1 Wednesday, 3 May 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Mr. Stewart before I invite to you continue the
11 examination-in-chief, I'd like to remind you, Mr. Krajisnik, that you are
12 still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of
13 your testimony.
14 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
15 [Witness answered through interpreter]
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
17 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. May I mention one practical
18 thing to do with team membership, Your Honour, we have the pleasure of
19 introducing a temporary new member of the team --
20 JUDGE ORIE: She's gone already.
21 MR. STEWART: Well, she's temporarily gone. And she hasn't walked
22 out in disgust yet.
23 But, Your Honour, we did wish Your Honours to know that the reason
24 you're not seeing Mr. Karganovic in court anymore is because he has left
25 the team. He left the team with effect from the end of April. He was our
1 case manager, Your Honour. But, Your Honour, I must say I am aware that
2 sometimes very inaccurate information floats around the place about the
3 reasons for team arrivals, departures and so on, so I just want to make it
4 publicly clear that Mr. Karganovic has left because we simply do not have
5 the money to pay him anymore, and it's as simple as that. And I would
6 just like to express publicly my thanks to Mr. Karganovic for his loyalty
7 to the Defence team over that period. And just for Your Honours to know
8 that we -- Ms. Pitcher is taking over the role of -- Kelly Pitcher, our
9 case manager. But that's the reason, it's the only reason, Your Honour.
10 That's what has happened.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much. Although no rumours yet
12 arrived. So no wrong information was there. It's always good to have the
13 right information directly.
14 MR. STEWART: I like to head them off in advance, Your Honour,
16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
17 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
18 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]
19 Q. Your Honours, Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking at and we were
20 getting towards the end of the minutes of the Fourth Session of the
21 Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We were at page 40 of
22 the English.
23 It was -- sorry, Mr. Krajisnik, it's where we had got to
24 yesterday. It was in the speech of Mr. Karadzic, Dr. Karadzic. Point 22
25 was some pages before. It's point 22 in the margin. We had been looking
1 at quite a long speech. There is a decision with 19 numbered items and
2 then a page or two on, Dr. Karadzic's speech, quite a long speech. And
3 then there is a reference to passage the -- I've got to find it for you,
4 Mr. Krajisnik. It's --
5 A. I think it's number 16, if I'm not mistaken -- no, sorry.
6 Q. We are going to give you the page number, Mr. Krajisnik, as soon
7 as Mr. --
8 JUDGE ORIE: If Mr. Krajisnik has found number 16, there seems
9 to be no problem but ...
10 MR. STEWART: It's not number 16 we are looking for ultimately,
11 Your Honour. My apologies, Your Honour. It's my fault. I didn't have
12 the B/C/S cross-reference.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's probably 77, my page number,
14 5138 being the last numbers. SA025138.
15 JUDGE ORIE: That's at least the beginning of a speech of Mr. --
16 MR. STEWART: It's in the middle of page 82. Thank you.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. STEWART:
19 Q. Middle of page 82, Mr. Krajisnik, a paragraph beginning: "We,
20 therefore, suggest the establishment of three entities."
21 Do you see that?
22 A. Yes, yes, I see that.
23 Q. Middle of page 40 in the English. "We, therefore, suggest the
24 establishment of three entities in BiH which would not threaten or
25 confront each other. On the contrary, they should at most complement each
1 other or at least be neutral and impartial towards each other so that
2 common institutions could be formed at the level of BiH, that is, the
3 existing republic of BiH.
4 "How could it become a link in those -- in these circumstances?
5 It could become a link if the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina could
6 exercise its right to remain within Yugoslavia and form some common
7 institutions with Yugoslavia. Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina could decide
8 whether it wanted to have any links with Yugoslavia or only confederal
9 links with the Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina could decide whether or not it wanted any links with Croatia,
11 e.g. federal, but at the same time it should have some links with
13 Although this proposal looks complicated and unique, and indeed it
14 is complicated and unique, as is BiH itself, we think that it can be
15 realised. It is better than civil war. As rational beings, we know what
16 civil war means; the experience of Croatia tells us exactly what civil war
17 has done to us."
18 Mr. Krajisnik, does it follow from what were you saying yesterday
19 that this particular idea that Dr. Karadzic was outlining here was coming
20 as something new to at least a significant number of the deputies present?
21 A. Yes. You're right. And that will be evident from the discussion
22 that followed. There is one contribution in particular from which you
23 will see the level of surprise on the part of some individuals.
24 Q. Well, so we can make sure we come to it at the right time, you
25 have a particular name of a particular deputy in mind, Mr. Krajisnik,
1 there, do you?
2 A. Specifically, at this session, Mrs. Plavsic spoke, and you can see
3 from her contribution that she doesn't understand how come we are now
4 linking up into a confederation with Muslims and on the other hand we want
5 Yugoslavia, but Karadzic cut that short, saying that --
6 Q. I'll cut you short, if I may, on that without any impoliteness. I
7 just want you to be sure, we are going to come to Mrs. Plavsic's
8 contribution so we can take that in its order. Thank you.
9 The -- but you yourself had had some discussion with Dr. Karadzic,
10 didn't come as a surprise to you, did it, what Dr. Karadzic was saying?
11 A. Well, I said yesterday that there was a turnabout in the vision of
12 things that I had learned about from Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic. I
13 think Mr. Koljevic attended that meeting but I don't know who else. I
14 know Mrs. Plavsic wasn't there. I'm talking now about the negotiators,
15 out of that circle.
16 Q. And then Dr. Karadzic goes on in the same passage: "Apart from
17 causing the deaths of several hundred thousand people and complete
18 destruction of several hundred towns, a civil war in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina would also result in massive and rapid population movements.
20 In other words, it would lead to population homogenisation. What would be
21 the end result of it all? The end result would be the situation as it is
22 today: Separate Serbian, Croatian and Muslim areas left impoverished by
23 several hundred towns and several hundred thousand people."
24 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, can you explain when Dr. Karadzic was
25 saying "the end result would be the situation as it is today," it's very
1 clear he doesn't mean that literally. What did you understand him to be
3 A. Specifically concerning this passage, I could define it as
4 follows: What Mr. Karadzic is saying is that his proposal is better than
5 war, because the war would have the same consequences, it would leave us
6 in the same place, with many more adverse consequences, and it makes it
7 incumbent upon us to continue negotiating, to find a solution, because we
8 have to find a political solution between the warring parties. A solution
9 has to be politically verified. That was the main objective of our policy
10 that we were trying to present to the MPs.
11 Q. Do you agree, just as a starting point, that what Dr. Karadzic is
12 saying is, in that last sentence, today we got separate Serbian, Croatian
13 and Muslim areas. If we have a war, we'll still have that but we will
14 have lost several hundred towns and several hundred thousand people, that
15 that's a summary of what he's saying? Do you agree? You're nodding,
16 Mr. Krajisnik. The tape won't pick up a nod.
17 A. Yes. You're right. I didn't look at the text, but I see that he
18 actually says we already have some -- already established regions, Croat,
19 Serb and Muslims, and after a war we would have the same thing, only
20 compounded by many other adverse consequences. You're completely right.
21 Q. Now, how -- how complete did you regard the degree of separation
22 among Serbian and Croatian and Muslim areas as being at this time,
23 December 1991?
24 A. Well, when a state is being broken up, the degree of separation is
25 much greater, and to the misfortune of that one entity, the degree of
1 separation between regions was rather high.
2 As for the Muslim and Croat majority, they had power on the
3 municipal level in their respective regions. So communities, which had a
4 relative majority, had also power in their respective municipalities. I'm
5 now talking about the Muslim and Croat areas.
6 Q. When Dr. Karadzic referred there to a civil war resulting in
7 massive and rapid population movements, first of all, did you share his
8 view that that would be the result of civil war?
9 A. You can study war from books as much as you like, but you never
10 learn about it so well as you do from direct participants, people who
11 survived a war, and we heard from our parents about the Second World War,
12 about the experience of those who were a minority in one area and had to
13 leave their homes and were expelled and had to move. So we knew that if a
14 war should break out, there would be population movements and nobody would
15 be happy.
16 It was not about what you call ethnic cleansing. It's a
17 phenomenon that comes inevitably with a war. In every war, inevitably a
18 certain percentage of the population flees their homes. That's some sort
19 of family memory that every -- every family had from the Second World War.
20 However, with regard to the Muslim people, there is a
21 term "mujahir" [phoen]. That means refugees. And after the Second World
22 War, there was talk about how many people had fled, how many ended up as
23 refugees. So we had both practical and theoretical knowledge and
24 experience about it, and I am making a distinction now between "mujahir,"
25 refugee, and "mujahedin." It's not the same thing.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can we get this clear? You used the phrase "ethnic
2 cleansing" in that last answer. You said this was not about what you or
3 what one calls ethnic cleansing. It's not a technical, legal term, ethnic
4 cleansing. What do you understand by the term "ethnic cleansing"?
5 A. Well, having spent as long as I have here in prison, I have
6 learned about the term of ethnic cleansing, and naturally, during the war,
7 I had heard that term as well. Ethnic cleansing means forcing people,
8 against their will, people belonging to a certain ethnic community, to
9 move, expelling them from their homes. That term implies that something
10 is done by force, applying various instruments.
11 For a more elaborate explanation, you should ask a lawyer, but to
12 me it means driving out a certain group, a certain minority, belonging to
13 a different ethnicity by force, by coercion, making them move to a
14 different territory.
15 That's how I understood the term "ethnic cleansing," as I heard it
16 here, and also during the war. That means forcing an ethnic group to
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when Dr. Karadzic was talking there about civil war
19 resulting in massive and rapid population movements, did you understand
20 him to be including in what he was saying about that result ethnic
21 cleansing as one of the causes of such movements?
22 A. This was in December 1991, and this is the presentation of
23 Mr. Karadzic about the move of the population who were fleeing war. That
24 term "ethnic cleansing" was not used in the Second World War, whereas he
25 was talking about the Second World War and what happened then. People
1 were moving, trying to escape from the war. He was only talking about
2 population movements that would necessarily come if war broke out. People
3 moving out of fear, looking for safety. There was no mention of driving
4 people or expelling people or applying force. All the negotiations that
5 took place before the war concentrated exclusively on finding a peaceful
6 solution that implied that everybody would stay where they were.
7 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, let's get some, if you like, ground rules
8 clear. It appears from the evidence that we've heard in this case that
9 the phrase "ethnic cleansing," in unhappily very common use now, was
10 probably coined during this particular conflict, so that in December 1991
11 it doesn't appear to have been a term in common usage. That seems to be
12 what we get from the evidence. Whether or not that's 100 per cent right
13 perhaps doesn't matter. If I am now asking you at any time about ethnic
14 cleansing, in my questions to you, Mr. Krajisnik, I am, for the moment,
15 adopting your definition as you gave it just now. So if I'm asking you a
16 question which includes that phrase, that's the concept I'm asking you
17 about. We can all argue until the end of time about ethnic cleansing at
18 some future point, but that's -- is that clear what I'm -- what I'm doing
19 and how I'm using the phrase then in questions to you?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, if you would use that I'd like to seek
21 one clarification in order to better understand the testimony.
22 Mr. Krajisnik, you used the word "by force," you used the word
23 "coercion." Would that include making life so miserable by whatever
24 means that people hardly had any other choice than to leave, that is,
25 deprive them from privileges -- well, you have heard during the course of
1 the case quite a lot of examples. Would that be included in the
2 words "force" or "coercion" you used, or would you limit that exclusively
3 to taking people -- taking them away, forcing them to -- physically
4 forcing them to leave the area? Since Mr. Stewart is going to use your
5 definition as the starting point of his questions, I'd like to have
6 clarity on that point.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is certain that I should have
8 provided a broader explanation.
9 As to your question, Your Honour, if the majority deliberately
10 created insufferable conditions that make a person hardly wait to leave,
11 of course, that constitutes ethnic cleansing. But in a war, the
12 distinction between something that is done deliberately and something that
13 is simply brought on by the war itself, as a result of the war, is very
14 difficult to make.
15 When I said forcing somebody to leave, I didn't mean necessarily
16 rounding up people. If somebody in power intimidated the other side, the
17 other group, of course, those people will leave. But if a person or a
18 group left because they were afraid of what might happen and then after
19 the war they come back and say, "Somebody drove me out actually, it's not
20 that I left out of fear," that is quite different.
21 So I would answer your question like this: If somebody
22 deliberately created difficult conditions of life for a group or for an
23 individual, then that comes very close to ethnic cleansing. However,
24 conditions in certain areas were very hard and still people stayed on.
25 And then the Dayton Accords came and some people started claiming being
1 victims of ethnic cleansing in retrospect.
2 You have the problem of the freedom of movement. Everybody should
3 be able to go wherever they like. And two different rights are in
4 conflict. If you enable somebody to leave, he will say he was ethnically
5 cleansed. If you don't allow him to leave, then he is an ethnic hostage.
6 So every municipality, every town, every particular case, should be
7 analysed separately to see how much of each of these two elements is
8 present in the movements of population.
9 Do you know how many people from Sarajevo left before the war even
10 broke out? Planeloads of people. People left for different reasons. And
11 I wouldn't like for a minute -- I myself am a refugee. I would never,
12 ever absolve somebody who made life so difficult for others that those
13 others had to leave. Leaving your home is very difficult. You never
14 forget your home. But you have very difficult cases. Different cases
15 contain elements so similar that it's very difficult to make a
17 Of course, I can't say that there was no coercion and no forcible
18 moves of population. Of course that happened. But to summarise, if
19 somebody deliberately creates insufferable conditions, that is close to
20 ethnic cleansing. It's not quite the same as ethnic cleansing.
21 Conditions of life were very difficult and still people stayed on; whereas
22 in other areas, conditions were less hard and still people left.
23 That is quite honestly how I see this question. And I lived
24 there. I know. I know at least about the community where I lived and
25 that I'm familiar with.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that you would like to make a
2 difference between those anticipating on what might happen and out of fear
3 of what would happen and those who were taken by the circumstances,
4 sometimes perhaps created deliberately and sometimes just being
5 consequences of a war situation. Thank you very much.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, Your Honour, just one more
7 thing. I'll be very sincere. Look at how hard the conditions were in
8 Zenica, Tuzla, Sarajevo, for everybody but people stayed; whereas there is
9 another town where the situation was quite liveable, so to speak, and
10 people of all ethnic communities left. And I'm absolutely sincere in
11 saying that people left for all sorts of reasons, and I can enumerate
12 them. People -- men sometimes left leaving their women and children
13 behind out of fear, because they were afraid of the war, and then blamed
14 somebody else.
15 I'm sorry for taking so much time. I wanted to be quite clear.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Your answer is perfectly clear. It's also clear how
17 you explained that it's sometimes difficult to make a distinction, but
18 that it should be made.
19 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
20 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when Dr. Karadzic was referring there to civil war
22 resulting in massive and rapid population movements, did you understand
23 him to be saying that there would be driving out of members of any ethnic
24 group by other ethnic groups?
25 A. Absolutely not. And I can give you an example that will make it
1 quite clear. Something that happened later, if you're interested.
2 Q. Well, perhaps you could just very briefly say what the example is,
3 Mr. Krajisnik, and then we might consider whether to come to it in due
4 course or to deal with it now. Could you just indicate what it is that
5 you're talking about?
6 A. I think Jews left Sarajevo, not Muslims, not Croats and not Serbs.
7 He meant that the war inevitably makes some people leave.
8 Let us leave aside all the other negative things. People go
9 somewhere else where they will fare better but the Jews left for Israel.
10 Population movements sometimes happen without any action being taken.
11 That's what Mr. Karadzic meant. I never heard him say otherwise.
12 Q. When he said there that -- he said: "In other words, it would
13 lead to population homogenisation."
14 Now, the individual words are fairly clear in their meaning,
15 Mr. Krajisnik, but in saying that it would lead to population
16 homogenisation, what did you understand him to mean as that result of
17 population homogenisation?
18 A. I don't remember how I understood it then, but I can explain how I
19 understand it now.
20 Population homogenisation implies that people who are a minority
21 in one place tended to go to another place where their ethnic community
22 was in majority. That's one. Second, people who were pacifists, who did
23 not have particular feelings of ethnic affiliation tended to side with
24 their ethnic communities because they were branded by the other side as
25 Serbs, Croats, whatever, and they did not feel that they were on an equal
1 footing. Of course, there were other ethnic groups apart from these three
2 main ethnic communities, but we are mainly talking about Serbs, Croats and
3 Muslims. So the homogenisation was two-pronged.
4 Q. Leaving aside the prospect that it might result from a civil war,
5 was population homogenisation something which you regarded as a positive
7 A. No, no. It wasn't good. When homogenisation of the population is
8 carried out -- it's not natural. I mean in war. It's not natural because
9 the war made people side with their ethnic communities in areas where they
10 are a majority, and the war makes them move. The situation itself makes
11 people move to places where their community is in the majority. It's a
12 consequence of the war. And Dr. Karadzic is talking about the possible
13 consequences of war. And we discussed it yesterday. We were saying that
14 at that time we discussed a new concept, saying that, let's not go to war,
15 let's try to avoid war, let's try to find a different solution.
16 Q. It's my fault. I'm not making myself sufficiently clear. Perhaps
17 it's because war is rather a large thing to put on one side. I'll -- so
18 I'll make it clearer.
19 Do you agree, the extreme form of population homogenisation is
20 where you have some areas containing, let's say, only Serbs and other
21 areas containing only Muslims and other areas containing only Croats.
22 That's the absolute extreme of population homogenisation, isn't it?
23 A. Yes, you're completely right. And that's the kind of
24 homogenisation that I called negative. That's one of the consequences of
25 war. That's what we would have if war broke out.
1 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, as Dr. Karadzic himself, it's an obvious
2 point, says, one of the terrible consequences of war is that a very large
3 number of people are likely to be killed. That's what he's saying.
4 That's obvious, isn't it?
5 A. Well, I mean -- well, Mr. Karadzic said a logical thing. People
6 get killed in a war. In every war that took place in our part of the
7 world, there were many, many victims, like in other states probably.
8 Again I'm relying on experience. Most casualties come in a civil war.
9 I'm talking about the civil war between the three peoples within that one
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I didn't want to dwell in a sense on that serious
12 but obvious point. I want to make it clear that I'm asking you about a
13 situation in which there was no war. Population homogenisation in the
14 context of there being no war. Was it SDS policy at this time that even
15 if there was not a war, you wanted to move towards a high degree of
16 population homogenisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
17 A. It's always a problem to interpret a question. I don't know how I
18 could explain this in a more persuasive fashion. Not at a single point in
19 time did we want to have pure territories and to have some kind of
20 homogenisation of Serbs in one territory. I'm talking about a peaceful
21 settlement to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where one particular
22 ethnic community is a majority, or the second one, or the third one, that
23 is the kind of entities that would exist.
24 Now, if we were to advocate something in an artificial manner, let
25 me be quite honest about this. The setting up of two ethnic communities
1 or, rather, parties, national parties, and then the third party, the Serb
2 Democratic Party, when that happened, it's amazing to what extent people
3 identified with these parties. Before that, in the elections they would
4 have voted for other parties that were not national parties. However, as
5 the crisis was aggravated, people identified to a larger extent with the
6 national parties. That is what a crisis is.
7 However, we did not want to have this kind of homogenisation to
8 say that we should have 80 per cent or 90 per cent Serbs, and in another
9 area there should be Muslims or Croats, because the point was to look at
10 the percentages of the population in order to see what these territorial
11 units would be. But this homogenisation would not be carried out on
12 political grounds or anything. It's my understanding that he was talking
13 about a war, what a war would bring about, population movements and things
14 like that. He was not talking about peace and homogenisation. He was
15 talking about the consequences of a war and homogenisation.
16 So my answer to your question is as follows: We did not advocate
17 homogenisation because automatically in a peaceful way -- well, it's not
18 that we had a plan of this kind, because that would have left to a second
19 homogenisation and a third homogenisation. You would be living in peace
20 and, on the other hand, you would not be living in peace. It is
21 indispensable to have cooperation and mingling. But it is important for
22 everyone to be master in one's own territory, in the majority of one's own
24 Q. Would, as you saw it at the time, Mr. Krajisnik, would the
25 establishment of three entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina by peaceful
1 means involve significant population movements?
2 A. I'm convinced that that would not have happened. Perhaps at first
3 some people would have left but people would have gone back. Everybody
4 likes to live where they live. I like my own "zabrdje." Even if they
5 were to give Paris or Madrid to me on a platter, I would prefer it.
6 Everybody likes the place there are they come from. So perhaps
7 there would be these individual cases, but when there is peace and when
8 there are no boundaries, when you can just cross them, then, yes, thank
9 you -- thank you, Mr. President. Perhaps it's a question of temperament.
10 I'm speaking very loud and very fast.
11 A war is a different situation. Well, we had municipalities, you
12 see. In one municipality there would be one tax, and in another
13 municipality there would be another tax, so it's not all the same to you
14 but then, on the other hand, you stay where -- in the place where you're
16 I'm convinced that it is a great, great pity that we did not
17 continue along the charted course, if I can put it that way, and why we
18 did not find a political solution and why Bosnia was not recognised that
19 way. That would have been a happy republic, if I can put it that way, and
20 an internationally recognised entity. Now I don't want to be partial and
21 to say everybody is to blame. After all, history will be the judge of
23 I'm sorry, and I apologise to the interpreters as well.
24 Q. Can we go on, while inviting Your Honours not to ignore the next
25 few paragraphs because they are part of a quite important speech. But if
1 we go on a few paragraphs to middle of page 41 of the English, and can you
2 pick up a very short paragraph, one line probably, or two lines,
3 Mr. Krajisnik, that says: "Sovereignty primarily means power, the
4 ultimate power over oneself."
5 It will be a page or so on from where we have just been.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Page 84, the semi-last paragraph.
7 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Do you see that?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. "Sovereignty primarily means power." But I'm going to the next
12 "Therefore, we could agree on the possibility of the Serbian,
13 Croatian and Muslim peoples exercising sovereign power over each other; a
14 possibility which would involve the establishment of a political union of
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina; a union which could one day provide a genuine
16 'link' which could reconnect people, should the goodwill for such
17 reconnection exist after all this. But at this point in time, given the
18 great deal of suspicion among people and the danger of civil war and
19 destruction, our proposal that I explained earlier is such and I urge you
20 to examine and discuss it today. What I mean is that you suggest specific
21 proposals for specific cities, and in particular, for Sarajevo, which
22 could have an extraterritorial status and where Serbs, Croats and Muslims
23 could each organise their own administration."
24 Is it a -- is it a correct understanding of what Dr. Karadzic is
25 saying that he was throwing the matter open to suggestions and inviting
1 proposals from deputies in relation to particular places in Bosnia?
2 A. Well, there is a sentence here that is a bit perplexing for those
3 who read this for the first time. He's saying that Croats and Muslims
4 could perhaps create a sovereign republic of their own and that that would
5 be a link with our republic, if there is a will, along those lines. At
6 this moment there is not enough confidence, et cetera, et cetera.
7 One has to understand that here Mr. Karadzic is trying in a soft
8 way to prepare the deputies and the others for the turnaround which had
9 not been disclosed yet. He's introducing different elements which are a
10 bit illogical as well.
11 Now, what you were saying or, rather, what you were asking, that's
12 the point. The point is that they should present different proposals and
13 he gave one for Sarajevo.
14 I have a newspaper article here a statement made by Mr. Karadzic
15 about Sarajevo after the Cutileiro negotiations when he said exactly what
16 our position was. And that was our position throughout.
17 Please, if you want, you will see that it's not a division. It's
18 precisely in this way, to have an extraterritorial part to create a
19 municipality, to have some council and so on and so forth. No one ever
20 mentioned any walls. And then you have Sarajevo and then perhaps Banja
21 Luka. I mean I'm just inventing names of towns now, but I was just trying
22 to say let's try to have as many proposals as possible so that we would be
23 prepared to negotiate with the other two ethnic communities or whoever we
24 may be talking to. Or what is it that we want to achieve? We as the Serb
25 side, what is our position? What do we want to achieve?
1 Q. Did the -- this Sarajevo proposal here, was that something which
2 came from you or to which you had made a contribution in discussion before
3 this meeting?
4 A. Well, I was one of the few Sarajevo-born people in the entire
5 political establishment. Out of the leading people, nobody was born in
6 Sarajevo. I loved Sarajevo very much and, of course, I loved the
7 interests of the Serb people because this was the second-ranking Serb
9 You will see the map that we proposed to Mr. Cutileiro. We
10 said, "Look, let this be under the UN, Sarajevo. And let us try to find a
11 specific solution so that within Bosnia-Herzegovina, this should be a
12 solution that would be a link so that these two entities, or three
13 entities, I beg your pardon, would be linked up. The joint institutions
14 would be there and everything else." I always expressed a keen interest
15 in order to make an effort to find a special solution for Sarajevo.
16 Now did I say this to Mr. Karadzic? He shared my views but I
17 guess this is his proposal. I don't think that I suggested anything to
18 him before this, but later on I took active part in possible solutions for
19 Sarajevo. Today, regrettably, Sarajevo is divided, without the Serbs. We
20 could have had a city that had not been divided had there been a bit more
21 wisdom but ...
22 Q. Could we move on, please, Mr. Krajisnik, from Dr. Karadzic's
23 speech, then? The next speaker is Mr. Nedic and then Mr. Vojnovic, and
24 then Mr. Koljevic, and then we come in a few pages to Dr. Kalinic. That's
25 page 45 of the English.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I think --
2 MR. STEWART: 93 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik. Dr. Karadzic --
3 JUDGE ORIE: There are a few other speakers as well.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
5 MR. STEWART:
6 Q. Yes, there are a whole lot of speakers, Mr. Cizmovic, Mr. Pejovic
7 and then to Dr. Kalinic. It was just really to find him, Your Honour.
8 I won't read everything of Dr. Kalinic here. The third or fourth
9 paragraph in what he says, he says: "I think that our absolute minimum at
10 the moment" -- do you see that?
11 JUDGE ORIE: Last two lines of the page.
12 MR. STEWART: In the English, Your Honour. I don't know what it
13 is in --
14 JUDGE ORIE: No, I said last to lines in the B/C/S.
15 MR. STEWART: It is by coincidence the last two lines in both,
16 Your Honour. Thank you.
17 Q. "I think that out of absolute minimum..."
18 A. Thank you very much. Yes, yes. Thank you.
19 Q. "... absolute minimum at the moment, which we as representatives
20 of the Serbian people, regardless of our party affiliation, can agree upon
21 is the proposal for the establishment of the three national communities in
22 the territory of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina.
23 "Of course, if our proposal is rejected in the course of the
24 ongoing negotiations, and according to my understanding of the situation
25 there are going to be limited to 14 January 2002, ladies and gentlemen who
1 are negotiating with us should be in no doubt about our response. We have
2 the solution that we presented today, which is the establishment of
3 independent Serbian political institutions in the territories where they
4 make the majority of the population."
5 Mr. Krajisnik, was Dr. Kalinic saying that he would, however
6 reluctantly, accept independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the footing
7 that there would be the establishment of three national communities in the
8 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
9 A. Yes. That's what Mr. Kalinic said, as president of the club of
10 the reformist forces in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which then
11 acceded to the Serb Assembly.
12 Q. About three paragraphs further on, or four paragraphs further on,
13 he starts: "Let me say this quite clearly." Do you see that?
14 You can skip over three paragraphs. Then he says: "Let me say
15 this quite clearly."
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. "And I hope you share my views on this matter," he
18 continues, "that no one has the right to deny the Muslim people, who have
19 their tradition, history and natural right to be sovereign, to establish
20 their own nation state, but only on the territories, and here I shall use
21 Mr. Izetbegovic's expression, which they make viable and prosperous in the
22 long run."
23 Mr. Krajisnik, wherever originally that phrase came from, what did
24 you or do you understand by that reference to "their own nation state,
25 [being] only on territories ... which they make viable and prosperous in
1 the long run"?
2 A. In the talks with the three ethnic communities, what was discussed
3 was how a sovereign Bosnia would be introduced in the territories where
4 the Serbs are a majority and where they control power. I was not present
5 at this discussion that I'm going to refer to now, but I heard about it
6 from Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic.
7 At that time the Muslim side said we are going to proclaim a
8 sovereign Bosnia in the territories where we can control them
9 prosperously. That is where Bosnia is going to be and that is where we
10 are going to be in power. They meant the places where they were actually
11 in power, where they were in government. That's what came from the Muslim
12 side and that's what I heard from Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic, that
13 either Mr. Izetbegovic said or Mr. Rasim Kadic. Please don't take my word
14 for it now.
15 But here, Mr. Kalinic is saying that it was Mr. Izetbegovic who
16 said that, but the meaning is the one that I refer to just now. That's
17 what it relates to.
18 Q. Did you understand there to be a significant difference between
19 what the Muslims were saying, as you've just reported it in that answer,
20 in relation to what might become their sovereign territory, and what the
21 Bosnian Serbs were saying in relation to what might become their sovereign
23 A. When you look at the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, if you're a Serb,
24 everything is blue to you. If you're a Muslim, everything is green to
25 you. If you're a Croat, everything is yellow to you. It depends on the
1 glasses that you're wearing. We don't know what they think. We know what
2 the Serb side thinks. That is why it was indispensable for the three
3 sides to reach agreement. You cannot know with what kind of glasses a
4 Muslim is looking at this map. They see everything green. When I say
5 "green," I mean the colour on the map that denotes where the Muslims are
6 a majority; and yellow where the Croats are a majority; and blue where the
7 Serbs are a majority.
8 So what you said, regardless of what people thought, and people
9 probably thought along different lines, it was necessary to sit down and
10 reach an agreement in order for it to be said exactly what should be done.
11 Mr. Cutileiro gave a solution for that, the census of '71, '81,
12 '91, who had a majority where, so that there could be this exchange of
13 territories. That was almost taken care of. That was almost done. It
14 wouldn't depend on what kind of glasses we were wearing. What I'm talking
15 about glasses, I'm speaking in a figurative manner. I, as a Serb, wear
16 glasses through which I see Serb colours and a Serb majority everywhere
17 and so on and so forth.
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you go on to page 97 in your version? And
19 this is page 47 in the English, Your Honours. There is a short
20 contribution by you: "Chairman: "Thank you very much. Ladies and
21 gentlemen, dear guests, if you will allow me I shall make a little comment
22 before we start voting on the proposal that has been put forward. Please
23 remember when we say something -- that when we say something about
24 decisions we are taking here today we are sending a message not only to
25 the Serbian people but to all nations ... of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
1 And then Mrs. Plavsic, this may or may not be what you were
2 referring to earlier, but Mrs. Plavsic begins: "I should say something
3 because I do not quite understand it. Some things are not quite clear to
4 me and perhaps they should be, since I was authorised by this Assembly to
5 take part in these negotiations, the negotiations with the two parties
6 mentioned earlier.
7 "By the way, I did not take part in these negotiations but this
8 is not the reason why I wanted to address you. The reason why I wanted to
9 address you is this idea of confederation. I am not at all clear about
10 what it means."
11 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, why did Mrs. Plavsic not take part in
12 the negotiations?
13 A. The Assembly authorised seven persons, and she was one of the
14 seven. You find the answer why she didn't participate just down below,
15 as explained by Mr. Karadzic. Other sides wanted to have direct,
16 bilateral talks. Karadzic, Izetbegovic; Karadzic, Kljuic, et cetera. So
17 Karadzic, in order not to be alone, expanded the delegation. I was a
18 member of the delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina talking to other republics,
19 so we held the primary role in this group. Mrs. Plavsic is expressing
20 here her dissatisfaction over why she wasn't involved, and Mr. Buha and
21 Mr. Koljevic were also negotiators. I looked at this just last night so I
22 remember it quite well.
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we can see a little bit later on, it's in the
24 middle of page 48 of the English, I won't trouble you with the detailed
25 reference, but we can see that Dr. Karadzic says: "We didn't want to
1 bother Mrs. Plavsic with procedural matters."
2 But sometimes people say things, Mr. Krajisnik. Was Mrs. Plavsic
3 excluded from the negotiating team because Dr. Karadzic didn't want her on
4 the negotiating team?
5 A. I don't know. If I had to make a guess, I would say that it's
6 rather the MPs who didn't want her on the negotiating team and the other
7 side that didn't want her there, because Mrs. Plavsic had already
8 displayed her radicalism on the Presidency and that was witnessed by
9 Mr. Kljuic and Mr. Izetbegovic, so they preferred to talk to Mr. Karadzic
10 and myself.
11 Mr. Karadzic always believed actually that Mrs. Plavsic was the
12 best defender of Serb interests, and he even later named her as his
13 successor. But on this occasion she was really excluded from the
14 negotiations, for several reasons. She wasn't really cut out to make
15 compromises. She was in favour of cut-and-dried solutions, like a Serb
16 state. But to be quite precise, I don't know which of the reasons, which
17 of the various reasons, prevailed here.
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, Mr. Sladojevic assures me that on
19 page 25, lines 3 and 4 of the transcript, where it said "that was
20 witnessed by Mr. Kljuic and Mr. Izetbegovic, so they preferred to talk to
21 Mr. Karadzic and myself," that in fact the Serbian translated ought to be
22 "Mr. Karadzic and us."
23 JUDGE ORIE: You could verify the matter with the witness.
24 MR. STEWART:
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you gave an answer, you said, the whole sentence
1 was -- I'd asked you whether it was that Dr. Karadzic didn't want
2 Mrs. Plavsic on the negotiating team. You said if you had a make a guess
3 you would say it's rather the MPs who didn't want her on the negotiating
4 team and the other side that didn't want her there, because Mrs. Plavsic
5 had already displayed her radicalism on the Presidency and that was
6 witnessed by Mr. Kljuic and Mr. Izetbegovic, so they preferred to talk to,
7 and then, well, you've heard the question is whether you then said
8 preferred to talk to Mr. Karadzic and myself, you, Mr. Krajisnik, or
9 Mr. Karadzic and us. Do you remember, Mr. Krajisnik, what you said?
10 A. Yes. Yesterday I said Mr. Sladojevic is right and he's right
11 again. "With us." I can add to it later. I meant Mr. Koljevic and
12 myself, for other reasons which have nothing to do with your question for
13 the moment.
14 Q. It was Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic and yourself?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. You were the negotiating team for all practical purposes, weren't
18 A. Well, that was the time when this pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina still
19 existed. Mr. Koljevic and I held official posts. We were in office and
20 Mr. Karadzic was party leader. So that's the team that was formed after
21 the abortive delegations for talks among republics, republic to republic.
22 Mr. Koljevic replaced Mr. -- Mrs. Plavsic as head of our delegation.
23 Q. Now, you've previously been asked by one of Their Honours,
24 Mr. Krajisnik, when you used the term "radical" or "radicalism," you've
25 been asked a more specific question. You said that -- so similarly, when
1 you said that Mrs. Plavsic had already displayed her radicalism, what are
2 the essential characteristics of that radicalism that she had displayed?
3 A. Well, I'm wrong like many other people when I call this
4 radicalism. I'll explain what I meant.
5 In negotiations, you have to bear in mind that there is the other
6 side, too, that has its own interests and you should strive for a
7 compromise. You should not be narrow-minded. Sometimes you're perhaps
8 asking for more in order to be able to achieve an optimum. If you just
9 stay put, without moving anywhere, and if you state that publicly, of
10 course, you're irritating the other side. They feel unpleasant, and they
11 say, I cannot reach any kind of agreement with you. Through negotiations,
12 you often present your views. The other side understands you. As soon as
13 they understand you, they resist what you want less.
14 When I'm talking about Mrs. Plavsic, Mrs. Plavsic is now -- well,
15 perhaps I'm not going to be partial -- impartial at other moments, but
16 I'll try to be as impartial as possible now but I have reason to be angry
17 with her. At that time, Mrs. Plavsic, as a woman, had a problem with all
18 those men around her. All the others on the Presidency were men. So as a
19 woman, she fought just in case. As best she could, and knew how to, she
20 defended Serb interests in that Presidency but she didn't have these
21 diplomatic skills to present this properly. She would simply come out
22 with what she thought so she would come out in an undiplomatic way
23 believing that she would help the Serb people in that way.
24 However, that would lead us further away from an agreement. We
25 started some discussions a hundred times from one position, and then we
1 would come to a completely different position and then we would say well
2 this is an optimal solution, then we would accept it. That's what I meant
3 when I said "radicalism," although that word radicalism is not right.
4 It's lack of diplomacy, lack of willingness to reach a compromise or
5 something like that. But believe me, whenever Mrs. Plavsic advocated
6 something, she was right almost always. However, it's not sufficient to
7 be right if you're negotiating. You have to be a bit more flexible in
8 order to somehow exercise that right of yours.
9 Now, I'm talking about someone for whom I don't have much sympathy
10 but this is the truth.
11 Q. Mrs. Plavsic continued: "Why should we, as a unit within this
12 imagined 'confederation,' enter in any kind of relationship with the
13 Muslim and Croatian national communities. We can enter into a
14 relationship with these two communities only as a unit within Yugoslavia
15 so that Yugoslavia defines its relations with them. Only under this
16 condition can we enter into any sort of relationship with them."
17 Mr. Krajisnik, that was taken and understood, was it, as
18 Mrs. Plavsic rejecting the idea which was being floated by Dr. Karadzic
19 for three separate entities as a negotiated solution?
20 A. Yes. She wanted a Serb state, to unite with Serbia, with
21 Yugoslavia, and then that Yugoslavia would be linked up to this remainder
22 of Bosnia. That's clear. You see that there was applause here. Many MPs
23 wanted that, that's absolutely the case, but that was not realistic, and
24 that is why Mr. Karadzic later tried to explain this. You can wish to
25 have New York, but it's not realistic. So that's why he tried to explain
1 this here now.
2 She didn't want a solution that was realistic. She went for a
3 wishful thinking in terms of what she thought was best. But let me say
4 under quotation marks, she was right, because only yesterday, so to speak,
5 the Muslim and the Croat said that they didn't want to compromise, that
6 they wanted independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If that's what you want,
7 then of course her reaction is, well, we don't want to be with you if you
8 don't want to be with us. However, that was not realistic. I've already
9 said that and that's why Karadzic was now slowly preparing, in the talks,
10 the existence of three constituent units and the recognition of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent internationally recognised state.
12 There is a telephone conversation here, we had it, where Karadzic
13 and I were talking about this and analysing this and saying, whatever
14 happened to Biljana? Actually, she was not "au courant," so that's why
15 she reacted in this uncontrolled way.
16 Q. Then the next paragraph of what Dr. Plavsic says is: "Why should
17 we, the Serbs, the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina enter into
18 any kind of relationship with say, the Republic of Muslim Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina. There is going to be no relationship!"
20 Did you -- for practical purposes, Mr. Krajisnik, did you know
21 that Mrs. Plavsic was going to be opposed to what Dr. Karadzic was
23 A. I was surprised. I thought that Mr. Karadzic had talked to her.
24 I don't know how. I was surprised, because it does carry weight when a
25 member of the Presidency is saying something that is opposite to what many
1 MPs felt. That was a surprise for me, and I didn't manage to talk to her.
2 Q. You had a sharp division of views, then -- sorry, Your Honour, I
3 beg your pardon.
4 You had a sharp division of views between the two members of the
5 BiH Presidency, two Serb members, didn't you, Dr. Plavsic and Professor
7 A. Yes. I have to be honest. The fault lies with the three of us
8 here. We should have explained this to Mrs. Plavsic, because when
9 something is explained to her, she will at least remain silent, even if
10 she doesn't agree. Obviously she was not kept abreast of matters and that
11 is why she came out with her position and that caused disruption. So
12 Mrs. Plavsic did not know what was going on, as opposed to the others, so
13 I'm just saying what was realistic.
14 It could have turned the Assembly in a completely different
15 manner, in a different direction, because she was making a fiery speech
16 and the MPs liked what she was saying. She was special. People like it
17 when you're straightforward, when you're making a speech, but they don't
18 realise at that time that it is an empty radicalism. Here I go with
19 radicalism again. It's just an empty words, nice but empty.
20 Q. And then just to complete Mrs. Plavsic's contribution there, she
21 says: "We are part of Yugoslavia, and only Yugoslavia can decide if she
22 wants to enter into a relationship with the Muslim Republic of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina, or the Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or any
24 other such entity.
25 "That is what is not clear to me."
1 And then Dr. Karadzic starts off by saying: "Mrs. Plavsic is
2 right," but then about four paragraphs further on, he says: "As to the
3 mutual relations, we do not want to be accused of destroying Bosnia and
4 Herzegovina. We are not opposed to Yugoslavia having links with them
5 through us since we are in direct contact with them, since we are part of
6 Yugoslavia ourselves. There is no reason why we should not have links
7 with them if our relations are going to be based on equality. Since it is
8 a complex constitutional arrangement, it will take time to be developed.
9 But that does not in any way affect our right to remain within Yugoslavia
10 and our right to keep our Yugoslav identity.
11 "Therefore, if we have to preserve the Bosnian framework in one
12 form or the other (everybody keeps saying that in some form Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina must be preserved), okay, let's preserve some elements of
14 Bosnia. Let some functions of the government remain shared."
15 And then there is an interruption. "How are we going to pay for
16 all that. We are already struggling to make ends meet!"
17 Now, I can't be absolutely sure, Mr. Krajisnik, but that appears
18 to be the first time that somebody has brought up starkly the question of
19 money. Was that a -- was an intervention about, how we are going to pay
20 for all that, was that something that you had anticipated?
21 A. I know that you find this striking, but it is invariably important
22 but money was not important here. All of these three peoples prefer a
23 state. They like a state and their children equally. And all the rest is
25 So this was just an excuse, who would pay for it and so on. There
1 was just used by way of argument, but it was not the main argument for
2 stating one's opposition.
3 Q. Anyway, Dr. Karadzic completes his speech and he says: "Is my
4 explanation clear enough?"
5 And Dr. Plavsic: "Adds that it is too complicated and the idea
6 that has emerged earlier today is much clearer."
7 When she refers to "the idea that has emerged earlier today," is
8 she -- is she harking back to preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina as simply
9 as part of Yugoslavia, or is she talking about some other idea?
10 A. When it says we gave a clearer picture, I believe that she means
11 what she said. Her solution is much clearer than Mr. Karadzic's, who
12 tried to wrap this nicely with different digressions, if I can put it that
13 way. Quite simply, he was not in a position to say, "wait a minute, we
14 have to give up on Yugoslavia now. We accept Bosnia and Herzegovina."
15 Mrs. Plavsic says, "My situation is a clear-cut one. I want this and
17 The idea was always there or, rather, not the idea but the
18 position, that we want Bosnia in Yugoslavia, that we were not opposed to
19 that. But what Mrs. Plavsic meant here was the Serb Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina. That is to say, part of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina. That
21 is to say, that these two ethnic communities did not want that. That's
22 what they showed. And if you said, well, we want them to go to Yugoslavia
23 too, then that would mean imposing one's own will on them. Now, how --
24 that is what she doesn't say.
25 Quite simply, two positions clashed. We are not going to impose
1 our own will on others. We are not going to divide Bosnia, and then you
2 see Mr. Karadzic saying, "We do not want to be accused of dividing
4 Well, we can't. We kept saying that we were against the division
5 of Bosnia. We want Bosnia to remain in Yugoslavia or to be transformed
6 but not to divide it, because that was a forbidden be topic, forbidden
7 under quotation marks, because somebody wanted to divide Bosnia, to cut a
8 live tissue, if it can be put that way. So her position was clear. And
9 then there were other people who took part in the debate and who spoke
10 along similar lines. And so what she is saying is what we said is a clear
11 position and what you are suggesting is not a clear position. That's
12 Mr. Karadzic.
13 But if you were to look at it formally that would be true. But
14 the policy was that he wanted to familiarise them with the course that had
15 to be taken because it came up as a necessity. The point was that we
16 always wanted to reach agreement with the other two sides. That's our
17 interest. We cannot do otherwise.
18 Q. Then Dr. Kalinic speaks again in a way which -- well, doesn't give
19 rise to questions immediately. And then you, Mr. Krajisnik --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, it seems that you're going to a new
21 portion of the minutes. I'm looking at the clock.
22 MR. STEWART: I'm entirely in Your Honour's hands. I would
23 probably be another five minutes or so to get to the end of this document.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Let's then finish with this and take that five
25 minutes. Please proceed.
1 MR. STEWART:
2 Q. You, Mr. Krajisnik, then are the -- well, you're the last person
3 to speak. You say -- I'll go to the second paragraph in what you
4 say. "Everything must have its direction, its way of doing things,
5 sequence of doing them. If you agree with me, and you already did so
6 earlier, that decisions have been made today have to be seen through
7 because we must not create any association that is against the interests
8 of the Serbian people. Before we vote, I would urge you to bear in mind
9 that you are sending a message to all of our citizens, to the Serbian
10 people and others, that this Assembly has not made any decision that is
11 aimed against honest Croats, Muslims, Yugoslavs or any other patriots.
12 "The decision that we made today is aimed to save the state.
13 That is our prerogative, that is our responsibility, and that is what we
14 have done today.
15 "Not a single decision of the Serbian Assembly has been aimed
16 against any decision of the SDA or HDZ. Everything that we have done has
17 been motivated by our desire to save our Serbian people, to save our
18 constitutional order and the rule of law, to preserve our equality.
19 "Therefore, I would urge you once again to send a clear message
20 of what has been decided here today. Can you please vote about this piece
21 of information, and this is a piece of information that is followed by
22 other details which [would] be given in due course.
23 "Do you agree with this piece of information?"
24 And the Assembly unanimously support that.
25 Mr. Krajisnik, where you say "not a single decision of the Serbian
1 Assembly has been aimed against any decision of the SDA or the HDZ," was
2 that -- was that 100 per cent correct?
3 A. Nothing in life is absolutely correct, but I'm almost sure, as far
4 as I can tell, on the basis of my own thinking, that I never agreed or
5 proposed that any decision be reached to the detriment of the other two
7 I'm saying that not even gold is 100 per cent pure, but I'm
8 convinced that this is so. We could not have done so. And that was not
9 our interest either.
10 Q. As far as decisions were concerned, you were still left with the
11 position where it appeared that the other -- the parties representing the
12 other nations wanted independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina but that was
13 not your primary position in the SDS, was it?
14 A. I'm sorry, your question is not clear, really.
15 Q. I'll break it up then. It still remained absolutely clear that
16 the SDA and the HDZ were likely to proceed towards wanting or demanding
17 independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, didn't it?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And it was -- remained the SDS primary position that it was
20 against that.
21 A. The SDS did not accept an untransformed Bosnia-Herzegovina. That
22 was the point. We did not accept a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina the way
23 the Muslims and Croats envisaged it to be, and that is a unitary
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is a major difference between a unitary
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the one hand and, on the other hand, a transformed,
1 decentralised state.
2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, would that be a convenient moment?
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Stewart. We will adjourn until five minutes
4 past 11.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
8 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honours, the next
9 matter I'm going to refer to is a document which has already been
10 exhibited. We prepared some copies, Your Honour, because it's a
11 relatively short document and it's relatively short notice. It's in P64A.
12 That's Mr. Treanor. Tab 144, which is in binder 5. Your Honour, we've
13 copied a version of the original B/C/S for Mr. Krajisnik if that could be
14 got to him one way or another. And, Your Honour, it's a handwritten
15 minutes of the SDS Deputies' Club meeting, 18th of October 1991. And,
16 Your Honour, so it's described.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you have that document, minutes of the session of
18 the Club of Deputies of the SDS, Serbian Democratic Party of BH, held at
19 1630 on 18th of October, 1991, in the blue hall of the Assembly of BH.
20 The session was attended by 49 deputies, and so on.
21 A. Yes, I see that.
22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you -- if you need to cast your eye down the
23 page to answer that, can you say whether you were at that meeting?
24 A. I believe I was. I mean, I'm certain I was. I don't believe I
25 wasn't. There may even be a contribution of mine somewhere below.
1 Q. One of the reasons I asked, Mr. Krajisnik, is that it doesn't
2 appear that there is. That's all. It was -- but it was possible that you
3 were there but never -- are not recorded as having made any specific
4 contribution yourself. Is that right?
5 A. I have to say that I don't see from this that I actually said
7 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, you've really answered that anyway.
8 I want you to go to -- I've marked -- I've taken the liberty of
9 marking in the margin just with a line, it's point 29 in the English.
10 It's on page 4 of the English, and it's towards the end of the document
11 you've got, Mr. Krajisnik.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I just interrupt you for one second?
13 You say Mr. Krajisnik does not appear as one of the speakers. How should
14 I understand almost at the bottom of the first page, is that a reference
15 to what he said elsewhere or ...
16 MR. STEWART: Well, actually, Your Honour, perhaps I was wrong.
17 That is how I had understood it as a mention by somebody else of
18 Mr. Krajisnik. But, Your Honour, perhaps I'm wrong about that. We better
19 clarify it.
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you see -- it may not be on the first page of
21 yours but it's quite early in this document, there is a number 1 --
22 JUDGE ORIE: It's the third page, approximately eight lines from
23 the top in B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik.
24 MR. STEWART:
25 Q. "Debate and voting on the illegal resumption of the Assembly
1 session on 14th October, 1991."
2 Do you see that, Mr. Krajisnik?
3 A. In Serbian, you said third page?
4 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the -- I have the first -- the page -- last
5 three digits, ERN 500, after six lines it reads: "1," and then three
6 lines down, I see "14th of October, 1991." And then it seems that it's
7 your name first appearing on the fourth line under number 1.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. That's right.
9 MR. STEWART:
10 Q. Just to clarify, Mr. Krajisnik, whether that is in fact recording
11 you talking or whether it's somebody else saying that you had done
13 A. It says: "Krajisnik, colon" so that's supposed to be something I
14 said. But actually these are notes made by the recording secretary who
15 describes what I said, Krajisnik colon, et cetera. But I actually believe
16 that's exactly what I said, the very words I used after that illegal
17 session on the 14th.
18 Q. Is it, Mr. Krajisnik, you think you were at this meeting?
19 A. I think so, although I'm not quite sure. I have to be perfectly
20 honest. There were many sessions. Maybe I attended some other session
21 with another club. It was all at the Assembly. To be quite honest, I
22 cannot say with absolute certainty but I think I think I was there.
23 Q. I think Your Honours will probably agree, we've carried that
24 particular point as far as we can, Mr. Krajisnik.
25 If you then go towards the end of this document, it's point 29. I
1 have just marked it with a simple line in the margin on the left-hand
2 side. It's on page -- the page that ends 506. You've got the numbering
3 in top right-hand corner. It's the one that ends 506. Do you see that?
4 A. Yes, I found it.
5 Q. Dr. Karadzic is noted as speaking. He says: "A team made up of
6 the leading men of the party, the government and the political council has
7 been working day and night. I have decided to impose a state of emergency
8 in the party. Please inform others that the party is working in emergency
9 conditions. We must not make a single wrong step and we must listen to
10 our leaders. Maximum discipline is required."
11 Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, with that reference to "a team made
12 up of the leading men of the party, the government and political council
13 has been working day and night," were you one of any such team that had
14 been working in the way he describes?
15 A. Maybe it's a good idea for me to explain the context in which
16 Mr. Karadzic said this and then answer your question. I think that would
17 be of greater assistance to you. Although if you prefer it that way, I
18 can answer your question immediately but it won't be absolutely clear
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I feel there is no objection to your answering with
21 the context first.
22 A. I said already that I had already analysed this -- these minutes
23 even before, so I have a very good idea of what these words of
24 Mr. Karadzic's mean.
25 Mr. Dragan Djokanovic was the previous speaker and he appeared as
1 a witness here. And he mentions the war in a frenzied voice filled with
2 panic. He says they had voted for independence, we were about to go to
3 war. It was a very unpleasant discussion. And now, Mr. Karadzic is
4 talking in response to the previous contribution. He is saying, "We are
5 working, we have everything under control. There is a whole team of
6 people working on it," to dissipate the tensions that arise when somebody
7 says, "We should have gone to war already."
8 And now to answer your question, there existed certain bodies,
9 such as the party council, the ministerial council, there were
10 commissions, there were experts, civil servants and the Executive Board of
11 the SDS party. And just after the 14th and the 15th, the MPs were in
12 favour of making some sort of radical move, and Karadzic is telling
13 them, "Take it easy. We have a whole team working on it. We have things
14 under control." That's a political message. All these people are working
15 on it.
16 And I have to be honest, in the ranks of the Serbs, in various
17 circles, there was a lot of concern. We all debated and debated, but it
18 was difficult to find a solution. It's easy to burn all the bridges but
19 it's difficult to find a solution. You will see that all sorts of
20 proposals had been made to that effect, so Mr. Karadzic was trying to play
21 things down, to appease those present. This team was not just five or six
22 men. All of us were debating this very difficult watershed that the
23 Serbian people were facing.
24 I hope I have answered your question.
25 Q. Had a decision to impose a state of emergency in the party been
1 taken by Dr. Karadzic in advance of this meeting of the Deputies' Club?
2 A. It's difficult for me to say that, but I have to because I'm under
3 oath. Mr. Karadzic kept saying all the time, "I'll impose a state of
4 emergency. I'll tighten the discipline, tighten the screws." Maybe he
5 indeed sent that kind of telegram but I assure you that everybody on the
6 ground did not take that with particular concern. They were not
7 particularly upset. We have, for instance, a place around Travnik,
8 Zivinica where they would reply. We organised something in response,
9 et cetera.
10 So maybe you will find a piece of writing where Karadzic says, "We
11 are hereby introducing a state of emergency," but this is a message aimed
12 at people like Mr. Djokanovic who were saying, "We should go to war now."
13 I don't think Mr. Djokanovic actually meant it, but for the audience who
14 was hearing him, that could have caused fear and confusion. So Karadzic
15 was saying, "We have to restore constitutionality. It's easy to make
16 radical moves but let's do something constructive."
17 So we were giving -- sending a political message to the other
18 side, to return to the constitutional order, and then we'll deal with the
19 rest easily. So we were saying, "You have a deadline until the 14th to
20 return to the constitutional procedure and the constitutional order. And
21 then we'll go back to the table."
22 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, I'd like to ask you to slow down a bit.
23 The interpreters are approximately three lines behind.
24 And Judge Hanoteau would have a question for you.
25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, please, when
1 we read what Mr. Djokanovic is saying, "[In English] I think we should go
2 to war right away," [Interpretation] does this mean that many people in
3 the SDS shared that opinion? Was that an opinion that only he had, or was
4 there a group of SDS MPs who wanted to go to war right away?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is pure nonsense.
6 Not a single serious person in the SDS thought this way. But this man was
7 seized by panic when he said that. I know him. He's prone to panic.
8 Nobody in the SDS wanted war. And my impression is nobody in the other
9 parties wanted war either, especially not at this moment. So this is an
10 isolated moment. That's why Mr. Karadzic reacted in this way, in order to
11 alleviate the tensions, because somebody was bringing up the issue of war
12 in December 1991, and we knew what was going on in Croatia and how
13 dangerous it was to advocate something like that. He was in a different
14 party, the party of federalists, but he attended this gathering because it
15 was some sort of party gathering.
16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. But yesterday and today you
17 told us about people who were more radical than others. So these people
18 who were more radical than others, were they envisaging a war, a conflict.
19 Yes. There was a conflict, after all, in the end.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not in Bosnia. There was a
21 conflict in Croatia.
22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. But later on, there was a
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So at that moment, right now,
1 when -- in October 1991, did you feel that among members of the SDS, there
2 were people who were already ready to go to war, you know, and live
3 through a war?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I absolutely can't remember a single
5 member of the SDS whom I would have heard saying, "I think now is the
6 moment we should go to war." Maybe there were individual radical
7 statements, but it was out of the question that there was any desire to
8 start a war. I didn't even hear it from the other side, apart from some
9 people who were out of control. It would be wrong of me to say that the
10 other side was advocating war. That's not true. I don't know why this
11 man said what he said. That's the way I see it, at least.
12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And thank you. I tried to speak
14 more slowly, and I always criticise those who speak fast, but I find it
15 difficult to control myself at this moment.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart will give you the good example,
17 Mr. Krajisnik.
18 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. I'll do my best.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, Mr. Stewart speaks much faster
20 than I do.
21 MR. STEWART:
22 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, taking it slowly, could we go up to point 6, back
23 to point 6 in this same document? The numbered points -- this is probably
24 a couple of pages into your copy.
25 JUDGE ORIE: 501 for you, Mr. Krajisnik.
1 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. It's points 5 and 6, and
2 it's Mr. Radic speaking; do you see that? T. Radic? Do you see him?
3 A. Yes. It's Trifko Radic, a MP from Ilijas. He was actually deputy
4 president of the MPs' club.
5 Q. And he says: "I don't want to concern myself with this infamous
6 Assembly anymore," he's obviously talking about the Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 Assembly, "because we've already said everything. That's why we have to
8 start working on a plebiscite of the Serbian people as soon as possible.
9 "Will we continue to work in the Assembly? And can we work as
10 the Serbian Assembly? What is the impact of the decision in The Hague on
11 the Serbian people in BH?
12 "My municipality, Ilijas, will disassociate itself from Sarajevo
13 and join the Serb Autonomous District of Romanija. I kindly request the
14 leadership to" -- well, that's not very clear. "We are preparing for war
15 and the people want" --
16 Mr. Krajisnik we get in the translation, as written. Is it where
17 it says "I kindly request the leadership to" -- is there something then in
18 Serbian that you're able to read, the rest of that sentence? Read out to
19 us, I mean, so that we can see what it says?
20 A. I'll read it all so you have context. He says: "My municipality,
21 Ilijas, will separate from Sarajevo and annex to SAO Romanija. I kindly
22 request the leadership to" -- and then goes the next sentence -- "we are
23 getting ready for war and people want" -- and then another incomplete
25 Q. Yes, I see.
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the English translation is simply
2 confirming that there is nothing there after those words.
3 Q. And then point 6: "We have to see what we ought to do. They are
4 preparing for war - is that not clear?"
5 Mr. Krajisnik, are you able to say whether that's Mr. Radic
6 continuing speaking or whether it could be somebody else?
7 A. Let me just read it, please.
8 Q. Yes, I'll read that whole paragraph 6 because it's the one I want
9 to ask about anyway. "We have to see what we ought to do. They are
10 preparing for war - is that not clear? You have our unqualified support
11 for everything you're doing. The concentration of Croatian forces in the
12 Neretva River valley is increasing daily. We are ready for war, and we
13 can only defend Serbian honour with the rifle."
14 Well, first of all, can you say who was speaking at that point?
15 A. We don't see who is speaking here. But since there is a reference
16 to the Neretva River valley, it cannot be Mr. Radic. It must be a MP from
17 Herzegovina, because it's there that there was a concentration of Croatian
18 forces, and the Neretva River valley is the area where Mostar is, the
19 eastern and western Herzegovina. I can only guess who it was but I
20 wouldn't be sure. Because one of the MPs repeatedly talked about the
21 Neretva River valley.
22 Q. So when whichever MP that was was saying, "We are ready for war,"
23 what war or prospective war was he talking about?
24 A. At this point, he's referring to -- it's pure marketing, actually,
25 but he's saying we are ready to defend the Serb people in the
1 Neretva River valley, to defend Serb honour. He's saying we are ready for
3 I think it was a situation tainted by panic and everybody is
4 talking from their own position. I think maybe the Yugoslav People's Army
5 was still there. I can't say for sure. But "ready for war" does not mean
6 that somebody actually wants war, but that they were mentally prepared to
7 defend their area, defend Serbian honour. That's a bit poetic.
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps I should make clear the clarification I'm
9 seeking is this: We know, don't we, that the Croatian war had been going
10 on for some considerable time by this point, hadn't it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And this MP refers to concentration of Croatian forces in the
13 Neretva valley. But you agree his reference to "they are preparing for
14 war," in saying "they are preparing for war," is he referring there to
15 Muslims or Croats?
16 A. That's in the first part of item 6, "They are preparing for war,"
17 he means the Croatian side. Let me say western Herzegovina, the border
18 between eastern and western Herzegovina, and he means them. I don't know
19 whether he meant Muslims as well, I'm not sure, but I think this is a
20 reference to Croats only. And when I say "Croats," I mean those that were
21 getting ready for war and were of Croat ethnicity.
22 Q. Point 9, just a little below that, of course, Jovan Tintor, it
23 doesn't say "Jovan," but we've seen him before, J. Tintor: "We've been
24 listening to the same stories for a year. The Serbs must take the
25 initiative or it will turn out that we have betrayed the Serbian people.
1 I suggest to the deputies that we fight for a Greater Serbia. We must
2 decide right now what we will fight for."
3 Was Mr. Tintor in or out of line with the senior membership of the
4 SDS in what he said there?
5 A. Mr. Tintor was in the founding board of the Serbian Democratic
6 Party. He had -- how shall I put it? He made radical, immoderate
7 statements. Too much tainted by Serb demands. And he was the object of
8 constant criticism by people who were telling him to soften his tone. And
9 he mentioned Greater Serbia here, but if you actually asked him what that
10 was supposed to mean, he would have probably said that all Serbs were
11 meant to live in one state.
12 That was certainly not the official position. And I don't think
13 anybody took up his words. I didn't really look through the rest, but I
14 don't think he made an impression on the others.
15 Q. I want to move -- you can put that document on one side,
16 Mr. Krajisnik. I'm handing you another one, it's a very short,
17 single-page document.
18 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honour, this is a document -- we have
19 plenty of copies of this as well in English. Your Honour, to be frank, we
20 don't know right now whether it's already in evidence but we will check
21 that, if we may, Your Honour, to make sure we don't get a duplication of
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 MR. STEWART: It's a document -- it's ET 00317417. It's being
25 handed around now, Your Honour. It's a single page.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have received a copy.
2 MR. STEWART:
3 Q. I expect you've read it in the last 30 seconds, Mr. Krajisnik. It
4 purports to be a telegram from Mr. Karadzic as SDS president addressed to
5 SDS Municipal Boards, Zavidovici, dated 18th of October, and I don't
6 believe that there is any dispute that it would be 1991. "I pronounce, by
7 the authority granted by the statute, a state of emergency in SDS, binding
8 for all SDS organs, members and personnel in the party authorities. You
9 will be receiving instructions about the measures daily. The first
10 measure to be taken is to organise daily meetings of Municipal Boards and
11 round-the-clock shifts on the party premises."
12 Mr. Krajisnik, did you have any role in the sending of any such
13 telegram at that time?
14 A. No, I did not. I did not have any role. But can I add something
15 in relation to this telegram?
16 Q. Please do, Mr. Krajisnik.
17 A. There is a document of the SDS here in court, of the SDS
18 Zavidovici where it says we have a state of emergency which involves duty
19 service. And that was it. Then there is also Novi Travnik and somebody
20 else too. I found that as I was leafing through documents.
21 Later on, I did not hear that Karadzic sent some instructions
22 subsequently, but I didn't know that he had imposed a state of emergency.
23 I thought this was just marketing. But I saw this telegram here when I
24 saw it -- when I came here. I think that I saw it in the documents given
25 to us by the OTP. Novi Travnik, Zavidovici, they are sending information
1 to the effect that they have duty service every day and so on, and I know
2 that there were other SDS Municipal Boards, too, and Mr. Karadzic was
3 angry because they were not resolving even the most basic of questions,
4 that there was poor discipline and so on. But as far as I could tell, I
5 didn't feel that there was anything extraordinary going on, and there were
6 some talks and some assemblies and the Municipal Boards were -- well, I
7 don't know that they were receiving different instructions, but I know of
8 this, about the SDS, that they responded, that they said, "We have duty
9 service now." I cannot tell you exactly because I don't have it here now,
10 but they have round-the-clock duty service.
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, no sooner do you mention the document from
12 Novi Travnik that it appears by magic in front of you.
13 A. There you go.
14 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, the Zavidovici telegram is P64, P65,
15 tab 51, and P529, tab 7.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The last information is ours as well. The
17 first one.
18 MR. STEWART: That's very helpful, Your Honour. Saves everybody's
19 time and energy. I'm grateful for that.
20 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry, the transcript seems to indicate that I
21 was speaking about the Novi Travnik document that Mr. Stewart just
22 produced. Of course, the reference earlier was to the Zavidovici
24 MR. STEWART: No. I appreciate that. I'm just grateful for all
25 information in that vein. We'll check with that very helpful piece of
1 information. We'll check all this, Your Honour, so we do avoid further
2 duplication of exhibits.
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is -- it's date stamped 20th of October as a
4 receipt apparently. The date of 19th of October itself, from Novi Travnik
5 Municipal Board, Mr. Krajisnik, this appears to be the document you were
6 referring to in relation to Novi Travnik a moment ago. Correct?
7 A. Yes, yes. It was my understanding that the fact that they
8 introduced duty service was the state of emergency. They didn't say what
9 else they did. So what I found here is the only thing. Secondly, at that
10 time, I really did not feel that any instructions were being sent and I
11 didn't hear about it from Mr. Karadzic either, although there was ongoing
12 correspondence all the time. I didn't mean that it was this way. It was
13 sort of autonomous.
14 Q. Did a declaration of a state of emergency in the SDS at this time
15 have any perceptible effect on your day-to-day work and your day-to-day
17 A. Absolutely not. We were in a state of emergency all the time.
18 When I say that, I mean in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were always some
19 kinds of negotiations, talks, crises, misinformation, information. So I
20 lived in that state from the moment I took the chair of the president of
21 the Assembly, all the way up to the end. So this specific move cannot be
22 linked to that at all.
23 Q. You can put that on one side as well, Mr. Krajisnik. And I'm --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, Mr. Registrar found P64A, tab 143,
25 and P529, tab 9.
1 MR. TIEGER: I have it as P529, tab 9, that's correct, but I also
2 had it as tab 52 for P65. We can double-check that. In any event, the
3 reference P529 accords with our --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Might even have three sources.
5 Yes. Please proceed, Mr. --
6 MR. STEWART: We are trying not to make it four, Your Honour.
7 That's all we are attempting to do.
8 Q. I'm handing you one further document. Again, it's a single page,
9 Mr. Krajisnik. And we have copies again, Your Honour. These are just
10 one-page documents. And this is -- it's described as telex to be
11 delivered to the mayor. Thanks. And it's the Sarajevo SDS order which
12 was brought to light at the all-mayors' meeting held on October 26, 1991,
13 at 1500 hours in Banja Luka, chaired by Dr. Karadzic and fully accepted at
14 the autonomous region Presidency meeting Krajina and the government of
15 Krajina. And it's apparently signed by -- the name at the bottom,
16 coordinator for implementation of decision, Radoslav Brdjanin, the
17 vice-president of the Autonomous Region Assembly, Celinac, 29 October
19 Were you at any such meeting as described there, Mr. Krajisnik?
20 A. It's the 26th. No, I don't think I was there. The 26th. I
21 cannot say -- I didn't hear this being said at some meeting that I
22 attended, but whether there was a meeting at that time and whether I was
23 there and that somebody then phrased it the way it suited them, that I
24 cannot say. I don't know. I cannot say whether I was there or not,
1 But the content, I find it quite foreign. I don't know whether I
2 ever actually saw this document. Well, maybe I did. I don't know. No,
3 no, no.
4 Mr. Brdjanin very often spoke along these lines at some meetings.
5 I think he was against desertion and things like that. If there was a
6 meeting in Banja Luka, and I believe that there was a meeting there,
7 perhaps Mr. Karadzic tried - how should I put this? - to stimulate people
8 at this gathering to respond to call-ups to the JNA because people didn't
9 want to.
10 But all these things that are mentioned here -- I mean, really, I
11 think that Karadzic would not say something like this. What is this?
12 Command, the first thing is to form commands? That is out of the
13 question. Karadzic wouldn't have said that. No way. Commands of towns
14 and villages, that is a Partizan expression, no.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, they're just for the public record, apart from
16 anything else, but I want to put a couple of points from -- there are 14
17 numbered points here. But number 5 is to take over power in public firms,
18 post office, account keeping institution, administration of justice and
19 especially in mass communication media.
20 In October 1991, were you aware of any instruction being given by
21 Dr. Karadzic or on his behalf for the taking over of power in public
22 firms, post office, account keeping institutions and so on, in any
23 municipalities or regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
24 A. I'll try to be very precise. As far as I know, Mr. Karadzic often
25 said, "Why do you want something new and you did not take over power where
1 you have it?" What he meant was you still have communists there, people
2 from the ancien regime and things like that. We do not have
3 a government because they didn't do anything.
4 This kind of wording certainly isn't Karadzic's. The wording was,
5 take over power, you won the elections, and implement things the way
6 you -- we agreed with our partners. Quite simply, power was not exercised
7 as agreed upon previously in many municipalities. As for this, no way.
8 Q. Would you read -- I'm not 100 per cent sure about the English
9 version, would you read point 6? It's very short, Mr. Krajisnik. Could
10 you read that out loud?
11 A. "At radio stations, announce a war programme scheme."
12 Q. Were you aware at that time of any war programme scheme?
13 A. No, absolutely not.
14 I'm trying to say something now. This is certainly a free
15 interpretation of something that was present. Radio stations -- well,
16 there was a war in Croatia, and radio stations very often perhaps had a
17 depressing effect, and perhaps somebody said you should have a more
18 stimulating effect. But as for a war scheme to be introduced, that is
19 certainly not true. I'm sure that Mr. Karadzic couldn't have said that,
20 unless they did something that I really have no idea about. But as far as
21 I know, Mr. Karadzic, he would never propose this kind of thing. And it
22 couldn't be possible either because there cannot be a war programme scheme
23 if there is no war, and there was no war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 Q. At point number 12 says: "If there are any paramilitary
25 formations, they are to be disbanded and transferred into territorial
1 army," what we've often referred to as the TO, "especially this is to be
3 Mr. Krajisnik, had you -- you at this point, late October 1991,
4 had you been involved in any discussions with Dr. Karadzic or other senior
5 SDS figures about paramilitary formations?
6 A. This formulation that in March or April 1992, well, that's all
7 right, but how can it be there in October 1991? There is no Territorial
8 Defence. If there are paramilitary formations, they could have been in
9 Croatia and then say individuals returned here. This is quite illogical
10 for someone to conclude this kind of thing in October 1991. And I don't
11 see what it means, Territorial Defence to be involved into the -- involved
12 in the JNA, fine, but I think this is groundless, that Mr. Karadzic
13 suggested this? No. Somebody worded this their own way.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I noticed, Mr. Stewart, that the English translation
15 does not translate the stamp which appears on the document. I don't know
16 whether it's confirmation of the reception or of sending the document.
17 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour, I'm temporarily disadvantaged, I
18 haven't got a -- we parted with all our B/C/S copies.
19 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact, I would like to invite the
20 Prosecution to look at P529, tab 13, which seems to me the same as this
21 one, and also as P64A, tab 325, to see whether the stamp is translated,
22 and if not, to provide additional information as far as this stamp is
24 MR. STEWART: Yes. Well, I think I'm understanding what the point
25 would be, Your Honour, though I don't have the document immediately.
1 JUDGE ORIE: No, but it's a document introduced by the
2 Prosecution. So therefore they are invited to do the additional work.
3 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. We appreciate that.
4 Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
6 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, I'm going to go now to a document
7 which has -- is already in evidence, P529.22.1, and it's -- what it is,
8 Your Honour, it's a little bit familiar by now. It's copy number 93 of a
9 document which has been known as Variants A and B. There's not much point
10 in creating much of a mystery in putting this to Mr. Krajisnik.
11 JUDGE ORIE: No, I even wonder whether it has to be -- unless
12 there is any specific reason why it should be distributed again, saves
13 half of wood not to do so, but we would be glad to bring it.
14 MR. STEWART: And while I hope Mr. Krajisnik has the version in
15 his own language.
16 Q. He has?
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, in this Court, you obviously have seen several
19 versions of this document before. So the question has to be: Before you
20 came to The Hague, to put it rather neutrally, before you arrived in
21 The Hague in April 2000, had you seen this document or a document with a
22 different number but a document in this very form?
23 A. I don't know. I've seen so many documents here. It's as if I had
24 seen this so many times, but I don't know whether I actually did see it
25 before I came to The Hague.
1 Q. Well, we know what it is. It's a document which is referred to as
2 Variants A and B. We can agree about that, can't we, Mr. Krajisnik?
3 A. Yes, yes, yes.
4 Q. And you after all have been in court throughout, naturally, and
5 you've heard a certain amount of evidence, and you've heard evidence in
6 particular about the distribution of a document in this form in late
7 December 1991. You recall just summarising that way, you recall that that
8 evidence was given by more than one witness?
9 A. I remember all of that.
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, casting your mind back to the second half of
11 December 1991, were you present at any meeting at which any such document
12 was produced or distributed?
13 A. I'm under oath, and that is why I would like to ask you to let me
14 explain. I do not remember being anywhere where somebody was distributing
15 this. Perhaps it was being distributed in relation to this Assembly of
16 the 21st of December and I wasn't paying any attention. The most
17 important thing for me was how to respond to the European Community so
18 that they do not recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was never a central
19 issue at any meeting that would draw my attention. Maybe it was being
20 distributed at some table but I didn't pay any attention.
21 As for the creation of this document, I never took part in this,
22 nor did I contribute to the writing of this document. And I didn't get
23 the document at that time either. Had I received it, perhaps I just would
24 have looked at it and put it away because I never found this to be
1 I analysed the entire situation. I can give many answers to this
2 question. I could get a Ph.D. on Variants A and B. I investigated all of
3 this so that you would get a picture of arguments, not just mere stories.
4 So, Your Honours, gentlemen attorneys, if you're interested in
5 this, then perhaps you can get the real picture, and if you get the real
6 picture then you'll know what the real state of affairs was. I did not
7 take part in this. I would not have taken part in this. I have my own
8 opinion regarding this which is a different matter.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Stewart will guide you through
10 this, and he knows exactly the difference between a witness and an expert
11 witness. So he'll take care of that.
12 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
13 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, first of all, were you -- you'll have to bear with
15 me, Mr. Krajisnik, if you think these questions have already been answered
16 because I'm nevertheless going to put them and invite a specific answer.
17 Were you present at any Main Board meeting in 1991 at which a document of
18 this type was under discussion?
19 A. I know that I answered, but my answer is that I never attended any
20 Main Board meeting where this document was debated and where it was
21 identified. Now, whether it was a joint meeting or whatever, as far as
22 this A/B Variant is concerned, let us discuss this. I have no memory of
23 this. And I'm convinced that I would have remembered something like this.
24 I'm trying to be as precise as possible. Perhaps I could be even more
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if this -- is it possible that a document of this
2 type was discussed at a Main Board meeting without your finding out that
3 it had been discussed?
4 A. Theoretically, yes.
5 Q. Well, leaving theory, Mr. Krajisnik, and going to the --
6 A. I'm saying theoretically yes, but I think that later on, I would
7 have had to find out. If it's an important document, somebody would have
8 to familiarise me with it. That's why I'm saying theoretically, yes, but
9 practically no one familiarised me with this document. No one said, "Look
10 we brought this document" and no one slowed it to me, and probably
11 somebody should have familiarised me with this document if I was supposed
12 to play some kind of a role.
13 Q. If you go just for the moment to the -- almost the very end of the
14 document, I'm not talking about any handwritten material at the end, but
15 to the end of the typed part of the document, that last numbered paragraph
16 is number 4. Do you see that?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And then underneath, does it say, in your own language, of course,
19 "SDS Crisis Staff"?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Was there at any time in December 1991 such a body as the SDS
22 Crisis Staff?
23 A. I hadn't heard about that body then, and I'm certain that a Crisis
24 Staff did not exist in the SDS on the level -- on the level of the
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I want to ask you a bit about the content.
2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I wonder if Mr. Krajisnik could be
3 asked to read the first numbered paragraph of this whole document for this
4 reason, that we have come across at least four different translations of
5 this, but we understand that there is only a single version of the text in
6 Serbian, whatever numbered copy we look at, but we come across certainly
7 four different English versions. It might, and they do vary in quite
8 striking ways sometimes. So could --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course if the variations are -- if a document
10 is translated two or three times, we know that sometimes slight -- but if
11 the variation is significant in your view, then we, of course, would ask
12 Mr. --
13 Yes, Mr. Tieger?
14 MR. TIEGER: Yeah, of course, I have no objection to any
15 commentary or any focus on any aspect of the document whatsoever in this
16 courtroom. However, if the interest in having it read is to resolve any
17 differences between translations, then it seems to me that a preferable
18 course would be to send it to CLSS where they can concentrate on the
19 written words and do the job that they are intended to do rather than ask
20 our simultaneous translators to do that. It doesn't seem like the
21 most --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because there is a risk of getting a fifth
23 translation at this moment or to have reproduced the one that is in front
24 of us which might be a right one.
25 So, therefore, if that's the only goal, Mr. Stewart, I would
1 support the suggestion by Mr. Tieger to have -- well, let's say, the final
2 translation of this document, which stands forever, rather than to have it
3 read again. It's similar like to ask Mr. Krajisnik whether at the end it
4 says "Crisis Staff." I mean, I can even read it by now in B/C/S, that
5 it's "Krizni Stab," so therefore these are -- that's not really -- it
6 takes some time, not much, but let's be as efficient as possible, because
7 we would end up with perhaps question marks rather than anything else.
8 So unless there is any specific point you'd like to raise with
9 Mr. Krajisnik at this moment, I would certainly prefer that you point at
10 the differences or even speak about it with Mr. Tieger, send it to CLSS
11 and get the best translation.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, straight away. Of course, I'm
13 aware that what I suggest produces a fifth version because I was
14 specifically going to invite the translation booth obviously not simply to
15 use the English version in front of them, because that's one of the four
16 different versions. So I was aware of that, Your Honour.
17 The problem is that with four different translations, first of
18 all, we are not particularly happy with number 93. But we think that
19 somebody else might not be particularly happy with number 100, and four is
20 rather a lot to handle. We sometimes compare two translations in court,
21 but if we were to sit around saying, "Well, we don't like that bit in that
22 one and that bit in that one."
23 JUDGE ORIE: Let's keep matters simple. If you want to put a
24 question to Mr. Krajisnik in relation to one of the differences in
25 translation, then, of course, the matter should be settled before we --
1 before you put such a question to Mr. Krajisnik. If it is just a matter
2 of having the best translation where we have now to choose out of four,
3 not knowing which is the best, then, of course, we should follow the
4 course suggested by Mr. Tieger. So it depends on what your next question
5 would be.
6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, can I indicate one of the -- it doesn't
7 matter. All right. Your Honour, we'll sort that out some other way.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 MR. STEWART:
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I invite you just, if you would read to yourself,
11 which you can probably take fairly quickly because you've seen this
12 document before, the four introductory paragraphs. Just say when you've
13 done that. I think you have read it.
14 A. I've read it.
15 Q. That's nice and quick.
16 Mr. Krajisnik, when we go on to Variant A and B, and you
17 understand, do you, that Variant A is intended to apply to municipalities
18 as you can see from those introductory paragraphs where the Serbian people
19 were in a majority and Variant B where they were not, they were in a
20 minority. You understand that essential distinction, right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Do -- in the light of that distinction, do you have any general
23 observation to make on the inclusion in this document of Variant A?
24 A. Variant A is completely unnecessary because all the obligations
25 stated here are something that was neither implemented nor was it possible
1 to implement, because those were areas where the Serbian side had power,
2 control. It says here the Serbian Assembly should be introduced. The
3 Executive Council should be dissolved and then the Main Board introduced.
4 I don't know a single place where the Variant A was implemented. We had
5 Bosanski Petrovac where they received this paper, allegedly, but they
6 didn't implement it because they were supposed to dissolve the Assembly
7 and then form a Serbian Assembly, and that was completely illogical.
8 So if this document was practicable at all, then it's only
9 Variant B that could be applied. Variant A was completely absolutely
10 unnecessary. I never heard from anyone from any locality that they had
11 implemented Variant A. Everything boiled down to the Crisis Staff which
12 is something entirely different. But they didn't form the Serbian
13 Assembly or the Executive Board or anything because it was all
15 Q. When you say it was superfluous, Mr. Krajisnik, the -- a very
16 large number of the items in Variant A simply match the items in
17 Variant B. You can see that, can't you?
18 A. Yes. Correct.
19 Q. The one your answer appears to be concentrating on is item 4,
20 under first stage, isn't it, convene and proclaim the Assembly of the
21 Serbian People?
22 A. Yes. How does it work? You have a municipal assembly in which
23 you are a majority and then you are to dissolve it and convene an Assembly
24 of the Serbian People. It's completely devoid of logic and nobody did it
1 Q. Can you, Mr. Krajisnik, can you think of any -- any practical
2 reason why a Serb-majority municipality should have taken the step of
3 convening and proclaiming an Assembly of the Serbian People in the
5 A. No. No. It was completely unnecessary. Why should they have?
6 That is confirmed by practice. Look at Banja Luka or Bosanski Petrovac.
7 There was an assembly in existence there. Croats and Muslims could have
8 left it because they were in the minority. Why would have Serbs have left
9 to form a Serbian assembly? I really don't see how that was practicable.
10 It's like somebody wrote this without thinking. Dubica, Prnjavor,
11 whatever locality our witnesses so far have come from, there was no
12 Serbian assembly formed in any of them. Maybe a Serb-dominated assembly
13 already existed there but nobody dissolved it to make a Serbian assembly.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you find any indications in this document that
15 enables you to suggest how it came into existence, who might have been
16 responsible for its conception and production?
17 A. I can tell you what I know. When I arrived here at the prison, I
18 had documents from my investigator and that was sent to Mr. Karadzic to
19 inquire, and the letter written by Mr. Bjelica, something similar to that
20 was sent to me. War veterans from the Second World War were concerned
21 about the looming danger, et cetera. These papers circulated.
22 I really analysed it. I'm trying to set aside this expertise as
23 the Presiding Judge warned me to do. But I can really say that a lot of
24 this is completely groundless. At least Variant A. Whereas about
25 Variant B, I would explain it a bit differently. Especially since you see
1 terms like "commander." I heard in one instance the term "commander of
2 the Crisis Staff." In all other instances it was called president of the
3 Crisis Staff or chairman of the Crisis Staff, et cetera, so a civilian
5 Q. Yes. You're thinking of, for example, in item, paragraph 3,
6 Mr. Krajisnik, are you, where it says, looking at Variant A first level?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. "The President of the Municipal Assembly or the Chairman of the
9 Municipal Executive Committee shall be the Commander of the Crisis Staff.
10 "The Commander shall appoint a member of the Crisis Staff" --
11 you're saying that that helps you to form some view, are you?
12 A. Yes. That's military terminology, that a -- there should be a
13 commander of the Crisis Staff. I even saw in one document the
14 term "Commander of the Crisis Staff" but in all the others, it's
15 written "President," "Chairman." Even Mr. Deronjic when he testified
16 here, he didn't refer to the Commander of the Crisis Staff because that
17 would be military terminology, not civilian. Whereas a Crisis Staff was a
18 civilian body, not a military one.
19 And even those who called themselves commanders later issued some
20 orders, and I mean Bosanska Krupa here. Of course, a Crisis Staff is not
21 entitled to issue any orders. Chaos broke out because somebody had
22 received this document, if they had received it at all.
23 Q. If we look at the content of the document, and I'm now not talking
24 about the political structures, the formation of Municipal Boards, Serb
25 assemblies and so on, but if we take number -- start at number 5, we can
1 do it in option A, or Variant A, first stage number 5, the second limb of
2 number 5: "Prepare the takeover of the staff facilities and equipment of
3 security services centres and their inclusion in the newly established
4 organ for internal affairs in the seat of the centre."
5 Had you been involved by the end of December 1991, let's take it
6 through to the end of that month, had you been involved in any discussions
7 concerning a need to take such steps within municipalities around Bosnia
8 and Herzegovina?
9 A. That is Variant A, and I wasn't involved in any such talks. But
10 you were presented with information here to the effect that all the
11 existing centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs were in the
12 majority remained the same. No new centres were formed. Stojan Zupljanin
13 [as interpreted], et cetera, Romanija. Maybe some existed, but there were
14 no new security centres established according to Variant A.
15 I don't know -- I don't know what else to say about this. How is
16 one supposed to dissolve one thing in order to form another?
17 Q. The 6, 7: "Strength from the organisation of the physical
18 security" -- well, Mr. Krajisnik, we'll go to Variant B because although
19 it's very similar, it's probably better to look at Variant B now.
20 Let's go to B. 6, you see that, number 6, in local communes or
21 populated places, with a majority Serbian population.
22 So, Mr. Krajisnik, that must be because Variant B is Serb-minority
23 municipalities, this must be, mustn't it, referring to communes or areas
24 within the municipality which have a majority-Serb population. That's
25 clear, isn't it? You're nodding.
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. "In local communes or populated places with a majority Serbian
3 population set up secret warehouses and depots for the storage of
4 foodstuffs and other products, raw materials and semi-manufacturers in
5 short supply which are to be taken out as much as possible through secret
6 channels from the commodity reserves, warehouses at all levels as well as
7 from the warehouses of transport organisations. The organisation and
8 supervision of these activities shall be done exclusively by Crisis
10 Were you involved in any discussion about any such procedure or
11 recommendation in December 1991?
12 A. No, the answer is no. Perhaps there was some talk about something
13 entirely different but there was no talk about this.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, is it realistically possible that discussions about
15 the matters addressed in this particular document took place in December
16 1991, between Dr. Karadzic and other senior members of the SDS, without
17 your being involved?
18 A. I don't believe Dr. Karadzic would have done something like that,
19 that he would have told this to a greater number of people than this inner
20 circle to which I belonged. It somehow doesn't fit.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, it seemed to me that in his answer to
22 your previous question, where you were asking Mr. Krajisnik about the
23 establishment of secret warehouses, that Mr. Krajisnik said perhaps there
24 was some talk about something entirely different. I got the impression
25 that Mr. Krajisnik wanted to draw our attention to another discussion
1 which might be confused with this one. That's at least what I -- that's
2 how I understood his reference to the other discussion. Perhaps just out
3 of caution, we should invite Mr. Krajisnik to tell us with what other kind
4 of discussion we -- this could be confused.
5 MR. STEWART: Certainly, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I had several meetings with the
8 trade union, I as a Speaker of the Assembly. Somebody sent them to me.
9 There was a large gathering outside the Assembly, and there was a man who
10 was breaking a loaf of bread and taking a toy gun from it. The message
11 was we want bread, we don't want guns.
12 And what I'm trying to say, maybe I was talking to the trade union
13 at some sort of meeting where I said we should have some reserves, but
14 that can in no way be linked to this formulation here about secret
15 warehouses, et cetera. But if somebody uninitiated listened in on my
16 talks with the trade unions, they would have perhaps understood this
17 differently and they could have said, well, you did discuss some
18 warehouses and things like that.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart. No. Perhaps we should
20 take a break --
21 MR. STEWART: Can I mention one point, Your Honour. It's a brief
22 translation point. Mr. Sladojevic tells me that the phrase "inner circle"
23 that appears at page 64, line 25, that that is -- that wasn't quite the
24 translation. Excuse me, just let me double-check what it's suggested it
1 [Defence counsel confer]
2 MR. STEWART: Yes, Mr. Sladojevic suggests that Mr. Krajisnik
3 said, by the people -- the -- instead of inner circle, "the people with
4 whom Mr. Karadzic had contact, including me."
5 JUDGE ORIE: Is that what you said, Mr. Krajisnik?
6 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
7 MR. TIEGER: I just wonder if the problem is if a particular
8 phrase is going to come back -- I mean, if the problem is the translation
9 of a particular phrase or word, then we're -- Mr. Krajisnik is going to
10 hear the same way and is going to repeat it the same way, and we are going
11 to have the same problem we had before.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Well, not necessarily. Translating one way, if you
13 translate it back, then he could say, well, how it's now translated but
14 there is a risk.
15 Apart from that, Mr. Stewart, in general terms, if Mr. Sladojevic
16 hints at some possible error in translation, I'd prefer that you ask
17 Mr. Krajisnik, pointing at the specific issue, to repeat his answer on
18 that specific, even if it's just half a line, you're, for example, saying
19 that you said in your -- and you start reading the sentence close to the
20 point where probably the mistake has been made and then ask Mr. Krajisnik
21 to repeat his answer. If that does not clarify the matter, then, of
22 course, you could -- we could then go more specifically in what
23 Mr. Sladojevic understood the answer to be.
24 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I accept that completely. But Your
25 Honour knows it's a translation point picked up, it's not our case that
1 Mr. Krajisnik was in the outer circle. That's not the Defence's case.
2 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, no, no. I'm not saying that. Could you take
3 us back, because I couldn't find it on page 64, line 25 so I have no
4 "circles" there.
5 MR. STEWART: Yes, it was at the very end of page 64.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see it.
7 Mr. Krajisnik, you said that you would not believe that
8 Dr. Karadzic would have done something like that, and that he would have
9 told this to a greater number of people than -- and then could you repeat
10 what you said. A greater number of people than ...
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will tell you what I meant to say,
12 and I don't know how it came across. Mr. Karadzic contacted with members
13 of the council, with Koljevic and Mrs. Plavsic, myself, with the
14 ministerial council, members of the Executive Board, and I don't believe
15 that he wouldn't have familiarised at least that group, maybe I even
16 called it a circle, but not in the sense in which it is sometimes used.
17 Of course, I thought he should have familiarised me as well. I didn't
18 think that I was outside that circle.
19 In any case, I thought we should have this paper at the meeting to
20 discuss it. That was the meaning of my answer. So first, if you exclude
21 all those other people, I think, still, that if that's an important
22 document, he should have told me, Mr. Koljevic, Mrs. Plavsic, he should
23 told us, I have there document here and you see --
24 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... cut the matter
25 short, you say it's very unlikely that he would have discussed it in a
1 wider circle and not in the smaller circle to which you belonged? Or that
2 he would be distributed --
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then I misunderstood you.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said this: Mr. Karadzic talked
6 with a relatively large number of people, who were a small number compared
7 to the entire structure of the SDS. I said the board, the council,
8 et cetera. And I believe that that number of people, although it
9 consisted of various bodies, would have been familiar with it. The
10 ministerial council, the Executive Board, et cetera. To me, that is a
11 smaller number of people compared to all the presidents of municipalities,
12 regions, et cetera.
13 So I -- I'm saying that he would have familiarised this smaller
14 number of people. Maybe I'm wrong. But I'm telling you what I thought
15 the practice was. He discussed in such meetings even less important
16 matters, but I never heard him discussing this at any meeting.
17 And what the witnesses mentioned here about assemblies, we'll deal
18 with that later.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Let me stop you there. It was exactly what I meant.
20 So I think there is no disagreement.
21 Mr. Stewart, my English might not have been very clear but the
22 wider circle, I had in mind the circle of the presidents of municipalities
23 and the inner circle the Executive Board, et cetera, et cetera, the
24 smaller circle.
25 MR. STEWART: Perfectly clear enough, with respect, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we'll have a break until 1.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 12.39 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 1.08 p.m.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
5 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I just want to ask you about something that came up
7 in the 26th January 1992 session of the Serb Assembly.
8 And Your Honour, I'm not going into that session and into those
9 minutes, it's a single point.
10 It's on page 14 of the English. It's up on the screen now. And
11 it's Mr. Cizmovic who we saw had been appointed in late December as a
12 coordinator for the Serb autonomous districts. And Mr. Cizmovic was
13 talking and he said: "As regards the borders, constitution of all the
14 republics, the Constitution of BiH being no exception, contain provisions
15 on the borders and the possibility of the alteration thereof. Provisions
16 on the alteration of borders in the Constitution of BH are rooted in two
17 fundamental principles. The first principle is that the constituents of
18 the state are the peoples who live therein, and the second is that BH is a
19 part of the federal Yugoslavia. In view of this, any change of the nature
20 of a state and the political arrangements in the Republic, as well as any
21 changes to the character of its borders must be subject to the consent of
22 its peoples. Taking the constitutional and legal status of the peoples as
23 a starting point, it is both politically and legally correct to allow all
24 peoples to create their own sovereign and independent states on the basis
25 of the right of each people to self-determination and an absolute respect
1 of the will of all other peoples, and not on the basis of a unilateral act
2 and by the use of force.
3 "To solve this problem, I propose that we begin with an urgent
4 operationalisation and a declaration on the establishment and promulgation
5 of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tasks set out in the
6 instructions of 19th December 1991 should be carried out.
7 "As to the work of the federal organs in general, including the
8 Assembly of Yugoslavia, I would like to point out that their work has been
9 frustrated either by their lack of a quorum, or because they are
11 Mr. Krajisnik, you presided over that assembly session in the
12 usual way. Can you say what Mr. Cizmovic was referring to when he talked
13 to tasks set out in the instructions of 19th December 1991?
14 A. The answer is I don't know, but let me explain. That assembly
15 session was dedicated, or rather one of the important items was that we
16 wanted to persuade the delegates of the Serbian Democratic Party to attend
17 the joint assembly session of Bosnia and Herzegovina that would decide on
18 declaring a referendum. That was the basic issue.
19 Anybody else could have raised any other sort of issue. I
20 wouldn't have remarked upon it. They were against the delegates going to
21 that assembly session, to make one last ditch attempt to find a solution.
22 He could have said instruction this, instruction that. I don't know
23 anything about this. He was the coordinator of autonomous regions. You
24 can say now that he talked about these instructions, but I simply didn't
25 note it because I was focused on the main topic.
1 As for Mr. Cizmovic, he is a lawyer, and when he talks about the
2 rights of nations and the forming of states, you tend to dwell upon it and
3 one sentence can easily elude your attention. I'm trying to say that he
4 meant some sort of instructions, maybe these ones in particular, but his
5 point was to explain our entitlements to us, such as the right to
6 self-determination, because he was a lawyer. I didn't register that bit.
7 I didn't pay attention to that.
8 Q. But now looking at that, Mr. Krajisnik, is there anything else he
9 could have been referring to, apart from these Variant A and B
10 instructions that we have seen, which do bear the date 19th December 1991?
11 A. Well, now I'm talking liberally. I think -- I believe, and this
12 is my opinion now, that such a document existed because I've heard all
13 sorts of testimony here, and I believe he may have been referring to some
14 instructions of that kind, but at that moment, I didn't make the
15 connection. It would be ugly if I said now he meant some other sorts of
16 instructions, because the date coincides, and he probably meant a copy of
17 these instructions, but why and how, I don't know. Because what I was
18 interested in was at the beginning, in the first part of his contribution,
19 how to establish states, et cetera.
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it's come up in evidence here in this trial, but do
21 you remember that in the course of this trial there has been produced an
22 article that was published in Slobodna Bosna in March 1992 which set out
23 in full the content of the Variant A and B document that we were looking
24 at just before the last break?
25 That's P405, Your Honours.
1 A. I assure you that I never read tabloids, and I did not read that
2 article in Slobodna Bosna at the time. Even today I don't read those
3 gossip magazines and newspapers. But now, in The Hague, I saw that
4 article that was published at the time in Slobodna Bosna, but I personally
5 didn't read the article and I had an antipathy for Slobodna Bosna because
6 they wrote badly about me when I was Speaker of the Assembly of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina. But here I saw that article that was published back then.
8 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, when we were looking at the -- not the
9 assembly session just mentioned there but the previous assembly session,
10 21st December 1991, and then considering Variants A and B, we've got
11 pretty much to the end of 1991, and you referred yesterday in your
12 evidence to certain information that came from Mr. Milosevic.
13 Mr. Krajisnik, can you remember when was the first time in your life that
14 you met Mr. Slobodan Milosevic?
15 A. The first time I met Mr. Milosevic was when I was part of the
16 delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was meeting a delegation of
17 Serbia to talk about the Yugoslav crisis. You can find it somewhere in
18 the papers. I don't recall the date now. But that was certainly 1991 and
19 that was my first meeting with him.
20 After that, I didn't see him again for a long time because my
21 office did not allow me to have free contacts with anyone outside of the
22 protocol. But when the crisis aggravated on several occasions, I,
23 together with Mr. Koljevic, who was also part of the delegation of Bosnia
24 and Herzegovina, and Mr. Karadzic as well, who joined the delegation, met
25 with Mr. Milosevic. And I have to say, on every occasion when I attended
1 those talks, they were always organised at the invitation of Mr. Milosevic
2 because he had received information or maybe requests or orders that the
3 European Community should talk to us through him. That's my entire
4 knowledge about 1991.
5 Q. When you said that your office didn't allow you to have free
6 contacts with anyone outside of the protocol, in the first place, you mean
7 your position as president of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly
8 constrained you in that respect, is that what you're saying?
9 A. Well, yes, if you are an official of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then
10 that very moment you stop being a private person. Your office accompanies
11 you wherever you go and, of course, you can't go to any meetings without
12 everybody knowing about it. It's not like I attended a birthday party for
13 a friend of mine. It was different for somebody who had been in the party
14 for a long time and could have gone on unmonitored trips, but I went
15 everywhere in my official status. The meetings held on the occasion of
16 the Belgrade Initiative. Because when you're an official everybody knows
17 about it, including the press. Private people can travel anywhere they
18 like. So you have complete information about all my travel in 1991, at
19 least the greatest part of 1991, especially prior to the crisis.
20 Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Milosevic in 1991 other than in the presence
21 of Dr. Karadzic?
22 A. In 1991? Apart from that time when we went as a delegation of
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Karadzic did not attend that meeting. But
24 apart from that -- and there was this other case when we discussed the
25 Belgrade Initiative. Mr. Karadzic wasn't there and I was. But if we are
1 talking about Serb-Serb meetings, to put it that way, if something like
2 that happened in 1991, and it did, then I'm almost certain that
3 Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic were there for sure, and that there was
4 somebody else too; I can't remember who. As far as I can remember, I was
5 never alone in 1991 with Mr. Milosevic, nor did I talk to him on the phone
6 in 1991. Not that I remember, at least.
7 Q. How many -- from your recollection, Mr. Krajisnik, how many
8 meetings, apart from the delegation meeting, the Bosnia and Herzegovina
9 delegation meeting, and the Belgrade Initiative meeting, leaving those
10 aside, how many times did you meet Mr. Milosevic in the course of 1991?
11 A. That's the hardest question you could ask. It's difficult to
12 qualify, a few times, many times, several times. I met with him several
13 times but I really couldn't tell you many times and I'll explain why.
14 When the crisis set on, we were supposed to have consultations
15 with legal experts, and they had very good legal experts in Belgrade. I
16 remember that we went to one meeting like that. And after the Assembly
17 was formed, we went to meet with those lawyers to check with them whether
18 our course was right and whether the law gives any options to Muslims and
19 Croats to do something, and we had a meeting with Mr. Milosevic then. In
20 1991 and maybe the beginning of 1992, when the Vance plan was being
21 discussed, Mr. Milosevic invited all the Krajinas, the Serb Krajina, the
22 Bosnian Krajina, and us, to try to persuade Mr. Babic to accept the Vance
23 plan. There was a -- some sort of round table. It was chaired by
24 Mr. Kostic, who did the persuading. But I'm sure that it wasn't a large
25 number of meetings. Except, excuse me, when we would go to a conference,
1 and then we would travel from Belgrade, then perhaps we met with
2 Mr. Milosevic because he simply wanted to know. He was some sort of long
3 arm, who was supposed to make sure that we weren't dragging our feet in
4 the search for a solution.
5 So there were meetings in 1991 and 1992, but I can't tell you
6 exactly how many.
7 Q. So staying in 1991, for the moment, Mr. Krajisnik, before the
8 information that you referred to yesterday, you referred to Mr. Milosevic
9 and Mr. Bulatovic but you said information had come from Mr. Milosevic
10 that came as a shock to you, essentially that he was pushing you towards
11 the European Community position. That was what you were telling the Trial
12 Chamber. But before that, was Mr. Milosevic supportive of Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina remaining within Yugoslavia, together with Serbia and
14 Montenegro and whatever other republics remained in Yugoslavia?
15 A. Mr. Milosevic was convinced that Bosnia-Herzegovina and
16 Mr. Izetbegovic would opt in favour of staying in Yugoslavia, especially
17 after Mr. Izetbegovic's and Mr. Gligorov's proposal. And he actually
18 complained to us that we did not know how to handle the Muslim side, and
19 in his opinion they were prepared to stay in Yugoslavia. He objected to
20 us several times on that score because he had the impression when meeting
21 with Mr. Izetbegovic at the meetings of presidents that Mr. Izetbegovic
22 and even Macedonia were prepared to stay in Yugoslavia.
23 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, it was true, wasn't it, that at various times
24 it appeared to you that Mr. Izetbegovic was prepared to stay in
1 A. Absolutely, yes.
2 Q. Was Mr. Milosevic giving you, in 1991, before that information
3 that came as a shock to you, was Mr. Milosevic giving you either advice or
4 instructions as to how you, the Bosnian Serb leadership, should handle the
6 A. Well, I could not say that he was giving us advice. Advice was
7 there when the crisis culminated. Until that moment, until the 14th of
8 October happened, up to that moment, there was the Belgrade Initiative,
9 the historic agreement and so on and so forth. There was no need for him
10 to give us any kind of advice. He simply supported it. He wanted that.
11 He supported that. So this was a mutual desire of ours, if I can put it
12 that way.
13 Later on, when the crisis escalated, well, then I can respond to
14 that a bit later, what his role was then. But then, until that moment,
15 until the crisis culminated, that is to say, when the Assembly fell apart,
16 if I can put it that way, it's not a very nice expression, is it, that
17 happened on the 14th of October. But until then, Mr. Milosevic made many
18 efforts to have a solution found at these meetings of presidents. I
19 cannot be the judge of that. I cannot say how this was done, but I know
20 that they were working autonomously and we were not a force to be reckoned
21 with. It's not that he would influence us so that we would obey him or
22 whether it would be the other way around or -- I mean, the periods are
23 different. So you have to distinguish between them.
24 Q. Well, if we take the period up to the 14th of October, then, up to
25 the parliamentary crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had you had any
1 discussions with Mr. Milosevic as to the role or prospective role of the
2 JNA in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina?
3 A. I do not remember having taken part in that kind of discussion.
4 I'm afraid that perhaps I'll forget something at some point. This was an
5 ongoing topic, that the JNA had to go, they have their constitutional
6 obligation to defend the people, et cetera, so perhaps we did mention that
7 at some point, too, but I don't remember that we said that some particular
8 importance should be given to the Yugoslav People's Army.
9 I know that he was the one who always influenced Mr. Karadzic so
10 that they would take political activity aimed at mobilisation because
11 people were not really eager to respond to call-ups. And we were there to
12 help with the mobilisation of the Yugoslav People's Army.
13 As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, I don't remember that at any moment we
14 discussed that, whether they would stay there or not. Up until the moment
15 when Mr. Izetbegovic reached agreement with the JNA that they would stay
16 for another five years, but that's a different matter altogether.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you've described various activities of yours --
18 well, the ones you've just described in relation to Mr. Milosevic, and you
19 were part of the negotiating team, as you've described. By the time we
20 get to December 1991, what was your typical daily activity in your
21 political work?
22 A. I came to work exactly at 8.00 or 9.00 in the morning, whenever it
23 would begin, and I would leave at 6.00 or 7.00 or 8.00 in the evening. My
24 activities were such that I always seemed to have some problem on my
25 agenda, that Mr. Konjicija came, Mr. Cancar and so on, and then we would
1 discuss these problems to see how we would include this in the assembly
2 procedure, to discuss it. So that required a lot of work. Then very
3 often, I received the presidents of clubs of MPs. There were clubs that
4 had two members only; others had 30 or 40. I made an effort to treat each
5 and every club equally. Then I talked to these people. I tried to see
6 what they thought, and that they would hear what I thought. Whatever we
7 did in 1991, everything had to do with this unfortunate crisis in Bosnia
8 and Herzegovina.
9 As for the rest of my time, everybody would go home because they
10 lived in the centre of town, and I lived on the outskirts of town. So
11 then these people -- well, since I would work all day long, and then these
12 people who wanted to come and see me, and I would receive them, you saw
13 that I had a few meetings with people, about problems that were perhaps
14 even semi-personal. So that was another part of my work.
15 A third part of my work are these talks. We were happy when the
16 three sides started to talk. And then either bilaterally or
17 multilaterally, the Serb, Croat and Muslim sides, or as we called them the
18 SDA, the HDZ and the SDS, we talked about different stages involved, and I
19 told you about all these stages that took up a lot of our work, up to the
20 14th of October, because that is the critical point.
21 In September, after the initiative regarding a historical
22 agreement we had a relaxed atmosphere. The Assembly was held I think on
23 the 30th of September. We all sat there as if it were a holiday when we
24 would visit each other, wish each other all the best, like it was the
25 Bajram holiday or something like that. We would talk for as long as it
1 took, and we would avoid war, and that was on television too, and believe
2 me, at that point, it seemed as if everybody was trying to apologise to
3 each other. I actively took part in that.
4 Now, what did I not take part in actively? I did not take part in
5 a single meeting of the SDS Executive Board. I don't think there were
6 more than one and two sessions of the Main Board. I did not take part in
7 any of the meetings of the personnel commission, although I was a member
8 of the SDS. I was resolving a different problem. The government was next
9 door to the assembly building, and the problem was the appointment of
10 personnel in MUP because that was the most difficult for the Muslims to
11 accept. And then these people complained to me and they said, "Well,
12 please, get me in touch with Mr. Karadzic because it was Mr. Karadzic and
13 Mr. Dukic who were reaching agreement on these appointments. So I did
14 that too.
15 My wife was sick, then, in 1991. I still have a guilty conscience
16 to this day because of all this work I did and because I did not spend
17 enough time solving my personal problems. I was simply trying to ensure
18 the success of all of this as much as I could.
19 I thought that the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
20 something sacred to me and that I had to preserve it as best I could and
21 that is why I made all these efforts up to the very last minute to do so.
22 That's why I even gave this interview when I said no matter happens, I'm
23 not going to be the last president of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 There is going to be somebody after me too.
25 I don't know if I got this answer right, but that is more or less
1 what I can remember.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, after the crisis on the 14th, 15th of October,
3 1991, how much, if any, of your time between then and the end of 1991 was
4 devoted to your work as president of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly?
5 A. I worked for the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the same pace
6 as I did for the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I
7 tried to work at the same pace and to continue the same activities, and I
8 did not change my position one little bit. I held sessions, meetings and
9 so on.
10 Truth to tell, we became a bit more distant. There were less
11 meetings because the former partners drifted apart. But I carried out all
12 of these activities as I was supposed to. All of that can be seen from
13 the minutes of the sessions. There are documents about all of that.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when -- as the Serb Assembly came to be formed, did
15 that then take up a substantial amount of your working time?
16 A. I said that from that moment, when the Assembly of the Serb People
17 was established, there was less activity, in terms of what I already
18 mentioned, the things that I was doing up until the crisis culminated. It
19 certainly took up quite a bit of my time, but I worked along parallel
20 lines and I did not leave any of my work unfinished. It so happened that
21 the activities of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina were on the decline,
22 and instead of them came those activities related to the Assembly of the
23 Serb People, although there was no major activity on my part in this area
24 because there were other people who were working on that, lawyers and so
1 Q. Apart from the lawyers, who were the other people who were working
2 on the establishment of the Serb Assembly?
3 A. Well, the lawyers were carrying through the political positions.
4 I believe that you were referring to the documents that were being
5 created. I think that the MPs and the Main Board and the council and the
6 members of the Presidency and the president of the Assembly, that is to
7 say I, and the president of the party and all others, gave a certain
8 contribution to spelling out specifically this political idea that we
9 wanted, creating an Assembly of the Serb People. The fundamental basis
10 around which everybody rallied was the club of MPs and the people who held
11 offices of state in Bosnia-Herzegovina and who were appointed by the SDS.
12 So there was this expanded meeting where things were being resolved. And,
13 of course, let me not forget members of the Executive Board of the SDS,
14 the members of the Main Board to a lesser extent, because this was a wider
15 body and they had less meetings. There were also some freelance
16 individuals, so to speak, like intellectuals who gave a contribution of
17 their own, but the lawyers are the ones that shoulder the greatest blame
18 for this because they did the most in terms of formulating the
19 constitution and everything else.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps, Mr. Stewart, these last words and
21 lawyers would be a suitable moment.
22 MR. STEWART: I was wondering about that, Your Honour, yes, we can
23 sleep on that, shall we?
24 JUDGE ORIE: To conclude for the day.
25 But before we adjourn, did I understand that some further
1 information concerning the stamp on P529, tab 13, that is the Brdjanin
2 document, is available?
3 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, once the Court made an inquiry about
4 that stamp, I had directed our language assistants to take a look at that
5 stamp and --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Harmon please adjust his microphone.
7 The interpreters cannot hear him. Thank you.
8 MR. HARMON: I'll start again then.
9 Once the Court had directed attention to that particular stamp
10 being untranslated, I asked my language assistants to provide me with a
11 translation. I've shown Mr. Stewart a copy of the translation, and I can
12 proceed any number of ways. I could have it drafted rather than read it
13 into the record. The stamp is not complex. It's something that we've
14 seen many, many times --
15 JUDGE ORIE: If it's merely technical, perhaps if you read it it's
16 on the record and we can save replacing all kinds of translations.
17 Because there is nothing wrong in the translation, it's just a matter of
18 incompleteness. So if -- I see Mr. Stewart agrees, if you would just read
19 the stamp.
20 MR. HARMON: The first line, in small print, it says "sent,
21 received, telegram number 260."
22 Second line of the stamp says: "Date, 29/10/1991 at 1420 hours."
23 Third line I'm informed by my language assistant that those
24 abbreviations are unknown.
25 Finally the last line reads: "Processed by," and there is a
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Doesn't give any -- doesn't give much
3 additional information because it doesn't even say whether it was sent or
4 received. Neither does it give any information about who wrote that in
5 the frame of the stamp. The only thing -- I've forgotten about that, as a
6 matter of fact, it's such a long time ago that we did send these kind of
7 telexes, whether this is the telex of the receipt or of the sending party,
8 and which one was the sending party.
9 I take it that since Celinac is in the text that it was sent by
10 Celinac to what seems to be Sokolje but ...
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm sorry, but there
12 seems to be no interpretation all the time.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Oh. Mr. Krajisnik we just discussed -- do you have
14 interpretation now?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Ever since the distinguished
16 Prosecutor started to speak, I did not receive any interpretation.
17 Ah, now I can. I guess it's the technical people who were
18 terrified of the Prosecutor and ...
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That is not a matter of fact but rather of
20 interpretation and opinion, Mr. Krajisnik, but you're not questioned at
21 this moment so -- do you now receive interpretation?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I hear you, yes.
23 JUDGE ORIE: We only discussed the stamp on the document you
24 testified about, which is -- seems to have been sent by Mr. Brdjanin and
25 we concluded more or less that the stamp only -- mainly says that it was
1 sent and/or received on the 29th of October, 1991 but doesn't give much
2 more information.
3 Then I think it's on the record, Mr. Stewart. Perhaps we should
4 not ask for any additional translation of the document.
5 We'll then adjourn until tomorrow, the 4th of May, 9.00, same
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 4th day of May,
9 2006, at 9.00 a.m.