1 Tuesday, 9 May 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Before we start, a few procedural matters.
6 First of all, I was informed that the Defence would like to
7 respond to the Prosecution's response to the -- well, let's say Rule 68
8 motion. The Chamber's inclined, has briefly discussed the matter, to
9 grant such a request if it would be made, but if the Prosecution would
10 strongly object against it, we'd like to hear it now. And when I say
11 "strongly object," that means that we'd prefer to -- but within certain
12 limits. That means, I take it, Mr. Josse, that going to the core of the
13 case and leaving out all the niceties and what the history is and what
14 again was the date of the filing. Just go to the qualification and be
15 done within three pages.
16 MR. JOSSE: Yes. The original motion wasn't very long, as Your
17 Honours probably observed.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Three pages would do?
19 MR. JOSSE: It would.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would there be any objection against a
21 three-page response to the response?
22 MR. HARMON: No, Your Honour. We initially -- we do object, but
23 when you characterise it as whether we strongly object, of course we can't
24 frame it that way. We do obviously reserve, if there are no issues raised
25 in the course of the pleading by Defence counsel reserve the right to
1 respond to any new arguments that have not been raised previously.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I would not expect that, because of course we
3 would get into a tradition where a response to a response would introduce
4 all kind of new matters apart from perhaps some details. Then of course
5 the Chamber might be less disinclined next time to decline grant such
7 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, absolutely. And might I say in passing,
8 I was going to inquire as to what happened to the Prosecution's
9 application for an extension of one day under Rule 27 -- 127. I assume
10 that was granted by the Chamber.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We should -- perhaps we should have asked you,
12 but I think as a matter of fact -- I don't know whether it's assigned
13 already, but on these kind of matters we're trying to be practical just as
14 I am now being practical for you.
15 MR. JOSSE: Of course.
16 JUDGE ORIE: It takes more time to argue on whether these three
17 pages could be submitted, yes or no, and at the same time the parties have
18 some understanding on that this kind of, I would say, flexibility. I'm
19 not talking about generosity should not result in new issues to raise.
20 MR. JOSSE: We don't wish to take that technical point.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Fine. Thank you. Then what is not yet
22 requested is nevertheless granted.
23 MR. JOSSE: We are grateful.
24 JUDGE ORIE: That is, respond three pages. Then I do understand
25 that P1166, P1168, P1147, P1092 are ready to be submitted, at least the
1 translations are ready to be submitted.
2 MR. HARMON: That's correct, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Then as usual, the Defence has got one week to object
4 against these translations, and otherwise they are admitted into evidence,
5 and the provisional admissions of the original will become a final -- a
6 final admission.
7 Then I do understand that the five lines of the 1st of January,
8 1992 telephone conversation have been -- has been freshly translated. The
9 parties have received it. If there's -- they have not received that yet.
10 Then you'll receive it very soon, I take it. Yes. And once you've
11 received it, please let me know whether there's any further reason to --
12 to take up this issue. Again, if not, the original lines will be replaced
13 by these five -- I shouldn't say lines; it's boxes.
14 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then a final issue is the following: Mr. Krajisnik
16 received the -- the floppy disk that was seized at the time of his arrest
17 and which stayed in the hands of the Prosecution for quite some time.
18 Mr. Harmon, Mr. Krajisnik would like to provide to Defence counsel
19 the printout of the list of files appearing on that floppy disk. I take
20 it that since you've seized it and have used it for whatever
21 investigations you would like, that you are aware, at least, of what the
22 content of that floppy disk was and whether there is any problem if at
23 this stage of the proceedings Mr. Krajisnik would provide just a list of
24 files on the floppy disk to Defence counsel.
25 If you say I'd first like to check to know exactly whether what
1 was on it before you'd respond ...
2 MR. HARMON: Yeah, the correspondence. I had a correspondence
3 with Defence counsel about what had been seized from Mr. Krajisnik at the
4 time of his arrest. I frankly put that correspondence aside, and I
5 haven't refreshed my recollection with it, so I will do so after the first
6 break, and then I'll be in better position to inform the Chamber.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Krajisnik, you've heard this, so let's wait
8 for at least a couple of hours to see whether the Prosecution would have
9 any objection against this. Would you mind if I provide a copy of what
10 you printed out to the Prosecution, because the Prosecution has had access
11 to the floppy disks for many, many years. So to say, well, they shouldn't
12 see it as perhaps -- even -- yes.
13 Mr. Harmon, perhaps that may assist you in choosing your position.
14 That's what Mr. Krajisnik would like to ...
15 So we'll hear from you on the matter. And then as soon as we have
16 heard from the Prosecution, Mr. Krajisnik, we'll decide whether you're
17 allowed to give this list Defence counsel.
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we seem to be in a rather odd position
19 now. The Prosecution have been given the list, and if they object now to
20 us having the list, they've had and we haven't. It seems a rather odd
22 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not saying that you shouldn't have it, but then
23 of course the next issue would be that whether the fact that Mr. Krajisnik
24 got it back only now, I mean, the issue is whether it should be given to
25 you during the course of the examination.
1 MR. STEWART: Well, it's been given to the Prosecution now in the
2 course of the examination, Your Honour. I take it Mr. Harmon will say we
3 can just have it.
4 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'll make a copy of this, or if a copy
5 of this can be made, I'll just give this to Defence counsel.
6 JUDGE ORIE: No problem.
7 MR. HARMON: There's no problem.
8 JUDGE ORIE: It's just matter of communication, witness and
9 Defence counsel at this moment. But Mr. Harmon has already said that he
10 has no problem.
11 MR. STEWART: Problem solved, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: It will be provided to you at this very moment by
13 Mr. Registrar.
14 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: So that matter has been resolved as well.
16 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to remind you that you're still
17 bound by the solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your
18 testimony, that you would speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
19 the truth.
20 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.
23 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Examination by Mr. Stewart [Continued]
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just before the adjournment yesterday evening there
1 was mention of the Law on Internal Affairs. That has been previously
2 exhibited as P64, binder 21, tab 598.
3 I wonder if Mr. Krajisnik could have that, please. That's the
4 B/C/S number, and there's the point 1 number translation.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I take it you want to refer to P64A.
6 MR. STEWART: Did I not say that, Your Honour?
7 JUDGE ORIE: I think you said --
8 MR. STEWART: Oh, I might have done. Yes. It's P64A, Your
9 Honour, thank you. Binder 21, tab 598.
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we can see it's the Law on Internal Affairs. We
11 should be able to save ourselves looking at the first 125 articles. If we
12 can go to very near the end and pick it up at Article 126. It will be in
13 the last couple of pages. It's on the very last page of your version in
14 your language.
15 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, Mr. Stewart may wish to move the lectern
16 away from the microphone.
17 MR. STEWART: I've done that. Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. Do you see Article 126, Mr. Krajisnik? You'll follow it in your
19 own language. "Centres for public security services and public security
20 stations of the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territory of the Republic of the Serb People
22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be closed from the day the present law
23 comes into force and shall resume their work as organising units of the
24 Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
25 accordance with the present law."
1 And then we should look at Article 127.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters request, we do not have the text of
3 the law and it's a bit awkward to interpret off-the-cuff the language of
4 the law. Maybe we could put it on the ELMO or something.
5 MR. STEWART: My apologies. Your Honour, I have a spare copy in
6 B/C/S myself.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you could put it on the ELMO so the last --
8 MR. STEWART: Last page I think.
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- five articles.
10 MR. STEWART: It's all on the last page in the Serbian, Your
12 Q. You've still got your own printed copy, Mr. Krajisnik?
13 A. Yes, yes, I have it.
14 Q. Article 127 reads: "Serb employees, other employees from
15 administrations in the seat of the Ministry of the Interior of SRBiH who
16 express their wish and employees of the closed centres of public security
17 services and public security stations who were employed at these centres
18 on the day the present law came into force shall be transmitted to the
19 Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
20 I won't trouble with Article 28 [as interpreted], which could be
21 regarded as consequential, but it -- important but it's to do with the
22 transfer over of equipment, so it's consistent with those other
24 Then Article 129, which we had looked at briefly
25 yesterday. "General acts on internal organisation of the ministry and the
1 public security services shall be enacted within 15 days from the day the
2 present law has entered into effect."
3 And 130: "The present law shall enter into effect eight days
4 after its publication in the Official Gazette of the Serb People in Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina."
6 And it's signed by you as president of the Assembly.
7 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik is it -- from that reading it's clear
8 to you what Article 126 and Article 127 together are purporting to do, is
10 A. Yes, it's clear.
11 Q. The -- and Article 130, we can leave 129 for a minute, but
12 Article 130: "The present law shall enter into effect eight dates after
13 its publication in the Official Gazette."
14 We have checked this, Mr. Krajisnik. This was published in the
15 Official Gazette number 4 on the 23rd of March, 1992. So that simple
16 arithmetic in accordance with Article 130, the law was to enter into
17 effect on the 31st of March, 1992.
18 First of all, do you -- take it from me, Mr. Krajisnik, certainly
19 at least for the moment, that there was that publication on the 23rd of
20 March, 1992. Is there any reason to suppose that it was not then to come
21 into effect on the 31st of March as I've just summarised it?
22 A. I said yesterday that this dispatch was dispatched in an
23 unauthorised manner. The Ministry of the Interior has its minister, and
24 the minister, as you could see, was nominated and accepted by the
25 president of the government, that is by the prime minister, only on the
1 24th of March, the day after the promulgation.
2 This law could not have been implemented without the government,
3 because it wasn't adopted by the government. And you skipped Article 29
4 [sic], which states that both the rules of the procedure of the ministry
5 and the security service have to be adopted within 15 days of its entry
6 into force, and those rules are something that the minister has to endorse
7 based on a draft proposed by the government, and the government couldn't
8 have done that because it was only established on the 15th of May.
9 So the entire subject of the discussion was this dispatch. The
10 man who sent it testified here, and he said clearly that he was instructed
11 to make this dispatch by Mico Stanisic. Mico Stanisic was here in
12 The Hague. He's now on provisional release. He probably gave a statement
13 to the OTP, and he needs to confirm whether he indeed made such
14 instructions or this witness did it on his own initiative. All the more
15 so, because a reference here is made to Ugljevik, whereas I know for
16 certain that Bijeljina was in play. Nobody knew about it.
17 And just one more thing. While we were at the conference, prime
18 minister was at Pale. He was able to consult both the minister and others
19 about whether this dispatch needed to be sent.
20 I'm not sure about the minister of interior, though, because maybe
21 he was replaced by Delimustafic by that time. You can check all that in
22 the documentation. It's verifiable.
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, did you -- did you in March 1992 personally study
24 the details of this Law on Internal Affairs?
25 A. No way. It was only supposed to serve as political pressure,
1 because in the Cutileiro Plan, in the negotiations about the Cutileiro
2 Plan, it was envisaged that we have power over the Ministry of the
3 Interior. We had already agreed with the other side about that, and it
4 was supposed to send a message you cannot go back on this. I think I read
5 about it here in The Hague already when Witness Mandic testified, and even
6 then I didn't read all of this.
7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, for the record, because it might cause
8 confusion later at page 8, line 12, it says Mr. Krajisnik did in fact say
9 Article 29, but it's plain that he meant 129.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Is that -- is that as plain -- could you please --
11 because Article 29 also deals with a --
12 MR. STEWART: Well, not -- Your Honour, it was -- I suggest it was
13 very plain from what he then went on to say that he meant --
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you meant 129, didn't you?
15 A. It was a slip of the tongue. I certainly meant 129, because
16 that's what I see on the screen.
17 MR. STEWART: Yes. The transcript's accurate, Your Honour. It
18 was a slip of the tongue by Mr. Krajisnik.
19 Q. The -- Mr. Krajisnik, given what you said yesterday about the
20 shock that came to those of you in Brussels when the piece of paper came
21 in indicating the step that had been taken by Mr. Mandic, was there then
22 any communication directly or indirectly subsequently from those who had
23 been in Brussels to Mr. Mandic in relation to what he'd just done?
24 A. I certainly didn't contact Mr. Mandic. I wasn't in touch with
25 him. I don't remember what Mr. Karadzic did, but I know he was upset and
1 anxious, and he wanted to check with somebody whether it was really an
2 authentic facsimile, an authentic dispatch or a forgery. All participants
3 can confirm what I'm saying, because this dispatch caused us great trouble
4 in the negotiations as I said yesterday.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm still a bit wondering about when a
6 law takes effect when government have to adopt or -- I don't know exactly
7 what Mr. Krajisnik said, but that the government would have to -- let me
8 just check what he literally said.
9 MR. STEWART: It's -- well, it's just after that reference to
10 Article 29 or that -- that -- that --
11 JUDGE ORIE: If you guide me to the line.
12 MR. STEWART: Oh, yes, I'm sorry. It's line 12 on page 8.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
14 MR. STEWART: I'm adding to the confusion if I say Article 29
15 because of course I mean Article 129 as was intended. Yes, and it's
16 Rules, not "rusle" obviously.
17 JUDGE ORIE: On page 8, line 13, you say this law could not have
18 been implemented without the government because it wasn't adopted by the
19 government. Please correct me when I'm wrong. I always understood the
20 legislative procedure to be that the government or minister would send the
21 proposal to the Assembly, that Assembly would then adopt that, and that
22 Rules would be made for when such a law would take effect.
23 Now, I see, if I'm well informed, but otherwise we should perhaps
24 look at what we find on the 23rd of March.
25 Could Madam Usher give us the top of this document on the ELMO so
1 that this, prior to 1, the very beginning of the document, where it
2 starts. Yes. Yes.
3 I understood this to be that in the Official Gazette of the
4 23rd of March, effect was given was to a law of which the text had been
5 adopted on the 28th of February. But perhaps we'll first invite the
6 interpreters to translate everything that's on the heading so that we know
7 at least what it says. Could we have the translation starting under
8 number 28. Perhaps English first. I don't -- do you have it on the
9 screen? Has the booth --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Are we expected to do an on-site translation
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course I could ask someone to read it and
13 then you would translate it. Perhaps Mr. Krajisnik, if you would slowly
14 read what this text says.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And later I would like to explain
16 something. I think I can be of great assistance in clarifying this entire
17 problem. And now I'm going to read.
18 "Pursuant to Article 80, paragraph 4 of the constitution of the
19 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in connection with
20 Article -- Article not stated, paragraph 2 of the constitutional law for
21 the implementation of the constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia
22 and Herzegovina, acting presidents of the Republic hereby adopt this
23 decree proclaiming the Law on Internal Affairs. The Law on Internal
24 Affairs enacted by the National Assembly at its session of the 28th of
25 February, 1992, is here by promulgated. Number 02-100/92. 28 February
1 1992. Sarajevo. Acting presidents of the Republic, Dr. Biljana Plavsic,
2 in her own hand; Dr. Nikola Koljevic, in his own hand."
3 That is the first part that you wanted me to read and that you can
4 see on the screen.
5 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore it's not clear to me yet that where the
6 law is promulgated a couple of weeks after it has been adopted, where the
7 law gives a clear indication of when it will take effect, that's eight
8 days after publication, being on the 23rd of March, that you say
9 there's -- nevertheless, it has to be accepted by the government. And the
10 basis for that is not entirely clear. And since we'd like to fully
11 understand your answer in that respect, I invite you to give the
12 explanation that you announced you were able to give.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you could just look
14 at Article 25. It is linked with -- it is related to Article 29. I can
15 read this Article 25 if you are interested.
16 JUDGE ORIE: We have the English translation of Article 25. And
17 on the P64A, tab 5, 198, the heading was not reflected in English,
18 although I think in one of the other versions of the same document it was.
19 But here 25 is translated on paper. So there's no need to -- to read it
20 aloud. We can see in front of us what it says.
21 Perhaps 25 should remain on the ELMO. Yes.
22 We have the English translation in front of us, Mr. Krajisnik.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says in Article 29 that: "Within
24 not more than 15 days from the entry into force of that law, general
25 enactments shall be passed --"
1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we keep getting these references, to 29
2 when it should be 129. It's going to be -- Your Honour, once again, it's
3 clear. I take Your Honour's point. It's clear from what Mr. Krajisnik
4 has just said that he is meaning 129. It's going to cause a lot of
5 confusion if we don't get that straight.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm saying 129.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters beg to differ.
8 MR. STEWART: That's my point.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Then there is a mistake. And where earlier you
10 said -- because -- I wouldn't say there is of course the famous play the
11 comedy of errors, but this of course is not a comedy. You referred --
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot understand that I can be
13 mistaken all this time. 129 is what I mean.
14 It says there that the Rules of Procedure shall be adopted within
15 15 days. That's Article 29. And Article 25 says that that -- those Rules
16 of Procedure shall be adopted by the minister at the proposal of the
17 government, whereas the government didn't exist at that moment. It wasn't
18 only formed on the 15th of May. Particularly in view of the fact that
19 there was a political reason behind all this. It was not the intention
20 for an unauthorised person to send -- to send a dispatch.
21 There are other things wrong with this as well. You will find
22 security centres here. In the -- in the law it's Ugljevik, and in the
23 dispatch -- in the law it's Bijeljina, and in the dispatch it's Ugljevik.
24 I really don't know why the man sent it the way he did, but this
25 law could not have been put into practice without the government, without
1 the minister. And this man could not have overridden the entire
2 organisation. All of this had to be endorsed by the government so that
3 the entire organisation be valid. And it was later indeed adopted by the
4 government once the government was established.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So if I understand you well, you say Article 25
6 tells us that the -- at least and I'm quoting the text, that internal
7 structure of the national security services, that they should be
8 determined by special ordinance and that it should be the minister who
9 shall enact the aforementioned ordinance with the government's consent.
10 So there we find in Article 25, first and second paragraph, we find,
11 and -- yes.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Other rules cannot be adopted
13 without the government either. Everything is said in the dispatch. The
14 organisation is there, security, everything. And it was not carried out
15 in accordance with the dispatch, so what happened was just a great deal of
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, just because I might have forgotten, then
18 at a later stage this was enacted? You tell us. Do you remember when
19 approximately this was? And I don't know whether it's in evidence yet,
20 but ...
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the beginning of April. Three
22 or four days later, the war broke out. There was chaos then, and there
23 was no effect involved whatsoever, positive or negative. Peace
24 conferences were held, and then --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then you say as far as the content is
1 concerned, that -- that ordinance was of a different character compared is
2 to what we find in the dispatch sent by Mr. Mandic.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Ugljevik instead of Bijeljina.
4 That's what he put. He mentioned a centre which does not exist.
5 Your Honours, just one small matter by your leave. The official
6 minister, Mr. Delimustafic, immediately sent a dispatch to all the
7 centres, and he said that this was invalid, and he sent a dispatch stating
8 that Mr. Mandic had been removed from office. But for two or three days,
9 this went all over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then compare -- I don't know to what
11 extent all this is in evidence, but we'll try to fine the relevant
12 documents and -- so as to better understand your testimony.
13 Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
14 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. Your Honour, we can go straight
15 to that very document that Mr. Krajisnik was referring to, which is
16 already in evidence as P421.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 MR. STEWART:
19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, well, first of all, can you glance at that and say
20 is that the document that you were referring to a moment ago?
21 A. I know that we had this document when Mr. Mandic testified. But
22 even then I hadn't read it in detail. If it's necessary for me to read it
23 in detail, then I need time. However, I know that that document was there
24 at the time. I think it was the Prosecution that presented it to
25 Mr. Mandic. I'm not sure, but I think that it was the Prosecution that
1 presented it.
2 Q. Well, you're right about that, Mr. Krajisnik. And we probably
3 don't need to look at every line of it, but it's 31st of March, 1992,
4 addressed to MUP administrations or SDB security service, CSB security
5 services centre, chief Sarajevo SUP, secretariat of the interior, SJB
6 public security station. It's all chief police stations, all commander.
7 It may be not exactly the same, but similarly to Mr. Mandic's document
8 it's been given very wide circulation within the MUP and related are
10 It says: "In very complex security conditions in the Republic in
11 which there is a need to secure the unity and coordinated action of the
12 state organs, especially the MUP, we have witnessed various attempts to
13 break the unity of the ministry and even workers in charge succumbing to
14 various foreign influences and daily politics. How destructive this is to
15 the unity of the MUP is testified to by the dispatch sent to you by the
16 UZSK crime prevention administration, number given, 31 March, 1992, which
17 was signed by assistant minister Momcilo Mandic. One hardly need say
18 anything about the contents of the dispatch in view of the existing legal
19 system taking into consideration all the current dilemmas pointed out in
20 the dispatch to workers of the MUP of a certain nationality, I am unable
21 to dwell more closely with the --" the next word appears to be illegible,
22 Mr. Krajisnik. It says, the something. It quotes. I don't know whether
23 you're able to decipher that word.
24 A. I read on, so I wasn't really following what you were reading.
25 Could you just tell me what part of the text you're referring to?
1 Q. After the reference to Mr. Mandic. It's a just a couple of
2 sentences on. It says: "I am unable to dwell more closely with the --"
3 and then can you read the next few words, Mr. Krajisnik?
4 A. It should say, "regulations that it invokes," but a letter is
5 missing, P. It should be "propisje," regulations that it invokes. The
6 reference is to the dispatch.
7 What I have here in Serbian is just the letter P, but the meaning
8 should be "propisje," regulations.
9 Q. "Because they are unknown to any of the professional services in
10 the MUP nor were they presented to me by anyone, not even by the workers
11 in charge whose names are mentioned in the dispatch. Unfortunately, they
12 are my advisor and assistant. Obviously these are problems in the
13 leadership and, therefore, I appeal to all ministry workers to stay out of
14 and above them and to continue," and if you're there, Mr. Krajisnik, what
15 are the next few words, please?
16 A. It should be "izvrsavanja." Probably "expression." No, it should
17 be "izvrsavanja," which means carrying out very responsible and honourable
18 duties. So it just said "is" and it should be "izvrsavanja." The entire
19 word should be there and only the first two letters are there.
20 Q. And then continues: "Very responsible and honourable work and
21 tasks entrusted to them in the existing organisation of the MUP. Finally,
22 I would like to take this opportunity to again express my belief that the
23 greatest number of MUP workers wish to work in a united MUP and that they
24 find any segregation, especially on a national basis, difficult. Do not
25 allow anyone to separate you from your work colleagues, because there are
1 countless examples of mutual solidarity and sacrifice for others in
2 carrying out security tasks even in conditions in which their execution
3 endangers one's own life. I believe the problems are current and the
4 fruit of manipulation by the ill intentioned because there are no
5 difficulties approximately 10.000 of us workers cannot resolve
6 successfully through unified, professional, and lawful work. Inform all
7 MUP workers of the contents of the dispatch. Minister of the Interior,
8 Alija Delimustafic."
9 And I won't for the moment, Mr. Krajisnik, unless somebody
10 insists I do, I won't read the -- what appears to be the attachment which
11 doesn't carry the central points any further for immediate purposes.
12 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, did you become aware of the existence of this
13 document at or very shortly after the time it was apparently circulated?
14 A. Well, together we tried to deal with the misunderstandings. When
15 I say "we," I mean the two sides. But reasons were put forth by both
17 This is a demagogic approach on the part of Mr. Alija
18 Delimustafic, the minister. Because irrespective of the dispatch that was
19 sent without authorisation, in the Ministry of the Interior there were
20 problems all the time that Serb personnel complained about, his behaviour
21 in terms of his own appointment and that of his associates. So there was
22 already disunity in the MUP. There was bitterness, too, that not a single
23 proposal could come through easily, whereas some could not come through at
24 all, although it had been agreed upon previously what kind of distribution
25 of posts should exist.
1 I would like to remind the Trial Chamber of the witness who came
2 from Vogosca. If you remember what kind of appointment they wanted and
3 that the municipality complained because they didn't want that
4 appointment, and this Mandic, because he was in charge, went to the
5 municipality to try to resolve the matter.
6 So there was no unity in the MUP. On the contrary. The MUP was
7 completely disunited for these reasons that went on and on throughout the
9 I knew about this. I knew about that the dispatch had been sent,
10 and I knew that Mr. Delimustafic later removed Mr. Mandic from office and
11 that a document was sent to that effect. That was a day or two before the
12 war broke out.
13 Q. So you -- you knew about Mr. Mandic's document in the way that
14 you've described. You knew about Mr. Delimustafic's document as well,
16 A. Yes. I found out about Mr. Mandic's document in Brussels. And as
17 for this, I learned about it later. Now, was it in Brussels? Was it
18 Sarajevo? I don't remember, but I knew about this document.
19 Q. Did you personally take any steps whatever to speak to anybody or
20 do anything yourself in relation to this issue?
21 A. Although that was not within the scope of my authority, but since
22 I was nearby, near the Executive Council building, Mr. Izetbegovic came to
23 my office, and a man came from the government too. I think it was
24 Mr. Pelivan, perhaps, the prime minister himself, but I'm not sure. And
25 Mr. Delimustafic came. And I don't know who came from among the Serb
1 appointees. We talked about the problem of the MUP which had culminated.
2 We wanted to deal with these problems irrespective of the dispatch on
3 which we all agreed. We all thought that it was not regular. But we
4 discussed these problems, and Mr. Delimustafic was there at the time, and
5 at one moment I even thought that he'd get a heart attack because he was
6 so upset, because he was being criticised. They were saying that he was
7 not taking timely action, and also that his associates were sabotaging his
9 But this was just a meeting by way of consultations. It was a
10 government problem, but we talked about it as people from the Republic of
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina because, of course, we wanted to avoid a crisis. It
12 was a state affair.
13 Q. Did you know at the time somebody called Bakir Alispahic?
14 A. I didn't know Mr. Alispahic directly. I know the family, though.
15 They are from Ahatovici. Perhaps I know him directly too. That's in the
16 area of Rajlovac. That's where his family hailed from. But I had no
17 contact with him while he held this position in the MUP, or at least I
18 don't remember that.
19 Q. And what -- did you know at the time whether he was in any way
20 involved in this issue about Mr. Mandic's instruction and then
21 Mr. Delimustafic's communication that we saw a few moments ago?
22 A. I cannot say with any degree of certainty. I knew of the problem
23 in general terms. At that time, perhaps I even knew the details, but now
24 I cannot recall the details.
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just going back to that Law on Internal Affairs --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, could I just try to put one question so
2 that -- to see whether I fully understand.
3 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I heard your testimony, and I
5 understood the following, and please correct me when I'm wrong, because
6 I'm really trying to understand as good as I can.
7 The law was adopted. The law was promulgated. Then the
8 constitution was promulgated as well, and then Mr. Mandic comes with a
9 dispatch of which you say it was not correct because the government had
10 not yet done what it should have done under Article 25 of that law, so
11 therefore Mr. Mandic was not in a position nor were the formalities met
12 which could lead to the implementation of that law.
13 And then you have drawn our attention to a message sent by
14 Mr. Delimustafic -- Delimustafic, in which he says that the MUP should be
15 united, should not be split up. Forget about a dispatch. That's not
16 something we -- you should obey.
17 Now, I do understand that Mr. Delimustafic was minister of the MUP
18 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the Republic of the Serbian People of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 It doesn't come to me as a surprise that where, I would say, the
21 whole exercise of creating a new constitution, adopting new laws,
22 et cetera, et cetera, was not something that had any support, in general
23 terms, I would say, of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it
24 was a kind of -- well, parallel structure for Serbs. And then
25 Mr. Delimustafic sends a message to the MUPs and says stay united. So he
1 tries to undermine whatever effect this dispatch of Mr. Mandic would have
3 Now, I can imagine that if you have two competing units, that one
4 is the -- well, let's say, at that time the Republic of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina and the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina, if this was considered to be illegal in the view of those
7 responsible for the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina, I would have expected that not only the -- I would say the
9 other government would have criticised the dispatch but that the Republic
10 of the Serb People of Bosnia-Herzegovina would also have taken distance,
11 because I can imagine that in view of the relation between the one
12 government and the other that Serbs might not that much be impressed by a
13 message which says ignore what has been sent to you by Mr. Mandic, but
14 that if you really want to take distance, that you would not leave it to
15 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina but that the Republic of the Serbian
16 People of Bosnia and Herzegovina would also have clearly expressed its own
18 Therefore, first of all, I'm seeking confirmation of whether I
19 well understood your testimony, and I added to that a rather long question
20 about what I would expect under those circumstances.
21 Could you please, first of all, confirm that my understanding of
22 your testimony was right, and then second, comment on what appears to me
23 not immediately logical; that is, that only Delimustafic criticised it and
24 not anyone from within the Serbian -- from the Republic of the Serbian
25 People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Judge is always right. I wish I
2 could say you were right, but there are some small corrections that need
3 to be made, and they are important.
4 Mr. President, the constitution of the Serb Republic of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the 28th of -- was not adopted on the 28th of
6 February. It was not promulgated on the 28th of February. It was
7 promulgated on the 27th of March, 1992.
8 JUDGE ORIE: That was a slip of -- yes, yes. It was between the
9 publication of the Law on Internal Affairs and the dispatch of Mr. Mandic.
10 Yes. I misspoke.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This promulgation of this law, you
12 can see that the two acting appointees did what they did. They said, "We
13 are promulgating this law. And even that was unlawful.
14 Another thing that I wish to say why we did not refute this,
15 because that is what you find the most important, Mr. Delimustafic first
16 derogated Mr. Mandic's dispatch. In my statement I said that he did not
17 have the right, according to the constitution or any other act, or
18 according to the law, Mr. Mandic did not have the right to do that. That
19 is one thing.
20 Secondly, as for the leadership of Republika Srpska, why didn't
21 they send the same kind of dispatch? I've already said, first of all,
22 there wasn't enough time. And secondly, also we had already reached
23 agreement on the MUP being within the jurisdiction of the Republic of the
24 Serb People. And that is what our constitution says towards the end, that
25 that constitution would fit into the results of the conference on
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So it is not an independent state.
2 That was the core of the matter. We did not want to refute.
3 Well, we didn't even have any time. We didn't want to do what
4 Mr. Delimustafic did because we would have created a great deal of
5 confusion. We wanted to resolve the actual causes which led to the chaos
6 in the MUP on the ground.
7 Mr. Mandic acted quite unconstitutionally. He did not have the
8 powers to do this. However, this is the constitution of the 27th of
9 March. It is only on the basis of this constitution that laws could be
10 passed. All of this was done clumsily, if I could put it that way, and it
11 was unfounded. So a great deal of effort had to be made in order to
12 rectify all the mistakes.
13 Now, what you are asking about and what is a sensitive issue is
14 the following: The Serb side was not against the future solution of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina envisaging a MUP of its own, of the Serb side. On the
16 contrary, we advocated that. But this was to be done through agreement by
17 all three sides, and this agreement was indeed reached by all three sides.
18 So it wasn't Mandic who he had the right -- who had the right to say that.
19 It should have been the parliament or the government, but we
20 didn't have a parliament or government. So with all due respect to the
21 entire context, this is not just one problem. There are a lot of
22 irregularities involved.
23 We could not say no, we do not want a MUP of our own. No. On the
24 contrary. We wanted the Republika Srpska to have a MUP of its own because
25 that had been agreed upon.
1 Now, we didn't have time. We had redressed the problems of the
2 MUP, do you understand that, regarding appointments and everything else,
3 all of this that led to this rift. There was very little time, because on
4 the ground there were constant divisions on appointments. That was
5 criticism. We were not dealing with this dispatch which was probably an
6 effect of that but in an inappropriate way.
7 I don't know if I managed to give you an explanation. Perhaps I
8 complicated things even further, but this is a very complex matter, and I
9 try to tell you about it in as pithy a way as possible.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I think I now better understand.
11 Judge Hanoteau also has a question.
12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to know if we agree
13 on the fact that this law was published in the Official Gazette on the
14 23rd of March, 1992. Do we agree on that?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We agree on that, yes.
16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] The Official Gazette was then
17 sent throughout the country, wasn't it?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. Maybe not. I will
19 tell you, Your Honour. If you remember, there was a trial going on here,
20 and Mr. Treanor testified, and he said that what they did was an
21 improvisation because there were no documents on the ground. They had not
22 been distributed. I don't know whether this one distributed or not. It
23 might well not have been because the time was very short. And when it is
24 published on the 23rd, it takes a couple of days to print it.
25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
2 MR. STEWART:
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, is this right: What you -- what you seem to be
4 saying is that the -- the legal and constitutional arrangements at that
5 time were got into some sort of tangle and that errors were made.
6 A. I'm sorry, I didn't hear you quite well, and it seems important.
7 If you mean that it was very confused, that it was complicated by a
8 hundred different interventions, then you're right. But I didn't hear all
9 of your question.
10 Q. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, I was putting it to you that what you have
11 been saying, among other things, is that the legal and constitutional
12 arrangements at that time for the Republika Srpska or the Serb republic
13 were got into some sort of tangle and that errors were made.
14 A. You could put it that way, although it was actually done
15 deliberately that way. We wanted things done stage by stage, and we
16 wanted to have the constitution proclaimed to have certain arguments and
17 to send a message to the other side, "Look, we are taking this path and
18 let us agree on this." That's why on the 25th or -- I don't know which
19 date in February the constitution was passed, and we postponed its
20 promulgation. It wouldn't have been promulgated even on the 27th had it
21 not been for the fact that we were going to that conference, and they then
22 made this statement that they wanted independence at all costs, and they
23 were not going to negotiate about that. They will have a unitary state.
24 And then we decided to do this, leaving a hand outstretched to
25 them promulgating this constitution that was to be built into the
1 constitution of Republika Srpska.
2 It does look confused, as Mr. Stewart says, but certain laws were
3 indeed adopted deliberately because of political needs, for political
4 considerations. However, when a certain move is made without thinking it
5 through very carefully, like this one was made, it can have very grave
7 Let me just remind you that on the 24th of March, one MP from
8 Pale, Veselinovic, or maybe it was the 18th of March, he told me at the
9 Assembly, "We want to bring up the question of MUP at the Assembly
10 session," and I told him, "Leave it until the 27th," because we were
11 dealing with a lot of grave problems. The reserve force people getting
12 armed. And that's why this story of Mr. Delimustafic was sham. It was
13 sham when he said that there were no problems, that they were united,
14 et cetera. Every day a new problem arose. Maybe not every day but
16 Q. The analysis which you offered a little while ago this afternoon
17 based on looking at Article 25 together with Article 129 of the Law of
18 Internal Affairs, is this, Mr. Krajisnik, an analysis which you have only
19 done since you were brought to The Hague but never did before that?
20 A. I have to say you're right. But even during the war I was aware
21 that nothing can be done. It's illogical, I know, but I had enough time
22 here in The Hague, and I was able to analyse this and compare it all,
23 especially after the testimony of Mr. Mandic.
24 Q. Yes. The reason I say that, Mr. Krajisnik, and perhaps I'll say
25 this for you and in effect with respect to the Trial Chamber and everybody
1 else, is that I have not called you, and you have not been called for the
2 Defence as an expert legal witness, Mr. Krajisnik. You are the defendant,
3 and you are a witness of fact. So there are limits to what I wish to
4 explore with you in the light of that answer.
5 But if we look at -- nevertheless, at Article 126 again, and could
6 you just -- could you have that in front you and focus on that for the
7 purposes of this next question.
8 A. 126?
9 Q. You're being handed it again, Mr. Krajisnik.
10 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, if -- if the government of the Serb republic,
11 Republika Srpska, took no steps to implement Article 126, and if
12 Mr. Mandic and any of his colleagues when he was within the government
13 took no steps to implement this Article and no steps of the sort that
14 Mr. Mandic didn't take, based on this Article 126, what would have
15 happened on the day that this law came into effect, on the day that
16 Article 126 said that the centres for public security services and public
17 security stations of the MUP on the territory of the Serb people of Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina should be closed? In real life, what would have happened
19 on that day?
20 A. I'm not a lawyer, and I didn't write this law, but I know what it
21 looks like in practice. There was no government. No matter how many laws
22 you had, they couldn't begin to be enforced without the enforcers, without
23 the ministers, without the government, and without this and that. This
24 was not put into practice because nobody obeyed this dispatch. Nobody
25 complied with the dispatch written by Mr. Mandic in those two days. And
1 later on, the war started. And when the war started, the situation
2 changed completely.
3 Unfortunately, we have an overlap between wars of force majure and
4 this law that was supposed to come into force. Had it not been for the
5 war, the government would have been established, the minister appointed.
6 The minister would have approved this law and sent it to technical
7 services. He would have appointed secretaries and assistants and then it
8 would have started to function.
9 You cannot do some thing without letters of appointment,
10 without -- I don't know what. This was impracticable at that moment. It
11 would have been practicable once you had a government and all the other
13 The war brought with it a new set of facts, but the dispatch of
14 Mr. Mandic didn't. The situation changed due to other forces and not this
16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm moving to another topic now, so I
17 see where the clock is.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If we are moving to another subject, perhaps we
19 first will have the break.
20 We'll have a break until ten minutes past 4.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 3.41 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 4.16 p.m.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
24 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Your Honour, I want to go to the 10th Assembly Session of the Serb
1 Assembly, which was on the 11th of March. And, Your Honour, I believe
2 that we are all going to be working from the same version of the English.
3 It was exhibited as P65, binder 9A, tab 107.
4 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to give you page references as we go
5 along. You should in most cases have the familiar by now numbering as
7 Can we go to page 4 of the English please, the foot of page 4.
8 This should be on page 5 probably of the -- your version, Mr. Krajisnik,
9 but it's got the margin number 1. Do you see that?
10 A. Yes, I've found it.
11 Q. And --
12 A. It's 00816439, if I can help the interpreters.
13 Q. The very same, I think, Mr. Krajisnik.
14 The paragraph begins: "Europe has --" it's Dr. Karadzic speaking.
15 He says: "Europe has realised and accepted --" no, I better read the
16 couple of sentences in the previous paragraph otherwise it doesn't make
17 much sense.
18 From the middle of the previous paragraph: "We have decided on a
19 compromise," and he's talking it becomes quite clear about these Cutileiro
20 discussions. "We have decide on a compromise to the effect that if the
21 Muslim and Croat --"
22 A. Excuse me. Is that before the 1?
23 Q. Yes, it is. It's just before.
24 A. I got it.
25 Q. Beg your pardon. Going back to the previous paragraph. "We have
1 decided --"
2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: I'm sorry, Mr. Stewart.
3 MR. STEWART: So sorry, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE HANOTEAU: We have not found it.
5 MR. STEWART: I beg your pardon. It's on page 4 and it's the --
6 about 20 lines up, the paragraph beginning "We have not pleaded for." And
7 then it's in the middle of that paragraph, Your Honour. I can pick it up
8 in the middle, "We have decided."
9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Thank you very much.
10 MR. STEWART: It's my fault, Your Honour, I was going a bit quick
12 "We have decided upon a compromise to the effect that if the
13 Muslim and Croat ethnic communities do," and that "not" seems to be quite
14 wrong, Mr. Krajisnik. It should read: "Ethnic communities do wish to
15 leave Yugoslavia and the Serbian community does not wish to leave
16 Yugoslavia, i.e., does not want to lose its state for that state is
17 Yugoslavia, the whole BH could exist even then within the current borders.
18 It could change its position vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, without the Serbian
19 people changing their position, namely without falling under the
20 domination of the majority people, that is the Muslim ethnic community,
21 within the current BH borders.
22 "Europe has realised and accepted this in part, and at the first
23 meeting in Lisbon, we were already offered a document envisaging
24 constituent states in BH, which were, in Izetbegovic's case, interpreted
25 as constituent units rather than constituent states, set up on ethnic
1 principles. The other side stated that this would also include economic,
2 geographical and other criteria, which we find fully acceptable, because
3 it is not our intention to create something meaningless in terms of
4 economy and geography, something that does not guarantee viability."
5 And, Mr. Krajisnik, there, and it may not be necessary for us to
6 take time to go back to the documents at this point. But there
7 Dr. Karadzic is referring, isn't he, to a change which was made between
8 the two versions of the agreement or proposed agreement that we looked at
9 the other day, the second version, which is D5 in our exhibits as opposed
10 to D6, the second version introduced, didn't it, an extra element to the
11 definition of territory of the constituent units to take into account
12 economic, geographical and other criteria?
13 A. Yes, certainly.
14 Q. We could look at the documents, Mr. Krajisnik, but at the moment
15 I'm not suggesting that we need to.
16 The -- and that in -- that proposal came from the Muslims, but it
17 was not resisted by your team of negotiators, was it?
18 A. Yes. We did not resist. On the contrary. All the four sides
19 agreed. That was a consensus on that. Between Muslims, Croats, Serbs,
20 and the European Community.
21 Q. And then Dr. Karadzic continues, and it's against point 2 in the
22 margin of your copy. It's at the top of page 5 in English: "The talks in
23 Sarajevo, after Lisbon, nevertheless ended in a fiasco, because
24 Mr. Izetbegovic, having returned from Lisbon immediately tried to play
25 down and devaluate had been achieved there."
1 And, Mr. Krajisnik, was it the position that at the time that you
2 were holding this Assembly meeting on the 11th of March there had been no
3 further change of Mr. Izetbegovic's position? He was expressing himself
4 rather negatively in relation to -- to this proposed agreement?
5 A. This was a preliminary paper that the three sides had not agreed
6 on yet, and you will see nobody either rejected or accepted it. It was
7 still only a working paper. And the Serb side would later have
8 reservations concerning this paper. Yes, that's the 11th Session --
9 sorry, the 11th, and on the 18th accepted.
10 Q. Now, then, Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps we can look at -- we don't need
11 look at both documents but if we could look again at D5.
12 Now, you -- the document in front of you, you have this document
13 in English there, do you, Mr. Krajisnik?
14 A. I have it in Serbian or maybe Croatian. It doesn't matter.
15 Q. The -- the document -- this is the document which bears the date
16 at the end, Sarajevo, 18 March, 1992, but at this point, 11th of March,
17 when you were having the Assembly session, was the latest form of document
18 that had emerged from the Cutileiro talks in the form of this draft which
19 came to be in some way adopted or in some way approved on the 18th of
20 March, or was it -- was the document in a different earlier state?
21 A. If you give me both the documents, I will tell you which version
22 is the first and which is the second, because this is the second version
23 that I'm holding now. On the first version, there are years, '71, '81
24 and '91. So this is the Sarajevo agreement, whereas the other one is the
25 first version of the Lisbon Agreement that was discussed on this session
1 on the 11th of March.
2 Q. We don't need to worry about that. It's already from your
3 evidence and general it's already been clearly established that the
4 document that we have at D6 came before the document that you're looking
5 at now. My question -- if you -- if you don't remember --
6 A. Yes, yes.
7 Q. I'm not quite sure if you -- it's still clear what question you're
8 answering yes to, Mr. Krajisnik. My -- my question --
9 A. I'm saying that this is the second version, whereas the other one,
10 D6, is in fact the first version that was on the table in Lisbon.
11 Q. Yes. My question is this, Mr. Krajisnik: The latest version of
12 the document as you had it at the time of this Assembly meeting on the
13 11th of March, was it changed the following week on the 18th of March or
14 did the document, as far as you remember, remain in the same state?
15 A. On the 18th of March, there were amendments and additions and
16 corrections to the document that was discussed in Lisbon and that was also
17 the subject of debate on the 11th of March.
18 Q. All right. Let's go to the point 4A, which is at the top of
19 page 7 in the English, and it's on page 8 of the Serbian.
20 A. We have it on page 7, 4A, if you said 4A, right.
21 Q. Well, it doesn't matter. If you've got 4A, Mr. Krajisnik. A
22 paragraph that begins "Pursuant to item 2." Do you see that?
23 A. Yes, yes, I see it.
24 Q. "Pursuant to item 2, we are required to confirm that neither the
25 governments nor the Assemblies of the national states will support or
1 encourage any request for any part of their territories to be annexed to
2 neighbouring states."
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. "We never had any ambitions or ideas to join a part of BH to
5 Serbia, but we had ambitions to exercise our rights to statehood and
6 sovereignty here where we live."
7 Is -- is that correct where Dr. Karadzic says, "We never had any
8 ambitions or ideas to join a part of BH to Serbia"?
9 A. That is correct. Either the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina was to
10 be a part of Yugoslavia or Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state
11 was to be transformed. And we didn't ask in those negotiations for our
12 part to be joined to Serbia. So this statement is completely accurate,
13 and you can see that from all the documents.
14 Q. Is it accurate as a statement of your, the Bosnian Serbs, position
15 in those Cutileiro negotiations but also as a statement of what your own
16 private policy had been?
17 A. That's correct. And I have said here before that we were pursuing
18 a realistic policy. We knew what was possibly. And we no longer dwelled
19 on any private different opinions of ours. We took a realistic position
20 that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be independent and we would have a
21 constituent unit in it. We accepted that we wouldn't be in Yugoslavia.
22 We accepted that there would be an independent Bosnia, and in exchange we
23 would get a transformed Bosnia with three constituent nation-based units
24 with all respect of all the cultural, economic, and other autonomy
1 That was the deal. It was a trade-off. They had to abandon the
2 idea of their unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we had to give up the
3 idea of being within Yugoslavia.
4 Q. Could you go to page -- well, it's page 11 of the -- page 15 of
5 your version, page 11 of the English. It's actually over the page,
6 page 16 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik. You've got a marginal number 6B,
7 and it's the bottom paragraph on page 11 of the English. The paragraph
8 beginning "During my stay there." Do you see that?
9 A. Yes, I found it. I have.
10 Q. For the context there is England in that case. "During my stay
11 there I was invited to attend a debate on Yugoslavia --" sorry, I should
12 have said it's Dr. Koljevic talking here.
13 "I was invited to attend a debate on Yugoslavia in the British
14 Parliament, and heard four very interesting things on which both the
15 Conservatives and the representatives of the Labour Party insisted. I
16 have a facsimile summary thereof which I got from journalists. For our
17 orientation, this was a highly interesting presentation of our truths.
18 And you know how poorly the Serbs performed in the media world and if it
19 were not for that there would have been no demands on our part from TV
20 Sarajevo which is not an independent television but a centre of power.
21 The most interesting thing is that in the discussion they criticised the
22 EC for the following," and then he goes on to certain matters.
23 Mr. Krajisnik, was it -- from what you could see at that time, was
24 it your view that the Serbs had performed poorly in the media world?
25 A. To be quite honest, I was not involved in that area if I can put
1 it that way. I was not involved in such issues. But I heard from people
2 who know more about it, that the media promotion of Serb interests was at
3 a low level and that we did perform poorly there. So I agree with what
4 the late Mr. Koljevic says here.
5 Q. Who were your main spokespeople so far as the international
6 community was concerned at this time?
7 A. Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic.
8 Q. And they were, each of them, very well equipped to conduct
9 interviews in English, for example, weren't they?
10 A. Yes. Well, when I said "spokesperson," I meant them because they
11 could address the public in English, but we did not have a particular
12 person who was at a lower level and who would speak on behalf of all of
13 us. Perhaps from time to time there would be someone, but for the most
14 part it was the two of them who spoke. Well, they were not exactly people
15 who played the role of a spokesperson, so that's why I said they presented
16 our views.
17 Q. Now, you speak, Mr. Krajisnik, at page 19 of your version, the
18 very foot of page 13 of the English. "Chairman: Thank you,
19 Mr. Koljevic." And then it says -- well it says: "Mr. Krajisnik has the
20 floor." But you were the chairman, Mr. Krajisnik, weren't you, at this
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And you say at the top of page 14 of the English, at the beginning
24 of that: "I shall not try to repeat what my predecessors have said," and
25 so on.
1 And then the next paragraph: "Lest I, perhaps, forget at the end,
2 I would like to suggest something imputed by the EC: Namely, that the
3 three of us," and the three of you -- the three negotiators meant you,
4 Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic and you, didn't it?
5 A. Yes, yes.
6 Q. "The three of us would try to talk you into not accepting this
7 document, but rather that this session of the Assembly is being held to
8 explain how it should not be done. That is why I would like to ask you
9 not to allow the discussion to be conducted as if the three of us were
10 intimating this was something damaging for the Serbian people but rather
11 with the aim of determining what is to the benefit or in the interest of
12 the Serbian people, and what is not to the detriment of others."
13 In saying, Mr. Krajisnik, that it had been imputed by the EC, are
14 you able to say who specifically in the course of those talks had
15 suggested that the three of you would try to dissuade the Serb Assembly
16 from accepting the document?
17 A. I said that this paper that was here, this Assembly, was more or
18 less fully unacceptable for all three sides. Our side had some
19 reservations, too, because there had been a change in the position
20 compared to what we had agreed upon previously.
21 When this paper was finalised, if I can put it that way, then
22 someone, I don't know who, that's my answer, I don't know who, I cannot
23 say whether it was Mr. Cutileiro, but -- well, you see, we were not
24 negotiating directly. We were in three different rooms and then he walked
25 around. It was a kind of shuttle diplomacy. Then it was imputed to us
1 that it was not true that the Assembly disagreed with this but that we
2 would explain to the Assembly that something said here was wrong. And
3 then I asked the chairman to chair the Assembly session while I spoke so
4 that this would not be -- and then I asked him to chair the entire session
5 so that they would not impute to me that I was doing something that was
6 not right.
7 This was a good foundation. The paper just needed a bit more
8 work. But for the MPs, this was a turnaround. They expected a great deal
9 more, but mercifully the conclusion was a positive one ultimately, but it
10 could have been rejected outright.
11 Perhaps I could say that it was Mr. Cutileiro, but well, I don't
12 know. I don't know who it was. But this objection was voiced to us that
13 we would now be against it because there were changes as compared to the
14 talks that we had had previously.
15 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik. My apologies. I think I had missed the fact
16 that you had had handed over the chair to Mr. Milanovic at some point
17 earlier in the meeting, hadn't you?
18 A. Yes, yes. Well, I didn't notice that. It is Professor Dr. Milan
19 Milovanovic, vice-president of the Assembly. There were two
20 vice-presidents. He was the one who chaired the Assembly meeting at this
21 point. I think that he chaired the meeting later, too, so that the
22 president of the Assembly could not influence the MPs in some way.
23 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, we see that at page 9 the English. I
24 think Mr. Milovanovic not only mispronounced by me but lost a syllable in
25 his name as well, but that's where it happens.
1 Q. The -- at where we -- we --
2 A. His name is Milanovic, Milanovic, but there is also a person
3 called Milovanovic, but the vice-president is Milovan Milanovic.
4 Q. Good. Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking at page -- now page 20,
5 please, of your version. This is page 14 of the English. And it's you
6 still speaking. You say: "Another point I wish to make is that if we
7 cannot find a common arrangement for joint life, then this people and this
8 Assembly must be asked whether they accept something contrary to the will
9 of the people, the will of the people explicitly voiced at the plebiscite.
10 I think that none of the possibilities underlying our policy and the
11 policy upheld by the Serbian people has been exhausted, but that is own --
12 it is only necessary to choose the most realistic one at the given moment,
13 the one most adjustable to the times. And despite the fact that I might
14 be misunderstood by some, I personally cannot give up on the idea of the
15 Serbian people living in one state or accept that Yugoslavia is an
16 exhausted option irrespective of the fact that these two things should be
17 given careful consideration."
18 Mr. Krajisnik, what you say there about not giving up on the idea
19 of the Serbian people living in one state or that Yugoslavia is an
20 exhausted option, was that public politics you were adopting there, or was
21 it genuinely your private view that you still retained some hope that one
22 or -- of those matters might be brought about?
23 A. Thank you for having put this question. We are presenting a
24 concept which is contrary to the decision of the plebiscite of the Serb
25 people; namely, to remain in Yugoslavia. I am saying that I personally
1 can never give up on that, that all of us live in Yugoslavia together, all
2 Serbs, all Croats, all Muslims. Here I was talking only about Serbs. But
3 then I said we have to decide whether we want to pursue a realistic
4 policy, or are we going to go on discussing something which at this point
5 in time shows that the position of the international community is
7 At that time, every Serb, including me, wanted Bosnia to be with
8 Yugoslavia, but if we have this realistic option that Bosnia will be
9 Bosnia, then we -- well, actually we worked in Lisbon on an option that
10 was contrary to the plebiscite.
11 So this entire discussion is, well, along the lines of yes,
12 perhaps we all agree on this, but we have to look at the actual balance of
13 power, and that is the meaning of my words. If Serbs were to be
14 interviewed today, whether they wanted live this way or that way, the
15 result would probably be the same. But many things are based on a
16 compromise. You do not resolve your problems on your own. It depends on
17 others too. So that's the point. You can see that on the basis of what I
18 said briefly and what I said later.
19 Your Honours, I'm sorry, but I just need a bit more time. We were
20 being told all the time what is this? At the plebiscite we said that we
21 are in favour of Yugoslavia. Who was it that betrayed us? Why are we not
22 staying in Yugoslavia? What kind of Bosnia is this now? And then of
23 course you say, well, this is a reality. And as for what you're saying,
24 yes, that is the view that was expressed, but then other things changed.
25 This was an expression of views to see what people's positions were, but
1 this was not a final decision. It would be as if somebody was bargaining
2 with themselves and then if you have two other people who have an interest
3 involved in that particular matter.
4 So there was this bitter fight with the MPs so that they
5 understand that the situation changed. To this day, some people have not
6 forgiven us. They cannot understand why we gave up on Yugoslavia. We
7 didn't give up. That's what the situation was. And people cannot
8 understand that.
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm not always the best person to give this advice.
10 I guess from the speed at which the interpreters are needing to go that it
11 would be in your interest to slow down a bit.
12 Mr. Krajisnik --
13 A. I thank you. I thank you all if you caution me this way. I don't
14 understand that as an objection. I know it's really difficult when people
15 speak this fast. It's a question of temperament. I speak that way. But
16 anyway, whoever cautions me, the only thing I can do is say thank you.
17 Q. The next paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik, you say: "Allow me, thanking
18 again. Allow me to thank you for the confidence placed in me by the
19 Serbian people and you ladies and gentlemen deputies both in the Assembly
20 and as a representative of the Serbian people to this delegation. I think
21 that it would be rational, useful and good to refresh the negotiating
22 team. I suggest that someone among those present here be nominated to
23 replace me so that something new might be introduced, because it is
24 evident that certain things must be adjusted to the situation we have
25 found ourselves in. I would recommend that it be a jurist or another
1 professor, a member of the Presidency. I will not nominate anyone now."
2 Mr. Krajisnik, whose idea was it that you would make this
4 A. It was imputed that Momcilo Krajisnik was powerful because these
5 negotiations were one of our most important tasks. And at the club of
6 deputies, there were several people who wanted to be on that delegation
7 because they thought they would handle it better or they wanted to be
8 important or whatever. You are not doing your best for the option of
9 Yugoslavia. Something else would be better. Why did you give this
10 territory? And so on and so forth.
11 Quite simply - how should I put this - the people who were there
12 did not understand why the whole model was being changed. Then I said
13 what I said previously. Well, perhaps I would have liked that just like
14 you, but I don't have the right not to pursue a realistic policy. So they
15 did not raise these objections vis-a-vis me but vis-a-vis all three of us.
16 I said, well, it's not about me. Choose whoever you want except for me.
17 Let me just digress a bit. On the 25th of July, I made the same
18 proposal and a few other times, because I did not want to be the subject
19 of this discussion as to whether I could do more or not. And all
20 negotiations are difficult when people work on that.
21 After the club of deputies, well, this came from the government
22 and from Mrs. Plavsic and so on, and I said, well, propose whoever you
23 want. Just replace me. Especially because I had personal problems of my
24 own, family problems that I've already emphasised.
25 Q. And then a little -- well, two paragraphs further on. That will
1 be at page 21 of your document, Mr. Krajisnik, at the top of page 15 of
2 the English, or nearly at the top. The paragraph beginning: "The third
3 thing I wanted to ask you is to bear in mind in today's debate that there
4 is a very serious problem, namely that it is not only the interests of our
5 two partners which are opposed to us but that objectively a much greater
6 power than these two sides is opposed to us, notably the interests of
8 Where did you see the main conflict between the interests of
9 Europe and the interest of you, the Bosnian Serbs?
10 A. Europe, and when I say "Europe" it was the European Community that
11 was the mediator, when they come, then the Muslims say one thing, the
12 Croats say another thing, and the Serbs say yet a third thing, and it's
13 not possible to find a solution. So then we try to reach a compromise.
14 Nobody likes that compromise very much but the representatives of Europe
15 say we are not going to support you in your maximalist interests. And
16 that was Yugoslavia. We are not going to support you in having a unitary
17 Bosnia, and so on and so forth.
18 Now, what am I saying? You have to understand that the objective
19 of Europe is to find a solution. Now, they shaped their proposal on the
20 basis of our interests. Well, our proposals. So, yes, we have the
21 Muslims and the Croats against us, but we also have Europe there too. We
22 could hardly wait for Europe to come because we could not reach an
23 agreement amongst ourselves, and that was true. And then I pointed out
24 that there were four sides, because if somebody came to help, he's not
25 going to side with one side only, of course.
1 Perhaps I'm not putting this very nicely if I say interest, but
2 then there is a proposal. There is a position.
3 Q. Then, Mr. Krajisnik, we can perhaps just note that it's at the
4 foot of page 15 of the English that Mr. Koljevic makes a short
5 contribution, and he does support your proposal that you should stand down
6 and be replaced as a member of the negotiating team, doesn't he?
7 A. No, no. No. Mr. Koljevic is saying here that he supports me, and
8 I think that it would have to say here that he said that he was prepared
9 to see other people brought in, and he includes himself there, because it
10 wasn't I who was criticised. The delegation was criticised.
11 Perhaps you'd like me to read this. Perhaps the team should be
12 refreshed, in a way, and you will see later that he is suggesting that
13 even he should be replaced, because before that people criticised us
14 saying that our delegation had not done very much and could have done much
15 more. I'm not sure whether that is what it says here or -- but, anyway,
16 he supports me here in terms of these changes in the delegation or this
18 Q. Was there any suggestion --
19 A. Sorry. Of course we think that the head of the delegation must
20 remain, but then new results might be obtained by introducing new players
21 into the game. Well, that's what he's saying. This is how this should be
22 understood. Change the two of us and find somebody.
23 Sorry for having interrupted you.
24 Q. So did anyone ever suggest that Dr. Karadzic might cease to be the
25 leader of the negotiating team?
1 A. I have pointed out that there were objections vis-a-vis the
2 delegation. Mr. Koljevic put this very well. If the three of us are the
3 delegation, then, he says, it would be a good thing if the head of the
4 delegation were to remain. And I support Krajisnik in terms of refreshing
5 the delegation, and, of course, if it's the two of us, then replace one of
6 the two of us. Then since I had proposed that I should be replaced --
7 well, I wasn't talking about him. I didn't propose a replacement for
8 Karadzic. No one made any proposals to the effect that Mr. Karadzic
9 should be replaced. On the contrary.
10 Q. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Krajisnik, could you go on then, please, to
11 page 42, which is page 28 of the English. And it's -- it's towards the
12 end of a contribution by Mr. Buha, Aleksa Buha. And he says about -- just
13 going a little way up from where you see the 8C in the margin. There are
14 a couple of bullet points or points with dashes, and he says: "I believe
15 that we should insist on the following."
16 Do you see that introduction? It's about three or four paragraphs
17 from the end of his contribution.
18 A. I see that, but the beginning is probably different. Could you
19 just give me the actual sentence, please?
20 Q. Yes. "I believe that we should insist on the following," and then
21 it goes down a couple of lines, " - this shy quasi-language must be
22 abandoned ..."
23 A. Yes. Yes. I found it.
24 Q. " ... must be abandoned and things called by their real names.
25 "The first real name to be expressed is that this Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina in its present borders can only be a union of independent
2 ethnic republics of the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim peoples.
3 "When this option is formulated, and I think the document
4 contains elements for something along these lines, things will take a much
5 easier and more favourable turn for all the three peoples in BH.
6 "We should therefore insist that as far as the Serbian people in
7 BH is concerned there can exist only independent ethnic republics,
8 individually, and at the level of the entire BH, a union of independent
9 republics or states, ethnic ones, in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
10 So just to invite you to make it clear, Mr. Krajisnik, was this to
11 be understood as Dr. -- Mr. Buha opposing what was under consideration in
12 the Cutileiro talks and wishing to go for a stronger position that this
13 should be a fully sovereign, independent Serb republic carved out of the
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina territory?
15 A. Mr. Buha was a member of the delegation. He must have been a
16 member of the delegation here as well. He was trying to sell his model to
17 the MPs. He's trying here to exaggerate the complexity of Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina, and he is painting this alliance of independent states a bit
19 thick. There's no longer any talk of Yugoslavia. There's only talk about
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
21 The discussion continued, never ceased whether it would be a
22 federation or a union or whatever.
23 I just want to draw the attention of the Trial Chamber to this:
24 The Dayton Accords refer only to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It doesn't
25 specify in the Dayton Accords whether it's a union or a federation or a
1 republic, because we couldn't agree what to call it. It just says Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina. So that later during the negotiations we came to the
3 union of three republics, et cetera, et cetera.
4 This complexity, we didn't want to separate it from what we had
5 earlier agreed. Whatever we call it, it has to be one Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina and one chair in the United Nations. That was beyond debate.
7 That was indisputable.
8 So when Mr. Buha was saying this, mentioning this alliance and the
9 confederation, that, too, would be one entity in the United Nations. Of
10 course, even this contribution of his, acceptable as it is, was not
11 endorsed by the deputies because the deputies kept thinking that things
12 could be much better still. They couldn't get over Yugoslavia.
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, what do you say the deputies would have understood
14 Mr. Buha to be saying by the use of the word "independent" in the
15 phrase "independent ethnic republics"?
16 A. In the terminology that prevailed in our former system, we used
17 the term "internal independence," "external independence," "independence
18 transferred powers," et cetera, et cetera. Mr. Buha was a wise man. He's
19 playing up to the deputies by using terms pleasing to their ears. He's
20 saying, "We will define what Bosnia will be, because a state is a state,
21 and the complex state union is a complex thing." And even this is remote
22 from the idea, the concept, and even that was not acceptable. The time
23 wasn't ripe. In six -- six, seven days later, things changed completely.
24 Although it may seem that way, Mr. Buha never advocated anything
25 unrealistic in terms of policy, although very often during negotiations in
1 order to obtain an optimal solution we said we will ask for independence,
2 et cetera. We were pulling the rope to our side in that tug-of-war,
3 because you have to start with -- with the more maximalist option so that
4 the eventual compromise doesn't water down your -- your original objective
5 too much.
6 Q. The -- Mr. Krajisnik, the -- the deputies at this Assembly, they
7 had copies of the latest form of the document under discussion in the
8 Cutileiro talks in front of them, didn't they?
9 A. I'm afraid there might be a misunderstanding. They had the first
10 version from Lisbon. They didn't have the Sarajevo agreement. The
11 Sarajevo agreement was the final version, after we agreed. If I remember
12 correctly, it's 6B here. It came -- or, rather, the version that was
13 discussed by the MPs at that moment came before the Sarajevo agreement.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
15 A. That's the misunderstanding I'm afraid of.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it's always possible that something creeps in in
17 the interpretation. When I put it to you that you had copies of the
18 latest form of the document, that was intended to convey the latest that
19 was in existence at the time of this meeting and not the ultimate last one
20 that lay in the future but the most up-to-date version of the document is
21 what they had; correct?
22 A. Yes. Yes. That's -- that's all right. We're on the same
23 wavelength now.
24 Q. Yes. And the reason I was suggesting that just for the reference
25 is it's apparent in bits of this transcript that we went over that there's
1 quite detailed reference by Dr. Karadzic, isn't there, to provisions of
2 the document which would have been incomprehensible to anybody who didn't
3 have it in front of them.
4 Mr. Krajisnik, it's -- the reference is to around page 7 in the
5 English. I think we can move on safely from there.
6 We get Mr. Nikola Perisin. I think we've seen him before. He
7 picks up at the bottom of page 28 in the English, and that will be
8 probably page 43 or so of the Serbian. But I want to move on a bit in his
9 contribution a couple of pages to -- it would be page 45, possibly at the
10 foot of page 44 of the Serbian, and it's at page 30 of the English. And
11 he says -- there's a paragraph beginning: "We have absolute Croatian rule
12 in Brod."
13 Do you see that?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. "This is occupation by a foreign state, a foreign army, to which
16 we are regrettably not reacting with sufficient arguments and clarity, not
17 to mention the legal organs of the still legitimate authorities of BH.
18 This is a taking of our pulse and a test of patience. The next phase is
19 certainly the area of Posavina, i.e., the taking of positions in Derventa,
20 Modrica after which they will have only a very small number of unoccupied
21 territories, for instance Rudan near Doboj. They have publicly stated
22 this to be their objective. I expect that if we really patiently and
23 passively watch what is taking place that they will occupy their territory
24 in the next 10 to 15 days. There is no more dilemma in that respect. In
25 addition to their political activities, they have really manifested their
1 intentions in the purely military domain."
2 Mr. Krajisnik, when Mr. Perisin was saying he expected that they
3 will occupy their territory in the next 10 to 15 days, who did you
4 understand he was saying would occupy what territory? Was it -- what --
5 was it -- no, I'll leave it in that bare form. Who was going to occupy
6 what territory?
7 A. This is about Nikola Perisic, not Perisin. Perisin is a mistake.
8 But let me explain -- although it does say "Perisin" in the
9 original, but I know exactly who this person is. He was the president of
10 a municipality, and I believe he held some other post as well.
11 Let me explain what these questions mean. Regardless of Serb
12 territories in Posavina, Croats were saying that the entire Posavina
13 belonged to them. Modrica, Derventa, and all the rest. And when he says
14 that he would take all their territories, he means those territories that
15 they are drawing for themselves in their own map.
16 Perisic is not protesting against them taking ethnic Croat areas,
17 because Croats were not alone in the population of Brod. I even believe
18 Serbs were a majority, and the same is true of Modrica and Derventa.
19 The underlying meaning of all his contribution is that regular
20 Croat forces helped install a fully Croat government in Brod, although it
21 was supposed to be divided between the three sides. And if you remember
22 this conversation between Mr. Koljevic and me when he says I had been to
23 Slavonski Brod on the other side of the Sava River, this ties in with that
24 conversation. Later there were conflicts and visits from -- visits by the
25 delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1 That's part of their territory. It's what they consider to be
2 their territory. It has a historical dimension as well. It used to be a
3 part of the Croatian banovina, and even though the situation had changed,
4 the Croats wanted all of Posavina to be Croat territory without any regard
5 to any other people who may populate it.
6 That's the meaning of what Mr. Perisic was saying.
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you -- you mentioned in that answer that you
8 believe that the Serbs were a majority in Brod and the same was true of
9 Modrica and Derventa. On the map, P211, that large coloured map that we
10 looked at the other day, it's -- Bosanski Brod is shown with a relative
11 Croat majority, 41 per cent; Serbs, 34 per cent. Since that is the
12 information on the map based on the 1991 census, it doesn't take you
13 particularly by surprise to find that your supposition that the Serbs were
14 in a majority is in fact wrong, does it?
15 A. Yes, yes. I'm wrong. I just said it like that because I know
16 there is a certain part of Serb territories. But just like you are wrong
17 in looking constantly on that map, just as Mr. Okun did, when the map is
18 completely wrong for the purposes of our discussion. You should look at
19 the other map that is divided into smaller areas, that shows
20 municipalities. It was the other map that was the basis for our
21 discussions, whereas this map that you are holding only created confusion.
22 However, as far as percentages are concerned, you are completely
23 right. I don't really have the figures in my head. Nobody had absolute
24 majority, and I take your word for it.
25 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that there's -- that it's a mistake
1 where it say -- where you said, Mr. Krajisnik, you should look at the
2 other map that is divided into smaller areas that shows municipalities. I
3 take it that you wanted to refer to smaller entities than municipalities,
4 like local communes, or at least divided up more precisely. Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As always, you are right. Smaller
6 parts of municipalities, like communes, et cetera. The one that
7 Mr. Stewart is holding shows municipalities.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.
9 MR. STEWART: I'm holding several at the moment, Your Honour. The
10 one that Mr. Krajisnik was mentioning a moment ago and which Your Honour
11 just corrected that particular point about the terminology is P293. It's
12 somewhere else as well but it's P293.
13 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps I should just mention that the map
14 P211, the one that you didn't like a moment ago, it does confirm and we
15 see that -- that the Serbs were in the majority in the other two
16 municipalities mentioned, Derventa and Modrica. That's clear on the
18 So, Mr. Perisic here, he's said to the meeting what he "predicts
19 or expects will happen if we really patiently and passively watch." And
20 he says: "And what have we been doing? Truth to tell, we are relying on
21 the army. We have endorsed such support here, and it is clear to me that
22 we are relying on the army, which, frankly speaking, is absolutely not a
23 reliable support. We are relying on an army which has been absolutely
24 beheaded in ideological terms, an army without a state, an army which is
25 in my opinion, and regrettably, trying to come out of this difficult
1 situation in BH intact and with the clearest and best possible personal
2 positions. An army declaring itself a neutral force which will separate
3 the conflicting sides. It is clear that we can do nothing but rely on the
5 Mr. Krajisnik, how nearly or otherwise would you at that time have
6 supported the views being put forward there by Mr. Perisic?
7 A. The truth lies somewhere in between Mr. Perisic's opinion and
8 mine. I was almost in love with the army. I -- I like the military
9 profession as a vocation. And at that time, many people saw the army as
10 communists and totally unprepared, although in fact the army was in a
11 difficult position. It was equidistant from the sides involved and from
12 the parties involved, and I thought that was perfectly all right.
13 So if there was any truth in assertions that there was no strong
14 entity behind the state, behind the army, no state behind it, no command
15 in Belgrade, it is also true that the army was in trouble because
16 conscripts were not answering call-ups, and there were many other
18 Mr. Perisic did not go into the deeper reasons for those problems
19 in the army. He just criticised the army. He's saying we have no other
20 army. We have no paramilitary formations. And the army that we have is
21 weak, so what are we relying on in fact?
22 Q. Mr. Perisic, from right up in the north of Bosnia and Herzegovina
23 on the border with Croatia, his concerns being expressed here specifically
24 relate to Croats, don't they?
25 A. Yes. He's from Teslic originally. But he spoke about that
2 Q. Did you understand all that he was saying here? Did he understand
3 it to relate only to issues between Serbs and Croats?
4 A. I understood him to be talking about Posavina, only about problems
5 between Croats and Serbs as far as Posavina is concerned. And as for the
6 Yugoslav People's Army, it's a completely different issue. You probably
7 meant this former issue. Because in Posavina, the overall population was
8 more or less evenly divided, or there were more Croats. I think most of
9 these municipalities had a Croat majority. In some municipalities they
10 may even have had absolute majority.
11 Q. Now, he continues by saying, "We have no parallel formations," a
12 point which you just alluded to a moment ago, Mr. Krajisnik. Then he
13 says, "At every meeting and talks with the army, our position was that we
14 would disarm paramilitary formations if any appeared apart from the army.
15 We have, regrettably, done so."
16 But, Mr. Krajisnik, did you know anything about such meetings and
17 talks with the army as were being referred to there by Mr. Perisic?
18 A. The answer is no, I don't know anything about it. But I'm afraid
19 that you may be interpreting this not quite correctly.
20 Mr. Perisic says, "We have no paramilitary formations." And then
21 he says, "In our talks with the army," and I'm interpreting this now, "the
22 army stated that it was against all paramilitary units and would disarm
23 them all." And then he goes on to say that's why we don't have any. All
24 of our men are in the army. That is the meaning of his contribution.
25 When he said this, he meant that the Yugoslav People's Army would
1 disarm all paramilitary units. They did not allow Serbs to have any
2 paramilitary units, and we can hardly rely on the Yugoslav People's Army.
3 That is the actual meaning of what he said here, and I'm afraid it can
4 easily lend itself to misinterpretation.
5 And they had on their territory various units, barracks, corps.
6 They must have had some talks. Everybody held talks on the local level.
7 When I say "everybody," I don't know really, but such contacts did take
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I notice that you were reading a line
10 as "we have no parallel formations," whereas Mr. Krajisnik quoted
11 Mr. Perisic as saying, "We have no paramilitary formations." Could we
12 please -- I haven't got the B/C/S in front of me. Could we just clarify
13 what that is?
14 MR. STEWART: Yes. That would be a good idea, Your Honour.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you see the paragraph? It's the previous
16 paragraph that ends, and we needn't go there again. The previous
17 paragraph ends: "It is clear that we can do nothing but rely on the
19 You see that sentence, do you?
20 A. I see it.
21 Q. Could you please then just read out loud from the beginning of the
22 immediately following paragraph.
23 A. "We have no parallel formations. And at every meeting we had --"
24 JUDGE ORIE: I think that's already. The word seems to be, even
25 from what I understood in the B/C/S, being "parallel" and not
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. STEWART: Well, I must say it was a pretty fair speculation on
4 Your Honour's part, but we got the answer anyway.
5 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, had you been involved by this time, it's the
6 11th of March, had you personally been involved in any discussions at all
7 anywhere concerning the -- any difficulties relating to paramilitary
8 formations, any questions of disarming paramilitaries, any issues about
9 absorbing them into the regular army?
10 A. I can only tell you about what I know. I didn't take part in
11 that. What I know is that the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav People's
12 Army, on several occasions issued orders through General Kadijevic to
13 disarm all paramilitary units starting with Croatia and continuing. I
14 mean, starting from Croatia mostly, the war, there. But as for the
15 disarming of any paramilitary formations, I didn't discuss that with
16 anybody. I told you what meetings I had. That was on the level of Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina with members of the General Staff of the JNA. And once, I
18 think, I had a semi-private meeting with Mr. Kukanjac because he was
19 speaking with the leaders in Sarajevo, but we didn't discuss those issues.
20 Instead, he wanted to hear what we thought about how they could help
21 prevent a conflict. And I think he escorted me to my home once when there
22 was a conflict, a clash in Kupres, but I don't remember that I ever talked
23 about this issue. But it's quite understandable, generally speaking, that
24 the army was against paramilitary units. And later, the Serb army was
25 against all parallel structures. In their eyes, anything parallel to and
1 outside of the army was irregular.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm looking at the clock. Would this be
3 a suitable moment?
4 MR. STEWART: Yes, I'm entirely in Your Honour's hands.
5 JUDGE ORIE: We will have a break until ten minutes to 6.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 6.10 p.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed. We need some time for a
9 few procedural matters, but I take it that they can be dealt with in ten
10 minutes. So if you'd keep that in the back of your mind.
11 MR. STEWART: Yes, of course, Your Honour.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, up to this -- we're still at 11th of March, this
13 Assembly session. Up to that point had any of the Bosnian Serb leadership
14 to your knowledge or in your hearing expressed any concerns about the
15 activities of paramilitaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
16 A. Well, if you look at the sessions of the Assembly and you look at
17 what Mr. Stanisic said and what the representatives of the MUP said when
18 they expressed their concern over the arming of paramilitaries on the
19 other sides, that is to say, the Patriotic League and the Croat side. I'm
20 saying that information was coming in. I testified about that, that we
21 received information of that kind.
22 Once, I think it was on the 24th of March, Mr. Mica Stanisic said
23 something about that. That is to say, that we had information about
24 paramilitary formations going public on the other sides.
25 As for the Serb side, our position was that we should seek
1 protection with the Yugoslav People's Army.
2 Q. So you mentioned concerns about Patriotic League and the Croat
3 side and then going forward to the 24th of March, but as at the 11th of
4 March, then, had any of the Bosnian Serb leadership expressed concerns
5 about the activities of Serb paramilitaries?
6 A. I really do not remember information to that effect. I was not
7 aware of any paramilitary units in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I knew about
8 volunteers who went to the Croatian theatre of war, but paramilitary
9 formations being active within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the Serb
10 people, I really did not know of any such thing, and I don't think that
11 any such thing existed.
12 Q. Now, Mr. Perisic continues, and if we go, please, to --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I ask for one clarification?
14 Mr. Krajisnik, if you're saying "volunteers," do I understand
15 correctly that you refer to volunteers as being members of regular army
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Yugoslav People's Army.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Yes, that's what I men.
20 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear.
21 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
22 MR. STEWART:
23 Q. Yes. Mr. Perisic -- if you go to page 47 on your copy. I think
24 the number may be very indistinct on the page, but page 47 and then 9A in
25 the margin. It's in the middle of page 31, or just below page 31 in the
1 English, Your Honours. He says, "I wanted to say this because perhaps
2 this Assembly is not aware of the actual state of affairs. It is, believe
3 me, on the verge of being unbearable. We had a seven-hour meeting of the
4 Crisis Staff yesterday, and our principal task was to calm down the
5 people, to tell the people from Ozren, Posavina, to wait, that perhaps the
6 time had not come. And each day they see that village after village,
7 position after position, is being lost."
8 He's talking distinctly there, is he, Mr. Krajisnik, about
9 continuing armed conflict in his area?
10 A. Well, the continuation of this discussion has to do with Posavina.
11 If you remember on the map near Ozren there is this blue enclave. I
12 showed that. They called it a mountain of sorts, and it was split up into
13 five municipalities. That's the map that's better, if I can put it that
14 way, than the other one.
15 So that's at -- that's near Posavina. It borders on Posavina.
16 Now he's saying I'm trying to pacify people. I'm telling them to calm
17 down, and they see these paramilitary units taking up military positions
18 in Posavina.
19 Q. Can we -- can we have the map that you regard as better,
20 Mr. Krajisnik, P293? Perhaps it would be most convenient to have it on
21 the ELMO.
22 Could you point out then, Mr. Krajisnik, what you wish to say?
23 A. People of Ozren, that's what he says. This is the area of Ozren.
24 And he says -- well, you see this. This is the area of Modrica and part
25 of Derventa. The blue line here is part of Brod. And then this up here
1 is order of Odzak. That's why I'm saying that the area can be seen much
2 better here.
3 The Croat side thought that all of this that used to be the
4 banovina should be the Croatian side. When I was saying about what they
5 considered to be their territory, this is the area where there's about
6 100.000 Serbs, and it's split up into several municipalities, five or six,
7 I think. That's why I said that you could see better here, because in
8 every one of these municipalities somebody can be a majority, because the
9 municipality is viewed as a whole rather than this smaller part.
10 There are other areas, too, where Serbs are a minority in a
11 municipality and the municipality is Croat or Serb. Now, that is what I
12 wanted to explain. And that can be seen very well here.
13 Q. So far as Mr. Perisic's area was concerned, Mr. Krajisnik, can you
14 say, had there been -- had there been more or less continuous fighting
15 there since the end of 1991 up to this time?
16 A. Well, by way of illustration, Derventa and Modrica, for
17 instance -- well, perhaps I'll exaggerate a bit now, were twice in Serb
18 hands and twice in Croat hands. Or I don't know how it was.
19 When he said people from Ozren and from Posavina, he was referring
20 to this, when he's talking about these people where the Serbs territories
21 are. So these are the people of Posavina where the Serbs are, and these
22 are the people of Ozren.
23 Q. Did the -- did the SDS leadership become or had -- over that
24 period, since the end of 1991, had the SDS leadership become in any way
25 actively involved in those continuing issues of conflict in Mr. Perisic's
2 A. Well, it did not become involved. I've already explained. We
3 were supposed to rely on the Yugoslav People's Army. But in addition to
4 this that can be seen here, everyone was concerned, was worried in their
5 own municipalities. Well, maybe they had weapons, too, but I don't know
6 about that. They were worried about their own mini location. Now, will
7 somebody from Posavina take the Serb ethnic areas. From the Serb point of
8 view, that is what people thought. I don't know what the other side was
9 thinking. It was probably along similar lines but just the other way
11 This is the Serb point of view, and that is how I interpret it.
12 But the Serb Democratic Party, apart from political support to stimulate
13 mobilisation, did not carry out any other activities. I don't know of
14 any, and I don't think that there were any. That can be analysed. On
15 several occasions that was confirmed.
16 Q. And when Mr. Perisic referred to a seven-hour meeting of the
17 Crisis Staff, had you known that there was a Crisis Staff there?
18 A. Well, I didn't know, but I assure you -- well, I've already
19 explained this. To establish a Crisis Staff was just like saying good
20 morning. If the situation was difficult, that is what people did at their
21 own initiative. Quite certainly there was no need on any side. This is
22 not to say that this was not encouraged by someone, that if somebody was
23 in a crisis they would establish a Crisis Staff. People would get
24 together and they'd elect some kind of leadership, and then they would see
25 what they would do. Well, this is part of our legacy, and in every crisis
1 that's what people would do. He mentions this Crisis Staff here, but
2 anybody could have mentioned it, and I wouldn't have reacted.
3 Q. Mr. Perisic continues, and it's in the middle of the penultimate
4 paragraph on page 31 of the English, page 47 of the Serbian, he
5 continues: "If we sit by and watch that, I frankly tell you I dare no
6 longer engage such politics. I am afraid, not so much of those who are my
7 enemies, but of what I will tell my own people, and what we will say if
8 tomorrow we find we have lost everything without having lifted a finger,
9 without having put up any resistance.
10 "If you are taking my words seriously, then I suggest that you sit
11 down with the command of the Second Army District and simply make it clear
12 to them: They can keep publicly proclaiming their neutrality, but let
13 them do what others are doing in the field. Let them get out of the
14 barracks, take strategic positions, relocate the weaponry. Let them
15 distribute arms to the people. Members of 70 per cent of the units still
16 have their weapons somewhere far away in the barracks. This is senseless
17 and absolutely incomprehensible for me."
18 Mr. Krajisnik, the Second Army District you've referred to, that
19 included Sarajevo, didn't it?
20 A. The Second Army District included Sarajevo and all of Bosnia, and
21 before that even part of Croatia, and Posavina and part of Knin. So was
22 not only for Bosnia.
23 In response to your question, yes, it did include Sarajevo, and
24 that is where their headquarters were.
25 Q. And General Kukanjac, whom you've mentioned on a number of
1 occasions, he was in command there, wasn't he?
2 A. Yes. Yes. He was commander. I don't know who was commander
3 before him, and I don't know when he came. I can't remember, actually.
4 Q. Had -- at the time of that Mr. Perisic was speaking here, had any
5 request been made by the SDS leadership to General Kukanjac that his men
6 should get out of the barracks, take strategic positions, relocate
7 weaponry or distribute arms?
8 A. As far as I know and remember, there was no such order and no such
9 thing was said. We did address the Assembly once saying that the Yugoslav
10 People's Army should protect the Serb people. Now, in what period of time
11 this was, I cannot remember.
12 But as for these words, that we sent that, it was not taken in a
13 compulsory sense. It was sort of an expression of panic and it never
14 crossed anybody's mind to dictate to the Yugoslav People's Army what they
15 would do.
16 Q. Now, in fact if we go on just -- he says a few more things,
17 Mr. Perisic. But then you speak, Mr. Krajisnik. That's page 32 of the
18 English, and it's 49 in your copy, Mr. Krajisnik.
19 President Momcilo Krajisnik: "I think that some clarification
20 would be in order: We should not depart from the agenda. It was useful
21 to hear about the major problems on the ground, but without any intention
22 or criticising we must stick to the agenda and hear what is related to the
23 relevant subject matter.
24 "I kindly ask that we do not expand the subject. And it would
25 not be good to have the army on the agenda now."
1 Mr. Krajisnik, it wasn't on the agenda as you made clear to start
2 with, but did you have any particular reason for resisting adding army
3 discussion to the business of this Assembly session?
4 A. Well, I was not chairing the session, although it looks that way
5 because it says "Chairman, Momcilo Krajisnik." I was sitting next to the
6 vice-president who was chairing the session, so then I probably asked for
7 the floor from that particular spot where three people sit.
8 What I'm trying to say is there is an agenda. That was the plan.
9 And then people want to talk and talk, and then they say things that were
10 not on the agenda. That happened often that people would digress from the
11 agenda and discuss matters that were also important, but that was supposed
12 to be an item on the agenda of another session, or somebody should have
13 asked for it to be included in the agenda at the very beginning of the
15 We just complained to each other the way Mr. Perisic put it or
16 something like that, but we could not adopt any binding conclusions on the
17 Yugoslav People's Army. That is why I kept saying that we should stick to
18 the agenda, because this was not on the agenda.
19 Q. Was it -- was it in any way an uncomfortable or awkward issue that
20 the leadership would not have wished to be raised at this point?
21 A. I don't know. I don't know what kind of issue it would take for
22 the leadership to be unwilling to discuss it. I don't see any reason not
23 to discuss an issue at an Assembly session. It's just that we needed to
24 have an agenda and to stick to it. I don't remember that there was a
25 single item or an issue that we didn't want to discuss.
1 Q. And then the next speaker is -- is -- well, actually, the next
2 speaker is a Mr. Mijatovic, but I -- with no disrespect to him I was then
3 going to Ms. Plavsic, the middle of page 33 of the English. It's point 11
4 in the margin at page 50, Mr. Krajisnik. And she says: "I think we
5 should adopt the remarks of Mr. Aleksa Buha, namely to have the term
6 'confederation of states' be incorporated into the material at any cost.
7 Everything else should be derived therefrom."
8 Now, as a matter of fact, the passage we looked at, Dr. --
9 Professor Buha, I think he is, which is at page 42 of your version,
10 Mr. Krajisnik, and at pages 26 to 28, the particular passage being at 28
11 as it is at page 42 of yours, in the English I can't find a reference
12 to "confederation of states" in Mr. Buha's contribution, but,
13 nevertheless, Mr. Krajisnik, the question arises. Mrs. Plavsic was making
14 it clear here that she was supporting Mr. Buha, and she refers to
15 expressly to "confederation of states." Is it correct that what you have
16 used the term "confederation," you personally in the course of this
17 evidence, you have used it to mean a confederation of states that would be
18 internationally recognised, each of them, as separate sovereign states?
19 A. It says "alliance of states" here in the original, and that's what
20 Mr. Buha said in his prior contribution. Mr. Buha made representations in
21 order to make this project attractive to the deputies. And then
22 Mrs. Plavsic says, "We need to introduce the term 'alliance of states.'"
23 It can also be interpreted as "union of states."
24 I don't know what Mrs. Plavsic exactly meant. Did she mean a
25 union or alliance of independent states? But Mr. Buha certainly didn't
1 mean it to be a union of internationally recognised states. He spoken
2 instead of Bosnia and Herzegovina that should be called a union of Bosnian
3 states, in the same sense as we say United States of America. But it was
4 never the intention for this union of Bosnian states to have constituent
5 units that would be internationally recognised. Only Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina would be an internationally recognised subject.
7 When I said "union," I used the term that we -- or, rather, when I
8 spoke of the confederation of states, I was talking about the term that we
9 used in our discussions, but Mr. Buha here spoke about the union of
11 Mrs. Plavsic is a bit more radical. She goes a bit further, but
12 even she did not mean that we should ask for an internationally recognised
13 Serbian Republic. Maybe in August she defended that position, but here
14 she just meant that it would be a union of entities, a union of states
15 rather than the unitary state we were so afraid of.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, Mr. Krajisnik started his answer by
17 saying that it should read "alliance of states" rather than anything else.
18 Could you please ask him to read the word and then --
19 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, what I've just been trying to do
20 is -- we've been, as quickly as we can, seeing if we can check which word
21 was used by Mr. Buha, which word used by --
22 JUDGE ORIE: I see on the English -- in the English on page 28,
23 that might be a clue, although it might not clarify the issue really,
24 because it reads --
25 MR. STEWART: I've just had the information, Your Honour, just
1 even as we've just been speaking, from Mr. Sladojevic, that the words in
2 the last paragraph at page 28 in the English, obviously I'm giving the
3 page in the English, but the word used in Serbian --
4 JUDGE ORIE: No, no. Always, Mr. Stewart, you know how I
5 appreciate the assistance of our interpreters, so if there is one word
6 which would need perhaps to correct then the translation, I would invite
7 Mr. Sladojevic to read that word and then have the translation by our
9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's what I was going to do. Your
10 Honour, in fact, I wasn't even going to do that. What I was going to say,
11 Your Honour, was we've established it is the same word in each place in
12 Serbian, and we were going to stop there in accordance with Your Honour's
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. STEWART: But, Your Honour, we can, then having mentioned
16 that, we could then of course in accordance with those guidelines hand it
17 over to the interpreters.
18 So it's the last sentence apart from the "thank you," it's the
19 last sentence at page 42 of the Serbian just before Mr. Milanovic, I hope
20 that is what he's called, speaks.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. STEWART: And then the other one is the first paragraph, short
23 paragraph, in what Mrs. Plavsic says at page 50 of the Serbian. Those are
24 the two passages, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that would be -- in English that would
1 be --
2 MR. STEWART: Sorry. In English it's 28, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. STEWART: Middle of 28 and the middle of 33.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MR. STEWART: It's more or less exactly in the middle on each of
7 those two pages.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that word would be, Mr. Sladojevic, if it's
9 the same?
10 MR. STEWART: He better say it, Your Honour.
11 MR. SLADOJEVIC: [Interpretation] "Union of states."
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. So at least Mrs. Plavsic is referring to
13 the same word used by Mr. Buha.
14 MR. TIEGER: For what it's worth, I'm just noting that [B/C/S
15 spoken] is used by Mrs. Plavsic, and that's not precisely the formulation
16 used in Mr. Buha's remarks. I have no idea whether that's -- that makes a
17 difference, but it is a small distinction that may be worth noting. I
18 leave that to the interpreters.
19 JUDGE ORIE: You say it's not exactly the same but --
20 MR. STEWART: We could have the two very short passages done by
21 the interpreters, Your Honour. That will probably solve everything.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If Mr. Sladojevic would read the first line
23 where Mrs. Plavsic is speaking. Slowly read it, please, Mr. Sladojevic.
24 MR. SLADOJEVIC: Yes, Your Honour.
25 [Interpretation] "I think we should adopt the remarks of
1 Mr. Aleksa Buha, namely to introduce into the material at any cost the
2 term 'union of states.'"
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then the last sentence spoken by Mr. Buha.
4 MR. SLADOJEVIC: [Interpretation] "Therefore, we should insist that
5 as far as the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the
6 only possibilities -- the only possibility is to have national republics,
7 individually speaking, and at the level of the entire Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina a union of independent republics or states nation based or
9 national in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The matter has been clarified. And then I'd
11 also like to know whether the same words are used in the -- a couple of
12 lines upwards where the English starts: "The first real name to be
13 expressed." If you could find that, Mr. Sladojevic, because there we find
14 a similar expression.
15 MR. SLADOJEVIC: [Interpretation] "The first thing that should be
16 called by its real name is that this Bosnia and Herzegovina in its present
17 borders can only be a union of independent ethnic republics of the
18 Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim peoples."
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Having verified this, please proceed,
20 Mr. Stewart.
21 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. And then, Mr. Krajisnik, if we go to page 51, and it's page 34 in
23 the English. Mr. Koljevic announces, "We just received an invitation from
24 Mr. Cutileiro to continue the conference on the coming Monday and
25 Tuesday," which is going to be the 16th and 17th of March, "and his appeal
1 to us contains the Declaration (American European) on the recognition of
2 the Yugoslav republics. I shall read the translation to you."
3 I'm not proposing to read all that out unless I'm asked to, but it
4 includes after the various numbered points in this context it concludes
5 the statement or request coming from the European Community: "In this
6 context all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina are invited to accept without
7 delay the EC's proposals on a constitutional order which will enable the
8 peaceful and harmonious development of this republic within its existing
10 "The EC and the USA have also agreed to oppose strongly any
11 efforts -- any effort endangering the stability and territorial integrity
12 of these two republics."
13 The -- there are a number of other points in between, but let's go
14 straight to -- from there, Mr. Krajisnik, to page 77, which is page 50 in
15 the English. And then Mr. Milanovic, as the -- formally the chairman,
16 it's clear, Mr. Krajisnik, in effect he's handing over the floor and the
17 effective chair to you. That really doesn't come from this text. He
18 says -- he hands it over to you and you say, "I should like to inform you
19 that the working group has drawn up a document which I shall read out and
20 then put to the vote.
21 "Let us try to do some conclusions.
22 "Conclusions. First, I should like to ask all the deputies to
23 vote on the EC's proposal entitled Statement of Principles for New
24 Constitutional Arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
25 "Who is for?
1 "The Assembly unanimously rejected the document of the European
2 Community entitled Statement of Principles for New Constitutional
3 Arrangements In Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4 "The deputies then adopted the proposal of the President of the
5 Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik, and individually declared themselves in respect
6 of this document. All were against (see list of names as annex.)"
7 Did that, by the end of this meeting then -- or near the end of
8 this meeting, Mr. Krajisnik, did that come as a surprise to you?
9 A. Well, you could see here on page 76 that the entire debate was led
10 by Mr. Milanovic, and the two of us swapped roles here. He asked me to
11 read out the conclusions of the working group that had been established,
12 and I read them out. And when you see this sentence, "Who is in favour of
13 this material," that's something that he said. And then he noted that
14 everybody was against.
15 To us this was a negative development, because if you reject a
16 certain paper, then how can you go to negotiate, whereas we had already
17 received announcement of continued negotiations. That's why I suggested
18 the following conclusion here below as the person sitting next to
19 Mr. Milanovic.
20 We're looking at minutes here, so it's difficult to establish who
21 proposed it for voting. I was not very happy with it. I wanted everybody
22 to vote individually. And then if everybody votes no, that means
23 everybody was against the peace plan.
24 If you want me to comment it any further, I can.
25 I intervened here as an assistant, as a helper to Mr. Milanovic,
1 because I wasn't chairing the Assembly.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- the point of my questions here is not really
3 who was technically or effectively chairing the Assembly, but that's -- so
4 bearing that in mind, you then, the president, Mr. Krajisnik, made the
5 following proposals: "To authorise the representatives previously
6 authorised by the Assembly of the Serbian People to continue negotiations
7 with the two other ethnic communities - the Muslims and the Croats - in
8 the presence of the EC, subject to the following restrictions:
9 "The minimum below which the negotiators must not go in
10 representing the interests of the Serbian people are the results of the
11 plebiscite or a confederal set-up of BH which entails three sovereign
12 national states which may be linked up on the confederal principle."
13 So, Mr. Krajisnik, you were -- is it correct that both limbs of
14 that proposal came from you here at this point, didn't they?
15 A. No. No. It's not correct. Those conclusions that were proposed
16 above were developed by the working group, and I was asked by the
17 chairman, I didn't chair the session, I was asked by the chairman to read
18 them out as he normally reads such conclusions when I chair the sessions,
19 and they were rejected.
20 Now, after they rejected the conclusions, I suggested this not as
21 the chairman but as the person sitting next to the chairman. And I had
22 made this suggestion to rescue the negotiations, to enable us to continue.
23 Maybe the interpretation is wrong, but it can be understood from this.
24 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, we clearly we haven't got to the
25 substance of this question, and bearing in mind what Your Honour said
1 earlier about the need for a little time at the end of the day.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
3 MR. STEWART: The next question is bound to take a little time,
4 Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Before doing so, perhaps, Mr. Krajisnik,
6 perhaps to think it over overnight. I see a little bit later in the same
7 minutes, I see that you're asking Mr. Ostojic to read something out which
8 seems to swap general the situation on who was presiding but it's perhaps
9 not that vital, but if there would be any explanation for that, please
10 give it to us tomorrow.
11 We have a few procedural issues -- yes?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you please, could
13 you just look at the previous page where Krajisnik takes the floor. "I
14 inform you that the working group has drafted the paper that I will read
15 out to you so that you can state your opinion whether we are going to
16 accept it."
17 So I'm talking about the working group and presenting their
18 conclusions when the chairman gives me the floor. And after the voting, I
19 did make another contribution. You're right on that.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we now move to the procedural issues.
21 First of all, I'll just find them. Yes, some deadlines that are
22 expiring today. Double pension legislation. I do see that on the 25th of
23 April the parties agreed that they would get back on the 9th of May; and
24 we do know that the Defence has sent this legislation to the CLSS on the
25 27th of April. Therefore, I wonder what to expect.
1 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I know that the CLSS have submitted some
2 documents to us. A member of our team told me earlier he was having
3 trouble accessing their website, so I don't know the answer. I will find
4 out for tomorrow and I will report back, if I may.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then hear from you.
6 Then the Neilsen source material. The material was submitted on
7 the 25th of April, and the Defence were supposed to come back with any
8 objections by May the 9th, which is today, and still the day is young,
9 Mr. --
10 MR. STEWART: Clearly I'm not, Your Honour, but day is. Your
11 Honour, we had appreciated, in fact we had mentioned we needed a couple of
12 minutes for precisely that point, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear, yes. As I said, the day is young.
14 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, the day is young. What we were
15 going to ask, Your Honour, is that we might have until tomorrow to make
16 our filing on that. We had three members of the team working on it today,
17 Your Honour. We just haven't managed to --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Any strong objections?
19 MR. TIEGER: Nothing too strong, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: You have until tomorrow, Mr. Stewart.
21 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then there's one issue I'd like to raise briefly in
23 private session.
24 Could we turn into private session for a second.
25 [Private session]
11 Page 23786 redacted. Private session.
1 [Open session]
2 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, then you have the floor.
4 MR. STEWART: That took us by surprise. I thought it would take
5 until 7.00. The --
6 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik. The two limbs the proposal which --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just -- I thought you would like to raise an
8 issue I mentioned before. I said that there was -- whether there were any
9 objections against -- what was it? Oh, no, no. You said that Neilsen
10 source material you would like to have until tomorrow. Yes. You first
11 said that that is exactly what I would like to address later on.
12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, took me by surprise. I wasn't
13 expecting to continue any cross-examination.
14 JUDGE ORIE: No, no. I thought that there was still something to
15 be raised. So it was the one-day extension.
16 MR. STEWART: Well, the day is young, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 Mr. Krajisnik, we conclude for the day. I again remind you that
19 you should not speak with anyone about your testimony given or still to be
20 given, and we'll adjourn until tomorrow afternoon, courtroom II, quarter
21 past 2.00.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 10th day
24 of May, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.