations about what happened.
13 He added no additional details than what we've had probably 30 or 40
14 witnesses describing with painful and detailed particularity.
15 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, if he's going to stop there and he's
16 going no further into this area in the course of his evidence, then we
17 don't need to consider this matter any more.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, any --
19 MR. HARMON: He's not going to go additionally farther than that.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then the matter seems to be resolved.
21 Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into the
23 You may proceed, Mr. Harmon.
24 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
25 Q. Mr. Kljuic, my apologies for the technical problems that we've
1 been experiencing. I was going to play for you a video clip of the
2 portion of the 34th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. Instead I have
3 a transcript of that. I'm unable to resurrect the actual video. So I
4 will read this to you, and then I will ask you some questions about it. I
5 will begin my reading:
6 "MOMCILO KRAJISNIK: Mr. Rajko Kasagic. Mr. Dragan Micic will
8 "RAJKO KASAGIC: Ladies and gentlemen, at this difficult moment it
9 is difficult to be wise. One should be prescient to be able to say what
10 will be achieved. Nevertheless, this Assembly constantly adopted, with
11 the utmost seriousness, certain decisions, especially these. And
12 therefore, in my assessment it is irresponsible whoever says ..." and
13 there's a break. "I am an attorney, a certain percentage of the
14 decisions is implemented through the courts, and a percentage is not.
15 Whether decisions will be implemented depends on the strength of the
16 state. When the state, a state ensuring the rule of law is stronger, then
17 they must all be implemented. This is a game played by the international
18 community and the world against the Serbian people. In the division of
19 the world, as they say, in the new international order, there are maps
20 where there are no Serbs in these parts. We see yet another trap for the
21 Serbs, constructed in the bamboozling period of Broz, as Mr. Krajis ...
22 Karadzic said, in 'Broz's boozling' period. They recognised the Muslim
23 nation and we thought, that's what they told us, that this was democracy.
24 But this recognition was not free --" there's a question mark, it may be
25 in vain. "We even hear that even the Islamic world received a lot of
1 money. And why? Because of their own state, because each people has a
2 right to its state. They are not interested in just this small enclave
3 depicted on our territory in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Take a look
4 at these pockets around the Drina River and that part of Posavina. These
5 are pockets where they who support the dispersal of the Serbs and ... the
6 establishment of an Islamic world in these parts, their state, are always
7 ready to jump into the fray against us, against the Serbian people. And
8 why? Their oil is cheap. It costs 55 cents a barrel because of the
9 boreholes which are cheap, in comparison with 18 dollars in other areas.
10 They are not interested in the Serbian people or in friendship, the
11 centuries-old friendship that someone invokes, not even in trade
12 relations. They are interested in today's situation, in today's oil. I
13 would therefore broach the matter with seriousness for us to separate for
14 all time, although I assert there will be no peace in these parts. This
15 assessment is shared by some of my friends who are in the military. They
16 know a lot more about that. Look at who is paying for this --" and then
17 there's an unintelligible word and the sentence continues -- "the Serbs in
18 Sarajevo and the Serbs in Krajina, I would accept a Bosnian Krajina, but I
19 refer to it as Banja Luka Krajina, to differentiate it from the Republic
20 of the Serbian Krajina. We are closed off. It is what we fought against.
21 We fought for the state of Krajina, unity ... a unified state of all Serbs
22 in the areas of the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are now getting
23 what we fought against. We are closed off at Brcko and I think that we
24 cannot accept these maps with that. At the very least, the borders must
25 be --"
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, yes. Mr. Harmon, I noticed that the
2 French translation was approximately eight lines behind.
3 MR. HARMON: Okay. I'll slow down.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I mean, by the end, we have to wait anyhow until
5 they're finished. So please proceed.
6 MR. HARMON: "At the very least the borders must be where they are
7 at present, at Vrba. They cannot be moved an inch towards Brcko because
8 all sorts of infrastructure must make its way through these parts. If we
9 already know that we must be ready for war, against that enemy which has
10 expansions for the world, how should we arm ourselves? It is easy to
11 bring weapons through Romania and even Hungary. We did not wage war
12 against them, but we are waging war with these people here. How are we to
13 arm ourselves via Brcko? And especially this demilitarisation, as they
14 refer to it, I think it was precisely prepared so America, which prepared
15 it in Broz's time, together with the Arabic world to give them a state.
16 No one would give up war if this part of Brcko were to be given. And
17 according to that agreement, as they refer to it, Annex A, Part 2, if one
18 republic should leave Bosnia and Herzegovina, the federation ..." then
19 there's a break -- "it remains in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Well, I
20 concluded it was Sarajevo, although I did not clearly see what Annex A,
21 Part 2 meant. If we have to yield that, and our second dream, the next
22 stage is separation and linking up with the Serbian states, to separate
23 completely and have no joint organs with those against whom we are at war
24 today. Let us then give that Sarajevo of ours and make them pay as much
25 as it is worth. I am not a patriot, a local patriot, but I am thinking of
1 achieving our unity, not to mention our wealth in some future time,
2 although there may be a big question mark there. That's what I wanted to
3 say. Thank you.
4 "MOMCILO KRAJISNIK: I have to intervene. This is another
5 discussion which is not appropriate now. And I think that Mr. Kasagic, in
6 addition to Mr. Micic, is speaking of something that really is not
7 appropriate. First, there are 150.000 Serbs in Sarajevo. Second, there
8 are resources which we have to preserve. Third, the people have
9 safeguarded that and if they have accepted it as a temporary solution, I
10 do not think that it is appropriate to make proposals now. Although Rajko
11 is my good friend, I want to ask him not to make such proposals,
12 especially since we have agreed to preserve that part of the Serb Sarajevo
13 where a large number of people were killed but it was not greatly
14 publicised, and now all these deputies are silent because they think that
15 someone else will solve that on their behalf. If you want me to say so,
16 gentlemen, the Muslims ... the Croats sought ... and the Muslims sought a
17 municipality in Banja Luka. And we did not accept it, because that
18 territory of ours must be clean. And I wish to ask you not to trade
19 territories when you really are not abreast of things. I must react,
20 although it is not appropriate that I react from here as the president of
21 the Assembly. I thought what Mr. Micic said was a joke. But now there is
22 a gradual and serious discussion about giving 150.000 Serbs for at least
23 15 cities which have 15.000 residents. And I wish to ask you to get
24 serious and make serious proposals, although we do not have such ... I am
25 not accustomed to speak in this tone. Go ahead ...
1 "MALE VOICE: I just want to ask ... What is Annex 2, Part 2?
2 "MOMCILO KRAJISNIK: I don't know. You can find it in the copy.
3 "MALE VOICE: I think it is Sarajevo ... We are offering it for
4 free ...
5 "MOMCILO KRAJISNIK: We are not offering it for free. Instead,
6 there will be a provisional solution for two years, and everyone stays in
7 their areas.
8 "MALE VOICE: ... then it will never be settled ...
9 "MOMCILO KRAJISNIK: And please don't ..."
10 Then there's an unintelligible male voice and then:
11 "MOMCILO KRAJISNIK: Please, if you are interested, if you are
12 interested in Sarajevo, there are deputies here ... for a period of two
13 years, Sarajevo is a provisional solution, and everyone remains in their
14 ethnic areas. It is really not appropriate to discuss whether the Serbs
15 will hold on to it or not, if we yield that area, look at how big that
16 area is over here. And if we start to argue now, we will accomplish
17 nothing. Go ahead ... Addresses Micic, who is waiting to speak.
18 "DRAGAN MICIC: Mr. President, fellow deputies ..."
19 And that concludes then my reading of this portion of the
20 transcript from the 34th Assembly session, Bosnian Serb Assembly session
21 of the 22nd of August, 1993.
22 Q. Now, Mr. Kljuic, let me direct your attention to a portion of the
23 comments that were made by Mr. Krajisnik, and then I would like to get
24 your reaction to them in relation to what these comments relate to and how
25 they relate to the strategic objectives.
1 So let me read this portion again. This is Mr. Krajisnik.
2 "MOMCILO KRAJISNIK: If you want me to say so, gentlemen, the
3 Muslims, the Croats sought, and the Muslims sought a municipality in Banja
4 Luka and we did not accept it because that territory of ours must be
6 Can you please comment on that statement by Mr. Krajisnik made in
7 1993 and related it to the strategic objectives, please.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I notice that the French interpreters are ready now.
9 MR. HARMON: Thank you for that intervention, Your Honour.
10 Q. Mr. Kljuic, did you understand my question? And if you did, could
11 you please give us your answer.
12 A. Yes. This Assembly, the Serb Assembly, which was held in the
13 summer of 1993, while the peace negotiations were going on in Geneva, it
14 was held at the same time. The Geneva negotiations had several stages,
15 several maps speaking about Bosnia's division and proposals put forward.
16 Now, at the Assembly, there are two things that clearly state that the
17 Serb deputies were facing a dilemma. They were motivated by their
18 belonging to people from the territory; those who were in Sarajevo and in
19 the environs of Sarajevo would not allow Sarajevo to be exchanged for some
20 other territory somewhere else. Whereas those who came from outside
21 Sarajevo, they didn't have the same sentiments and feeling for Sarajevo,
22 so they agreed to forfeit Sarajevo in order to gain other territories.
23 Now, for me, the principle applied by Mr. Krajisnik seems to me to be all
24 important here. I should like to remind you that in the city of Banja
25 Luka, for example, there were 60.000 Croats and Muslims living there. So
1 they were not able to gain a municipality, not because they were not
2 deserved to have one, in view of their numbers, but they were not able to
3 get a municipality because the Serbs wanted a pure territory.
4 So this idea of ethnically pure territories was one of the causes
5 and one of the reasons for the ethnic cleansing which was put into
6 practice in all the areas in which the Serbs had taken control.
7 Q. Then how do you relate, Mr. Kljuic, that ethnically pure
8 territories to strategic objective number 1 that was promulgated on the
9 12th of May?
10 A. The areas which they planned to attach, first of all, the Serbian
11 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the discussions that were heard, you
12 heard that the Serbian Krajina already existed on the territory of the
13 Republic of Croatia, for instance. So in the final stages of realising
14 the project of a Greater Serbia, all those territories were supposed to
15 unite, to form one single Serbian state. And that was the objective of
16 Milosevic's message before the war, that all Serbs had to live in one
17 state. And those people delving in political history, they will know that
18 65 years ago there was another such man in Europe who said that the
19 Germans had to live in the same state. And therefore, in a state of that
20 kind, there could be no place for other ethnic groups. And in Banja Luka,
21 there could be no place for the 60.000 Croats and Muslims.
22 Q. Now, Mr. Kljuic, can you inform this Trial Chamber what
23 Mr. Krajisnik's position was post-Dayton in respect of the separation of
24 ethnic groups.
25 A. You see, after Karadzic was eliminated, Karadzic who even hadn't
1 been in Dayton, Mr. Karadzic was the first among Bosnian Serbs, and as
2 such came onto the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina that had three
3 members in 1995, 1996. The change was that it only had three members
4 instead of the previous six. All of them had to respect the decisions of
5 the Dayton Accords, and an essential annex of the Dayton Accords is annex
6 number 7, which deals with the return of refugees to their homes.
7 However, the Dayton Accords stipulated that Serbian forces in Bosnia had
8 to leave certain territories that they had conquered and that, according
9 to the accords, belonged to the Federation.
10 Among those territories were some areas that had suffered from the
11 most radical ethnic cleansing, including Sarajevo and some of its
12 neighbourhoods, Grbavica, part of Hrasnica, Vogosca, Ilijas. Under the
13 Dayton Accords, those areas were included in the Federation, and our
14 Presidency sent an appeal to the Serbs, who had done no wrong and
15 committed no crimes, calling upon them to feel free to stay in those
16 territories because there was a general amnesty in place, and all their
17 rights on the territory of the Federation were being guaranteed.
18 However, a part of the Serbian leadership did not wish those
19 people to remain in the territory of the Federation, despite the fact that
20 many Serbs were locals there, especially in Ilijas, Vogosca, and Grbavica.
21 The transition of territories towards the Federation was gradual, one or
22 two municipalities each month. However, the leadership in Pale insisted
23 that the Serbs who found themselves in places included in the Federation
24 should leave their homes and move to Republika Srpska. That was a painful
25 and very dramatic process in which people were burning their own homes and
1 leaving into the unknown.
2 There are many documents about this TV footage, interviews with
3 those Serbs, who always ended up saying those were the orders.
4 Q. What was Mr. Krajisnik's position in respect of whether the Serbs
5 should remain within the territories that were non-Serbian?
6 A. To say the least, although he was a member of the Presidency, he
7 didn't stop them or try to make them stay in the territory of the
8 Federation. He didn't make a single public gesture inviting them to stay
9 in their homes. Whether he personally issued orders that they should
10 leave the areas that belonged to the Federation, I can't say, but it was
11 evident that he was the highest Serb authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 There are certain indications, but, Your Honours, I have no
13 specific data.
14 Q. Let me turn my attention to another subject, Mr. Kljuic, and that
15 is, turn your attention to 1991 and 1992. Can you tell this Court what
16 sources of information were available to you that were reporting ethnic
17 cleansing that was occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Just identify
19 A. A large number of policemen remained loyal to the state of Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina, and in the course of performing their regular duties,
21 these policemen reported on the situation on the ground. On the other
22 hand, speaking of Croats, we had detailed reports from our citizens,
23 reports from the ground, sent by fax and relating day-to-day events in
24 certain territories, indicating the great losses we were suffering,
25 primarily in terms of dismissals, requisition of material assets, but also
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 killings, rapes, and deportations into concentration camps.
2 Q. What kind of international news media sources and other
3 independent third-party sources of information was available to you about
4 the ethnic cleansing that was occurring in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992? Can
5 you just identify the sources, the media sources.
6 A. I must tell you that the press was primarily represented by the
7 British and American media. There was also the French minister, Bernard
8 Kouchner, and they had the opportunity to visit territories held by Serbs,
9 including Sarajevo. There was American journalist Burns, Christiane
10 Amanpour, SkyNews television, and they were the only ones at the time,
11 American reporters, who crossed the entire territory of Bosnia and
13 Q. Were there other sources of information available to you,
14 Mr. Kljuic, including the reports of Mr. Mazowiecki, Mr. Bassiouni,
15 Bosnian news sources, Serbian news sources, NGOs, the United Nations,
16 UNPROFOR, ICRC? Were they providing information about what was happening
17 on the ground in Bosnia in 1991, 1992?
18 A. Certainly. A broad circle of people, whether they were Doctors
19 Without Borders or Pharmacists Without Borders, or some other group, as
20 well as inspectors and investigators of the United Nations, such as Cherif
21 Bassiouni, and Mr. Mazowiecki and Mr. Bernard Kouchner, whom I mentioned
22 earlier, was there. And we also had the reports of the UNPROFOR, who was
23 a neutral force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reporting like this, for instance:
24 In the area of such-and-such town, shooting was heard, followed by
25 transportation of some people to the hospital. However, if there was a
1 person who knew the identity of these people, it always turned out that
2 these were victims of Serb violence.
3 As for Mr. Mazowiecki, there were direct instructions by the UN
4 Security Council to conduct an inspection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
5 these inspections provided the best confirmation of the actual situation
6 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in those territories that were held by Serb
8 Q. I have three exhibits now. These are the Mazowiecki reports to
9 the United Nations dated the 28th of August, 1992, followed by a report of
10 the 27th of October, 1992, followed by a third report of the 17th of
11 November, 1992.
12 JUDGE ORIE: While these documents are distributed, Mr. Harmon,
13 I'd like to seek one clarification. You told us about American reporters
14 being able to visit different areas. Was there -- were their reports also
15 broadcast? So would you have access to their reports?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. These reports were published
17 in American newspapers, and John Burns received the Pulitzer prize for his
18 reporting from Bosnia-Herzegovina. I had an opportunity to see his
20 JUDGE ORIE: So they were published in American newspapers. Were
21 the television programmes, the -- well, let's say the American television
22 programme, were they aired in the region?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, John Burns was
24 reporting for the New York Times. Second, we were able to watch SkyNews
25 television and CNN. Christiane Amanpour, CNN reporter, came to Sarajevo
1 several times in 1992, and among other things, she called on me at the
3 JUDGE ORIE: I just want to know whether in the area one could
4 receive these programmes, and your answer to that is yes. Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
6 MR. HARMON: Could I have the exhibit numbers for those three
7 particular exhibits.
8 THE REGISTRAR: The 28th of August, 1992 report, P295. The 17th
9 November, 1992 report, P296. And the 27 October 1992 report, P297.
10 MR. HARMON: Could the witness be provided with copies of those
11 reports. It should be copies in B/C/S.
12 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me first of all ask you: Do you know who
13 Mr. Mazowiecki is?
14 A. I do.
15 Q. And he was a former Prime Minister of Poland, was he not?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Let me read you from his reports two excerpts from his reports,
18 and then I will seek your comments on them.
19 MR. HARMON: This first report that I'm quoting, Your Honour, is
20 the report of the 27th of October, which is P297, and I direct your
21 attention to paragraph 6 in that particular report, the report of October
23 Q. Let me quote from paragraph 6: "The Special Rapporteur shares the
24 view of other observers that the principal objective of the military
25 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment of ethnically
1 homogenous regions. Ethnic cleansing does not appear to be the
2 consequence of the war, but rather its goal. This goal, to a large
3 extent, has already been achieved through killings, beatings, rape,
4 destruction of houses, and threats."
5 Now, let me turn to another portion of Mr. Mazowiecki's report.
6 This is the report of the 17th of November, 1992, Prosecutor Exhibit 296.
7 And let me direct your attention and the Court's attention to paragraph
8 12, which is found in the section "Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnic cleansing
9 general observations." I'm going to be reading you a portion of paragraph
11 Let me read from that portion: "The greater prevalence of ethnic
12 cleansing in Serbian-occupied territories is undoubtedly related to the
13 political objectives formulated and pursued by Serbian nationalists,
14 namely, ensuring Serbian control over all territories inhabited by
15 significant numbers of Serbs, as well as adjacent territories assimilated
16 to them owing to logistical and military considerations. It should be
17 noted that ethnic cleansing is not practiced exclusively in areas where
18 Serbs form a majority of the population. In some of the cities most
19 strongly affected by Serbian ethnic cleansing, such as Prijedor, Muslims
20 and Croats were in the majority."
21 Do you agree with the observations made by Mr. Mazowiecki?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Have you reviewed the reports of Mr. Mazowiecki and do you find
24 them to be objective?
25 A. I have.
1 Q. I would like to have --
2 A. And I do.
3 Q. -- passed out.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, are we going to get -- may I ask, are
5 we going to get the specific, factual foundation in terms of this
6 witness's own knowledge and sources which enable him to make -- give such
7 a sweeping answer which is in effect to introduce with an endorsement a
8 very substantial report obtaining this witness's imprimatur once again
9 clearly beyond the scope of the 65 ter and, on any fair reading, beyond
10 the scope of the statement that's been offered to the Court as well. This
11 really is, Your Honour, going, once again, too far.
12 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, this basis of Mr. Kljuic's conclusions
13 that there was ethnic cleansing was already described by Mr. Kljuic who
14 was a member of the state commission. Two, he has discussed the political
15 objectives at length. He was a participant for many years in these
16 discussions with Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Karadzic, Mrs. Plavsic, and
17 Mr. Koljevic. He had intimate knowledge of what those objectives were and
18 what the objectives that had been described by this report. So this --
19 that is the basis of the endorsement of Mr. Mazowiecki's independent
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I thought we were told expressly about
22 45 minutes ago that there was going to be no further evidence in this area
23 from this witness. And here we are.
24 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, this is a repeat of the evidence that
25 we've heard for over a year in this case. This witness should be
1 permitted to conclude his testimony. The fact that there was ethnic
2 cleansing in Bosnia is not a surprise. It was something that has been the
3 testimony and the subject of numerous witnesses who have testified.
4 MR. STEWART: So what's the position, Your Honour; any witness can
5 come and give evidence about anything because we've heard some evidence
6 from other witnesses about it? And over a year, it's only just a few
7 weeks over a year that I came into this case at all, and it's about a year
8 since Ms. Loukas came into this case at all. This is indiscipline of the
9 way this trial is proceeding, Your Honour, because it is not, with
10 respect, open to the Prosecution to just produce any witness to cover any
11 ground that's been covered by anybody. We need to know and can fairly
12 require to know in relation to any witness what are the areas he's going
13 to cover. And specifically this morning that Mr. Harmon's comment then is
14 no answer at all to my absolutely well-founded objection that we were told
15 about 45 minutes ago, or 50 minutes ago now, that there would be no more
16 evidence from this witness in this area, and there is now more evidence
17 being adduced on this witness in this area.
18 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, these reports -- Defence was informed
19 that these were going to be exhibits in this trial. They were informed --
20 MR. STEWART: That doesn't answer the question, Your Honour. It
21 doesn't answer my objection one bit. What about what was said 45 or 50
22 minutes ago and the fact that what is now happening is in direct
23 contradiction of what we were expressly assured 50 minutes ago?
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber has considered the matter and allows
1 Mr. Harmon to proceed, especially in view of the last questions, whether
2 the witness agreed with the conclusions of Mr. Mazowiecki. Of course the
3 Chamber keeps in mind that the witness has testified that he received
4 large portions of information from several sources, and Mr. Harmon is
5 asking whether the conclusions reached by Mr. Mazowiecki, as he said,
6 needed any comment or that the witness would agree. Of course, that does
7 not mean that the Chamber accepts all the factual bases for such an
8 assessment just on the basis of that report or on the basis of this
9 testimony. The Chamber will consider this part of the testimony in
10 connection with other factual evidence that is presented or will further
11 be presented.
12 Mr. Harmon --
13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I say that I wish to put on record
14 that I specifically sat down and said no more on this matter about 50
15 minutes ago, trusting the assurance I was offered that there would be no
16 more evidence in this area. And in future, the Defence will need to be
17 considerably more wary of such assurances received from the Prosecution
18 and through the Trial Chamber in relation to such matters if those
19 assurances are going to be broken in this blatant way.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The first is put on record. The second comment
21 is also on record. Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
22 MR. HARMON: Yes. If I could have the next exhibit, Prosecution
23 Exhibit 298, distributed.
24 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask you one thing. I think you dealt with
25 two out of the three exhibits you presented; that is, the 17th of November
1 and the -- no. First the 27th of October, 1992, and then the 17th of
2 November, 1992. You also presented -- let me just have a look.
3 MR. HARMON: There are three, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then the 28th of August. Although I'm a bit --
5 oh, I see that the 27th of October is again attached to the 28th of August
6 document. Perhaps ... Yes, I see. We have a double now. In 295 we have
7 two times -- we have also a reproduction of 297.
8 MR. HARMON: Apologies, Your Honour.
9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I mention, because it's a
10 convenient point to mention, we were only notified yesterday, at about 20
11 past 1.00, after this witness had already been giving evidence for several
12 hours, we were only notified yesterday that this particular batch of
13 exhibits were to be used at all in relation to this witness. And that is
14 not good enough.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I do not fully remember. Were they on
16 your list distributed earlier?
17 MR. HARMON: I will check, Your Honour. I am assuming they were.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If they were, then of course the objection
19 lacks --
20 MR. STEWART: That's when we got the list, Your Honour. That's
21 what I'm saying. The -- yesterday --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I do understand. I thought it was an earlier
23 list at the beginning.
24 MR. STEWART: Yes, there was, and they weren't on it, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber would like to know whether they were on
1 the initial list or whether these exhibits were distributed --
2 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, I should be careful because I'm
3 not even sure there was an earlier list. Ms. Cmeric is highly sceptical
4 there was an earlier list, but if there was, then these items weren't on
5 it, but we actually think there wasn't even a list.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I think as a matter of fact that I saw an earlier
7 list, but I'm not quite sure about that. The Chamber would like to be
8 informed whether for the first time these exhibits were announced to be
9 used in relation to this witness only yesterday or that it was at an
10 earlier stage, and the Chamber will consider that if the Defence would
11 either need additional time for preparation of cross-examination or would
12 express a wish to recall the witness for further cross-examination.
13 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
14 MR. HARMON: I will, Your Honour. Thank you very much. Yes, Your
15 Honour. Thank you very much. This is a copy -- the next exhibit is a
16 copy of an article, of an interview with Mr. Krajisnik. It is from Glas
17 Serbski in Banja Luka and it is dated the 8th of September, 1992. And I
18 will read a portion of this interview. First reading the question and
19 then reading Mr. Krajisnik's answer.
20 Question: "Mr. President, mainly on the basis of the report of
21 the former Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN Commission
22 for Human Rights adopted a resolution by which Serbs are exclusively
23 blamed for the genocide."
24 Mr. Krajisnik's answer: "To be honest, I would not expect in my
25 wildest dreams some former Prime Minister of a country to be so partial.
1 Mazowiecki wrote his report in his office, as ordered, and not on the
2 spot. Because if he were to write the report at the same time while he
3 was visiting almost all camps and collection centres in the area of the
4 former BH, then he would not accuse the Serbian people so easily as he
5 did. Fortunately, Elie Wiesel, a Nobel prize winner, visited us and I
6 believe that a man like him would be more honest and would never allow
7 himself to be bribed. Mazowiecki wrote a report, was ordered by somebody,
8 not an honest, credible report, on the breaking of human rights on the
9 territory of the former BH."
10 Q. Now, Mr. Kljuic, very quickly and very succinctly, do you know by
11 reputation Mr. Mazowiecki and whether he is such a man to have been
12 bribed, to have not been honest and who would be partial in his
13 examination of the events on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
14 A. I do know Mr. Mazowiecki. His findings, as far as we're
15 concerned, were not a surprise but were important because they confirmed
16 this and presented to the United Nations, which was -- which led up to the
17 UN Resolution 725 or 727 - I'm not quite sure of the number - which was to
18 be --
19 MR. STEWART: This is not an answer --
20 A. -- voted on.
21 MR. STEWART: This is not an answer to the question, and moreover,
22 the answer to the question, though in a sense the bare answer "I do know
23 Mr. Mazowiecki" could in theory just leave it to cross-examination to
24 explore what that means, given the range of possibilities as to what that
25 means, we suggest that something more specific should be required,
1 because, after all, all of us might know a particular or know of a
2 particular figure, in which case, any particular person's evidence is of
3 no value.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Have you ever met Mr. Mazowiecki?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. I had three official
6 meetings with Mr. Mazowiecki.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you with that answer. Is there -- do you have
8 any reason or any fact available to you which would support a claim that
9 Mr. Mazowiecki was bribed or ordered to write his report as he did?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it was like this: It would be
11 possible to claim this only if you were the Serb side. The whole world
12 knows that Mazowiecki was sincere. I don't know anybody who would be able
13 to bribe Mazowiecki.
14 JUDGE ORIE: So you say there's no fact known to you, neither is
15 there any reason to believe that. The answer could have been a simple no.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. HARMON:
18 Q. Let me then conclude this. Based on the information that was
19 available to you through the media sources, through reports like
20 Mr. Mazowiecki -- it's a very simple question, but do you believe that
21 Mr. Krajisnik was fully informed about the ethnic cleansing that was
22 occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992?
23 A. I do believe that.
24 Q. I'd like to play an intercept, if I could. It's the next exhibit.
25 This is an intercept from Exhibit 282, and I want to give --
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, is Mr. Harmon going to explore the
2 factual basis of the witness's assertion of belief that Mr. Krajisnik was
3 fully informed about the ethnic cleansing? It's what one might regard as
4 a relatively central issue in this case, and really a question for the
5 Trial Chamber ultimately.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Before I would intervene, I was waiting what
7 the next exhibit would bring us, and if we would have gone to another
8 subject, then I would have asked Mr. Harmon --
9 MR. HARMON: We are going to go through some additional exhibits,
10 Your Honour, about whether Mr. Krajisnik was aware that there was ethnic
11 cleansing taking place.
12 JUDGE ORIE: So Mr. Stewart was a bit early in his --
13 MR. STEWART: Better to be cautious on the Defence side, Your
14 Honour, and I accept, if we are, then the answer is yes. But I think we
15 can be forgiven for being cautious in this area.
16 MR. HARMON: Your Honour --
17 JUDGE ORIE: It would be easier to forgive you, Mr. Stewart, if it
18 would be done a bit more efficiently, with less words, same content.
19 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
20 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, just for purposes of this particular
21 exhibit and asking the ensuing questions, can you tell me when we will be
22 taking our break? Because this exhibit is 7 minutes and 56 seconds long.
23 JUDGE ORIE: We had an early break. If we take a break now, that
24 would -- I think we would have a break at approximately 12.00.
25 MR. HARMON: All right. That gives me guidance. Thank you very
2 If we could play the exhibit. For Your Honours, the reporters, it
3 is found at tab KID 31460. And before I play it, I want to give everyone
4 time to find it in the respective binders.
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I really would welcome guidance from
6 the Trial Chamber on how on earth I could have made the point I made in
7 less than the 16 seconds or so that I took. I hope I'm no too easily
8 offended, Your Honour, but it is impossible for me to see how I could have
9 made that point more efficiently. But if I'm wrong about that, and if
10 there is some useful guidance the Trial Chamber could give me on how I
11 could possibly have made that point more quickly, then I would welcome it.
12 MR. HARMON: Can we, Your Honour, address that after we finish --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll do that, not at this moment.
14 MR. HARMON: Thank you. Okay. If we could proceed with this
15 particular intercept, then.
17 Yes? Yes?
19 Good evening.
20 Good evening.
21 Could I please speak with Mirko?
23 I'm calling from the cabinet of President Krajisnik.
24 Oh, of course. Hold on, please, he'll be right here.
3 Good evening, Mirko.
4 Good evening.
5 How are you?
6 I'm all right, and you?
7 Are you hanging in there?
8 Some shooting's started.
10 Here, the president would like to talk to you. Hold on a moment,
12 Put him on.
13 Who is shooting?
14 Hello? Hey, Milan.
16 Hello. What's going on?
17 What's new?
18 Lots of things. You?
19 My mate Momo is here, so I thought to ask you.
20 Nothing. I don't know what would be worth doing.
21 What's going on?
22 I don't know what to tell you. Some shooting started just now.
24 Cannons around the village.
25 Around the village?
1 Yes. Well, what is it? Are you being shot at?
2 We're just trying to find out. It's dark, you know.
3 Did they inform you about that Karkin thing?
4 Yes. We called the Presidency, but he had gone. I don't know
5 even know where.
7 Yes. Milena called him.
10 All right.
11 Yeah, let me see...
12 Does he know how to leave a message or...
13 What did he tell you he wanted?
14 Has Milan been to see you?
15 Well, yes, but forget that. I know he only called me because I
16 had called. This is -- he's called me from Izetbegovic's office to check.
17 He asked you not to shoot the JAT skyscraper up there. His mother
18 has been wounded and things like that.
19 Not to shoot at the JAT skyscraper?
20 Listen ... Vito called me.
22 He's been up there today.
24 So he wanted me to tell you the details and things like that.
25 Has Simovic accepted this?
1 Yes, but he says nothing will come of it.
3 He says the government is no good. He also told me there was a
4 terrible fight in the Presidency session today.
6 He said it got really ugly. Alija wants either Pusina or that
7 Gras, director of internal affairs.
9 And the guy from Kladusa wants Delimustafic in that position, you
11 Yes. So they offered Delimustafic's position in supplies or
12 something like that. He said, Wait, Alija, I'm not here to work for you.
13 I'm a rich man. I've supplied more goods in this war. You're obviously
14 installing this Sandzak guy in the Gras. Then he said, It's easy for you
15 to sit there in your easy chairs eating lamb while people up there... He
16 told him all these things, you know.
17 Did Simovic really accept this?
19 He accepted it?
20 Yeah, but when this guy told him it was a shame he had done so,
21 that it was a puppet government dominated by Muslims in which Serbs played
22 a minor role, he said the government would fail because it wasn't set up
24 And Nikolic too, right?
25 Did you see that? Ranko Nikolic?
1 Well I can't believe he had the guts to do this.
2 Well, they have done it. Their names are being published.
3 Well, no, but I mean ... did they accept this or what?
4 Well, I don't know. On the whole their names have been
5 published. They wouldn't have published their names if they hadn't
7 Yeah, that's just their proposal...
8 Then this guy says today that things aren't really functioning in
9 the Presidency. Kecmanovic said all kinds of things, you know.
11 That people think the Serbs would get the Presidency, Alija can't
12 get a third mandate.
14 So, he says, you're thinking of becoming Presidency chairman,
15 getting yourself a good deal, some position as an ambassador. Reportedly,
16 the reformists have asked for Kecmanovic's removal.
18 Well, he's not following the party guidelines which put him in the
19 Presidency. So they made the decision on Jure Pelivan without consensus,
20 and all kinds of things.
21 What about Jure Pelivan?
22 The decision to appoint him Prime Minister.
23 Oh, I see.
24 No consensus was reached, you know. He said he had attacked
25 Pejanovic. He gave me a telephone number in case you want to see...
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
3 All right, give it to me.
4 He has all kinds of things to tell. 619-494.
5 What was that again?
9 All right.
10 He says hello. It wouldn't be bad if he were to call him, you
12 Okay, but what is he doing there?
13 He spent the whole day there after they had invited him. He was
14 like, 'You will not drag me into these dirty affairs ... You ignore Serbs
15 everywhere.' You'll hear all kinds of things from him. Call him up.
16 All right.
17 What's going on up there?
18 Well, we've been really busy all day.
19 Fuck, this morning I heard that the Muslims, who were running away
20 from Misoca, killed a full busload of Serbs in Srednje. Misoca was being
21 cleansed ...
23 So Muslims killed a full bus of Serbs ...
25 ... who were on their way to Pale as refugees. Just a little
1 while ago they told me this wasn't the case, but that, in fact, they took
2 these prisoners with them. Actually, an older sergeant who does exchanges
3 up there received a phone call from the city.
4 Can you hear me?
5 Say it again.
6 This guy from the city called him, you know. But what was his
7 name? Can't remember. Alispahic. And he said those prisoners had been
9 What prisoners?
10 They took the prisoners to Pale again.
12 At Srednje they were intercepted by Muslims who killed all those
13 prisoners. Our two men have been heavily wounded.
14 They thought those were our people?
15 They thought those were our people.
17 Tonight they want to retaliate against all Serbs in the city and
18 in prison.
20 To kill them all.
22 Supposedly, they will use their cutthroats to attack Rajlovac in
23 groups and all kinds of things like that. That's what they called them.
25 To retaliate.
1 All right. I'll talk to you later. Tell our people there I said
3 All right.
4 Okay. Just, who sent that girl there?
5 Well, she'll go tomorrow at 11.00.
6 Go where?
7 To Belgrade.
8 Oh, really?
10 All right, then.
11 Yeah. Well, these people haven't come, have they?
13 The two you talked about.
14 Which ones? Oh, no. They will come. They will come. Today ...
15 We'll do something about that tomorrow.
16 We should do something about this thing down here. The
17 insinuations are very possible. Fuck it.
18 All right. I'll talk to you later.
19 All right. Give it some thought. Check with the best man Momo
20 about that, what he was supposed to do for Zarko, please.
21 Yes. I've told him.
22 All right.
23 Call me before you go to bed. I'll be there.
24 Yeah, we'll hang out a little longer and we'll ... I'll call you
25 before I go to bed.
1 All right. Have a good one. Bye.
3 MR. HARMON:
4 Q. Mr. Kljuic, in this intercept of the 15th of June, 1992, Mirko
5 Krajisnik tells Momcilo Krajisnik that Misoca, Muslims were running away
6 from Misoca. Misoca was being cleansed. Do you know what kind of village
7 ethnically the village of Misoca was?
8 A. I do know. It is, in fact, a multi-ethnic village with a very
9 small number of Croats and a vast majority of Muslims and a very
10 negligible number of Serbs, perhaps 10 per cent or even less than that.
11 MR. HARMON: My next exhibit is some demographic data, Your
12 Honour, taken from the 1991 census, relating to the village of Misoca.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit number P299.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. HARMON: That exhibit, Your Honour, has the demographic
16 distribution of the village of Misoca. Now if we could then turn to one
17 other element in this particular intercept. I'd like to draw your
18 attention to the following portion in the English translation. It's on
19 page 3 of the intercept and it's where Mirko Krajisnik -- it's about a
20 third of the way up. Mirko Krajisnik informs Momcilo Krajisnik: "He
21 asked of you not to shoot at the JAT skyscraper up there."
22 Q. Now, do you have some observations as to this particular part of
23 the intercept?
24 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, just in relation to this aspect, I would
25 register the objection that of course a document speaks for itself, just
1 as a telephone intercept speaks for itself. And if there are inferences
2 to be drawn, they're for the Trial Chamber to draw, and a foundation has
3 not been laid in relation to in which way the witness could possibly
4 assist by giving an explanation of the conversation. This is a matter for
5 the Trial Chamber to determine and not a matter for the witness to give
6 evidence on.
7 JUDGE ORIE: The witness could make observations in relation to a
8 telephone conversation. For example, he could say it couldn't be -- he
9 could say a JAT skyscraper does not exist, as far as I'm concerned. So
10 therefore, it's totally not understandable what they're saying. And it's
11 not something that the witness could nothing add to from his factual
12 knowledge. So the objection is denied, Ms. Loukas.
13 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, of course, we are in the luxurious
14 position, of course, of having that particular outline, and I make my
15 objection on the basis of what has already been foreshadowed might be
17 JUDGE ORIE: The witness may answer the question.
18 MR. HARMON:
19 Q. Let me repeat the question.
20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Harmon.
21 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry.
22 Q. Now, in respect of this particular sentence, "He asked of you" -
23 he's referring to Momcilo Krajisnik - "not to shoot at the JAT skyscraper
24 up there." Do you have some observations in respect of that particular
25 request made to Mr. Krajisnik not to shoot at the JAT skyscraper?
1 A. It wasn't only linked to Mr. Krajisnik, but to other leading Serbs
2 at Pale as well. And if you had any links to them or convection with
3 them, you could help save your family, your house, or the place you were
4 living in. So from the request made by this Sarajevo lawyer, it is
5 obvious that the person in question had the power to do that.
6 Q. Okay. Now we would like to play one additional intercept,
7 Mr. Kljuic, and this is intercept from Exhibit 292. The KID number is
8 31469. This intercept lasts four minutes and 58 seconds, and I think I
9 will have enough time to conclude my examination, assuming we proceed on
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You may proceed.
12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Hello.
15 Hi, hi. We've been waiting.
16 Has he arrived?
17 Just a minute.
18 Yes. Yes.
19 Hello, good morning, Momo, Milijana speaking.
20 Hello, Milijana.
21 How are you?
23 President Krajisnik wants to talk to you, just a moment.
1 What's new, Mandic?
2 Mr. President, how are things? I must tell you ... did you have
3 the hiccups just now? I just said that you're a real hero. All the
4 others are just useless.
5 You're right in that one and for the rest we'll see.
6 Useless, I must tell you. There are just a few Serbs with such
7 name and that reminds me of Vojvoda Momcilo. Listen, Momo.
8 Yes, tell me.
9 Milos Savic's brother has been arrested.
11 And now listen to this ...
12 Mr. President.
14 The first part has been mopped up. It was done today.
15 The first part has been mopped up.
16 Yes, it's been mopped up. The first part has been mopped up.
17 Which part?
18 That one, the one that was uncertain.
19 I don't know which one. Oh, the one up there?
21 On the top, is it?
22 Yes, yes.
23 No kidding?
24 Yes. Listen, and the men, they've already been transferred there.
25 Is that right?
1 Yes, they're working.
2 Good, excellent. I have to tell you this for your ears only.
3 This, I'm giving you compliments.
4 Yes. Listen, please. Milos Savic has been arrested.
6 Since you're in that commission, Savic Dusan.
8 Savic Dusan, is that right?
9 He's up there in that Knezevica potok, but his wife,
10 sister-in-law, and his sister are there with him too.
11 In which potok?
12 You know, that is Knezevica potok.
13 Where is that settlement?
14 It's up there higher than Boljakov potok.
15 Boljakov potok?
16 Between Buca potok and Boljakov potok.
18 Let me tell you... Savic Dusan has been arrested.
20 But please, if you can, when you have time to contact them, you're
21 in that commission, you know ... make a contact because his wife and all
22 the others are going insane.
23 Okay, okay, we'll put him for tomorrow. Done.
24 What is that part? Yesterday when we were looking at that portion
25 that was not clear ...
1 Yes, okay, good.
2 That has been done.
3 And tell me, that stronghold, has it been put together?
4 Yes, yes.
5 I must tell you that you will be decorated, when the circumstances
6 are right you'll get a medal...
7 It's the people that did it.
9 These specialists of mine.
10 There are not many like that.
11 No, okay, go ahead.
12 Agreed Mr. President.
13 I have seen this and you ... just a moment ... Milos is telling me
16 Have a good time.
20 Please will you write down this house number.
21 Yes. Okay. And what is the last name? Okay give me just the
22 house number.
23 Babic Dusan, 81 Dolacka Street.
24 81 Dolacka Street?
25 Yes, he was captured yesterday on the 24th of June, 1992.
4 When was he captured?
5 Yesterday on the 24th of June about 7.00.
7 Apparently the MUP men, some three cars, my house ... his house
8 was searched, he was captured and so on.
10 I kindly ask you ...
12 Please do something. He's my brother...
14 And is he for exchange ...
16 I want to take everyone from there, my sister-in-law,
17 brother-in-law and then let them set things on fire, loot and do whatever
18 they want.
19 Okay, okay, I'll put them on the list and we'll finish that.
20 Here are the names of the others.
21 Yes, give me their names.
22 Savic Zorka.
23 Savic Zorka.
24 Savic Dunja.
25 Savic Zorka, Dunja.
1 Yes, Cucilo Nedeljko.
2 Cucilo Nedeljko?
3 No, yes, and Cucilo Slavojka, that's my sister.
4 Cucilo Slavojka?
5 Yes, there are also Dolacka Street, these two ... Dolacka number
8 Sorry 63.
9 All 63, Dolacka Street?
10 63. The last two on the list, they're all on Dolacka Street.
12 Please do something.
13 We'll be in touch.
15 MR. HARMON:
16 Q. Mr. Kljuic, can you, in respect of the portion of the intercept
17 where there is a dialogue between Mr. Mandic and Mr. Krajisnik, the
18 English translation reads: "President --" Krajisnik answers "Yes."
19 This is found, Your Honour, on the second page of the English
21 "The first part has been cleaned. It's done today."
22 Krajisnik: "Did it go?"
23 Krajisnik -- I'm sorry. Mandic says: "Yes, cleaned up."
24 Krajisnik: "Huh?"
25 Mandic: "The first part has been cleaned."
1 "Which part?"
2 And Mandic answers: "That one, the one that was under question
4 Now, how do you interpret those words, Mr. Kljuic? You heard
6 A. Mandic was the former deputy police minister and an operations
7 man, and I think that in his government, in official terms, he had the
8 status of minister of justice. And it is in fact a report according to
9 which some part, certainly around the city of Sarajevo, had been cleaned,
10 because regardless of their force, they were not able in the first stage
11 to subjugate the whole surrounding parts of Sarajevo. There was sporadic
12 resistance. And then it was thanks to the power they had, step by step,
13 they cleared up the area.
14 MR. HARMON: This intercept, for the record, Your Honour, is -- I
15 believe it is ten days after the previous intercept. This intercept, the
16 one we have just heard, is dated the 25th of June, 1992. And that
17 concludes my questions at the moment. I have some -- I will resume after
18 the break, Your Honour, with some questions about intercepts as directed
19 and instructed by Your Honour earlier.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Harmon, I must admit that in the previous
21 intercept, it went so quickly that where Serbians were killed in a bus and
22 on the road to Pale, as far as I understand, as far as I understand, and
23 in that relation, the word "cleansing" was used. It's not entirely clear
24 to me what the position is. Perhaps you could clarify that after the
1 MR. HARMON: Yes. I can clarify it now, Your Honour, if you'd
2 like, or I can do it after the break.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I don't know whether -- if you want to give
4 your interpretation of what happened, then it should be done not in the
5 presence of the witness. So perhaps --
6 MR. HARMON: Fine.
7 JUDGE ORIE: -- we'll do that immediately after the break and see
8 whether this clarifies at least the position of the Prosecution in respect
9 of that exhibit.
10 MR. HARMON: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: We'll adjourn until 20 minutes past 12.00.
12 --- Recess taken at 11.59 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
15 MR. HARMON: I'm prepared to proceed, Your Honour. Before the
16 witness comes in, I am prepared to proceed in the manner in which Your
17 Honours have requested on these intercepts and I'm going to go through
18 each of the intercepts in the binder and I'm going to direct the witness's
19 attention to specific portions in those intercepts and ask him to comment
20 on those. He had listened to those. It will require him to momentarily
21 refresh his recollection on what the intercept is in its entirety.
22 There is a separate issue that relates to this and I propose that
23 the solution will be that I will lead him on this issue. In the chart
24 that you have before you, there is a column where he has identified the
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. HARMON: And I propose to say: Did you identify in this
3 intercept X and Y as the speakers, and I will be following as my guide
4 the --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could we do that in a bit different way? If we
6 would have a copy of that document without any comments in it, just the
7 speakers, and then go through that list. I mean, that might be easier.
8 It's just copying the list once and then covering with a bit of white
9 sheet of paper the comments and then we could go through that a bit more
11 MR. HARMON: Yes. I could --
12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that is exactly and precisely the
13 suggestion that I made to Mr. Harmon about five minutes ago. So by
14 definition I endorse it, yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I take it, then, that of course it would be a bit of
16 a surprise if he suddenly comes up and says, no, these are totally
17 different persons. So perhaps we could do then that -- we don't have to
18 do it immediately, I would say, but --
19 MR. HARMON: I can lay a foundation by asking him if in fact he
20 had listened to the intercepts and had identified them and those
21 identified speakers were reflected in the document that he signed and then
22 I can redact the comments and submit those to you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: That would be -- let's solve that in the most
24 practical way. Mr. Harmon, I asked you a question about the cleansing and
25 the bus with the Serbs. That was -- because it was not entirely clear to
1 me. That was about KID 31460.
2 MR. HARMON: Yes. I'm familiar with the passage that Your Honour
3 is referring to and I can give you my interpretation of it, if that's what
4 Your Honour requests.
5 JUDGE ORIE: At least it seemed that it was clear to everyone or
6 not, but I didn't fully understand that.
7 MR. HARMON: This -- intercept, Your Honour, this portion of the
8 intercept is -- let me read it.: "Fuck, this morning I heard that the
9 Muslims, who were running away from Misoca, killed a full load -- full bus
10 of Serbs in Srednje. Misoca was being cleansed ..."
11 What this intercept is saying is Mirko Krajisnik is informing
12 Momcilo Krajisnik that the village of Misoca was being cleansed, that
13 Muslims were running away from it, and as they were running away from it,
14 they killed a full bus of Serbs in the village Srednje.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand from the transcript that the
16 bus full of Serbs were refugees. Is that -- or were they prisoners? It's
17 not --
18 MR. HARMON: Well, then it gets -- we have to -- beyond that we
19 have to submit additional evidence. There's a discussion as to whether
20 they were prisoners, as we go down below.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. HARMON: Alispahic and he said, Those prisoners had been
23 killed. Mr. Krajisnik says: What prisoners? And then there's a
24 discussion about the prisoners. And I think what, in my view, they are
25 referring to people who were in the bus. That is a bit confusing, but ...
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But it is basically your understanding that
2 Misoca was being cleansed means in this context that Misoca was cleansed
3 by the Serbs although a busload of Serbs were on their way to Pale and
4 then killed by Muslims who had fled that village.
5 MR. HARMON: Correct.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, at least it's clear to me now what the
7 Prosecution's position in this respect is. Whether it automatically
8 follows and whether it logically follows from the text has to be
9 considered, but --
10 MR. HARMON: I understand.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Therefore, you're now aware that at least it raises
12 some questions in the Chamber's mind.
13 MR. HARMON: Yes. Thank you.
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I mention in relation to -- well,
15 it's KID 31469.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. STEWART: That's the Prosecution number, which I think should
18 be the intercept considered immediately before the break. When Mr. Harmon
19 puts the -- in fact follow-up questions, he read from the translation
20 which referred to "cleaning." There appear to be two translations of this
21 particular intercept into English, but the phrase which came across in the
22 transcripts before Mr. Harmon's questions was "mopped up" or "mopping up,"
23 which is the phrase which appears in the translation -- well, the main
24 translation, I'll put it that way, that we've been working from. There is
25 really a difference, and I'm not quite -- we're simply not clear here
1 about the status of these two rival translations. But it appears to us
2 that "mopping up" is the correct translation rather than "cleaning."
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But me not being a native speaker and knowing
4 that none of my colleagues is, could you explain to me exactly what the
5 difference then is between "mopping up" and "cleaning." Because I saw
6 both terms used in similar context with, at first sight, similar meaning.
7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, yes. Let me start with something very
8 simple. You can clean a floor in all sorts of ways, and that's general.
9 If you are mopping up the floor, it generally implies that you're getting
10 rid of bits of dirt and bits of problems on the floor. I think that's a
11 fair summary. But applied to something less mundane, when we're talking
12 about these things, "mopping up" is a -- and I'm confident this is
13 correct: "Mopping up" is used in a military context, again in an
14 analogous way, as a metaphor, that you are dealing with, for example,
15 pockets of resistance. For example, if you've had a major operation in an
16 area and it's been, say, largely successful, but you've got little pockets
17 of enemy troops around, if you were to go in to eliminate them, those
18 remaining pockets, that would be a "mopping up" operation, and that's how
19 it's widely used.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Removing the remaining particles.
21 MR. STEWART: Yes. And one can see, as a metaphor, one can see
22 exactly how that arises. Of course it matches cleaning in the sense that
23 you've produced a clean result, in one sense, by that mopping up
24 operation, but "mopping up" is the -- does have its own distinct
25 connotation --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 JUDGE ORIE: Is that the American --
2 MR. STEWART: -- quasi-linguistic expert role.
3 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I don't offer myself up as an expert in
4 the B/C/S language.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Would you immediately oppose it as saying this
6 English interpretation of --
7 MR. HARMON: I think the word, from what I understand, can have
8 two meanings, and I think it's up to the Court to attach the meaning it
9 finds appropriate under the circumstances. That's why I asked --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, the original language has to come first
11 and that --
12 MR. HARMON: That is why I asked the witness what his impression
13 -- he had listened to the intercept and what his impression of it was.
14 In addition, Your Honours will be hearing evidence from the Sarajevo
15 municipalities that may also augment and assist you in understanding this
17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the very simplest way of dealing with
18 it, I'd suggest --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Let's ask our interpreters first.
20 MR. STEWART: May I make a practical suggestion, Your Honour: The
21 very simplest way of dealing with it is simply to ensure that when, for
22 example, Mr. Harmon uses the word "cleaning," or anybody uses the word
23 "cleaning" or "mopping up," that's the word which is used in B/C/S is the
24 word which appeared in the original transcript. Because if we have that,
25 then there's no problem because the witness is getting what the original
1 transcript in his own language, what the original conversation, the
2 original speaker actually said, and then the English becomes irrelevant
3 for those purposes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course it's not sure that the interpreters
5 may always be in a position to immediately find -- perhaps if Ms. Cmeric
6 could assist us and read the relevant line, which is, I would say -- let
7 me just see where it is.
8 MR. HARMON: It's on page 2, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see it's just -- it seems to be the line
10 which starts with the word "Onaj." Is that --
11 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, just for the record, this translation
12 that I have and that is in your binders is the official English
13 translation from the CLSS services. So ...
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps --
15 MR. STEWART: -- we were given then, Your Honour. It's very
16 confusing for us.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please read that line, Ms. Cmeric, if you
18 would be so kind, to assist us.
19 MS. CMERIC: Yes, Your Honour. [Interpretation] That first part
20 was "cleansed" or "mopped up." Both translations are acceptable. "It was
21 finished today."
22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: We can only offer our
23 opinion that the word "ciscenje" means cleaning, cleansing, and mopping
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It now becomes clear, Mr. Stewart, that the
1 subtleties of the English and the difference between mopping up and
2 cleaning or cleansing is not similarly existent in the B/C/S version.
3 Then let's have --
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, yes, I see. So is my suggestion going
5 to be followed, then, that the witness is going to be given, in these
6 questions, the original word that was used in the original conversation?
7 Because that is the obvious, we submit obviously correct --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but.
9 MR. STEWART: -- way to proceed.
10 JUDGE ORIE: But I also do understand that whether we, in English,
11 say "cleaning," "cleansing" or "mopping up" it will be translated into the
12 same word anyhow in B/C/S because no distinction is made.
13 MR. STEWART: If that's right -- I'm sorry, if that's correct,
14 then, yes, my practical suggestion is, by definition, adopted. That's all
15 I want to be clear about. Because if there are two possible translations
16 back into B/C/S, then we wish to make sure that the translation is the one
17 that matches the original conversation. If there is only one translation
18 back into B/C/S, then that happens automatically.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's how I understand the observation by the
20 interpreters. If I'm wrong, they'll certainly correct me.
21 Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into the
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: The word "mopping up" in
24 English, this expression "mopping up" is usually translated into Serbian
25 with a more precise term "ciscenje terena," meaning cleaning of the
1 terrain or mopping up of the terrain.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
3 MR. HARMON: If the witness could be given the exhibit which, if I
4 can find the number, it is 292, I believe, the binder of intercepts.
5 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me tell you how we're going to proceed.
6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I wonder if Your Honour does note the
7 comment made by the interpreters, which is very pertinent to this
8 particular point, and helpful.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Certainly. If "mopping up" in English is used, then
10 they'll use the same word in B/C/S but add the word "terrain" to that.
11 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that isn't what the interpreter said as
12 we understand it. We're now interpreting what the interpreter said. The
13 interpreter is saying that it's translated into Serbian with a more
14 precise term. I understand that as meaning that there is a different word
15 which may be used in Serbian. That's what seems to be saying.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Let's stop at this moment. Whenever we come to the
17 word "cleaning," "cleansing," we'll see what to do.
18 Mr. Harmon.
19 MR. HARMON:
20 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me tell you how we're going to proceed. You have
21 in front of you a binder with intercepts. The binder has both English and
22 B/C/S intercepts. Those intercepts are all intercepts that you have
23 listened to, and you have had the opportunity to prepare a -- some
24 comments in respect of each of those intercepts and you have identified
25 the speakers in each of those intercepts. You've had a chance to review
1 the list in the spreadsheets where you have, in respect of each intercept,
2 indicated which speaker you can identify. And I take it you reaffirm that
3 your identities of speakers in respect of the intercepts is accurate; is
4 that correct?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Okay. I am going to have to -- I will ask you questions in
7 respect of each of these intercepts. I will not play these intercepts for
8 you again in court, but I will ask you to follow my direction. I will
9 give you the number in the binder with a specific intercept, and I would
10 ask you to review the B/C/S translation of that intercept and then I am
11 going to direct you to specific parts of the intercept and I'm going to
12 ask you some questions about specific parts. But I want to give you the
13 opportunity before I ask you those questions to please review the
14 intercept in the language that you best understand.
15 So if we could turn to -- and if the witness could be given, have
16 the assistance of the usher as well so we make sure we're as efficient as
17 possible, if you could turn to the first intercept, which is KID 30320.
18 And this -- to double-check, this is an intercept of the 18th of July,
19 1991, and it is -- the B/C/S version is two pages. So if you could review
20 that and tell me when you have finished reviewing that.
21 A. I'm ready now.
22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me -- I will read to you the passages that I'm
23 interested in and ask you to try to find them at the same time in the
24 intercept. The passage I'm interested in first directing your attention
25 to is found in page 2 of the English translation, in the middle of the
1 page. And let me read you the passage and perhaps you can locate it.
2 "Mr. Krajisnik: All right. I will go up there, then. Look
3 here. In that thing. What's it's called? Han Pijesak. Oh, and listen
4 another thing, please. Today, Radovan, we have to have -- we should have
5 actually today and tomorrow a meeting with all our MUP cadres. I would
6 organise it all.
7 Karadzic: Aha.
8 Krajisnik: But you should come as well. We have to clear things
9 up with them and set an ultimatum, either withdraw all the men or not make
10 a disgrace of ourselves with this.
11 Karadzic: All right.
12 Krajisnik: But do you want me to organise it? Just tell me when.
13 Karadzic: You organise it. Organise it for, let's say, tonight
14 at 6.00.
15 Krajisnik: At 6.00?
16 Karadzic: Yes.
17 Krajisnik: All right. Then I'll organise it at 6.00."
18 This is an intercept, Mr. Kljuic, that's dated the 18th of July,
19 1991. My first question to you is: Can you tell us -- strike that.
20 Let me ask you, in terms of your previous testimony about the
21 close collaboration between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik, your views as
22 to whether this intercept supports or does not support your position.
23 A. It clearly corroborates my opinion, because on a daily basis they
24 agree on a plan of work.
25 Q. And you mentioned that as well that there had been ultimatums. In
1 terms of ultimatums in this intercept, can you offer the Court any
3 A. It is evident that the two of them held Serb policemen in joint,
4 mixed institutions under their control very well. Namely, on every issue,
5 be it a current, daily issue or a controversial one, all Serb policemen
6 had to hold a similar view. That was particularly difficult to implement
7 on the ground, because we wished for the Bosnia-Herzegovina police to be
8 harmonious in terms of personnel, in view of the fact that at the time of
9 the former Yugoslavia, the Serb policemen were represented in an
10 excessively large measure in police force.
11 This ultimatum Karadzic made to Sarajevo was part of his daily
12 rhetoric, and in all disagreements, in all cases of disagreement, instead
13 of discussing, in looking for a compromise, a compromise that is always
14 indispensable in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he would always say we would
15 withdraw from all the institutions, we will establish our own exclusively
16 Serb institutions. And in this way, he was practically seeking to break
17 up the constitutional system.
18 Q. In this intercept -- a few lines below the passage I read, there's
19 reference to somebody named Leovac. Can you identify who that person is?
20 A. In addition to the official SDS leadership, including the top
21 leaders I've already mentioned, Karadzic set up a council which was
22 supposed to include prominent Serb intellectuals. In fact, it included
23 only those who supported the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science,
24 and the most prominent among them were Milorad Ekmecic and Slavko Leovac.
25 Slavko Leovac was chairman of that council, and generally speaking, both
1 Leovac and Ekmecic were lecturers at the philosophy school of the Sarajevo
2 university, whereas Ekmecic was also a member of the Academy of Sciences
3 in Belgrade. They were expected to send a message on behalf of the
4 intelligentia that what the SDS leadership was doing was right, they were
5 supposed to lend it authority, and that anything else was contrary to the
6 interests of Serbs in the territory of Yugoslavia.
7 Q. Mr. Kljuic, if we could turn to the next intercept in order. It
8 is KID 30392. If you could familiarise yourself with the contents and
9 then I will ask you questions about specific portions.
10 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it would be most helpful if Mr. Harmon
11 were able to give the date of each intercept as he introduces it, because
12 we're working from a slightly different system here.
13 MR. HARMON: The date of this intercept is the 26th of August,
15 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, I take it that you have recently read
17 through these intercepts. So therefore, if you feel that you can orient
18 yourself without reading the whole text first, please indicate to
19 Mr. Harmon when you are at a point where you -- it's in your recollection
20 again what the intercept was about, and then he'll turn you to specific
21 parts of that. Please proceed.
22 A. Some of these intercepts I have already read. I read them last
23 year, preparing for testimony in the Milosevic trial. But I can answer
24 questions without reading it all over again.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please indicate when you feel comfortable that you
1 are able to deal with any questions in relation to the intercepts. Please
3 MR. HARMON:
4 Q. Are you prepared to proceed on this particular intercept,
5 Mr. Kljuic?
6 A. I'm ready.
7 Q. Let me direct your attention to --
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. -- the first page. This is an intercept of the 26th of August, a
10 conversation between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. And let me read the
11 passage I'd like you to comment on.
12 For Your Honours, it's on page 1, toward the top.
13 This is Karadzic: "Mr. President, please tell me: Are you having
14 problems with the women in the army?"
15 Mr. Krajisnik: "Oh, fuck you. Fuck a hero who's with women.
16 Where are you now?"
17 Karadzic: "I'm at the clinic."
18 Krajisnik: "I think we should adopt a very serious decision
19 today. I think it's high time and the people are right in saying that."
20 Karadzic: "Really."
21 Krajisnik: "I think the parliament is finished. We should make
22 it clearly known. Prepare people. It's over, Radovan."
23 Karadzic: "Really."
24 That's the passage I'd like you to comment on, please.
25 A. I would like, Your Honour, to describe briefly the context in
1 which this was happening. The war in Croatia is raging full bore. In the
2 territory of the whole Yugoslavia, mothers are demanding their children be
3 returned from the army, one of the reasons being that the JNA had lost the
4 confidence of the people, as well as its multi-ethnic purpose. The women
5 in Sarajevo were also demanding their children back, the children that had
6 been regularly mobilised, generation by generation. And when Karadzic
7 asks Krajisnik, in derogatory terms, about the battalion of broads, it is
8 a vulgar reference to the women's battalion, to these women asking for
9 their children.
10 On the other hand, we in the parliament were about to take a
11 decision that soldiers from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina could
12 not be recruited for the war in Croatia, and since Croats and Muslims had
13 already refused to go to battlefields in Croatia in their overwhelming
14 majority, the only ones responding to call-ups were Serb volunteers.
15 We're talking about here about boys who had already been in the army at
16 the time when they were sent to the Croatian theatre of war.
17 Since there was no goodwill for dialogue in the parliament and no
18 goodwill to find a solution to protect all the children in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina, the BH parliament would become paralysed every now and then.
20 In Karadzic's statement that this would come to nothing, this was going
21 nowhere, and that it needed to be stopped, is not something that promises
22 a solution in the future, and it's not geared to find a peaceful way of
23 resolving it.
24 Q. In the context of this particular passage, can you tell us whether
25 the women who were opposed to the war did indeed visit the parliament?
1 A. A huge number of mothers resisted the participation of their
2 children in that war, and a great number of them did indeed come to the
3 parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, demanding to be received by the
4 speaker. They demanded, in ultimatum terms, that their children be
5 returned to them.
6 Q. Let me turn your attention to another passage. It's on page 2 of
7 the English translation, a little bit below halfway down.
8 Krajisnik: "The Croatian representative said today: Let me tell
9 you, the HDZ held a press conference today. See here. Let's discuss this
10 a bit and then we'll come over."
11 Karadzic: "All right.
12 Krajisnik: For a while. Tonight at 8.30.
13 Karadzic: Yes.
14 Krajisnik: Vojo and I will come over for a bit.
15 Karadzic: "All right. At the press conference one of the
16 journalists told me that he's crazy. He wants to leave the coalition to
17 create a crisis. Well, let him create a crisis, the motherfucker. That's
18 excellent. They wanted to push us to the margins of the political system
19 several times so far. Now, that's excellent. Let him marginalise
20 himself. That's excellent. Now intelligence will come to the fore.
21 Krajisnik: All right. I'll come over and we'll come to an
23 Can you tell me your assessment of that paragraph.
24 A. Well, this madman that Karadzic is referring to is myself. I was
25 then president of the HDZ. It was me holding that press conference, where
1 I said that we were not going to war against Croatia as part of the JNA,
2 nor should our children continue to serve in the Yugoslav People's Army.
3 And I explained why. I went on to say: If the current government does
4 not support this position, we, as one of the three main parties in the
5 coalition, would step out. How were we supposed to go on being part of
6 that coalition if the people of that coalition were approving the
7 aggression against Croatia and the killing of innocent people? And
8 Karadzic then said that it was a good thing for them if I indeed took that
9 step. Of course, I didn't make that step, because on that date we are
10 discussing, I still believed that a compromise was possible in
12 Later on, Karadzic and his entourage would lose their nerve and
13 walk out themselves.
14 Q. Let me turn to the next intercept, KID 30403 and the date on it is
15 the 2nd of September, 1991. It is a conversation between Mr. Krajisnik
16 and Mr. Karadzic.
17 Can I proceed?
18 A. [In English] Yes, I remember the text.
19 Q. All right. Let me direct your attention to the first part of the
20 text and I will read the part I'm referring to.
21 Krajisnik: "Hello."
22 Karadzic: "Oh, hi."
23 Krajisnik: "Hi, Doctor."
24 Karadzic: "What's up?"
25 Krajisnik: "Well I'm talking to some Serbs who could become good
1 Serbs but haven't yet."
2 Karadzic: "Oh, really."
3 Krajisnik: "Can you imagine."
4 Karadzic: "Is it Kecmanovic or isn't it?
5 Krajisnik: "Ha, Kecmanovic, no. It's not Kecmanovic, by God.
6 He's from a region with good households. You know what they're like.
7 Kecmanovic is a city boy. You know he can never be a real Serb as this
8 one is."
9 Karadzic: "Yes, yes."
10 Krajisnik: "Mr. Nedjo Miljanovic."
11 Karadzic: "Ah, Nedjo Miljanovic."
12 Krajisnik: "Yes, he says hello.
13 Karadzic: "Well how much does he need? A lot or a little?"
14 Krajisnik: "Let me tell you. He's short by a hair's breadth."
15 Karadzic: "To be a good Serb."
16 Krajisnik: "Well, that's the worst. That it's a hair's breadth.
17 If it was more I would start working on him."
18 Karadzic: "Uh huh. All right."
19 Krajisnik: "Only a hair's breadth."
20 Karadzic: "Say hello. Well, he should help us achieve the
21 independence of that studio in Banja Luka, dammit."
22 Krajisnik: "Well I can tell you from what he's doing now, I
23 realise that you real Serbs are not even close to him."
24 Karadzic: "Is he doing it wisely?"
25 Krajisnik: "Well, wisely and superbly. He has some latecomer
1 Serbs now. It's always a bit, you know."
2 Okay. That's the passage I want to direct your attention to. Can
3 you interpret that passage for us and can you identify who Mr. Kecmanovic
5 A. Mr. Kecmanovic was a university professor during communist times
6 who, after Professor Koljevic left, came to the Presidency of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina in a legitimate manner because he was third on the list
8 on the Serb ticket in the elections. He was a member of the Presidency
9 just briefly and then went to Belgrade via Pale. They did not consider
10 him to be a good Serb, not because he was a city boy but because he did
11 not become included in the SDS but was a member of the Reformist Party.
12 And Kecmanovic did not join the SDS because he had personal ambitions of
13 being the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, something he did not succeed in
14 later on when he did actually go to Belgrade.
15 Now, the second point that is important in this piece of dialogue
16 is that in the offices of Mr. Krajisnik was the then director of the
17 television of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo. So the message that he
18 should prepare the Banja Luka studio as best as possible meant that they
19 should take as much as possible from joint property and relocate it to
20 Banja Luka, so that, in future, the television would be in Banja Luka and
21 that it would be powerful and up to the task in front of it.
22 As far as I'm concerned, this was a shocking piece of information,
23 namely, that the director of the joint television company was that close
24 to the leaders of the SDS on such intimate terms. And today, from this
25 distance of time, we can use that to explain the power that the SDS had in
1 its propaganda machine via the illegitimate media, and that media in
2 Bosnia was all important. And I, for example, as a leading politician in
3 the country at the time - I was also president of a ruling party and
4 thereby member of the Presidency - never had the possibility or was given
5 the opportunity of explaining our political programme on television. All
6 I could do on television was to take part in some joint programmes.
7 Q. Let me turn to another passage in the intercept. On the English
8 version it's found on page 4, about a third of the way from the bottom.
9 And this is the passage -- this is Karadzic speaking first: "Yes. Half
10 an hour. Are you listening to that Grubac who is an SPO, Serbian renewal
11 movement, adherent of the worst kind? They are the biggest traitors.
12 They don't care about anything else. They don't care that the
13 five-pointed star still exists, you know."
14 Krajisnik: "Well, they are idiots."
15 Then there's a break. "House on fire." And that's the passage I
16 direct your attention to. Can you tell us -- Do you see the passage I'm
17 referring to, Mr. Kljuic?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. First of all, can you tell us who Mr. Grubac is and why they're
20 referring to him as the biggest traitor -- one of the biggest traitors?
21 A. Grubac was one of two representatives of the second ethnic Serbian
22 party, the Serbian Defence Movement, the president of which is in
23 Belgrade, Vuk Draskovic. They only had two representatives, and the SDS,
24 72, had 72. The SDS, therefore, considered that they had to blindly
25 adhere to the directives of the SDS. And they didn't want to do that.
1 But their motives were not that they wanted peace or a multi-ethnic
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. No. They did that for some separatist or separate
3 goals. One of the things they wanted was to take the five-pointed star
4 emblem away from the army caps that soldiers wore, for instance. And that
5 is why these two men are saying that they're idiots and just out to secure
6 their own interests.
7 Q. Let me go to the next intercept. It's KID number 30406. This is
8 dated the 4th of September, 1991, and it is a conversation between
9 Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic. Just cast your eye on that for a moment,
10 Mr. Kljuic. Tell me when you're ready for me to proceed.
11 A. I'm ready.
12 Q. Okay. This -- I'm going to read you two passages, Mr. Kljuic.
13 The first is found at the bottom of page 1 in the English and it refers to
14 an incident that took place in the Serbian village of Kravica. I will
15 read this.
16 Karadzic: "Do you know that shots were fired up in --"
17 Krajisnik: "I heard. Two dead, aren't there?"
18 Karadzic: "Three. I think the third one is dead and two are
19 seriously injured."
20 Krajisnik: "All Muslims?"
21 Karadzic: "All Muslims, but they attacked the Serbian village of
23 Krajisnik: "I'm not sure if that's true. You know what I said
24 this morning. Please."
25 Karadzic: "Yes."
1 Krajisnik: "Cengic called me."
2 Karadzic: "Really."
3 Then I'm going to skip over a passage because I want to carry on
4 on the top of page 2 in the English about five lines down. This is
5 Krajisnik: "No, no. I also told Vito to make sure he goes up there and
6 put in an appearance before the people. They are our people. You know,
7 they become agitated. They want an army, they want all sorts of things,
8 you know."
9 Karadzic: "Yes. The army has set off from Tuzla."
10 Krajisnik: "Yes. So that's -- oh, let them all just --" then
11 there's a break -- "go to --" a break. "We must make sure that we put our
12 point across today."
13 Karadzic: "We'll make our point. You see, that's where it leads,
14 where your policies lead."
15 Krajisnik: "Exactly."
16 Karadzic: "Can you see where this leads and do you realise that
17 you will disappear in all of this?"
18 Krajisnik: "Exactly."
19 Karadzic: "Man, you will disappear. Many of us will also
20 disappear, but you will be annihilated."
21 Krajisnik: "No. We should say that we will all disappear, both
22 sides, you know."
23 Karadzic: "True."
24 Krajisnik: "We should deliberately say this."
25 Karadzic: "Exactly."
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Krajisnik: "That's what should be done."
2 Karadzic: "Yes."
3 Krajisnik: "We should soften --" there's a break -- "toughen up.
5 That's the end of the passage I'd like to ... First question:
6 Can you very, very briefly tell us what happened, to your knowledge, in
7 the village of Kravica, and then I want to turn my attention to the second
9 A. This refers to an incident in which the Muslims had three dead and
10 two seriously wounded and the accusation made was that they had in fact
11 attacked that Serb village. In all similar situations, the Serbs asked
12 the Yugoslav People's Army to step in, as being a guarantor of peace and
13 security for them. But when the army actually did turn up, then they
14 would have absolute power.
15 Now, why Karadzic and Krajisnik didn't want Cengic to go, then he
16 was the vice-president of the SDA at the time, was because any mixed
17 commission could arrive at truthful information, could uncover the truth,
18 and then could deduce who was to blame for that particular incident. And
19 finally, yesterday we heard Karadzic's threats in parliament, in the BH
20 parliament, made two months later. He never hid those threats, never
21 masked his threats, when he said that unless such-and-such a thing were to
22 happen, somebody would disappear. In this dialogue, in this conversation,
23 we can see all the difference that exists between Krajisnik and Karadzic.
24 Krajisnik, as the wiser of the two, says that it would have a better
25 effect if we say all were to disappear, we will all disappear, as he says.
1 But Karadzic had his own way of public speaking. He considered that he
2 would raise his authority, lend more importance to himself, if he were to
3 be the one to forecast the fate of individual ethnic groups in
5 Q. And does this intercept again reflect the close working
6 relationship between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. If we can turn to the next intercept.
9 MR. HARMON: This intercept, Your Honour, I will -- the next
10 intercept is KID 30656, and I will only -- I will not be asking Mr. Kljuic
11 any particular questions about this. There has been sufficient foundation
12 for name recognition in this. And we can then pass -- no, I'm sorry. Let
13 me look at my next -- yes. If we could turn then to the next intercept
14 that I'd like to ask some questions about. It is KID 30821.
15 JUDGE ORIE: That's of the 6th of December, 1991?
16 MR. HARMON: That is the 6th of December, 1991. If you would take
17 a look at that, Mr. Kljuic. Do you have the intercept of the 6th of
18 December, 1991 before you?
19 A. I do.
20 Q. This is a rather long intercept, but I'm going to be asking you
21 about, on the English translation, a passage that is found starting on
22 page 2 of the English translation and going over to the top of page 3.
23 Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Kljuic?
24 A. [In English] Yes.
25 Q. Let me read the passage. I'm referring to, on the English
1 translation, it is found, well, at the top of page 2, and it reads as
2 follows: Karadzic: "Well, he first let me say what I thought. I said
3 that was out of the question, that we thought that needed not be, that
4 this was a very sensitive balance, very frail balance, which we have
5 managed to maintain. We have maintained it. And that the arrival of any
6 foreign military force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is a part of
7 Yugoslavia, would disrupt the balance. And then those two, they have
8 positioned themselves divinely."
9 Krajisnik: "Yeah."
10 Karadzic: "They started bad mouthing Serbia. They started to --
11 they said they needed the military observers and the foreign forces here
12 because Bosnia was cramped with army and could be neutralised with the
13 United Nations forces only and that they would never let Bosnia stay in
15 Krajisnik: "Both of them?"
16 Karadzic: "Yes. Yes, and things like that, you know. And then
17 when I -- second round now. I have a right to talk again, and I say: I
18 am grateful to Mr. Mahmutcehajic and Mr. Kljujic."
19 Krajisnik: "The two of them were present?"
20 Karadzic: "Yes, yes. They told Mr. Mahmutcehajic and Mr. Kljujic
21 what they needed for the United Nations forces for. That is the thing I
22 have already told you about in Belgrade. They want the United Nations
23 forces to confront the Yugoslav People's Army and neutralise it, with the
24 help of the United Nations. They want to use the United Nations to solve
1 Krajisnik: "Yeah."
2 Karadzic: "To solve the political crisis. Yes, they want to use
3 their presence to effect the solving of the political crisis. In one
4 word, all our -- all our doubts and fears have come true and now you can
5 see why the Serb side can't accept that. I screwed them badly. Then
6 Marek Goulding said: Gentlemen, you have unfounded great expectations
7 from the United Nations' presence, and your minister, Karadzic, have
8 unfounded great fears because the United Nations will not do what has just
9 been said. They would be here in the presence of unarmed observers, but
10 only if you all agree, and so on, you know. I said we couldn't agree,
11 because that might trigger a civil war, an inter-ethnic and interreligious
12 conflicts, and that the United Nations bore a huge responsibility, that
13 this was Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav army maintained the public order
14 here along with the Ministry of the Interior, and so on, you know. I
15 simply screwed them. They have -- then that one bad mouthed Serbia and so
16 on. Kljujic."
17 Krajisnik says: "Yeah."
18 That's the passage I'd like you to discuss. This is an intercept
19 of December 6th, 1991.
20 THE WITNESS: May I speak, please?
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You may answer the question.
22 A. [Interpretation] At that time, the war operations in Croatia were
23 drawing to a close. The status quo remained. 40 per cent of the
24 territory was won over by the Serb rebels. And in Sarajevo, 20 days
25 later, after this conversation, we would have a peace signed, a
1 provisional peace of three years. The whole of the Yugoslav army that was
2 withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia, all the troops were brought to
3 Bosnia. Then the reserve corps also came in from Montenegro and Serbia.
4 The paramilitary formations and volunteers arrived. So with a set-up of
5 this kind, Bosnia was in actual fact occupied, and it was not possible to
6 conduct normal political negotiations with the SDS. The only thing that
7 we could do and request was to have the UN forces come in first, as a
8 preventive measure, and since the UN forces would only arrive if there was
9 a consensus, and there was no consensus because Karadzic and his men did
10 not want to accept the UN force's arrival. That was the first point. And
11 second, we asked for observers, monitors. So that means unarmed observers
12 coming from the United Nations. Because we believed that once those
13 people arrived and saw the situation in the field, that they would be able
14 to clearly inform the United Nations about our position. However,
15 Karadzic did not accept any of these things, apart from having the
16 Yugoslav army come in.
17 For us Croats and for the vast majority of Muslims, that army had
18 been completely compromised. You must know that before that, it had
19 committed crimes in Dubrovnik and Vukovar and other parts of Croatia, and
20 the people had a revulsion towards that army, the army which had lost the
21 Yugoslav character and sense that it once had under Josip Broz Tito, and
22 that was that it was a popular national multi-ethnic army. So the army
23 then was exclusively composed of the leading cadres of Serbs and
24 Montenegrins afterwards. And as an example of this, on the 24th of
25 December of that same year in the BH Presidency we had a top-ranking
1 delegation from the JNA, led by the defence minister of the day,
2 Mr. Veljko Kadijevic. It was a top-level delegation. It had 14 leading
3 generals. There was just one Slovenian admiral, Admiral Brovet. But
4 apart from that, there was not a single Croat or Muslim among the
6 I asked Kadijevic on the occasion: How do you think that the
7 Croats - because I was the leader of the Croats - how do you think the
8 Croats will accept that army, when you have failed during the negotiations
9 to have one leading Croat officer in the JNA? His brutal answer was that
10 everybody will listen to what the army says. So our efforts for a
11 peaceful solution to the crisis was that we should have the UN forces come
12 in, or at least UN observers and monitors, and the answer that was given
13 you have heard through the intercept and conversation mentioned earlier
15 Q. I direct your attention, then, to an intercept that is one, two,
16 three tabs later. It should be KID ID 30911. This is an intercept of 1
17 January 1992, a conversation between Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic. It
18 starts out with the words: "Hey, what's up?" I'm not quite sure the next
19 word is exactly a literal translation, but ... 30911. Take a look at
20 that, if you would, Mr. Kljuic, and then I'm going to direct you to a
21 passage that's toward the end of that intercept.
22 MR. HARMON: And Your Honours, the passages that I'm going to
23 direct Your Honours' attention to start on page 5. There will be a second
24 passage on page 6. I can read the passage to you, Mr. Kljuic. It's a
25 passage that deals with releasing tigers. So if you could find that
1 particular part, then I will read it into the record.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm ready, yes.
3 MR. HARMON:
4 Q. Let me read, then, the passage that starts on the English
5 translation the top of page -- the third line down from page -- from the
6 top of page 5. Radovan Karadzic: "He was like, 'If we're all the same,
7 this and that, in a sovereign and independent Bosnia.' Now he's talking
8 openly of a sovereign and independent Bosnia. Does he want to destroy
10 Krajisnik: "Yeah."
11 Karadzic: "Fuck. He's really crazy. Now he openly talks of a
12 sovereign and independent Bosnia."
13 Krajisnik: "Yeah."
14 Karadzic: "You know that --"
15 Krajisnik: Yeah.
16 Karadzic: It was until recently fuck him we will release our
17 tigers and let them do their job.
18 Krajisnik: "Yeah. Can you imagine this impertinence?"
19 Karadzic: "Fuck. I've -- we've been calming the Serb people for
20 a year because of his foolishness. What can I do? I will not be calming
21 anyone any more, nor can I."
22 Krajisnik: "No, but he says we don't want -- this isn't an
23 independent -- that's not a state, he says, it's a sovereign. So it is
24 equal in the talks. Now he says independent. Fuck him. They really are
25 crazy. Europe is crazy too if they think this can be so. Man, this is
1 impossible. This -- I don't think there's a man who could turn the
2 situation around now and make it so."
3 Karadzic: "Na, Na."
4 Krajisnik: "Na. Those are --" and there's an unknown term --
6 Karadzic: "No way. We need to release those people. We
7 shouldn't hold them back."
8 Krajisnik: "We have to, but they'll do it anyway whether you want
9 them to or not."
10 Karadzic: "Like I said, you can't hold them back any more."
11 Krajisnik: "No way. And what does this mean now? 'I really
12 appreciate you Yugoslavs as a nation,' I said. Now, they too have some
13 crazy ideas, but I said this softly. They want me to help them in the
14 parliament so they can get the status of constitutive people."
15 Karadzic: "Yeah."
16 I will not read any further in that particular passage.
17 Can I have your comments as to that particular passage. Go ahead,
18 Mr. Kljuic.
19 A. As the situation became increasingly difficult for the citizens of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially for the non-Serbs, because of the constant
21 increase of military materiel and equipment and pressure being exerted via
22 the media at the same time and incidents breaking out in the field, and
23 based on everything we had seen that had happened in Croatia, as well as
24 the witnesses and young men who left the Yugoslav People's Army during
25 that time and the behaviour of the SDS leadership, bearing all this in
1 mind, there was less and less chance that Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a state
2 itself, would remain connected to Milosevic in Belgrade in any way, that
3 it would have any more ties, anything more to do with them.
4 So I claim and state that at the beginning, the idea wasn't to
5 separate Bosnia from Yugoslavia, but that through their violent actions
6 and the force they used and the way in which they misused the army, they
7 did everything to give us Hobson's choice and not have us enter into any
8 kind of ties with Belgrade. And that is why our requests went along the
9 lines of having Bosnia-Herzegovina from the very beginning on a footing of
10 equality, just like all the other republics of the former Yugoslavia, that
11 it have an equal footing. But ultimately, this led to the demand for
12 independence, just as Slovenia and Croatia had done before that.
13 For us to gain popular support for this idea, we organised a
14 referendum, under very difficult conditions, but as you know very well,
15 over 64 per cent of the electorate went out to vote in favour of an
16 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. So the conclusion that we can make on the
17 basis of this conversation between Karadzic and Krajisnik is that they
18 were not interested in any kind of equality in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Q. And in respect of the sentence by Mr. Karadzic, "We'll release our
20 tigers and let them do their job," how do you interpret that?
21 A. That is the traditional method of coercion they were using,
22 because they were in possession of armed forces, whether they belonged to
23 the Yugoslav People's Army, the paramilitary units outside of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina, or autonomous forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina. In some
25 sort of nationalist euphoria, they were looking to solve the national
1 issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina by force, and their demands did not imply
2 any dialogue or discussion. On the contrary; thanks to the advantage they
3 had in terms of armaments, they thought they would be able to deal with it
4 fairly quickly. This allusion to the wolves that were on standby was one
5 of Karadzic's key arguments in every discussion. He would say: How long
6 do you think we would go on discussing this? How long do you think I can
7 keep the wolves on leash? They would like to come in and deal with things
9 So it was not Karadzic's intention to go on with political
10 discussions. He was using threats to make ultimatums. I never even
11 thought, it never crossed my mind, that I could accept such ultimatums,
12 particularly in view of the fact that the Croatian people in Yugoslavia
13 had suffered great sacrifices even before the aggression. But the events
14 of 1991 showed us best what was in store for us if those tigers from
15 Bosnia were indeed released.
16 Q. Let me turn to one other passage in this particular intercept.
17 It's found on the English translation at the bottom of page 6. And let me
18 read this to you, Mr. Kljuic.
19 Krajisnik: "We have to use the first opportunity to tell him that
20 he's playing with fire and we'll say clearly that they're playing with
22 Karadzic: "We will not tell him in private, but we shall do so in
23 public, and him --"
24 Krajisnik: "Yeah, in public. That's what I meant."
25 Karadzic: "In private we'll tell him some other things."
1 Krajisnik: "Yes, yes, that's all clear. Fuck. All right."
2 Okay. That's the end of the passage I'd like to read. Can you
3 comment as to that particular passage, Mr. Kljuic? Do you see it, and can
4 you comment on it?
5 A. In the later developments, we started preparing for independence.
6 It was not just a military aggression that took place in Bosnia. Huge
7 amounts of money were being printed in Belgrade, and at the time, it was
8 in fashion to trade using foreign currency. Special units of people,
9 smugglers, received money from Belgrade to buy German marks from the
10 citizenry. The Yugoslav dinar had already been put out of circulation in
11 Croatia, in Slovenia even before that, and now we were wishing
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina to get its own currency too. That was another occasion
13 for Karadzic to repeat his threats. He possibly -- maybe he thought that
14 we were supposed to use the Belgrade currency forever, the currency that
15 they were going to print and we were going to use.
16 Q. Does this passage reflect the close collaboration between
17 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik?
18 A. Certainly. I regret very much that I now heard Mr. Krajisnik
19 speaking in even more vulgar terms than Karadzic, who was very vulgar in
20 his speech.
21 Q. If we can turn to the next intercept. I'll direct your attention
22 to, Your Honour. It is --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, before you do so, may I just for the
24 record note that when you move to the next paragraphs on the last
25 intercept, you also moved from KID 30911 to KID 30985.
1 MR. HARMON: Yes. I did that intentionally, Your Honour, because
2 I know my time is limited and I can only --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But otherwise people might -- we even had some
4 problems in finding page 6, where it seems to end at page 5. But we now
5 move to the next one. That would be --
6 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour. The next one -- it should be two
7 tabs beyond. It's KID number 31023 [Realtime transcript read in error
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. HARMON: It says January 1992. It is a conversation between
11 Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic. I'll wait, Mr. Stewart, for your signal
12 to tell me you've found it, and then I will ...
13 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry. It's just without -- it just says
14 January, does it? Can you just give me the first words, please.
15 MR. HARMON: It says: "What are you doing, Doctor?"
16 MR. STEWART: I don't want to hold things up. Please go ahead.
17 MR. HARMON:
18 Q. Do you see the intercept, Mr. Kljuic? And please, the passage I'm
19 going -- if you would read the first -- or review the whole intercept.
20 MR. HARMON: There appears to be an error in the transcript or I
21 misspoke, it says 21023. The intercept is 31023. So if the record could
22 stand corrected.
23 Q. Mr. Kljuic, give me your signal when you're finished, I'll
24 proceed. The passage I'd like to direct your attention to appears, at
25 least in the English on page 2, about a third of the way down. It read as
1 follows: Krajisnik: "Down from municipality. Novo Sarajevo -- Novi
2 Sarajevo, Novo Sarajevo."
3 Karadzic: "Yes."
4 Krajisnik: "It has to do with Birac. Me and you and him and the
5 two of them sit down. They say there are small problems down there, and
6 that is an important municipality for us."
7 Karadzic: "Yes. Of course. And Birac I think that he is anyway
8 very intelligent, has a good presentation, but does not catch."
9 Can you comment on that small passage that I read to you.
10 A. That seems to indicate that Krajisnik and Karadzic had insight
11 into everything that was going on on the ground. And if you look at the
12 date, the issue of Nova Sarajevo was very important because in that area
13 near Pofalici, the city is at its narrowest, only a couple of hundred
14 metres. And on one of the sides of this area is one of the largest
15 barracks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, holding a great number of soldiers.
16 In the eyes of the SDS, Nova Sarajevo was very important, because
17 in their plans to cut the city in two, this point between Miljacka river
18 and Pofalici was crucial. The distance is only 200 to 300 metres between
19 these two points.
20 Later, after this conversation, on two or three occasions,
21 barricades would be put up in the city, fanning the tensions and anxieties
22 among the citizenry, which is an overture to the upcoming aggression and a
23 sort of rehearsal to see whether Sarajevo could be cut in two near
25 The citizens of Sarajevo were also aware of the importance of this
1 point in town, and defence had been prepared. So that in spite of all the
2 preparations, they did not manage to cut the city in half, because the old
3 town, where the parliament, the Presidency, and other government agencies
4 were, would have been cut off had they succeeded.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kljuic.
6 MR. HARMON: I see the time, Your Honour, and I think it's --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Usher, would you escort Mr. Kljuic out of
8 the courtroom after I have asked him to return to this same courtroom,
9 Madam Registrar, tomorrow morning at 9.00, and after having instructed
10 you, Mr. Kljuic, not to speak with anyone about your testimony, whether
11 given or still to be given. Thank you.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, how much time would you think you'd still
14 need for the examination-in-chief? Of course, I'm aware that we had a lot
15 of technical problems, that Mr. Kljuic may have arrived late, and
16 therefore his comments were put on paper in a rather late stage. I'm
17 aware of the problems, but nevertheless you said several times that
18 Mr. Kljuic had to return Thursday.
19 MR. HARMON: I think it's unrealistic, frankly, to expect
20 Mr. Kljuic to not -- he has to come back, I think, and I think there's no
21 question that if he finishes -- and I can't talk to him, so I can't
22 discuss with him his schedule.
23 THE COURT: That's the reason why I raised the issue.
24 MR. HARMON: I will probably have an hour, I think. I'm going
25 through these intercepts, I've made some selections. I think I can finish
1 in approximately an hour or a little bit longer than that. It depends how
2 many more of these intercepts --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you say -- if we have got another hour,
4 well, that means, well, let's say in general terms, two days, which makes
5 eight hours, nine hours, under normal circumstances, and I'm also looking
6 at the Defence, 60 per cent of nine hours, would it be approximately close
7 to six hours. But I can imagine that with this witness that the normal
8 balance would not be adhered to by the Defence. Of course, we would have
9 to discuss that. But if you say Mr. Kljuic has to return Thursday, would
10 that mean that he is not available on Thursday any more or that he would
11 leave, let's say, later in the afternoon on Thursday?
12 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, the problem is I am not able to talk to
13 him about his schedule.
14 JUDGE ORIE: You indicated several times Thursday. I thought you
15 might have -- okay. We'll ask the Victims and Witness Unit to find out
16 whether he's still available on Thursday in the morning, or what his
17 schedule is.
18 And then, Mr. Stewart, do you have any idea two issues: The
19 first, whether you'd be able to start the cross-examination; and the
20 second one, how much time it would take.
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I can certainly start the
22 cross-examination. So far as the time is concerned, I would aim to be
23 around the normal guideline. But it's early for that, Your Honour. Can I
24 just make one specific request, though, Your Honour? I wonder if I could
25 be told now, this afternoon, whether Mr. Kljuic is going to continue on
1 Thursday or go home. It does significantly affect planning. So if I
2 could know that straight away.
3 JUDGE ORIE: It's the first thing on our agenda, that we'll check
4 with the Victims and Witness Unit at what time Mr. Kljuic is unavailable
5 to us on Thursday, whether it would be for the whole day or only later on
6 on that day and then we'll inform you as soon as possible. Because if
7 he's not available Thursday during the morning, we'll certainly not finish
8 the whole of his examination, because I take it that you would not be able
9 to do it in three hours, Mr. --
10 MR. STEWART: There's no chance of that, Your Honour, and it would
11 make a significant difference to the most useful use of time if I were to
12 know straight away. Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: We'll find out as soon as possible. We'll inform you
14 as soon as possible.
15 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, could the Witness Unit also inform
16 Mr. Kljuic that if he does leave on Thursday, in all likelihood he will be
17 required to come back so he can measure whether he can make changes in his
18 plans and stay this week for the remainder of the week.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. To find the best solution also for himself, you
20 would say.
21 That's the first thing on our programme, to contact the Victims
22 and Witness Unit and inform the parties as soon as possible.
23 We'll then adjourn until 9.00 tomorrow morning, same courtroom.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Wednesday,
1 the 29th day of September 2004, at 9.00 a.m.