1 Friday, 12 May 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
7 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
9 Mr. Stewart, are you ready to continue the cross-examination?
10 If so, I'll remind Mr. Krajisnik that he's still bound by the
11 solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony,
12 Mr. Krajisnik.
13 Please proceed.
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, at this point I am going to ask once
15 again to go briefly into private session.
16 JUDGE ORIE: We'll turn into private session.
17 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 Examination by Mr. Stewart [Continued]
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 23943-23953 redacted. Private session.
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. STEWART: Thank you Your Honour, Mr. Registrar.
3 Your Honours, yesterday when he stopped Mr. Krajisnik's evidence
4 at the adjournment, we were looking at the minutes of the National
5 Security Council and government of the 15th of April, 1992. We got really
6 close to the very end of those minutes.
7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the last couple of -- I'll just give you a chance
8 to get hold of that document.
9 A. I think that I returned the document. I'm not quite sure.
10 Q. I know a copy's here ready for you anyway, Mr. Krajisnik. So if
11 you'd go to the end of that, please. I'm looking at the last couple of
12 paragraphs. Certainly on the last page. I can see that from here.
13 The -- do you see the last but one paragraph says: "Presidency
14 member, Professor Nikola Koljevic, is tasked with making a plan of
15 activities for the truthful presentation of the situation in the Serbian
16 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the presentation of information to
17 the Yugoslav and international public in order to avoid an information
19 Mr. Krajisnik, was that something that you were involved in
21 A. No. I didn't deal in that kind of thing.
22 Q. And how was the division of -- of responsibilities and work in
23 relation to that matter, as between Mr. Koljevic and Mr. Ostojic?
24 A. Well, as far as I am able to understand this, Mr. Koljevic could
25 have addressed the international public, and his -- well, he could
1 communicate because he was well-versed in the English language and was a
2 professor of it. So it was up to him to inform the international public
3 and international community about things that we held dear to our hearts.
4 Mr. Ostojic was supposed to be of service as a ministry to contact
5 people to perhaps lift the blockade and to contribute to having domestic
6 journalists informed about the situation and have them tour the region.
7 I'm improvising this now, but on the basis of this document here,
8 I can only interpret why Mr. Koljevic was tasked with these matters. We
9 were in total isolation. Some people didn't know whether we existed at
10 all, or whether we were alive or not. That is to say people from some of
11 these structures and organisations of the Serb people.
12 Q. Did -- were you in Pale, if you had the necessary equipment, were
13 you able to receive the same television station programmes as others in
14 Sarajevo itself?
15 A. I have heard things like that on several occasions here, and I'm
16 trying to remember what the situation was actually like. What I can say
17 is this: I know that we did not have -- or, rather, we couldn't view
18 television programmes. Later on, I was not able to listen to foreign
19 programmes, first of all because I don't speak foreign languages, but
20 secondly because I was very busy myself. But as far as I am able a
21 remember, it was not possible. Well, there was no electricity on many
22 occasions. It was not possible to view television programmes. But why
23 I'm in a quandary here is this: I very often heard reactions from people,
24 whether it be Karadzic or Koljevic. They would say, "Well, look at the
25 propaganda being launched against us on an international level. They are
1 sending out disinformation" and things like that. And my information was
2 that the people putting out that information about the situation speak
3 against the Serbs and give out erroneous information.
4 On several occasions I tried to see why this was and what was
5 actually happening, but quite certainly if I were to rank information, the
6 information system from 0 to 10, we were at 0 level, especially in that
7 first stage. So anything I can tell you now would be guesswork on my
8 part, to be quite frank. The impression that I have gained from that time
9 and from that situation is what I've already told you. The -- there was
10 very poor information. The information that I received, for example, I
11 received from my close associates, and they always said that the wrong
12 kind of information and tendentious information was given out about the
14 For purposes of illustration, and this happened much later, I
15 happened to see a report that was put out, that was televised. This was
16 later on, of course, where they showed a cemetery with crosses, and the
17 journalist said, "Take a look at how many Muslims have been killed." And
18 as you know, Muslims don't have crosses on their graves. And what could
19 we do? We just laughed at that piece of information and saw that it was
20 another instance of disinformation that was being disseminated in the
21 world, because in the world people don't know the difference and who the
22 Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina are.
23 So an example of this -- that is a good illustration of an example
24 of this, and I really did come to realise that this was propaganda being
25 put out to the detriment and against the Serbs.
1 Q. And the last point that's mentioned in these minutes, is
2 it "minister of traffic and communication was tasked with establishing a
3 road connection between Sarajevo and Pale through Tvrdimici," perhaps it's
4 said, "as urgently as possible." Was there a road connection between
5 Sarajevo and Pale at this time?
6 A. There was communication between Sarajevo and Pale, but it was in
7 the control of or the hands of the Muslims. It's around the fringes of
8 Sarajevo. And it says here that it was across Trebevic, across the
9 mountain, that they had took to a mountain path in order to link up Pale
10 with Lukavica because there was no road, no proper road. So for a long
11 time this very arduous route -- communication route was used to reach
12 Lukavica, that is to say the part that I spoke about yesterday that lies
13 south of Sarajevo. But at this point in time there was almost no
14 communication. It was just a rugged pathway, and you could only go that
15 way in a cart. That's how I went to Pale. And you could be held up in
16 hundreds of places.
17 Q. So without -- we probably don't need to look at maps on this,
18 Mr. Krajisnik, certainly not at the moment, but the idea here was that a
19 road connection -- the minister was to establish a road connection which
20 ran entirely through Serb-controlled territory, was it?
21 A. Yes. And it would be a good idea for you to see that briefly just
22 to give you an idea of what a large route this was. A dirt road had to be
23 made so that four-wheel drives could be used to reach Lukavica.
24 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, if you consider it would be helpful to the
25 Trial Chamber to see this, then we can look on a map.
1 A. Yes, there's map here. I think it would be a good idea just to
2 take a brief look at that map just to give you a general idea of the
3 layout. I'm explain it to you just briefly.
4 Q. Is this -- is this one of the maps that we've previously been
5 using, Mr. Krajisnik, or is it one that you've produced yourself?
6 A. This is an exact line, front line, as it was towards the end of
7 the war, and it underwent very minor changes.
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I am just trying to identify the map at the moment.
9 Is it a new one that we haven't had in evidence that you have just put
10 before the Trial Chamber? It's not a problem, Mr. Krajisnik. I just need
11 to know.
12 A. No, I it didn't in evidence. This is a map of Sarajevo showing
13 the front line, and it says the date, the 30th of November, 1995.
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, perhaps we can proceed with this map.
15 We can all see it on the screen.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the explanation you were going to offer the Trial
17 Chamber by reference to this map then is what?
18 A. Pale is here. Could you adjust the screens, please.
19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, Mr. Josse helpfully suggests since this
20 map isn't going to have any wider, general use Mr. Krajisnik might very
21 well mark it and as he marks it can go into evidence marked.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think there's marking on it, it already but I
23 don't know who made that. We certainly could invite Mr. Krajisnik mark if
24 there's anything to be marked.
25 But before we do so, and just to avoid whatever confusion later
1 on, Mr. Krajisnik, you said it was a map of the 30th of November, 1995. I
2 do, however, read that it's the 21st of November. May I take it that was
3 a slip of the tongue?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. That's quite right. I do
5 apologise. The 21st of November, 1995. I do apologise.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then you're talking about a road to be used to travel
7 between Pale and Lukavica. If you would consider it more clear for us if
8 you would -- if you would mark the map with that road, then Madam Usher
9 will provide you with, what is it? I think it's a black -- black pen.
10 But, Mr. Krajisnik, is it correct that Pale as such does not
11 appear on the map? I see Mount Trebevic, but ...
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Pale is beyond this map. The
13 Pale municipality starts at the end of this map here and stretches
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that there was a road or
17 route going this way towards Lukavica. The road wasn't free at that time.
18 This is Grbavica here. And later on, the Serbs liberated, or whichever
19 you like to say, took control of Lukavica. So as Pale is here, you had to
20 make this kind -- go this kind of -- go this route, take this route along
21 Tvrdimici along Mount Trebevic. That would be the route you'd take. And
22 that path was made in order to be able to reach Lukavica.
23 So this is the airstrip controlled by the UN, and I spoke about
24 that yesterday. There was no other road or path except this one going via
25 Tvrdimici towards Pale. So you had to link up the routes in order to be
1 able to pass that way.
2 Now, later on, although it was under fire, came under constant
3 fire, we managed to pass this way because Grbavica, Mount Grbavica, was
4 held by the Serbs. And later on you could take this other route. But
5 this was not a route taken before the war ever. You always went via
6 Sarajevo. However, during the war you had to use this route. And for
7 purposes of illustration, this is Zabrdje, this is Vlasenica. This is the
8 Muslim part. This is all the Muslim part. This is the airport and
9 airstrip. This is Ilidza. I explained that to you yesterday. And this
10 is the Serb-held territory, and the Muslim Kotorac.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, it appears that there is a problem,
12 because once it is translated to us, for example, when you said this is
13 the Zabrdje, then you are pointing already at the next spot. So
14 therefore, if you do this you have to do it one by one then make a pause
15 so that we see where you're pointing at. It's then translated to us,
16 because we are always one spot behind as -- and that could create quite
17 some confusion.
18 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. TIEGER: I fully agree with Mr. Stewart and Mr. Josse's
20 suggestion. I mean, having a mark makes it much easier over the long
22 JUDGE ORIE: Let's try to keep matters simple, Mr. Krajisnik. I
23 think you indicated that in the beginning the connection between Pale and
24 Lukavica was over Mount Trebevic. Well, let's say the wide southerly
25 road. If we would call that the first road.
1 Then you talked about at later stage although under fire there was
2 another road which was close or at least closer to the confrontation line.
3 You pointed at Grbavica at that moment.
4 And then the third connection I think you mentioned was the one up
5 to the north just all around. For you I should do it the other way.
6 Could you please with some proximity indicate and mark the three
7 connections, the first one, most southerly and then the next one and the
8 third all around the centre of Sarajevo. If you would please mark them
9 with a marker, with a black marker. Then we'd -- so if you'd give them 1
10 for the most southerly. We'd prefer you to do it when it's still on the
11 ELMO so that we can see and follow what you are doing.
12 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So the first one.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This route -- well, I have to
15 improvise now, because you can't see the actual path or route here, but
16 from Brus you would go this way. Let me just find -- yes. This route
17 leads you to Tilava, and then you move forward towards Lukavica. So that
18 would be it roughly.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please add a 1 to that first road.
20 And we see that in the west it ends in Lukavica and at the east -- well,
21 somewhere not on this map goes to Pale.
22 The second one, please.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I said about this other
24 route -- I just mentioned two routes. At that point in time there was a
25 separation line here. That's where it was. And there's a road here, or a
1 path, this one here. This is the road that existed. And that's number 2.
2 I'll mark that with a number 2.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, the third road connected --
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not mention a third road, a
5 third route, but I spoke rather quickly so I mentioned the airstrip there,
6 the airfield. So it was these two routes. And this was the route
7 discussed here in this document, in these minutes. That's the route
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise, but I don't know if
11 I'm precise enough, but the route the road went through Tvrdimici give or
12 take five metres.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'll even give you a bit more, Mr. Krajisnik.
14 The precision here, it gives us an impression on at least the first road
15 that you had really to go over Trebevic more southerly, and the rest after
16 that, although not under fire, the road taken was -- was that an existing
17 road which, as far as I remember, an existing road which would come by far
18 closer to the confrontation line?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The other one you mean. Oh, yes.
20 That one was on the very boundary or, rather, separation line.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
22 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, this is a relatively small point: These minutes at
24 the end show Sarajevo, 15th April, 1992. You are quite clear that this
25 will meeting was held in Pale, are you?
1 A. Yes. Yes. I know that I attended a meeting in Pale for the first
2 time, and I said yesterday that I do not remember the date when I went for
3 two reasons, but then since there are these minutes here, I assume that it
4 is correct, that I attended that meeting, because I remember some things
5 from these minutes, and for others I assume that they were put in
6 subsequently because that had been agreed upon earlier, before I came to
7 Pale, like about SRNA and the director and so on.
8 Q. Do you know who was preparing or who prepared these minutes?
9 A. I don't know. Obviously this was typewritten. It says "Meeting
10 ended at 2000 hours." Obviously it was typed out the following day or
11 when I went home.
12 Q. All right. Mr. Krajisnik, we can put those -- that document on
13 one side, please.
14 You -- could you be given, then, the Exhibit which is P64A, binder
15 26, tab 768, which is a record, as it's described in English, of the
16 expanded session of the National Security Council and the government of
17 Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina. And it's not dated at the top, but it's
18 dated at the end, 20th of April. Your Honour, the ERN number here is
20 MR. TIEGER: Before we put the map that was just used too far off
21 to one side, it might be useful to mark it.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MR. STEWART: I was reminded by Mr. Sladojevic and forgot with 30
24 seconds, Your Honour. So thank you for the double reminder
25 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D190, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. It of course still has to be copied, but
2 at least no translation is needed.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Go ahead.
4 MR. STEWART:
5 Q. First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, do you know whether you were actually
6 at that meeting?
7 A. I cannot remember. I cannot remember any one of these items. I
8 have the impression that all of this is subject matter that the government
9 deals with. For example, decision on the appointment of Miroslav Lalevic
10 for Secretary-General of the bureau of the government in Belgrade. To
11 this day, I don't know who this man is, and I did not take part in this,
12 so I probably did not attend, although -- well, I don't remember all these
13 things that were referred to at this meeting. Well, in actual fact, I
14 don't remember any of this.
15 Q. Well, let me ask you then, Mr. Krajisnik, about a particular topic
16 which did come up at the meeting, and it's item -- it's under heading 1,
17 and it's item (c)4. It's two-thirds of the way down the page in the
18 English the it's probably a little bit further on in the Serbian I would
19 guess. Do you see a letter (c), the following decisions were adopted 1,
20 the decision to establish the financial police, and then I'm going down to
21 number 4 in that section relating to municipalities and refugees. Do you
22 see that?
23 A. Yes, I see that.
24 Q. First of all, Mr. Krajisnik, whether or not you were at this
25 meeting, at this point in time, so we're about three weeks into April,
1 what was your knowledge of the existence and scale of any refugees in
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
3 A. I was constantly informed by individuals who were in Pale that
4 there was a mass phenomenon, namely that people were leaving Sarajevo and
5 coming to Pale. Pale is a small town of 15.000 inhabitants, and its
6 population grew to perhaps 30.000 or even more than that. If people had
7 contact with others, they kept receiving information to the effect that on
8 all sides people were trying to get to safer areas. I mean, since we were
9 near Sarajevo, most of our information came from people who wanted to
10 leave Sarajevo. I'm primarily referring to Serbs. So they would get to
11 Pale and then go elsewhere.
12 As for further communication, I did not know what the situation
13 was in other areas. Simply there was no communication. Sometimes perhaps
14 a bit of information would get through, but it would be unfounded about
15 people who were going someplace, but it mainly had to do with Serbs who
16 were leaving areas held by Croats and Muslims.
17 I did not have any other knowledge. There was very poor
18 information on all accounts.
19 Q. What, if anything, had you been able to observe yourself in Pale
20 about either an influx of additional, more people into Pale, or people
22 A. There is a saying in Serbian to the effect that it's as busy as a
23 beehive. There are lots of weekend cottages there, and then people have
24 these weekend cottages, and then they would come there and they would stay
25 there. You could come across refugees everywhere. That happened every
1 day. Sometimes you hadn't seen a person in years, and you'd run into them
2 in Pale. Perhaps they were there in transit or whatever, but at any rate,
3 they'd left Sarajevo as refugees.
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can we take it as a starting point that people who
5 come from Pale to weekend -- sorry, who come from Sarajevo to weekend
6 cottages in Pale, whether or not they then fall within the definition of
7 refugees, they were not a practical problem, were they, because they -- by
8 definition they got their accommodation in Pale?
9 A. You misunderstood me. Not all refugees had weekend cottages to
10 stay in. There were quite a few weekend cottages where people were
11 staying, but they did not actually belong to them. There was quite a bit
12 of housing space, if I can call it that, because it was that kind of area
13 where people went away for weekends, and that is how these refugees found
14 accommodation, in most cases in other people's weekend cottages. It was
15 important for them to find accommodation because they had left their own
16 homes. Very few people came to their very own weekend cottages. There
17 were such cases, but a person would, say, run away from Sarajevo and try
18 to find accommodation in order to be able to survive. And if there was no
19 accommodation, then they had to go on.
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in -- as previously in your evidence you've shown a
21 resistance to what you seem to regard as a Western custom of seeking
22 numbers, so in whatever way you wish best to describe it to the Trial
23 Chamber, could you indicate at this time, about three weeks into April,
24 what you had seen and what the scale was in the first place of an influx
25 of more people into Pale?
1 A. It could best be described as fairgrounds with lots of bags, lots
2 of people at their wits' end. Mr. Trbojevic was here as a witness and he
3 came in torn trousers, without a jacket. A woman came only wearing a
4 blouse although it was cold. There were people there, say, who left on
5 their own, and their entire families were left behind, and then they'd
6 say, "Let me use a telephone so that I can try to talk to them." And then
7 he'd tell you his story of how he left, and then he'd phone somebody in
8 Serbia to find out whether he could go there. At first it was possible to
9 have this kind of communication. And then these people were trying to
10 find accommodation in Pale.
11 I told you, we say it was as busy as a beehive, or it was like a
12 fairground, whatever. These were people of different profiles who did not
13 really have a particular goal in mind. They were simply glad to have
14 escaped from the war and from torture. I'm telling you what they were
15 saying. And now when you ask me how often this happened, perhaps I could
16 give you three or four or five individual cases of people I saw who seemed
17 to be in a normal state. Everybody was in quite a state psychologically
18 speaking, because they had to resort to different things in order to get
19 out of Sarajevo.
20 I don't know if I got this right, whether I got this answer right.
21 Is this what you were asking me about?
22 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm not -- I'm not going to press you to go
23 into descriptions of the individual cases. I'm more concerned if perhaps
24 you could give the Trial Chamber an idea -- by this time had you seen that
25 it was hundreds of people who had come into Pale, or was it thousands of
1 people? Could you give the Trial Chamber some idea of -- of the scale of
2 this influx of additional people to Pale?
3 A. I thought that I had already explained this. This was a process,
4 a process, an ongoing process from the very beginning or, rather, even
5 from before the beginning, say, from the 4th or 5th of April. This was an
6 ongoing process. People were coming individually, in groups, as families.
7 It wasn't that hundreds of people were coming in, but this was like a
8 river flowing to Pale and beyond, for as long as people could get out.
9 And later on through different channels, illegal channels, people got out.
10 And now you're asking me how many.
11 According to some rather reliable information, already by the end
12 of 1992 or perhaps during the course of 1992, Pale had its population grow
13 from 15.000 to 30.000. Perhaps even more people passed through Pale when
14 you compare them to the number of people who stayed, because whoever could
15 went further on to Serbia or elsewhere.
16 One of the ways in which people left was the following: There was
17 this helicopter link transporting the wounded from Pale to Belgrade, to
18 the Military Medical Academy. That is where the seriously wounded were
19 treated, those who could not be treated locally or operated on locally.
20 So then along with these seriously wounded persons some other people were
21 transported there as well. People went in other ways, too, but I'm
22 telling you what I saw.
23 I saw this relatively little -- I saw very little of this,
24 relatively speaking, because I was in my office, but then I heard people
25 talking, so that is how I got more complete information.
1 What I found particularly alarming was when Pofalici was attacked,
2 a group of people fled through the mountains. I never saw people who were
3 more frightened in all my life. They were talking about the dead and
5 So you did not experience in tragedy firsthand, but then you are
6 trying to calm these people down, say they had their parents and spouses,
7 children killed. And then also there were these people from Sarajevo who
8 came in who were professors. One man who came, he was president of the
9 constitutional court, Marko Arsovic. Later on he was at the
10 Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. His wife is a Croat and he's
11 Montenegrin. He was trembling. His entire body was shaking, and he told
12 us about all the torture he had experienced and how this criminal rescued
13 him and helped him get out to Pale.
14 A well-known medical doctor, Guzina, came and told us about all
15 things they did to him and about the statements that he had to make on
16 television. And he was a member of the council of the Serb Democratic
17 Party. He had to say that they were criminals and whatever, the most
18 terrible things, just so they wouldn't kill him.
19 That's what I saw that day.
20 Your Honours, I don't want to be partial. I don't know what
21 happened on the other side, but I'm telling you what I heard there in Pale
22 from people who were coming in. Sometimes you would see intellectuals
23 before you with full credibility, and that is what they looked like
24 before, but then it all of a sudden they would go around looking for
25 shabby coats to wear and looking for food and accommodation. That was the
1 atmosphere that prevailed. Women were particularly panic-stricken. They
2 were really making the atmosphere even worse as they were talking about
3 what was going on in Sarajevo.
4 I am talking about what they said about informal groups that
5 tortured them. They didn't talk about bombing or whatever. They were
6 talking about what these evil people did to them. They barged into their
7 apartments. They took them away. And other people were taken away, too.
8 That's what they were saying. And how some of them ended up in prison,
9 how one of them was wounded, and how another one was shot up by a sniper.
10 Those are all the things they were saying. So these people said, "Let me
11 do anything. Let me just find a place to stay, because I have no where to
12 go and all my belongings are still in Sarajevo."
13 The municipality had these weekend cottages put at their disposal,
14 and then they would put families up in these different weekend cottages.
15 They'd even put two families in one weekend cottages. They tried to help
16 in different ways.
17 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you've given the Trial Chamber a picture of how
18 individuals and individual families are affected by such matters, and the
19 Trial Chamber's heard throughout this trial such evidence, much of which,
20 Mr. Krajisnik, and I can say this safely. Individual instances in the
21 course of the Prosecution case contained a great deal, a great number of
22 events that you nor we as counsel on your behalf dispute, Mr. Krajisnik.
23 So I want to turn to a slightly bigger picture.
24 At this time in second half of April, was there observable
25 movement out of Pale of significant numbers of people?
1 A. As for the month of April, the only thing I observed was that
2 people from Sarajevo were in transit. That is to say that they were
3 passing through and going to other places, those who had places to go to.
4 I think or, rather, I saw a relatively small number of people who left.
5 These were Serbs from Sarajevo who couldn't really get organised there, so
6 then they went beyond.
7 If you have a specific case that was presented here I can comment
8 on that. I can tell you about what I think about that. But I was talking
9 about Serbs who were leaving Sarajevo.
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we see the broad figure that we have from the
11 coloured map, P211, based on the 1991 census, that the Pale municipality
12 as a whole, in that municipality 27 per cent of the population were
13 Muslim, 69 per cent shown as Serb and 3 per cent as Yugoslav. There's a
14 missing 1 per cent there.
15 The 27 per cent, Mr. Krajisnik, there whether that was precisely
16 the right figure or not, were they for practical purposes still there in
17 late April, 1992?
18 A. I was not familiar enough with the situation in Pale, but I'm
19 going to tell you the following as far as this percentage is concerned:
20 In Pale itself, there was a very small percentage of Muslims. Further
21 away there is a small settlement separate from Pale that had a large
22 Muslim population, but it belonged to the municipality of Pale.
23 Q. May I just -- when you say in Pale itself, you mean in the town as
24 opposed to the municipality? That's what you're saying, are you?
25 A. Yes, the urban area, this little town. I didn't really get any
1 further. But when this percentage is concerned, then you also take into
2 account these people from Podgrad or whatever, there is a larger Muslim
3 population. But I never went there and I didn't know the area. I just
4 knew the area that was within a one- or two-kilometre diameter. And now
5 did I have any knowledge about this? No.
6 But in relation to the question you put, I will give an answer.
7 There is information here -- I didn't even know who the Muslims in Pale
8 were and who lived where, but I know that there were Muslims there, and by
9 way of an illustration, before the end of July they left. Please, you
10 have a record here. You have a record here of the 25th of July, in
11 Jahorina. That's the second session where Karadzic says, "All the Muslims
12 are in Pale. They have no trouble. They haven't left Pale." So he
13 didn't even know when they left. And according to these records, they
14 left sometime before the end of July. You'll find this record that I
15 read, and you will see it for yourself.
16 We were not dealing with that problem. They had fully equal
17 rights, and we never heard of any problems with Muslims in Pale at the
19 Q. The -- the reference in these minutes to "the decision to help the
20 municipalities affected by the war and burdened by the presence of
21 refugees," whether or not you were at that meeting was a subject, was that
22 an issue of which you had knowledge?
23 A. Well, now that I'm trying to remember, there was this constant
24 concern for municipalities that were stricken by the war. It's much
25 easier for those who are further away from the lines than those who are at
1 the front line itself. It's much easier for those who are further
2 in-depth in the territory. I take this to be a very logical conclusion.
3 Now, would it help if the government dealt with this problem? I'm
4 convinced that the government did reach such a conclusion as far as Pale
5 is concerned because they did not have information about all the places
6 where this was going on if it was going on, but then they saw what was
7 going on in Pale vis-a-vis Sarajevo, so then they said, well, let's help
8 these people in Pale, and let's help others who are now refugees due to
9 the war.
10 Q. If -- if you are able to say from what you knew at the time,
11 Mr. Krajisnik, was that decision to help municipalities affected by the
12 war and burdened by the presence of refugees a decision which was intended
13 to cover all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or did it have the less
14 ambitious aim of helping municipalities within the Sarajevo area?
15 A. The decision had to be worded this way. It had to pertain to the
16 entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But what I know for sure is that
17 although it was unfair, what they had in mind was probably the
18 municipalities or the municipality that is near Sarajevo and that the
19 members of the government knew about. As for the others, they had no
20 knowledge of that even theoretically, because they didn't have any
21 communication or information. They could not say, "Let's just help Pale
22 and not help others." The decision had to be a general one, if I can put
23 it that way, so that they could help others if this information came
25 I don't know what kind of assistance could have been provided
1 because the government was poor, but that is one of the ways in which the
2 government works. It provides help.
3 So it was less ambitious, as you had put it. It did not have a
4 broad scope of understanding.
5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I note the clock. May I inquire,
6 Your Honour, whether we are having one or two further sessions?
7 JUDGE ORIE: 99.9 per cent that we have only one.
8 MR. STEWART: The percentage is changing, then, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, percentages are changing as the time goes on.
10 Yes. We'll have a break. I have, however, and it relates also to
11 the previous one, one question to clarify. I see the abbreviation CSCE
12 both in the earlier, the 15th of April minutes, and I find it in this one
13 again. I don't know what it is.
14 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I have written, I don't know when, but
15 some time ago I have written OSCE, question mark. I must have thought to
16 myself that it probably meant Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
17 Europe, which I think may have changed its name at various times. So it
18 was possibly called that, CSC at that time, the Conference on Security and
19 Cooperation Europe. But it's that as far as I know, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I see. But perhaps we could ask Mr. Krajisnik.
21 I see that it's called KEBS in the 15th of April, B/C/S version.
22 Mr. Krajisnik, can you tell us what KEBS is?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's KEBS, Conference on European
24 Security and Cooperation.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Clarified.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what was -- it used to be
2 known as the OSCE.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you very much for that.
4 We will adjourn until quarter past four.
5 --- Recess taken at 3.48 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 4.22 p.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, Mr. Stewart, I do understand
8 that the Defence would like to give a CD-ROM to Mr. Krajisnik with some
9 intercepts on it and that a list has been provided to the Prosecution.
10 MR. JOSSE: Not a CD-ROM, simply a hard copy. I've just done
11 that, in fact, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it, Mr. Tieger, that there was no
13 objection against that?
14 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. JOSSE: The list of what is contained within the bundle has
17 been distributed to everybody, and --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. JOSSE: So --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Fine. No problem. Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already put it in so as to
22 avoid anybody taking it.
23 JUDGE ORIE: So it's safe, Mr. Krajisnik. That's good to know.
24 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
25 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, in talking about decision to help the
2 municipalities, and you gave some answers in relation to that, at this
3 point, the 20th of April, 1992, from what you knew what was the practical
4 ability of the governments of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina to help
5 municipalities in relation to refugees?
6 A. As an economist, I will tell you what I know about that. At that
7 time, in formal terms, there was payments turnover between Banja Luka and
8 our firms in Yugoslavia. And Mr. Pejic, Mr. Momcilo Pejic, was the
9 Minister of Finance in the former government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And
10 one of the ways was that -- well, the dinar was the currency in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time. He asked to enjoy the right that each
12 republic had of primary mission, that is to say, credits, loans, monies,
13 et cetera. If you have a central bank, you can obtain money. So he asked
14 for this right of issue of money. And as he went to Belgrade, and he was
15 in the government before that, on that-those grounds the bank was
16 duty-bound to provide money. Anybody who is an economist is well aware of
17 this. The national bank always provides the money for the goods realised.
18 That's when we are talking about financial matters.
19 On the other hand, there were a certain amount of resources, or,
20 rather, storehouses of food, food stocks, and I think this was dealt with
21 by the government at one of its meetings and the government could help out
22 there. Let me remind the Trial Chamber that there is a letter sent by the
23 government of the Crisis Staff of Sokolac asking them to send food
24 supplies to Vogosca or Ilijas, food stocks. So that's something the
25 government could do. It couldn't do a great deal but that's one of the
1 things it could do and that the government was ready to undertake.
2 But as I say, I'm telling you what was theoretically possible.
3 When it comes to this particular decision, I do believe that it was more
4 declarative in nature at that time, because they just didn't have the
5 resources. But it was a groundwork and basis for providing assistance to
6 certain areas which had large numbers of refugees living in them.
7 Q. Suppose, for example, Mr. Krajisnik, 20 refugees had reported in
8 late April to the government in Pale that they had significant refugee
9 problems with a few thousand refugees. Would there have been any
10 possibility that the government could have given significant help to 20
11 municipalities in relation to -- to that problem?
12 A. Yes and no. Let me explain why yes and why no. I said that the
13 government didn't have many resources, and I said the kind of assistance
14 that they could give, and I mentioned the national bank. As I say, the
15 dinar was the currency in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time, and the bank
16 would issue or grant money.
17 Now, all economic power was vested in the municipalities. Would
18 have companies, warehouses, and so on. The government was empty-handed.
19 There was very little possibility of the government being able to do
20 anything, except, for example, if there was a warehouse somewhere that the
21 government was in control of, and then it could say well, let's send the
22 goods from that warehouse somewhere. Or it could put in a request and ask
23 somebody else to help.
24 So this was the beginning of the war, the beginning of the crisis,
25 and what was available was negligible.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, at the meeting on the 20th of April, which you have
2 already indicated you're not sure whether you attended it, item 3, as a
3 heading under item 3, it's in the middle of page 2 of the English, it's
4 quite near to the end, there are 10 numbered points at the end of these
5 minutes. Do you see those?
6 A. You've taken the document. You took it back. I returned it.
7 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I would do my best to see
8 that you get it back, Mr. Krajisnik.
9 A. I blame you for anything that I'm lacking here, so there's no
10 problem there. Thank you.
11 Q. That's nice and clear, Mr. Krajisnik, at least. You've made a net
12 gain of one piece of paper, Mr. Krajisnik.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. All right.
15 A. Yes. Thank you.
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. Could you repeat what you were saying, please?
18 Q. I will, Mr. Krajisnik. Point number 3 there, "Instructions for
19 procedure of organs of the Serbian Republic of BH in wartime should be
20 drafted." You see that? Are you able to cast any light on what that
21 point and that decision was about?
22 A. I don't know what this is about, but perhaps I could contribute by
23 giving you an explanation. May I go ahead?
24 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, I asked if you're able to cast light. If
25 your explanation casts light, then that's an answer to my question.
1 A. We were informed that on the 8th of April, the other side, in
2 Sarajevo, had proclaimed immediate threat of war, and after that it
3 introduced a wartime regime. And there was this idea that pervaded to see
4 what that meant, the introduction of this state of war, because there was
5 a war conflict. So most probably this was a forerunner to one of the
6 tasks that was written down as a government task and discussed by the
7 government and analysed by the government, what this would mean when a
8 state of war was proclaimed. And you'll be able to find this in one of
9 the later minutes.
10 The general mood -- well, actually it was a situation of war, and
11 an inexperienced government -- well, the government was inexperienced
12 because that was the first time it had encountered a problem of that kind.
13 It saw what was going on, on the other side, what the other side was
14 doing, and then they sort of said, well, let's see what we could do to
15 make conditions easier for us during the war, because quite obviously war
16 was imminent.
17 So I think that this was the first initiative that they took, and
18 later the government did analyse what this meant, if a state of war was
19 declared or an imminent state of war. You'll be able to find a document
20 where the government analyses the situation and what should be done and
21 who should be given what assignments.
22 Q. And then there's a reference, it's point number 7, to -- well, I'm
23 going to invite you to read point number 7, Mr. Krajisnik, just in case
24 there's a question about the English. Do you see point number 7?
25 Very near to the end of these minutes.
1 A. "That misunderstandings should be cleared up between -- along the
2 lines of the Serbian police-Territorial Defence, and to determine
4 Q. Now, is it -- is it clear to you, Mr. Krajisnik, whether that
5 reference to Serbian police is to police in Bosnia or police in Serbia or
7 A. No. What is meant here is the police which was established in the
8 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So the misunderstanding between
9 that police force, let's call it the police force of Republika Srpska,
10 although that's not what it was called then, and the Territorial Defence
11 also of Republika Srpska. So the armed people and the police have entered
12 into some sort of misunderstanding.
13 Q. Excuse me. Do you know what that misunderstanding was?
14 A. Specifically here I don't know, but what I do know is this: That
15 there was constant rivalry and one side would blame and accuse the other
16 side, or one armed component set it against the other armed component.
17 Even when the army was established, then the police would be blamed if
18 something was amiss, and the police would blame the army if something was
20 So most probably at the beginning of all this, there were some --
21 there was some kind of regional misunderstandings that cropped up which
22 needed to be cleared up, who was to blame and who was not to blame. So
23 that's the kind of thing that would happen when you have two participants
24 or two parties engaged on one assignment.
25 The police had the role, not the kind that the police usually has,
1 but it was there setting up a defence. It acted like an army, in fact.
2 Q. And then the next point in these minutes was that "A comprehensive
3 report on war achievements and problems encountered in some areas of
4 Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina should be prepared."
5 Were you, Mr. Krajisnik, the person or one of the people who was
6 given the task of preparing that report?
7 A. No. No. This probably followed on from the previous point. Most
8 probably, somebody had given an assignment to the ministry of the police
9 or the minister of defence, because as far as I remember, both posts
10 existed, or Territorial Defence, that is what it was on paper, to write a
11 report about what they knew. I don't think they could have written
12 anything, but quite simply that meeting called for some information so
13 that they could see whether there was something that was known beyond Pale
14 and beyond Sarajevo and, if so, to inform the meeting thereof so that they
15 could sit down and discuss the report later on.
16 So I think that was always on the agenda of the government as
17 well, that the ministers should compile and prepare reports to inform it.
18 So this is a forerunner to that kind of report, although no -- nothing was
19 specified. I assume it referred to these two or three people.
20 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we can put that document on one side, please.
21 A. I'd just like to ask you, if I may, if I could be allowed to
22 explain something with respect to point 9. May I?
23 Q. I'm sure the Trial Chamber wouldn't wish to stop you from doing
24 that, Mr. Krajisnik. Please go ahead.
25 A. I mentioned here -- actually, I testified about Capljina, and I
1 said that the son of a Presidency member, a member of the Yugoslav state
2 Presidency had died, and this is what it is about. Sejdo Bajramovic was
3 the Presidency member of Bosnia-Herzegovina. His son died in Capljina,
4 was killed in fact in Capljina. So this is to express condolences over
5 the death of his son, and it relates to my testimony about Capljina.
6 May I go on and explain that, because it would be a good idea for
7 us to know what this is about.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I would leave that to Mr. Stewart.
9 Mr. Stewart, if you would like to have further --
10 MR. STEWART:
11 Q. I'm not pressing you to, Mr. Krajisnik, but if -- I'm sorry,
12 Your Honour?
13 JUDGE ORIE: Would it be a compromise if Mr. Krajisnik thinks it's
14 very important that he briefly explains and then if we need more details
15 then we'll ask for further details.
16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that would have been exactly my
17 position. I'm more than happy with that.
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it's -- yes, I'm not pressing you, but if you
19 consider it important, Mr. Krajisnik, please explain briefly.
20 A. I told the Honourable Trial Chamber that a witness had testified
21 here, that he was expelled from -- Serbs were expelled from Capljina, and
22 here I said that it was in Croatian hands throughout the war and that the
23 barracks were under siege and that the son of a Yugoslav state Presidency
24 member was killed. So I wanted to confirm that the testimony that we
25 heard, or, rather, when he said that the Muslims [as interpreted] were
1 expelled he was harbouring a delusion. Could be quite the contrary. All
2 the Serbs were expelled from Capljina. And this now confirms it because
3 they wished to express condolences to a soldier who was the son of a
4 Presidency member. He was from Capljina where he was -- in Capljina he
5 was killed. So I wanted to put this in context.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand that you consider this a full
7 explanation. At the same time, Mr. Krajisnik, of course we should be
8 aware that you could be killed as a soldier both from an expelling
9 [Realtime transcript read in error "expelled"] party or from an expelled
10 party so to that extent the explanation is not full yet. Do you
11 understand what I mean?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Your Honour. Now, all
13 this can be checked out. I just wanted to round this off, this discussion
14 about Capljina. But you can check this out that, Sejdo Bajramovic, who is
15 also no longer alive, was killed by Croatian soldiers who had expelled
16 Serbs from Capljina. So I just want to tell you what propaganda can do,
17 because you see the news that was put out was that it was the Muslims who
18 were expelled, whereas in fact it was the Serbs who were expelled. So
19 that's the substance of my testimony, and of course you can investigate
20 this issue and check it out for yourselves.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
22 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like you, please, then to put that document on
24 one side and be given the record or minutes of the meeting held on the
25 22nd of April, which is P64A, binder 24, tab 656, or P65, binder 11, tab
1 122, or P529, tab 75. But I hope in all those cases it will be ERN
3 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Stewart, I saw that my words
4 were not fully reflected in the transcript. I said you could be killed as
5 a soldier from an expelling party or a -- and then I think I said an
6 expulsed party or an expelled party. I never know what word to use as a
8 MR. STEWART: Expelled, Your Honour. Expulsion is what happens to
9 people when they expelled.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Therefore it was an expelled party or a --
11 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. It's clear.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you have that? 22nd of April?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. This is described, Mr. Krajisnik -- if you can't say, if you can
15 say, can you say whether you were at this meeting on the 22nd of April?
16 A. I think that I was already at the meeting, because many of the
17 things I see here -- well, Mr. Stewart, all these minutes -- there was a
18 meeting. Somebody recorded the minutes. Now, he recorded this as he knew
19 best. So some things I can recognise here, and if I recognise them, then
20 I can tell you whether I was informed about it or not.
21 I think I was there at Pale on the 22nd already.
22 Q. Had you already at this time or close to this time been at a
23 meeting with representatives of the United Nations?
24 A. I think I was, although I can't remember who was there, but, yes,
25 I do think I attended a meeting with representatives of the United
1 Nations. I can't be quite sure when this was. I'm not quite sure.
2 Q. Can you remember where it was?
3 A. No, I can't, I'm afraid. I can't remember whether it was -- well,
4 it was probably at Pale. I don't know any other place where it could have
5 been. It wouldn't have been anywhere else.
6 Q. Can you remember what it was about?
7 A. I really can't say. It would be guesswork on my part. But I seem
8 to remember having attended, and this is why: Certain matters -- well,
9 the representatives of the United Nations came to Pale at that time, and
10 very often when they wanted or, rather, they didn't want to, they talked
11 to me from time to time because they thought that I was more legitimate
12 than others because I was a member of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 I hadn't tendered my resignation. And they tried to avoid, for example,
14 Karadzic, although they had to talk to him. But they talked to
15 Mrs. Plavsic and Mr. Koljevic mostly when Mrs. Plavsic arrived later, but
16 I talked to them, too, or they talked to me.
17 So, yes, I do seem to remember that I did talk to certain UN
18 representatives, but I can't remember who now.
19 Q. Now, turning to the minute of the meeting of the 22nd of April, we
20 can see that this one and the previous one, not the first one we looked
21 at, 15th of April. So this one and the previous one on the 20th of April
22 are each described as minutes or record of the expanded session of the
23 National Security Council and the government of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 or Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Can you cast any light on
25 why the word "expanded" is used in the heading to these documents?
1 A. I would like to state emphatically that this meeting and similar
2 meetings were held in a room that was 12 or 15 square metres large at the
3 most, and anybody who occupied any post and had fled to Pale would live
4 there in Kikinda, and we would meet and see what we should do. So those
5 were the consultations that were held.
6 Now, why it says expanded meeting here is this: First of all,
7 there were people who did not belong to any government structures. That's
8 the first reason. Secondly, it was an informal meeting, a consultation in
10 Now, why it was termed expanded, I seem to recall very well that a
11 news was put out -- the news was put out that this consultation or
12 consultative meeting, as we referred to it, to give it a name so that
13 people knew that Mr. Karadzic was taking part, the council for national
14 security was never constituted nor was the decision taken and recorded in
15 the minutes. However, we put him forward as president. And I mentioned
16 yesterday that a decision did in fact exist whereby the Serbian Democratic
17 Party was supposed to set up its own National Security Council with other
18 members, but I don't know if that ever came to fruition, and Karadzic was
19 supposed to be at the head of that council.
20 Now, we had to appear as if this was a government and say that,
21 yes, there were some meetings, there were minutes and so on. So the
22 person to blame for meetings of this kind was Mr. -- or, rather, they were
23 responsible for these meetings, Mr. Djeric and myself, and we said, well,
24 let's get together. Let's consult each other so that each one of us could
25 do our -- go about our business.
1 Now, I didn't have any work because there wasn't any Assembly
2 meetings going on at the time. I worked in an enterprise where the staff
3 would get together, where the managers would get together. Everybody
4 would sit down and write down what their assignments are and then put them
5 into practice. So that was the purpose of this meeting.
6 Now, it was called a council because the proposal by the council
7 of the national security of the Serb republic came from -- stemmed from
8 Mr. Karadzic. And if you look at the minutes of the 24th of March, you'll
9 see that he insisted that we introduce a body of that kind in the Serb
10 republic if it hadn't already been formed by the party. So that on the
11 27th of March, once the war had already started, we adopted as an advisory
12 body this council, but we didn't manage to establish it or put it into
13 practice. So that's why it was an extended or expanded meeting. And all
14 the people that took part were people that happened to be there. It was
15 just a consultative meeting. There was no government yet. I don't know
16 whether Mrs. Plavsic had arrived or not or maybe she was away in Zvornik.
17 Just to consolidate our positions and to consolidate some power and
19 Now, why did these meetings begin in the first place? Well, we
20 insisted that we get together in the morning, consult each other, not to
21 sit alone in our offices. Let's all get together and see what we should
22 do. And the council couldn't take any decisions nor did it. So on the
23 12th of May, you can see that it was just the decisions taken by the
24 Presidency that were approved. So where it says here government and
25 council, they were in fact Presidency decisions, although in official
1 terms these decisions were just verified by the 12th of May when we had
2 our first Assembly meeting. But you'll be able to find all this in the
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you -- you said in that answer that you didn't have
5 any work because there weren't any Assembly meetings. My next question
6 could sound slightly rude in English. It's not intended that way and I
7 hope it won't come across in Serbian at all like that.
8 You say you didn't have any work? What did you do all day?
9 A. Well, I now know that when I use this rather loose term it's taken
10 quite literally. I was there. The Assembly didn't go into session as of
11 the 27th of March, and I had nothing to do with the deputies. I didn't
12 have any contacts with the deputies. They weren't able to come. So
13 that's when I said that my -- I didn't engage in my usual current work,
14 but I tried to put all these links together, to bring people into contact,
15 to rally up the deputies and prepare matters for the first Assembly
16 session. That's what I did.
17 What else did I do. Well, I did all sorts of things. I wouldn't
18 be able to define them all precisely. I consulted people. I would
19 receive people in my offices. Perhaps a representative of the United
20 Nations might come and see me.
21 So all this was improvised to a large extent, and I didn't meddle
22 in any government decisions. I might have discussed them in one way or
23 another, but that's why I said I didn't do my regular work. I was sort of
24 on standby waiting for the Assembly to go into session so that I could go
25 about my Assembly business. After that, the negotiations started, and
1 then I was taken up with them.
2 So I'm talking about this period of time.
3 Q. The minutes that we're looking at of the 22nd of April, they have
4 under item 1, heading, "Strategic issues." Regarding the first item of
5 the agenda, which is simply called "Strategic issues," "Regarding the
6 first item on the agenda, consultations were held on the most important
7 strategic issues."
8 Now, at this point, Mr. Krajisnik, the discussion or the
9 consultations that are being referred to here, were they a precursor or
10 first stage in the development of what became the six strategic goals?
11 A. No, this is not linked to the six strategic goals. What this is
12 about is consultations we held amongst ourselves. Somebody had to contact
13 the United Nations or the European Community, because there was pressure
14 on us saying that somebody around Sarajevo was attacking the Muslims. And
15 in that connection you can see that our strategic aim was that we should
16 safeguard our positions and to explain to the European Community or who --
17 who is it that's mentioned here, that our lines were attacked, not that we
18 were attacking Sarajevo. And that's exactly how it was. That's the truth
19 of it.
20 The opposite side - when I say the opposite side I mean the Muslim
21 and Croat side - it didn't suit them to negotiate. It suited them for the
22 United Nations forces to come in and to subjugate Bosnia, to intervene and
23 calm down the situation, and to have Bosnia internationally recognised but
24 not transformed. And there were many provocations, whether organised or
25 unorganised, I can't say. I don't know that. But they attacked Serb
1 positions. And when the Serbs responded, the Serb forces responded, we
2 were accused and blamed, at least that's what people told us, of being the
3 first to attack. So these observers couldn't see who attacked first and
4 who was to blame, because it was very often difficult to establish.
5 So this is what this is about. Somebody who had been in contact
6 with the United Nations representatives told us this, and we consulted
7 each other to see what the best reaction should be from us.
8 Q. Now, it's -- it's recorded or note inned next paragraph of this
9 document that a request was to be sent to the European Community observer
10 mission to post observers at the position of "our forces," it says, Serb
11 forces. Was such a request sent?
12 A. Yes. Actually, that was the intention, but I don't know whether
13 that was the case. We wanted the representatives of the European
14 Community to be next to our positions and to see whether we were being
15 attacked or whether we were attacking. This was a constant request,
16 because we were the ones who were being accused, not the other side.
17 Now I have to make a small correction. These people who were on
18 the ground were informing us, who were in Pale, that it wasn't true that
19 we were attacking, that it was the Croats and the Muslims who were
20 attacking us. If you are telling us the truth, then let the international
21 observers come and let them establish the truth.
22 So if by some chance somebody was lying on our side, then they
23 should be punished or perhaps corrected. But we kept being told that it
24 was the other side that was attacking our positions because they were
25 trying to sabotage the conference.
1 I'm not saying that it was organised. Maybe this was individual,
2 because they were falling apart, too, but it is certain that their
3 interest was not to have the conference work.
4 Q. And when you refer to "our positions," where you wanted the
5 representatives of the European Community to be next "our positions," was
6 that a reference to positions -- well, I'll rephrase that. That was a
7 reference to positions in what area, in what places?
8 A. The positions around Sarajevo. You saw the map. Sarajevo was the
9 biggest problem, and we thought that they should come wherever necessary.
10 Let them be there from where these attacks against Sarajevo are allegedly
11 being launched. Let them see who the culprit is, whether we are attacking
12 or being attacked. So the subject here is Sarajevo.
13 Q. And who -- what forces were present at what you described there
14 as "our positions," at the Serb positions?
15 A. On the 20th of April, as I've already explained, there were groups
16 of armed people and there was the Yugoslav People's Army. In Lukavica,
17 for instance, that's where the Yugoslav People's Army was. And then even
18 on these slopes near Mojmilo, I showed you that road there a moment ago,
19 but anyway, at the highest elevation that's where the Muslims were. So it
20 was easy for them to target Lukavica.
21 So when I was saying "our," at that time the Muslim armed forces
22 were surrounding or holding under siege barracks throughout
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they turned the Yugoslav People's Army against
24 them. Not sufficiently, though. It was still neutral. But when I was
25 saying "our forces," they meant here let them come to anyplace that is not
1 the Muslim side, even if it's the Yugoslav People's Army. Let them see
2 who is being targeted, including the Serb territorial units, just in order
3 to establish the truth.
4 This was done inadvertently here that the JNA was mentioned.
5 Maybe it's not nice for me to say, but everything that was the non-Muslim
6 side. And partly it was in Lukavica, partly in Sarajevo in the barracks
7 that were later under siege. Well, I wasn't referring to that. I didn't
8 mean there. I meant on our side.
9 Q. And there's a reference then to it being established with
10 credibility or "... so that it could be established with credibility who
11 is violating the truce or who is attacking first."
12 Was there a truce in force or in operation at that time?
13 A. I remember that there were several such examples, and I remember
14 that there was a cease-fire at this particular time because this was
15 insisted upon all the time. The conditions should be created for
16 continuing the conference. I'm almost sure that there was a cease-fire
17 which was being violated, so the conference was being postponed.
18 Q. And then when the minutes record in the next short paragraph, "The
19 assessment is that we are close to the goal," what is being referred to
20 there as the goal?
21 A. You see what's written here? That is an optimistically defined
22 conclusion. The objective is to continue the conference and to transform
23 Bosnia through political means, through a political solution. That was
24 our objective.
25 Now, this was inserted here was - how put I put this? - well,
1 there was this optimism that we could obtain our objective, that the
2 negotiations could continue and that there would be a favourable outcome.
3 There was no other objective.
4 Q. And then the next point refers to: "The need to elaborate a
5 precise strategy for the defence of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
6 especially the positions around Sarajevo, was highlighted."
7 Was there -- was there a strategy in place at that time for the
8 defence of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially positions around
10 A. Well, in Sarajevo the balance of forces was sort of five or six to
11 one in favour of the Muslim side. The Serbs had a long front line and
12 relatively few soldiers compared to the population and, therefore,
13 compared to the soldiers who were in Sarajevo too. There was this
14 constant danger, psychological danger, that they could break through, so
15 to speak, and penetrate our territory and commit a crime or something like
16 that. So the defence of these ethnic areas was an item on the agenda, the
17 concern of people whether these peripheral parts that were called Serb
18 Sarajevo could be held onto.
19 So this was a cause of concern, and it was on the agenda so that
20 those who had expertise could perhaps work out a plan how to organise the
21 defence because they realised that the organisation of the defence boiled
22 down to nil.
23 Q. Were you personally involved in the development or elaboration of
24 a strategy for defence?
25 A. That was not sent to me, and that was not within my province of
1 work. I did not participate in that, and no one expected me to
2 participate in that. That was supposed to be done by experts, namely the
3 minister of defence, the Territorial Defence, whatever, those whose
4 profession this was. Let me be quite clear on this. This was never
5 actually done though.
6 Q. The next subitem is "Military commanding," and we see it was
7 decided that the president for national security, you say it didn't
8 technically exist, Mr. Krajisnik, but the president of the Council for
9 National Security, that was Mr. Karadzic, wasn't it?
10 A. It could have also said that it was decided that Dr. Radovan
11 Karadzic should coordinate command, et cetera, because he just had this
12 name of president of the National Security Council and that's the way it
14 I talked about this yesterday. There was this -- this
15 dissatisfaction with the commander of the Territorial Defence. They
16 couldn't do anything, and nothing could really be expected from them, so
17 this was an attempt to improve things a bit.
18 Mr. Karadzic was not president of the republic. He wasn't
19 president of the Presidency. He did not hold the position of Supreme
20 Commander. In this way -- how should I put this? At this coordinating
21 meeting, it was said it would be best if he took over this coordination.
22 I think it says coordination here.
23 Q. Did he -- Mr. Karadzic, did he involve you in that work
24 coordinating the command of the TO?
25 A. If I can put it this way, this was the first division of labour.
1 Mr. Karadzic was in charge of coordinating things. I think that's what it
2 says here. Yes, it says "coordinate." To coordinate this structure of
3 command. Well, coordination of command. So that through his authority he
4 would deal with these poor links between the MUP and the others. So that
5 was his function.
6 It's not that two coordinators were needed. Mr. Koljevic,
7 Mrs. Plavsic, myself, we weren't needed. He was the one who had this
8 coordinating role. You can coordinate without any particular decisions
9 being passed.
10 So I was not involved, and it wasn't necessary for two men to
11 coordinate something. And I mean no one gave me those powers anyway.
12 Q. Then the next item which is headed "Dr. Radovan Karadzic's
13 platform," it says: "Dr. Radovan Karadzic's platform for an immediate
14 resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the auspices of
15 the European Community, was adopted. The platform was communicated to
16 prominent figures and to the general public."
17 Now, we -- we have that in evidence already, the platform. It was
18 introduced in the course of Mr. Treanor's evidence. It's 64 -- P64A, tab
19 369. I wonder Mr. Krajisnik could have that please. The ERN is 00595751.
20 Sorry. Perhaps that -- yes, it's my responsibility there.
21 Perhaps that didn't find its way onto the list. We notified a list. It's
22 a single page. I can --
23 MR. TIEGER: Yes, it is not on the list. We have no objection to
24 it being placed on the ELMO if that will --
25 MR. STEWART: If we got --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Is that the 22nd of April document, 1992?
2 MR. STEWART: Yes, it is, Your Honour. Indeed, yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Could we put it on the ELMO, and perhaps it's
4 a short document, so ...
5 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honour. I haven't got a hard copy.
6 I'm working from a screen.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Otherwise, may I suggest one page, Mr. Registrar.
8 MR. TIEGER: We also have it available electronically, and I
9 believe that can be put on the system.
10 JUDGE ORIE: So has the registrar, I take it. If the first one
11 opens it out, could he provide it.
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, I've got no printer right here, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: No. It sounds as if Mr. Registrar has one.
14 MR. STEWART: The thing is I'm saving a tiny bit of a tree by not
15 having a piece of paper, and then --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar printed out a B/C/S copy. Perhaps
17 that's not bad. Let's put it on the ELMO.
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I think that would be, with everybody's
19 goodwill and cooperation I think that would be entirely adequate
20 Mr. Krajisnik has the hard copy.
21 JUDGE ORIE: If it could be put on the ELMO so that -- and it
22 could be zoomed in, in such a way that Mr. Krajisnik can read it from the
24 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you. One of the points about this is a
25 lot of words came up as illegible in the translation. I think we're
1 beginning to see why.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it's -- it's dated the 22nd of April, 1992, and it
3 bears a stamp, "Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
4 president's cabinet," as it gets translated into English, "22nd of April,
5 1992. Platform of Radovan Karadzic, Ph.D., for resolving the crisis in
7 And then, Mr. Krajisnik, going very quickly through it,
8 "unconditional and immediate cease-fire and observing the agreement dated
9 12th April, 1992."
10 Number 2, "urgent continuation of the conference on BiH and its
11 continuous work until a solution is found."
12 And we can take it, can't we, that's the European Community. It's
13 the Cutileiro conference that's being talked about there isn't it?
14 A. Yes, yes, you're right.
15 Q. And then 3 is within the framework of that conference, drawing up
16 of maps and constituent states.
17 4, "public obligation of all the sites in BiH that constituent
18 parts of BiH would not be joined to" -- Mr. Krajisnik, the next word is --
19 was found by the translators to be illegible. I don't know whether it's
20 illegible to you or you can help?
21 A. Territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Q. And that "no armed forces from outside of BiH would be called or,
23 again," something illegible on the territory of BiH.
24 5, "public obligation of all the sites in BiH that the policy of,"
25 and I don't know whether you can read that next word, Mr. Krajisnik.
1 Policy of something illegible?
2 A. Policy of a fait accompli, I believe. I'm sorry. I don't know
3 where to start.
4 Q. Read paragraph 5, please, Mr. Krajisnik, as best you possibly can
5 from the paper in front of you.
6 A. "It is the public obligation of all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 that the constituent parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 should not be annexed to neighbouring states and that on the territory of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina --"
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I think you're reading number 4. I'd invite you to
11 read number 5.
12 A. I'm so sorry.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Nevertheless, this clarifies some issues. I had some
14 difficulties what Mr. Krajisnik earlier said about number 4 but it's
15 neighbouring countries. Therefore the word, the first word, illegible, in
17 MR. STEWART: Yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
19 MR. STEWART:
20 Q. Yes, well, then that's a bonus, Mr. Krajisnik. So if we go on
21 then to number 5.
22 A. Very well. "The public obligation of all sides in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina not to accept a policy of a fait accompli and not even
24 that which stems from some milieu," or something. I can't read the rest
25 of this.
1 Q. Well, it looks --
2 A. Oh, "Communist. Communist milieu and --" I don't know this
3 word. "That territorial something obtained by force." I assume that this
4 is "territorial -- territorial gains obtained by force."
5 Maybe it would be easier for me to read it if I had it right in
6 front of me.
7 JUDGE ORIE: If that would help, you can take it for a second from
8 the ELMO. Perhaps -- it is translated and now I fill in the word you
9 added. It's translated as "and that -- and that no territorial material
10 advantage gained by force."
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to read it as to be.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they do not have the text
13 in any language.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "It is the public obligation of all
15 sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina not to accept a policy of fait accompli, even
16 those stemming from Communist --" is this "influence" or what? I'm not
17 sure about the word. "And that territorial -- territorial something
18 obtained by force will not be recognised."
19 The word looks like prinasi [phoen], which would be gains, but I
20 cannot really read this. It is illegible.
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I -- we could avoid -- I could always
22 come back to it. We could avoid being bogged down on this. I understand
23 that Mr. Sladojevic who has the advantage of, A, much younger eyes and B,
24 Serbian as his native language, he tells me he is able to decipher a
25 number of these words, so perhaps we could try and do that out of court
1 and produce a -- a better agreed Serbian text and then work from that.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps let's not try to do all these exercises
3 at this moment. It seems to me that that the major parts are more or less
4 consistently translated and, it might be that --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The word is advantages, territorial
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, yes, that comes close to what is
8 translated. So let's proceed, and if we could get a better -- I must say
9 I admire Mr. Sladojevic in looking at the original and what he can do.
10 MR. STEWART: He can do more than you and I put together,
11 Your Honour, in that vein, so --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Let's proceed. Let's proceed.
13 MR. STEWART:
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- now, this platform described or policy
15 signed by Mr. Karadzic as president of the party and described as coming
16 from the president's cabinet or the president's office of the party, as
17 far as you know, Mr. Krajisnik, was this something that Mr. Karadzic
18 developed on his own or, if not, with which of his colleagues?
19 A. I don't know who it was that worked on this, but this was the
20 position that we all held at the time. If I can put it that way, this was
21 accepted by all as if it were a plebiscite. This entire gathering
22 supported it. Well, I know that this was the policy as it's put here.
23 Q. What did the -- what does the first bit of number 5 mean? Not the
24 bit referring to territorial advantage or advantage going by force. So
25 leaving off that second half, the first part of number 5, what -- referred
1 to fait accompli.
2 A. Yes, yes.
3 Q. What did that mean?
4 A. Well, what is being said here is what was imputed to the Serb
5 side, like they took some territories and that's a fait accompli. The
6 transformation would be based on who was standing where now.
7 Karadzic is pointing out here that no side -- or, rather, it is
8 the public obligation of all sides, that is to say the Serb side, in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina not to accept a policy of fait accompli. That is to
10 say a war broke out and then people stopped where they stopped and that
11 will be verified politically.
12 "We accept that everything is open to debate and that there can be
13 no military conquests from any side" -- or, rather, that "they cannot be
14 the solution that has to be adopted."
15 This was more of a sign of goodwill. We accept that everybody
16 should be in the same position.
17 Q. So that -- that -- number 5, then, is this right, Mr. Krajisnik,
18 number 5 was a policy statement that the approach of what we have we hold
19 should not be anybody's position?
20 A. You are quite right. There's just something I would like to add.
21 The reason is because the Muslim and Croat -- or, actually, the Muslim and
22 the Croat side were saying that the Serbs were trying to gain as much
23 territory as possible and then say what they gained is theirs. And they
24 were using that as a reason they would not go to the conference. And
25 Mr. Karadzic is saying that that is our position and that a policy of fait
1 accompli cannot be accepted unless a final solution is reached, because
2 their reason not to go to the conference was, when they said, "Well, we
3 don't want to go now," or rather they are looking for different excuses.
4 So you're quite right.
5 Q. Was there any resistance or opposition to that element of
6 Dr. Karadzic's platform among the attendees at meetings of the council for
7 national security and the government?
8 A. I've already said that the answer was no. This was absolutely the
9 policy before the war and at this time that we're talking about. We can
10 resolve the problem only by way of the conference, not by continuing the
12 I'm sorry. You saw here that the cease-fire was signed on the
13 12th of April, and Karadzic is saying that it should be renewed on the
14 22nd, because in the meantime somebody had violated the cease-fire. So
15 there was a cease-fire before that. That was what you had asked me by way
16 of a question. A cease-fire signed among the parties.
17 Q. And then in these minutes, item 4, conclusions and information,
18 point number 2, that the government -- there was a conclusion adopted
19 among others that the government of BH. I don't know what it says in the
20 Serbian. That must be a slip, Mr. Krajisnik, isn't it? It's not Bosnia
21 and Herzegovina. It must be Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
22 intended there isn't it?.
23 A. I will read it out. Perhaps that would be the best way. "The
24 public obligation of all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina --"
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm so sorry. We've moved on and I think we're at
1 cross-purposes. I moved on in the minutes to heading, item 4. If you
2 could put the platform --
3 A. I see, I'm sorry. Yes.
4 Q. It's my fault, Mr. Krajisnik.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, before we continue, it's now 100 per
6 cent that we'll finish at 5.30, and since we are now moving to -- again to
7 the same document and perhaps a new line of questions --
8 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we're anxious for an answer please in
9 relation to that other matter that was left over from earlier today.
10 JUDGE ORIE: That other matter will not be decided today.
11 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that is unfortunate because
12 Mr. Krajisnik, he, A, he would -- we haven't communicated with him
13 directly but it's apparent he would like to know. And, Your Honour, we
14 would like to move the matter on when Mr. Krajisnik has had that
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We -- we have discussed the matter during our
17 last break, and we decided that we'll not give a decision today. We need
18 more time.
19 MR. STEWART: Of course, Your Honours. If Your Honours need more
20 time, you must have it, of course.
21 JUDGE ORIE: It's not because we have not paid attention to it.
22 MR. STEWART: I didn't suppose that for one second, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn until Monday, the 15th of May, 9.00,
24 same courtroom, and I wish everyone a good weekend.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.33 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Monday, the 15th day
2 of May, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.