1 Wednesday, 26 April 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [Mr. Krajisnik entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. And, Mr. Registrar, would
6 you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik. Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Before we continue the examination of you, Mr. Krajisnik, I have
11 one announcement. From the last session of yesterday a DVD -- a video DVD
12 has been produced and will be handed out to you today so that you can look
13 at it. It has been produced in the B/C/S version. It was considered that
14 that is what you would need. If that would be not the case, then please
15 inform us, and you're invited to look at whether it functions on your
16 computer so that you -- and please report to the Chamber if you can't look
17 at it so that we can try to fix that.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have already received
19 the DVDs. Your employees are very prompt.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So I'm, perhaps as always, a bit behind the
21 fact. And have you tested it already, Mr. Krajisnik? Not yet. Okay.
22 So then we'll hear from you if it doesn't function. Yes.
23 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to remind you that you're still
24 bound by the solemn declaration that you've given at the beginning of your
25 testimony yesterday.
1 And, Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
2 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
4 [Witness answered through interpreter]
5 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking at and I hope you still have a copy
7 in front of you of the transcript of your interview on the television
8 programme, Club 91. You're nodding so I can see that you have that.
9 Where we got to yesterday, do you find in the margin of your copy the
10 number 3?
11 A. Yes.
12 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honour, this is in the -- almost in the
13 middle of page 4 of the English where Mr. Krajisnik is recorded as
14 saying: "The viewers will see that but I hope you will also recognise
15 that," and then we continue in the transcript. The presenter
16 says: "Mr. Krajisnik, so, to begin - behind us is yesterday's
17 long-running government session at which there was discussion, as you
18 know, viewers, about the problems of regionalisation in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina. We have all heard the conclusions and there have already
20 been reactions today. Can you tell us your opinion about these problems,
21 yesterday's government session and regionalisation in general?"
22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, you did not personally attend that
23 government session, did you?
24 A. No, I did not.
25 Q. And you -- is it correct you wouldn't have normally attended the
1 government session because you weren't, in fact, a member of the
3 A. You're correct.
4 Q. Then I'll go through the answer that you gave on that occasion.
5 You said: "I think it is very difficult to form an answer to this
6 question. Much happened and I think that there are differences as regards
7 regionalisation. I will tell you my personal view, which I think is a
8 duty that I must say from the position of president of the Assembly but
9 talking also as a man and a citizen of this Bosnia and Herzegovina. I
10 unambiguously believe and this was stated at the session of the
11 Assembly and the government itself that according to the Constitution
12 regionalisation is allowed, in fact, it is a voluntary act of the
13 municipalities which want it and which can realise it with their voluntary
14 action if they established that there are political interests. Legally,
15 too, even though there have been objections here, it is unambiguous here
16 that, also legally there is no basis to challenge that."
17 MR. STEWART: And then, Your Honours, the next two lines are one
18 of those handwritten notes that we can scrub for immediate purposes.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, the question you'd been asked by the presenter
20 included asking your opinion about regionalisation in general. But the
21 question I am putting to you now today is would you tell Your Honours what
22 at this time in this context - this time in 1991 - what was
24 A. In 1991 regionalisation, albeit legally grounded in the
25 constitution, had a certain political dimension as well. It created a
1 rift between parties, between sides. Therefore, it did not have the real
2 basis as designed, as imagined by the writer of the constitution.
3 Q. Let me start with this then, Mr. Krajisnik. Did the three main
4 parties, all three of them, the SDA, the HDZ, and the SDS, have differing
5 approaches to regionalisation at that time, in May 1991?
6 A. Right. They had different approaches.
7 Q. Was there -- just to clarify, was there, to start with, a
8 difference of approach between the SDA and the HDZ?
9 A. Perhaps, but it was not a visible difference. If you allow me to
10 explain, HDZ was in favour of regionalisation, whereas SDA was absolutely
11 against it, categorically against it. When I say that the HDZ was in
12 favour of regionalisation, that applied only when it was in the interest
13 of the Croatian people, and that's when they implemented it. As for the
14 Serb side and as for what the Serbs did, then the HDZ was sympathetic with
15 the SDA in their opposition to regionalisation.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is -- if I may comment, this is clearly a
17 potentially complex subject, so just as we go into it I'd invite you to --
18 to stick to my questions and we'll take it in steps.
19 The -- you've said in your answer there in relation to difference
20 of approach between the SDA and the HDZ, you said: It was not a visible
21 difference. And then I'm not cross-examining you, Mr. Krajisnik, but you,
22 first of all, say it's a visible difference and then you say the HDZ was
23 in favour of regionalisation, whereas the SDA was absolutely against it.
24 That second comment does seem to be rather a sharp difference between them
25 as opposed to you saying there was no visible difference. So would you
1 clarify that. What I'm putting to you is that on your own answer there
2 plainly was a substantial difference between the SDA and the HDZ.
3 A. In the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agenda featured
4 mainly the regionalisation implemented by the Serbs, and on that issue the
5 HDZ and the SDA were joined against such regionalisation. And when I was
6 trying to explain a moment ago about regionalisation in general and the
7 approaches of the various sides, I said that the SDA was absolutely
8 against it, whereas the HDZ would be in favour of it when it applied to
9 Western Herzegovina, for instance. So one thing happened in the Assembly,
10 and the political moves outside of it was something quite different and we
11 were aware of those political moves. In this interview I was talking only
12 about what was going on at the Assembly.
13 Q. Let's then -- let's start, Mr. Krajisnik, with asking you to
14 describe as succinctly as you can the essentials of the SDS policy on
15 regionalisation at that point in time.
16 A. Did you mean the SDS?
17 Q. I hoped I said the SDS. I did mean the SDS, Mr. Krajisnik, yes.
18 A. The SDS exercised the possibility provided by the constitution to
19 revive the issue of regionalisation which was topical even before the
20 multi-party elections, and it was all legally justified. However,
21 politically it was an answer to the violation of the constitution by two
22 sides concerning the fact that they put their declaration of the
23 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda of the Assembly in
24 February 1992 [as interpreted].
25 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, what -- leaving aside for one moment whether --
1 what it was an answer to and the reasons why it was adopted, you've
2 indicated, as an answer, what were the essentials of the regionalisation
3 as a practical policy of the SDS?
4 A. Even apart from this first answer, this first reaction, the SDS
5 wanted municipalities to regionalise, it wanted regionalisation to go on,
6 because many regions had been left behind, forgotten, because Sarajevo, as
7 the centre, enjoyed all the advantages. And in order to provide for a
8 polycentric development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we in the SDS pushed
9 regionalisation for Bosnia and Herzegovina always looking to Switzerland
10 as a model.
11 Q. When you say that the SDS wanted municipalities to regionalise,
12 then what is it that the SDS wanted the municipalities to do to implement
13 that regionalisation?
14 A. To act according to the constitution. Each municipality was
15 supposed to declare its own will to say whether they wanted to join a
16 particular region if such an initiative existed, and that was carried out
17 in practice. They were only exercising their right given by the
18 constitution to declare what they wanted, which region they wanted to
20 Q. I want just to -- in your answers, please, to try to take these
21 steps in -- in specific detail bit by bit. You say that "each
22 municipality was supposed to declare its own will." By what mechanism was
23 the municipality to declare its own will? What body was to do it? How
24 was it to be done?
25 A. The constitution provided the grounds for regionalisation. Under
1 the socialist system it was all orchestrated, whereas we suggested that it
2 should be somehow coordinated and negotiated among representatives of
3 various municipalities. They would meet and agree, and after that each
4 municipality would start an initiative in its own to implement that idea.
5 It was actually only about reviving the regions that had existed earlier,
6 before those multi-party elections.
7 Q. So the representatives of the various municipalities that you
8 suggested should somehow coordinate and negotiate among themselves, are
9 you talking about Serbs only or Serbs and representatives from the other
11 A. I'm not talking only about the Serbs, because various ethnic
12 communities lived in each of the municipalities, Croats, Serbs, and
13 Muslims. I'm talking about adjoining municipalities, contiguous ones.
14 You cannot regionalise municipalities that are far from each other; only
15 contiguous municipalities could form one whole. So a municipality which
16 leaned territorially on to an existing region had the possibility of
17 declaring its will at a referendum and joining that region. That's how it
18 was done in practice.
19 Q. And was the intention then, Mr. Krajisnik, that there would
20 eventually be regions that were politically run by Serbs and there would
21 be other regions that were politically run by Muslims or by Croats?
22 A. Speaking of regionalisation, at that time there was no thought of
23 unifying only Serb majority municipalities. We have proof in the
24 statement of the president of the then-Serb region of Krajina in which he
25 invited other Muslim majority municipalities to join that region.
1 Q. So that when you referred to a municipality declaring its will, it
2 was the Municipal Assembly of a particular municipality that would make
3 that decision and declare its will if it wanted to join a particular
4 region. Is that correct?
5 A. You are quite right. That's the way it went all the way up to
6 the outbreak of armed conflict.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I ask --
8 MR. STEWART: Of course.
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- you to seek one clarification.
10 MR. STEWART: Of course, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: In this respect Mr. Krajisnik also mentioned, and I
12 read that a municipality had the possibility of declaring its will at a
13 referendum, and I have some difficulties to reconcile a -- the expression
14 of its will by a decision of the Municipal Assembly or by a referendum.
15 That's just unclear to me.
16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour's absolutely right.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, your reference to referendum, was that -- was that
18 on the basis that a municipality would hold a referendum before
19 deciding -- well, I'll ask that question first.
20 Was that on the basis that it was expected that a municipality
21 would hold a referendum before a decision was taken?
22 A. I don't actually recall mentioning a referendum.
23 JUDGE ORIE: It might be a translation issue. Perhaps we check
24 that during the next break.
25 MR. STEWART: Well, perhaps I --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, yes. Perhaps if I put the answer to
3 Mr. Krajisnik to see if he does accept it straight away, otherwise we'll
4 look at it.
5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, what we have -- and I'm reading of course from the
6 English transcript now. What we have a few minutes ago is you saying,
7 first of all, you can't regionalise municipalities that are far from each
8 other, and only contiguous municipalities could form one whole. And then
9 you are recorded on our transcript as having said: "So a municipality
10 which leaned territorially on to an existing region had the possibility of
11 declaring its will at a referendum and joining that region. That's how it
12 was done in practice."
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note, if this will be of
14 assistance, I hope, it was a misunderstanding by the interpreter when
15 the -- when Mr. Krajisnik said "declaring its will."
16 MR. STEWART:
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... a moment, please. We'll
18 listen to the interpreter first, if we may.
19 MR. STEWART: I'm so sorry. Thank you, interpreter. Could you
20 just finish what you were saying?
21 THE INTERPRETER: I have finished. I misunderstood Mr. Krajisnik
22 to mean a referendum when he was talking about declaring its will.
23 JUDGE ORIE: It's been clarified.
24 MR. STEWART: Thank you very much. Thank you, Your Honour. Thank
25 you, Madam Interpreter.
1 Excuse me, Your Honour, I'm trying to pick up where we were.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Page 8 --
3 MR. STEWART: Yes, that's very kind, Your Honour. Perhaps we
4 should clarify what Mr. Krajisnik did say at that point.
5 So is it -- Madam Interpreter, is it --
6 May I, Your Honour, put that question through the Bench to Madam
7 Interpreter as to what Mr. Krajisnik did actually say at that point?
8 THE INTERPRETER: Everything except "referendum." Declaring its
9 will and joining that region.
10 MR. STEWART: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: So the "referendum" was added in the translation.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you. Thank you.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not actually -- I don't
14 remember saying "referendum."
15 MR. STEWART:
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you are absolutely right about that. It seems to
17 be completely agreed now; it was just a misunderstanding.
18 The -- so it was -- just to summarise. It was to be -- it was for
19 Municipal Assemblies to make the decision. If -- once municipalities --
20 let's take that -- once municipalities had declared their will to join a
21 particular region, so it's got to be more than one municipality, otherwise
22 you don't have a region. So but once some municipalities have declared
23 their will to join a particular region, what was the SDS expectation as to
24 how that region would then be governed?
25 A. Municipalities took their decision like any other decision at
1 Assembly sessions. Since I am under oath to tell the truth, I'm going to
2 say that the SDS only made a political move that would be a reply to the
3 other side to the effect that the Bosnian Herzegovinian crisis should be
4 resolved by agreement instead of imposing a solution. Because even
5 regions should be based on agreement between all three sides, whereas in
6 this respect there was obviously no agreement even about regions among the
7 three sides.
8 So it was a political answer to the self-willed decision-making by
9 the other two sides. It was a signal that we should have an agreement,
10 both about the regions and the solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could we then stick with the -- first of all, with
12 the question -- the specific question that I asked you. You've -- let's
13 assume you've got a situation where at least a few municipalities have
14 declared their will in the way you've described to join a particular
15 region. What was the SDS expectation as to how that region would then be
16 governed? In other words, in some way above the level of the individual
18 A. [No interpretation].
19 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm not getting
20 translation. Your Honour probably isn't either.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English booth now?
22 MR. STEWART: Now yes. Your Honour --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course we need some other -- some foreign
24 words to be spoken in order to see whether the translation continues.
25 If you please continue or repeat your question, Mr. Stewart, then.
1 MR. STEWART: Yes.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just say something in your language like
3 congratulations on the football or something like that, just anything in
4 your own language.
5 A. Well, I can say that I can hear all of you.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.
7 So I will put my question again, though, Mr. Krajisnik. You've
8 got a situation where at least a few municipalities have declared their
9 will in the way you've described to join a particular region. What was
10 the SDS expectation as to how that region would then be governed, in other
11 words, in some way above the level of the individual municipalities?
12 A. Quite simply, I'm not saying that that's what the SDS wanted it to
13 be like, but I'm giving you the position of the SDS. These regions were
14 to behave exactly as envisaged by the BH constitution, and what was
15 envisaged was that municipalities could transfer some of their powers to
16 the region. And these powers would be dealt with at the Assembly of the
17 region or the Executive Council of the region. I do not remember what the
18 name was in the constitution. But these bodies would in turn pass
19 decisions which would then be handed down to the municipalities that had
20 been brought together.
21 Q. And the -- you've indicated that the -- something about the HDZ
22 position. How did the HDZ at that time then, how did they express their
23 position on this process? Did they say that they were overall in favour,
24 or did they say that they were generally against or what was their
25 expression of policy?
1 A. As far as I can remember, the HDZ was silent. They did not
2 publicly express their views on regionalisation. However, tacitly in the
3 Assembly when there were decisions concerning regionalisation, they would
4 actually express their solidarity with the SDA.
5 Q. And the SDA you have already said were opposed to regionalisation.
6 Did they express, first of all, publicly, did the SDA publicly express
7 reasons for their opposition?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And what reasons did they give?
10 A. The SDA interpreted regionalisation to mean the break-up of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina because they were advocating a unitary firm united
12 sovereign, as they say, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13 Q. And when you say, to clarify, at that time were they advocating a
14 unitary -- I beg your pardon. Were they advocating a sovereign Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina as part of a larger state of Yugoslavia or an independent
16 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina?
17 A. There are different stages in which they advocated different
19 If you allow me to explain, the SDA in the election campaign
20 advocated Bosnia within Yugoslavia. In the first period after the
21 multi-party elections they advocated Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia, a
22 reformed one of course, and then a self-reliant Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
23 then a Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia when the historical agreement
24 was reached, and then, yet again, a Bosnia-Herzegovina outside Yugoslavia.
25 And that was the last stage that went on from October 1991 until the
1 beginning of the armed conflict.
2 Q. In this time we're talking about, in May 1991, was it your
3 understanding -- and I'm asking specifically about you, Mr. Krajisnik.
4 I'm not talking about the SDS or any larger group. Was it your
5 understanding that the SDA were supporting a continuation of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina within a larger state of Yugoslavia?
7 A. Well, it's hard for me to define what the position of the SDA was,
8 but precisely in that period of time there was a debate on the declaration
9 that was -- this was the declaration concerning a sovereign
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina that was discussed at the constitutional commission and
11 different bodies. And there was an opportunity that an agreement would be
12 reached which would mean a third thing, so that is to say that at that
13 time the SDA was not firmly in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina being an
14 independent state. However, in all the debates that model was favoured --
15 or rather, it was promoted because they wanted the declaration to be
17 Q. But Mr. Krajisnik, you -- you have -- in your answers this morning
18 to the Trial Chamber, you have indicated that the SDS policy of
19 regionalisation was an answer, as you put it, to the policies of positions
20 of the other parties. That's correct. That's what you have said. Is
21 that right?
22 A. That is correct. At the moment when -- or rather, exactly from
23 March until May, up to May, that was the political move concerned.
24 However, the -- when the SDS wanted a recommendation to be put forth at
25 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina to stop regionalisation until a
1 political solution is found in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for as long as the
2 negotiations go on.
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- in describing regionalisation as an answer,
4 what was the problem to which it was an answer? Let me put it this way:
5 What did the SDS see as the negative aspects of the other parties'
6 policies which could then be met by regionalisation?
7 A. In February 1991, the SDA proposed the declaration at the
8 Assembly. There were 20 signatures by SDS deputies, and it was sent to
9 the Council. In these discussions that took place, the SDA position
10 became clear, but what particularly called for regionalisation was a
11 statement made by Mr. Izetbegovic unwittingly at a meeting that was held
12 in Split, a meeting of the presidents of the republic. He said the
13 declaration will be adopted regardless of whether the SDS agrees or not.
14 Then everything followed, that is to say, giving a political response to
15 regionalisation. There is a document that includes this statement made by
16 Mr. Izetbegovic. There is a newspaper article as to what he stated after
17 the Split meeting.
18 Q. The --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart --
20 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ORIE: -- I'd like to clarify one matter. Page 5, lines 20
22 and following, I'll read them to Mr. Krajisnik.
23 Mr. Krajisnik, it has been translated to us, and it -- I doubt on
24 whether this is what you said or whether you misspoke. You
25 said: "However, politically," you were talking about regionalisation, "it
1 was an answer to the violation of the constitution by two sides concerning
2 the fact that they put their declaration of the independence of Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina on the agenda of the Assembly in February 1992," whereas you
4 are now referring in relation to -- to what the regionalisation was a
5 response, you're referring to 1991. Did you intend to say February 1992
6 in your earlier answer?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1991 is the year. 1991. Maybe it
8 was a slip of the tongue, maybe I misspoke, but it was in 1991.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I just sought to clarify that.
10 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. I should have picked
11 that up at the time, but that's absolutely right. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I formulated a question for myself, and since
13 you revisited the matter I thought clarification now would be better.
14 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you. That's most helpful, Your Honour,
15 thank you.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- we can -- we can look out these documents as
17 necessary, but the -- the key point about Mr. Izetbegovic's statement at
18 that time was what?
19 A. The key point of Mr. Izetbegovic's statement when he did not
20 exercise caution, if I can put it that way, was that the Assembly
21 procedure was there, that the declaration was there in the Assembly
22 procedure, and that it would be adopted regardless of whether the SDS
23 agreed to it or not. That was a signal to the effect that all these
24 debates that we had with the representatives of the other two sides in the
25 Assembly procedure -- well, that their position is clear. That they will
1 want that declaration to be carried through, that they would advocate an
2 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. That sounded off an alarm that we were
3 debating things for no reason whatsoever, because their position was quite
5 I'm trying to be brief, and perhaps my answers are, therefore, not
6 very clear. I can give lengthier answers, but I would like my attorney to
7 lead me and then perhaps I can give shorter answers so that will do. I
8 mean, the questions can be phrased that way.
9 Q. What a very good idea. Shall we do it exactly that way.
10 Mr. Krajisnik, the -- the key point -- yes. The key point of the
11 declaration then independent -- or the statement, rather, of
12 Mr. Izetbegovic, independence, Mr. Krajisnik, you may think this is all
13 very obvious after we've been here for about two years, but why did that
14 point require steps to the taken by the SDS and the Serbs as an answer?
15 A. Well, at the Assembly in 1991, that is to say in February,
16 Mr. Izetbegovic also made a statement that meant that he was not exactly
17 exercising caution, that he would sacrifice peace for a sovereign
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that showed quite clearly what the intentions of
19 the other two sides were.
20 Just another small addition. A month before that in January 1991
21 at the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic came out to explain
22 a platform that he was advocating on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the
23 other presidents of the other republics where he said: I advocate a
24 Bosnia within Yugoslavia; of course a reformed Yugoslavia. And he was
25 applauded by all of those present, and this meant a great deal of relief
1 in the general public. Only a month later the same side, the same man,
2 made a different statement which caused a reaction, the one that I spoke
3 about, that now the SDS sought a political response to. So all of that
4 was involved.
5 Q. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- and if I may, in a sense, address the
6 Trial Chamber as well. Throughout the whole of the period during which --
7 with which this case is primarily concerned, and certainly 1991 and early
8 1992, there were from time to time, weren't there, quite sharp
9 fluctuations in the message that was coming from the SDA about their
10 attitude towards independence of Bosnia. That's right, isn't it?
11 A. That's right.
12 Q. And is this, without, I hope, leading improperly -- once the SDA
13 at some point had indicated a wish for independence, subsequent swings
14 back in the other direction away from independence were really not
15 sufficiently reassuring to the Bosnian Serbs. Is that also correct?
16 A. Well, the answer is both yes and no.
17 Q. Well, give the yes first, Mr. Krajisnik, then and then the no.
18 That's probably the best way of dealing with it.
19 A. Since those were very hard times, even a small positive,
20 favourable statement became a major one and would lead to an alleviation
21 of the situation, as if somebody had pressed a button. So just a small
22 positive statement made by the SDA would bring about a general easing, a
23 general relaxation. If a different statement were made, as soon as a
24 different statement would be made, then the reaction was different, as if
25 the first thing had never happened in the first place.
1 That is why I'm saying yes and no. Because practically the
2 situation changed from one day to another on different grounds. So this
3 complex situation has to be understood. Perhaps no one can understand it
4 because it was so dynamic that even I myself cannot remember all the
5 details sometimes.
6 I beg your pardon, when I'm talking about the SDA -- can I just
7 add something?
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --
9 MR. STEWART:
10 Q. His Honour is indicating "yes," Mr. Krajisnik.
11 JUDGE ORIE: It's part of your answer, so if Mr. Stewart would
12 like otherwise he will give you the guidance, but please add what you
13 would like to add.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm talking now here as if I were
15 accusing the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic. I must say that the driving force
16 that was instigating the SDA was the HDZ. This is my personal opinion.
17 Had the SDA pursued their independent policy, had they not been instigated
18 I think they would have made moves that were a lot more reasonable. I
19 know Mr. Izetbegovic personally, too, and I know that many times he wanted
20 to achieve something and he could not do it because there were pressures
21 coming from the other side. But that's a different story altogether. I'm
22 saying this for the sake of the truth. I don't want it to appear that I'm
23 not telling the entire truth.
24 MR. STEWART:
25 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, that was the "yes" part of your answer. I had
1 asked you a question to which you said the answer was yes or no, and that
2 was your yes part. And no -- just to remind you -- the question was
3 really where there -- when there was swings back away from a policy of
4 independence by the SDA you had said that that might lead to a general
5 easing, but on the no side? On the negative side?
6 Were there ways in which it wasn't sufficiently reassuring, or it
7 didn't ease the situation sufficiently?
8 A. When a people, a nation, are in a difficult situation, then
9 misinformation is bandied about, too. And if a positive statement is made
10 by the SDA, then it seems that somebody says, on purpose: Well, they're
11 just playing both sides. There are some people who are skeptical and some
12 people who believe misinformation and who say: Well, he just said it for
13 political reasons and it's not true. And that is why I said that perhaps
14 it's a yes or no answer.
15 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, so far as the SDS were led to have concern that
16 the SDA would pursue policy of independence, essentially why was that a
17 problem for the SDS?
18 A. We were all fearing a conflict, not to say a war. You know, we
19 have a tradition. Every person who is born in Bosnia knew that if the
20 three sides don't agree, that's not a good thing. And knowing that the
21 SDA represented the most numerous people, we knew that if they don't agree
22 with something that's not good. And that's why we were concerned, we were
23 worried, not about the vote but worried generally that things might get
24 out of control. And that's why we were worried if the SDA was against
25 something. If it had been a small party representing a small community, a
1 small minority, that would have been different. But SDA representing a
2 very major portion of the people, their opinion had a weight.
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, for the purposes of these questions now, I want to
4 start by drawing, I hope, a clear distinction between two things so we
5 understand the basis of the question.
6 If you had one nation that wanted independence and you had another
7 nation -- I'm leaving aside for the moment the fact that there were three
8 nations, but if you had one nation that wanted independence and another
9 nation that didn't and they were sufficiently determined, there was the
10 prospect of a civil war. That -- that's clear, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?
11 A. I can say that it was absolutely crystal clear to everybody in
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13 Q. But my question first, my prior question, is intended to, if you
14 like, move back a step from that, Mr. Krajisnik. Why was the prospect of
15 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina itself unacceptable to the Serbs which
16 then led them to oppose it so strongly?
17 A. For a number of reasons. First, because somebody would be
18 abolishing a state overnight. We had Yugoslavia at the time. Second,
19 because the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was being pursued
20 through unconstitutional means and not everybody was equally committed to
21 a compromise. Instead, the other side, the coalition between the SDA and
22 the HDZ, the two sides that agreed, they were willing to have Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina out of Yugoslavia without being choosey about the means. And
24 when I say "without being choosey," I mean pursuing an illegal,
25 unconstitutional road, whereas we wanted a legal, constitutional position
1 that would allow for a compromise, which was what actually happened when
2 the international community got involved.
3 Q. But, Mr. Krajisnik, what was it about living in an independent
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina as it was structured before regionalisation that
5 was inherently unacceptable to the Bosnian Serbs?
6 A. I will voice my opinion, and I believe that it is shared by an
7 overwhelming majority of Serbs. First of all, the Muslim side said: We
8 won't stay in Yugoslavia because we're afraid to stay together with Serbs
9 as a minority. And the reaction of the Serbs was: If you are afraid of
10 having us as a majority in a common state, then how can we trust you, to
11 be together with you as a minority if you are already acting
12 unconstitutionally within Yugoslavia? What would you do if you were a
13 majority then?
14 We thought that Yugoslavia was the best solution because all
15 the "problematic" communities, Muslims and Croats and others, would
16 be together in one state. Of course it applied to us Serbs as well. We
17 would be in one state without borders together with all the other Serbs,
18 but so would others, Muslims and Croats. That was our approach. Maybe
19 there was some other reasons, too, but those were the primary reasons.
20 Q. Is this correct, Mr. Krajisnik, that if you -- and I'm here
21 talking about the SDS, if you had been confident that come what may Bosnia
22 and Herzegovina would remain part of Yugoslavia, regionalisation would
23 have been unnecessary from the SDS viewpoint?
24 A. We believed -- I often use the word "we" because I don't like to
25 say "I." And when I say "we," I mean the SDS. We believed that it was
1 necessary to reshape both Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 But to answer your question, if this regionalisation was in
3 dispute, if Bosnia stayed within Yugoslavia, regionalisation itself would
4 be automatically eliminated and that solution was already within reach
5 under one of the plans that had been developed. I learned to use the
6 word "Muslims" rather than "Bosniaks" a long time ago, and I apologise for
8 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, the -- you mentioned earlier that policy of
9 regionalisation was seen by the SDA as the break-up of Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina, or leading to the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did --
11 did the SDS view regionalisation as in any sense the break-up of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina?
13 A. I will answer, if you allow me, with a small addition.
14 SDS did not consider that as a break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
15 and it wasn't, and it could not have been. The SDA was not right about
16 that, and if you allow me to add. The SDA ruled the -- in the
17 unregionalised Bosnia and Herzegovina in a great number of municipality
18 which had a large percentage of Serbs and they wanted domination. In
19 their eyes, regionalisation was taking away from the power of the centre
20 of Sarajevo, giving more power to the regional level. The SDA represented
21 the majority people, and regionalisation diminished their power to rule.
22 And their desire to rule was evident at the republic level in Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina and it was also quite obvious on the local level.
24 Q. Was it -- was it the SDS policy that, provided cooperation could
25 be achieved from the other parties, there would, as part of this
1 regionalisation process, be some regions which were under the control of
2 the Muslims or, in some parts of the country, Croats?
3 A. Sorry, I don't think I understood the question.
4 Q. Well, would -- did the SDS policy contemplate that as the
5 regionalisation process proceeded, some regions would be under the control
6 of Muslims?
7 A. Absolutely. We were not against regionalising all of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina, so the answer is: Yes, certainly.
9 Q. And some regions would be under control of Croats, would they?
10 A. Yes, certainly.
11 Q. Did -- did such a policy include any expectation that there would
12 be significant population movements as a consequence?
13 A. Absolutely not. You can see that in one shorthand note where I
14 gave a statement. Nobody was supposed to move from their location.
15 Somebody would be in the majority in one region, another side would be in
16 the majority in another region. But nobody was supposed to move, and it
17 was a complete fallacy. Nobody was advocating any moves of the
18 population, at least not that I know.
19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- we started here with a reference to the
20 Club 91 interview which had referred to a long-running government session
21 the previous day. What had been the outcome of that government session?
22 A. The government, as far as I remember now, made a decision contrary
23 to the decision of the Assembly concerning regionalisation; namely, as far
24 as I remember, the government's decision on regionalisation was negative.
25 Maybe it was not a ban but it was contrary to the recommendation of the
1 Assembly. The government, conditionally speaking, made a decision to ban,
2 or to forbid - I don't remember the exact wording - but it was formulated
3 in an imperative, obligatory way, negatively.
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you find, returning to the transcript of
5 the -- of your television interview, could you find the number 5, please,
6 in the margin?
7 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, this is right in the middle of
8 page 5 of the English transcript where there's a paragraph beginning: "I
9 did not like the way."
10 Do Your Honours see that?
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we have got a passage in the English transcript
12 which begins, I hope you can pick it up against the number 5: "I did not
13 like the way in which regionalisation was included on the Assembly's
15 Do you see that sentence in the -- your own language? Thank you.
16 So you say: "I did not like the way in which regionalisation was
17 included on the Assembly's agenda. I think that was a mistake, as well.
18 First of all, the question was created that this was regionalisation ...
19 The municipalities of Bosnian Krajina were separating and joining the
20 Serbian Autonomous District or Region Krajina. That was included in the
21 Assembly so alarmingly that I was appalled."
22 Mr. Krajisnik, could you -- could you clarify, please, what --
23 what was the mistake -- what it was you were appalled by at that point?
24 A. I think that Assembly session was in June. I don't remember
25 exactly. That Assembly session first adopted its agenda, and there was a
1 debate that did not include regionalisation. And suddenly an SDA
2 representative comes out bringing news that an agreement was included by
3 SAO Krajina and Bosnian Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina was leaving Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina and joining Yugoslavia. And he wanted it included in the
5 agenda, although the agenda had already been adopted.
6 So we continued to discuss regionalisation, although it was not
7 part of the agenda, and that representative, that deputy, put it to others
8 in a very alarming way: Bosnian Krajina is leaving now. And that group
9 of deputies presented it in such a way that it caused great concern to the
10 Muslim side. That's the way that they infiltrated this issue into the
11 agenda. After all the discussions and all the debate about the agenda,
12 after the agenda was adopted, and it was completely against all rules of
14 Q. So you -- you say that that particular representative, that
15 deputy -- do you remember who that was that conveyed that news to the
17 A. I think it was Mr. Irfan Ajanovic. I think. But that can be
18 checked in the transcript of that Assembly session that adopted the
19 recommendation on regionalisation. You can see from those notes exactly
20 how that issue came to be debated. When the recommendation was adopted to
21 include that in the agenda, you can see how it was done, and I think it
22 was Mr. Irfan Ajanovic.
23 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, continuing to ask you to give the Trial
24 Chamber your recollection of these events, you said that that particular
25 deputy, whether it was that particular man, conveyed or discussed this
1 matter in a very alarming way. So you're saying, Mr. Krajisnik, are you,
2 that there was -- there was some gap or difference between what was
3 actually happening in relation to the Bosnian Krajina and what the
4 Assembly was being led to understand by this particular deputy. Is that
6 A. Yes, yes. There was a gap, a big gap.
7 Q. Well, can you explain that gap, Mr. Krajisnik? In other words,
8 compare what was actually happening with the way it was presented to the
10 A. In Grahovo, late Milan Babic met with several MPs from the Bosnian
11 Assembly who were Serbs from Banja Luka, and they prepared a communique
12 presenting an idea for the Serbian Krajina to join with the Serbian
13 Autonomous District in Croatia.
14 It was no Assembly decision. It was not a -- an authoritative
15 body that took that decision, it was just an idea. And the way it was
16 presented, it was very dramatic, like something that was being done behind
17 our backs. And it was, actually, behind our backs because none of us were
18 aware of that intention. And the comment, which was very important, was
19 that by this act the Bosnian Krajina was being taken away from Bosnia and
20 annexed to Serbia. If a part of Bosnia was being taken away, that was of
21 great concern to everybody, of course. And that just added fuel to the
22 already-existing tensions in the -- in the Assembly that were running
23 high. It was very difficult to lead that session.
24 I'm just summing up all that this deputy said. I can't remember
25 exactly whether it was Cengic or Ajanovic, but one of the two said that
1 the dramatic tone in which it was presented was unbelievable, especially
2 to the viewers who were following that session. And I particularly didn't
3 like the way it was being included in the agenda. We were practically
4 finishing one session and starting a new session. If they had only waited
5 for the new session to begin, we could have done everything according to
6 the rules of procedure.
7 Q. You said in that answer, Mr. Krajisnik, that it was actually
8 behind your backs because none of you were aware of that intention.
9 When -- when this particular matter was brought up by this particular
10 deputy, whoever exactly it was, are you saying that you personally did not
11 know whether what the Assembly was being told was accurate or not?
12 A. I was absolutely unaware. I didn't know that it happened at all.
13 Q. So, returning to what you say in the interview, about six lines
14 into that passage that we were looking at, you said: "That was included
15 in the Assembly so alarmingly that I was appalled. I thought that, this
16 is it, this is the moment when Bosnia and Herzegovina disappears,
17 Yugoslavia disappears, there will be war," and so on.
18 So you're telling the viewers of the television programme what
19 your reaction had been in the Assembly. That's right, isn't it?
20 A. Exactly.
21 Q. And what -- what was it, as specifically as you can tell the Trial
22 Chamber, that led you to that view at that moment, that Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina would disappear, Yugoslavia will disappear, there will be war?
24 A. I don't know how this text is understood, but when you see a man
25 talking about something in a very dramatic tone and you are not in the
1 know at that moment, one Krajina is leaving the state and joining another,
2 Bosnia is being broken up, I can say that the way he's talking, the way I
3 hear it, it's so dramatic that the war will begin any moment now.
4 I'm just trying to explain how he was talking about it. I didn't
5 believe at that time that the war was imminent. I was just saying that --
6 just hearing him talk, one had no choice but to believe that Bosnia was
7 about to cease to exist and the war was about to begin.
8 Q. And then you continue in the interview. The next sentence after
9 that you say: "As time went by, I think that ... and what happened
10 yesterday in the Assembly ... in the government, I think that was a
11 mistake in one basic approach. That is to say, I have now heard that ...
12 the reactions which have come from the Bosnian Krajina, from Herzegovina,
13 and from other regions, have in fact been ignored. Just as they were
14 ignored regarding the recommendation, they were ignored on such decisions
15 of the government."
16 What -- ignored by whom?
17 A. Municipalities.
18 Q. And -- well, which municipality were ...
19 A. Well, those municipalities that were involved in regionalisation,
20 that had joined a region, because the government passed a decision
21 abolishing regions, and those municipalities were disregarding, going
22 against their decision. And I was saying that it was a very bad thing
23 that we had a situation in which municipalities did not honour, did not
24 observe, the decisions of the government.
25 Q. And then you say: "So it is good if the government is not divided
1 and there is no out-voting, that was positive last night, and I think that
2 everyone should assess that from their own point of view."
3 What was the particular point from the previous night, by which
4 clearly means the government session, doesn't it -- well, perhaps we had
5 better confirm that. When you say "that was positive last night," you are
6 referring to the government session, aren't you?
7 A. Yes, right.
8 Q. And what was it particularly that you were describing there as
10 A. Well, the government passed that decision through out-voting, that
11 is, without the consent of Serb ministers. And I was saying here that
12 that was not a good thing.
13 Another bad thing was that the way it was taken, that government's
14 decision was impossible to implement because every decision impossible to
15 implement was showing the public that the state was impotent, and it was
16 the fact that the Assembly's recommendations were not followed that
17 brought the state into that situation.
18 Q. So the positive -- the positive point was what?
19 A. What I'm saying here is that it is positive when the government
20 stands united, when there is no out-voting within the government. So the
21 word "positive" here pertains to my own opinion that it is a good thing
22 when the government is a monolithic one because it consists of the
23 representatives of three different peoples. The word "positive" applies
24 to that.
25 Q. Yes. Well, perhaps to clarify, Mr. Krajisnik, it seems that
1 what's happened here, whether it's a translation point, that you were not,
2 in fact, saying in this television programme that there had been anything
3 positive the previous night. That's right, isn't it?
4 A. Yes. Nothing happened. I'm just giving a comment, that it's a
5 good thing when there is no out-voting within a government and that that
6 is positive, and then I continue to say what is negative. It would have
7 been positive had there been no out-voting, but that was not the case.
8 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik.
9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, is that positively time for a break?
10 JUDGE ORIE: This would be a -- if this would be a suitable moment
11 for you, it would be for the Chamber as well.
12 We'll adjourn until 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
16 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, on that transcript that you have, could you find
18 the number 6, please, in the margin?
19 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, this is at page 6 of the English
20 transcript, the first intervention by the presenter: "We will certainly
21 get to that subject," it says.
22 Q. Do you have that number 6, Mr. Krajisnik? Thank you.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. The presenter says this: "We will certainly get to that subject.
25 I think that this is a key -- it is a key issue, but I would only ask you
1 to answer this - as regards regionalisation the Serbian Democratic Party
2 is being accused of wanting to divide up Bosnia and Herzegovina according
3 to the 'Knin method' and place its sovereignty on, and I quote, 'the
4 sacrificial alter of a Greater Serbia.'"
5 Mr. Krajisnik, how did you understand at that time the Knin
7 A. In the Serb autonomous province of Krajina, that's in Croatia,
8 municipalities declared their own positions and they made up these
9 autonomous regions by uniting certain municipalities. This was also a
10 political response in Croatia. And now a parallel is being drawn to what
11 was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
12 Q. And was there a distinction between the Knin method and the method
13 of regionalisation contemplated by the SDS in Bosnia?
14 A. There was a big difference.
15 Q. What was that difference?
16 A. Because in Croatia this happened through the use of force, that is
17 to say, that there was a conflict, and that is how it was being resolved,
18 whereas in Republika Srpska -- well, another thing. I don't know how they
19 regulated things constitutionally, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina this was
20 going on and beforehand it was only done also in accordance with the
21 constitution exclusively. And it relied upon what happened in socialism
22 before the multi-party elections, whereas over there it was just a defence
23 mechanism against the Croatian regime that threw the Serbs out of the
24 constitution and they used to be in the constitution as a constituent
1 Q. And the reference there in the presenter's question or comment
2 on -- to the "sacrificial alter of a Greater Serbia," at that time was the
3 concept of a Greater Serbia any part of SDS policy?
4 A. The notion of a Greater Serbia was used in election campaigns by a
5 certain number of people, but the platform of the SDS was never a Greater
6 Serbia, if I can call it that way. Even if I were to be asked today what
7 it meant I would have great difficulty in explaining it.
8 Q. That was going to be my next question, Mr. Krajisnik, so you've
9 headed it off. But could you do your best then, despite the great
10 difficulty. My question is precisely what -- what did you understand at
11 the time to be meant by those who did campaign for a Greater Serbia?
12 A. I'm just going to make a small correction. What those who accused
13 Serbs of wanting a Greater Serbia meant, that is what I'm going to tell
14 you about. Through this accusation that the Serbs were advocating a
15 Greater Serbia, they meant and were saying that the Serbs wanted to expand
16 Serbia now to Serb ethnic lands outside Serbia and to take areas that did
17 not belong to Serb ethnic areas, that is to say that they wanted to create
18 a Greater Serbia, a Serbia bigger than the existing one. This was used in
19 a pejorative sense, in a negative sense, and that was something that they
20 did not have the right to do. It is linked to an agreement that was
21 reached a long time ago at the London conference, and this was being
22 imputed to the Serbs all the time that they were trying to take something
23 that did not belong to them and to create a greater state -- a Greater
24 Serbia, sorry.
25 Q. The -- was there -- were there among the Bosnian Serbs - and I'm
1 talking about those who were politically active, Mr. Krajisnik - were
2 there among the politically active Bosnian Serbs any who did speak in
3 favour of a Greater Serbia?
4 A. No one advocated a Greater Serbia, but that word was used often by
5 people who wanted to be radical and to explain something that would be in
6 their view positive for the Serbs, but that was not the concept, one of a
7 Greater Serbia, and that can be seen by the sequence of events that
9 Q. If you would find number 8 in the margin, please, Mr. Krajisnik.
10 MR. STEWART: That's -- Your Honours, we're going on to the page
11 now -- that's on page 9 of the English, the first reference to
12 Mr. Krajisnik: "I have to say that every party ..."
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you find number 8?
14 A. I've found it.
15 Q. Well, I'll give the presenter's short passage first. The
16 presenter says: "Yes, but in the meantime, they scare each other ... the
17 parties, or they get scared or we scare them, for example, by saying that
18 it is someone's aim to create an independent state of Croatia; that
19 someone is thoroughly and quietly preparing a Muslim state; that someone,
20 again, is keeping the others in some Serboslavia or a Greater Serbia. Are
21 these phantom categories or real options in your opinion?"
22 And then you say: "I have to say that every party has a left and
23 a right wing and centre. And that right wing, to call it that, that
24 right-oriented wing is promoting a Greater Serbia, in fact, they promote
25 an Islamic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a third group promotes a
1 confederation or a Greater Croatia or an NDH, independent state of
2 Croatia, and want some kind of national" --
3 Just pausing there to seek clarification, because it's perhaps not
4 a hundred per cent clear in English anyway, you're saying that -- is this
5 right: You're saying that right wing, that there are right wings in the
6 three parties. The right-oriented wing of the SDS is promoting a Greater
7 Serbia; the right-oriented wing of the SDA is promoting an Islamic state;
8 and the right-oriented wing of the HDZ is promoting a confederation or a
9 Greater Croatia or an independent state of Croatia? Is that a correct
10 summary of what you are saying there, Mr. Krajisnik?
11 A. Well, not completely.
12 Q. Well, please correct that summary, then, Mr. Krajisnik.
13 A. Actually, the right wing in a party accused the others, say the
14 right wing of the SDS accused others of creating an NDH or an Islamic
15 state. Among them there were some who said: If they don't want to be
16 with us, we're going to create a Greater Serbia. So that was the rhetoric
18 The others from the SDA, the right wing of the SDA, would say:
19 Well, you in the SDS wanted to create a Greater Serbia, a Serboslavia, we
20 don't want to be there. And among them there were people who said: We
21 want to have our own state, we want Bosnia-Herzegovina to be our own
22 state, even to have Islamic laws.
23 In the HDZ the situation was rather specific. From the very
24 outset they officially advocated a confederal Bosnia -- sorry, Yugoslavia,
25 a confederal Yugoslavia. As for Bosnia, they officially advocated
1 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina only to get it out of Yugoslavia, and they
2 believed that in the stage that would follow they would manage either to
3 regionalise their own areas or to annex them to Croatia.
4 If I were to be sincere, on all three sides there were accusations
5 leveled at the others and also promoting certain negative ideas in terms
6 of one's own programme. That is as far as extremist views go.
7 Q. How -- how prevalent, if they were prevalent, how prevalent were
8 such views within the membership of the SDS?
9 A. At big meetings, different views were heard, and if we were to go
10 through all of that there were such statements made in public, too.
11 However, the conclusions reached and the official policy were quite clear.
12 First of all, that we should remain in Yugoslavia; and later that there
13 should be a transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which we were to
14 have a constituent unit of our own.
15 Q. In this answer here at -- well, it's point 8, the marking you've
16 got on your transcript, then just carrying on from where I stopped reading
17 it goes on about five lines in: "So that Bosnia is a nation state of one
18 people with, perhaps, superiority over the others."
19 You're reporting views of various factions there. "I think that
20 that is not the basic rule, that is not -- that is not the basic concept
21 of any party ..."
22 So among other things, Mr. Krajisnik, you're saying it's not the
23 basic view of any party that an Islamic state should be promoted. Was
24 that genuinely your view at that time, that the SDA policy did not involve
25 promotion of an Islamic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
1 A. It was only the SDA that could have advocated that option. They
2 were the most numerous people. And due to the birth rate there they would
3 have easily reached the figure of 51 per cent, so it would have been their
4 state, demographically speaking.
5 However, from contacts with the SDA, from conversations with the
6 SDA, on several occasions I was convinced that they were really at a
7 crossroads. Perhaps they wanted that, to have only a state of their own,
8 but they would like to have a compromised solution because they know what
9 the specific characteristics of Bosnia are and they want peace.
10 Now, I am saying what they were saying in our conversations; what
11 they were saying when they were talking on their own is something that I
12 don't know. I know what they said in public, too, when certain people
13 said that the Serbs have Serbia, the Croats have Croatia, and that this is
14 our state. However, I had the impression that in conversations for a long
15 time they aspired for a rational, compromised solution. There were ups
16 and downs, that is to say. Of course people from our party accused them,
17 just like they were accusing us, but that was political rhetoric to my
19 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, there's a -- on the fourth line --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry, just a moment. But for sure,
21 had there been an independent Bosnia, in our view, due to the birth rate,
22 it would have become a predominantly Muslim state soon, so this was just
23 an addition I wanted to make.
24 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honours, on the fourth line of that
25 answer, that's line 10 on page 36, the phrase appears "demographically
1 speaking," Mr. Sladojevic tells me and I trust the interpreters would
2 agree that it was perhaps democratically. Perhaps we can seek
4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters believe that Mr. Krajisnik said
6 JUDGE ORIE: Both make sense, as a matter of fact.
7 MR. STEWART: Well, that's why I raise it.
8 JUDGE ORIE: When you said, Mr. Krajisnik, that they would have
9 easily reached the figure of 51 per cent, so it would have been their
10 state, did you say "demographically speaking" or did you
11 say "democratically speaking"? Both could make sense, but what did you
12 say? There's some dispute about what you said.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my statement now I
14 said "demographically," birth rate; and before that I said that it's
15 democratic, too. If you have 51 per cent it's democratic as well, if you
16 have the 51 per cent.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The matter has been clarified.
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think the explanation is the words
19 sound very similar in Serbian as well. Something of course I know.
20 That's what I'm told anyway.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what happens if they are classical
23 MR. STEWART: Yes, of course, Your Honour.
24 Q. Yes. So, Mr. Krajisnik, can we go, please, to point 10. It's
25 very shortly afterwards; it's probably over the next page on your copy,
1 but it's page 10 of the English. It's a long answer or comment from you
2 in the interview. So, Mr. Krajisnik, it starts: "As regards a
4 But, Your Honours, Mr. Krajisnik, I want to go just beyond halfway
5 through that answer unless anybody tells me I should -- ought to go
6 somewhere else. "We should not be politically blind."
7 Do you see a sentence that begins in that way, Mr. Krajisnik?
8 It's just over halfway down that --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You do, thank you.
11 "We should not be politically blind, to not see obviously that one
12 people wants to remain in one state, that is the Serbian people, the
13 Muslim people wants an independent Bosnia, an autonomous Bosnia, the
14 Croatian people wants a confederation and that these two options - a
15 confederation and an independent Bosnia - happen to correspond."
16 Mr. Krajisnik, could you just explain what you understood at that
17 time to be a -- a confederation to be?
18 A. At that time the official policy of the republics that had
19 separated from Yugoslavia was advocating a confederation, so all the
20 states would be independent, but there would just be this umbrella of a
21 confederation. This is what Mr. Tudjman advocated, this is what the
22 Croatian side in Bosnia advocated. So in this way Bosnia would also
23 become independent basically as a state. All these states would actually
24 have very loose ties at an all-Yugoslav level.
25 Q. Could we move on then, please -- we'll go right on, please, to
1 where you find the number 13 in the margin.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And for us, Mr. Stewart?
3 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. It's -- it's against the
4 word "jingle" on page 19, toward the top. We won't play the jingle, Your
5 Honour, we'll spare you that.
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it's actually -- that's the point of reference.
7 But if we go a bit further down, the presenter is saying -- two answers
8 from you on that page, and then the presenter says: "You see, we have an
9 awful lot of questions from viewers," this was a phone-in programme. We
10 can see that on the video, actually. "I would ask you, let us start, if
11 we have dealt with any of that we won't go back.
12 Hasan Brkic, a journalist in Tesanj, asks you: What fund is being
13 used to pay for arming the Bosnian Serbs with Kragujevac weapons? Do you
14 know anything about that?"
15 And you say: "I don't know, I think they are being armed, but
16 if such a fund exists then really ... I think that the question is more of
17 a provocative one."
18 You're saying you think they are being armed. These are Bosnian
19 Serbs. Which Bosnian Serbs were you referring to there that you thought
20 were being armed?
21 A. My answer here was to a provocative question. I gave a
22 provocative answer to a provocative question, because if somebody asks me
23 as if it were a fact, Serbs are being armed and with what funds, and then
24 I said: Well, yes, they are being armed. Of course I was being
25 provocative. I answered -- I gave a political answer because if somebody
1 is telling me they are being armed, they are asking the president of the
2 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina whether they are being armed, that is to
3 say that this person is saying that he knows that I know. So it was put
4 in provocative terms.
5 Maybe here it looks as if I said it seriously, but later on there
6 are similar answers, too, because somebody is making -- it's not that
7 somebody is putting a question to me, but this person is making an
8 assertion saying: They are being armed, and then putting a question on
9 the basis of that. I did not know that they were being armed. I could
10 just assume that all peoples were being armed because that later became
11 evident when the war broke out.
12 Q. If we can go on to point 14 which is -- it will be -- well, on
13 everybody's version it will be at least a couple of pages on.
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, it's at page 22 of the English
16 Q. Presenter -- towards the top of the page, page 22, Mr. Krajisnik,
17 right against 14 in the margin the presenter says: "Regionalisation - many
18 questions - let us see, could ... is it true that by going to Pale you
19 contributed to Pale being joined to the Romanija region?" That's a viewer
20 from Pale asking that question.
21 And you say: "I think that's provocative. As the president of
22 the Assembly, I would never be against the recommendation nor would I
23 influence regionalisation. The people have done that themselves."
24 Mr. Krajisnik, there was some specific visit you have made to Pale
25 that was included in this viewer's question, was there?
1 A. That viewer was making an allusion to a visit, but I don't
2 remember ever being in Pale except on a students' class trip just before
3 the war when an Assembly session was held there. It's not that I didn't
4 take part in it; I simply don't remember ever having been in Pale. And I
5 absolutely don't understand which meeting was alluded to. I did not take
6 part in the regionalisation at Pale nor did I attend any such meeting.
7 Q. Is it right, Mr. Krajisnik, at this time in May 1991 you had --
8 you had no personal connection with Pale?
9 A. No, no.
10 Q. No, that's correct?
11 A. Except when somebody would come to the Assembly. But I absolutely
12 didn't go to Pale.
13 Q. Then it's just -- do you find 15, number 15, in the margin?
14 A. I found it.
15 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I want to go just above that to the
16 point where Mr. Krajisnik says: "No kind of repressive measures are
18 And then the presenter says immediately after that: "Why are the
19 municipalities of the Krajina" --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Which page?
21 MR. STEWART: Oh, so sorry, Your Honour. Page 23, top of the
22 page, about -- well, it's four items down: "Why are the municipalities of
23 the Krajina and Herzegovina separating? This separating, it probably
24 means - creating their own region and not separating," that's a question
25 from a viewer in Mostar.
1 And you say: "They are not separating and they are staying in
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina and they will certainly not make any states
3 because that is now solely the reason for this situation but if that were
4 to acquire a political character I think that that can only be if we do
5 not pay attention to ... preserving this state of ours and if we want to
6 break it up."
7 Q. Now, first of all, Mr. Krajisnik, was it -- was that, in fact,
8 your -- your genuine understanding of the position at that time that the
9 Krajina and Herzegovina would not separate and would stay in Bosnia and
11 A. That was my position, that was my view, and I would have been
12 strongly opposed to anybody leaving Bosnia and being annexed to whatever
13 else. That was in May 1991, and that was -- that continued to be my
14 position all the way up to the beginning of the war and even a bit later.
15 Q. Who was it who would have been in a position to decide at that
16 time whether -- let's take Krajina, whether the Krajina municipalities
17 would separate?
18 A. If you just give me some leeway to give a broader answer. Krajina
19 is a territorial area that is partly in Croatia and partly in Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina. It was created during the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian
21 empires, and it was a persisting aspiration of their people to be
23 When democracy came, there were several attempts to unite these
24 two parts into one whole, even into one state. We politicians were
25 opposed, not because we were opposing their view but because it was
1 against the Vance Plan and it ran counter to our theory that Bosnia should
2 be a recognised state, and we had a lot of problems dealing with that
3 burning desire of the people. They thought we didn't understand them, and
4 they accused us of trying to work against them. But even if that entity
5 were to be created, it would have been impossible to recognise because it
6 ran counter to all the existing plans. It would not have been possible to
7 implement like the Vance Plan in Croatia. It was simply not realistic
8 politically speaking. Desires and aspirations are one thing and reality
9 is quite another.
10 Q. Does that answer you've just given apply equally to Herzegovina or
11 are there differences?
12 A. Almost in the same terms, with a small difference. Part of
13 Herzegovina, by decision of the Berlin Congress was given to Montenegro,
14 and the people of Herzegovina are very similar to those of Montenegro but
15 they have a Serb orientation. And their desire to join Montenegro was
16 more subdued than in the Serb Krajina in Bosnia and in Croatia.
17 Q. Now returning to the --
18 A. I'm talking about the people, the communities. I'm talking about
19 the desire of the people.
20 Q. Returning to the transcript, point 15 -- well, we've been using
21 point 15 as the reference point, so if we go down, it's page 23, Your
22 Honours, of the English text.
23 Right in the middle of the page it's against -- number 15 in your
24 copy, Mr. Krajisnik, middle of page 23. The presenter asks: "Asim from
25 Sarajevo wants to know: Is the regionalisation that the Serbs are
1 carrying out in the Banja Luka Krajina honest?"
2 And your answer is: "That, honest, is disputable. It is
3 economically justified."
4 I'm not entirely sure from the English there, Mr. Krajisnik. What
5 was the implication that it might be dishonest? Could you explain in what
6 sense it might have been suggested that the regionalisation being carried
7 out by the Serbs was dishonest?
8 A. I can try to guess what the viewer meant. The viewer thought that
9 in those municipalities where decisions were taken to join certain
10 municipalities, Muslims and Croats had been out-voted, just as Serbs had
11 been out-voted, perfectly legally, in the parliament. There's only one
12 difference. On the regional level it is all according to the law; whereas
13 at the republican level there is a constitutional provision against
15 Now, he as a Muslim is asking: Is it fair to go on with this
16 regionalisation wherein you are out-voting us? And I'm answering: Yes,
17 economically it is good, but if it acquires a nationalist -- a national
18 dimension, it is not good because it would only add fuel to the flames and
19 lead to war. And that is how I am understanding his question and trying
20 to answer it.
21 Q. The -- you say then that: "It's economically justified, but I
22 think we must make a lot of efforts so that it does not have negative
23 national consequences."
24 What sort of negative consequences did you have in mind there?
25 A. Well, I meant just what I explained just a moment ago. At that
1 time everything had a political dimension, everything was politicised. If
2 you go forward with an economic regionalisation, like in Krajina which was
3 very underdeveloped, and it is viewed by other sides as Serbs coming
4 together against them, then it would have very negative consequences.
5 Because everything that was done by anyone was viewed at that time through
6 a political prism.
7 Q. And then further down, just about ten lines further down,
8 Mr. Krajisnik.
9 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honour, it's the third item from the
10 bottom on page 23. The presenter says: "Sinan from Zenica," a viewer,
11 obviously, raising a question. The viewer says: "I have a high opinion
12 of you personally but are you identifying yourself with the so-called Duke
14 And you say: "Thank you, Sinan, for your high opinion, but I
15 think that it is not all right to identify me with Seselj."
16 What at that time was Seselj -- who was he and what was he up to
17 that you did not identify with?
18 A. At this point I was talking about what Sinan, the viewer, was
19 implying. He saw Seselj as a nationalist, oriented against Muslims, and I
20 answered that I don't want to be identified with him in that way.
21 Seselj was a very intelligent man, and he wasn't the person that
22 Muslims took him for. In that way, I didn't want to be compared with him.
23 I didn't even want to be compared with the US president or anybody else.
24 But on this particular point I didn't want to be identified with Seselj.
25 Otherwise, I had meetings with Seselj and he made a good impression on me,
1 and I thought he was a different man from the one that Muslims saw. But
2 that's quite a different issue.
3 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I wish to leave that Club 91 interview
5 and transcript now, please.
6 Excuse me one moment.
7 [Defence counsel confer]
8 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I want to refer to a document which
9 we -- isn't among those scanned and available, so we have hard copies of
10 this. Your Honour, it's called -- in English it's called: "Decision on
11 the establishment of a Serb National Council." Its ERN number
12 is SA04-1938 to 1939.
13 JUDGE ORIE: You say it's not scanned. Has it been exhibited
15 MR. STEWART: To be frank, I'm not a hundred per cent -- oh, yes
16 it has, Your Honours. Yes. It's there in Mr. Treanor's exhibit.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I can't give Your Honour immediately
19 the tab and volume number in Mr. Treanor's exhibits, but it is there, it
20 is there, if it's helpful, Your Honour. We -- no doubt we can identify
21 the precise location for the record.
22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I've got a note that it is exhibited in
24 Treanor, so that's my note which I must have got it from somewhere.
25 JUDGE ORIE: That means that it should be somewhere in P64.
1 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: The registrar tells me that on the basis of his
3 latest list it's most likely in P64, tab 15.
4 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, sorry, I could have said it was
5 in P64, but I sort of -- we live and breathe P64 sometimes. We've got it,
6 I think.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's proceed. We'll find where it is just
8 for purposes of reference.
9 MR. STEWART: Yes, it is in tab 15, Your Honour. We -- well,
10 there's a reference to TR428A, but for the life of me I forget what that
11 signifies. But if it's of help, it's on Mr. -- well, whether it's his
12 personally but Mr. Haider's exhibit list. Yes, it is his personally.
13 JUDGE ORIE: We should sufficiently locate it to continue.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. But we've produced copies
16 in Mr. Krajisnik's own language as well as English.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is jogging back just a short way in time from
18 this -- that Club 91 interview, because this is a document which bears the
19 date 8th of April, 1991. It's not a very long document, Mr. Krajisnik.
20 You've probably been casting your eye over it anyway, but if you would
21 just -- just cast your eye over it to familiarise yourself. Let us know
22 when you've done that.
23 A. I have.
24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, were you personally involved in any way in any
25 meeting that led to this decision?
1 A. No, I wasn't involved in any way.
2 Q. Did you know -- well, first of all, do you know whether there was
3 a meeting that led to this decision?
4 A. I know.
5 Q. Therefore -- well, what do you know?
6 A. I don't know much, but I will tell you what I know. An initiative
7 came from parties in Serbia, Montenegro, and I believe Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina - I'm not sure whether there was some from Croatia as well -
9 for a political council to be created that would formulate the national or
10 ethnic interests and simply present them as the will of the Serbian people
11 in a broader area. So these parties met in Belgrade, as I learned later.
12 Some were there and some that are listed here walked out of that meeting
13 and didn't sign the document and even some rough language was used to the
14 effect who was the greater patriot, et cetera. But this body was unable
15 to function in practice, and I never felt any of its work in practice.
16 And I'm seeing this document for the first time.
17 Q. Do you --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, yes.
20 JUDGE ORIE: May I seek one clarification. You're referring to
21 this document as a decision being adopted and immediately --
22 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, it says "draft," Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. STEWART: I wanted to give Mr. Krajisnik the opportunity of --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you refer to it, so therefore I was a bit
1 confused --
2 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, but I --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Please clarify the matter, if you would.
4 MR. STEWART: Yes, I think it's clear now, Your Honour. Thank
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, who -- do you know who was or were either the
7 representative or the representatives of the Serb Democratic Party, the
8 SDS, referred to in this draft document?
9 A. From what I see here, the president of the Serbian National
10 Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that was Mr. Radovan Karadzic. He
11 should be under number 12.
12 Q. The -- did you receive a report of discussion relating to this
14 A. From some conversations I learned what happened there, but I
15 memorised only a little of what I heard. I know some people walked out.
16 I know some people accepted the proposal, and as far as I understood - but
17 I'm not quite sure - this initiative was not entirely successful as a
18 result of the boycott by some parties.
19 Q. Did this initiative, as you've just labelled it, did it lead on to
20 anything which had any significant impact on the subsequent policies and
21 actions of the SDS?
22 A. I'm sorry, you mean the policy of the SDS? Yes, right. You mean
23 the SDS.
24 This body never had any influence that I felt or that I
25 encountered in practice later, and that's why I can say that it did not
1 exist, especially not in terms of actual decisions.
2 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, on the -- we've already seen this many times.
3 On the 12th of July, 1991, there was an Assembly of the SDS on the
4 anniversary of the previous year's inaugural meeting.
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, we have a transcript of that meeting.
6 It's among those hyperlinked and scanned documents.
7 Excuse me one moment.
8 Your Honour, may I hand Mr. Krajisnik a similar document. In a
9 sense it has got the number -- the numbers marked in the margin --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.
11 MR. STEWART: -- reference point in the same way.
12 Thank you.
13 [Defence counsel confer]
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I was just --
15 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
17 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, I was just inquiring whether Your
18 Honours have and if not, whether Your Honours need a hard copy of this
20 JUDGE ORIE: We have not -- let me just ...
21 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
22 JUDGE ORIE: If you provide us with a hard copy, we will check
23 whether we can find it on our computers at this very moment.
24 MR. TIEGER: That would be true with the Prosecution as well, Your
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It may well be, but I have not yet logged in on
2 our series of ...
3 MR. STEWART: [Microphone not activated].
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I'm sorry, yes.
6 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour, I remind -- Mr. Sladojevic is
7 bringing it up for Your Honours.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 MR. STEWART: But, Your Honour, I'm sorry, I have --
10 JUDGE ORIE: I again have the blurred version of -- it's -- that's
11 the stenogramme.
12 MR. STEWART: I think it's a different button. Mr. Sladojevic
13 tells me that a different button gets pressed. Is it the middle one on
14 the left?
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's a better one than the right upper-hand.
16 MR. STEWART: Yes. I haven't forgotten Your Honour's request for
17 hard copies of these matters, though on this occasion it hasn't yet been
18 implemented. I do acknowledge that.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's proceed for the time being.
20 MR. STEWART:
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you go, please, to point number 2 in the
22 margin. It's quite a number of pages on. And it's on page 25 of the
23 English version. Do you have that?
24 A. I got it.
25 Q. Thank you. And this is -- this is Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic speaking,
1 and he says about ten lines down: "I have to say one thing: We have to
2 preserve the strength of the party, not to give in to power-grabbing
3 impulses and 'little Napoleons' who are trying to do things that will harm
4 the Serbian people.
5 "We did have a regional board, which we had to change. It was in
6 fact in Bosnian Krajina, which had become completely alienated and become
7 a power above the municipal boards."
8 Mr. Krajisnik, can you say who was Dr. Karadzic referring to in
9 his reference to "little Napoleons"?
10 A. Oh, he meant little Napoleons, people at the regional level who
11 got to be in charge of the regional SDS policies and grabbed power,
12 elevated themselves, and decided they were independent of our policies,
13 who decided they could chart their own policies independent of the party.
14 And prior to that, Mr. Karadzic put some people on the regional level in
15 charge of coordinating regional boards of the SDS. So these people
16 acquired a certain power and, to put it crudely, abused it.
17 Q. Did he -- Mr. Krajisnik, did he clearly have particular people in
18 mind in that reference?
19 A. He certainly meant some specific people, but I would have to
20 engage in guesswork as to who he meant. He meant the top people in
21 certain regions that were not social-political communities, as he said,
22 who started behaving in an arbitrary fashion. It would be unfair of me to
23 say: It's this person or that person, because it would just be guesswork.
24 But these were important people in the region. These were not ordinary
25 members. Perhaps the most important ones.
1 Q. He -- when he referred to -- he said: "We did have a regional
2 board, which we had to chance, it was in fact in Bosnian Krajina," were
3 you personally involved in any way in that change of regional board that
4 Dr. Karadzic refers to?
5 A. That was not my responsibility. I did not take part in that.
6 Perhaps that for some reason I attended some meeting of that kind, but
7 that was only within the domain of the president of the party, and I don't
8 know who was involved, if it has to do with Bosnian Krajina.
9 Q. Would you turn to -- Mr. Krajisnik, to -- it's number 4 in the
10 margin. It's a couple of pages -- well, it's actually about four or so
11 pages further on, probably. It's page 29 of the English. There's a
12 passage, again Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and just stop at number 4 in your
13 margin. Do you see that?
14 A. Yes. Yes, yes.
15 Q. And if it's the same layout, it's five paragraphs into that
16 contribution of Dr. Karadzic where it says in English: "I have to say
17 here that the policy of the Serbian Democratic Party is not to divide
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina until others bring it to that point. The SDS
19 furthermore does not approve of the creation of new federal units before
20 the constitutional and legal system has broken down."
21 When Dr. Karadzic referred there to the creation of new federal
22 units, what -- did you understand what he had in mind there?
23 A. He meant that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be federalised, that is to
24 say, to make one, two, or three federal units, just like Bosnia was in
25 Yugoslavia. There should be a certain number of federal units in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Federalisation would mean legalising a canton or a
2 bigger region through regionalisation but through appropriate
3 parliamentary process.
4 Q. Now where -- but that's -- but that process at that point,
5 Mr. Krajisnik, the creation of new federal units, is -- that was a correct
6 reflection of SDS policy, was it, that the SDS did not approve of creation
7 of new federal units at that point?
8 A. Yes. That is the month of June 1991 and --
9 Q. Yes, July, Mr. Krajisnik.
10 A. July, July. July.
11 Q. I'm sorry. I interrupted you just to correct the month,
12 Mr. Krajisnik. You --
13 A. And at that time there was a very active debate between the Serb
14 and Muslim sides that was supposed to be crowned with a historic agreement
15 between the Serbs and the Muslims.
16 Q. When Dr. Karadzic says here: "I have to say the policy of the
17 Serbian Democratic Party is not to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina until
18 others bring it to that point," had there been discussion within the SDS
19 of at what point the Serbian Democratic Party would switch to a policy of
20 dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina?
21 A. I think that that's a good question, so I'll try to explain.
22 The first part of Mr. Karadzic's answer is the official position
23 at that time of the SDS. There was a left wing and a right wing, and
24 there were many discussions. An answer to those who said: Well, we don't
25 want to break up Bosnia and Herzegovina but it's the other ones who want
1 to break it up. Then he added what he did in order to bring about a
2 political compromise in this political discussion, believing that this
3 would not happen at all. So that was the position of Mr. Karadzic as a
4 politician, to give an answer in advance to those who would later debate
5 the issue. We don't want to do it, others want to do it, so that was the
6 answer that he gave at that point in time in July 1991.
7 Q. Was there a contingent SDS policy at that time for any sort of
8 break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
9 A. Perhaps -- well, I'm sorry. Perhaps the best way of answering
10 would be as follows. All of us advocated maximalist views in
11 negotiations, but we had our reserve positions. Our concept was
12 Yugoslavia, and our reserve position was that if there is no Yugoslavia
13 then we would have our constituent unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There
14 was no third option. Intimately some people said: If Muslims want to
15 create their state and the Croats want to create their state and if they
16 want to secede, well, why would we not have a state of our own? But that
17 was not an option that was discussed at the time in Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 at the level of the SDS.
19 Q. When you say it was your reserve position, then, that you would
20 have your constituent unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina, do you mean that it
21 was, although not publicly stated, it was -- it was actually a matter of
22 discussion within the SDS?
23 A. Yes. That kind of option was always discussed but as a reserve
24 option; the primary option was for us to remain in Yugoslavia, for Bosnia
25 to remain in Yugoslavia, and for Yugoslavia to be re-arranged, that some
1 institutions be moved to Sarajevo. We were talking about a reformed
2 Yugoslavia. Of course we advocated a Bosnia. We participated in that,
3 too, that is to say, that certain things from Yugoslavia be transferred to
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So why -- the only thing we didn't want were borders
5 and passports that would separate us.
6 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, this particular session of the SDS, it moved
7 into a different type of session, didn't it, at some point where there
8 were a number of invited guests from other parties and other
9 nationalities. That's right, isn't it?
10 A. I think so, because there were guests from other parties at all
11 sessions. All parties were invited, so I believe that it was the case
12 here, too.
13 Q. In fact, if you find point 6 in the margin, Mr. Krajisnik. That's
14 page 45 of the English. And then in fact we go on about four or five
15 paragraphs into Dr. Karadzic's contribution there. It's top half of
16 page 46 of the English.
17 Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic says: "We have the formal part of the session
18 here, and I would kindly ask the delegates to remain here after the formal
19 part and then we can vote. Because Messrs. Izetbegovic and Cengic, people
20 from the HDZ will come here. They have invited us, too, and we must
21 pursue the policy of cooperation."
22 And then if we go on, Mr. Krajisnik, quite a long way, about eight
23 or ten pages, do you have point 9?
24 MR. STEWART: Which is page 58 of the English, Your Honours.
25 Q. Do you have 9, Mr. Krajisnik?
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. There's Abdulah Konjicija, I'm doing my best with that
3 pronunciation, president of the Chamber of Citizens of the Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina Assembly. What nationality was he? He was Muslim, was he?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And then the next speaker is point 10, it's middle of page 59,
7 Mr. Rabija Subic. Who was he?
8 A. It's a lady --
9 Q. No, I beg your pardon -- well, I beg her pardon.
10 A. I did not receive any interpretation of that.
11 Rabija Subic was president of the Socialist Party of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, if you were asking me about her party affiliation.
13 Q. And her nationality?
14 A. Her name is a Muslim one but she was married to a Serb, so perhaps
15 she was a Yugoslav.
16 Q. Could we go on, it will be about another ten pages, Mr. Krajisnik,
17 to find number 14. It's page 68 of the English.
18 [Defence counsel confer]
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I've found it.
20 MR. STEWART:
21 Q. This is you speaking, Mr. Krajisnik: "Ladies and gentlemen, I'm
22 glad that you have greeted me" -- did I say it was the middle of page 68?
23 MR. STEWART: Yes, I did say it was page 68, Your Honours.
24 Q. "Ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad that you greeted me, and
25 particularly because Mr. Konjicija was the first to get up and Mr. Muhamed
1 Cengic was the last.
2 "I like both of them, they fight for their people with honour,
3 and I for mine, and all those who fight for their people deserve to earn
4 only respect, never criticism."
5 And then you complement previous speakers. And then at the top of
6 page 69 in the English it is, but it is about five paragraphs on into that
7 answer you say: "I am likewise happy that the people in this our party
8 have never asked me to work to the detriment of other peoples because that
9 would have been devastating."
10 And then at the -- in your -- the last paragraph of that answer, I
11 want to read through the whole thing, Mr. Krajisnik, I don't feel that's
12 necessary. But the last paragraph of that -- not answer but contribution
13 you say: "The only thing I can say before this gathering is that I will
14 speak out in support of those things that the Serbian people has
15 authorised me to do. When I'm not able to do so, then I will certainly do
16 so, just as I did a few days ago. All those who know me know that I will
17 sooner convert to another religion than break my word."
18 Mr. Krajisnik, the -- you were -- at this meeting you were elected
19 to the Main Board, weren't you, of the SDS?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And of course you remained the president of the Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina Assembly throughout this period. Were you -- what degree of
23 direction, if any, did you receive from leading members of the SDS as to
24 what you should say and what positions you should adopt in public?
25 A. I think that the positions were generally known and simple, and
1 that's what I said here, that I protect my own people but that I could
2 never work to the detriment of other peoples. So I was chairing the
3 Assembly fairly, I was fairly voting, and I was fairly presenting my
5 Within this general milieu, so to speak, there were never any
6 requests put forth to me: You defend the Serb people. I did not have any
7 individual instructions as to: You have to do this or you have to do
8 that. We had consultations. As a witness said here, we had these
9 brainstorming sessions, so to speak. It was actually a reflection of the
10 will of the entire Serb people, and I knew what the people wanted and that
11 is what I propounded. This has to do with the people primarily, not the
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Would you have an opportunity to clarify the question
16 mark in the part you just read from these minutes where it reads: "When
17 I'm not? Able to do so, then I will certainly do so," which created
18 some ...
19 MR. STEWART: Yes, indeed, Your Honour.
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you see it? It's your -- your contribution that
21 starts at margin number 14, and then the very last paragraph of that, the
22 first sentence beginning: "The only thing I can say before this
23 gathering," I read that a few moments ago.
24 Then the next sentence after that in English that begins: "When I
25 am not," I wonder if you could just read out that sense from the -- your
1 Serbian version.
2 A. I just have to find it.
3 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, take your time. It's the very -- it's the
4 very end of -- you find marginal point number 14. Do you have that?
5 A. I've found it. I've found 14.
6 Q. Yes, and then go to the very last paragraphs of that contribution
7 by you. It ends up with: "Thank you.
9 Do you see, just before the chairman speaks up again. Do you find
11 A. Would you like me to read it?
12 Q. Yes, please, Mr. Krajisnik. It's the -- simply saying -- read the
13 paragraph that starts: "The only thing I can say before this gathering."
14 Just please read that short paragraph out loud, please.
15 A. What it says here is the following. "Before this gathering I can
16 only say that I will advocate to do those things that I have been
17 authorised by the Serb people to do. When I cannot do that, I will, just
18 as I did the other day, certainly do it. Everyone who knows me knows that
19 I will rather convert to a different faith than not keep my word."
20 I will explain what this is all about.
21 Q. Well, yes, Mr. Krajisnik.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps, Mr. Stewart, since what Mr. Krajisnik just
23 read, that we first tell him what our problem is in English.
24 The line reads: "When I'm not able to do so, then I will
25 certainly do so," so therefore I have two problems in understanding that
1 if you are not able to do it that you will certainly do it. That's my
2 problem. But if you can explain, please.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I explained a few moments ago what
4 my mandate was: To work fairly, not to work to the detriment of other
5 peoples, and to defend the interests of the Serb people. That was my
6 mandate, and that's what I said. I thanked the SDS for not having asked
7 me to protect the Serb people only to the detriment of other peoples.
8 That was my mandate.
9 Before this meeting, there was an Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
10 and the SDS MPs walked out there. That is what Mr. Bjelobrk referred to
11 here. I stayed on my own with the other deputies. Irfan Ajanovic went
12 out -- or rather, took the floor, and others did, too, and said that they
13 had an objection. They wanted me to be replaced. And I said: All right.
14 I want to have a vote on me straight away. If I'm not fair -- well, they
15 said: Well, there are no SDS MPs. I said: Never mind. Only the HDZ and
16 the SDA were there, and that's what I was alluding to. They were trying
17 to tell me not to do that, but I insisted that they vote only on that.
18 And then when they said: We're sorry. We are not going to ask for that,
19 Mr. Ajanovic started praising me, and I said: Don't praise me any
20 longer. Now the SDS is going to replace me. And that's why I'm saying
21 that I'm going to be asked to be replaced if I'm ever asked to work
22 outside the scope of my mandate. That is what I was trying to say, that I
23 would rather convert to a different faith than not keep my word.
24 That intention of mine, I certainly would have carried it out.
25 This is an Assembly meeting that I was presenting here and that everybody
1 knew about, because you saw this other person here thanking me for having
2 chaired the Assembly in a certain way, and I chaired the meeting, although
3 it was the HDZ and the SDA MPs who were there and the SDS MPs walked out.
4 I said that I would have a vote of confidence as far as my work was
5 concerned if I were not acting fairly.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
7 MR. STEWART: [Microphone not activated].
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Stewart, please.
9 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Your Honour, it looks as if there was just a slip in the Serbian
11 text, but --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's not fully clear to me yet, but nevertheless
13 I think it's not such a major point that we should spend more time on it.
14 MR. STEWART: Well, I agree, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at the clock. It's 25 minutes
16 past 12.00. If we would have a break now for 20 minutes, we would have
17 one hour remaining.
18 MR. STEWART: Certainly, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we will adjourn until quarter to 1.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 12.26 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.56 p.m.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, I'd like to deal with a very
23 practical matter which also explains why we are later than you would have
25 At very short notice, a plenary meeting of the Judges was
1 scheduled for tomorrow morning. Since at the moment this was announced
2 none of the courtrooms was available in the afternoon, and since the
3 Judges find it very important not to lose any day, if possible. We're
4 trying to seek solutions for that, one of them being a request to the
5 President to be relieved from our duty to be present at the plenary. It
6 is of such importance to us. It now turned out that the Martic case has
7 finished for the week and they were sitting tomorrow in the afternoon. So
8 the latest instruction I gave is to see whether we could use the courtroom
9 used by the Martic case and then move to the afternoon tomorrow. Even
10 Mr. Registrar was not aware yet of that last move. We only saw the Martic
11 Judges seven minutes ago.
12 Would it cause any major problem? And I would like to ask the
13 parties to keep in mind that we found it important enough, if need would
14 have been, to ask the President to relieve us from the duty to be present,
15 would there be any major problem if we would move tomorrow to the
17 MR. STEWART: It's no problem at all for the Defence, Your Honour.
18 MR. TIEGER: No, Your Honour, none for the Prosecution.
19 JUDGE ORIE: That's -- well, Mr. Krajisnik, you're the witness now
20 so you're in a bit of a different position, although you're nearby and
21 mainly available, but it could have been that you had other matters such
22 as medical examinations or whatever, but I see that you are nodding that
23 it is no major problem for you as well.
24 Therefore, Mr. Registrar, you're invited to seek verification that
25 we could move to the afternoon tomorrow and inform me as soon as possible.
1 Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
2 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you find, please, point 15 in the margin.
4 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, this will be at the top of
5 page 76 of the English. In fact, it's the very bottom of the previous
6 page, 75, in the English. It simply says "Dr. Radovan Karadzic," and then
7 what he says: "Just a few words," at the top of page 76.
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you have that where Dr. Krajisnik [sic] begins
9 to speak and starts with "just a few words"?
10 A. Yes, I can see that.
11 Q. And then he says: "We have tested the attitude of the Army and in
12 the past few months we have seen that the attitude of the Army towards all
13 the parties is more or less the same. I will tell you off the record that
14 they recognise that the SDS is a centrist party, not a rightist party, but
15 officially their attitude towards all the parties is more or less the
16 same. We have seen that they have resolved to defend, not the Serbian
17 people, but whoever comes under attack. And that's fine by us. Because
18 we will not be attacking anyone and there is no way and no chance that we
19 would enter into any conflict with the Army."
20 Mr. Krajisnik, the -- this -- this is clearly a pretty public
21 meeting, wasn't it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Were the press present, do you -- can you recall?
24 A. I don't remember. Probably, yes.
25 Q. Had you personally been involved in any discussions with
1 representatives of the JNA?
2 A. Yes, I had for a while.
3 Q. What period?
4 A. I think in the second half of 1991, as the Speaker of the
5 parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I attended meetings with the local
6 commander of the 2nd Military District and the federal officials of the
7 Yugoslav People's Army.
8 Q. You've just referred to the second half of 1991. I think perhaps
9 my question wasn't specifically clear enough. This meeting we're looking
10 at now is the 12th of July. At this meeting at the time that Dr. Karadzic
11 was talking, had you, up to that point, been personally involved in any
12 discussions with the JNA?
13 A. I don't think I was, but if I had been it could have been only
14 discussions between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Yugoslav People's Army.
15 I never talked to the Yugoslav People's Army on behalf of my party.
16 Q. Did -- as far as you knew at the time, did what Dr. Karadzic was
17 saying here about the position of the JNA genuinely represent your
18 understanding of the army's attitude?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And Dr. Karadzic continues: "If, however, we come under attack
21 and since the Army is obliged to defend the victim of the attack, then it
22 will have to defend us because it is an important state institution. It
23 is defending those who are under attack in Croatia now.
24 "We have said clearly that we will not be creating any party
25 armies. We know that Serbs are arming themselves with smuggled weapons
1 and some ancient ones. We as a party do not have the right to arm the
2 people, but we do not have the right to discourage it either because we
3 could lead it into a position so difficult that it could result in it
5 Did you have any knowledge, Mr. Krajisnik, at that time of Serbs
6 arming themselves with smuggled weapons and some ancient ones?
7 A. In my previous answer I said I really didn't know in which way
8 Serbs were arming themselves, if they were arming themselves. Later when
9 the armed conflict began I saw that they had weapons which meant that even
10 back at that time various communities had been arming themselves.
11 Q. Then Dr. Karadzic continues: "As for the Army" --
12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the speaker to
13 indicate what is the number of the page in the B/C/S version.
14 MR. STEWART: I'm so sorry.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps you can help us on that. What page number
16 are we on, please, in your version?
17 A. 92.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 A. Page 92. 0092 -- the number ends with 722. Right?
20 Q. It's -- there's an internal page number of the document itself.
21 I'm not talking about in an elaborate reference number, just the simple
22 page number.
23 A. 92, page 92.
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters do not have that page.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, is it one missing page or do you -- doesn't it
2 end in 92? The difference is quite big between what we have, 76, and --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, we have certain pages 90, then we
4 don't have 91, 92, then we have 95. I mean, it's random a bit.
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I don't know how this has happened. My
6 apologies. We'll do better tomorrow.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Next time Mr. Stewart will count all the pages.
8 MR. STEWART: I will personally do it, Your Honour, certainly.
9 Giving the page number and not the page was sort of good news and bad
10 news, wasn't it, really.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Is -- the interpreters without it, would they like to
12 have re-read the portion just translated or ...
13 THE INTERPRETER: We simply ask the speaker to read it slowly, so
14 we will try to do it a vista. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. STEWART: Okay. That's a deal.
18 Q. So yes: "As for the Army, we have issued an instruction which
19 they resent. We have issued an instruction that all personnel should
20 respond to the first call-up of the JNA. We will not allow the JNA, if it
21 comes under attack in this area, to be defeated and humiliated in our
22 Bosnian crags. This will not happen because the Army is also our Army, as
23 long as it defends Yugoslavia. The volunteers will not be exclusively
24 Serbian. I know that there are volunteers from the" --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's only now that -- at least the French
1 translation, which I can follow, has -- so you're invited to slow down
2 even in your pace of reading, Mr. Stewart.
3 MR. STEWART: I will then, Your Honour.
4 "The volunteers" -- it doesn't come naturally, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: That's --
6 MR. STEWART: "The volunteers will not be exclusively Serbian. I
7 know that there are volunteers from the ranks of other peoples in Bosnian
8 Krajina, for instance, in Bosanski Novi there are Muslims who are
9 volunteering to defend the Serbs in Croatia, and I know for a fact that
10 they are taking in refugees and helping provide accommodation and food for
12 "So we for our part advise our members to respond to all JNA
13 call-ups. I believe that it would be sensible for other parties who want
14 to have peace to recommend to their members that they respond. We will
15 not be responsible for any imbalance in the ethnic composition of the
16 Army. Those who prevent their party members and members of their people
17 from responding will be responsible. Those who encourage reservists to
18 leave exercises, et cetera."
19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, all this was being said by Dr. Karadzic in the
20 presence of the invited guests from the different parties and
21 nationalities, wasn't it?
22 A. At that meeting I believe Dr. Karadzic said that and everybody who
23 attended heard it. I'm now speaking on the basis of this text. He said
24 that in -- publicly at that meeting.
25 Q. Was there any negative reaction or hostility from any member of
1 any other party or nationality to anything that was said by Dr. Karadzic
2 at this meeting?
3 A. I don't think so, but I'm saying this with one proviso. Very
4 often there were individual extremists advocating the creation of a new
5 Serbian army. I'm not sure if on this occasion there was a discussion of
6 that kind. I don't think so, but this was heard by everybody who
7 attended. Because to give you one example, some extremists viewed the JNA
8 as "a communist" armed force.
9 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, at this point, and it may be a tiny
10 bit in the nature of an experiment, but we hope it will go smoothly, Your
11 Honour. At this point, we would like to deal with one or two intercepts
12 that tie in, and the -- largely the way we're proposing to do the
13 intercepts, though, we'll be flexible, Your Honour, is that -- with Your
14 Honour's permission is I'm going to invite Mr. Josse to deal with those.
15 I hope that's not at all disruptive; it should be far from it, actually.
16 So may I from time to time handover to Mr. Josse at an appropriate point
17 in examination for him to deal with such matters?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, although usually, of course, counsel would -- it
19 would be one counsel that examines one witness. This is -- in view of the
20 length --
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Teamwork is not opposed to by the Chamber, but of
23 course a final decision could only be given if the Prosecution would have
24 expressed itself.
25 MR. TIEGER: Well, first of all, I have no objection at this
1 point. Mr. Stewart points out, it is an experiment. If some matter
2 arises that we think we should bring to the attention of the Court, then
3 we certainly will.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then a decision at this point is final. That there
5 is no opposition from the Chamber. Of course what happens in the near
6 future, we will see.
7 Please proceed.
8 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. I will handover to
9 Mr. Josse then.
10 Thank you.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, intercepts will be played in a similar
12 way. That means everything in order to get it on the record will be read
13 in English and translated into French so that we have a complete record.
14 And I think the procedure was that where the interpreters almost
15 necessarily are a bit behind, that one is following and reading and the
16 other one is reading the -- or is translating.
17 MR. JOSSE: Well, Your Honour, this also is going to be a further
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
20 MR. JOSSE: The first intercept that I'm going to take the witness
21 to has not previously been exhibited and I do propose to play it. Quite a
22 number I'm simply going to refer him to without actually playing them.
23 In order, again, to cut down on the welfare of paper, we've got a
24 number of B/C/S versions of the intercept, one of which will of course go
25 to the witness. One will go into the translation booths, as well. The
1 English will be on the screen, and Mr. Sladojevic will follow the audio
2 and bring the text up on the screen accordingly.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. Nevertheless, here the same is valid as
4 for exhibits. First of all, if we said that we would like to have hard
5 copies of the exhibits, if it's an existing exhibit if we could get a list
6 prior to the hearing, then of course we could try to collect them and
7 bring them ourselves which saves half a wood in copying. Because although
8 I highly appreciate the work of Mr. Sladojevic, he is now at the mouse and
9 I'm not at the mouse anymore.
10 MR. JOSSE: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: So I can't scroll back and that's -- so we are losing
12 some of our control, not over the presentation, but on verifying other
13 matters such as going back to the date, et cetera.
14 But let's start with the -- let's start with the experiment and
15 let's see whether it works. And if anyone, either interpreters,
16 technicians, or Judges, parties, or you, Mr. Krajisnik, will have any
17 difficulty with the procedure, I would like to hear from you.
18 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.
19 MR. JOSSE: So, Your Honour, we're going to play an intercept of
20 the 16th of July, 1991.
21 Could one be handed to Mr. Krajisnik. One is going to need to go
22 into the booths, please. There's a --
23 JUDGE ORIE: This is an unexhibited --
24 MR. JOSSE: To the best of our record. We've checked this as
25 thoroughly as we can, and we do not think this has previously been
2 Let me also add that all exhibits are as a result of Prosecution
3 disclosure -- I beg your pardon. All intercepts, what I should have said,
4 are a result of Prosecution disclosure.
5 JUDGE ORIE: You do not expect any objection as far as their
6 origin is concerned?
7 MR. JOSSE: Well, that's right.
8 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we would like to be provided with a copy
9 of the B/C/S as well.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, with a B/C/S copy, yes.
11 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, whilst this is being handed to the final
12 booth, I spoke to that booth, which is the B/C/S booth, and really --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Correction, English booth.
14 MR. JOSSE: Thank you, the English booth. And I think they would
15 like some guidance as to what Your Honours would like them to do. Simply
16 to read out this transcript or attempt to translate the intercept.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Our experience in the past was that it's impossible
18 to translate it immediately from the spoken word, words spoken. And it's
19 my recollection that we ask some teamwork under those circumstances, one
20 following the B/C/S text and the other one reading the English
21 translation, as it has been prepared, which of course also gives us an
22 opportunity later to check whether the translation is -- whether there are
23 any mistakes in the translation. But that's at least the translation we
24 work on. So actually, it is the written translation that serves us, but
25 at the same time for the completeness of the record, we want those -- this
1 English translation to be read out so that the transcript of this hearing,
2 of this court hearing, is complete.
3 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
4 JUDGE ORIE: And we should instruct those who are making telephone
5 conversations to speak a bit slower for the interpreters.
6 MR. JOSSE: I'd invite this to be played now, please.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 [Intercept played]
9 THE INTERPRETER: Where is the English translation, may we
11 MR. JOSSE: We are inquiring as well.
12 JUDGE ORIE: We have to stop for a moment. We expected to have
13 the English translation on our --
14 MR. JOSSE: So did we.
15 JUDGE ORIE: -- but as we see nicely the two children.
16 MR. STEWART: I think -- southern Germany, Your Honour, that is.
17 The -- Mr. Sladojevic is having -- it's beyond his control, I can
18 see that. He's having a -- there's a difficulty with the technical
19 connection, I think. He's doing the normal and right thing, and it's just
20 not working.
21 JUDGE ORIE: I think he'll -- may receive some assistance from our
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we have an English translation for the
25 intercept. It is 03219444. We may be able to show it if the Court -- if
1 that would be of assistance to counsel and to the booths.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And then perhaps later resolve the technical
3 problems. You could do that through your computer or should we put it on
4 the ELMO?
5 MR. HARMON: I will defer to my expert.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 MR. TIEGER: No, we don't have it in hard copy, Your Honour, it
8 won't be on the ELMO.
9 JUDGE ORIE: It won't be on the ELMO.
10 MR. TIEGER: We've called it up electronically.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes -- well, at least could it be enlarged a bit and
12 then scrolled in such a way that the interpreters could perhaps read it
13 from their screens. It's rather small. My eyes would not -- well, would
14 have some difficulties in -- yes, that's perhaps better.
15 Is that sufficient? Yes. Let's then proceed.
16 Mr. Sladojevic, if you can --
17 MR. JOSSE: I'm grateful to everyone.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 It has no exhibit number yet, Mr. Registrar.
20 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D178, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
22 THE REGISTRAR: With the B/C/S transcript as .1 and the English
23 as A.1.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Now, let me just check.
25 One question: Are we going to receive this on a CD-ROM? Because
1 the -- intercepts usually are submitted in electronic format and then the
2 transcripts get number A for the transcript and A.1 for the translation.
3 MR. JOSSE: Could I discuss that overnight with Mr. Sladojevic,
4 Mr. Haider and also the very helpful technical staff of the Chamber,
5 because we are very reliant on them to help us with that type of
7 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps I can even imagine that not a new CD will be
8 burned for every transcript but perhaps at a certain moment that we get
9 various telephone intercepts on one CD which then says: This is D178 up
10 till D -- yes.
11 MR. JOSSE: If we can do that after the event, because clearly I
12 won't make a final decision --
13 JUDGE ORIE: No, no --
14 MR. JOSSE: -- as to what I'm in fact going to play --
15 JUDGE ORIE: But it's just a suggestion -- and since my children
16 even learned me how to burn a CD, I'm fully confident that Mr. Sladojevic
17 would be --
18 Let's start. Yes.
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Now we have a problem of which -- I thought before
21 that it's difficult to feed our electronic evidence systems from two
22 different computers at the same time. Therefore, usually we had the
23 intercepts which was a combined text -- combined text and sound CD. We
24 don't have it here. Also perhaps a matter to be further explored by you,
25 Mr. Sladojevic, and to the extent the Tribunal can help you, of course we
1 will, and the same will be true, I take it, for the OTP.
2 At this moment Mr. Registrar offered us to make a printout of the
3 electronic -- of the transcript in English so that that can be provided to
4 the booths so that while playing it we have a hard copy available for the
6 The logistical aspects of these exercises need some more attention
7 as well.
8 MR. JOSSE: Yeah --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Although I envy Madam Usher for having an opportunity
10 to have some exercise during the day. I would not encourage that.
11 MR. JOSSE: There's no question about that, Your Honour, I accept
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 Mr. Registrar, were you able already to make a printout?
15 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
16 [Defence counsel confer]
17 MR. JOSSE: We're going to have one try, I think, of playing the
18 intercept and having it up on the screen.
19 [Intercept played]
20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
21 Radovan KARADZIC: Both Osijek and all of that up there ...
22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Well, your party is really something. There's
23 no other like it.
24 Radovan KARADZIC: (Laughs).
25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Do you see the way we work? Listen?
1 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: When you get the Montenegrins and the people
3 from Krajina together, and you yourself come from the old Herzegovina, you
4 can only imagine how it works out.
5 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
6 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Professor Bulatovic is here. Those
7 premises ...
8 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
9 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: They are there for certain" --
10 The text has scrolled up out of sight.
11 JUDGE ORIE: The text should follow the -- perhaps we stop again.
12 By scrolling you should -- Mr. Sladojevic, you should follow the
13 English interpretation and not the original B/C/S.
14 MR. JOSSE: Exactly. That was my fault for giving Mr. Sladojevic
15 the wrong instruction. Precisely, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So if we could re-start. At the same time, the
17 teamwork within the booth will not become more easy, but we are in an
18 experimental phase at this moment.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that the transcript is always
20 read out at a reasonable speed, whereas the actual conversation is as fast
21 as it is. So we do our best, but that's it.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 And therefore, Mr. Sladojevic is invited to follow your speed and
24 not anything else.
25 Let's re-start and --
1 [Intercept played]
2 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
3 Radovan KARADZIC: Both Osijek and all of that up there
4 should ... at least ... at least the Drava.
5 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, your party is really something. There is
6 no other like it.
7 Radovan KARADZIC: (Laughs).
8 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Did you see the way we did it? Listen!
9 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
10 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: When you get the Montenegrins and the people
11 from the Krajina together, and you yourself are from the old Herzegovina,
12 I can ... you can only imagine how it goes.
13 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
14 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Professor Bulatovic is here.
15 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.
16 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Those premises ...
17 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes?
18 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: They are there for certain.
19 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.
20 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Will you please -- he only says that the
21 request ... He is going to deal with it but regarding this we should ...
22 We should get together and finish this.
23 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh. Listen.
24 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: For it's complicated. The government doesn't
25 have to do anything.
1 Radovan KARADZIC: It doesn't.
2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Nothing.
3 Radovan KARADZIC: Great. Shall we -- well, okay, we'll see about
4 it. Listen, Zulfikarpasic was looking for me frantically for a couple of
6 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes.
7 Radovan KARADZIC: He got me on the phone today. I had been
8 avoiding it all, but he got me on the phone today.
9 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes.
10 Radovan KARADZIC: He says we have to meet up, a historically
11 important agreement between Serbs and Muslims is coming into sight. We
12 can't ... I said ... and I said, remember when I told you this. Before
13 our founding convention and you said you wanted to see who would be in the
15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Uh-huh.
16 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, now the chips are down. He says: I also
17 persuaded Alija. He will join all this. We'll meet up today and arrange
18 me a meeting with Milosevic tomorrow. They are in a panic.
19 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: They have to pay the entrance fee.
20 Radovan KARADZIC: I tried to avoid it, but I said I'd meet him
21 for a short while at this.
22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: That's okay.
23 Radovan KARADZIC: To meet him at Nikola's, so I thought it would
24 be a good that you come and then.
25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Just tell me at what time.
1 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, around 2.00. I think we should meet
2 there at quarter past 2.00.
3 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Good. Will you ...
4 Radovan KARADZIC: Is it okay with you?
5 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Well, no, listen, I don't think you can find
6 two guys like Bulatovic and me anywhere. You're okay but you're only the
7 second best.
8 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, I'm honoured to be second best to you.
9 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Huh?
10 Radovan KARADZIC: I am honoured.
11 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Bad politician. You're a diplomat. I must
12 say. Those poor things, those of other denominations, they've got a tough
13 deal to have to cope with you.
14 Radovan KARADZIC: (Laughs).
15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I'm kidding. Quarter past 2.00 is okay.
16 Radovan KARADZIC: Okay then.
17 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Listen. You know what we're going to do?
18 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
19 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: You know, when you get an assignment, you want
20 to finish it as soon as possible. He and I ...
21 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.
22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Somebody from up above, one of our men should
23 write it or we should write a letter on behalf of ... but it should be a
24 memo ... no, it can't.
25 Radovan KARADZIC: It has to be a memo, but over there, those
1 were flooded up there, so they can't enter those ...
2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes. Let me tell you - this should, I
3 mean ... as soon as possible. Here's what I told him" --
4 THE INTERPRETER: Shall we go on?
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. I take it that something -- I don't know
6 whether the original in B/C/S has finished by now?
7 THE INTERPRETER: It has.
8 JUDGE ORIE: It has. So then perhaps we could do without the
9 music and stop that and ask the interpreters to finish the English
10 interpretation and the French interpretation.
11 I expected at least some Yugoslav music under the circumstances,
12 but unfortunately ... the interpreters are invited to read the remainder
13 of the translation.
14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Here is what I told him. He should take care
16 of this. He should say, whenever the HDZ and the SDA ask for it, we'll
17 give them the premises that they want.
18 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes, of course.
19 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: So that the Assembly should act according to
21 Radovan KARADZIC: That's great! Excellent.
22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Will you then please listen to what I suggest?
23 It can, since there is no room up there ...
24 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I'll definitely meet up with ... to get it
1 over with.
2 Radovan KARADZIC: Okay.
3 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: And we shall assign Mr. Bulatovic, since he
4 makes big sacrifices for our people.
5 Radovan KARADZIC: Okay, that's a deal. And we shall talk
6 before 2.00 so that we can meet at a quarter past 2.00 and then maybe ...
7 finish it.
8 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: And will Alija be there? No, I don't think he
10 Radovan KARADZIC: No, no. He said he had talked with Alija and
11 convinced him. Alija would like to be a part of this. He wants Milosevic
12 to see him tomorrow right after the talks with us.
13 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: No, no, he has to earn that. I don't know,
14 we'll see.
15 Radovan KARADZIC: No, we have to analyse. Yes, but first we have
16 to hear ... to get a loan.
17 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes, yes, good ... to Bosnia. Good, that's a
18 deal. And what are we going to do about these premises. Please ... just
19 get this over with.
20 Radovan KARADZIC: I'll call down there right away to see if there
21 is anyone to write this ...
22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: You don't have to. I'll tell you what - I'm
23 going to call Ostojic.
24 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Since little Zoran was there.
1 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.
2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: We have to see where he went.
3 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.
4 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: And we should tell him to get in touch, to
5 write that memo, the request for the premises.
6 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh. And you know what you should do? Call
7 Simovic and Ostojic. Simovic has already had a request like that and it
8 went through ... I mean, since it was ... he had to go through the
9 government. It went through some commissions.
10 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes. That is wrong. That is not Vlado's --
11 THE INTERPRETER: That is not up to the government, or the
12 governments. That is interpreter's correction.
13 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Not Vlado's.
14 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.
15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: It belongs to the Centar municipality.
16 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh. It's theirs, for sure.
17 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Here's what I'll do. I'll hook up Simovic
18 and ... I mean Mr. Bulatovic so that the two of them can finish it and
19 there you are.
20 Radovan KARADZIC: Great! Now I'll call Simovic to ...
21 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Okay. You don't have to do anything. I'll do
22 it all.
23 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, then.
24 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: All of it. Don't worry.
25 Radovan KARADZIC: See you.
1 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: See you. Everything's settled.
2 Radovan KARADZIC: Thank you. Have a nice day. Give my regards
3 to the Professor.
4 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I will."
5 Examination by Mr. Josse:
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you and Dr. Karadzic are discussing the proposed
7 historical agreement. Is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The Chamber has heard something about that. There is reference
10 here to Mr. Zulfikarpasic. What was his role in the proposed agreement?
11 A. Mr. Zulfikarpasic was the president of the Muslim-Bosniak
12 organisation, and they had launched an initiative together with Professor
13 Filipovic to have a historic agreement reached between the Serbs and the
15 Q. Now, Professor Filipovic and Mr. Zulfikarpasic were not in
16 Mr. Izetbegovic's political party, were they?
17 A. No, they were not. At first they were, but at this point in time
18 they weren't. At the beginning of political pluralism in 1990, that's
19 when they were with him, but at this point in time they were no longer
20 with him.
21 Q. What's the name of their political party at this point in time?
22 A. The MBO, the Muslim-Bosniak Organisation.
23 Q. And why were they in the vanguard of the proposed agreement from
24 the Muslim side?
25 A. They had a proposal for two peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina through
1 their political representatives to reach an agreement and resolve many
2 questions that were controversial ones throughout history in order for a
3 solution to be found for the future as to how they should live together in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The point was for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain
5 within Yugoslavia and that it remain integral. That was their request and
6 that corresponded to the interests of the Serb side.
7 Q. And have you any idea how they presented the matter to the SDA and
8 Mr. Izetbegovic?
9 A. I was present at a meeting, perhaps it was precisely this one at
10 Mr. Koljevic's, when the two of them, Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic,
11 said: We have a proposal for a historical agreement. And they presented
12 what I said to you a few moments ago. And we also have the support and
13 consent of Mr. Izetbegovic.
14 Q. And it may be obvious, but it's central to the questions I'm
15 asking. Why were you in favour of this agreement?
16 A. Well, I shared that view. I wanted Bosnia to remain an integral
17 whole and that it remain in Yugoslavia, and I wanted us to reform
18 Yugoslavia and to find a long-term solution that would lead to peace, that
19 there would be a long-term agreement between the two peoples. Of course
20 the third people would have to be involved, too, and the others as well,
21 but this was an initiative of two peoples that would have been offered to
22 the Croat side as well.
23 Q. What was Mr. Milosevic's involvement in it?
24 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic was considered by the Muslims to be the leader
25 of all Serbs, and they would have only been too pleased to have
1 Mr. Milosevic's consent as well. They even thought that we were under
2 Mr. Milosevic's patronage. So if we agreed and he did not agree, that
3 would be an insufficient guarantee for them; that's why they wanted to
4 talk to Milosevic as well, which actually did happen. And this was
5 confirmed by Mr. Zulfikarpasic in the interview he gave to Nin magazine.
6 Q. What was the relationship between the historical agreement and the
7 Belgrade Initiative?
8 A. Well, I think that it is practically the same thing or there were
9 only technical differences in nuance. This is an interpretation based on
10 that kind of historical agreement.
11 Q. Why did the agreement and/or the initiative fail, from your
12 perspective anyway?
13 A. The answer is simple. The Muslim side -- or rather, the SDA gave
14 up on the agreement. Of course the Croat side -- or rather, in parliament
15 as well, but the focus here is on the Muslim side. Their role was crucial
16 as personified through Mr. Izetbegovic. He gave up on this.
17 Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Mr. Filipovic said that. They drew back and that's
18 why it went down the drain.
19 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, perhaps that would be a convenient
20 moment. We will consider overnight whether to play any more intercepts in
21 relation to this or perhaps some other way of presenting them.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that.
23 Before we adjourn for the day, perhaps a few practical matters.
24 Mr. Registrar, if I could specifically have your attention. The
25 Nielsen source material has not received a number, did it?
1 THE REGISTRAR: No, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: That's four tabs in one binder.
3 THE REGISTRAR: That would be P1177.
4 JUDGE ORIE: P1177. That had been reserved and not been used
5 meanwhile, yes.
6 Then in relation to P64A, the descriptions have been added to the
7 exhibit list and the tabs are in a chronological order rather than the
8 earlier unique numbering. There are 831 tabs in total. 380 tabs out of
9 these 831 tabs are now on the judicial database. Hard work is done to get
10 the remainder of these tabs on the judicial database as well. These are
11 some practical matters.
12 Mr. Registrar, did I understand the message I got from you that it
13 has now been finally confirmed that we can sit tomorrow in the afternoon?
14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: We will then adjourn until tomorrow, the 27th of
16 April, quarter past 2.00, Courtroom II, quarter past 2.00 in the
17 afternoon, of course.
18 We'll adjourn.
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day of
21 April, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.