1 Tuesday, 16 May 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.17 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. I do understand that we
6 have overcome the technical problems.
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
9 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Before we continue, I do understand that Mr. Krajisnik has worked
12 yesterday on the text of P64A tab 698, and I just want to get it on my
13 screen again. What Mr. Krajisnik did, as far as I understand,
14 Mr. Krajisnik -- and before putting this to you, I first remind you that
15 you're still bound by the solemn declaration that you've given -- what you
16 tried to do is to see whether you could decipher the badly legible
17 paragraph 10 of this document.
18 May I invite the usher to put the -- I would say the work product
19 of Mr. Krajisnik on the ELMO and I do understand that what we'll now see
20 is the original bad legible text and also the typewritten transcript of
21 this text, both in Cyrillic and in Latin script. Can the interpreters see
22 it now? The first thing I'd like to verify, and perhaps we should do this
23 after the break, after having given an opportunity to both parties to look
24 at it and to see whether they would agree that this is the text as read by
25 Mr. Krajisnik and whether this would be disputed, that this is the way how
1 it should be read.
2 Perhaps we make some copies and during the first break, that
3 counsel, assisted by their -- assisted by those who can read and speak the
4 language, verify whether this is a reasonable explanation of what is
5 written there. I do not hear any objections. Mr. Registrar, you're
6 invited to get that document back for the time being to make two copies of
7 it, provide it to the parties and the Chamber would like to hear --
8 perhaps if you make a few extra copies so that the booth is provided, the
9 different booths are provided with it as well so that we also could then
10 check on whether the translation, as we found it in tab 698.1 is an
11 accurate translation.
12 Then, Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
13 MR. STEWART: Yes, we'll do that. Your Honour, it could be a
14 reasonable explanation but wrong so we'll look to see whether it's
15 actually what we can agree is the correct one but absolutely we will do
17 JUDGE ORIE: That's the purpose of the exercise.
18 MR. STEWART: We will do that as soon as we possibly can,
19 Your Honour.
20 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]
23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, good morning. We were coming on to the 10th of
24 May, Mr. Krajisnik, and a particular minute or record in question at the
25 session of the national Security Council and government of Serbian
1 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is found in P64A, binder 22, tab 617.
2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the ERN there is 01245315.
3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- we know there was an assembly session coming
4 up now on the 12th of May in Banja Luka. That's clearly on the record.
5 We also know from your evidence that you had a fairly recently, doesn't
6 matter exactly what day, returned from a trip away with Dr. Karadzic and
7 Professor Koljevic in connection with the European Community negotiations.
8 Now, first of all, immediately before the assembly session which was
9 coming up on the 12th of May, what was the state of play as far as the
10 European Community, Cutileiro talks were concerned?
11 A. The Cutileiro talks had been frozen before the assembly.
12 Q. And frozen for what reason and by what process?
13 A. Well, the European Community in a way interrupted the negotiations
14 for an indefinite period of time, probably because the last meeting had
15 not - how shall I put this? - yielded any good results, and that is why we
16 addressed that appeal at that session.
17 Q. Was the suspension of those negotiations linked in any way with
18 issues relating to cease-fires or alleged breaches of cease-fires?
19 A. Well, I cannot recall exactly what the reasons were, but the
20 reasons were formulated by the European Community. Quite simply, in a
21 way, they interrupted or suspended for a moment, not over the longer term,
22 these negotiations and at that moment there was that kind of decision.
23 Probably, well, actually I think that at that meeting where
24 Mr. Izetbegovic did not want to come, saying that the cease-fire was being
25 violated, and that he would not come as a sign of his protest, somebody
1 else did come, as far as I can remember, but it was explained differently
2 by our side.
3 Q. And did you and Dr. Karadzic have the same reaction and the same
4 view in relation to the suspension of the European Community talks?
5 A. Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic and I had the same view that
6 negotiations should be continued as soon as possible.
7 Q. Was there any dissent from that view among other senior figures in
8 the -- among the Bosnian Serbs?
9 A. The people who were in Pale and who took part in these
10 consultative meetings all shared this view I think and there weren't any
11 exceptions. However, there is always someone who voices a doubt as to
12 whether negotiations can resolve anything. Because as they were saying
13 then the Muslim side was sabotaging the negotiations. However, these were
14 isolated views, people were saying that out of concern, so these were not
15 really relevant views. Everybody wanted the negotiations to continue as
16 soon as possible, or perhaps I should put it this way: A maximum majority
17 wanted it that way. Perhaps somebody said something different but I
18 cannot remember.
19 Q. In what way was it that the Muslim side -- well, first of all, was
20 it in your view correct that the Muslim side were sabotaging the
22 A. We were confident, I have to say I was confident, if I'm talking
23 about my own feelings, that this was done by the Muslim side because this
24 was in their interest, not to have negotiations because they already had a
25 recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina and through negotiations there would be a
1 transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was not in their interest. So
2 there was this suspicion, I cannot say that it's 100 per cent correct but
3 it's quite logical and that made us feel right in our belief that they did
4 not want negotiations and that they were violating the cease-fire.
5 Q. What about the Croats? Were they at this point supporting or
6 opposing or in any way sabotaging the negotiations?
7 A. Well, the Croat side actively worked on rounding off their own
8 ethnic areas but they were not opposed to continuing the talks. Quite
9 simply, well, let me put it this way: The worst case scenario would be
10 that they were neutral but they were more in favour of continuing the
11 negotiations and bringing them to an end. It also suited them to have a
12 third entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
13 Q. During the talks, the EC talks, before they were suspended, had
14 there been discussion of the actual war situation in Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina outside Sarajevo?
16 A. Do you mean at the session, at the negotiations, at the conference
17 itself, or are you referring to Pale?
18 Q. No, I'm referring to the negotiations with Mr. Cutileiro and the
19 European Community representatives.
20 A. Well, yes. Because the other side kept giving this reason, well
21 when I say the other side I mean the Muslim side, I beg your pardon, they
22 thought that the negotiations should not continue because the cease-fire
23 was being violated, that there is a war going on, that the war should be
24 stopped and only then things could happen. So there were these mutual
25 accusations. The European Community tried to act as an arbiter and tried
1 to clarify certain matters or spell them out in an objective manner. Of
2 course, it goes without saying that we accused them and they accused us.
3 How should I put this? That's the way it was at this conference.
4 Q. Was there a cease-fire agreed or imposed in relation to anywhere
5 outside Sarajevo?
6 A. Well, I think that you had occasion to see here the platform of
7 Mr. Karadzic and that on the 12th of April, this cease-fire was signed,
8 and that was valid for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That means that you
9 agree to a cessation of hostilities but it mostly pertained to Sarajevo.
10 How should I put this? That's where the fiercest conflict took place, and
11 in the eyes of the European Community and the international community and
12 all of us who were there and lived there. I'm sorry, the objections were
13 for the most part that the cease-fire was being violated in Sarajevo.
14 You're right. So those were the objections voiced at the conference, yes.
15 Q. Now, before the assembly session which we know was held in Banja
16 Luka on the 12th of May, was there at any time in May, any attempt to hold
17 an assembly session before the Banja Luka session?
18 A. In my memory, there is -- how should I put it? This information
19 exists, and I'm so sure of it but I couldn't double check it with other
20 people. I scheduled a meeting in Pale, at Jahorina actually, and a small
21 number of MPs came because the MPs from Krajina could not come actually
22 from Banja Luka. And when we didn't succeed in that, then all of us, the
23 MPs and all throws who were present there, got together and went to Banja
24 Luka. I did not remember how it was that we went there but in the record,
25 I saw, in Mr. Karadzic's remarks, that it was by plane that we went to
1 Banja Luka. Now, scheduling a session, that is something I know. I know
2 that we were sitting there and I know about that. But whenever I asked a
3 MP or a deputy, I wanted to sort of double check, and to resolve this
4 dilemma of mine, nobody seems to remember that. But then I remember this,
5 the fact that a session was scheduled and that it failed, and that that is
6 why we went to Banja Luka to have the session held there on the 12th of
8 Q. And at this time, in the period in the run-up to the Banja Luka
9 assembly session, you were working every day, were you, Mr. Krajisnik, at
10 the Kikinda building?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And you were living there as well; is that correct?
13 A. Oh, I forgot to say that. My family and I lived in Panorama
14 actually, in a room, from the very outset. All the rest had rooms in
15 Kikinda. Well, not everybody but a maximum majority. First I thought I
16 was in Kikinda too but no, I wasn't. I was in Panorama from the very
17 beginning all the way up to the arrest.
18 Q. And we heard some evidence already about the working arrangements
19 in Kikinda. Mrs. Cenic gave evidence, you recall, Mr. Krajisnik. Was her
20 description of the working arrangements with you in an office at the end
21 of a corridor, Dr. Karadzic in a room on the other side of the corridor,
22 was her description of the physical layout and arrangements in Kikinda
24 A. Well, yes. We all had a small room each. Well, it wasn't an
25 office space or anything. It wasn't like a suite. It was a small room,
1 intended for the accommodation of people who were vacationing. He had one
2 room, I had one room, Mr. Koljevic - what should I say -- everybody else?
3 And we had a room which was a bit bigger, if I can put it that way, and
4 that could have been, say, 12 square kilometres.
5 THE INTERPRETER: I mean the bigger room was 12 or 15 square
6 meters, interpreter's correction.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's where we met and talked.
8 That was it. It was upstairs. The secretary had another small room next
9 to this room, and well, it wasn't that there were doors between the
10 adjacent rooms. That is how we managed to get organised at the time.
11 MR. STEWART:
12 Q. And you had a secretary of the assembly, did you?
13 A. Yes. The secretary of the assembly was Mr. Milos Savic, the late
14 Milos Savic.
15 Q. And where did he work?
16 A. Likewise, he had a room where he slept and where he worked. I
17 mean, I think he was there in Kikinda at first and I think that later he
18 moved to Panorama as well, but he worked there in Kikinda all the time. I
19 mean, until we left later. But while we were in Kikinda he worked there.
20 I was talking about sleeping. Later he slept in Panorama but at that
21 moment he slept and worked in Kikinda.
22 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, a question expressed generally, so do your
23 best; if you need a more specific question say so, but at this time, in
24 the run-up to the assembly meeting in Banja Luka, on the Bosnian Serb
25 side, who was running the war?
1 A. At one moment, when the Presidency at the suggestion of -- well, I
2 don't know whether it was anybody's suggestion, and it doesn't matter, but
3 they certainly didn't do it on their own, they proclaimed the
4 establishment of the Serb Territorial Defence. So it was the armed
5 people, and everybody stood on their own ethnic lines. I mentioned
6 yesterday that the Yugoslav People's Army was present. Up until this
7 moment, that is to say up until the 12th of May, I think that all the way
8 up to the attack against the column and the siege of the JNA barracks, I
9 think that the JNA was neutral to a maximum. After that, they took care
10 of themselves. How to get the resources out of the barracks, and soon
11 they prepared to leave. That is to say, for the people who were not from
12 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to leave. I'm certain that at
13 that time the Yugoslav People's Army did not take any active steps to the
14 advantage of these Serb territorial forces unless barracks were attacked
15 or unless they themselves were attacked. This was confirmed in this
16 conversation between Mr. Smajic and General Gagic or rather Colonel
18 There was a lot of proof. There is a hill above the Lukavica
19 barracks that was the only barracks in the Serb territory. At this hill
20 called Mojmilo, there were Muslim force that very often targeted the
21 barracks and then possibly they would respond. I can say therefore that
22 that goes for that area. As for Rajlovac, the JNA was there and the armed
23 territorials were there, and the civilian population. I don't know who
24 responded to what because when the barracks were attacked, everybody was
25 attacked. That is my view of what was happening at the time.
1 Now, in this Yugoslav People's Army, tank crews and artillery
2 crews, as a rule, came from the area. As a rule, when the war broke out,
3 everybody stayed in his own area. One should not preclude the possibility
4 of these people using JNA equipment, and doing something in their own
5 initiative, if I can put it that way, but the policy of the Yugoslav
6 People's Army was to be equidistant to all the sides and to have the role
7 of the intermediary. I absolutely know that on the basis of the
8 conversation I had with Mr. Kukanjac, who was fully convinced that he
9 could retain his role and play the role he was supposed to play. Whenever
10 our people were being unrealistic. He said, "This is my mandate. That is
11 not my mandate. I cannot do that," and so on and so forth.
12 So the situation was roughly the way I presented it just now.
13 Q. What did you understand, and I'm being as specific as I can on
14 time, Mr. Krajisnik, if I talk about the immediate run-up to that session
15 in Banja Luka. So we are talking about the 9th, 10th, 11th of May 1992.
16 What did you personally understand the military situation to be in
18 A. I still think what I thought then. When the conflict broke out,
19 everyone stood on their ethnic border so to say. There were some shifts
20 later on in Ilidzanska Opstina, and Rajlovac, and in Grbavica itself.
21 Everyone stood on the borders of their settlements. The Serbs were on the
22 periphery and the Muslims were in the town. Next to the centre of town,
23 there was a large area called Hrasnica which was separated from the town
24 by the airport. Where they took up positions on the 4th or 5th of April,
25 those were more or less their ethnic areas. In my view, this was logical.
1 Within a relatively large ethnic area, there may have been a enclave or
2 two of other ethnicities in the Serb areas but for the most part the rest
3 of the territory was inhabited by Serbs. As I explained, the territory of
4 the town was far more Serb than Muslim, but in terms of population, it was
5 the other way around, by far. Perhaps 80 to 20 per cent. In the areas
6 around the town, there were perhaps 20 per cent and 80 per cent in the
7 town centre. So this was the other way around. Territory did not
8 properly represent the population numbers, because it was the areas around
9 the town and the rural areas.
10 I don't know whether I've answered your question. If I haven't,
11 I'll be happy to say whatever is necessary.
12 Q. Well, what Serb forces did you understand at that time to be on
13 the periphery, as -- to use your word, of Sarajevo?
14 A. Well, these were people from that settlement, from that area,
15 local people, people who lived there. I really don't know whether there
16 were any others from outside. I know for a fact that everybody was
17 defending his own area. The people from Vraca were protecting their area,
18 from the people from Zabrdje theirs, and so on. Of course, at points
19 where the forces were contiguous, people would ask for assistance from the
20 next village, and they would hold the line together, the demarcation line,
21 that is, or rather the line of armed conflict.
22 Q. And in the hills surrounding Sarajevo, what forces did you
23 understand to be there?
24 A. There was only one point in Sarajevo, and this was on the route I
25 drew, near Grbavica, were the Serbs dominant. In other areas, it was the
1 Muslims who predominated. From this point where the Serbs were, one could
2 fire on Sarajevo. The Muslims were dominant on other points and they
3 could fire on the outskirts, where the losses were less, the effects were
4 less. That's why this image was created that it was the Serbs who were
5 dominant around Sarajevo, because the population was dense there. When
6 they were shooting at Lukavac, Rajlovac, and so on, the population was
7 less dense so there were fewer casualties. They also used snipers and so
8 on, but this was not so evident. In the meantime, I consulted some
9 generals who understand these things and I can tell you precisely what the
10 points were where they were dominant, in positions overlooking Sarajevo.
11 You can see that on the map, the map I gave you with the demarcation line.
12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, concentrating for a moment on this forces, you said
13 that at that one point near Grbavica, Serbs were dominant, and leaving
14 aside the other areas for the moment, Mr. Krajisnik, what Serb forces did
15 you understand to be there at that point near Grbavica where they were
17 A. Just a small correction. The Serbs were not dominant in Grbavica.
18 They were in a hole there. It was at the top of Grbavica where there is a
19 road; that's Vraca. There was a place there where there was a police
20 school, and at one point on that road, the Serbs held a dominant point.
21 So the connection between Grbavica and Lukavica, at that peak, that's
22 where the Serbs were dominant. What were the force? I know that there
23 were police forces and the territorial forces, the armed people. That's
24 what I know was there. Later on, when Grbavica was taken, the JNA was
25 stationed there. But in the taking or liberation of Grbavica, I don't
1 think the JNA participated in that.
2 Q. Now, at this point, still talking about these few days in the
3 run-up to the Banja Luka assembly, was anybody in military command of such
4 Serb forces as there were near Grbavica, as you've described?
5 A. There wasn't anyone from the military command. There was someone
6 from the Territorial Defence. There is a telephone conversation of the
7 7th of May between a member of the MUP and a person from the Territorial
8 Defence, and they were talking with me, because I, as a deputy and as a
9 citizen of Sarajevo, wanted to know what was happening in Sarajevo. He
10 told me that someone had carelessly come down from that hill in the
11 direction of Grbavica and there were many military personnel residing in
12 Grbavica and perhaps this was a Serb-majority area. He wanted to liberate
13 this area but was not successful. Quite a lot of people were killed
14 there. I wanted to know what had happened. And one of them said, "I'll
15 come up there and tell you what this is all about."
16 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honour.
17 [Defence counsel confer]
18 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, in asking you whether anybody was in military
20 command, I had intended military in a broad sense, not confined to army as
21 opposed to Territorial Defence. So if you understand my question, please,
22 in the broad sense of military command, was anybody in command of such
23 Serb forces as there were near Grbavica?
24 A. Well, this was an example of how these territorials acted on their
25 own initiative. Somebody led that group down there and they suffered a
1 defeat, and many men were killed. That's why I wanted to find out what
2 had happened as a person from Sarajevo, and, of course, somebody
3 organised -- or, rather, of course, had somebody organised this, I would
4 have called him up and asked him, Why did you do this? But nobody knew
5 who had taken these people down to Grbavica. You can see that from the
6 telephone conversation. It was just an adventure that somebody embarked
7 on and it ended up tragically. The JNA was over the hill in Lukavica.
8 They did not participate in this. Those people thought they could do that
9 easily, but to this very day, I can't recall who it was who did that. It
10 wasn't the police. You can tell that from the telephone conversation.
11 And who it was, I don't know. I mean, I don't know who organised it.
12 Q. Now, at this point in time, Mr. Krajisnik, you, the Bosnian Serb
13 leadership in Pale, you did regard yourself, did you, as fighting a war?
14 A. Yes. Well, it was clear to us that the war had started. There
15 was no doubt about that.
16 Q. And were you, the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale, were you trying
17 to develop and implement a coordinated strategy for fighting that war?
18 A. First, I have to tell you about myself. When I sought
19 information, I did so as a person who had lived in Sarajevo, and who was
20 interested in what was happening and who was a deputy from the area. As a
21 citizen, I wanted to know whether anyone had been killed or wounded and
22 what the situation was. That was my approach to this problem. You saw
23 that there was the Territorial Defence and Mr. Karadzic was supposed to
24 coordinate the MUP, the National Defence and the Territorial Defence but
25 he was not successful in coordinating them because at every point in every
1 village, everybody stood on their own lines and they were only defending
3 If there was an unwritten order or an implied order, it was to
4 defend oneself, to avoid crimes and people being killed, and the
5 politicians had to do their job in continuing the negotiations, stopping
6 the war, and finding a solution. That's why, as a prerequisite for the
7 continuation of negotiations, those cease-fires were signed, in order --
8 well, it's much easier to talk when there is no shooting than when there
9 is fighting on the ground and you are negotiating and discussing a
10 political solution.
11 There was no strategy at that time. All the fighting was focused
12 on our hopes that the JNA would play their role and defend us if we were
13 attacked, and the Territorial Defence or rather the armed people, it
14 wasn't a proper Territorial Defence, it was the armed people, everyone was
15 defending their own lines. At that time I never heard anybody talk about
16 any kind of active moves. I'm talking about the period up to the 12th of
17 May when the army of Republika Srpska was established. Whether someone
18 was doing this on the ground, on their own initiative, that's a different
19 matter, but I never heard anything of that nature from Mr. Karadzic or
20 Mr. Koljevic or Mrs. Plavsic and especially not from the commander of the
21 defence or the Minister of Defence. I never heard that from them.
22 Q. And the commander of the defence, who was that?
23 A. The Minister of Defence was Mr. Subotic. That's who I was
24 referring to. The commander of the Territorial Defence formally and
25 briefly was a person called Lukic. I think his first name was Vidoje, but
1 I can't be sure of his first name. Those were the people holding those
2 posts. We didn't have anybody else. And it was the task of the
3 coordinator to coordinate their work and that was Mr. Karadzic. But he
4 was unable to establish any kind of coordination.
5 Q. You mentioned Mr. Lukic before.
6 Apart from the people you've just mentioned, was there anybody
7 else who was regarded by you at that time as a senior military commander
8 of the Bosnian Serb forces fighting a war against Muslims and also, of
9 course, in various areas, Croats?
10 A. The only armed force was still the police. That police had their
11 minister, it was Mr. Stanisic. There was no other armed force.
12 Everything we heard here about private armies and paramilitaries, if it
13 did happen, it was all arranged by local people who were concerned because
14 they did not have the forces to defend their territories. It was they who
15 organised all this. I don't remember anyone recruiting any people from
16 the circle you are mentioning at Pale.
17 Q. Up to the period when you held the assembly in Banja Luka, had
18 Mr. Mladic come to Pale for any discussions about what was happening on
19 the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
20 A. There was a brief period, I don't remember how long, before the
21 assembly session, before Mr. Mladic became the commander of the Main
22 Staff. He was standing in for Mr. Kukanjac and he became -- or rather he
23 replaced Mr. Kukanjac and he became the commander of the 2nd military
24 district and I know that he was at Lukavica. At one occasion I was at the
25 airport or I was speaking to someone in Lukavica, I don't remember who,
1 and then I spoke to him. His role in his conversations with us was not
2 significant, although when he learned that he was going to be appointed
3 commander, there was a certain amount of coordination. Just before going
4 to Banja Luka with Mr. Ostojic, he visited Herzegovina and Kalinovik, and
5 at that session he explains this. So there was some kind of link, but he
6 wasn't reporting on what was happening on the ground. I don't remember
7 ever sitting down with Mr. Mladic before the 12th of May for him to inform
8 us about developments on the ground. He was focused only on getting men
9 out of the barracks, which had still not been done. In parallel with the
10 representatives of the JNA from Belgrade. And most of his activity was
11 centred on that. And this was done quite separately from anything we were
12 doing. He was doing this on his own, without any influence from the
13 government or anybody else.
14 Q. And during the period up to the Banja Luka assembly session, did
15 any other senior military figures, using "military" again in the broad
16 sense, Mr. Krajisnik, come to Pale to report what was happening on the
18 A. I don't remember that, but I can say that the representatives of
19 the JNA were not duty bound to inform us, and they didn't do so, to the
20 best of my recollection. They could volunteer information about the
21 situation because they already recognised an additional opponent in the
22 Muslim side. They had issued a communique saying that all barracks should
23 be besieged and communications cut off for the JNA. But I don't remember
24 somebody coming to a meeting to provide us with information because it was
25 his duty or because he had to do it or wanted to. We took the initiative
1 to find out what they were doing, but to small effect.
2 Q. So if you'd been asked at that time, Mr. Krajisnik, who are your
3 military commanders for the Bosnian Serbs, what would your answer have
5 A. I would have said we didn't have any military commanders and that
6 every municipality was acting separately. I thought it was the commander
7 of the Territorial Defence, then I thought it was the Minister of Defence,
8 and then I saw that these people had no power and there was nothing in
9 practice they could do. I would have said that the -- those who were
10 protecting us and those in whom we placed our confidence was the JNA. I'm
11 now speaking about what the situation was in practice.
12 Q. When did the planning of the establishment of a Bosnian Serb army
14 A. Well, there were intimations and we knew that there was some kind
15 of UN resolution and the Muslim side insisted on this, that the JNA had to
16 withdraw from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that the
17 resolution was passed at that time. And we were then in a quandary
18 because we thought that the JNA would stay there for at least five years,
19 as had been agreed in Skopje between Mr. Izetbegovic and the
20 representative of the General Staff. We were in a quandary then because
21 the JNA would withdraw and the JNA then meant all the active duty
22 officers. We would be left only with armed, unorganised people, and I
23 remember well on one occasion we contacted someone in Belgrade, I don't
24 know what time it was exactly, to find out what the plan was. They had
25 promised that the JNA would stay and now it was withdrawing. And I saw
1 then Mr. Karadzic -- or rather, excuse me, the late Mr. Milosevic
2 suggested that we set up our own army, and so then we discussed how this
3 could be done. He was adamant that representatives of the JNA, who were
4 not born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, could not remain, unless they declared
5 themselves to be volunteers, and we were asked to suggest who the
6 commander could be, who could set up his own staff and organise an army.
7 I remember on one occasion, when we went to see Mr. Kukanjac, he spoke on
8 the telephone to Mr. Mladic in Knin. He mentions this in an interview.
9 Mr. Karadzic liked him as a commander and as a soldier. I mean,
10 Mr. Mladic, because he was frequently in the newspapers, as he had been
11 born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, his name was put forward, and all the soldiers
12 and officers from Bosnia-Herzegovina who wanted to stay could stay on the
13 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At first, let me just add there were
14 different ethnicities, it wasn't only Serbs, but later on the men of other
15 ethnicities left or went over to the Muslim army. That's how the process
17 I don't think that we ever would have established our own army had
18 the Yugoslav People's Army stayed behind. These armed people would have
19 to be placed under the command of the Yugoslav People's Army. Now, why
20 was this not the case at the time? Because the Yugoslav People's Army
21 specifically in Sarajevo, Mladic, who was standing in for Mr. Kukanjac or
22 rather who replaced Mr. Kukanjac, was only occupied with a single problem,
23 and that is, how should I call this, those soldiers who were under siege
24 in Sarajevo, to get them out, and then these talks, negotiations,
25 whatever. You really couldn't talk to him about anything else then.
1 Q. Now, you said that when Mr. Milosevic suggested that you set up
2 your own army, you said, and so then we discussed how this could be done.
3 Who were the "we", anybody else for that matter, who were engaged
4 in those discussions?
5 A. Very often, Mr. Stewart, Your Honours, gentlemen of the
6 Prosecution, I use the word "we" and now it seems as if I took part in
7 something atom sometime. Well in this case, I did take part in it. So
8 perhaps I should make this distinction. Now, why did I take part in this?
9 Because the negotiating team, on one occasion took an opportunity, and I
10 don't know what the occasion was, to discuss that question. Perhaps we
11 were even invited because we were the ones who were representing the Serb
12 people from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the negotiations any way, and then
13 somebody invited us and we became, well -- well, we were invited to be
14 informed about these problems. Of course, it had to do with the offices
15 we held because before I was on the negotiating team, of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that's why the three of us, perhaps it wasn't all
17 three of us, perhaps it was somebody else too, I don't know that, but I
18 know that Karadzic was there, I was there, and I'm convinced that the late
19 Mr. Koljevic was there too.
20 Q. Now, would you please say whether this was right, Mr. Krajisnik,
21 what you appeared to be talking about in that last answer was discussions
22 with people outside the Bosnian Serbs about the principle of having a
23 separate army. Was that -- is that correct? That was what you were
24 talking about then?
25 A. The principle then was that members of the Yugoslav People's Army,
1 who had been born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, could stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina
2 if they wished, and join our new army. I'm saying that when that was
3 said, later on in the realisation, in that army there were Muslims and
4 there were Croats who had been born in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they were
5 there for a while then but then later they left the army of Republika
6 Srpska, or rather the army of the Serb republic, and they joined the
7 Muslim army, or they left the army altogether and went to Belgrade, where,
8 of course, they were received and I don't know how their status was
10 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, among the Bosnian Serbs, who were involved in
11 discussions and planning for the setting up of a new and separate Bosnian
12 Serb army?
13 A. I think that it was done by the Minister of Defence, along with a
14 team that was around Mr. Mladic. I think that none of us took part in the
15 law or the organisation. This was just brought to the assembly and we
16 adopted it. Not only I, but my colleagues too, as far as I can remember.
17 None of us took part in this. I remember some General Kovacevic, a lawyer
18 who worked on this new law on defence, the army, and so on and so forth --
19 the organisation of the army, rather, on behalf of the General Staff. And
20 he was indeed from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. And the team that -- you said you thought that was done by the
22 Minister of Defence. That was Mr. Subotic, along with a team that was
23 around Mr. Mladic. Are you able to say who were the members of that team
24 around Mr. Mladic?
25 A. Maybe I wasn't very precise. I'm saying that if someone was in
1 contact with this expert team, on behalf of the Serb republic, it was the
2 Minister of Defence. I am convinced that even he did not significantly
3 influence the establishment of these documents. It was this expert team
4 established by Mr. Mladic that prepared all of that. I saw that this law
5 itself was foreign to the Minister of Defence, and he made some objections
6 in respect of this law even after it had been adopted. So that was the
7 only link to them.
8 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, let's consider directly some practical matters. Do
9 you agree, if a new army is being set up, whatever its origin in some
10 other army, it's got to -- there have got to be such things as laws and
11 regulations, as you've indicated. There have got to be financial
12 arrangements, there have got to be logistical arrangements, there have got
13 to be uniforms at some point fairly early on. We can agree about all
14 those practical things that would need to be done, can we, Mr. Krajisnik?
15 A. You're right that that's the way it was supposed to be. At that
16 meeting I remember very well, I put a question: Who is now going to pay
17 these officers? We have no money.
18 Then they made a promise and indeed they carried it out. Since
19 these future officers were people who were members of the Yugoslav
20 People's Army for many years, they would just pay these active-duty
21 officers. They would pay those who would want to stay in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina of their own free will, and that was indeed carried
23 through. All the rest, reserve officers, the army, everything else, all
24 of that, the Territorial Defence too, all of that was - how should I put
25 this? - all of that was supposed to be regulated later on we did regulate
1 it. I don't know whether people were paid and how much they were paid,
2 but they were paid a lot less than they were supposed to be paid.
3 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask one clarifying question? You said -- you
4 are talking about the meeting. Is that a meeting -- which meeting exactly
5 are you referring to? Is that a meeting with the late Mr. Milosevic where
6 you discussed the army, and they would pay those -- that means, that
7 the -- Serbia and Montenegro or what was left of Yugoslavia would take
8 care of the salaries of -- of active-duty officers even if they would have
9 then joined the VRS? Is that a correct understanding? Apart from whether
10 they did it in full but --
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. That is correct.
12 But could I just clarify it a bit? They were not willing to do that.
13 Quite simply, there was a surplus of officers but we said, "We invested in
14 that. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a right to this property of the JNA. We
15 also allocated resources for the Yugoslav People's Army. We have the
16 right at this point in time to participate in that." That is why,
17 unwillingly, they accepted there and indeed they kept their promise that
18 members of the army of Republika Srpska, active-duty officers, who used to
19 be members of the Yugoslav People's Army, who voluntarily stayed in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the army of Republika Srpska, well, they would be
21 paid by the Yugoslav People's Army or rather some kind of financial
22 service of theirs.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
24 MR. STEWART:
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, can I just clarify one point? Mr. Bozidar Antic
1 had been appointed minister of the economy, as we have it in English. Was
2 he also Finance Minister or was there somebody else in that position?
3 A. No, no, no. Mr. Antic was, as far as I can remember, Minister of
4 the economy, whereas the Finance Minister was Momcilo Pejic.
5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, straight away, I see that. It's in the minute of
6 the meeting on the 22nd of April, he was the Deputy Prime Minister, wasn't
7 he, with responsibility for finance, and it says, "and the economy"?
8 A. Yes, yes, yes, yes. I'm sorry, he was Deputy Prime Minister in
9 charge of finance, but you're right, another person was Minister of
10 Finance. I think it was Petra Markovic. But the Deputy Prime Minister,
11 Mr. Pejic, was also in charge of that field of finance.
12 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik.
13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm looking at the clock.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's time for a break. We'll have a break
15 until five minutes to 11.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
18 JUDGE ORIE: I'd like to go in private session for a second.
19 [Private session]
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.
20 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could we then look now at the minute or record of
22 the meeting of the 10th of May 1992 that's been in front of you for some
23 time? The -- first of all, Mr. Krajisnik, do you remember whether you
24 were at this meeting or not?
25 A. I've read this record, and I'm practically sure that I was not
1 present at this session, but there was a consultative meeting with the
2 government. Perhaps it was earlier on, but I don't think I attended this
3 session, although I find all of this familiar. The agenda, that is.
4 Q. Now, when you refer to a consultative meeting with the government,
5 consultative meeting between the government and whom?
6 A. Well, this meeting, which is called a joint meeting of the council
7 and the government, there was this meeting similar to this one between the
8 negotiating team and the government, concerning the preparation of the
9 assembly meeting. I know that that took place.
10 Q. What would be the difference in practice, then, between a
11 consultative meeting of the type you just mentioned and a meeting such as
12 is recorded in this document that we are looking at?
13 A. There wouldn't be much of a difference, but here in this record
14 there are certain decisions that I don't remember that we discussed at
15 this consultative meeting. Somebody wrote this up later on. I mean,
16 recorded what happened at that meeting where all of this was presented,
17 all of this that is on this sheet of paper in front of me. So there
18 wouldn't be much of a difference. I'm just saying that I do not remember
19 this specifically. For example, these assignments that come later. I did
20 not realise that that took place at the meeting that I attended.
21 Mr. Kalinic and others. You have it here on page 2.
22 Q. And then the -- it was decided, we see that there was to be an
23 assembly session on the 12th of May, and an agenda proposed for the
24 assembly session. You had been involved, had you, in the preparation of
25 that agenda?
1 A. Yes, yes, yes, I've already said. This should be after the
2 meeting that I remember, that I'm the only one who remembers it at
3 Jahorina. Well, they had a meeting and perhaps I attended it too, and
4 then it was repeated what should be on the agenda. I did take part in
5 establishing the agenda, and I even signed an invitation including the
6 agenda, apart from one particular item, and then the MPs received this
8 Q. And the first item, to make it clear, of course, this is the
9 proposed agenda for the assembly session, and the first item, 1A, Report
10 on the Political and War Situation. And that was to be made by the
11 president of the national Security Council, and then Velibor Ostojic was
12 charged with preparing the report with the assistance of, it was
13 Mr. Stanisic, wasn't it, Minister of the Interior, and Mr. Subotic,
14 minister for National Defence. Why was Mr. Ostojic the person charged
15 with the preparation of that report?
16 A. Mr. Ostojic is a linguist by profession. He has a degree in
17 Serbian, in the Serbo-Croat language, as it was called at the time. He
18 was active in the party, that is to say that he cooperated closely with
19 Mr. Karadzic, and he was on the government too. He was one of the very
20 few ministers who was a member of the SDS. That is to say that it was
21 this cooperation that led him by way of inertia to write this report on
22 behalf of Mr. Karadzic. Now, how could he write a report? He could bring
23 together the information that other government members had, the Minister
24 of Defence, the Prime Minister, and I don't know who else, and then he
25 would technically write up this report. Because he did not have all
1 information, of course, he could not have written this autonomously. He
2 technically wrote a report so that Mr. Karadzic would present it, although
3 he did not read it later. Mr. Karadzic spoke off the cuff. He did not
4 read the report.
5 Q. And then 6B, do you see the same document, just to clarify, it
6 says 6B on the Obligations of Serbian Authorities Towards International
7 Humanitarian Organisations, Dr. Kalinic in charge. Was that intended to
8 mean Bosnian Serb authorities or wider?
9 A. This has to do with the Minister of Health and social affairs,
10 Mr. Kalinic. We mentioned him already. He was in charge of cooperation
11 with international humanitarian organisations, that primarily included the
12 International Red Cross and the UNHCR and others too probably. So it is
13 about the government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its
15 Q. And then if we go, Mr. Krajisnik, to the second section, main
16 section of this record or minute, do you see where it goes on to point 8?
17 There is a heading in the middle, 2, and then it goes on to point 8, the
18 state commission. Do you see that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I want you to look at 9B, a decision to grant a subsidy from the
21 budget to Pale municipality, "seeing that this municipality is
22 overburdened by numerous refugees and has huge expenses related to the
23 accommodation of relocated organs and the like." Was the -- was the
24 refugee situation in Pale getting worse compared with how you described it
25 earlier this week? I think it was earlier this week; I think it was
1 yesterday. Earlier in your evidence anyway.
2 A. Well, yes. I mean, it was slightly worse because at the very
3 outset, it was extremely difficult, so it could have been, say, a bit
4 worse. Suffice it to say that it was so hard at the very beginning and
5 then there was this pressure of refugees coming from Sarajevo to Pale.
6 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik. I'd like you to put that document
7 on one side, then, please, and be given the minutes and the record of the
8 16th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People.
9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's in P64A, tab 612, and the ERN is
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I've marked a lot of points in the margin, not
12 because I'm necessarily going to ask you a question at every point where
13 there is a letter. It's that much of the speeches are very long so it's
14 not so easy and -- Your Honours, it's not so easy to find a point by
15 saying, Well, so and so begins to speak because particular contributions
16 go on for pages. I've basically just given us lots of markers there so,
17 with a little bit of luck, we can find our way around pretty quickly. You
18 have got a copy with letters and -- well, if you haven't got that, you can
19 have one straight away, Mr. Krajisnik.
20 A. I don't think those letters are here. I haven't found a single
21 one here.
22 Q. There is something that's just gone wrong, Mr. Krajisnik. There
23 is one?
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart. Mr. Stewart, I think Mr. Krajisnik has
25 been provided with a registry copy with no markings on it. Is that
1 correct, Mr. Krajisnik?
2 MR. STEWART: I think that's what's happened, Your Honour.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then perhaps that should be returned to the Registrar
5 and then he provide you, marked copy. Yes.
6 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. If it's 1A, then I found it.
8 MR. STEWART:
9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it starts with A, and I'm afraid I ran out of
10 letters in my own alphabet so towards the end we get some numbers as well.
11 The -- now, we've heard about this meeting before, Mr. Krajisnik.
12 I would like you to go straight to letter F in the margin which you will
13 find at page 7, and it's at page 13 of the English.
14 A. Yes. I have found it.
15 Q. Thank you. Now, this is Mr. Karadzic speaking and he has already
16 been speaking at this point for quite a while, reporting on the war and
17 the particular passage I'm looking at begins, "The Serbian side in Bosnia
18 and Herzegovina." Do you see that?
19 A. Yes, I do.
20 Q. "The Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency, the
21 government, the Council for National Security which we have set up have
22 formulated the strategic priorities, that is to say the strategic goals
23 for the Serbian people." Now, Mr. Krajisnik, before we explore those
24 goals which are hardly a mysterious item at this point in this case, how
25 were the strategic goals formulated to go before this assembly meeting in
1 Banja Luka? Who, when, and by what process were the strategic goals
3 A. As I mentioned, we held a session at Jahorina, and we contacted
4 Banja Luka and a certain number of deputies and were informed, or rather
5 received two pieces of information. One was that they were unable to pass
6 through and reach Pale, and secondly, we concluded that we had entered a
7 stage in which a certain number of deputies would prefer not to attend the
8 assembly but to continue acting as they had been. More than a month had
9 gone by. Each one had his own autonomous region and had some sort of
10 power. The general opinion was that the war was over, that we had done
11 everything with the other side to reach a political solution and that
12 there was simply nothing for us to discuss with them. This is very
13 important. There was a feeling that we had been let down, that somebody
14 did not want to respect the agreement we had reached, and which was
15 incorporated into the principles that we should transform Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina if we have given up the idea of Yugoslavia.
17 As we had a certain number of deputies at Jahorina we decided to
18 go to Banja Luka directly, all those deputies, and Mr. Mladic was there at
19 the time because he was supposed to be appointed commander of the Main
20 Staff. Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic were there but Mrs. Plavsic wasn't.
21 The representatives of the government were there. And we considered how
22 the negotiations could be continued especially in view of the fact that it
23 had been announced that the negotiations had been suspended. After the
24 last session the international community interrupted the negotiations.
25 The idea was or rather people kept saying nobody knows what we are doing
1 at these negotiations, nobody knows what the goals are, and I know. I
2 participated in this. When we were preparing the session, we said, "Let
3 us put what we said to Mr. Cutileiro down. Let's put it down into some
4 kind of exposition so that those who listen will know what we are fighting
5 for." When I use the word "fight," I'm referring to what happened at all
6 the previous conferences. There was various disinformation. People were
7 saying they have been betrayed this or that area. It's left out of the
8 map. Nobody knows what they are doing because there hadn't been any
9 sessions so that everything that is on the map, please, Your Honours,
10 everything that was on our map, which we gave to Mr. Cutileiro, was
11 included except for one additional goal, and that was the corridor. This
12 was at the talks with the Croatian community in Graz. The problem was now
13 something that was indispensable. The territory had to be a single
14 territory. The Serb representatives did not want the Serb constituent
15 unit to consist of several parts.
16 There was a consultative meeting, not these minutes here, and we
17 all got together and formulated these goals as briefly as possible, to
18 avoid someone latching on to something and entering into a big discussion.
19 We say separation, then we say the corridor, then we say part of Sarajevo,
20 and so on.
21 I can explain each one of these strategic goals and say what it
22 was we wanted to present to these deputies.
23 The goal was --
24 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just so that we go along the right track, perhaps I
25 can make it clear that I am going to ask you questions which will give you
1 the opportunity to explain each one of these strategic goals, so if you
2 could wait for those questions we'll stay on the right track.
3 A. I wasn't going to explain but thank you. Thank you. It's you who
4 are in charge of this, I agree.
5 Q. Am in charge of my questions in the first place, Mr. Krajisnik,
7 What I was going to ask you next, Mr. Krajisnik, was this: The
8 consultative meeting that you refer to, you say there was a consultative
9 meeting, not these minutes here. You're talking about a consultative
10 meeting in Pale, are you?
11 A. At Jahorina, where we -- I've just explained that -- memory of
12 this. We saw there was no quorum so we had a meeting to discuss what to
13 do, and that's when we agreed on this. There should be something in my
14 view before this meeting. These items in these minutes -- well, the
15 cabinet had a separate session. Maybe it was right after that meeting.
16 Q. The -- who were present at the discussion before this assembly
17 meeting when the strategic goals were put together in the way that you've
19 A. I think -- I'm not asserting this -- I think that it was the usual
20 people: Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Djeric, myself, the ministers.
21 I'm not sure but I'm almost certain that it was those deputies who had
22 arrived. They attended the meeting because it wasn't any special secret
23 we were discussing but I'm not sure about that.
24 Q. Is there any possibility that Mr. Djeric was not involved in the
25 formulation of the strategic goals?
1 A. I don't believe so. I think yes, but it's possible he was having
2 a government session. I can't confirm this. I have to say that I know
3 there was a group of people, I know, I participated in this. I know what
4 the purpose was. But who exactly was there, all the people who were
5 there, I can't be certain about that.
6 Q. Had there been, before that consultative meeting, had there been
7 discussion of a need or requirement to have some strategic goals,
8 extending back over the previous few weeks?
9 A. Absolutely not. It was at that meeting, as one of the ways of
10 preparing for the assembly, as we knew we would be asked what we were
11 fighting for over there, what we were doing, that's when we had this idea
12 and agreed on it. I don't know whether it was in the report.
13 Mr. Karadzic put this forward but he did have a brief summary of the goals
14 on a piece of paper.
15 Q. You said in a longish answer a few minutes ago, and Your Honours,
16 this is at page 31, line 10, you said "the general opinion was that the
17 war was over." First of all, is that what you said, as far as you recall?
18 A. I said we contacted the deputies in Banja Luka and gained the
19 impression that in many areas people thought that the negotiations were
20 excluded and that there was no more war, that everybody had their own
21 territory and they began to act as if all this was over. That's what I
22 meant to say in connection with the telephone conversation with the
23 representatives from Banja Luka, our deputies, and the impression.
24 In the municipalities where one didn't feel the war, as one felt
25 it around Sarajevo.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, going back to the record of the Banja Luka assembly
2 session, I want to ask you about the first goal, but to go back first on
3 that point, do you find letter C in the margin, which should be at page 3
4 of your document, page 8 of the English?
5 A. Yes, yes, I see it.
6 Q. I'm using that as a reference point, Mr. Krajisnik, because
7 about -- well in the English it's about 30 lines, I don't know exactly
8 what it would be in the Serbian, but there is a reference to
9 Mr. Izetbegovic, so his name is probably in capital -- upper case letters.
10 There is a passage that begins, "The Serbian people would not accept the
11 unitarist Bosnia of Alija Izetbegovic." It's at the top of page 9, Your
12 Honours, so easily, "and that is how we came to the conference on Bosnia
13 and Herzegovina under European auspices."
14 Can you find that passage, Mr. Krajisnik?
15 A. I see a reference to Alija Izetbegovic but I don't think that's
16 it. Oh, yes, I found it now.
17 Q. Good.
18 A. In World War II -- is that it? -- will not accept the unitarist
19 Bosnia of Alija Izetbegovic. Yes, yes.
20 Q. That's exactly it, Mr. Krajisnik. And then it continues: "At
21 that conference, we have won a great political success, gaining the
22 approval of the international community, in this case the European
23 Community, for a three-part Bosnia and Herzegovina as opposed to the
24 unitarist Bosnia and Herzegovina, a complex Bosnia and Herzegovina,
25 consisting of three nation states, of three constitutive states whose
1 relations and links will be stronger or weaker. We were for weaker, the
2 Croats were for weaker, while in Europe they were for stronger links but
3 that is less important. What is important is that in the political field
4 we have won recognition of the legitimacy of our wish to have our own
5 state unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that nobody has the right to
6 dispute that. They may dispute a village or a municipality here and
7 there, but nobody can dispute our right to have our own state unit, our
8 own state organism or entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
9 Mr. Krajisnik, in the way that that was presented there by
10 Dr. Karadzic to the deputies, did that leave room for ambiguity in the
11 minds of deputies as to whether Dr. Karadzic was talking about an
12 independent, sovereign state of -- for the Serbs within Bosnia, recognised
13 internationally as such, or whether he was talking about something which
14 would fall within an internationally recognised state of Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina containing all three parts?
16 A. I have described the atmosphere. Mr. Karadzic stated clearly what
17 we had achieved at the conference. We had achieved a tripartite solution.
18 No one could speak of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an internationally recognised
19 state because politically, at that point in time, this was very unpopular.
20 But he did say clearly, "We have got our own constituent state." That was
21 permissible to say. But within Bosnia and Herzegovina. There would be
22 three constituent units and how they would be linked up, whether loosely
23 or more firmly, well, that's another question. But there is no doubt
24 about what Karadzic said. He tried to present this and interpret it in a
25 way so as to win over the deputies who were angry and felt betrayed
1 because Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised. This was his way of
2 interpreting it, but it states quite clearly what we had achieved at the
3 conference. Bosnia had been accepted and our constituent unit within it.
4 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, it's correct, you and your co-negotiators,
5 Mr. -- Dr. Karadzic and Professor Koljevic, you understood perfectly
6 well, didn't you, that the European Community representatives and
7 Mr. Cutileiro and others were not thinking in terms of a separate,
8 internationally recognised state for Bosnian Serbs? That's right, isn't
10 A. Absolutely not. From the very beginning, it was clear that
11 Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina in an alliance of Bosnian states cannot have
13 anything more than internal autonomy and independence. The overarching
14 umbrella so to speak would be an internationally recognised Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina. That was beyond discussion. As for us, although later
16 during the war, there were certain proposals by the international
17 community but we'll come to those later.
18 MR. STEWART: Your Honours --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Again the answer starts with absolutely not but from
20 the explanation it appears that Mr. Krajisnik agrees with you that the aim
21 was not separate, internationally recognised states but one state.
22 Mr. Krajisnik is nodding yes.
23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour has absolutely anticipated the request
24 for confirmation of the Trial Chamber's understanding that I was going to
25 put forward. Thank you for that.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you consider that that essential point was as
2 clear to the deputies who attended the assembly session in Banja Luka?
3 A. It was clear to all of them, but their rhetoric, which came from
4 some of the deputies, was inflamed by desires. If the Muslims had given
5 up this compromise, they would have nothing further to do with them but it
6 was clear to everybody what Dr. Karadzic was saying, at every session we
7 provided information and we said that we had given up Yugoslavia, that we
8 had accepted the compromise, and agreed to have Bosnia-Herzegovina become
9 an internationally recognised entity.
10 Q. Are you saying, Mr. Krajisnik, that it was clear to the deputies
11 what it was that you, the negotiators, were saying about this, but that
12 there was resistance among the deputies to accepting that position?
13 A. I will be clear. From the moment when we changed our policy and
14 let it be known that we could not respect the decision of the plebiscite
15 and remain in Yugoslavia, there were constant complaints about why we had
16 done this, and we had to explain hundreds of times why this had been done.
17 This was a compromise. The desire to remain within Yugoslavia was
18 something that people could not let go so easily and whenever an
19 opportunity arose, it was expressed. In this case, they said that the
20 agreement had been betrayed. We had said that, well, we have Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina and our own constituent unit within it. Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina will be internationally recognised. However, now the
23 situation was that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised but had not
24 been transformed. And they said, Well, it's futile for you to negotiate
25 with the other side because they will never respect this agreement. And
1 now they were saying, Well, you see your attempts have been futile. Let's
2 go another way. But after that, there would be just vagueness because
3 nobody knew where they -- where to go next. That was what happened from
4 the time we changed our policy and agreed to the compromise.
5 War had broken up and the atmosphere was very heated.
6 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, was it -- well, I'll ask you this question first:
7 Can you confirm, there was no difference between you and Dr. Karadzic at
8 this point in relation to these strategic goals, was there?
9 A. Well, you're always asking me between Mr. Karadzic and myself.
10 Between Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Buha, and myself, most often there
11 was no difference. So, yes, you're right. There was no difference
12 between Mr. Karadzic and me. But this refers not just to the two of us
13 but to all of us who participated in the negotiations.
14 Q. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, just explain the reason I ask you: It's
15 Dr. Karadzic who was presenting these strategic goals at the assembly
16 meeting. So you confirmed that. As far as the first goal is concerned,
17 then, was it -- was it your intention, and you for these purposes can be
18 at least the group that you've just mentioned, was it your intention that
19 there should be any difference between this first goal and what you had
20 hoped to achieve through the Cutileiro negotiations?
21 A. Your Honours, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Prosecutor, separation was the very
22 foundation of the Cutileiro plan, its basis. And this meant drawing up
23 internal demarcation lines among the three constituent units. Without
24 that, there could be no three constituent units. One had to draw maps.
25 It wasn't separation of peoples but separation of territories. This is
1 written in an inept way, but to say Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina will be over
2 there, Croatian Bosnia and Herzegovina will be here, and Serbian Bosnia
3 and Herzegovina will be here, this was about setting up constituent units.
4 There was no way to set them up but to separate the territories in this
5 way. Separating the peoples, well, you can't do that without separating
6 the territory. This is the fundamental transformation, drawing up three
7 constituent units. I know that. Whoever says differently is wrong. I
8 know that that's what we thought. Well, what about separating the people?
9 It's not sending one people to the moon and the other people to Mercury.
10 It meant drawing up demarcation lines within Bosnia. This wasn't done by
11 someone else. I participated in it, and I know exactly what we did and
12 what we thought.
13 MR. STEWART: Your Honours just on a practical matter because I'm
14 not sure we put it on our list, at some point quite soon, I would like
15 Mr. Krajisnik, not right this second, to have P47, which is that Official
16 Gazette announcement of the six strategic objectives. Your Honour, we
17 don't need it this second but if Mr. Registrar could very kindly fish that
18 out, that will smooth things along.
19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, so let me put what is essentially the same
20 question but I'm going to put it in a slightly different way: Was this
21 first strategic goal intended to go any further than what had been
22 proposed during the Cutileiro talks?
23 A. With full liability, I assert that this was agreed from the
24 beginning. As there is no Yugoslavia, we will have internal separation.
25 Maps of the units will be drawn up. And this was never in dispute. Those
1 units would be predominantly Serb, predominantly Muslim, predominantly
2 Croatian, not exclusively Serb, Muslim or Croatian. Mr. Cutileiro
3 proposed this, not to have certain territories cleansed or to create a
4 Serbian state, but to have an area predominantly populated by Serbs where
5 they would govern themselves. The Muslims were afraid to remain within
6 Yugoslavia. They said that. But we had reason to be afraid of a unitary
7 Bosnia because if they were outvoting us now, they would be doing the same
8 later, unless we had our own constituent unit. If you don't want to be in
9 Yugoslavia with us, then we want to have our own constituent unit here.
10 It would have been borders, just like municipal borders or district
11 borders. And I assert that that's how it was, under full liability. I
12 have heard various interpretations but they are certainly not correct.
13 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, returning to the record of the assembly
14 session, page 13 of the English, it's page 7. It's where we were before,
15 against letter F. We will be returning to that passage frequently because
16 this is where Dr. Karadzic sets out the six strategic goals. So we will
17 take them one by one. The second strategic goal, do you see that? It's
18 the second paragraph after the letter F in the margin.
19 A. Yes, yes. I see it.
20 Q. "The second strategic goal it seems to me is a corridor between
21 Semberija and Krajina. That is something for which we may be forced to
22 sacrifice something here and there but this is of the utmost strategic
23 importance for the Serbian people because it integrates the Serbian lands
24 not only of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina but Serbian Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina with Serbia and the Serbian Krajina with Serbian Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina and Serbia. So that is a very important strategic goal which
2 we have to achieve because there will be no Krajina, Bosnian Krajina,
3 Serbian Krajina or alliance of Serbian states if we do not secure that
4 corridor which will integrate us and give us an unimpeded flow from one
5 part of our state to another."
6 Now, first of all, Mr. Krajisnik, one thing is perfectly obvious,
7 isn't it, it's in order to join up what you regarded as the Serb parts of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, you had to have some such corridor. That's
9 plain as can be, isn't it?
10 A. Yes, yes. And I can explain this rhetoric of Mr. Karadzic's, if
11 you're interested.
12 Q. Well, actually my question was going to betray interest in that
13 topic, Mr. Krajisnik, so please do.
14 A. The Bosnian Krajina, that is to say Banja Luka, from April until
15 the 12th of May, was completely sealed off. It even says in the
16 newspapers that 12 babies died due to the lack of oxygen. And there was a
17 lot of nervousness on the part of the MPs and the people of Bosnia and
18 Bosnian Krajina, that they are sealed off and that they want to have
19 communication with other parts because the other side, the Muslim side or
20 the Croat side, would not let them go through. There were combinations
21 when they took the highway and were escorted by UNPROFOR and so on and so
22 forth. However, all that went down the drain. So there were these talks
23 as to how to get them out of this ghetto.
24 In order to resolve the situation, we talked about this corridor
25 with the Croats. Again, on the basis of geographical principles of
1 exchanging territories, in Graz. Now Mr. Karadzic is introducing a new
2 objective. Your Honours, you will take the maps and you will see that
3 there are some Serb villages in that blue, green, and yellow one. So
4 territories should become more compact. But there is a part of territory
5 that is missing, that's not Serb, in order to have this linked up. So
6 then we thought that we would give the Croats some concessions near
7 Kupres. Mr. Karadzic is saying here we will have to sacrifice some
8 territories. That is on the political plane, territorially. Now, in that
9 case, there would be this communication through the corridor. So the
10 rhetoric was adapted to these people who we came to see, and who were so
11 bitter because they were in a ghetto all the time. And what does that
12 mean? They were encircled all the time. That is why this was presented
13 here and I understand it fully, and perhaps others may not understand it
14 if they cannot put all of this information together.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when -- so had -- you say you had discussed this
16 corridor with the Croats in Graz. Had there been any discussion with the
17 Muslim side about such a corridor?
18 A. Not then, but I can give you an example. Later on, there was even
19 a map of this corridor and the solution that we had with the Croats.
20 There is a map. But this was later. I can show you this map. By way of
21 illustration, let me just say that Brcko was always a problem and they
22 even suggested that it would go via Croatian territory. Then that we
23 would have a bridge or a flyover so that the Muslims would go above and we
24 would go underneath. There were different combinations, because there was
25 a problem all the time with the Muslims, how to establish this corridor
1 and how to handle things around Brcko. At that time we were not talking
2 to Muslims because they didn't want to talk about any kind of
3 transformation. They wanted the status question to remain. They had an
4 independent state and they were no longer interested in negotiations.
5 Q. In his description of the second strategic goal here, Dr. Karadzic
6 obviously is including very clearly the notion of joining up the Serb
7 parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also refers to -- he says, it's in
8 about the fourth or fifth line, he says, it's the third line of the
9 English, "It is of the utmost strategic importance for the Serbian people
10 because it integrates the Serbian lands not only of Serbian Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina but Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia" and then a
12 little later on, in the same paragraph, he says, "It's a very important
13 strategic goal because without it," is what he's saying, "There will be no
14 Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian Krajina, or alliance of Serbian states."
15 What -- what was Dr. Karadzic -- as you understood it, what did he
16 have in mind by referring to an alliance of Serbian states?
17 A. In order for a project to be presented to the deputies, who keep
18 thinking that they should return to Yugoslavia, to this common state, if I
19 can put it that way, Mr. Karadzic spoke to them in stages. We have to
20 resolve this in Bosnia and in the future, if the situation is right, let
21 it be some kind of alliance of Serb states. Republika Srpska, Serb
22 Krajina, Serbia, so on and so forth. So this is for political purposes so
23 that this would be achieved now. And later you will see, Your Honours,
24 gentlemen, what kind of debates took place in that parliament and you will
25 see how much resistance there was to any kind of talks with those who had
1 been betrayed us in terms of having Bosnia transformed and they were even
2 angry at the European Community, which viewed this favourably. That is
3 why this rhetoric was required. It was just this second objective that
4 Mr. Karadzic was supposed to read out. But this was just the sugar
5 coating so that they could accept this. And then later on we would appeal
6 for negotiations. That was the objective.
7 At any rate, I have to admit that if the international situation
8 had been right then, for example for Serbs to say whether they wanted to
9 live with Serbia or not or whether Serb Krajina would live with Serbia or
10 not, everybody, well not exactly everybody, but a very large part would
11 certainly say that they wanted to live with Serbs in Serbia rather than
12 with Croats or Muslims from Bosnia because that is a natural right. But
13 you are involved in real politics now, and you have Bosnia as it is and
14 you have the international situation as it is. It is very hard to explain
15 this wish to someone. On the one hand, you have people who are just
16 talking without any obligations, and then you have to talk about what is
17 doable. That is why this rhetoric was necessary in order to chart the
18 course that was the only one possible. We were not the only ones in
20 Q. You said in the course of that answer that it was just this second
21 objective that Mr. Karadzic was supposed to read out. Are you saying that
22 Mr. Karadzic went off script in some way at this point in the meeting?
23 A. No, no. He just should read the first sentence, the other
24 objective, because he had some written material in front of him but then
25 perhaps he read this first sentence. As for the rest it was not in the
1 material. He extemporised. He gave a free interpretation. He explained
2 why it was necessary for them to understand why we were advocating the
3 corridor. That was the point. And that is what I meant when I was
5 Q. Was -- in the discussion and formulation of the strategic
6 objectives before, and for the purposes of this assembly meeting, was
7 there any specific discussion as to the width of this corridor?
8 A. Well, no. Because we were supposed to agree on this with the
9 Croat side, and we thought that this should be based on agreement. I can
10 tell you about all the proposals that were bandied about, 30 kilometres,
11 five kilometres, the width of a bus, and what have you not. All sorts of
12 proposals. And then for aircraft to fly over. People were coming up with
13 all sorts of things. But the basic idea was that we should have a
14 corridor linking up the two ethnic territories, the two Serb territories,
15 Semberija and Krajina. And it was supposed to be based on an agreement.
16 Q. You said all sorts of proposals were being bandied about. You
17 mean, do you, at the talks between you and the Croats?
18 A. No, no. We had some contacts with the deputies probably, if
19 that's what I remember, when this assembly was held. Perhaps there was a
20 break too, I don't know. And then everybody was saying what was
21 necessary, that it should go up to the Sava River and there should be 30
22 kilometres or five kilometres or the width of a bus so that a bus could
23 get through. And so on and so forth. It wasn't at the session itself.
24 It was in the corridors. When you're chatting to people, when you're
25 talking to people, and when you hear these proposals.
1 Q. In the discussions that you told the Trial Chamber you had already
2 had with the Croats, at Graz particularly, at which the question of a
3 corridor had come up, what discussion had there been there about the size
4 of this corridor?
5 A. We talked to the Croat side primarily about regrouping these Serb
6 ethnic areas in Posavina and the Croat areas. If we have Serb areas up to
7 the Sava we would concede that to the Croats and then they would give us
8 this area that would be the corridor. We talked about their interest in
9 certain points. So Kupres was mentioned. In principle, we agreed that
10 that should be an agreement that should be reached later. Of course, we
11 cannot have a corridor without the agreement of the third side, because
12 there is this narrow belt where this imaginary corridor went through
13 Muslim territory as well. So we would have to achieve that too, but, of
14 course, if you resolve four-fifths with the Croats, then there is just
15 this one little thing left to discuss with the Muslims, and after all, the
16 Croat side was not in charge of the area around Brcko.
17 Q. So was it -- was it the broad understanding at the Graz talks that
18 through what was regarded as Croat territory, this corridor would be at
19 least many kilometres wide as opposed to the very narrow type of corridor
20 that allowed just the width of a bus?
21 A. Well, I was speaking figuratively when I said a bus but I remember
22 that there was a proposal like that in actual fact. We were speaking in
23 general terms. We did not want to set this in stone, how big the corridor
24 would be. We would see how many of these blue areas we had, so to speak,
25 and how many brown ones and then we would reach an agreement ultimately.
1 We would find a solution. The basic thing that the Croats agreed upon was
2 that they understood our problem, and that they were willing for us to
3 reach an agreement in that respect. What kind of agreement? That would
4 be dealt with subsequently.
5 There is something I forgot to mention here, forgot to tell the
6 Honourable Trial Chamber and all the others. We then talked about our
7 right to access to the sea. I mean, this was in Graz. That's what we
8 discussed in Graz. Because Bosnia did have access. I forgot all about
9 that. The representative of Croatia was there too and they said, "We will
10 talk about that later, between Croatia and Bosnia and we will work out
11 some kind of arrangement" but the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina could not
12 pass any kind of judgement on that. I remember that now that you asked me
13 this other question. So the width was not agreed upon with the Croat
14 side, I mean the width of the corridor, that is.
15 Q. When -- on your side, those discussions in Graz, did you have in
16 mind a corridor of at least many kilometres' width?
17 A. Well, yes. We did have in mind a corridor that should be -- well,
18 not to have just a path, to have a reasonable type of corridor. It can
19 best be seen on a map that we drew where we talked about this. That is in
20 Mr. Owen's book as well, exactly what this corridor should look like, the
21 one that we kept talking about. This is going through somebody else's
22 territory. It would be our territory but it's not territory that would be
23 used actually. It would just serve the purpose of passing through it but
24 then it wouldn't just be the road. You would have a bit of land on the
25 side as well.
1 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, at this point, I wonder if you could be given two
2 items which we've notified, the first is P68, tab 16, and the other is the
3 P47 that I mentioned a few minutes ago. I can see from here that that's
4 the right item, Mr. Krajisnik.
5 Now, this is -- this was produced by Mr. Treanor. You probably
6 remember this. This was his map just in a fairly simple form, indicating
7 the six strategic objectives and then in English, on his map, the six
8 strategic objectives as they were later set out in the Official Gazette,
9 which is, among other things, why I would like you to have P47, because
10 that's the Serbian version of what the rest of us have in English on
11 Mr. Treanor's map.
12 So what you have is P47 so far as I'm aware, Mr. Krajisnik, is
13 exactly what we see in English on -- in that block on Mr. Treanor's map.
14 First of all, are you -- you -- there have been lots that
15 Mr. Treanor's said that you don't agree with, Mr. Krajisnik. That would
16 never come as a surprise to me or anybody else. But so far as Mr.
17 Treanor's map is concerned, are you satisfied that it does at least
18 indicate clearly where these objectives lay on the ground and is at least
19 an accurate summary of, if you like, the issues?
20 A. I think that there are some major mistakes that require
21 explanation, especially the Neretva River valley and the Drina, and also
22 access to the sea. It is not well defined. It is not correct.
23 Q. All right. Let's narrow it down, then, Mr. Krajisnik. Objective
24 1 can't conveniently be shown on the map and hasn't been shown on the map.
25 Objective 2, you didn't mention any particular difficulty with that.
1 It's -- in very bare terms, that's the location of that particular issue
2 is correctly shown on the map, isn't it?
3 A. Well, yes. Right. It would link up Krajina and Semberija. It
4 would be a bit further up but yes.
5 Q. Mr. Krajisnik -- it's very simplified of course. Objective 5 is
6 just stated. There is nothing that arises out of the description of that
7 objective on this map, is there? It's simply tells us where Sarajevo is
8 and says that that was objective 5. Correct?
9 A. Yes, right.
10 Q. You have -- as far as this map is concerned, where you take issue
11 and we are going to come to those objectives is on numbers 3, 5 and 6,
12 just trying to narrow it down. That's right, isn't it?
13 A. No. 3, 4 and 6.
14 Q. Sorry, my slip of the tongue. I beg your pardon. 3, 4 and 6. My
15 mistake. 3, 4 and 6.
16 A. Yes, yes, that's it.
17 Q. Just wanted to narrow it down, then, Mr. Krajisnik. So let's look
18 again then at the assembly minute and see what Mr. Krajisnik --
19 Mr. Karadzic, rather, is saying about the third strategic goal. Page 13
20 of the English. Page 7 of the Serbian. "The third strategic goal is to
21 establish a corridor in the Drina valley, that is elimination of the Drina
22 as a border between two worlds. We are on both sides of the Drina and our
23 strategic interest and our living space are there. We now see a
24 possibility of some Muslim municipalities to be set up along the Drina as
25 enclaves in order for them to achieve their rites but that belt along the
1 Drina must basically belong to Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, as much as
2 it is strategically useful for us in a positive way, it helps us, by
3 damaging the interests of our enemy in establishing a corridor which would
4 connect them to the Muslim international and render this area permanently
6 Mr. Krajisnik, at the time of this assembly meeting, can you say,
7 were you content with that description by Dr. Karadzic of the third
8 strategic goal?
9 A. I was not content. I believe he wasn't content either.
10 Especially with this second part of the explanation. Because he wanted to
11 say that enclaves would be there and then he added, well, Republika
12 Srpska, but it can't be our enclaves if -- if it's going to be other
13 ethnic communities. Quite simply, he didn't want the MPs from that part
14 of Republika Srpska to be opposed to this.
15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to have to ask you perhaps to clarify a
16 bit of that answer. Where you said then he added, well, Republika Srpska
17 but it can't be our enclaves if it's going to be other ethnic communities,
18 are you -- are you saying that what -- what Dr. Karadzic is recorded as
19 having said here is -- inaccurately expresses what you understood to be
20 the third strategic goal?
21 A. Mr. Karadzic said that by attaining this objective of having a
22 corridor in the valley of the Drina River, not on the Drina, as it says
23 here, that in that corridor, and that can be seen in our proposal too, the
24 one that we gave to Mr. Cutileiro, that's where the enclaves would be, the
25 Muslim enclaves. We can already see that, Srebrenica, Zepa, and I don't
1 know, doesn't matter. He is saying that the Drina cannot -- well, that
2 the whole belt cannot be Serbian, and there should have been a full stop
3 there. But he went on, explaining, so that he would pre-empt the
4 possibility of other discussions. These enclaves would be part of
5 Republika Srpska. But he knew according to the Cutileiro plan, this
6 belonged to the other ethnic community and it would have to be resolved in
7 a different way, either through exchanges or through annexation or that
8 their ethnic community would consist of several parts. Well, I don't
9 agree with that. He doesn't agree with that either but that's the way he
10 put it. So this is not the corridor. This is the border. This is the
11 Drina River. And the corridor was envisaged elsewhere.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, could we please invite Mr. Krajisnik to
13 take the pointer and tell us exactly what in his view now this objective 3
14 was? Establish a corridor on the Drina River valley, eliminating the
15 Drina as a border separating Serbian states. Now, we see that the
16 northern part of the Drina is separating at this moment Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina from Serbia. The more southerly part is within Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina. Yes. When we are talking about the Drina River valley, are
19 we talking about the whole of it or are we talking about the southern part
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please give me another
22 map, if possible, the one with blue and green, and then I'll tell you
23 precisely. Or the Cutileiro plan, give me that and then I'll show you
24 exactly. You can't see anything here.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Well, as long as the rivers are in the right place, I
1 think, Mr. Krajisnik, you should be able to explain to us what this would
2 result in finally. Perhaps we have another copy of this map which we
3 could then use so we know that objective 3 has got something to do with
4 the Drina, so to that extent it doesn't -- it doesn't disturb the
5 exercise, the same for the Neretva, it just says, Neretva, objective 4,
6 and for the Una, objective 4 as well.
7 Would there be any spare copy of this map? Because this one is in
8 evidence. Yes, I see that Mr. Harmon has a spare copy. Perhaps the other
9 one to be taken from the -- is this the original? Yes.
10 Mr. Krajisnik, if you would take a black -- perhaps first with the
11 pointer or with the pen and then we'll invite you to make any markings
12 when it has become clear enough to us.
13 Could you try to explain on the basis of this map and just
14 concentrate on the municipalities we have over there, you could explain to
15 us where there were any majority-Muslim or majority-Serb municipalities,
16 what did you understand by exactly by a border separating Serbian states
17 and which states you had in mind. Could you please guide us.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I please explain the entire
19 objective? This corridor is supposed to be here, between Semberija and
20 Romanija. That should be the corridor. And you see this is Serbian
21 territory. This is the Drina but the territory is Serb. Only with this
22 part does Bosnia border with Serbia. This is the border of Bosnia. There
23 is no Drina River here. So what it says here? That Drina should not be
24 the border between two worlds. That's what it says. Up to here, the
25 Drina is the border between Bosnia and Serbia, whereas up here, there is a
1 Serb enclave and Serbia. So that's not what was being referred to. And
2 down here the Drina is not on the border with Serbia. So what we wanted
3 was to link up the Serb territories. You will see on the Cutileiro man
4 and on our map that there should be a corridor in the Drina River valley
5 and it's marked there, whereas the Neretva --
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE ORIE: We would like to have the other map there as well.
8 That is the coloured map with the ethnicities indicated so that we know
9 more or less what are majority.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have it here.
11 JUDGE ORIE: The big one with the orange and --
12 MR. STEWART: It's P211, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's the one I had in mind.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphones, please.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not this map, no, no. That's the
16 whole municipality. Could I please have the other map, where those parts
17 are? I have the map here.
18 JUDGE ORIE: If you show us which map you have in mind, then --
19 that's the one you'd like to have.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: If you can better explain it with that map, we'll
22 give you an opportunity. That's 293.
23 MR. TIEGER: Before we -- perhaps before we leave or whether we
24 return to the map we were just using, I would not wish to return to the
25 footage of today's session in order to accurately identify those portions
1 that Mr. Krajisnik was pointing to. I understood the Court was going to--
2 JUDGE ORIE: I'll try to do my utmost best to have everything
3 clear on the record but not until after the break.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a break.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, would you prefer to deal with the number
9 10, paragraph number 10 provided by Mr. Krajisnik now or rather do it at a
10 later stage? It has been distributed.
11 MR. STEWART: I think we would rather do it at a later stage.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Then we leave it for the time being and go back to
13 the Drina River. I do understand that we have now the different map.
14 Mr. Krajisnik, you said you could better explain it to us on the
15 basis of that map. Please tell us where exactly -- what I'm a bit
16 concerned about is whether the maps are -- looks a bit stretched in the
17 north-south directions rather than to get the right proportions but I
18 haven't got a copy with me at this point.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It should be positioned a bit better
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Usher?
22 MR. STEWART: I have a slightly different concern, Your Honour,
23 but no doubt Mr. Krajisnik --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you please -- yes, could you
25 please put the map in such a way on the ELMO -- yes, I see that the
1 dimensions, north, west, east -- north, south, east, west seem to be
2 different from any other maps we've seen, I don't know what happened with
4 MR. STEWART: It clearly has got stretched north south. If I can
5 just mention my own concern, if Mr. Krajisnik just bears it in mind, it
6 may be shared by others, this strategic objective is defined by reference
7 to a river, and explanation by reference to a map on which the river is
8 impossible to see, wouldn't seem perfect. So, if Mr. Krajisnik would just
9 please have that in mind when he goes through the explanation, it might be
10 clearer as we go along.
11 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, the Judges have in front of them
12 still also P68, 16, which gives us the rivers.
13 MR. STEWART: Oh, indeed Your Honours, we have that but if
14 Mr. Krajisnik would just please bear that in mind having regard to the
15 place at which we go through this explanation.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik --
17 MR. STEWART: Mr. Tieger wants to say something.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. HARMON: I hope this is helpful. In any event, I have an
20 extra copy of P293 which is large. It can be marked on if the Court
21 requests so but I wanted the court to know this is available.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now we have some competing maps. If you show
23 to Mr. Krajisnik exactly what -- you have P293? Yes.
24 Mr. Krajisnik, there is a large one which seems not to be
25 distorted, as a matter of fact. If markings would be better made on that
1 map, could you -- Madam Usher, could you please show it to Mr. Krajisnik?
2 If that would be better for your purposes, Mr. Krajisnik, then it's easier
3 to mark.
4 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I ask -- sorry.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the same map. It's the same
6 map. It's not elongated here either. Only it's not elongated here, the
7 map here, I think it's something --
8 JUDGE ORIE: It's distorted on the screen. If you say, "I can
9 work on the map that you've got at the moment please do.
10 MR. STEWART: Can I just ask Your Honour whether this map we have
11 been using, P93, is a reduced version of the original or whether what
12 Mr. Tieger just produced is a blown-up version of the original? Which is
13 the -- which is the original map? Is it the big one or the small one is
14 my question.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik may explain on the basis of the map he
16 has in front of him the matter and let's now proceed.
17 Mr. Krajisnik.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The original maps were like this one
19 and these are reduced maps, sized down, and the gentlemen in the Office of
20 the Prosecutor have the original maps.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik if you can work on the map that's now
22 on the ELMO, please proceed. Let's stop talking much more about -- yes,
23 before you mark, please explain. Yes? The corridor was supposed to be
24 from where to where?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Along -- you mean the Drina
2 JUDGE ORIE: I'm talking about the Drina corridor.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will say: Roughly, the corridor
4 was supposed to go like this. Along these blue lines, and possibly to
5 have an exchange of territories --
6 JUDGE ORIE: No, no. Exchange is a later state. I first want to
7 know where the corridor was. You started connecting and I'm trying now
8 to --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we would go through our
10 own territories and here, where there are some villages, we would try to
11 link up with Semberija.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could you take a black pen and draw a line which
13 would be at the centre of the corridor you had in mind, so the centre of
14 the corridor, and later I'll ask to you make a dotted line where
15 approximately the bell -- borders of the corridor would be. So could you
16 first take the core of what was to be the corridor, approximately?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we did not define where
18 the corridor would run. We only said how, through our territory, and
19 that's along the Drina River valley. As for the precise route that would
20 be a matter of agreement and exchange of territories. We would not go
21 through somebody else's territory. That's why this map would be better.
22 That's all I wanted to say. We wouldn't be going through here or through
23 here but through this area, and then we would try, in a planned way, to
24 exchange and where there is a bypass, to go that way. This was something
25 that was to be agreed upon.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE ORIE: Then before making any markings, could you explain to
3 us where you found potential obstacles, where you would find territory of
4 others which you would not want to include? Where were the problematic
5 parts? Could you please point at them?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Wherever there is the Muslim green
7 colour along the route. For example, here. And maybe we could squeeze
8 through. But there would be an obstacle here and it would have to be
9 exchanged for those territories which would perhaps be left for the
10 Muslims. But I'm saying all this off the top of my head now.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. We are all aware that we are not talking
12 about a precisely defined corridor but a corridor to be situated
13 approximately there. So I would -- is there another copy of this map
14 available? Because I'm going to do it in a totally different way.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The best logistics we have is
17 through the Office of the Prosecutor. Thank you very much.
18 JUDGE ORIE: My next question: What I'm going to do is I'm trying
19 to understand what you tell us. I'm trying to mark that on a copy of this
20 map myself. And then at a later stage, you'll see whether the drawing is
21 of any success or where it should be adjusted and then we might make a new
22 one with your adjustments. One further question: When you said where
23 approximately the corridor should be, you went approximately to the level
24 of Sarajevo, little bit south. I take it that's what you call Romanija.
25 In the beginning you went even further south. Would the corridor stretch
1 even further south as well or would it stop at the Sarajevo level?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were only talking about between
3 Romanija and Semberija. That's the Drina, from Romanija upwards. That
4 was that strategic objective.
5 JUDGE ORIE: So I'll now try, you'll later see what the result is,
6 to approximately indicate where there was a need for a corridor. Could
7 you again tell us where you saw potential obstacles? I think you pointed
8 at a place just northwest of Zvornik.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Either we would squeeze
10 through here, where there are blue lines, or we would search here,
11 depending on what we achieved through negotiations and agreement but there
12 is an obstacle here, you can see that on the map.
13 JUDGE ORIE: I'll then encircle approximately the area of the
14 first obstacle. Any other obstacle on the way to Romanija? I see further
15 south there is a larger portion of --
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is Romanija, Your Honour. And
17 down here, this is not part of the strategic objective down here. But
18 from Romanija one would have to go up.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And I see there is another patch of not really
20 blue. You would go to the -- would you consider that to be a potential
21 obstacle as well? And I'm looking now at the area just southeast of
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see there is access to the Drina
24 here. Here there are Serb territories. So it would all be open to
25 discussion. Our aim was to link this.
1 JUDGE ORIE: So most important was to create a link.
2 Now we have the --
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: -- Ilijas, I would say close to the Drina river, east
5 from Sarajevo, where we find patches, yes. Those areas, what were the
6 plans with those areas? And I'm talking from Srebrenica to Visegrad and
7 Gorazde. There you will find some non-blue. Could you please point at
8 Srebrenica? A little bit --
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Srebrenica. This is the area of
10 Srebrenica and Bratunac. This is Zepa and this is Srebrenica and
12 JUDGE ORIE: First let's concentrate on Srebrenica and Bratunac.
13 What was the intention to do with that area, which is only partly blue and
14 is also a relatively light blue?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A small municipality was formed here
16 called Skelani and it was part of Srebrenica municipality. Certainly, a
17 much smaller area here would be Serbian and a far larger part would be
18 Muslim, because there is a lot more green here than blue. Skelani --
19 well, this perhaps would be Serbian, the municipality of Skelani.
20 JUDGE ORIE: So to say that the most easterly part of Srebrenica
21 municipality would then be Skelani, I'll make a circle around that on my
22 map and mark that with a 2.
23 Okay. Now we go further south, Visegrad seems to be also very
24 much a non-Serb, I take it Muslim, part, Visegrad, where we are now on the
25 eastern side of the Neretva River. What was intended --
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] East of the Drina, yes, you are
3 JUDGE ORIE: I'm sorry, yes, east of the Drina. Very much by
4 colour Muslim. What did the third strategic objective had in mind for
5 this area?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the Cutileiro plan, this part,
7 Rudo, Cajnice, and this part would belong to the Serbs and all the rest to
8 the Muslims. Visegrad itself --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Unless you say that the Cutileiro plan in this
10 respect reflected the strategic objectives completely, I'd like you to
11 answer the question on what the strategic objectives were doing with this
12 part, unless you say it was not -- well, it was not elaborated yet in such
13 a detail but I'd like to know what in accordance with the strategic
14 objective number 3, what would happen with the Visegrad and Rudo
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the basis for the
17 strategic objectives was the Cutileiro map. If you look at it, you will
18 see where Semberija and Romanija would be linked up, where there are Serb
19 areas and where there are Muslim areas. That was our objective. You will
20 see that there precisely. That was the basis. It was open to
21 negotiation, of course, because we had interruptions or obstacles in two
22 places on the map.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then the problem with the Cutileiro map is that there
24 are several Cutileiro maps but I'll invite Mr. Registrar to provide me
25 with I think it's D4 or D5, D6, and if you would please tell me which
1 would be the best one to consult to better understand the strategic
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is only one Cutileiro map.
4 The others are ours. There are four maps. There are Muslim, Serb, Croat
5 maps, and the Cutileiro map. Ours has more Serb territories. The
6 Cutileiro map has smaller Serb territories.
7 MR. JOSSE: I think it may be D7, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Just to be sure, D7, not D7B?
9 MR. JOSSE: Well, looking at the list, it's D7A and D7B.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes that brings me again to the problem that I can't
11 copy something from two maps at the same time. Which one, Mr. Krajisnik,
12 which one would be the better one.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That one is the Cutileiro map, the
14 one in your right-hand is the Muslim map.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I then work on 7B, which is the -- which seems
16 to say in Cyrillic, Cutileiro map on the bottom.
17 So -- yes. Now I see on the Cutileiro map that the part of
18 Srebrenica you just said you would like to have as a Serb territory, that
19 was the eastern part, is on the Cutileiro map not Serb but for the
20 remainder, I do understand that -- and I'll try to do that as good as I
21 can --
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, since you asked me
23 about the corridor, I showed the blue patch and said that was Skelani
24 municipality which had been set up. I didn't say it would be part of the
25 corridor. It's far from the corridor.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You say the corridor is only that. Okay. Then
2 that portion I would say the Visegrad, Cajnice, Rudo area, I more or less,
3 although not in every detail, copied that from the Cutileiro map, although
4 it continues but I only took that specific part and without any details.
5 Now the corridor is clear to me. I know approximately what happens in
6 the -- on the area east from -- east from the Drina river. Now, could you
7 explain, perhaps on the basis of the map that is in front of you, exactly
8 where was the problem of -- I'll have to -- part of objective 3 is that
9 the Drina should be eliminated as a border separating Serbian states.
10 Could you clearly explain to us where changes were needed or perhaps not
11 changes but where the problem was of the Drina separating -- the Drina as
12 a border separating Serbian states? Could you please do that on the basis
13 of the map which is on the ELMO? Because I now concentrate on the --
14 first of all, on the northern part of the Drina where it bends to the
15 east, and before it bends back to the west, or I should say the other way
16 because it's flowing from south to north, I think. Yes. In the northern
17 part I would say up to -- from Bijeljina, Zvornik, Bratunac, there the
18 Drina forms the border between Serbia proper and to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Was there an issue?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. I'll explain right
21 now. In the Cutileiro plan, you have the constituent units, and we had
22 the right to special links with the neighbouring republics of Serbia and
23 Montenegro, so we wouldn't need passports, there wouldn't be a real
24 border. I gave -- the speech made by Mr. Izetbegovic in December 1991,
25 who said Drina must never be a border for the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia,
1 however we set up Bosnia. The Drina should not be a border between
2 worlds. Later on, in the strategic objectives, the word was "states" so
3 it wasn't about the map, it was about the right to have links, apart from
4 statehood we could have links in culture, education and so on which would
5 not be to the detriment of the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You
6 can see that in the Cutileiro plan. That's what this sentence means.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Now, I see in the Cutileiro plan that in the northern
8 part of the border between Serbia proper and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a
9 whole, that up to approximately Zvornik, the territory west of the Drina
10 would become Serb, and at the other side of the river, we would find
11 Serbia proper, so the Drina would there not -- I mean it would have united
12 Serb, Bosnian Serb, although the Drina river was flowing there, or is that
13 a wrong understanding?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With all due respect, that's not
15 what it was about. There would be a border here between Bosnia and
16 Yugoslavia but the border would not be visible. There would be no
17 passports. One could pass through, and that is enshrined in the written
18 part of the Cutileiro plan and today in the Dayton Accord so we would have
19 dual nationality, we could have links in culture, education and so on.
20 But not as a state. That was the meaning of this sentence. There would
21 be a border crossing. The Serbs would be -- there would be Serbs in
22 Serbia and Serbs here. We could cross the border in Srebrenica, in Rudo,
23 anywhere. But Drina --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. I do understand. So although the Drina was
25 there the administrative border between two states, nevertheless it would
1 be hardly visible. Would that mean that the border control, et cetera,
2 would move westwards to where you would enter the territory of I now say
3 Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is would there be some border control?
4 Would there be no border control at all any more?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The administrative border of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina that existed in Yugoslavia would become the state
7 border, and it would be just like any other border that's easy to cross,
8 just as in the European Union, you don't have to have a visa and so on.
9 That's what we wanted, the border would not be visible. It wouldn't be
10 the kind of border where you needed a passport. And that was enshrined in
11 every agreement and the Croats agreed to this, they liked it, and the
12 Muslims accepted it. And you can see that in the principles.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, that part of eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina
14 that on the basis of the Cutileiro map would become Muslim, and I'm now
15 talking about more or less the area between Zvornik and Bratunac, where
16 Muslim territory would be separated by the Drina river from Yugoslavia or
17 Serbia proper, would there also be no border control and would it also be
18 an invisible, although existing, administrative border?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Every national unit would have the
20 right to have special connections. It would apply to everyone. Today,
21 there is Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Our goal was for the psychological border
22 on the Drina not to be there for the Serbs. It was a problem for
23 centuries, especially -- well, there is no problem concerning Bosnia.
24 JUDGE ORIE: No. It's not a direct answer to my question. Part
25 of the eastern border of the state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and mainly between
1 Zvornik and, well, it goes even further than Bratunac, Srebrenica, that
2 portion in the -- on the Cutileiro map, would be Muslim. Was it left to
3 the Muslims whether they would have any visible border control for the
4 population or was it up to them to agree that with Yugoslavia or was it
5 foreseen that there should not be a visible border there as well? Because
6 I do understand that further up north, and further south, although further
7 south it's not -- the Drina is not -- is not the border, but further up
8 north, there should be no visible border, although everyone knew that to
9 the west of the river it would be Serb territory or territory of a Serb
10 entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to the east it would be Yugoslavia, but
11 should there be no visible border either on that portion where the Muslims
12 were controlling the territory which was at the border and was at the
13 Drina river or would you leave that to the Muslims themselves?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this would be
15 regulated, but the Muslim constituent unit would have the right to reach
16 an agreement on crossing the border with Serbia. Now, how they would
17 regulate it, and in which way, that would be an agreement between their
18 constituent unit and Serbia. We would regulate it where we have
19 territory. Today, there is a single border control service, but then it
20 was envisaged that every constituent unit should control the border.
21 You know why this would particularly be the case? Because Sandzak
22 is on the other side is on the other side and it suits the Muslims to have
23 a soft border there, so to speak. It's not that there would not be a
24 border anywhere. It would be a soft border where you could cross any way
25 you wanted to but it would be known who is where. We were just talking on
1 behalf of the Serb side, not on behalf of the Muslim side.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's now perfectly clear to me.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I'm just worried about your map,
4 Mr. President. I wonder whether you drew it well.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you please -- I may have to look that up.
6 The eastern part of Srebrenica, that would be municipality of -- you gave
7 the name. I've forgotten. That portion would be?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Skelani, Skelani.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Skelani, yes.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It was always a municipality
11 except that it's been done away with now.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But it did not exist in the
14 Cutileiro plan.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I just marked it as Skelani because you
16 explained that in your testimony and --
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE ORIE: This map does not depict the whole of the story, but
19 just illustrates what we understood to be your testimony. Could it be put
20 on the ELMO? Only the eastern part of the map is relevant. Okay. What I
21 tried to do is to say approximately what area should be linked through
22 that corridor, Semberija in the north and Romanija in the south, not
23 giving any details as to where exactly to locate that. I indicated under
24 1 as a potential obstacle as you said still to be resolved one way or
25 another to find your way through so that there would be -- that it would
1 really be a corridor. Under 2, I indicated the municipality of Skelani,
2 which perhaps the Serbs may have wished but certainly would not become
3 Serb in the Cutileiro plan, and then in 3, I worked a little bit further
4 south. It ends in nothing but, of course, in the Cutileiro we have that,
5 we can see that it continues. But to know that in that area in the
6 Cutileiro plan it would be Serb. And I'm not talking about any details.
7 And now I understood that most important for the Drina not to be a border
8 between Serbian states is that it would, although a state border, it would
9 be, as you called it, a soft border, allowing for free movement, no
10 control, exchange culturally, whatever way, and in the area between --
11 between Zvornik and Bratunac, which would be a border where, on the west
12 side, there was Muslim territory, that you left it to the Muslims how soft
13 or how non-soft that border would be. Is that a correct understanding?
14 And I'm not talking about details but just about --
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The essence of it is there but the
16 corridor would go this way. It's not that this part would be taken
17 because there is a big Muslim enclave. So it will go this way, here.
18 That would be it. So that is just a small objection. But at any rate, it
19 would be our territories that would be linked up.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then if you --
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, Mr. President, I'm sorry,
22 and there would be a bit lower, you know it would be here.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I tried to copy that. I did not perfectly copy that
24 from the Cutileiro map but it's intended to represent what you find on the
25 Cutileiro map. So let's say if you could give me -- could I have the map
1 back for one second again? Could it be put on the ELMO again? Now I'll
2 formulate it in a different way. Between these dotted lines, the corridor
3 would find its way from Semberija in whatever way and I now made it a bit
4 wider in the south, would find its way still to be defined from north to
5 south or south to north linking Semberija with Romanija.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Semberija would be linked up
7 this way. Well, then it would be precise. It wouldn't go all the way out
8 here. That would be too far away. I mean, this would be too far out to
9 the west. Couldn't be done that way.
10 JUDGE ORIE: It's mainly for our understanding and I do understand
11 that where I made the dotted line to the east a wit wider, it should be a
12 little bit moved, and that the other dotted line, that is the western
13 dotted line should be a little bit more to the east, especially in the
14 southern part of it. Yes. Well, I think that we now fully grab --
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Your Honour, it would go
16 this way, yes, here, where the Serb territories are only so that there
17 would be as little exchange of territory as possible.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. This is not an expert map or anything but it's
19 just an instrument which helped us to better understand what exactly
20 strategic objective 3 was.
21 I don't know whether we have similar problems with the other part
22 of strategic objective 3. I think it's far less. But I would leave that
23 to Mr. Stewart.
24 Yes, Mr. Krajisnik?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, Skelani, over here, I added
1 that. That was not in the strategic objective. I added that. I said
2 that it had been established as a municipality. Only this is the
3 strategic objective. And that the Drina should be a soft border. That's
5 JUDGE ORIE: I think that becomes clear from the testimony itself,
6 and therefore I didn't add anything to Skelani apart from that that's
7 Skelani and your testimony was clear on that.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, perhaps this should be marked as a
10 Chamber exhibit.
11 MR. STEWART: TC 1 or I don't know what the convention is.
12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be C 2, Your Honour.
13 MR. STEWART: C, is it? Same idea.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, if it's going to be
15 marked, then it has to be corrected a bit. It wouldn't be good for this
16 part to remain this way, it should be the other way.
17 MR. STEWART: [Previous translation continues] ... suggestion for
18 that, Your Honour, because Mr. Krajisnik was without marking indicating
19 corrections. I wonder if we perhaps might invite Mr. Krajisnik to do some
20 homework and produce --
21 JUDGE ORIE: No, no. As a matter of fact I think I now perfectly
22 understood. It's not about details. I'll make another one which is
23 clearer and then adjusting everything I'll just copy from here, I'll take
24 a bit more precisely the Cutileiro and then we don't have any further
25 discussions on it because it just --
1 MR. STEWART: Well, provided Mr. Krajisnik then is completely
2 happy with it, Your Honour, because with -- Your Honour's help is greatly
3 appreciated but Mr. Krajisnik indicated a moment ago his reservation.
4 JUDGE ORIE: If Mr. Krajisnik is not happy with it we'll see what
5 to do and, of course, we are all trying to make Mr. Krajisnik happy in
6 this respect. Let's move --
7 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour -- it was why I was suggesting, if
8 Mr. Krajisnik were to produce the version overnight that he is happy with.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and I took a different course.
10 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour is the Judge or one of the Judges.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We have no time left apart from two minutes.
12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour could I -- on P293, Your Honour, it did
13 have a point, Your Honour, my inquiry about the size. If the original map
14 is the larger one, that's the one that should go in evidence, Your Honour.
15 It's a difficult map to use any way and if the original is that larger
16 version, we would suggest that is the one that ought to go into evidence.
17 JUDGE ORIE: I think the smaller one is in evidence. It has been
18 used before. We leave that. If you feel that there is any need to also
19 have the larger one admitted into evidence, we'll hear the specific
21 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's not such a big deal. I would be
22 grateful to have a larger one any way if at all possible. It's not an
23 easy map to use, this little one. But that's just a request. The
24 Prosecution have got that map, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As you said, Mr. Stewart, and rightly so --
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE ORIE: You rightly said that I'm the Judge, one of the
4 Mr. Krajisnik, if you would limit yourself to putting at that map
5 what I did, but then make the right dotted lines with a red pen, I don't
6 know whether you have a red pen, otherwise you can borrow the red pen of
7 the Chamber, you're invited to do it better than I did, so overnight, if
8 you could, but please limit yourself to what I put on the map.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I just say something,
10 Your Honour?
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have understood you. It was my
13 understanding that this map was just for your understanding, that the
14 corridor goes along the Serb territories, that we did not define it, but
15 that it would be subject to negotiations, and that now you drew this in
16 order to understand what it was that I was saying. So we are going along
17 these Serb territories linking up Semberija and Romanija. That is why
18 this map does not have to be admitted if you understood what I meant by
19 strategic objective. Because what I draw is not correct. It's not that
20 we drew this map. That is why this is how you understand our linking up
21 of Semberija and Romanija, along our territories, and when there is a
22 problem it should resolved by way of agreement.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, the problem might be in the
24 future, the Appeals Chamber. They have to know what we did exactly. I
25 suggest the following. You keep for the time being that map. You'll be
1 provided with a -- you'll be provided with an empty map of the same map
2 but not marked. We'll leave it up to you to consider overnight whether
3 you can make, especially the dotted lines, a bit more precise. If you do
4 so, you're invited to do it either clearly on the existing map and then
5 tomorrow we'll decide on admission of this map. If you'd prefer to copy
6 the markings but more accurately on the empty copy, then you're invited to
7 do so with the red marker but also please be aware that there should be --
8 nothing else be marked on it apart from what I marked on the map. Is that
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me do it straight away. I'll do
11 it now.
12 JUDGE ORIE: No, because the other court is waiting, I take it.
13 So we have to finish for the day, yes.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see. It goes without saying that
15 I get to keep the marker, right?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. As I said, you can borrow ours and that's a red
17 one. Mr. Krajisnik, it will not often happen that you will do the red
18 marking because usually for the Defence it's the black marking. So
19 exceptionally, although you as a witness did the marking, it is -- you may
20 do it in red.
21 I do understand that a copy has been given to Mr. Registrar to be
22 provided to you, Mr. Krajisnik, with the C -- no, I'm -- you'll receive
23 what you're supposed to receive through Mr. Registrar. Then we adjourn
24 until Wednesday, tomorrow, Courtroom II, 9.00 in the morning.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 17th day of May,
2 2006, at 9.00 a.m.