1 Tuesday, 12 July 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honours. This is case number
7 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
9 Mr. Harmon, before I invite you to continue the examination of
10 the expert Brown, Judge Hanoteau would like to address you.
11 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Good morning -- or rather, good afternoon, Mr.
12 Prosecutor. I follow with great attention what was said yesterday. I said
13 that it was very fast; things are going fast. Maybe sometimes a little bit
14 too fast. What I wanted to ask you is the following: I was wondering if
15 you thought of asking or raising a certain number of issues that would
16 interest me, and I hope that you will not be surprised. I would like to
17 tell you which issues I would like you to ask questions about -- rather, I
18 would like you to ask certain clarifications from that witness.
19 This expert report was given to us. I read it with a great deal
20 of attention, and there are some points on which I would like to get some
21 clarification from the witness, also to develop a bit more. A report,
22 being a report, is a written document; it is a document that was pondered
23 upon. And this is why I would like to get some further clarifications or
24 some development. I would like him to develop on various topics. And with
25 your permission, if you will allow me, I would like you to take down what I
1 would like you to ask.
2 In the report, there was a great deal of attention about the
3 detention camp and of the way the roles between the police and the army --
4 the role was shared as to the control of these detention camps.
5 The second point being the following: the second point that I am
6 particularly interested in but the Chamber, as well, because we do discuss
7 this when we meet outside of the courtroom: I would like to know what was
8 the role of the paramilitary formations and those various groups, which
9 role they played, and I would like to know a bit more on the exact position
10 that the regular army had with respect to those paramilitary groups.
11 In the report, we can read that some command officers were
12 hesitant somewhat, and I would like to get more clarification on this. In
13 that same chapter, I would like to understand if the army had to report to
14 the civilian authorities, and if they were telling the civilian authorities
15 what difficulties can these paramilitary groups cause.
16 The third point is the following: In this report, we see how
17 there was a division between ethnic groups. It is said in the report that
18 the soldiers, the military, was -- or they were involved greatly in the
19 division. There's also a certain mention of reactions of military
20 authorities with respect to this policy of ethnic division, and I would
21 like you to develop on this, as well. And I -- rest assured I have one
22 last point, Mr. Prosecutor. In this report, we can see that there were
23 some unrests in the army and that some people who were captured were
24 killed. We can call them incidents, if you will. But I would like to know
25 what the expert has to say on the reactions that the military authorities
1 had with respect to that, to what happened. So I hope, Mr. Prosecutor,
2 that those are the points that you will be able to elaborate on with the
3 expert. I do not know what your strategy is; I also do not know what your
4 agenda is and what you had planned to do today. I took the liberty - with
5 the authorisation, of course, by the President of the Chamber - I took the
6 liberty to call your attention on this, on those points which for me are
7 real important issues.
8 Thank you very much for your attention.
9 MR. HARMON: Judge Hanoteau, thank you very much. It is my
10 intention today to cover all of those topics.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Usher, could you -- yes.
12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And one last point, and, in
13 fact, before we resume, I would like to ask the witness to give me a
14 clarification, with your permission, of course, Mr. President, and Mr.
15 Prosecutor. That's all. Thank you very much. [Previous translation
16 continues] ... before you brought the witness into the courtroom.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. HARMON: And, Your Honours, while the witness is coming into
19 the courtroom, if Your Honours could take tab 6, which is the report on the
20 army, I'll be referring to that immediately and very briefly. And we will
21 be going to volume 2 of the documents.
22 The first item -- the first item I'll be referring to is the
23 small -- it should be in the small binder.
24 JUDGE ORIE: If you would already tell us the page, Mr. Harmon.
25 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honours. Page 70 -- pages 70 and 71.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
2 [The witness entered court]
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Mr. Brown.
4 Mr. Brown, I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by the
5 solemn declaration that you gave at the beginning of your testimony.
6 Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.
7 WITNESS: EWAN BROWN [Resumed]
8 MR. HARMON:
9 Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Brown --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Yes. No, Judge Hanoteau has one question. He
11 indicated before. I apologise.
12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Sir, I have a question for you.
13 I would like to talk about the methodology used when you drafted your
14 report. I'm just a little curious about one point.
15 In your report, you talk about -- rather, there are a lot of
16 footnotes in your report. Those footnotes correspond to what you call
17 Krajina Corps reports or, also, 1st Krajina Corps regular combat reports,
18 1st Krajina Corps letters, VRS Main Staff reports. I'm just quoting you
19 some examples. You talk about the Prijedor SJB reports. And I would like
20 to understand -- I would like to ask you: Those reports were addressed to
21 whom? Who they were forwarded to? They were drafted; we know that. But
22 you do not tell us whom they were forwarded to or whom they were addressed
23 to. I don't know if my question is relevant or not, but upon reading your
24 report, I was wondering who was to receive all those reports.
25 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, obviously the report is quite lengthy
1 and it does have many footnotes. Most -- or many of the 1st Krajina Corps
2 reports that I refer to relate to reports that went to the VRS Main Staff.
3 There are a number of 1st Krajina Corps reports that are disseminated down
4 to subordinate units of the corps. The footnotes don't necessarily
5 indicate which way. The regular combat reports went to the VRS Main Staff,
6 or when they were the 5th Corps -- the JNA 5th Corps, they went to the 2nd
7 Military District. So the regular combat reports went up. Some of the
8 other 1st Krajina Corps reports are reports that are internal for the corps
9 that were going down to subordinate units. So, for example, there's one
10 document on the 10th of June which is a corps-wide instruction for further
11 combat operations. That is disseminated down to the subordinate corps.
12 There are other reports, some of the morale reports of the 1st
13 Krajina Corps, were disseminated down to subordinate units of the corps. I
14 believe that generally the Main Staff - I'd have to check the reports,
15 probably individually - but the Main Staff references are ones that are
16 coming to the Main Staff from the 1st Krajina Corps. The majority of these
17 documents were formed or were found in part of the Krajina Corps archive,
18 so they presumably were transmitted from the Main Staff down to the corps,
19 and they kept a copy in their archive.
20 As to the police reports, there are a number of police reports -
21 - I would have to look, I think, again at some of these myself because I
22 haven't looked necessarily at every single footnote more recently. Some of
23 the police reports are internal; some, I believe, go from municipality to
24 CSB Banja Luka. And I can think of at least one report that goes from CSB
25 Banja Luka to the Ministry of the Interior.
1 So I don't know if that answers your question in entirety.
2 Maybe it was an omission of mine in the footnotes not to say exactly who
3 the reports were going to, but it is a lengthy report as it is, and -- and
4 maybe the footnotes would have become somewhat unmanageable.
5 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Very well. No, in fact, you
6 did not answer my question completely. What I would like to understand is
7 the following: Was there a dissemination of these reports towards the
8 state apparatus? There must have been a war ministry. There were civilian
9 authorities that were dealing with matters, military matters. So these
10 reports that were going to the Supreme Command or to the headquarters,
11 those reports, were they also forwarded to the state itself? Were you able
12 to find any traces of that? Or in other words, you talked about the
13 Presidency yesterday; you've also talked about the Assembly. So I would
14 like to know if in the documents that you were able to consult were you
15 able to see, for instance, the military reports stemming from the head,
16 from the lower instance? Were they sending that to, let's say, a higher-up
17 hierarchy, and then, therefore, it was disseminated forward up to the state
19 THE WITNESS: As I discussed yesterday, I -- I think the combat
20 analysis readiness report itself indicates that the civilian leadership or
21 the Presidency, Supreme Command were made aware in great detail. It's a
22 phrase that they used. There are -- I mentioned one of the documents
23 yesterday about meetings that the corps commanders had to give to the
24 Presidency. There's one on the 3rd of June.
25 The -- there is the reference, of course, which I mentioned
1 yesterday to the removal of non-Serbs from the army, a document which went
2 to the Presidency, as well as to the Main Staff. There are references in
3 the Presidency sessions of Main Staff officers briefing the Presidency at
4 those sessions. So there -- and there was on the admission of the army a
5 very good communications system, which included telephone links to the
6 government. And I was shown yesterday the transcripts of some intercepts
7 which seem to bear that there was a communication process.
8 Now, we were hampered somewhat in the investigation in that we
9 were not able to access or not given access to the VRS Main Staff archive,
10 although that was requested many, many times to the various authorities,
11 certainly during the time that I was there. And clearly the Main Staff
12 archive, in essence, would find -- we may find the -- the material that's
13 coming up from the corps and the dissemination of that material onwards.
14 The 1st Krajina Corps was a formed corps in a chain. It -- it
15 sat within a chain to the Main Staff. So it is not surprising to me that
16 the main transmission method of the vast bulk of the documents from the 1st
17 Krajina Corps is within that military chain. It is to its superior
18 headquarters, which was General Mladic and the Main Staff.
19 But even within that there clearly are some -- there is some
20 evidence that they were able to send documents to the -- to the Presidency,
21 and that one about the removal of Muslims is one.
22 So there -- there are those transmission means I discussed
23 yesterday. And also the transmission down, the -- the issue of the
24 strategic objectives and their -- their appearing in military
25 documentation, very clearly in documentation at the Main Staff level down,
1 then transmitted down to the corps, and the corps then taking those
2 references and using them as -- as their own means. It would indicate to
3 me that there was clearly -- a functioning communication chain.
4 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I understand. But can you tell
5 us, with regards to these footnotes, if, for instance, when we talk about
6 the 5th Corps regular combat report dated 25th April 1992, if we take that
7 one, for example, could you tell us who it was sent to? Or is it extremely
8 complicated to give us that information? You cannot, of course, remember
9 or tell us from memory, but is it possible to find easily who was to
10 receive all these reports that you've quoted here?
11 THE WITNESS: In that case, that specific example --
12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] No, no, let's not take this
13 specific example. We have many different footnotes here, and you mention
14 many various reports. Is it easy for you to say who those reports were all
15 being sent to, or is it incredibly complicated for you to find that out?
16 THE WITNESS: Most of the combat -- regular combat reports went
17 to the subordinate military -- the superior military formations. Most of
18 the Krajina Corps daily combat reports have annotated on them that they are
19 being sent to the VRS Main Staff. In this example that you give, that was
20 the JNA period before it became the VRS, and similarly there were same-
21 structured documents that went to the JNA 2nd Military District
22 headquarters in Sarajevo. Most of the regular combat reports do have an
23 address of who they're being sent to.
24 JUDGE ORIE: But may I insist on an answer. The question was
25 how difficult it would be for you to verify who was the person addressed in
1 this -- or in any other -- I mean, how difficult is that?
2 THE WITNESS: Well, it's not difficult because it's written in
3 the document, of course.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So you would have to consult the document?
5 THE WITNESS: That's correct. That's right, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: And are they available to you at this moment?
7 THE WITNESS: Not -- not here. But I can --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand, but ...
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If, for example, we would ask you to --
11 either give you a list or say for page -- this one to that one, please give
12 us a list of the documents and then attached to it who were the addressees,
13 would that be possible?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, it would. Your Honour, I'd have to obviously
15 receive some assistance from the -- from the Office of the Prosecutor
16 because I don't work here now, but I would imagine that most of the
17 footnotes have already been submitted, anyway, as part of the report.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But the support would consist of just having
19 available to you the documents rather than any other support because as you
20 may understand, an expert who further works on his expertise is supposed
21 not to be guided by the Prosecution.
22 THE WITNESS: That's right. It's only to get accessibility to
23 the documents, of course.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
25 MS. LOUKAS: One point I might raise, Your Honour, is there is a
1 DVD with hyperlinked -- or where the footnotes are all hyperlinked and you
2 can just press "control", click, and just get the document.
3 JUDGE ORIE: All footnotes are hyperlinked. Do we have -- have
4 we received that CD?
5 MR. HARMON: No, Your Honour. We can provide that, if you'd
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I ...
8 MS. LOUKAS: Well, I'm just thinking that it would be useful to
9 the witness. I have a spare copy in the Defence room.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, that's very nice of you, Ms. Loukas,
11 but ...
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE ORIE: And this includes English translations so that we
14 can read, also, and understand the language?
15 MR. HARMON: It does, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you very much.
17 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
18 MR. HARMON: Perhaps -- Judge Hanoteau, perhaps I can be of
19 assistance to you, as well, in response to some of these questions because
20 we will be getting to some of these documents. But, for example, if you --
21 just for your reference - we will be coming to it soon - the document that
22 is found in tab 54, a very important document relating to paramilitaries,
23 and that you'll see from the top of the document, the upper left-hand
24 corner, that the originator of the document was the VRS Main Staff. And
25 you can see at the end of the document where it was distributed, and you
1 will see in this document, for example, it was sent to all of the corps
2 formations in the VRS, the president of the SRBH Presidency to the SRBH
3 Prime Minister to the SRBH army Main Staff commander.
4 And if you'll look at other documents, you'll always be able to
5 see either -- at the front page in the upper left-hand corner who the
6 originator was, where the destination was, and if you look oftentimes on
7 the rear page of the document, it will have the distribution list, so it
8 will say exactly where it was distributed and all the formations. That's -
9 - that could be of assistance to Your Honour.
10 Now, Your Honours, I would like Your Honours -- we are talking
11 about the 1st Krajina Corps, and if Your Honours could turn to tab 6, page
12 70 and 71. I merely point this out for the benefit of Your Honours. On
13 the last paragraph in page 70, there is a paragraph that relates to the
14 original size of the VRS, indicating that the total army strength was
15 177.341. And on the top of page 71, as of the 3rd of July, 1992, you will
16 see a -- a chart -- not a chart, but you'll see a diagram that indicates
17 the numerical strength of each of the corps, and you'll see the 1st Krajina
18 Corps is strength at -- for combat strength, 43.128 men. And if you
19 compare it against the other corps, you will see that it's the largest
20 corps as of the 3rd of July, 1992.
21 If you proceed to the figure 22 on the same page, then as of the
22 time of this report you'll see that the strength of the army had swelled to
23 222.727, and the size of the 1st Krajina Corps was 72.330 persons. And
24 you'll see once again that that -- size of that corps is by far the largest
25 corps in the -- in the army of the Bosnian Serbs and not that figure 22
1 relates to combat formations.
2 On the next page, there is also a chart dealing with non-combat
3 units and services and the strengths of those, but I wanted to point that
4 out to Your Honours so I could orient you and give you a better picture of
5 the size of the 1st Krajina Corps.
6 MS. LOUKAS: Just in relation to that, in relation to orienting
7 Your Honours, of course, I think it would be preferable if the -- the
8 witness were to provide that information, as opposed -- this is a marker --
9 as opposed to Mr. Harmon providing the information. I think it's -- we
10 have an expert here, and I think the expert should be supplying -- it can
11 be done very simply through questions and answers of the expert as opposed
12 to Mr. Harmon.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would it make any difference if Mr. Harmon
14 would ask the witness to say, "What was the strength of the corps on the
15 basis of figure 21," or ...?
16 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, as I indicated, it's a marker.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MS. LOUKAS: Of course, the information has emerged from the
19 mouth of Mr. Harmon in this circumstance, but I want to ensure that the
20 questioning and the information comes through the witness.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But I take that as a general rule, Ms.
22 Loukas. But at the same time, if we're looking at tables and charts, then
23 it's just -- I would not -- well, it's a marker. Let's keep it to that,
25 MS. LOUKAS: It's a marker.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Harmon, it's marked.
2 MR. HARMON: I've noted the marker, Your Honour. I want to also
3 note that given the limited amount of time that I have, I could ask four or
4 five or six questions about a piece of evidence --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, exactly --
6 MR. HARMON: -- in evidence, and so --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, the witness is here. If -- when Mr.
8 Harmon draws our attention to something and if he would in any way give not
9 the accurate impression of what you would read in this report, then please
10 alert us immediately.
11 MR. HARMON: We're going to be discussing the strategic
12 objectives, Your Honours, and this topic is found in Mr. Brown's report at
13 page 24.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could I ask one question in relation to
15 figure 21 we just had in front of us. Independent units, 19.384, as we
16 find in figure 21. What are independent units, as far as you know?
17 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure exactly what -- what they're
18 referring to, but I do know that there were some -- they called them
19 independent units at the corps level, which were not necessarily attached
20 to brigades. They -- they sat as an independent unit that could be moved
21 around very quickly within a brigade. So in our military, we would often
22 call them some specialist units or -- they weren't attached to a division
23 or a brigade. And that's -- basically it's -- it's another type of unit
24 that was more flexible for the corps commander to use. But I -- I would
25 have to look at it again to see exactly.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That would not be units from -- well, let's
2 say paramilitary origin which more or less orbited around the regular
4 THE WITNESS: I am aware of some documentation that
5 paramilitaries at times, when they were integrated into the VRS, were
6 integrated and called "independent" or, "assault" or "sabotage units." But
7 often they were formed into a brigade, as part of a brigade, so they would
8 be a small component of a brigade, rather than a large independent -- a
9 larger independent unit. So I couldn't say from this document.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. That's clear. Thank you very much.
11 Mr. Harmon, please proceed.
12 Examined by Mr. Harmon:
13 Q. Mr. Brown, as I said, we're going to be discussing the issue of
14 strategic objectives, and if we could turn first to tab 43 in Volume 2.
15 These are the strategic objectives. Can you, Mr. Brown -- actually, before
16 I ask that question, Mr. Brown, I'm going to try to get through a large
17 volume of documents in a very short period of time, and to do so, we will
18 go through some of these documents at a very quick pace. Could you look at
19 the strategic objectives, and could you identify for the Judges which
20 specific strategic objectives or parts thereof related to the area of
21 responsibility of the 1 Krajina Corps.
22 A. Strategic objective number 1, number 2, and part of number 4.
23 Q. Which part of number 4?
24 A. "Establish a border on the Una River." That objective actually
25 was split between the 1st Krajina Corps and the 2nd Krajina Corps, so it
1 wasn't exclusively a 1 KK objective.
2 Q. Could you, Mr. Brown, turn to the next tab, tab 44. And, Mr.
3 Brown, this exhibit is a transcript of the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb
4 Assembly that was held on the 12th of May, 1992, in Banja Luka. Why did
5 you look at this document in preparing your report, and what is the
6 significance of it to you?
7 A. When I began reviewing some of the military documentation from
8 the 1st Krajina Corps, I noted that there were some references in there to
9 goals or objectives, and I wanted to explore what that may have meant to
10 the 1st Krajina Corps. And when I reviewed this Assembly session and
11 especially the announcement of the strategic goals by Dr. Karadzic, I
12 wanted to explore whether those political goals that were announced at that
13 session were in any way tied or linked to the documentation that I'd seen
14 in the 1st Krajina Corps and also the activities of the 1st Krajina Corps
15 in 1992.
16 Q. Did you find references in this session of the Assembly that did
17 relate to military -- conduct of military operations in the area of
18 responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps and elsewhere in Bosnia?
19 A. Yes. I would argue that the six strategic goals outlined by Dr.
20 Karadzic can be tied to very many military operations and not exclusively
21 to the 1st Krajina Corps, which I probably know better than others, but you
22 can link it to many of the operations. And as we discussed yesterday,
23 there are a number of military directives that directly relate to those
24 goals, and, importantly, there are clear examples of military operations
25 that -- that are very much linked to the -- to the goals.
1 Q. Is there a hierarchy in the strategic objectives that were
2 promulgated on the 12th of May?
3 A. Yes, there -- I believe Dr. Karadzic himself said there was a
4 hierarchy, and then I believe later on in the session Mr. Krajisnik himself
5 said that ...
6 Q. I'm going to refer to a part of the transcript. Could you refer
7 to it by page number first, identify the page number, and then make the
9 A. Yes. Well, they're -- they're given numeric hierarchy on page
10 13, when Karadzic announces them. Mr. Krajisnik on page 49 of the
11 translation said that "I would just like to offer an explanation since I
12 also -- I have also taken part in adopting these goals. We must make a
13 choice regarding one thing: The first goal is the most important one, and
14 in relation to all other goals, all other goals are subitems of the first
16 I think there was also a reference that Karadzic said that the
17 Sarajevo goal could be switched, so he did talk about hierarchy of goals.
18 Q. In paragraph 1.43 of your report, you assert that strategic
19 objective number 1 would entail the movement of a significant part of the
20 non-Serb population out of the new Serb state. How did you arrive at that
21 conclusion, Mr. Brown?
22 A. I believe there are a number of references directly in the 16th
23 Assembly Session that would indicate that in achieving those goals, and in
24 particular the first goal, that it would involve resettlement or the
25 movement of people. There are a number of speakers there who -- who make
1 reference to that. Ratko Mladic, I believe, is maybe the only speaker in
2 the Assembly session then who -- who utters some words of caution and makes
3 mention of people being moved. I can quote those references.
4 Q. Would you do so, please, Mr. Brown.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Again, directing the Court's attention to the page numbers of the
8 A. Dr. Karadzic himself says that, when talking about the first
9 strategic goal, that "It's separation from the other two national
10 communities, separation of states." But he goes on to say that "Separation
11 from those who are enemies" --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Brown, if I may interrupt you. You were
13 invited by Mr. Harmon to draw our attention to the page number so that --
14 THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour. Page 13 on the
15 translation, about halfway down the page.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 THE WITNESS: "Separation from those who are our enemies and who
18 would have used every opportunity, especially" -- sorry -- "and who have
19 used every opportunity, especially this century, to attack us and who would
20 continue with such practices if we were to stay together in the same
22 On page 16 of the translation, Dr. Karadzic also says, "We do not
23 want to get in our state with a huge number of people who are against that
25 On page 24 and 25, there is a speech by Miroslav Vjestica, who
1 was an SDS leader in Bosanska Krupa.
2 MR. HARMON: Mr. Brown, could you wait just a minute, please.
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
5 THE WITNESS: And Mr. Vjestica gave a detailed account of what
6 had happened in Bosanska Krupa, including making reference to the fact that
7 a large number of Muslims had moved out. And he himself said at the bottom
8 of the page, "What are our adversaries doing? At the moment, they're all
9 in the Kazin Krajina. On the right bank of the Una River, there are no
10 more Muslims in the Serbian Municipality of Bosanska Krupa. All the
11 enclaves that were there - Rapusa, Veliki, Verbovik [phoen], Ostruznica,
12 Babic, Muslim Jasenica, and Zavir - we have evacuated them, so there will
13 be none there for the duration of war operations. Will they have a place
14 to return to? I think it's unlikely after our president told us the happy
15 news at the right bank of the" -- "the right bank" - I am assuming it is of
16 the river - "is the border."
17 There is also a reference on page 17 -- I'm sorry, on page 18 -
18 - no, I'm sorry, 19, which is a comment by Trifko Radic, who makes mention
19 about the borders and separation, and he says halfway down the page, "As
20 for continuing the war, please deal with this now. Please make sure that
21 the lines of demarcation and goals are determined, and the rest will easily
22 follow. I read reports on when the Swedes and Norwegians separated; the
23 process of resettlement lasted ten years. We will see the same thing here,
24 but it is still better to do that and know exactly who is resettling where.
25 It will be a difficult process; it will require a lot of toil and effort
1 and explaining to people who have to leave their hearths."
2 There are two comments from Ratko Mladic, who himself, I
3 believe, understands what -- what this implies. He, as I say, seems to be
4 one of the few, if not the only in this -- surprisingly in this speech who
5 -- who utters some word of caution. He -- he, first of all, actually says
6 that --
7 Q. What page, Mr. Brown?
8 A. On page 33 -- oh, I'm sorry. Before I come to Ratko Mladic,
9 there's a section by Professor Milojevic on page 33, at the very bottom.
10 He's talking about maps and state borders. "If it is a state border
11 intrinsically implies moving a contingent of population."
12 Ratko Mladic on page 37 states that -- and he's discussing more
13 widely that -- the objectives. He says, "People and peoples are not pawns,
14 nor are they keys in one's pocket. They can be shifted from here to there.
15 It's something easily said but difficult to achieve."
16 And then later on page 39, he states --
17 Q. Could you direct us before --
18 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I'm very sorry, but where is it
19 on page 37? This is not clear.
20 MR. HARMON: On a long page like this, if you could, Mr. Brown,
21 please approximately locate on the page where the quotation you're
22 referring to is located.
23 THE WITNESS: I apologise, Your Honour. On page 37, it's at the
24 very, very top, the first two lines.
25 On page 39, about -- about 15 lines down approximately, Mladic
1 says, "Therefore, we cannot cleanse, nor can we have a sieve to sift so
2 that only Serbs would stay or that Serbs would fall through and the rest
3 leave. Well, that is -- that will not -- I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik
4 and Mr. Karadzic would explain this to the world. People, that would be
5 genocide. We have to call upon any man who has his brow -- who has browed
6 his forehead to the ground to embrace these areas and territories of the
7 state we plan to make."
8 And so those are some of the -- those are some of the comments
9 at the Assembly session that leads me to believe that there was an
10 awareness that -- that resettlement was going to be a feature, and possibly
11 more -- more importantly, when I looked at the documentation -- the
12 military documentation from the 1st Krajina Corps, they themselves were not
13 only aware that resettlement and the movement out of the population was
14 occurring in the months after this Assembly session, but they were involved
15 in that process, and some documentation indicates that they were clearly
16 supportive of that process.
17 MR. HARMON:
18 Q. Mr. Brown, besides General Mladic and beside the representatives
19 who -- from the various municipalities who were present at -- attending
20 this session, were there other military personnel and other nonmilitary
21 personnel that you're aware of who attended this particular session?
22 A. Yes. I believe that Bogdan Subotic, the Minister of Defence,
23 attended. I believe that General Talic attended. Milorad Sajic [phoen],
24 who was a Territorial Defence officer and was the Regional Minister of
25 Defence at the ARK attended, and I also believe that members of the
1 Autonomous Region of -- or the Serbian areas in Croatia, the Krajina in
2 Croatia, attended the meeting, as well. So it wasn't exclusively SDS;
3 there were some military personnel there and members from the Serb areas in
5 Q. Mr. Brown, was the public pronouncement of these strategic
6 objectives an epiphany to the people who were attending that session?
7 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, that's an inappropriate question.
8 MR. HARMON: May I have the basis for that being an
9 inappropriate question?
10 MS. LOUKAS: Well, firstly, it's -- was it an epiphany? It's
11 leading. Secondly, the nature of the question. The use of the term
12 "epiphany," I think --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Let's, before we --
14 MS. LOUKAS: The question has been objected on the basis of
15 there's rather too much journalism in the question previously.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And --
17 MS. LOUKAS: It seems to me there is a little in that, Your
18 Honour; that's inappropriate. Number one, it's leading. There is -- it's
19 an inappropriate legal question.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know whether it's a legal question or not,
21 whether it's an epiphany or not, but could you tell us how the public
22 received the public pronouncement by those who were attending that session?
23 THE WITNESS: I'm not so sure I can answer how the public
24 perceived the announcements, Your Honour. If -- if Mr. Harmon's question
25 was about whether -- whether it's --
1 JUDGE ORIE: I think -- I didn't ask how the public perceived
2 it. No, I did so. I made a mistake. How was the public announcement
3 received by those who attended the session?
4 The public announcement of the strategic goals, I think it was.
5 Yes, objectives.
6 THE WITNESS: Well, it may be difficult in some areas for me to
7 answer the question for those --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Please ask it -- if to the extent you can respond
9 to the question -- answer the question, please do so, and if there is
10 specific issues you'd say, "I couldn't say anything about," please tell us.
11 THE WITNESS: Reading this Assembly session, I don't see any,
12 apart from possibly General Mladic, who issued some -- those -- those
13 phrases of caution. I see nothing in there that would indicate that people
14 disagreed with this, stood up against it, voiced opinions that they thought
15 it was going to lead to problems, or that they whole-heartedly disagreed
16 with it, reading this Assembly session. In fact, some of the language used
17 by some of the speakers - in particular, Mr. Vjestica - would seem to be
18 very supportive of it. I don't see any -- any debate or critical comments
19 from this Assembly session. That's as far as I could tell you about the
20 political leadership from reading this Assembly session. What I --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any indication that this public
22 announcement may have come either as a surprise or as something, well, that
23 the -- those attending were well acquainted with it? Is it something of
24 the kind you can observe from the session minutes?
25 THE WITNESS: I would argue that some components of these goals
1 were already -- were already implemented, and I would imagine they could
2 only have been implemented if they'd been aware. Mr. Karadzic, for
3 example, mentioned that they already had Sarajevo in encirclement and that
4 they had municipalities under their control. And -- and that would seem to
5 be one of the -- one of the features that they would require to achieve the
6 strategic goal in relation to Sarajevo.
7 There already had been, I know in the Krajina in some areas,
8 takeovers of power, and there had already been some military attacks. Mr.
9 Vjestica had mentioned that -- what had gone on in Bosanska Krupa. Mr.
10 Vjestica already in his speech was talking about the neighbouring
11 municipality of Bosanski Novi and what was going on there. So even reading
12 this and placing it with some of the documentation, I would find it hard to
13 believe that it was a complete revelation at that time, and I don't believe
14 that the 16th Assembly Session and the goals that were announced there
15 were, in essence, a start point.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
17 MR. HARMON:
18 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, you said that there had already been some actions
19 taken to implement these particular goals, and you cited some references.
20 Can you tell us, to the best of your knowledge, where, in what locations,
21 there had been efforts taken by the JNA or there -- by Territorial Defence
22 units, Serb Territorial Defence units, or SDS party-associated units that
23 started the implementation of these strategic objectives prior to the 12th
24 of May, 1992? Can you identify some of those municipalities?
25 A. Bosanska Krupa was one municipality clearly highlighted there,
1 and I know that elements of Talic's corps had been involved in that
2 takeover. I'm aware of -- and that -- that was combat action; that wasn't
3 simply just a takeover.
4 I'm aware that prior to the Assembly session, only days before
5 in Bosanski Novi, that there were the issuance of deadlines for the
6 surrender of weapons and there were attacks on non-Serb areas there; I
7 believe on the 10th and the 11th of November -- of May.
8 I'm aware of -- in areas outside the Krajina, in Zvornik, in
9 Bijeljina, that there had been military operations.
10 And then there had also been takeovers which -- which may not
11 necessarily have involved direct military actions, in terms of combat. And
12 I know that that had happened in Prijedor, in Kljuc prior to this Assembly
13 session in the Krajina.
14 So there are examples, I think, that I am aware of.
15 Q. Now, I'd like to focus your attention, Mr. Brown, on the role of
16 Serbian Territorial Defence units in the securing of territory in the
17 implementation of the strategic objectives prior to their public
18 announcement at the 16th Assembly Session. First of all, if I could direct
19 your attention to an exhibit which is found in tab 45, which is the 14th
20 Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. This is an extract. That session
21 was held on the 27th of March, 1992, in Pale.
22 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, I am -- Dr. Karadzic is identified as
23 the speaker at the bottom of page 22, and I am going to refer Mr. Brown to
24 a passage that is found on 23, starting a little bit below halfway. It
25 starts with the words "they can attempt."
1 Q. This passage deals with the Territorial Defence, Mr. Brown. It
2 says, "They can attempt to intimidate the Serbs here and there in Gorazde.
3 They can kill someone in Brod. But they can never incorporate Serbian
4 areas into their state or conquer them because they do not possess the
5 forces required for the extensive territory held by the Serbs."
6 Karadzic goes on to say, "We know that our people have armed
7 themselves. We don't know the various ways and means by which this was
8 done, but we do know that the people have enough weapons. I must say,
9 however, that we do not have paramilitary units."
10 "When you" -- he's -- now it's Karadzic talking to the members
11 of the Assembly.
12 "When you return to your municipalities, especially the newly
13 formed municipalities, I ask you to do what you are required and entitled
14 to do under the law. The moment you arrive in your municipality, you must
15 urgently establish Crisis Staffs. You must try to organise the people so
16 they can defend themselves. Find a number of reserve officers for those
17 staffs and have them register everyone who owns weapons, as well as units.
18 They should organise Territorial Defence, and if the JNA is there, they
19 must be placed under its command. If they are not, let them be placed
20 under the command of reserve officers."
21 Now, let me also refer you, Mr. Brown, to the report on the
22 army; then I'm going to invite your comment. On page 10 on the report on
23 the army, which is, again, tab 6.
24 MR. HARMON: I'm referring Mr. Brown to the last paragraph.
25 Q. In that paragraph, it reads, "The command and" -- "The control
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 and command function in the army framework of the establishment of the army
2 of the Republika Srpska developed in two stages. First, from the 1st of
3 April to 15 June 1992; and the second from that date until today. An
4 important development in the first period was the self-organising and
5 municipal" -- "of municipal and other regional units on the basis of
6 Territorial Defence units under the political and patriotic influence of
7 the Serbian Democratic Party. These units provided protection for the
8 Serbian people against the Muslim and Croat forces, which were growing and
9 becoming even more brutal. These units usually secured and liberated their
10 municipality within their borders and stopped at that."
11 Now, Mr. Brown, can I invite your comment on those two passages
12 I've read to you, specifically focussing your attention on the development
13 of Serb TOs and what role they had in achieving or attempting to achieve
14 the strategic objectives that had -- were to be announced in a period
16 A. It would seem that there is a relationship between both documents
17 and there are other documents - I know of one in mid-April - which formally
18 established the Serbian TO. I'm aware of the TO being involved in the
19 takeover of authority in a number of Krajina municipalities in April and in
20 the period before the 12th of May and the formal establishment of the army
21 on the 12th of May. There is other references in the combat analysis
22 report in 1993 saying that there was this two-phase: Phase 1, where there
23 was Territorial Defence before the army was established, and then when the
24 army was established, these Territorial Defence units being absorbed in.
25 And I think there's a reference on page 69 of the army report which echoes
1 that earlier comment, saying that during that first phase they failed to
2 secure some of the strategic objectives. But I do know that they were able
3 to take control of municipalities, some municipalities in the Krajina, and
4 that some of that involved operations and joint operations with the JNA.
5 Q. So while they were able -- well, let me let the translators
6 finish, first of all.
7 While they were able, Mr. Brown, to achieve part of this
8 realisation of the strategic objectives announced on this 16th Session, you
9 said they couldn't achieve them all; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, that's what they say themselves in the 1993 document, and
11 I'd actually maybe draw your attention, also, to something that Mr.
12 Krajisnik said at the 16th Assembly Session when the army was established.
13 They passed a decision formally establishing the army.
14 MR. HARMON: While you're looking for that passage, Mr. Brown,
15 may I direct Your Honours' attention to the report on the army, page 69.
16 Mr. Brown referred to it. It is passages that are found on page 69,
17 starting with the paragraph that reads, "At the same time in the territory
18 of the Republika Srpska ...." It's about the second paragraph down.
19 And following down two paragraphs, which indicate that "The
20 Territorial Defence units failed to achieve the main strategic objectives."
21 And then in the passage that follows, it identifies -- the army report
22 identifies which strategic objectives the Territorial Defence units failed
23 to achieve.
24 Q. Mr. Brown.
25 A. On page 51 of the translation of the 12th of May session, Mr.
1 Krajisnik says, "We are at war, and it will be possible to solve this thing
2 with Muslims and Croats only by war. And the politics will be instrumental
3 in bringing it to an end. I do not know whether I have encompassed
4 everything, but before we conclude, I would like to ask that we adopt and
5 let us not compete/to see/who is the greater Serb. If it were up for
6 election, no one in this hall is a greater one than me, but it will be the
7 rational Serbs who are leading the Serbian people. Please, if we acquire
8 these territories which we agree on and have conceived of today, plus the
9 corridor we will get up there, we have done this generation -- we will have
10 done -- this generation will have done so much for the Serbian people that
11 this debt will be impossible to repay. What will really happen in reality?
12 We will leave that to time. But it will be easier to achieve this now once
13 we establish the Serbian army which we could have done earlier."
14 And this may also be an indication that the objectives would
15 have been easier to achieve or will be easier to achieve now that they have
16 formed the army, rather than relying on what they had prior to that, which
17 was the Serbian TO.
18 Q. Mr. Brown, throughout the --
19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, I apologise for
20 interrupting. You have quoted from the report of the army the sentence [In
21 English] : "They failed to achieve these strategics objectives,"
22 [Interpretation] and so on. Could the witness tell us why this territorial
23 force could not achieve their principal objectives. What were the reasons?
24 Was there resistance that existed? Could he answer this question, please?
25 Why did the Territorial Defence, this territorial force, why did they fail
1 in their attempts, or why did they not achieve their objective?
2 THE WITNESS: I think they had achieved some of them. They had
3 managed to secure some territory. Dr. Karadzic talked about Sarajevo, for
4 example, being encircled, that some of the municipalities had been taken
5 over with their assistance and with their help. But in relation to, say,
6 the corridor, maybe they were just not strong enough, maybe they were not -
7 - not as well equipped, and it would have required the assistance of the
8 equipment, the numbers, and the command and control and support processes
9 that came with the JNA once it transitioned into the VRS. I don't know if
10 they could have achieved the goals, you know, if they'd continued, but it
11 might have taken an awful lot longer. But I think these are some of the
12 reasons. It would have been easier to achieve it if they had had all the
13 support, all the heavy weapons, all the artillery, the communications that
14 came with the JNA when it transitioned into the VRS.
15 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.
16 MR. HARMON:
17 Q. Mr. Brown, in this period before the strategic objectives were
18 announced at the 16th Session, did the documentation that you reviewed show
19 that the Territorial Defence units worked in conjunction with SDS political
20 bodies and in conjunction with the JNA to attempt to and actually implement
21 parts of the strategic objectives?
22 A. Yes, some of the documentation I saw included references to joint
23 operations between the JNA and the TO.
24 Q. Let me turn your attention, Mr. Brown, to --
25 MS. LOUKAS: Actually, before we move on to the next question,
1 "Yes, some of the documentation included references," I think it would be
2 useful for the Trial Chamber to know precisely what --
3 MR. HARMON: That's where I was going before I was interrupted.
4 MS. LOUKAS: I'm very pleased to hear that because I was afraid
5 that we were moving on to another topic.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I understood that Mr. Harmon would have an idea on
7 what the witness might have in mind and was taking us to those.
8 MR. HARMON:
9 Q. Could we first of all take a look at the document in tab 46.
10 This is a military secret; it is from the command of the 5th Corps, the JNA
11 unit. It is dated the 1st of April. It is addressed to the command of the
12 10th Partizan Division, and it is a -- it's an order, an order that is
13 signed by the commander, General Talic. And if I can direct your attention
14 first to the -- and affirm this for me, first of all, Mr. Brown: This is
15 an order that relates to the elements under General Talic's control coming
16 from Croatia into Bosnia at this point in time; is that correct?
17 A. That's correct. The 6th Partizan Brigade was currently -- or at
18 that time had been in Croatia.
19 Q. I --
20 A. And was moving back from Croatia.
21 Q. And I would like to have you read part of his order and have you
22 comment on it. It is found in the middle of -- a little bit below the
23 middle of page one. General Talic orders, "Establish full cooperation with
24 the organs of government in Sanski Most municipality and collaboration with
25 TO and police units." Can I invite your brief comments on that.
1 A. I think it's somewhat self-evident from the order. He's ordering
2 his -- his subordinate brigade to go into Sanski Most and establish
3 cooperation, full cooperation, with the organs in Sanski Most, and that is
4 indeed what happened.
5 Q. Now, let me refer you to tab 47, again staying on this -- this
6 theme, if you will, of the cooperation between Territorial Defence units
7 and the JNA and SDS prior to the announcement of the strategic objectives.
8 This next document in tab 47 is from the Ministry of Defence of the Serbian
9 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's dated the 16th of April, and it
10 is addressed to the governments of the Autonomous Region of essentially
11 Krajina and the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to all
12 municipal -- to all Serbian municipalities. And it is signed by the
13 National Defence minister, Bogdan Subotic. And this is a decision that was
14 taken by the Ministry of Defence declaring a mobilisation, which we can see
15 on the top of page 2, calling for a general mobilisation. And could you
16 comment on the last paragraph in that document, "In the preparation for
17 training and deployment of the TO units, effect cooperation with JNA units
18 and, where possible, establish unified command."
19 A. Well, again, this seems to be self-evident that they are
20 establishing the TO; they're mobilising the TO. And here in that section,
21 they are instructing that there should be effective cooperation with the
22 JNA units and where they can, establish a unified command in those areas.
23 Q. Mr. Brown, if we can turn to the next exhibit, which is tab 48.
24 Mr. Brown, this is a Crisis Staff of the Serbian Municipality of Sanski
25 Most. It's conclusions, and it is the conclusions of a meeting that took
1 place on the 28th of April, a few weeks before the announcement of the
2 strategic objectives -- two weeks before the announcement of the strategic
4 And if I can refer you to the last item that reads, "That the
5 Crisis Staff of the Serbian Municipality of Sanski Most meet with the
6 commander of the 6th Krajina Brigade, Colonel Basara, and start regulating
7 the relationship between the Armed Forces of the Serbian Territorial
8 Defence in the Yugoslav Army." I invite your comments.
9 A. Well, it would seem to indicate that the previous instructions --
10 well, firstly, that a Serbian Territorial Defence had been established in
11 Sanski Most; that the 6th Brigade had arrived in Sanski Most, which it had
12 done. Colonel Basara was the commander of the 6th Brigade. And that
13 General Talic's order to ensure cooperation with the TO and the Subotic
14 instruction, saying that there should be cooperation with the JNA, was, in
15 fact, being -- were, in fact, being followed, and that in Sanski Most the
16 Krajina Brigade and the TO were going to meet to regulate the relationship.
17 Q. Throughout the report on the army, one sees references to the
18 term "liberating," "liberating territory." Mr. Brown, what does
19 "liberating territory" mean in the context of the army report?
20 A. I believe that "liberating" meant taking over the levers of power
21 in a territory, deploying where necessary military forces in order to do
22 that or to assist in that, taking over complete control of that territory,
23 deemed by, in this case, the Serbs as territory they wanted to control. I
24 think that's what "liberating" -- "liberating" meant.
25 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it from one of your earlier answers that
1 the 6th Partizan Brigade was later renamed in the 6th Krajina Brigade?
2 THE WITNESS: That's right, Your Honour. It was later renamed
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
5 MR. HARMON:
6 Q. Then if we could turn to the document in tab 49. Mr. Brown,
7 again on the issue of cooperation, this is a document that is dated the
8 11th of May, which is one day before the announcement of the strategic
9 objectives. It is from the 5th Corps command. It is to the command of the
10 6th Brigade of the 10th Partizan Division, and it is from General Talic.
11 And at the bottom of that document, it says, "I take this
12 opportunity to pay tribute to and congratulate all the soldiers of the
13 brigade and you personally for the successfully completed task of
14 liberating the town of Bosanska Krupa."
15 Now, Mr. Brown, can you comment on that particular paragraph,
16 and can you tell the Judges, based on what you have seen in the
17 documentation that you've reviewed, what happened in Bosanska Krupa.
18 A. This is the same brigade that was in Sanski Most, and it deployed
19 a component of that brigade to assist in -- in the takeover of Krupa. And
20 General Talic here is congratulating the commander and the brigade for
21 liberating, and if I -- liberating Bosanska Krupa. And if I take you back
22 to what Miroslav Vjestica said had happened in Bosanska Krupa, clearly it
23 had happened prior to the 12th of May in the 16th Assembly Session. That
24 may give you an indication of what "liberating" meant.
25 Q. Now, let me turn to tab 50. Tab 50 is a Minister of the Interior
1 Public Security Station sector report from the Municipality of Bosanski
2 Novi, and it is a report that was prepared pursuant to a decision of the
3 Ministry of National Defence of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina on the decision of the government of the Autonomous Region of
5 Krajina in association with the Bosanski Novi municipality Territorial
6 Defence headquarters and with representatives of organs of the government.
7 That's the -- that's why this report was prepared.
8 And under the first subpart of this, "Reception centres in
9 Bosanski Novi," the first paragraph, there is a reference, and I'd like to
10 read this reference to you. It says, "However" -- it's about mid-
11 paragraph. "However, these activities did not have the desired effect on
12 the voluntary relinquishment of arms. And apart from that, during the
13 night of 10 May 1992 in the village of Blagaj Rijeka," according to the
14 report, "of a military police patrol an attack was mounted upon it. These
15 events provoked a series of attacks on the areas and villages with majority
16 Muslim population. Thus, on the 24th of May, 1992, the entire population
17 from the villages in the area of Dolina Japra was accommodated in the
18 central part of Blagaj Rijeka."
19 Now, there is reference in this report to cooperation between
20 the JNA and the Territorial Defence units participating in those attacks
21 before the announcement of the strategic objectives. Mr. Brown, can you --
22 based on the documentation that you saw, can you tell us what happened in
23 the area of the Japra Valley in Bosanski Novi.
24 A. I believe from that document that most of the Muslim population,
25 if not all of the Muslim population, was -- was moved out or left.
1 I'd also draw your attention --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, is my recollection correct that we had
3 quite some evidence on what happened --
4 MR. HARMON: Yes. I'm just trying very quickly to put it into
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
7 MR. HARMON: I don't intend to explore it. We've heard, as I
8 recall, considerable evidence on this municipality.
9 A. I would just maybe quickly draw your attention as well to, again,
10 Miroslav Vjestica, in his statement at the 16th Assembly Session, indicated
11 that he had visited Novi around this time and he made mention that the area
12 had been sealed off, an ultimatum had been issued, and that he -- he
13 believed that -- that there was a issue of weapon deadlines and the
14 surrender of weapons. So he clearly had visited that area himself and --
15 and articulated that at the 16th Assembly Session.
16 And there are a couple of other references in this police
17 document. For example, at the top, the reference 1/92 of the 16th of April
18 is the Bogdan Subotic instruction which we've just seen. And the -- there
19 was a -- also a decision, I think, on the 4th or 5th of May from the
20 Autonomous Region of Krajina which referenced the Bogdan Subotic
21 instruction that set these deadlines for the illegal -- to the handover of
22 illegally-held weapons. So there's a chain that runs from the Ministry of
23 the Interior -- the Bogdan Subotic Ministry of Defence instruction and the
24 establishment of the TO and the mobilisation through the ARK down to the
25 municipality, and using those references as reasons, as well as the fact
1 that they referenced that they were -- there was an attack on a military
2 police patrol, but those were the reasons why they were carrying out these
3 operations. So there is a -- there is a relationship between the regional
4 level, the republic level, and this municipality attack.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, if we could turn to tab 52, and we will conclude with
6 the topic of these Territorial Defence units before the break. Tab 52 is a
7 1st Krajina Corps strictly confidential proposal that went to the Main
8 Staff of the army. It is dated the 27th of May, 1992, which is 15 days
9 after the strategic objectives were announced, and this is a proposal that
10 in part proposes, Mr. Brown, that the Territorial Defence units be
11 incorporated into the VRS; is that correct?
12 A. Yes, that had actually also been discussed at the 12th of May
13 Assembly session, I have to say, that the TO should be integrated into the
14 VRS. General Talic indicated in his corps on the 27th of May which TOs he
15 felt should be integrated into his corps, and that is, in fact, what
16 happened. They generally became known as light brigades. So most often if
17 you see the reference to a "light brigade," or a "light infantry brigade,"
18 quite often that was formed from the Serb TO or the TO that was present
19 prior to the establishment of the army.
20 Q. Could you turn to page 4 and page 5, and very quickly, Mr. Brown,
21 just guide the Court through subpart 4, which is at the bottom of page 4,
22 all the way through the -- part 4, if you will. It ends on about a third
23 of the way up on page 5.
24 A. The first part on -- or the first part of page -- of section 4 on
25 page 4, the very last few lines, are the -- were the areas that General
1 Talic believed that he could form light brigades from existing TO units.
2 He then suggests how these units should be grouped, and then he makes a
3 note that the current commanders of municipal TO defence staffs would be
4 commanders of light infantry brigades. And so he -- and then he talks
5 about the rough strength of these light infantry brigades.
6 And in many cases, I believe - I'm not quite so sure about
7 Prijedor - but I think for many of the other ones these light infantry
8 brigades did -- did become formed units of the Krajina Corps and operated
9 under General Talic's command.
10 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I -- is this the appropriate time for
11 a break?
12 JUDGE ORIE: It's an appropriate time for a break. Mr. Harmon,
13 we'll have a break until quarter past 4.00.
14 MR. HARMON: Thank you.
15 --- Recess taken at 3.49 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 4.23 p.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Harmon, in view of
18 scheduling, the Chamber thought it wise to have some escapes, if need would
19 be. Of course, the Chamber hopes that we do not need escapes. The escapes
20 would be to continue tomorrow for one more half hour, and if that would not
21 do - I said one more -- one half hour more, I should say. I think that's
22 proper English. If that would not do, I was informed that if we would need
23 one or two hours in the morning of Thursday, although the Chamber
24 considered Thursday sacrosanct, that it would not meet insurmountable
25 objections by the Defence. And one of the other escape modes would be the
1 morning of next week Thursday. That would be the day of the Plenary, but
2 the Chamber finds it very important to see whether we can meet the 22nd of
4 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, on the 22nd of July, I will be on a
5 different continent.
6 JUDGE ORIE: The 21st, then, I take it.
7 MR. HARMON: I will be on a different continent on the 20th of
9 JUDGE ORIE: On the 20th. Let me just -- I think I was talking
10 about the 21st, but if I'm not mistaken ...
11 So it's good to know that on the 20th and the 22nd you'll be on
12 another continent, so we could sit on the 21st, Mr. Harmon.
13 MR. HARMON: I have colleagues that will be sitting with you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. These are just escape routes, but that
15 the parties are informed where the escape lanes are. And for next
16 Thursday, I'd like to know very much whether the parties would think we
17 would need, next Thursday, a couple of hours in the morning.
18 Mr. Harmon.
19 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I have spoken with Mr. Stewart --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MR. HARMON: -- in respect of the possibility of sitting on this
22 Thursday --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. HARMON: -- it being designated earlier as a free day. And
25 Mr. Stewart has informed me that he has no objection in that situation,
1 should it arise.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes, but for -- it's not only whether we are
3 willing, but the Registry has to organise it all with teams of
4 interpreters, et cetera. So therefore I would also very much like to know
5 not whether we could sit but whether we would need those hours to sit.
6 That depends on the time you'd still need, Mr. Harmon, and the time the
7 Defence would need and the time the Judges would need.
8 Could you give us any impression?
9 MR. HARMON: If I can reserve that till the end of the next
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MR. HARMON: I will --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Although Madam Registrar would have loved to know
14 it by now because now she can take action; at the end of this session, she
15 can't take any action.
16 MR. HARMON: I think, Your Honour, I will need the rest of this
18 JUDGE ORIE: The rest of this day.
19 MR. HARMON: I will try to finish earlier, but the rest of this
21 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas, would you need more than one day?
22 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, on current indications, yes, I
23 would need more than one day.
24 JUDGE ORIE: One day and half an hour would not be ...?
25 MS. LOUKAS: Well, of course, that would be a day, of course,
1 for my cross-examination, leaving alone, of course, questions of re-
2 examination and additional questions from Your Honours and, of course the
3 question of --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik.
5 MS. LOUKAS: -- cross-examination by Mr. Krajisnik.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I would rather say additional questions by Mr.
8 MS. LOUKAS: Indeed, Your Honour. Yes.
9 So in that regard, Your Honour, I can indicate I am more than
10 happy to proceed on Thursday, be it if we're talking about this week
11 Thursday or in addition next week Thursday, as well. That would be fine
12 from my perspective, I can indicate.
13 The other question is: I was -- I was also asked if I was
14 prepared to agree to sitting one hour earlier tomorrow, which I agreed I
15 was -- I was happy to do.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I don't know whether we can combine the one
17 hour earlier and the half an hour. That's not possible, I hear.
18 MS. LOUKAS: No.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
20 MS. LOUKAS: But that's where I stand, Your Honour. I'm in Your
21 Honours' hands in that regard.
22 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand.
23 MS. LOUKAS: I can -- it seems to me quite clear that the time
24 available for this witness, if we were to end by close of play Wednesday,
25 would not be sufficient to deal with the witness.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If we --
2 MS. LOUKAS: And so therefore it's a question of logistics, in
3 terms of the remaining time --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas, I think the matter is clear enough, and
5 let's give the opportunity to Mr. Harmon to see whether he succeeds in
6 finishing earlier than 7.00.
7 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
8 MR. HARMON: [Microphone not activated]
9 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
11 MR. HARMON: We're going to be proceeding on the topic of
13 Q. Mr. Brown, during the period before the announcement of the
14 strategic objectives, were Serb paramilitary forces used in part to
15 liberate territories sought by the Bosnian Serbs?
16 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honours, rather than the question being asked
17 in this leading form, the -- I would submit the evidence should be elicited
18 from the witness by means of a -- an open question. I mean, this is an
19 important question, and it -- and it deserves a non-leading approach, in my
21 JUDGE ORIE: I -- Mr. Harmon, although I sometimes find that Ms.
22 Loukas is objecting to leading too early, she's not here. Could we ask the
23 witness first to tell us about the involvement of the paramilitaries in --
24 paramilitary forces, if any, in the military operations.
25 MR. HARMON: In total, Your Honour? Before and after the
1 strategic objective or ...?
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, in military operations by armed forces of the
3 Bosnian Serbs.
4 THE WITNESS: I am aware of some documentation that highlights
5 that paramilitary units -- some paramilitary units were involved in -- in
6 operations by -- by Bosnian Serb, TO, and JNA forces.
7 JUDGE ORIE: What kind of operations?
8 THE WITNESS: I'm aware of Arkan in Zvornik and Bijeljina. I'm
9 aware of the integration of the Serbian defence force into the Serbian TO -
10 - or a document that highlights the integration of the Serbian defence
11 force, SOS, into the Sanski Most TO.
12 I'm aware of the activities of Veljko Milankovic, a paramilitary
13 leader who came from Prnjavor and had a group that operated in -- both in
14 Croatia in 1991 and was integrated into the VRS 1st Krajina Corps in 1992,
15 and that unit was involved in operations.
16 I'm aware of some paramilitary groups that operated in Prijedor,
17 Cigo's group, Zolja's group.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, the Chamber has heard quite some
19 evidence on taking military control of Serbian municipalities. Were they
20 involved in that type of operations, as well? Or were the examples you
21 gave in relation to such type of operations?
22 THE WITNESS: I'm aware of in Prijedor those groups, Cigo's
23 group, being part of the 43rd Motorised Brigade, which took part in the
24 attacks in Prijedor in May 1992. The reference to the SOS in Sanski Most,
25 I think the document is late April 1992.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We heard some evidence on the SOS in Sanski
3 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
4 MR. HARMON:
5 Q. Can we turn to the item in tab 53. This, Mr. Brown, is a
6 conclusion of a Crisis Staff of Sanski Most meeting that was held on the
7 21st and the 22nd of April, 1992. It is dated the 22nd of April, 1992.
8 And point 6 in that group reads as follows: "The Crisis Staff of the
9 Serbian Municipality of Sanski Most hereby adopts the conclusion that the
10 Serbian defence forces are to be placed at the disposal of the commander of
11 the Serbian Territorial Defence and engaged as a special unit of the
12 Serbian Territorial Defence."
13 The Serbian defence forces: what can you tell the Court about
14 them? Very briefly, Mr. Brown.
15 A. I know the Serbian defence forces, or SOS, had been involved in
16 blockading Banja Luka in April, early April 1992. And I would assume that
17 here they are being integrated into the TO according to this document.
18 Q. Now, could we turn, then, Mr. Brown, to paragraph -- tab 54.
19 This, Mr. Brown, is from the Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic
20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is a document that was distributed, as
21 one can see on page 6, to, among others, the 1st Krajina Corps, the 2nd
22 Krajina Corps, the Eastern Bosnia Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and
23 the Herzegovina Corps, and to the president of the SRBiH Presidency, the
24 Prime Minister of the SRBiH, and the commander of the Main Staff. And it's
25 a report that was prepared on the 28th of July, 1992 on paramilitary
1 formations that were operating in the Serbian Republic of BH. Can you tell
2 us, Mr. Brown, what this document is in respect of, that report. What are
3 the salient features of this report?
4 A. This fairly lengthy document outlines a number of issues. It --
5 it highlights that -- well, as it's entitled, it's a report on paramilitary
6 formations in the territory of the SRBH, and outlines that they are a
7 feature of the -- of the war, and it lists the characteristics and the
8 characteristics are, you know, the unpleasant characteristics, low moral
9 qualities, looting, robbing, mass murder; I think they use the phrase
10 "genocidal element of the Serbian people." So it presents them in a very
11 critical way.
12 It then outlines later in the document, from around about page
13 3, I think, some of the various groups, that they -- they categorise as
14 paramilitaries, and it lists a number of them in various locations
15 throughout SRBiH, saying where they work, what they may have done, and
16 where they are now. Some of those groups highlighted in here have --
17 appear already to have been integrated into the VRS.
18 Q. Mr. Brown, let me stop you right there. A list of groups that
19 you're talking about, it starts on, I think, page 3 and it carries over
20 until page 5. Can you identify the groups that were operating within the
21 area of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps?
22 A. On page 3, third paragraph from the bottom indicates a group, a
23 Serbian -- a Serbian Radical Party group in Banja Luka.
24 The next paragraph indicates a group in Sipovo.
25 In the following page, page 4, the second -- or, sorry, the
1 group headed by Zoran Barisic, that brigade was highlighted -- the 19th
2 Brigade was part of Talic's corps, and it would seem to have been
3 integrated by then.
4 Mrkonjic Grad is within General Talic's corps; that's the next
5 paragraph down.
6 There's a -- a reference -- the following paragraph is a revival
7 of paramilitary formations in the area of Kljuc. That was in General
8 Talic's zone.
9 The next paragraph down, the group of 13 members held -- headed
10 by Zeljko Skrbic in the zone of the 1st Krajina Brigade of the 30th
11 Division; that was in General Talic's corps.
12 The proclaimed groups in Prijedor, Cigo's group, Zolja's group,
13 that was -- they were in General Talic's corps, and they were actually part
14 of the 43rd Brigade, which was one of General Talic's units.
15 The following one, Mile Janjatovic in Bosanska Gradiska, that
16 was in General Talic's corps.
17 The detachment of Veljko Milankovic from Prnjavor, that was in
18 General Talic's corps. And Milankovic was, in fact, it says here, formally
19 under command of the 1 KK.
20 There's the reference to the Serbian defence forces in Banja
21 Luka. That was in General Talic's corps.
22 On page 5, Teslic was in General Talic's corps, and the Teslic
23 area fell under his authority.
24 I think -- I think those are the main ones there which ...
25 Q. Can I refer you down to -- no, strike that. Okay.
1 Now, what was the role, Mr. Brown, of these paramilitary units
2 that are identified in this document in achieving strategic objectives that
3 have been identified by the Bosnian Serb Assembly? What role did they play
4 in that respect?
5 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honours, I would object to approaching it with
6 this assumption in the question.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I think the question should be whether
8 they did play any role in that respect and what, if any, that role would
9 be. Could you tell us?
10 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I can't tell you for each of these
11 paramilitary groups exactly what they did. It is -- it is not -- I have
12 not necessarily come across material that would indicate every single issue
13 that they -- they were involved in. But what I would say is that some of
14 them were integrated into the 1st Krajina Corps. This document highlights
15 that some of them were already working in the 1st Krajina Corps. I know
16 that the units in Prijedor were formally part of General Talic's brigade
17 that actively took part in attacks on Kozarac, Hambarine, and other areas
18 in Prijedor. I know that Veljko Milenkovic, who is referenced in this
19 report, took part in -- well, he came from Prnjavor (Milankovic) and
20 actually had been active in the 5th Corps, but was also involved in --
21 directly in combat operations in the Corridor in June 1992 as a unit that
22 took part in that -- in that wider operation.
23 So in some of these units, I would argue that they were
24 integrated into the VRS and they took part in -- in combat operations of
25 the -- of the 1st Krajina Corps, but I -- I cannot say for -- for all of
1 them, because I -- I have not looked at -- in detail at all of them. But
2 some of them I do know.
3 And actually the document itself is -- is about integrating
4 these units into the VRS, bringing them under control of the army. The --
5 the document is very critical in the first couple of pages about what these
6 paramilitaries have done and are capable of doing. And, you know, they
7 call it the genocidal element of the Serb -- the Serbian people, but when
8 you get to the end, page 6, the instruction is that they are -- they are --
9 they're causing difficulties because they diminish the trust in the
10 government and they discourage the fighting of other -- of the army, and
11 they -- they instruct that every armed Serb group must be placed under the
12 command of the army, and if they don't, then they can be disbanded and
13 legal measures taken. But what they don't do in this document is upfront
14 say that here we have a group of people who are the genocidal element;
15 these people should be prosecuted. That should be -- but it would seem to
16 me what they're doing here is bringing the type of people that you would
17 least want to have in a military, which are people who loot, who don't
18 fight, who are war profiteers, and who have clearly committed crimes. And
19 the implication here is that these people will be tolerated as long as
20 they're brought within the legal framework of the army, and this is why I
21 think this document is of -- is of some importance.
22 JUDGE ORIE: May I put a question in this respect directly
23 related to your answer: If they say the presence and activity negatively
24 affect the Serbian people in two ways, is it logical to assume that once
25 they're subordinated, that one would expect them to continue exactly the
1 same activities? I mean, that would not help anyone out.
2 THE WITNESS: Maybe I could illuminate that by an example.
3 Veljko Milankovic was highlighted in late 1991. He is referenced in this
4 document. He is highlighted in 1991 as being a man who had a criminal
5 record and whose group was causing problems. His group was attached to the
6 5th Corps and continued to cause problems, and I think there are highlights
7 of looting. This document highlights that he is still engaged in that
8 process, yet he is formally under the command of the 1st Krajina Corps.
9 And I would argue in his case that -- you know, that this is a man who had
10 a previous record; he was employed in Croatia; he conducted that -- that
11 activity; he continued to cause problems when he was in the VRS, and yet he
12 remained in the VRS, being given orders to go to Knin in late 1992 -- late
13 1993, where he was wounded and later died. So from a military perspective
14 and from an ex-military officer, I have to go back to this issue of these
15 people would be the least likely -- you know, the least -- the people you
16 would last want to have in -- in a military with that clear pattern and --
17 and clear background, and yet this document to me seems to be saying that
18 they will be tolerated as long as they're brought within the formal
20 JUDGE ORIE: But at the same time, if you would get them into
21 the normal army structures it would not help in any way, since they would
22 even perhaps more diminish the trust in the government than being part of
23 the official army; and, second, if they would continue to act as they did
24 before, would they any less discourage the fighting [inaudible] of the
25 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina army members? I try to understand
1 how, if they would continue to act as they did, how this would change
2 anything in view of the concerns expressed on page 6.
3 THE WITNESS: I can only imagine that they felt that if they
4 were in there that, you know, they were part of a formal structure and
5 therefore they could somehow maybe control them. But -- but --
6 JUDGE ORIE: That would then express a wish to end the
7 misbehaviour of these paramilitary units; is that correctly understood?
8 THE WITNESS: I can't say whether that is what -- it -- it may
9 well be one of the reasons that, this was -- seems as a problem, and that
10 one way was to bring them in, and they felt that -- that might be able to
11 control them. But it -- it would strike me as being -- that having already
12 highlighted what these people had been capable of doing, that what they're
13 not saying is the very thing that should happen, which is that these people
14 should be disarmed and prosecuted.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 THE WITNESS: And I can only assume that they didn't want to do
17 that because they also may have, you know, been against their wider
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that answer.
20 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
21 MR. HARMON:
22 Q. You say --
23 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I have to -- do you know
24 anything about the origin of these paramilitaries? How did they appear?
25 Where did they come from?
1 THE WITNESS: I -- I can't tell you the details. I haven't
2 studied each group in -- in -- as an individual. I am aware that they --
3 they became present, many from -- actually the war in Croatia, as well,
4 helped; Milankovic, you know, being an example of that. But I don't think
5 I can explain all of them. I haven't studied them in-depth.
6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Can we, then, say that this
7 happened spontaneously, that there was no initiative by certain
8 individuals? Did they correspond to a need that was expressed by a certain
9 authority? How would you account for their being about -- for their
10 appearance on the ground?
11 THE WITNESS: One explanation, maybe, if I draw you back to that
12 document, one of the earlier documents which I flagged up, which was a
13 distribution of weapons by the JNA and the SDS. Clearly the arming had
14 occurred. There are some references, I believe, in this document - I'd
15 like to go over it a little bit later - which link them to some political
16 affiliations, political parties. I think there's references, even though
17 they say at the beginning they're not linked to the SDS, I think there are
18 a couple of references from the individual groups themselves that talk
19 about SDS relationships. There are political parties referenced in the
20 document, and -- and that might be a way when -- you know, as a means of
21 them being armed.
22 MR. HARMON:
23 Q. May I direct your attention, Mr. Brown, you said "SDS." If you
24 turn to page 3, to the municipality of Sipovo. Do you see that reference?
25 The second paragraph from the bottom of page 3.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes. I think there's another reference here, as well, on page 4,
2 to -- in a different municipality.
3 Q. It is.
4 A. Mrkonjic Grad, maybe.
5 Q. It's found at the top of page 4, third paragraph -- second
6 paragraph down: "SDS members in the area of Mrkonjic Grad." Can you
7 comment on those references?
8 A. Well, they would seem to indicate that there was this
9 relationship with the SDS and that they had been -- and certainly Sipovo
10 had been formed under the leadership of -- or backed by SDS leaders, and
11 the SDS had tried to form one in Mrkonjic Grad. So this document would
12 seem to say that there is a relationship there.
13 Q. Mr. Brown, you were talking about disarming these groups. By and
14 large or generally speaking, if you know, how large were these groups? Are
15 we talking thousands of men? Are we talking hundreds of men?
16 A. Well, this report itself mentions, I think -- I think it says
17 there -- they tend to be in groups of about 30 to 40 men, and I think at
18 this time they said there were about 60 groups working in the BiH. So that
19 would be under 1.000, maybe, in total, under 2.000. But not, in comparison
20 to the VRS, somewhat --
21 Q. We had -- we took --
22 A. -- significantly smaller.
23 Q. We took a look at the earlier document, the report on the army.
24 I started out this afternoon by identifying a portion that showed the
25 number -- the numerical strength of the army in respect of the
1 paramilitaries. Did the army, in your opinion, have the capacity to
2 suppress all of those paramilitary groups that are identified?
3 A. Absolutely. If the army had been capable of conducting the
4 large-scale military operations that it did in some places in Bosnia, like
5 the Corridor, in Sarajevo, and other places, with its size alone, in
6 comparison with these other paramilitary, I would argue that yes, they
7 could quite easily have dealt with this issue.
8 Q. Mr. Brown, in the first paragraph of this document, it identifies
9 a number of formations: Arkan's men, Seselj's men, Dragan's -- Captain
10 Dragan's commandos and the like. You earlier in your testimony referenced
11 Bijeljina. And do you know in -- in -- the events in Bijeljina occurred in
12 -- actually, do you know when the events in Bijeljina occurred?
13 A. Yes. I believe Bijeljina was -- the events occurred in the last
14 few days of March and first few days of April 1992.
15 Q. Do you know if any paramilitary formations were involved in the
16 events in Bijeljina?
17 A. Yes. Arkan's paramilitaries were involved in that.
18 Q. So by late March in Bijeljina, there was reference to -- there
19 was an awareness of paramilitary activities and conduct. And this document
20 is dated the 28th of July, almost four months later. I have two questions
21 for you. One is, By the 28th of July, 1992 in the area of responsibility
22 of the 1st Krajina Corps, what -- can you give us a summary of what had
23 happened in respect of the strategic objectives and the implication of the
24 strategic objectives in the 1st Krajina Corps by the 28th of July, 1992?
25 Just a general overview.
1 A. Much of the territory that encompassed the 1 Krajina Corps's area
2 of responsibility had been under control of the corps. They had conducted
3 attacks in many of the municipalities: Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc, Kotor
4 Varos. It -- and they had control of -- of most of their zone. They had
5 conducted a large-scale operation in the Corridor, along with another corps
6 and -- and other elements, and had taken control of the Corridor by then.
7 And they had -- the small section that they did have on the Una River was
8 also under their control.
9 Q. In respect of the non-Serb population, what had happened to the
10 non-Serb population in the area of the 1 KK by the 28th of July, 1992?
11 Generally speaking.
12 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, that is actually a question that
13 the witness can't answer. His report is based on his reading and
14 assimilation of various documents. What occurred in the area of the 1 KK,
15 as indicated by Mr. Harmon, is actually the -- the matter -- one of the
16 matters that Your Honours must decide and certainly someone, Your Honour,
17 who was not there and is merely analysing the documents cannot glean what
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I disagree with counsel. This report
21 that has been prepared by Mr. Brown addresses specifically that issue. And
22 the documents that he used to base his report in his conclusions on address
23 those very issues of resettlement. There's a section in Mr. Brown's report
24 on the resettlement, the role of the JNA, the role of the VRS in those
25 events, the role of the police, so I think Mr. Brown is perfectly capable
1 of answering that question.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas, the witness, when asked about certain
3 events, very often started his answer by saying "on the basis of the
4 documents, I found that." Let's hear his answer and see whether he
5 certainly has personal knowledge of matters or whether he still relies on
6 documents he studied.
7 MS. LOUKAS: Indeed, Your Honour. [Microphone not activated]
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Ms. Loukas, please. Microphone
9 for Ms. Loukas, please.
10 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... let's listen
11 to his answer.
12 THE WITNESS: From the documentation I have reviewed, there are
13 references to expulsion, removal, resettlement, people moving out, people -
14 - authorities who should work harder at this. There are documents
15 indicating numbers of people had moved out. There are references to people
16 being moved to detention centres, being moved to detention centres from
17 other detention centres, and there are references of people being moved out
18 of the territory.
19 MR. HARMON: All right. I have concluded this portion of the
20 examination on paramilitaries if Your Honours have any questions.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At least, I have one question which -- the
22 document you're dealing with at this moment confuses me a bit. On the top
23 of page 4, where I always thought that Arkan was Zeljko Raznjatovic,
24 suddenly another Arkan appears, which is new to me. Could the witness help
25 me out, because Mr. Zoran Barisic is here, given the name Arkan, and apart
1 from that, I have some difficulties to understand the whole paragraph.
2 THE WITNESS: I can only imagine that he's used that -- that
3 name. It's not relating to the Arkan who took over Bijeljina. It's a
4 different one. And he may just have decided to use the same name or -- or
5 -- it was a name that was given to him.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This is what you think might be the case.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can only assume that from the --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. That's clear, then.
9 Then it says, "But the commander of the 19th Brigade has
10 received constant treats from both the former and the present group." I
11 have not seen a former and a present group, apart from what treats are
12 supposed to mean here or would it be threats or ...?
13 THE WITNESS: I would imagine it's probably a misspelling and
14 it's "threats."
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then I take it, Mr. Harmon, that you'll -- and
16 "former and present group," is ...?
17 THE WITNESS: It's unclear whether -- it's not too clear from
18 this what exactly he means, whether he's -- you know, he was part of a
19 previous group before he joined the 19th Brigade.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But this is speculation, just as the other --
21 THE WITNESS: It is. I can't tell you.
22 JUDGE ORIE: We have no further questions.
23 MR. HARMON: I'll check the translation. On the B/C/S, it's
24 page 4 of the B/C/S. I'll have that checked.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I -- I'm not asking you for a new translation
1 to be provided. If it's a mistake, we could correct it and ...
2 MR. HARMON:
3 Q. One final -- actually, I have one final question, Mr. Brown. Are
4 you aware that after some of these paramilitary groups were entered --
5 integrated into the VRS that they continued to commit crimes?
6 A. Yes. I know of the groups in Prijedor that -- that continued to
7 do that. And I know that Milankovic caused some significant problems at
8 the VRS. In fact, they mentioned that he's involved in looting, I think,
9 and he's -- he's already in the VRS by then, I think.
10 Q. Do you have any information as to what happened to those people
11 who were integrated into the VRS who continued to commit crimes?
12 A. I know that Milankovic remained in the VRS until he was wounded
13 in the Knin. He was sent to the Knin by Talic in, I believe, February
14 1993. He was wounded there and later died in -- in the military hospital
15 in Belgrade.
16 Cigo, his -- his unit remained, I believe, in Prijedor between
17 the 43rd Brigade and another brigade that was based in Prijedor. I don't
18 think he -- anything happened to him through the war.
19 Zoran Karlica who was another one in the 43rd Brigade, I
20 believe, was -- was killed during the operations in -- in Prijedor. But I
21 know certainly of Cigo and -- and Milankovic. They stayed in.
22 Q. All right. I'd like to change the subject, Mr. Brown. I'd like
23 to go to the -- come back to the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly
24 and ask you, Mr. Brown, if you know how those strategic objectives were
25 disseminated, disseminated to both the military units in the 1 KK and to
1 the civil structures, if you know that based on the information you have
3 A. Well, clearly the dissemination of the -- at the Assembly session
4 itself, when Mr. Karadzic announced the goals and -- and spoke to the
5 delegates there as a dissemination process, Ratko Mladic was there, General
6 Talic was there. You know, the -- the whole announcement itself was a
7 dissemination process. So that is one. And I'm assuming that the Assembly
8 sessions were a vehicle whereby that could be disseminated down the
9 political chain.
10 I'm aware from documentation that there are references soon
11 after the announcement of the goals in documents that would relate to the
12 goals of our struggle, the announcements of the goals in one document. The
13 directives clearly indicate a dissemination of the goals and a knowledge
14 and understanding. So there -- there seem to be very much a dissemination
15 of those goals down to the military.
16 Q. Let me turn to tab 55. This is a document that is an excerpt
17 from the minutes of a tape recording of the RS National Assembly, the 27th
18 Session that was held on the 3rd of April, 1993. I'm not sure if this has
19 been admitted as an exhibit this. This is a document provided by Mr.
20 Krajisnik earlier.
21 Now, let me draw the Court's attention to page 7 of this
22 document, the portion under the word "chairman," which is Mr. Krajisnik,
23 and let me quote a portion of this to you and get your reaction. I'm
24 reading from -- starting at the fifth line down from the word "chairman."
25 "Why are so many people attending Assembly sessions? Why are
1 some people sitting at the rear? Presidents of Executive Boards of
2 municipalities and presidents of local SDS branches come along, et cetera.
3 It is because it has a special significance in war. That is the best way
4 to keep our people aware of what is going on. We have seen that people
5 were leaving the Assembly sessions with a clear vision of what they were
6 supposed to do."
7 And it goes on, and a few lines down it says, "And believe me,
8 once our opinions are crystal clear, then it is way easier to work in the
10 Can you comment? You were talking about dissemination of
11 information, and I'm talking about the dissemination of the strategic
12 objectives on -- can you comment on this passage?
13 A. It would seem to state the importance of the Assembly sessions in
14 disseminating the message that they wanted down and that people would leave
15 with a clear understanding of what they were supposed to do. So it's not
16 just a dissemination of -- of a message but -- but what people were
17 actually meant to do with that message.
18 Q. Mr. Brown, I'd like to take you through a series of documents
19 showing the dissemination of these strategic objectives. If we could start
20 with the document that is found on tab 56. And this document is from the
21 command of the 1st Partizan Brigade. It is dated the 14th of May, which is
22 two days after the strategic objectives were announced. It's a meeting
23 with the presidents of municipalities in the zone of responsibility of the
24 division. And it identifies in Part 4 on page 1, it discusses a discussion
25 on -- and proposals -- I'm sorry, this is the agenda: Discussion and
1 proposals for future cooperation with JNA units in the domains of securing
2 territory and treatment of soldiers (unit commanders) in the area of
3 Serbian Krajina. And then it identifies the people who are present.
4 And very briefly, Mr. Brown, can you identify the military
5 people who are present, what their roles were.
6 A. Colonel Galic was the commander of the 30th Division, which was a
7 subordinate formation of General Talic and part of the 1st Krajina Corps.
8 Colonel Basara, we've mentioned before; he was a brigade
9 commander, and his brigade -- it says "Partizan Brigade," it was later
10 called the Krajina Brigade. It was a subordinate -- no, it wasn't a
11 subordinate, the 30th Division. It was a brigade operated under General
12 Galic and it covered Sanski Most.
13 Colonel Stevan Popovic [phoen] I think, was a staff soldier
14 under General Galic, and then there's a reference of the TO staff
15 commander, Major Bosko Lukic [phoen] from Kljuc. And then there are
16 various -- various presidents of municipalities, and those municipalities
17 were within the zone of the 30th Division.
18 The stamp on the top of the document is from the command of the
19 1st Partizan Brigade. The 1st Partizan Brigade was a subordinate unit of
20 the 30th Division. So I'm assuming that these minutes had been
21 disseminated down from the 30th Division to the Partizan Division.
22 Q. Could I direct your attention to page 3 of this document,
23 referring to the second and third paragraphs in that document. Can you
24 tell us about that, Mr. Brown.
25 A. Yes. Colonel Galic, from the minutes, is informing those present
1 of what's happening in the various zones, so in terms of the various
2 municipalities in his zone. And in Kljuc, they mention the partial
3 takeover of power, the situation in the territory of Kljuc municipality is
4 relatively calm. At the time of the takeover of power, units from the 9th
5 Corps and the 5th Corps (a battalion of the 6th Partizan Brigade and the
6 3rd/1st" -- "3rd Battalion, 1st Partizan Brigade) were secure in Kljuc."
7 Q. Can I direct your attention, Mr. Brown, to page 3, and
8 specifically in reference to the strategic objectives. What's happening?
9 A. After Colonel Galic gave an overview of the municipalities, the
10 president of Mrkonjic Grad municipality, Milan Nalija [phoen] presented the
11 conclusions from the meeting held in Banja Luka, and bearing in mind this
12 is two days after the 12th of May. And also what he discusses were the
13 very issues that had been discussed at the 12th of May. I'm assuming he is
14 referencing that conference that he presumably had attended. He talks
15 about the formation of the army and he says here, "It was assessed that
16 this army can occupy a large territory." And he talks about the strategic
17 goals formulated at the meeting in Banja Luka, and he presents them, and he
18 lists the strategic goals as articulated at the -- I mean, they're not
19 exactly a verbatim word-for-word copy of what Radovan Karadzic says, but
20 it's the same goals: separation, the Drina -- the Corridor, the Drina,
21 borders on the Una and Neretva, Sarajevo must be divided -- and here he
22 says "or razed to the ground" and examine the possibility of access to the
24 So he seems to be relaying those goals down within this forum,
25 which includes the municipal leaders, the military commanders, and, as I
1 say from the stamp on this document, it would seem that this had been
2 disseminated further down the chain in the military.
3 Q. Mr. Brown, at the end of the document, Colonel Galic makes a
4 proposal. And can you review and comment on the proposal that was made and
5 ultimately adopted at this session, this meeting.
6 A. Colonel Galic, the first one is -- states, "Implement the
7 decisions from the meeting in Banja Luka, but submit them to the commands
8 of units and municipalities."
9 He then talks about "all forces of the Serbian Republic of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina should work towards the same goals." He also mentions
11 war profiteering should be prevented.
12 And he commends soldiers "for the combat results achieved so
13 far." So he then -- these conclusions are unanimously adopted, presumed,
14 by those who attended the meeting.
15 He also notes that "meetings should be held every 15 days," and
16 that "Municipal presidents" -- "Presidents of Municipal Assemblies," sorry,
17 "should be responsible for this."
18 So for me this document is of some interest in that it comes
19 very quickly after the Assembly. It reflects or briefs the goals. It
20 shows cooperation between the military and the civilian leadership. It
21 stresses decisions that -- or conclusions that they should implement the
22 decisions from the meeting in Banja Luka, that they should all have the
23 same goals. These decisions are unanimously adopted by those present at
24 the meeting, and that they should continue to have meetings afterwards.
25 Q. Mr. Brown, on the subject of dissemination, if we can turn -- on
1 the subject of dissemination of the strategic objectives, if we can turn to
2 tab 57, and very briefly, Mr. Brown, because we have a lot of exhibits to
3 go through. This is a document dated the 21st of May, 1992 --
4 [Prosecution counsel confer]
5 MR. HARMON: Is this -- is this the document that appears, Your
6 Honours, in your tab 57, a document dated the 21st of May from the 1st
7 Krajina Corps?
8 MS. LOUKAS: That's actually document 58, I think -- behind tab
10 JUDGE ORIE: 57 seems --
11 MR. HARMON: I'm sorry.
12 JUDGE ORIE: -- to be a 1st Krajina Corps command, 2nd of August,
13 1992, combat report.
14 MR. HARMON: It should be 57, Your Honour. What -- maybe
15 there's some confusion in these documents. Is 57 -- the document that
16 appears in your 57, a document from the 1st Krajina Corps dated the 21st of
17 May, 1992?
18 JUDGE ORIE: It is not.
19 MR. HARMON: Okay. Then if we could go to tab 9. It may have
20 been placed in tab 9 of your binders.
21 JUDGE ORIE: That is the 21st of May.
22 MR. HARMON: This, Your Honour, should be a document from the
23 1st Krajina Corps dated the 21st of May, an order on general mobilisation.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 MR. HARMON: Okay.
1 Q. Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Brown?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Okay. Again, we're discussing dissemination. Can you briefly
4 explain the significance of this document, which is dated nine days after
5 the strategic objectives were announced.
6 A. I covered briefly this document yesterday, and I think, if I
7 direct you to the section 6 on page 2, General Talic states here -- this is
8 a general mobilisation order based on a Presidency decision of the previous
9 day, and he outlines many -- many issues. But on section 6, he says,
10 "Explain to conscripts as they arrive the goals of our struggle and brief
11 them on the rights" -- "their duties and rights."
12 Q. And the distribution list at the end is quite extensive, from
13 what I can see so far.
14 A. Yes. That's -- that's the -- the various units and sub-units of
15 the corps.
16 Q. If we could turn to tab 58 now. Just take a minute for the
17 Judges to get control of the paper that's in front of them.
18 JUDGE ORIE: We gain experience, Mr. Harmon.
19 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'm referring Your Honours to tab 58
20 in this document.
21 Q. This is a document, Mr. Brown, that is from the 1st Krajina Corps
22 dated the 21st of May, 1992, to the command. It is a document that -- you
23 can see at the end, the distribution list, at the bottom of page 3 it's
24 sent to all of the corps units, and it's been sent to them by -- this
25 document has been prepared by the assistant commander for moral guidance,
1 Colonel Vukelic. And I direct your attention, Mr. Brown, to the top
2 paragraph at page 2, starting at the third line. It says, "The constituent
3 Serbian people who live on or around 65 per cent of the area and represent
4 more than 35 per cent of the population of BH must struggle for the
5 complete separation from the Muslim and Croat peoples and form their own
7 Can I invite you to comment on that, Mr. Brown.
8 A. This would seem to echo very much the issue of separation and
9 strategic goal number 1. This is a report that was written by the morale
10 officer who went down to the corps and outlines the -- the view of the
11 current conflict.
12 I'd also like to draw your attention to the very end, where he
13 says -- the very last sentence, actually, before the signature block on
14 page 3: "Inform all members of the army of the Serbian Republic of BH
15 about the contents of this report in the most suitable way." And it's
16 handwritten on the back, "Sent to all corps units."
17 I think the complete separation would seem to have some
18 resonance with strategic goal number 1.
19 Q. Now, these strategic goals, Mr. Brown, I want to focus on the
20 subject of their being re-emphasised after the 16th Session of the Bosnian
21 Serb Assembly. And if we could turn first of all to the document that is
22 found on -- in tab 59. This is a large document.
23 On page 1, it identifies the document. A name is used in it.
24 And this is a diary. The name is Colonel Novica Simic. Do you know who
25 Colonel Novica Simic is?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. Who is he?
3 A. He was the -- he initially was a JNA officer who served in the
4 1st Krajina Corps. But at this time, he -- he was the East Bosnia Corps
5 commander. So he was a corps commander based in Bijeljina.
6 Q. Could I direct Your Honours' attention and your attention, Mr.
7 Brown, to page 37 of this diary. This diary -- actually, we're going to be
8 referring to pages 37 through 39. But this diary entry starts with the
9 reference "A meeting with the RS Presidency," and it's dated September the
10 2nd. It identifies the participants in this meeting.
11 And if we turn to page 38 of this meeting, it identifies the
12 president of the Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik, and what he talked about. And if
13 you go to the bottom of this page, under "Strategic goals," as noted by
14 Colonel Simic, it appears they are listed with the first goal -- the first
15 goal is "the separation from the Muslims"; and then 2 is "corridors"; 3,
16 "division of Sarajevo"; 4, "Drina Valley-Serbs"; "Border on the Neretva
17 River," and 6, "exit to the sea."
18 Mr. Brown, can I have your observations about the notations that
19 are entered in this -- in Colonel Simic's diary.
20 A. Well, it would seem that at this meeting in September the
21 strategic goals were still being put forward, re-emphasised at a -- at a
22 high level, and this is the corps commander. And it's the same strategic
23 goals as were articulated in May.
24 Q. Mr. Brown, if you'd get the next binder, binder 3.
25 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
2 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour.
3 Q. If we could turn to tab 60. Mr. Brown, this is an excerpt from
4 the Bosnian -- the 20th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, which was
5 held on the 14th and 15th of September, 1992, in Bijeljina, and if I can
6 direct your attention and Your Honours' attention to page 3 of this
7 excerpt. I'll quote the relevant passage, which is found on page 3, and I
8 will be reading from the eleventh line down, where reference is to Mr.
9 Krajisnik. And the speaker of this is Dr. Karadzic, as identified on page
10 -- at the top of page 1. Dr. Karadzic says the following --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any problem?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I cannot follow because all
13 the time a reference is made to the English version and the Prosecutor
14 never mentions the B/C/S version of that same text, making it very hard for
15 me to follow what's being said.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, it's difficult enough for us to find it
17 regularly. Could we -- I'll also try to assist in locating the relevant
18 B/C/S portion.
19 MR. HARMON: Well, unfortunately, Your Honour, this is in
20 Cyrillic, and I can't read Cyrillic, so -- it is on the third -- it's on
21 the third page of the English translation, and it mentions Mr. Krajisnik's
22 name, so perhaps Mr. Krajisnik can easily find it. But I will read it,
23 Your Honour, and in the process Mr. Krajisnik may be able to better locate
24 the document, the passage that ...
25 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I've asked my case manager to assist
1 Mr. Krajisnik.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I see that we are all working on a solution.
3 MR. HARMON: If I may read, Your Honour, then, this passage.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
5 MR. HARMON:
6 Q. The passage that I'm going to read, as I say, I've identified its
7 location and this is Dr. Karadzic speaking, and he says the following:
8 "Mr. Krajisnik, Koljevic and myself were Visegrad yesterday and then in
9 Rudo. The military leadership of the Cajnice Brigade was also in Rudo -- "
10 MS. LOUKAS: Sorry to interrupt. It just -- I think just to
11 assist this process, it would be useful to have the ERN number in the
13 MR. HARMON: I can't read it, so I can give you the ERN numbers
14 of the document.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, the ERN numbers are not in Cyrillic.
16 MR. HARMON: The ERN number is 04226207. That's the -- on the
17 first page. And it goes through 212.
18 I'll start again, Your Honour, if I can.
19 Q. "Mr. Krajisnik, Koljevic and myself were in Visegrad yesterday
20 and then in Rudo. The military leadership of the Cajnice Brigade was also
21 in Rudo, and we talked about the fact that since the relieving of pressure
22 on Gorazde the pressure on those municipalities has increased, so we'll
23 have to increase pressure on Gorazde in order to relieve these
24 municipalities. There will be another meeting of commanders tomorrow, and
25 we think that together with them we will make some important decisions;
1 namely, the Drina is of great strategic importance to us, that is, it is of
2 the highest strategic importance. If the green transversal is to cut off
3 along the Drina, then a Muslim Bosnia will lose significance."
4 A few lines down, at the end of the paragraph, Dr. Karadzic
5 continues and says, "We want to secure the Drina and all of the
6 municipalities -- and all of our municipalities and all of our houses along
7 the Drina. That way we will connect with the Eastern Sanski Corps."
8 Now, Mr. Brown, if we go to tab 61. Go to tab 61, Mr. Brown.
9 This is a document that is from the 1st -- from the command of the 1st
10 Krajina Corps, dated the 14th of September. It's from Colonel Vukelic, and
11 it's a report on military consultations. And, in fact, as you can see in
12 the first and second paragraphs, it is a report on consultations that were
13 attended by, among others, General Mladic, General Talic, Major General
14 Ninkovic, Colonel Bogdan Subotic, who was the Minister of Defence.
15 And in the second paragraph, it says, "In addition to the
16 commanders of units and institutions of the 1st Krajina Corps,
17 consultations were attended by the presidents of 26 municipalities in the
18 organs of the Minister of the Interior in our zone of responsibility."
19 And in this document, it says two paragraphs down, "In his
20 presentation, General Ratko Mladic described the overall political and
21 military situation as very complex and demanded the absolute unity of all
22 armed forces, political structures, and MUP organs, especially in carrying
23 out our" -- "out operations and strategic tasks, the functioning of the
24 government, and the prevention of war profiteering, which is a heavy burden
25 on people's minds."
1 Now, Mr. Brown, did you see throughout the documentation that
2 you reviewed, the military documentation, a reiteration of the objectives,
3 strategic objectives that had been announced on the 16th of -- at the 16th
5 A. Yes, I did. I -- I see -- I see that in a number of areas.
6 We've covered that in some areas. I would like to draw your attention to
7 that first document that you mentioned, about the Drina Valley, that being
8 a strategic objective. That comes some six weeks before operational
9 directive objective four came out, which tasked the Drina Corps to take
10 control of those municipalities we talked about yesterday. It highlights,
11 as well, that from -- from this document that Mr. Karadzic -- that you said
12 Mr. Krajisnik and one other, Koljevic, were able to visit areas, speak to
13 military commanders. There was going to be further meetings.
14 The second document, clearly municipal leaders were being talked
15 to by senior military commanders and re-emphasising the strategic tasks
16 that were being set out. And that along with the directives and some of
17 the other documentation would seem to indicate that the strategic
18 objectives were -- were being re-emphasised and were important.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, let's -- let's go from the reiteration of the
20 objectives to the actual implementation of the objectives, and let me
21 highlight some documents that are found in your report. In your report, in
22 paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3, at pages 60 and 61, you describe combat operations
23 as being two distinct types; they can be divided into two distinct but
24 overlapping categories. One, a series of operations to seize and control
25 and secure territory claimed by the Serbs; and in paragraph 2.3 of your
1 report, you say the second category consisted of large-scale formal
2 military operations directed by the Main Staff, and you describe two of
3 those operations, Operation Corridor and Operation Vrbas, which dealt with
5 I don't want to dwell on Operation Corridor, Mr. Brown, but can
6 you very briefly describe what its purpose and objective was.
7 MR. HARMON: And this Operation Corridor, Your Honour is
8 described in Mr. Brown's report at paragraph 2.212 to 2.217. We're not
9 going to emphasise --
10 Q. We're not going to spend a lot of time on Operation Corridor, Mr.
11 Brown, but can you just briefly describe to the Judges what is that
12 operation was?
13 A. Operation Corridor was an operation, as its name would suggest,
14 to open up a corridor between the -- the Krajina, as articulated by Radovan
15 Karadzic in strategic goal number 2. The sequence very briefly would seem
16 to be the -- possibly the issue I discussed yesterday, when there was a
17 briefing on the 1st of June -- a document highlighting briefing that was to
18 take place on the 3rd of June. I know that on the 9th of June there was a
19 directive that the 1st Krajina Corps received and they were operating on
20 that directive. General Talic on the same day -- on the 9th or 10th sent
21 out his own corps-wide instruction for combat operations, which did two
22 things: One was to secure territory; and the second was to prepare
23 operations in the wider corridor area. He did that between the 10th of
24 June and round about the 20th of June, 24th of June. When Operation
25 Corridor was formally instigated, on the 24th of June, elements of the 1st
1 Krajina Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, Milan Maric's MUP from Knin, and
2 Veljko Milankovic and others took part in Operation Corridor from the 24th
3 of June. They succeeded in achieving their goal of maintaining or getting
4 a corridor link by the 4th of July, so within about ten days. They then
5 spent a few days pushing to the Sava River, and they spent some rest of the
6 summer expanding the corridor. But to all intents and purposes, the formal
7 operation was announced on the 24th of June. It succeeded in obtaining the
8 corridor by the 4th of July. The corridor was never severed in the war.
9 Q. So from the time of the announcement of the strategic objective
10 to the time of the accomplishment of strategic objective number 2 was a
11 period of about seven weeks.
12 A. That's correct, yes.
13 MR. HARMON: Okay. Your Honour, just for your -- Your Honours'
14 information - I won't go through these documents, but I'll describe them
15 very briefly - tabs 62 and 62.1, these are documents from various
16 authorities congratulating other entities within the service of the 1st
17 Krajina Corps, sending them their congratualations for successfully
18 completing Operation Corridor. And tab 63, you will find a -- on the last
19 page, page 6 of that document, you will find a -- a statement that is -- we
20 have a CD. We will submit the CD. Now, General Talic, who is the
21 commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, this is a statement he makes apparently
22 on the 30th of June, 1992, in which he says, among other things, "You know
23 that we have achieved our aim of linking up with the East Bosnia Corps and
24 further on with Mother Serbia." And he says that -- toward the end he says
25 that "We must be united in realising our common goal. When I say 'united'
1 I mean all Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia."
2 I won't dwell on those documents; those are contextual
3 documents. And if we could then change -- we'll start with another topic,
4 which was --
5 Q. Mr. Brown, in your report at paragraph 2.2 --
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, if we move to the next subject -- it's
7 twenty minutes to 6.00, I'd prefer to have a break now and resume at 6.00.
8 MR. HARMON: Fine. All right.
9 --- Recess taken at 5.41 p.m.
10 --- On resuming at 6.02 p.m.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, once the witness is brought into the
12 courtroom ...
13 Mr. Usher, could you escort the witness into the courtroom.
14 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, whilst the witness is being brought
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MS. LOUKAS: -- if I could just raise a point. Your Honours will
18 recall that during the last session, Mr. Krajisnik was having some trouble
19 keeping up with the --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MS. LOUKAS: -- the documentation. And Mr. Krajisnik asked me to
22 ask Mr. Harmon if we could ensure that there was just an indication of an
23 ERN number.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We --
25 MS. LOUKAS: That would make it a lot easier.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Otherwise, I will assist, Ms. Loukas.
2 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: I wouldn't say that my Cyrillic is very well, but
4 usually I find the relevant pages. And I'm just looking at how much
5 Cyrillic is about to arrive. Not much.
6 MS. LOUKAS: Much obliged, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 MS. LOUKAS: I must say my Cyrillic is not that impressive.
9 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please be seated, Mr. Brown.
11 Mr. Harmon, please proceed.
12 MR. HARMON:
13 Q. Mr. Brown, we're going to deal very, very briefly with what is
14 found in paragraph 2.2 of your report, which deals with the description in
15 general terms of the nature of the 1st Krajina Corps operations generally
16 to seize control and secure territory claimed by the Serbs.
17 And if we could turn very briefly, Mr. Brown - because I'd like
18 to try to complete the examination or a large part of it today - turn to
19 tab 64. This -- in tab 64, if I could refer you to page 4 of that
20 document. This is a 1st Krajina Corps command -- it's from the 1st Krajina
21 Corps command and is dated the 9th of June, and it's to the --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. HARMON: --
24 Q. -- 670th, and I don't know what that -- those initials mean. Can
25 you help me out?
1 A. Yes. It's pontoon battalion, I think it was. It was an
2 engineering unit of the corps.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, it is ERN, last three digits, 872.
4 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, just in respect of that, I have given
5 the witness a complete set of binders. Is -- usually I don't refer to the
6 first -- I usually refer to the documents by tab numbers.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But I'm -- since this -- you are referring to
8 page 4 in the English translation, which equals to last three digits 872 in
9 the B/C/S version.
10 MR. HARMON: All right. Well ...
11 Q. Could we look at this document very briefly, Mr. Brown. I want
12 to direct your attention to the thesis that you espouse in your report that
13 the operations were designed to secure and control territory. Specifically
14 I direct your attention to page 8, that is, 01105461 ERN. And if you see
15 the subpart C on that page, there is a reference to a -- an order to the
16 30th PD to take measures to achieve full control over the territory. And
17 if you go down to subpart 5.11, an order to the 122nd engineering unit
18 you've described, set up measures to achieve full control over the
20 Is this a reflection of what you meant in your report when you
21 said "efforts were designed to achieve full control over the territory,"
22 Mr. Brown?
23 A. Yes. This is the document I referenced earlier that has, to all
24 intents and purposes, two components. One is to -- subordinate units to
25 establish control over the territory, and the other, to conduct operations
1 in the corridor.
2 Q. Now, let's focus on the integrated effort to achieve the
3 strategic objectives after their announcement at the 16th Session. And I'd
4 like to refer you to a series of documents, if I could, starting with the
5 document found at tab 66. This, Mr. Brown, is the document which is the
6 conclusions of the Crisis Staff of Sanski Most dated the 30th of May, 1992.
7 And in subpart A, it identifies 12 people, members of the Crisis Staff,
8 each one having a clear domain of activities. Can you identify the members
9 of the VRS who are in this -- VRS or -- well, actually strike that.
10 Number 7 identifies Nedjo Anicic, and number 10 identifies
11 Branko Basara, who's a 6th Krajina Corps commander. Can you give us your
12 insight into this document.
13 A. Yes. Well, this would seem to be one of the examples whereby
14 Crisis Staffs brought together military, police, TO, civilian leadership,
15 and this is in relation to Sanski Most. Colonel Basara we've talked about
16 before. And Nedjo Anicic was the commander of the -- the Territorial
17 Defence in the municipality.
18 Q. So these people are becoming members of the Crisis Staff, a
19 political entity; is that correct?
20 A. Yes, it would appear so from this document.
21 Q. Would you look at the -- one of the conclusions under subpart 2,
22 is also -- it says, and I quote, at the bottom of page 1, almost at the
23 bottom, it says, "Also make contact with the leadership of the Autonomous
24 Region of Krajina regarding implementation of the idea on resettlement of
25 the population." How do you interpret that, Mr. Brown, based on the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 documents you've seen?
2 A. This would seem to indicate that there was some relationship
3 between the Crisis Staff and the regional authority, and they're discussing
4 the issue of resettlement, which would presumably as a result of the
5 actions that had happened prior to this date. They also talk about "a
6 long-term solution needs to be found from the problem of refugees from the
7 Mahala area," which was a Muslim area. So it's clear that they were
8 talking about the resettlement of Serb, I would say, from the area of
9 Sanski Most.
10 Q. Let's look at the next document, tab 67. This is dated the 19th
11 of June, 1992. It's a -- the conclusions of the Sanski Most Crisis Staff.
12 And it identifies, does it not, Mr. Anicic, who was the TO commander, and
13 Mr. Basara, who was the VRS commander, as being permanent members of the
14 Crisis Staff?
15 A. Yes, it does.
16 Q. And it also references that permanent members -- above the
17 listing of names, that permanent members of the Crisis Staff "meet every
18 day and take decisions which everyone -- everybody else is obliged to
20 A. Yes. Again, it would highlight this issue of cooperation --
21 cooperation between the military and political leadership and -- in this
23 Q. So can you generally comment, and then we'll look at some other
24 documents, on the cooperation between the military and the SDS and the
25 political authorities that you saw in the area of the ARK. So a general
1 overview, and then we'll reference some documents.
2 A. I saw -- from the documentation, I was able to view significant
3 cooperation in the ARK area. General Talic was a member of the Autonomous
4 Region of Krajina Crisis Staff, which included police, SDS, and political
5 leaders. I saw some documentation from a number of municipalities where
6 military commanders were either, in this case, a permanent member or
7 another is briefed or appeared to be ex officio members. I saw that in
8 Kotor Varos, Sanski Most, Prijedor, I believe also in Kljuc, and it seemed
9 to me that the Crisis Staff were very much an important feature of the
10 operations in -- in -- in the Krajina in bringing together the political,
11 military, and police bodies in order to conduct their respective works and
12 in order to seize control of territory that they deemed to be theirs.
13 Q. I want you to look at some additional documents in that respect.
14 If we could turn to tab 68. This is an extract from the minutes of a -- of
15 a Crisis Staff meeting that took place on the 7th of July, 1992. And if
16 you could go to item 3, and at the end of the list of people, could you
17 comment on this document.
18 A. Yes. This is another example where it highlights that
19 "Participating in the work of the War Presidency shall be Lieutenant
20 Colonel Peulic." Colonel Peulic was the commander of the -- well, he was
21 concurrently commander of the 122nd Brigade, which was one to have brigades
22 that we just highlighted in that document on the 10th -- or the 9th of
23 June. And he was also what was Operations Group Vlasic, which with was
24 slightly larger military group under Talic, which contained a number of
25 Brigades. So he was, in essence, the military commander that covered Kotor
1 Varos, Skender Vakuf, and -- in that area. And he would seem to be
2 participating -- and in fact, there are other documents, I think, from
3 Kotor Varos which indicate that he's briefing and he's present at a number
4 of Crisis Staff meetings.
5 Q. If you could turn to the next tab, 69.
6 A. Yes. This would appear to be a --
7 Q. Just wait a minute, Mr. Brown, please.
8 A. Sorry.
9 Q. 69, Mr. Brown, is a document from the Celinac Municipality War
10 Presidency dated the 23rd of July, 1992, and it is a decision on the status
11 of the non-Serbian population of Celinac. Can you give me your
12 observations on this document.
13 A. Well, this document seems to outline a decision that severely
14 restricts what the non-Serb population in Celinac are allowed to do. And
15 it lists in Article 5, for example, all the issues that they're forbidden
16 to do, including lingering on streets, bathing, using telephones --
17 Q. Mr. Brown, without giving us a description of the contents
18 because the Judges will have an opportunity to see that, my question should
19 have been more precise: How does this relate to coordination and
20 cooperation with the military?
21 A. Well, on the distribution, it's sent to the Celinac -- or the
22 commander of the Celinac Light Infantry Brigade, so I assume that they felt
23 there was a need to disseminate this decision to them for some purpose.
24 Q. If we could go to another municipality now. Mr. Brown, I'm
25 referring to tab 70. And this is a document from the Kljuc Municipal
1 Assembly Crisis Staff War Presidency; it's a report. It is dated July of
2 1992, and it's a report, then, between the period of 15 May 1992 and July
3 of 1992. And in its report at page 3 of the document, it talks about --
4 "Throughout the armed conflict, representatives, commanders of the Army of
5 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina regularly participated in
6 sessions of the Crisis Staff and the War Presidency." And it goes on to
7 say that "These representatives were in command of and conducted combat
8 activities to defend the territory and the citizens of Kljuc municipality
9 against Muslim extremists in good cooperation and coordination with the
10 Crisis Staff of the Kljuc municipality. All major questions relating to
11 the army and police were resolved within the Crisis Staff of the Municipal
12 Assembly. The period can be described as one of very successful
13 cooperation between the Crisis Staff and military organs in crushing armed
14 resistance by Muslim extremists. The Crisis Staff of the municipality paid
15 special tribute to the 30th Division of the 1st Corps for a job well done
16 in crushing armed resistance."
17 Can you give us your comments on this document, Mr. Brown?
18 A. Well, this would seem to very much echo some of the other
19 documentation from other municipalities that the military and the civilian
20 and the police cooperated at the Crisis Staff, and it was a vehicle where
21 they -- they operated together. The reference to the 30th Division: I
22 know that the 1st Partizan Brigade, as it was called prior to the
23 transition, was one of the units that was involved in operations in Kljuc
24 in the early part of June 1992, so I'm assuming that they're passing on
25 their congratualations to that unit.
1 That's the same unit, by the way, that was also on that stamp
2 for the passing of the strategic goals a couple of days later.
3 Q. If we could turn -- turn to tab 74. This is from the -- the ARK
4 War Staff of Banja Luka to the municipality president from Radoslav
5 Brdjanin, who was identified as the president. Can you discuss with the
6 Court what this document represents.
7 A. Yes. This seems to be a list of members of the Autonomous Region
8 of Krajina War Staff and which links in political -- political members,
9 members of the SDS, General Talic, Stojan Zupljanin, who was head of the
10 CSB in Banja Luka, and it would seem to highlight at the regional level
11 there was a Crisis Staff fulfilling a similar function.
12 I would also possibly like to draw your attention to number 15,
13 Nenad Stevandic, whom I believe is referenced in that paramilitary
14 document. Maybe if I could check that, but I've got a feeling that he is
15 referenced in that document.
16 JUDGE ORIE: He is.
17 THE WITNESS: I believe so.
18 MR. HARMON:
20 Q. This is dated the 6th of May, 1992.
21 If we could turn to tab 75.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Just not to make any mistakes, Stevandic was of the
23 SOS, isn't it?
24 THE WITNESS: That's correct, sir. Yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 MR. HARMON:
2 Q. Now, those -- those documents showed the integration into a -- a
3 joint effort -- a coordination between military, the political authorities,
4 as well as some police authorities.
5 I'd like to focus your attention on the document that I've just
6 referred to in tab 75, which is a 1 Krajina Corps report to the Main Staff
7 of the army. It's a regular combat report. It is signed by General Talic
8 at the end of the document. And if I can direct your attention to
9 paragraph 2 of the document, starting with "The combat disposition of the
10 units." Could you look at that first paragraph and give us your
11 observations about it.
12 A. Well, this would seem to highlight that there was cooperation
13 between the Ministry of the Interior, the police, and the military in --
14 they call mopping-up the terrain and confiscating weapons that, I believe,
15 would link to the issue of weapon deadlines that were issued in a number of
16 municipalities in the Krajina, in Prijedor, in Sanski Most, in Kljuc. And
17 I know from other documentation -- from police documentation they also
18 referenced that they were involved in combat operations in those
19 municipalities and that cooperation existed there at that time.
20 Q. Further to the issue of cooperation, again, in terms of the
21 implementation of the strategic objectives and the joint operations of the
22 authorities, if I could turn your attention to tab 76. Mr. Brown, this is
23 a report that is prepared by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. And it
24 relates -- it relates what has occurred in a number of municipalities in
25 the area of responsibility of the 1 Krajina Corps. Prijedor is mentioned;
1 Sanski Most, on page 6; Bosanski Novi, on page 8. And in it -- and this
2 document is a report concerning the situation as found in questions
3 relating to prisoners, collection centres, resettlement, and the role of
4 the police in connection with those activities.
5 And I'd like to turn your attention, if I could, to page 2 of
6 the document, and page 2 deals with the municipality of Prijedor. Could
7 you look at page 2, the -- the two paragraphs at the bottom, Mr. Brown.
8 And in respect of the coordination of police and military and the Crisis
9 Staff and the transfer of people from that municipality to detention
10 centres, could you give us your observations.
11 A. I think the document speaks for itself. It's actually also, I
12 believe, corroborated by other military documents, too. But it would seem
13 to me that this document is very rich, both in terms of Prijedor and the
14 other municipalities, in highlighting this issue of police-military
15 cooperation and in Crisis Staff and -- as well. It discusses that the army
16 generally brought prisoners to detention centres; these detention centres
17 were invariably organised or run by the police. And then the document
18 also, I believe, discusses the numbers of people who have left either prior
19 to the combat operations or who are in detention centres or who are
20 leaving, they say, voluntarily, either registering or unregistering their
21 property. And I think it's a very large document, but it's quite rich, and
22 I think it -- it highlights very well this issue of cooperation, both in
23 terms of moving people into detention centres and those camps that were --
24 that were established and what was happening to the population in those
1 Q. You say at -- can you give us -- this is a very dense document,
2 Mr. Brown, isn't it?
3 A. Yes, it is.
4 Q. And this is a document I think we could spend a lot of time
5 discussing. Unfortunately, that is something I don't have, but I'd like to
6 take you to some highlights in this, if I can. I'd invite your brief
7 comments, Mr. Brown.
8 There is a reference to the army transporting people and joint
9 teams of police and military interrogating those people in this document,
10 is there not?
11 A. Yes, there is.
12 Q. Did you find that to be a common feature of the documentation
13 that you reviewed, that there would be a -- a coordinated effort by the
14 army and the police to capture, detain, incarcerate, and interrogate non-
15 Serbs; those were joint operations?
16 A. I think this document highlights -- does seem to highlight that,
17 and there are other documents that show a relationship -- for example, in
18 this document, page 3, they discuss the categorisation of prisoners. I
19 know of another documentation in Sanski Most that discusses the issue of
20 categorisation, which would seem to include both the military and the
21 police involved in that process.
22 Q. Did --
23 A. I'm aware that -- that generally this report especially
24 highlights that individuals were taken by the army. I think in Novi it was
25 members of the TO as well as the JNA. But it tends to be that the army was
1 taking people to these detention centres and that the police were
2 invariably running them. And then there is also this cooperation in some
3 cases highlighted whereby prisoners were moved from these detention camps
4 to Manjaca army camp, which was run by the 1st Krajina Corps. So that in
5 itself, both in some military documentation as well as this documentation,
6 or the three municipal reports which this report forms the basis of,
7 highlights the joint nature of -- of that process.
8 Q. Now, it also identifies the number of people in detention
9 facilities at various times, does it not?
10 A. Yes, it does in some detail.
11 MR. HARMON: Now, Your Honours, I'm not going to spend more time
12 on this particular document, but I would like to inform you that there are
13 other documents that are inserted in this binder that relate to this
14 document. From what I see from this document, each of these municipalities
15 prepared a report that was sent to a commission. I've included each of the
16 individual municipality reports that were sent that form the basis of this
17 document. In respect of Bosanski Novi, you'll find that - I don't ask you
18 to look at it - but you'll find that at tab 50. In respect of the Prijedor
19 report that was sent to the commission, you'll find that at tab 77.1. So
20 in -- and in response to the Sanski Most report that formed the basis of
21 this document, you'll find that at tab 77. That's just for your own
22 guidance, Your Honour.
23 [Prosecution counsel confer]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Just for me, Mr. Harmon, I -- after 76, there seems
25 to be no 77, but we were just provided with a 77.1.
1 MR. HARMON: I was informed of that just now, Your Honour, so --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Oh.
3 MR. HARMON: There is --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. HARMON: -- some reconstruction of this document -- of this
6 binder that needs to be done, so ...
7 But you will see in the tabs that I had mentioned, Your Honour,
8 that these are documents that gave rise to the final report that I was
9 referred to with Mr. Brown a few minutes ago.
10 Now, Your Honour, if you need more time to examine your binders,
11 if you'd let me know. Otherwise, I could proceed to the next document.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We will consult the portions you just
13 mentioned being at the basis of that report. So the binder now jumps from
14 76 to 77.1. It -- and then to 78.
15 MR. HARMON: Your Honour should have -- I can --
16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
17 JUDGE ORIE: I'm the only one -- I should not talk on behalf of
18 the Chamber, Mr. Harmon.
19 MR. HARMON: Yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I'm the only one who's doing without, but I'll
21 borrow one.
22 MR. HARMON: We have -- we have one for you, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
24 MR. HARMON: I can proceed? Yes. Thank you.
25 If we could turn to the document at tab 78. This is, Your
1 Honours, a slightly extended report from Prijedor. It covers a greater
2 period of time. The report from the commission was in August. This covers
3 the last nine months of the work of the public security section in
4 Prijedor. It's dated January 1993, and it's from the Minister of the
5 Interior in Banja Luka. It's an extensive report.
6 Q. And, Mr. Brown, I'd like you to comment on its contents in
7 respect of the cooperation between the army and the police in military
8 operations, and I direct your attention to page 4 of the document.
9 A. This would seem to echo a little bit of what -- what was
10 articulated in the previous Prijedor report or the Prijedor section. It
11 also reflects that combat report that indicated that the police were
12 assisting in combat operations in Prijedor. And this section, paragraph 4,
13 outlines that the police were involved in combat operations in the
14 particular villages in -- in Prijedor, Kozarac, Kozorusa, Trnopolje and so
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Brown, I do not see any paragraph on page 4,
17 and for Mr. Krajisnik's information it seems to be page 3 of the B/C/S
19 THE WITNESS: Yes, it's page 4 under paragraph B, participation
20 of the members of the station in combat operations.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. HARMON:
23 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, could you also turn to the next page. It
24 actually quantifies, does it not, the number of hours that the police in
25 Prijedor served in combat operations, does it not?
1 A. Yes, and the above paragraph also highlights the other
2 municipalities that they were -- they were engaged in, so it wasn't
3 exclusively just Prijedor.
4 And then the section below the table in the middle of the page
5 talks about the establishment of Keraterm, Trnopolje, Omarska, and the
6 number of interviews that they conducted in those camps. And it states
7 here that "Except for Trnopolje, the reception centres were dismantled on
8 the 21st of August, 1992."
9 Q. Now, let me ask you: In respect of these camps, at the end it
10 talks about -- at the end of page 5, it talks about persons who had spent
11 time in Omarska and Keraterm, and then it says, "Several convoys were
12 organised for -- for the transportation of these persons to Skender Vakuf,
13 Bugojno." Was that territory that was outside the territory controlled and
14 occupied by the Bosnian Serbs?
15 A. Skender Vakuf and Bugojno actually sat on the -- the border
16 between the RS territory and Central Bosnia, and I believe that's where bus
17 convoys would travel to, that border area in Skender Vakuf and Bugojno.
18 Q. And deposit people who were to be transported out of the
19 Republika Srpska?
20 A. Yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, that was on page 4.
22 MR. HARMON:
23 Q. Well, let me go back to page 4 with an ERN number of 01108987,
24 subpart B. And this indicates that there were combat operations conducted
25 by the police in part with others in the various locations, most
1 intensively in Kozarac, Hambarine, in Prijedor itself, and that "the police
2 were engaged in intensive mopping-up activities in those locations."
3 Do you know what happened in those locations to the non-Serb
5 A. Yes. They were moved out -- or many of those villages were moved
6 out to Omarska, Trnopolje, or Keraterm camps.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Is it on the basis of documents that you have this
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, it is, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 Please proceed.
12 MR. HARMON:
13 Q. All right. Let's go, if we can, Mr. Brown, to the subject of
14 disarming, and if I can direct your attention to the first document on that
15 subject. And you mentioned, Mr. Brown, you mentioned in your expert report
16 that disarming of the non-Serb population was part of a pattern that you
17 saw in the military documentation. You discuss that pattern on page 61 of
18 your report at paragraph 2.4. And you say, Mr. Brown, in that report that
19 the pattern that you observed based on the documentation would include "the
20 movement of forces into the areas of non-Serb areas prior to combat
21 activity, an overwhelming military response to low-level" -- "relatively
22 low-level events, the issuance of deadlines for the handing-over of weapons
23 and/or personnel, the shelling, attacking, and destruction of villages and
24 towns, cooperation with the TO and police units, the forcible movement in
25 sections of the population for questioning and detention at interrogation
1 centres and camps, looting, killings, and the movement out of many of the
2 non-Serbs from the area."
3 Now, Mr. Brown, let's -- I'd like to focus on at least one --
4 we're going to focus on all of the elements that you've just described as
5 part of the pattern that you saw in the documentation. If we could turn to
6 tab 71, and the document that you have before you is a Kljuc Municipality
7 Crisis Staff order that was issued on the 28th of May, 1992, at 8.00 in the
8 morning. And could you look at subpart 1 and explain subpart 1 of this
9 order that was issued by the president of the Crisis Staff, Jovo Banjac.
10 A. Yes. This references or calls for "All citizens who own
11 illegally acquired weapons to hand them over and a particular deadline on
12 that day; otherwise, vigorous measures would be implemented to carry out
13 disarmament." And I have seen in a number of municipalities this very same
14 issue of deadlines being -- being given. I saw it in Bosanski Novi, in
15 Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kljuc, Celinac, I believe. And as I've mentioned
16 earlier on, I noted that there appeared to be a relationship between the
17 instruction that came out in April, the Subotic instruction, an ARK
18 decision that came out in early May, and various Crisis Staff decisions
19 that came in municipal -- municipal Crisis Staffs relating to this issue of
20 disarmament, invariably with a deadline. And most often the deadline on
21 expiring would result in combat operations. So I think the issue of
22 deadlines and potentially very important, and it did seem to occur in a
23 number of municipalities in the Krajina.
24 Q. As a result of non-compliance with deadlines, what happened?
25 What happened to the non- -- the civilian population, the non-Serb civilian
1 population as a result of non-compliance with the deadlines, from what you
2 can see in the documentation, Mr. Brown?
3 A. Well, from the documentation I can see, after the deadlines
4 expired, areas were attacked by Serbian forces.
5 Q. What happened to the non-Serb population?
6 A. Many of the non-Serbs were rounded up, sent for questioning, and
7 a significant number appeared in the detention camps that are highlighted
8 by these police documents.
9 Q. Could we turn to the document at tab 79, which also is a document
10 that references -- strike that.
11 This references Kljuc, but this is a document that is dated the
12 28th of May, 1992, and it's a regular combat report from the Sipovo command
13 post to the command of the 30th Infantry Division. And if I could draw
14 your attention, Mr. Brown, to page 2, the second paragraph above the bottom
15 line. And this is ERN number 03009308.
16 Could you direct your attention to that paragraph, please, Mr.
17 Brown, and explain what --
18 A. Is this the paragraph that starts "Because of the situation ..."?
19 Q. Correct, "Because of the situation in Kljuc."
20 A. "The 3rd Battalion of the first infantry brigade was made fully
21 combat ready as ordered. If the Muslims do not surrender their weapons by
22 27 May 1992 at 1200 hours, the battalion will carry out a mopping-up
24 This is the battalion that fell under the 30th Division that was
25 congratulated in the previous document from the Kljuc Crisis Staff report,
1 and I know that this battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Infantry
2 Brigade, was involved in combat operations in Kljuc in the days following
3 this report.
4 Q. This use of the term "mopping-up," what -- can you tell the Court
5 what that term means in military terms and what it meant in -- to you in
6 reviewing these documents.
7 A. I know what "mopping-up" means from my perspective as an ex-army
8 officer, which normally means small, already broken up, fragmented units
9 that might have to be cleared up in an area that you've already generally
10 conducted operations in. Well, I'm not sure that they use that phrase with
11 that meaning here because the result of this operation in Kljuc was that
12 areas were attacked and people were brought to detention centres, and it's
13 -- it's not a phrase that -- or the operation appeared to be carried out in
14 Kljuc is not one that I would classify as a -- as a mopping-up operation,
15 from my military experience.
16 Q. This unit that's going to be doing the mopping-up is mentioned on
17 page 1 in the table on the right-hand side as comprising 269 people; is
18 that correct?
19 A. Yes, that's correct. It wasn't the only unit that was involved
20 in Kljuc. Actually, there were -- there were other -- other units, as
21 well, but this was one of them.
22 Q. Now, I'd like to look at two -- two orders, if we could, that
23 relate to Sanski Most and relate to this topic that we're talking about.
24 The first is found in tab 80, and this is from the Crisis Staff of Sanski
25 Most, and it's dated the 23rd of May, 1992. And in sub- -- it's a
1 conclusion of the Crisis Staff, and in subpart 3 it says, "The question of
2 disarming paramilitary formations of armed individuals implement the
3 conclusions of the previous Crisis Staff meeting, issue a proclamation to
4 the radio station on Saturday, 23 May 1992 to be read out every 20
6 Now, that's on the 23rd of May. And if we could turn to tab --
7 the document in tab 81, also from Sanski Most. This is a document issued
8 by the Territorial Defence commander, Colonel Anicic, who we have earlier
9 seen, I believe, as a member of the Crisis Staff. And this is an order for
10 a disarmament operation. What is this document, Mr. Brown? Briefly.
11 A. This is an order to -- to the Territorial Defence to -- along
12 with, in fact, the 6th Brigade to conduct operations in the, I believe,
13 Mahala area and other non-Serb areas, Mahala, Otoka, in order, to they say,
14 disarm -- disarm those settlements. And it makes reference to the 6th
15 Brigade as being engaged in that, as well.
16 Q. Down in paragraph 2, the references in paragraph 2, three lines
17 from the bottom -- or four lines from the bottom, it says, "Maintain in
18 coordinated action with units of the 6th Brigade complete control of the
19 territory in order to ensure stable functioning of our government and to
20 create conditions for unobstructed life and work."
21 And if I could -- the attack, according to this document, on
22 page 2, third paragraph down, was to commence at 5.00 in the morning on the
23 26th. And if we go to paragraph 8 on that same page, it says, "Carry out
24 artillery preparations for attack by firing at significant targets in
25 Demisevci village, Bonjancic and the Mahala and Otoka neighbourhoods."
1 Do you know from the documentation that you observed what
2 happened in Mahala and Otoka?
3 A. I'm aware not from the documentation, but I am aware that -- that
4 this attack did occur.
5 Q. Okay. And at the end of this document, then, Mr. Brown, on page
6 3, paragraph 15, it says, at the last subpart of that, it says, "Upon
7 completion of the task, take the prisoners to the sports hall of the
8 secondary school centre and hand over the war booty to the Sanski Most
9 Serbian TO staff."
10 Earlier you discussed a pattern. Does this document reflect
11 that pattern that you've been testifying about, Mr. Brown? Can you comment
12 on that?
13 A. Yes, I think it does. It brings together some of the threads:
14 Cooperation between the TO, 6th Brigade; it brings together that there was
15 to be artillery preparation. That generally means firing on targets. It's
16 targeted against a non-Serb area. Complete control is to be achieved of
17 the area. And I know from the Sanski Most police document and also from
18 the CSB-compiled report that the sports hall was used as a detention centre
19 where people were brought to. So it corroborates that document also, and -
20 - and I think it's -- it's a -- it's a document with many components. It
21 would seem to highlight that -- that issue of -- of a pattern.
22 Q. If we could turn to tab 82. I'd like your interpretation of this
23 document, please, Mr. Brown. This is a 1 Krajina Corps report dated the
24 31st of May, 1992, that goes to the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb army,
25 and it is signed by General Talic.
1 I'd like to direct your attention to the second page, ERN number
2 00867035, and under 5, subpart B, it reads, "After the actions in Kozarac,
3 Kljuc, and Sanski Most, some conscripts of Muslim nationality have asked to
4 be released from the units. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the
5 massive destruction of their towns."
6 It goes on to say in that paragraph, "This is made worse by
7 public statements made in the media by SDS Bosanska Krajina Autonomous
8 Region leaders who advocate moving and expelling all Muslims and Croats
9 from these areas."
10 Mr. Brown, how do you interpret this paragraph? In particular,
11 in light of the earlier document that we saw that referenced attacks in
12 Sanski Most. Is there any connection?
13 A. Yes, I think there is. It comes only a few days after the
14 attack. An order was issued. It highlights there has been significant
15 destruction in those municipalities and that there's an advocation that
16 people should be moved out and -- and expelled from Muslim and Croat -- or
17 Muslims and Croats should be expelled from those areas. And there are
18 other references in this document.
19 For example, on page 1, at the very bottom of the page, "In the
20 municipality of Kljuc, suburban areas are being cleared and the weapons
21 seized in Muslim-populated villages," highlighting here that the target is
22 Muslim villages.
23 I think it's -- it's a -- a document indicating where the
24 actions are occurring at that time, that the military are involved in those
25 actions, and that there's significant destruction as a result of those
1 actions, and that this issue of expelling and moving people out is known.
2 Q. I'd like to talk, Mr. Brown, on the topic of -- what the
3 documentation showed on the killing of civilians, the 1 KK documentation
4 showed. And if we could start first with the document that's found at tab
6 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just ask one question in between --
7 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: -- in relation to --
9 You read about the -- the dissatisfaction with the massive
10 destruction of their towns expressed by conscripts of Muslim nationality.
11 What could you tell us about the presence still on the 31st of May, 1992,
12 of conscripts of Muslim nationality? We heard quite some evidence on
13 officers that for whatever reason left their units or -- how about the
15 THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of the percentage or numbers in the
16 1st Krajina Corps. It was not an area that I was able to -- to look at,
17 and I didn't get information outside this particular report. As you say, I
18 was made aware of the documentation relating to officers, and they -- them
19 being placed on leave and sent -- sent away in June. But I don't -- I
20 don't know of the figures of Muslim conscripts that were serving in the 1st
21 Krajina Corps.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
23 Please proceed, Mr. Harmon.
24 Q. Let's -- can we turn to the document that is found at tab 82.1.
25 And I'd like to address -- ask you, Mr. Brown: First of all, in the
1 documentation that you reviewed, did you see references to the killing of
2 civilians or people in the custody of the Bosnian Serbs?
3 A. Yes. There were a number of references directly to killings of
4 civilians and others in the 1st Krajina Corps report, and I think I
5 addressed that in the report. In a number -- there were a number -- a
6 number of examples.
7 Q. Can you -- generally -- generally - and we'll get to the
8 documentation in a minute - tell the Court what was the reaction of the
9 military authorities to these killings of civilians? What did you see in
10 the documentation?
11 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, that -- that question's incredibly
12 general for such an important area. If the witness can refer the Trial
13 Chamber to specific documents in that regard, that, of course, I think,
14 will be more helpful than a generalised question and a generalised answer
15 of that nature, I would submit.
16 JUDGE ORIE: At least it's not leading, Ms. Loukas.
17 MS. LOUKAS: Indeed.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. HARMON: Well, Your Honour --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Could you answer the question and be as specific as
21 possible on your sources.
22 THE WITNESS: I only remember of one documented incident of
23 killing that I saw an element of follow-up through the military judicial
24 process, and that related to a document or a series of documents relating
25 to a killing in Kljuc in 1992 at the school, Velagici School. However,
1 when I followed or we followed the documentary trail through -- through the
2 military court records, there appeared to be a tailoring off, although
3 there was initially some people rounded up and held, there was a tailoring
4 of the investigation -- a tailing-off of the investigation, and nothing
5 appeared to happen as a result of that.
6 I do not remember seeing any other examples whereby the killings
7 that were referenced in the 1 Krajina Corps documents resulted in any
8 apparent follow-up from the documents that I was able to see.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Are you specifically talking now about killings of
10 civilians, or are you talking about people being killed?
11 THE WITNESS: No, predominantly killings of civilians, or
12 massacres, they would sometimes call them. I'm not talking about killings
13 like, say, combat deaths.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I'm looking at the clock. It's ...
15 MR. HARMON: I can just -- if I can just have one additional
16 document that Mr. Brown referenced.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. HARMON:
19 Q. It's found in tab 82.1, and this is the regular combat report of
20 the 4th of November, 1992, again 1st Krajina Corps. It goes to the Main
21 Staff of the army, and it is a document that was prepared by and signed by
22 Colonel Vukelic. And, Mr. Brown, if you'd take a look at paragraph 2, the
23 second paragraph in paragraph 2. Could you comment on this -- this
24 paragraph that references a massacre -- a brutal massacre.
25 A. Yes. Actually just to finish the question that the -- Judge Orie
1 placed to me, it was civilians or prisoners. And this was one -- either
2 killings of civilians or prisoners. This is one example whereby they
3 reference the killings of prisoners. And in Kotor Varos, although there
4 had been military operations in there in June, there was a small pocket
5 that held out through most of the summer and into the autumn of 1992 in
6 Vecici. That group -- there were references in the Krajina reports that
7 they were negotiating how to resolve that and whether that group was going
8 to be moved out. And whilst that negotiation was underway, men appeared to
9 have broken out of this small pocket in Kotor Varos, but they were
11 And this document on the 4th of November references that they
12 were -- they were -- they were captured and a brutal massacre occurred on
13 that group in Vecici.
14 The subsequent documents on the 1st Krajina Corps - and I do
15 reference this issue in the report - the subsequent documents are --
16 characterise that group as combat deaths. And I'm aware that the Kotor
17 Varos Light Infantry Brigade commander continued in his command at least
18 until 1993, from documentation I've reviewed. So I think here was an
19 example of a large-scale killing of people who'd been captured in Kotor
20 Varos; it was initially reported as a brutal massacre. I believe in the
21 following-on days it was portrayed as combat casualties, and I'm aware that
22 nothing -- or from the documentation anyway, I'm aware that nothing --
23 nothing came of this incident.
24 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: It's three minutes past 7.00. We'll adjourn until
1 tomorrow, quarter past 2.00, same courtroom.
2 I inform the parties that arrangements have been made to
3 continue on Thursday morning.
4 We'll adjourn until tomorrow.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of
7 July, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.