Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 23016

1 Wednesday, 26 April 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [Mr. Krajisnik entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. And, Mr. Registrar, would

6 you please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik. Thank you.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

10 Before we continue the examination of you, Mr. Krajisnik, I have

11 one announcement. From the last session of yesterday a DVD -- a video DVD

12 has been produced and will be handed out to you today so that you can look

13 at it. It has been produced in the B/C/S version. It was considered that

14 that is what you would need. If that would be not the case, then please

15 inform us, and you're invited to look at whether it functions on your

16 computer so that you -- and please report to the Chamber if you can't look

17 at it so that we can try to fix that.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have already received

19 the DVDs. Your employees are very prompt.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So I'm, perhaps as always, a bit behind the

21 fact. And have you tested it already, Mr. Krajisnik? Not yet. Okay.

22 So then we'll hear from you if it doesn't function. Yes.

23 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to remind you that you're still

24 bound by the solemn declaration that you've given at the beginning of your

25 testimony yesterday.

Page 23017

1 And, Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.

2 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.


4 [Witness answered through interpreter]

5 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]

6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking at and I hope you still have a copy

7 in front of you of the transcript of your interview on the television

8 programme, Club 91. You're nodding so I can see that you have that.

9 Where we got to yesterday, do you find in the margin of your copy the

10 number 3?

11 A. Yes.

12 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honour, this is in the -- almost in the

13 middle of page 4 of the English where Mr. Krajisnik is recorded as

14 saying: "The viewers will see that but I hope you will also recognise

15 that," and then we continue in the transcript. The presenter

16 says: "Mr. Krajisnik, so, to begin - behind us is yesterday's

17 long-running government session at which there was discussion, as you

18 know, viewers, about the problems of regionalisation in Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina. We have all heard the conclusions and there have already

20 been reactions today. Can you tell us your opinion about these problems,

21 yesterday's government session and regionalisation in general?"

22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, you did not personally attend that

23 government session, did you?

24 A. No, I did not.

25 Q. And you -- is it correct you wouldn't have normally attended the

Page 23018

1 government session because you weren't, in fact, a member of the

2 government?

3 A. You're correct.

4 Q. Then I'll go through the answer that you gave on that occasion.

5 You said: "I think it is very difficult to form an answer to this

6 question. Much happened and I think that there are differences as regards

7 regionalisation. I will tell you my personal view, which I think is a

8 duty that I must say from the position of president of the Assembly but

9 talking also as a man and a citizen of this Bosnia and Herzegovina. I

10 unambiguously believe and this was stated at the session of the

11 Assembly and the government itself that according to the Constitution

12 regionalisation is allowed, in fact, it is a voluntary act of the

13 municipalities which want it and which can realise it with their voluntary

14 action if they established that there are political interests. Legally,

15 too, even though there have been objections here, it is unambiguous here

16 that, also legally there is no basis to challenge that."

17 MR. STEWART: And then, Your Honours, the next two lines are one

18 of those handwritten notes that we can scrub for immediate purposes.

19 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, the question you'd been asked by the presenter

20 included asking your opinion about regionalisation in general. But the

21 question I am putting to you now today is would you tell Your Honours what

22 at this time in this context - this time in 1991 - what was

23 regionalisation?

24 A. In 1991 regionalisation, albeit legally grounded in the

25 constitution, had a certain political dimension as well. It created a

Page 23019

1 rift between parties, between sides. Therefore, it did not have the real

2 basis as designed, as imagined by the writer of the constitution.

3 Q. Let me start with this then, Mr. Krajisnik. Did the three main

4 parties, all three of them, the SDA, the HDZ, and the SDS, have differing

5 approaches to regionalisation at that time, in May 1991?

6 A. Right. They had different approaches.

7 Q. Was there -- just to clarify, was there, to start with, a

8 difference of approach between the SDA and the HDZ?

9 A. Perhaps, but it was not a visible difference. If you allow me to

10 explain, HDZ was in favour of regionalisation, whereas SDA was absolutely

11 against it, categorically against it. When I say that the HDZ was in

12 favour of regionalisation, that applied only when it was in the interest

13 of the Croatian people, and that's when they implemented it. As for the

14 Serb side and as for what the Serbs did, then the HDZ was sympathetic with

15 the SDA in their opposition to regionalisation.

16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is -- if I may comment, this is clearly a

17 potentially complex subject, so just as we go into it I'd invite you to --

18 to stick to my questions and we'll take it in steps.

19 The -- you've said in your answer there in relation to difference

20 of approach between the SDA and the HDZ, you said: It was not a visible

21 difference. And then I'm not cross-examining you, Mr. Krajisnik, but you,

22 first of all, say it's a visible difference and then you say the HDZ was

23 in favour of regionalisation, whereas the SDA was absolutely against it.

24 That second comment does seem to be rather a sharp difference between them

25 as opposed to you saying there was no visible difference. So would you

Page 23020

1 clarify that. What I'm putting to you is that on your own answer there

2 plainly was a substantial difference between the SDA and the HDZ.

3 A. In the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agenda featured

4 mainly the regionalisation implemented by the Serbs, and on that issue the

5 HDZ and the SDA were joined against such regionalisation. And when I was

6 trying to explain a moment ago about regionalisation in general and the

7 approaches of the various sides, I said that the SDA was absolutely

8 against it, whereas the HDZ would be in favour of it when it applied to

9 Western Herzegovina, for instance. So one thing happened in the Assembly,

10 and the political moves outside of it was something quite different and we

11 were aware of those political moves. In this interview I was talking only

12 about what was going on at the Assembly.

13 Q. Let's then -- let's start, Mr. Krajisnik, with asking you to

14 describe as succinctly as you can the essentials of the SDS policy on

15 regionalisation at that point in time.

16 A. Did you mean the SDS?

17 Q. I hoped I said the SDS. I did mean the SDS, Mr. Krajisnik, yes.

18 A. The SDS exercised the possibility provided by the constitution to

19 revive the issue of regionalisation which was topical even before the

20 multi-party elections, and it was all legally justified. However,

21 politically it was an answer to the violation of the constitution by two

22 sides concerning the fact that they put their declaration of the

23 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda of the Assembly in

24 February 1992 [as interpreted].

25 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, what -- leaving aside for one moment whether --

Page 23021

1 what it was an answer to and the reasons why it was adopted, you've

2 indicated, as an answer, what were the essentials of the regionalisation

3 as a practical policy of the SDS?

4 A. Even apart from this first answer, this first reaction, the SDS

5 wanted municipalities to regionalise, it wanted regionalisation to go on,

6 because many regions had been left behind, forgotten, because Sarajevo, as

7 the centre, enjoyed all the advantages. And in order to provide for a

8 polycentric development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we in the SDS pushed

9 regionalisation for Bosnia and Herzegovina always looking to Switzerland

10 as a model.

11 Q. When you say that the SDS wanted municipalities to regionalise,

12 then what is it that the SDS wanted the municipalities to do to implement

13 that regionalisation?

14 A. To act according to the constitution. Each municipality was

15 supposed to declare its own will to say whether they wanted to join a

16 particular region if such an initiative existed, and that was carried out

17 in practice. They were only exercising their right given by the

18 constitution to declare what they wanted, which region they wanted to

19 join.

20 Q. I want just to -- in your answers, please, to try to take these

21 steps in -- in specific detail bit by bit. You say that "each

22 municipality was supposed to declare its own will." By what mechanism was

23 the municipality to declare its own will? What body was to do it? How

24 was it to be done?

25 A. The constitution provided the grounds for regionalisation. Under

Page 23022

1 the socialist system it was all orchestrated, whereas we suggested that it

2 should be somehow coordinated and negotiated among representatives of

3 various municipalities. They would meet and agree, and after that each

4 municipality would start an initiative in its own to implement that idea.

5 It was actually only about reviving the regions that had existed earlier,

6 before those multi-party elections.

7 Q. So the representatives of the various municipalities that you

8 suggested should somehow coordinate and negotiate among themselves, are

9 you talking about Serbs only or Serbs and representatives from the other

10 nationalities?

11 A. I'm not talking only about the Serbs, because various ethnic

12 communities lived in each of the municipalities, Croats, Serbs, and

13 Muslims. I'm talking about adjoining municipalities, contiguous ones.

14 You cannot regionalise municipalities that are far from each other; only

15 contiguous municipalities could form one whole. So a municipality which

16 leaned territorially on to an existing region had the possibility of

17 declaring its will at a referendum and joining that region. That's how it

18 was done in practice.

19 Q. And was the intention then, Mr. Krajisnik, that there would

20 eventually be regions that were politically run by Serbs and there would

21 be other regions that were politically run by Muslims or by Croats?

22 A. Speaking of regionalisation, at that time there was no thought of

23 unifying only Serb majority municipalities. We have proof in the

24 statement of the president of the then-Serb region of Krajina in which he

25 invited other Muslim majority municipalities to join that region.

Page 23023

1 Q. So that when you referred to a municipality declaring its will, it

2 was the Municipal Assembly of a particular municipality that would make

3 that decision and declare its will if it wanted to join a particular

4 region. Is that correct?

5 A. You are quite right. That's the way it went all the way up to

6 the outbreak of armed conflict.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I ask --

8 MR. STEWART: Of course.

9 JUDGE ORIE: -- you to seek one clarification.

10 MR. STEWART: Of course, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE ORIE: In this respect Mr. Krajisnik also mentioned, and I

12 read that a municipality had the possibility of declaring its will at a

13 referendum, and I have some difficulties to reconcile a -- the expression

14 of its will by a decision of the Municipal Assembly or by a referendum.

15 That's just unclear to me.

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour's absolutely right.

17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, your reference to referendum, was that -- was that

18 on the basis that a municipality would hold a referendum before

19 deciding -- well, I'll ask that question first.

20 Was that on the basis that it was expected that a municipality

21 would hold a referendum before a decision was taken?

22 A. I don't actually recall mentioning a referendum.

23 JUDGE ORIE: It might be a translation issue. Perhaps we check

24 that during the next break.

25 MR. STEWART: Well, perhaps I --

Page 23024


2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, yes. Perhaps if I put the answer to

3 Mr. Krajisnik to see if he does accept it straight away, otherwise we'll

4 look at it.

5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, what we have -- and I'm reading of course from the

6 English transcript now. What we have a few minutes ago is you saying,

7 first of all, you can't regionalise municipalities that are far from each

8 other, and only contiguous municipalities could form one whole. And then

9 you are recorded on our transcript as having said: "So a municipality

10 which leaned territorially on to an existing region had the possibility of

11 declaring its will at a referendum and joining that region. That's how it

12 was done in practice."

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note, if this will be of

14 assistance, I hope, it was a misunderstanding by the interpreter when

15 the -- when Mr. Krajisnik said "declaring its will."


17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... a moment, please. We'll

18 listen to the interpreter first, if we may.

19 MR. STEWART: I'm so sorry. Thank you, interpreter. Could you

20 just finish what you were saying?

21 THE INTERPRETER: I have finished. I misunderstood Mr. Krajisnik

22 to mean a referendum when he was talking about declaring its will.

23 JUDGE ORIE: It's been clarified.

24 MR. STEWART: Thank you very much. Thank you, Your Honour. Thank

25 you, Madam Interpreter.

Page 23025

1 Excuse me, Your Honour, I'm trying to pick up where we were.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Page 8 --

3 MR. STEWART: Yes, that's very kind, Your Honour. Perhaps we

4 should clarify what Mr. Krajisnik did say at that point.

5 So is it -- Madam Interpreter, is it --

6 May I, Your Honour, put that question through the Bench to Madam

7 Interpreter as to what Mr. Krajisnik did actually say at that point?

8 THE INTERPRETER: Everything except "referendum." Declaring its

9 will and joining that region.

10 MR. STEWART: Yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: So the "referendum" was added in the translation.

12 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you. Thank you.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not actually -- I don't

14 remember saying "referendum."


16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you are absolutely right about that. It seems to

17 be completely agreed now; it was just a misunderstanding.

18 The -- so it was -- just to summarise. It was to be -- it was for

19 Municipal Assemblies to make the decision. If -- once municipalities --

20 let's take that -- once municipalities had declared their will to join a

21 particular region, so it's got to be more than one municipality, otherwise

22 you don't have a region. So but once some municipalities have declared

23 their will to join a particular region, what was the SDS expectation as to

24 how that region would then be governed?

25 A. Municipalities took their decision like any other decision at

Page 23026

1 Assembly sessions. Since I am under oath to tell the truth, I'm going to

2 say that the SDS only made a political move that would be a reply to the

3 other side to the effect that the Bosnian Herzegovinian crisis should be

4 resolved by agreement instead of imposing a solution. Because even

5 regions should be based on agreement between all three sides, whereas in

6 this respect there was obviously no agreement even about regions among the

7 three sides.

8 So it was a political answer to the self-willed decision-making by

9 the other two sides. It was a signal that we should have an agreement,

10 both about the regions and the solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could we then stick with the -- first of all, with

12 the question -- the specific question that I asked you. You've -- let's

13 assume you've got a situation where at least a few municipalities have

14 declared their will in the way you've described to join a particular

15 region. What was the SDS expectation as to how that region would then be

16 governed? In other words, in some way above the level of the individual

17 municipalities.

18 A. [No interpretation].

19 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm not getting

20 translation. Your Honour probably isn't either.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English booth now?

22 MR. STEWART: Now yes. Your Honour --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course we need some other -- some foreign

24 words to be spoken in order to see whether the translation continues.

25 If you please continue or repeat your question, Mr. Stewart, then.

Page 23027


2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just say something in your language like

3 congratulations on the football or something like that, just anything in

4 your own language.

5 A. Well, I can say that I can hear all of you.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.

7 So I will put my question again, though, Mr. Krajisnik. You've

8 got a situation where at least a few municipalities have declared their

9 will in the way you've described to join a particular region. What was

10 the SDS expectation as to how that region would then be governed, in other

11 words, in some way above the level of the individual municipalities?

12 A. Quite simply, I'm not saying that that's what the SDS wanted it to

13 be like, but I'm giving you the position of the SDS. These regions were

14 to behave exactly as envisaged by the BH constitution, and what was

15 envisaged was that municipalities could transfer some of their powers to

16 the region. And these powers would be dealt with at the Assembly of the

17 region or the Executive Council of the region. I do not remember what the

18 name was in the constitution. But these bodies would in turn pass

19 decisions which would then be handed down to the municipalities that had

20 been brought together.

21 Q. And the -- you've indicated that the -- something about the HDZ

22 position. How did the HDZ at that time then, how did they express their

23 position on this process? Did they say that they were overall in favour,

24 or did they say that they were generally against or what was their

25 expression of policy?

Page 23028

1 A. As far as I can remember, the HDZ was silent. They did not

2 publicly express their views on regionalisation. However, tacitly in the

3 Assembly when there were decisions concerning regionalisation, they would

4 actually express their solidarity with the SDA.

5 Q. And the SDA you have already said were opposed to regionalisation.

6 Did they express, first of all, publicly, did the SDA publicly express

7 reasons for their opposition?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And what reasons did they give?

10 A. The SDA interpreted regionalisation to mean the break-up of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina because they were advocating a unitary firm united

12 sovereign, as they say, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13 Q. And when you say, to clarify, at that time were they advocating a

14 unitary -- I beg your pardon. Were they advocating a sovereign Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina as part of a larger state of Yugoslavia or an independent

16 sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina?

17 A. There are different stages in which they advocated different

18 things.

19 If you allow me to explain, the SDA in the election campaign

20 advocated Bosnia within Yugoslavia. In the first period after the

21 multi-party elections they advocated Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia, a

22 reformed one of course, and then a self-reliant Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

23 then a Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia when the historical agreement

24 was reached, and then, yet again, a Bosnia-Herzegovina outside Yugoslavia.

25 And that was the last stage that went on from October 1991 until the

Page 23029

1 beginning of the armed conflict.

2 Q. In this time we're talking about, in May 1991, was it your

3 understanding -- and I'm asking specifically about you, Mr. Krajisnik.

4 I'm not talking about the SDS or any larger group. Was it your

5 understanding that the SDA were supporting a continuation of Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina within a larger state of Yugoslavia?

7 A. Well, it's hard for me to define what the position of the SDA was,

8 but precisely in that period of time there was a debate on the declaration

9 that was -- this was the declaration concerning a sovereign

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina that was discussed at the constitutional commission and

11 different bodies. And there was an opportunity that an agreement would be

12 reached which would mean a third thing, so that is to say that at that

13 time the SDA was not firmly in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina being an

14 independent state. However, in all the debates that model was favoured --

15 or rather, it was promoted because they wanted the declaration to be

16 adopted.

17 Q. But Mr. Krajisnik, you -- you have -- in your answers this morning

18 to the Trial Chamber, you have indicated that the SDS policy of

19 regionalisation was an answer, as you put it, to the policies of positions

20 of the other parties. That's correct. That's what you have said. Is

21 that right?

22 A. That is correct. At the moment when -- or rather, exactly from

23 March until May, up to May, that was the political move concerned.

24 However, the -- when the SDS wanted a recommendation to be put forth at

25 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina to stop regionalisation until a

Page 23030

1 political solution is found in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for as long as the

2 negotiations go on.

3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- in describing regionalisation as an answer,

4 what was the problem to which it was an answer? Let me put it this way:

5 What did the SDS see as the negative aspects of the other parties'

6 policies which could then be met by regionalisation?

7 A. In February 1991, the SDA proposed the declaration at the

8 Assembly. There were 20 signatures by SDS deputies, and it was sent to

9 the Council. In these discussions that took place, the SDA position

10 became clear, but what particularly called for regionalisation was a

11 statement made by Mr. Izetbegovic unwittingly at a meeting that was held

12 in Split, a meeting of the presidents of the republic. He said the

13 declaration will be adopted regardless of whether the SDS agrees or not.

14 Then everything followed, that is to say, giving a political response to

15 regionalisation. There is a document that includes this statement made by

16 Mr. Izetbegovic. There is a newspaper article as to what he stated after

17 the Split meeting.

18 Q. The --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart --

20 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE ORIE: -- I'd like to clarify one matter. Page 5, lines 20

22 and following, I'll read them to Mr. Krajisnik.

23 Mr. Krajisnik, it has been translated to us, and it -- I doubt on

24 whether this is what you said or whether you misspoke. You

25 said: "However, politically," you were talking about regionalisation, "it

Page 23031

1 was an answer to the violation of the constitution by two sides concerning

2 the fact that they put their declaration of the independence of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina on the agenda of the Assembly in February 1992," whereas you

4 are now referring in relation to -- to what the regionalisation was a

5 response, you're referring to 1991. Did you intend to say February 1992

6 in your earlier answer?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1991 is the year. 1991. Maybe it

8 was a slip of the tongue, maybe I misspoke, but it was in 1991.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I just sought to clarify that.

10 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. I should have picked

11 that up at the time, but that's absolutely right. Thank you.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I formulated a question for myself, and since

13 you revisited the matter I thought clarification now would be better.

14 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you. That's most helpful, Your Honour,

15 thank you.

16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- we can -- we can look out these documents as

17 necessary, but the -- the key point about Mr. Izetbegovic's statement at

18 that time was what?

19 A. The key point of Mr. Izetbegovic's statement when he did not

20 exercise caution, if I can put it that way, was that the Assembly

21 procedure was there, that the declaration was there in the Assembly

22 procedure, and that it would be adopted regardless of whether the SDS

23 agreed to it or not. That was a signal to the effect that all these

24 debates that we had with the representatives of the other two sides in the

25 Assembly procedure -- well, that their position is clear. That they will

Page 23032

1 want that declaration to be carried through, that they would advocate an

2 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. That sounded off an alarm that we were

3 debating things for no reason whatsoever, because their position was quite

4 clear.

5 I'm trying to be brief, and perhaps my answers are, therefore, not

6 very clear. I can give lengthier answers, but I would like my attorney to

7 lead me and then perhaps I can give shorter answers so that will do. I

8 mean, the questions can be phrased that way.

9 Q. What a very good idea. Shall we do it exactly that way.

10 Mr. Krajisnik, the -- the key point -- yes. The key point of the

11 declaration then independent -- or the statement, rather, of

12 Mr. Izetbegovic, independence, Mr. Krajisnik, you may think this is all

13 very obvious after we've been here for about two years, but why did that

14 point require steps to the taken by the SDS and the Serbs as an answer?

15 A. Well, at the Assembly in 1991, that is to say in February,

16 Mr. Izetbegovic also made a statement that meant that he was not exactly

17 exercising caution, that he would sacrifice peace for a sovereign

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that showed quite clearly what the intentions of

19 the other two sides were.

20 Just another small addition. A month before that in January 1991

21 at the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic came out to explain

22 a platform that he was advocating on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the

23 other presidents of the other republics where he said: I advocate a

24 Bosnia within Yugoslavia; of course a reformed Yugoslavia. And he was

25 applauded by all of those present, and this meant a great deal of relief

Page 23033

1 in the general public. Only a month later the same side, the same man,

2 made a different statement which caused a reaction, the one that I spoke

3 about, that now the SDS sought a political response to. So all of that

4 was involved.

5 Q. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- and if I may, in a sense, address the

6 Trial Chamber as well. Throughout the whole of the period during which --

7 with which this case is primarily concerned, and certainly 1991 and early

8 1992, there were from time to time, weren't there, quite sharp

9 fluctuations in the message that was coming from the SDA about their

10 attitude towards independence of Bosnia. That's right, isn't it?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. And is this, without, I hope, leading improperly -- once the SDA

13 at some point had indicated a wish for independence, subsequent swings

14 back in the other direction away from independence were really not

15 sufficiently reassuring to the Bosnian Serbs. Is that also correct?

16 A. Well, the answer is both yes and no.

17 Q. Well, give the yes first, Mr. Krajisnik, then and then the no.

18 That's probably the best way of dealing with it.

19 A. Since those were very hard times, even a small positive,

20 favourable statement became a major one and would lead to an alleviation

21 of the situation, as if somebody had pressed a button. So just a small

22 positive statement made by the SDA would bring about a general easing, a

23 general relaxation. If a different statement were made, as soon as a

24 different statement would be made, then the reaction was different, as if

25 the first thing had never happened in the first place.

Page 23034

1 That is why I'm saying yes and no. Because practically the

2 situation changed from one day to another on different grounds. So this

3 complex situation has to be understood. Perhaps no one can understand it

4 because it was so dynamic that even I myself cannot remember all the

5 details sometimes.

6 I beg your pardon, when I'm talking about the SDA -- can I just

7 add something?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --


10 Q. His Honour is indicating "yes," Mr. Krajisnik.

11 JUDGE ORIE: It's part of your answer, so if Mr. Stewart would

12 like otherwise he will give you the guidance, but please add what you

13 would like to add.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm talking now here as if I were

15 accusing the SDA and Mr. Izetbegovic. I must say that the driving force

16 that was instigating the SDA was the HDZ. This is my personal opinion.

17 Had the SDA pursued their independent policy, had they not been instigated

18 I think they would have made moves that were a lot more reasonable. I

19 know Mr. Izetbegovic personally, too, and I know that many times he wanted

20 to achieve something and he could not do it because there were pressures

21 coming from the other side. But that's a different story altogether. I'm

22 saying this for the sake of the truth. I don't want it to appear that I'm

23 not telling the entire truth.


25 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, that was the "yes" part of your answer. I had

Page 23035

1 asked you a question to which you said the answer was yes or no, and that

2 was your yes part. And no -- just to remind you -- the question was

3 really where there -- when there was swings back away from a policy of

4 independence by the SDA you had said that that might lead to a general

5 easing, but on the no side? On the negative side?

6 Were there ways in which it wasn't sufficiently reassuring, or it

7 didn't ease the situation sufficiently?

8 A. When a people, a nation, are in a difficult situation, then

9 misinformation is bandied about, too. And if a positive statement is made

10 by the SDA, then it seems that somebody says, on purpose: Well, they're

11 just playing both sides. There are some people who are skeptical and some

12 people who believe misinformation and who say: Well, he just said it for

13 political reasons and it's not true. And that is why I said that perhaps

14 it's a yes or no answer.

15 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, so far as the SDS were led to have concern that

16 the SDA would pursue policy of independence, essentially why was that a

17 problem for the SDS?

18 A. We were all fearing a conflict, not to say a war. You know, we

19 have a tradition. Every person who is born in Bosnia knew that if the

20 three sides don't agree, that's not a good thing. And knowing that the

21 SDA represented the most numerous people, we knew that if they don't agree

22 with something that's not good. And that's why we were concerned, we were

23 worried, not about the vote but worried generally that things might get

24 out of control. And that's why we were worried if the SDA was against

25 something. If it had been a small party representing a small community, a

Page 23036

1 small minority, that would have been different. But SDA representing a

2 very major portion of the people, their opinion had a weight.

3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, for the purposes of these questions now, I want to

4 start by drawing, I hope, a clear distinction between two things so we

5 understand the basis of the question.

6 If you had one nation that wanted independence and you had another

7 nation -- I'm leaving aside for the moment the fact that there were three

8 nations, but if you had one nation that wanted independence and another

9 nation that didn't and they were sufficiently determined, there was the

10 prospect of a civil war. That -- that's clear, isn't it, Mr. Krajisnik?

11 A. I can say that it was absolutely crystal clear to everybody in

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13 Q. But my question first, my prior question, is intended to, if you

14 like, move back a step from that, Mr. Krajisnik. Why was the prospect of

15 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina itself unacceptable to the Serbs which

16 then led them to oppose it so strongly?

17 A. For a number of reasons. First, because somebody would be

18 abolishing a state overnight. We had Yugoslavia at the time. Second,

19 because the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was being pursued

20 through unconstitutional means and not everybody was equally committed to

21 a compromise. Instead, the other side, the coalition between the SDA and

22 the HDZ, the two sides that agreed, they were willing to have Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina out of Yugoslavia without being choosey about the means. And

24 when I say "without being choosey," I mean pursuing an illegal,

25 unconstitutional road, whereas we wanted a legal, constitutional position

Page 23037

1 that would allow for a compromise, which was what actually happened when

2 the international community got involved.

3 Q. But, Mr. Krajisnik, what was it about living in an independent

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina as it was structured before regionalisation that

5 was inherently unacceptable to the Bosnian Serbs?

6 A. I will voice my opinion, and I believe that it is shared by an

7 overwhelming majority of Serbs. First of all, the Muslim side said: We

8 won't stay in Yugoslavia because we're afraid to stay together with Serbs

9 as a minority. And the reaction of the Serbs was: If you are afraid of

10 having us as a majority in a common state, then how can we trust you, to

11 be together with you as a minority if you are already acting

12 unconstitutionally within Yugoslavia? What would you do if you were a

13 majority then?

14 We thought that Yugoslavia was the best solution because all

15 the "problematic" communities, Muslims and Croats and others, would

16 be together in one state. Of course it applied to us Serbs as well. We

17 would be in one state without borders together with all the other Serbs,

18 but so would others, Muslims and Croats. That was our approach. Maybe

19 there was some other reasons, too, but those were the primary reasons.

20 Q. Is this correct, Mr. Krajisnik, that if you -- and I'm here

21 talking about the SDS, if you had been confident that come what may Bosnia

22 and Herzegovina would remain part of Yugoslavia, regionalisation would

23 have been unnecessary from the SDS viewpoint?

24 A. We believed -- I often use the word "we" because I don't like to

25 say "I." And when I say "we," I mean the SDS. We believed that it was

Page 23038

1 necessary to reshape both Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2 But to answer your question, if this regionalisation was in

3 dispute, if Bosnia stayed within Yugoslavia, regionalisation itself would

4 be automatically eliminated and that solution was already within reach

5 under one of the plans that had been developed. I learned to use the

6 word "Muslims" rather than "Bosniaks" a long time ago, and I apologise for

7 that.

8 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, the -- you mentioned earlier that policy of

9 regionalisation was seen by the SDA as the break-up of Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina, or leading to the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Did --

11 did the SDS view regionalisation as in any sense the break-up of Bosnia

12 and Herzegovina?

13 A. I will answer, if you allow me, with a small addition.

14 SDS did not consider that as a break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

15 and it wasn't, and it could not have been. The SDA was not right about

16 that, and if you allow me to add. The SDA ruled the -- in the

17 unregionalised Bosnia and Herzegovina in a great number of municipality

18 which had a large percentage of Serbs and they wanted domination. In

19 their eyes, regionalisation was taking away from the power of the centre

20 of Sarajevo, giving more power to the regional level. The SDA represented

21 the majority people, and regionalisation diminished their power to rule.

22 And their desire to rule was evident at the republic level in Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina and it was also quite obvious on the local level.

24 Q. Was it -- was it the SDS policy that, provided cooperation could

25 be achieved from the other parties, there would, as part of this

Page 23039

1 regionalisation process, be some regions which were under the control of

2 the Muslims or, in some parts of the country, Croats?

3 A. Sorry, I don't think I understood the question.

4 Q. Well, would -- did the SDS policy contemplate that as the

5 regionalisation process proceeded, some regions would be under the control

6 of Muslims?

7 A. Absolutely. We were not against regionalising all of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina, so the answer is: Yes, certainly.

9 Q. And some regions would be under control of Croats, would they?

10 A. Yes, certainly.

11 Q. Did -- did such a policy include any expectation that there would

12 be significant population movements as a consequence?

13 A. Absolutely not. You can see that in one shorthand note where I

14 gave a statement. Nobody was supposed to move from their location.

15 Somebody would be in the majority in one region, another side would be in

16 the majority in another region. But nobody was supposed to move, and it

17 was a complete fallacy. Nobody was advocating any moves of the

18 population, at least not that I know.

19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- we started here with a reference to the

20 Club 91 interview which had referred to a long-running government session

21 the previous day. What had been the outcome of that government session?

22 A. The government, as far as I remember now, made a decision contrary

23 to the decision of the Assembly concerning regionalisation; namely, as far

24 as I remember, the government's decision on regionalisation was negative.

25 Maybe it was not a ban but it was contrary to the recommendation of the

Page 23040

1 Assembly. The government, conditionally speaking, made a decision to ban,

2 or to forbid - I don't remember the exact wording - but it was formulated

3 in an imperative, obligatory way, negatively.

4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you find, returning to the transcript of

5 the -- of your television interview, could you find the number 5, please,

6 in the margin?

7 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, this is right in the middle of

8 page 5 of the English transcript where there's a paragraph beginning: "I

9 did not like the way."

10 Do Your Honours see that?

11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we have got a passage in the English transcript

12 which begins, I hope you can pick it up against the number 5: "I did not

13 like the way in which regionalisation was included on the Assembly's

14 agenda."

15 Do you see that sentence in the -- your own language? Thank you.

16 So you say: "I did not like the way in which regionalisation was

17 included on the Assembly's agenda. I think that was a mistake, as well.

18 First of all, the question was created that this was regionalisation ...

19 The municipalities of Bosnian Krajina were separating and joining the

20 Serbian Autonomous District or Region Krajina. That was included in the

21 Assembly so alarmingly that I was appalled."

22 Mr. Krajisnik, could you -- could you clarify, please, what --

23 what was the mistake -- what it was you were appalled by at that point?

24 A. I think that Assembly session was in June. I don't remember

25 exactly. That Assembly session first adopted its agenda, and there was a

Page 23041

1 debate that did not include regionalisation. And suddenly an SDA

2 representative comes out bringing news that an agreement was included by

3 SAO Krajina and Bosnian Krajina and the Bosnian Krajina was leaving Bosnia

4 and Herzegovina and joining Yugoslavia. And he wanted it included in the

5 agenda, although the agenda had already been adopted.

6 So we continued to discuss regionalisation, although it was not

7 part of the agenda, and that representative, that deputy, put it to others

8 in a very alarming way: Bosnian Krajina is leaving now. And that group

9 of deputies presented it in such a way that it caused great concern to the

10 Muslim side. That's the way that they infiltrated this issue into the

11 agenda. After all the discussions and all the debate about the agenda,

12 after the agenda was adopted, and it was completely against all rules of

13 procedure.

14 Q. So you -- you say that that particular representative, that

15 deputy -- do you remember who that was that conveyed that news to the

16 Assembly?

17 A. I think it was Mr. Irfan Ajanovic. I think. But that can be

18 checked in the transcript of that Assembly session that adopted the

19 recommendation on regionalisation. You can see from those notes exactly

20 how that issue came to be debated. When the recommendation was adopted to

21 include that in the agenda, you can see how it was done, and I think it

22 was Mr. Irfan Ajanovic.

23 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, continuing to ask you to give the Trial

24 Chamber your recollection of these events, you said that that particular

25 deputy, whether it was that particular man, conveyed or discussed this

Page 23042

1 matter in a very alarming way. So you're saying, Mr. Krajisnik, are you,

2 that there was -- there was some gap or difference between what was

3 actually happening in relation to the Bosnian Krajina and what the

4 Assembly was being led to understand by this particular deputy. Is that

5 right?

6 A. Yes, yes. There was a gap, a big gap.

7 Q. Well, can you explain that gap, Mr. Krajisnik? In other words,

8 compare what was actually happening with the way it was presented to the

9 Assembly.

10 A. In Grahovo, late Milan Babic met with several MPs from the Bosnian

11 Assembly who were Serbs from Banja Luka, and they prepared a communique

12 presenting an idea for the Serbian Krajina to join with the Serbian

13 Autonomous District in Croatia.

14 It was no Assembly decision. It was not a -- an authoritative

15 body that took that decision, it was just an idea. And the way it was

16 presented, it was very dramatic, like something that was being done behind

17 our backs. And it was, actually, behind our backs because none of us were

18 aware of that intention. And the comment, which was very important, was

19 that by this act the Bosnian Krajina was being taken away from Bosnia and

20 annexed to Serbia. If a part of Bosnia was being taken away, that was of

21 great concern to everybody, of course. And that just added fuel to the

22 already-existing tensions in the -- in the Assembly that were running

23 high. It was very difficult to lead that session.

24 I'm just summing up all that this deputy said. I can't remember

25 exactly whether it was Cengic or Ajanovic, but one of the two said that

Page 23043

1 the dramatic tone in which it was presented was unbelievable, especially

2 to the viewers who were following that session. And I particularly didn't

3 like the way it was being included in the agenda. We were practically

4 finishing one session and starting a new session. If they had only waited

5 for the new session to begin, we could have done everything according to

6 the rules of procedure.

7 Q. You said in that answer, Mr. Krajisnik, that it was actually

8 behind your backs because none of you were aware of that intention.

9 When -- when this particular matter was brought up by this particular

10 deputy, whoever exactly it was, are you saying that you personally did not

11 know whether what the Assembly was being told was accurate or not?

12 A. I was absolutely unaware. I didn't know that it happened at all.

13 Q. So, returning to what you say in the interview, about six lines

14 into that passage that we were looking at, you said: "That was included

15 in the Assembly so alarmingly that I was appalled. I thought that, this

16 is it, this is the moment when Bosnia and Herzegovina disappears,

17 Yugoslavia disappears, there will be war," and so on.

18 So you're telling the viewers of the television programme what

19 your reaction had been in the Assembly. That's right, isn't it?

20 A. Exactly.

21 Q. And what -- what was it, as specifically as you can tell the Trial

22 Chamber, that led you to that view at that moment, that Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina would disappear, Yugoslavia will disappear, there will be war?

24 A. I don't know how this text is understood, but when you see a man

25 talking about something in a very dramatic tone and you are not in the

Page 23044

1 know at that moment, one Krajina is leaving the state and joining another,

2 Bosnia is being broken up, I can say that the way he's talking, the way I

3 hear it, it's so dramatic that the war will begin any moment now.

4 I'm just trying to explain how he was talking about it. I didn't

5 believe at that time that the war was imminent. I was just saying that --

6 just hearing him talk, one had no choice but to believe that Bosnia was

7 about to cease to exist and the war was about to begin.

8 Q. And then you continue in the interview. The next sentence after

9 that you say: "As time went by, I think that ... and what happened

10 yesterday in the Assembly ... in the government, I think that was a

11 mistake in one basic approach. That is to say, I have now heard that ...

12 the reactions which have come from the Bosnian Krajina, from Herzegovina,

13 and from other regions, have in fact been ignored. Just as they were

14 ignored regarding the recommendation, they were ignored on such decisions

15 of the government."

16 What -- ignored by whom?

17 A. Municipalities.

18 Q. And -- well, which municipality were ...

19 A. Well, those municipalities that were involved in regionalisation,

20 that had joined a region, because the government passed a decision

21 abolishing regions, and those municipalities were disregarding, going

22 against their decision. And I was saying that it was a very bad thing

23 that we had a situation in which municipalities did not honour, did not

24 observe, the decisions of the government.

25 Q. And then you say: "So it is good if the government is not divided

Page 23045

1 and there is no out-voting, that was positive last night, and I think that

2 everyone should assess that from their own point of view."

3 What was the particular point from the previous night, by which

4 clearly means the government session, doesn't it -- well, perhaps we had

5 better confirm that. When you say "that was positive last night," you are

6 referring to the government session, aren't you?

7 A. Yes, right.

8 Q. And what was it particularly that you were describing there as

9 positive?

10 A. Well, the government passed that decision through out-voting, that

11 is, without the consent of Serb ministers. And I was saying here that

12 that was not a good thing.

13 Another bad thing was that the way it was taken, that government's

14 decision was impossible to implement because every decision impossible to

15 implement was showing the public that the state was impotent, and it was

16 the fact that the Assembly's recommendations were not followed that

17 brought the state into that situation.

18 Q. So the positive -- the positive point was what?

19 A. What I'm saying here is that it is positive when the government

20 stands united, when there is no out-voting within the government. So the

21 word "positive" here pertains to my own opinion that it is a good thing

22 when the government is a monolithic one because it consists of the

23 representatives of three different peoples. The word "positive" applies

24 to that.

25 Q. Yes. Well, perhaps to clarify, Mr. Krajisnik, it seems that

Page 23046

1 what's happened here, whether it's a translation point, that you were not,

2 in fact, saying in this television programme that there had been anything

3 positive the previous night. That's right, isn't it?

4 A. Yes. Nothing happened. I'm just giving a comment, that it's a

5 good thing when there is no out-voting within a government and that that

6 is positive, and then I continue to say what is negative. It would have

7 been positive had there been no out-voting, but that was not the case.

8 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik.

9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, is that positively time for a break?

10 JUDGE ORIE: This would be a -- if this would be a suitable moment

11 for you, it would be for the Chamber as well.

12 We'll adjourn until 11.00.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.

16 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, on that transcript that you have, could you find

18 the number 6, please, in the margin?

19 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, this is at page 6 of the English

20 transcript, the first intervention by the presenter: "We will certainly

21 get to that subject," it says.

22 Q. Do you have that number 6, Mr. Krajisnik? Thank you.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. The presenter says this: "We will certainly get to that subject.

25 I think that this is a key -- it is a key issue, but I would only ask you

Page 23047

1 to answer this - as regards regionalisation the Serbian Democratic Party

2 is being accused of wanting to divide up Bosnia and Herzegovina according

3 to the 'Knin method' and place its sovereignty on, and I quote, 'the

4 sacrificial alter of a Greater Serbia.'"

5 Mr. Krajisnik, how did you understand at that time the Knin

6 method?

7 A. In the Serb autonomous province of Krajina, that's in Croatia,

8 municipalities declared their own positions and they made up these

9 autonomous regions by uniting certain municipalities. This was also a

10 political response in Croatia. And now a parallel is being drawn to what

11 was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 Q. And was there a distinction between the Knin method and the method

13 of regionalisation contemplated by the SDS in Bosnia?

14 A. There was a big difference.

15 Q. What was that difference?

16 A. Because in Croatia this happened through the use of force, that is

17 to say, that there was a conflict, and that is how it was being resolved,

18 whereas in Republika Srpska -- well, another thing. I don't know how they

19 regulated things constitutionally, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina this was

20 going on and beforehand it was only done also in accordance with the

21 constitution exclusively. And it relied upon what happened in socialism

22 before the multi-party elections, whereas over there it was just a defence

23 mechanism against the Croatian regime that threw the Serbs out of the

24 constitution and they used to be in the constitution as a constituent

25 people.

Page 23048

1 Q. And the reference there in the presenter's question or comment

2 on -- to the "sacrificial alter of a Greater Serbia," at that time was the

3 concept of a Greater Serbia any part of SDS policy?

4 A. The notion of a Greater Serbia was used in election campaigns by a

5 certain number of people, but the platform of the SDS was never a Greater

6 Serbia, if I can call it that way. Even if I were to be asked today what

7 it meant I would have great difficulty in explaining it.

8 Q. That was going to be my next question, Mr. Krajisnik, so you've

9 headed it off. But could you do your best then, despite the great

10 difficulty. My question is precisely what -- what did you understand at

11 the time to be meant by those who did campaign for a Greater Serbia?

12 A. I'm just going to make a small correction. What those who accused

13 Serbs of wanting a Greater Serbia meant, that is what I'm going to tell

14 you about. Through this accusation that the Serbs were advocating a

15 Greater Serbia, they meant and were saying that the Serbs wanted to expand

16 Serbia now to Serb ethnic lands outside Serbia and to take areas that did

17 not belong to Serb ethnic areas, that is to say that they wanted to create

18 a Greater Serbia, a Serbia bigger than the existing one. This was used in

19 a pejorative sense, in a negative sense, and that was something that they

20 did not have the right to do. It is linked to an agreement that was

21 reached a long time ago at the London conference, and this was being

22 imputed to the Serbs all the time that they were trying to take something

23 that did not belong to them and to create a greater state -- a Greater

24 Serbia, sorry.

25 Q. The -- was there -- were there among the Bosnian Serbs - and I'm

Page 23049

1 talking about those who were politically active, Mr. Krajisnik - were

2 there among the politically active Bosnian Serbs any who did speak in

3 favour of a Greater Serbia?

4 A. No one advocated a Greater Serbia, but that word was used often by

5 people who wanted to be radical and to explain something that would be in

6 their view positive for the Serbs, but that was not the concept, one of a

7 Greater Serbia, and that can be seen by the sequence of events that

8 followed.

9 Q. If you would find number 8 in the margin, please, Mr. Krajisnik.

10 MR. STEWART: That's -- Your Honours, we're going on to the page

11 now -- that's on page 9 of the English, the first reference to

12 Mr. Krajisnik: "I have to say that every party ..."

13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you find number 8?

14 A. I've found it.

15 Q. Well, I'll give the presenter's short passage first. The

16 presenter says: "Yes, but in the meantime, they scare each other ... the

17 parties, or they get scared or we scare them, for example, by saying that

18 it is someone's aim to create an independent state of Croatia; that

19 someone is thoroughly and quietly preparing a Muslim state; that someone,

20 again, is keeping the others in some Serboslavia or a Greater Serbia. Are

21 these phantom categories or real options in your opinion?"

22 And then you say: "I have to say that every party has a left and

23 a right wing and centre. And that right wing, to call it that, that

24 right-oriented wing is promoting a Greater Serbia, in fact, they promote

25 an Islamic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a third group promotes a

Page 23050

1 confederation or a Greater Croatia or an NDH, independent state of

2 Croatia, and want some kind of national" --

3 Just pausing there to seek clarification, because it's perhaps not

4 a hundred per cent clear in English anyway, you're saying that -- is this

5 right: You're saying that right wing, that there are right wings in the

6 three parties. The right-oriented wing of the SDS is promoting a Greater

7 Serbia; the right-oriented wing of the SDA is promoting an Islamic state;

8 and the right-oriented wing of the HDZ is promoting a confederation or a

9 Greater Croatia or an independent state of Croatia? Is that a correct

10 summary of what you are saying there, Mr. Krajisnik?

11 A. Well, not completely.

12 Q. Well, please correct that summary, then, Mr. Krajisnik.

13 A. Actually, the right wing in a party accused the others, say the

14 right wing of the SDS accused others of creating an NDH or an Islamic

15 state. Among them there were some who said: If they don't want to be

16 with us, we're going to create a Greater Serbia. So that was the rhetoric

17 involved.

18 The others from the SDA, the right wing of the SDA, would say:

19 Well, you in the SDS wanted to create a Greater Serbia, a Serboslavia, we

20 don't want to be there. And among them there were people who said: We

21 want to have our own state, we want Bosnia-Herzegovina to be our own

22 state, even to have Islamic laws.

23 In the HDZ the situation was rather specific. From the very

24 outset they officially advocated a confederal Bosnia -- sorry, Yugoslavia,

25 a confederal Yugoslavia. As for Bosnia, they officially advocated

Page 23051

1 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina only to get it out of Yugoslavia, and they

2 believed that in the stage that would follow they would manage either to

3 regionalise their own areas or to annex them to Croatia.

4 If I were to be sincere, on all three sides there were accusations

5 leveled at the others and also promoting certain negative ideas in terms

6 of one's own programme. That is as far as extremist views go.

7 Q. How -- how prevalent, if they were prevalent, how prevalent were

8 such views within the membership of the SDS?

9 A. At big meetings, different views were heard, and if we were to go

10 through all of that there were such statements made in public, too.

11 However, the conclusions reached and the official policy were quite clear.

12 First of all, that we should remain in Yugoslavia; and later that there

13 should be a transformation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which we were to

14 have a constituent unit of our own.

15 Q. In this answer here at -- well, it's point 8, the marking you've

16 got on your transcript, then just carrying on from where I stopped reading

17 it goes on about five lines in: "So that Bosnia is a nation state of one

18 people with, perhaps, superiority over the others."

19 You're reporting views of various factions there. "I think that

20 that is not the basic rule, that is not -- that is not the basic concept

21 of any party ..."

22 So among other things, Mr. Krajisnik, you're saying it's not the

23 basic view of any party that an Islamic state should be promoted. Was

24 that genuinely your view at that time, that the SDA policy did not involve

25 promotion of an Islamic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Page 23052

1 A. It was only the SDA that could have advocated that option. They

2 were the most numerous people. And due to the birth rate there they would

3 have easily reached the figure of 51 per cent, so it would have been their

4 state, demographically speaking.

5 However, from contacts with the SDA, from conversations with the

6 SDA, on several occasions I was convinced that they were really at a

7 crossroads. Perhaps they wanted that, to have only a state of their own,

8 but they would like to have a compromised solution because they know what

9 the specific characteristics of Bosnia are and they want peace.

10 Now, I am saying what they were saying in our conversations; what

11 they were saying when they were talking on their own is something that I

12 don't know. I know what they said in public, too, when certain people

13 said that the Serbs have Serbia, the Croats have Croatia, and that this is

14 our state. However, I had the impression that in conversations for a long

15 time they aspired for a rational, compromised solution. There were ups

16 and downs, that is to say. Of course people from our party accused them,

17 just like they were accusing us, but that was political rhetoric to my

18 mind.

19 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, there's a -- on the fourth line --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry, just a moment. But for sure,

21 had there been an independent Bosnia, in our view, due to the birth rate,

22 it would have become a predominantly Muslim state soon, so this was just

23 an addition I wanted to make.

24 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honours, on the fourth line of that

25 answer, that's line 10 on page 36, the phrase appears "demographically

Page 23053

1 speaking," Mr. Sladojevic tells me and I trust the interpreters would

2 agree that it was perhaps democratically. Perhaps we can seek

3 clarification.

4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters believe that Mr. Krajisnik said

5 demographically.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Both make sense, as a matter of fact.

7 MR. STEWART: Well, that's why I raise it.

8 JUDGE ORIE: When you said, Mr. Krajisnik, that they would have

9 easily reached the figure of 51 per cent, so it would have been their

10 state, did you say "demographically speaking" or did you

11 say "democratically speaking"? Both could make sense, but what did you

12 say? There's some dispute about what you said.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my statement now I

14 said "demographically," birth rate; and before that I said that it's

15 democratic, too. If you have 51 per cent it's democratic as well, if you

16 have the 51 per cent.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The matter has been clarified.

18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think the explanation is the words

19 sound very similar in Serbian as well. Something of course I know.

20 That's what I'm told anyway.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what happens if they are classical


23 MR. STEWART: Yes, of course, Your Honour.

24 Q. Yes. So, Mr. Krajisnik, can we go, please, to point 10. It's

25 very shortly afterwards; it's probably over the next page on your copy,

Page 23054

1 but it's page 10 of the English. It's a long answer or comment from you

2 in the interview. So, Mr. Krajisnik, it starts: "As regards a

3 referendum."

4 But, Your Honours, Mr. Krajisnik, I want to go just beyond halfway

5 through that answer unless anybody tells me I should -- ought to go

6 somewhere else. "We should not be politically blind."

7 Do you see a sentence that begins in that way, Mr. Krajisnik?

8 It's just over halfway down that --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You do, thank you.

11 "We should not be politically blind, to not see obviously that one

12 people wants to remain in one state, that is the Serbian people, the

13 Muslim people wants an independent Bosnia, an autonomous Bosnia, the

14 Croatian people wants a confederation and that these two options - a

15 confederation and an independent Bosnia - happen to correspond."

16 Mr. Krajisnik, could you just explain what you understood at that

17 time to be a -- a confederation to be?

18 A. At that time the official policy of the republics that had

19 separated from Yugoslavia was advocating a confederation, so all the

20 states would be independent, but there would just be this umbrella of a

21 confederation. This is what Mr. Tudjman advocated, this is what the

22 Croatian side in Bosnia advocated. So in this way Bosnia would also

23 become independent basically as a state. All these states would actually

24 have very loose ties at an all-Yugoslav level.

25 Q. Could we move on then, please -- we'll go right on, please, to

Page 23055

1 where you find the number 13 in the margin.

2 JUDGE ORIE: And for us, Mr. Stewart?

3 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour. It's -- it's against the

4 word "jingle" on page 19, toward the top. We won't play the jingle, Your

5 Honour, we'll spare you that.

6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it's actually -- that's the point of reference.

7 But if we go a bit further down, the presenter is saying -- two answers

8 from you on that page, and then the presenter says: "You see, we have an

9 awful lot of questions from viewers," this was a phone-in programme. We

10 can see that on the video, actually. "I would ask you, let us start, if

11 we have dealt with any of that we won't go back.

12 Hasan Brkic, a journalist in Tesanj, asks you: What fund is being

13 used to pay for arming the Bosnian Serbs with Kragujevac weapons? Do you

14 know anything about that?"

15 And you say: "I don't know, I think they are being armed, but

16 if such a fund exists then really ... I think that the question is more of

17 a provocative one."

18 You're saying you think they are being armed. These are Bosnian

19 Serbs. Which Bosnian Serbs were you referring to there that you thought

20 were being armed?

21 A. My answer here was to a provocative question. I gave a

22 provocative answer to a provocative question, because if somebody asks me

23 as if it were a fact, Serbs are being armed and with what funds, and then

24 I said: Well, yes, they are being armed. Of course I was being

25 provocative. I answered -- I gave a political answer because if somebody

Page 23056

1 is telling me they are being armed, they are asking the president of the

2 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina whether they are being armed, that is to

3 say that this person is saying that he knows that I know. So it was put

4 in provocative terms.

5 Maybe here it looks as if I said it seriously, but later on there

6 are similar answers, too, because somebody is making -- it's not that

7 somebody is putting a question to me, but this person is making an

8 assertion saying: They are being armed, and then putting a question on

9 the basis of that. I did not know that they were being armed. I could

10 just assume that all peoples were being armed because that later became

11 evident when the war broke out.

12 Q. If we can go on to point 14 which is -- it will be -- well, on

13 everybody's version it will be at least a couple of pages on.

14 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, it's at page 22 of the English

15 transcript.

16 Q. Presenter -- towards the top of the page, page 22, Mr. Krajisnik,

17 right against 14 in the margin the presenter says: "Regionalisation - many

18 questions - let us see, could ... is it true that by going to Pale you

19 contributed to Pale being joined to the Romanija region?" That's a viewer

20 from Pale asking that question.

21 And you say: "I think that's provocative. As the president of

22 the Assembly, I would never be against the recommendation nor would I

23 influence regionalisation. The people have done that themselves."

24 Mr. Krajisnik, there was some specific visit you have made to Pale

25 that was included in this viewer's question, was there?

Page 23057

1 A. That viewer was making an allusion to a visit, but I don't

2 remember ever being in Pale except on a students' class trip just before

3 the war when an Assembly session was held there. It's not that I didn't

4 take part in it; I simply don't remember ever having been in Pale. And I

5 absolutely don't understand which meeting was alluded to. I did not take

6 part in the regionalisation at Pale nor did I attend any such meeting.

7 Q. Is it right, Mr. Krajisnik, at this time in May 1991 you had --

8 you had no personal connection with Pale?

9 A. No, no.

10 Q. No, that's correct?

11 A. Except when somebody would come to the Assembly. But I absolutely

12 didn't go to Pale.

13 Q. Then it's just -- do you find 15, number 15, in the margin?

14 A. I found it.

15 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I want to go just above that to the

16 point where Mr. Krajisnik says: "No kind of repressive measures are

17 advisable."

18 And then the presenter says immediately after that: "Why are the

19 municipalities of the Krajina" --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Which page?

21 MR. STEWART: Oh, so sorry, Your Honour. Page 23, top of the

22 page, about -- well, it's four items down: "Why are the municipalities of

23 the Krajina and Herzegovina separating? This separating, it probably

24 means - creating their own region and not separating," that's a question

25 from a viewer in Mostar.

Page 23058

1 And you say: "They are not separating and they are staying in

2 Bosnia and Herzegovina and they will certainly not make any states

3 because that is now solely the reason for this situation but if that were

4 to acquire a political character I think that that can only be if we do

5 not pay attention to ... preserving this state of ours and if we want to

6 break it up."

7 Q. Now, first of all, Mr. Krajisnik, was it -- was that, in fact,

8 your -- your genuine understanding of the position at that time that the

9 Krajina and Herzegovina would not separate and would stay in Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina?

11 A. That was my position, that was my view, and I would have been

12 strongly opposed to anybody leaving Bosnia and being annexed to whatever

13 else. That was in May 1991, and that was -- that continued to be my

14 position all the way up to the beginning of the war and even a bit later.

15 Q. Who was it who would have been in a position to decide at that

16 time whether -- let's take Krajina, whether the Krajina municipalities

17 would separate?

18 A. If you just give me some leeway to give a broader answer. Krajina

19 is a territorial area that is partly in Croatia and partly in Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina. It was created during the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian

21 empires, and it was a persisting aspiration of their people to be

22 together.

23 When democracy came, there were several attempts to unite these

24 two parts into one whole, even into one state. We politicians were

25 opposed, not because we were opposing their view but because it was

Page 23059

1 against the Vance Plan and it ran counter to our theory that Bosnia should

2 be a recognised state, and we had a lot of problems dealing with that

3 burning desire of the people. They thought we didn't understand them, and

4 they accused us of trying to work against them. But even if that entity

5 were to be created, it would have been impossible to recognise because it

6 ran counter to all the existing plans. It would not have been possible to

7 implement like the Vance Plan in Croatia. It was simply not realistic

8 politically speaking. Desires and aspirations are one thing and reality

9 is quite another.

10 Q. Does that answer you've just given apply equally to Herzegovina or

11 are there differences?

12 A. Almost in the same terms, with a small difference. Part of

13 Herzegovina, by decision of the Berlin Congress was given to Montenegro,

14 and the people of Herzegovina are very similar to those of Montenegro but

15 they have a Serb orientation. And their desire to join Montenegro was

16 more subdued than in the Serb Krajina in Bosnia and in Croatia.

17 Q. Now returning to the --

18 A. I'm talking about the people, the communities. I'm talking about

19 the desire of the people.

20 Q. Returning to the transcript, point 15 -- well, we've been using

21 point 15 as the reference point, so if we go down, it's page 23, Your

22 Honours, of the English text.

23 Right in the middle of the page it's against -- number 15 in your

24 copy, Mr. Krajisnik, middle of page 23. The presenter asks: "Asim from

25 Sarajevo wants to know: Is the regionalisation that the Serbs are

Page 23060

1 carrying out in the Banja Luka Krajina honest?"

2 And your answer is: "That, honest, is disputable. It is

3 economically justified."

4 I'm not entirely sure from the English there, Mr. Krajisnik. What

5 was the implication that it might be dishonest? Could you explain in what

6 sense it might have been suggested that the regionalisation being carried

7 out by the Serbs was dishonest?

8 A. I can try to guess what the viewer meant. The viewer thought that

9 in those municipalities where decisions were taken to join certain

10 municipalities, Muslims and Croats had been out-voted, just as Serbs had

11 been out-voted, perfectly legally, in the parliament. There's only one

12 difference. On the regional level it is all according to the law; whereas

13 at the republican level there is a constitutional provision against

14 out-voting.

15 Now, he as a Muslim is asking: Is it fair to go on with this

16 regionalisation wherein you are out-voting us? And I'm answering: Yes,

17 economically it is good, but if it acquires a nationalist -- a national

18 dimension, it is not good because it would only add fuel to the flames and

19 lead to war. And that is how I am understanding his question and trying

20 to answer it.

21 Q. The -- you say then that: "It's economically justified, but I

22 think we must make a lot of efforts so that it does not have negative

23 national consequences."

24 What sort of negative consequences did you have in mind there?

25 A. Well, I meant just what I explained just a moment ago. At that

Page 23061

1 time everything had a political dimension, everything was politicised. If

2 you go forward with an economic regionalisation, like in Krajina which was

3 very underdeveloped, and it is viewed by other sides as Serbs coming

4 together against them, then it would have very negative consequences.

5 Because everything that was done by anyone was viewed at that time through

6 a political prism.

7 Q. And then further down, just about ten lines further down,

8 Mr. Krajisnik.

9 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honour, it's the third item from the

10 bottom on page 23. The presenter says: "Sinan from Zenica," a viewer,

11 obviously, raising a question. The viewer says: "I have a high opinion

12 of you personally but are you identifying yourself with the so-called Duke

13 Seselj?"

14 And you say: "Thank you, Sinan, for your high opinion, but I

15 think that it is not all right to identify me with Seselj."

16 What at that time was Seselj -- who was he and what was he up to

17 that you did not identify with?

18 A. At this point I was talking about what Sinan, the viewer, was

19 implying. He saw Seselj as a nationalist, oriented against Muslims, and I

20 answered that I don't want to be identified with him in that way.

21 Seselj was a very intelligent man, and he wasn't the person that

22 Muslims took him for. In that way, I didn't want to be compared with him.

23 I didn't even want to be compared with the US president or anybody else.

24 But on this particular point I didn't want to be identified with Seselj.

25 Otherwise, I had meetings with Seselj and he made a good impression on me,

Page 23062

1 and I thought he was a different man from the one that Muslims saw. But

2 that's quite a different issue.

3 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik.

4 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I wish to leave that Club 91 interview

5 and transcript now, please.

6 Excuse me one moment.

7 [Defence counsel confer]

8 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I want to refer to a document which

9 we -- isn't among those scanned and available, so we have hard copies of

10 this. Your Honour, it's called -- in English it's called: "Decision on

11 the establishment of a Serb National Council." Its ERN number

12 is SA04-1938 to 1939.

13 JUDGE ORIE: You say it's not scanned. Has it been exhibited

14 before?

15 MR. STEWART: To be frank, I'm not a hundred per cent -- oh, yes

16 it has, Your Honours. Yes. It's there in Mr. Treanor's exhibit.


18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I can't give Your Honour immediately

19 the tab and volume number in Mr. Treanor's exhibits, but it is there, it

20 is there, if it's helpful, Your Honour. We -- no doubt we can identify

21 the precise location for the record.

22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I've got a note that it is exhibited in

24 Treanor, so that's my note which I must have got it from somewhere.

25 JUDGE ORIE: That means that it should be somewhere in P64.

Page 23063

1 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ORIE: The registrar tells me that on the basis of his

3 latest list it's most likely in P64, tab 15.

4 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, sorry, I could have said it was

5 in P64, but I sort of -- we live and breathe P64 sometimes. We've got it,

6 I think.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's proceed. We'll find where it is just

8 for purposes of reference.

9 MR. STEWART: Yes, it is in tab 15, Your Honour. We -- well,

10 there's a reference to TR428A, but for the life of me I forget what that

11 signifies. But if it's of help, it's on Mr. -- well, whether it's his

12 personally but Mr. Haider's exhibit list. Yes, it is his personally.

13 JUDGE ORIE: We should sufficiently locate it to continue.

14 Please proceed.

15 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. But we've produced copies

16 in Mr. Krajisnik's own language as well as English.

17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is jogging back just a short way in time from

18 this -- that Club 91 interview, because this is a document which bears the

19 date 8th of April, 1991. It's not a very long document, Mr. Krajisnik.

20 You've probably been casting your eye over it anyway, but if you would

21 just -- just cast your eye over it to familiarise yourself. Let us know

22 when you've done that.

23 A. I have.

24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, were you personally involved in any way in any

25 meeting that led to this decision?

Page 23064

1 A. No, I wasn't involved in any way.

2 Q. Did you know -- well, first of all, do you know whether there was

3 a meeting that led to this decision?

4 A. I know.

5 Q. Therefore -- well, what do you know?

6 A. I don't know much, but I will tell you what I know. An initiative

7 came from parties in Serbia, Montenegro, and I believe Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina - I'm not sure whether there was some from Croatia as well -

9 for a political council to be created that would formulate the national or

10 ethnic interests and simply present them as the will of the Serbian people

11 in a broader area. So these parties met in Belgrade, as I learned later.

12 Some were there and some that are listed here walked out of that meeting

13 and didn't sign the document and even some rough language was used to the

14 effect who was the greater patriot, et cetera. But this body was unable

15 to function in practice, and I never felt any of its work in practice.

16 And I'm seeing this document for the first time.

17 Q. Do you --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.

19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, yes.

20 JUDGE ORIE: May I seek one clarification. You're referring to

21 this document as a decision being adopted and immediately --

22 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, it says "draft," Your Honour.


24 MR. STEWART: I wanted to give Mr. Krajisnik the opportunity of --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you refer to it, so therefore I was a bit

Page 23065

1 confused --

2 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, but I --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Please clarify the matter, if you would.

4 MR. STEWART: Yes, I think it's clear now, Your Honour. Thank

5 you.

6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, who -- do you know who was or were either the

7 representative or the representatives of the Serb Democratic Party, the

8 SDS, referred to in this draft document?

9 A. From what I see here, the president of the Serbian National

10 Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that was Mr. Radovan Karadzic. He

11 should be under number 12.

12 Q. The -- did you receive a report of discussion relating to this

13 proposal?

14 A. From some conversations I learned what happened there, but I

15 memorised only a little of what I heard. I know some people walked out.

16 I know some people accepted the proposal, and as far as I understood - but

17 I'm not quite sure - this initiative was not entirely successful as a

18 result of the boycott by some parties.

19 Q. Did this initiative, as you've just labelled it, did it lead on to

20 anything which had any significant impact on the subsequent policies and

21 actions of the SDS?

22 A. I'm sorry, you mean the policy of the SDS? Yes, right. You mean

23 the SDS.

24 This body never had any influence that I felt or that I

25 encountered in practice later, and that's why I can say that it did not

Page 23066

1 exist, especially not in terms of actual decisions.

2 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, on the -- we've already seen this many times.

3 On the 12th of July, 1991, there was an Assembly of the SDS on the

4 anniversary of the previous year's inaugural meeting.

5 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, we have a transcript of that meeting.

6 It's among those hyperlinked and scanned documents.

7 Excuse me one moment.

8 Your Honour, may I hand Mr. Krajisnik a similar document. In a

9 sense it has got the number -- the numbers marked in the margin --

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.

11 MR. STEWART: -- reference point in the same way.

12 Thank you.

13 [Defence counsel confer]

14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I was just --

15 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

17 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, I was just inquiring whether Your

18 Honours have and if not, whether Your Honours need a hard copy of this

19 item.

20 JUDGE ORIE: We have not -- let me just ...

21 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

22 JUDGE ORIE: If you provide us with a hard copy, we will check

23 whether we can find it on our computers at this very moment.

24 MR. TIEGER: That would be true with the Prosecution as well, Your

25 Honour.

Page 23067

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It may well be, but I have not yet logged in on

2 our series of ...

3 MR. STEWART: [Microphone not activated].

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 JUDGE ORIE: I'm sorry, yes.

6 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour, I remind -- Mr. Sladojevic is

7 bringing it up for Your Honours.


9 MR. STEWART: But, Your Honour, I'm sorry, I have --

10 JUDGE ORIE: I again have the blurred version of -- it's -- that's

11 the stenogramme.

12 MR. STEWART: I think it's a different button. Mr. Sladojevic

13 tells me that a different button gets pressed. Is it the middle one on

14 the left?

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's a better one than the right upper-hand.

16 MR. STEWART: Yes. I haven't forgotten Your Honour's request for

17 hard copies of these matters, though on this occasion it hasn't yet been

18 implemented. I do acknowledge that.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's proceed for the time being.


21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you go, please, to point number 2 in the

22 margin. It's quite a number of pages on. And it's on page 25 of the

23 English version. Do you have that?

24 A. I got it.

25 Q. Thank you. And this is -- this is Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic speaking,

Page 23068

1 and he says about ten lines down: "I have to say one thing: We have to

2 preserve the strength of the party, not to give in to power-grabbing

3 impulses and 'little Napoleons' who are trying to do things that will harm

4 the Serbian people.

5 "We did have a regional board, which we had to change. It was in

6 fact in Bosnian Krajina, which had become completely alienated and become

7 a power above the municipal boards."

8 Mr. Krajisnik, can you say who was Dr. Karadzic referring to in

9 his reference to "little Napoleons"?

10 A. Oh, he meant little Napoleons, people at the regional level who

11 got to be in charge of the regional SDS policies and grabbed power,

12 elevated themselves, and decided they were independent of our policies,

13 who decided they could chart their own policies independent of the party.

14 And prior to that, Mr. Karadzic put some people on the regional level in

15 charge of coordinating regional boards of the SDS. So these people

16 acquired a certain power and, to put it crudely, abused it.

17 Q. Did he -- Mr. Krajisnik, did he clearly have particular people in

18 mind in that reference?

19 A. He certainly meant some specific people, but I would have to

20 engage in guesswork as to who he meant. He meant the top people in

21 certain regions that were not social-political communities, as he said,

22 who started behaving in an arbitrary fashion. It would be unfair of me to

23 say: It's this person or that person, because it would just be guesswork.

24 But these were important people in the region. These were not ordinary

25 members. Perhaps the most important ones.

Page 23069

1 Q. He -- when he referred to -- he said: "We did have a regional

2 board, which we had to chance, it was in fact in Bosnian Krajina," were

3 you personally involved in any way in that change of regional board that

4 Dr. Karadzic refers to?

5 A. That was not my responsibility. I did not take part in that.

6 Perhaps that for some reason I attended some meeting of that kind, but

7 that was only within the domain of the president of the party, and I don't

8 know who was involved, if it has to do with Bosnian Krajina.

9 Q. Would you turn to -- Mr. Krajisnik, to -- it's number 4 in the

10 margin. It's a couple of pages -- well, it's actually about four or so

11 pages further on, probably. It's page 29 of the English. There's a

12 passage, again Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and just stop at number 4 in your

13 margin. Do you see that?

14 A. Yes. Yes, yes.

15 Q. And if it's the same layout, it's five paragraphs into that

16 contribution of Dr. Karadzic where it says in English: "I have to say

17 here that the policy of the Serbian Democratic Party is not to divide

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina until others bring it to that point. The SDS

19 furthermore does not approve of the creation of new federal units before

20 the constitutional and legal system has broken down."

21 When Dr. Karadzic referred there to the creation of new federal

22 units, what -- did you understand what he had in mind there?

23 A. He meant that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be federalised, that is to

24 say, to make one, two, or three federal units, just like Bosnia was in

25 Yugoslavia. There should be a certain number of federal units in

Page 23070

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Federalisation would mean legalising a canton or a

2 bigger region through regionalisation but through appropriate

3 parliamentary process.

4 Q. Now where -- but that's -- but that process at that point,

5 Mr. Krajisnik, the creation of new federal units, is -- that was a correct

6 reflection of SDS policy, was it, that the SDS did not approve of creation

7 of new federal units at that point?

8 A. Yes. That is the month of June 1991 and --

9 Q. Yes, July, Mr. Krajisnik.

10 A. July, July. July.

11 Q. I'm sorry. I interrupted you just to correct the month,

12 Mr. Krajisnik. You --

13 A. And at that time there was a very active debate between the Serb

14 and Muslim sides that was supposed to be crowned with a historic agreement

15 between the Serbs and the Muslims.

16 Q. When Dr. Karadzic says here: "I have to say the policy of the

17 Serbian Democratic Party is not to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina until

18 others bring it to that point," had there been discussion within the SDS

19 of at what point the Serbian Democratic Party would switch to a policy of

20 dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina?

21 A. I think that that's a good question, so I'll try to explain.

22 The first part of Mr. Karadzic's answer is the official position

23 at that time of the SDS. There was a left wing and a right wing, and

24 there were many discussions. An answer to those who said: Well, we don't

25 want to break up Bosnia and Herzegovina but it's the other ones who want

Page 23071

1 to break it up. Then he added what he did in order to bring about a

2 political compromise in this political discussion, believing that this

3 would not happen at all. So that was the position of Mr. Karadzic as a

4 politician, to give an answer in advance to those who would later debate

5 the issue. We don't want to do it, others want to do it, so that was the

6 answer that he gave at that point in time in July 1991.

7 Q. Was there a contingent SDS policy at that time for any sort of

8 break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

9 A. Perhaps -- well, I'm sorry. Perhaps the best way of answering

10 would be as follows. All of us advocated maximalist views in

11 negotiations, but we had our reserve positions. Our concept was

12 Yugoslavia, and our reserve position was that if there is no Yugoslavia

13 then we would have our constituent unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There

14 was no third option. Intimately some people said: If Muslims want to

15 create their state and the Croats want to create their state and if they

16 want to secede, well, why would we not have a state of our own? But that

17 was not an option that was discussed at the time in Bosnia and Herzegovina

18 at the level of the SDS.

19 Q. When you say it was your reserve position, then, that you would

20 have your constituent unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina, do you mean that it

21 was, although not publicly stated, it was -- it was actually a matter of

22 discussion within the SDS?

23 A. Yes. That kind of option was always discussed but as a reserve

24 option; the primary option was for us to remain in Yugoslavia, for Bosnia

25 to remain in Yugoslavia, and for Yugoslavia to be re-arranged, that some

Page 23072

1 institutions be moved to Sarajevo. We were talking about a reformed

2 Yugoslavia. Of course we advocated a Bosnia. We participated in that,

3 too, that is to say, that certain things from Yugoslavia be transferred to

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So why -- the only thing we didn't want were borders

5 and passports that would separate us.

6 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, this particular session of the SDS, it moved

7 into a different type of session, didn't it, at some point where there

8 were a number of invited guests from other parties and other

9 nationalities. That's right, isn't it?

10 A. I think so, because there were guests from other parties at all

11 sessions. All parties were invited, so I believe that it was the case

12 here, too.

13 Q. In fact, if you find point 6 in the margin, Mr. Krajisnik. That's

14 page 45 of the English. And then in fact we go on about four or five

15 paragraphs into Dr. Karadzic's contribution there. It's top half of

16 page 46 of the English.

17 Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic says: "We have the formal part of the session

18 here, and I would kindly ask the delegates to remain here after the formal

19 part and then we can vote. Because Messrs. Izetbegovic and Cengic, people

20 from the HDZ will come here. They have invited us, too, and we must

21 pursue the policy of cooperation."

22 And then if we go on, Mr. Krajisnik, quite a long way, about eight

23 or ten pages, do you have point 9?

24 MR. STEWART: Which is page 58 of the English, Your Honours.

25 Q. Do you have 9, Mr. Krajisnik?

Page 23073

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. There's Abdulah Konjicija, I'm doing my best with that

3 pronunciation, president of the Chamber of Citizens of the Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina Assembly. What nationality was he? He was Muslim, was he?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then the next speaker is point 10, it's middle of page 59,

7 Mr. Rabija Subic. Who was he?

8 A. It's a lady --

9 Q. No, I beg your pardon -- well, I beg her pardon.

10 A. I did not receive any interpretation of that.

11 Rabija Subic was president of the Socialist Party of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, if you were asking me about her party affiliation.

13 Q. And her nationality?

14 A. Her name is a Muslim one but she was married to a Serb, so perhaps

15 she was a Yugoslav.

16 Q. Could we go on, it will be about another ten pages, Mr. Krajisnik,

17 to find number 14. It's page 68 of the English.

18 [Defence counsel confer]

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I've found it.


21 Q. This is you speaking, Mr. Krajisnik: "Ladies and gentlemen, I'm

22 glad that you have greeted me" -- did I say it was the middle of page 68?

23 MR. STEWART: Yes, I did say it was page 68, Your Honours.

24 Q. "Ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad that you greeted me, and

25 particularly because Mr. Konjicija was the first to get up and Mr. Muhamed

Page 23074

1 Cengic was the last.

2 "I like both of them, they fight for their people with honour,

3 and I for mine, and all those who fight for their people deserve to earn

4 only respect, never criticism."

5 And then you complement previous speakers. And then at the top of

6 page 69 in the English it is, but it is about five paragraphs on into that

7 answer you say: "I am likewise happy that the people in this our party

8 have never asked me to work to the detriment of other peoples because that

9 would have been devastating."

10 And then at the -- in your -- the last paragraph of that answer, I

11 want to read through the whole thing, Mr. Krajisnik, I don't feel that's

12 necessary. But the last paragraph of that -- not answer but contribution

13 you say: "The only thing I can say before this gathering is that I will

14 speak out in support of those things that the Serbian people has

15 authorised me to do. When I'm not able to do so, then I will certainly do

16 so, just as I did a few days ago. All those who know me know that I will

17 sooner convert to another religion than break my word."

18 Mr. Krajisnik, the -- you were -- at this meeting you were elected

19 to the Main Board, weren't you, of the SDS?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And of course you remained the president of the Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina Assembly throughout this period. Were you -- what degree of

23 direction, if any, did you receive from leading members of the SDS as to

24 what you should say and what positions you should adopt in public?

25 A. I think that the positions were generally known and simple, and

Page 23075

1 that's what I said here, that I protect my own people but that I could

2 never work to the detriment of other peoples. So I was chairing the

3 Assembly fairly, I was fairly voting, and I was fairly presenting my


5 Within this general milieu, so to speak, there were never any

6 requests put forth to me: You defend the Serb people. I did not have any

7 individual instructions as to: You have to do this or you have to do

8 that. We had consultations. As a witness said here, we had these

9 brainstorming sessions, so to speak. It was actually a reflection of the

10 will of the entire Serb people, and I knew what the people wanted and that

11 is what I propounded. This has to do with the people primarily, not the

12 party.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.

14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Would you have an opportunity to clarify the question

16 mark in the part you just read from these minutes where it reads: "When

17 I'm not? Able to do so, then I will certainly do so," which created

18 some ...

19 MR. STEWART: Yes, indeed, Your Honour.

20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you see it? It's your -- your contribution that

21 starts at margin number 14, and then the very last paragraph of that, the

22 first sentence beginning: "The only thing I can say before this

23 gathering," I read that a few moments ago.

24 Then the next sentence after that in English that begins: "When I

25 am not," I wonder if you could just read out that sense from the -- your

Page 23076

1 Serbian version.

2 A. I just have to find it.

3 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, take your time. It's the very -- it's the

4 very end of -- you find marginal point number 14. Do you have that?

5 A. I've found it. I've found 14.

6 Q. Yes, and then go to the very last paragraphs of that contribution

7 by you. It ends up with: "Thank you.

8 "(Applause)."

9 Do you see, just before the chairman speaks up again. Do you find

10 that?

11 A. Would you like me to read it?

12 Q. Yes, please, Mr. Krajisnik. It's the -- simply saying -- read the

13 paragraph that starts: "The only thing I can say before this gathering."

14 Just please read that short paragraph out loud, please.

15 A. What it says here is the following. "Before this gathering I can

16 only say that I will advocate to do those things that I have been

17 authorised by the Serb people to do. When I cannot do that, I will, just

18 as I did the other day, certainly do it. Everyone who knows me knows that

19 I will rather convert to a different faith than not keep my word."

20 I will explain what this is all about.

21 Q. Well, yes, Mr. Krajisnik.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps, Mr. Stewart, since what Mr. Krajisnik just

23 read, that we first tell him what our problem is in English.

24 The line reads: "When I'm not able to do so, then I will

25 certainly do so," so therefore I have two problems in understanding that

Page 23077

1 if you are not able to do it that you will certainly do it. That's my

2 problem. But if you can explain, please.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I explained a few moments ago what

4 my mandate was: To work fairly, not to work to the detriment of other

5 peoples, and to defend the interests of the Serb people. That was my

6 mandate, and that's what I said. I thanked the SDS for not having asked

7 me to protect the Serb people only to the detriment of other peoples.

8 That was my mandate.

9 Before this meeting, there was an Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

10 and the SDS MPs walked out there. That is what Mr. Bjelobrk referred to

11 here. I stayed on my own with the other deputies. Irfan Ajanovic went

12 out -- or rather, took the floor, and others did, too, and said that they

13 had an objection. They wanted me to be replaced. And I said: All right.

14 I want to have a vote on me straight away. If I'm not fair -- well, they

15 said: Well, there are no SDS MPs. I said: Never mind. Only the HDZ and

16 the SDA were there, and that's what I was alluding to. They were trying

17 to tell me not to do that, but I insisted that they vote only on that.

18 And then when they said: We're sorry. We are not going to ask for that,

19 Mr. Ajanovic started praising me, and I said: Don't praise me any

20 longer. Now the SDS is going to replace me. And that's why I'm saying

21 that I'm going to be asked to be replaced if I'm ever asked to work

22 outside the scope of my mandate. That is what I was trying to say, that I

23 would rather convert to a different faith than not keep my word.

24 That intention of mine, I certainly would have carried it out.

25 This is an Assembly meeting that I was presenting here and that everybody

Page 23078

1 knew about, because you saw this other person here thanking me for having

2 chaired the Assembly in a certain way, and I chaired the meeting, although

3 it was the HDZ and the SDA MPs who were there and the SDS MPs walked out.

4 I said that I would have a vote of confidence as far as my work was

5 concerned if I were not acting fairly.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

7 MR. STEWART: [Microphone not activated].

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Stewart, please.

9 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Your Honour, it looks as if there was just a slip in the Serbian

11 text, but --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's not fully clear to me yet, but nevertheless

13 I think it's not such a major point that we should spend more time on it.

14 MR. STEWART: Well, I agree, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at the clock. It's 25 minutes

16 past 12.00. If we would have a break now for 20 minutes, we would have

17 one hour remaining.

18 MR. STEWART: Certainly, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we will adjourn until quarter to 1.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 12.26 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 12.56 p.m.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, I'd like to deal with a very

23 practical matter which also explains why we are later than you would have

24 expected.

25 At very short notice, a plenary meeting of the Judges was

Page 23079

1 scheduled for tomorrow morning. Since at the moment this was announced

2 none of the courtrooms was available in the afternoon, and since the

3 Judges find it very important not to lose any day, if possible. We're

4 trying to seek solutions for that, one of them being a request to the

5 President to be relieved from our duty to be present at the plenary. It

6 is of such importance to us. It now turned out that the Martic case has

7 finished for the week and they were sitting tomorrow in the afternoon. So

8 the latest instruction I gave is to see whether we could use the courtroom

9 used by the Martic case and then move to the afternoon tomorrow. Even

10 Mr. Registrar was not aware yet of that last move. We only saw the Martic

11 Judges seven minutes ago.

12 Would it cause any major problem? And I would like to ask the

13 parties to keep in mind that we found it important enough, if need would

14 have been, to ask the President to relieve us from the duty to be present,

15 would there be any major problem if we would move tomorrow to the

16 afternoon?

17 MR. STEWART: It's no problem at all for the Defence, Your Honour.

18 MR. TIEGER: No, Your Honour, none for the Prosecution.

19 JUDGE ORIE: That's -- well, Mr. Krajisnik, you're the witness now

20 so you're in a bit of a different position, although you're nearby and

21 mainly available, but it could have been that you had other matters such

22 as medical examinations or whatever, but I see that you are nodding that

23 it is no major problem for you as well.

24 Therefore, Mr. Registrar, you're invited to seek verification that

25 we could move to the afternoon tomorrow and inform me as soon as possible.

Page 23080

1 Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.

2 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you find, please, point 15 in the margin.

4 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, this will be at the top of

5 page 76 of the English. In fact, it's the very bottom of the previous

6 page, 75, in the English. It simply says "Dr. Radovan Karadzic," and then

7 what he says: "Just a few words," at the top of page 76.

8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you have that where Dr. Krajisnik [sic] begins

9 to speak and starts with "just a few words"?

10 A. Yes, I can see that.

11 Q. And then he says: "We have tested the attitude of the Army and in

12 the past few months we have seen that the attitude of the Army towards all

13 the parties is more or less the same. I will tell you off the record that

14 they recognise that the SDS is a centrist party, not a rightist party, but

15 officially their attitude towards all the parties is more or less the

16 same. We have seen that they have resolved to defend, not the Serbian

17 people, but whoever comes under attack. And that's fine by us. Because

18 we will not be attacking anyone and there is no way and no chance that we

19 would enter into any conflict with the Army."

20 Mr. Krajisnik, the -- this -- this is clearly a pretty public

21 meeting, wasn't it?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Were the press present, do you -- can you recall?

24 A. I don't remember. Probably, yes.

25 Q. Had you personally been involved in any discussions with

Page 23081

1 representatives of the JNA?

2 A. Yes, I had for a while.

3 Q. What period?

4 A. I think in the second half of 1991, as the Speaker of the

5 parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I attended meetings with the local

6 commander of the 2nd Military District and the federal officials of the

7 Yugoslav People's Army.

8 Q. You've just referred to the second half of 1991. I think perhaps

9 my question wasn't specifically clear enough. This meeting we're looking

10 at now is the 12th of July. At this meeting at the time that Dr. Karadzic

11 was talking, had you, up to that point, been personally involved in any

12 discussions with the JNA?

13 A. I don't think I was, but if I had been it could have been only

14 discussions between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Yugoslav People's Army.

15 I never talked to the Yugoslav People's Army on behalf of my party.

16 Q. Did -- as far as you knew at the time, did what Dr. Karadzic was

17 saying here about the position of the JNA genuinely represent your

18 understanding of the army's attitude?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And Dr. Karadzic continues: "If, however, we come under attack

21 and since the Army is obliged to defend the victim of the attack, then it

22 will have to defend us because it is an important state institution. It

23 is defending those who are under attack in Croatia now.

24 "We have said clearly that we will not be creating any party

25 armies. We know that Serbs are arming themselves with smuggled weapons

Page 23082

1 and some ancient ones. We as a party do not have the right to arm the

2 people, but we do not have the right to discourage it either because we

3 could lead it into a position so difficult that it could result in it

4 suffering."

5 Did you have any knowledge, Mr. Krajisnik, at that time of Serbs

6 arming themselves with smuggled weapons and some ancient ones?

7 A. In my previous answer I said I really didn't know in which way

8 Serbs were arming themselves, if they were arming themselves. Later when

9 the armed conflict began I saw that they had weapons which meant that even

10 back at that time various communities had been arming themselves.

11 Q. Then Dr. Karadzic continues: "As for the Army" --

12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the speaker to

13 indicate what is the number of the page in the B/C/S version.

14 MR. STEWART: I'm so sorry.

15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps you can help us on that. What page number

16 are we on, please, in your version?

17 A. 92.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. Page 92. 0092 -- the number ends with 722. Right?

20 Q. It's -- there's an internal page number of the document itself.

21 I'm not talking about in an elaborate reference number, just the simple

22 page number.

23 A. 92, page 92.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters do not have that page.

Page 23083

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, is it one missing page or do you -- doesn't it

2 end in 92? The difference is quite big between what we have, 76, and --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, we have certain pages 90, then we

4 don't have 91, 92, then we have 95. I mean, it's random a bit.

5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I don't know how this has happened. My

6 apologies. We'll do better tomorrow.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Next time Mr. Stewart will count all the pages.

8 MR. STEWART: I will personally do it, Your Honour, certainly.

9 Giving the page number and not the page was sort of good news and bad

10 news, wasn't it, really.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Is -- the interpreters without it, would they like to

12 have re-read the portion just translated or ...

13 THE INTERPRETER: We simply ask the speaker to read it slowly, so

14 we will try to do it a vista. Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

16 Please proceed.

17 MR. STEWART: Okay. That's a deal.

18 Q. So yes: "As for the Army, we have issued an instruction which

19 they resent. We have issued an instruction that all personnel should

20 respond to the first call-up of the JNA. We will not allow the JNA, if it

21 comes under attack in this area, to be defeated and humiliated in our

22 Bosnian crags. This will not happen because the Army is also our Army, as

23 long as it defends Yugoslavia. The volunteers will not be exclusively

24 Serbian. I know that there are volunteers from the" --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's only now that -- at least the French

Page 23084

1 translation, which I can follow, has -- so you're invited to slow down

2 even in your pace of reading, Mr. Stewart.

3 MR. STEWART: I will then, Your Honour.

4 "The volunteers" -- it doesn't come naturally, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: That's --

6 MR. STEWART: "The volunteers will not be exclusively Serbian. I

7 know that there are volunteers from the ranks of other peoples in Bosnian

8 Krajina, for instance, in Bosanski Novi there are Muslims who are

9 volunteering to defend the Serbs in Croatia, and I know for a fact that

10 they are taking in refugees and helping provide accommodation and food for

11 them.

12 "So we for our part advise our members to respond to all JNA

13 call-ups. I believe that it would be sensible for other parties who want

14 to have peace to recommend to their members that they respond. We will

15 not be responsible for any imbalance in the ethnic composition of the

16 Army. Those who prevent their party members and members of their people

17 from responding will be responsible. Those who encourage reservists to

18 leave exercises, et cetera."

19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, all this was being said by Dr. Karadzic in the

20 presence of the invited guests from the different parties and

21 nationalities, wasn't it?

22 A. At that meeting I believe Dr. Karadzic said that and everybody who

23 attended heard it. I'm now speaking on the basis of this text. He said

24 that in -- publicly at that meeting.

25 Q. Was there any negative reaction or hostility from any member of

Page 23085

1 any other party or nationality to anything that was said by Dr. Karadzic

2 at this meeting?

3 A. I don't think so, but I'm saying this with one proviso. Very

4 often there were individual extremists advocating the creation of a new

5 Serbian army. I'm not sure if on this occasion there was a discussion of

6 that kind. I don't think so, but this was heard by everybody who

7 attended. Because to give you one example, some extremists viewed the JNA

8 as "a communist" armed force.

9 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, at this point, and it may be a tiny

10 bit in the nature of an experiment, but we hope it will go smoothly, Your

11 Honour. At this point, we would like to deal with one or two intercepts

12 that tie in, and the -- largely the way we're proposing to do the

13 intercepts, though, we'll be flexible, Your Honour, is that -- with Your

14 Honour's permission is I'm going to invite Mr. Josse to deal with those.

15 I hope that's not at all disruptive; it should be far from it, actually.

16 So may I from time to time handover to Mr. Josse at an appropriate point

17 in examination for him to deal with such matters?

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, although usually, of course, counsel would -- it

19 would be one counsel that examines one witness. This is -- in view of the

20 length --

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE ORIE: Teamwork is not opposed to by the Chamber, but of

23 course a final decision could only be given if the Prosecution would have

24 expressed itself.

25 MR. TIEGER: Well, first of all, I have no objection at this

Page 23086

1 point. Mr. Stewart points out, it is an experiment. If some matter

2 arises that we think we should bring to the attention of the Court, then

3 we certainly will.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Then a decision at this point is final. That there

5 is no opposition from the Chamber. Of course what happens in the near

6 future, we will see.

7 Please proceed.

8 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. I will handover to

9 Mr. Josse then.

10 Thank you.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, intercepts will be played in a similar

12 way. That means everything in order to get it on the record will be read

13 in English and translated into French so that we have a complete record.

14 And I think the procedure was that where the interpreters almost

15 necessarily are a bit behind, that one is following and reading and the

16 other one is reading the -- or is translating.

17 MR. JOSSE: Well, Your Honour, this also is going to be a further

18 experiment.


20 MR. JOSSE: The first intercept that I'm going to take the witness

21 to has not previously been exhibited and I do propose to play it. Quite a

22 number I'm simply going to refer him to without actually playing them.

23 In order, again, to cut down on the welfare of paper, we've got a

24 number of B/C/S versions of the intercept, one of which will of course go

25 to the witness. One will go into the translation booths, as well. The

Page 23087

1 English will be on the screen, and Mr. Sladojevic will follow the audio

2 and bring the text up on the screen accordingly.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. Nevertheless, here the same is valid as

4 for exhibits. First of all, if we said that we would like to have hard

5 copies of the exhibits, if it's an existing exhibit if we could get a list

6 prior to the hearing, then of course we could try to collect them and

7 bring them ourselves which saves half a wood in copying. Because although

8 I highly appreciate the work of Mr. Sladojevic, he is now at the mouse and

9 I'm not at the mouse anymore.

10 MR. JOSSE: Yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: So I can't scroll back and that's -- so we are losing

12 some of our control, not over the presentation, but on verifying other

13 matters such as going back to the date, et cetera.

14 But let's start with the -- let's start with the experiment and

15 let's see whether it works. And if anyone, either interpreters,

16 technicians, or Judges, parties, or you, Mr. Krajisnik, will have any

17 difficulty with the procedure, I would like to hear from you.

18 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

19 MR. JOSSE: So, Your Honour, we're going to play an intercept of

20 the 16th of July, 1991.

21 Could one be handed to Mr. Krajisnik. One is going to need to go

22 into the booths, please. There's a --

23 JUDGE ORIE: This is an unexhibited --

24 MR. JOSSE: To the best of our record. We've checked this as

25 thoroughly as we can, and we do not think this has previously been

Page 23088

1 exhibited.

2 Let me also add that all exhibits are as a result of Prosecution

3 disclosure -- I beg your pardon. All intercepts, what I should have said,

4 are a result of Prosecution disclosure.

5 JUDGE ORIE: You do not expect any objection as far as their

6 origin is concerned?

7 MR. JOSSE: Well, that's right.

8 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we would like to be provided with a copy

9 of the B/C/S as well.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, with a B/C/S copy, yes.

11 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, whilst this is being handed to the final

12 booth, I spoke to that booth, which is the B/C/S booth, and really --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Correction, English booth.

14 MR. JOSSE: Thank you, the English booth. And I think they would

15 like some guidance as to what Your Honours would like them to do. Simply

16 to read out this transcript or attempt to translate the intercept.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Our experience in the past was that it's impossible

18 to translate it immediately from the spoken word, words spoken. And it's

19 my recollection that we ask some teamwork under those circumstances, one

20 following the B/C/S text and the other one reading the English

21 translation, as it has been prepared, which of course also gives us an

22 opportunity later to check whether the translation is -- whether there are

23 any mistakes in the translation. But that's at least the translation we

24 work on. So actually, it is the written translation that serves us, but

25 at the same time for the completeness of the record, we want those -- this

Page 23089

1 English translation to be read out so that the transcript of this hearing,

2 of this court hearing, is complete.

3 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

4 JUDGE ORIE: And we should instruct those who are making telephone

5 conversations to speak a bit slower for the interpreters.

6 MR. JOSSE: I'd invite this to be played now, please.


8 [Intercept played]

9 THE INTERPRETER: Where is the English translation, may we

10 inquire?

11 MR. JOSSE: We are inquiring as well.

12 JUDGE ORIE: We have to stop for a moment. We expected to have

13 the English translation on our --

14 MR. JOSSE: So did we.

15 JUDGE ORIE: -- but as we see nicely the two children.

16 MR. STEWART: I think -- southern Germany, Your Honour, that is.

17 The -- Mr. Sladojevic is having -- it's beyond his control, I can

18 see that. He's having a -- there's a difficulty with the technical

19 connection, I think. He's doing the normal and right thing, and it's just

20 not working.

21 JUDGE ORIE: I think he'll -- may receive some assistance from our

22 technicians.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we have an English translation for the

25 intercept. It is 03219444. We may be able to show it if the Court -- if

Page 23090

1 that would be of assistance to counsel and to the booths.

2 JUDGE ORIE: And then perhaps later resolve the technical

3 problems. You could do that through your computer or should we put it on

4 the ELMO?

5 MR. HARMON: I will defer to my expert.


7 MR. TIEGER: No, we don't have it in hard copy, Your Honour, it

8 won't be on the ELMO.

9 JUDGE ORIE: It won't be on the ELMO.

10 MR. TIEGER: We've called it up electronically.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes -- well, at least could it be enlarged a bit and

12 then scrolled in such a way that the interpreters could perhaps read it

13 from their screens. It's rather small. My eyes would not -- well, would

14 have some difficulties in -- yes, that's perhaps better.

15 Is that sufficient? Yes. Let's then proceed.

16 Mr. Sladojevic, if you can --

17 MR. JOSSE: I'm grateful to everyone.


19 It has no exhibit number yet, Mr. Registrar.

20 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D178, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

22 THE REGISTRAR: With the B/C/S transcript as .1 and the English

23 as A.1.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Now, let me just check.

25 One question: Are we going to receive this on a CD-ROM? Because

Page 23091

1 the -- intercepts usually are submitted in electronic format and then the

2 transcripts get number A for the transcript and A.1 for the translation.

3 MR. JOSSE: Could I discuss that overnight with Mr. Sladojevic,

4 Mr. Haider and also the very helpful technical staff of the Chamber,

5 because we are very reliant on them to help us with that type of

6 production.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps I can even imagine that not a new CD will be

8 burned for every transcript but perhaps at a certain moment that we get

9 various telephone intercepts on one CD which then says: This is D178 up

10 till D -- yes.

11 MR. JOSSE: If we can do that after the event, because clearly I

12 won't make a final decision --

13 JUDGE ORIE: No, no --

14 MR. JOSSE: -- as to what I'm in fact going to play --

15 JUDGE ORIE: But it's just a suggestion -- and since my children

16 even learned me how to burn a CD, I'm fully confident that Mr. Sladojevic

17 would be --

18 Let's start. Yes.

19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

20 JUDGE ORIE: Now we have a problem of which -- I thought before

21 that it's difficult to feed our electronic evidence systems from two

22 different computers at the same time. Therefore, usually we had the

23 intercepts which was a combined text -- combined text and sound CD. We

24 don't have it here. Also perhaps a matter to be further explored by you,

25 Mr. Sladojevic, and to the extent the Tribunal can help you, of course we

Page 23092

1 will, and the same will be true, I take it, for the OTP.

2 At this moment Mr. Registrar offered us to make a printout of the

3 electronic -- of the transcript in English so that that can be provided to

4 the booths so that while playing it we have a hard copy available for the

5 booth.

6 The logistical aspects of these exercises need some more attention

7 as well.

8 MR. JOSSE: Yeah --

9 JUDGE ORIE: Although I envy Madam Usher for having an opportunity

10 to have some exercise during the day. I would not encourage that.

11 MR. JOSSE: There's no question about that, Your Honour, I accept

12 that.


14 Mr. Registrar, were you able already to make a printout?

15 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

16 [Defence counsel confer]

17 MR. JOSSE: We're going to have one try, I think, of playing the

18 intercept and having it up on the screen.

19 [Intercept played]

20 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

21 Radovan KARADZIC: Both Osijek and all of that up there ...

22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Well, your party is really something. There's

23 no other like it.

24 Radovan KARADZIC: (Laughs).

25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Do you see the way we work? Listen?

Page 23093

1 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: When you get the Montenegrins and the people

3 from Krajina together, and you yourself come from the old Herzegovina, you

4 can only imagine how it works out.

5 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

6 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Professor Bulatovic is here. Those

7 premises ...

8 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

9 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: They are there for certain" --

10 The text has scrolled up out of sight.

11 JUDGE ORIE: The text should follow the -- perhaps we stop again.

12 By scrolling you should -- Mr. Sladojevic, you should follow the

13 English interpretation and not the original B/C/S.

14 MR. JOSSE: Exactly. That was my fault for giving Mr. Sladojevic

15 the wrong instruction. Precisely, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So if we could re-start. At the same time, the

17 teamwork within the booth will not become more easy, but we are in an

18 experimental phase at this moment.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that the transcript is always

20 read out at a reasonable speed, whereas the actual conversation is as fast

21 as it is. So we do our best, but that's it.


23 And therefore, Mr. Sladojevic is invited to follow your speed and

24 not anything else.

25 Let's re-start and --

Page 23094

1 [Intercept played]

2 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

3 Radovan KARADZIC: Both Osijek and all of that up there

4 should ... at least ... at least the Drava.

5 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, your party is really something. There is

6 no other like it.

7 Radovan KARADZIC: (Laughs).

8 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Did you see the way we did it? Listen!

9 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

10 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: When you get the Montenegrins and the people

11 from the Krajina together, and you yourself are from the old Herzegovina,

12 I can ... you can only imagine how it goes.

13 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

14 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Professor Bulatovic is here.

15 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.

16 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Those premises ...

17 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes?

18 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: They are there for certain.

19 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.

20 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Will you please -- he only says that the

21 request ... He is going to deal with it but regarding this we should ...

22 We should get together and finish this.

23 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh. Listen.

24 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: For it's complicated. The government doesn't

25 have to do anything.

Page 23095

1 Radovan KARADZIC: It doesn't.

2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Nothing.

3 Radovan KARADZIC: Great. Shall we -- well, okay, we'll see about

4 it. Listen, Zulfikarpasic was looking for me frantically for a couple of

5 days.

6 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes.

7 Radovan KARADZIC: He got me on the phone today. I had been

8 avoiding it all, but he got me on the phone today.

9 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes.

10 Radovan KARADZIC: He says we have to meet up, a historically

11 important agreement between Serbs and Muslims is coming into sight. We

12 can't ... I said ... and I said, remember when I told you this. Before

13 our founding convention and you said you wanted to see who would be in the

14 party.

15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Uh-huh.

16 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, now the chips are down. He says: I also

17 persuaded Alija. He will join all this. We'll meet up today and arrange

18 me a meeting with Milosevic tomorrow. They are in a panic.

19 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: They have to pay the entrance fee.

20 Radovan KARADZIC: I tried to avoid it, but I said I'd meet him

21 for a short while at this.

22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: That's okay.

23 Radovan KARADZIC: To meet him at Nikola's, so I thought it would

24 be a good that you come and then.

25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Just tell me at what time.

Page 23096

1 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, around 2.00. I think we should meet

2 there at quarter past 2.00.

3 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Good. Will you ...

4 Radovan KARADZIC: Is it okay with you?

5 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Well, no, listen, I don't think you can find

6 two guys like Bulatovic and me anywhere. You're okay but you're only the

7 second best.

8 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, I'm honoured to be second best to you.

9 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Huh?

10 Radovan KARADZIC: I am honoured.

11 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Bad politician. You're a diplomat. I must

12 say. Those poor things, those of other denominations, they've got a tough

13 deal to have to cope with you.

14 Radovan KARADZIC: (Laughs).

15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I'm kidding. Quarter past 2.00 is okay.

16 Radovan KARADZIC: Okay then.

17 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Listen. You know what we're going to do?

18 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

19 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: You know, when you get an assignment, you want

20 to finish it as soon as possible. He and I ...

21 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes.

22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Somebody from up above, one of our men should

23 write it or we should write a letter on behalf of ... but it should be a

24 memo ... no, it can't.

25 Radovan KARADZIC: It has to be a memo, but over there, those

Page 23097

1 were flooded up there, so they can't enter those ...

2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes. Let me tell you - this should, I

3 mean ... as soon as possible. Here's what I told him" --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Shall we go on?

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes. I take it that something -- I don't know

6 whether the original in B/C/S has finished by now?


8 JUDGE ORIE: It has. So then perhaps we could do without the

9 music and stop that and ask the interpreters to finish the English

10 interpretation and the French interpretation.

11 I expected at least some Yugoslav music under the circumstances,

12 but unfortunately ... the interpreters are invited to read the remainder

13 of the translation.

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Here is what I told him. He should take care

16 of this. He should say, whenever the HDZ and the SDA ask for it, we'll

17 give them the premises that they want.

18 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes, yes, of course.

19 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: So that the Assembly should act according to

20 this.

21 Radovan KARADZIC: That's great! Excellent.

22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Will you then please listen to what I suggest?

23 It can, since there is no room up there ...

24 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I'll definitely meet up with ... to get it

Page 23098

1 over with.

2 Radovan KARADZIC: Okay.

3 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: And we shall assign Mr. Bulatovic, since he

4 makes big sacrifices for our people.

5 Radovan KARADZIC: Okay, that's a deal. And we shall talk

6 before 2.00 so that we can meet at a quarter past 2.00 and then maybe ...

7 finish it.

8 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: And will Alija be there? No, I don't think he

9 will.

10 Radovan KARADZIC: No, no. He said he had talked with Alija and

11 convinced him. Alija would like to be a part of this. He wants Milosevic

12 to see him tomorrow right after the talks with us.

13 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: No, no, he has to earn that. I don't know,

14 we'll see.

15 Radovan KARADZIC: No, we have to analyse. Yes, but first we have

16 to hear ... to get a loan.

17 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes, yes, good ... to Bosnia. Good, that's a

18 deal. And what are we going to do about these premises. Please ... just

19 get this over with.

20 Radovan KARADZIC: I'll call down there right away to see if there

21 is anyone to write this ...

22 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: You don't have to. I'll tell you what - I'm

23 going to call Ostojic.

24 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

25 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Since little Zoran was there.

Page 23099

1 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.

2 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: We have to see where he went.

3 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh.

4 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: And we should tell him to get in touch, to

5 write that memo, the request for the premises.

6 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh. And you know what you should do? Call

7 Simovic and Ostojic. Simovic has already had a request like that and it

8 went through ... I mean, since it was ... he had to go through the

9 government. It went through some commissions.

10 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Yes. That is wrong. That is not Vlado's --

11 THE INTERPRETER: That is not up to the government, or the

12 governments. That is interpreter's correction.

13 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Not Vlado's.

14 Radovan KARADZIC: Yes.

15 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: It belongs to the Centar municipality.

16 Radovan KARADZIC: Uh-huh. It's theirs, for sure.

17 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Here's what I'll do. I'll hook up Simovic

18 and ... I mean Mr. Bulatovic so that the two of them can finish it and

19 there you are.

20 Radovan KARADZIC: Great! Now I'll call Simovic to ...

21 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: Okay. You don't have to do anything. I'll do

22 it all.

23 Radovan KARADZIC: Well, then.

24 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: All of it. Don't worry.

25 Radovan KARADZIC: See you.

Page 23100

1 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: See you. Everything's settled.

2 Radovan KARADZIC: Thank you. Have a nice day. Give my regards

3 to the Professor.

4 Momcilo KRAJISNIK: I will."

5 Examination by Mr. Josse:

6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you and Dr. Karadzic are discussing the proposed

7 historical agreement. Is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The Chamber has heard something about that. There is reference

10 here to Mr. Zulfikarpasic. What was his role in the proposed agreement?

11 A. Mr. Zulfikarpasic was the president of the Muslim-Bosniak

12 organisation, and they had launched an initiative together with Professor

13 Filipovic to have a historic agreement reached between the Serbs and the

14 Muslims.

15 Q. Now, Professor Filipovic and Mr. Zulfikarpasic were not in

16 Mr. Izetbegovic's political party, were they?

17 A. No, they were not. At first they were, but at this point in time

18 they weren't. At the beginning of political pluralism in 1990, that's

19 when they were with him, but at this point in time they were no longer

20 with him.

21 Q. What's the name of their political party at this point in time?

22 A. The MBO, the Muslim-Bosniak Organisation.

23 Q. And why were they in the vanguard of the proposed agreement from

24 the Muslim side?

25 A. They had a proposal for two peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina through

Page 23101

1 their political representatives to reach an agreement and resolve many

2 questions that were controversial ones throughout history in order for a

3 solution to be found for the future as to how they should live together in

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The point was for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain

5 within Yugoslavia and that it remain integral. That was their request and

6 that corresponded to the interests of the Serb side.

7 Q. And have you any idea how they presented the matter to the SDA and

8 Mr. Izetbegovic?

9 A. I was present at a meeting, perhaps it was precisely this one at

10 Mr. Koljevic's, when the two of them, Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic,

11 said: We have a proposal for a historical agreement. And they presented

12 what I said to you a few moments ago. And we also have the support and

13 consent of Mr. Izetbegovic.

14 Q. And it may be obvious, but it's central to the questions I'm

15 asking. Why were you in favour of this agreement?

16 A. Well, I shared that view. I wanted Bosnia to remain an integral

17 whole and that it remain in Yugoslavia, and I wanted us to reform

18 Yugoslavia and to find a long-term solution that would lead to peace, that

19 there would be a long-term agreement between the two peoples. Of course

20 the third people would have to be involved, too, and the others as well,

21 but this was an initiative of two peoples that would have been offered to

22 the Croat side as well.

23 Q. What was Mr. Milosevic's involvement in it?

24 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic was considered by the Muslims to be the leader

25 of all Serbs, and they would have only been too pleased to have

Page 23102

1 Mr. Milosevic's consent as well. They even thought that we were under

2 Mr. Milosevic's patronage. So if we agreed and he did not agree, that

3 would be an insufficient guarantee for them; that's why they wanted to

4 talk to Milosevic as well, which actually did happen. And this was

5 confirmed by Mr. Zulfikarpasic in the interview he gave to Nin magazine.

6 Q. What was the relationship between the historical agreement and the

7 Belgrade Initiative?

8 A. Well, I think that it is practically the same thing or there were

9 only technical differences in nuance. This is an interpretation based on

10 that kind of historical agreement.

11 Q. Why did the agreement and/or the initiative fail, from your

12 perspective anyway?

13 A. The answer is simple. The Muslim side -- or rather, the SDA gave

14 up on the agreement. Of course the Croat side -- or rather, in parliament

15 as well, but the focus here is on the Muslim side. Their role was crucial

16 as personified through Mr. Izetbegovic. He gave up on this.

17 Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Mr. Filipovic said that. They drew back and that's

18 why it went down the drain.

19 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, perhaps that would be a convenient

20 moment. We will consider overnight whether to play any more intercepts in

21 relation to this or perhaps some other way of presenting them.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that.

23 Before we adjourn for the day, perhaps a few practical matters.

24 Mr. Registrar, if I could specifically have your attention. The

25 Nielsen source material has not received a number, did it?

Page 23103

1 THE REGISTRAR: No, Your Honours.

2 JUDGE ORIE: That's four tabs in one binder.

3 THE REGISTRAR: That would be P1177.

4 JUDGE ORIE: P1177. That had been reserved and not been used

5 meanwhile, yes.

6 Then in relation to P64A, the descriptions have been added to the

7 exhibit list and the tabs are in a chronological order rather than the

8 earlier unique numbering. There are 831 tabs in total. 380 tabs out of

9 these 831 tabs are now on the judicial database. Hard work is done to get

10 the remainder of these tabs on the judicial database as well. These are

11 some practical matters.

12 Mr. Registrar, did I understand the message I got from you that it

13 has now been finally confirmed that we can sit tomorrow in the afternoon?

14 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE ORIE: We will then adjourn until tomorrow, the 27th of

16 April, quarter past 2.00, Courtroom II, quarter past 2.00 in the

17 afternoon, of course.

18 We'll adjourn.

19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

20 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 27th day of

21 April, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.