1 Tuesday, 17 May 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
7 number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 Good afternoon to everyone as well. Is the Prosecution ready to
10 call its next witness?
11 MR. HARMON: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Yes, we are.
12 JUDGE ORIE: No protective measures?
13 MR. HARMON: No protective measures.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Your next witness will be ...
15 MR. HARMON: General John Wilson.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
17 Madam Usher.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Wilson. Before you give
20 evidence in this court, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to
21 make a solemn declaration that you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and
22 nothing but the truth. May I invite you to make that declaration of which
23 the text is now handed out to you by Madam Usher.
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I solemnly declare that I
25 will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. Please be seated.
2 WITNESS: JOHN WILSON
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
4 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 Examined by Mr. Harmon:
6 Q. Good afternoon, General Wilson.
7 A. Good afternoon, Counsel.
8 Q. I am going to ask you a number of questions, General Wilson,
9 throughout this afternoon and because we speak the same language, I'm going
10 to ask you to pause after I ask the question, because my question has to be
11 interpreted. And if you answer too quickly, the interpretation will get
12 overrun and it will be quite confusing. So if you could bear that in mind.
13 I know it's difficult, but I will ask you to do so.
14 A. Thank you. I will.
15 Q. General Wilson, I'd like to start by summarising your background,
16 and I'm going to read from a document that I have prepared, and I'm not
17 going to ask you to answer until -- when I do, I'm going to ask you to
18 merely affirm what I have said is correct.
19 A. I understand.
20 Q. General Wilson, you were born on the 25th of March, 1947. You
21 were a career military officer in the Australian Armed Forces. You
22 attended the Royal Military College from 1964 to 1967, and upon graduation
23 you were commissioned as a lieutenant in the infantry corps. In 1968, you
24 deployed to Malaysia. You were an infantry platoon commander in that
1 In 1970, you deployed to Vietnam, and during the first six months
2 you were second-in-command of a company, and during the latter part of your
3 tour, six months, you were the ADC, the aide-de-camp, to the commander of
4 Australian forces in Vietnam.
5 In 1976, you were a company commander, and prior to your
6 secondment to the United Nations in 1984, you were engaged for a period of
7 approximately six years in the selection, training, and assessment of
8 individuals who were officer candidates for the Australia Army.
9 In 1984, you were seconded to the United Nations to serve in
10 UNTSO, and that is U-N-T-S-O, the United Nations truth supervision
11 organisation, in Lebanon, where you served as the chief of the observer
12 group in Lebanon. You held the rank of lieutenant colonel and you
13 commanded a battalion in that capacity.
14 In mid-1990, you were again seconded to the United Nations and
15 you returned to Jerusalem, where you were Deputy Chief of Staff of UNTSO.
16 You held the rank of Colonel at that time. While you were there, the Gulf
17 War occurred and the Syrian invasion of Lebanon occurred, during which time
18 you were involved in mounting a number of UN missions.
19 Now, do you affirm that to be accurate?
20 A. There are two minor corrections, if I can.
21 Q. Yes, please.
22 A. Firstly, I was a company commander in 1975.
23 Q. I see.
24 A. Secondly, my time in Lebanon was the equivalent a battalion
25 command, not an actual battalion command.
1 Q. All right.
2 A. There were about 120 United Nations military observers under my
4 Q. All right. Thank you very much, General Wilson.
5 Let me -- let me continue. In January of 1992, you were seconded
6 to the -- by the United Nations to the former Yugoslavia on a temporary
7 mission. On the 14th of January, 1992, you were deployed as a senior
8 military liaison officer for UNMLO-Y, and let me tell the Court what that
9 acronym means, it's the United Nations Military Liaison Officers Yugoslavia
10 mission, where your tasks were to establish UN liaison with both sides of
11 the Croatian/JNA conflict.
12 During February of 1992, you were involved in negotiations along
13 with Marek Goulding, the Undersecretary General for peacekeeping operations
14 regarding the deployment of the UNPROFOR force to the former Yugoslavia.
15 In those negotiations, you attended meetings with Mr. Goulding with
16 Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, Gojko Susak, Mr. Cozic, and Mr. Babic
17 among others.
18 In mid-March 1992, UNPROFOR deployed to Belgrade. This
19 deployment ended the UNMLO-Y mission and a new organization, the United
20 Nations Military Observers, or UNMOs, were introduced into the former
21 Yugoslavia as a subordinate part of UNPROFOR. You were appointed chief of
22 the United Nations Military Observers for UNPROFOR.
23 Do you affirm what I have just read?
24 A. That's accurate and correct. Thank you.
25 Q. On March 22nd, 1992, you were deployed to Sarajevo to establish a
1 headquarters for UNPROFOR and you did so. The UNPROFOR mission was
2 relocated from Sarajevo to Belgrade on the 16th and 17th of May, 1992 due
3 to heavy shelling of the city; however, you remained in Sarajevo until the
4 24th of June, 1992 along with seven UNMOs and a 70-man French protection
6 During this period of time, your mandate was to, one, maintain UN
7 presence in Sarajevo; two, secure UN property; and, three, lend your good
8 offices to the parties.
9 In the latter capacity, you participated in May and June 1992
10 respectfully in negotiations for the withdrawal of the JNA from barracks
11 located in Sarajevo and in negotiations to open the Sarajevo airport.
12 On the 24th of June, 1994 you relocated to Belgrade along with
13 your UNMO headquarters, and you departed your post in December of 1992.
14 You were also involved, during the period of time you were in the
15 former Yugoslavia, in other negotiations. You participated, for example,
16 in negotiations over the withdrawal of the JNA from Dubrovnik, and in
17 October you were given the task of negotiating the implementation of the
18 no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Is that correct?
20 A. That's correct, sir.
21 Q. In September of 1992, you were promoted to the rank of brigadier
22 general. In December of 1992, you were deployed to the international
23 conference on the former Yugoslavia, also known as ICFY or ICFY, to act as
24 the military advisor to Mr. Cyrus Vance and also as the UNPROFOR liaison
25 officer to the conference, and you remained there until December of 1993.
1 During this period of time, you were closely involved in the negotiations
2 conducted by the co-chairmen, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, and later with
3 Ambassador Stoltenberg.
4 Is that correct?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Now, for your service in the former Yugoslavia and in the Middle
7 East, the Australian government awarded you the conspicuous service cross.
8 Between 1994 and 1996, you served as the commander of the Australian joint
9 services college, which is a senior leadership college for Australian
10 military personnel. In 1997, you served as a brigade commander, a brigade
11 comprised of approximately 5.000 men, and you were the area commander for
12 the area of Sydney, Australia. And in January of 1998 you retired from the
13 Australian military; is that correct?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Now, we'll get to your testimony.
16 General Wilson, let me go back to January 14th of 1992 when you
17 were deployed as the senior military liaison officer for the UNMLO-Y
18 mission. Could you inform the Judges what your duties and responsibilities
19 were in that capacity.
20 A. The -- the 50 officers whom I led were not actually designated as
21 a formal mission, but we were given a task by the secretary-general to
22 establish liaison on both sides of the line of confrontation in -- in
23 Croatia and to facilitate communications between the two parties.
24 Essentially, we were collocated with the ECMM mission, so there were --
25 there was some redundancy between the mission of the two organisations.
1 We reported back to UN New York on violations of the cease-fire,
2 which Mr. Cyrus Vance had negotiated on the 2nd of January. There were
3 between two and three hundred violations on any given day, some of them
4 minor, individual sniper fire, in some cases hundreds of rounds of
5 artillery being fired into urban areas.
6 Q. General Wilson, if we could distribute to the Judges the exhibit
7 that has been previously exhibited as Prosecution Exhibit 121, and if the
8 witness could also be given a copy of that exhibit. It could be placed on
9 the ELMO for the witness.
10 MR. HARMON: This is an exhibit for the record, Your Honour, that
11 was previously exhibited through the testimony of Mr. Kirudja. And I bring
12 this to Your Honours' attention only to refresh everybody's recollection.
13 Q. General Wilson, your mission as -- in respect of what you were
14 monitoring dealt with Croatia; is that correct?
15 A. That's correct. We had no responsibility whatsoever for any
16 activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.
17 Q. Using the pointer that's in front of you, could you just point
18 out on the exhibit that is on the ELMO the areas where your military
19 liaison officers were located.
20 A. We had approximately 50 military observers, and about 40 of them
21 were actually deployed out in the lines of confrontation. Firstly along --
22 or in the area of Sector East, I think they're actually located physically
23 somewhere near the Danube River. We also had some military -- some people
24 located in what became known as Sector West, also throughout the Krajina.
25 Essentially, there were six liaison teams located on each side, a total of
1 12 teams.
2 They -- they reported back to two headquarters, one located in
3 Zagreb, one located in Belgrade, and I spent my time equally between the
4 two headquarters, as was mandated by UN New York.
5 Q. Now, at the time this mission was implemented, am I correct that
6 the conflict in Croatia had essentially become static; it had by a large
7 measure resolved into areas where there were protection -- UN protection
8 areas. Is that correct?
9 A. No, you're talking about when we arrived there. There was
10 actually a line of confrontation which was roughly reflected by this --
11 this line on the map which became the boundaries of the UNPAs, but the --
12 the Croat forces and the JNA and -- and the Serb forces of the Krajina were
13 in static defensive positions lined up against each other. They were
14 conducting harassing operations against each other and there were, as I
15 said, between two and three hundred violations a day. Back from the
16 confrontation area, there was some normalcy in life in that people did go
17 about farming, for example, in the Krajina, although the effects of ethnic
18 cleansing were potently obvious. And, in fact, those activities continued
19 during the time that we were, and indeed well into the time that UNPROFOR
20 was there.
21 Q. What sort of damage did you and your military observers see in
22 the areas where you were located?
23 A. Our teams, as accurately said, were deployed behind the
24 confrontation line. They were not actually on the confrontation line, they
25 were deployed at what the -- to a place called corps headquarters. But it
1 was incidental travel in getting to visit them that you were able to see
2 what had happened in those areas. Certainly where is there had been
3 conflict there was significant damage. But even within villages where
4 there was no apparent reason for damage you could see that buildings had
5 been damaged by fire and by explosive activity.
6 Q. What had happened to the civilian population?
7 A. Well, very few people actually seemed to be on the ground at the
8 time, given the number of houses in the village, there were very few
9 residents there. I was told that most of these people remaining there were
10 Serbs, although there were people of other nationalities who continued to
11 reside in those areas for some months.
12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I just make a small observation
13 that when the witness -- we have this from time to time. When the witness
14 refers to a line on the map which he points to, it subsequently is
15 incomprehensible to anybody reading. So I wonder whether for the
16 transcript some specificity as to the line on the map could be introduced
17 into the evidence so that at a later date all concerned can -- can follow
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This is a good suggestion. I think the
20 witness referred to the blue line on the map.
21 MR. HARMON: Yes. He's also referred to Sector East, which is
22 located and identified on the map specifically, and to Sector West, which
23 is identified specifically on the map. So I can more precise, but I think
24 in this case it speaks for itself.
25 MR. STEWART: Well, I was thinking of line 11 where there's just
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 a reference to this line on the map. It's just --
2 JUDGE ORIE: The blue line, yes.
3 MR. STEWART: Well, I'm sorry, it didn't say blue line on my
5 JUDGE ORIE: No, I said it was the blue line. Yes.
6 MR. STEWART: Oh, I beg your pardon. Yes, thank you, Your
7 Honour. I see.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, let's proceed.
9 MR. HARMON:
10 Q. General Wilson, in discussions with Croatian liaison officers,
11 did they offer any prognostications about what a future conflict in Bosnia
12 would be like?
13 A. Yes, for -- for -- in an unprompted conversation, they pointed
14 out that should the conflict spread from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it
15 will be far more serious and have much more impact than had been the case
16 in -- in Croatia. This surprised me at the time because I was unaware that
17 there was any likelihood of the conflict spreading; and secondly, the --
18 the effects in Croatia seemed to be dramatic enough anyway. So I found it
19 hard, at the time, to believe it could be worse.
20 Q. When you had this conversation, with whom did you have this
22 A. There were two Croat one-star officers who were members of the
23 liaison office in Zagreb who were appointed to liaise with the UN forces at
24 that time. Their names, I can't recall.
25 Q. Did you have a similar conversation with the JNA corps commander
1 from Banja Luka?
2 A. I did. Sometime during February - the exact date, I don't know -
3 I visited the -- the corps commander actually in his forward headquarters
4 on the Sava River just at the southern end of Sector West. We had a
5 conversation about the role of UNMLO-Y and what we were doing. But as an
6 aside, I indicated to him that I had heard rumours that the JNA was
7 disarming non-Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He acknowledged the fact
8 this had been taking place, that it was, in fact, renegade elements that he
9 was disarming. And he also expressed concern that if conflict were to
10 break out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be a very serious matter.
11 Q. If we could take Prosecution Exhibit 527, which is the book of
12 maps. And if it could be opened to page 2, and if page 2 could be placed
13 on the ELMO.
14 MR. HARMON: Can you move that down just a bit so we can see the
15 northern part of -- thank you. That's fine.
16 Q. General Wilson, you said you had a conversation with a JNA
17 commander from the Banja Luka -- from Banja Luka, and the issue of
18 disarming the non-Serbs came up. Using the map in front of you and the
19 pointer, can you point to the area that he was discussing when he was
20 referring to disarming of the non-Serb population?
21 A. I -- I didn't, at that time or today, in fact, know the exact
22 area of responsibility for that JNA corps, but in -- in our dealings with
23 him and in regard to this conversation, I assumed he was talking about this
24 area of Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina from really the -- what was the Bihac
25 pocket in the west right across to Bijeljina in the east, and in an area
1 down about as far as Banja Luka. I assumed that that was his area of
2 responsibility and that's what we were discussing.
3 Q. Now, did he say why he was conducting -- why the JNA was engaged
4 in disarming activities? Could you expand on that a little bit?
5 A. Well, he -- firstly, I'd heard about these reports that the JNA
6 were disarming Serb -- non-Serb people from the Croat liaison officers,
7 from general media reports which we would receive and we would have
8 translated, from general contact with the population in Croatia, with
9 people who had relatives living in -- in Northern Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I
10 -- I raised it as a -- a topic of conversation that I was not necessarily
11 directly responsible for, given that we didn't have a mission in Bosnia-
12 Herzegovina, but I was just happening to express to the corps commander
13 that we were aware on an official basis that there were some unusual
14 activities taking place and I hoped that he would take note of that. He
15 indicated that yes, he was disarming people and he described them as
16 "renegade elements."
17 Q. Now, I may have asked you or you may have answered, but can you
18 tell the Court approximately when conversations took place, roughly.
19 A. Roughly, I believe February of 1992.
20 Q. Did you raise the issue with him of the JNA arming the Serb
21 population in Bosnia?
22 A. I think this was part of the same conversation, that I at least
23 implied to him that one element was being disarmed and the others were --
24 were being armed. I can't recall his reply in that regard.
25 Q. In respect of the information that was available to you about the
1 JNA arming the Serb population, had you received such reports?
2 A. As I indicated before, we were prompted in this belief by
3 comments by the Croat liaison officers, by general media reports, by casual
4 comments from civilian population, by dealings of UN officials with members
5 of the population.
6 Q. Now, General Wilson, based on the information that you were
7 receiving about the situation in Bosnia, did you recommend deployment of
8 UNMOs, United Nations Military Observers, to Northern Bosnia and to other
9 areas, tense areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. There's a preamble to that, in that once UNPROFOR was
11 established, the military observers were the only element of UNPROFOR which
12 actually had a mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The headquarters of UNPROFOR
13 was to be located in Sarajevo and there were to be some military observers
14 deployed in the Bihac and Mostar areas to monitor what was foreseen in
15 December of 1991 as areas of ethnic tension and conflict. By mid-March,
16 when UNPROFOR was deployed, it was apparent that there was considerable
17 ethnic tension in that northern area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I made a
18 recommendation to the force commander in writing that we should change the
19 deployment of the military observers by taking some out of the -- the Bihac
20 deployment and deploying them in a series of teams across the north of
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina where they could monitor activity. That -- that request
22 or that proposal was not agreed. So we went forward later during April
23 with a deployment of observers to Bihac and also to Mostar.
24 Q. Let me change the topic and turn your attention to communications
25 and the types of information that were available to you. Let me ask you,
1 then, focussing on that, General Wilson, in order to fulfill the UN mission
2 in the former Yugoslavia, was it essential for you and others who were
3 leading these operations to be fully informed about developments on the
5 A. Yes. In any peacekeeping or indeed military operation, military
6 information is essential so that commands can make informed decisions,
7 anticipate events, and use the limited resources that are usually available
8 to the maximum efficiency. And the way of doing that is by collecting as
9 much information as you can in the military environment, it's called
10 "intelligence." In the UN it's called "military information." And it is a
11 very important function. I would say something that UNPROFOR in its early
12 days was not very good at, but UNMLO-Y, the first mission I tried very hard
13 to -- to acquire this type of information.
14 Q. Okay. Can you describe to the Trial Chamber the sources of
15 information that you received and accepted.
16 A. There are routine reports submitted by all -- all military units
17 up through the chain of command. They're usually done on a daily basis, or
18 if there's an important incident, it would be reported directly. There are
19 visit reports from people travelling. There are specific missions that are
20 set for people to go out and find out information about -- that could be
21 about geography, routes, infrastructure, or to go and meet and deal with
22 some difficult local warlord. We also monitor the press, both
23 international and local, very closely to glean what information could come
24 out of that. There's a lot of interagency exchange of communication,
25 UNHCR, ECMM, the various humanitarian organisations. In some cases there
1 was a formal exchange of information with people attending daily weekly or
2 monthly meets. In other cases there was an information exchange of
4 The parties are also very keen to tell you what the other side
5 was up to. You had to take that, perhaps, with a grain of salt, but there
6 was -- there was a lot of valuable information that used to come out of
8 Q. How was it --
9 A. That's it for the most part.
10 Q. How was it, General Wilson, that that massive information was
11 then analysed and determined to be reliable?
12 A. Well, UNPROFOR headquarters, and indeed UNMLO-Y, had a section
13 within the headquarters, military intelligence, which used to process that
15 Your Honour?
16 JUDGE ORIE: I notice, Mr. Harmon, that the French translation is
17 a couple of lines behind.
18 MR. HARMON: Okay.
19 JUDGE ORIE: So we should slow down.
20 MR. HARMON: Yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: And let me first -- let them first finish the
22 translation and then perhaps proceed in a bit slower speed.
23 MR. HARMON: Well, I will turn to the -- if I can be informed as
24 to what the French channel is, I will listen to the French channel. Is --
25 is it 3? Number 3? Number 5.
1 JUDGE ORIE: It's number 5.
2 MR. HARMON: All right.
3 Q. General Wilson, I'm going to be listening to the French channel,
4 and there will be longer pauses between my questions and your answers, so
5 I'm going to ask you to pause a little bit.
6 A. I'll try and speak a little more slowly.
7 Q. General Wilson, in the course of the information that you were
8 receiving, did you receive reports about ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina by -- committed by the Serb forces?
10 A. Yes. Yes, we did.
11 Q. And are you familiar with the term "ethnic cleansing"?
12 A. Yes, I am.
13 Q. What do you understand -- what do you understand the term to mean
14 and did you understand in 1992 that term to mean?
15 A. I understand it to mean the forcible movement of a population out
16 of an area, either with the threat of violence or actual violence.
17 Q. Can you tell the Court when you first received such reports and
18 the areas where that ethnic cleansing was reported to have taken place. If
19 you will wait -- I will give you a signal.
20 A. It's difficult to be precise about the date, but I would estimate
21 it was late March, certainly through April of 1992. And the particular
22 areas that were referred to mainly in the media, but also from the ECMM,
23 referred to the area around Bijeljina and the Drina Valley.
24 Q. According to the information that -- reports that you received,
25 who were the victim groups affected by the ethnic cleansing? And if you'd
1 just wait one moment, General.
2 A. My understanding of the reports was that it was non-Serb elements
3 of the population that were being evicted from these areas.
4 Q. According to the reports you were receiving, which ethnic group
5 was responsible for conducting the ethnic cleansing?
6 A. Serbs.
7 Q. Did you personally travel to Bijeljina and did you observe --
8 make observations in that area?
9 A. Yes, I certainly travelled through Bijeljina in March, where I
10 didn't particularly note any -- any disturbance there, but I travelled
11 through there on the 13th of May and was quite -- it was quite clear there
12 had been significant damage from fighting to -- to the village.
13 Q. In these early reports, did you receive information about the
14 involvement of particular groups in the ethnic cleansing?
15 A. It had been reported to me, I think most likely by personal
16 contact with media, that these activities had been conducted by militia
17 groups with the assistance of the JNA who would provide security, perimeter
18 security while the militias would enter the village, carry out some sort of
19 activity which would intimidate the population and induce them to leave.
20 Q. Were any of these militia groups identified by a name?
21 A. Two were mentioned. The first one being Arkan and the second
22 being the White Eagles. Both of these groups were also active in what
23 later became known as the UNPAs.
24 Q. Did you ever personally observe any members of such militia
1 A. During, I think, February I observed some members of the Arkan
2 organisation in Knin. These were well-dressed, very cleanly presented,
3 almost military-like, looked to be well-disciplined, and were accepted by
4 the local population. They were not -- they didn't stand out as being out
5 of place.
6 Q. If we could move to the next exhibit, General Wilson. And this
7 is an exhibit which is a new exhibit. It is a final report on -- entitled,
8 "Final report on tour with UNPROFOR, Brigadier J.B. Wilson." It is dated
9 the 15th of November, 1992.
10 General Wilson, do you recognise this report and can you tell the
11 Trial Chamber what it is precisely.
12 A. Yes. At the completion of my tour with UNPROFOR, I was required
13 to submit two reports: One to the United Nations with a summary of my
14 experience and recommendations on, perhaps, corrective action or future --
15 better ways of doing things. The second was a report to my national
16 authorities, reporting on my activity for the previous 12 months. This
17 report is directed to my immediate superior in Australia. He was a man who
18 was familiar with the activities in Bosnia -- in the former Yugoslavia, and
19 he was somebody who knew me personally.
20 MR. HARMON: I'd like to, first of all, get an exhibit number for
21 this, because I was a little precipitous in proceeding without a number.
22 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecution Exhibit number P720.
23 MR. HARMON:
24 Q. General Wilson, I would like to direct your attention to two
25 paragraphs, paragraphs 6 and 7. Paragraph 6, there is a -- a long
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 paragraph and a description of particular aspects of the operation in --
2 operation. Can you tell me, does this paragraph 6 apply to Croatia, does
3 it apply to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or does it apply to both?
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I observe here that there is no
5 translation apparently yet of this particular item. So I believe Mr.
6 Harmon is obviously aware of that, but it would be necessary, therefore, to
7 go at a suitable pace and to incorporate such material in the questions as
8 to properly enable Mr. Krajisnik to follow the matter.
9 MR. HARMON: I'm happy to read paragraph 6 slowly into the
10 record, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MR. HARMON: And then ask the question.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Will you provide us with a B/C/S translation
14 or --
15 MR. HARMON: We've requested a B/C/S translation. I will try to
16 get it on an expedited basis, but it wasn't available.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. HARMON: So I'm happy to read --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then would you please read it slowly.
20 MR. HARMON: Yes.
21 Q. General Wilson, I'm going to read paragraph 6. For purposes of
22 the record, I will read it very slowly and then I will ask you a question,
23 but I will wait for -- before I ask you the question, I'll wait for the
24 translation to be completed.
25 Paragraph 6, under the caption: "Operational situation."
1 "Full analysis of the UNPROFOR operational situation exceeds the
2 scope of this report. It is a complicated and dynamic situation. The
3 Vance plan for the demilitarisation of areas of Croatia formerly occupied
4 by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was stalled from June 1992. Various
5 militias emerged on the JNA withdrawal under the guise of 'police' forces.
6 "Some 16.000 'police' exist in the four UNPROFOR sectors in an
7 area which, before the war, had a maximum of perhaps 2.000. Their heavy
8 weapons (tanks, artillery, et cetera) have been placed in store under
9 'double lock,' but they remain well equipped with small arms. Despite the
10 presence of the Serb 'police,' and 11 UNPROFOR battalions, there has been a
11 total collapse of law and order. Ethnic cleansing, and all associated with
12 it, continues and is, for the most part, conducted by 'police' forces.
13 "The court system is unable or unwilling to prosecute cases of
14 murder, et cetera, which are fully documented by UN police monitors
15 (UNCIVPOL). The political leadership is clearly responsive to directives
16 from Belgrade and actively opposes UNPROFOR's attempts to fulfil its
17 mandate. Further, UNPROFOR attempts to fully disarm the militias have been
19 Now, General Wilson, does that paragraph apply to Croatia or to
20 Bosnia or to both?
21 A. It applies solely to the UNPA areas.
22 Q. The areas located in Croatia, then.
23 A. Indeed. It refers to Croatia.
24 Q. Now, I'd like to turn your attention to paragraph 7 of your final
25 report, and let me read it slowly into the record and then I will ask you
1 some questions.
2 "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) continues to
3 deteriorate. There are appalling violations of human rights by all parties
4 but, in particular, by Serb forces. Large-scale conventional military
5 operations continue with a view to securing an ethnic division of the
6 Republic. UN forces deployed in Sarajevo are subjected to regular fire by
7 all parties, and casualties are a daily event. The 6.000 UN troops
8 deployed in BH in early November, with a task of escorting UNHCR convoys,
9 will soon be directed to assume additional tasks and it is suspected this
10 will not be the last deployment of troops into BH. Despite the best
11 efforts of UNHCR, it will be a hard winter in BH with up to 100.000 deaths
12 amongst the civilian population being predicted."
13 General Wilson, let me focus your attention on the second
14 sentence in paragraph 7, dealing with "appalling violations of human rights
15 by all parties but, in particular, by Serb forces." When you wrote that,
16 what were you referring to in terms of "appalling violations of human
18 A. Can I say first of all or emphasise that this report is a -- a
19 concise synopsis of 12 months of operational activity written to a man who
20 has a -- a fairly good understanding of what's been happening in Bosnia-
21 Herzegovina and, indeed, the former Yugoslavia for the past 12 months. But
22 in -- in the second sentence, I'm really referring to the fact that there
23 had been extensive ethnic cleansing, that there was ample evidence by
24 November of 1992 that large segments of the population of Bosnia-
25 Herzegovina had been moved out of their -- their resident areas. In many
1 cases, this had been done with quite brutal force. There had been
2 indiscriminate use of force against urban areas and against civilian
3 population in gross violation of the Geneva Conventions. There was
4 substantial damage to the infrastructure, many refugees, and it appeared
5 that in many cases military operations were conducted without any regard
6 whatsoever for the civilian population.
7 In this sentence, I'm trying to summarise the fact that all three
8 parties in the conflict were guilty of excesses, but there's particularly
9 strong evidence in that time -- at that time that the Serb forces had
10 carried out systematic and sustained operations, which had resulted in
11 significant violations against the civilian population. There was also, by
12 that time, some suggestion of mistreatment of prisoners of war.
13 I think that summarises, Counsel, what I was implying.
14 Q. Thank you very much, General Wilson. Let me turn to the next
15 sentence: "Large-scale conventional military operations continue with a
16 view to securing an ethnic division of the Republic." When you drafted
17 that sentence, whose military operations were you referring to?
18 A. The military operations I am referring to are -- indeed cover the
19 three parties. By "large scale" I mean that the confrontation line was
20 some 5.000 kilometres long, and there must have been the best part of a
21 half a million soldiers involved in all three sides. The actual process of
22 directing, controlling, and sustaining operations of that level can only be
23 described as "large." I'm referring to trying to secure an ethnic
24 division. I'm really referring to actions by Croatian and Serb forces to
25 carve out ethnically pure areas within that territory of the former
1 Yugoslavia -- of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 Q. And let me then -- when you said earlier you're referring to
3 "large-scale conventional military operations continue with a view to
4 securing an ethnic division of Bosnia," I'm sorry, "a division of the
5 Republic," your answer, in part, was "I'm referring to all parties." Did
6 this -- your evidence also apply to the Muslim -- the Bosnian government
7 authorities? Were they, in your view, seeking a -- an ethnic division on
8 the ground?
9 A. No, I'm not referring, in fact, to the Muslims in that case
10 because their stated political position was quite clear, to retain a fully
11 integrated ethnically intertwined Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was clear at
12 that time in 1992 and subsequently all through 1993 during the peace
13 negotiations in Geneva.
14 Q. Now, when you drafted this succinct conclusion, was this based,
15 in part, on your personal observations, your contacts with leaders from the
16 respective parties? Was it based on reports that you had received from
17 responsible third parties? What was it based on?
18 A. It was based on all of those elements. My observations from
19 almost 12 months in UNPROFOR, my personal contacts with the political
20 leadership at the highest level. There had been many statements from
21 responsible Serb authorities, both military and political, that it was
22 their aim to carve out a republic for the Serb people within Bosnia-
23 Herzegovina; that they couldn't live with the other nationalities any
24 longer; that the Serb people had to be protected from the aggressiveness of
25 the Muslims, or the Turks, as they were called; and that there was no
1 future for a united Bosnia-Herzegovina but there was a need to establish a
2 Serb independent republic.
3 Q. Okay. Let me -- General Wilson, let me turn to a different
4 topic. You remained in Sarajevo from the 22nd of March until the 30th of
5 April, when you left the theatre for two weeks for personal business. And
6 you returned on, I believe, the 13th of May, 1992; is that correct?
7 A. That is correct.
8 Q. Can you describe to the Chamber the situation in Sarajevo when
9 you returned, and incorporate in your answer, if you would, the manner in
10 which you returned.
11 A. On the 13th of May, I travelled from Belgrade to Sarajevo by the
12 -- by road down through Bijeljina, Tuzla, in the most direct route to
14 When we arrived in Sarajevo, it was clear that there was an
15 exchange of small arms fire going on within the city and it was necessary
16 for us to negotiate our entry into the city through a Serb checkpoint. The
17 security situation in Sarajevo in the two weeks that I'd been gone had
18 significantly deteriorated. When I returned to the UNPROFOR headquarters,
19 I was briefed on the activities for the time I was away. The major event
20 which had taken place had been the evacuation of the JNA headquarters, the
21 ambushing of the evacuating convoy, and the kidnapping of President
22 Izetbegovic. These events seemed to have markedly affected the security
23 situation in Sarajevo.
24 Q. Can you describe the events on the following day, the 14th of
25 May, 1992, in Sarajevo.
1 A. On the 14th of May, very early in the morning, significant
2 hostilities broke out certainly in the immediate area of Dobrinja where I
3 was living in a civilian apartment. But from what I could observe
4 generally in the area of -- in all areas of Sarajevo. I was able to
5 observe in my immediate vicinity infantry assaults, heavy artillery
6 attacks, and employment of armoured forces. In my assessment, something in
7 the order of 5 to 10 thousand rounds of artillery would have been fired
8 into the city on that day. It was impossible to leave the building which I
9 was in, and we were forced to remain very quiet and keep a low profile
10 during the day.
11 Q. General Wilson, you describe a very large volume of artillery
12 shells being fired. Can you inform the Trial Chamber what heavy arms were
13 available to the Serbs in and around Sarajevo on the 14th of May, 1992,
14 what types of weapons.
15 A. From the effect of fire on the ground, they certainly had
16 artillery of 122-millimetre calibre, mortars of 160-millimetre, mortars of
17 82-millimetre, tank and anti-aircraft weaponry used in a ground role.
18 Q. Can you describe the type of heavy arms that were available to
19 the government Bosnian forces in Sarajevo on that day, to your knowledge.
20 A. From what I observed, the Bosnian Presidency forces were armed
21 only with small arms. I subsequently learned that they did have a small
22 number of primarily mortars, virtually no artillery, and just a few tanks.
23 They were, essentially, a lightly armed force facing a very well-armed
24 sieging force.
25 Q. Now, the -- were you able to determine the -- who was firing the
1 artillery -- the majority of the artillery shells that were coming into
3 A. I was not actually able to observe the firing positions, but it
4 was known at that time that the city was surrounded by Serb forces and by
5 at least some remaining elements of the JNA. It's very hard to say when
6 all elements of the JNA completed their withdrawal from the area, but from
7 the sophistication of the operations that were conducted at that time, I
8 suspect the JNA retained some presence in the area until at least the
9 evacuation of the last of the JNA barracks from Sarajevo.
10 Q. Did you form an opinion, General Wilson, as to the shelling of
11 Sarajevo on the 14th and in the days that immediately followed as to its --
12 as to the volume of shells, as to the targets that were used? What
13 conclusions did you reach?
14 A. I would describe the use of artillery as extensive,
15 indiscriminate, and disproportionate. I've been involved in conventional
16 military operations as a soldier, and I had never seen such weight of fire
17 used, in particular, not against civilian targets. In many cases there
18 seemed to be no military value in the targets that were selected during
19 that time of May through June of 1992.
20 Q. The result of the shelling, what -- the result of the shellings
21 of, artillery shelling, that occurred on the 14th of May, 1992 in Sarajevo,
22 what actions did UNPROFOR take?
23 A. I think there had been a decision prior to that date to relocate
24 the headquarters away from Sarajevo because it was operationally
25 impractical to continue their presence there. So on the 16th and 17th of
1 May, when UNPROFOR staff were able to leave their accommodation safely
2 around the fighting, the headquarters was evacuated to Belgrade. And as
3 indicated in your introduction to -- of me, I remained behind with a force
4 of about 80 UNPROFOR people to maintain a presence in Sarajevo.
5 Q. And I had earlier indicated that part of your mission in Sarajevo
6 was to lend the UN's good offices to assist the parties; is that correct?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Now, I'd like to turn to two incidents when you lent the good
9 offices of the United Nations to assist the parties, and the first was the
10 evacuation of JNA barracks in Sarajevo. Can you describe to the Chamber
11 how many JNA barracks there were, what their state was in May and June of
12 1992, and what the negotiations generally were about.
13 A. There were three JNA barracks within the confines of the city at
14 that time. One was Marsal Tito Barracks, the other became known as Bear
15 Camp, and the third one, which was indeed the first one to be evacuated,
16 I've forgotten the name but it was located near Hrazna [phoen].
17 The three barracks contained not a lot of fighting troops, is my
18 understanding. There were a lot of cadets, there were families, and there
19 was a large amount of equipment within those barracks. The barracks were
20 surrounded by the Bosnian Presidency forces, and there was regular sniping
21 and exchange of fire in the immediate area of those barracks. I believe
22 that essential services had been cut by the Presidency forces so that no
23 electricity or water was going into those barracks, and the JNA described
24 their circumstances there as "very uncomfortable."
25 Q. General Wilson, when did these negotiations take place,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 A. The negotiations took place approximately from mid-May until
3 about the 2nd or 3rd of June. They were led by a Finnish UN officer, a
4 Colonel Hougland, H-o-u-g-l-a-n-d. He facilitated the discussion between
5 the parties, and I occasionally attended those meetings to see what was
6 going on. My primary interface with the meetings was when a plan for
7 evacuation was agreed, that I made sure that it was a workable plan and
8 gave it my final approval.
9 Q. Can you identify for the Trial Chamber the parties to these
10 negotiations, starting with the Bosnian Serbs and then going to the JNA and
11 then going to the Bosnian government forces.
12 A. Well, the JNA were represented by a -- a JNA general. I think
13 his name was Boskovic. He was an Air Force officer, I think, with an
14 intelligence background. He was assisted by the JNA United Nations liaison
15 officer, a Colonel Kadja [phoen], I think it's pronounced.
16 For the evacuation of the Marsal Tito Barracks, which was quite a
17 large operation, General Panic, the commander of the JNA, came from
18 Belgrade and personally participated in the negotiations.
19 On the Bosnian side, the Bosnian Presidency side was led by the
20 Minister of Defence, Mr. Doka [phoen]. He was assisted by the second-in-
21 command of the army, I can't remember his name.
22 Mrs. Plavsic attended the -- the negotiations. At that time, the
23 Bosnian Presidency wouldn't negotiate with the Serb party, so it didn't
24 want to give them any political credence, but Mrs. Plavsic was acceptable,
25 I believe, because she was also a member of the Bosnian Presidency, so they
1 were happy for her to attend those negotiations.
2 General Mladic was also actively and intimately involved in those
3 negotiations, though he didn't usually attend the meetings in the PTT
4 building. We went to discuss matters with him in Lukavica.
5 Q. During these negotiations, General Wilson, did you have frequent
6 contact with the parties to these negotiations?
7 A. Yes, I did on a daily basis. I certainly saw Mrs. Plavsic,
8 General Boskovic, et cetera, on a daily basis and --
9 Q. Can you just quickly summarise, if you will, completely summarise
10 the respective positions of the parties at these negotiations.
11 A. The JNA position was to effect the immediate evacuation of their
12 forces at any cost as quickly as possible. The Presidency position was to
13 bargain for the release of these forces to obtain arms and ammunition and
14 concessions for humanitarian activity within the city. The Bosnian Serb
15 position was to effect the release of the -- of the JNA from those
16 barracks, but not at the expense of having to hand over weaponry to the
17 Presidency forces. General Mladic was particularly strong on this issue of
18 not handing over weapons.
19 Q. During the course of these negotiations, did you have an
20 opportunity to gain insight into the thinking of Mrs. Plavsic and General
21 Mladic as to the positions that they represented, they advocated for their
22 -- their people?
23 A. Yes. Both -- both Mrs. Plavsic and General Mladic restated
24 issues that had been said many times before about the threat to the Serb
25 people, the need to defend them, the need to establish a separate Serb
1 state, the fact that military operations were solely intended to protect
2 the Serb people or to defend the military forces that were deployed.
3 Q. Did they express their views about the Muslim and the --
4 actually, about the non-Serb populations during these negotiations to you
6 A. Not actually during the negotiations, but as an aside or perhaps
7 related to other issues, yes. I'd be repeating myself, but certainly their
8 concern was the advancement of the interests of the Serb people, the
9 defence of the Serb people, and the fact that they were threatened by the
10 non-Serb population.
11 Q. And very briefly, just to close this part of your evidence, how
12 did these -- these negotiations end? What was the result of these
13 negotiations? Don't dwell on it, but just briefly tell the Court how these
15 A. Two of the barracks, Marsal Tito and the first one, were
16 successfully evacuated. The other barracks, which became known as Bear
17 Camp, was a poorly executed operation and resulted in some 30 people
18 missing. Whether they were actually killed or not, we're not sure, but
19 there was significant difficutly with that operation due to poor planning
20 and execution.
21 Q. Now, you also participated in a second set of negotiations where
22 the UN lent its good offices, and that dealt with the negotiations to open
23 the Sarajevo airport. Can you tell the Judges when those negotiations took
24 place, General Wilson.
25 A. Those negotiations took place between approximately the 2nd and
1 the 5th of June, 1992.
2 Q. Can you tell the Judges, in general terms, the purpose of those
4 A. The purpose was to open the Sarajevo -- Sarajevo airport so that
5 humanitarian supplies and relief could be brought to the city of Sarajevo
6 and the surrounding area.
7 Q. Who controlled the airport at the time those negotiations took
9 A. That's difficult to say accurately. It was a combination of the
10 -- the Bosnian Serb forces and the JNA. I suspect the JNA still had a
11 heavy presence there.
12 Q. Can you identify, General Wilson, the persons from the
13 international community who participated in these negotiations?
14 A. Mr. Cedric Thornbury, who was the senior political officer from
15 UNPROFOR, came down from Belgrade, I think on the 2nd of June, the 1st or
16 the 2nd of June. I acted as his -- the military participant in that team,
17 negotiating team.
18 Occasionally, the local civil affairs officer, Mr. Razek, I think
19 his name was, and my staff officer, an Irish commandant, Murphy, attended
20 those meetings.
21 Q. Who represented the Bosnian Serbs in those negotiations?
22 A. The Bosnian Serbs were initially represented by Mr. Karadzic,
23 Mrs. Plavsic, and General Mladic.
24 Q. Did other political figures later appear in those -- at those
25 negotiations from the Bosnian Serb side?
1 A. On the last day of the negotiations, the 5th of June, Mr.
2 Koljevic -- I've got a mental blank here.
3 Q. Did Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Krajisnik appear?
4 A. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm sorry. He attended on the last day.
5 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, Mr. Harmon's function is not to
6 fill in mental blanks that the witness expressly acknowledges.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon.
8 MR. HARMON: Well, Your Honour, I think there is no dispute about
9 who attended these meetings, because I'm going to examine General Wilson at
10 length about his contacts with Mr. Krajisnik at these meetings. The fact
11 that he had a temporary blank, it seems perfectly proper that I can assist
12 him with that.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. He mentioned a name of Mr. Koljevic, more
14 prudence and caution should have been taken before you suggested the name
15 of Mr. Krajisnik. Because it -- although it does not appear on the
16 transcript, it's my recollection that you then introduced after the witness
17 told us about Mr. Kojevic that you asked him about Mr. Krajisnik's
19 MR. HARMON: That's correct, I did ask him about Mr. Krajisnik's
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it does not appear on the transcript before Mr.
22 Stewart interfered.
23 MR. STEWART: The word is not interfered, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: No, intervened.
25 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Interference is --
2 MR. STEWART: I accept it entirely, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, Mr. Harmon, I think it's clear that you
4 should have taken more caution there to -- to elicit from the witness the
5 possible presence of other persons, rather than to introduce one that you
6 might have thought that could have been present.
7 Please proceed.
8 MR. HARMON:
9 Q. General Wilson, can you briefly summarise for the Chamber the
10 issues in dispute in respect of opening the Sarajevo airport.
11 A. Firstly, the -- the Presidency refused to meet with the Bosnian
12 Serb party to -- in any of the negotiations. So it was a question of
13 shuttle diplomacy between the Lukavica military base and the Presidency
14 building. The Presidency position was that not only the -- that the
15 airport should be open, but that all Serb heavy weapons should be withdrawn
16 out of range of Sarajevo.
17 The Serb position was that if they were to hand over the airport,
18 they would, in a practical way, like to continue to -- to actually control
19 it. And during the negotiations, in fact right up until the eleventh hour,
20 the Serbs were making proposals and counterproposals which would, while
21 supposedly discreet, would in effect leave them in actual control of the
22 airport. It was only when Mr. Cedric Thornbury said that such proposals
23 were totally unacceptable and that the negotiations couldn't proceed that
24 the Serb side finally gave ground and agreed that the airport could be
25 handed over to the UN in accordance with an agreement which was signed by
1 both parties but on separate bits of paper on the 5th of June.
2 Q. Was the airport negotiations the first opportunity you had to
3 meet Mr. Krajisnik?
4 A. I might have met Mr. Krajisnik in my first few days in Sarajevo
5 when we were -- when principal staff of UNPROFOR were received by and
6 introduced to the members of the Bosnian Presidency, but I don't remember
7 him then. I do remember him appearing on the last day of the airport
9 Q. Can you describe his role in these negotiations?
10 A. He was central to the negotiations. He was quite clearly, by the
11 group dynamics involved, he was closely consulted. He was involved in
12 discussions to the side when there were breaks. In my view, he was quite
13 central to the final agreement that the airport could be handed over to the
15 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'm going to switch into a different
16 topic and it's four minutes remaining.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps we could have an early break then.
18 We'll adjourn until ten minutes past 4.00.
19 --- Recess taken at 3.43 p.m.
20 --- On resuming at 4.19 p.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.
22 MR. HARMON:
23 Q. General Wilson, let's continue with our discussion about the
24 airport negotiations. When you were involved in these negotiations, did
25 you have the opportunity again to hear the positions of the Bosnian Serbs
1 reiterated to you? I'm talking about the positions in respect of the non-
2 Serb population, the territorial ambitions of the Bosnian Serbs, and
3 discussions that you've described earlier in your testimony.
4 A. I can't specifically remember whether it was raised, but in all
5 of those types of meetings, that sort of issue was reiterated many times
7 Q. Now, during the discussions in the airport negotiations, did you
8 have a discussion with Mrs. Plavsic in respect of the detention of
10 A. Yes, I did. I had received reports and a representation from the
11 Bosnian Presidency that there were -- civilian prisoners had been taken to
12 an area to the south of Sarajevo and were detained in a railway tunnel or a
13 road tunnel and they were concerned that some harm would come to these
14 people and asked me to raise it with Mrs. Plavsic. I did raise this matter
15 with her, and she acknowledged the fact that the Bosnian Serbs did hold
16 prisoners, but she said that they were people of military age and they were
17 arrested so that they would not participate in the fighting and that they
18 were well treated for. She made counter-allegations that the Bosnian
19 Presidency were holding prisoners, in effect, in the cellar of the
20 Presidency building.
21 In both of these incidents I offered to follow up and
22 investigate, but whenever it came to the practical -- the practicalities of
23 visiting these locations, there were always obstacles put into place -- in
24 our place. Since it was not directly within my mandate anyway to pursue
25 these matters with vigour and there were other priorities, I never got
1 around to visiting these locations.
2 Q. Your evidence, General Wilson, was that she did acknowledge that
3 the Bosnian Serbs held prisoners. Were you discussing prisoners of war or
4 were you discussing civilians?
5 A. I would raise the issue of her with civilians, and she countered
6 that by narrowing it down to saying that they were holding people of
7 military age to take them out of the fighting. It was a pre-emptive
9 Q. Okay. Now, during these discussions, did you have an opportunity
10 to observe, generally, the relationship of the political leaders in the
11 airport negotiations with General Mladic?
12 A. Yes, I did.
13 Q. And can you describe to the Judges what the relationship was
14 overall between General Mladic and the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership.
15 A. It seemed to be a very comfortable relationship. They were
16 relaxed in each other's company. There was a free exchange of information.
17 General Mladic was not afraid to disagree with members of the political
18 leadership, but in the end, he -- he claimed that he was subordinate to
19 political leadership and followed their direction.
20 Q. AT one point in these negotiations did there become an animated
21 disagreement between General Mladic and Karadzic?
22 A. Yes. The negotiation over the airport went on for about three
23 days with proposals, counterproposals, and an evident reluctance by General
24 Mladic to hand over the airport. He claimed that the Serb forces had
25 fought and died for that territory and that he couldn't give it up; these
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 soldiers would find that unacceptable. So he was somewhat inflexible on
3 Come the last day of the negotiations, it was clear that unless
4 the Serb side made significant concessions in their bargaining position no
5 agreement would be reached. On that last day, Dr. Karadzic took Mr. --
6 General Mladic out of the room, evidently to the room next door, and one
7 could hear a violent argument between the two of them. When they cam came
8 back into the room, Dr. Karadzic announced that the Serb side was prepared
9 to accept the agreement and Mladic no longer raised any objections to it.
10 Q. At some point in time, General Wilson, during these discussions
11 on the airport did you ask General Mladic directly about his relationship
12 to the political leadership?
13 A. Yes, I did, on a number of occasions from late May and through
14 the airport negotiations. I asked General Mladic whether he was
15 subordinate to and responsible -- and responsive to the political
16 leadership. He stated on at least three occasions that he was. The reason
17 I raised those issues was there were some concern from the JNA
18 representatives at the barracks negotiations that Mladic was out of control
19 and acting independently and irrationally. He made it quite clear to me on
20 a number of occasions that he was -- that he was responsible or responsive
21 to his political leadership.
22 Q. Now, if I could turn to the next exhibit, which is a new exhibit.
23 It is the outgoing -- it's entitled "Outgoing crypto fax," dated the 25th
24 of May, 1992, "Record of discussion with Mrs. Plavsic and Lieutenant-
25 General Mladic," dated 25 May 1992.
1 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecution Exhibit P721.
2 MR. HARMON:
3 Q. General Wilson, this is an exhibit that I showed you prior to
4 coming into court; is that correct?
5 A. It is, Counsel.
6 Q. And is this a record that you prepared?
7 A. I personally drafted this document.
8 Q. This document reflects a meeting that took place between
9 yourself, Abdel Razek, Commander -- "CMDT," is that commander or
11 A. Commandant.
12 Q. Commandant Murphy, between yourself -- between those parties and
13 General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic at the Lukavica barracks.
14 In the -- this document, just before we enter into it and explore
15 it in greater detail, in paragraph 1 the initials "CMO" appear. What do
16 those stand for?
17 A. They mean "chief military observer," and that refers to my
18 appointment as the chief military observer UNPROFOR.
19 Q. Now, from this first paragraph in this document, it appears that
20 the meeting was initially to take place between -- with Mrs. Plavsic only;
21 is that correct?
22 A. That's correct.
23 Q. And the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the opening of the
24 Sarajevo airport for humanitarian aid; correct?
25 A. As I recall, yes.
1 Q. Now, if we turn to paragraph 2 in this document. If you'd cast
2 your eye on paragraph 2, I'm going to direct your attention to a part of
4 A little below midway through that paragraph it says: "The
5 evacuation had to be completed in three days or strong action would be
6 taken against Sarajevo." Can you explain what that sentence means.
7 A. This was a threat made by General Mladic that if the barracks
8 were not evacuated within three days, that he would generally engage the
9 city of Sarajevo with heavy artillery fire. He asked that this be passed
10 to the members of the Presidency. He was very impatient about the
11 evacuation of the barracks and not really prepared to waste time on
12 negotiation. He wanted action.
13 Q. And having experienced the intensive artillery barrage on the
14 14th of May, 1992, did you take that threat seriously?
15 A. I did. General Mladic was well known for carrying out what he
16 said he would do, good and bad.
17 Q. If you direct your attention to paragraph 3, the first sentence,
18 please. It says, and I quote: "International military intervention could
19 only bring catastrophe on Sarajevo as, in a military operation, Sarajevo
20 would be levelled." Explain that sentence, if you would, please.
21 A. There was discussion in the international media at that time that
22 unless the Serbs moderated their behaviour, and in particular opened up the
23 Sarajevo airport, that NATO might initiate airstrikes against the -- the
24 Bosnian Serbs. I think at this stage General Mladic is displaying some
25 bravado saying that such action would only have negative impact upon the
1 general situation.
2 Q. Now, if we turn -- can I turn your attention to paragraph 7 of
3 the document. And earlier in your testimony, General Wilson, you said that
4 you had asked General Mladic on a number of occasions to whom he was
5 responsive. Let me read paragraph 7 of this into the record.
6 "In reply to a CMO question, the general denied that he had
7 imposed martial law in BH and said that he was subordinate to the political
8 leadership of the so-called Serbia Republic of Bosnia."
9 Is this one of the occasions that you referred to earlier in your
10 testimony where he made such a statement?
11 A. Yes, it is indeed.
12 Q. He made this statement in the presence of Mrs. Plavsic, did he?
13 A. Yes, he did.
14 Q. Now, let me turn to another exhibit, which will be the next new
15 exhibit in order. And I -- if I can have a number for that, please. It is
16 a -- it is an outgoing crypto fax dated the 30th of May, 1992.
17 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecution Exhibit P722.
18 MR. HARMON:
19 Q. General Wilson, do you have a copy of that document in front of
21 A. I do indeed, Counsellor.
22 Q. And did you have an opportunity to see this document prior to
23 coming into court today?
24 A. Yes, I did.
25 Q. Did you prepare this document?
1 A. I personally drafted this document.
2 Q. This document, for the record, is dated the 30th of May, 1992,
3 and the subject is a record of a meeting between Colonel Wilson and General
4 Mladic. And this --
5 MR. STEWART: If Mr. Harmon could bear in mind this hasn't been
6 translated either. So again, the same request that we go at a suitable
8 MR. HARMON: Yes.
9 MR. STEWART: To enable Mr. Krajisnik to --
10 MR. HARMON: Yes. I intend to read parts of this. The previous
11 document was translated. This document, when I get to the text, I will
12 read it just like I was reading the caption before Mr. Stewart intervened.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I even see Dutch on the document to be
14 translated, Mr. Harmon, on the cover page. But -- the word
15 "Werkexemplaar." I expect you to read slowly if you come to any specific
16 portion of the document.
17 MR. HARMON:
18 Q. Now, turning our attention to paragraph 1, I will read the first
20 "This meeting was requested by CMO to convey the secretary-
21 general appeal to General Mladic. Code table MSC-369 refers."
22 Now, what was -- what's referenced in that particular paragraph?
23 A. I don't know the exact contents of that particular code table,
24 but I presume it was an appeal from the secretary-general to the Serb
25 forces to moderate their behaviour in Sarajevo and, in particular, to
1 facilitate the opening of the -- the Sarajevo airport.
2 Q. Okay. If we -- if we turn to paragraph 5 of the document, which
3 I'll read into the record. "When asked for confirmation of his president's
4 offer to withdraw all heavy weapons outside of range to Sarajevo, he said
5 that he had no knowledge of such an offer but would give his advice to his
6 government and abide by any agreement made."
7 Can you comment on this particular paragraph in respect of
8 General Mladic's position in respect of the civilian authorities?
9 A. This is, once again, a reaffirmation of his position that he was
10 responsive to and subordinate to political leadership. In this case here
11 he's using it as a -- a delaying tactic because he's probably unaware of
12 the detail of the offer made by Dr. Karadzic in regard to withdrawal of
13 heavy weapons and the opening of the Sarajevo airport, or if he is aware of
14 it, he's not prepared to discuss it in this forum.
15 Q. General Wilson, based on your personal contacts with General
16 Mladic, your observations of General Mladic's interactions with --
17 MR. HARMON: Pardon me. There seems to be some ... let me start
19 Q. General Mladic -- General Wilson, I'm sorry -- General Wilson,
20 based on your observations of the VRS, General Mladic's interactions with
21 the Bosnian Serb political leadership, comments made to you by General
22 Mladic, can you -- did you reach conclusions about the responsiveness of
23 the Bosnian Serb army to the political leadership in 1992?
24 A. Yes. General Mladic is a very strong personality, but
25 nevertheless -- and I guess capable of independent action, but the bottom
1 line is that he did what his political masters told him to do.
2 Q. And let me -- if I could turn to an exhibit that has been
3 previously introduced.
4 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, this is from Prosecution Exhibit 64.
5 And I would have taken -- it's a lengthy document, it's 150-plus pages.
6 I've excerpted two pages which I -- from this exhibit which I will ask to
7 be exhibited.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I take it it's a certain tab from 64. Tab 29, Madam
9 Registrar tells me -- 529.
10 MR. HARMON:
11 Q. General Wilson, do you have a copy of the document in front of
13 A. I do.
14 Q. Did I give you an opportunity to review the analysis of combat
15 readiness and activities of the Army of the RS document, a lengthy
16 document, that was dated the 5th of April, 1993?
17 A. Yes, you did.
18 Q. And have you had an opportunity to review the portion of the
19 document that I'm presenting to you at this point?
20 A. Yes, I did read this -- this part of the document.
21 Q. Now, this document that is before you is pages 152 and pages 153
22 from the document I've described earlier, and it is captioned "The
23 concluding remarks, the findings of the analysis of the combat readiness
24 and activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska in 1992." It is dated
25 at the end of page 153 "Han Pijesak, 5 April 1993, Supreme Commander of the
1 Armed Forces of Republika Srpska, Dr. Radovan Karadzic."
2 And I would like to read into the record and then ask you to
3 comment on the second paragraph of paragraph 4. So if I can direct your
4 attention there, General Wilson. I will slowly read into the record that
6 "The Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska has performed the
7 functions of the Staff of the Supreme Command and at the same time that of
8 the superior command for operational and some joint tactical formations,
9 which presupposed the agreement of the Supreme Command in respect of all
10 tasks and objectives of the armed struggle. This relationship between the
11 command structures and the organs of government and the Supreme Command
12 made it impossible for the Main Staff to make decisions absolutely on its
13 own, rather every operational battle was politically endorsed on the basis
14 of the interests of the Serb people and approved by the highest authorities
15 of Republika Srpska."
16 Now, can you comment on the contents of this particular
17 paragraph which I have read, in particular in relation to the relationship
18 between the Army of the Republika Srpska and the political structures of
19 the Bosnian Serb Republic.
20 A. This makes it quite clear to me that all military operations were
21 conducted in accordance with political direction and objectives, and that
22 there was no authority for independent action by the military staff to take
23 any decisions or -- or direct operations other than those approved by the
24 political authority. This is made in retrospect, so it's a summary of what
25 had happened during 1992.
1 Q. And is this consistent with your personal observations, General
3 A. It's certainly consistent with my discussions with General
4 Mladic, who said that he, as the military commander, was subject to
5 political control.
6 Q. Thank you. I've concluded with that exhibit, General Wilson.
7 Now, General Wilson, I'd like to turn your attention to the next
8 occasions when you saw and met with Mr. Krajisnik. When was that?
9 A. I believe the next time I met Mr. Krajisnik was in Geneva during
10 the period December/January of 1992/1993, when I was military advisor to
11 Mr. Cyrus Vance at the peace conference in Geneva, and Mr. Krajisnik
12 attended as part of the Serb delegation.
13 Q. So these were the -- this was the international conference on the
14 former Yugoslavia in Geneva.
15 A. Yes, it was.
16 Q. Now, what was your specific role in that? You mentioned you were
17 a political advisor to former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Did you have
18 another role as well?
19 A. He was actually the military advisor.
20 Q. I'm sorry.
21 A. And my secondary role was to act as liason officer with UNPROFOR.
22 So I was the conduit from Mr. Vance and later Mr. Stoltenberg.
23 Q. How long did you participate in those roles in the international
24 conference for the former Yugoslavia?
25 A. I was assigned to the conference for almost exactly one year,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 from mid-December, 1992 until the 1st of December, 1993.
2 Q. Can you identify who the Bosnian Serb negotiators were at that
4 A. The Serb delegation varied over time. For most of the
5 negotiations, only a small party were present, but they were led by Dr.
6 Karadzic, but also in attendance on occasions was General Mladic, but not
7 frequently. Mr. Krajisnik was frequently there. I have -- I don't recall
8 the frequency with which Mrs. Plavsic or Mr. Koljevic may or may not have
9 attended. They -- they were the principal officers representing the Serb
11 Q. Did you have an opportunity to meet with Mr. Krajisnik or to
12 observe Mr. Krajisnik during the course of those negotiations?
13 A. I would say that I never really met with Mr. Krajisnik, but I was
14 present in the room with him on many occasions. I was able to observe the
15 negotiations. Usually I did not sit at the table but sat at a chair
16 behind, and I was able to observe and take notes on what was happening
17 during those negotiations.
18 Q. And did you, as part of your advice capacity and part of your
19 observations, did you take the measure of the various negotiators?
20 A. I did. That was one of the responsibilities of those observers,
21 that you were to take notes to make sure that at the end of the day when
22 reports had to be written up that all matters were covered, and part of
23 that debriefing process was the participation of the various negotiators
24 and an assessment of what their role was.
25 Q. Can you describe the role of Mr. Krajisnik as you observed it and
1 as you assessed it.
2 A. Mr. Krajisnik did not have a lot to say, I assume this is because
3 he didn't speak English. But certainly he was very carefully consulted by
4 Mr. Karadzic or Dr. Karadzic. He sat at a central part of the table, and
5 he seemed to be a very important member of the delegation.
6 Q. Throughout these negotiations, either formally or in informal
7 conversations, did the Bosnian Serbs set forth their positions in respect
8 of their territorial ambitions, their territorial objectives and their
9 views toward non-Serbs?
10 A. Yes, they did. They clearly stated their position and in great
11 detail. When it came to negotiating over the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
12 how the territory might be divided up into different ethnic identities
13 there was a great deal of argument, supporting argument, for the division,
14 and there was a continual restatement of the Serb concerns for their safety
15 of their people, the need for a republic, et cetera.
16 Q. What did they say in respect of living -- the ability to live
17 with non-Serbs?
18 A. Well, at various times, they indicated that it was no longer
19 possible for the three nations to continue to live together in harmony in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina and it was necessary to physically and politically
21 separate the nations, otherwise the Serb people would continue to live
22 under threat, and that this was no longer a viable solution for them.
23 Q. Was that a uniform Serb position that was taken by the
24 negotiators on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs?
25 A. Yes, it was. It was repeatedly stated at many, many meetings.
1 Q. Now, at the -- these negotiations, who were the main negotiators
2 for the international community?
3 A. This depended upon the topic, but certainly Mr. Cyrus Vance
4 initially in the period December to -- of 1992 until approximately May of
5 1993, he really led the negotiations on behalf of the international
6 community. And then in the period after May 1993, Lord Owen really was the
7 intellectual leader of the -- the conference.
8 Mr. Stoltenberg, when he arrived, played more of a support role
9 to Lord Owen, but there were also a number of ambassadors attached to the
10 conference who led individual negotiations on smaller topics. But on the
11 issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was generally the co-chairman who led the
13 Q. At these negotiations, were the Bosnian Serb leaders confronted
14 with accusations of ethnic cleansing?
15 A. Could you repeat the question, please.
16 Q. At these negotiations, were the Bosnian Serbs confronted by
17 claims -- confronted by the co-chairman or by others who were conducting
18 the negotiations about claims of ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbs in
20 A. Yes, they were. This was a -- my understanding is this was a
21 frequent topic. Lord Owen, on occasions when negotiations were not
22 progressing smoothly, would sometimes lecture the participants on their
23 conduct and on their -- on their conduct and their failure to respect human
24 -- human rights. He was very forthright in this regard. It was like an
25 irritated headmaster talking to an errant schoolboy and there was not much
1 diplomacy involved.
2 Q. In other words, he was blunt and direct; is that correct?
3 A. Exactly.
4 Q. Did the Bosnian Serbs have at their disposal interpreters when
5 these -- when Lord Owen and others made such accusations?
6 A. Yes, they did. During central forums interpreters were usually
7 provided by the United Nations; however, in the more common smaller working
8 groups, the parties usually brought their own interpreters.
9 Q. Did it appear to you that -- oh, sorry. Did it appear to you
10 that the Bosnian Serbs understood Lord Owen when he was making those
11 accusations and understood the accusations made by others about ethnic
13 A. Dr. Karadzic understood English very well and Lord Owen's address
14 was made in English, or certainly made in the presence of all of the Serb
15 delegation. Whether it was translated for them into Serbian Croat, I can't
17 Q. What was the reaction of Dr. Karadzic to such claims?
18 A. Usually a -- a restatement of the need to defend the Serb people,
19 the need for a Serb republic. The circumstances were actually quite
20 embarrassing for Dr. Karadzic, and I guess his delegation, because Lord
21 Owen was very direct in what he said and used very blunt language, so there
22 was an air of embarrassment. But essentially, the Serb party responded by
23 restating their position.
24 Q. Let me -- maybe you can help the Trial Chamber understand this.
25 How was it or when did -- actually let me withdraw that.
1 The discussions that took place at the conference involved
2 discussions about territory; is that correct?
3 A. That was one of the issues. The other significant one was a
4 constitution that the new political entity could use.
5 Q. Let us focus on the questions of the territory. Can you just
6 inform the Court, when certain parts of the territory were under discussion
7 did the issue arise about ethnic cleansing in the context of those
9 A. I'm not exactly sure what you mean by that question.
10 Q. Okay.
11 A. Could you restate it or rephrase it, please.
12 Q. Were there certain boundary lines that were established that were
13 under discussion in those negotiations?
14 A. About 80, 85 per cent of the division was broadly agreed by the
15 three parties as being an acceptable solution, if there needed to be a
16 division. The argument was really about 10 or 15 per cent. And the
17 discussions were done in considerable detail with the benefit of the
18 various census that had been done by the former Yugoslavia -- the
19 government of the former Yugoslavia in that area. There were quite
20 detailed arguments about historical claims to quite small geographic areas.
21 When the co-chairman would indicate that an area which was claimed by -- by
22 one party might contain a significant minority from another nation or
23 group, all three parties seemed quite comfortable with the idea of
24 relocating large numbers of people from those contested areas. There was
25 never any really denial of facts on the ground that areas had -- no longer
1 had their original population, that there had been already in the process
2 of the war ethnic cleansing or relocation of population.
3 Q. Now, you stayed in those negotiations through December of
4 1993; is that correct, General Wilson?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. Now, based on your contacts with Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Karadzic,
7 Mrs. Plavsic, Mr. Koljevic, based on information at your disposal, did you
8 form an opinion as to the hierarchical relationship amongst the Bosnian
9 Serb leadership?
10 A. Yes, I did.
11 Q. And what were your conclusions in respect of that leadership?
12 A. I believe that Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik were the principal
13 political power or authority within that grouping. Though while Mrs.
14 Plavsic and Mr. Koljevic may well have had some political authority, on the
15 real issues, the important issues, was Mr. Krajisnik and Dr. Karadzic who
16 had the significant say. I think General Mladic probably had significant
17 input too on a -- not only on the military side, but perhaps in influencing
18 political outcomes. The short answer, I think, the political leadership
19 was dominated by Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik.
20 MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, General Wilson. I have no
21 additional questions.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.
23 Mr. Stewart, is it -- I am informed that if you now start your
24 cross-examination, that we might finish tomorrow for a considerable time,
25 not having any further witnesses. Mr. Harmon, is that a correct
2 MR. HARMON: Sorry, I -- Your Honour, I had trouble hearing you.
3 I'm sorry.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Do I understand that your next witness would
5 not be available until Thursday?
6 MR. HARMON: That's correct.
7 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore --
8 MR. HARMON: That's correct.
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- there's no specific need at this moment to start
10 your cross-examination, Mr. Stewart, where usually the Chamber insists on
11 continuing, there might be less reason to do so at this very moment.
12 Therefore, my question to you is whether you'd like to start your cross-
13 examination now or whether you'd prefer to start it tomorrow morning.
14 MR. STEWART: Yes. I -- Your Honour, I think it's the afternoon.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. STEWART: But the -- the answer with that adjustment, the
17 answer to Your Honour's question is I would prefer to start it tomorrow.
18 Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Wilson, you may have noticed that I
20 address you as Mr. Wilson and not as General Wilson as many do. That's
21 merely an expression of whatever witness here, in whatever capacity he
22 works outside, is here to testify -- to assist the Chamber to find the
23 truth and that it's -- it's not any disrespect of your position.
24 You've heard that the Defence would prefer to start to cross-
25 examining you tomorrow.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber grants the request of the Defence. That
3 means that we'd like to see you back tomorrow at quarter past 2.00 in the
4 afternoon. I'd like to instruct you not to speak with anyone about the
5 testimony you have given or you still are about to give.
6 Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr. Wilson out of the
8 [The witness stands down]
9 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Since we have some time left but we also have some
11 time left tomorrow, I'd like to address two matters at this moment and a
12 few other procedural matters tomorrow.
13 Since I take it, Mr. Stewart, that you would not need the whole
14 morning for -- the whole afternoon for cross-examination.
15 MR. STEWART: I don't think so, Your Honour. No.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: The first thing I'd like to bring to the attention
19 of the parties has to do with the procedure for examining expert witnesses.
20 This Chamber is not inclined to set a new Guinness Book of Records standard
21 for who goes quickest through the most documents in one hour. The
22 experience this Chamber has gained with 18 binders in three days or 12
23 binders in one day and a half does not encourage the Chamber to proceed in
24 the same way in this respect. Therefore, I'd like to give some guidance on
25 the procedure for examining expert witnesses. I'll do it by giving you six
2 If the parties, who have not been consulted on these points,
3 would like to briefly respond tomorrow when we have some time available for
4 procedural matters, they will be allowed to do so.
5 Point 1: Following affirmation of the witness as an expert
6 witness, the central item of evidence is the expert's report.
7 2: The Prosecution is instructed to limit its examination to
8 matters of central importance to the case which are likely to be
9 controversial and which require further explanation, clarification, or
10 illustration in terms of how the opinion was arrived at by the expert.
11 3: Limit on exhibits by the Prosecution. The Prosecution is
12 invited to tender documents referred to in the expert report which are
13 necessary to achieve the purpose of point 2 and, in re-examination, to deal
14 with matters raised in cross-examination.
15 4: Use of exhibits by the Defence. The Defence may introduce
16 into evidence, in addition to any of its own documents, any supporting
17 documents referred to in the expert report which have not yet been admitted
18 and on which the Defence relies in cross-examination.
19 5. All remaining documentation underlying the expert report will
20 not be admitted into evidence unless one of the parties, showing good cause
21 in light of the above, or the Chamber itself, specifically requests so.
22 6. In relation to point 5, the parties are referred to the
23 Chamber's guidance to the parties delivered orally on the 1st of March of
24 this year and on the 27th April 2005, the transcript references being
25 transcript page 9606 and for the 27th of April, 12754.
1 Then the next issue is, Mr. Stewart, the Chamber owes you a
2 response to a request made in relation to the scheduling of 98 bis matters.
3 The Chamber recalls that at a recent housekeeping session on the
4 27th of April of this year you, Mr. Stewart, expressed your concern that
5 the date set by the April scheduling order for the Defence's Rule 98 bis
6 submissions comes too close to the tail end of the summer recess. Mr.
7 Stewart, you suggested that much, if not all, of the summer recess would
8 therefore have to be given over to preparations for 98 bis submissions and
9 that members of the Defence team would all -- would as a result have little
10 or no time to take vacation.
11 Mr. Stewart, you requested the Chamber to comment on this
12 concern, and I promised you that we would do so.
13 The scheduling order of the 26th of April, 2005 has the
14 Prosecution's case closing on or before the 22nd of July, 2005. At this
15 stage, we don't know when the Prosecution's case will actually close, so to
16 that extent, Mr. Stewart, your application is somewhat premature, but I'm
17 going to assume for argument's sake that the Prosecution's case does close
18 on the 22nd of July, as scheduled.
19 There are 16 working days in the period after the 22nd of July
20 and before the 16th of August. The 16th of August is the day reserved for
21 oral submissions on the acquittal motion, assuming that there is one. The
22 Chamber was never under the impression that the Defence team would spend
23 all 16 work days of the summer recess working on their 98 bis submissions.
24 This is because the 98 bis procedure, as it was amended last year, is not
25 the work-intensive milestone it once used to be. The Rule was amended
1 precisely with the aim of keeping the milestone in place while reducing the
2 workload that had come to be associated with it.
3 The Chamber is not expecting, and indeed will not accept, any
4 written submissions on the 98 bis motion. The Defence is simply to notify
5 the Chamber and the Prosecution at the close of the Prosecution's case
6 whether it intends to move for acquittal. This may be done orally, or by
7 e-mail, and no reasons need to be given at that stage. If the Defence
8 notifies the Chamber of its intention to move for acquittal, it will be
9 invited to do so orally on the 16th of August. There will be an
10 opportunity for an oral response from the Prosecution. The Chamber will
11 then decide the matter, again orally, within three days.
12 The new oral format of the 98 bis procedure changes the nature of
13 the preparation required, while not in any way diminishing the Chamber's
14 responsibility to make a considered decision. If the Defence intends to
15 move for acquittal, it should begin already now to develop the points it
16 wishes to make come the 16th of August. There is no reason to wait for the
17 Prosecution's last witness to be heard before such an exercise may start.
18 Indeed, by the time of the last Prosecution witness, the Defence should be
19 aiming to be finalising any 98 bis submissions it intends to make.
20 The same is true also of the Prosecution, which under the new
21 procedure is effectively obliged to anticipate the Defence arguments and
22 respond to them within a very short time frame. In the present case, the
23 Prosecution must be prepared to respond to the Defence on the very same day
24 it hears the Defence's submissions. I think it is clear, therefore, that
25 the amended 98 bis procedure obliges both parties and, for that matter, the
1 Chamber, to think about the midpoint review well in advance of the date of
2 the review.
3 On the understanding that the 98 bis procedure cannot be a last-
4 minute exercise, it follows in the Chamber's mind that the 98 bis dates
5 which have been set by the scheduling order are reasonable.
6 This, Mr. Stewart, concludes my remarks on your observation or
7 application for an answer.
8 We will adjourn until tomorrow in the afternoon, quarter past
9 2.00 in this same courtroom and expect you then to start cross-examination,
10 Mr. Stewart.
11 We'll adjourn.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.15 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of
14 May, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.